Afghanistan’s Islam

FROM CONVERSION TO THE TALIBAN

Edited by Nile Green
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Religion has been one of the most influential cultural, social, and political forces in Afghan history. In premodern times, a variety of different versions of Islam spread through the uneven geography of what later became Afghanistan, echoing its ethnically varied demography through similarly variant patterns of religious practice. In modern times, these many versions of Islam served as powerful sociopolitical resources, providing idioms and organizations for both state and anti-state mobilization. Even as religion has been deployed as the national cement of a multiethnic emirate under the Taliban and then an Islamic republic under their recently elected successors, Islam has been no less a destabilizing force in Afghan society. Yet despite the universal recognition of the centrality of Islam to Afghan society in past and present, Afghanistan's Islam has attracted strikingly little sustained study. Beyond a few monographs devoted to particular moments or movements (predominantly the mujahidin and Taliban), there exists no survey of the developmental trajectories of Afghan religiosity across the course of history. The scholarship becomes particularly patchy for the period before the Soviet invasion of 1979, making it difficult to position the fundamentalist movements from the 1980s onward in relation to earlier patterns of religious activity, whether local or transnational.

To begin to fill this gap of understanding, this volume brings together international specialists on different periods, regions, and languages to develop a more comprehensive, comparative, and developmental picture of Afghanistan's Islam from the eighth century to the present. The aim of the eleven chapters is to collectively provide an in-depth, critical, panoptic overview of the major developments and transformations of Islam from the early medieval period to contemporary
times in the territories that today make up Afghanistan. Given the variety of sources and languages required for such a project—Persian, Pashto, and Uzbek, as well as Arabic and Urdu—the contributors have been selected on the basis of their previous research with both spoken and written testimony in these languages. Since the authors are specialists on a range of different periods and movements, their case studies of a variety of Muslim religious forms will allow us to see beyond the unifying rhetoric of Islam into its disparate and even fissiparous expressions.

It is for this reason that the introductory chapter speaks of “versions of Islam,” in the social-scientific plural rather than the theological singular. In part, this usage is an attempt to move beyond facile and emic notions of the singularity and unity of Islam. Stepping outside such insider discourses helps observers analytically recognize the religious differences that have so often proved a source of, or justification for, social discord and violence. In a volume that brings together scholars from the humanities and as well from the social sciences, this pluralistic formula allows us to recognize also the cultural variety of Afghanistan’s rich religious heritage. The aim, then, is to walk the tightrope between critical distance and sympathetic appreciation of a religious history that, for different groups, has been a source of solace as well as of oppression.

There are certainly difficulties with using the rubric “Afghanistan” to bring together studies of the medieval and modern eras. As a nation-state Afghanistan acquired its shape and name only between the later eighteenth and the later nineteenth century. In the period dealt with in the earlier chapters in this book, “Afghanistan” would have been a meaningless term: indeed, the label seems not to have been officially adopted in the region itself till the 1870s. The region had previously been understood as a congeries of different territories, such as Khurasan and Turkistan, which were sometimes governed by the same ruler and more often divided among different rulers. Nonetheless, the collective national label “Afghanistan” is helpful in allowing us to easily conjure the geographical space under scrutiny in this volume and in enabling us to focus on its religious transformations through time. For as the following chapters show, the later nation-state of Afghanistan was heir to the religious institutions, authorities, and practices that emerged in its former fragmentary parts.

A further reason for adopting the formula “Afghanistan’s Islam,” rather than the shorter “Afghan Islam,” is that many of the Muslim peoples under scrutiny here would not have identified themselves as Afghans. Indeed, before the early twentieth century, when the label “Afghan” became an official state bureaucratic term denoting common national identity, it had for centuries denoted a more narrow ethnic identity, equivalent to what we would now term Pashtun (or Pathan). Even today, the label “Afghan” is a highly contested term among citizens of Afghanistan.

For these reasons, this book uses the more inclusive rubric “Afghanistan’s Islam” to bring together (but not merge) the variety of Muslim traditions developed by
the diverse peoples who inherited the territories that came to form the nation-state of Afghanistan. This dual sense of both diversity and inheritance is important. For in a study devoted to the history of religion, it allows us to grapple with the relations—whether of coexistence or conflict, continuity or change—among a variety of religious forms within the same geographical space. Through competition as much as collusion, the religious institutions, practices, authorities, and traditions founded in earlier periods were handed down to later periods to form the variant versions of Islam that later Muslims in the region we now call Afghanistan chose to respect or reject.

The introductory chapter that follows this preface aims to introduce the study of Afghanistan’s Islam to readers with no previous knowledge of the region. It provides both a synopsis of Afghan religious history and a summary of existing scholarship on the subject. Since the book as a whole is intended to collate existing expert knowledge on Afghan Islam into a single volume, the introductory summary of over half a century of scholarship in English, French, German, Italian, and Swedish provides the most comprehensive general survey of the history and anthropology of Afghanistan’s Islam yet available. The introduction structures this précis in chronological terms that follow the emergence, expansion, and diversification of Afghanistan’s various versions of Islam from the eighth to the twenty-first century. In this way, the introduction should enable readers to navigate the more specialist case-study chapters that follow while at the same time drawing attention to the gaps in even expert understanding.

As well as state-sponsored religion, the chapters cover such issues as the rise of Sufism, the changing role of Shari’a, women’s religiosity, and transnational Islamism. The book is the outcome of a three-year project coordinated by the UCLA Program on Central Asia and funded by the American Institute of Afghanistan Studies (AIAS). Together, these funding sources enabled the international meetings and conferences that gave initial shape to the chapters in this volume by scholars from Afghanistan, Germany, Switzerland, Britain, Australia, Pakistan, and the United States. In turning toward acknowledgments, I would therefore like to thank first the awards committee of AIAS, and particularly the president, Thomas Barfield, and U.S. administrative director, Mikaela Ringquist. At UCLA, I would like to thank Chris Erickson, Elizabeth Leicester, Nick Menzies, Aaron Miller, and Bin Wong for their years of support for the Program on Central Asia under my directorship from 2008–16.

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Nile Green

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INTRODUCTION

Afghanistan’s Islam

A History and Its Scholarship

Nile Green

CHARTING THE TERRAIN

This introductory chapter provides a survey of major developments in the religious history of Afghanistan. As part of this book’s overall aim to construct a synoptic vision of Afghanistan’s Islam, it presents a summary of existing scholarship in chronological terms that follow the emergence, expansion, and diversification of Afghanistan’s various versions of Islam through the course of thirteen centuries. In this way, the following pages not only provide a summary of scholarship. They also chart the historical terrain of Afghanistan’s religiosity so as to give a fuller sense of what is and is not known about the authorities, institutions, and practices of different periods. While many of the works cited here will be unknown even to specialists, general readers will find that the survey points to resources for initial research. Summarizing half a century of scholarship on Afghanistan’s Islam, both in the humanities and in the social sciences, reveals both the scope and the limits of expertise by way of what is and is not known about Afghanistan’s religious history. The final section of the introduction builds an investigative bridge to the new research presented in this volume by outlining subsequent chapters that range from Afghanistan’s initial conversion to the emergence of enduring institutions in the medieval period and the more recent religious agendas of the mujahidin and Taliban.

The following sections focus initially on historical and literary studies of the periods prior to the mid-twentieth century before moving to social-scientific scholarship for discussion of research focusing on more recent decades. Although this dichotomy does not perfectly echo the division of scholarly labor, it does broadly
reflect the character of, on the one hand, the textual and art-historical research that have informed our understanding of Afghanistan's pre-twentieth-century religious history and, on the other hand, of the anthropological and political-scientific research that have shaped our appreciation of twentieth-century religiosity. As we will see in the later section on the limits of existing research, this division of labor has very much defined the colors and blanks on our map of Afghanistan's religious history. Humanities scholars who focused on periods before the mid-twentieth century relied on textual and artistic sources that overwhelmingly reflect the religiosity of urban and relatively elite groups. By contrast, in line with the disciplinary penchants of the day, social scientists working between the 1950s and the 1980s focused on the nonliterate religiosity of rural and tribal groups. As a consequence of this combined research focus on urban and literate Islam in premodern times and rural and nonliterate Islam in modern times, our collective perspective is highly skewed. Although not all research fits into this pattern, its broad contours have created what is surely an artificial—because highly selective—cartography of Afghanistan's religious history, in which a past of poets and Sufis seems to bear no relation with a present of Islamists and suicide bombers. Recognizing from the onset that this perspective is formed by gaps and clusters of research will prevent us from making hastily naive conclusions about the loss of golden ages and the dominant contemporary standing of fundamentalists. For all the media and military attention given to Afghanistan, the fact is that we still know far less about its religious heritage than about the history of Islam almost anywhere in the surrounding Middle East and South Asia.

Although scholarly understanding of Afghan religiosity was given primary shape by scholars and administrators working during the colonial period of British and Russian rule over neighboring India and Turkistan, these works do not form part of the survey that follows. Part of the reason for overlooking colonial scholarship is that such works—by the likes of the British Henry Raverty (1825–1906), the French James Darmesteter (1849–94), and the German Bernhard Dorn (1805–81)—are already far better known than the writings of the more professional scholars discussed below, many of whom had access to a far wider range of source materials. But the reason is also because, whatever their intrinsic value, colonial-era scholarship has already had far more influence than it merits. Much of this exaggerated influence is due to the easy availability of these writings, not least through cheap reprints, which has encouraged many supposed experts to rely on them in place of more reliable and recent work published in less accessible journals. In an attempt to move beyond this unreliable collusion of colonial orientalism and contemporary journalism, the following survey points to an abundance of lesser-known works. At the same time, it aims to afford readers an honest sense of the limits of expertise by way of what has and has not been researched.
CONQUESTS AND CONVERSIONS, CIRCA 700–1000

In line with the logic of chronology, this survey turns first to the formative era of conquests and conversions. Though this trope of military incursions and rapid conversions has been called into question for other areas, there is no doubt that the initial coming of Islam to Afghanistan occurred through the conquests of Arab generals serving the Rashidun caliphs (r. 632–661) and the Umayyad dynasty (r. 661–750) based in Damascus. But though the Arab governor of Basra, ‘Abdul-lah ibn ‘Amir, subdued Herat, Balkh, and Badghis as early as 652, it was not until the Abbasid era half a century later that Arab power over Khurasan and northern Afghanistan was consolidated through the governorship of Qutayba ibn Muslim between 705 and 714. As its Buddhist monasteries (vihara) closed down, Balkh gradually became an important center for the initial Islamization of the wider region, at least in the lowlands. Nonetheless, such was the nature of Afghanistan’s mountainous terrain, and the patchy political geography that it created, that in other regions non-Muslim rulers hung onto power for almost two more centuries. These included Buddhist rulers in Bamiyan, Hindu Shahi rulers in Kabul, and the followers of the local cult of Zhun around Ghazna.

Although Kabul had initially fallen to the Umayyads in 671, the tenuous hold of the Hindu Shahi dynasty over the region saw non-Muslim rulers remain in power till 879, when Kabul fell to Ya’qub-i Laith Saffari (r. 861–79), founder of the new Saffarid dynasty. From their capital at Zaranj, in southwestern Afghanistan, the Saffarids also defeated the last Zunbil, the ruler of the Zabulistan region around Ghazna who upheld the worship of Zhun. In 871 the Saffarids had also seized Buddhist-ruled Bamiyan, though one source records that Bamiyan’s subsequent rulers had to be reconverted to Islam as late as 962. And even though the surrounding Khurasan region had fallen under Muslim rule very early, the Syriac Church of the East maintained a bishopric in Herat well into the tenth century, pointing to the survival of a community of liturgically Syriac but likely Persian-speaking Christians there till at least this period. It was not, then, until almost 900 C.E. that Muslim political power was proclaimed over all the region’s main cities. And it was not until sometime afterward that Islam reached the majority of the region’s population. Remote mountain regions such as Ghur remained beyond the reach of the muezzin’s call till the eleventh century, while so-called Kafiristan (“Land of the Infidels”) held on to its indigenous religion till the conquests of ‘Abd al-Rahman Khan in the late nineteenth century.

