Togetherness in South Africa

Religious perspectives on racism, xenophobia and economic inequality
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Edited by
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Research Justification

Race and inequality have always been sensitive topics in South African society due to its colonial past, diverse social composition and apartheid legacy of legal discrimination against people on the basis of their skin colour. Racial tensions seem to be escalating in South African society and disturbing racialised rhetoric and slogans are re-entering the political and social landscape. Another disturbing phenomenon has been violent incidents of xenophobia against African immigrants. The question probed by this book is: What perspectives can theology offer in addressing the roots of racism, inequality and xenophobia in South Africa and how can it and the church contribute to reconciliation and a sense of togetherness among South African citizens?

Various methodologies and approaches are used to address this question. In chapter 1, Theuns Eloff employs a historical and socio-analytical approach to describe the social context that has given rise, and is still giving impetus to racism and other forms of intolerance in South African society. Nico Vorster approaches the issue of distorted racial identity constructions from a theological-anthropological perspective. Utilising various empirical studies, he attempts to provide conceptual clarity to the concepts of racism, nationalism, ethnocentrism and xenophobia, and maps the various racisms that we find in South Africa. His contribution concludes with a theological-anthropological discussion on ways in which theology can deconstruct distorted identities and contribute to the development of authentic identities. Koos Vorster provides a theological-ethical perspective on social stratification in South Africa. He identifies the patterns inherent to the institutionalisation of racist social structures and argues that many of these patterns are still present, albeit in a new disguise, in the South African social order. Jan du Rand provides in chapter 4 a semantic discussion of the notions of race and xenophobia. He argues that racist ideologies are not constructed on a factual basis, but that racial ideologies use semantic notions to construct social myths that enable them to attain power and justify the exploitation and oppression of the other. Du Rand’s second contribution in chapter 5 provides Reformed exegetical and hermeneutic perspectives on various passages and themes in the Bible that relate to anthropology, xenophobia and the imperative to xenophilia [love of the stranger]. Dirk Van der Merwe’s contribution analyses, evaluates, and compares both contemporary literature and ancient texts of the Bible to develop a model that can enable churches to promote reconciliation in society, while Ferdi Kruger investigates the various ways in which language can be used as a tool to disseminate hate speech. He offers an analytical description of hate language, provides normative perspectives on the duty to counter hate speech through truth speaking and phronesis (wisdom) and concludes with practical-theological perspectives that might enable us to address problematic praxis. Reggie Nel explores the Confessions of Belhar and the Declaration of Accra as theological lenses to provide markers for public witness in a postcolonial South African setting. The volume concludes with Riaan Rheeder’s Christian bioethical perspective on inequality in the health sector of sub-Saharan Africa.

This book contains original research. No part was plagiarised or published elsewhere. The target audience are theologians, ministers and the Christian community, but social activists, social scientists, politicians, political theorists, sociologists and psychologists might also find the book applicable to their fields.

Prof. Nico Vorster, Unit for the Reformed Theology and the Development of the South African Society, Faculty of Theology, North-West University, South Africa
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### Abbreviations appearing in the Text and Notes

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#RMF</td>
<td>#RhodesMustFall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AICC</td>
<td>African Independent Christian Churches</td>
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<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<td>ARNSA</td>
<td>Anti-Racism Network South Africa</td>
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<td>ASGISA</td>
<td>Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa</td>
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<td>CEO</td>
<td>Chief Executive Officer</td>
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<td>CODESA</td>
<td>Convention for a Democratic South Africa</td>
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<td>COSATU</td>
<td>Congress of South African Trade Unions</td>
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<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Democratic Alliance</td>
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<td>DRMC</td>
<td>Dutch Reformed Mission Church in South Africa</td>
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<td>EFF</td>
<td>Economic Freedom Fighters</td>
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<td>eNCA</td>
<td>eNews Channel Africa</td>
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<td>FBJ</td>
<td>Forum for Black Journalists</td>
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<td>FET</td>
<td>Further Education and Training</td>
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<td>FIFA</td>
<td>Fédération Internationale de Football Association</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEAR</td>
<td>Growth, Employment and Redistribution</td>
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<tr>
<td>GPS</td>
<td>Global Positioning System</td>
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<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
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<tr>
<td>IBC</td>
<td>International Bioethics Committee</td>
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<td>IJR</td>
<td>Institute for Justice and Reconciliation</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>IRRT</td>
<td>International Relations Round Table</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSE</td>
<td>Johannesburg Stock Exchange</td>
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<td>MPNP</td>
<td>Multiparty Negotiating Process</td>
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<td>NDP</td>
<td>National Development Plan</td>
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<td>NDR</td>
<td>National Democratic Revolution</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>National Planning Commission</td>
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<td>NRSV</td>
<td>New Revised Standard Version</td>
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<td>NSMs</td>
<td>New Social Movements</td>
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<td>Pan Africa Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDP</td>
<td>Reconstruction and Development Plan</td>
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<td>RSA</td>
<td>Republic of South Africa</td>
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<td>SACP</td>
<td>South African Communist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADTU</td>
<td>South African Democratic Teachers Union</td>
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<td>SAIRR</td>
<td>South African Institute of Race Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>SETA</td>
<td>Sectoral Education and Training Authorities</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWAPO</td>
<td>South West Africa People’s Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRC</td>
<td>Truth and Reconciliation Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDBHR</td>
<td>Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>United Democratic Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation</td>
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<td>WARC</td>
<td>World Alliance of Reformed Churches</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wits</td>
<td>University of the Witwatersrand</td>
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<tr>
<td>WSRC</td>
<td>Wits Student Representative Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organisation</td>
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Notes on Contributors

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The heartbeat of this contribution

Another year, another series of racially orientated outbursts in South Africa, and another first in research publications on the relevant issue of racism and xenophobia in ‘our beloved country’. This contribution participates in the process of trying to reflect scientifically on the unfortunate evergreen intolerance, blind hatred and fear, emanating from racism.

A group of Reformed theologians get together in seminars and conferences to discover the essence of racism, xenophobia and the situation of economic inequality in South Africa. The research stretched over a period of a year. The researchers, approached to participate in this project, were selected on the basis of their dedication to the subject, integrity, raw honesty and ability to be unbiased. Among the participants were activists against apartheid, leaders of social organisations who are concerned with combating inequality, ministers of religion and professors at universities involved in guiding previously disadvantaged students to degrees and postgraduate qualifications. Every member of the group operated with passion, sensitivity and loyalty to all the people of South Africa.

The common premise is taken from the Constitution of South Africa, ‘[w]e, the people of South Africa, believe that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, united in our diversity.’

As citizens of this country, we pledged to perform research with integrity and to offer a meaningful contribution to black and white fellow South Africans from a Reformed theological angle.

The sensitive but serious question is asked whether the struggle against apartheid was only a civil rights journey or a real revolution intended to usher in a totally new political democracy, a new non-racist society, a new representative economy and a new ethos of humanity. Unfortunately we cannot naively accept that racism disappeared after the death of apartheid. Given our racial history, it is easy to take sides instead of promoting social cohesion. Colonial governance has structured South Africa for decades along the lines of racial separation, so it is to be expected that both white and black people still experience and grapple with the aftershocks of racism.

In the following chapters, the various authors argue that blind hatred and intolerance will only lead loyal citizens deeper into a racial marsh of despair. We see in our society a widespread, almost paranoic, hypersensitivity concerning racism.

Is discrimination or antagonism directed against someone of a different race based on the acceptance that one’s own race is superior? If we degenerate into an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ mentality, we create the basis for discriminatory racism.

According to the authors, the question remains whether the political transition adequately brought about economic transformation. The perception of some is that white capital has reinvented a new socio-spatial colonial separateness, resulting in an internal and external racially skewed South Africa. Others hold that the recent ongoing racial conflict does not originate between races, so to speak, but between classes: the ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’. Poorer people demand a share in economic structures and prosperity.

Along what lines will we find a solution? There is no easy way out in our multicultural, multiracial and politically pluralistic society. Solving the ‘brainless’ attitude of racism is not only an academic issue, but part of the real South Africa. The whole society and the churches must rid themselves of the still appalling legacies of apartheid. As Reformed theologians, we firmly believe that non-racism begins in the heart and that it is manifested in public by the search for equality and political, cultural, spiritual and economic transformation.
Apartheid has destroyed the essence of human dignity in the political and social realms, instead of promoting social cohesion. All of us in South Africa are faced with the onerous task of rejecting racism and promoting non-racial social cohesion.

**Scope of the book**

A learned and experienced team of researchers have investigated a variety of dimensions and interconnections between racism, sexism, xenophobia and economic inequality in South Africa from a Reformed theological and ethical perspective. Different angles of approach have been followed: sociological, biblical, systematic-theological, ethical and practical-theological. One of the evaluators of this publication declared that, as yet, no theological book with a focus on racism, xenophobia and economic inequality has been published in post-apartheid South Africa.

The book is relevant in the racially charged social landscape of South Africa and deals with important recent developments that affect racial relations.

The target audience is academic scholars, theologians, churches, missionaries, politicians and social activists who are equally concerned about South-Africa’s future.

**Value of this research publication**

Every author in this publication rejects any form of direct and indirect racism. One of the reviewers states that the transdisciplinary methodology of this book delivers a sound theoretical basis and touches reality with actuality. Striking examples of recent direct and indirect racism in a tense context, both historically and recently, ensure that it is not a sterile text.

**Contribution of the book**

- The contributions deliver an honest and comprehensive critique of racism as perceived through racial apartheid in the past.
Current forms of direct and indirect racism, xenophobia and economic injustice are forcefully rejected. These include white people’s racism towards black people as well as black people’s racism towards white people.

The relation between xenophobia and racism, and the danger of ongoing racial classification, is thoroughly discussed.

Important biblical and theological data are collected, and the role of the church spelt out, taking into consideration the actuality of Christian Reformed perspectives.

The sensitive issue of explicit and implicit hate speech and current protests of students and other groups of disadvantaged people are intensely studied.

In more than one chapter, the local South African situation is compared to global tendencies of sophisticated racism, particularly regarding human rights and health care. One of the most degrading issues to be solved is, without a doubt, the reinstitution of a system of racial classification in government policies.

■ An introduction to the content

■ Chapter 1

Theuns Eloff, former vice-chancellor of North-West University, political commentator and currently Executive Director of the F.W. de Klerk Foundation, has been dynamically involved in social, cultural and socio-economic organisations and bodies combating racism. During his career, he played a leading public role in efforts to create platforms for political dialogue and to transform South Africa into a society of social harmony. He was involved in the Dakar expedition and the CODESA (Convention for a Democratic Society) Constitutional Forum, thereby participating in the birth of the new democracy.

Theuns realistically sketches the South African society in political, economic and social terms as being fertile to racist practices. He takes into account the state of poverty, inequality, unemployment and the educational backlog as major contributing factors to the perpetuation of racism. He asks the crucial question: What went wrong since the dawn of democracy?
■ Chapter 2

Nico Vorster has dedicated his academic career to the study and promotion of human rights within the framework of Reformed theology and ethics. He is nationally and internationally known as a prolific researcher on human rights. Nico states that racism emanates from distorted processes of identity construction. In order to address racism, typical racist identity constructions have to be deconstructed and replaced by authentic identity constructions. Nico clarifies the concept of racism and gives an overview of the new spectrum of racisms that have emerged in post-apartheid South Africa. He employs Calvin’s doctrine on sin as a deconstructive tool and John Althusius’s symbiotic political philosophy as a social tool that can help us in constructing authentic identities.

■ Chapter 3

Koos Vorster, well-known ethicist and internationally respected researcher on human rights, asks serious questions about the state of our democracy: Why is racism still surging after 22 years of democracy? Have South Africans reached a tipping point where the old apartheid patterns of racism are replaced by similar patterns, building new structures on old forms of racial prejudice? He argues that the South African society is racialised by current debates and actions and, worst of all, racial classification. This classification is one of the major causes of recent upheavals of racism in South Africa.

■ Chapter 4

Jan du Rand is known for his publications on the Johannine writings, the book of Revelation and biblical eschatology. He is also involved in social projects among the poor people in Bosmont, Johannesburg. Jan’s contribution to enhance equality in the scholarly realm has been to deliver nine doctorates and 23 master degrees to previously disadvantaged people. In this chapter, he focusses on the semantic orientation of the concepts of xenophobia, race, racism, xenophilia and xenodochia. Xenophobia is closely linked to the distorted realities of race and racism, fuelled nationally and internationally by apartheid and slavery. Cultural, social, economic and religious
differences can create social tensions among locals, immigrants and foreigners. Research on historical aspects of racism and xenophobia has come up with surprising results. The challenge is to find a route from xenophobia to *xenophilia* and *xenodochia*. There exists an obvious difference between institutional and individual xenophobia. An arbitrary historical classification of *Homo sapiens* according to race inevitably ends up in the evil abuse of power, stimulating superiority over and against inferiority.

## Chapter 5

In this chapter, Jan du Rand examines the biblical references to strangers and migrants. He takes as premise Numbers 15:16 that states that the same laws and regulations apply to the ‘native born’ Israelites and to ‘strangers’. Meticulous caring for the stranger was a prominent requirement for the children of the covenant. Xenophobia was a typical experience during the Babylonian exile according to the Old Testament. The story of Ruth, on the one hand, represents *xenophilia* and *xenodochia*. On the other hand, Ezra’s expelling of the foreign wives demonstrates raw xenophobia. Jan asks the pertinent question: What should a sensitive Reformed Christian’s response be to the contemporary situation of xenophobia, flaring up from time to time in an overheated and tense South Africa?

Jesus can be described as the typical ‘stranger’ and ‘migrant’ from heaven, providing his own notion of what *xenophilia* and *xenodochia* entail. Philip shows *xenophilia* to the Ethiopian eunuch (Ac 8) and Jesus’s conduct towards the Samaritan woman (Jn 4) illustrates that xenophobia can be transferred to *xenophilia*.

## Chapter 6

Dirk van der Merwe’s point of departure is that racism is well and alive as a global reality in the history of humankind. Dirk pleads for a rapid addressing of this phenomenon within the South African context before it becomes unmanageable. Ironically, politicians are in many cases the main culprits. From the perspective of Reformed theology and the church, general racism has to be combated.
This chapter consists of four sections: the first seeks consensus on a definition of racism; the second section focuses on recent occurrences of racism in South Africa; the third part comments on the Belhar Confession to show what already has been done to combat racism and the fourth section examines the practical methods that can be employed to promote and realise reconciliation.

**Chapter 7**

Ferdi Kruger focuses on the harmful effect of hate speech in the racially charged atmosphere of contemporary South Africa. Hate speech often feeds on issues such as gender, race, age, dress and physical characteristics. Ferdi asks the striking question whether it is possible that the voicelessness in the public sphere regarding hate speech could contribute towards people’s unawareness of biases that are revealed in the manifestation of hate speech. The fields of Ethics and Social Psychology provide at least one possibility. Another response offers normative perspectives on the role of silence, boldness to speak and the challenge to speak the truth in love and the concept of *phronesis*. Thirdly, practical theological perspectives make a valuable contribution towards the resilient functioning of a problematic praxis.

**Chapter 8**

Reginald Nel was a dynamic activist in more than one youth movement during the 1980s. He was active in the Freedom United Democratic Front. He still uses his ministry and academic work to make a firm stand against any racism. Reginald is a master of reconciliatory communication in recent tense situations in South Africa. He served on the International Board for the Scholarly Societies for Youth Ministry and Missiology.

Reginald’s chapter departs from the Soweto uprising against the institutional racism of apartheid (1976). From 2015, students have protested against the postcolonial higher education system and the South African government. Students participating in the #FeesMustFall campaign demonstrate against the corporate managerialism of colonialism and the protection of white interests. Reginald sees this student unrest as part of the postcolonial or
decolonisation struggle against institutional racism. This chapter puts these realities within the African Reformed theological framework and links it with the Belhar Confession and the Accra Declaration.

**Chapter 9**

Riaan Rheeder adds a fresh breeze to the book. He is internationally known in the field of Bioethics and participated at UNESCO on medical ethical issues. Riaan focuses in this chapter on the global inequality that manifests itself within the health environment. In other words, global research funds for health purposes are unequally spent. Patients in South Africa are part of this distorted practice of unequal funding. Whatever the reason, less than 10% of global funds were spent recently on researching diseases affecting more than 90% of the world population. Less than 1% of global funds are spent on tuberculosis, a serious disease among South Africans. The serious bioethical question is whether a nation state or global community has the moral right to request equal spending.
Introduction

It is a truism to state that we live in interesting times. A publication on racism, xenophobia, sexism and related intolerance is extremely timely, as will be apparent at the end of this chapter. South Africa is suffering from many ailments and some of the most difficult of these to address are racism, xenophobia, sexism and economic...
inequality. Especially the first three are deeply rooted in the human psyche and sometimes even have religious foundations (Eloff 1988; Fredrickson 2015:1548). Racism, xenophobia and sexism often have their origins in what has been called life and world view, how humans see and experience the world. Because these are so personal and part of one’s psyche, it makes them extremely difficult to change. In addition, the adage ‘you cannot legislate morality’ is also applicable to these three matters. Economic inequality is likewise a very complex issue, as it is multidimensional and has its causes in more than one factor. It is also a phenomenon that builds up over time and that is not easy to solve.

The aim of this chapter is to try to describe the historical and socio-political context that gave, and is giving, rise to racism and related intolerance.

Historic overview: How did we get here?

To set a proper context, it is necessary to trace the roots of our history briefly. The first people who walked the beaches of the Cape, the desert and the Karoo were the Khoi-Khoi and the San. When Jan van Riebeeck arrived in 1652, he found them at the southern tip of Africa, where they had been living a nomadic existence for at least 2000 years. The so-called Bantu tribes had moved southwards from the north and middle of Africa from as early as the 13th century and settled on the land, mostly in the northern parts, in what would come to be called Kwa-Zulu Natal, the Eastern Cape, Botswana and the Free State (Meyer 2012:30–36).

From the 17th to the 19th centuries Southern Africa was, like much of the rest of the continent, the scene of struggles among colonial powers to dominate, in this case the Cape (whether it was the British, the French or the Dutch). The indigenous people were part of the struggle only at times, but remained subject to whoever was in power. British occupation forced the white Dutch settlers to move northwards, encountering various black

During the middle of the 19th century, two Boer republics were established in the present-day Free State and what was previously called the Transvaal. When gold and diamonds were discovered during this time, the British Empire focused its military might on these republics and, at the turn of the century, subdued the Boers. This led to the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910 as part of the British Empire. But, as in the preceding 250 years, it was a union where only white votes mattered (with the exception of a brief period when people of mixed race had the vote) (Scher 2012:255–274).

Shortly after the Union of South Africa came into being, the African Native Congress was formed in 1912. This organisation later became the African National Congress (ANC), the party that forms South Africa’s government today.

In 1948, the National Party secured the majority of white votes and came into power – and with it came the policy of apartheid. Apartheid became a system of racial exclusion based on the notorious Population Registration Act of 1950 (Eloff 1988). The ANC continued its peaceful struggle against apartheid and decided to opt for violent resistance only in 1961, a year after it was banned. The majority of its leadership was jailed in 1964. The Pan Africanist Congress and its leadership were also banned (Grobler 2012:369–388).

Economically, the 1960s were called the golden years of South Africa. The gold price was high, the rand strong and economic growth consistent. But the political problems were simmering under the surface and emerged in 1976 with the Soweto uprising. Once the lid was off the pot, internal political resistance continued and strengthened, especially with the formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1983. The government responded with a series of states of emergencies, but the downward spiral was unstoppable.Externally, South Africa was involved in a full-blown war with the South West Africa People’s Organisation.
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(SWAPO) in South-West Africa, the Angolan People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and Cuban soldiers in Angola (Grobler 2012).

F.W. de Klerk became president in 1989 after P.W. Botha had suffered a stroke and was asked by the members of his cabinet to resign. On 02 February 1990, F.W. de Klerk surprised friend and foe by announcing that the unconditional release of Nelson Mandela and other prisoners and the unbanning of all the banned organisations were imminent.

The South African government and the leaders of the ANC met on a number of occasions in 1990, but political violence was still widespread. The Peace Accord, signed on 14 September 1991, was a huge step to normalise matters, and in December 1991 the first session of the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) took place in Kempton Park. After suffering a deadlock in June 1992, the Multiparty Negotiating Process (MPNP) resumed in March 1993, and the Interim Constitution was agreed upon on 17 November 1993 (see De Klerk 1994; Eloff 1994).

South Africa’s first democratic elections took place peacefully on 27 April 1994. Nelson Mandela became president, with Thabo Mbeki and F.W. de Klerk as his deputies. There was to be a Government of National Unity until 1999. The two houses of parliament, sitting as the Constituent Assembly, agreed to the final Constitution in 1996 (South Africa 1996), and the Constitutional Court certified it as being in line with the 34 principles agreed by the MPNP.

The first years of the new South Africa were characterised by optimism and good will, and some naivety. Policy documents were plentiful and well-researched. Progress was slow but sure. The National Party left the Government of National Unity, but this did not hamper progress. Thabo Mbeki was elected as the second president of South Africa in 1999 and again in 2004.

During Mbeki’s second term, elements in the ANC started to become restless and impatient with what they perceived as
slow progress. These elements came mainly from the left of the ANC, inter alia Cosatu and the South African Communist Party. Against almost everyone’s expectations, Mbeki was succeeded as ANC leader at the 2007 elective conference in Polokwane by Jacob Zuma, with the assistance of the ANC Youth League, Cosatu and the SACP. Mbeki remained president of the country for a few months before being replaced by Kgalema Motlanthe as interim president. After the 2009 national election, Jacob Zuma became South Africa’s third president. He is still the president of the ANC and the country. His tenure as president has been controversial. Controversies range from rape charges (that have been dropped), to corruption charges (that have not yet been brought), to allegations of an unhealthy friendship with the Gupta family and the capturing of state institutions for personal gain.

In 2016, the results of the local government elections showed resistance to President Zuma and the ANC at the polls by ordinary black South Africans for the first time, many of whom abstained from voting or voted for the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). There have even been calls from within ANC ranks that Mr Zuma must resign or that an earlier than end of 2017 elective conference should be held. The latter seems unlikely to happen.

At the time of going to press in mid-2017, even people inside the ANC spoke of a party at war with itself. Faction fighting and blaming were the order of the day. The most controversial of these was the position of the Minister of Finance, Pravin Gordhan. He was seen by some as the only person standing between South Africa and a fatal downgrade by the international rating agencies, taking South Africa’s investment rating to so-called ‘junk status’. The National Prosecuting Authority in October 2016 summoned him to court to answer to charges that he signed off on a severance package of a senior SARS official a number of years ago and then later rehired him as a consultant. These charges were withdrawn before the set court date. At that time, the question dividing the ANC had become whether you are for or against Pravin Gordhan. Eventually, Gordhan and his deputy,
Mcebisi Jonas, were dropped from the cabinet by president Zuma at the end of March. This was the most important factor in the downgrading of South Africa's investment status by international rating agencies shortly afterwards.

During 2017, the succession battle for the presidency of the ANC began in all seriousness. This would carry on until the elective conference scheduled for December 2017.

**Where are we now?**

**Poverty, inequality and unemployment**

Against this historic background, it is necessary to briefly assess the factors that have an influence on the four issues at hand. With regard to economic subordination, the following facts are pertinent.

For a number of decades, the United Nations has been compiling a Human Development Index (UNDP 2016). It takes into account a whole range of factors, including education, health, employment and income per capita. South Africa’s HDI rating for 2015 was 0.666, which puts the country in the ‘medium human development’ category of countries and places us 116th out of 174 countries. In the ‘very high human development’ category are countries such as Norway, Australia and the USA, and in the ‘high human development’ category countries such as Romania, Russia and Brazil. Other countries in the same category as South Africa are Iraq (121st), Bolivia (119th), Vietnam (116th), Uzbekistan (114th), Indonesia (110th), Samoa (105th) and Tonga (100th).

Poverty levels in South Africa are a cause for concern. Although the country had slightly improved on its poverty index by 2010 when it stood at 0.044, in 2015 it still stood at 0.041. The index values of Brazil (0.012), Egypt (0.036), China (0.026) and Argentina (0.015) are all better than that of South Africa, but India (0.282), Kenya (0.226) and Namibia (0.2) are much worse.
For more developed countries such as Australia, the USA and Germany, there is no index value available, probably because the level of poverty there is not high enough to measure (UNDP 2016).

Moreover, the percentage of the population who lived near multidimensional poverty was 17.1% and those in severe multidimensional poverty 1.3%. But in general, 53% of South Africans lived below the national poverty line at the time of measurement, with 9.4% earning less than $1.25 (R17.50 per day). Statistics South Africa has stated that this could have been worse if it had not been for the social security system. More alarming is the fact that, in 2011, more than 60% of poor people were under the age of 25. It has also been established that rural poverty is twice that of urban poverty in South Africa (StatsSA 2014:8).

Formal unemployment (the narrow definition that excludes those who had given up on looking for work) is above 25%. In the present repressed economic climate, this is bound to rise. The problem is that there is no national consensus on how to address unemployment, with widely divergent views among the main political parties and economists.

The international yardstick for inequality is the Gini index or Gini coefficient. According to the World Bank, the Gini index measures the degree to which the distribution of income or consumption expenditure among individuals or households in a country deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Gini index of 0 would indicate no deviation, meaning that the society so rated was perfectly equal. The people in a country with a Gini index of 100 would be totally unequal. Not all countries allow their Gini index to be determined. The World Bank keeps the index updated for those countries whose figures are available (World Bank 2014).

In 2009 (the latest figures), South Africa’s Gini index was 63.14 (World Bank 2014). The country’s figure for 2013 was 0.658, which was up on the figure for 1980 (0.569). To put that into context, it can be compared with the figure for other countries in
the G20 group. Among these countries, Germany has the lowest figure (30.63, measured in 2010), while countries such as India (33.90, measured in 2010) and Britain (38.04, measured in 2010) are also doing well. Countries with a higher figure include China (42.06, measured in 2009), Mexico (48.07, measured in 2012) and Brazil (52.67, measured in 2012). But South Africa’s inequality index is the worst of all the G20 countries (World Bank 2014).

South Africa, for what it is worth, is not, in fact, the worst in the world with regard to inequality. Namibia and the Seychelles are even higher on the Gini index than South Africa.

StatsSA stated that in 2011, the poorest 20% of South Africans earned 4.3% of the income, while the richest 20% earned 61.3% of the income (2014:14).

The ‘terrible triplets’ can only be addressed sustainably through good policies and leadership, and this is not something that is in abundance at the moment. On the other hand, it must be said that there are several factors that alleviate this otherwise gloomy picture. The first is the informal economy, which is completely invisible to official statistics, but nevertheless plays a substantive role in alleviating poverty and unemployment. The LED Network, an NGO, estimates the value of the informal sector at R160 billion per year, or 28% of South Africa’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (LED Network 2015). In addition, the concept of the extended family, where a breadwinner looks after far more people than his immediate family, also plays a positive role. Finally, it must be stated that the support of ordinary South Africans to their home workers, garden workers and other labourers (in the form of food, clothing and other items) should not be overlooked as another avenue to curb the consequences of the terrible triplets.

Education

In any country, good education and training for the population is the most effective tool of empowerment the government and
society have at their disposal. This is also true for South Africa, and one would expect that the government would have gone to great lengths to achieve this.

Unfortunately, according to even the National Development Plan (2011), government officials and the minister of Basic Education, the system is not performing optimally. Some commentators even say that it is in shambles, with the general quality of education remaining poor (National Planning Commission 2011a:14) and up to 75% of schools dysfunctional (Van der Berg et al. 2011; Spaull 2013).

The South African Institute for Race Relations (2015) gives these sobering statistics:

"If ten children enrol in Grade 1 in any given year, one can expect five of them to reach matric, three to pass, and at most, only one to pass maths with 50%. There is no better way to explain the damage that the current school system causes to the life prospects of South Africa’s children. (n.p.)"

To add insult to injury, even the few who pass matric do not, by and large, have the skills and knowledge to make a success of tertiary studies. The average fall-out rate for first year students at South African universities is close to 40% (Shay 2016). If it had not been for the few private schools and most of the former model C-schools, the results for the country may have been even worse.

A functioning system for the training of technicians and artisans does not exist, despite efforts to raise the level of functionality and quality of the Further Education and Training Colleges (National Planning Commission 2011a:16).

There is more or less consensus among commentators that the main causes for the failed basic education system are teacher performance and the quality of school leadership (National Planning Commission 2011:15). Linked to both of these is the negative effect the largest teacher union (the South African Democratic Teachers Union [SADTU]) has on the school system
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The primary cause is weak capacity throughout the civil service ... the mirror image of this weakness ... is a culture of patronage that permeates almost all areas of the civil service. Nepotism and the appointment of unsuitable personnel further weaken government capacity. (p. 270)

A ministerial task team report, which was commissioned by the Department of Basic Education (DBE) in response to media reports of widespread corruption in the appointment of principals and teachers and the alleged involvement of SADTU, was published in May 2016 (DBE 2016:16–28). It found, among other factors, that the investigated cases ‘point to widespread practices of improper and unfair influence affecting the outcomes of the appointment of educators’. Because of the management weakness within some districts, it was found that the Department of Education was ‘effectively in control of education of one-third of South Africa’s provinces’. The report recommended that (DBE 2016):

[B]oth school- and office-based educators (should) cease to be office bearers of political parties and that educators in management posts (including school principals) be prohibited from occupying leadership positions in teacher unions. (pp. 16–28)

In addition, the report (in line with the NPC’s analysis) recommended that ‘measures be put in place to ensure that the practice of cadre deployment into DBE offices and schools ceases entirely’, and that (DBE 2016):

[T]hose who are appointed to Districts and provincial offices should be required to demonstrate their capacity to carry out the job for which they have applied. There should be no political appointments nor cadre deployments. (pp. 16–28)

Although commendable, this report and its recommendations point to the toxic stranglehold of SADTU on the basic education system.

All of this has an inevitable negative impact on the tertiary system, specifically universities. Not only does the university
sector receive underprepared first year students, but it is under increasing financial pressure. The latter is caused by consistent under subsidising by government and the ‘fees must fall’ phenomenon. These pressures, government pressure for demographic representivity and transformation and loss of institutional autonomy, could in the next 5 years lead to a mediocre university sector in South Africa (Shay 2016).

The tragic fact is that any government’s strongest empowering mechanism, education, has failed miserably. This is reflected in the state of the economy, poverty, unemployment and inequality levels.

**Xenophobia and Afrophobia**

South Africa has in the recent past (2008 and 2015) had a spate of xenophobic attacks on non-South Africans. These were mainly citizens from other African countries living and working in the country but also included Indian and Pakistani traders.

The Helen Suzman Foundation conducted research (including discussions and workshops) after the 2008 incidents and came to the conclusion that the reasons for the attacks were multidimensional and overlapping. Two specific reasons were given: a widespread view by South Africans that we are ‘special’ and therefore apart from ‘Africa’, and wide-spread inequality for poor South Africans with fewer and fewer survival possibilities (Hovsha 2015).

The Helen Suzman Foundation’s research gives a number of other perceptions that are evident from interviews with South African individuals:

- migrants are involved in crime (62%)
- they take job opportunities away from South Africans (62%)
- they are culturally different (60%)
- they cheat South Africans, among others, through food prices (56%)
• they use free health services (55%)
• they take RDP houses (52%)
• they steal South African women (52%).

Out of this variety of reasons, it is clear that economic considerations for xenophobia are the most important. In addition, there is popularly a gross overestimation of the number of foreigners, which makes the ‘threat’ even bigger. The popular view on the number of foreigners can be anything between 5 and 10 million, but Africa Check (2017) points out that StatsSA’s figures for 2011 were 2.1 million and for 2016 1.6 million. The Helen Suzman Foundation pointed out that the Forced Migration Studies Programme at the University of the Witwatersrand (Wits) put the number at between 1.6 and 2 million (Hovsha 2015).

Some want to speak rather about Afrophobia, but this phenomenon is not limited to animosity toward other Africans. Whatever the reasons, and whether they can be substantiated or not, xenophobic attacks and attitudes are immoral and counter to the letter and spirit of the Constitution (South Africa 1996).

What went (and is still going) wrong?

To answer the question ‘where did we go wrong?’ a complex array of factors, causes and effects have to be considered. The answer lies in the multidimensional nature of the recent South African history. It is also important to note that the factors that should be considered are overlapping and are often both cause and effect.

The socio-political angle

Nelson Mandela was the first democratically elected president of the Republic of South Africa (RSA). The economy grew by almost 5% per annum between 2005 and 2007 (Trading Economics 2017). There was, in fact, some net job creation during this period. But then two things happened, (1) Polokwane and (2) a massive global downswing.
At the end of 2007, the ANC held its elective conference in Polokwane. Jacob Zuma, having run a military style internal election campaign and gaining the support of almost all the power blocks in the ANC, ousted Thabo Mbeki as president of the ANC. Most of the branches, the Youth League, the SACP, the Women’s League and Cosatu turned against Mbeki and voted Zuma in as ANC president. It was clear that Zuma would become president of the country in 2009, when the next general election would be held (Gordin 2011).

When Mbeki was forced to vacate the office of president of the country prematurely in 2008, Kgalema Motlanthe took his place for a few months. When Jacob Zuma put together his first cabinet, it was clear that he had to accommodate those that supported him. The number of cabinet ministers, who were also SACP Central Committee members (12), surpassed anything in the past and most of them were in portfolios associated with the economy.

The first consequence of this was that, despite the fact that the National Planning Commission (NPC) brought out an extensive report in 2011, it was clear that very few of the projects proposed to get South Africa to the ‘ideal state’ in 2030 had been implemented. The reason for this was that there was (and still is) an economic policy schizophrenia in the cabinet. Ministers who were members of the SACP did not want to implement what they believed were the neo-liberal goals of the NDP, and therefore either went another route, or did nothing (new) (Eloff 2017).

In addition, the global downturn hit during 2008 and kept the world GDP low for at least 4 years. South Africa, which is normally a year or so behind global economic events, this time did not follow the (albeit small) upswing that came in 2012. This was the second consequence of Zuma’s reign. The most important reasons for this state of affairs were low business confidence, political uncertainty, labour law rigidity and the lack of capacity in the civil service to drive the big NDP projects.
This lack of capacity was, and is, a direct consequence of the ANC and government’s ideological approach to affirmative action, employment equity and black economic empowerment (Public Service Commission 2014).

A lack of capacity in the government at all levels

President Zuma was quoted in September 2015 by Beeld as saying that ‘[t]here are many good policies, but we are struggling to implement them’ (Eloff 2017). He did not give the reasons why the government was struggling to implement its policies. There are, however, a variety of reasons for this situation.

The 2007 Strategy and Tactics document of the ANC (2007:para. 14, 33) made the point that out of South Africa’s history emerged ‘colonialism of a special type’. It meant that both the coloniser and the colonised were located in a common territory and with a large European settler population. This produced ‘national oppression based on race; class super-exploitation directed against black workers on the basis of race; and triple oppression of the mass of women based on their race, their class and their gender’. The main aim of the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) is to liberate (ANC 2007):

Africans in particular and Blacks in general from political and socio-economic bondage. It means uplifting the quality of life of all South Africans, especially the poor, the majority of whom are African and female. (para. 39)

Therefore, a:

[C]ontinuing element of democratic transformation should be a systematic programme to correct the historical injustice and affirm those deliberately excluded under apartheid – on the basis of race, class and gender. The need for such affirmative action will decline as the centres of power and influence and other critical spheres of social endeavour become broadly representative of the country’s demographics. In the process, the inequalities that may persist or arise should be addressed. (para. 43, [author’s own emphasis])
From the above it is clear that it is a stated strategy of the ANC to capture the centres of power and influence. Through this strategy, the words in section 195(1) of the Constitution (South Africa 1996) that the civil service should be broadly representative of the country’s population were extended to ‘all centres of power and influence and other critical spheres of social endeavour’. This has been implemented with great vigour – and further than the Constitution (South Africa 1996) intended. Through an array of laws and regulations the concept of *transformation* was made the national norm on the basis that all sections of South African society should reflect the national racial demographic of 80% African people, 9% white people, 9% mixed race people and 2% Indian people. This is being applied not only to the civil service but also to the private sector, non-governmental organisations, sports bodies and civil society at large.

In the civil service, this has led to practices of either leaving vacant positions where able African candidates could not be found, or African candidates who were not able were appointed. A working document drawn up by the Public Service Commission (2014:6) states that affirmative action and cadre deployment are the most important reasons for poor service delivery. ‘Efficiency and competence should not be sacrificed at the altar of remedial deployment.’ It goes further by saying that cadre deployment ‘is taken to mean the appointment, on purely political considerations and patronage of persons who are not suitably qualified for the posts concerned’ (Public Service Commission 2014:8).

Since this document was published, it has become common cause that there is a serious problem with capacity in the civil service (Public Service Commission 2014). This is the result of the ANC’s own policy of transformation, affirmative action, employment equity and broad-based black economic empowerment – based on the racial quota of 80-9-9-2. This is not to say that all decisions taken in terms of these policies are wrong, but the consequences for capacity in the civil service have been disastrous.
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It has also had negative effects in other sectors of South African society. Again, the problem is not that South Africans from the racial minority groups do not want to see more representative and diverse organisations, sports teams and the like, but that South African society is again separated and often discriminated against along racial lines.

However, the people who suffer most from these policies are not the racial minorities who are systematically sidelined on the basis of race, but the poor majority of black South Africans who do not receive the services to which they are entitled as can be seen from the hundreds of service delivery protests experienced annually (Municipal IQ 2015). Furthermore, the concept of the developmental state is stillborn without strong capacity in the civil service.

A wrong approach to empowerment

If a country has a majority of people who have been economically disadvantaged and discriminated against, the question is how to change that. Everyone would agree that it would be impossible to achieve it overnight and that it would take time. One of the international benchmark solutions for empowerment is education and training (Eloff 2017:106). Give people a good education and appropriate training, and over time they will be employable and many will even become entrepreneurs and create their own jobs.

The Mandela government therefore put a lot of money into education, especially basic education. Some gains were made, with almost universal access being achieved. By the early 2000s more than 90% of children of school-going age were attending a school. Unfortunately, this input factor did not improve the quality of education for these children, and this was aggravated by the highly sophisticated system of outcomes-based education that was later acknowledged as a huge mistake (Ramphele 2008) and replaced by another system. The parlous state of the basic education system described above has made proper empowerment of the disadvantaged majority very difficult, if not impossible.
With regard to training, and especially technical training, the situation became worse. When the system of Sectoral Education and Training Authorities (SETAs) came into being in the early 2000s, the unintended consequence was that private companies stopped training their own artisans and waited for the state to do this. The SETAs, which worked on the principle of a levy by industry to take care of its training needs, was a good idea in principle, but the lack of capacity, bad management and corruption in many rendered it largely useless (South African Qualifications Authority 2015). Unfortunately, the technical college system that should have done the training all but imploded because of a lack of good management and capacity. The same was true of the Further Education and Training College system (FETs) that had to be rescued through a massive government intervention at the beginning of 2000 (when 150 of these colleges were consolidated into 50). This intervention did not have the desired effect, and today only a handful of the FETs are functional. They have now been renamed as ‘community colleges’, but the fact remains that very little effective technical training is done. South Africa has to import skills like welding from outside the country.

The weak state of the basic education system also had a knock-on effect on higher education. It is generally accepted in higher education circles that the entering students arriving at the gates of the universities are, by and large, ill-equipped and underprepared for higher education. A massive drop-out rate of first years (an average of 40%; Shay 2016) is the consequence, despite valiant efforts by university authorities and lecturers. This is especially true in the so-called hard sciences, like mathematics, accounting, life sciences and natural sciences.

In summary: potentially the most effective empowerment tool in the hands of any country, its education and training system, has been rendered ineffective in South Africa, and there is no light yet at the end of the dark tunnel.
The Mandela and Mbeki governments were successful in making good progress with socio-economic development, mainly through the Reconstruction and Development Programme of the late 1990s. At the time, the money the economy was generating as taxes helped to fund massive housing, water, electricity and sanitation programmes. Better and more effective tax collection also ensured that the government had enough funds to embark on these projects. During this time, more than five million houses were built and electricity, water and sanitation provided to millions of South Africans (Zuma 2014).

But against this background the lingering question always remained: Where would new economic growth and more taxes and more job opportunities come from? South Africa was struggling to grow at the 6% needed for sustainable development.

In President Mbeki’s time the concept of a developmental state came to the fore (ANC 2007:para. 188 et al.). It was premised on a so-called mixed economy where the state and the private sector both played a role in growing the economy. Among others, it meant the state would kick-start or boost the economy through large infrastructure projects. The infrastructure for the FIFA World Cup in 2010 was an example of such a project. The one critical ingredient of such a strategy was, however, a well capacitated civil service and technocracy to drive the big projects. This is why, among other factors, the NDP failed (see above).

With all of the above stark information in the minds of policy makers, another empowerment strategy emerged: black economic empowerment. The concept was that the still largely white-owned private sector should help create a wealthy class of black business men and women. This would be done through a variety of mechanisms, which, by 2016, had become a carefully prescribed and monitored system of preferential procurement, share schemes and points. When initially this concept mainly led to the establishment of a new and small black elite, the word broad was added to black economic empowerment. The outcome was, however, not much broader than before.
While not contesting the merit of much needed empowerment for black South Africans, the question should be asked whether this is the best way to empower the disadvantaged majority. What, in effect, has happened is that a raft of legislation (including affirmative action, employment equity and transformation measures) is aimed at trying to take wealth away from a white minority and give it to a black minority (at the top of the pyramid). It did not change the lives of the black majority at all. Even where empowerment has taken place, this has not always been done in the most effective manner. Listed companies who concluded large empowerment deals by essentially giving away shares (to score monitored points), find themselves in the predicament that black shareholders, having seen the value of their shares growing, often sold the shares to the market, leaving the company exactly as it was previously as regards ownership (see Jeffery 2014).

Having said this, it is also true that some success had been achieved in establishing a new black ‘middle class’, especially through employment in the civil service and the private sector. The question is whether this middle class is strong enough and whether it could have been larger if better empowerment mechanisms had been used.

Suffice to say that the empowerment mechanisms selected by the South African government over the last number of years have largely advantaged a small minority of black South Africans, while the majority has been left out in the cold, disillusioned and even bitter.

A word must be said about the social grants given to more than 16 million South Africans every month. Together with other parts of the ‘social wage’ such as free water and electricity, these expenses make up 60% of the annual budget. As an economic intervention, this is not sustainable. On the other hand, StatsSA (2014:8) has made the point that had it not been for these grants, poverty levels would have been much higher.
Additional contributing factors

In addition to the three main factors described above, a number of other issues that went wrong should also be mentioned.

After the historic democratic elections of 1994, the country and the politicians were in an understandable state of euphoria. The thinking was that now we had ridden ourselves of the big problem (apartheid) we could draw up the best policies, implement them and we would be able to change most things in a fairly short time. The reality is that the government (and other sectors of South African society) had underestimated the nature and complexity of the challenges that South Africa as a country faced. The globalised world of the 21st century was much more complex than the isolationist world of apartheid. Because of ideological reasons, the civil service did not retain enough officials with good experience.

The second fact is that, as a country, we were not good enough in the implementation of a variety of good plans, and perhaps we changed plans too quickly. The Reconstruction and Development Plan (RDP), the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) policy, the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA), New Growth Path and the NDP all came and went in the space of 18 years.

Major portions of the population slowly but surely slipped into a culture of entitlement, perhaps because of high expectations not met. Nevertheless, the fact that there is a general feeling that it is ‘now my, or our, turn to eat’, fuels corruption. According to Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index for 2015, South Africa was in the 61st place out of 168 monitored countries, clearly not in the best place (Transparency International 2014). Willie Hofmeyr, then head of the now disbanded Scorpions, reported to Parliament in 2011 that between R25 billion and R30 billion had disappeared from the fiscus as a result of senior politicians awarding tenders to family members or using public funds for personal use (Newham 2014).
What is not yet well documented, but comes up persistently, are reports of the network of patronage built by senior politicians (including the president) inside the ANC and between the ANC and certain businessmen (notably the Gupta family). This has recently led to reports of the capture of state institutions and state-owned enterprises.

The consequences

Recent political developments inside the ANC and the government

As discussed above, there was real progress up until about 2007 (including fair economic growth and job creation). But, as of 2009, it has been clear that there was a slow but clear change. According to the organisation Municipal IQ, major service delivery demonstrations not only occurred in all provinces in 2014, but also reached a new high point in that year. The 111 protests in 2010, the year before the last local government elections, also represented a high point, but by 2014 the number had increased dramatically. In that year, 191 protests were recorded. This receded slightly in 2015 to 164 and even further in the election year of 2016 (Municipal IQ 2015).

But it is clear that even the new middle class is increasingly unhappy with poor governance and corruption. The phenomenon of rising expectations of people who are experiencing a socio-economic transition also contributed to this. Once I have a house, running water and electricity, I naturally want more (Cronje 2014:7–8). This time of dissatisfaction was also the time when the EFF was established as a political party.

Unfortunately, these tendencies did not elicit strong leadership by the president or the cabinet. More recently, the contradictory public statements between high profile political leaders (President Zuma, Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa, former Minister Gordhan, Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, Minister Zwane and Jesse Duarte, to name but a few) is unprecedented in South Africa’s democratic
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history. This shows a clear lack of leadership. Accusations of state capture and the involvement of the Gupta family do not die down. There seems to be a formidable network of patronage.

There were three further reactions to these circumstances. On the one hand, it seems that the corruption and greed in certain ANC and government circles became more intense and took place on a much larger scale. One such example was the selling of all of South Africa’s oil reserves - at a time when the oil price was at an almost all-time low. A feeble explanation was given in parliament by the Minister of Energy and a Zuma confidante, Tina Joemat-Pettersson, and the auditor-general has found that not all the funds that were paid, were received in the fiscus (Hogg 2016).

Secondly, and especially in the run-up to the local government elections of May 2016, a distinct racial element came into the governing party’s electioneering speeches. President Zuma, on a number of occasions, played the race card, warning supporters not to vote for the DA ‘because then the whites will govern you again and apartheid will be brought back’. Other leaders displayed definite populist tendencies, and tried to ‘out EFF’, the Economic Freedom Fighters.

Thirdly, in reaction to accusations that, for black South Africans, very little had changed, ANC politicians, instead of taking responsibility themselves, blamed apartheid, its legacy and the previous white rulers for the ailments of the country. This helped to create the atmosphere for a more racialised debate. The core of the problem had become white privilege and white people in general - notwithstanding the fact that they constitute less than 9% of the population.

New black consciousness youth movement (and consequently racial polarisation)

A recent phenomenon is the rise of a new black consciousness movement, not unlike that of the mid-1970s, then led by Steve Biko. A new generation of young black people (mostly academics,
students and middle-class professionals), who did not experience apartheid or the constitutional settlement of 1994, are essentially looking at history through their parents’ eyes and are experiencing the pain, suffering and disadvantage anew (Haffajee 2015).

This new generation’s intellectual father is the French philosopher Frantz Fanon, who played an important role after the Second World War in the decolonisation philosophy of Africa, and especially Algeria. Also influential in Afro-American circles, Fanon’s central thought is that of an (IEP 2015):

\[
\text{[E]xpansive conception of humanity and his decision to craft the moral core of decolonization theory as a commitment to the individual human dignity of each member of populations typically dismissed as ‘the masses’. (n.p.)}
\]

The new generation of young black people (organised in groupings such as #Feesmustfall, #Rhodesmustfall, OpenStellenbosch, ReformPuk and Black First, Land First) apply the Fanon philosophy to the South African situation, attacking the power of white privilege and the disadvantage of being black in South Africa today. An important aspect is the demand to return the land that had been ‘stolen by whites’. Another is the tenet that only people with power can be and can act racist. Because whites are viewed as still possessing power in South Africa (the black government is viewed as in authority, but not really in power), whites and only whites can be racist. Black people, being disempowered, cannot be racist. A further element of this narrative is that, because of this history and inborn racism, whites should not speak out and participate in any debates, but should keep quiet, as they cannot experience nor understand the pain of black South Africans.

Haffajee (2015:60) notes that in a working group that she used in preparing her book, the answers to her question of how many white people think are in South Africa today were inevitably much higher than 8%.

But things have developed even further. In a brilliant article, Matthew Kruger, at the time a researcher at the Helen Suzman
Foundation, analysed the three presentations at the 2016 Ruth First Memorial Lecture. According to Kruger (2016), the members of the ‘New Left’ emphasise (a la Marx) the material conditions they think determine ideas and values, but they also now speak about ‘intersectionality – the idea that all material conditions, all past experiences, go towards determining the content of our ideas and the forms of our institutions’. Their violent and revolutionary rage can only be understood then by the term ‘lived reality’. This means, in the first place, that others cannot legitimately question the fact of personal experiences or sensations. Secondly, others cannot legitimately question the packaging and telling of these experiences to others or ourselves as stories or as a narrative.

This is treated as an article of faith, and, as Kruger puts it, a temple or ‘safe place’ is then built where only those who belong to the ‘cult of lived reality’ can enter. He continues (Kruger 2016):

Like good absolutists, they forcefully resist threats to the sanctity of these spaces – that is, anyone who does not conform to their revealed truths, rituals or canons. When confronted by people who question their faith, or act contrary to it by trying to participate as equals in political and moral discussion, they react with a desperate, frightened rage: ‘Sit down!’ they scream, their voices breaking and eyes burning with tears. Moving closer as they realize that their lusted-after enemy is not submitting to their individual commands, they now collectively and convulsively bawl in agonistic rage: ‘This isn’t your space! You don’t have a voice here! Sit down now!’ (n.p.)