However, conversion was not always directly related to conquest, and beyond the level of the political, bureaucratic, and religious elite, conversion was likely a slow, patchy process. Conversion was more rapid in urban (and lowland) than in rural (and highland) areas and was in many cases more likely a slower, multigenerational process of acculturation than a single moment of conversion. We know
that Buddhism survived until the late tenth century, which would in turn suggest that popular Buddhist practices survived much later, while the region's pre-Islamic religious heritage also included Zoroastrian, Indic, and other local cults that were the fruit of centuries of selective adoption from religious influences that ranged from India to Greece. Some communities, including wealthy Jewish and Hindu merchant groups, avoided conversion entirely to survive into recent times.¹

Despite what may appear to be the obviousness of the topic, the early arrival and spread of Islam during the eighth and ninth centuries through the territories of what later became Afghanistan have received remarkably little attention. The main studies have been articles by the British and Italian scholars C. Edmund Bosworth and Gianroberto Scarcia, both drawing on early Arabic and Persian sources, albeit sources written at considerable distances from the events themselves.² More recently, Hugh Kennedy and Arezou Azad have reexamined sources pertaining to the Islamization of Balkh, Afghanistan's earliest major Muslim city.³ A significant problem with studying this early period is that the written sources are very few and that, where archaeology has been carried out, it has largely focused on pre-Islamic periods—to the point of not even recording data on strata from the Islamic era. The problems in reconstructing the conversion of Afghanistan are not unique: the earliest arrival of Islam in India with the Umayyad conquests of 711 presents parallel problems of Arabic sources written at long distances of space and time and recounting simple events rather than the more nuanced processes needed to explain phenomena as complex as conversion and acculturation. However, recent discoveries of early Islamic Arabic and Persian administrative documents from northern Afghanistan lend hope of future insights into the slow process of acculturation.⁴ Even so, the Islamization of surrounding regions has still received much fuller attention. In methodological terms not least, the studies of Derryl Maclean, Richard Bulliet, and Deborah Tor on early conquests and conversions in Sindh, Khurasan, and Central Asia may offer insight or inspiration for further research on Afghanistan.⁵

The fullest case study so far of early Islamic life in Afghanistan is Arezou Azad’s account of early Islamic Balkh between the eighth and the twelfth century, as revealed by the Faza’īl-i Balkh (Merits of Balkh), a late-thirteenth-century Persian recension of an Arabic account of the city and its Muslim luminaries first composed in 1214.⁶ Azad has argued that this “patchwork of texts merged together” not only reveals “the social memory of Balkh” as an early Islamic center. It also shows the process of Islamization by which “not only were Balkh’s Buddhist sites converted, but by default, its Buddhist landscape as a whole” as new Muslim holy sites were inscribed like palimpsests on the same spaces as their Buddhist predecessors.⁷ Together with other sources, Azad has also used the Faza’īl-i Balkh as a source on early Muslim women’s religiosity in the region through a case study of the ninth-century female mystic Umm ‘Ali of Balkh.⁸ So far, Azad’s studies of Balkh are the richest accounts of an early Islamic city in Afghanistan. However, it
seems likely that the Balkh experience reflects that of other lowland urban centers in Central Asia rather than of highland cities such as Kabul, which was still under non-Muslim rule in the late ninth century. For the present-day border regions with Pakistan, André Wink has recently argued that large Muslim populations began to emerge only with the pastoral nomadic migrations that followed the Turkic and Mongol conquests of the twelfth and the thirteenth century. His argument is effectively one of Muslim migration and resettlement rather than of conversion and acculturation.

Although by the year 1000 most of Afghanistan was at least under Muslim rule, many of its former Buddhist monuments remained standing for centuries, in some cases being adapted into Muslim religious sites. Yet it was not only physical structures that remained but also social structures, as formerly elite Buddhist families transformed themselves into new Muslim elites around Balkh. The most famous case is the Barmakid family. Former hereditary overlords of Balkh’s Buddhist great monastery (called Nawbahar in Persian sources, from the Sanskrit nava vihara, “new monastery”), the family’s Arabicized name, Barmaki, was itself derived from the Sanskrit pramukha (chief administrator). After converting to Islam, the Barmakids became not only local Muslim elites around Balkh but also one of the premier political families in the ‘Abbasid capital, Baghdad, where they sponsored the translation of Sanskrit works into Arabic. The Buddhist and more generally Bactrian background of the Barmakids has been painstakingly uncovered by Kevin van Bladel, who has pointed to the degree to which pre-Islamic cultural practices continued after nominal conversion. Arguing for the importance of family and social history for understanding how Balkh’s pre-Islamic culture was transmitted into the Islamic period, van Bladel explains that “we are dealing not with two ideologies (Buddhism and Islam) bouncing off one another like stones . . . but rather with human populations in daily contact . . . changing their beliefs and practices as a response to that contact over several generations.”

A more forceful, if contentious, argument for transmission of Balkh’s Buddhist practices into the Islamic world and even Christian Europe has been made by Christopher I. Beckwith, who has declared that “the Latin [university] college borrowed directly from the Islamic madrasa, which was in origin the Central Asian Buddhist vihara [monastery].” Noting the predominance of scholars from Central Asia in the early ‘Abbasid centuries, and the fact that the first-ever madrasa was constructed in the Afghan city of Bust, Beckwith argues that it was not only Buddhist families and institutions that survived into the Islamic period. Buddhist intellectual methods also survived, having developed in the region around Balkh, and being thereby distinct from Indian Buddhism. Specifically, this transmission comprised what Beckwith terms the “recursive argument method,” which he claims Central Asian Buddhist thinkers handed down “in situ in Central Asia as part of Central Asians’ conversion to Islam.”
Focusing more on material than on intellectual transmission, the French researcher Étienne de la Vaissière has investigated the links in the same area between pre-Islamic institutions and the Muslim *ribat*, a frontier residence for holy warriors and ascetics.\(^{18}\) Echoing Beckwith’s attention to the location of early madrasas, Vaissière has pointed to the very large number of *ribats* sponsored by the ‘Abbasids in Central Asia and in turn argued that they developed in part out of the preexisting Buddhist houses of charity that had spread along merchant routes through unsettled nomadic areas.\(^{19}\) Focusing on the more spectacular physical survival of the Buddhas of Bamiyan, the Swiss scholar Pierre Centlivres has traced the afterlife of Afghanistan’s pre-Islamic heritage by examining medieval Persian and Arabic accounts of Bamiyan, the folklore of local Hazara Muslims, and the periodic iconoclasms that predated their final destruction in 2001.\(^{20}\) However, more useful for understanding the spread of Islam as such are the various archaeological and art-historical studies of Afghanistan’s earliest mosques. Of particular interest is the eighth- or ninth-century Nuh Gunbad (Nine-Dome) at Balkh, which demonstrates substantial similarities with pre-Islamic religious architecture and may have been turned into a mosque only years after its construction.\(^{21}\)

For more than a century, scholars have noted the possible impact of Buddhist narratives on the stories told about the early Sufis, in particular Ibrahim ibn Adham (d. 779?), the semi-legendary prince-turned-ascetic from Balkh whose biography closely resembles that of the Buddha. Unfortunately, the issue has never been explored in depth. The main early Islamic religious movement from the region that has received considerable study is the Karramiyya, the focus of research by C. Edmund Bosworth, Afaf Hatoum, Margaret Malamud, Wilferd Madelung, and Jean-Claude Vadet.\(^{22}\) Emerging in Khurasan, which encompasses eastern Iran and much of western and northern Afghanistan, the Karramiyya were named after their founder, Abu ‘Abdullah Muhammad ibn Karram (d. 874). He taught that salvation was to be found through the renunciation of the world by means of rigorously ascetic practices, doctrines that he linked to a particular reading of the Quran. Given that the Karramiyya was largely a lower-class movement apparently comprising recent converts, there is every chance that its ascetic profile—out of tune with the religious teachings emerging from Baghdad, the ‘Abbasid capital, in this period—was linked to Afghanistan’s Buddhist heritage.\(^{23}\) By developing large monastic communities devoted to asceticism and prayer, and attracting patrons who endowed them with landholdings, the Karramiyya flourished in Khurasan from the ninth through the twelfth century. However, how far people in what is now Afghanistan can be linked to the well-studied development of early mystical thought (as distinct from ascetic practice) in other Khurasani urban centers such as Tirmiz or Nishapur is uncertain.\(^{24}\) Even though research on the lower-class ascetics of the Karramiyya and the more urbane luminaries of Balkh spotlights the early profiles of Islam in Afghanistan, our overall understanding of the early
expansion and variety of Islam in the region remains as patchy as the sources. Another focus of study has been the so-called Ghulat (Exaggerators), rebel movements during the Umayyad–early ‘Abbasid era that appear to have blended newer Islamic teachings with older Zoroastrian and Buddhist motifs that still survived in Khurasan.²⁵

SULTANS AND SUFIS, CIRCA 1000–1200

Between the late tenth and the twelfth centuries, the period of Ghaznavid rule from 977 to 1186 offers much richer textual and architectural testimony that scholars have used to reconstruct the religious life of the period. Based on the most thorough acquaintance with the Arabic and Persian court histories of the period,
it is again to C. Edmund Bosworth that we must turn for the fullest studies of the Ghaznavids. However, aside from short discussions of Ghaznavid court culture, Bosworth was more interested in Ghaznavid politics and administration than in Ghaznavid religion. Given the nature of the sources, his studies tell us more about the Ghaznavid state, its administrators, and its capitals in Ghazna and Lahore than about its peoples, religious practices, and provinces. While Andrew Peacock and Ali Anooshahr have also recently turned to the Ghaznavid court histories, the focus still necessarily remains on the period’s historiographical rather than its religious writings. Fortunately, Ghaznavid court patronage also supported Hakim Sana’i (d. 1131), the writer of some of the earliest Persian mystical poetry, whose works have been the focus of close scrutiny by J. T. P. de Bruijn, Franklin D. Lewis, and Bo Utas. Another of the most famous early Sufi writers—and the earliest to write in Persian prose about Sufism—was ‘Ali ibn ‘Usman al-Hujwiri (d. ca. 1075). Though he settled, and wrote, in the later Ghaznavid capital of Lahore, in what is now Pakistan, many of the pilgrimage and other pious practices he described in the third and final section of his Persian Kashf al-Mahjub (Unveiling of the Hidden) were current around his native Ghazna in what is now eastern Afghanistan. Farther west, on the outskirts of the city of Herat, al-Hujwiri’s contemporary ‘Abdullah Ansari (d. 1089) was another of the first Sufis to make use of Persian. Ansari wrote in a local dialect, suggesting an attempt to spread his teachings among ordinary people rather than the Arabic-educated ‘ulama. Ansari’s extant writings are the focus of studies by the French Dominican scholar Serge de Laugier de Beaurecueil, the Afghan scholar and diplomat A. G. Ravan Farhadi, and the Swedish linguist Bo Utas.

Also from this period was the great Isma‘ili thinker Nasir Khusraw (d. 1088). Although he was one of the most important figures in the history of Afghanistan’s Islam, his Isma‘ili beliefs made him seek refuge in the mountains of Afghan Badakhshan, far from the aggressively Sunni Ghaznavid court. His voluminous writings, studied by such scholars as Henry Corbin and Alice Hunsberger, helped form the doctrinal basis of Isma‘ili Islam. Later followers of Isma‘ilism managed to survive persecution through the remoteness of their mountain communities in the Badakhshan region, where according to tradition Nasir Khusraw himself died. His shrine in the Badakhshan valley of Yumgan, a major pilgrimage site for Isma‘ilis, is the subject of an article by the German researcher Marcus Schadl. More recently, through a groundbreaking reconstruction of the centuries-long hagiographical tradition surrounding Nasir Khusraw, Daniel Beben has shown that for much of his posthumous cultic history this “Ruby of Badakhshan” was not regarded as an Isma‘ili at all. On the contrary: Beben has shown that, as Nasir Khusraw’s shrine became a focus of patronage from the Chinggisid period through the Timurid era and well into the nineteenth century, Khusraw was reframed as a Sunni holy figure. Only via the gradual revival of Isma‘ilism in the eighteenth
century and later were his Isma‘ili identity and writings recovered and reclaimed by the reinvigorated Isma‘ili imamate based in Iran and then India. Beben’s study is a rare and important example of the kind of longitudinal study that is able to trace the transformations of Afghanistan’s Islam over extended periods of time. More such work is needed.

In addition to the larger corpus of written materials that has survived from this period, the era of the Ghaznavids and their Ghurid successors has bequeathed to the present a considerable amount of religious architecture, particularly by way of minarets. The most famous of these is the stunning and remote Ghurid minaret of Jam, whose Quranic inscription was studied by the Belgian and French epigraphers André Maricq and Gaston Wiet shortly after its discovery in the early 1950s with the Afghan historian Ahmad ‘Ali Kuhzad. The minaret was later the subject of a fuller study by Janine Sourdel-Thomine. Several other religious structures from the Ghaznavid and Ghurid periods have been scrutinized. The Ghaznavid mosques and mausoleums at Balkh, Ghazna, and Lashkari Bazaar were the subject of early studies by Ali Ahmad Naimi, Janine Sourdel-Thomine, and Daniel Schlumberger, while André Godard and Ralph Pinder-Wilson examined the epigraphy and architecture of the great victory minaret built by Mas‘ud III (r. 1099–1114) in his capital, Ghazna.

Particular attention has been given to the Ghurid stone mosque at Larwand, in central Afghanistan, by Italian and British archaeologists and more recently by Alka Patel, who argues for its construction by migrant non-Muslim craftsmen from the recently conquered Ghurid domains of Gujarat and Rajasthan. Bernt Glazer and Assadullah Souren Melikian-Chirvani have also researched the since-destroyed twelfth-century Ghurid madrasa of Shah-i Mashhad, in Badghis province, and the Ghurid reconstruction of the great mosque of Herat that took place from around 1200. The latter’s blue-glazed portal has recently been reexamined so as to uncover its original construction techniques. However, the most recent and fullest study of Ghurid archaeology is by David C. Thomas.

A TIMURID RENAISSANCE, CIRCA 1400–1500

Though as much a part of the religious heritage of Iran as of Afghanistan, the city of Herat under Timurid rule during the fifteenth and the early sixteenth century has been the focus of more research than any other city of present-day Afghanistan. The rich literary, artistic, and architectural legacy of Timurid rule has nourished three interrelated strains of scholarship. In terms of architectural history, there are major studies by Lisa Golombek, Donald Wilber, and Bernard O’Kane, as well as shorter studies of Timurid patronage of madrasas and Sufi shrines. With regard to Afghanistan, the most important of the latter is Lisa Golombek’s monograph on the Timurid reconstruction of the shrine of ‘Abdullah Ansari at Gazurgah, outside
Herat. Complementing Golombek’s work, Maria Subtelny has analyzed textual sources describing Timurid courtiers’ devotion to Ansari’s shrine, pointing to the high status of Sufi pilgrimage centers in this period. It was not only Herat but also Balkh that received patronage from the Timurids, and the Soviet Tajik scholar Akhror Mukhtarov has examined numerous Arabic and Persian sources to compile a study of Balkh’s numerous mosques, madrasas, and shrines. The wealth of landholdings and other assets that such shrines gathered under the Timurids was to render them influential shapers of society for centuries to come. By focusing on the economics and administration of the shrines of Herat, Balkh, and other Timurid cities, R. D. McChesney has shown them to be the fulcrums of entire “shrine societies” that were as dependent on a shrine’s water resources, employment, and conflict resolution as on its religious teachings. Moving from saintly agriculture to Sufi art, among the rich body of scholarship on Timurid artworks the most relevant studies with regard to the history of Afghanistan’s Islam are those of miniature paintings, such as Rachel Milstein’s account of Sufi themes in Herati painting.

By using Arabic ijaza (permission-to-teach) documents relating to ‘ulama teaching in Herat in the reign of Shahrukh (r. 1409–47), Maria Subtelny and Anas Khalidov have shown how the spread of a Hanafi “core curriculum” in the city’s madrasas under the Timurids helped bolster the place of Sunnism in a city that in 1510 would fall to the Shi’i Safavid rulers of Persia. In a similar vein, an earlier study by the historian Roger Savory deals with attempts to spread Safavid Shi’i religious ideas in Herat at this time, pointing to the origins of the Shi’i community that survives in Herat to this day. However, it is Sufism—and particularly the legalistic Sufism of the Central Asian Naqshbandiyya—that has formed the main focus of research on Timurid religion. The Timurids were far from the first rulers of Herat to patronize Sufis, as shown in Lawrence Potter’s studies of the ties between Sufis of the Jami order and the Kart dynasty (r. 1244–1381), which preceded the Timurids in Herat. However, because of the sheer wealth of the Timurids and the fact that their polity also encompassed large parts of Central Asia, their rule over Herat saw the arrival of the Central Asian Naqshbandi order into what is today western Afghanistan. Studies by Jo-Ann Gross and Jürgen Paul, American and German specialists on Central Asia, reveal the strategies by which the Naqshbandis laid roots in the material as well as the religious economy of Herat. As Paul argues, during the reign of Shahrukh in Herat a fundamental, long-term shift was made in Naqshbandi attitudes toward political power. This shift saw a move away from the quietism of such earlier masters as the eponymous Baha al-Din Naqshband (1318–89) toward the close political connections with Muslim rulers that are associated with the later Naqshbandiyya. Mining the same rich seam of sources, the French Türkologists Alexandre Papas and Marc Toutant have examined the links between Sufi ideas and the
great Timurid statesman and litterateur Mir ‘Ali Shir Nawa’i (1441–1501). Papas has decoded Nawa’i’s writings on the occult sciences (makhfi ‘ilm), while Toutant has examined a long poem in Chaghata’i, written by Nawa’i himself, in which he encouraged the Herat ruler Husayn Bayqara to do more to promote Shari’a as opposed to Mongolian customary law.

However, it is the Herati Naqshbandi Sufi and poet ‘Abd al-Rahman Jami (d. 1492) whose writings have attracted the most scholarly attention, particularly by Okten Ertugrul and Farah Shadchehr. Much scholarship has focused on Jami’s poetic and doctrinal works, as in studies by the American and Afghan specialists on Sufism William C. Chittick and Jawid A. Mojaddedi. Chad Lingwood’s monograph on Jami’s *Salman wa Absal* (Salman and Absal), by contrast, pays close attention to the political dimensions of his writings, albeit mainly at the Aq-Qoyunlu court in what is now western Iran rather than in Herat. Staying with the theme of Sufi links to holders of political power, Maria Subtelny has studied how Jami received material support by way of landholdings granted by Herat’s Timurid rulers.

With regard to the crucial link between land grants and religious institutions, the most important study for the entire region is R. D. McChesney’s history of the shrine of the Prophet’s son-in-law Imam ‘Ali at Mazar-i Sharif from its late-fifteenth-century foundation under the Timurids to the late nineteenth century. Based on the study of numerous Persian historical works and waqf (endowment) documents, McChesney’s monograph is arguably the most important single work...
on the religious history of Afghanistan. Demonstrating the importance of shrines as both architectural and narrative spaces, McChesney has also researched the long history of the shrine of the Naqshbandi Sufi Abu Nasr Parsa (d. 1461), in Balkh.\textsuperscript{60} The Timurids’ support for such shrines positioning Afghanistan into a wider regional pattern. For just as at Mazar-i Sharif they patronized a shrine dedicated to one of the founding figures of Islamic history, so in their erstwhile capital at Samarqand, to the north, did Timurid elites patronize the preexisting shrine of Qusam ibn Abbas, known as Shah-i Zinda (The Living King). As a cousin of the Prophet and a purported martyr in the initial Muslim conquest of Central Asia, Qusam became the focus of tremendous veneration by both Timur’s family and his military elite. Together they transformed Qusam’s preexisting mausoleum into a dynastic cemetery and major pilgrimage site that remains today one of Central Asia’s chief artistic wonders, albeit outside the present-day borders of Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{61}

Around the same time that the Timurids were ruling over what is now western Afghanistan, northern India was being ruled by a dynasty that can truly be called Afghan in that its rulers belonged to the Lodi tribe of Pashtuns. During the centuries that had followed the Ghaznavid conquests of northern India around the year 1000, large numbers of Pashtun tribes had migrated southward into the subcontinent as warriors, horse traders, and pastoralists. Though the religious practices of these Indo-Afghans cannot be considered part of Afghanistan’s Islam in geographical terms, they cannot be overlooked in a broad survey such as that offered here, particularly because they have been the focus of a great deal of research by scholars of Indian history. Among the dozens of articles related to the Lodi (1451–1526) and Suri (1540–56) dynasties of Indo-Afghans, it is worth singling out the studies of their relations with the subcontinent’s Sufis by Raziuddin Aquil, Simon Digby, and Nile Green.\textsuperscript{62} As their research has shown, during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the Indo-Afghans became deeply intertwined with the Sufi orders and institutions that by this time flourished throughout the regions where the Indo-Afghans lived and ruled in the subcontinent. As a result, from this period onward, Sufi Islam in Afghanistan proper became inseparable from the Sufism of Mughal and post-Mughal India, particularly with regard to the circulation of the Naqshbandi order into and out of the subcontinent.

**AFGHANISTAN AMID EARLY MODERN EMPIRES, CIRCA 1500–1800**

After Afghan rule over India succumbed to the Mughals, around 1530, between the sixteenth and the eighteenth century much of what is now Afghanistan was ruled by the competing Mughal and Safavid empires. Such dual imperial rule resulted in increased circulation of religious texts and specialists between Afghanistan and the major cities of these two imperial polities in India and
Persia. Unfortunately, despite the great potential, little research has been conducted on Afghanistan’s cities under either Safavid or Mughal rule, notwithstanding the fact that before the conquest of Delhi, in 1526, Kabul was the first capital of the Mughal Empire.\(^6^3\) The Safavid impact on Afghanistan’s Islam has been especially neglected, despite the likelihood that the Safavids were responsible for the conversion of the Hazaras and other groups to Shi’ism.\(^6^4\) Given that Kabul lay midway between the Mughals’ Central Asian homelands and their new domains in northern India, the city formed a transit point for the Naqshbandi Sufis who followed the new conquerors south. An important article by Stephen Dale and Alam Payind uses an endowment (\textit{waqf}) document to uncover early Mughal patronage of the Naqshbandiyya in Kabul, showing how Naqshbandi migration to the subcontinent was enabled by that order’s material as well as initiatic ties to the conquering Mughal elite.\(^6^5\)

Moving from the city to the province of Kabul, Joseph Arlinghaus has presented the richest study to date of competition between different forms of Islam under early Mughal rule, not least among the tribal Pashtuns who occupied the rural hinterlands of Kabul.\(^6^6\) Together with the Russian researcher Sergei Andreyev, it is also Arlinghaus who has conducted the fullest research into the Rawshaniyya movement, which flourished among Pashtuns in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Founded by the charismatic \textit{pir-i rawshan} (illuminated master) Bayazid Ansari (d. 1585) and expounded partly in Pashto in his written revelation \textit{Khayr al-Bayan} (Best of Expositions), this new Rawshani Islam gained many supporters among the powerful Pashtun tribes.\(^6^7\) However, the latter’s control of the empire’s northern frontier encouraged the Mughal rulers to use charges of heterodoxy as an excuse to violently suppress them. During the reign of Akbar (r. 1556–1605)—a figure usually regarded as the epitome of Mughal tolerance—his younger brother, Muhammad Hakim, also led a crusading mission in 1582 against the so-called Kafirs (infidels) of what is today northeastern Afghanistan. The Persian record of the expedition by Darwish Muhammad Khan has been edited, translated, and studied by the Italian scholar Gianroberto Scarcia.\(^6^8\) It is also to Scarcia that we owe the only study to date of any Afghan Sufi poet from the Mughal period, pointing to the use of Persian as a common language of religious exchange between Afghanistan and Mughal India.\(^6^9\)

Unfortunately, the period when Afghanistan began to emerge as a recognizable political entity, during the eighteenth century under Ahmad Shah Durrani (r. 1747–72) and his immediate successors, has been the least studied period of all. We have only short articles by Afghan and Russian scholars: Muhammad Ali has recounted later oral traditions on Ahmad Shah Durrani’s coronation by the wandering Sufi Sabir Shah; Rawan Farhadi has given an overview of the life and works of the Naqshbandi Sufi Miyan Faqirullah (d. 1781), who enjoyed the support of the early Durrani emperors; and Sergey E. Grigoryev has summarized eighteenth-century
accounts of the bringing of the cloak of the Prophet Muhammad to Qandahar from Bukhara in 1768. Fortunately, a recent article and doctoral thesis by Waleed Ziad brings to light the close connections forged between Durrani rule and Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi Sufis who migrated to Afghanistan from India under Durrani patronage. Casting rare light on the mountainous region of Badakhshan, an article by Alexandre Papas has brought forward the writings of the Naqshbandi mystic and poet Mir Ghiyas al-Din Badakhshi (d. 1768). Together, Papas and Ziad show the deep connections forged by migrant shaykhs of the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi between even the most remote regions of Afghanistan and the Indian town of Sirhind, where Ahmad Sirhindi (d. 1624) lay buried in his family shrine. The mechanics and doctrines of the expanding Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi network is the focus of Waleed Ziad’s chapter in this volume.
Aside from the work of Papas and Ziad on the successors to these late Mughal Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi lineages, for most of the nineteenth century we know very little about religious developments in Afghanistan. An important exception is a study by the German historian Christine Noelle-Karimi of several anti-Wahhabi texts published during the 1870s and 1880s. Written ostensibly by the rulers Shir 'Ali Khan (r. 1868–78) and ' Abd al-Rahman Khan (r. 1880–1901), these two texts were among the earliest items ever published in Afghanistan and show the increasing role of the state in policing what was viewed as a potentially seditious form of Islam.

It is only for the nineteenth century's last two decades, and in relation to the state-building project of ' Abd al-Rahman Khan, that there exists a small, albeit important, cluster of research, mainly but not exclusively by scholars with Afghan backgrounds. For ' Abd al-Rahman’s reign saw attempts to use religion to leverage increasing control over Afghanistan's population. In her study of ' Abd al-Rahman’s attempts to use Islam to consolidate central control over a tribal society, Asta Olesen described a policy of “establishing the hegemony of state-sanctioned interpretations of Islam” through centralized support and brutal suppression of different Sufis and 'ulama.

The two most notorious examples of this political deployment of Islam were ' Abd al-Rahman’s wars of conquest during the 1890s against the mountainous highlands of central and northeastern Afghanistan, whose Hazara and Kafir populations followed Twelver Shi'i Islam and their own indigenous religion, respectively. Aided by Sunni judicial opinions (fatwa) proclaiming the legality of ' Abd al-Rahman’s war against the Shi'i Hazaras as a jihad, Hazara men, women, and children were enslaved and then sold by Pashtun and even Hindu slave traders, in addition bringing vast revenues to the central government through its taxation of the slave trade. A decade after many thousands of Hazaras escaped into the safety of exile around Quetta in British-administered Baluchistan and Mashhad in Iran, in 1904 ' Abd al-Rahman’s successor Habibullah Khan gave the exiles a ten-month window to return home or forfeit their lands. In the event, even when Hazara exiles returned, they found that the Pashtun government had granted much of their former land to its favored Sunni Pashtun tribes. It was a foreshadowing of the government decision thirty years later, discussed below, to confiscate Jewish property and similarly redistribute it to Sunni Pashtun elites.

Returning to ' Abd al-Rahman’s reign, it was also during this period that print technology spread in Afghanistan, albeit as a tool for increasing state control rather than for fostering civil society. Though printed books had previously been imported to Afghanistan from the Muslim presses of colonial India, and a few texts had been issued from an earlier state press in Kabul during the 1870s, it was under ' Abd al-Rahman that religious works were first printed in Afghanistan through a
newly established government press. Unsurprisingly, this small number of publications prominently included works by ‘Abd al-Rahman himself and his religious officials. Crucial documents on the close links forged between religion and state during the era in which Afghanistan took its present form, these works have been studied by the Afghan historian (and subsequent president) Ashraf Ghani. Along with Ghani, another Afghan historian, Amin Tarzi, has carried out pioneering research on the state’s construction of Islamic law courts during ‘Abd al-Rahman’s reign, which saw increased attempts to centralize and bureaucratize enforcement of the Shari’a as part of the larger state-building project.

Amin Tarzi has also studied the evolution of the numerous constitutions proclaimed in Afghanistan since the 1920s. His work has revealed the central place given to Islam (and hence, to the role of unelected clerics) in every constitution except that propounded by the failed royal reformer Amanullah in 1923. However, religion also served as a force of resistance to such state ventures, not least when religious leaders failed to adhere to the policies of a central government that lacked power and legitimacy in the rural provinces. The American anthropologist David B. Edwards has used oral sources on the life of the influential Mullah of Hadda to look back on moral conflicts during ‘Abd al-Rahman’s reign as revealed in narratives concerning the relationship between the saint and the ruler. In this way, memories of past actions, whether purported or real, served as legitimizing templates for future rebellions.