This, by the way, is what many a student, lecturer and manager during the #Feesmustfall has experienced. The rage that was expressed when they dared to participate, question and debate the issues was almost unthinkable. But it is clear that it is a religious and fanatical rage.

Kruger closes his analysis by pointing out that the outcome of this type of rage and action is inevitably violence. Now the New Left not only justifies political violence, but also glorifies and eroticises terror, and they do this, while they do not understand the terror of violence or war. This is possibly the most dangerous aspect of the New Left.
The phenomenon of the new youth movement has certain consequences. In the first place, it, in effect, moves away from the constitutional principle of non-racialism to at best a renewed black consciousness or at worst a new form of racism (or at least racialism that leads to racial polarisation).

The second consequence is credence to the view that black people cannot be racist. Sobantu Mzwakali (2015) explains this well:

Black people can never be racist – we never had the tools or power to institutionalize racial oppression … On discrimination based on one’s colour, I can only concur that Blacks can be prejudicial towards Whites – but not racist … Prejudice refers to a positive or negative evaluation of another person based on their perceived group membership. Racism on the other hand refers to social actions, practices or beliefs or political systems that consider different races to be ranked as inherently superior or inferior to each other. Furthermore, racism is socio-economic, with systemic structures which promote one race’s powers over another … The usage of the word racist relative to a hate speech by Blacks on Blacks or Whites is incorrect. A subjugated group cannot be racist – they can only be prejudicial … The colour of my skin does not discount me from being racist, but the very society that we as Blacks find ourselves in – where we are automatically inferior due to the continuous systemic support of White privilege – discounts us from being racist. (n.p.)

This argument made me realise that there is a third consequence. On the one hand, the (at least high profile) examples of white racism was about categorising blacks as a group or individuals as inferior and ‘lesser’ than whites (Penny Sparrow’s comments being a case in point). On the other hand, the most prominent examples of black racism was about hating and wanting to kill and ‘fuck’ whites and were not derogatory as such toward the group or the individual, such as calling them ‘monkeys’. Whatever the largely semantic explanation, the results of the argument that blacks cannot be racist and the narrative are the same: racial polarisation and responsive intolerance.

A fourth consequence is that the approach and philosophy of the new youth movements cuts off any intellectual debate
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between opposite views, especially between blacks and whites – and therefore the possibility of finding joint solutions and reconciliation. The argument is that it is time for blacks to feel and express their pain without whites’ (patronising) inputs and even presence.

A fifth consequence is violence – on and off campuses. The new youth movements declare themselves entitled to the revolution. Kruger warns in no uncertain terms about the dangers of the violence argument and approach.

The speakers at the 2016 Ruth First Memorial Lecture dream of a future where violence, revolution and rage have cleansed the world of injustice. But, why do they dream at all? There is no need, for we can look to the past. We know what violent, revolutionary rage brings. It does not bring glory, but ignominy. It does not bring pleasure, but pain (Kruger 2016).

Finally, the most fundamental problem with the philosophy of the new youth movement is that, although it is broadly based on black consciousness and Fanon’s decolonisation views, it is (still) contextualised and shaped by ‘whiteness’ and ‘white privilege’. It looks back and is stuck in the present, but does not and cannot move forward – with the exception of ‘hallucinating’ (Naidoo). Haffajee (2015) describes this problem succinctly:

I came to write this book because I found the Black adherence to theories of whiteness self-limiting. And so, the question: what if there were no Whites in South Africa? To which I got the answer: it is not about Whites, but about whiteness – the system of privilege and prejudice that is still held in place. I get some of that, but my question remains: what is it that Black South Africans want to do with this fine land of ours? Does an obsession with Whites and whiteness not obstruct the building to be done? (p. 190)

Roots of and increase in white racism

On the other side of the racial fence is the white community. In the recent past, a number of racist incidents and remarks (especially on social media) captured the attention of all South
Africans. The most well-known incident was the remarks of the estate agent Penny Sparrow, who described the black South Africans on the beaches of KwaZulu-Natal as ‘monkeys’. This was roundly condemned by black and white South Africans, but often in similar racist language. One Velaphi Vel-hova Khumalo wrote that ‘white people deserve to be hacked and killed like Jews’ (Gqirana 2016).

Going further back, white racial prejudice has its roots in three factors. Even before apartheid was institutionalised, white (and Afrikaans) theologians preached the message of Afrikaners as the chosen people who had been led by God out of the Egypt (Cape) of oppression, to trek to the northern promised land and bring the light of the gospel to the (black) heathen nations.

Secondly, the ideology of apartheid found its first roots here, in the concept of a chosen people and, by implication, a people apart. Upon this a system of racial segregation and eventually discrimination was built.

Thirdly, and perhaps more applicable to non-Afrikaans white South Africans is the sense of white and Western superiority, also displayed in the colonial attitudes.

It is also worth noting that there may be a new root of white racism (or at least reverting to pre-1994 racism), and that is a combination of loss and fear. This is loss of past privilege and fear of the future as an ever-smaller minority – especially where government policies are racialising society again, thereby pushing the white minority into tiny corners. This makes more and more whites lash out – if not in public or social media, then in private around dinner tables.

### Conclusion

The answers to all the questions and issues raised in this chapter are sought in the rest of this book. The point is that, as South Africans, we cannot condone or agree with acts of racism,
xenophobia and other forms of intolerance. It is not in our mutual and long-term interest, it is against our Constitution (South Africa 1996) and it is morally wrong.

**Summary: Chapter 1**

The recent upsurge in racism, xenophobia, sexism and related intolerance is not attributable to chance. The ground has been prepared for this through a combination of political and socio-economic factors over the last 10 years. To trace these, it is in the first instance important to reflect on the history of South Africa and how democracy came about. Secondly, it is important to take into account the state of poverty, inequality, unemployment and education as possible contributing factors to the phenomena under discussion. Xenophobia is dealt with briefly. Thirdly, the question has to be answered what went wrong since the dawn of democracy. In this regard, socio-political factors, the lack of capacity in the state and a wrong approach to empowerment are highlighted as well as a number of aligned factors including an underestimation of the complexities of government, the non-implementation of good plans, a culture of entitlement and a network of corruption and patronage. At the heart of this is the (new) racialising of South African society through a number of government policies. The consequences of all these issues are finally described under three headings: recent political developments inside the ANC and the government, the rise of a new black consciousness and racial polarisation, and the roots of and increase in white racism. All of these present the context for examining racism, xenophobia and other forms of intolerance in South Africa today.
Distorted racial identities in post-apartheid South Africa: A Reformed perspective on constructing authentic human identities

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Introduction
The establishment of a constitutional state in South Africa in 1994 has coincided with a realignment of the relations between
different population groups in South Africa. Not only have political power relations shifted dramatically, but the Constitution (South Africa 1996) aims to reconfigure relations between various racial groups by promoting an integrated society based on values radically different to those of the segregated apartheid state. The inevitable result of this large scale realignment of group relations is a complex process of reconfiguration of racial identities. This reconfiguration process is characterised by the dislocation, renegotiation and reconstitution of previously established racial identities. Steyn (2014) states it as follows:

The social divisions brought about by the political re-alignment of the different population groups in relation to each other are far-reaching, complex and multiple. Not least among these is the re-negotiating of identities. South Africans, willingly or unwillingly, successfully or unsuccessfully are engaged in one of the most profound collective psychological adjustments happening in the modern world. (p. xxi)

The ‘collective psychological adjustment’ that post-apartheid South Africa has undergone and still is undergoing is a complex process which has produced mixed results. During the Mandela era some progress was made in creating a national identity, but since 2008 we have seen a rapid escalation in ethnic and racially charged conflict in South Africa ranging from xenophobic attacks on foreigners, racial violence on university campuses, and the use of racist slogans during political gatherings and racist outbursts on social media. As economic conditions in South Africa are worsening, ethnic and racial divisions seem to multiply.

The aim of this chapter is threefold. Firstly, it will set the stage by attempting to provide some conceptual clarity to the ambiguous and interrelated terms of *racism, ethnocentrism, nationalism* and *xenophobia*. Without clear conceptual markers it is difficult to discuss the topic intelligibly. Secondly, it will map and analyse the new spectrum of racisms that have emerged in South Africa since 1994. In doing so, recent empirical studies will be utilised. Lastly, it will attempt to make a constructive contribution by discussing ways in which a Reformed theological anthropology can assist us in deconstructing distorted racial identities and constructing authentic identities within a multicultural social context. A social
model based on Reformed underpinnings will be proposed to address the unity-plurality conundrum that modern societies face.

Conceptual clarification

South Africa is currently embroiled in a symbolical struggle between various cultural groups who aim to dominate the discourse of what racism is and how it should be addressed (see Ansell 2004:11). Ansell (2004:16) describes this as a battle to claim ‘victim status’ in order to ‘lubricate the racial order at this particular historical juncture’.

Some social scientists therefore prefer to move away from theories of racism, because theories tend to provide racism with a fixed meaning. Instead, a discourse is favoured that attempts to understand the sociological and psychological motives behind racial stereotypes (see e.g. Durrheim, Mtose & Brown 2011:61, 197). Although studies of the social and psychological forces behind racism are of great value, a clear definition of what racism actually constitutes, is important from an ethical, juridical and theological perspective. Ethicists and theologians are concerned with moral rights and wrongs and thus need to work with clear and well-defined concepts to make informed moral judgements, while jurists need clear legal definitions of racism in order to discern whether a particular act constitutes crimen injuria or whether forms of discrimination in public life amount to fair or unfair treatment on the basis of race. Without clear definitions of what racism entails we might enter into open-ended debates that confound various issues with one another, thereby adding confusion rather than clarity to a sensitive topic.

Racism as ideological and behavioural category

Tzvetan Todorov (2000:64) observes that the term *racism* usually designates two different ideas. It can either depict an ideological category that refers to a distorted doctrine on race, or it can be
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employed as a behavioural category denoting categorical actions of unfair treatment or hatred towards people of a different skin colour. Racism, as an ideology, finds its origins in an ideological movement with a coherent set of propositions that originated in Western Europe and exercised most of its influence from the mid-18th to mid-20th century (Todorov 2000:64). Although the core ideas of this movement had largely been discredited in the second part of the 20th century, the underlying tenets continue to evolve in new disguises and are still being transplanted to various parts of the world. Racism as an ideology is no longer limited to Western Europe or former European colonies, but have been appropriated by nationalist movements in other parts of the world. The emergence of Hindutva ideology in India is a case in point.

Racism, in a behavioural sense, refers to human actions that express a categorical and generalised prejudice, hatred and contempt towards other groups of people purely on the basis of their physical and phenotypical features. As Todorov (2000:64) rightly notes, people that entertain racial prejudices on an ideological level do not necessarily act in a visible hateful or contemptuous way towards other groups, while people who behave in a hateful manner towards other groups do not necessarily entertain a coherent set of ideological propositions on race. To give an example: it is perfectly possible that a philanthropist who presents himself as a benefactor might actually be racially prejudiced, because his philanthropic work is inspired by a patronistic sense of racial superiority. Conversely, it is also conceivable that a black or non-European person who experienced oppression and does not entertain the racialist notions of European colonialism might be a racist, because he or she acts in a hateful way towards other persons on the basis of their physical features. Whereas racism in an ideological sense has a specific historic and demographic origin, racism in a behavioural sense cannot be limited to people of Western European origins, but is a universal phenomenon that was always part of human history. In fact, ancient texts such as the
Hebrew Scriptures already attest to various racial conflicts in the ancient Near Eastern world. We must therefore reject the often expressed view that racism is an exclusively white, Western or European phenomenon. Not only is this factually untrue, but it denies the universal, pervasive and tenacious impact of racism on humanity.

Racist ideology is historically characterised by various fundamental tenets. Marger (1994) identifies the following three features:

1. Humans are divided in different physical types and distinct hereditary groups.
2. Physical traits and racial characteristics are seen as unchangeable and as determining the mental capacity and cultural ability of groups of people.
3. Some groups are seen as innately superior to others on the basis of their genetic inheritance. Physical integration should therefore be avoided in order to keep the superior race pure.

Racist ideology serves various self-serving functions. Firstly, it provides a pseudo-scientific theory that justifies political doctrines of oppression by constructing demeaning images of the other. Because the pure race needs to be safeguarded from contamination by inferior races, political action is needed to preserve the natural order of things. Such political actions might include segregation, ethnic cleansing and even genocide. Secondly, ideological racism justifies the unequal distribution of social goods and economic oppression (cf. Marger 1994:29). Because of their perceived inferior status, certain groups can be denied equal access to life opportunities or even be enslaved to conform to their naturally assigned place in the hierarchical order of reality.

The historical tenets of racist ideology, however, is based on pseudo-science. Biologists no longer utilise the notion of race, because all members of the human species function within a genetically open system. Genes are interchangeable, resulting in an unlimited variety of physical types among the human
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population (see Marger 1994:20). We therefore can no longer speak of pure races or classify people on the basis of their race. Marger (1994) states it as follows:

Racial categories form a continuum of gradual change, not a set of sharply demarcated types. Physical differences between groups are not clear cut but instead tend to overlap and blend into one another at various points ... Biologically, then, racial groups differ in relative, not absolute, ways. (pp. 20–21)

Evidently, it is also highly problematic to ascribe the social and behavioural traits of individuals such as their temperament and intelligence to their racial inheritance. As Marger (1994:21) rightly observes, social scientists generally agree that social environmental factors are the most critical determinators of behavioural patterns, not hereditary factors.

Yet, although the concept of race has no objective fixed status, it seems implausible to dispense with it. Firstly, visible differences between groups of people do exist. The racial perceptions of ordinary people are not informed by theoretical biological categories, but by the immediate visible differences they observe between groups of people with regard to skin colour, facial characteristics and hair types (see Todorov 2000:65). Secondly, the term race has become a universally shared political, social, philosophical and even juridical construction to mark and articulate difference. Differences need to be articulated in some way or another, and it has become commonplace in various social discourses to refer to persons as white, black, Asian, African, Caucasian, Arab and so forth. Winant (2000) describes the conceptual difficulty in dispensing with the notion of race as follows, ‘[t]o be raceless is akin to be being genderless. Indeed, when one cannot identify another’s race, a microsociological crises of interpretation results’ (Winant 2000:184).

Appiah (2000:610–611) notes in a similar vein that racial identification is impossible to resist, because racial ascription is insistent and hard to escape. Bystanders are always aware of our race and immediately notice it. In our daily lives race inevitably
acts as a signifier that immediately signifies an aspect of our identity. Hence, though the concept of race is not biologically warranted, it is a necessary social construction that marks identity and articulates difference.

### Ethnocentrism, Nationalism and Xenophobia

Marger’s definition of racism is not exhaustive. In fact, it would be highly simplistic to depict racism as a monolithic phenomenon only tied to concepts of biological inferiority. Racism is usually interconnected with notions of ethnicity, nationhood and patriotism. We therefore cannot reflect on racism without referring to the closely related categories of ethnocentrism, xenophobia and nationalism.

Ethnic groups are collectives that display unique sets of cultural and behavioural traits that distinguish them from other groups in a society. These traits usually include common ancestry, language and religion (see Marger 1994:13). Such ethnic groups often exhibit a strong sense of peoplehood, a shared cultural heritage, feelings of solidarity and an awareness of difference. Ethnocentrism arises when distinctive ethnic traits are used as markers for assessing the inferiority or superiority of groups of people. The ingroup (we) is usually depicted as innately superior, while the outgroup (they) is regarded as inferior. Ethnocentrism consequently displays various features that are also typical of racist ideology, yet the markers of inclusion and exclusion extend beyond a person’s race to also include features such as language, religious affiliation, cultural customs and demographic origins. In practice, racism and ethnocentrism are often interrelated phenomena, because racial ideologues usually ground the supposed superiority of their races, not only in superior biological features, but also in superior ethnic qualities such as linguistic purity. However, it needs to be noted that race does not always play a central role in ethnocentrism, because
ethnocentrism can also be exclusively based on a social attitude of we against them. Conversely, racism is not always ethnocentric in character, because people of different ethnic origins such as Americans and Germans can be regarded by racists as superior to other groups of people simply on the basis of their shared skin colour. Therefore, it might be wise to differentiate between ethnocentrism and racism, while keeping in mind that the two often overlap.

Xenophobia is broadly defined as a hatred, dislike and fear of individuals who originate from outside a community or nation. Such individuals are regarded as foreigners, strangers and outsiders who hold a political, existentialist or economic threat to indigenous communities (see Tafira 2011:114). Xenophobia overlaps with ethnocentrism when it is based on differences in nationality, ethnicity, language and customs. Yet, we need to differentiate between xenophobia and ethnocentrism in cases where hatred towards immigrants is driven by experiences of existential threat rather than feelings of superiority based on cultural and ethnic characteristics. Xenophobia intersects with racism when the inferiority of the foreigner is justified on the basis of biological characteristics. However, when xenophobic prejudice occurs between persons of the same skin colour, which is often the case, it ought to be distinguished from racism.

Nationalism depicts a process of ethnic mobilisation aimed at preserving a collective identity and attaining particular political goals, such as self-rule or territorial sovereignty. Ethnic mobilisation often result in racial antagonisms, because it is a form of identity politics that relies heavily on a bifurcation between us and them. Epistemologies based on difference generally find racialised forms of thinking attractive, hence the close historical relation between nationalisms and racisms (cf. Goldberg 2000:155). However, nationalism does not necessarily have to result in racial antipathy. When nationalist aspirations are not combined with negative stereotypes of the other and do not utilise violent means to achieve their goals, they can be a manageable force in society. However, when nationalist
self-identification is combined with negative stereotypes of the other it provides the breeding ground for racist attitudes, policies and actions. Early 20th century German nationalism, for example, used Romanticist notions such as the purity of the German language and Aryan myths to create a particular language of self-love that elevates the German above other social groups. At the same time, the Jew was defined as the other that holds a threat to German national aspirations. Nationalisms that combine their language of self-love with poisonous notions of the other are particularly dangerous phenomena and inevitably provoke racial tensions.

- Distorted racial identities in South Africa

The demise of apartheid has seen the end of overt structural and legal racial discrimination against black, Asian and people of mixed race in South Africa. Great strides have indeed been made in fighting racist ideology and attitudes through the acceptance of a Bill of Rights, legislation on hate speech and crimen injuria as well as the establishment of independent constitutional mechanisms such as the Human Rights Commission, the Public Protector and the Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities. Yet, race remains a troublesome concept in South Africa and a fundamental feature of social discourse, because past legacies of racial policies and practices continue to bear on present relations. Durrheim et al. (2011) state it well:

> Race continues to feature prominently in (these) new forms of social interaction and, by participating in them, South Africans are cast once again as racial subjects, advantaged or disadvantaged, included or excluded, colonisers or colonized. (p. 24)

With race historically so firmly embedded in the South African psyche it is almost inevitable that racism and ethnocentrism continue to be pervasive features of South African society. Although pseudo-scientific racist ideologies have largely been discredited in
the modern world, racist ideologies and attitudes have proven to be resilient. They are not static or unchanging in nature, but they exhibit an ability to evolve and rearticulate themselves in ever more subtle ways. Therefore, while it is important to analyse the history of racism, specifically the racial stereotypes that colonialism and imperialism created, we should not lose sight of the multifarious nature of racist ideology and the influence of contemporary mores on racist attitudes. Solomos and Back (2000:22) warn that the contemporary period is characterised by a ‘complex spectrum of racisms’. This is also true of post-apartheid South Africa. Ansell (2004) locates racial discourse in post-apartheid South Africa within a broader social dynamic:

Conceptions of race, the performance of racial identity, and notions of racism are no longer so closely bound to Apartheid structures; rather, they are each articulated around new axes of the local post-transitional moment and increasingly global racial politics. (p. 6)

The result of the power game that Ansell refers to is that various population groups draw on the past, often selectively, to renegotiate their position in the new society. Previously disadvantaged groups prefer to identify themselves as black, not only because they believe that they share a collective experience of discrimination, but also for the social benefits that it brings. White liberal groups, conversely, prefer to deracialise social discourse by emphasising the need to create a non-racial society. Though driven by genuine moral beliefs in many cases, this stance is often motivated by the realisation that whiteness is associated in post-apartheid South Africa with illegitimate privilege and that ‘whiteness’ therefore no longer yields social benefits.

### White racism in post-apartheid South Africa

Various empirical studies have been done on the phenomenon of white racism in post-apartheid South Africa (see Ansell 2004; Durrheim et al. 2011; Verwey & Quayle 2012). These studies have found that even though overt ‘white racism’ has declined
considerably in post-apartheid South Africa, it does not follow that ‘white racism’ has disappeared from the South African scene. Instead, the discourse that legitimises white racism has changed. Rather than overtly appealing to racialist theories, white racists have invented new racially encoded terms that defend a racially unequal social structure (see e.g. Verwey & Quayle 2011:552). Such terminology include binary distinctions between ‘African culture’ and ‘civilized culture’, ‘Third World’ versus ‘First World’ and ‘traditional society’ versus ‘modern society’. These depictions are metaphors underlain by the racialised notion that African society is essentially primitive, idle, superstitious, communal, polygamous, sexually promiscuous, technologically poorly advanced and incompetent, while civilised society is depicted as Western, modern, hardworking, competent, monogamous, technologically advanced, human rights based, rational and based on individual property rights. Although these terms are more subtle than the openly crude depictions of blacks that were found in apartheid South Africa, the prevailing underlying presumption is that black culture is backward. As South Africa is considered as a ‘black country’, it is ‘naturally designated’ by some post-apartheid whites in a derogatory manner as a mismanaged ‘Third World’ country, despite the considerable advances that have been made since 1994 in modernising the economy and improving service delivery to poor communities (see Goldberg 2000:165).

A second characteristic of white racism in post-apartheid South Africa, specifically observed in the studies of Durrheim et al., is the prevalence of white exclusionary practices. Because the racial divide in South Africa is also characterised by a corresponding class divide in that the poor class in South Africa is largely black, it is possible to exclude groups of people through the exercise of financial power. This includes practices such as ‘semi-grating’ that entail that exorbitantly expensive and exclusive neighbourhoods closed off by fences are created in residential areas; increasing school fees at predominantly white schools so that the average black child is not able to enter and
creating expensive private areas of relaxation that are difficult for the broader public to enter.

Linguistic and cultural arguments are also often used to justify exclusionary practices. Although the fight for the preservation of minority languages and cultural customs in the very diverse context of post-apartheid South Africa is important for social cohesion and is generally not driven by racial agendas, white right wing racial discourse often abuses such social drives and other identity arguments to prevent social change. Ansell (2004:22) concludes on the basis of her study of public submissions made to the South African Human Rights Commission on racism leading up to the 2000 National Conference on Racism that white right wing groups have replaced the old apartheid style of discourse with a narrative that calls for the protection of white culture with a multicultural context. Behind the veil of respect for linguistic and cultural difference lies a resistance against racial reintegration.

A third feature of white racial attitudes revealed by the mentioned studies is that whites often make efforts to deny or downplay the past, while obstructing attempts to transform the racial legacy of South Africa (see e.g. Ansell 2004:10–11). As noted earlier non-racialist language is often appropriated by white people to close off the past and to avoid the necessity for the redress of the racial socio-economic legacies of apartheid. While non-racialism is an important constitutional principle, some white racial ideologues inappropriately embrace this concept to claim moral high ground, while, at the same time, aiming to avert the need to address the systemic effects of apartheid. The argument offered is that policies of redress are themselves racist and undermine the constitutional value of non-racialism. The fallacy lies in it denying the structural and systemic dynamics of racism.

Similar forms of white obstructionism manifest themselves in the corporate environment where black managers are often appointed as tokens for window dressing purposes, while the
essential make-up of the particular corporations remains racially undiversified. This phenomenon is called ’fronting’ and entails that black women and men are superficially included in white businesses so that companies can be deemed as compliant with Black Economic Empowerment Legislation (see Durrheim et al. 2011:51).

A further troubling feature of white racism is the tendency to racialise crime. As Durrheim et al. (2011:54) notes, whites are depicted by white racialists as the primary targets of crime, because they are white, while blacks are portrayed as the ‘primary’ perpetrators. However, crime statistics show that black people are more vulnerable to crime, because a large percentage of the black population cannot afford private forms of security.

With the decline of the South African economy since 2014 and the erosion of democratic values and institutions under the Zuma administration, isolated incidents of crude white racist behaviour have raised their ugly heads again on social media and in public discourse. For many white racists the current political and economic volatility in South Africa are affirmations of black incompetency and the backwardness of African culture. Again, the delusion lies in the generalised and stereotypical images that are created of blacks and African values without any regard for the complexities of South Africa’s social dynamics.

**African nationalism and black racism in post-apartheid South Africa**

According to Durrheim et al. (2011:63), recent empirical studies have shown that racism has not declined within the black community. Some surveys have even shown that black respondents display more prejudice than white respondents (2011:63). Of course, this might be due to white people being cautious not to openly articulate their prejudices because of the racist stigma attached to whiteness, while black people might find it less of a social taboo to openly articulate their prejudices. Yet, these
findings contradict the widespread perception that racism is not a black phenomenon. In her study of public submissions made to the South African Human Rights Commission on racism, Ansell (2004:12) notes that various submissions made the argument that blacks cannot be racists. These contributors argued that racism presupposes the subjugation of others and requires a sense of racial superiority. Because blacks are economically oppressed and thus cannot subjugate or experience racial superiority, it is posited that there is no such thing as black racism (see Ansell 2004:12). This kind of argument is by no means restricted to a few, but is often articulated in public by black leaders (e.g. see Punt 2009:254). The fallacy of these arguments consists in their denial of the psychological and attitudinal nature of racism. As noted earlier, racism is not only an ideological or structural phenomenon, but it consists in attitudes and acts inspired by categorical forms of racial hatred. Racial hatred does not depend exclusively on a sense of superiority or the ability to subjugate, but it can be inspired by feelings of threat, experiences of past oppression or prejudice. Moreover, even if racism depends on possessing power, which is not the case, it is highly problematic to associate power in South Africa exclusively with white people as the political elite are mostly black people. Arguments that dismiss black racism as a social phenomenon, while defining racism as an exclusively white reality conveniently close off debate and evade the imperative for critical self-reflection among black people. Durrheim et al. (2011:78) aptly remind us that ‘in the post-Apartheid context, racism has mutated and the “white perpetrator – black victim” frame of analysis is not so readily applicable’.

Since the 1940s ‘black’ South African politics have been characterised by a tension between non-racialism on the one hand, and black consciousness and African nationalism on the other. The Freedom Charter, drafted in 1956, championed a democratic non-racial society where whites and blacks live as equals. However, the more radical Youth League of the ANC never subscribed to the ideal of non-racialism. In fact, the Youth
League’s Basic Policy Document of 1948 made no mention of non-racialism but invoked African nationalism as the ideological force behind its policies (see ANC 1948; Posel 2014:9). The Pan Africa Congress (PAC) broke away from the ANC in 1959, because they regarded multiracialism as a threat to the political destiny of blacks (see Durrheim et al. 2011:12). Poqo, the armed wing of the PAC, declared in a 1961 leaflet that ‘the white people will suffer, the black people will rule’ (as quoted in Durrheim et al. 2011:12).

Whereas the Freedom Charter represented non-racialism in the apartheid era, the Black Consciousness movement of Steve Biko, which showed a strong affinity with Frantz Fanon’s philosophy, exemplified black racialist thought. Biko criticised the notion of non-racialism as artificial, because blacks and whites first need to overcome their respective inferiority-superiority complexes before racial integration can be achieved (Whitehead 2012:1249). For Biko it was evident that non-racialism and colour blindness are impossible within a world where whiteness serves as the normative standard (see Biko 1979:24). Instead, Biko embraced a black self-consciousness that endeavours to shed the demeaning image that white society has projected on blacks. It entails claiming the authenticity of black identity and black self-determination and seeking self-emancipation.

During the immediate aftermath of the demise of apartheid, non-racialism won the day. It proved to be a useful and unifying concept to manage the transition in South Africa. Article 1b of the Constitution of South Africa (South Africa 1996) upheld non-racism and non-sexism as key values of the new South African state, while the Mandela administration utilised the concept with some degree of success to effect reconciliation efforts in South Africa. However, for redress-minded politicians the concept soon proved to be too ambiguous to bring about transformation. Tensions between non-racialism and black racialism quickly resurfaced.

Thabo Mbeki’s administration introduced a shift away from the non-racialism of the Mandela era to a more race conscious
African nationalism. During a speech to Parliament in 1998, Mbeki described South Africa as consisting of ‘two nations’ (quoted in Ansell 2004):

South Africa is a country of two nations … One is white, relatively prosperous, regardless of gender or geographic dispersal. It has ready access to a developed economic, physical, educational, communication and other infrastructure. The second and larger nation of Africa is black and poor … This nation lives under conditions of a grossly underdeveloped economic, physical, educational, communication and other infrastructure. It has virtually no possibility to exercise what in reality amounts to a theoretic right to equality. (pp. 4–5)

Mbeki’s two nations doctrine coincided with the realisation that the concept of non-racialism does not fit well within a programme of redress and social transformation. As Ansell (2004:4) rightly notes, the ‘abstract ideal of non-racialism that served so well during the period of transition has run up against the imperatives of transformation’. The notion of race had to be included into post-apartheid law for the strategic purpose of identifying those people who are regarded as previously disadvantaged and as qualifying for remedial action. Though race was no longer seen as the moral basis for citizenship, racial distinctions were seen as imperative to redress the racialised socio-economic legacy of South Africa and to measure its success. It is fair to posit therefore that the South African state kept the problematic concept of racial classification alive to reshape South African society and recalibrate power relations between the various population groups. Eloff (2016:53) rightly notes that the transformation policies, introduced by the ANC government, went much further than the stipulations of the Constitution (South Africa 1996) itself. The transformation of social institutions was understood as consisting in changing the racial makeup of social institutions to reflect the racial demography of society in all spheres of life.

Besides moving away from the value of non-racialism, Thabo Mbeki gave further impetus to African nationalism through the
concept of the *African Renaissance*. Mbeki’s African Renaissance philosophy was essentially humanist in nature and called for the rebirth of the African continent through political renewal, the establishment of sound democratic systems of governance and the need for changing the place of Africa in the global economic order so that the agenda of the weak and poor may become part of the world agenda. Underlying Mbeki’s philosophy was a resistance against what he perceived as the neo-imperialism and neo-colonialism that globalisation brings about (see Ajulu 2001).

Under the administration of Jacob Zuma, the ANC’s African nationalism gradually lost its humanist orientation and increasingly acquired a tribal and cultural chauvinistic character. In fact, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009:74) depicts Zuma’s populism as a shift away from African nationalism to ‘nativism’. During his rape trials and amidst the corruption charges made against him, Zuma consistently used Zulu ‘culture’ as part of his defence (Gibson 2011:64) After his election as ANC chairman at Polokwane in 2009, Zuma quickly tapped into clientelism as a legitimate way to conduct politics at a local level (cf. Gibson 2011:64), while using his ‘Zuluness’ appeal to consolidate his support in KwaZulu-Natal (for an extended discussion, see Twala 2010). Zuma, moreover, introduced the phenomenon of gatekeeper politics to government by appointing political leaders in key positions of authority to regulate access to resources and simultaneously protect the president against possible persecution for corruption. Zuma’s patronage system has a strong ethnocentric ring to it, as it is legitimised by a discourse of ‘Africanist racial solidarity’ and ‘indigenous traditionalism’ (Lodge 2014:2). These gatekeeping politics have created a ‘volatile politics of exclusion and inclusion’ that provoked ‘bitter factional struggles’ within the ANC for access to state networks (Beresford 2015:1).

Julius Malema, the leader of the Economic Freedom Party (EFF), which was founded in 2014 after a breakaway from the
ANC, introduced a much cruder racial populism to the South African political scene. According to Posel (2014) Malema positioned himself as:

[A] counterpoint to Nelson Mandela unsettling the iconography of non-racialism, reasserting an angry and confrontational version of race that re-instated the spectre of violent conflagration that Mandela’s ‘miracle’ held at bay. (p. 32)

Whereas Mandela represented the archetype of reconciliation and non-racialism, Malema exerts the image of the angry, masculinist black man who will not make any compromises with white people (Posel 2014:39). In fact, speaking at the 67th anniversary of the ANC Youth League in 2011, Malema named the ‘white minority’ explicitly as the enemy, ‘[t]hey [whites] have stolen our land. They are criminals and must be treated like that. We want our land back and we want it for free.’

Malema also called for the nationalisation of mines that, according to him, represent white capitalism as well as the transferral of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) to black control (Malema 2011). Malema’s overt racist utterances are consistently cloaked in language of economic liberation that requires a racial struggle of the poor blacks against white minority dominion (see Posel 2014:46).

The rise of racial populism, tribalism and nativism together with social factors such as scarce resources, illegal immigration, difficult economic conditions and shared living in small spaces probably contributed to the spate of xenophobic attacks South Africa experienced in the last decade. In 2008, South Africa saw the eruption of violence against black immigrants in various townships in Gauteng. Sixty-two people died and hundreds were injured or maimed (see Tafira 2011:114). The same events repeated themselves in 2015 in Kwazulu-Natal, when Zulu gangs in Isipingo attacked foreign nationals. The violence quickly spread to Johannesburg. Five people were killed and scores injured (Haffajee 2015).
South African sociologist, Kenneth Tafira (2011:114–121), has conducted an empirical study on xenophobic attitudes in Alexandra, where the 2008 outbreak of violence started. He (Tafira 2011:117) found that xenophobic practices in this area coincided with racist labels being used in the process of ‘Othering’ to ‘degrade, deprecate and inflict physical harm’. According to Tafira (2011), foreigners are defined as outsiders based on their phenotypical appearances. Foreigners are given derogatory labels such as Makwerekwere, cultural differences in speech are depicted as illustrations of the inferiority of the foreigners, and they are depicted as invaders usurping the material gains made by black South Africans.

From the above discussion we can deduce the following: white forms of racism have evolved and mutated to subtler forms of expression and practice. Because many white people have been socialised within the racial system of apartheid, white racist attitudes and practices are hard to root out. As political and economic conditions in South Africa worsen and the struggle of cultural survival intensifies, racial attitudes towards blacks seem to harden. Conversely, we have seen the rise of an unhealthy form of African nationalism. The non-racialist ideal of the Freedom Charter has proven to be too ambiguous to address the imperatives of social transformation. Thabo Mbeki’s administration opted for a humanist African nationalism, but this evolved in the Zuma era to cultural chauvinistic forms of nationalism. At the same time we have seen the emergence of the EFF’s racial populism as well as the rise of xenophobic violence.

Race and identity construction

At the heart of the phenomena of racism, nationalism, ethnocentrism, xenophobia and sexism lies the complex concept of identity. Hall (2000) rightly notes that the structure of self-identification is always characterised by ambivalence:

Identification is always constructed through ambivalence. Always constructed through splitting. Splitting between that which one is,
and that which is the other. The attempt to expel the other to the other side of the universe is always compounded by relationships of love and desire. This is different language from the language of, as it were, the Others who are completely different from us. (p. 147)

Identity becomes an issue in times of crisis when stable and fixed understandings of self-identity are threatened by changing circumstances. Developments in post-apartheid South Africa and the recent rise of right wing populist movements in Europe are good examples of this trend. Globalisation and migration put pressure on traditional concepts of identity, rearrange the social make-up of society and enhance the competition for resources and social goods. This inevitably leads to racial and social conflict. Within South Africa we are not only facing the challenges of globalisation and illegal immigration, but also extreme diversity and a racially divided past. To address these phenomena we need to reflect on the troubling concept of identity. The question we face is: How can distorted racial identities be deconstructed and replaced with authentic human identities?

## Identity and race

As noted already, racist ideologies and attitudes emanate from distorted forms of identity construction. Human identity is not a fixed reality, but a fluid social construct influenced by historical and social factors such as linguistic formation, educational upbringing, religious affiliation and cultural background. Identity construction is usually characterised by individual self-definition – self-definition in relation to a specific in-group, and definitions of the Other. Racist identity constructions emanate from self-definitions based on ethnocentric premises and are characterised by excessive forms of self-love and hubris as well as the racial stereotyping of others. Because the self is defined in racial terms, the other is also evaluated through racial lenses.

Racial stereotyping usually serves two functions. Firstly, they enhance the individual’s self-image as well as the collective identity of the social in-group by giving social meaning and a
sense of superiority both to the individual and the in-group. Secondly, they categorise and depersonalise the out-group through a process of what Jeremy Punt (2009:263–264) calls ‘cognitive simplification’, which is exemplified by exaggeration and overgeneralisation. By depersonalising the other, actions and attitudes of hatred and antipathy towards the out-group are justified.

Deconstructing distorted racial identities

To address racism we need to deconstruct the distorted process of identity construction that underlies racialised thinking. John Calvin’s doctrine on sin might be helpful in this regard, as he focuses a great deal on the nature of distorted identity construction. According to Calvin (Inst. 1.1.1), authentic human identity consists of a true knowledge of God and a true knowledge of ourselves. These two aspects are closely tied together and it is not possible to determine which precedes the other and which gives birth to the other. Without true knowledge of God we cannot have a true knowledge of ourselves, and without a true knowledge of ourselves we cannot have true knowledge of God. The character of sin consists therein that it distorts our relationship with God with the result that our identities become corrupted. Sin, first of all, has a noetic effect on the human being. Calvin uses the metaphor of blindness: sin cuts off human reason from the source of knowledge. Deprived of the light of God our understanding becomes ‘darkened’ and our hearts ‘blind’ (Inst. 2.3.1). The result is that the human being becomes ‘carnally minded’ and that he creates and venerates idols in the place of God (Inst. 2.3.1; 1.15.2). In fact, human reason itself becomes an idol (Inst. 1.15.4). No longer are human beings willing to confine themselves to God’s will, but they elevate themselves above God (Inst. 1.15.4). This self-elevation leads to a distorted identity characterised by self-love, self-adoration and pride. These forms of hubris are, however, mere illusions. In searching for independence human beings cut themselves
loose from the Source of Life, which inevitably leads to bondage. Alienated from God, humans are neither free nor independent, but become prisoners of themselves and their own wretchedness (Calvin 1847: Gn 2:9; 1996:97).

How can human beings be salvaged from their hubristic misery? According to Calvin, only through a divinely initiated course of self-deconstruction that decentres the human being. This decentring of the self requires self-denial, that is, a reorientation of focus away from ourselves to God. The two main features of self-denial, according to Calvin, are self-mortification and vivification (Inst. 2.8.3). Self-mortification entails a distrust in our own ability, the renunciation of our selfish desires, the uprooting of our craving for glory, the abandonment of sinful vices and the dying of the egoistic self; while vivification manifests itself in a life of cross-bearing inspired by a love of God and our neighbour (see Inst. 3.6.2). Most importantly, for Calvin self-denial requires that we resist ‘carnal’ forms of reasoning and that we devote ourselves to our neighbours by serving them through our divinely bestowed gifts (Inst. 3.7.5; 1848; 1 Cor 2:3). For Calvin self-denial and self-mortification do not entail obliterating the human’s sense of self-worth. All persons are, after all, created in the image of God. Rather, it entails an effort to replace our natural inclination to egoism with a love and charity that extends even to the enemy (Calvin 1845: Mt 5:43). Love for the enemy is, according to Calvin, an ethical duty that emanates from humanity being one flesh, and all human beings being created in the image of God (Calvin 1850: Is 53:8). Calvin (Inst. 2.8.55) states it as follows:

But I say that the whole human race, without exception are to be embraced by one feeling of charity; that there is no distinction of Greek or Barbarian, worthy or unworthy, friend or foe, since all are to be viewed not in themselves but in God. (n.p.)

Calvin’s depiction of sinful identity construction as consisting in excessive hubris is particularly relevant for our theme. Though racism is a universal problem, it is no accident that racist ideologies
flourished in the intellectual climate of the Enlightenment and modernism. The Enlightenment has been so fixated on the positive attributes of human reason, the unlimited potential of human ingenuity and the competence of the human being to reorder his or her environment through science that excessive hubris had to become endemic to Western culture. Because civility was measured by Enlightenment thinkers in terms of progress, technological ingenuity and cultural sophistication it was inevitable that Western culture would regard non-European cultures and less developed civilisations as backward and that racial ideologies would soon arise to explain the ‘backwardness’ of other civilisations. The illusion of Western hubris resided in its evaluation of other cultures from the perspective of its own normative standards. The legacy of this illusion was catastrophic, as is attested to by the after-effects of colonialisation and the two world wars.

Racism and ethnocentrism ought to be exposed for what they are: excessive self-love and self-adoration. To break down these narcissistic attitudes, Christian theology needs to identify and deconstruct the hubris that underlies nationalist, collectivist and tribalist ideologies. Drawing on Calvin, we can state that such a deconstruction requires decentring human beings by instilling in them the values of a God-centred lifestyle, self-denial and extending love and charity to all people irrespective of race, religion or gender. From a theological point of view, authentic self-understanding can never be framed by ethnicity, but it ought to be inspired by the universalist premise that God demands that all people be treated as bearers of God’s image.

Deconstructing distorted identities and constructing decent identities cannot occur within a vacuum. Societal arrangements need to be conducive to decent identity construction. Modern societies are, in my view, in dire need of a plausible and constructive social philosophy that addresses the new environment that globalisation has created.
Unity in diversity through a politics of recognition

The pluralising effect of globalisation has been a major catalyst for the rise in xenophobic and racist attitudes around the world. Globalisation has brought about the mass movement of people to different parts of the world, thereby changing the traditional make-up of various societies and heightening cross cultural pressures. Societies are becoming increasingly fragmented; so much so, that hyper plurality seems to be a pervasive feature of the vast majority of societies today. The hyper plural nature of modern societies often leads to various members of society experiencing an absence of a sense of belonging and identity (see Vorster 2015:28). This creates an environment where populist forms of identity politics can flourish.

The Reformed social model of unity in diversity may be of some value in addressing the problem of living together in plural environments. John Calvin’s social philosophy was based on the principle of differentiating in order to relate. Calvin used the formula of *united but not confused* (*unitis, licet non confuses*) to explain the unity, but also diversity of reality (see *Inst.* 2.14.4). He specifically applied this formula to the two natures of Christ, the soul-body relationship, the church-state relationship and the connection between justification and sanctification. The term ‘*united but not confused*’ connotes that a whole can be composited of parts, and be informed by its parts, without the parts losing the properties peculiar to them. The parts communicate their properties to the whole resulting in a singular effect (see *Inst.* 2.14.4). Therefore, Calvin could affirm that the church and state are united in that they form two regiments of God’s one reign, but they are also different in that the church is spiritual in nature and the state temporal. Though some of the church’s properties inform the state, and some of the properties of the state assist the church, the spiritual cannot be absorbed into the temporal or the temporal into the spiritual (see *Inst.* 2.2.13).
Calvin’s attempt to preserve unity in diversity is specifically displayed by his doctrine on society as a neighbourhood. According to Calvin, human community is made possible by human interdependence and the wide range of natural gifts that God bestows on people (Inst. 3.7.5; see Vorster 2016:134). God calls us to live as a community in mutual subjection and servitude to one another by serving one another through our gifts (Calvin 1854:317). Our social responsibilities are, according to Calvin, determined by our vocation that places us within a particular sphere and context of responsibility (Inst. 1.5.1). Social cohesion is achieved when every person performs his or her duty within the particular mode of life in which God has placed them.

Johannes Althusius (1557–1638) applied Calvin’s theological arguments to the political realm. Althusius’s main aim was to provide a political theory that would address the instability that 17th century European societies faced after the Reformation. He specifically aspired to limit the spread of centralised monarchies by proposing symbiotic kinds of associations (see Vorster 2015:29, 30). Whereas Enlightenment thinkers used individualist premises and egoistic interests (Hobbes) to construct their political theories, Althusius based his political theory on the reciprocal nature of the human being and the symbiotic quality of human existence (see Vorster 2015:31). According to this theory, no individual is born self-sufficient, but we are created with different gifts and abilities. This difference in ability makes people dependent on one another and necessitates people to provide services to one another by setting up institutions that facilitate the communication of useful and necessary things (Althusius 1964, Politica 1.27). Politics, consequently, is about organising social life in a manner that allows for a symbiotic and interdependent existence where human beings live together and foster symbiotic relationships through social pacts based on mutual agreement (Althusius 1964):

Politics is the art of associating (consociandi) men for the purpose of establishing, cultivating and conserving social life among them. Whence it is called ‘symbiotics’. The subject matter of politics is
therefore association (consocatio), in which the symbioses pledge themselves each to the other, by explicit or tacit agreement, to mutual communication of whatever is useful and necessary for the harmonious exercise of mutual life. (*Politica* 1.1–2)

Symbiosis requires much more than mere toleration of others, but depicts processes of sharing, communal problem-solving and aid that Althusius (1964, *Politica* 1.7) defines as the communication of rights (*juris*), things (*rerum*) and services (*operarum*). These processes, according to Althusius (1964, *Politica* 1.23), must be infused with the principles of piety and justice that makes orderly symbiosis possible. The various social associations, constructed by social pacts, ought to possess autonomy in handling matters that directly and exclusively relate to them so that power can be distributed among many (Althusius 1964, *Politica* 18.72). Yet, together they stand in a symbiotic interdependent relationship.

The important contribution of Althusius’s political theory is that he stresses the importance of recognising diversity and plurality as essential features of and prerequisites for social cohesion. Plurality makes possible the interdependency and mutual assistance needed for unity of action in society (see Vorster 2015:48). Because the human being is a reciprocal and associational being, linguistic, religious, cultural and other collective rights are as important as individual rights (see Vorster 2015:49).

How does all of this relate to the problem of racism? Reformed social philosophy reminds us of the need to recognise pluralism and diversity as essential features of life and to utilise them as tools to achieve social cohesion. It warns against imposing hegemonic ideals on society and encourages us to see diversity as part of the multi-faceted created order of God. Social diversity and the existence of various associations and groups is not a threat to human society, but an asset that serves the flourishing and symbiosis of society. Associational and cultural rights therefore need to be taken seriously in the public realm. As Elazar (1964:xl) rightly points out, ‘groups are also to be recognized as real, legitimate and requiring an appropriate status’. The right to associate in linguistic, cultural
and religious groups are as fundamental as individual rights and ought to be recognised in the public space. When groups are not recognised in public spaces, individual rights lose their ‘practical import’, because people often express their rights through groups (Vorster 2015:49). Recognising cultural, linguistic and religious particularity does not involve promoting sectarianism or new forms of cultural segregation, but is, in fact, compatible ‘with a form of universalism that counts the culture and cultural context valued by individuals as among their basic interests’ (Gutmann 1994:5). Individualist liberal rights discourse, as enacted in most Western societies, attempts to create neutral public spheres where various groups can coexist in peace. The problem, as recent events in Europe have shown, is that toleration alone does not enable the integration of groups in a manner that serves the symbiotic interdependence of society. Immigrant minorities in Western Europe, for instance, have largely functioned on the periphery of society without being fully integrated in broader society. This creates feelings of misrecognition and alienation that inspires radicalisation.

Because of its difference-blind emphasis on universal identity, individualist rights discourses are often prone to imposing an unintended homogeneity on plural societies and, moreover, to allowing mass intrusions on minority cultures. Charles Taylor has identified this problem in his influential essay entitled ‘The Politics of Recognition’ (1994). According to Taylor, human identity is essential to human existence. If the identity of individuals or groups of people is misrecognised alienation and disillusionment follows. Identity construction does not occur in isolation, but human identity is formed dialogically by negotiating it through dialogue with others (Taylor 1994:34). This process entails engaging with our cultural heritage, reflecting upon it and modifying it through our interactions with other people (see Gutmann 1994:7). Because human identity is formed dialogically through collective dialogues and the recognition of others, we need a politics of recognition that publicly acknowledges the needs and interests of particular individuals as members of specific cultural groups. This includes a recognition of the history of groups, their unique forms of life,
their vulnerability, their need for cultural survival and their worth and value to broader society. A politics of recognition will accept that not all groups in society can be treated uniformly, but that we need to treat some groups differently for the sake of their survival and effective contribution to the common good. In South Africa a politics of recognition would entail that we recognise the disadvantaged socio-economic position of the African, mixed race and Asian population groups as a result of the history of apartheid as well as the vulnerability of minority groups in South Africa and the need to protect them against intrusions from mass culture. Recognition therefore involves much more than mere toleration, but demands genuine respect for differences and a real appreciation of the contribution that various groups and cultures can make to social symbiosis and harmony.

Respect, however, ought to be qualified, as not all views or group practices are worthy of respect. A politics of recognition ought to be animated by the universal values of human dignity and justice that are basic preconditions for social cohesion. Amy Gutmann (1994) states it as follows:

Undeserving of respect are views that flagrantly disregard the interests of others and therefore do not take a genuine moral position at all, or that make radically implausible empirical claims (of racial inferiority for example) that are not grounded upon publicly shared or accessible standards of evidence. (p. 22)

According to Gutmann (1994:23), racism and anti-Semitism discourses are, for instance, not worthy of respect, because they do not reflect a respect for the equal dignity of all members of society. A politics of recognition therefore has limits. It recognises particularities, but only up to a point. When collective identities become disruptive forces in society that endanger the common good they are to be treated and regarded as harmful.