Along with Helena Malikyar and Amin Tarzi, Edwards has also written about the continued importance of the hereditary Jilani and Naqshbandi Sufi families in Kabul around the turn of the twentieth century. However, the reigns of Habibullah Khan (r. 1901–19), Amanullah Khan (r. 1919–29), and Nadir Shah (r. 1929–33) saw a range of new religious ideas emerge in Afghanistan having little apparent connection with the older, establishment Islam represented by such urban Sufi elites. An important Afghan primary source on religious developments during the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century is the *Siraj al-Tawarikh* (Torch of Histories) of Fayz Muhammad Katib (1862–1931), which has recently been translated and annotated by R. D. McChesney, with M. M. Khorrami. Turning back to the secondary literature, the fullest study of religious reform during the early twentieth century is the Afghan historian Senzil Nawid’s monograph on the policies of King Amanullah Khan during the 1920s. Drawing on many Persian sources from the period, Nawid explores the motivations of the negative and ultimately violent coalition of mullahs and tribesmen whose rebellion overthrew Amanullah’s reformist government in 1929.

An important element of Amanullah’s reforms were his attempts to control the hold of the ‘ulama over education and legislation in Afghanistan. The reforms included a policy of state certification of mullahs’ qualifications and hence authority. As the Afghan educational historian Yahia Baiza has shown, after Amanullah’s
downfall his successor Nadir Shah sought to placate the religious classes by placing ‘ulama in key posts in the Ministry of Justice. The first girls’ school, opened in the 1920s, was closed under Nadir Shah, and the first article of the new 1931 constitution enshrined Hanafi Sunni Islam as the state religion. Modern constitutionalism thus served to institutionalize older discrimination against Shi’i Muslims as well as Afghanistan’s Jewish and Hindu second-class citizens. In 1933, the Afghan government also signed an agreement of cooperation with the fundamentalist Deoband seminary in India, whose cross-border influence Amanullah had tried to restrict.

Another body of scholarship has used documentation from the increasing transnational connections of the period to show the importing to Afghanistan of reformist religious ideas from surrounding regions. With regard to links with Iran, Nikki Keddie has reconstructed the activities of Jamal al-Din “al-Afghani” (1838–97) in Kabul during the late 1860s, when the pioneering pseudo-Afghan Pan-Islamist attempted (and failed) to gain influence in government circles. However, most studies have focused on travelers from the post-Tanzimat Ottoman Empire on the one side and from colonial India on the other. Based on Turkish rather than Persian or Pashto sources, studies of Ottoman connections by Christoph Herzog, Raoul Motika, Michael O’Sullivan, and S. Tanvir Wasti have used the travelogues written by diplomats, intellectuals, and an exiled soldier-turned-printer to reveal the varied ideological contours of these Ottoman migrants. While the impact of late Ottoman reformist ideas on the influential Afghan nationalist minister (and longtime Damascene exile) Mahmud Tarzi (1865–1933) has long been vaguely acknowledged, these studies reveal more concrete Ottoman connections with reformist circles in Kabul between the 1870s and the 1910s.

Turning to religious connections with India (and present-day Pakistan) during this period, the fullest studies are those of the Pakistani scholar Sana Haroon and the American imperial historian Benjamin D. Hopkins. Haroon has traced the increasing influence of mullahs from the Indian madrasa at Deoband among tribal groups on the Indo-Afghan frontier, while Hopkins has focused on British colonial accounts of the so-called fanatics of the frontier. Their work shows the difficulties of separating empirical data on the Pashtun religiosity of the borderlands from the politics and rhetoric of British colonial concerns. The discourse of empire notwithstanding, there is no doubt that the very creation of an imperial frontier rendered the region a destination point for anticolonial activists of all kinds, including the new Muslim activists who emerged in colonial India. The Russian scholar G.L. Dmitriev has studied the activities of Indian nationalist revolutionaries, including several influential Muslims, who resided in Kabul during the reign of Habibullah. However, it is only in the more recent dissertation of Thomas Wide that the ideas flowing from the Ottoman Empire, colonial India, and as well Russian Central Asia have been brought together for comparison. Staying with the focus on
transborder connections, the Pakistani and German scholars M. Naeem Qureshi and Dietrich Reetz have produced studies of the mass migration of poor Indian Muslims to Afghanistan during the hijrat (pious emigration) from Christian-ruled colonial India that took place in 1920. Responding to the religious rhetoric of Afghan leaders who portrayed themselves as anti-imperial defenders of Islam, most of these poor migrants found themselves unwelcome and destitute on their arrival in Afghanistan. Thousands of them were forced to walk back across the mountain roads to India in a state of near-starvation, though several hundred remained in Kabul to form a distinct community of muhajirin, “pious exiles.”

The vast Muslim population of the subcontinent notwithstanding, it is important not to see the Afghan religious encounter with India solely in Islamic terms. Many of the communities of ethnic Pashtuns (known as Pathans in India) that had emerged in India over the previous centuries lived peaceably among their Hindu neighbors. Most of these Indo-Afghans lost the ability to speak Pashto and instead spoke Hindi and Punjabi. In at least one case, we know of a Pashtun local dynasty that patronized the Hindu priests and temples within their domains. This was the nawabs of Savanur, a small Mughal successor state and then princely state in what is now the Indian region of Karnataka that existed from 1672 to 1948, when it was absorbed into the Indian Union. As the Indian scholar K. N. Chitnis has shown, throughout almost three centuries of rule the Afghan nawabs of Savanur issued land grants to Vaishnava temples (mandir) and Lingayat monasteries (math), donated revenues to brahmins and lower-caste religious specialists, and supported various Hindu festivals. Research among the records of other Indo-Afghan successor and princely states, such as Rampur, would likely reveal this to have been a more general pattern that continued into the twentieth century.

Returning to Afghanistan proper, for the reigns of Amanullah and Nadir Shah in the 1920s and early 1930s, the British, Afghan, and Pakistani scholars Nile Green, Khalilullah Khalili, and Barbak Lodhi have examined the Afghan interactions of Indian Muslim reformists. The most famous of these travelers was the philosopher-poet Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938), who exerted considerable influence on the new Afghan intelligentsia that developed between the 1920s and the 1940s. Such interactions brought the ideas (and even the Urdu language) of Indo-Islamic reform into contact with Afghanistan. However, in an age of increasing mobility, it was not only older contact routes with the subcontinent that were intensified through the expansion of overland road and rail networks. Afghanistan’s links with colonial India’s railroad towns and port cities also enabled increasing numbers of Afghans to make the pilgrimage to Mecca, which had previously been made by very few people indeed from Afghanistan. With regard to Afghans making the hajj, the French Turkologist Thierry Zarcone has brought to light the existence of Afghan Sufi lodges along the pilgrimage route through Ottoman territory.
Of particular interest is the Afghan lodge (zawiyya al-afghaniyya) in Jerusalem, which, though founded in 1633 as a Qadiri Sufi lodge, served mainly as a hostel for Afghan pilgrims between the late nineteenth and the mid-twentieth century.98

In a detailed and robust study of the most remarkable of all the period’s transnational connections, Christine Stevens has uncovered the history of extensive Pashtun Afghan labor migration to Australia during the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century, when Afghan cameleers pioneered the trans-Australian overland route. One chapter of Stevens’s book focuses on the religious lives of these migrants, piecing together the history of the “bush mosques,” built first of mud and then of corrugated iron, in such outback Afghan settlements (or “Ghan-towns”) as Marree in 1884 and North Broken Hill in 1891.99 Even in this early period of settlement, Afghan migrants supported mullahs (such as Hajji Mulla Mirban of Coolgardie) who performed marriage ceremonies, mediated in disputes, and

FIGURE 4. Afghan mendicant dervish. (Original photograph ca. 1890; collection of Nile Green)
encouraged them to invest in larger mosques. The long history of migration out of Afghanistan that created many diasporas in the premodern and modern periods suggests that other Afghan communities created or shared religious institutions in their new homelands. The tens of thousands of persecuted Shi‘i Hazaras forced into exile in Persia and British India in the late nineteenth century form only one obvious example.


Returning to religious developments in Afghanistan itself and looking to the mid-twentieth century, the long reign of Zahir Shah (r. 1933–73) has been the focus of a small number of studies of attempts to create a state-approved (and state-approving) Islam. The Swedish researcher Jan Samuelsson, for example, has examined the somewhat successful state-led attempts to produce a reformist Islam in the 1950s and 1960s that flourished before the rise of the mujahidin in the 1980s. An overview of official, state-sponsored Islamic education during the 1960s at such government madrasas as Kabul’s Dar al-‘Ulum-i Arabi (Arabic Studies Center) is given in an article by Abdul Satar Sirat, who in the 1960s served as dean of the Faculty of Islamic Law at Kabul University. Still, as the Italian Persianist Gianroberto Scarcia has shown, Afghan ‘ulama were already turning to the Quran to find powerful sources of objection to the nationalist political system that was taking shape in the mid-twentieth century. Islamist ideologies were already present in Afghanistan before the rise of the anti-Soviet mujahidin.

All such studies have focused mainly on the government and the capital, so that we know little of the practice of Islam beyond the confines of the state and capital even into the twentieth century. For the first decades of the twentieth century, it is mainly the work of the American scholar James Caron on small-town Pashto poets that shines an indirect light onto Pashtun religious culture in the provinces. The belated spread of print technology among Pashtuns in the 1920s saw the flourishing of a small Pashto reading public that placed a range of religious ideas into circulation. These included more subaltern visions that differed from the official Islam sponsored by the state and its urban Pashtun elites. As one of very few Western scholars trained in Pashto, Caron has also written a critique of what he sees as the dominance of modernization theory in framing the history of Pashtun Islam for the period before 1978 as a sequence of anti-state rebellions.

We are also afforded some glimpse of Afghan (if not necessarily Pashtun) Islam beyond both cities and rebellions through the early work of the French archaeologist Ria Hackin and the Afghan historian Ahmad ‘Ali Kuhzad. As part of the arrival of European archaeologists to Afghanistan during the 1920s, Hackin and Kuhzad collaborated to collect a series of folktales from people residing around their excavation sites, mainly in the outskirts of Kabul and in Hazarajat. Many
of these stories comprised oral traditions concerning the coming of Islam to Afghanistan and aetiological tales about the shrines of local saints. These offer all-too-rare glimpses of Afghanistan’s predominant rural Islam.

THE PERSISTENCE OF CUSTOM, CIRCA 1960–1980

Despite the early and somewhat amateur endeavors of Hackin and Kuhzad, the urban and official focus of scholarship changed significantly only in the late 1950s. It was then that anthropologists, and later political scientists, began to work on Afghanistan as part of the great postwar expansion of the social sciences. Following the intellectual concerns of the period, the decades between the 1950s’ opening of Afghanistan to foreign anthropologists and the closure of the field to non-Soviet scholars during the 1980s saw a wealth of research on Islamic practices that were rural and tribal, nonliterate and nonstate. Increased access to Afghanistan also enabled several textual scholars to research the contemporary religiosity that they witnessed between their visits to the archives.

Many of the classic monographs of this period (such as those of Fredrik Barth, Thomas Barfield, Shuyler Jones, Nancy Tapper, and Donald Wilber) dealt with social and political structures, particularly among tribal communities. Such studies often necessarily touched on religious life, particularly in the case of Akbar Ahmed’s study of the links between Pashtun social structure and charismatic religiosity.

Though strictly speaking Ahmed’s was a study of Pakistani rather than Afghan Pashtuns, when reread decades later in the wake of the Taliban it presents a startling premise. For the work of Ahmed (as also of Barth before him) forces us to ask whether the success of the Taliban is to be understood in social-structural terms (as another example of the charismatic leadership repeatedly produced by tribal communities) or as a rejection of Pashtun tribal values (through the deployment of new values borrowed from nontribal urban institutions such as Deobandi madrasas).

Turning to the heyday of Afghan anthropological fieldwork in the 1960s and the 1970s, it was a series of shorter studies by the indefatigable American ethnographer Louis Dupree that saw rural Afghan religious practices become for the first time the true focus of study. Less inclined to theorize than many of his structuralist and then culturalist contemporaries, Dupree was content to ethnographically describe such Afghan traditions as saint veneration on their own terms. Even so, what his descriptions show is the continuity between such practices in Afghanistan and forms of Muslim saint veneration in surrounding areas in the Indian subcontinent and pre-Soviet Central Asia.

Led by the Afghan and American anthropologists M. Nazif Shahrani, Homayun Sidky, and Audrey Shalinsky, during the 1970s another important shift was made, this time toward the study of Islam among the Uzbeks of northern Afghanistan.
The Uzbeks were later the focus of the research of the German Turkologist Ingeborg Baldauf, whose many field-based investigations in northern Afghanistan have included research on the religious practices of Uzbek women from the region. Meanwhile, another German researcher, Lucas-Michael Kopecky, became one of a small number of researchers to focus on the Shi'i religious traditions of the Hazaras of Bamiyan.

In one of the classic anthropological studies of Afghanistan, Robert Canfield placed Bamiyan's Shi'is among their Sunni and Isma'ili neighbors to study the complex patterns of alliance, competition, and conversion among the region's sectarian “mosaic.” Observing that the region's Shi'is, Sunnis, and Isma'ilis inhabited distinct but neighboring territories, Canfield argued for a model of “cultural ecology” that studied changing sectarian allegiances in the context of competing claims for irrigated land and variable access to Sunni-dominated trade networks. Despite the fact that his informants denied that conversion was possible, Canfield was able to make sense of the fact that different groups did at times convert, theorizing that conversion formed a strategy of “social realignment” through which weaker groups sought solidarity with the more powerful. By way of a general conclusion, Canfield argued that his research demonstrated that sectarian groups such as the Shi'is, Sunnis, and Isma'ilis of Bamiyan were “not merely different cultural groups transmitting their characteristic traditions from the past, but . . . also political units existing in tension within their socio-political contexts.” In a context of increasing sectarian violence in the region, more than forty years after he outlined them Canfield's findings are more important than ever.