**Conclusion**

The thesis of this contribution is that racism, both in an ideological and behavioural sense, emanates from distorted identity construction
processes. Ideological racism usually emanates from excessive hubris, self-adoration and pride that are often closely connected with nationalist and ethnocentric doctrines. However, behavioural forms of racial hatred might also arise among minorities and historically disadvantaged groups because of feelings of misrecognition. To address racism we need to focus on the issue of identity, and we need to understand the process involved in identity construction. To dispense with particularist identities based on race, origin, culture and gender in favour of universal identities, will not do, because human beings cannot escape identity ascriptions. Humans exhibit by nature a desire to experience a sense of belonging and to be recognised authentically for who they are. Doctrines of sameness not only tend to deny the particularist notions that underlie their universal claims, but they also create environments where minority cultures experience the consistent threat of intrusions by mass cultures. This creates feelings of anxiety, alienation and threat that could result in feelings and actions of racial hatred. Recognising particularist identities, however, does not mean that universal values such as respect for human dignity and justice can be abandoned. These universal human values, after all, articulate the basic preconditions for orderly social interaction.

Reformed theology can play an important role in fighting racism in two ways. Firstly, Reformed theology provides resources to deconstruct distorted racial identities and to construct decent identities. Deconstructing distorted racial identities requires exposing the idolatrous individual and collective hubris that underlies ideologies of superiority as well as the cognitive simplification involved in depersonalising the Other. Decent identity construction, conversely, entails decentering human identity. This involves a reorientation away from ourselves to God and our neighbour, and the nurturing of an attitude of self-denial and self-mortification. Such an attitude should be informed by a universal respect for all human beings as created in the image of God as well as a love that extends even to the enemy.

Secondly, Reformed theology provides us with impulses to devise a social model that addresses the challenges of
hyperpluralism brought about by globalisation. The confusions that globalisation bring, is one of the great reasons for the emergence of new spectres of racism. Drawing on Calvin, Althusius and Charles Taylor, this study proposes a symbiotic social model that strives after unity in diversity by recognising diversity and plurality as God-given gifts that enrich societies and serve social cohesion. Such a symbiotic social model ought to be accompanied by a politics of recognition that recognises and respects the rights, interests and needs of collective entities in the public space on the precondition that these collective entities are worthy of respect. To be worthy of respect collective entities need to conform to basic universal values such as respect for dignity and justice.

■ Summary: Chapter 2

In recent times South Africa has seen the rise of new kinds of racism. As a result of the change in power relations, white racist practices have become much more subtle, but do surface from time to time overtly in public racial incidents and on social media. Black racism, in contrast, has become much more overt as can be seen in the wide array of anti-white rhetoric used by black politicians in public life. This chapter argues that racism emanates from distorted processes of identity construction. To address racism, racist identity constructions need to be deconstructed and replaced with authentic forms of identity construction. Moreover, a social model needs to be provided that will enable us to address the pluralisation and accompanying racial tensions that globalisation brings about. After providing conceptual clarification on the concept of racism and a brief overview of the new spectre of racism that has emerged in post-apartheid South Africa, this chapter employs Calvin’s doctrine on sin and Althusius’s understanding of politics as symbiotics, Neo-Calvinism’s understanding of sovereignty and universality in own sphere, and Charles Taylor’s philosophy of political recognition to propose ways in which decent identities can be constructed and social cohesion can be improved.
Racism in South Africa: Are we at a tipping point?

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Introduction

The concept of ‘race’ describes a group of people with the same physical characteristics and with notable cultural and social similarities. Modiamo (1996) defines a race as:

Reasonably large groups of individuals which differ from each other (from group to group) for a ‘sufficient large’ number of independent ‘mayor’ anthropological markers (inter-groups, discontinuous, inherited self-evident characteristics) which in spite of being independently determined lead to a ‘strongly concordant’ subdivision. (p. 146)

The concept of ‘racism’ has a wide range of definitions. Generally speaking, racism can be defined as an attitude of
hostility, enmity or even as a hatred of people of a particular race or any other race. It is the belief that race determines the person’s other human traits, which can then produce an inherent attitude of superiority towards other races (Mekoa 2011:104). According to Marger (1994:6), racism is the belief that humans are subdivided into hereditary groups that are innately different in their social behaviour and capacities, and that can therefore be ranked as superior or inferior.

However, racism can also be used to describe ‘bias’ and ‘intolerance’ among groups other than racial such as ethnic and religious groups. Schutte (1995:18) is of the opinion that ethnic groups can construct themselves on the basis of language, religion, culture, descent or a combination of these and other features. An ethnic group may even shift the basis on which it constructs its identity from one feature to another. Historical ethnic groups may merge and found their solidarity on a new basis. Racist beliefs are therefore not only limited to ideas about groups commonly referred to as ‘races’. Racism can be applied to the attitude of any ethnic group and can be applied to Jews, Italian Americans, Northern Irish, Catholics or French Canadians as much as to African Americans, North American Indians or other more physically salient groups (Marger 1994:28). The presumed superiority of some groups and the presumed inferiority of others are subsequently used to legitimise the unequal distribution of the resources of societies – specifically the various forms of wealth, prestige and power. In view of this description, racism can be defined as an attitude of prejudice, bias and intolerance between various racial groups which can lead to structural discrimination and social stratifications.

South Africa is well-known for a history of racism. Since the establishment of a democratic government in 1994, various political administrations endeavoured to deal with racism. Most importantly is the work done by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in 1998. However, racism did not come to
an end with the inauguration of democracy (Pillay 2014:144). Although the South African Institute of Race Relations (2016:2) reported recently on the basis of empirical scientific research that racial relations have improved in South Africa and that there are reasons for hope, the current rigorous debates on the issue – especially on social media – leaves the impression that racism is surging again. Boonzaaier (2010:86) argues that post-1994 South Africa still struggles with ongoing racist behaviour. This enduring racism has also been accompanied by surges of violent xenophobia (Adjai & Lazaridis 2013:255).

The research question of this investigation could be divided into two related issues: Why is racism still surging after 22 years of democracy and what is the reason for these perennial racist beliefs? The aim of this chapter was to investigate and evaluate this perceived resurgence of racism and the persistent racialisation of South African societies. The central theoretical argument of this examination was that the ongoing racial classification of white, black, mixed race and Indian people, which in the past led to social stratifications and policies based on racial segregation, can be viewed as the root cause for the perennial upheavals of racism in South Africa and are a hindrance to the establishment of truly non-racial societies. One can therefore ask: Are we at a tipping point where the old patterns of racism are only replaced by new, but similar patterns which can again result in new structures built on racial prejudice? To unfold the argument, the process of social stratifications before 1994 was revisited and a pattern of racism could then be discerned. In conclusion, a case

1. The SAICC report says the following in this respect, ‘[s]ocial media in particular, have spoken of an “unbridgeable gap” that has developed between black and white South Africans. South Africans were said to “have no interest in reconciliation, redress and nation-building”. The white community was alleged to be wracked with racism and filled with a deep desire to bring back Apartheid. Black South Africans were said to be filled with hatred for whites and a strong desire for vengeance. Threats of racial violence were made. The perception created was of a country on the verge of a race war.’
was made for the argument that the current racial classifications within South African societies can be regarded as a stepping stone to a new pattern of racism and a violation of the ideal of truly non-racial societies.

### Social stratifications in South Africa before 1994

A comprehensive study on the history of social stratifications was done by N. Vorster (2003:9–113). He identified four historical periods in the development of social stratifications. The first period stretched from the coming of the Dutch colonists in 1652 until the emergence of the influence of the Cape Patriots in 1795. In this period, the social order of the Cape colony was dominated by people of European descent. The indigenous people – the Khoi – and liberated black slaves were excluded from any positions of leadership and in organised business. Class and race were classified with white Europeans becoming the affluent class and black people the poor race (see Elphick & Gilomee 1982:403). People were therefore classified on the basis of race and this classification was apparent in the first laws promulgated in the colony. Although the Khoi was a free nation and the initial inhabitants of the Cape, their position was economically and socially inferior and they were excluded from positions in the civil administration and economic environment. This classification was largely due to the European post-Reformation Christianity where identity was seen as God-given. Europeans regarded themselves and their history and culture as superior. They classified societies as European and native and had no idea of the relatedness of aboriginal people to nature and earth and the wealth of their traditional religions, culture and histories. Jennings (2010:60–61) provides a seminal description of this ethos of European superiority that can be related to theology and determined racial classifications.
Furthermore, the mercantilist economic system of the United East Indian Company of the Dutch colonists was aimed at the interests of the business elite and had very little impact on the alleviation of the growing poverty among the indigenous population. Slavery also played a major part in growing social stratifications (Shell 1994:395). In the Reformed tradition, resulting from the influential Synod of Dordt (1618–1619), slaves were baptised when they became Christians. However, they could not be sold out of the spiritual household they had chosen and remained slaves without any fundamental human rights (Gerstner 1997:18). Society was therefore stratified as European colonists, indigenous people and the slaves. These were the main social categories in the period under discussion. Racial classifications were at the root of political policies, economic planning and social development and, as a result of the mentioned ideological and theological influences, the underclass consisting of slaves and the indigenous people were plunged into poverty.

The second period of social stratifications in South Africa, as discussed by Vorster (2003:35), lasted from 1795 with the emergence of the revolutionary ideas of the Cape Patriots to 1910 with the inception of the Union of South Africa after the South African War. The Cape Patriots were influenced by the ideas of the French Revolution and the emerging idea of fundamental human rights for every individual as proposed by Locke (1632–1704), Hugo de Groot (1583–1645) and Montesquieu (1689–1755). They aligned themselves with the social ideals of enlightenment and the American wars of liberation that led to the establishment of the United States of America with a liberal constitution honouring the inalienable rights of every individual. These liberation movements promised the alleviation of social stratifications, but these promises were never fully realised as the Patriots claimed liberation rights for themselves against the mercantilist economy and did not include the struggle for the rights of slaves, the poor and the indigenous black population. Racial classifications continued as the Voortrekkers moved
east and north. British colonisation introduced segregated areas forced by harsh laws and based on racial classifications. White supremacy in virtually all areas of life became the rule. Africans had no political rights and were systematically disowned of their land as a result of the European *terra nullius* principle. The colonial powers regarded unregistered land and ‘wide open spaces’ as *terra nullius* [nobody’s land] and, as a result, claimed this land that was in fact tribal land. Land was divided into farms with new deeds and, in this way, tribes were dispossessed.

In African culture, the tribe’s history of occupation and control of territory determined its land ownership and other land rights. Communal ownership was the order of the day. Land was owned by tribes and large families under the leadership of a chief. Terreblanche (2002:260) refers to this phenomenon as ‘semi-feudalism’. The idea of individual land ownership and the *terra nullius* doctrine that came from the colonial powers was strange to the African setting. In fact, traditional law did not recognise individual rights. The land rights of individuals were not independent rights, but derived rights that were dependent on the ownership of the tribe to which these individuals belonged. Shared tribal rules determined the access of individuals to the land held in common. If the tribe lost ownership, all the derived individual access rights were also void (Steytler 2000:2). Africans did not understand why a single person could own land exclusively, while others have no claim to use the land. The different views on property rights resulted in many conflicts between black and white people in South Africa. The same was true of the indigenous people of North America and Latin America.

At the end of the 19th century, South Africa consisted of two British Colonies (Cape and Natal), the Republics of the Free State and Transvaal and various African tribal lands. However, many black people worked in the mines in inhumane conditions.
The third period of racial stratifications commenced with the unification of all the colonies and republics as well as the tribal lands in South Africa into the Union of South Africa in 1910. The first harsh step into the mode of additional stratifications was the promulgation of the well-known and highly contentious *Land Act of 1913*. The *Land Act of 1913* in South Africa reserved separate land for white people and Africans respectively and expropriated large areas of land belonging to the black population. As the African population increased, their land deteriorated rapidly and men had to move to ‘white’ areas where they received meagre wages and were banned from advancement by a legislated ‘colour-bar’ – especially with regard to the system of private ownership for white people only. See in this regard the exposition of Elphick (1997:351) and Terreblanche (2002:260). In addition, more and more laws and local ordinances were systematically introduced to protect white supremacy, but at the same time to assure the constant flow of cheap African labour in a ‘[w]hite South Africa’.

Social stratifications – flowing from racial classifications – accelerated with the inception of the policy of apartheid in 1948 when the National Party gained political control. The policy of segregation developed into a policy of separate development with the intention to create separate states for African people that should have provided them with land and franchises in independent black republics. The slogan was, ‘[p]olitical independence and economic interdependence’. However, this ideal was not realised. The migration of poor African people to the cities continued, the migrant labour system with resulting negative influences on family life continued and expanded, and the political rights of African people in the cities were still not adhered to. Even the establishment of a new constitution in 1983 in an attempt to rectify the fundamental rights of mixed race and Indian people did not bring about reconciliation, but rather
led to further oppression and alienation. Apartheid, segregation and separate development had the same negative results. McDonald (2006) rightly states that apartheid and segregation:

\[R\]endered the systematic subordination of Black to White as an inviolable principle of public and private relations; both reserved the vast bulk of land for Whites, prohibited Africans from leasing land owned by Whites, and shunted Africans to reserves – later called ‘homelands’ – to be administered by chiefs who, in turn, were propped up by the White state, both restricted the access of Africans to labour markets, limiting their mobility and restricting their wages; both reserved jobs for Whites; both obstructed the urbanization of Africans; both imposed residential and territorial segregation; and both regarded government as the preserve for Whites. (p. 10)

A large variety of segregation laws were passed in the period 1948–1989 to impose total segregation. The most atrocious display of social stratifications was the composition of South African cities into urban areas for the different populations – white people, Africans, Indians and mixed race people.3

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2. The following survey of racial laws in the history of racism in South Africa is a clear example of social stratification: Asian Laws Amendment Act (47/1948); Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act (55/1949); The Population Registration Act (41/1950); Immorality Amendment Act (21/1950); Internal Security Act (Suppression of Communism Act) (44/1950); Reservation of Separate Amenities Act (49/1953); Bantu Education Act (47/1953); Black Labour Regulation Act (48/1953); Riotous Assemblies and Suppression of Communism Act (15/1954); Blacks Resettlement Act (19/1954); Industrial Conciliation Act (28/1956); Prohibition of Interdicts Act (64/1956); Native (Urban Areas) Amendment Act (69/1956); Sexual Offences Act (23/1957); Native Laws Amendment Act (36/1957); Native Laws further Amendment Act (79/1957); Extension of University Education Act (45/1959); Aliens Control Act (40/1973); Separate Promotion of Self Government Act (30/1956); Representation of Voters Amendment Act (Sabotage Act) (76/1962); General Law Amendment Act (37/1963); Criminal Procedure Amendment Act (96/1965); Industrial Conciliation Further Amendment Act (61/1966); Terrorism Act (83/1967); Affected Organisations Act (31/1974); Prohibition of Political Interference Act 6 (51/1968); Bantu Laws Amendment Act (19/1970); and the Internal Security Act (74/1982).

3. See for a critical adjudication of the vestiges of this urban segregation the research done by Seekings (2010).
This short overview of the history of social stratifications in South Africa indicates what the ideology of racial classifications can lead to. Social stratifications are deeply rooted in racial classifications where people are differentiated on the base of colour, ethnicity or culture and societies are then arranged according to these characteristics. Classifications are rooted in racism and, at the same time, institutionalised racist policies and strategies are nurtured. Usually institutionalised racism follows the same pattern in various and different environments as Marger (1994) indicated in his study about racism in the United States of America, South Africa and Brazil. In an earlier study, I have developed a schematic presentation of the pattern of institutionalised racism (Vorster 2004:146). This scheme could – with minor adjustments in view of new research – be applied again in the following paragraphs of this chapter in order to answer the question whether we are on the brink of a new form of institutionalised racism in South Africa which can evolve out of a new manifestation of racial stratifications.

The pattern of institutionalised racism

Racial classifications divide societies into ‘us’ and ‘them’ based on perceived ‘racial’ features. Usually ‘us’ are then clothed in a cloud of uniqueness and ‘them’ in a cloud of otherness. ‘Us’ forms the in-group and ‘them’ the out-group. This demarcation is then followed by idolising the ‘us’ and demonising the ‘them’. In order to attain this ‘ideal’ environment, the identity of ‘us’ was venerated and solidarity against ‘them’ developed. ‘They’ were regarded as opponents and even enemies (see Morgan & Henning 2011). The development of the policy of apartheid in South Africa provides clear evidence of the solidarity based on the ‘us’ mode. At schools white children were warned against the ‘swart gevaar’ [the danger of black domination], and the
history of Afrikaners was written and taught with the purpose of nurturing nationalism and solidarity. Public holidays were set aside for ‘volksfeeste’ [gatherings of Afrikaner communities] to honour the heroes of the Afrikaner history. The adulation of ‘us’ developed into a mentality of superiority and the inclination to regard ‘others’ as inferior. Eventually these classifications – ‘us’ versus ‘them’ – (solidarity against perceived enemies) led to social stratifications where ‘superior’ ‘us’ groups developed a system to protect their own privileges and power. This is what happened with the emergence of apartheid in South Africa (see United Nations 1994). The system was then typified as an unequal pluralist system where the oppressors held the power and the oppressed had no political means to change the system. This system resulted in the end in oppression and counter aggression. Oppression and aggression branded the history of South Africa between the 1960s and 1994 and manifested in the harsh apartheid and security laws on the side of the apartheid government and the struggle of the liberation movements on the other side.

The only way this pattern could have been abolished was by a violent overthrow of the system or by a peaceful change. After a low intensity war and strict international pressure as well as a growing realisation among the white electorate that the system of Apartheid, as it was practised in South Africa, was untenable from an economic and moral perspective, the National Government and the ANC and smaller political role players opted for peaceful negotiations with the aim to construct true democracy. A settlement was reached in 1994 and a new democratic constitution was accepted in 1996. Since then South Africa is viewed as a constitutional democracy. This peaceful process was adequately portrayed by Mandela (2007:669) and was lauded worldwide.

This pattern of institutionalised racism is highlighted in the diagram (Figure 1).
The question therefore arises whether a settlement such as the construction of a constitutional democracy in South Africa suggests the end of institutionalised racism and eventually the abolishment of all attitudes of racism and racist behaviour. This did not happen in South Africa. In my mind, deracialisation depends on whether or not the new dispensation still holds on to racial classifications, or if racial classifications were abolished.
When racial classifications continue this destructive pattern, racism can be repeated as described above and expressed in the diagram. To establish whether racism in South Africa is at a tipping point, this issue should be explored and the following question should be asked: Are racial classifications repeated in South Africa today in such a way that social stratifications can be evoked in a new appearance?

Revised racial classifications

The development of institutionalised racism in South Africa was founded on racial classifications of societies on the basis of race, colour, culture and ethnicity. In the colonial period, classifications between Europeans and non-Europeans were very popular. Africans were negatively defined in terms of not being Europeans (non-Europeans). Later this formula was replaced by differentiating between white people and non-white people. ‘Whiteness’ became the norm. This formula was eventually replaced by classifications based on whether people were white, black, mixed race and Indian (Thompson 1990:190).

Racial classifications as illustrated in the South African history and elsewhere were the starting point of social stratifications on a racial basis later on. Apartheid cast a dark shadow over the new democratic South Africa and it is fair to ask whether the maintenance of racial classifications in a post-1994 South Africa are not paving the way for new forms of institutionalised racism? Lefko-Everett (2012:144) found in a qualitative study that South Africans still think in terms of race. In my mind, this phenomenon is largely fuelled by political debates. The most potent example of a post-1994 classification was the well-known two nation’s theory of President Mbeki. He said (Mbeki 1998):

We therefore make bold that South Africa is a country of two nations. One of these nations is white, relatively prosperous, regardless of gender or geographical dispersal. It has ready access to a developed economy, physical, educational, communication and other infrastructure. (p. 71)
He (Mbeki 1998) then continued:

The second and larger nation of South Africa is Black and poor with the worst affected being women in the rural areas, the Black rural population in general and the disabled. This nation lives under conditions of a grossly underdeveloped economic, physical, educational, communication and other infrastructure. (p. 72)

Although President Mbeki softened his viewpoint at a later stage by speaking about two economies rather than two nations, he implanted the idea in the psyche of the nation that rich and poor can be classified as white and black. This kind of classification formed the basis of laws regarding affirmative action and black economic empowerment. How did this classification theory affect the post-1994 developments regarding racism?

In a 2010 report of Holborn (2010) – published by the South African Institute of Race Relations – various areas regarding race relations were investigated and interesting findings were reported. In 2000, polls found that the proportion of South Africans who believed that race relations had improved were 74% (Holborn 2010:127). This percentage dropped dramatically in 2008 to 49%. This number has risen again to 76% in 2016 (South African Institute of Race Relations [SAIRR] 2016:2). Holborn dealt in her research with various spheres in societies in an effort to establish whether racism has increased or declined. Her findings are mentioned when new research is discussed.

With respect to interracial violence, Holborn found in 2010 that evidence perhaps points:

[T]o it being too soon to tell whether race relations in South Africa are genuinely worsening. However, small changes in attitudes suggest that recent [pre 2010] high-profile incidents of racism, alongside less well-known cases, may well be remnants of the past, and part of an ongoing phase of transition. (n.p.)

Cases of interracial violence seem to have declined according to this report and this fact should be viewed as a positive development. Her findings about racism in politics and the courts are equally inspiring. In this regard, she found that evidence does
not suggest a worsening of race relations in South Africa since 1994. She (Holborn 2010) concludes:

What does become clear, however, is that those in positions of power in politics and public life may well have an effect on the state of race relations in the extent to which they resort, or refrain from, the use of racial sentiment. (p. 58)

Regarding her research about racism in business and employment, she found that the legislation on affirmative action and black economic empowerment have both served to reformalise the apartheid era categorisation of races. Racial categorisation affects two significant areas within societies, namely businesses and workplaces. She concludes by stating that racial identity is a deciding criterion for employment, promotion, ownership and control of enterprises and assets. According to her, the policies of the ANC have done little to promote the deracialisation of societies. In this sphere of life, it has become clear that racial classifications have a negative effect on societies, because racial classifications are still used to promote certain economic ideals.

In the field of education, she found that racial tensions on university campuses and in schools – which were particularly bad during the few years following the elections in 1994 – seemed to have declined in recent years4 (Holborn 2010:99). However, many incidents of racist behaviour in educational institutions are reported in the media. What happened since 2010? In 2015, and again in 2016, South Africa witnessed country-wide protests by students about the financing of their studies and it is significant that these protests are conducted by white and black students side by side against the system. They express racial solidarity, and this phenomenon indicates a positive development. But part of these protests are aimed at the removal of Afrikaans as a language of tuition at certain universities in favour of the decolonisation of curricula. However, these developments should not be termed as racism, but as a well-needed form of rectification of injustices of the past.

4. This has been resurged recently.
The other side of the coin is, however, that the transformation of higher education institutions recently became a pressing issue in official government policies. The aim of this transformation is to rectify the white-dominated representations of academic staff, to enhance the accessibility of black students to these institutions, and to promote equity. Various laws have been passed to achieve these goals in higher education. These laws are based on racial classifications as in the time of apartheid. However, Mekoa (2011:120) concludes in his study regarding the effect of these laws that these ideals have not been reached in higher education. The 2015 and 2016 national protests of students confirm this fact, and the deracialisation of higher education is still challenging. But will it be attained by way of a new form of racial classification?

The aim of the general transformation is to limit white representation to 9%, mixed race people (‘coloured’) to 9%, Indian to 2% and black people to 80% (Eloff 2016:71). Higher education will follow this route. These limitations are a very clear form of racial classification which has a strong potential to develop into racial stratifications in the tertiary educational sector. Eloff (2016:72) reminds us that these classifications are similar to classifications expressed in the Population Registration Act in the apartheid era which forced parents to register their newborns according to racial categories. To achieve these quotas in South Africa today, discrimination will be inevitable. It will entail that merits be set aside and that the access of, for example white applicants at universities, has to be limited. This will be decided solely on the basis of race. Racial quotas at universities can therefore be regarded as a form of racial classification with the potential of renewed racial stratifications. In this instance, South African societies are dangerously near the tipping point into a new pattern of racial stratifications and institutionalised racism.

Sport is another area of concern when the issue of resurging racism is debated. In the apartheid era, black people, with only a few exceptions, were not selected to represent South Africa in national sport teams. After 1994, the various
administrations of the democratic government endeavoured rightly to transform sport. Various policies were introduced (Holborn 2010:117). Racial quotas were introduced in view of the fact that 61% of people favoured a quota system in 2007. Since then, this number has dropped. In 2016, responses in the SAIRR survey showed that 77% of all South Africans support purely merit-based selections without reference to racial quotas. ‘No fewer than 74.2% of black South Africans endorsed this view’ (SAIRR 2016:3). The report concluded in this regard by stating that politicians might seek to compel quota-based selections, but this is not what most black people want. Yet, the Zuma administration introduced harsh new policies on transformation in sport based on racial classification. South African Cricket reintroduced quotas and restricted white players to five per team – two team members should be ‘ethnically black’ (Moonda 2015:1). The Minister of Sport banned four disciplines in sport from organising international competitions, because they failed, in his view, to achieve racial quotas in their respective sport teams (Gedye 2016:1). This ban was lifted in 2017, because, according to the Minister of Sport, these disciplines have now reached the prescribed quotas. Since 1994, sport has contributed largely to nation-building in South Africa, and many black sport icons and role models for the youth emerged without the burden of race, but on the basis of their achievements. In spite of this positive development, racial quotas were reintroduced. This action is an additional example of the negative effects of repeated racial classifications entertained by the Zuma administration.

Holborn (2010) concludes her research by stating that:

Overall, a general trend of a decrease in expressions of racial sentiment by decision-makers of the areas covered (in her research) can be detected from the material analysed. However this is not to suggest that the use of racial rhetoric by politicians is a thing of the past, or that inter-racial tensions have been overcome. (p. 155)

In view of her research, one may ask: Have these trends worsened since 2010? Although recent developments – especially
during the Zuma administration – have not been investigated in a valid scientific manner it seems that incidents of racist behaviour have increased especially on social media (Harvey 2016). Scholars should be hesitant to promote extreme cases of racist behaviour perpetrated by radicals to the rule, but it seems that racist behaviour has risen to alarming levels. An alarming aspect of this trend is the way in which President Zuma used racial classifications in his propaganda before the 2016 local elections, when he depicted white people as the enemy of progress and the reason for the poverty of African people (ENCA 2016:1). He has stated on several occasions that the economic problems of South Africa started with the coming of the Dutch colonists in 1652 and called on black voters not to vote for white political leaders and parties with a large component of white politicians. He introduced the slogan of ‘white monopoly capital’ to demonise white business people and to hold them responsible for the perennial poverty of some black people. This is done as an effort to conceal the vast irregularities and failures of his own administration. As the head of state, his reracialisation of society paved the way for a new surge in racism along the lines of ‘us’ and ‘them’.

■ Conclusion: ‘Us’ and ‘them’ again?

The examples provided in the discussion above prove, to my mind, that racial tension has increased since 2010 and that the positive assessment of Holborn can no longer be viewed as a general trend. We are indeed at a tipping point of new forms of social stratifications. Racial classifications are still used as a foundation for economic policies, land reform, sports, political discourse, higher education and political discourse. Racial classifications are still alive and well and can be viewed as a major obstacle in the realisation of non-racial societies – societies of South Africans instead of black, white, Indian and mixed race people. Are South Africans forced again to relive the historical pattern of social stratifications dividing people into ‘us’ and ‘them’? To my mind, we have already reached this point.
Having said this, anyone who is sincere about non-racialism in South Africa should admit that the programme to introduce non-racialism can only be effective and sustainable when common South African identities are built on equality. Everatt (2012) is to the point with his statement that the project of non-racialism should be taken further. He argues that:

Racism and race obsession is fuelled by inequality – social as well as economic – and if the non-racial project is not about redistribution and attacking inequality, it will fail. At the same time it needs to be anti-racist, not merely seeking some colour-blind space where intermarriage and common prayer resolves the problems facing us. It has to attack xenophobia as much as Black/White racism. Non-racialism needs to be active, proactive, and attack the current status quo, which is economically, socially and culturally unsustainable. If South Africa really does belong to all who live in it, Black and White, then all those who live in it, Black and White, need to be equal. (p. 24)

All South African social role players should be actively involved in this process. Matthews (2012b:188) notes that white people should attend to forms of white racism and privileges that remain, but they have to involve themselves in the struggle for non-racialism in ways in which they do not try to redeem themselves. They should put themselves in the shoes of Africans. Also, care should be taken that white involvement is not principally an attempt at self-justification or guilt alleviation. However, the recognition of being white does not necessarily mean that white people ought to retreat out of fear of ‘contaminating’ any struggle with the taint of ‘white privileges’. Similarly, black people should proclaim equality without demonising white people as outsiders who are the ‘enemies’ of justice and empowerment. They should allow, in the words of Matthews (2012a:13), a two-way flow of social influence and recognise that the settlers are becoming natives in spite of all the difficulties this process entailed (see Matthews 2012a). South Africans have to develop a common frame of mind by way of the two-way flow of social influence, because such a common South African frame of mind is the most important way in reaching a non-racial South Africa. Such a frame of mind has to bridge the ‘us’ and ‘them’ mood which tends to
plague South African societies again. Only if South Africans can nurture a common ‘South Africaness’ can the shadow of ‘us’ and ‘them’ be finally escaped. Furthermore, the government should abolish all attempts to see South African communities through lenses of racial classifications. Social stratifications, including all the negative consequences, can only be abolished when all South Africans are seen and defined as South Africans – irrespective of colour, creed or culture.

**Summary: Chapter 3**

The research question of this chapter could be divided into two related issues: Why is racism apparently still surging after 22 years of democracy, and what is the reason for these perennial racist beliefs? A survey of the resurging patterns of racism in South Africa at this present time forced the researcher to ask the question whether South Africans have reached a tipping point where the old apartheid patterns of racism are replaced by new but similar patterns that again can result in new structures being built on racial prejudice. The aim of this chapter was to investigate and evaluate this perceived resurgence of racism and the persistent racialisation of South African societies in current political debates and actions. Of special interest in this investigation are the ongoing racial classifications made in public spheres by the current Zuma administration and in other moral discourses about racist behaviour. The central theoretical argument of this study was that these ongoing racial classifications of white, black, mixed race people and Indians, which, in the past, led to social stratifications and policies based on racial segregation, can be viewed as the root cause for the perennial upheavals of racism in South Africa and a hindrance to the establishment of truly non-racial societies. To unfold the argument, the process of social stratifications before 1994 is revisited. The analysis resulting from this historic overview is then applied to the current pattern of racism. In conclusion, a case is made for the argument that current racial classifications within South African societies can
be regarded as a stepping stone to a new pattern of racism and a violation of the ideal of truly non-racial societies. With an ongoing official modus of racial classifications, South African societies are indeed at a tipping point and inclined to revert back to social structures based on racist beliefs.
We cannot escape the harsh reality of xenophobia and racism in South Africa

Tension and conflict on the streets

Xenophobia is known nationally and globally for its corrupt interdependent relationship with racism. Tension among people and communities can often escalate into hostility related to cultural, social, economic and religious differences.

On 11 May 2008, violent riots erupted in a township northeast of Johannesburg. South African residents attacked foreign
immigrants from Mozambique, Somalia, Zimbabwe and Nigeria. Immigrants to South Africa are known among the local people as Makwerekwere, a derogatory term for foreigners and people who are thought to speak unintelligibly (see Klotz 2012:189). The xenophobic attacks proliferated, spreading to settlements further afield in Durban and Cape Town. Angry vigilante mobs attacked thousands of immigrants, mostly from Africa, and the escalating violence became difficult to control. The media reacted quickly with sensationalistic reporting, ‘South Africa descends into xenophobic chaos’. The country was shocked by the death of a Mozambican national, Ernesto Nhamuave, who was ‘necklaced’ with a tyre filled with burning petrol. At that stage, xenophobia had arrived and more than 60 people died in subsequent attacks and at least a hundred thousand people were displaced (see reviews by Everatt 2011:234; Klotz 2012:98; Landau 2012:146).

Ahmed Kathrada, a well-known figure in the struggle against apartheid, is of opinion that xenophobia is still simmering because of raging racism in the South African society (cf. Beeld 24 May 2016:14).

### Failure of multiculturalism brings comprehensive xenophobia in South Africa

South Africa is facing an alarming and very tragic situation. The so-called ‘Rainbow Nation’ reeled with shock and was forced to face the horror by contemplating and doing introspection on the issue in an effort to explain why multiculturalism in the ‘Rainbow Nation’ appeared to have failed. What had gone wrong with the ‘Invictus’ nation of the Rugby World Cup of 1995 (see Desai 2008:56)? Xenophobia had become a gruesome ongoing reality in South Africa. Studies were conducted and books written on this scandal (see Hassim, Kupe & Worby 2011).

Violence against foreigners who are ‘brothers and sisters out of Africa’ is less about fixing flows and ordering anomy than about re-establishing the conditions for social reproduction and demarcating the precincts of moral personhood (Hickel 2012:1).
These violent xenophobic attacks have sporadically continued up to the present time (2017).

Prof. Michael Neocosmos (2010:59; see Gibson 2011:179) refutes that the problems of xenophobia in South Africa are fundamentally economic and that xenophobia is the typical problem of the poor. Trevor Manuel’s well-known NPC identifies nine key challenges facing South Africa, but xenophobia is glaringly absent from the list. Researchers regard this omission as an anomaly; on the other hand, we note the degeneration of African nationalism into nativism and xenophobia. We should also research the view held by Mandani (2001:19) that colonialism is responsible for artificial African borders, creating and reinforcing divisive ethnic identities. We also know that colonialism is taken as a synonym for apartheid. Inclusive civic nationalism has narrowed to ethnic nationalism, which leads to xenophobia. No wonder Rothney Tshaka (Sunday Times 27 November 2016:21) prefers to call South African xenophobia Afrophobia, the fear of the specific ‘other’ – the black ‘other’ from north of the Limpopo River. It is, according to Tsaka, the notion of a nervous condition which refers to a situation created among hegemonies in which the oppressed become willing participants in their oppression. This has its roots in typical slavery and apartheid where the superior control the inferior by exploiting the differences among the sufferers to sow fear, distrust and envy. This strategy is part of the ‘white narrative’ as well as the ‘black narrative’.

From a survey by Moodley and Herbert (2012:1673; see Peberdy 2001:26) it becomes clear that South African locals regard migrants in working class areas not as ‘brothers and sisters of Africa’, but as economically competitive enemies (see Muller 1999:69). This is contrary to the general principles of the ANC’s Freedom Charter (ANC 1955) as well as the Constitution of South Africa (South Africa 1996) which states that equal rights belong to all who live in South Africa, not only to citizens (see Everatt 2011:7–36; Martin 2013:3).

Xenophobia and racism in South Africa are neither new nor unexpected, but to seek its source requires traversing a murky
and convoluted path. However painful as it may be to admit, and despite statistics that may indicate the contrary, the majority of South Africans are, to some degree or other, racist. Racism in our country is an appalling reality exacerbated by the history of apartheid and the ongoing search for political and economic liberation from its burden. Two researchers from the Human Sciences Research Counsel, Moolman and Bialostocka (cf. *The Star* 27 June 2016:13) have come to the conclusion that xenophobia and racism are bound with multiple oppressions in apartheid. Economic inequalities in South Africa have divided the society into fault lines which, because of the racialised history of dividing people into groups, take on a racial character resulting in xenophobia. Therefore, xenophobia cannot be addressed in isolation; it is structurally bound with a history of oppression in Africa and South Africa.

Recent incidents in South Africa have highlighted ongoing racially motivated xenophobia. Blatant racist remarks in social media by Khumalo against white people and Penny Sparrow against black people have made the front pages of the media. Even T-shirts with the slogans, ‘kill the whites’ and ‘fuck the whites’, worn by activists of colour, illustrate raw xenophobia and racism.

According to the front pages, the general impression is created that the nation has lost its moral compass. Is South Africa at risk of becoming a failure because of xenophobia and racism? It is becoming apparent that frustrated anger has turned into intolerance and hatred. A legitimate question is whether the dream of the ‘Rainbow Nation’ is crumbling. The possible reasons for this regrettable situation are discussed later on. Rightly, Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela (cf. *Sunday Times* 11 September 2016:17) calls the battle against xenophobia and racism a really long-distance human race, because xenophobia and racism have historically become an integral component of our South African society. Mamphela Ramphele (*Saturday Star* 08 April 2017:11) links to this view and says that South African politics are still too fragmented, diversified and ‘colour-coded’. The author of this chapter fully agrees with Ramphele’s view.
Additional thought-provoking facts on xenophobia and racism are provided by the South African Institute for Race Relations in a reliable survey, which has shown that 9.5% of white people compared to 4.7% of black people see black racism, or ‘reverse apartheid’ – as some would name it – to be the most serious problem facing South Africa (see Adam & Moodley 1986:69). Ten million people are of the opinion that relations between black and white people have deteriorated over 22 years.

Racism, in all its various insidious guises, undoubtedly played a prominent role in the decision made by the president, Jacob Zuma, to dedicate the Human Rights Day celebrations 2016 to the theme of ‘South Africa united against racism’, the purpose of which was to lay the foundation for a long-term programme of building a non-racial society. The memory of the 1960 Sharpeville massacre where 69 people were killed, should serve to reignite the drive for a non-racial and equal society. At its Durban Declaration and Programme of Action in 2001, the United Nations declared the date of the anniversary of the massacre, 21 March, to be the annual United Nations International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.

An online microsite called #RacismStopsWithMe has been established to serve as a platform for dialogue on racism and xenophobia. The press group Independent On Line plays a prominent role in this initiative (cf. Zungu 2016:9).

The particular role of racism in relation to xenophobia features prominently in the initiative taken by a group of Afrikaans organisations and churches. On the agenda at the founding forum was the growing racial tension in South Africa. Some delegates went so far as to name the situation ‘the darkest hour in South African history’. The destructive effects of anger and fear among different races in South Africa, coupled with the lack of reliable moral leadership, is an alarming prospect, according to the F.W. de Klerk Foundation, Afriforum, Federasie van Afrikaanse Vereniginge, Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk van Afrika, Reformed

Churches of SA, Agri SA, Afrikaanse Taal en Kultuurfond, Afrikanerbond and Fedsas. The purpose of this collective forum was to file an agenda for discussion with the president.

We have to come to the conclusion that the recent racial situation in South Africa constitutes a national crisis that could potentially create even further racial and xenophobic polarisation. The frequent manipulation and exploitation of racism issues for political gain by both individuals and institutions, particularly on social media and in public, is a dangerous and misleading practice. The Dutch Reformed Church attended that forum, but did not sign the declaration. The concluding resolution of the forum was that the ideals of tolerance and respect for human dignity should be aspired to by South Africans from all communities, irrespective of racial, religious, cultural or socio-economic status.

The conspicuous and sometimes sensation-seeking role of social media in fuelling racist attitudes, and the consequent stirring of xenophobic sentiment cannot be underestimated. Even though social media reports may often be regarded as a toxic mixture of unproven remarks presented as facts, they nevertheless exercise tremendous public influence. A journalist who wrote, ‘it is time for some racial violence’, referring to the student violence on campuses. Such a remark can be taken as irresponsible and provocative (see Montagu 1997:64). The recent destruction of university property in South Africa emphasises the underlying racial tension among angry students and workers. The burning of university buildings highlights the extent of racial polarisation.

However, the truth remains that the different races in South Africa need one another. Ferial Haffajee, editor of City Press and the author of If there were no whites in South Africa (2015), focuses on the recent racial explosion and is of opinion that the South African population failed to face its devils in 1994. She holds the opinion that there was no national crusade against racism, which was dearly needed at that stage of our history. This ‘unfinished business’ has caught up with us and serves
as a reminder of the failure of racial integration. This reality permeates the psychological and spiritual fibre of the nation (2015:32; see Mnyaka 2003:74). Consequently, the progress of a new xenophobia because of a new racism against white people is flourishing (cf. Gibson 2017:10). Biased slogans against White Monopoly Capital and exclusive white ownership of land are some of the examples.

Conversely, the affliction of political brain damage has become endemic with either exaggerated racial and political correctness or irresponsible inattention to the issues of racism and xenophobia.

**Not only a South African phenomenon**

This protectionist attitude towards jobs and livelihoods is also seen elsewhere in the world. Consider the supremacist attitudes of the Japanese towards the Koreans, the Chinese Han’s attitude towards minorities like the Tibetans or the Arab sentiment towards black Africans (see Mandani 2001:143). Cosmopolitan citizenship may be an utopian ideal that flounders on the reality of economic competition and survival. The most striking recent example is that of the exodus of millions of refugees from Syria to Europe.

The Islamophobic movement, Pegida, which originated in the former communist East Germany, has ravaged Saxony with its far-right extremism. The scourge of xenophobia has gained a foothold in Saxony where representatives of the far-right Neo-Nazi National Party of Germany now hold seats in government. According to the German premier Stanislav Tillich of Saxony, 924 cases of xenophobia were documented across Germany during 2015 (Tillich, quoted by News 24, 22 February 2016:17). Pegida, the Islamophobic group, started less than 3 years ago in 2014 as a xenophobic Facebook group and has seen increased support subsequent to the arrival of Syrian asylum seekers. In resistance to the terrorist Islamic State (Isis) group,
German far-right factions are waging an anti-refugee ‘war’. In 2015 more than a million migrants arrived by land and sea in the Eurozone, while a further 3600 had died or gone missing in their efforts to flee, according to the International Organization for Migration (cf. The Mercury 23 December 2015:8).

Daniel Louw has meaningfully shed light on the problem of xenophobia in a paper read at the Faculty of Theology at the North-West University at the beginning of 2017: ‘Politics of Democracy or Policy of Embracement? The Current Refugee and Immigrant Crisis within the Framework of Globalisation: A Challenge to the Paradigm of Reformed Thinking – Design for a Theology of the Intestines’. He (Louw 2017:16) proposes philoxenia, the mutuality of ‘brotherly love’, and xenodochia, hospitals and safe havens where threatened people can become whole again as an alternative to xenophobia.

According to press releases, hundreds of people have been killed in the battle between Islamic Isis and resistance groups in Brussels, Yemen, Afghanistan, Tunisia, Ankara, Beirut, Paris, San Diego, Libya and Baghdad. In October 2015, a Russian plane crashed over Egypt and left many unanswered questions. The right-wing Norwegian mass murderer, Anders Breivik, killed 77 people to draw attention to what he considered the pollution of his nation by foreigners. These examples bear witness to the horrific real consequences of xenophobia. At the deepest core of xenophobia, racism has found an underlying shelter.

There is an underlying stimulus keeping xenophobia alive

Examples of the reality of xenophobia because of racism are also seen in the rest of Africa. According to Stalker (2001:8–9), around 200 million people worldwide live outside their country of birth, many of whom fall prey to hostile xenophobic treatment in the countries to which they have migrated. It is useful to consider
some examples. In Ethiopia, strangers are called ‘outsiders’ and are discriminated against regarding landownership, business and travel (see Volkan 2006:79). In Egypt, refugees and migrants are denied access to health care, education and employment (Dienga 2011:1). Hundreds of Mauritanians were stripped of their citizenship and deported to Senegal as a result of xenophobic sentiment (see Geschiere & Jackson 2006:10). Non-citizens cannot own land in Nigeria, and women are subject to customary law (Volkan 2006:84). Zambian women with foreign spouses are denied citizenship.

Combined with the scourges of hatred, fear and racism, the issue of identity has now gained prominence, resulting in further national, racial and ethnic intolerance. In the latest South African Reconciliation Barometer 2015, released by the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR), it has become clear that racism and xenophobia continue to flourish in the South African context. Two out of three South Africans do not trust others across the racial line, particularly those migrants hailing from neighbouring countries. High levels of distrust exist and are proliferating among the ‘native born’ and migrants, even for those from the same ethnic group. Foreigners and locals are in direct competition for jobs, housing, transport, town planning and public amenity purposes (The Star 15 December 2015:5).

Since the outbreak of civil war in Syria in 2011, an estimated nine million people have fled their homes and taken refuge elsewhere. Three million fled to neighbour countries Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq and many millions of others have resettled in Europe, particularly Germany. Such an inflow of migrants has dire implications for international economic stability, while simultaneously testing the moral fibre of the whole world, particularly Africa and Europe, on the thorny issues of xenophobia and racism (see Hammed 2011:226).

The poignant image in the world press of the drowned Syrian boy, Aylan Kurdi, focuses attention on the uncertain fate of aliens, refugees, migrants, strangers, foreigners, outsiders, sojourners
and legal or undocumented immigrants who will either be met with xenophobia or xenophilia.

**Is it possible to transform xenophobia into xenophilia?**

The purpose of research

After taking cognisance of the reality of xenophobia – probably prompted by racism – the primary question is what, in principle, are the semantic uses of the concepts of xenophobia and, conversely, xenophilia [love of the stranger]? Such basic understanding in principle is a *sine qua non*. The second question concerns the relationship between xenophobia and racism. It is of paramount importance to understand the concept of, and causes for, xenophobia in a particular society. To what degree should institutions and societies pay heed to the expectations and rights of migrants and refugees? Does it make sense to give to a group of Reformed theologians the opportunity to air their views and experience through this publication in order to be noticed and to participate in this matter of national and global urgency?

On which humanistic and ethical principles can a reasonable and workable strategy be based to stimulate the process of transforming xenophobia into xenophilia? Does the phenomenon of xenophobia in the South African situation provide an insight into the spiritual state of the nation? Would it be possible to functionally incorporate contributions and opinions from psychological, sociological and anthropological sources? Definitions of xenophobia from different disciplines should be researched. After scrutiny, assessment and study of the definitions of xenophobia and racism, together with consideration of the factors influencing the fear and hatred of strangers in everyday life, it may be possible to formulate possible suggestions. Theological and ethical answers are dealt with in another chapter in this publication.
Semantic perspectives

Consider different views from a variety of angles

First of all, some general semantic views

Xenophobia is generally described as a strong fear or dislike of people from other countries, nations or religious groupings (see Prill 2013:2). The word xenophobia comes from the Greek words *xenos* [people] and *fobos* [fear]. ‘Hatred’ instead of ‘fear’ is historically and semantically wrongly attached to the term and concept of xenophobia (see Appadurai 1998:234).

Xenophobia is best understood within the framework of migration (see Riviera-Pagan 2013:576).

In our examination of different views to reach an accurate definition, it is important to distinguish between immigrants and so-called aliens or strangers who are not refugees. Refugees are not necessarily illegal immigrants (see Handmaker 1996:22–24), particularly, while they are waiting for the processing of their asylum applications. Undocumented or illegal aliens who continue to reside in the new country are not bona fide refugees.

Legitimate political refugees flee their countries of origin for various reasons including economics, politics, war, social unrest, or ethnic and religious persecution (see Pretorius 2004:132; Zolberg, Suhrke & Aguayo 1989:5). In the case of the Syrian refugees, they were driven out of their country because of the civil war, mainly as a result of religious intolerance by certain factions.

Since the earliest days of democracy in South Africa, many people from other parts of Africa have viewed this country as their destination of choice. Their motivation for leaving their troubled countries has been to make a new beginning in what
they considered to be the new ‘Rainbow Utopia’. Most arrived as undocumented refugees with reasons ranging from political to economic. The sad twist in the refugees’ tale is the hostility and xenophobia with which they were met and that they were made to endure. The ironic fact is that many South Africans, either white people or people of colour, were themselves once refugees from a variety of countries.

To come to grips with the concept

There are many definitions of xenophobia and racism. In the interests of this writing, I found the logical discussion of Joseph Barndt in his publication *Understanding and Dismantling of Racism, the Twenty First Century Challenge* (2007) most erudite and meaningful (see Adam & Moodley 2013:69ff.).

According to Barndt (2011:47–69), who writes about a situation that is comparable to that in South Africa, the solution to the racial problem lies within the reach of the white people who have, effectively, become prisoners of racism. Racism is the root of xenophobia, sexism, heterosexism, anti-Europism, nationalism, militarism, anti-Semitism and anti-Islamism (2007:27). Barndt is further convinced that colonialism and racism are interrelated, although some reasons for his conclusion may be questioned. Christopher Columbus is seen by Europeans as a hero for his accomplishments, as is Jan van Riebeeck. However, the converse belief among those people conquered by Columbus and Van Riebeeck is also true. They view these men as cruel perpetrators of violence whose chief mission was to further the cause of colonialism (cf. Adam & Moodley 2013:74). The natural reaction of those colonised would be to equate the invasion of their territory with the racial profile of the colonisers. Cruelty and genocide in the USA, Australia, Africa and South America, combined with all the evils associated with slavery, have left historians with a jaundiced view of the colonisers. The indigenous conquered people ask
the question whether European white people were destined, designed and equipped or, indeed, entitled to colonise these continents. This is an issue still being debated.

The colonisation process in general was inextricably linked to the subjugation of the indigenous people. The acquisition of land was a patent demonstration of supremacy and racism with subsequent justified opposition and resentment from the victims. These tense and resentful encounters may well have been the catalyst for the categorisations of ‘developed’ and ‘underdeveloped’ people and countries. These facts help us to recognise the recent shift in definitions from racial injustice and how it evolved into racial justice.

Different words are used to characterise xenophobia and racism: personal prejudice, systemic and institutional power, bigotry, personal and institutional discrimination, hate, oppression, forced segregation, economic inequality, politically biased control, stereotyping, white/black supremacy, to name some of the prominent characteristics (see Barndt 2007:214).