Looking beyond sociopolitical questions to cultural practices in their own right, other researchers—as for example the German, Polish, and Czech ethnographers Jürgen Frembgen, Danuta Penkala-Gawęcka, and Lutz Rzehak—produced accounts of popular practices ranging from cures at shrines and belief in the jinn to cattle amulets, dervishes' begging bowls, and other aspects of religious material culture. However, in the 1970s it was the German researcher Harald Einzmann who produced the fullest ethnographic account of shrine veneration, focusing on popular pilgrimages to dozens of saintly shrines located in and around Kabul. Einzmann's work offered a rare glimpse into forms of popular religiosity that flourished all over Afghanistan and to which both the Afghan socialists and their Taliban successors were opposed for their different political and theological reasons.

With regard to the more formal Sufi brotherhoods, the Swedish literary scholar Bo Utas wrote two articles describing the Sufi status quo prior to the Soviet invasion of 1979. His work was complemented by a short overview of the Naqshbandi of Afghanistan by the French sociologist Olivier Roy and in a biography of the twentieth-century Naqshbandi master Sayf al-Rahman (1925–2010) by the American researcher Kenneth Lizzio, who has detailed the rise to Sufi leadership and the subsequent fall of this former sharecropper's son whose career stretched from
his home region of Kunduz to his thirty-year exile in Pakistan. A short account of
the Afghan Sufi poets who were still active during this period—such as Ghulam
Nabi ‘Ashqari (1894–1979) and Haydari Wujudi (1939—)—has been written by Ar-
ley Loewen and Partaw Nadiri, who have also translated some of their verses.¹²⁰

Twenty years after the research of Harald Einzmann, his account of Kabul’s
Sufis was brought up to date by the work of another German researcher, Almut
Wieland-Karimi, who in the mid-1990s used interviews with Afghan exiles to show
how almost two decades of socialist rule and then war had massively disrupted
the Sufi networks that had been inseparable from Afghan society for centuries.¹²¹
Pointing to the links between traditional religiosity and festivity, Wieland-
Karimi also wrote an account of the Kabul neighborhood of Kharabat, traditionally a cen-
ter for Sufi musicians associated with the Chishti brotherhood, and by extension
the city’s entertainment district.¹²² However, it has been the British ethnomusicolo-
gist John Baily who has paid the most sustained attention to the Sufi musical tradi-
tions of Kabul and Herat. Particularly notable are his studies of the ghazal singer
Ustad Amir Muhammad and of the intoxicated-dervish lutenist Amin-i Diwana.¹²³

COMMUNISTS AND JIHADISTS, CIRCA 1980–1995

If Sunni practices of Sufism and shrine veneration formed the mainstay of scholar-
ship on pre-Soviet Afghanistan, then that focus changed rapidly after the Soviet
invasion of 1979 and the rise of the mujahidin. Sufis did not entirely disappear from
the research scene any more than they disappeared from Afghan society, and sever-
al articles by the French researchers Olivier Roy and Marc Yared examined the role
of Sufis in encouraging and in some cases leading mujahidin to fight the Soviets.¹²⁴
However, in the 1980s the greater number of scholars by far began to focus on the
role of Islam in what was being called the Afghan resistance.¹²⁵ The most prominent
scholar in this analytical shift during its earlier phase was Olivier Roy.¹²⁶ But as the
years of war progressed and began to include people from almost every region of
Afghanistan, researchers turned toward greater specialization on the effects of the
bellicose politicization of Islam. For example, the American anthropologist David
Edwards and the Afghan political scientist Hafizullah Emadi examined the impact
of the Iranian Revolution in providing both ideological and material resources for
the distinctly Shi’i Islamist resistance that developed among the Hazaras.¹²⁷

However, it was the German and Swedish researchers Rolf Bindemann, Jan
Grevemeyer, and Kristian Harpviken who offered the fullest studies of Hazara
Shi’i ideological internationalism, while Alessandro Monsutti examined the re-
ligious life of the Hazaras in their Pakistani exile.¹²⁸ Looking at Arab rather than
Iranian ideological (and indeed theological) input into Afghanistan, Abdallah al-
Amri and Simon Wolfgang Fuchs have studied the doctrinal dimensions of the
jihad against the Soviet Union.¹²⁹ David Edwards, meanwhile, has examined the
informal and underground printing methods that Afghanistan’s Islamists used to
distribute their message. Yet it was not only the Afghan mujahidin and their
international supporters who made political use of Islam during this period. As
Gilles Dorronsoro, Chantal Lobato, and Eren Tasar have shown, in line with its
much older policy in its long-standing Central Asian domains, the Soviet Union
(and the socialist government that it supported in Kabul) created its own Islamic
institutions and discourse in occupied Afghanistan. Far from suppressing Islam
tout court, the Soviets were keen to conserve and control it as a means of promot-
ing their own ideology and rule.

While most of the research on the jihad and civil wars of the 1980s and 1990s
focused on the politicization of religion, a few scholars looked at the more phe-
nomenological dimensions of the jihad. Pierre Centlivres, for example, placed the
massive production of new “martyrs” (shuhada) into the context of long-standing
traditions of Afghan martyr veneration. Similarly, Darryl Li has used an influ-
ential Arabic martyrological text written during the 1990s to show the importance
of stories of miracles taking place in the battles against the Soviets. Diana Gla-
zebrook and Mohammad Jalal Abbasi-Shavazi, meanwhile, have examined how
the Hazaras’ enforced exile in Iran has rendered pilgrimage to Mashhad an in-
creasingly important aspect of Afghan Shi’i piety. Through exile in Iran from
the 1980s, what had for centuries been a distinct and localized Shi’i Islam was
being rapidly transformed. The vast number of other Afghans who became refu-
gees outside their country—proportionally more than any national population in
the world during the 1990s—were similarly exposed to new ways of seeing their
religion in their different places of exile.

TALIBAN AND TRANSNATIONALISM, 1996–2015

The rise of the Taliban, and their rule over most of Afghanistan between 1996
and 2001, meant that political Islam remained the main focus of research. A rare
exception came in 1996–98 when the American researcher Kenneth Lizzio spent
a year among Afghan Sufis exiled in the borderlands between Afghanistan and
Pakistan, leading him to write a book about the émigré circle of the Naqshbandi
master Sayf al-Rahman. Detailing everyday life conditions, sources of income,
local politics, and, especially, the form and content of teaching, Lizzio’s study offers
a unique glimpse into an exiled Sufi khanaqah during the very years when the Tali-
ban conquered Afghanistan. Ironically, the rise of the Taliban was at first greeted
with enthusiasm among Sayf al-Rahman’s Sufi followers, with the shaykh himself
expressing interest in taking a position in their government. But there was to be
no such collusion between Sufis and Talibs. Having fled his native Kunduz after
the Russian invasion, and having spent twenty years building his new khanaqah
at Bara, in the Pakistani Tribal Regions beyond Peshawar, the emergence of local
neo-Taliban then pushed Sayf al-Rahman into a second exile in Lahore, where he died in 2010. After being attacked in 2006, his khanaqah at Bara closed down, leaving the borderlands increasingly in the hands of neo-Taliban.

Lizzio’s fieldwork was a brave exception to the more common pattern of withdrawal from the field as the danger of fieldwork inside the country in the 1990s saw political scientists claim an increasing role in discussions that had previously been dominated by anthropologists. The ethnographic accounts of the practice of Islam on the ground that had flourished over the previous three decades gave way to theoretical depictions drawn at a considerable distance, both geographical and linguistic. Even setting aside the numerous journalistic accounts of the Taliban, in many academic works the foundational place of primary source materials gave way to theoretical models drawn from political science and then security studies. The chief exception to the political-science framing was a book of contemporary history in which the American anthropologist David Edwards provided a historical genealogy for these “armed students from nowhere” by way of a rich and nuanced account of Afghanistan’s suppressed Islamist politics of the 1960s and 1970s that eventually metamorphosed into Taliban ideology. Although we must leave aside works by newcomers with limited expertise, there are several helpful studies of the Taliban written by seasoned specialists such as Neamatollah Nojumi, Olivier Roy, and the Pakistan specialist Mariam Abou Zahab. Two collected volumes edited by William Maley and by Robert Crews and Amin Tarzi are also notable for collating historical, sociological, and political perspectives on the Taliban.

All too often, though, studies of the Taliban lacked any firm footing in written or otherwise published sources by Taliban actors, a problem compounded by the fact that very few scholars have ever studied Pashto and the Taliban has been a predominantly Pashtun movement. Several Germany-based scholars, such as Lutz Rzehak and Kaltoum Djeridi, have found ways around this evidentiary impasse through a translation of the Persian memoir of an Afghan observer of the Taliban’s rise and a study of the Taliban’s reception in the Middle Eastern Arabic media. Similarly focusing on the transnational dimensions of Afghan Islamism, the Turkish political scientist Pinar Akcali has written a short but helpful study of the connections forged between the Afghan mujahidin and the new Islamist political parties that emerged during the 1990s in post-Soviet Central Asia. In a rare attempt to understand the more religious dimensions of Taliban life, Iain Edgar has examined several accounts of the purported dreams of Mulla ‘Umar, arguing that the Taliban displayed more traditional forms of piety than is often realized, albeit within a framework of finding nocturnal justifications for their jihad.

However, political-science approaches have dominated the scholarship on the post-2001 neo-Taliban. This is seen to fullest effect in the work of Antonio Giustozzi, which has the benefit of combining theory with fieldwork. Nonetheless, historians and political analysts such as Sana Haroon and Thomas Ruttig have
added their perspectives on the cross-border character of the neo-Taliban, pointing to the longer history of mullah-led activism among the Pashtun groups whose habitats cross the Durand Line.\textsuperscript{144} Yet paradoxically, in many studies of the Taliban the Islamic profile—the beliefs and practices, debates and decisions—that render them more than a simple peasant insurgency gets lost in the dust of explosions. The legacy of the Western propaganda that framed the \textit{mujahidin} as freedom fighters and their \textit{jihad} as “resistance” has meant that the discursive, ideological, and transnational dimensions of Afghanistan’s Islamists are still underdocumented.

Despite the reopening of Afghanistan to foreign fieldworkers during the relatively peaceful years that followed the collapse of the Taliban in 2001, the concerns of U.S. officials and NGOs to foster civil society without offending religious sensibilities meant that religion received startlingly little attention. Islam became the elephant in the NGO seminar rooms devoted to voting lessons and women’s empowerment. With fieldwork now all but impossible again, a more recent return to texts and discourse has begun to provide insights into the religious life of the Taliban. For instance, a translation of Taliban poetry by Felix Kuehn and others, and a short study of Taliban media tactics by Hekmat Karzai, which shows the impact of new media in Afghanistan no less than in the Middle East.\textsuperscript{145} However, apart from Jan-Peter Hartung’s recent investigation of the Taliban’s doctrinal response to the Islamic state, the fullest textual study of Taliban doctrine is Yoshinobu Nagamine’s account of several editions of the Taliban’s Pashto \textit{Layeha}, or “code of conduct” manual.\textsuperscript{146} The \textit{Layeha} formed an attempt to explain (and, arguably, constrain) through Islamic precepts the violence and looting of the Taliban. Although in being first issued only in 2006, the manual is primarily a source on the later neo-Taliban rather than on the period of Taliban rule in the 1990s, Nagamine claims that its influence was widespread. The 2009 edition “was copied 20,000 times,” so that “it may reasonably be assumed that the \textit{Layeha} was distributed to all Taliban members.”\textsuperscript{147} Valuable as Nagamine’s work on the \textit{Layeha} is, its frame of analysis conceived the manual in strategic rather than theological or broadly religious terms. By contrast, John Mock’s fieldwork between 2004 and 2011 on the continuation during the twenty-first century of shrine-based Islam in the remote Wakhan provides a rare ethnography of nonpolitical Islam that avoids the Taliban in favor of the much older traditions of Pamir Isma’ilism.\textsuperscript{148} How long such local Islams will survive in the future remains uncertain, as does the possibility that researchers will be able to study them.

**“KNOWN UNKNOWNS”: ACKNOWLEDGING THE BLANKS ON THE MAP**

Although this overview of research on Afghanistan may appear extensive, it actually points to a somewhat underdeveloped field of inquiry. It would be impossible
to summarize the entire body of scholarship on Islam in neighboring Iran or India-Pakistan in a similar number of pages. While this survey may seem to draw a detailed picture of religious history, there remain many gaps in its coverage of the broad canvas of Afghanistan's Islam. With regard to research by historians and textual specialists, the most striking issue is the narrowness of geographical focus. While it has always been difficult for historians to access the rural populations of Islamic Asia, in the Afghan case we know little of the history of religious practice in even its major urban centers, including such key cities as Kabul and especially Qandahar. Only Herat has received sustained coverage—and only during the Timurid period, at that. Such skewed geographical coverage is hugely problematic, given the fact that Afghanistan's geography comprises highlands and deserts, agrarian and nomadic societies, many different languages, and highly variable access to writing. The sheer inconsistency of Afghanistan’s physical and human geography renders it impossible to base assumptions about one region (and its people) on research from another region, however nearby such regions may be.

If coverage of the varied terrains of Afghanistan's Islam has been patchy, then the same can be said for attention to the variety of its written sources. It is fair to say that Persian and particularly Sufi materials have been given vastly more attention than Arabic sources pertaining to Shari'a and the ‘ulama. Though the corpus of Pashto and Turkic (that is, Chaghata'i or Uzbek) sources for earlier periods is undoubtedly much smaller than that of Persian or Arabic, written materials in Pashto and Turkic have still received far too little attention.149 As for the many unwritten languages of Afghanistan, we can only rely on the anthropological research of the 1960s and 1970s, a period in which anthropologists preferred to focus on social structure rather than language and discourse.