It is important to distinguish between individual and collective racism and xenophobia. Personal and/or individual racism and xenophobia mainly focus on prejudice, stereotyping and personal dislike. Collective racism is a racial group prejudice towards another group or groups. The practices of paying unrealistic salaries to people of colour and reserving jobs exclusively for people of colour, sow the seeds of discontentment, conflict and unrest. It is important to be candid and honest when discussing, defining and applying definitions of particular racism and xenophobia without intentionally and exclusively assigning guilt to any particular societal group. Undoubtedly, the political dispensation prior to 1994 was corporately guilty of denying people of colour full human rights. Ironically, similar but opposite principles have been applied after 1994 with the governing party instituting policies aimed at denying white people certain job opportunities.
The underlying hermeneutical platform to launch xenophobia

In such a process of formulation, we have to keep the following factors in mind:

• Both the individual and institutional aspects of racism and xenophobia must be addressed. Institutions cannot hide behind their damaging practices by blaming individuals.
• The formulation of an accurate definition is a process, seriously taking the historical past and the present day realities into consideration. The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission is a legitimate example of the process of historically defining racism and its healing. Healing and overcoming racism and xenophobia is the aim and effort of this publication.
• The causes of racism and xenophobia must be exposed and those responsible must be identified. Equally so, those who participate in the healing process must also be identified. Nobody, from the president to a part-time worker, is above this moral process.
• Finally, any definition must be open for disagreement and challenge to stimulate the research process.

Barndt's definition (2007:78) itself is clear and uncomplicated and reads as follows: ‘Racism = racistic personal prejudice and the misuse of power by individuals, systems and institutions.’

To clearly understanding this definition, some commentary is necessary: Race prejudice is not the same as racism. The fact is that all of us are racially prejudiced to some degree. As typical South Africans, we are by birth and upbringing stereotyped and racially distorted. That does not mean, however, that everyone is a racist. Real racism and xenophobia are propped up by power, either collective or individual. From a logical perspective one can say that prejudice is a judgement or opinion formed before the facts are known. It can be favourable or unfavourable. Prejudice’s semantic roots lie in Latin, meaning ‘to prejudge
a situation or a person’. Would it be legitimate to say that prejudice is in the South African air we breathe? We live in a historically prejudicial toxic environment open to racism and xenophobia.

The take-off of race can be seen as a foundation of xenophobia. Some see race as a cultural entity that cannot be scientifically proven. In the USA race is seen as a legal concept and not only a matter of choice. For example, nobody can switch from one race to another. The status quo in South Africa is to a large extent ‘racialised’, although we do not have an official, legal or commonly shared definition of race. The perception is that we live in a race-based society where everything is politically, socially and economically determined by race. Permit me to share an example that happened some time ago. The President was addressing a large meeting in his native Zulu language, asking them to vote for him, warning that otherwise the white people would reclaim the land. The president’s narrative is typical of South Africa’s traditions of nationalism, which root identity principally in struggles along the colonial frontier. These narratives speak of the racial categories, black and white that are deeply embedded in racism, judging by colour (see Monguerane 2016:21). In the municipal elections during August 2016, this artificial distinction, to a large extent, was turned upside down.

Research has found that race is not exclusively scientific, biological or even genetically based. Neither is race the same as culture or ethnicity, because ethnicity consists of linguistic, tribal and national heritage. Race is also not the same as religious identity.

Some dictionaries still define race in terms of colour, body shape, science, culture, ethnicity or religion (see Webster’s New Twentieth Century Dictionary:ad loc.). The current edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica contains a valuable article on race written by Audrey Smedley, who suggests that race should be
defined by making use of a totally new hermeneutic approach. She (Smedley 2005) says:

Genetic studies in the late twentieth century divided the existence of biogenetically distinct races. Indeed, races are cultural interventions reflecting specific attitudes and beliefs. When we understand the concept race, a definition of racism becomes understandable. (pp. 8, 586)

It is my conviction that it is necessary to trace the recent usage of the term ‘race’ back to its origin. As recently as 500 years ago, the Western world formally divided Homo sapiens into so-called races with one race being considered dominant and oppressive over other races. In this way the concept of race was used as justification for human cruelty and the domination of others. The 16th and 17th centuries saw the focus of natural science studies fixed firmly on scientific classification of everything and everyone. The species Homo sapiens was classified into three species of so-called races: Caucasoid, Mongoloid and Negroid and followed later by a fourth classification, Australoid. Thereafter, these race divisions were further classified from superior to inferior with the Caucasoid race considered superior in every aspect, followed by the Mongoloid and the Australoid with the Negroid in the lowest position. This fundamental and progressive degrading of races gives rise to the toxic evil of racism, which leads to xenophobia (see Smedley 2005:8, 594).

This classification was accepted at the time and incorporated into a political ideological framework, resulting in colonial enterprises throughout Europe, and particularly so in universities. Caucasoid supremacy became the typical ideological principle to validate colonialism and it was additionally endorsed by the churches. But this was not all. Together with the classification into races, male authoritarianism was entrenched and a ‘colour-coded’ class system was created to formalise racial identity connected to either white, red, brown, yellow or black. The colour white was reserved for European immigrants; red for the indigenous natives of America; black for the slaves from Africa; brown to
the people of Central and South America and the Middle East and yellow for the Chinese labourers from Asia.

My preliminary conclusion is that race has semantically influenced the classifying of people into a hierarchy of superior to inferior. This basic underlying principle is still the dominant semantic description of the concept of *race*. The consequence of this semantic etiological research has put the so-called Caucasoid race firmly in the most superior position. Solving the problem of racism therefore lies mainly in the hands of white people.

Another definition to summarise the issue is the one by M. Karenga (quoted by Barndt 2007) which reads as follows:

Race is an arbitrary (specious, false) socio/biological construct created by Europeans during colonial expansion and adapted by political and social structures, to assign human worth and social status, using themselves as the model of humanity for the purpose of legitimizing white power. (p. 94)

From this summarised definition it can be concluded that the concept *race* is neither scientific nor logical, but a social human construct, designed for the purpose of control and exploitation. This conclusion is the basis and root of racism. In itself, race is a racist way to stigmatise and manipulate people and to define humanity by political construct.

Xenophobia and racism function as the instrumental framework and foundation for the implementation of power, be it personal, collective, systemic or societal. Power is never neutral and has been demonstrated to be even more toxic than prejudice. Power can be a selfish manifestation of racism to control and dominate the humanity of another person. The most malevolent manifestation is when power is used to control, to hurt, to oppress and to disempower someone of another colour. South Africa’s apartheid history demonstrated the unconscionable and ultimate power of racism. Examples of racist power manifest socially and politically such as salaries paid that are too low for survival, unemployment, underemployment, inadequate or no housing, substandard education, poor medical services and
disregard for basic human rights. This powerful racist onslaught on people of colour in South Africa seems to have made a U-turn, and, in so doing, has become apartheid in reverse.

The negative consequences of racism provide the framework for xenophobia. With the use of power, racism manipulates and dominates by means of deprivation of the inferior or people of colour. Unfortunately, the concept of race currently appears to be defining South African society with most decisions being based on colour. Even the emphasis of differences between the so-called ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’ is a racist way of categorising a nation, in this case with materialistic racism. Racism is a direct threat to the freedom of Homo sapiens and poses a real and imminent danger of destruction of human relations.

We would do well to heed the following declarations related to xenophobia and racism. The journalist, Joel Netshitenze (Sunday Times 21 February 2016), says the following:

At base, racism exists in the unequal distribution of wealth and income. It feeds on inequitable access to opportunity and services, and thrives in social networks of varying utility for the rich and the poor. The many fracas that South Africa today experiences … are not disjointed events; they form part of the chain of deficits in our search for a democratic and equitable society. (n.p.)

For Ronnie Kasrils (Saturday Star 19 March 2016), Marxism is the alpha and the omega:

It was Marxism and its class basis that deepened our understanding and explained the role that racism played in conquering territory and nations, dividing workers and people, creating myths, furthering exploitation and fomenting wars – all to further the interests and power of the capitalists and their imperialist system. (p. 20)

Theuns Eloff, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the F.W. de Klerk Foundation, chaired a meeting of businessmen, churches and civil organisations to discuss racial tension in South Africa (Beeld 04 Maart 2016). He emphatically declared intellectual war against racism and warned society that bargaining in the name of racism for political gain would have grave consequences. The crisis of the lack of ethical leadership will stimulate racial
polarisation. The international appeal by the Pope to European countries not to turn their backs on refugees and strangers resonates with Eloff's views (2016a:28–47, 2016b:28–46).

Edward Kieswetter, member of the Ahmed Kathrada (The Star 16 November 2015) Foundation board, expresses his view as follows:

Racism is significantly more than what is crafted in law... it is a prejudice, discrimination, or antagonism directed against someone of a different race, based on the belief that one’s own is superior. (p. 11)

He further emphasises that ‘poverty and economic disenfranchisement of people of colour majority stubbornly persist. And this fuels discontent and widespread protests and xenophobia’.

Ferial Haffajee (2015), the editor-in-chief of City Press, has given her honest opinion and definition in her book, What if there were no Whites in South Africa?:

I have watched the establishment’s thinking on race begin to change and to move to a new establishment – a generational shift to new Black opinion-makers has radicalized race discourse and has begun to question fundamentally the terms of the transition and the idea of non-racialism ... it is not about Whites, but about whiteness – the system of privilege and prejudice that is still held to be in place’. (pp. 33, 190)

To summarise, the so-called white power mainly functions collectively by passing the white mentality and spiritual outlook from generation to generation. This evil chain has to be challenged. When a privilege becomes available for everyone in South Africa, it becomes a human right.

Can we speak of xenophobic intolerance in South Africa?

There are refugees and migrants, legal and illegal

It is important to understand that a refugee is a forced migrant who has to leave his or her own country to escape persecution, war or natural disaster. It is on record that many refugees apply
for asylum. This is the term for the protection granted by a country to a refugee who fled his own country as political refugee (see Prill 2013:2).

Research at ground level in South Africa revealed some glaring realities in this regard. Migrants struggle to obtain work, permanent residence permits and economic stability. The presence of the migrants in the job market or informal business sector elicits an aggressively negative response from the locals. Aliens are seen as unfair competition in the labour market. In some instances the strangers and/or migrants contribute to the crime rate and are implicated in drug smuggling and rape offences, among others. Therefore, xenophobia is an obvious reaction of the local citizens. From 2008, and sporadically thereafter, violent xenophobic clashes between strangers and locals occurred. Shops were looted and foreigners killed. Outrageous xenophobic behaviour filled the front pages of newspapers with additional international scrutiny via social media and the internet. Xenophobia fiercely raged and continues to do so with cases of assault, physical and verbal abuse, exploitation of workers and intimidation being documented.

There have been cases in South Africa of refugees, while waiting for the outcome of asylum applications, being wrongfully detained (see Handmaker 1996:22). Documented aliens enter the country legally and receive temporary or permanent permits of residence. Undocumented or illegal aliens do not have residence permits or work permits and are declared prohibited persons (see Hough 1995:9). Xenophobia flared up against these illegal aliens who were accused of taking the locals’ jobs and housing. The obvious result is that of xenophobic attacks by locals. Lately, incidents of religious discrimination and persecution of foreigners by locals have been reported with increasing frequency (see Anand & Alley 1993:29).

Understanding xenophobia in South Africa’s social and religious situation is a complex issue. Even being a church in South Africa is a challenge when one takes the ‘big seven’ giants threatening society into consideration: HIV, crime and corruption, violence, poverty and unemployment, sexism, racism and crisis in the family (see Kenyon 2005:67).
What triggers xenophobia: the causes?

There are a couple of obvious reasons for a xenophobic reaction:

- The primary reason for xenophobic attacks is undoubtedly related to economic factors. Migrants who fled threatening situations in their own countries are seen as competition for jobs by locals in South Africa. Skilled foreigners, desperate for jobs, take the jobs from local residents, because they are willing to work for much lower than market-rate salaries because of their dire circumstances. It is clear that the worldwide root cause of xenophobic attacks is economic.

- The second reason has a political connotation. It is a well-known fact that foreigners are the first to be blamed during economic and political instability. South African locals have become increasingly frustrated because of poor service delivery, transport problems and strikes in the mines and post office. In these tense situations, incidents of xenophobia proliferate with foreigners being seen as culprits and bearing the brunt of the frustration.

- The third reason – related to the first – is that of poverty and criminality. Structural or institutional poverty, as result of apartheid, still accounts for radical inequalities of resources, opportunities and skills. The poorer the community, the fiercer the xenophobic onslaught on foreigners (see Nell 2009:234).

- Without doubt, historic and cultural factors have exacerbated the South African xenophobic situation. South Africa is paying the price for the cultural humiliation and economic impoverishment experienced by indigenous communities during a previous political dispensation. This situation has led to the awakening of Africanism and nationalism, providing the stimulus for a violent onslaught as a result of frustration caused by feelings of being let down by the government. We call this reaction xenophobia. The political dispensation has changed from a colonial government to a democracy, but the economic situation has deteriorated. Expectations have not been met with regard to education, medical services and housing, and the frustrated population is looking for someone to blame. The target has become foreigners against whom violent attacks have been perpetrated.
• Ethnocentrism has subtly inserted itself into the fibre of society with locals deeming foreigners to be the weaker party. Social deprivation, clashes with police and increasing frustration, have even resulted in cases of murder during xenophobic attacks.

• An additional important reason to consider is that of using social regulation of religion as a proxy measure for xenophobia. Besides political and economic causes, religious intolerance is a leading cause of social conflict. While there are overlaps between religion and ethnicity, they provide different stimuli for xenophobia (see Grim & Finke 2007:647; Sauer 2009:79). Grim and Finke have identified xenophobia as a result of religious and social conflict where the targeted group is identified by their religion (2007:643; cf. Jorgenson, Timani, Hwang 2015:70ff.).

Migrants fleeing from Syria after the civil war cited the control of religion as a contributing frustration that led them to flee their country. In Iraq, as an example, with its 28 million population (65% Shiite Muslims and 30% Sunni Muslims), there have been reports of ‘religious cleansing’ of neighbourhoods, kidnappings, Christians being forced to pay the Islamic jizya to local mosques and coercion to convert to Islam. The large scale religiously-motivated xenophobic violence of Shiite and Sunnis against each other has been televised worldwide (see Marshall 2008:211–214). Incidents of Islamophobia, where Muslims are targeted by xenophobic attacks, occur globally (see Allen 2010:127).

Can we learn from related insights from sociological and psychological viewpoints?

Dienga (2011:11) mentions ‘institutional xenophobia’, where the hatred or fear of a particular society has increased to such an extent that the institution becomes the instigator of xenophobia (see Thompson 1997:289). The anger provoked by frustration is often targeted towards a group on the grounds of race, ethnic background, nationality, political affiliation, religion, gender or
sexual orientation (see Peberdy 1999:78). In extreme cases of xenophobia, genocide of a group has resulted.

To put it in broader perspective: in past centuries, social order strictly defined the place of every individual (see Zukier 1996:3). During the Middle Ages, personal identity was not a case of individual choice. The individual was defined by his or her social network of relationships. Modernity emphasised that personal identity is a private achievement of self-completion and something by which the individual has the right to expect recognition by society. Technology and communication during the late 20th century created a ‘global village’ where the stranger is no longer the invisible, but has become the recognised.

The outsider has become a powerful presence, and the xenophobic antagonism against them has become the reinforcement of personal or group identity. Boundaries have been established for differentiation between the self and the others. It is when these boundaries are overstepped that xenophobia, rather than xenophilia, occurs. Self-consciousness leads to self-defence and ultimately to conflict (see Steyn 2001:203). We have clear examples of this from the earliest times – conflict fosters group cohesion, which fuels xenophobia. The so-called ‘shemone ezrê’ [Eighteen Prayers] sent by the Jewish leaders of Jerusalem constituted their group cohesion and attitude of conflict towards the earliest Christians.

Another example of intolerance was the tactic adopted by the Greek-Roman citizens who cited the practices involved in the Christians’ Eucharistic liturgies and interpreted the practices as cannibalism. In a similar way, anti-Semitism [against Jews] and Islamophobia [fear of Muslims] are demonstrations of xenophobia. By way of categorisation so-called ‘in-groups’ and ‘out-groups’ are labelled. Christianity overturned such categorisation by rejecting ‘biological birth’ for a ‘spiritual birth’ (see Gl 3:28). This is a clear example of xenophilia overruling xenophobia.

A typical social and psychological response by a group or individual could elicit prejudice, which could lead to xenophobia.
Prejudice can be classified as racial, cultural or religious (see Klegk 1993:58). It reflects an attitude of racism that causes frustration among locals and strangers. Such frustration can lead to aggression and collective violence (see Dienga 2011:16; Tshitereke 1999:84). Very often, social xenophobic action is related to the harsh socio-economic realities of contemporary South Africa. Relative deprivation still occurs in the spheres of employment, housing and education (Dienga 2011:17). This leads to domination by the local group and subjugation and powerlessness of the stranger group (cf. McKechnie 1962:ad loc. ‘race’)

In South Africa, in general, we are currently experiencing a period of discontentment and deprivation. The locals’ expectations have not been met, nor have government promises been kept, leading to frustration and deprivation. Therefore, the foreigners, aliens or refugees are made scapegoats (see Hunter 2010:106; Tshitereke 1999:4). Frustration breeds anger which results in xenophobic violence, generating social unrest with relative deprivation proliferating among the locals.

From a psychological viewpoint, xenophobia is also a fear of the unknown. One of the consequences of the previous dispensation is the emphasis on boundaries and segregation and the intolerance of differences. Xenophobia is the typical defence reaction against the anxiety induced by the unknown (Dienga 2011:27).

■ Underlying racism exercises a dominant inward influence

■ Understanding the inward reality of racism

Having examined the outward reasons for xenophobia, it is important that the inward reality of racism as a dominant underlying factor is also scrutinised.

As previously mentioned, race, as such, is an arbitrary classification of humans into a variety of groupings according to
genetic heritage. Race is no longer seen as a biological reality, but as an anthropological construct. Therefore, any definition of race and racism depends on social, cultural, geopolitical and ideological criteria (cf. Hollard 2012:1–15). Because race is an ideology, it has logically become part of a cultural world view. When this ideology becomes the basis for assigning group identity, it constitutes blatant racism (see Barchiesi 2011:446; Comaroff & Comaroff 2009:801; Smedley 1999:49).

**The seriousness of identity as a national and global issue**

It is well known that certain elements of identity serve as a basis to determine a person’s position in society such as social status, reliability or productivity. Race-based identity is dehumanising, as it is based on a false construct. On the other hand, Christian believers have received a new identity which supersedes all human-based answers and attitudes. The fact that two thirds of South Africa are believers should have an impact on people’s opinion of race and racism.

The new ideology of race and racism also forces the church to consider the issue from a theological anthropological perspective (cf. Nguyen 2013:199; Prill 2009:339). In some instances in the past, the church was linked to typical racist thinking in South Africa.

Racism predictably assumes the hierarchical ordering and rejection of other races, ideas, customs and attitudes associated with a particular race (cf. Kieswetter 2015:9).

Institutional racism focuses on the restriction of other social group needs. Aversive racism occurs when a person feels discomfort or disgust in the presence of other racial groups. Symbolic racism assumes that people of colour and others violate the values of self-reliance and discipline, and resentment is felt for special concessions such as affirmative action (see Klein 2007:199). In some extremist circles racist theology believes that the white race is singled out to be God’s chosen in South Africa.
Racist scholars have wrongly used the Noah narrative to suggest that the descendants of Ham are the people of Africa. The implication is that they are the culprits for Ham’s transgression (see Finger 2013:29; Sjollema 2015:61).

Such interpretations are unfounded and serve only to harm relationships. Racism has infiltrated human society and wrecks what God intended. According to the biblical message, God has no greater love for one ethnic group over another (Gl 3:28). Christ’s redemption on the cross was for all humankind. The symbolic wall, built with ethnic enclaves and racial myths, was broken down. Therefore, the shackles of our tradition must not prevent us from embracing identities different to our own.

Racism in the form of prejudice for other creatures of God is an evil attitude. Stereotyping of one another by white and black people can only result in negative racial attitudes (cf. Sweet 2014:47).

The only solution to the dilemma of racism is for white and black people to take the initiative and lead their own people to a totally new paradigm of unreserved acceptance of so-called other races. That involves the readjustment of the national compass. Then, and only then, will xenophobia be transformed into xenophilia because of a new ethical and spiritual ethos of love (cf. Herron 2011:94–96).

The hypnotist, Russel Brownlee (2016:8), is outspoken when he says the South African environment hypnotised most people into racism from early childhood, but if you could relax deeply enough through hypnosis your brain could make new associations. This cure would only work on those who want to be cured. This researcher is in favour of the transference of history and communal memory through narrative to solidify a collective identity that binds the people together. In this regard a meaningful return to the Freedom Charter and Constitution of South Africa is proposed (see Shaikh 2016:1; Wicks 2015:4–6). Should we not think of a national indaba on racism?
Professor Manganyi, chairman of the Tiso Foundation, made the remark that it should be taken into consideration that racism is not a deep-seated psychological illness or an inevitable occurrence, but comes from structural inequality. Therefore, it can only be solved by carefully crafted legal, ethical, educational and economic strategies to eliminate race-based inequality (Manganyi 2016:8).

Summary: Chapter 4

Should the stranger be feared or even hated, or loved? This chapter endeavours to answer this question by focusing on the semantic orientation concerning the concepts xenophobia [fear of the stranger], race, racism and xenophilia [love of the stranger]. Can the recent deprived South African situation be influenced or even healed by a legitimate chapter by a reformational citizen of this beloved country?

The phenomenon of xenophobia is nationally and globally linked to a corrupt relationship with the realities of race and racism. Tension among locals and migrants or foreigners often escalates into hostility, pouring over in cultural, social, economic and religious differences.

The research question in this instance originates from efforts to come to grips with the original thought world of race and racism; the role it plays in the intensifying of xenophobia and the challenge to South Africans to combat this evil. The final outcome of this project aims to find a workable route from xenophobia to xenophilia and/or xenodochia [commitment with the stranger].

Semantically, defining xenophobia and race is a multifaceted task against the typical South African situation, taking into consideration the historic role apartheid has played. Therefore, the recent reality of xenophobia and racism in South Africa have to be traced back to their very cultural, political and economic roots. This process brings meaningful results to the foreground that should be dealt with in the recent inflammatory situation
of xenophobic intolerance in South Africa. Some commentators define this phenomenon as Afrophobia.

The difference between institutional and individual xenophobia has to be explored to gain the full picture. Anger, heading towards violence towards a selected group of strangers is often manifested on hostile grounds of race, ethnic background, political affiliations, sexual or gender orientation. The arbitrary historical original classification of *Homo sapiens* according to race has been linked with power – artificially often emphasising white superiority over and against black inferiority. The South African community (‘rainbow nation’), is unfortunately still ‘colour coded’ by white racism against black people and black racism against white people. Since democracy 22 years ago the South African scene is defined by a ‘white narrative’ and a ‘black narrative’.

The biblical perspective (see next chapter) is that God does not prefer one ethnic group or race over another, because the wall built with ethnic enclaves and racial traditions is broken down.
How about the biblical GPS on our way to xenophilia instead of xenophobia?

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The scary reality of xenophobia and racism in the recent South African society

According to Numbers 15, the Lord asks of every ‘native-born’ Israelite, and from ‘the alien/stranger or anyone else living among you’, that they present their offerings. This biblical example shows that ‘the same laws and regulations’ apply to both the

‘native born’ Israelites and to the so-called ‘strangers’. This clearly
establishes the theological and ethical basis that both categories,
‘native born’ and ‘strangers’, socially and religiously constituted
the community of an obedient people of God, Israel.

Because of racism, millions of refugees flee their countries
of origin for a myriad reasons, only to become the target of
possible hostility in their destination countries (Stalker 2001:8).
The antipathy and antagonism to which they are subjected is
called xenophobia [fear of the stranger]. Among many other
African countries, xenophobia is rife in Ethiopia, Mauritania,

In South Africa, since 2008, racism has led to conflict in the
form of xenophobia because of underlying hatred and fear of
economic competition and possible job losses (Dienga 2011:1ff.;
Geschiere & Jackson 2006:10). And, on the global scene, millions
of Syrian refugees are fleeing their country despite the risk of
being subject to xenophobia in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and
Iraq, but, particularly so, in Europe (cf. Tshaka Sunday Times
27 November 2016:21). This flood of refugees not only has grave
implications for the political and economic stability of the world,
but also for a meaningful analysis by Christian ethics.

The theological and ethical dilemma to be studied concerns
the relationship between xenophobia and racism, particularly in
a growing racist South African society. In what way could biblical
scenarios of xenophobia and racism provide clarity on the issue?
Proof of direct and indirect xenophobia in the society characterises
the typical identity of behaviour in South Africa – suffering from
instability – concerning human dignity to all people (Vorster
2004:58ff.). According to the media reports, Africans do not trust
foreigners across racial lines (see The Star 15 December 2015:5). Dali
Tambo says, ‘[s]poken racism no longer evokes anger in me. It is
systemic racism that provokes me’ (Sunday Times 06 March 2016:16).

Olivia Exstrum (The Star 18 May 2016), a journalist from the
USA, gives her particular view on the South African situation:

During my time in South Africa I have been continually shocked,
provoked, confused and fascinated by the beautiful country:
South Africa faces difficult issues of racism, sexism, classism and other “isms” head on and unapologetically in a way I wouldn’t dream of happening in the USA, I imagine that in part this has to do with sheer newness of the democracy. (p. 15)

Albertina Luthuli, daughter of the former ANC leader and Nobel Prize winner Albert Luthuli (Rapport 15 Mei 2016), says:

Racism is the curse of our country. If we do not destroy racism, racism will destroy us. Black on White racism does not exist, racism consists of Whites looking down upon Blacks. (p. 11)

This comment has to be understood within the broader historical perspective.

First of all, a theological framework for the purpose of evaluation

It is all about theological and ethical values

First of all, in the process of understanding and evaluating xenophobia and racism in the Bible and theology it is imperative for a Reformed biblical approach to construct a theological and ethical framework within which the research can be understood and described (see Barndt 2011:46ff.; Botha 2013:116).

Xenophobia and related racism primarily concern relationships between people and lead us to theological anthropology. This is the theological discipline that explores the deeper truth of humanity in its mystery of a relationship with God and with one another. Natural science, sociology and psychology can also give valuable insights into Homo sapiens. From a biblical viewpoint, the essence of being human is only exclusively revealed before God (coram Deo).

According to theological anthropology, Adam does not refer only to a single historical person associated with the known reference to be ‘created to God’s image’ (Gn 1:26). This image of God (Hebrew: tselem) can be interpreted in different ways, but, in my opinion, preferably so in terms of a relationship. Humanity was created to function in relationships, with God and one another. After the disastrous Fall of Adam and Eve, this relationship was
deeply damaged by the sin of disobedience which, from then onwards, has had a profound effect on all human relationships.

Therefore, the very roots of xenophobia and racism can be traced back to the Fall. Romans 5:12 clearly argues that, while sin originated with one man, Adam, another Man, Jesus Christ, offers salvation. Sin has a devastating effect on the human ethos and behaviour. But the restoration of humankind’s image-likeness in Christ (see Col 3:10; Eph 4:24) has placed a totally new responsibility on the covenant people of God. Only the God of the covenant can nurture individuals and communities to live in harmony with locals and strangers alike. However, the believer remains an earthly creature and shares as the ‘image of God’ the mystery of God’s ‘olam’, that is eternity. It is this ‘eternity’, the ‘already’ of God’s merciful destination in the present, which gives meaning to human life through the Holy Spirit (see Ariarajah 2012:96; Volf 1996:162).

The ‘heart’ of man, representing the ‘inner person’ (see 1 Pt 3:4), determines one’s intelligent insight and ethical attitude towards the refugee and stranger (see Price 2002:256). The entire person before God carries freedom in Christ (Rm 5:6), but this person can lead his or her body to become a ‘body of sin’ (Rm 6:6). Xenophobia and racism – as real everyday phenomena – should be understood and evaluated within this theological and ethical framework. As members of God’s reign on earth, personalising the ‘image of God’ (tselem) and the ‘likeness of God’ (demuth), believers adopt a different view of xenophobia and racism. To convince believers of this view is not as problematic as to influence non-believers. Therefore, church leaders have a greater responsibility in the South African situation.

■ Striking examples of biblical pilgrimage and migration

The root of the word ‘xenophobia’, comes from the Greek words xenos [people] and fobos [fear] with the literal meaning
being ‘fear of the stranger or alien’. The meaning of ‘fear’ was later inaccurately replaced by ‘hatred’ with the result, ‘hatred of strangers’ (see Grosby 2002:71; Riviera-Pagan 2013:575). Xenophobia is, according to biblical occurrence, best understood in the contextual framework of migration related to relocation, resetting, transhumance, moving and emigration.

Stories of pilgrimage and migration are well known in the biblical narratives. We read in Deuteronomy 26:5 that, ‘[a] wandering Aramean was my ancestor, he went down into Egypt and lived there as a stranger.’ We note also that strangers were maltreated and oppressed by the Egyptians and forced into hard labour (Dt 26:6, 7). We know that these aliens or strangers, with or without documents, migrated to the powerful Egyptian empire. As immigrants they were compelled to do the least prestigious and most strenuous work. Simultaneously, the locals appeared to react with paranoia, fear and hatred of the newcomers which led to typical xenophobia.

According to the well-known Exodus narrative, migration can result in slavery or, conversely, liberation. God heard the cries of the suffering immigrants and liberated them from xenophobic attacks, leading them to victorious possession of the new land they could call their own. The people of God emigrated, not only because of economic and political reasons or ethnic or religious persecution, but also because of the call of God to his own to inherit the Promised land (see Pretorius 2004:132; Zolberg, Suhrke & Agnayo 1989:14).

A comparison between the Bible narratives and the South African situation can be hermeneutically risky but challenging. The church in South Africa is doing its best to urge believers to participate in society and to be Christian witnesses during troubling times of xenophobia. The complex situation is fuelled by HIV, corruption, violence, crime, serious poverty, drastic unemployment, all of which tend to culminate in racism (see Kenyon 2005:69). Nell (2009:234ff.) mentions different reasons for xenophobia in South Africa such as economic factors,
political instability, local frustration directed at foreigners, the legacy of apartheid as institutional historical cause, unrealised expectations after 1994 and religious differences fuelled by ethnicity. In the Middle East, for example, Christians experience discrimination, and in East Germany Islamophobia is proliferating (see Allen 2010:127; Marshall 2008:214; Sauer 2009:79).

### The contribution of sociological issues and psychological attitudes

Another perspective for the understanding of biblical references to xenophobia and racism involves the possible role of sociological institutions and individual psychological spiritual attitudes. Dienga (2011:11; see Zukier 1996:3) emphasises that an institution or society can become the instigator of xenophobia. A prominent and persuasive leader may make racist statements that could serve to fuel xenophobic attacks. Depending on the leader’s political, religious, gender, ethnic or sexual orientation affiliation, the fire of xenophobia could well be sparked. We have examples of unfortunate statements made by leaders in South Africa.

The church, believers and researchers should also understand the psychological framework of the South African people. Social media provides recognition to the individual, resulting in the recognition of everyone. This may be seen as positive, but it very often awakens the negative side of humanity. The outcome is that group identity is strengthened and boundaries are accentuated which, when transgressed, can lead to xenophobic outbursts. A definite and new South African self-consciousness leads to defensive racial attitudes that may translate into xenophobia against strangers who are perceived to have overstepped the self-defined identity boundaries.

Back in biblical times, the well-known ‘Eighteen Prayers’ sent by the Jerusalem church to the provinces with the aim of
ensuring the Jewish character were directed towards those who confessed Jesus as Messiah, and resulted in Jewish cohesion and a confessional split in Christianity. Christianity has, until now, paid the price for categorising people in so-called ‘in-groups’ and ‘out-groups’ with regard to their denominations. The only real Christian categorisation can be between ‘biological birth’ and ‘spiritual birth’, which defines the opposite of xenophobia, namely *xenophilia* (cf. Gl 3:28).

On a psychological level, the influence of prejudice should not be underestimated. Klegk (1993:58) sees prejudice as a manifestation of racial, cultural or religious discrimination. This can lead to frustration, aggression and violent xenophobic reaction.

■ **Again, the dominant role of underlying racism?**

Race and racism are no longer seen as a biological reality, but as an anthropological construct (see Du Rand 2017:ch. 4). As part of God’s good creation and the new identity in Christ, believers have become members of the reign of God. The crux of Christianity is to love God and one’s neighbour (see Mt 2:34ff.). The semantic heart of racism is the lack of love, revealed by the hierarchical ordering and rejection of other races, ideas, customs and attitudes. Symbolic racism can express resentment for the unjust privileges of another (see Dt 7:6, 10:15; 1 Pt 2:9; see Sechrest 1995:653). To argue on ‘biblical grounds’ that descendants of Ham are the people of Africa is a blatant racist use of the Bible. The symbolic wall, based on racial and sinful convictions (Eph 2:14; 1 Pt 2:9–10), was broken down by Christ’s victory over sin.

It is unacceptable for Christian believers to look down upon any other race. It is an act of blatant racism. With this viewpoint in mind, we proceed to take notice of a selection of biblical references on xenophobia, *xenophilia* and racism.
Are there conspicuous examples of xenophobia and racism in the Bible?

God’s biblical ‘GPS’ guides his people on the road from xenophobia to xenophilia

In his book Asylum and Immigration – A Christian Perspective on a Polarised Debate, Spencer (2004:85) points out that the concept of asylum cannot be found in the Bible. But this does not mean that the Old and New Testament cannot be called a narrative of migration (see Riviera-Pagan 2013:580). The theme of forced migration is prominent in the Pentateuch and the Old Testament historical books, and themes of wandering and homelessness are common in the New Testament (see Prill 2013:6). Therefore, it is understandable that the Hebrew nation and Christians would have – in the light of their own history – a sensitivity towards and suspicion of strangers and refugees.

Caring for strangers always was an important issue in the Torah (Law) and part of the Covenant Code of justice between Yahweh and Israel. Exodus 23:9 puts it into words, ‘[d]o not oppress an alien; you yourselves know how it feels to be aliens, because you were aliens in Egypt’ (see Dt 24:14, 17–18; 27:19). It is clearly stated in Deuteronomy 27:19, ‘[c]ursed be anyone who deprives the alien, the orphan, and the widow of justice.’ Aliens or strangers were seen as vulnerable people: the poor, widows, fatherless children and foreigners. The prophets reminded Israel of the injustice and oppression of vulnerable people (see Ezk 22:6). Jeremiah 7:6 is such a reminder ‘deal with each other justly, if you do not oppress the alien, the fatherless or the widow...’ (see Jr 22:3, 5). The role of xenodochia [commitment to shelter the affected] fits into the Covenant Code of conduct proclaimed by God.

Therefore, caring for the poor and strangers became the foundation for a biblical ethics of love towards aliens and refugees in Israel (Lv 19:9–19; Mt 22:36–39). We could call this an
ethical manifesto: xenophilia – love for the stranger – which has to become part of Israel’s identity. The two definitive reasons to practice xenophilia and xenodochia in Israel were: the Israelites themselves had been sojourners and foreigners in Egypt, and to love strangers is to act as God would – ‘[t]he Lord watches over the strangers … fatherless … and the widow’ (Ps 146:9).

Regrettably, xenophobia also features in the Hebrew Bible. Leviticus 25 mentions harsh xenophobia ‘[a]s for the male and female slaves whom you may have, it is from the nations around you […] and they may be your property …’ (Lv 25:44–46).

In the growing presence of xenophobia, Ezra and Nehemiah demonstrated the hard-hearted establishment of traditionalism and exclusivity, which included xenophobia (see Riviera-Pagan 2013:583). The same Ezra and Nehemiah’s rejection of foreign wives can definitely be seen as obvious and nationalistic xenophobia (see Neh 13:23–31).

The most obvious Hebrew marker ‘ger’

In order to gain a better understanding of xenophobia in the Old Testament, we must explain the usages of the Hebrew concept ger. It is translated as ‘stranger’, ‘sojourner’ and ‘resident alien’. The concept referred to the sojourner who was placed under Israelite protection without full legal rights (Riviera-Pagan 2013:580f.; Spencer 2004:86ff.). The oldest reference to ger is found when a young man reports the death of Saul and Jonathan to David and says of himself, ‘I am the son of a ger, an Amalekite’ (2 Sm 1:13). This word for a foreigner is also used for an Israelite in a foreign land (see Ex 2:22).

The well-known Covenant Code (Ex 20:22–23:33) and Twelve Curses (Dt 27:15–26) freely use the Hebrew word ‘ger’. The typical co-text and context of ger are used as follows, ‘[d]o not oppress an alien; you yourselves know how it feels to be aliens because you were aliens in Egypt’ (Ex 23:9). The Israelites are
even commanded to love the alien or stranger (Dt 10:19). This meaning of *ger* generally spread to be used by the prophets (see Jr 7:6; 22:3).

Leviticus 24:22 sums up the Holiness Code (Lv 17–26) in one sentence, ‘[y]ou are to have the same law for the alien and the native born’. In the priestly material the acceptance of the *ger* as full member of the community is a *sine qua non* (see Nm 15:14; 35:15). In the final stage of development, the Chronicler emphasises that the *gerim* (plural) are no longer strangers, but part of the household (see 1 Chr 29:15; Ps 119:19). Foreigners and strangers (*gerim*) who are circumcised and observant of the law are considered to be in full religious communion with the native born Israelites (see Krauss 2006:265; Spencer 2004:87).

To summarise: according to the Torah, the *ger* is a non-Israelite resident who is obligated to follow the Torah laws. The concept of *ger* as non-Israelite who is able to convert was a post-exilic development (see Krauss 2006:269). Until the 5th century BCE, men only had to be circumcised and to change their names to become full citizens. In the writings of Ezra and Nehemiah the laws also accommodated matrilineal descent. The impression is that *ger* could be a convert within the gates, but not outside the gates.

**Take us to related incidents in the Old Testament!**

Abram, originally from Ur in Mesopotamia, is called by God to go to Canaan, a country unfamiliar to him. He was seen as an alien in his new country, although called by God. Because of the possible loss of his wife, Sarai, to the powerful leaders of Egypt, he fabricated the story that she was his sister. Taking a stranger as a wife was not only considered a deed of cowardice by the Egyptian pharaoh, but also provoked xenophobia with the bullying of the powerless and vulnerable Hebrew stranger (see Amos 2004:79). Additionally, the abduction of married women...
by both King David and the Mesopotamian king, Gilgamesh, can be seen as deeds of xenophobia.

The book of Exodus narrates an interesting story of real xenophobia and oppression in Egypt where the Israelites were forced into slavery. A new pharaoh, probably Ramses II, who did not know Joseph, became the ruler (Ex 1:8). The expansion of the Hebrew population was abhorrent to the pharaoh as he feared that his Hebrew workforce could be lost (see Ex 1:9–10) to some ally. Through institutional xenophobia the Hebrews were forced to become labourers (see Crowell 2013:11). Xenophobia reached a cruel peak when the new pharaoh ordered the death of every newly born son (Ex 1:15–16). This event may be viewed as genocide motivated by racism and xenophobia. The pharaoh’s racist attitude exploited the prejudices and fears of his own people to justify xenophobia and genocide (see Prill 2013:9). Economic exploitation and oppression forced the Hebrews to migrate. Their exodus was about liberation, but, importantly, also concerned God’s command for the spiritual formation of a religious and national identity and order.

Exodus 22:21–24 describes the result of a new order for the Israelites, the name of God and God’s redemption. God commanded social responsibility in Exodus 22:21, ‘[d]o not mistreat an alien or oppress him, for you were aliens in Egypt.’ The founding of a nation should preclude xenophobia and oppression (Ex 22:21). It becomes increasingly clear from Exodus 22 that God cares for the stranger; God hears the alien; God defends the poor and the aliens; God will avenge crime against aliens and God’s own people should look through new eyes at the vulnerable aliens (see Dienga 2011:49).

The book of Deuteronomy is a remarkable witness against xenophobia on racial grounds. Modern scholars see Deuteronomy’s origin in the traditions of the northern kingdom, which were taken south to the kingdom of Judah during the Assyrian destruction of Samaria (8th century BCE) and then adapted into King Josiah’s reform programme (7th century BCE) with the final application
How about the biblical GPS on our way

in the milieu of the return from the Babylonian exile (see Benware 1993:108; Dienga 2011:50). In other words, the territories where Deuteronomistic history was narrated were under rule from the foreign powers of the Assyrians and Babylonians, Greeks and Romans (see Crouch 2011:2).

After a brief period of independence under King Josiah in the early 6th century, the Israelites were once again subjugated by the foreign rule of the Babylonian and Achmedic empires. The typical Deuteronomistic reaction to foreign women can be described as xenophobic (see Dt 7:1–4; 21:10–14). The women were described in sexualised terms as depraved seducers who misled the faithful (see Boehmer 2005:129).

Deuteronomy 10 provides, on the one hand, a remarkable example of the mercy of God and Israel’s fear of God. This is the co-text of Deuteronomy 10:17–19 – God’s love for the widows, orphans and strangers, ‘[a]nd you are to love those who are aliens, for you yourselves were aliens in Egypt.’ On the other hand, according to the typical Deuteronomistic warning against foreign women, the role of the prostitute Rahab (Jos 2:1) is interesting. She entertained two spies (see Jos 2:3, 4; Gn 19:33–35), and this foreign woman was then considered the ‘good girl’, because she rejected her own culture in favour of the two spies. She, as a Canaanite, became loyal to Yahweh and Israel.

The Samson cycle in Judges 13–16 is another example of the Deuteronomistic view of the seductive nature of foreign women. Samson encountered three Philistine women, all of them hypersexualised.

Another ‘bad girl’, according to the Deuteronomistic view, is the Phoenician princess, Jezebel (see 1 Ki 16). This political and economic marriage solidified Israel’s alliance with Ethbaal, the king of Sidon, and led to Israel’s worshipping of Baal. The Samson narrative is an example of the Deuteronomistic warning against foreign women according to Deuteronomy 7 (see Crowell 2013:7).

The Babylonian exile was not only a political and economic deportation of people, but also institutional xenophobia with
particularly racist undertones. Nebuchadnezzar removed only the elite, the royal family, soldiers and skilled craftsmen (2 Ki 24:16) – all the people who could participate in a future rebellion. Nebuchadnezzar’s hunger for power to gain full control over Judah only left the poor in Judah and, in such a way, ruined the economy of Judah out of xenophobia (see Ps 137).

When considering xenophobia and racism, the narrative about Ruth is a jewel of xenophilia and xenodochia in the Old Testament. According to Ruth 1, an Israelite family from Bethlehem in Judah, migrated to the nearby Moab because of a severe famine in Judah. The father, Elimelech, died as did his two sons: Mahlou, who married a Moabite woman, Ruth, and Chilion, who married the Moabite, Orpah. The mother, Naomi, then decided to return to Bethlehem. She told her daughters-in-law to return to their own Moabite mothers. Orpah returned, but the Moabite, Ruth, answered Naomi, ‘[w]here you go I will go, and where you stay, I will stay. Your people will be my people and your God my God’ (Rt 1:16–17). Ruth’s loyalty is a remarkable example of xenophilia and xenodochia (see Hubbard 1988:62; Matthews 2004:215). The Moabite Ruth’s strong affiliation with her mother-in-law’s nationality became a shining example of xenophilia. God’s care for the Moabite, Ruth, illustrates that his love goes beyond ethnic boundaries. The mixed marriage of the Moabite, Ruth, and the Jew, Boaz, not only became part of David’s family tree, but was also blessed with a boy, Obed.

Although mentioned previously, the xenophobic attitude of Ezra should be discussed further. Ezra wanted to expel all foreign wives with their own culture and religious affinities. He deployed the doctrine of impurity against the women accusing them of defilement (see Ezra). The priests who were among the returnees were very tolerant towards the foreigners. While Ezra was lamenting the unfaithfulness of the exiles, he gathered the men of Judah and Benjamin and accused them of marrying foreign women and ordered them to cast aside their foreign wives. This was a blatant and selfish religiously-motivated act of xenophobia. Ezra’s severe utterances about the foreign women echo those in Deuteronomy 7 and Exodus 23, where we read about the Hittites, Girgashites,
the Amorites, the Canaanites, the Perrizzites, the Hivites and the Jebusites who were ordered to be destroyed. The men were ordered not to make marriages with these women, because these nations would turn their sons away to serve other gods.

The Hebrew term *nokri* [foreigners who were uncircumcised] was used by Ezra (see 10:2) and not *gerim* [circumcised strangers or sojourners] (see Ex 12:43). The term *nokri* would strengthen the case against the wives. Mary Douglas (2002:8) says Ezra’s ‘decree contained plenty of inflammatory matter’ (see Neh 8:1–2; 13:1). In this regard, Ezekiel 44:7–9, probably an inner exegesis of Leviticus 22:25, could be considered xenophobic, as it barred uncircumcised foreigners from entering the sanctuary (see Awabdy 2012:687).

### The undercurrent of xenophobia and racism in the New Testament

#### Much more than expected in this theological framework

Often in the New Testament it is found that there is not only an undercurrent of racism and xenophobia, but also *xenophilia* and *xenodochia*. We find such an example in the Gospels and Acts, focusing attention, inter alia, on the Gospel of Luke and the Acts of the apostles, mentioning six notable Samaritan episodes. In the light of the history of the Samaritans (see Tienou 2007:218), the following occurrences are related (see Marshall 1978:94):

- Luke 9:51–56: Jesus was not received in a friendly manner in a Samaritan village.
- Acts 1:8: The disciples will be witnesses, also in Samaria.
- Acts 8:4–25: Samaria accepted the Word of God.
Xenophilia sometimes has the undertone of universalism — in a sense the opposite of racism and xenophobia — in Simeon’s words in Luke 2:31–32, alluding to universalism in Isaiah 49; in the genealogy emphasising Jesus as representative of all humanity (Lk 3:23–4:30; see 4:18–19). The parable of the Good Samaritan (Lk 10:25–37) explicitly counters racism. Love for the neighbour transcends all racial and cultural boundaries. Pentecost in Acts 2 can be interpreted as a reversal and opposite of the Tower of Babel episode in Genesis 11.

The apostles definitely practiced xenophilia and xenodochia when they appointed deacons to take care of the Hellenistic Jewish widows (Ac 6:1–6). The Ethiopian eunuch episode could also refer to xenophilia and xenodochia instead of racism (Ac 8:26–39). The conversion of Cornelius, a Roman centurion, showed that God does not pursue racism (Ac 10:34–35). One of the prophets and teachers in Antioch was called ‘Simeon Niger’ and was probably from Africa (Ac 13:1). Jesus ignored all social, gender, ethnic and religious boundaries in his encounter with the Samaritan woman (Jn 4:1–42). John 10:16 speaks of a unified community that includes ‘the other sheep [...]’.

An important anti-racist remark is found in Galatians 3:28, ‘[t]here is neither Jew nor Greek, slave nor free, male nor female, for you are all one in Christ Jesus’ (cf. Col 3:1–11; see Kim Ji-Sun 2006:48).

The Pauline ethos stresses unity beyond racist, gender and socio-economic stratification (see 1 Cor 12:12–30). Ephesians 2:11–22 describes Paul’s theology of race relations in Christ. By way of interpretation, it is evident that Ephesians 2:11–12 was written from a Judaistic perspective of superiority when Paul addressed the ‘gentiles’. Ephesians 2:14–15 places all emphasis on Christ — the Shalōm of the new humanity. Jews and Greeks are one in the new humanity, stripped of racism, gender and economic discrimination or xenophobia. Hebrews 13:1 reminds readers ‘not to forget to entertain strangers’ and 1 Peter is written to ‘aliens and strangers in this world’ (1 Pt 2:11). 1 John 3 admonishes his readers not to
be like Cain who murdered his brother and to remember that the world hates the children of God. The pivotal difference between xenophilia and xenophobia, also to the stranger, is, respectively, either to love one another, receiving eternal life, or to be a murderer, only to receive death (1 Jn 3:11-16).

In the book Revelation, believers were even killed because of institutional and religious xenophobia. Rome, symbolised as the prostitute of Babylon, went so far as to have the witnessing prophets killed (Rv 18:24).

Real examples of racial tension but also racial harmony in the New Testament

The most well-known ‘Stranger’ in the New Testament was, without doubt, Jesus of Nazareth. He suffered brutal oppression by the mainstream religious leaders. He was surrounded with people, but suffered alone as a Stranger from heaven. A stranger’s deepest vulnerability is to be alone with one’s identity denied. Jesus shares with strangers, not only in compassion, but he also shares his life and identity. That is why, according to Matthew 25:35, Jesus says, ‘I was a stranger and you invited me in’ (see Van de Beek 2008:257).

Unity in Christ gives believers the strength to cope with challenges facing strangers. Therefore, Christians are inherently and morally committed to xenophilia and xenodochia! When Jesus was still a baby boy, to escape King Herod’s cruelty, he and his parents fled to Egypt as refugees (see Hagner 1993:35). We know that Egypt was ‘a safe haven for first-century Jews’ (Girgis 2011:72). His parents fled from persecution. The symbolic meaning of Egypt is remarkable (see also 1 Ki 12:40; 1 Ki 11; Jr 41:16-18) with regard to the relationship of countries.

The ‘Stranger’ from heaven’s followers also suffered under xenophobia and oppression, although it was in subtle ways. The so-called church became a prime target. In Acts 8:1 we read, ‘[o]n that day a great persecution broke out against the church at
Jerusalem.’ The Jewish name of the destroyer of the church was Saul, known by his Greek and/or Roman name Paul. Christian refugees, because of persecution, became agents of God’s mission. That was the case with Priscilla and Aquila, a refugee couple from Italy (Ac 18:2).