A further major issue is the lack of diachronic case studies that allow us to document transformations through time. Here the only major examples of such projects are R. D. McChesney’s five-century history of the shrine of ‘Ali in Mazar-i Sharif and Daniel Beben’s study of the hagiographical legacy of Nasir Khusraw.150 What we lack even more are studies on religious discontinuity, of how certain groups of Afghan Muslims came to reject one version of Islam in favor of another, a theme taken up in detail only by the anthropologist Robert Canfield. Given the importance of institutional as well as human agents in such patterns of change, longitudinal historical studies of such transformations are all the more important. We therefore have little understanding of how particular forms of Islam developed over time, such that even such basic questions as how the Hazara became Shi‘i are only hazily answered.

Indeed, Afghanistan’s several Shi‘i minority communities have long been marginalized in the scholarship. Though there is a small number of works on the Isma‘ilis and Hazaras, there has been effectively no research on the Farsiwan of Herat and Farah or the Qizilbash of Kabul and Qandahar.151 The Qizilbash form a
particularly interesting community, having settled in Afghanistan during the eighteenth-century conquests of Nadir Shah Afshar and having then gained great influence in the military and bureaucracy before falling foul of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman, who confiscated much of their property. Nonetheless, they remain an important urban community today, who like other minorities deserve detailed study. In the wake of the First Anglo-Afghan War, one group of these Qizilbash migrated from Afghanistan to settle in colonial India. Their leader, 'Ali Riza Khan Qizilbash (d. 1865), was granted 147 villages by the British for his loyalty. He used the extensive revenues from these agricultural villages to become a major sponsor of Shi'i ceremonies in Lahore, where he also endowed a Shi'i mosque and madrasa. The
Qizilbash waqf, as his endowment became known, was subsequently enlarged by his grandson in 1892, since when it has funded some of South Asia’s most lavish ta’ziya processions in commemoration of the martyrdom of imams Hasan and Husayn.

‘Abd al-Rahman’s internal jihads also forced thousands of Hazara Shi‘is into exile in colonial India, where they settled in the city of Quetta in particular. Needing to find work and seeking powerful patrons, many of them joined special regiments of the colonial Indian Army called the Hazara Pioneers. Work on the interplay between Muslim religious practice and colonial soldiering in other regions of India suggests that the experience, status, and revenues gained from serving in the Indian Army may have similarly helped bolster or transform the Hazaras’ Shi‘i traditions during their decades of exile. Although no one has yet studied this topic or the development of Hazara Shi‘i institutions in colonial Quetta (or Qajar Mashhad), the subject is ripe for research as a counterpoint to studies of the high-status Indian reformists who moved between Afghanistan and India in this period. Similarly unstudied is the history of the Ahmadiyya in Afghanistan, which in the late nineteenth century saw several prominent converts to the new Islam promoted by the Indian Muslim messiah Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835–1908). In the early 1900s, several Afghan Ahmadis were executed in Kabul at the behest of the Sunni ‘ulama, pointing to wider patterns of state-‘ulama collusion in sectarian persecution that was clearly not limited to followers of Shi‘i Islam.

Another important lacuna has been the relative neglect of intergroup relations. This is equally as true of relations between Muslims and the various non-Muslim groups of Afghanistan (including Jews, Hindus, Sikhs, and Armenian Christians) as it is for the lack of studies of relations between different Muslim sects (particularly Sunnis and Twelver and Isma‘ili Shi‘is). As we have seen, among different Muslims, the only historical cases of intergroup relations that have received somewhat sustained coverage have been the Mughal imperial suppression of the Rawshaniyya movement and ‘Abd al-Rahman’s bellicose policies toward the Shi‘i Hazaras, many of whom were sold into slavery as infidels.

Although Afghanistan is invariably presented as a Muslim country by Afghans and non-Afghans alike, it has always in fact been home to various non-Muslim minorities. In terms of numbers, the largest are the communities of Hindus and Sikhs. They were mainly merchants and petty traders, but during the reign of ‘Abd al-Rahman Khan, at least, there was a small number of influential Hindu bureaucrats. Aside from studies of the pre-Islamic period and the very occasional art-historical study, these communities have been entirely ignored by scholarship. Yet as late as the 1980s Hindu cult statues (murthi) were still being worshipped in Kabul’s several Hindu temples. Only Scott Levi’s recent work on the trade in Hindu slaves between the eleventh and the eighteenth century has begun to shed light on these forgotten communities, though his focus is on economic rather than religious history. Despite the bravery of Afghan Sikhs in returning to their
Afghan homeland and reopening a gurudwara after the fall of the Taliban, the Persian-speaking Sikh communities of Kabul and Jalalabad have received even less attention.

Afghanistan’s former (and smaller) community of Armenian Christian merchants has fared little better in the scholarly record, with only a short article by the historian Jonathan Lee that focuses on the eighteenth and the early nineteenth century. Although Afghanistan stridently resisted the expansion of the Christian missionaries who were active in British India, the Protestant mission of the “Frontier Doctor,” Theodore Leighton Pennell (1867–1912), had some influence on Pash-tuns from across the border in Afghanistan who traveled to his school and clinic. However, even as late as the 1960s, the only legal church in Afghanistan remained the Catholic chapel established in the Italian embassy in 1935, which by Afghan law could only minister to European Christians. Nonetheless, between the 1960s and the 1980s, the French Dominican Serge de Beaurecueil (1917–2005) made passionate attempts to bring what he saw as the light of Christianity to Afghan Muslims. Together with a group of American Protestant missionaries, Beaurecueil was able to make a number of covert conversions in a pattern that was to recommence with the quiet return of American missionaries to Kabul after the fall of the Taliban.

While Afghanistan’s Hindus, Sikhs, and Christians have been all but overlooked, the Afghan Jews have received somewhat fuller attention. The Jews of Afghanistan were part of the wide but thinly dispersed population of Persian-speaking Jews who dwelt in the trading cities of Iran and Central Asia. They became the focus of study first in the mid-twentieth century, after the discovery in the 1940s and 1950s of increasing numbers of tombstones inscribed in Judeo-Persian (that is, Persian in Hebrew script) in the mountainous region around Jam. Through their struggles to decipher these inscriptions, epigraphists eventually realized that these seventy-four tombstones could all be dated between 1012 and 1215. This pointed to the existence of a flourishing but previously unknown Jewish merchant community in one of the main cities of the Ghaznavid and then the Ghurid Empire. The community appears to have survived till it was destroyed during the Mongol invasions of the early 1220s. Another Judeo-Persian inscription, this time in the even more remote mountain setting of Tang-i Azao, was dated by the German Persianist W. B. Henning to 752/3. This date would make it the earliest written example of the Persian language, predating the earliest examples of the Islamic use of Persian in the Arabic script. The discovery during illegal excavations during the 1990s and early 2000s of a haul of early manuscripts has also brought to light a number of eleventh-century Judeo-Persian documents relating to the former Jewish community of Balkh, which have been the focus of study by the Israeli Persianist Shaul Shaked. Such discoveries have important implications in turn for how we understand the medieval Muslim sultanates in which these wealthy communities of Jews apparently flourished.
Aside from these epigraphical and paleographical investigations, a smaller number of studies by Eric Brauer and particularly Sara Koplik have examined the modern history of Afghan Jewry from the eighteenth to the twentieth century. The community at first grew during this period as Jewish refugees fled persecution in Qajar Persia and Soviet Central Asia. It then shrank into disappearance as a result of persecution in Afghanistan itself so grave as to leave only one Jewish resident in post-Taliban Kabul. Pointing to the longer roots of persecution, Koplik has detailed the role of ruling Muslim elites in organizing the state seizure of Jewish assets in Afghanistan during the 1930s. Fortunately, since the early twentieth century much of the Judeo-Persian literature produced by Afghan Jews (and Central Asian Jews more generally) has been published in Jerusalem. Such publication has preserved an important part of Afghanistan’s religious heritage that would otherwise have been persecuted out of the historical record. Of particular note are the writings of the Garji family, who for several generations provided the main community of Afghan Jewry in Herat with its leading rabbis. Their works included Judeo-Persian commentaries on the Bible and Psalms, such as Sefer Ha-nukkat Zion and Sefer Minhat Shmuel. Through working with Afghan Jews in exile, the Israeli researcher Tsila Zan-Bar Tsur has also managed to recover part of their oral and folkloric heritage. Comparison with Afghan Muslim folklore may reveal elements of a common religious culture that was once shared between Jews and Muslims who shared their language and many other aspects of their lives.

Reflecting the grim modern pattern of so many Muslim-ruled nation-states, it is only in recent times that Afghanistan’s minorities have fled into exile. This development points to the emergence of a religious uniformity that has made Afghanistan the least religiously diverse Muslim-majority nation in the world. Despite the existence of many studies of the fate of non-Muslim minorities in surrounding regions, the processes behind this “de-diversification” have been entirely ignored in the Afghan case, in part perhaps because of the lack of recognition given to non-Muslim Afghans. This omission makes it all the more important that their (former) presence is signaled in a study such as this. Looking to the future, only research into interreligious relations can help us understand the processes behind the emergence of such uniformity. Such processes are all the more important now that Islam has also become a tool of sectarian persecution among Muslim Afghans themselves.

Although Afghanistan’s non-Muslims were ignored during the heyday of fieldwork between the late 1950s and the 1970s, the gaps of coverage look somewhat different when we move from historical studies to research by anthropologists and other social scientists. In line with the disciplinary biases of the day, the core era of anthropological research on Afghanistan during the 1960s and the 1970s gave overwhelming attention to rural, tribal, or otherwise provincial forms of Muslim religiosity, in this way reversing the predominantly urban focus of historical
studies. Reflecting tendencies in the discipline at large, anthropologists also focused largely on nonliterate groups (or, when their subjects were literate, they ignored their use of texts). David Edwards has been the only anthropologist to pay sustained attention to the social life of written religious texts in Afghanistan. The years since the toppling of the Taliban in 2001 have seen both a revival of anthropological work and a massive increase in studies framed by the disciplinary foci of political science and development and security studies. But with few exceptions, much of this work has focused on developmentalism and democratization, reflecting a tendency to overlook religion and regard it as a dated (even “Orientalist”) category of analysis. The extensive anthropological and sociological literature that has developed around the massive and far-flung Afghan diasporas that emerged during the past quarter-century has also overlooked the roles played by Islam in diaspora life.

All these neglected areas merit closer attention if we are truly to be able to account for the changing places of Islam in Afghanistan's past and present. Though the state of the field is such that it is impossible at present to plug all these gaps in coverage, the eleven case studies brought together in this book share the collective aim of presenting the best overview currently possible of the development of Afghanistan’s Islam from the first centuries of Islamization to the present day.

LOOKING MORE CLOSELY: A CHAPTER SUMMARY

As the previous pages have shown, the scholarship on Afghanistan’s Islam has been produced by researchers from many different countries. Reflecting these diverse academic lineages, the contributors to this volume originate from Afghanistan, Austria, Britain, Germany, Iran, Pakistan, Switzerland and the United States. These international specialists have been chosen for their expertise on specific periods of Afghanistan’s religious history. They are distinguished by their rare ability to use written sources in the primary languages in which Afghanistan’s Islam was expressed, including Persian, Arabic, Pashto, Uzbek, and Urdu. The case studies that they present aim to show how Afghanistan’s different versions of Islam emerged, coexisted, and at times competed. In the chapters that follow, we will see the circumstances in which different religious institutions and actors rose to differing degrees of prominence in different regions of the country. Afghanistan is often described as an ethnic mosaic. In this way, by moving beyond the unifying rhetoric of a singular “Islam in Afghanistan,” we will also see how a nation was constructed from the sometimes ill-fitting pieces of such a religious mosaic. As readers progress through the chronological chapters, it is therefore important to realize that the institutions and authorities created in one period did not disappear or merely linger in the next but continued to exist as sometimes complementary, sometimes competing claimants to religious leadership.
Covering the period from 709 to 871, chapter 1, by Arezou Azad, traces the initial conversion of Afghanistan from Zoroastrianism and Buddhism to Islam. Highlighting differential developments in four regions of Afghanistan, Azad discusses the early history of Afghanistan’s Islam both as a religion and as a political system in the form of a caliphate. The chapter draws on underutilized sources, such as fourth- to eighth-century Bactrian documents from Tukharistan and medieval Arabic and Persian histories of Balkh, Herat, and Sistan. Azad argues that Islam did not arrive in Afghanistan as a finished product but instead continued to evolve during these early centuries in Afghanistan’s multireligious environment. Through fusions with Buddhism, Zoroastrianism, and local cult practices, the Islam that resulted was less an Arab Islam that was imported wholesale than a patchwork of religious practices.

Chapter 2, by Nushin Arbabzadah, moves further into the medieval period to shed light on the foundational Timurid era of Afghan history, which saw important and enduring religious institutions established in the capital city of Herat and other urban centers. Her chapter focuses on how during the fifteenth century women of the Timurid ruling class patronized religious architecture with their own private funds. The most audacious of these patrons, Queen Gawhar Shad (r. 1405–47), broke the traditional taboo that banned women from patronizing mosques by building two prestigious Friday mosques that stood at the intersection of political and religious power. Drawing on various Persian sources, the chapter provides an overview of the role of female elites in shaping the medieval religious landscape that the Timurids bequeathed to later times.