The most well-known persecuted follower of this ‘Stranger from heaven’ was the apostle Paul. After his conversion he spent time in Arabia and Syria (Gl 1:16-18). In some of the cities where Paul preached the gospel he was met with severe opposition, particularly for being a Jew. In Lystra he was stoned (Ac 14:19), and in Philippi he was flogged and imprisoned (Ac 16:23). In nearly all the incidents religious resistance and rejection by Jews and Greeks followed (O’Neill 2009:231). We have to be careful not to name every rejection of Christianity as xenophobia.

In the Jerusalem church, it is estimated that 20% spoke Greek and the remainder either Aramaic or Hebrew (cf. Prill 2009:333). Peter’s speeches (Ac 2, 3) were directed mainly at a Jewish audience. He addressed them as ‘men of Judea’ (Ac 2:14), ‘Israelites’ (Ac 2:22, 29; 3:12) and ‘brothers’ (Ac 2:37). But when the dispute between Hellenists and Jews developed over the distribution of food, it was settled in a racist way. The struggle between Hebrews and Hellenists actually started in the 2nd century BCE when the latter tried to transform Jerusalem into a Greek city.

The church in Antioch was founded by refugees because of religious xenophobia after the death of Stephen. These refugees were received with open cultural and religious arms by the majority of the Greek-speaking church. Barnabas, for example, was a Jewish Cypriot and Simeon, called Niger, was from Africa. The church in Antioch had to religiously repair with xenophilía and xenodochia what the church in Jerusalem had handled in a religiously biased manner.

The Jerusalem Council (see Ac 15), a central event in the history of the Early Church, took religious (circumcision and incorporation into the church) risks, but displayed no cultural or ethnic xenophobia. The Gentile believers were not forced by
the Council to become Jewish, but only to agree to mandatory circumcision.

Luke, in Acts 16:4 and 21:25, emphasises church unity and racial equality within the church. These precepts set the tone for decisions on church founding. The Early Church policy was not to found ethnic churches, but rather to integrate migrants and refugees into one body of Christ. Whatever the ethnic background (Ac 15:8–11), a sense of equality of Judaistic and Greek migrants existed. Non-Jewish migrants were not forced to become Jews, but had to respect the Jewish customs (see Ac 15:20).

Matthew and the question of Anti-Judaism: Related to the previous paragraph, the meaning of Matthew 25:31–46 is questioned (see Byrne 2004:196; Gnilka 1988:371; Luz 2005:1024). Will there be separate judgement for Christians and non-Christians because of this statement, ‘[h]e will separate the people one from another …’? The answer is no, according to Matthew 16:27, where we read that ‘the Son of Man … will reward each person according to what he has done’. Some scholars are of the opinion that Jesus rejected the Jewish purity laws by touching a haemorrhaging woman and then a corpse (Mt 9:18–26). In the incident when Jesus ignored a Canaanite woman’s remark that he should help her with her daughter who suffered from demonic possession, he was accused of Jewish exclusivism (see Levine 2007:413).

To return to Matthew 25:31–46, the term stranger is repeated four times in this paragraph (vv. 35, 38, 43–44). Matthew uses the Greek word xenos when referring to strangers – those people who do not belong to their community. It is important to remember that it was unheard of for strangers to be treated badly. Morris (1995:638) infers that the use of xenos in the context could even mean a refugee or exile. It was the custom that strangers (xenoi) should be provided with accommodation. Jesus identified himself with these strangers. The stranger should not be met with xenophobic aggression, but with xenophilia
and xendochia. Many people, particularly women and children in Africa, can identify with this biblical narrative because of the scourges of war, famine, violence, sickness and sexual abuse. The new destination of these strangers should practice xenophilia towards them.

The dramatic event on the road from Jerusalem to Gaza represents an interesting and meaningful exercise to study Luke’s narrative as a model of xenophilia and xendochia (Ac 8:26–40). The narrative tells the story of what happened with Philip and the Ethiopian eunuch of the treasury of Queen Candace, queen of the Ethiopians. The eunuch was returning from Jerusalem where he had worshipped. During the encounter, contentious issues such as ethnicity, culture, social and even sexual boundaries were touched upon. How did Philip, the ‘insider’, react to the ‘outsider?’ The baptism of the eunuch served as a bridge between the two social and religious orders (see Dube 2013:3). The Ethiopian eunuch may well have been considered to be a stranger because of his different sexual, ethncal, psychological and social background and consequently subjected to stigmatisation, because he was an ‘outsider’. Philip’s approach was not only important in a missionary sense, but also as a deed of xenophilia. Philip was sensitive and did not react in a racist way with anti-immigrant harassment and violence. He was not concerned that his attitude of xenophilia would result in ‘ghettoization’, interethnic violence, poor labour performance, criminality, terrorist activism and other possible social flaws (see C. Boswell 2005:5).

According to theological interpretation of the book of Hebrews, some Christians were tempted to abandon their Christian faith in favour of reverting to Judaism (see Heb 10:35), as doing so would spare them from religious persecution (see Lane 1985:81; Peterson 1982:124). Some had already become apostate (see Heb 6:4–8). For this reason, the Letter to Hebrews was written to encourage the Christian readers to remain faithful to Christianity (see Peterson 1982:109). In a well-defined exhortation in Hebrews
13:1–3, readers are reminded ‘not to forget to entertain strangers, for by so doing some people have entertained angels without knowing it’. The Greek word for xenophilia in Hebrews could also be translated, ‘to exercise hospitality towards strangers’ (filoksenia). In the ancient world, hospitality meant to be gracious and to kindly receive a stranger or alien in need (xenodochia; cf. Lane 1985:98). An encounter with a stranger was seen as an opportunity to exercise love, also known as xenodochia.

In Galatians 3:27–28, we find the explanation of the above-mentioned ‘hospitality to the stranger’. Paul says that Christians in Christ belong not only to God through faith, but also to one another. Traditionally, divisive distinctions like race, ethnos and power become less important (see Cole 1993:155), ‘[t]here is neither Jew nor Greek, slave nor free, male nor female, for you are all one in Christ Jesus.’ Racial or ethnic background, gender, social status or economic power are secondary to oneness in Christ with xenophilia fully replacing xenophobia, because Christians have a ‘new’ identity (Cole 1993:142).

To briefly focus on 1 Peter 2:4–10, a survey of the Greek terms ethnos [nation], genos [race] and laos [people] in pre-Christian Jewish literature (Septuagint) and in the New Testament, reveals the value of 1 Peter where Christian identity in conceived in ethno-racial terms (see Horrell 2012:134). The correlation of the two terms paroikoi and oikos tou theou are of importance to the research. The recipients of 1 Peter were paroikoi [resident aliens], a term applied to those who had fled or been forced from their native communities for any personal, economic, political or religious reasons and who were trying to make a living in a foreign land. The term parepidêmoi can be translated as ‘visiting strangers’ who were in conflict with society and did not have any real home. These Christians probably suffered xenophobia in the provinces of Pontus, Galatia, Cappadocia, Asia and Bithynia (1 Pt 1:1). This experience of xenophobia reinforced the Christians’ view of their group identity, boundaries and cohesion. Such displaced people found ultimate comfort and identity in the household of God’s ‘house’: oikos tou theou, [the church]
These Christians were estranged and displaced *paroikoi* seeking an *oikos* [home].

The very Greek terms *paroikoi* and *parepidēmoi* suggest xenophobic causes. The restrictions of *paroikoi* were many: not being able to own land, probably being forced to work as a slave, worker or craftsperson, legal restrictions regarding intermarriage, commerce and succession of property and no political rights to vote or to join guilds. To summarise: they had fewer rights than citizens. Even more marginalised were the *parepidēmoi*. They were ‘temporary visitors passing by’ with no social or civil rights, and more than likely destined to be slaves.

Natives of the five Anatolian provinces were deeply suspicious of outsiders (see Finger 2013:2). They did not know what to expect from these Jesus groups. 1 Peter 2:4–10 emphasises that these ‘outsiders’ – referring to Christians spiritually – are ‘a chosen race, a royal priesthood, a holy nation’ and states that they are now God’s people, although Peter still refers to the recipients as ‘aliens and strangers’ (*paroikoi* and *parepidēmoi*) in 1 Peter 2:11. To conclude, we must consider that the terms *xenos* [passing-by stranger], *paroikos/parepidēmos* [sojourner or stranger] and *katoikos* [permanent dweller] are frequently used in a cosmological and/or spiritual sense. Despite the social and xenophobic circumstances of the recipients of 1 Peter, their journey on earth, as God’s covenantal people, had spiritual consequences.

**Two well-known xenophilia-narratives: the Samaritan stories**

*Xenophilia* is clearly revealing its ethnic and religious effect: the parable of the Good Samaritan (Lk 10:25–37) and Jesus’ interview with the Samaritan woman at the well (Jn 4).

The Samaritans were a racially and religiously mixed society with Jewish and pagan ancestry. They only accepted the first five books of the Bible as canonical and their temple was situated on Mount Gerazim. The Samaritans were despised by the Jews because
of their racially mixed society. The Assyrian king, Ezarhaddon (677 BCE), brought people from Babylon to settle in Samaria in the place of the original inhabitants whom Sargon (722 BCE) had removed into captivity (2 Ki 17:24). These strangers integrated with the Jews who had remained in the land. The new ‘mixed’ group was called Samaritans, and they partly adopted a variation of the Jewish religion. The Jews viewed this mixed group with disdain and had ‘no dealings with the Samaritans’ (Jn 4:9; see Lk 9:52, 53) to the extent that Jews who travelled from Galilee in the north to Judea (Jerusalem) in the south bypassed Samaria in order not to be ‘contaminated’ by the Samaritans. Jesus was even contemptuously called ‘a Samaritan’ (Jn 8:48). Many Samaritans, however, embraced the Gospel (see Jn 4:5–42; Ac 8:25; 9:31; 15:3). When Judah returned from captivity, the Samaritans wanted to assist with the building of the temple, but the Jews would not allow it. Sargon banished nearly 28 000 of the inhabitants among whom were leaders, men of wealth and influence and the priests. Only the humbler classes remained to tend to the vineyards and to till the land.

The racial and religious antagonism between Jews and Samaritans, and the bitterness of both parties explain the racial differences in the parable (see Larsen 2008:17, 86). The parable (Lk 10:30–37) starts with a lawyer asking Jesus about eternal life and Jesus’ response was ‘[l]ove your neighbour as yourself.’ The lawyer then asks, ‘[a]nd who is my neighbour?’ The focus of the parable is the ‘mixed’ neighbour. According to the parable, the priest passed by the injured man. So, too, the Levite. But a Samaritan, hated and despised by the Jews, pitied the injured man and took care of him. In a moment, historical hatred and racial discrimination were overturned. One of the despised minim [heretics] showed what neighbourliness really means. Those who considered themselves superior because of their ethnic and religious purity passed by the injured man. Racial prejudices and boundaries prohibited the priest and Levite from doing their duty. Likewise, the lawyer sought a boundary as an excuse to ignore his obligation to love, but Jesus negated the concept of any boundary.
Jesus also showed this in his conversation with the Samaritan woman at the well at Sychar – another narrative demonstrating xenophilia and xenodochia.

God’s reliable biblical GPS replaces xenophobia and racism with xenophilia and xenodochia

See the broader picture!

As mentioned earlier, the challenge with research on xenophobia and racism could be to view the issues in the broader perspective of theological anthropology. One should also remember that not all xenophobia is rooted in racism. Typical ‘Western’ individualism may be seen as repulsive by many. To appeal theologically and ethnically to the South African society, is to take up the African slogan: ‘We are, therefore I am’ (see Kapolyo 2005:23). This Libyan slogan is typically African. The biblical God nurtures communal and individual harmonies.

In Christ, God created the new humanity, revealed in the church (see Punt 2009:252). Sin and perversion results in corruption, which damages human togetherness. The reality of ‘original sin’, which was considered rebellion against God, is the root of racism and xenophobia in their negative sense. The introduction of sin was the historical origin of created freedom, which has given history and mankind its tragic cast. Believers must ‘put to death the deeds of the body’ (Rm 8:13).

Within the perspective of life within the reign of God where his will prevails, opposition to xenophobia and racism strikes a chord with all religions that hope to transform xenophobia into xenophilia and that espouse hospitality, love and care for the stranger (xenodochia). Recent history has seen economic and political globalisation with subsequent inevitable convergence of different cultures and languages. The same could, hopefully, be expected from differing religions. I am aiming initially at Judaism,
Islam and Christianity, where there is enough common ground to unite against xenophobia, racism and gender discrimination.

It is important to remember that national and religious identities are mainly historical constructs. A common ethos of migration would have to focus on ecumenical, international and intercultural perspectives to arrive at meaningful results (see Riviera-Pagan 2013:584). Within the reign of God, Jesus Christ is the core around whom all relationships are restored, not only between God and humans, but also among humans themselves. Such relationships call Christians to realise their new identity in Christ.

The role of the church in South African society can be powerful and has recently been underestimated. In this regard, Koos Vorster (2013) gives valuable information in his writings. He says:

Churches and Christians fail to offer an alternative way of living amidst violence. Unfortunately, the general post-modernist revival of pietist and quietist theology overshadows the social calling of the church. (p. 7)

The church is the agent of peace and love, and is called to be a bastion of holiness, unity and a Christ-like alternative to witness the meaning of Jesus Christ as an alternative example of stewardship, unselfishness and service in obedience to God (see Kilner 2015:117; Vorster 2002:64). Instead of following the ideological and social patterns of society, the church should be the visibly erected new humanity (2 Cor 5). With the new humanity comes a ‘new’ ethos. Instead of selling empty church buildings, believers should use them to found new congregations among strangers such as Somalians and Nigerians.

The church should become a home to the strangers and aliens who should be welcomed into the ‘household of God’ (Eph 2:19). Love and hospitality (philoxenia [love of the stranger]) is at the very heart of Christian discipleship and/or church, whatsoever xenophobic conditions prevail. The church is steward to the vulnerable strangers (xenodochia) and the needy (see Mt 8:11; 22:1–14; Lk 14:12–14). I fully agree with Sampson Ndoga (2012:158) who
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Koos Vorster (2013:9), referring to the violence in South Africa, emphasises the place and meaning of respect for human dignity as a ‘core moral principle in interpersonal relations’. Christians should be the custodians of human dignity and examples to communities in all walks of life (see Kretzchmar 2010:585; Vorster 2013:9). Human unity (cf. Moatshe & Hans 2017:5) and dignity is enshrined in the South African Constitution, but has still to become evident in everyday life to foster a culture of human rights. The plea of Luka Mosoma (2016) in this regard sounds clear and firm:

The protection and promotion of cultural, religious and linguistic rights is intended to assist us to discern and identify moral and spiritual values across religions for creating a cohesive society and building a united South Africa – a country in which peace and religious tolerance are respected and nurtured. (p. 12)

The greatest need, with regard to xenophobia, lies in the field of socio-economic rights.

At the heart of resolving xenophobia lies the issue of poverty. The Bible makes it known that transformation and development are important concepts of the Good Message. Vorster (2013:12; Nguyen 2013:204; Swain 2011:12) proposes nation building – the social process of transforming an underdeveloped, very poor, confused and divided community by offering peace, equal opportunities and economic viability (Vorster 2013:12). The alleviation of poverty and the propagation of social cohesion will positively impact on the issues of xenophobia and racism.

The social cohesion of the South African community remains a complex problem. To recognise the other and to join hands is the challenge that must be faced to combat xenophobia and racism (see Nell 2009:240). The objective is to emulate the dynamics
of the intimate relationship between God and his own covenant people and that of Jesus and his disciples. The churches have to take responsibility to reach the goal of a non-racist xenophilial society.

Social cohesion will find its fulfilment when South Africans are reconciled with one another. Peace can only follow after reconciliation and forgiveness have set aside historical differences. Tolerant and positive relationships among locals and foreigners must be fostered and maintained. Strangers have to be incorporated into the economic and social streams.

The positive effects of sound spiritual and moral values far outweigh the effects of politics and economics. Therefore, social cohesion can only be accomplished by ‘the tenderness of conscience: a spirituality of politics’ (Boesak 2005:17).

Gospel neighbourliness must partner with social cohesion with the emphasis on the metaphorical embracing of the foreigner. Daniel Louw calls this xenodochia, meaning pastoral care of the threatened (2017:16ff.). Local response should never be that of marginalising and demonising foreigners, but rather that of building lasting bridges. The marginalisation of Muslims by Christians or Christians by Muslims is unacceptable. Undocumented immigrants and aliens are vulnerable to a range of unconscionable practices, including indentured servitude, harassment, hostile treatment and misplaced blame for crime. Foreigners often complain of rude detention, which does not serve good neighbourliness. The parable of the Good Samaritan carries a profound message that should be remembered and repeated. God’s image should be sought and seen in the foreigner and alien (see Herron 2011:94; Muller 1999:69).

The role of love as loyalty can never be overestimated. Love, understood as being absolute loyalty to someone, means to make room for the neighbour, a foreigner, and cultivates understanding and responsibility. ‘Love of the neighbour’ becomes ‘love of the stranger’ (Lk 10:25) and ‘love of the enemy’ (Mt 5:43). The love of the Good Samaritan (Lk 10)
proves that neighbourliness is not based on a pre-existing historical status. Love of the neighbour even becomes ‘love of the sinner’ (Lk 7:36). Xenophobia has no place among real loving neighbours. The African principle of ubuntu more or less correlates with the Christian moral value of love expressed as human dignity, human rights, reciprocity, compassion, hospitality and forgiveness among other moral attributes (see Jeanrond 2010:25–44; Mnyaka 2003:64).

An open channel of communication between locals and foreigners must be available and effectively used at all time. From a Reformed Christian view communication should be understood within the framework of God’s grace, treating foreigners as equals, while their otherness are to be accepted. We have to keep in mind that Christians and the church are on stage, in front of the world, called to reveal humanity and love, particularly to the foreigner.

Differences should be bridged according to biblical principles: the Apostle Convent according to Acts 15 highlights communication among those of different viewpoints. Luke goes out of his way to present a harmonious picture of the church after the Jerusalem Council. What strikes me, as Luke portrayed it, is that the decisions taken were clearly a compromise. The church leaders only asked of gentile Christians that they observe certain Jewish food laws and to abstain from sexual immorality. The gentile believers were not ordered to assimilate culturally, and it was not asked of them to convert to Judaism. They were only asked to observe the minimum requirements for strangers who sought fellowship with Jews. The integration of migrants is and always has been a sensitive process. The words from Exodus 23:9 should be borne in mind, ‘[d]o not oppress an alien, you yourselves know how it feels to be aliens, because you were aliens in Egypt’ (cf. Nel 2009:142ff.).

External political, economic and cultural representatives and institutions have to be careful and sensitive not to make dubious or inflammatory statements in the media or on social channels.
Foreigners are vulnerable concerning issues of employment, the youth, security, hospital services and economic issues. The South African society should strive to be more sensitive towards African immigrants and migrants. Love and ubuntu should trust each other and take hands (cf. Institute for Justice and Reconciliation 2015:5).

Attention should also be given to comprehensive immigration and labour legislation reform. The chairman of the Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Rights Commission in South Africa stated that the Commission promotes the goal of societal common good, social cohesiveness, coexistence and harmony.

We judge the significance of any cultural, religious and linguistic practice by its ability to be present and to contribute to the transformation narrative of democratic life for all who live in South Africa – ‘native born’ and strangers.

Summary: Chapter 5

The question whether the Bible contains examples of xenophobia and xenophilia is without any doubt legitimate. Definitely, more than one example will be mentioned in this chapter. The biblical leitmotiv concerning strangers and migrants is adequately laid down in Numbers 15:16, stating that the same laws and regulations apply to strangers as to ‘native born’ Israelites.

Xenophobia [fear of the stranger], related to the concepts race and racism, is an actual global and South African reality, particularly recently in Africa and Europe, with floods of migrants causing political, economic and religious consequences. Reasons for increasing xenophobic activity in South Africa can be related to economic factors, frustration concerning identity towards strangers and job losses, to name but a few.

According to the Old Testament, forced migration played a prominent role in the Pentateuch (Genesis-Deuteronomy), but meticulous care of the stranger is clearly stipulated in the Torah (Law). The prescribed Covenant Code, emphasising love and
human dignity, guided the people of God (Israelites) against xenophobia. The ger [stranger, migrant], according to the Covenant Code (Ex 20), has to be cared for and the Book of Exodus shares with the readers more than one narrative of xenophobia.

On the one hand, we meet examples of institutional xenophobia in the narrative of the Babylon exile. On the other hand, the story of Ruth demonstrates xenophilia [love of the stranger]. The opposite is also true: the prophet Ezra expelled all the foreign wives on grounds of cultural differences, which is an explicit example of xenophobia.

Applied to the South African situation, inequality and poverty, mainly caused by apartheid, still stimulate the clash of cultures, emphasising cultural, economic and even religious differences that lead to xenophobia. The question remains: What should a Reformed Christian’s response to such a tense situation be? And where and how do the churches fit into such a dilemma?

The Bible sketches individual and institutional xenophobia. Biblical anthropological narratives amply illustrate the relationship between xenophobia and racism. The Reformed and pastoral outcome, based on biblical norms, remains to transform xenophobia into xenophilia and xenodochia [safe haven to the threatened].

The New Testament focuses on Jesus, himself being the ‘stranger’ and ‘migrant’ from heaven. The apostles also became involved in the process of witnessing the transformation from xenophobia to xenophilia. The cultural differences between the Greeks and Jews can be seen as a natural playground to illustrate xenophobia but also xenophilia and xenodochia. The narrated event of Philip and the Ethiopian eunuch (Ac 8) illustrates xenophilia. The narratives of the Good Samaritan (Lk 15) and the Samaritan woman at the well (Jn 4) are also examples of xenodochia and xenophilia.

This chapter concludes by focusing on xenophilia and xenodochia, replacing xenophobia within a framework of Christian ethics and its worth following influence.
Christianity at war with racism in South Africa

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Introduction

The issue of racism has been front-page news in most newspapers in South Africa on several occasions during the year 2016 and midway through 2017. It is phenomena like those referred to in the newspapers that tear a nation apart and paralyse it. Ethnic groups accuse one another of racism to escape their own guilt. A search on the internet looking for solutions only results in discovering how much has been written on this issue, the different angles from which it has been approached, the time span over which it has occurred, and the fact that it is currently a serious worldwide phenomenon (see Fredrickson 2015 [2002]). The volume of

literature is a surprise, and the variety and the nature of the themes of these publications. This shows how complex and acute racism is and how wide the diverse understandings of racism stretch. An internet search not only points out the complexity of racism, but also the danger of a biased interpretation (see Van der Merwe 1998:12) of its phenomenology. The word *racism* has been used daily in a biased way by millions of people to suit their conduct.

This research offers a proposal. Considering that more than two thirds of the South African population regard themselves as Christians, the church should nationally and individually step forward to tackle this acute issue incisively. The politicians are not capable of doing this – they are there only for themselves and use racism to divide the people of South Africa even further to suit their own ideologies.

This discourse consists of four sections. There is no uniformity with regard to the interpretation, understanding and definition of racism among all the parties participating in the problem of racism. Consensus is needed to establish a definition of racism. The first section in this discourse is therefore about defining a widely acceptable realistic working definition of ‘racism’ to be used by all groups. The second section reflects on some recent occurrences of serious incidents of racism in South Africa, indicating how acutely serious this issue is in the current situation. This section also includes reference to what has already been done over a number of years up to this present moment to address this serious and destructive problem, not only in South Africa, but also worldwide. The third section addresses the issue of racism. The Belhar Confession is used as the point of departure. Opposite to racism is reconciliation, which is a key term in the Belhar Confession. Where racism divides, reconciliation unites. Finally, it is spelled out how the church must play a major, catalytic and critical role in this regard.

### Defining racism

The word *racism* is part of the daily vocabulary of millions of people. The question is: Do they use it in the same sense? No, not
at all. They use it arbitrarily with different meanings in different contexts and situations. Moreover, they use it in such a way as to suit their ideologies.

The English Oxford Living Dictionaries (2016) defines *racism* as ‘prejudice, discrimination, or antagonism directed against someone of a different race based on the belief that one’s own race is superior’. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2016) defines it as ‘poor treatment of or violence against people because of their race; the belief that some races of people are better than others’. Wellman (1993:1203) defines racism as a ‘system of advantage based on race’. Van Soest and Garcia (2003:32, quoted by Hoyt 2012:229) say, ‘we view racism above all as a sociopolitical phenomenon that is characterized by social power.’ Wijeyesinghe, Griffin and Love (1997) define racism as:

*The systematic subordination of members of targeted racial groups who have relatively little social power in the United States (Blacks, Latinos/as, Native Americans, and Asians), by the members of the agent racial group who have relatively more social power (Whites). This subordination is supported by the actions of individuals, cultural norms and values, and the institutional structures and practices in society. (pp. 88–89)*

For Della-Dora (1970) ‘racism is different from racial prejudice, hatred, or discrimination. Racism involves having the power to carry out systematic discriminatory practices through the major institutions of our society.’ Ridley (2005) gives a more extended and reliable definition of racism on which this discourse stands:

*Racism is any behaviour or pattern of behaviour that tends to systematically deny access to opportunities or privileges to members of one racial group while allowing members of another racial group to enjoy those opportunities or privileges ... This definition includes five key features: It emphasizes the variety of racist behaviors, the systematic nature of racist behavior, and the roles of preferential treatment, inequitable outcomes, and nonrandom victimization. (p. 1)*

To clarify, Ridley (2005:1–6) then briefly discusses each one of the features referred to in the definition:
The variety of racist behaviours: The majority of people visualise racism as deliberate and possibly extreme biased acts, for example violence. They rarely regard themselves as racists. It is because their understanding of themselves does not fit such behaviour. Existentially, though, racism comprises more. In fact, it is much, much more than some dishonourable acts of violence. Racism manifests itself in an extensive variety of conducts, many of which do not relate to the ordinary person’s understanding of racism (Ridley 2005:1).

The systematic nature of racist behaviour: Every incident of racism exists in a specific time and space. It operates in ‘social contexts’ of interaction between people. In these social contexts acts and attitudes of racism, which can be regarded as a problem of social systems, take place. Such a system ‘is a pattern of relationships that prevails over time’ (Ridley 2005:3).

Preferential treatment: In impartial systems, all participants are treated equally and have the same opportunities. Not a single person is treated unfairly. No advantage or disadvantage occurs. Contrary to this, racism involves favoured treatment. Consequently, participants of the advantaged group have bigoted benefits over participants of the non-advantaged group.

Inequitable outcomes: Racism normally bestows benefits on the members of the advantaged group, but not on those of the disadvantaged groups. ‘Such benefits may be psychological, social, economic, material, or political’ (Ridley 2005:5).

Non-random victimisation: To be a victim of a bad system and be treated accordingly is one thing. Much worse, however, is continuous victimisation (Ridley 2005:6).

6. Ridley (2005:5) uses the distinction ‘minority vs. majority’, which refers to his circumstances. The South African context is different – therefore the distinction ‘advantage vs. disadvantage’ is used.
It is clear from the above that there are various definitions of racism. One definition should not be given preference to any other. They should rather be seen as complementing one another, because they reflect the different aspects of racism and the different meanings attached to the concept of *racism*. The circumstances and context determine the particular aspect or meaning of racism. We can take something from each of these definitions to help us define racism.

In South Africa, where racism occurs across colour lines, a possible wide-ranging working definition of racism might be:

Racism is any behaviour or system that tends to systematically deny access to opportunities or privileges to members of one racial group, while allowing members of another racial group to enjoy those opportunities or privileges. This includes any attitude or discriminatory practice perpetrated by the institutional structures of society which subordinate a person or group because of their colour or ethnic lineage. (n.p.)

This definition is derived from the above-mentioned definitions and makes all ethnic groups guilty of racism in South Africa. What is crucially important is that most South Africans should agree on what we understand under ‘racism’ before any constructive dialogue on racism can follow. Such a definition must be acceptable to groups of all colours and should not benefit one group or harm another group.

The following section points out a few recent occurrences of incidents of racism in South Africa. Many more can be added!

### Racism in South Africa is currently an acute problem

After the ANC’s 104th anniversary celebrations that were held at the Royal Bafokeng Stadium in Rustenburg in the North-West Province during the second weekend of January 2016, Bulelwa Dayimani (2016) reported on a comment President Zuma made
about racism in South Africa. Has South Africa beaten racism? According to him the President thinks so. He told eNCA:

With time, people have tended to exaggerate the issue of racism because they say SA is still a racist country – not true. We defeated racism when we pursued the non-racial society. Our society is a rainbow nation, it’s a non-racial society. But it does not remove certain individuals who have racist behaviour who are uttering racist statements. (n.p.)

President Zuma added that ‘South Africa can’t be judged as a racist country because a few individuals still harbour racist attitudes.’ According to Dayimani (2016), ‘[m]any political analysts have disagreed with President Zuma’s claim that South Africans exaggerate levels of racial discrimination and that the country has triumphed over racism’.

This view of President Zuma is the opposite of what he said on Human Rights Day on Monday, 21 March 2016 (only a few weeks later) at the Moses Mabhida Stadium in Durban. At that event president Zuma ‘bemoans racism’ (Khoza 2016:News24).

The following is a brief synopsis of only a few reported and notable occurrences of racism. There are many more on both sides of the colour divide.

**Students:** Two of the most degrading incidents were perpetrated by students. The one was illustrated in a racist video made by students of the University of the Free State where white students degraded black female staff with humiliating rituals. The other entailed instances where black students destroyed valuable statues (and paintings) of ‘white’ historical characters on various campuses. The South African Catholic archbishop, William Slattery of Pretoria, states that the student riots (during February and March 2016) articulated racial inequality. According to the archbishop, the recent violence and vandalism at the universities were a reaction to ‘institutional racism’ in a country ‘still dominated by white culture’ (Gamble 2016). According to

7. eNews Channel Africa.
Msomi and Shilaho (2015), the ANC leadership has not succeeded in building up a non-racial and democratic South Africa.

**Sparrow:** There was the Facebook case of Penny Sparrow, who caused anger on social media as many South Africans reacted and condemned her views about black people. She (Sandleir 2015) described black beachgoers as ‘monkeys’ on her Facebook page:

> These monkeys that are allowed to be released on New Years Eve and new years day on the public beaches towns etc. obviously have no education what so ever so to allow them loose is inviting huge dirt and troubles and discomfort to others … (n.p.)

**Human Rights Commission:** Masombuka (2014) declares that, according to the Human Rights Commission, allegations of racism make up, on average, 80% of the 10 000 human rights complaints they receive annually.

**Affirmative action:** Punt (2009:253) points out that most South Africans still perceive racism to be prevalent in South Africa. He (Punt 2009:254) indicates that the, ‘South African government [that] has been accused of the sin of omission and commission with regard to racism.’ They are guilty of unlimited (no time frames or targets) affirmative action and other social and political contriving. This stimulates racist discourse, because it has not yet been accounted for.

**Black journalists:** On 22 February 2008, the Forum for Black Journalists (FBJ) in South Africa met in the Sandton Sun hotel, located in Johannesburg. They hosted the newly elected president of the ANC, Mr Jacob Zuma. For that specific occasion they invited only black colleagues. A few white journalists also attended this event. The black journalists then demanded that the white journalists leave the meeting. After the departure of the white journalists, the meeting continued, allegedly with the approval of Mr Zuma. The black journalists claimed that they had the right to act in this manner. They claimed to have the right to gather on their own behalf, based on the institutionally entrenched right of freedom of association (Punt 2009:250–251).
Pizza delivery man: On 14 March 2016, Wicks (2016) reported that the DA (Athol Trollip) in Port Elizabeth requested the criminal prosecution of an Afrikaans-speaking driver who ‘intentionally’ bumped his vehicle into a pizza delivery (black) man on a motorcycle in the city. The driver of the vehicle filmed the incident. This incident was described by the DA as a ‘vicious race attack’.

Racism as a playing card: An International Relations Round Table (IRRT) spokesperson, Mienke Steytler, accuses politicians of diverting the attention of citizens from the real issues. ‘Instead of paying more attention to the economy, government spending, and job creation, politicians are using racism as playing card in the political game’ (Schwikowski & Govender 2016).

Racism as part of systems: According to Schwikowski and Govender (2016), ‘[w]e are a country still very much focused on race, for example when you go to a government department you are expected to fill in forms and indicate your race’. According to them, this form of racism should be removed from all systems, because, as long as race is maintained as a category of identification in South Africa, we are going to experience numerous problems.

Hate speech: Most recently, three serious forms of hate speech on the part of radical students occurred during October 2016. All three relate to the Feesmustfall campaign at universities, which demands free tertiary education. At Wits University, a statement has been circulating online saying that ‘one white student, whether male or female, must die to get the attention of the Wits University vice chancellor, Adam Habib’ (Goba 2016). In the second case, graffiti appeared on the School of Law entrance at Wits, reading, ‘fuck white people’ (Roman 2016). The third case relates to the new Twitter slogan Whitesmustfall.\(^8\) Journalist Max du Preez (2016) writes that:

\[\text{It's time to face the reality. The ‘revolution’ on our campuses is not primarily about university fees any longer. Nor is it about the}\]

\(^8\) Also a discussion point on Twitter. This slogan occurs on the same internet page of the previous case.
‘decolonization’ of the curricula. The subtext, the unspoken agenda, is beginning to look more and more like an effort to create a mini Arab Spring moment and to turn the entire post-1994 dispensation on its head. What we’re seeing on campuses reflects a deep anger and resentment at the status quo, which stretches way beyond fees. A cue that this is not about fees any longer is the extreme race rhetoric we have witnessed over the last few weeks, unlike anything we have ever seen. The legitimate struggle against whiteness and white privilege is being overtaken by a populist assault on white citizens. Some days #FeesMustFall sounds more like #WhitesMustFall. (n.p.)

Racism addressed – the road travelled has to be acknowledged

It is crucial to acknowledge the road travelled and to take cognisance thereof. This helps to see what has already been done, what works and what did not work. Political analyst Professor Susan Booysen from Wits acknowledges that ‘much has been done to fight racism in the last 20 years’. But, as pointed out above, she adds that ‘[r]acism is not a mission that is accomplished’ (Dayimani 2016).

The following are some examples of what has already been done:

**Anti-racism week:** Schwikowski and Govender (2016) report that during the week of 17 March 2016 an anti-racism campaign, namely TakeOnRacism, took place in South Africa. The objectives of the campaign were ‘to change attitudes and curb racial incidents’.

**Anti-Racism Network:** Schwikowski and Govender (2016) also refer to the launch of the Anti-Racism Network South Africa (ARNSA) campaign by about 80 civil society organisations to combat racism at a national level. They aim to fight racism and related forms of discrimination. According to Schwikowski and Govender, this network constitutes ‘a platform for South Africans to openly speak on their experience of racial prejudice’.
**Nelson Mandela foundation:** Two principles of the Nelson Mandela Foundation are (Anon. 2016a):

1. Convening dialogue around critical social issues, including particular issues regarding human rights and democracy, to contribute to a just society.
2. The promotion of, or engaging in, philosophical activities, including discussion regarding issues pertaining to human rights and democracy. (n.p.)

The vision of this foundation is that a society remembers its past, listens to all its voices, and pursues social justice. Its mission is to contribute to the making of a just society by promoting the legacy of Nelson Mandela, providing an integrated public information resource on his life and times, and convening dialogue around critical social issues (Anon. 2016a).

**National House of Traditional Leaders:** Jenni Evans (2016) reports on what President Zuma said at the opening of the National House of Traditional Leaders in Cape Town on 03 March 2016:

Racism subjugated our communities and so it is important that we speak against racism and not allow it to come back. We should not think it is for other people, nor should we think it is for political parties or politicians. It is for all of us, *[to speak out against it]*. The whole of March will be dedicated to spreading the message that the country is united against racism, he said, and traditional leaders must do their part too. Let all South Africans speak in one voice on March 21 and every other day, and say we are united against racism and that together we will continue to build a united, non-racial, non-sexist, democratic and prosperous South Africa. A rally will be held in Durban on March 21 in a national day against racism. (n.p.)

From the above it is evident that a few specific occurrences of racism in South Africa have pointed out the reality of racism within all ethnic groups. It is also clear that much attention has been given to combating racism in South Africa, but with mixed success. This can be ascribed to the fact that these
were individual and different efforts to address racism. There is also no uniform understanding and formulation of what racism means and comprises. A unified definition should be sought. This certainly also calls for a national effort to actively, radically and systematically address this destructive phenomenon.

Combating racism in South Africa: the involvement of the church

According to Kritzinger (1994:613), 1991 statistics show that about 68% of the South African population regard themselves as Christians. South African Statistics 2012 (Lehohla 2012) indicated in 2012 that about 70% of the South African population is Christianity-oriented. Religion statistics on the internet indicate that, in 2014, about 68% of the people in South Africa were Christians. In view of this high percentage of Christians and the growing interest in Christianity on the African continent (cf. Kollmann 2010:4), the church should play a major and critical role in combating racism. The church has to consider four things to respond to the evils of racism:

1. In South Africa a national uniform understanding of racism has to be adopted and a national paradigm shift is needed to address it. The church has to take cognisance that in South Africa, racism is no longer only a matter of superiority, but also a matter of retaliation and back payment from a socio-political perspective.
2. All groups must acknowledge their guilt of injustice in the past and in the present. The church must act as facilitator in all

9. Cases of success occurs in small groups, especially at charismatic churches (e.g. the countrywide Christian Revival Church) where the style of worship accommodates all groups and where English is the accepted language to create tolerance, acceptance and love for one another.

10. The non-academic internet site ‘Religious population’ determines the percentage of Christians in South Africa as 68% (Anon. 2016b).
groups to stop hate speech and must create and serve as a platform for an atmosphere and positive attitude of collaboration. If this is regarded as futile by any group, then racism will remain a critical issue. A complex problem like racism does not have an instant solution. Combating it will be a difficult and long process at different levels and in different areas of life.

3. Belhar Confession (Anon. 1986c): The means by which the church should deal with racism should be through the serious implementation of the Belhar Confession. This is the blueprint of how the church should act. An extract from the Belhar Confession reads:

- That Christ’s work of reconciliation is made manifest in the church as the community of believers who have been reconciled with God and with one another (Eph 2:11–22).

- That unity is, therefore, both a gift and an obligation for the church of Jesus Christ; that through the work of God’s Spirit it is a binding force, yet simultaneously a reality that must be earnestly pursued and sought, one that the people of God must continually be equipped to attain (Eph 4:1-16).

- That this unity must become visible so that the world may believe that separation, enmity and hatred between people and groups is a sin that Christ has already conquered, and accordingly that anything that threatens this unity may have no place in the church and must be resisted (Jn 17:20–23).

- That this unity of the people of God must be manifested and be active in a variety of ways: in that we love one another; that we experience, practise and pursue community with one another; that we are obligated to give ourselves willingly and joyfully to be of benefit and blessing to one another; that we share one faith, have one calling, are of one soul and one mind; have one God and Father, are filled with one Spirit, are baptized with one baptism, eat of one bread and drink of one cup, confess one name, are obedient to one Lord, work for one cause, and share one hope; together come to know the height and the breadth and the depth of the love of Christ; together are built up to the stature of Christ, to the new humanity; together know and bear one another’s burdens, thereby fulfilling the law of Christ that we need one
another and edify one another, admonishing and comforting one another; that we suffer with one another for the sake of righteousness; pray together; together serve God in this world; and together fight against all that may threaten or hinder this unity (Phil 2:1–5; 1 Cor 12:4–31; Jn 13:1–17; 1 Cor 1:10–13; Eph 4:1–6; Eph 3:14–20; 1 Cor 10:16–17; 1 Cor 11:17–34; Gal 6:2; 2 Cor 1:3–4).

- [7]hat this unity can be established only in freedom and not under constraint; that the variety of spiritual gifts, opportunities, backgrounds, convictions, as well as the various languages and cultures, are opportunities for mutual service and enrichment within the one visible people of God by virtue of the reconciliation in Christ (Rm 12:3–8; 1 Cor 12:1–11; Eph 4:7–13; Gal 3:27–28; Jas 2:1–13).

4. Churches working together: The term unity (also reconciliation) occurs a number of times in the Confession. In South Africa the different Christian denominations have members from all over the colour spectrum. Geographically, they are separated and grouped. All members of all church denominations will have to cross boundaries, reach out to one another and build new relationships between congregations and members. A prerequisite would be that all groups work together honestly.

11. The church must reflect the unity of the body of Christ in its structure, life, and work. Paul wrote: “For just as the body is one and has many members, and all the members of the body, though many, are one body, so it is with Christ. For in the one Spirit we were all baptized into one body—Jews or Greeks, slaves or free—and we were all made to drink of one Spirit.’ (1 Cor 12:12–13, NRSV). From this text it is apparent that the unity of the church transcends all races and cultures and is to be evident in accepting and including all peoples (The Commission on Theology and Church Relations of the Lutheran Church 1994:38). The Bible requires the church to confront moral evil, including the sin of racism, reminding the Ephesian Christians to ‘Take no part in the unfruitful works of darkness, but instead expose them’ (Eph 5:11, NRSV). Paul continues to exhort them to “Be careful then how you live, not as unwise people but as wise, making the most of the time, because the days are evil. So do not be foolish, but understand what the will of the Lord is’ (Eph 5:15–17). Racism must be regarded as ‘works of darkness’ that produce no value to anyone (The Commission on Theology and Church Relations of the Lutheran Church 1994:39).

12. For instance the Reformed tradition, Pentecostals, Roman Catholics, Apostolic groups, et cetera.
The essence of the Christian message is the way to reconciliation. This term *reconciliation* occurs a number of times in the Belhar Confession and is an essential way to combat racism and to create unity among the different ethnic groups in South Africa.

### Reconciliation is the only way to heal broken relationships

Brown (1978:145) in his *Dictionary of New Testament theology* (vol. 3) states that ‘[r]econciliation means the restoration of a good relationship between enemies’. To achieve such a relationship, the aspects that caused the enmity must be removed. This is attained through atonement.

In the New Testament, three different Greek nouns are used to describe such restoration: ἀποκατάστασις [restoration], ἱλασμός [expiation] and καταλλαγή [reconciliation].

13. The noun ἀποκατάστασις is a political term that has also been used in eschatological discussions to refer to a ‘partial or universal restoration’ (Brown 1978:146; also Arndt, Danker & Bauer 2000:112).

14. The other noun ἱλασμός and its derivatives are cultic terms and the verb denotes activities that sought favour with the gods. The noun καταλλαγή and its derivatives come from the secular world. It means ‘the improvement of a negative relationship’ (Brown 1978:146); ‘reestablishment of an interrupted or broken relationship, reconciliation’ (Arndt et al. 2000:521). From this brief analysis it seems as if the noun καταλλαγή would be applicable when we deal with racism.

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To keep it simple, reconciliation in the South African context will have to entail the improvement of negative relationships. What this in essence comprises is evident in the New Testament. According to the New Testament, believers see in Jesus God’s love and forgiveness that brings about reconciliation between him and humans. Therefore, love and forgiveness are the two complementary constituents of reconciliation – where forgiveness is the one side of reconciliation, love is the other side. They are inseparable.

The church responds to racism in both word and deed by showing love and forgiveness to all for whom Christ died. The church should be seen to reflect honour and esteem for all people (1 Pt 2:17; Gl 6:10). By accepting all people as the objects of God’s inestimable love, believers act as witnesses and make known God’s way of countering racism. God’s love, which has saved, forgiven, accepted and blessed all his children, should cause his people to commit themselves to love and respect other human beings equally, and to do so in deeds, not only with pious-sounding resolutions and good intentions. (The Commission on Theology and Church Relations of the Lutheran Church 1994:39)

### Mutual love, the one component to establish reconciliation

One of the best descriptions of love in the New Testament is where Jesus washes the feet of his disciples (Jn 13). This event undoubtedly does not have only one meaning. As a symbol in Christianity, it is a source of endless reflection. It engenders a deep understanding of the unity to which the disciples of Jesus are called. What happens here is that ‘the horizon of the text fuses with the various horizons of generations of readers’ (Schneiders 1999:166).

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15. According to Belsterling (2006:81), the fundamental point in John 13 is, that in the same way as Jesus loved his own disciples, they love one another.
This activity certainly is not only a good example of humility, but rather a revelatory act which reveals Jesus’ love for his disciples. Jesus even washed the feet of Judas who would betrayed him and Peter who would deny him. The fulfilment of his mission was to complete God’s boundless love for the world (Schneiders 1999:167). Jesus is on his way to be crucified, to lay down his life for the sake of others.

After washing Peter’s feet, Jesus called on his disciples to follow him (Jn 13):

So if I, your Lord and Teacher, have washed your feet, you also ought to wash one another’s feet. For I have set you an example, that you also should do as I have done to you. (vv. 14-15 [NRSV])

The unity to which Jesus calls his disciples is augmented when Jesus calls on them to ‘follow him’ by ‘example’. Jesus had set the parameters by frequently using the comparative particle καθὼς [according to or just as]. He had set them an ‘example’ (ὑπόδειγμα) of mutual service; in fact, he set them a prototype. The disciples should inspire others to have the same of love that they had (Schlier 1978:33).

(footnote 15 continues ...)

Three key statements characterise this love. All three start with a conditional particle ‘unless’ (ἐάν) or ‘if’ (εἰ): ‘If I do not wash you, you have no part with me’ (v. 8); ‘If I then, the Lord and the Teacher, washed your feet, you also ought to wash one another’s feet’ (v. 14); and, ‘If you know these things, you are blessed if you do them’ (v. 17). In this manner, Jesus expresses his will of how the disciples are to live after his departure to the Father. Jesus also stressed that it is not sufficient to know him or how to love others; love should be expressed through service (Mt 7:24–27; Ja 1:22–25).

16. The noun υπόδειγμα [example] should firstly be interpreted according to its immediate context – the foot washing event. Notwithstanding, it also has wider semantic implications. Jesus is the true model who has set an example for his disciples with regard to their mission. Jesus’ example is depicted throughout John’s Gospel by means of various motifs: the light and/or darkness motif (3:19–21); the shepherd motif (10:2–6, 11–18); the kernel-of-wheat motif (12:24–26); the foot-washing motif (13:2–11); and the obedience motif (14:31; 15:10; see 14:15, 21, 23, 24). See Van der Merwe (2001:135–139) for a discussion of these motifs.
The evangelist portrays Jesus as a servant in this action of foot washing. This kind of service was normally understood as something that one person does for the benefit of another. In its extreme form, it could imply that the one who serves would offer his or her life to the benefit of the one served. This kind of service to one another is a proficient way of expressing supreme love. The love command given by Jesus implies this inner form of service. Every act of service that consists of preferring another to the self, irrespective of how ordinary it is, is basically an act of self-giving. It expresses an ultimate love of self-giving (Schneiders 1999:70).

For contemporary followers of Christ, the fundamental principle in the act of the foot washing lies in participating in Jesus’ work to transform the errant structures of dominion, operative in society. This exemplary of friendship should express itself in the mutual abidance in Christ, the mutual love and mutual service of one another. A healthy friendship between church members engages them in relationships and creates unity among them (Schneiders 1999).

**Forgiveness – the other component to establish reconciliation**

Forgiveness is the other side of the coin (of reconciliation). Forgiveness, together with love, constitutes reconciliation and is an act of the will. It starts with taking a decision and then becomes a process of implementation.

Adams (1982:63) defines reconciliation as ‘a change of relationship between persons’. Such a change consists of three elements: confession of the transgressions,\(^\text{17}\) forgiveness by God and those who

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\(^{17}\) My description of restitution can be added here.
have been offended, and the establishment of a new relationship between the parties involved. Reconciliation ultimately means that hostility and division are replaced by peace and fellowship.

It is crucial to be bear in mind that forgiveness not only marks the end of a distorted relationship, but it also marks the beginning of something new. This means that all those matters that caused the division should be cleared up. Adams (1982:63) declares that ‘[c]hange in human relationships not only leads to the abandonment of the old ways (putting off), but also to the establishment of a new relationship (putting on)’.

Confession and restitution

The first step to reconciliation is that infringements must be acknowledged. All groups must tell their stories. Confession and restitution by all groups are imperative. It is very important for people to have platforms where they can engage on issues of racism. Before they can begin to talk about reconciliation, they need to look at what it is that divides them and deal with it. For as long as we are not getting to the root causes of the many ills of our country, we will continue going backward. The Christian principles pointed out in this discourse to change the lives of people and enhance reconciliation can facilitate this process:

- Frequency of confession: A question that immediately arises is: How many times and how must all groups confess their transgressions that contributed extensively to the climate of racism in South Africa and apologise about the harm done in the past and present? How many times must the same stories be told again and again? If a person, after confessing honestly, believes that God has forgiven him or her, why can people not forgive? Forgiveness sets all of those involved free and gives peace of mind, while lack of forgiveness keeps on binding and causes discontent. Let us listen to each other’s stories with open hearts and minds and compassion (Bosch 1979) and make a concerted effort to process the past (and the present offences) so that we can finally lay them to rest and move
forward. If we keep living in the past\textsuperscript{18} it will restrict us from moving forward. Let us learn from the East Europeans who freed themselves from the negative thoughts and terror of communist oppression.

- **Content of transgressions:** Apartheid has not been destroyed; it still features. It also features in a different garment. In both the past and present there were and are killings, discrimination, corruption, fraud, restrictions on freedom of movement, land claims, et cetera.

- **Mode of restitution:** How restitution should be made is a difficult question. How can the dead be resurrected? How can the billions of fraud money and money lost due to a poor currency be paid back? How can relational harm be healed? How can land claimed be given back without in the end harming the poor? How can any form of injustice in the past and present be corrected? How can millions of South Africans in diaspora be brought back to their home country? Who decides when and what is enough?