In the next chapter, Jürgen Paul addresses the important questions of why and how the Khwajagan-Naqshbandi order became the paramount Sufi group in Timurid Herat, paving the way for the Naqshbandis’ central role in Afghan society down to the twentieth century. At the beginning of the fifteenth century, Khwajagan-Naqshbandi Sufis came to Herat as outsiders from Bukhara with the odds set against them. But through their Shari’a-mindedness, their flexibility in ritual practice, and their intellectual appeal to the Timurid cultured class, they rapidly rose to prominence, not least through their close associations with the ruling elite. Their ascent was also enabled by the support of wealthy hereditary Sufi landlords who controlled popular shrines, such as that of Ahmad-i Jam, now in Iran. The chapter shows how, in the 1450s, political support became instrumental to the Khwajagan-Naqshbandi ascent when the newly established Sufi group around ‘Ubaydullah Ahrar (d. 1490) in Samarqand exercised a notable influence in the Timurid territories in Afghanistan. Since the impact on Afghanistan of Sufi (and especially Naqshbandi) Islam can hardly be overestimated, Paul’s chapter reveals the early history of this Sufi rise to power. In this way it lays the background for the later chapter by Waleed Ziad, which turns to a second phase in the eighteenth century that saw the Naqshbandis win the support of the Afghan Durrani Empire.
In chapter 4, R. D. McChesney focuses on the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to provide an overview of the process of transmitting and transforming Islam in Afghanistan. He places special emphasis on the organization and exploitation of the material resources of religion, drawing on a variety of Persian biographical works written by religious scholars from the period to show how Islam was taught, institutionalized, and funded. McChesney focuses his discussion on the crucial question of how the religious professionals that emerged from such material and institutional forms of support were able to earn a living from Islam. By examining the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century economy of Islam in Afghanistan and its surrounding region, his chapter shows that the majority of resources was allocated by ruling groups who established the built landscape of Islam in Afghanistan and funded the endowments that paid for their religious staff. By exploring the flow of material resources and religious ideas from this patron class through the professional religious class to the population at large, the chapter provides a holistic view of the social and economic position of Islam in premodern Afghanistan.

Waleed Ziad continues the chronological tracing of historical developments by examining the religious consequences of the unification of Afghanistan with parts of what is today Pakistan and India under the Pashtun Durrani Empire between 1747 and 1826. Ziad’s chapter follows the expansion of the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi Sufi order from the Indian subcontinent. As a consequence of Durrani support, the influence of the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidis in Afghanistan became such that, until the upheavals of the Soviet invasion, their leaders formed the closest thing Afghanistan had to a religious establishment. Showing how their doctrines came to Afghanistan, Ziad examines how religious knowledge was transmitted from India by Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi teaching manuals. Through a careful reading of two such handbooks composed in the early nineteenth century in Kabul and Peshawar, this chapter argues that such texts served as easily replicable tools for the efficient transfer of complex knowledge systems through the diverse cultural environments of the Afghan Durrani Empire.

While premodern Naqshbandi Sufis emphasized the Shari’a and cultivated close connections with ruling elites, the emergence of Afghanistan as a nation-state in the nineteenth century saw Islamic law (and its exponents) drawn into a closer relationship with the ruling authorities as the latter sought to centralize their power over society. The resulting development of a state legal system based on Shari’a is the theme of the next chapter, by Amin Tarzi, who takes us forward to the reign of the “Iron Amir,” ‘Abd al-Rahman Khan, between 1880 and 1901. Although the relationship between Pashtun political authorities and the peoples they governed was traditionally very loose in Afghanistan, under ‘Abd al-Rahman Khan the establishment of a centralized legal apparatus became a governmental priority. Pushing back against this governmental need was the state’s weak legitimacy, forcing state actors to use Islam as a means to achieve legal legitimacy in their bid to expand
central authority. Tarzi’s chapter examines this process by chronicling the formation of Afghanistan’s state law through a focus on the establishment of official state Shari’a courts in the late nineteenth century. In this way, the chapter details the central role that Islam—Shari’a in particular—has played in the centralizing efforts made for more than a century to build a modern state in Afghanistan.

In chapter 7, Sana Haroon takes us into the first half of the twentieth century to examine the Jama’at-i Mujahidin (Society of Holy Warriors), which emerged from the Pashtun border regions of Afghanistan and British India. By drawing on both Afghan Persian and Indian Urdu sources, Haroon presents a prehistory of the cross-border religious activism and violence that are usually associated with more recent decades. Comparing Indian Muslim, frontier Pashtun, and centralized Afghan nationalist discourses from the period, her chapter highlights the inadequacies of the concept of tribalism for understanding the frontier’s religious dynamics. Haroon shows how Indian and Afghan nationalists challenged the idealized model of the tribe (qabila) as the foundational familial and moral basis of Muslim society by producing nationalizing counternarratives instead. Nonetheless, tribalist discourse continued to have political purchase later in the twentieth century. For as Haroon’s chapter goes on to show, the United States and Pakistan sought to instrumentalize these older invocations of tribal solidarity in an effort to identify and mobilize Pashtun tribes to resist the Soviet invasion.

The interplay—and, indeed, competition—between tribal, nationalist, and religious models of collective identity is taken up, next, in Faridullah Bezhan’s chapter on the heyday of Afghan nationalist political discourse. Through a focus on Afghanistan’s liberalizing midcentury, Bezhan shows how nationalism and constitutionalism, not Islam and Islamism, formed the ideological basis for the new politics that emerged at this time. His chapter examines these developments through a case study of Wish Zalmiyan (Awaken Youth) between 1947 and 1953 as the first political party to operate openly in Afghanistan. However, while a blend of liberal constitutionalism and Pashtun nationalism made the party popular with the intelligentsia and parts of the ruling elite, it brought resentment from the religious establishment. For the formerly influential ‘ulama, Islam was the only ideology to be followed and the Quran the only constitution that the country needed. Drawing on a wide variety of newspapers, journals, and memoirs in both Persian and Pashto, Bezhan’s chapter reveals the ideological battles that took place as advocates of constitutionalism and Pashtun nationalism confronted proponents of religion-based politics. In this way, the chapter demonstrates the alternatives to Islamist politics that emerged in Afghanistan’s most successful period of modernization. Even after the suppression of political parties, this nationalist mode of politics remained the dominant state ideology until the Afghan Marxists staged their coup d’état in 1978.

The outcome of the Sawr Revolution of April 1978 and the Soviet invasion that it triggered marked the onset of Afghanistan’s ongoing decades of war. During the
Introduction

In the latter's subsequent rule over the Uzbek-majority north, even the cult of a female saint was shaped by the powerful warlords who emerged as the new religious patrons of the period. Drawing on Uzbek oral materials, the chapter shows how, after a young girl from Shibirghan was killed in mysterious circumstances in the spring of 1996, strange phenomena started to occur around her burial place, suggesting to locals that she was a saint. Over the following decade, her grave became a pilgrimage site, attracting the sick, deprived, and persecuted from near and far. At the same time, its religious status was contested by local Islamist warlords. By recounting the rise and fall of a female saint at the height of Taliban rule, Baldauf reveals how women's religiosity cross-fertilizes with regional varieties of Islam to continue to produce new forms of religious expression. In turn, the chapter shows how the brutal conditions of a warlord society produce an ever-increasing demand for distinct religious services that can be supplied only by a variety of different versions of Islam.

Turning to subaltern women in post-Taliban Kabul, the final chapter, by Sonia Ahsan, continues this theme of the expression of female religiosity in a male-governed society. Its focus is the khana-yi aman, a safe house or shelter set up after 2001 to house women undergoing criminal trials for sexual or moral transgressions. Despite the defeat of the Taliban, the chapter shows how morality laws continued to shape the lives of Afghan women in a decade that was celebrated for the triumph of democratic government and the liberalizing impact of foreign NGOs. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork, Ahsan shows how the women who
administered and inhabited the shelter tried to render dangerous forms of sexual expression acceptable, or at least intelligible, in Islamic terms. Though the khana-yi aman was a shelter for the religiously and morally condemned, the women within its confines were able to dance, play music, and express themselves freely. Created by a democratic state that confined sexually transgressive women to its institutionally silenced margins, ironically the khana-yi aman served as a rare space in which Afghan women could debate their moral positions, religiosity, and life choices.

If Ahsan’s chapter does not present Islam as a weapon of the weak, it at least shows religion’s continued role as a consolation for those pushed to the margins of society. As the words of the khana-yi aman’s women show, Islamic righteousness is forever being claimed, reshaped, and contested. This theme is also taken up in the afterword, by the anthropologist Alessandro Monsutti, focusing on the case of the Hazaras and their Shi’i Islam, which cannot be overlooked in any study of Afghanistan’s Islam. Building on years of fieldwork in Hazarajat during and after the period of Taliban rule, Monsutti shows how in recent decades Shi’i rituals, symbols, and narratives have provided the principal language for political mobilization among the Hazaras. As he explains, Hazaras turned to their religion to connect the ancient injustices of Shi’i sacred history with the modern history of their own persecution by Pashtun dynasts and their Taliban successors. In this way, their Shi’i Islam provided the Hazaras with both the consolation to endure oppression and the justification to resist it.

As the afterword makes clear, Islam has been a means to legitimize central power but also a vector of rebellion. As much as it has been a unifying factor, Islam has also been used to create and sustain boundaries between the many different groups in Afghan society. The chapters in this book show that this was no less the case in the past than it is in the present. The key difference is that war and globalization have undermined the institutions and traditions of religious authority that emerged during the long medieval period and the shorter modern era. From transnational fundraising to videos, smart phones, and the Internet, new means of religious production now enable exponential numbers of religious entrepreneurs to claim religious authority in Afghanistan. The current Afghan state—or rather Islamic republic (Jumhuri-ye Islami)—is only one religious actor among many Afghan rivals, both within Afghanistan itself and in the vast Afghan diaspora. In a region with so few legal avenues for social mobility, religion will remain a favored career for the ambitious as well as the godly. If nothing else, this volume shows the range of past religious resources from which new versions of Islam may in future emerge in Afghanistan while still claiming to preach the unique path of the Prophet. Islam has been, still is, and will remain a multifarious presence in Afghanistan.
Islam was first introduced to the territories that today make up Afghanistan through the conquests of the Umayyad caliphs in the 650s and their ‘Abbasid successors in the 700s. Over the following centuries, the city of Balkh emerged as an important center of Islamic scholarship. However, followers of Buddhist, Hindu, and local cults remained the majority population of many regions of Afghanistan until the late ninth century at least, when the Muslim Saffarid rulers of Sistan seized control of Buddhist Bamiyan and Hindu-Shahi Kabul. Fuller Islamization took place between the tenth and the twelfth century through the efforts of the Persianized Turkic dynasties of the Ghaznavids and Ghurids. Based in the high mountains of central Afghanistan, they patronized Muslim religious institutions and, through their southern conquests, pushed Perso-Islamic culture deep into the Indian subcontinent. Elegant mosques and madrasas were built in cities such as Firuzkuh and Lashkargah, while Ghazna and Herat exported Sufis and ‘ulama to India and Persia. Many of the most important early works of Persian religious poetry and prose were composed in these cities by the likes of Hakim Sana’i, ‘Abdul- lah Ansari, and al-Hujwiri. In more remote regions such as Badakhshan, Isma‘ili Islam found refuge, whereas rural and nomadic groups developed their own local Islams. After the widespread urban destruction of the Mongol conquests, between 1370 and 1507 the Timurid Empire saw Herat emerge as one of the greatest cultural centers of the entire Islamic world.
The conquest of Balkh in 708–9 marked the beginning of the Umayyad caliphate’s control over the lands that are today Afghanistan. Some of the people of Afghanistan rebelled against the new Damascus-based overlords. Others joined the militias that in 749 enabled the rival ‘Abbasid caliphs to take over from the Umayyads. By the ninth century, the city of Balkh was being canonized as the Dome of Islam and its Muslim intellectuals memorialized as saints with sanctuaries deeply intertwined with the Islamic identity of their city of burial. How could the Islamic caliphate become so firmly embedded in classical and late antique Afghanistan’s thousand-year-old civilization within the relatively short time span of a hundred and sixty years? What strategies did the Muslim conquerors use to establish their authority in Afghanistan and maintain an economically viable and politically sustainable engagement? These questions guide this chapter’s investigations, which serve to test the conversion models proposed by Nehemiah Levtzion, Richard Bulliet, and Richard M. Eaton for neighboring parts of the Islamic world.

These three scholars have all emphasized that large-scale patterns of conversion cannot be explained by popular, unsubstantiated statements alluding to an immediate and violent conversion by the sword. Nor can softer methods, such as conversion through political or economic patronage (e.g., for tax reasons), provide the full answer. Rather, under the umbrella of Muslim rule, the coexistence of multiple religions in the early Islamic period initiated a centuries-long process of acculturation and adaptation of rituals and belief systems. As the following pages show, similar trends can be detected in early medieval Afghanistan.

This chapter is divided into four parts. After an overview of the geographic context and the sources for the study of early Islamic history in Afghanistan, there
follows a historical sketch of Afghanistan before the Muslim arrival and of the Islamic conquests and the transition to Muslim rule. The chapter then explores the cross-fertilization of the Muslim conquerors’ religious ideas with preexisting local beliefs in Afghanistan. Although the time period of a hundred and sixty years is broad, the state of research is still limited. For this reason, the discussions and conclusions of this chapter are necessarily tentative and anecdotal.

**Contexts and Sources**

In the eighth and ninth centuries, two successive caliphal dynasties—first the Umayyads, then the ‘Abbasids—ruled over parts of Afghanistan. The period covered in this chapter begins with the establishment of Umayyad rule in 709, when the Muslim armies conquered Balkh once and for all. It closes in 870 with the de facto ‘Abbasid retreat after the takeover of Balkh by the Saffarid dynasts of Sistan. So far, no detailed study of Afghanistan in this crucial period has been undertaken, partly because of scholarly neglect and partly because of the tense security situation in Afghanistan that has made access to primary sources difficult. The tradition of limiting the discipline of Afghan Studies to the history of the nation-state of Afghanistan created in the eighteenth and the nineteenth century has further restricted the study of early Islam in Afghanistan.