The evils of the past and the present have to be dealt with. However, it is important to also look ahead and move forward towards a better, prosperous and safe country of which all citizens can be proud.

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**Forgiveness is to think about the past without any more experiencing the harm**

In Scripture we are commanded to forgive:

- **Matthew 6:14–15 (NRSV):** ‘For if you forgive others their trespasses, your heavenly Father will also forgive you;\textsuperscript{15} but if you do not forgive others, neither will your Father forgive your trespasses.’

- **Luke 17:3–4 (NRSV):** ‘So watch yourselves. If your brother sins, rebuke him, and if he repents, forgive him.’\textsuperscript{4} If he sins

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\textsuperscript{18} What is past? How far back does the past stretch? We can distinguish between distant and immediate past, although both are the past.
against you seven times in a day, and seven times comes back to you and says, ‘I repent’, forgive him.’

- **Ephesians 4:32 (NRSV):** ‘Be kind and compassionate to one another, forgiving each other, just as in Christ God forgave you.’
- **Colossians 3:13 (NRSV):** ‘Bear with each other and forgive whatever grievances you may have against one another. Forgive as the Lord forgave you.’

These texts extend God’s forgiveness of us to our forgiveness of others. Complete forgiveness implies a complete change and a completely new relationship. The founding of this new relationship does not imply that the offended must forget the past. Scripture says nothing about this (Adams 1982:64; see Deist 1997:34). According to Adams, ‘forgiveness’ does not mean to forget immediately. For him it ‘involves a commitment not to raise the issue again’ (Adams 1982:64). Forgiveness would then imply not to hold the offences of the past over the heads of the offenders - that is, to dwell on it no more.

Matthews 6:14–15 is a conditional expression by Jesus. God’s forgiveness is only granted and experienced when we forgive others (see also Mt 6:14ff.; 5:23ff.; 18:35; see Van der Merwe 1998:16). Goppelt explains what the Synoptics communicate regarding forgiveness. For Goppelt (1983):

> [T]his correlation between God’s forgiveness and forgiving one’s neighbor was not a relationship of reciprocity, but a circulatory system. The circular flow between God’s forgiveness and human forgiving was destroyed whenever the latter collapsed. (p. 134)

Hogan (1990:34) adds another perspective to forgiveness: the choice to judge the offenders no more but in love and prayer to support them in every way possible towards a solution. Only the will of the victim to forgive, aided by the grace of God, can bring about a solution.

The Bible says (Rm 12):

14Bless those who persecute you; bless and do not curse them …

19Beloved, never avenge yourselves, but leave room for the wrath of God; for it is written, ‘Vengeance is mine, I will repay, says the Lord.’
No, ‘if your enemies are hungry, feed them; if they are thirsty, give them something to drink; for by doing this you will heap burning coals on their heads.’

Do not be overcome by evil, but overcome evil with good. (vv. 14, 19–21 [NRSV])

Forgiveness is not to run away from reality. Rather, it means to face reality with the help of God and other people. Forgiveness is for the sake of both groups and the manifestation of love. Forgiveness has nothing to do with feelings. Forgiveness exists in the will, the decision-making of a person (graced by God). The feelings of victims may be hurt, their emotions bruised, but in the end their will must agree to cooperate with the way God prescribes in the Scripture. In the end, then, no vendetta is carried out and no revenge is taken (Van der Merwe 1998:17).

Forgiveness is not to forget the past - the harm done by apartheid; the killings of black people in riots (Sharpeville and Lonmin) and those of white farmers; the injustices done to black people; discrimination; ineffective affirmative action; the devastation of many municipalities in our beautiful country; fraud of billions of Rands; the increase in the difference in wealth between the rich and the poor; the support of criminal activities, et cetera. One can add to this list.

We can also ask the following questions: Can the white Afrikaners ever forget how black people murdered white farmers? No. Did the older white Afrikaners ever forget how British soldiers burned down their farms and how many women and children died in concentration camps during the Anglo-Boer war? No. Can the black people in South Africa ever forget the injustice of apartheid in the past and the Sharpville events? No. Can the world, especially the Jews, forget the holocaust and all the harm done by the Germans during the First and Second World Wars?

19. Can’t we also add Lonmin here? Davies (2012, The Guardian) reported that, ‘On 16 August 2012, South African police opened fire on a large crowd of men who had walked out on strike from a platinum mine at Marikana, about 80 miles north of Johannesburg. They shot down 112 of them, killing 34.’
No. Can the Japanese nation ever forget what the Americans did to the cities of Nagasaki and Hiroshima? No. Can the apostle Paul ever forget his persecutions for the sake of spreading the Gospel (Phlp 3:6; 1 Tm 1:13)? No. He also remembered in detail how the Jews lashed him 39 times on five occasions and that they once stoned him and left him for dead (2 Cor 11:23).

Reconciliation is not based on amnesia. It is grounded in forgiveness. Forgiveness deals with the transgressions of the past. Peace can only be established through anamnesis and forgiveness (see Deist 1997:34). Therefore, the foundation of reconciliation is not ‘forget’, but rather ‘remember’. Reconciliation from the perspective of Scripture demands of transgressors to remember their guilt and consequently confess it, and of victims to remember their sufferings and, notwithstanding, to forgive (Deist 1997:34).

Unreconciled memories cause pain whenever any one of the parties, both offender and victim, think about the transgressions of the past and the present. This then incubates negative memories which continue to affect both groups adversely. Reconciled memories are different. Reconciliation ensures that the offenders and victims will remember the offences without pain. By removing any form of pain from the memory, reconciliation changes the quality of the remembrance. Destructive memories are then changed into constructive memories. This, then, can give birth to the peace of God. South Africans must learn from their historical mistakes. If not, history will repeat itself; it actually has already repeated itself (see Deist 1997:35).

The establishment of new relationships between church members

When a Christian congregation finds itself in a changing situation, the members must reach out to one another as members of the Christian family. Then the restoration of fellowship can take place through the simultaneous processes of the dehabituation of
racism and discrimination, and the rehabituation of acceptance and wellbeing.

Restoration of fellowship comprises involvement in the lives of those subjugated

The forgiveness of Jesus did not only consist of a declaration of the restoration of fellowship. Neither should the forgiveness of South Africans (Christian believers) consist only of declarations. Jesus’ forgiveness never ceased; so should it be with South Africans (see Mt 8:21). Jesus sets us an ‘example’ (ὑπόδειγμα, Jn 13:15). Goppelt (1983) significantly remarks that Jesus’ forgiveness was constantly linked with his personal involvement in the life of the individual.

The question that remains is: How can we address (habitual) offenses? The solution is clearly spelled out in Ephesians 4:22–24, where the apostle Paul refers to the dehabituation of bad habits and the rehabituation of new and good habits.

Dehabituation and rehabituation, the two components in changing one’s life

In Ephesians 4:17 the apostle Paul writes to guide readers on how to change bad habits and conduct, ‘[n]ow this I affirm and insist on in the Lord: you must no longer live (μηκέτι ὑμᾶς περιπατεῖν, ‘to walk, lead a life’, according to Lincoln 1990:276) as the Gentiles live, in the futility of their minds’. Although Paul uses the present,

20. ‘You were taught, with regard to your former way of life, to put off your old self, which is being corrupted by its deceitful desires; to be made new in the attitude of your minds; and to put on the new self, created to be like God in true righteousness and holiness.’

21. Arndt et al. (2000:803) define it as ‘conduct one’s life, comport oneself, behave, live as habit of conduct’.
active infinitive, he presents this exhortation in the strongest sense\textsuperscript{22}: he ‘affirms and insists on in the Lord’.

The principle here is that the readers must differentiate clearly between their ways of life and those of the members of the surrounding society of which they were part before they became Christians (see Lincoln 1990:276). Applied to the South African situation, one would say: distinguish sharply between the life of racism and discrimination and how your life as a Christian should be. If you are a Christian, your daily activities (lifestyle) must change to resonate with how believers in Christ should act (see Adams 1982:177). In this text Paul calls ‘for a change in the manner of life (see 4:22) ... change in the person’. If Paul then commands this change and if it is viable, then he would have informed the readers about the mechanisms to be applied to bring about such change. The change contemplated by Paul is not directed at some activities or some attitudes. No, the change contemplated by Paul is ‘directed toward a way of life’ (Adams 1982:177). Paul refers to this ‘way of life’ in his usage of the verb \(\piεριπατείν\) [to walk, to live].

In Ephesians 4:22 Paul says ‘put away your former way of life’ in order ‘to clothe yourselves with the new self’ (4:24), a new way of living. In the rest of 4:24 he says that this new way of life should be ‘according to the likeness of God in true righteousness and holiness’. Paul goes even further to inform the reader on how it should be done and where it all should start, namely ‘to be renewed in the spirit of your minds’ (4:23; see also Rm 12:2).

Paul’s call for renewal in Ephesians 4 recalls his earlier formulation in 2:10, where he states that believers are ‘created for good works which God prepared beforehand’. At the same time, as we have already seen, the mention of the virtues here in 4:24 is in an overall paraenetical context in which it is made clear that believers must appropriate the new humanity and its ethical qualities. The choice of righteousness and holiness as ethical qualities underlines the point that the new humanity has been

\textsuperscript{22} According to Lincoln (1990:276) ‘the infinitive with the accusative is employed here for the imperative in indirect speech (see also Ac 21:2, 4)’. 
recreated to be like God, because righteousness and holiness are both characteristics of God (Lincoln 1990:288).

**Some practical suggestions how the church can play a leading, catalytic and critical role in combatting racism in South Africa**

South Africa will be motivated and consider uniting through ecumenical endeavours to combat racism and interreligious dialogues and not politics. A key approach is the prayer of Jesus at the Last Supper, ‘That they may all be one ...’ (Jn 17:21). Churches need to present to South Africans key principles of unity as life-principles establishing a spirituality of unity based on the Word. Evidence of past successes need to be presented as well as failures.\(^\text{23}\)

**Role of the church**

Acknowledging previous contributions, the governing bodies of all the church groups (main line Protestant and Catholic churches, the African Independent Christian Churches [AICC] and South African Council of Churches [SACC]) should join and intensify their united decisive initiatives and proposals to start negotiations with leaders in all sectors of the community. These should include: church leaders; political leaders of all parties; private sector and civil services; media; people at grassroots and all sectors of education so as to facilitate the following:

**Local churches**

The church has to play a leading role where all members, representing the various races in their communities, should reach

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\(^{23}\) Many churches failed in the past to annihilate racism because of the national Afrikaner ideology of apartheid.
out to one another in joint meetings and projects to address racism. Racism should receive serious attention in and through biblical education. The church does not only bear the message of reconciliation, but must also set the example. Issues of the PAST as well as the PRESENT should be addressed. How are all groups going to correct the PAST and the PRESENT? The Belhar Confession should be used as guideline to implement reconciliation.

Local churches could combine at every level (e.g. ministers’ fraternal, adults, parents, single parents, youth) to form ecumenical and interreligious groups to begin dialogue about racism and establish strategies to combat racism locally, regionally and nationally. This could include organising workshops, activities or games to promote mutual respect and living the golden thread of mutual love.

Political environment

Political leaders should stop dividing the nation with their radical critique of certain ethnic groups. They should put legislation in place for the benefit of all groups in South Africa. They should seriously attend to matters such as crime, fraud, safety and the repatriation of illegal immigrants, et cetera. Much has to be done to create many working opportunities. All these things enhance racism. The church(es) should encourage and give basic biblical training to regular church-goers in their communities who could pursue the world of politics and even become politicians.

Affirmative action

Just as ‘Apartheid’ became a swearword for those who suffered under apartheid, so will ‘affirmative action’ become a swearword for those who promulgated apartheid. Church-going, God-committed employers must create a climate of non-discrimination and respect for all citizens. Responsible affirmative action should
be practiced. The church could provide biblical guidelines on why members of all races should be treated equally in both the social and corporate sectors.

■ Role of the media

All forms of media (radio, television, magazines, hoardings, etc.) should be used to promote reconciliation. More positive reports and messages should receive preference. A new frame of reference should be created. Social networks can also be added here. Churches should identify, promote training and support candidates for the media from among their members. Christians should be encouraged to take the lead in journalism, from television and radio to the written word. Local church groups could write to newspapers, phone-in to radio programmes and produce brief YouTube video presentations of successful anti-racist projects.

■ Role of parents

Churches could lead in compiling courses for parents which exhort and guide them to teach their children to respect other ethnic groups and cultures.

■ Role of school education

On the levels of primary and secondary education a compulsory (non-examinable) subject on socio-cultural respect should be part of the curriculum (over 12 years). An ecumenical board could promote research on what makes a non-racial school successful, and identify positive contributions made by both church-run and state-run schools. Case studies in the Johannesburg area could include schools such as Bishop Bavin, St Stithian’s, St John’s, Sacred Heart College Observatory and Mercy Convent Rosebank (and sister-schools in Soweto). Topics could include school
activities combatting racism, projects promoting the integration of all cultures in a school, principles in manifesto's and practice, for example concerning payment of school fees, curriculum, and sports activities. Churches could organise religion-orientated groups to present video or textbook outlines for a curriculum course on racism, with discussion points about events or activities on how their specific orientation and viewpoint (Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism ...) educates youth to mutual respect and unity.

Role of higher education

Church leaders and representatives of tertiary institutes could collaborate on compiling a curriculum for a module(s) on combatting racism. Content could augment existing modules lacking church input or establish a completely new curriculum. It is believed that tertiary education plays a vital role in the phenomenon of creating and nourishing good relationships in all areas of life. The following disciplines in the Faculty of Arts (College of Human Sciences) could be approached: Psychology, Sociology, History, Education, Theology and Religious Studies, Philosophy.

Symbols of reconciliation

Symbols played major roles throughout history to convey certain messages (Voortrekker Monument, Statue of Liberty, Eifel tower, etc.). Why can’t statues depicting reconciliation and good relationships be erected in all the metropolitan areas to be seen daily and function as reminders? Churches and societies could begin with billboards in front of churches, taxi ranks, bus termini, railway stations and shopping malls, for example a big picture showing millions uniting on a Bloemfontein farm to reconcile and pray for peace under the inspiration of the evangelist Buchan. ‘They can unite, can we?’ Explore symbols of reconciliation in other countries, for example in the Holocaust Museum in Israel. Compile a journal, publish a book of
quotations from church leaders which promotes reconciliation and understanding between races, for example Dalai Lama, Popes, Archbishops of Canterbury, Moderators, Patriarchs of Constantinople (Istanbul).

Responsibility of all individuals

A new rhetoric should be adopted by all South Africans. The *leitmotiv* for all South Africans should be to reconcile in order to live in peace, to support those in need, and to work together towards an economically prosperous South Africa. Ecumenical church groups could establish key motivation stimuli to promote this by appealing to everyone, including those who do not believe in a God. Churches need to identify and support different cross-boundary biblically-based motivational groups that could promote such ‘rhetoric’ or activities.

Public holidays

Public holidays, which politicians used to promulgate their ideologies, should rather be used to promote reconciliation and good relationships. Churches could expose the potential for RSA public holidays, for example Youth Day 16 June – could include a march for unity; 09 August Women’s Day – women march for unity, but also deliver talks on the role of the Christian, Jewish, Muslim, Hindu and non-affiliated Woman in a non-racist society; Heritage Day – cultural fests in city parks. People should be bombarded and indoctrinated from all spheres in life to abandon racism and to endeavour to promote peace.

Conclusion

South ‘Africans’ must never rely on politicians or the media to fight racism. It is the responsibility of each citizen in South Africa not to make themselves guilty of practising racism. The Christian
Christianity at war with racism in South Africa

church in general in South Africa must take drastically the initiative and guidance to fight racism radically on both local and national levels. Then, what has been proposed in this research can serve as guidelines for combating racism and establishing healthy relationships and better circumstances for all South African citizens. This is certainly not an easy task. For the church this can lead to all sorts of resistance from the ‘world’. Is this not what Jesus meant when he said to his disciples in Mark 8:34, ‘If any want to become my followers, let them deny themselves and take up their cross and follow me.’ The keywords in such a formidable campaign must be holistic, simultaneously and together.

Summary: Chapter 6

Looking at the phenomenon of racism from the perspectives of time and space as a worldwide occurrence, it is discernible that racism can never be completely eradicated. This seems to be a realistic statement. Racism has occurred throughout history and is today still a worldwide acute phenomenon as is evident on the internet and in many publications about the history of mankind and racism. This does not mean that racism should not be addressed. It is imperative that racism should be addressed critically and radically in South Africa before it becomes unmanageable. Politicians seem incapable of solving this problem. The media exposes many politicians as those who pursue a welfare for themselves and not for the people of South Africa, especially the poor. This discourse intends to make a contribution towards coping with racism from the perspective that the Christian church should play a decisive leading role in combatting racism in South Africa. This discourse consists of four sections. There is no uniformity with regard to the interpretation, understanding and definition of racism among all the parties participating in the problem of racism. Consensus is needed to establish a definition of racism. The first section in this discourse is therefore about defining a widely acceptable realistic working
definition of racism to be used by all groups. The second section reflects on some recent occurrences of serious incidents of racism in South Africa, indicating how acutely serious this issue is in the current situation. This section also includes references to what has already been done over a number of years up to this present moment to address this serious and destructive problem, not only in South Africa, but also worldwide. The third section addresses the issue of racism. The Belhar Confession is used as the point of departure. Opposite to racism is reconciliation, which is a key term in the Belhar Confession. Where racism divides, reconciliation unites. Finally, it is spelled out how the church must play a major, catalytic and critical role in this regard.
The predatory nature of hate speech betrays attribution biases within a South African context

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Introduction

People’s language use within our South African society tends to reflect a distorted view of other people’s motives and expectations. Communities rely on good communication to function in an orderly manner (Deeg 2015:44). In fact, communication is one of the

most basic skills at people’s disposal; yet it is also one of the most concerning aspects, because it can have such dehumanising effects if abused. Communication per se and the importance of quality communication strike people when they become aware of the fact that they are communicating with humans instead of objects. People, after all, share something of their own human experience when they communicate with other people (Pieterse 1987:76; Tubbs & Moss 2008:7). Communicative acts are, above all, aimed at understanding other people’s viewpoints and the encounters between people (Habermas 1993:147). It is essentially something that nourishes and guides mutual understanding between people. There are certain prerequisites before people can understand one another such as that they should treat one another equally and should accept one another as independent interlocutors (Vos 1995:14). For Habermas, it is pivotal that communication between people should be free so that the participants’ humanity and dignity can really come into their own (see Pieterse 2011:12). Ricoeur (1976:12–15), on the other hand, emphasises the role of the frame of reference when he proposes that communication is a referral to the reality that people are experiencing at the given moment.

Hate speech is a threat to constructive communication, especially in a society that should enable people to become interlocutors. Hate speech can be defined as communication that attacks a person or group on the basis of attributes such as gender, ethnic origin, religion, race, disability or sexual orientation (Morton 2004:3). The concept of hate speech makes reference to speech that attacks the person or group at whom it is directed on the basis of hatred or incitement of harm. From the definition listed above, it seems that people notice the obvious attributes first, namely gender, race, age, dress and how physically attractive or unattractive someone is. First impressions (attributions) are important, because it is so powerful in colouring the later ideas we form about people. Impressions are often verbalised as destructive ways of talking to one another and about other people. This, in itself, creates a volcanic crater and a never-ending spiral of predatory speech, resting on the principle of ‘what you do to me, I do to thee’.
In principle, language opens up opportunities for better understanding, but it also constitutes a threat to human dignity in a democratic society. People are comfortable with using a certain kind of language register to label and define other people, because once something is named, it is simultaneously defined (Cleary 2010:117; Steinberg 2007:113). People therefore use language to assess or to tax things as good or bad. This phenomenon contributes to the fact that people can be either supportive of other people or critical of other people’s behaviour. It is noticeable how people, in talking about other people in an inappropriate manner, can convince themselves about negative impressions of people in their own taxation. People employ language to indicate how they feel about one another and to describe their experiences within their environment (Cleary 2010:26). From the above discussion it already seems like hate speech offers an indication of what people regard as important and reveals the direction they want to take. All communication and language eventually entail communication barriers that block a reasonable way of communication. Cleary (2010:12–13) defines two obvious barriers, namely the role of the frame of reference and the role of perceptual barriers. The frame of reference is the sum of one’s cultural background, educational background, attitudes, values, beliefs, physical attributes, age and gender. Perception is information taken in by the senses, processed by the brain, stored in memory and produced by some physical or mental response (Steinberg 2007:69). People are constantly taking in new information, but they evaluate it in terms of their existing frame of reference. This frame of reference also influences people’s perceptions. People’s inlet and outlet mechanisms are intriguing, because one possible way of communicating attitudes and attributes is language used as an outlet.

In South Africa, the way in which people speak about one another is becoming an increasing concern for Christians and for authorities. Prominent examples of hate speech are also something of a public concern. In a controversial judgement,
Julius Malema was found guilty of hate speech for singing his song ‘kill the farmer, kill the boer’ in terms of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act, also known as the Equality Act. The matter was later settled out of court after Malema appealed and, with this settlement, an opportunity to test the definition of hate speech in the Supreme Court of Appeal was lost. The Act prohibits hate speech on the grounds of, among other things, race, gender and religion.

The debate about what constitutes hate speech was reignited when a Durban estate agent, Penny Sparrow, referred to black people as ‘monkeys’ on social media. Several potential court cases loom in the aftermath of that incident. These are only two prominent examples of a resilient problematic praxis within a South African context. It is time to do rigorous introspection to see how often hate speech occurs in our own daily communication, even unconsciously. In this process one should recognise that the phenomenon of hate speech is complex in nature. On the one hand, experts argue that the current jurisprudence on hate speech is problematic, because the courts have gradually broadened its definition to the point where freedom of expression is threatened. On the other hand, it has been argued that hate speech has not been properly targeted by the courts and by various pieces of legislation and that this situation should be remedied with more aggressive laws. This difference in the evaluation of hate speech highlights the fact that this issue should be investigated from a theological vantage point as well. What makes it even more important is that people tend to justify their ways of speaking retroactively.

Inge (2003:124) indicates that whatever the public opinion of hate speech is, this kind of speech is indicative of certain people causing harm to other people and to individual group members. What is more, there is a problematic praxis that forms a circle within a bigger circle, namely the silence of the churches on the negative and degrading effect of hate speech. It is a burning issue, because silence in this regard seems to have an inherently negative ring to it (Kritzinger 2012:233). If communication is
important to a community of believers because God is also a communicative God, his followers should pay careful attention to the kind of speech they use in their communication. Therefore, Vorster (2014:153) highlights the significance of a church that possesses a community attribute and community character. The church has a prophetic voice that should be heard in society (Tubbs-Tisdale 2010:89). As the theology of God’s kingdom, Christian theology should be a public theology. It should be a public, critical and prophetic complaint to God (Moltmann 1999:5). Morton (2004:27) concurs with Moltmann and indicates that for theology to be in the open and in the face of the public it should also deal with the concept of conversation or dialogue. Public theology has to use persuasive messages that could also be referred to as advocacy. This advocacy is not just about speaking the truth, but also about attentively listening to what is happening in society and looking at incidents in public life. Smit (2008:89) and De Gruchy (2004:45) are spot-on with their appeal that the church should contribute to the public discourse about public interests. Kruger (2016:2) also contributes to this view and indicates that concern for the world should be visible in an attitude of earnestness and willingness to take care of the world, also in speaking about the realities of life.

The central theoretical argument in this chapter is that first impressions are enduring and that the voice of hate speech divulges attributional biases. The research question is whether the silence of the church regarding hate speech within the public sphere contributes to the fact that people are unaware of attributional biases, which then derail and are manifest as hate speech. The methodological insights of Dingemans (1996:62) are suitable for research on this matter. This entails that the study divides into the following three phases in a hermeneutical interaction of perspectives:

- The analytical description of the problematic praxis.
- Research on normative perspectives.
- The development of practical theological perspectives.
Analytical description of the problematic praxis of hate speech

Brief overview of practical theological research on the role of the church in communicating societal issues

Prominent thinkers in the field of practical theological research (research over the last seven years) offer several insights on the role of the church within society. Louw (2015a:3) indicates that democratic societies are at a crossroads, oscillating between resistance (anxiety–hate) and outreach (maintaining human rights). This makes evident a tension field that oscillates between resistance and accommodation. De Ruiter (2013:17) underlines the importance of preaching, for example keeping in mind the importance of contextualisation. In this process, aspects such as, among other things, hermeneutics, communication and faith acts should receive specific attention. Cambell and Cilliers (2012:37) indicate that the communication of the church, inter alia preaching, should interrupt people in their lives. It inspires resistance to all powers that hold people captive. Communication by the community of believers should be based on the fact that God had already invaded this earth through the cross and resurrection of Christ. It is about changing people’s perceptions and, above all, about discernment (Cambell & Cilliers 2012:38). Buchanan (2012:21) in turn is concerned about the accusation that the church and its preaching are becoming irrelevant. This is due to a reluctance among preachers to preach about burning issues within society. Keller (2012:194) is also concerned about the church’s view on culture. The reaction of people on culture could be problematic according to Keller. He identifies possible manifestations and reactions on culture, namely:

- A withdrawal from the world into the safe space of the church.
- The quest for a generic Christ for culture.
- A Christ that is superior to culture.
• A dualistic view of Christians as citizens of both God’s kingdom and the kingdom the world.
• An attempt to change culture into a culture in Christ.

Wilkerson (2012:41) emphasises the importance of inspirational preaching that focusses on making sermons applicable to hearers’ contexts. Inspirational preaching should not only focus on what to do, but also on how hearers do (apply) it. Preaching has to resonate in public places to reach people in the workplace and marketplace. Immink and Vos (2009:18) argue from a liturgical viewpoint that communication about God should remain relevant to the reality that people are experiencing. God’s name should be affiliated with daily life and in this process the manner in which communication about God manifests, could contribute towards a better understanding of God’s presence in people’s lives. Pieterse (2009:250–253) notices, in his contribution regarding a communal engagement with poverty, a disturbing trend within the traditional Afrikaans-speaking churches. They do not allow God’s Word to speak within the real life context of hearers. He is also concerned about the possible reasons for this reluctance. Long (2009:51) stresses the importance of the context of preaching, namely the worship service, the liturgy of the street, the liturgy in the workplace, the liturgy of the marketplace and the liturgy of public spaces. Within all the spheres, the witness of the church should give direction as salt and light. Brouwer (2008:26–28) did research within a European context and indicates that the church’s physical address in society is more comprehensive than a mere physical street address. He shows that events within society influence the formation of believers’ attitudes.

It seems as if the concept of a public voice by means of the liturgy in worship services and through one element of liturgy, namely preaching, is evident within practical theological research. However, there is insufficient research regarding the impact of hate speech on a liturgy of togetherness within society. The liturgy of walking in the midst of voices that are clinging to certain memories of the past seems to be problematic, and the way in
The predatory nature of hate speech betrays attribution biases which people are communicating proves it. In order to address this issue from a practical-theological viewpoint, the study consults interpretative perspectives from social psychology and the communication sciences regarding the complexity of hate speech. This can guard one from oversimplifying in an evaluation of this topic.

**Inter- and intradisciplinary perspectives**

This chapter recognises the interdisciplinary and intradisciplinary approaches of the social sciences (Cartledge 2003:15; Pieterse 2001:13). In practical theology, research often focuses on communicative acts, which causes the field to overlap with other sciences that have the same focus. This section briefly engages in an interdisciplinary and intradisciplinary discourse with the fields of ethics, social psychology and communication sciences regarding the mechanism of hate speech, which is sometimes tolerated by a community of believers, because they feel voiceless.

**Perspectives on the ethics of communication within a South African society**

Vorster (2014:153) distinguishes three key components regarding the responsibility of the church as a community of believers, namely the church as a prophetic community, the church as therapeutic community and the church as moral community. The church is also a communicative community that is based on God’s communication and relies on effective communication between people. The community of believers are dependent on communication. In their communication the community of believers should be an example of the profound effect that morals have. Raising a prophetic voice in society and acting as therapeutic community assumes that word and deed should function in a healing capacity. To name the
three aspects above is the easier side of the challenge, but Vorster (2014:155) rightly refers to the deeper-lying challenge, namely to which extent the community of believers succeeds in influencing people in a secular society through their own communication. This question becomes a nerve-racking question if one realises that people in a secular society are becoming more and more disappointed in the church and even sceptical about the potential involvement of the church in societal issues (see Bosch 1991:172; Vorster 2014:159). An ethical framework is needed in the assessment of the relentless influence of hate speech and the possible influence of attributions on this kind of speech. A possible ethical point of departure could be to compare speech (communication) with a diamond in that various and radiant perspectives on the topic of communication are evident. In this instance we investigate silence as interpretive guide to effectively speaking the truth. Two aspects are discussed in this section, namely the ethics of silence and the holiness of uncovering and speaking the truth.

The concept of silence within a South African context

There should be recognition of the exceptional correlation between speech and silence when considering the prickly pear that is hate speech. In this instance silence should not be regarded as the opposite of speech, or even as the mere absence of voice. Silence in this regard is not the same as voicelessness. It should rather be regarded as an integral part of conscious communicative activity. South Africa is, after all, a country of paradoxes. One example of the paradoxical reality of the country is the ability to host a successful World Cup event in 2010, while one of the most severe bouts of xenophobia occurs at the same time. Cilliers (2015:7–8) points in the right direction by referring to the fact that South Africa is indeed a place of
The predatory nature of hate speech betrays attribution biases

paradoxes where one is introduced to the idea of liminality. Within the liminal spaces people have to deal with certain kinds of uncertainty, grief and sometimes a certain view on societal issues to gain new insight. Dehumanising speech is often just the symptom of a very deep and underlying illness. In this regard the influence of underlying attributional biases should never be underestimated. It is inevitable that theological reflection has to speak on behalf of those who have been silenced by harmful speech or has to call for silence in the ranks of offenders so that normative voices could be heard (Muers 2004:3). Theological reflection on the topic of hate speech is also a constructive form of communication with the wider communicative environment in which discourses on this topic are taking place.

Dauenhauer (1980:4) describes the various manifestations of silence. He refers to silence as an intervening act, as it has the function of pausing between sentences or units of thought. The intervening silence binds the parts of an utterance. The meaning of the preceding thoughts and the following thoughts is captured within this communicative moment of silence. Silence has the function of articulating or making sense of speech. This kind of silence is interrupting in nature, but it is also something that opens up new possibilities for mediating acts and new patterns of communication (Muers 2004:6). This insight correlates with the fact that people are interpreting beings. Before uttering words, people have to learn how to utilise communication before using it with freedom. Words and language could be very harmful and require caution. Silences enable people to explore mediating activities within communication. It is notable that people allow themselves the right to say what they are thinking and, in so doing, they appeal to freedom of speech in accordance

24. Liminality can be defined as the description of the human rituals marking the passage from one life cycle to another. It could also denote the uneasy experience of having left your home and not yet having arrived at your destination. Therefore, it refers to the being in limbo. This in-between space is also filled with potential danger. It is therefore about the sense of being in no-man’s land (Cilliers 2015:3).
with the Constitution (South Africa 1996) of the country. In this regard the concept of *interrupting silence* becomes relevant. When Christians confess that they are also a moral community, their deeds and words should confirm this. When words and deeds do not complement one another, an inflation process of communication emerges (Frame 2008:829). Churches should contribute to establishing creative and interpretive moments of silence. This kind of silence promotes the realisation of the value of words. Silence has the potential to enrich the value of encounters between people, even people from different cultural backgrounds and beliefs. In this sense of the word, silence can also add value to the liturgy of togetherness or the liturgy of becoming aware of the dignified presence of other people.

On the other hand, Dauenhauer (1980:75) also distinguishes something that could be described as terminal silences. This kind of silence does not open up possibilities for mediating activities (see intervening silence), but forbids people to speak. It is a kind of silence that declares communication or interpretation on a specific subject closed. It declares that no further act of mediation is possible (Dauenhauer 1980:76). Muers (2004:6) argues that the 20th century has confronted Western languages and culture with a terminal silence as a result of what he describes as the brutalisation and devaluation of words. It could also be said that silence should be regarded both as intervening and as terminal. Discernment is needed to identify each particular situation. In this bigger ellipse, intervening silence and terminal silence are the two focal points within effective communication. When a community of believers are communicating, they are paying attention to their own and to other people’s language, but they are increasingly becoming aware of the fact that some kinds of communication should rather be silenced. In order to speak about people from a different race, gender and other country, the speakers need understanding and clarity about the dignity of people.

Silence to rethink one’s own attributional biases and perceptions is crucial. Silence, as a deep-rooted method of communication, is directed at people’s sense of responsibility.
It should not function as a shield to protect people who are harming other people or as a kind of burden that makes powerless people even more powerless (Muers 2004:9). It should not function as an excuse to turn the back on present challenges within society. It is about a responsible silence and an interpretative moment in the realisation that thinking before speaking and swallowing your words rather than contaminating people’s environment should start with a hermeneutical moment of interpretive silence. Silence creates calmness and calmness leads to the utterance of therapeutic words. In this sense of the word, communication should always serve a better understanding of other people’s context. Silence offers the scaffolding for constructive and healing communication between people. But, as stated above, silence should promote meticulously mediated communication. This aspect is now addressed in more detail.

Holiness in uncovering and speaking the truth

Kaiser (1983:222) indicates that the interpretation of the 9th commandment has often been regarded as problematic. The 9th commandment simply states ‘You shall not give false testimony against your neighbour’. Should all persons, at all times, under all circumstances, tell the truth to all persons in word and deed when asked and not asked? In his delineation of Christian ethics as kingdom ethics, Vorster (2014:102) points out that truth creates peace and good relations between people. Vorster (2014:5) also evaluates the manifestation of hate speech against the background of the 3rd commandment and underlines the fact that people who impair the covenant relationship in its wider horizons by acting loveless are guilty of impairing God’s love. Within the context of hate speech, Vorster continues with his emphasis on the fact that hate speech denotes behaviour that impairs God’s community of love. It is like a beast with many heads or horns. Hate speech can be found in derogatory language, humour, body language, comic representations
of people, cursing and in degrading narratives about people (Vorster 2014:5).

Frame (2008:831) even highlights the fact that the idea of property law is evident in the 9th commandment. Therefore, the focal concern of the 9th commandment is witnessing. Vorster (2014:132) and Frame (2008:831) both articulate the importance of the relationship between truth and communication within a covenant relationship. Cilliers (2000:167) is concerned about the fact that words are spoken in all spheres of life without cognisance of their influence. He also pleads that people should realise that when they communicate, their words should be uttered in responsibility so that God’s Word may be recognised within human words. In this sense of the word, the 9th commandment reminds people of the fact that they should become more word responsible because of God’s presence in their lives (Cilliers 2000:168).

The 9th commandment confronts people with a deep ontological issue, namely to what extent is God’s Word evident in your own words. It is even more serious. It is about to whom should we say the words belong? It is also about whether God’s presence through his Spirit really influences people’s thought processes and their communication. Kaiser (1983:223) focusses on the meaning of the concept of truth and indicates that the meaning of the Hebrew word for truth is to be steady or firm. In speaking the truth, people edify and sustain things (Kaiser 1983:222). This concept is the opposite of falsity and falsehood. Telling the truth often reveals the character and the integrity of men in the Old Testament. The Hebrew concept of truth is therefore more than telling the truth. It is, in fact, the basis for life (Kaiser 1983:224). The 9th commandment forbids the ruination of people’s characters and lives by not telling the truth about them (Kaiser 1983:228).

Proverbs 26:4–5 contains an apparent paradox. Two sentences apparently contrast each other, namely do not answer a fool according to his folly (v. 4), and answer a fool according to his folly (v. 5). This passage addresses a certain kind of attitude towards
The predatory nature of hate speech betrays attribution biases foolish people. The poet of Proverbs is clear about this issue. Even in this instance, people should sometimes provide an answer and sometimes they must refrain from providing an answer (Van Rooy 1997:4). What should be understood by sometimes or occasionally? To speak or not to speak? In considering the various options, it is important to recognise that whatever your moral choice is, to speak or not to speak should not lead to contamination of human dignity. Words and human speech are deadly and labelling people or using hate speech are mere manifestations of a kind of speech that does not reckon with the fact that truth means that holiness is evident. Christians as a moral community have to regard communication as words that have to sanctify God.

The section above illustrates that people should be aware of the power of silence to communicate in an appropriate manner. The appropriate manner of communication has to do with the fact that cognisance for God’s presence and his Word should be evident within human communication. People have to learn to become more and more word responsible.

Perspectives from social psychology

Within the framework of this discussion on hate speech, insights from the field of social psychology could offer valuable insights on the mechanism of hate speech. In order to understand why people use hate speech to express their deeper feelings, it is important to provide an explanation of the broader context in which it occurs. In order to do this, the unique place of perceptions has to be identified. Perception refers to the manner in which people try to make sense of sensory impressions around them (Bergh & Theron 2006:125; Swartz et al. 2004:355). People’s perceptions regarding other people could be terribly wrong. They tend to interpret things against a certain background. Woolfolk (2007:251) describes perceptions as one of the determinants within the sensory memory which determines the aspects that will be remembered so that people can act in appropriate manner. In people’s perception of other people, they form impressions
of them (Louw & Edwards 1998:683). The following section only focuses on the cognitive process of attribution that actively works as part of someone’s perception of other people. Du Plooy-Cilliers and Olivier (2000:38) and Barker and Angelopulo (2010:272) reflect on the accuracy of perceptions and propose that perceptions often derail, because people use only one of their senses. People’s perceptions improve when they apply more than one sense while observing other people’s lives.

**Attributions play a significant role in social relations**

Attributes are inferences that people make about the causes of events, the behaviour of others and their own behaviour (Weiten 1992:584). One can formulate it slightly differently and say that people make attributions, because they have the need to understand their experiences. It is an attempt to make sense of other people’s behaviour and actions (Bergh & Theron 2006:686). Three important factors should be considered, namely:

- People make attributions when unusual events grab their attention.
- People make attributions when events have personal consequences for them.
- People make attributions when other people behave in unexpected ways.

People tend to locate the cause of behaviour either within a person (personal factors) or outside a person (environmental factors) (Cleary 2010:185). They react quickly with a process of taxonomy when they observe other people (Louw & Edwards 1998:424). The process of taxonomy is the evaluation in one’s mind of the personal meaning of what has been observed. This process occurs instantly. In line with this process of evaluation (good or bad), a next process of attribution is also evident (Bergh & Theron 2006:130). This process contains attributions of the motives of others. There is a need for attribution, because it
enables people to predict the future and to exert some influence over events and people.

The difficulty in understanding the process of attribution is that it is guesswork about the causes of events and the behaviour of other people (Weiten 1992:587). Attributional errors and biases lead to inaccurate judgements of whether the cause of behaviour is internal or external (Bergh & Theron 2006:130). The harm of attributional errors is disturbing. Barker and Angelopoulos (2010:193) highlight the following attributional biases:

- **The fundamental attribution error.** In this case the other person’s friendliness or unfriendliness could be the object of misattribution.
- **The actor-observer effect.** In one’s attribution there is a focus on the people one sees, and the situational forces nobody can see are ignored. This is also called salience.
- **Blaming the victim for the attribution.** By blaming people of other groups, people allow themselves to think that, because they do not share the other person’s attributes, they will escape the reality that the other person is experiencing.
- **The self-serving and group-serving bias.** Self-serving bias is the tendency to distort attributions about one’s behaviour to make oneself look good. Group-serving bias is more or the less the same as self-serving bias, but it occurs within or between groups. The intention behind this kind of attribution bias is to allow oneself to look good and favourable to other people.

When people meet each other for the first time they begin to form impressions of each other right away (Wood & Wood 1999:571). This process starts early on in people’s lives. The influence of opinion formers in children’s lives should never be underestimated. It could be their own parents, the social media, friends or events within their environment. People notice obvious attributes first, namely gender, race, age, dress and how physically attractive or unattractive someone is. First impressions (attributions) are important, because they are powerful and can colour the later impressions we form about people. It is tragic, but
also true that an overall judgement of another person is influenced more by the first information received than by information that comes later (Steinberg 2007:297). Social psychologists describe this as the primary effect. Once an impression has been formed, it provides a framework based on which people interpret later information. Any information that is consistent with the first impression is likely to be accepted and strengthens the impression (Wood & Wood 1999:571). Expectations about how other persons will act in certain situations influence the way people act themselves. The expectations regarding gender, race, age and ethnic group also influence your attitude, the manner in which you treat other persons and the way you speak about them. The difficulty in evaluating the attributions people make is that people use different measures to evaluate themselves. When they make inferences about themselves, they use the measures of situational attribution and dispositional attribution. In their own mind they are fully aware of external factors and internal causes (Wood & Wood 1999:572). In making attributions about other people, people tend to utilise only personal factors, and therefore assume that people from another race, gender, race and ethnic group have a consistency in behaviour. In short, people have excuses for their own behaviour and thoughts, but they struggle to find excuses for other people’s mistakes.

**Hate speech and the acquisition of language**

Louw and Edwards (1998:388) explain that there is a correlation between cognition (thought) and language. We give a thing a name, a label, a handle; we rescue it from anonymity and pluck it out of namelessness to identify it. This implies that in naming something, people are enabled to bring the said thing into being. In the acquisition of language we should recognise three important factors (Louw & Edwards 1998:386), namely, imitation, observation and innate language acquisition.
The learning environment plays a major role in language acquisition. The importance of modelling parents and opinion formers can never be underestimated. Children tend to imitate the way important people in their lives speak. The way in which parents and leaders speak about race, gender and ethnic groups is something that children hear and, at some stage, they imitate what they hear. Woolfolk (2007:41) indicates that the role of cultural tools in people’s cognitive development should be recognised. Examples of cultural tools are computers, the internet and language that allow people to communicate, think and solve problems. Children’s attitudes are influenced by their appropriation of the ways their culture and the members of their own group act and think. Language is pivotal for cognitive development, because it provides a way to express ideas and concepts for thinking. Language and thinking processes cannot be separated from each other. Vygotski (1987:120) even believes that thinking depends on speech and that language or speech guides cognitive development. Children’s self-talk, for example, is egocentric and they are not able to see the world from someone else’s point of view. As children mature they develop socialised speech. The issue at stake is therefore to what extent their thinking process and the way they communicate are contaminated from early on.

Fiske (2004:96) highlights the ripple effect of hate speech within the context of attributions. The worrying factor in the mechanism of hate speech is that people try to offer an explanation for why people act the way they do. They do this as adults. When people experience something negative they tend to appraise the degree of threat and harm, which enables them to cope (Fiske 2004:449). One of the ways in which people can cope with outcomes in their lives, especially when they have a stigmatised identity, is by attributing them to the other person’s prejudice. Applied to the issue addressed in this chapter – if people from stigmatised groups have negative encounters with one another, they tend to attribute the cause either to something about themselves personally or to prejudice against their
group membership. This is called attributional ambiguity (Fiske 2004:449). Hate speech is, in its essence, intended to harm other people because of ideological impressions (attributes) underlying the way the speakers express themselves. Hate speech is capable of instilling or inciting hatred of, or prejudice towards, a person or group of people on a specified ground, including race, nationality and ethnicity, country of origin, ethno-religious identity, religion, sexuality, gender identity or gender. The cause of hate speech is more deeply rooted and problematic than one realises when taken at face value.

**Normative perspectives on the underlying attitude in speaking**

This section only addresses three aspects, namely the idea of boldness to speak, the idea of speaking the truth in love and the essence of sagely wisdom.

**The concept of boldness - παρρησία**

The Greek concept of παρρησία denotes the idea of freedom of speech (Hultin 2008:82). Among the Greeks it was regarded as the biggest gift in life. For the Greeks and Romans, speech was also an indicator of one’s character and place in society (Hultin 2008:67). The concept implies *saying anything*. Louw and Nida (1993:306) place this concept within the framework of boldness and freedom. Herholdt (1995:128) concurs with this idea and highlights the fact that this concept was a technical term referring to the Greeks’ democratic (constitutional) right to speak freely and in boldness. Brown (1986a:734) argues that the concept of παρρησία should be regarded as a person’s confidence to communicate. This concept is typical of the Christians’ boldness in witnessing and speaking about their faith in Christ. There is abundant mention of the concept of παρρησία in the book of Acts and in the Hebrews sermon (Herholdt 1995:128). In the book
of Acts, this concept of boldness refers to the authoritative witnessing of Christians.

It is clear that this παρρησία [boldness to speak to speak their mind] functioned within a framework of love, almost like when someone talks to a friend (Hultin 2008:84). It is also evident that the boldness to witness about the gospel elicits various reactions, namely amazement, prosecution, dissent and people coming to faith. Christians are free to speak, they have boldness to communicate, but it is a boldness to speak the healing words of Christ. As a communicative community of believers within the resilient praxis of hate speech, Christians should be aware of the fact that their prophetic witness and the boldness to speak therapeutic words could meet resistance from people who also have a boldness (hastiness) in speaking freely about other people. Boldness in speaking healing words is constructive, but boldness in committing hate speech is destructive and dehumanising. When Christians speak in boldness it has to do with respect for the wholeness of life. Boldness to harm people through harmful speech is inspired by hollowness and emptiness. The difference between these two manifestations of boldness has to do with the idea of attitude. It has to do with an attitude towards the essence of life and personal views about the dignity of people. The manner in which boldness in speech comes to the fore exposes a person’s deepest attitudes towards many things.

To speak truth in love (Eph 4:15)

To speak the truth in love is something that also needs the scrutinising of people’s attitude. This is also evident from a passage such as Matthew 5:22. It is clear that the attitude in which words are attributed toward people requires responsibility. Floor (2007:146) proposes that people should become aware of the impact of intrinsic emotions and its possible influence on communication. Earlier in this chapter it was argued that freedom to speak should be anchored in truth. Truth should
also function as prerequisite of the freedom to speak. It should also be said that truth can be pronounced in capital letters and be summarised within one word, namely Christ. Ephesians 4:15 offers the foundation for a certain kind of cognition or perception regarding truth (Floor 2007:147). Christians have to scrutinise and contemplate truth within the sphere of love. People should learn to speak in the correct manner. This can also be formulated slightly differently, namely that love creates the opportunity for people to live a truthful life. The concept of speaking also has a dual meaning, namely doing or speaking (Floor 2007:147). Whatever people say when they speak, the people around them can never forget their acts. People’s words do not have any constructive influence when they are negligent about their conduct in life, or they have no awareness of the liturgy of togetherness.

Love for the truth and for human beings is the fertile soil in which to grow communication (Floor 2007:148). Love without truth is like a sponge and truth without love is like a knife, or even like a bugle with its sharp sound. Human speech that does not flourish in the soil of love becomes cold, harsh and offers self-justification for own mistakes. Truth serves or ministers love, while love opens the way for truth to reach the hearts of other people (Floor 2007:149). Freedom of speech does not mean that people are free to say whatever they want. Freedom of speech is connected to both love and truth. Love and truth are the strong legs of constructive communication. Therefore, true freedom of speech should take into account the idea that you are adhering to the right choice. From a Christian viewpoint, it has to do with following the footsteps of Truth – of Jesus Christ. Freedom is simultaneously to be bounded and to be committed to righteousness. Someone who is captured in the jail of hate speech is a prisoner of hate and harm. It is the speech of a prisoner who is captured in attributional biases and attitudes. To speak in boldness and to speak in freedom and in love is real freedom. Such speech is concerned with constructiveness and the dignity of people.
Understanding the concept of Φρονησίς – Philippians 2:5

The parenetic section of Philippians 2:1–4 is closely connected with Philippians 2:6–11 by means of Philippians 2:5 (Smit 1995:180). The following words are evident in Philippians 2:5, namely τοῦτο φρονεῖτε ἐν ὑμιν ὡς και ἐν Χριστῷ Ιησοῦ [think about that what (mind) you have in Christ Jesus]. The question is what kind of verb must be assumed in the last part of this sentence. The formula in Christ Jesus is important, because that gives an indication that verse 5 should be understood as a directive to have the same attitude (mind) as people that are in Jesus Christ (Smit 1995:182). Louw and Nida (1993:259) indicate that the concept of ϕρονησίς can denote to have attitude, to hold a view, thoughtful planning or wisdom. The concept of careful planning and wisdom in human acts offers the insight that communication should deal with the mind of Christ that should be evident in human speech. Philippians 2:5 shows the like-mindedness that believers in Christ should have. Believers should attune their attitude to the humble mind of Jesus Christ and should take such a view of life (Manser 2010:2136). The wisdom of phronesis should therefore be the driving force behind the actions of religious communities (Louw 2015b:62). Brown (1986b:616) indicates that the concept of ϕρονησίς [mind of Christ] denotes the idea of discernment and judicious insight. When considering Old Testament thinking, it also refers to the right understanding of God and life.

Philippians 2:5–6a gives a clear command. The followers of Christ should have the same mind-set (attitude), because we are made in God’s image. Janson (2003:96–97) finds the choice to use μορφῇ very interesting. This concept refers to the fact that Christ was really God. Although he was truly God, he took the form of bond servant and became a man. The concept of μορφῇ is used once again. Jesus fully embraced being a man. In becoming a man, he literally emptied himself. He came to serve as man and not God (Phlp 2:6). The concept of ἁρπαγμὸν is striking in this context. This concept denotes something of a predator stalking
its prey. Jesus didn’t act like a predator (Janson 2003:99). The same mind-set or attitude of Christ should be part of believers’ lives. People should learn to be followers and not predators. Predatory language (hate speech) is clearly not the way of wisdom and *phronesis*. When people cling to their own voices and speech and allow their voices to verbalise their attitudes, it becomes a life-style of form-Christians rather than of μορφῇ-Christians. The difference lies in the idea that Christians should not appear to look and sound like Christ, they should rather be like Him and follow in his footsteps.

Louw (2015b:64) therefore indicates that the concept of *φρονησίς* is meaningful within the context of the Christian faith that deals with the issue of wisdom as the driving force behind the actions of religious communities. *Phronesis* [cognition] is not a mere intellectual concept. Wisdom is to understand the mind of Christ (to be his followers), having insight into what is right for daily life, understanding of what the driving force behind decisions is, sober judgement according the living faith and the quest for wisdom in church and society. A person’s renewed mind, which is capable of discerning God’s will, is the driving force in the evaluation of the self and of the person’s real identity (Stott 1994:325). The renewed mind is indicative of the sober self-image or a humble mind like Christ’s (Moo 2002:180).

### Practical theological perspectives on the mechanism of hate speech

Given the hermeneutical interaction between all the perspectives addressed above, it is apparent that the following aspects can serve as practical theological perspectives, namely:

- Naming the attributes, perceptions and attitudes that are becoming evil.
- Discernment for private and for public life.
- Persuasive communication within local congregations.
Naming the attributes, perceptions and attitudes that are evil within a South African Society

Attitudes influence social behaviour and provide people with ways to react to their social environment (Tubbs & Moss 2008:149). Within one’s attitudes regarding other people in society, the role of perceptions should not be underestimated. People are constantly creating opinions regarding other people. Prejudices and impostures are evident within this process. The problem is that people choose to use shortcuts. Bergh and Theron (2006:128) highlight the following aspects:

- People categorise other people according to a taxonomy of schemes. Generalisation is becoming a major concern within this process.
- First impressions are important, because people tend to stick with their first impressions regarding the looks, appearance and kindness of people.
- In a process of taxonomy, people stereotype other people to form an opinion. People can easily be overestimated or underestimated. People evaluate people from the same group of race, gender or foreign country on the basis of their frame of reference with similar people.
- This process is highly selective, because people seem to speed up their reading of other people to stimulate their views of other people.

The research above reveals that hate speech is a way to express inner experience. What is more, within the private space and silence of people’s own cognition things can go seriously wrong. People try to make sense of life and of the behaviour of other people. This process of making sense is sometimes communicated with the use of speech that is harmful and disrespectful. Attributions, perceptions and attitudes regarding other people can be healthy, but they can also be evil. Boesak (2015:9) indicates that the evil in the world should be named. He even elaborates by saying that the moment of naming the evil
is the moment when the church becomes aware of the calling of God to participate in the mission of God to abolish evils. The church as prophetic, therapeutic and communicative community has the responsibility to name and list evil in society.

Therefore, it is apparent that the unique place of the hearer and the function of hearers (believers) within society should receive attention within practical-theological reflection. Within the ministry in local churches and in the theological training of ministers, the perimeters of attitudes, attributes and perceptions should be clearly understood so that ministers can communicate them within the acts of liturgy, preaching, pastoral care and equipment of the believers. The intriguing question still remains whether it is possible that preaching, which functions in isolation from the other communicative acts, could contribute towards a solution in addressing the phenomenon of hate speech. It seems somewhat unfair to expect that preaching as a lone act should offer a solo solution. An integrated approach where the act of preaching is interwoven with the other communicative acts within ministry is regarded as the most suitable approach in addressing this issue. The proclamation of wisdom in the midst of the folly of hate speech entails that the aspects of koinonia, marturia, leitourgia, catechesis and diakonia should meet one another organically. All communal communication should educate people to become word-responsible interlocutors.

The essence of the language of wisdom (phronesis) in the midst of the resilient nature of predatory speech such as, inter alia, hate speech, should be heard in ever-widening circles of edifying local congregations. It is clear that preachers do have a boldness to proclaim the word of truth regarding God’s Kingdom that has come and is still coming.

Earlier in this chapter the discussion touched on the fact that preachers sometimes shy away from the challenge of naming evil practices in boldness. They even fail completely in the area of demonstrating a liturgy of the walk or liturgy of togetherness. There is a multitude of possible reasons why this happens.
One of the distressing reasons is the possibility of the preacher’s own attributes regarding societal issues. To speak in boldness despite one’s own attributes is very demanding. Preachers sometimes experience internal resistance because of deeper and underlying attributes, perceptions and attitudes. People do not want to distance themselves from their attributes and attitudes. They do not want to be told about the wrongness of their attitudes. Without naming the evil, people will continue to suffer from a blind spot. In this sense of the word, theologians are called to reflect on silence. Liturgy could possibly create a sphere of silence to be able to hear God’s voice regarding the predatory voice of hate speech. It is a kind of silence that should come to a new understanding of reality so that believers can communicate words of wisdom (phronesis) within a praxis of terminal silence where God’s will is not communicated. Communication within a community of believers could gain new momentum within a liturgical space of silence and can be enriched by the energy value of all other manifestations of communication. In this process, preaching can provide believers with a new appetite for deeper conversations within pastoral care and within the sphere of equipping people to be dignified interlocutors in the liturgy of the walk. To walk the walk involves speaking words of wisdom that build up other people as you walk the walk of a life in Christ.

Discernment for private and public life: A call for community (societas) within society

The distinction between private and public life should be regarded as positions on a continuum (Morton 2004:25). One can distinguish between person-to-person relationships, person-to-groups relationships and group-to-group relationships, but they are in fact inseparable. What people do within their homes, their families, study rooms and what they do as fellow workers in the workplace or marketplace affects others, especially when one views this from the perspective of a liturgy of walking together. The overemphasis on the distinction between private and public
life may result in people downplaying the influence of the public on the private. The role of religion is defined as something that should function within the private life. The concept of *discernment* – like-mindedness with Christ, because he is living in us – should provide direction for the way the community of believers look at their own attitudes, attributes and perceptions regarding other people in society. Discernment in society has to do with the fact that believers have something in common with this world. As salt and light, and because Christians are called to be God’s ambassadors in this world, the community of believers should realise that local churches are much more than physical addresses in community. Interaction and communication between Christians should be an example of therapeutic words in action. Predatory language like hate speech is something that Christians do not want to tolerate within their immediate community. The community of believers has to invite people to become part of this new way of *communitas*, a communicative community that becomes aware of the importance to put a guard before one’s mouth. In this sense, private life and public life should interact. From the fullness of the heart, the mouth speaks. The boldness to speak (*parresia*) always implies that the speaker regards the listener as a friend. A community of friends use words that are uplifting. The community (*societas*) of friends is no dumping site for ravening predators while the roar of hate speech is audible.

Instructing children within the space of youth ministry could offer dynamic opportunities to address this issue of regarding other people as friends. Children should be exposed to people from other cultural backgrounds and other opinions to provide them with new directives regarding the predatory speech that often emanates from first impressions. They should gain a new understanding of attributes that could lead to harmful speech. Children should learn that they do not have to be scared of society, but that they have the calling to be salt and light. Their language and words should make other people thirsty for the message of the living waters. Hate speech creates a barrier to constructive communication. The influence of children on their
The predatory nature of hate speech betrays attribution biases

parents could therefore open new possibilities in addressing the harmful effects of hate speech.

**Persuasive language as a way to address hate speech within a South African context**

Persuasive communication is communication that intentionally aims to change a person’s attitudes and behaviour (Louw & Edwards 1998:711). Within local congregations there are numerous opportunities to influence people’s lives. The proclamation of the Word is regarded as a suitable way of using persuasive communication. Tubbs and Moss (2008:524) pay attention to the role of persuasive messages where the primary intention is not mere information, but inspiring life-change. Communicators (preachers) first of all have to examine the sources of their own attitudes before creating persuasive messages. Despite the role of the internet, the importance of television can never be underestimated. Exposure to different points of view through the mass media often serves to strengthen the receiver’s initial attitudes and opinions. However, it must be said that the media’s interpretation of matters often takes on greater importance than people initially think. The effect of television, and to a certain extent newspapers, lies in the repetition of the major issues in society day after day (Tubbs & Moss 2008:27). If the media decides to emphasise an ethical issue, the public is given more information more frequently. In this way, the mass media raises the level of people’s consciousness. Preachers or ministers should always remember that even their own attitudes could easily be the product of the influence of the media. The impact of social media and the internet on the formation of people’s attitudes and attributions is also a reality. People listen to sermons and participate in liturgy with intrinsic attributes, perceptions and attitudes that are foreign to the language they hear in worship services. It stimulates what is often called cognitive dissonance (Barker & Angelopulo 2010:89). Cognitive dissonance creates awkwardness in people’s lives as a result of
two sets of information or communication that appeal to them. The obstinacy of attitudes, attributes and perceptions requires a long-suffering attitude from preachers, but without neglecting the calling to speak in boldness.

During childhood, the importance of modelling is very important. Films, books, radio, television programmes, the internet and other instruments of communication present a number of models for behaviour. Role models propose a kind of behaviour to people that influences their view of gender, social issues, violence, morals and a number of other issues (Tubbs & Moss 2008:68). People often distrust the world, are pessimistic about it and try to distance themselves from it. People choose a certain kind of speech to label the mean world. Homes these days have cell phones, personal computers, fax machines, e-mail and satellite links. This has increased the speed of information (Barnard 2015:9). People are focused on visual stimuli. They communicate in real and electronic spaces. The danger is that technological communication can overshadow human issues and the naming of reality in society. People are linked to spaces or addresses where hate speech is regarded as normal. Persuasive messages within local churches should never underestimate the challenge of a global village. Therefore, the importance of reckoning with attributes, perceptions and attitudes is important. To be persuasive entails that reality of life should be confronted and be enriched by the living proclamation of God’s communication in and through his beloved Son. His nearness should create an environment in which words of phronesis can be heard, words that are in conflict with existing beliefs.

Every worship service has to be open towards society. Worship services and sermons have to name the realities in society and have to highlight the important fact of God’s presence so that it does not preach a past-tense God to the present age (Buttrick 1998:22). All the elements of liturgy during worship services should focus on the liturgy of life and therefore preaching must reach out to the world. The liturgy of life and the liturgy of the walk has to include a liturgy of communication. Within
a South African context it is crucial that preachers name the reality of the hate speech, but they also have to communicate the boldness of speech that God offers.

**Conclusion**

This chapter puts forward that hate speech is a concern within the South African society. What is needed is a constructive boldness to speak. Communication that has no recognition of deeper attributes, perceptions and attitudes is circulating toxic air. Within this toxic atmosphere, predatory kinds of speech like hate speech is heard like a roar. The church, as a prophetic and therapeutic community, cannot be silent. A clear voice should go out against the dehumanising consequences of hate speech. Without boldness to speak and to uncover the truth in love, the praxis of communication within society is distorted, because people are regarded as objects rather than dignified people. Hate speech should be silenced, not in the sense that it should not be communicated, but rather in that a new kind of boldness should arise, namely communication of wisdom.

**Summary: Chapter 7**

This chapter argues that hate speech functions as a harmful kind of communication within a South African context. It seems that people who are inclined to hate speech notice other people’s obvious attributes first, namely gender, race, age, dress and how physically attractive or unattractive someone is. Language offers people the opportunity to gain understanding and to express themselves, but the paradox is that language and communication can also threaten people’s dignity. In an effort to examine and counter the mechanism of hate speech within a South African society, this chapter reflects on the influence of first impressions and how they manifest in language use. It is challenging because of the fact that this kind of speech also has a detrimental effect on the political landscape. The discussion specifically reflects
on the danger of becoming voiceless or silent over against the harmful effect of hate speech. The research question for this chapter is: Is it possible that especially silence from a community of believers on hate speech within the public sphere contributes to people’s ignorance about the influence of attribution bias, which comes to the fore in hate speech? In answering this question, three important aspects are highlighted. Firstly, the chapter offers an analytical description of the problematic praxis from the fields of ethics and social psychology. Secondly, normative perspectives on the role of silence, the boldness to speak, the challenge to speak the truth in love and the concept of *phronesis* [wisdom], follow. Finally, the chapter proposes practical theological perspectives that may contribute to resolving a problematic praxis. This research intends to raise a voice to counter the harmful voice of hate speech.
Introduction

It is often said that the various South African student movements that burst onto the public square in 2015 and continued its militant activism in 2016 are, at their roots, about the transformation, or what they prefer to call the ‘decolonialisation’, of higher education. To some extent, this was also the struggle of students 40 years ago during and after 16 June 1976 as students took on the then apartheid government’s language policy. My own
experiences in our primary and high schools, and later university bear the imprint of these battles with class boycotts and bitter confrontations between students and authorities. While the youth and student movements we participated in at the time were of a specific religious orientation, namely Christian, we wrestled with these contextual realities of colonial racism and, related to that, socio-economic inequalities and exclusion alongside people of various faith traditions. The current, often volatile, waves of student movements, often referred to as the ‘Fallist’ movements as I will show later, consciously take their inspiration from these earlier generations of student activists.

Education is the key to unlock the potential of a nation’s young people and thus to effect upward social mobility. In this contribution, I focus on the agency of those recent student movements that sharply focussed the public attention on the challenge of transforming or decolonising (in whichever manner they understand this) higher education. They consciously narrowed this struggle down to the advocacy for ‘free’ university education. This is explicitly a struggle against economic inequality. For them, it is a matter of justice. This contribution then, will first address the question: What is the nature of this ‘Fallist’ movement, in particular the #FeesMustFall campaign? I narrow this question down to the socio-economic dimensions of the challenges raised by this campaign. At this moment, so they argue, equitable access to education is about the ability of the students and their parents to pay for tuition. Secondly, I present a proposal on how we are to understand this phenomenon theoretically and then theologically by using two postcolonial African Reformed symbols, the Belhar Confession and the Accra Confession, as key lenses. The chapter ends with some of the pointers for addressing the fundamental questions the current challenges raise.

## The Fallist movement

In this study, I would argue that one should first understand the Fallist movement in terms of the participants themselves,
that is, their leaders and the members participating. This must happen before one can draw conclusions on a theoretical level. My broader research interest in nurturing a respectful and sensitive dialogue with students and these youth movements aims at taking seriously the agency of young people such as these students to effect change in society (Nel 2013:144–152). In doing so, they also challenge religious communities to reimagine their public witness. In this section then, I gather data from their own reflections in an attempt to understand the movement from the inside. In attempting this, one has to make a distinction between the broader Fallist movement consisting and expressed through various localised campaigns relating to specific contextual moments. What do I mean by this distinction?

Brian Kamanzi (2016), in an opinion piece in the Daily Maverick, provides an important overview of various campaigns on the different South African campuses under the title, *Demythologising campus violence: towards a united front for free education*. He shows how the dynamics and unique context of the different university campuses evoke different campaigns, yet they occur under the one umbrella of decolonising the higher education sector in South Africa. Examples of these interrelated (intersectional) campaigns would be the campaign against the pervasive rape culture, driven, in particular, by student movements at the Stellenbosch University, Rhodes University and the Witwatersrand universities. At the University of Pretoria, University of the Western Cape and University of South Africa, alliances were forged with labour movements to challenge the outsourcing of support personnel under the banner of #OutsourcingMustFall. There are also the #Rhodesmustfall and #OpenStellenbosch campaigns, among others. As already indicated in this chapter, I focus specifically on the #FeesMustFall campaign as one expression of this broader Fallist movement addressing economic inequality. How, then, did this Fallist movement unfold?
#FeesMustFall

Initially, this myriad of local campaigns burst onto the public space in 2015, with dramatic images of students occupying and, in some instances, removing specific symbols on campuses. The insistence was to remove symbols of what was referred to as the colonialist, racist history linked to figures like Cecil John Rhodes. When Vuyisile Msila presents an overview of the #FeesMustFall campaign, he, however, points out that its origins and unfolding must be seen as a part of a bigger picture. He (Msilā 2016) explains:

The Fees Must Fall campaign’s ideals have always been in parents’ prayers and wishes, for higher education has become a goal so difficult to reach. It was a campaign that the higher education department and government had to do something about. We also need to think about the bigger questions that society asked during the campaign ...

Just before it, there was what appeared to have been the mother of the campaigns in 2015 – the Rhodes Must Fall (RMF) campaign, which raised uncomfortable questions for many members of society. The symbolism of Rhodes and all other imperialists and oppressors were questioned. (n.p.)

Msila refers to ‘parents’ prayers and wishes’. These student movements were framed in terms of their own rhetoric, as continuing the struggles of the iconic 1976 generation. Of the initial #RhodesMustFall or simply #RMF campaign, Ashraf Jamaal (2016) then writes:

This month (April) marks the anniversary of the RhodesMustFall (RMF) movement, regarded by many as the most significant marker of social and political unrest since the student uprising of 1976. Whether this is indeed the case is disputable, but what cannot be denied is that RMF has, within a single year, channelled some of the most desperately urgent instances of ‘Black Pain’. (n.p.)

He (Jamaal 2016) continues to describe, what he calls, the RMF movement:

While pitted against infrastructural racism, the movement’s most profound concerns were less material than they were psychological, for what continues to aggrieve the RMF is its contention that freedom remains in abeyance: that the custodianship of the Black self remains
deferred, that at the core of the country’s tertiary structure lies the maintenance of White power and the suppression of Black agency. (n.p.)

For him this is not just about universities, because, as he shows, the problems they address are what are called infrastructural racism, psychological and the custodianship of the ‘black self’, ‘white power’ and ‘black agency’, that is, concerns that are not peculiar to academia. The tertiary system, he shows, has become a ‘theatre for a greater sphere of contestation and despair’. And, as he argues, for the #RMF movement, ‘Cecil John Rhodes, [is] perceived as the rotten embodiment of a white imperial and capitalist monopoly.’ The RMF campaign consequently became a new phase in the struggles to overcome the legacy of colonialism in its various guises. What these reflections have in common are their lament that, at least in higher education, there has not been much deeper debate or concrete transformation since the euphoric moment of the first democratic elections, also called the ‘dawn of democracy’, in South Africa on 27 April 1994, and the subsequent mythology of the ‘rainbow nation’. In the case of RMF the debate and contestation was specifically about the place of what is called colonial or imperialistic symbols on university campuses.

For Jamaal (2016) therefore:

As a society, we need to think deeply when we debate these meaningfully. It sounded trivial to some, but the imperial nature of the curriculums in our institutions may be linked to the symbols that reign on campuses. But I am certain that many would not support the arbitrary nature in which this was approached in some cases.

These were not only about transforming the institutions of higher learning but also the larger society. Indeed, this was clearly a demonstration that education and social issues are intertwined.

The transformation in higher education should go beyond the name change of the institution’s buildings and the mere hiring of more Black staff. We need to go further by ensuring that faculties embrace the indigenization of knowledge. Before we step into the global world and contest as intellectuals, we need to understand our space as well. (n.p.)

It seems that the power of national myths and democratic optimism of the 1990s have been dramatically losing strength
(falling) since 2015 on university campuses throughout South Africa, giving a peculiar meaning to the term *Fallism*. For Msila and Jamaal, this movement of ordinary people, mostly students (and supporting parents), raised bigger questions. Msila, in particular, declares rather boldly that 2015 will go down in history as a year second only to 1976 in the way students have shown their muscle in trying to alter the direction of the wheel of history.

In a more modest tone, for Shaeer Kalla (2016), a key leader at Wits, the #FeesMustFall campaign is ‘undoubtedly’ the biggest student protest since democracy. Kalla refers to the ‘1 Million 1 Month’ campaign in 2015, where they, as the Wits Student Representative Council (WSRC), focused on how being ‘intelligent’ is not good enough – if you are poor. She shows that later (in October 2015), using the social media platform, Twitter, the WSRC started to send messages specifically about the fees protest planned to reach a national shutdown using a number of hashtags. A hashtag (#) is a technique used on these social media platforms, like Twitter, to create and bring together loose hubs or networks of specific themes or conversations. Kalla shows that the one hashtag (conversation) that the students on these platforms responded to most was initially #WitsFeesMustFall, which built on the earlier #RhodesMustFall hashtag. Once other universities joined in on the planned shutdown, it became merely #FeesMustFall, leading to a march to the Union Buildings where the president announced the decision that there would be a 0% increase in tuition fees in 2016.

In 2016, this #FeesMustFall movement, however, erupted again with the announcement of the Ministry of Higher Education and Training’s proposals for fee increases in 2017. In this phase of the campaign, a stronger national and more pronounced militant strategy was pursued. The ultimate demand now was for free, quality and decolonised higher education. This is pursued through specific localised structures and protest tactics.
When one refers to the structure of the movement, it needs to be clarified that #FeesMustFall itself initially did not consist of a national leadership, because it was led by students and by what is called ‘the collective’ on each university campus. The idea of a ‘leaderless movement’, ‘the collective’ and ‘direct democracy’ within the movement (see Castells 2012:178) was followed to ensure that a flat network of ideas was formed where every student had a voice and a channel of communication through which they could express their voices, more specifically their anger and frustration at the ‘system’. This system, in this rhetoric, is described by Kalla (2016) as the ‘lily white councils that govern our universities’, but also ‘regressive and conservative management and VCs who are detached from the reality of the black child’ and also ‘curriculums which are Eurocentric’. Most importantly for her, it is essentially, ‘a system that is anti-black and anti-poor, a system that sees commodification of education as a rational way of operating’. Kalla sees herself ‘with other students on the front of the picket lines, standing up for injustices on our campus and beyond our borders’. She does this in the context of understanding their significance in the ‘upskilling and training of our youth as we move towards a knowledge-based economy’. This, she states, is critical to the collective success as a country, ‘in as much as this is a student led struggle it represents something so much bigger’. For her, universities and the relevant government ministry has failed to respond to this challenge. Therefore, ‘Universities need to become more efficient in terms of how they use their resources. Universities are not transparent and do not use funds efficiently’.

In turning to government, Kalla is clear, ‘[g]overnment is undoubtedly underfunding higher education.’ The initial fee increases in 2015 then became the trigger to the campaign, because as Kalla (2016) states:

The increased dependence on fees from students is the reason for the commodification of our universities, which function as businesses where poor students are seen only as liabilities. (n.p.)
Over against this, universities themselves need to cater for African needs to create an empowering and enabling environment, unlike the current university model which is, for Kalla, ‘both anti-poor and anti-black’.

In addressing this challenge, Kalla describes their strategy with regard to the roles of government, the private sector and the university authorities. For the ideal of free education, their view is that the government should find the political will to direct (policy) changes with regards to subsidies. However, corporates, which in her view benefitted from “‘trillions of illicit financial flows,” should also to be contributing to the upliftment of young people’. She (Kalla 2016) explains:

In an ideal world no one should have to pay for education because it is a public good. However, we do not live in an ideal world and we understand that in the neoliberal world we live in, nothing is ever free. (n.p.)

We will return to this analysis in the next section, specifically to the reference to the ‘neoliberal world we live in’. However, this reference shows that, for student leaders like Kalla, the #FeesMustFall campaign is a mass student-led movement for institutional, systemic and social transformation. The rhetoric of justice as well as the structures and linkages with broader social justice movements is evident. Students are, for them, united across political divides. Glowingly, Kalla then pronounced that it ‘showed the world that the power of a mobilised youth can shake the core of an unjust system’.

While key demands related to the #FeesMustFall campaigns related to resisting student exclusion, there is a bigger vision concerning the clearing of historical student debt that prevents students from re-registering and graduating - ensuring no one who qualifies academically to study is turned away. It is about access. This, as I indicated previously, occurred not only through mobilisation on the various campuses, but also through social media campaigns from where various symbolic actions on campuses and later in government spaces were organised.
Therefore, for Kalla, ‘this movement belongs to everyone and no one at the same time’ – these movements are part of a bigger collective in their understanding of how their plight as young people and students is linked to the world in which they live as well as their underlying theories of social change. The next section presents a theoretical assessment of this understanding.

**Theoretical assessment of socio-economic transformation globally**

In this section, I aim to go behind the rhetoric and social constructions of student leaders and present a theoretical assessment of how socio-economic development is understood by different social theorists. These student movements also have their own theories of socio-economic transformation. The aim here in this contribution is to assess the specific macroeconomic policy developments in South Africa and therefore also the role and significance of this current wave of student movements. I first present some classic theories and then theories on post-colonial economic development. In a following section, I relate them to South Africa’s own trajectory.

Sociologist Anke Hoogvelt (1982:105) draws what is now a classic distinction between, on the one hand, thinkers explaining the economic developments with regard to what she calls the liberal, bourgeois tradition and, on the other hand, the neo-Marxist tradition. The liberal tradition, she shows, works with a linear evolutionary process of modernisation that aspires to the model of industrialised countries with key proponents like Herman Kahn, WW Rostow, the Club of Rome think tank and thinkers like Jay Forrester, Mesarovic, Pestel and Tinbergen. Their analysis of the world is based on the systems theory and historically builds on the works of the classical sociological thinkers in the evolutionary and neo-evolutionary tradition on how societies grow and develop. This particular theoretical framework is then used in quantifying data through the means of
the new technologies. Its aim is to develop World Future Theories and scenarios which would, positively, either be globally growth-focussed, or negatively, doomsday prophetic warnings pointing to the ultimate destruction of the environment and the security danger (instability) caused by growing global poverty. The key concepts and strategies being proposed within the liberal tradition are (economic) growth (Kahn and Wiener) under US leadership (Rostow), global limits and constraints, zero (economic) growth (club of Rome I), redistribution and international economic reform. This reform constitutes a new world order, with every individual having economic rights to a life of well-being and dignity. On a national level, they advocate self-reliance to poor countries within the context of developing policies of domestic redistribution. The latter includes expansion of social service to the poor, agrarian reform, increased development expenditure in rural areas, stimulation of small and medium-sized enterprises and better tax administration. This is what is offered as the liberal solution to the problems of poverty.

The main criticism, coming especially from neo-Marxist thinkers, against this liberal position, Hoogveld shows, concerns the lack of a historical context in its method and therefore a dearth in theory of social change that identifies sources and mechanisms for social change and can answer the question, what’s next, beyond modernity. In this respect, the only response of these liberal thinkers is the belief that individuals can change their behaviour at will, and that this must happen collectively for history or societies to change. What is needed, then, is a change of heart, a change of values. Hoogvelt (1982:147) calls this a voluntarist theory of social change.

Within the Marxist tradition of conceptualising global socio-economic transformation, the theories of historical materialism also work with stages in the development of the societies. Within this development, the stages are, however, based on the modes of production that are being transformed by the growing contradictions inherent in themselves. This leads to class conflict
and eventually a revolution towards a more egalitarian society. These thinkers, especially in the predominantly Western school of neo-Marxists, aim at understanding the reality of the world in terms of one world capitalist system. This system develops the centre, but, as an integral part of the working of the system, under develops or exploits the periphery or satellite states or sites. Hoogveld refers to thinkers like Gunder Frank, Paul Baran and Raul Prebisch who worked out these ideas of dependency and underdevelopment on the basis of the classical theories of Marx and Engels.

With the changed historical situation of post-independent, or what are sometimes called postcolonial states, and the growing differentiation and demise of what was called at the time the Third World, especially since the early 1970s, the question was asked why there is evidence of continuing exploitation - even within a post-independence and postcolonial context. Out of these questions rose the debate between the productionist’ and circulationist conceptions of exploitation. These debates deal with the question of whether the locus of exploitation is the ‘imperialist dominated’ production within the Third World (‘productionist’) or in the world capitalist market arrangements (‘circulationist’). Among the circulationist thinkers or world system thinkers are Immanuel Wallerstein, Ernest Mandel, and Samir Amin.

I will not go into the complexities of these debates, but Hoogvelt as an example refers to Immanuel Wallerstein who argues that a world system consists of one single division of labour comprising of multiple cultural systems, multiple political entities and even different modes of surplus appropriation. This system is not an integrated whole, seeking equilibrium, as described by the functional systems theory in the liberal tradition. Those thinkers such as Wallerstein, argue that the basic contradictions and class struggles within this (capitalist) system are part of the dynamism in it. They base their work on a basic radical conflict theory, not a functional systems theory.
of the liberal tradition. The main themes, concepts and units of analysis within this tradition are, on the one hand, the increasing role of multinational or transnational companies, that is, corporatisation, the discourse on local, national or international struggles in the quest for liberation from the global exploitation of workers and nature.

On the other hand, the question of involvement or non-involvement in the world capitalist system is a key issue in the discourse. Terreblanche (2002:104-107; 2014:loc. 1810) points to the fact that this all-pervasive system seems to have led to the over-accumulation of money and power for a very few, not nations, but individuals since the 1980s into the 1990s during the neo-liberal economic policies of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, in particular. As a result of these policy shifts in these new international monetary systems, the central (powerful) actors are now the investors who, through the mechanisms of the stock exchanges, increasingly draw money away from the manufacturing and production sectors into private financial institutions in their quest for the maximisation of profits. This economic shift inevitably leads to the downsizing and restructuring of national industries, and the retrenchments of workers or, alternatively, the move of production plants to countries where there is an oversupply of workers and less rigid labour legislation that will lead to a higher profit margin for the private shareholders. In an analysis of the various ideological categories that can be distinguished in the aforementioned socio-economic context, Bond (2004:23–27) identifies the ‘Resurgent Right’ standing in a neo-conservative political tradition; the ‘Washington Consensus’ in neo-liberalism; the ‘Post-Washington Consensus’ in social democracy; ‘Third World nationalism’ in national capitalism and, what he and others call, the ‘global justice movements’ which stand within a (Marxist) socialist and also anarchist political tradition. He calls these categories ‘rough approximations, sometimes proudly worn as labels, sometimes not’ (Bond 2004:22).
These categorisations are confirmed by former chief economist at the World Bank and Nobel Prize winner for economics in 2001, Joseph E. Stiglitz. Stiglitz (2012:298–331) shows the relationship between macroeconomic policy and the role of policymakers, on the one hand, and how it affects ordinary citizens with regard to employment, poverty and inequality, on the other. His analysis comes in the aftermath of the global economic crisis of 2008. For Stiglitz (2012; see also Terreblanche 2014), the choice for policymakers is not simply between capitalism and socialism, or liberalism and Marxism. It is much more nuanced. He is, however, clear: the financialisation of the economy with regard to the Resurgent Right and Washington Consensus contributed to inequality globally and within countries, and that it came, not as an accident, but as a result of specific macroeconomic and monetary policies. This, Stiglitz (2012) shows, affects the world when he states:

More than anything else, a sense that economic and political systems were unfair is what motivates protests around the world. In Tunisia and Egypt and other parts of the Middle East, it wasn’t merely that jobs were hard to come by but that those jobs that were available went to those with connections.

In the United States and Europe, things seemed more fair, but only superficially so. Those who graduated from the best schools with the best grades had a better chance at the good jobs. But the system was stacked because wealthy parents sent their children to the best kindergartens, grade schools, and high schools, and those students had a far better chance of getting into elite universities. (p. xiii)

Stiglitz (2015:164–169) continues to narrow his analysis down to the impact of these policy developments on student debt and the affordability of tertiary education. He warns the policymakers in the USA, in particular, that a crisis such as the housing crisis in 2008 related to the soaring inequality is about to explode, namely ‘student debt and how we finance education’ (Stiglitz 2015:164). Stiglitz (2012:165) maintains that, while education is ‘the only way up’ and that specifically within the USA context ‘a college
degree becomes increasingly essential to making one’s way in a 21st century economy …’, however, it has become ‘increasingly unaffordable’ for those who are not born wealthy. This is because of cutbacks in government subsidies, with costs soaring and household income stagnating. He (Stiglitz 2012) concludes:

Student debt has become an integral part of the story of American inequality … We now have a pay-to-play, winner-take-all game where the wealthiest are assured a spot, and the rest are compelled to take a gamble on huge debts, with no guarantee of a payoff … Those concerned about the damage America’s growing divide is doing to our ideals and moral character should put student debt at the top of their agenda. (p. 169)

Globally, traditional and social media\(^{25}\) have hailed broad youth movements in challenging these kinds of policy developments and their impact in their own societies. One only has to mention what became popularly known as the ‘Arab Spring’ or the widespread #OccupyWallStreet and #BlackLivesMatter movements. These are fundamentally driven by youth and student protests. When Mason (2011:66) reflects on what he calls the ‘New Global Revolutions’ (2011), erupting in Egypt and Tunisia, but also in England, Greece and the USA, and why it was happening at that time, he refers first and foremost, to the ‘graduate with no future’. He shows that they share common traits: firstly, their revolt erupts in the global city, secondly, they ‘recognise one another as part of an international sub-class’ and lastly, their size means that ‘it is a transmitter of unrest to a much wider section of the population than before’ (Mason 2011:69). In this respect, he refers to the fact that, in many instances around the world, the lines between the student communities, in particular those from the activists, working classes and poor communities, have

become blurred (Mason 2011:70). He (Mason 2011) refers to a case study in December 2008, in Greece, where the rioters:

[*R*anged from high school students and university students to young, mostly precarious, workers from sectors like education, construction, tourism and entertainment, transport and even media [Older workers] were a minority ... very sympathetic towards the burning down of banks and state buildings, but were mostly passive ... (p. 70)

It seems that there are resonances with what is happening in South Africa. Therefore, we now need to narrow our engagement down to the South African socio-economic context and how it relates to the position of the students and their parents.

### Locating student movements within the South African socio-economic context

The aforementioned categories and contestations set the parameters within which the African, and in particular the South African, socio-economic developments (and current contestations) take place, and, according to student leaders like Kalla, the broader ‘neoliberal world we live in’. The global focus and scope of trade, as we have seen, are deemed not to be new phenomena. This new phase has a few key features. As pointed out by student leaders as well as theorists, neo-liberal economic ideology aims to justify politically and culturally the centralisation of capital in the North. It proposes and implements economic policy on the periphery of this global system, with the corresponding impact on the life chances of communities, including families and students. While it is not necessary to present an overview of policy shifts in South Africa as in the opening chapter of this publication, it is relevant to use the aforementioned theoretical framework in that chapter to understand these shifts and therefore the student movements of 2015 and 2016. While Terreblanche (2014:loc. 1001) roots the fundamental shift in South Africa’s economic policies in the adoption of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act by the
USA Congress in 1986 in the heyday of the neo-liberal economic policy of Ronald Reagan, I will focus the attention on the policy shifts since 1994. For a more comprehensive overview the reader is referred to the first chapter of this work. One of the key policy initiatives highlighted in that chapter is what became known as the reconstruction and development plan.

### Reconstruction and development

Initially, through the policy of reconstruction and development and the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), the new government, elected on 27 April 1994, adopted this framework to redress the colonialist, economic legacy of the past, aiming to give material substance to what was referred to as the ‘democratic transformation’ (African National Congress 1994). Terreblanche (2014:loc. 85) speaks of this economic legacy as ‘n Brits-georiënteerde stelsel van koloniale en rassekapitalisme’ [A British oriented system of colonialism and racial capitalism]. He (Terreblanche 2002) describes this as follows:

This version of capitalism [colonial and racial capitalism] had indeed demonstrated a deep-seated tendency towards systemic exploitation of and structural injustice in respect of people other than whites, and would maintain a tendency towards neglecting the poorest half as long as it remained ‘fundamentally unrestructured. (p. 110)

Consequently, as published in the election manifesto and later the new government policy, the RDP aimed at the transformation of the civil service and the restructuring of the economy with regard to the developmental needs of the country’s poor and oppressed. This social policy programme aimed at transformation from two angles, that is, reconstruction as well as development.

Through the notion of ‘reconstruction’, institutions and structures had to be rearranged and focussed at redressing the legacy of the past. This was an attempt to shift strategy and emphasis from political liberation to reconstruction, that is, altering (transforming) economic structures. With labour sensitive economic policies being proposed, among others,
this policy framework seemed to be in line with a more radical approach (over against a liberal approach) towards a socialist transformation. Terreblanche (2002:108) shows that this original RDP ‘base document’ with this radical emphasis was largely conceptualised within the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). The other leg of this policy was ‘development’, which proposes that through a linear, evolutionary process, the social needs would be addressed through state support in the social sphere. This liberal dimension set out to learn from social democracies of the past on the role of the state and aimed not to make the same mistakes all over again. It stressed the need for fiscal discipline and for avoiding welfare programmes which only lead to poverty traps. The aim was to develop social policies that are sustainable and developmental. The notion of the transformation of higher education and the funding of deserving students should be considered against this framework.

While the initial RDP ‘base document’ was revised as a White Paper on RDP in November 1994, nullifying most of the radical demands, a more fundamental policy shift, however, took place during the latter part of 1995. According to Terreblanche, the RDP, in its original form, was a failure when it came to delivering on the electoral promises. This lack of implementation, for him, came because of an elite pact between the ruling party, the ANC, on the one hand, and what he calls the Mineral-Energy-Complex or the leaders of white capital in South Africa, on the other hand (Terreblanche 2014:loc. 1089–1116). This pact was forged as a loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), with specific conditions, was negotiated and signed (see also Stiglitz 2012:226–228 on the role of the IMF). It was therefore not a surprise that the RDP was scrapped for a new economic policy.

**Growth, employment and redistribution**

After the appointment of Trevor Manuel as Minister of Finance, a fundamental policy shift led to the acceptance in June 1996 of what was called a new growth strategy, named Growth, Employment
and Redistribution, popularly known by the acronym GEAR. The South African government underplayed and defended this shift, arguing that it was basically a strategy to fund the RDP. The reality was, however, that the RDP disappeared from the public discourse, while the provincial and local structures and community-based forums became moribund. The final curtain was drawn with the announcement of the closure of the national RDP office in March 1996.

A new macroeconomic framework was then put in place through the GEAR policy. This policy placed more emphasis on growth, more specifically economic growth, which would guide the macroeconomic framework of South Africa. As indicated in the previous theoretical section, the motivation behind this shift was, to a large extent, influenced by the global economic forces that provided the practical realities governing South Africa. Through this policy, which some commentators called a homegrown neo-liberal policy (Terreblanche 2014:loc. 1071), the government argued that it wanted to create an environment conducive to socio-economic transformation in historical and ideological continuity with the RDP. The government argued that, for ‘strategic reasons’, it aimed to create an environment conducive to economic growth. Sparks (2003, see also Terreblanche 2002:116–121) however, explains that GEAR is essentially:

[A]n unvarnished free-market programme, directly in line with the neo-liberal agenda, or what is known as the ‘Washington consensus’, a combination of relaxed exchange rates, privatization, fiscal discipline and collaboration with the private sector to produce export driven growth. (p. 193)

This policy shift gave rise to the question about what had happened to government’s commitment to the plight of the poor and marginalised in terms of the policy development process. This question comes against the background of the growing unease and public critique against this neo-liberal globalisation ideology and the growing populist struggles of the people. This unease with the shift to embrace the neo-liberal globalisation ideology emerged especially from a growing number of new
social movements in South Africa. Examples of these movements were the Jubilee 2000 movement, which pushed for the cancellation of unpayable Third World debt, including South Africa’s odious apartheid debt; the People’s Water Forum; the growing protests and struggles against the role of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), IMF, and the World Bank presence in South Africa followed much later in 2015, in particular, by the student movements.

A theological reading from Belhar to Accra

The question is how we (theologians) are to understand these movements globally and now from within South Africa? Theology has offered a few studies from South Africa on various popular youth movements – mostly, however, as a way of containing, controlling, ‘reaching out’ or ultimately ‘saving’ the youth ‘lost’ in political ‘fanaticism’, ‘debauchery’ and, perhaps, ‘mindless hedonism’. To my mind, at least missiologically, these multi-vocal innovations, sometimes perceived as ill-discipline or rebellion, should be understood instead of analysed from a clinical distance (Nel 2013:140ff.). The question is whether the traditional theological methodologies have been able to adequately account for these shifting and profoundly innovative expressions posed by new youth social movements.

Greg Leffel’s approach (2007:45) in developing what he calls a missio-ecclesiology in dialogue with new social movements, is helpful and, in my view, resonates with the kind of methodology that is needed. For Leffel (2007), social movements (like the current youth and student movements) are:

Non-institutionally organised human collectives that put meaningful ideas into play in public settings, that actively confront existing

26. See Bibliography of Smith (1974) for a dialogue between theology and popular youth movements, in particular the ‘Jesus People’ Movement.
powers through the strength of their numbers and the influence of their ideas, and that grow in size and power by inspiring others to act, to create or to resist change. (p. 48)

He shows how youth and student movements played key roles in the social uprisings as symbolised, for example by what is often referred to as the ‘revolution of 1968’. They did not merely transform society itself, but also transformed the actual forms and dynamics of social activism. Since then some social scientists of social movements (Larana, Johnston & Gusfield 1994) started to speak of *new* social movements (NSMs) that go beyond classic, class-based social movements as defined by sociologists of a Marxist orientation (Leffel 2007:46;52f.). For Larana et al. (1994) this is ‘a provocative and innovative reconceptualisation of the meaning of social movements’ (Larana et al. 1994:loc. 19). Leffel (2007:46) then refers to the helpful typology of Ray and Anderson which divides NSMs into political movements, consciousness movements and ‘cultural arms’ that challenge cultural ideas. Alongside this typology, I would also refer to Castell’s definition of social movements. Castells (1997:3) speaks of social movements as ‘purposive collective actions whose outcome, in victory as in defeat, transforms the values and institutions of society’. For him, they are in themselves ‘symptoms of who we are, and avenues of our transformation …’ (Castells 1997:3) in what he prefers to call the Network Society.

These definitions are relevant for theology globally as they present a different perspective for understanding social transformation and the role of new youth and student movements. This perspective (as suggested earlier by the voices from the Fallist movement as well) goes deeper than mere institutional restructuring or personnel change and individualist assimilation into existing institutions of learning. While the critical importance of education is recognised, the focus, it would seem, is deeper, on the shifting of values of society. It challenges the values and principles upon which current policy and institutional systems are built. This brings us to two key theological documents, the Belhar
Confession and the document called, Covenating for justice: the Accra Confession, or simply, the Accra Confession, which I propose as theological lenses through which I aim to interpret theologically the ‘FeesMustFall’ movement.

From Belhar to Accra

These two documents found their origin or are rooted in the African Reformed Christian context, yet speak to the broader issues – they aim to have a global impact. The ideas that the Fallist movement speaks to are of relevance, not only to South Africa, but also to the broader postcolonial struggle from the southern tip of Africa (as represented by the notion of ‘Belhar’, - a township created under the apartheid system for mixed race people in Cape Town) to Accra in Ghana, that is, the rest of our continent, and from there to the world. In this next section, I explain this in more detail by starting with the relevance of confessions of faith, at least for the Reformed faith tradition.

Religious faith should be confessed (Rm 10:9-10) in the concrete social realities, yet it has broader (ecumenical) significance and reach. In order to interpret social reality, not just as social phenomena, but also theologically, religious communities such as the Reformed tradition have to say what they believe as individuals and as a faith community within a broader community. Confessions articulate these theological interpretations and choices. Acclaimed Reformed theologian Willie Jonker (1994) explains:

Om eenstemmigheid te verkry oor wat presies die inhoud van die evangelië is, het daar in die geskiedenis van die kerk beslissings geval wat die inhoud van die evangelië omlyn en die juiste verstaan daarvan dien.27 (p. 3)

27. To gain common understanding on what precisely the content of the gospel is, there have been key decisions in the history of the church which outlined the content of the gospel and which served the understanding thereof.
He then continues to explain that confessions are typical of the Reformation and the churches and theological traditions that came out of the Reformation. Reformed confessions, he shows, give a succinct summary of the essentials of the Christian faith, of what they believe. It speaks, confesses, in a specific context and time where there is confusion and where the truth of the gospel is threatened. It confesses against a turning away from the sound teachings of the gospel. It also teaches, guides the church towards restoration, (reformation) and her building-up. Religious communities, like the Reformed churches, are confronted with new questions, new challenges to the gospel, which then call for confessions. Jonker (1994) explains:

Die reformatoriese belydenisse het ontstaan met die oog op binnekerklike verskille in 'n tyd toe die Christendom grotendeels nog net 'n Europese verskynsel was .... Dit bring mee dat die kerk in die moderne wereld voor uitdaginge gestel word wat in die sestiende eeu nog onbekend was.28 (p. 153)

The (Reformed) churches and traditions are therefore called to read the Word of God again, in new situations, and thereby to understand not only the Word, but also the world. This is the background for understanding the Belhar Confession and the Accra Confession.

The Belhar Confession (1986) was adopted by the Dutch Reformed Mission Church in South Africa (DRMC) in 1986 in a township created for the people of mixed race called Belhar, close to Cape Town. It was formulated as a response to the theological justification of the racial separation of churches. It speaks on the issues of unity, reconciliation, justice and obedience, and it follows on the declaration of a status confessionis29 on the theological

28. The Reformed confessions came into being, aiming at intra-ecclesial differences in a time when Christianity was largely a European phenomenon ... This means that the church is confronted, in the modern world, with challenges that were unknown in the 16th century.

29. Smit (in Cloete & Smit 1984:14) explains that this expression is a ‘gelaaiide uitdrukking, maar wat die voorwaardes en die implikasies daarvan is, is minder voor-die-handliggend’. He continues that this expression came into the debates
justification of racial separation, also in churches. In turn, the Accra Confession, also often called a declaration, adopted by the World Alliance of Reformed Churches (WARC) in 2004, speaks to a different set of circumstances. This set of circumstances is now presented as they relate to how the student movements framed their context.

The current global economic processes have been assessed from the perspective of the Reformed tradition through a process started by the WARC that formally commenced in 1997. The Belhar Confessional tradition and the Kairos prophetic movement, informed by the Kairos Document (1995), played a key role in this respect. The Southern African constituency, which met in Zambia (Kitwe) in 1995, actually called for a status confessionis on economic injustice and ecological destruction. These matters, it was felt, were not merely a matter of ethics or morality; they were matters of faith. In partnership with the World Council of Churches, the Lutheran World Federation and regional ecumenical organisations, the World Alliance of Reformed Churches then engaged in consultations in all regions of the world, from Seoul and Bangkok (1999) to Stony Point (2004). At the General Assembly of the WARC in Debrecen, Hungary, this world reformed community then called for a process of confession (processus confessionis), aiming at studying and recognising, educating, confessing and acting in light of the economic and ecological implications of this social globalising force (Smit 2002:114). At this assembly, a very relevant theological analysis was presented as a basis for further reflection and practice. It concluded that the current (neo-liberal)

(footnote 29 continues ...)
on matters which, under normal circumstances, were neutral, but which, in other situations, threatened the heart of the gospel. It becomes critical when asking which situation would call for a new confession of the gospel. In a sense, one could indeed speak of a moment of truth or kairos where issues like the structure of the church and church order arrangements become critical for the ministry of the gospel. Smit (1984:22) defines it as ‘where a Christian, a group of Christians, a church or a group of churches, discern that a situation has arisen, a moment of truth, where nothing less than the truth of the Gospel, their most basic belief on the Christian faith, is at stake, which compels them to witness or act against it’.
economic ideology and reality, as discussed in previous sections of this chapter, endanger life as God intended it to be. God’s vision for the world is prosperity, peace and justice and a world where life is enjoyed and celebrated. From a Trinitarian perspective, it was argued that God is the Source and Sustainer of life in fullness for all (Jn 10:10). It was argued that there is a need for a critical self-reflection where the idols of greed and power are unmasked. It was affirmed that the free market is not divine and that the church must engage in the economic policy processes so that the market is regulated and reformed by the quest to serve God’s creation for the well-being of the whole cosmos. This vocation, it was stated, is the essence of our public witness in the particular time and space – that life with all its riches is a gift from God. Within this context, the affirmations of the tenets of faith with regard to the various historical confessions were also relevant and were asserted and summarised succinctly in the belief and confession that Jesus of Nazareth is the Lord of all life.

In the processes confessionis the choice was made for a holistic understanding of witness and spirituality, which implied concrete historical choices regarding the principles of this rule of Christ for the contemporary economic challenges. This meant that everything that happened globally had to be analysed with reference to the question whether the reign (what some called, the ‘kingdom’ of God), the rule of justice for the poor and oppressed, is served. The Belhar confessional tradition, as referred to earlier, affirmed that the imperative for justice calls for the choice to ‘stand where God stands’, namely on the side of the poor and oppressed in the context of neoliberal globalisation and the call to obedience and concrete witness in this context.

This belief from Belhar on the way to Accra in the late 1990s and early 2000s, led to the discernment of a faith praxis that aims to transform this world, inclusive of this concrete economic reality. This witness and action towards the transformation of the world and the church in her economic dealings is a key witnessing call and therefore understood to be an integral part of
discipleship within this tradition. It is this life of discipleship and world transformative action that was to inform every component of personal, social and church life.

It is therefore in this context where the Accra Confession was born. Gathered in Ghana in 2004, the delegates for the General Council of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches first visited the various slave dungeons of Elmina and Cape Coast and lamented that ‘the cries of “never again” are put to the lie by the ongoing realities of human trafficking and the oppression of the global economic system’. This was an indication of the setting in Accra, but also an affirmation of the history of where the struggle for socio-economic justice comes from and an affirmation of the current ongoing struggle. In the Accra Confession this Assembly then stated (Covenanting for Justice 2005):

The signs of the times have become more alarming and must be interpreted. The root causes of massive threats to life are above all the product of an unjust economic system defended and protected by political and military might.

We live in a scandalous world that denies God’s call to life for all. The annual income of the richest 1% is equal to that of the poorest 57%, and 24,000 people die each day from poverty and malnutrition. The debt of poor countries continues to increase despite paying back their original borrowing many times over. Resource-driven wars claim the lives of millions, while millions more die of preventable diseases. (p. 186)

For the drafters and signatories of the Accra Confession, this crisis is ‘directly related to the development of neoliberal economic globalization’ and they show the key ‘beliefs’ of this, namely that unrestrained competition, consumerism and the unlimited economic growth and accumulation of wealth is the best for the whole world; the ownership of private property has no social obligation. Capital speculation, liberalisation and deregulation of the market, the privatisation of public utilities and national resources, unrestricted access for foreign investments and imports, lower taxes and the unrestricted movement of capital will achieve wealth for all. Indeed, social obligations, protection
of the poor and the weak, trade unions and relationships between people are subordinate to the processes of economic growth and capital accumulation. In biblical terms, they state (Lk 16):

[S]uch a system of wealth accumulation at the expense of the poor is seen as unfaithful to God and responsible for preventable human suffering and is called Mammon. Jesus has told us that we cannot serve both God and Mammon. (v. 13)

The journey from Belhar to Accra can be seen as a sharpening of the will to unmask the principalities and powers behind the lack of unity, reconciliation and justice. This journey provides a key postcolonial theological lens to discern the Fallist movement.

An assessment

In assessing the Fallist movements through the postcolonial lenses of Belhar and Accra, one can immediately observe the resonances in relating the current realities with regard to what are considered to be colonial symbols or economic measures of exclusion without taking into account historical structural realities and matters such as language and workers’ rights on campuses. It seems that student leaders’ assessment of their struggle, as part of a bigger (global) struggle for economic justice, calls for theological (and ideological) assessment, instead of merely responding with either outright (disdainful) condemnation or a superficial attempt at ‘building good relations’. Therefore, the analysis of the student movements should first be understood and located within a broader theoretical and global context as a symptom of the deeper marginalisation of youths’ dreams and aspirations by specific policy choices. Secondly, the ideological underpinnings of policy choices with regard to fullness of life for all should be unearthed. There should be a thorough evaluation and theological assessment at this level. Thirdly, while aware of the ideological choices, there should be a process of assessing university and higher education policies through an interdisciplinary forum in order to draft a workable policy.
framework for affordable higher education in South Africa. It may be that the current crisis can provide the opportunity to do so.

Let there not be another 40 years where the voices of students are silenced. May the generations to come refer back to 2016 as a watershed year.

## Summary: Chapter 8

The struggles of young people against colonisation in South Africa are etched in the memory of the Soweto student uprisings of June 1976. In 2015 and 2016, it was again the student movements who raised their fists – this time against the postcolonial higher education authorities and ultimately the government. Their fight, they argue, was still against the exclusion and economic marginalisation of young black people. This contribution takes as a starting point the significance of the #FeesMustFall student movements against the background of the socio-economic developments and subsequent rise of corporate managerialism at universities, globally, but more specifically in South Africa. The student movements argue that the developments in macroeconomic policy and the subsidisation of higher education since the ‘dawn of democracy’ in South Africa in the 1990s continue to protect and entrench colonial interests. The chapter shows that this is, for them, the new terrain of the postcolonial struggle against systemic oppression and institutional racism, but also broadly the struggle for economic justice. This contribution puts these realities within the theological framework of the imperatives of two key theological lenses, that is, the Confession of Belhar and the Accra Declaration and concludes with pointers for public witness.
A Global bioethics of equality in health research

A broad Protestant and global bioethical perspective on equality and tuberculosis in South Africa

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Unequal funding

Global context

Previous discussions have touched on inequality in South Africa in various ways, whether directly or indirectly. It has been shown that this inequality is leading to frustration, suffering

and hopelessness. The first chapter has given an in-depth analysis on the state inequality, while the previous chapter has included economic inequality as one of the major motives for the frustration of students at many universities. What is absent from the previous chapters is a specific focus on inequality and health in South Africa. This is a multifarious theme with many challenges that cannot all be addressed in this contribution. Therefore, the focus will be only on equality and tuberculosis from a global perspective in South Africa.

Global inequality is a huge reality and in the health environment there are different forms of inequality. Carvalho and Albuquerque (2015) have performed an in-depth study of global inequality as a bioethical issue in light of Article 10 of the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (UDBHR) of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). As it is impossible to deal with all the global bioethical issues in this discussion, the focus will only be, as an example, on the unequal spending of global research funds and the implications of this imbalance for inequality in South Africa. As far back as 1990, the Commission on Health Research for Development pointed out that minimal amounts of global research funds available for health problems were spent in developing countries, although the largest percentage of health problems were found in these countries—a disparity that became known as the ‘10/90 gap’ (IBC 2010:84; The Commission on Health Research for Development 1990:36, 88–89). Henk Ten Have (2016), previous Director of the Division of Ethics of Science and Technology at UNESCO, agrees with this finding in his recent book Global bioethics: An introduction:

Expenditure on research in global health has increased rapidly. However, in 2000, the Global Forum for Health Research estimated

30. ‘The fundamental equality of all human beings in dignity and rights is to be respected so that they are treated justly and equitably’ (UNESCO 2006).
that less than 10 percent of the $55 billion global spending on health research is devoted to diseases or conditions that account for 90 percent of the global burden of disease. For example, pneumonia, diarrhoea, tuberculosis and malaria together account for 20 percent of the disease burden in the world, [but] receive less than 1 percent of the public and private funds for health research. This disparity is the result of economic as well as policy decisions. (p. 62)

The calculation of the Global Forum for Health Research in 2000 was reconfirmed in another study in 2008 (Global Forum for Health Research 2008b:29). The International Bioethics Committee (IBC) of UNESCO supported the previously mentioned claim of Ten Have (IBC 2010:30–31). The University of Oslo Commission on Global Governance for Health (2014:641) found the amount spent on global research in 2010 was probably nearer to $240 billion.

Currently, less than 10% of global funds are spent on researching diseases and conditions that affect more than 90% of the world’s population. In developing countries with a low or middle income, little money is spent on research, which is a manifestation of global unequal appropriation of available funds (IBC 2010:31). Ten Have (2016:69) describes the results of the unequal spending saying, ‘[l]imited access to treatment and care is a global bioethical problem, because effective medication is not available due to priorities in research.’

As claimed above, globally available research funds spent on tuberculosis research are far less than 1%. One must also pay attention to the fact that there is a global increase in the recurrence of tuberculosis as a result of drug resistance (e.g. in South Africa). Ten Have (2016:137) says that ‘these infections pose global threats to human health, even in countries where they do not originate’. The reasons for the unequal spending of funds are economic and political in nature. Ten Have argues that companies do not regard it profitable to develop medicine for poor populations who cannot afford it. There is no urgency
among them either, as poor populations cannot put pressure on policy direction and decisions.

To address inequality and thus enhance health, more research is essential in order to obtain new information and create technology (IBC 2010):

There is a need to focus scarce resources on health research in poor countries in order to optimize health benefits and achieve equity. There is a need to budget for research and to see research as an investment’, is the view of UNESCO. (p. 31)

This investment would include a wide spectrum of research fields such as biomedical sciences (creating new, affordable and easily obtainable medicine, vaccines, diagnostic methods and applications), health systems and policy directions, social and political sciences, economic, behavioural and effectivity studies, epidemiological research on the relationship between health and cultural, physical, political and social environment as well as the development of guidelines for best practices. Health research can make a large contribution to the improvement of health and social development. In 2008, at the Bamako Global Ministerial Forum (co-organised by the Global Forum for Health Research), 62 countries’ ministers of health, science, technology and education admitted that environmental, demographic, social and economic research is essential to ascertain the nature and scope of health problems and to develop and implement effective, lifesaving interventions (Global Forum for Health Research 2008a; IBC 2010:30–31). In view of this fact, UNESCO recommends the following (IBC 2010):

In particular, more research is needed to address the lack of appropriate drugs and technologies to treat the multiple burdens of communicable and chronic diseases that many developing countries now face, and to provide knowledge and evidence about what policies, systems and services work in different places and settings, about what is failing, and about what is needed to improve the situations in the most cost-effective ways. (p. 31)

Many countries are in need of international assistance to further equality. Greater global equality is furthered by research as part
of comprehensive health care and the strengthening of research structures. In 2004, the Global Forum for Health Research appealed to developed donor countries to spend more of their health budgets on supporting research in developing countries (Global Forum for Health Research 2008b:82; IBC 2010:30–31). To support low-income countries in achieving this goal will cost developed and rich countries only 0.1% of their annual GDP. For this reason, Ten Have (2016:210) is of the opinion that greater equality with regard to research and health is attainable.

**Local context**

The unequal global spending of funds on research is probably a factor that contributes to the large incidence of tuberculosis in Africa and, particularly, South Africa. According to Mayosi and Benatar (2014:1345), South Africa has one of the largest tuberculosis epidemics in the world (which is also influenced by HIV infection). The incidence of tuberculosis has increased from 300 per 100 000 in the 1990s to more than 950 per 100 000 in 2012. In the United Kingdom, the incidence of tuberculosis is currently more or less two mortalities per 100 000 (Benatar 2013:154). Mayosi and Benatar point out that the largest incidence of drug-resistant tuberculosis is also found in South Africa (cf. also WHO 2013:i–x, 45). According to Statistics South Africa, tuberculosis was the biggest and heart disease the fourth biggest cause of disease-related deaths in 2011–2013. In the above-mentioned period, tuberculosis-related deaths only occurred within the black and brown population, whereas no deaths in the white and Indian population were reported (Statistics South Africa 2013:27, 126–127). These alarming data indicate the absolute necessity of this discussion. These statistics were yet again confirmed by Statistics South Africa in 2017 (Statistics South Africa 2017:31, 131–133).

In light of these statistics, the IBC (2010:23) is correct in stating that ‘huge, growing inequalities are indeed what we see, both at the domestic and especially at the international level’. Both the
high incidence of tuberculosis and the high degree of resistance to medicine require in-depth research that does not only include biomedical, but also socio-economic, psychological and political research (Vidyasagar 2006:56). With reference to the previously mentioned unequal spending of global research funds as well as the inequality in a specific country (in this instance, South Africa), Mayosi and Benatar (2014:1351) appeal on bioethical grounds to the global community for a larger contribution to transdisciplinary sociopolitical and economic research.

Against the background of the appeal, the following bioethical question, which is also the research question, arises: Does a nation state and/or global community have the moral right to request greater equal justice in spending global research funds for the promotion of health (and addressing other global inequalities in health care)? Some people claim that equal justice is a national responsibility only and that the world’s different nations are not globally responsible for one another; they maintain that only charity can be discussed (Ten Have 2016:205). Are there universally accepted bioethical principles and human rights that may lead to an appeal to the global community for equal justice? The bioethical question arises whether addressing tuberculosis in, for example, South Africa is an exclusively national responsibility or whether the global community also bears responsibility for each other and, in particular, for South Africa to promote equality. May, or should, the South African government seek help from the international community? Is it shameful to do so?

From a theological angle, radical economic inequality is one of the greatest theological issues of the 21st century (Pressler 2011:275), and continuous Christian reflection on global justice is therefore necessary and relevant (Hollinger 2008 [c. 2002]:217–218, 237). If such a global ethical appeal exists, the following theological question arises: Can it be supported from a Protestant perspective and in this way also become the commission of Christians? ‘Protestant’ is used in a general sense here, indicating the Christian tradition that originated in the 16th century and that forms the third of the three
great traditions, the other being Roman Catholicism and Greek Orthodoxy. Protestantism is diverse with diverse standpoints, but especially two characteristics form the core of the tradition, namely emphasis on the Word of God and protest against injustice, for example protest in support of religious freedom (Van Leeuwen 2014:419–420). The central theoretical tenet of this discussion is that an obligation to promote greater global equality in research is justifiable and that it can be defended from a Protestant perspective. Following the example of Carvalho and Albuquerque (2015:229) as well as Garrafa (2016), attention will be given to two matters in answering the above-mentioned research question. In the first place, the UDBHR will be discussed in general and Article 10 will be investigated in particular. In the second place, the UDBHR and Article 10 will be evaluated from a Protestant perspective.

### Equality as global right

#### Global authority

In this subdivision, it will be indicated briefly why the UDBHR is selected in answering the research question. It follows that attention will necessarily have to be given to the authority and scope of the instrument. What is the position of authority of the UDBHR in which Article 10 resides? UNESCO is a specialist organisation within the UN as a global organisation and has 193 member states, one more than the UN’s General Assembly in New York. The UN is currently the only platform where all nations can conduct debates and eventually concur on normative instruments (Ten Have & Jean 2009:18–49). In 2005, members of the General Assembly of the UN were unable to reach consensus on the Declaration on Human Cloning, as 84 countries voted in favour of it, 34 voted against it and 47 abstained from voting. Some countries declared openly that they did not support the declaration (Ten Have 2016:156). Contrary to this, the UDBHR was unanimously accepted by all the member states in 2005.
This means that this declaration is the first and currently the only bioethical (political) text to which almost all the governments in the world, South Africa included, have committed themselves (UNESCO 2005). It is of the utmost importance that all the member states of UNESCO were able to agree with one another on all the principles in the UDBHR and thus to reach an exceptional achievement for universal bioethics. The unique power of the declaration is found in the fact that the declaration reflects global perspectives on bioethics that emanate from the discourse between different cultures, traditions and schools of thought within the member states. All the great religions of the world, Christianity included, participated in drawing up the code of conduct (Ten Have & Jean 2009:31).

Declarations such as the UDBHR that are accepted by the UN agencies form part of the ‘soft law’ instruments that are not as strong as conventions, as they are, according to international law, not legally enforceable (Ten Have 2011:8). Therefore, words such as should instead of would are used in this declaration (Kirby 2009a:73). Despite the lack of enforceability, the unanimous acceptance of the instrument by the General Assembly of UNESCO without any noted countervote, reservation or qualification as well as the instrument’s universal aim, means that it does not merely have symbolic value, but that it is meant and accepted as an instrument with moral authority and obligation that has to be taken very seriously (Ten Have 2011:20–21). The fact that the bioethical principles and norms are presented in human rights terms strengthens the moral appeal of the declaration (Kirby 2009a:78; Ten Have 2016:103, 106). This declaration can only be understood as a global commitment (Garrafa 2016:1695) that should be honoured as a ‘normative expression of global bioethics’ (Carvalho & Albuquerque 2015). In 2006, the moral authority of the declaration was also acknowledged by the European Court of Human Rights with its reference to the instrument in the case of Evans against the United Kingdom (Ten Have & Jean 2009:44–45).
What is the scope of the UDBHR in which Article 10 resides? From the title, aims and ethical principles of the instrument, a global ethical aim can be derived. The objectives of the declaration are discussed in Article 2 and the following two objectives are relevant (UNESCO 2006):

2(a) [7]o provide a universal framework of principles and procedures to guide States in the formulation of their legislation, policies or other instruments in the field of bioethics.

2(f) [7]o promote equitable access to medical, scientific and technological developments as well as the greatest possible flow and the rapid sharing of knowledge concerning those developments and the sharing of benefits, with particular attention to the needs of developing countries. (n.p.)

From these objectives, it is clear that the instrument should be used by States as a universal directive in formulating legislation and policy that must reflect the content of the declaration and that legislation and policy must also pay regard to other countries, specifically the developing countries. Kirby (2009b:86) agrees with this standpoint when he writes that ‘the terms of Article 2(f) is reflected in Article 14 (social responsibility and health) and Article 15 (sharing of benefits)’. Article 14 states that there is a responsibility to promote the health ‘of every human being’ and Article 15 states that all benefits from research must be shared with the ‘international community, in particular with developing countries’. Article 13 of the UDBHR corresponds with this principle and states that ‘solidarity among human beings and international cooperation towards that end are to be encouraged’ (Carvalho & Albuquerque 2015:233). The UNESCO Committee summarises the universal intention of the UDBHR as follows (IBC 2010):

Governments have a first and primary obligation to the people for whom they are directly responsible. Beyond this duty, there is an obligation to help other countries, which is increased in so far as more resources are available and the governments abroad lack the means to protect the health of their people. This obligation can also entail some legislative measures. (p. 23)
It must also be kept in mind that other influential bioethical human rights instruments are either regionally related (Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 1997) or health related (Ten Have 2011:69, 75; WMA Declaration of Helsinki 2013). Garrafa (2016:1695) calls this declaration the most important document that currently exists in the area of global bioethics. ‘The UDBHR illustrates that bioethics has developed into a global endeavour’ (Ten Have 2016:101).

The question arises what the particular meaning of Article 10 of the declaration for the global community would be.

**Global equality**

‘It is [...] true that the text is very general. Definitions of crucial terms are not provided and the wording of principles is not specific’, Ten Have (2016:101–103) writes with regard to the principles of the UDBHR. This remark brings the following question to fore: How should one interpret the declaration? According to Kirby (2009a:73), it makes sense to explain the UDBHR in light of the internationally acknowledged directive of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties that states that ‘a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose’. ‘Ordinary meaning to be given to the terms’ indicates textual analysis; with ‘context’, the meaning is the preface, the text in its entirety, *travaux préparatoires* and official educational material of UNESCO; and ‘object and purpose’ indicates the scope and objectives of the declaration (Martin 2014:119; Shickle 2014:486).

In the first place, the UDBHR links human dignity and equality with each other in Article 3. This is confirmed by Article 2 of the UDBHR that states that the *objective of the Declaration*  

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31. ‘Human dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms are to be fully respected’ (UNESCO 2006).
is, inter alia, ‘to provide a universal framework of principles’ with the specific goal ‘to promote respect for human dignity’ (UNESCO 2006). ‘Nevertheless, in order to use “dignity” in our lives, some practical principles were established’ (UNESCO 2011:10). Recognition of equality gives expression to human dignity and where this principle is respected, people are treated with human dignity.

In the second place, Article 10 states the principle of the ‘fundamental equality of all human beings’. For UNESCO, ‘equality’ is understood as ‘sameness’, which means that people are equal to one another. In the official manual of UNESCO (Bioethics Core Curriculum: Section 1: Syllabus Ethics Education Programme 2008:45), the definitions of concepts in Article 10 are concisely explained in the following way, ‘[d]iscuss definitions of “equality” (sameness in some respect such as human dignity), “justice” (different types, but generally fairness), “equity” (application of fairness, which may require unequal treatment)’.

In the definition of the Bioethics Core Curriculum, it is not clearly stated that it deals with the equality of all people, but it is plainly stated in the wording of Article 10, mentioning the ‘fundamental equality of all human beings in dignity and rights’. In this regard, all people, no matter who they are, where they live or what they believe, must have an equal moral right to health care (Articles 10 and 14).

UNESCO does not understand ‘equality’ in an egalitarian sense. The definition of the Bioethics Core Curriculum (2008:45) goes one step further, though, by stating that ‘equality’ must be understood as ‘sameness in some respect such as human dignity’. Article 10 corresponds with this definition and describes ‘equality’ as ‘equal to each other’, specifically in ‘dignity’ and ‘rights’, thereby implying that people do have multiple lives physically, psychologically, mentally and genetically, and that they are equal with regard to dignity and rights. ‘Human rights and cosmopolitan discourse both emphasize that human beings have equal moral worth’, Ten Have (2016:208) writes. This respect
for equality also applies to all the bioethical rights, meaning that some people do not have more or less rights than others do (Garrafa 2016:1699). All people around the world have a right to all the universal principles as declared in the UDBHR. D’Empaire (2009) has the following view saying:

In order to respect justice and equity, all previous principles listed above (human dignity, human rights, autonomy, beneficence, no harm, integrity, privacy, confidentiality) have to be equally respected by all human beings. (p. 181)

This means that all people must be considered equal in value and rights irrespective of inequality and inhuman behaviour.

It is important to observe that no mention is made of ‘fundamental’ equality. UNESCO distinguishes conceptually between general and derivative principles. A general or fundamental principle is an independent principle that does not result from other principles, but is a principle in itself from which other derivative principles arise (Evans 2009:115). By using the concept *fundamental*, UNESCO already wants to indicate that the concepts of *justly* and *equitably* in Article 10 are closely related to the concept of *equality*, from which the norms *justice* and *equity* are derived. In his comments on the UDBHR, D’Empaire (2009) states the following:

As it has been established in Article 10 of the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, justice and equity are only possible if all human beings are treated equally in their dignity and rights. (p. 175)

In the *third place*, the first norm that arises from the fundamental equality of all people is the concept of *justness* or *being treated justly*. This norm arises from the principle of equality and, according to the above-mentioned definition, is understood as ‘fairness’. The latter implies that in equal circumstances, people must receive equal treatment. To treat people justly thus means to treat them the same or with equity by virtue of human dignity (D’Empaire 2009:173–174). In this regard, UNESCO (2008:45) distinguishes between distributed, affirmative and social justice at a global level. Globally, medical
resources have to be distributed more equally. The IBC (2010) specifically links fairness and research with each other when describing the obligation of States as follows:

Seeing health as a universal common good motivates countries to work towards a more equitable distribution of health resources: vaccines, drugs, innovation, and research. We all know that scientific progress will not stop but its applications should benefit every region of the world and not only help rich countries to increase the quality of life of their citizens, while poor countries are still lacking what is needed to survive decently. (p. 23)

With reference to Article 14 of the UDBHR, people may not be treated unequally based on race, religion, political persuasion, economic or social position. In particular, no political, legal competence or international status of countries or territorial areas in which people reside may be used as an argument to treat people (or countries) unequally or to merely accept inequality (IBC 2010:23).

The IBC (2010:23) points out that ‘equality’ in Article 10 must not be understood in absolute terms in the sense of perfect equality that must be strived for, but that it means the ‘the highest attainable standard’ that must be set as objective (UNESCO 2008:46). This approach emphasises that there will always be limitations and some inequality, but that equality must be described and strived for as far as possible. Article 14 of the UDBHR (Social Responsibility and Health) can be applied as basis for this approach when it states that ‘the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of every human being’.

In the fourth place, the second norm that arises from the fundamental equality of all people is the concept of equity. ‘Equality is the desired consequence of equity and equity is the starting point for equality’ (Garrafa 2016:1699). According to the above-mentioned definition (Bioethics Core Curriculum 2008), this norm deals with the application of ‘fairness’ as unequal treatment in some cases. Whereas justness is a norm that pleads for equal treatment of all people by virtue of human dignity,
fairness is the norm that requests that people will be treated specifically unequally in some cases. This principle admits that, despite the equality of all people, complete equal treatment of all people at all times is impossible, because they might find themselves in different circumstances. The norm of fairness refers to the use of discretion where formal equality is impossible by looking at the circumstances of the specific problem and then discriminating or doing a temporary injustice to someone in all fairness. Garrafa (2016) explains the norm in Article 10 in the following way:

Inequality occurs when equal and unequal people are dealt with equally and without distinction. Unequal people should be dealt with unequally, precisely to take into consideration the fact that they are unequal. In this case, justice is done not by attributing the same to all people as if everyone is equivalent to everyone else, but by dealing with people who are not equal in a differentiated manner. (p. 1699)

Fairness means that under certain circumstances, precedence is given to certain people or groups of people, for example women and children (Article 14(2) (a) of the UDBHR, UNESCO 2006), which means that there is sometimes fair discrimination against men (temporarily). When disproportional inequality is determined, certain individuals or groups can be given preference in order to restore equality. In light of the example of the global unequal spending of research funding, the norm of fairness would mean that in South Africa more global money would be spent (temporarily) for research on tuberculosis than, for example, heart or other diseases, implying that more funds should be spent on a disease that concerns mainly the black population.

In the fifth place, this basic equality of all people must be respected (‘is to be respected so that they are treated justly and equitably’). Against the background of the preface of the UDBHR as well as Article 10, ‘respect’ should be understood as the acknowledgment and application of the principle of equality. This respect must be exercised within the context of ‘issues
related to medicine, life sciences and associated technologies as applied to human beings’ by the interested parties as indicated in Article 1(1)(2) of UNESCO (2006), ‘[t]his Declaration is addressed to States. As appropriate and relevant, it also provides guidance to decisions or practices of individuals, groups, communities, institutions and corporations, public and private’.

To summarise: Against the background of the above-mentioned discussion, it is clear that the UDBHR has been accepted by the world community as an authoritative universal instrument that must be applied in this way. UNESCO and the global community hold the opinion that a global ethical responsibility or obligation exists towards everybody in the health environment (UNESCO 2011:102). Article 10 states the fundamental equality of all people, which is an expression of human dignity. The principles of equity and fairness flow forth from the fundamental principle of equality (equal value). To treat people the same on the basis of equality is equity. This means that social benefits such as research will also be distributed equally at a global level in such a way that the highest attainable equality will be accomplished, also known as distributive equity. To treat people unequally in unequal circumstances, sometimes on the basis of equality, is fairness, which means that women and children may temporarily be given preferential treatment in some situations. To respect Article 10 means States and the civil society will acknowledge inequality and promote equality.

Subsequently, attention will now be given to the question whether the Protestant community of believers can fully support this universal principle by UNESCO as authoritative.

A theological perspective

Foundation

A Christian perspective on the UDBHR and Article 10 will now be presented. In this subsection, two matters will be dealt with:
In the first place, the focus will be on the question why a Christian foundation is expedient, and in the second place, a Christian ethical foundation for Article 10 will be presented.

In the first place, why is a Christian evaluation expedient? To answer this question, three reasons can be pointed out briefly: Firstly, according to the set objective, the UDBHR presents itself as a ‘framework of principles’ (Art. 2a; UNESCO 2006), also known as ‘principlism’, of which the aim is to address and solve universal bioethical problems. The reason for using principles is that they are not founded in any specific ethical theory, but have a particular value with which proponents of diverse ethical theories on bioethical principles can agree as the acceptance of the declaration clearly showed (cf. also Gallagher 2014:135; Ten Have 2011:23). The preface of the UDBHR formulates the ethical point of departure of ‘universal principles based on shared ethical values’ (UNESCO 2006), known as ‘common morality’, which forms an independent meta-ethical theory. This theory emanates from the point of view that diverse ethical traditions share a minimum of ethical values that are determined by interaction between the diverse traditions. Related to this, the concept of fallibility also exists within the theory of ‘common morality’. This means that no principle is absolutely sure and that there is always a chance that it could be incomplete or wrong. Therefore it implies a ‘need for continuous testing and assessing [...] validation and revision’ (Ten Have 2011:25; Wallace 2009:55–68).

This ethical theory leads to the following two problems:

- Tham (2014:2–3), who offers comments on the UDBHR, points out that during a very long developing process with much debate within UNESCO, there was only one opportunity for religions (Islam, Confucianism, Buddhism, Hinduism, Roman Catholicism and Jewish tradition) to make an official contribution (IBC 2004:2–4; Ten Have & Jean 2009:31; Gallagher 2014:135). He also mentions that there has been no
specific contribution from the Protestant tradition in the development of the UDBHR. Ten Have (2016:102) confirms this view when he argues, ‘it is clear that given the short time frame for drafting the declaration, the development of the text and the resulting consensus has been vulnerable to criticism, since not all relevant actors could be consulted, while others did not feel represented by the experts involved.’ To determine whether the Protestant tradition can really share the values of Article 10 with the world community, new and continuous theological reflection is necessary. Reflection and possible acceptance can only strengthen the universality of the declaration.

• Tham (2014:2) also observes, ‘[b]y its very nature, United Nations documents tend to be non-religious and non-sectarian.’ Within Protestantism there are two epistemological instruments: the first one is natural law and the second one is the written Word. Lorenzen (2009:283) pleads for a holistic approach that includes both instruments in a dialectical relationship. This means that Article 10 must be accepted temporarily as a product of natural law that in this discourse enters into a discussion with the Word. For an extremely large number of Protestants, in imitation of Calvin and Barth, the written Word is the primary source of ethical foundation. According to this point of view, values must be considered in light of the Word and Christ (Eph 5:1, 2 Cor 10:5; Douma 1997:60, 89, 91; Macaleer 2014:10). The Protestant human rights authority and ethicist, J.M. Vorster (2015:109) links the Bible and human rights instruments when he claims that the second commandment lays down knowledge of and living from the Word as a Christian duty. From this viewpoint, he (Vorster 2015:109) then draws the following conclusion, ‘[w]ith this [command], an important foundation for Christian moral actions is profoundly laid. Ultimately, the written Word provides the principles for the ethics and it is also the touchstone for all ethical codes and acts.’

In his religious commentary on the UDBHR, Gallagher (2014:135) is also convinced that universal principles must be founded in the Word. Christian testing as well as the foundation
of universal bioethical (and human rights) principles is a new development within the Protestant theology. As far as could be determined, Douma (1997:82-91) is the first Protestant theologian who has provided a Christian evaluation, even though it is vague and brief. Macaleer (2014:24-30) points out clearly that no Protestant ethicist has yet given in-depth attention to a theoretical foundation for modern global bioethical principles. His book (or thesis, *The New Testament and bioethics: Theology and basic bioethics principles*) deals with the Protestant theological foundation of four universal bioethical principles by Beauchamp and Childress (autonomy, beneficence, maleficence and justice). Macaleer (2014) summarises the book as follows:

As outlined by Beauchamp and Childress, these principles are based on what they call the common morality. Thus, the principles have no specific theological foundation; this book attempts to give those principles a Scriptural foundation. (pp. ix-x)

The same argument holds for the universal principles of the UDBHR, for which there is no theological foundation. In this way, the ‘common morality’ can be tested and upheld as a natural right. According to Lorenzen (2009:282), however, no bioethical principle is neutral, because it is co-determined by context and, as God is the basis of ethics, a Christian foundation is necessary.

Secondly, what is the particular value of a theological foundation for these universal bioethical principles? According to Stott et al. (2006:197) a Christian basis provides a theological foundation for a universal principle and therewith moral authority (Lorenzen 2009:298). Thus, a biblical foundation is of particular value for the Christian medical practitioner, researcher and politician, because a Christian foundation forms the religious motivation for the recognition and execution of a human right. A foundation forms part of ‘I believe in’ (Waldron 2010:233-234) and will help fostering human rights in the Christian’s heart as Vorster (2004) recommends. Nullens (2006:215-216) also points out that a foundation shows the public at large that the Christian
belief is directed at the well-being of the community and is not estranged from human rights.

Thirdly, the provision of a Christian foundation and authority to universal principles has a far greater chance to influence the church community and strengthen the possibility that church members will use and promote these principles in reflection (Stempsey 2012:18). The community of believers, as part of the civil community, can exercise influence in the area of global bioethics. Regarding the influence of believers who are knowledgeable about bioethics, Ten Have (2016:21–22) refers to the example where the Tongan government gave permission to Autogen, an Australian biotechnological company, in secret to gather genetic material from citizens and store it in a databank with a view to performing research on it in exchange for annual financial support for research and royalties. When this agreement became known, churches (and pro-democratic groups) rebelled against the agreement. They were of the opinion that no well-informed permission was given by the citizens and that it held a great danger for their privacy and confidentiality. In 2001, the project was dismissed (Burton 2002:443).

Various Protestant theologians such as Douma (1997:41), Macaleer (2014) and Vorster (2003:240) support a thematic treatment in ethical evaluation of Scriptures. Macaleer (2014:10, 14, 212) points out that modern universal bioethical concepts do not occur directly in the Bible, because the bioethical concepts of the 21st century did not form part of the world of thought in the New Testament (Verhey 2011:96). Before J.F. Childress (2002), the well-known Protestant ethicist, made an in-depth ethical evaluation of informed consent with research in view, he commenced with the following statement:

Which Protestant beliefs lend support to standards of self-determination (autonomy) and voluntary, informed consent/refusal in clinical care and research? Methodologically, Protestants have tended to downplay tradition in favor of direct appeals to Scripture, and they have found in, or developed from, Scripture several key themes. (p. 190)
In the second place, a Christian ethical foundation for Article 10 will subsequently be presented. In the evaluation of Article 10, attention will be given to the view of God, Christology, the Fall and the human being as image of God as different themes.

Equal dignity

In the first place, according to VanDrunen (2009:33), God's covenant with the world in Genesis 1–11 forms the background for understanding global bioethics. In his theological discussion of the UDBHR, Mackler (2014) gives a summary from an Old Testament perspective:

Modern thinkers increasingly came to see in the Bible’s account of having God begin humankind with but one pair of people an early intuition of the truth that all ethics is necessarily universal. Put symbolically, one Divine Parent meant that all human beings have familial obligations to one another (p. 397).

The Bible reveals the development of universal justice with a view to governing the diverse and broken human existence after the Fall. König (2010:113–114) and Van Wyk (1998:176) point out that Chapters 1–11 of Genesis deal with universal human history (before Abraham’s calling) and that they should be understood in the following way: firstly, that God is universally involved (or in a covenant with all of humanity – Gn 9:16) from the beginning; and secondly, they deal with matters that all humankind have in common (Kelly, Magill & Ten Have 2013:15; Vorster 2004:42). The manner of involvement and the communality, which are not named explicitly by König, are explained by VanDrunen (2009) in his book Bioethics and the Christian life:

Genesis 4:15 and 9:6 are particularly relevant. In both of these texts God ordained a system of human justice, not as the sole possession of those who believed in him, but as the common possession of the human race (pp. 31–33).

32. ‘Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed; for in the image of God has God made man’. 
This point of departure is also affirmed in Matthew 7:12 in an Christological manner when Jesus uses the well-known golden rule, an ethical rule that appears *verbatim* in most religious and philosophical systems. With this rule, Jesus wants to point to the reality that shared values are indeed possible and should be striven after (Østnor et al. 1995:19). There are two theological reasons why a universal legal system of shared values outside Christianity is possible: The first reason is that the Bible draws attention to the fact that God reconciled ‘all things, whether things on earth or things in heaven’ to himself by the blood of his Son on the cross (Col 1:17–20).

Notwithstanding the visible contrary, Christian ethics occurs in a world (as well as entire creation) that has already been reconciled with God (Berkhof 1985:513–521; MacDonald 2013:44–51; Moltmann 2012:184, 227–228). A universal legal system expresses the reconciliation that has been accomplished by Christ concretely. The second reason is the fact that God created his law, known as natural law, in the hearts of all people (Rm 2:14–15). All people have an ethical notion that corresponds with the law of God.

Genesis 1–11 and Christology indicate that God's earthly authority will provide in the form of universal codes such as the UDBHR with the purpose to protect man and creation from evil and to promote well-being (Vorster 2007:108). The fact that all people are created in God’s image (Gn 9:6) implies that all people have a responsibility towards one another (Macaleer 2014:177–178). In this sense, the world forms brothers and sisters of all people (Am 1:9) with the common goal to promote peace and stability within a diverse and secular world (Jr 29:4–7; Rm 12:18) by means of a universal system of justice and fairness (Is 32:17; Ps 85:11; Ja 3:18; Van Wyk 1991:259). Because God is good to all people (Ps 145:9; Mt 5:44–46), the human person is commanded to be good to all people (Gl 6:10). All humans must promote the common good (Douma 1990:54).
In the second place, attention will be given to the fact that one form of common good to all people is the acknowledgment and promotion of global equality. Firstly, equality, multiplicity and justice are founded in the character of the triune God (Bridger 1995:352-253; Lorenzen 2009:288). God is the norm, source and standard of all normative activities. The Holy Trinity, as persons in relation, is regarded as a social model for humankind. In the social model, the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are coequal (Mt 28:19; 2 Cor 3:17-18; Rm 9:5). This is equality in godly status, not in characteristics (Bridger 1995:325-353; Plantinga, Thompson & Lundberg 2010:115). The being of God does not only indicate equality, but also multiplicity. Although the persons in the Trinity are equal in value, it does not mean that they are similar (Bridger 1995:352-353). Equality and multiplicity are also related to equity, which is the character of God (Ps 103:6; Is 45:21; Rm 3:5). This is the reason why God promotes equality between people (Ps 103:3, 140:12; Hollinger 2008 [c. 2002]:218-219).

Secondly, God associates humankind with his being and characteristics by creating them in his image (Gn 1:26-27). The fact that all humans, male and female, are created in God’s image indicates the anthropological status of humans and this has four implications (Bridger 1995:352-253):

1. To be created in his image indicates human dignity. In this hierarchical existence, God forms axiomatically the highest form of existence and worthiness (Higginson 1995:98) and is therefore praised in Revelation 4:11 as the utmost worthy One (cf. also Heb 3:3). If God is absolute worthiness and the human is his image, then the human possesses derived but definitive worthiness (Mt 6:26; 2 Pt 1:4). ‘If God can become a man, how great can man be?’, argues Morphew (2015: loc. 680).
2. All humans are equal in value (Bridger 1995:352-353). Because all people are created in the image of God, all people are equal (Hollinger 2008 [c. 2002]:230; Macaleer 2014:172). The equality of all people is affirmed throughout Scripture. Job 31:15 points to the same fact when he talks about his ‘inferior’ servants: ‘Did not He who made me in the womb make them?
Did not the same one form us both within our mothers?’ (cf. Wright 1995:50.) Before the law, equality exists (Lv 24:22), rich and poor are equal (Lv 19:15; Pr 22:2; 29:13), and the unequal treatment of people is defamation of God (Pr 14:31; 17:5; 19:17). In the New Testament, Christ affirms the equality of people (Mt 5:43–45; Lorenzen 2009:288). Because God redeemed all people in Christ by grace alone (Eph 2:8–10; Col 1:19–20; Rm 4:5), all people must acknowledge one another as equals (Pressler 2011:276). The fact that people are created in the image of God affirms that equality is not an inherent quality of a human, but a status that has been granted by God (Vorster 2011:117).

3. The multiple being of God does not only indicate an equal but also a multiple human existence. In this regard, one can point to man and woman who are individually called the image of God (Gn 1:27; 5:2). According to Vorster (2011:117), the relationship between man and woman in Genesis 2 serves as a good example of the intertwinement of equality and multiplicity. The fact that woman has been created with less physical strength than man does not implicate an inequality, as both are created in the image of God, regardless of their different characteristics and gifts (1 Cor 12:22–23). The cultural command is given without distinguishing between man and woman (Gn 1:28). Natural inequality is acceptable as long as it is not caused by force or unequal treatment. Diversity and multiplicity do not cancel equality.

4. ‘Image of God’ means that all people have an inborn sense of justice and fairness and can thus pursue justice and fairness (Rm 2:14–15).

Thirdly, according to the Creation stories, the Fall caused people to suppress the normative character of equality, resulting in inequality and dominating relationships (Vorster 2011:117–118). This started out with the male domination of the woman (Gn 3:16) and extended to all human relationships (Gn 6), a condition that will probably never be obliterated from the earth (Jn 12:8). The concept of the Fall must be a call to humankind to realise that inequality is a possibility against which there must be guarded continuously (Lorenzen 2009:285–286).
Summarised

From a Protestant point of view, the existence of a globally directed instrument (grounded in the ‘common morality’ such as in the UDBHR) that calls governments and believers to global responsibility for each other is defendable. The UDBHR declares in Article 10 the equality of all people, from which equity and fairness as compulsory global principles arise. The principles and norms of equality, equity and fairness must be accepted as Christian, because they are founded in the Triune God who created the human person in his image. Like God, people are equal, multiple and have a sense of equity and fairness.

Equality as justice

Against the background of the character of God, the equality of people and the reality of sin, it is found that God keeps humankind co-responsible to bring about greater equality (Hollinger 2008 [c. 2002]:219). God’s covenant with the believer (Gn 17:2) in the Old Testament implies the pursuit of justice (Mi 6:8). The new covenant is introduced by Christ’s death and resurrection as the foundation of and motivation for equity (Rm 3:26; Lorenzen 2009:284). The bioethicist, Macaleer (2014), states the following as starting point, ‘[t]hus, justice is grounded in the image of God, requiring equal treatment of all of those made in God’s image. Equity is thus a logical consequence of equality' (Lorenzen 2009:287).

According to the Exodus story, Israel, as nation of the covenant, was liberated from oppression and inequality, because all people are created in God’s image. The liberation from oppression serves as acknowledgement of the equality of the Israelites and non-Israelites as well as of God’s involvement in bringing about greater equality as freedom in society (Lorenzen 2009:292). From the Exodus narrative can also be deducted that equality, freedom and justice are closely related (Hollinger 2008 [c. 2002]:226; Vorster 2011:119). One of the essential features of
the covenant is that there will be no poor people (Dt 15:4), which already implies distributing justice (Macaleer 2014:178). Therefore, God calls on his entire nation to practise justice to all people, but especially to poor, unequal people (Ex 23:6; Is 1:16–17; Hollinger 2008 [c. 2002]:221). The prophet Amos accuses the nation of social and institutional injustice (Am 1:1; 5:7, 24; 6:12), inter alia in the form of oppressing poor people, which is tantamount to the promotion of inequality (Am 4:1; 8:6). The basic structure of the Israelite community must be arranged in such a way that defenceless people (widows, strangers and orphans) should be treated justly by promoting their interests, particularly because God is just (Am 4:1; Dt 24:17).

A covenant economy also contributes to the discourse on the command to the human to bring about greater social equality (Macaleer 2014:179). Endeavours to lessen economic inequality are visible in the laws of the Sabbath in the cancellation of debt or the provision of rent-free loans (Dt 15:1-11; 23:19–20; 26:12) and in the liberation of slaves, with compensation, in the 7th year (Ex 21:2–6; Dt 15:12–18; Frame 1988:47; Macaleer 2014:179). One can also point to the covenant economy of the country. Because all land belongs to God (Lv 25:23), part of the yield of the land had to be distributed to unequal persons (Ex 23:10-11; Dt 24:19-21; 26:12). The Jubilee laws in Leviticus that indicate the inalienability of land ownership are particularly meaningful in this regard (Lv 25:23, 28). Provision is made for land that had to be sold for some reason or another and was no longer in the possession of a specific family, which points to inequality. This land had to be given back to the original owner after 50 years (Lv 25:10). This also indicates distributive justice (Lorenzen 2009:293; Pressler 2011:276). Macaleer (2014:179) summarises it saying, ‘[t]he Israelite community found unique ways to distribute a basic set of social goods to all of the members of their community, especially to the poor and underprivileged.’

Christ sets his task in the kingdom as equalising people (Mt 11:4–6) and therefore confronts rich people in positions of power who exploit poor people and thus maintain inequality (Mk 12:40;
The prayer for daily bread, the appeal to cancel debt (Mt 6:9–11; Lk 7:41–43), and the call of Jesus to combat poverty (Mk 10:21) point to the continuation of the covenantal economy that wants to promote greater equality (Macaleer 2014:180–181). The promotion of greater equality was also practised in the Early Church (Ac 2:44–45; Frame 1988:47).

An important perspective is the emphasis of the written Word on the promotion of equality and justice within the health environment. Particularly in the Old Testament, a connection between justice, health and inequality is found (Job 29:14–16; Ps 146:7–8). Jesus concurs with this when He heals women (Lk 8:2) as well as many people in Galilee (with limited access to health care in contrast to Jerusalem). It was his self-declared task to bring about and demand equality in the healthcare environment (Lk 4:18; Macaleer 2014:183–184). Using the parable of the Good Samaritan (Lk 10), Frame (1988:47) summarises the implication of the above-mentioned argument saying, ‘[f]rom this truism, one might deduce that we should seek to minimize inequalities of access to medical care.’

The question arises whether people may (temporarily) be treated unequally in the process of promoting equality. In an answer to this question, Vorster (2007a) writes the following:

Seen from an ethical perspective, a case can be argued that equality should not only be regarded as a principle, but should also be treated as an aim. This means that the principle should sometimes be set aside to reach the goal ... This means that people can be treated unequally for a time to ultimately establish equality for all. (p. 107)

The temporary cancelling of equal treatment can also be motivated from Philippians 2:5–11 in an Christological manner. Vorster (2007a) discusses the song about Christ as a powerful moral directive within the context of human rights and social ethics. The Logos holds, together with God, the highest thinkable position and Paul describes his existence as equal to that of God (Phlp 2:6). The Logos owns all divine majesty, has been glorified by the Father (Jn 17:5) and worshipped by the angels. He was free of pain, frustration and disparagement and experienced a carefree
tranquillity that can altogether be described as heavenly riches (2 Cor 8:9). According to Macleod (1998:216), there is a linguistic relation between Christ who is in ‘very nature’ (or in the form of) God and thus equal to God (Phlp 2:6) and the fact that He took on the ‘very nature’ or form of a servant or slave (Phlp 2:7). Equality to God is related explicitly to being a servant. In ancient society, a servant was a definite example of social inequality (Beavis 1992:41). The Logos ‘emptied’ his existence of being equal to God, meaning that He took on an inferior position as servant (Ex 23:12) and thus gave up his Godly position, rights and equality by becoming poor (temporarily) (2 Cor 8:9; Lorenzen 2009:288). This position of inequality to God was specifically taken by Christ for the benefit of sinful, defenceless people (Phlp 2:8) and to free people from inequality (Gl 3:28). On the cross, Jesus reached the highest form of inequality to the living God: death. This attitude of Christ should be imitated (Gl 2:5).

Who should promote equality? Both the global (see above) and covenant communities (Dt 6:25) serve as framework in which the principle of equality should be promoted. In both the Old and New Testaments, the theme of the kingdom of God is found, which implies that God rules over all areas (Ps 93:1; Mt 1:31; 3:2; Eph 5:5) and that believers, as co-rulers and co-workers, also bear responsibility for areas in and outside the church (1 Cor 3:9–11; Col 4:11; Lorenzen 2009:286). The kingdom of God is called a kingdom of righteousness or justice (Rm 14:17) in which it is specifically expected from believers to promote justice (Mt 5:10). Believers are expected to be the salt in all spheres where they have been placed and to have a local, but also definite global aim (Mt 5:13–14). States also bear responsibility for their citizens and for one another to promote equality, justice and fairness (Ps 72:1–2, 4; Dn 4:27; Hollinger 2008 [c. 2002]:235).

**Summarised**

Article 10 of the UDBHR declares the accomplishment of greater equality as equity compulsory within the global health-care
environment. From a Protestant point of departure, this obligation is justified by the fact that God, by virtue of his character and the equality of people, encourages governments and believers to practise greater equality as distributive equity. This is clearly affirmed in the liberation from Egypt, condemnation of poor people being exploited as well as the appeal to cancel debt, give interest-free loans, liberate slaves and make restitution of lost land to previous owners. The aim of Article 10 in the healthcare environment can also be founded on the fact that Scripture connects healthcare and justice with each other. Article 10 thus also sets the norm of global fairness as the unequal treatment in unequal situations. This norm can be founded in an Christological manner, because Christ gave up his status that is equal to God temporarily with a view to promote the best interest of human persons.

## Conclusion

In light of the UDBHR, it is safe to claim that the South African government (as well as the civil society) has the right to appeal to the international community for a more equitable division of research funds, particularly aimed at addressing the tuberculosis epidemic. Carvalho and Albuquerque (2015:233) state the following: ‘Thus, the principle of justice contained in the UDBHR proclaims that a just international society should prioritize the welfare of the underprivileged on the global scale.’

Van Leeuwen (2014), who has evaluated the UDBHR briefly from a Protestant paradigm, can be supported fully when he argues:

From the small overview of Protestantism above, it is possible to deduce the main points of concordance with the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights. The first ten articles of the declaration are in accordance with the recognition of personal, individual conscience and responsibility and with the communal aspects of Protestant religion and its emphasis on justice and being equal in the eye of God. (p. 425)
Believers in South Africa have the calling to support the UDBHR and therefore to motivate the government and other civil organisations to campaign for the greater division of global research funds within the healthcare environment.

**Summary: Chapter 9**

Previous discussions in this book have touched on inequality in South Africa in various ways, whether directly or indirectly. It has been shown that this inequality is leading to frustration, suffering and hopelessness. What is absent from the previous chapters is a specific focus on inequality and health in South Africa. Global inequality is a huge reality and there are different forms of inequality in the health environment. It is impossible to deal with all the global bioethical issues in this discussion. The focus will therefore only be, as an example, on the unequal spending of global research funds. At present, less than 10% of global funds are spent on the research of diseases and conditions that affect more than 90% of the populations in the world. Less than 1% of globally available research funds are spent on tuberculosis, while there is a global increase in the recurrence of tuberculosis as a result of drug resistance. An example is South Africa, which has one of the largest incidences of tuberculosis in the world. This incidence has increased from 300 per 100 000 in the 1990s to more than 950 per 100 000 in 2012. In light of this fact, the bioethical question arises whether a nation state or global community has the moral right to request greater equal justice in spending global research funds aimed at the promotion of health (and addressing other global inequalities in the health environment). The following theological question also arises: If such a global ethical appeal exists, could it be supported from a Protestant perspective and thus become the commission of Christians?


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Zuma administration, 41, 74–75, 77
This insightful and timely book discusses the vital issues of racism, xenophobia and economic inequality. The analysis is multifaceted and reveals the authors’ rejection of all forms of racism. The methodology is trans-disciplinary in nature; reference is made to a wide range of literature and a number of several fields of study, including theology and humanities.

The authors engage in a comprehensive critique of racism and its widespread, destructive effects in South Africa’s history. The book is written from a Reformed perspective and its authors reflect on important biblical and theological themes, including the role of the church. The essays express a reasoned rejection of current forms of racism, xenophobia and economic injustice, and the social stratification and conflict that result from them. They explain the links between xenophobia and racism and expose the dangers of on-going racial classification. The nature and effects of hate speech are discussed and the authors engage theologically with student and other discourses, suggesting a path beyond racism that includes the formation of authentic human identities. The book reveals the global neglect of human rights and health care research in ‘developing’ countries.

This discussion makes a contribution to the vital debate on racism, xenophobia and economic inequality in South Africa and invites responses from other thinkers.

Prof. Louise Kretzschmar, College of Human Sciences, University of South Africa

This book is ‘brave’ and ‘open’. It touches topics that the people on grassroots level ponder about, and it is time that the faith community, as a role-player representing civil society, enters this debate and provides guidance for the way forward.

Dr Marichen Ann van der Westhuizen, Department of Social Reformation, Hugenote Kollege, Wellington