Yet writing the early Islamic history of the region that later became Afghanistan fills important gaps in its cultural history. Nor is it a teleological exercise, given that while the boundaries of the modern nation-state are relatively new, those of its four main regional components are not. The regions of Herat and the west; Qandahar and the south; Balkh (today’s Mazar-i Sharif) and the north; and Kabul and the east have all existed since late antiquity. In order to reconstruct the early Islamic history of Afghanistan, these regions need to be brought into one historical narrative. If we do so, Afghanistan obtains an early Islamic history that is based on scholarly evidence and embedded within the diachronic study of Afghanistan’s various versions of Islam that this volume provides.

It is pertinent to understand how medieval Islamic scholars described Afghanistan’s regions. They placed them within the provinces that they knew as Khurasan and Sistan. Khurasan was the Sasanian Empire’s eastern province (satrapy) and home to the cities of Balkh and Herat in what is today Afghanistan, as well as Nishapur in Iran and Merv in Turkmenistan. Each of these cities was an oasis town that was part of a larger district known by the same name. Our knowledge of Umayyad Khurasan is limited, largely because of the inadequate source base for Umayyad history in general. In *The Nativist Prophets of Iran*, Patricia Crone attempted to break the impasse in understanding Umayyad Khurasan by assessing the impact on the development of Islam of the rebellions and supposed heresies that burgeoned in the region during the Umayyad occupation. Through Elton Daniel’s monograph on
early ‘Abbasid Khurasan, things come into sharper focus after the ‘Abbasid revolution.⁶ Daniel inventoried the opposition movements that ensued after the treacherous murder in 755 of Abu Muslim al-Khurasani, the ‘Abbasid governor in Khurasan and previous leader of the covert subversion known as the da’wa on behalf of the ‘Abbasids, at the hands of the second ‘Abbasid caliph, al-Mansur (r. 754–75).

To understand the effects of Umayyad rule on Afghanistan, historians are now turning to recently discovered documents that have been translated into English from Bactrian and Arabic by Nicholas Sims-Williams and Geoffrey Khan.⁷ The corpus includes some 250 documents dating from the fourth to the eighth century. Most, if not all, are believed to originate in the family archive of the local rulers of Rob, in Tukharistan. The corpus is marked by its bilingual nature, with documents written in Bactrian or Arabic following different documentary protocols and templates, sometimes within the same year. The Bactrian documents bring exciting new material to the study of Umayyad and very early ‘Abbasid Khurasan, providing a reality check on the standard sources for the study of early Islamic Afghanistan. The standard sources include the medieval Arabic political and geo-administrative accounts cited in this chapter by Ibn al-Faqih al-Hamadani (fl. 903), Ibn Khurradadbih (d. 911?), Qudama ibn Ja’far (d. 922?), al-Tabari (d. 923), and Yaqt al-Rumi (d. 1229).⁸ Such purportedly universal chronicles and reports come with two main caveats, namely that they were written in the distant ‘Abbasid center, Baghdad, and that they were produced at least a century after the events that they recount. In their accounts of Khurasan, this inevitably leads to exoticisms, occasional lapses, and political biases (such as seeking to depict the Umayyads in a negative light to justify the ‘Abbasid takeover in 749).

Local histories provide another important check against these inaccuracies. The Faza’il-i Balkh, a local history of Balkh written by a certain Shaykh al-Islam al-Wa’iz in the late twelfth century, nuances the teleological ‘Abbasid narratives of wholesale conversion.⁹ A recent discovery of a fragmentary twelfth-century history of Herat by ‘Abd al-Rahman Fami is another local source that will recalibrate our knowledge of Umayyad and early ‘Abbasid Afghanistan.¹⁰

After Khurasan, Sistan is the second medieval region to which a number of major Iranian and Afghan cities belonged. It included the Afghan cities and regions of Ghazna (modern-day Ghazni), Zarang, Bust, Qandahar, Kabul, Kabulistan, and Zabulistan (the lands between Ghazna and Kabul). Qandahar was better known in the medieval sources as al-Rukhkaj and Zamindawar.¹¹ Zarang already became an Umayyad base in 652–53, and it was from there that the Arabs undertook their eastward campaigns. An anonymous local history used mainly for the study of the Saffarid dynasty, the Tarikh-i Sistan (completed in 1062), also provides interesting details on the early years of Islam in Sistan. C. E. Bosworth’s monograph Sīstān under the Arabs, even fifty years after its publication, has not been surpassed in its extensive coverage of the subject.¹²
Yet the local histories also come with their limitations, notably the obscurity of their authors and their poor manuscript-survival rates, which sometimes make it difficult to verify their accounts. For the historian in particular, another caveat is the authorial license established in the literary genres (faza'il, tabaqat, tarikh) from which the local histories grew, which allowed the authors of such texts to prioritize the ideal state of places in an Islamic imagination at the expense of factual accuracy. An example of these problems is the Faza'il-i Balkh, which was written in Arabic in 1214 (this original is now lost) and translated into Persian in 1278 (recensions of which survive): it has a spurious author and translator, and its surviving manuscripts date from three to seven centuries later. The main surviving local history of Badakhshan dates from as late as the eighteenth century. Local histories of Kabul date from even later, and there do not appear to be any surviving medieval local histories from the Qandahar region at all. Some of these gaps can be filled by using documentary and archaeological evidence, such as the Bactrian documents discussed earlier and the excavation reports of the Délégation Archéologique Française en Afghanistan (DAFA), the Italian archaeological mission in Ghazni, or the more recent discoveries at Mes Aynak.

BEFORE THE MUSLIMS ARRIVED

In order to test the Islamization process in Afghanistan, we must necessarily begin with the prelude and context for the Muslim conquests in Bactria, a vast province centered on northern Afghanistan and subjected to Sasanian viceregal control. Prior to Muslim rule, three out of the four Afghan regions—Balkh, Herat, and Sistan—were integrated within the Sasanian orbit. Balkh and Herat belonged to Khurasan, which was one of four Sasanian provinces governed from Merv by an ispahbadh, or Sasanian general. Effectively, this meant that the Sasanian footprint on Balkh and Herat was light. Practically, this translated into an engagement focused on the exaction of taxes and the policing of the frontiers with the Hephthalite domains in Central Asia and eastern and southern Afghanistan, and with the domains of the Chinese T’ang Empire. In economic terms, Balkh and Herat also served as Sasanian mint towns.

This light Sasanian footprint can be demonstrated rather easily in the region of Bactra (which was Arabicized to Balkh). The conquest accounts often stand out for the limited presence of Sasanian administrative and military machinery. In 705, the Umayyad general commanding Balkh’s final conquest, Qutayba ibn Muslim (d. 715 or 716), was met by the ispahbadh of Balkh and some local dignitaries. In 708–9, the ispahbadh was one of the local rulers to whom the Hephthalite rebel Nizak Tarkhan wrote when he was trying to unite against Qutayba the local aristocracy of Tukharistan (the subregion, north of the Hindu Kush, of which Balkh was the capital). The barmak, the leader of the Buddhist Naw Bahar
monastery, also appears to have been one of the architects of this revolt; his wife was taken prisoner.  

The lack of any reference in the sources to a princely leader in Balkh at the time of Qutayba’s advances may be explained by the power of the barmak. The source of his power was the Naw Bahar, which was not only a Buddhist religious complex but also a hub for major landholding, agricultural, and revenue-generating enterprises that extended over two-thirds of the large Balkh oasis, an area of more than 72 square kilometers. The transmission of Sasanian origin myths in the sources on Balkh (notably the Zoroastrian legends that the prophet Zoroaster died there and that his patron, Gushtasp, had built the city), as well as the presence of Zoroastrian fire temples in the region, points to Sasanian cultural and religious influences. The archaeological remains at Chashma-yi Shafa’, near Balkh, currently under investigation by the DAFA, may also support this argument.

Looking beyond Balkh, in Tukharistan’s rural metropolises of Samangan and Rob, we find an even weaker Sasanian presence. While making frequent references to Sasanian taxes, the Bactrian documents from this era provide rather scant
notice of Zoroastrian or Buddhist deities. In this part of late Sasanian and early Islamic Tukharistan, the principal objects of worship were a set of local deities, such as Zhun, Wakhsh, and Kamird. Like that of pre-Islamic Balkh, the population of Tukharistan was diverse: people spoke and read many languages, including Bactrian, Turkic, Syriac, Pali, and Sanskrit. Since the Bactrian documents are discussed in more detail below, it is worth noting that Bactrian belonged to the Iranian language group and was written in Cyrillic script. It was a legacy of the conquests of Alexander the Great and the Seleucid Empire that emerged from them between the fourth and the first century B.C.E.

Once we reach the southern point of the region of Balkh, at Bamiyan, indications of a possible Sasanian presence diminish quickly. The Chinese Buddhist pilgrim Xuanzang traveled through the area in the 630s and described the two colossal Buddha statues at Bamiyan, which were probably built in the sixth or the seventh century. Late antique Bamiyan appears to have been ruled by a dynasty that was perhaps of Hephthalite origin but was certainly subject to the prince (yabghu) of the western Turks. The dynasty was still ruling in the first quarter of the eighth century, when it continued to profess Buddhism.

With regard to Herat farther west, “Harev” (hryw) is listed in the inscription of the Sasanian ruler Shapur I (r. 239–70) at Ka’ba-yi Zardusht, near Persepolis, in Iran. The name “Hariy” (hr’y) is also mentioned in the Pahlavi (middle Persian) catalogue of the provincial capitals of the empire. Moreover, Sasanian seals and engraved gemstones have been found in and around Herat. Kushano-Bactrian coins have also been studied, revealing Sasanian fire temples and other iconography typical of Bactrian coins from this period. However, the Sasanian grip did not extend into Herat’s hinterland. There, the northern branch of the Hephthalites and their political successors continued to rule in the Ghurid mountains and river valleys well into the Islamic period.

The third area that was part of the Sasanian domains was Sistan, a region that was south of the Hindu Kush in Afghanistan (centered around Zarang and Nimruz) and in southwestern Iran (centered at Zahidan). The area was a shallow basin in which civilizations clustered around the Helmand riverine areas. Sistan—the Arabic form of the name—derives from the Middle Persian Sakastan, which is also mentioned in another inscription of the Sasanid ruler Shapur I at Naqsh-i Rustam, near Persepolis. When the Umayyad Muslim armies established their base at Zarang in 652/3, Zoroastrianism was well established, marked by the presence of a chief mobadh and hirbadh, while the major fire temple of Karkuya continued to function long after the Umayyad conquest. The Nestorian Church was represented with a bishopric that continued well into the Islamic period. However, there remained one part of the Sistan region that was not under Sasanian or Islamic control for two centuries, namely Qandahar (viz. al-Rukkhkaj and Zamindawar).
This leads us to the fourth region, which was Kabul and Zabulistan, the latter lying between Kabul and the Kabul River Valley on the north and the territories around the confluence of the Helmand River and Arghandab River of Qandahar and based around the city of Ghazna. From the third century B.C.E. to the first century C.E., the region had formed part of the Greco-Bactrian realm. It was subsequently overrun by nomadic tribes from the north, including the Kushans, Kidarites, and Hephthalites. Buddhism flourished there, as did Indic cults. The Zunbils and Kabulshahs were persistent in their resistance to Muslim rule for some two centuries, until the Saffarids of Sistan temporarily subdued them in 870. This did not prevent the Muslim armies and traders from carrying out business, in which Kabul served as an entrepôt for the India trade. The region was not brought into the dar al-Islam (realm of Islam) until the Ghaznavid conquests of the eleventh century.

CONQUEST AND THE TRANSITION TO CALIPHAL ADMINISTRATION

Back in the seventh and eighth centuries, the Umayyad Muslim conquests had toppled the Sasanian Empire. The fall of the Sasanian administrative capital at Ctesiphon (20 miles southeast of modern Baghdad) in 637 and the assassination of the last Sasanian emperor, Yazdgird III, in 651 at Merv had a domino effect. Farther east, the Muslim conquests were by no means immediate. The population of Afghanistan went through a repetitive pattern of submission, rebellion, and resistance, and eventually final submission. Balkh was the first city to come under direct Umayyad control, after its conquest by the Umayyad general Qutayba ibn Muslim in 709. Having previously garrisoned twelve kilometers away at al-Baruqan, the Muslim soldiers and their mawla (clients of Arab tribesmen) moved into the city of Balkh in 724/5.

The Umayyad dynasty ruled over Khurasan from its regional command center at Merv, following the example of the Sasanians. It was not the only continuation of Sasanian practice. The Barmakid family, who had previously run most of the district through the Buddhist Naw Bahar estate, were now proving to be useful local operators for the Umayyads. The caliphate was stretched far from its capital at Damascus, and needed to co-opt and eventually assimilate local power-holders. Among the most popular medieval Islamic conversion narratives is that of the formerly Buddhist Barmakid family. Islamic accounts describe the head barmak as a Muslim mawla who voluntarily traveled to Syria to declare his loyalty to the caliph Hisham ibn ‘Abd al-Malik (r. 723–42). The Barmakids’ influence increased after their support for the ‘Abbasid struggle against the Umayyads, leading to the ‘Abbasid takeover of the caliphate in 749. The next generation of Barmakids formed the immediate entourage of the caliph Harun al-Rashid...
(r. 786–809) in the new caliphal capital, Baghdad. There, Yahya ibn Barmak (d. 805) and his sons Fadl (d. 808) and Ja'far (d. 803) served as vizier and governor, respectively. In the tales of the Arabian Nights, the relationship between Harun al-Rashid and the Barmakids was turned into legend. The Barmakids had become an Afghan dynasty that permeated the highest echelons of caliphal power, both in the imperial center in Baghdad and in the vital province of Khurasan, where they participated in the creation of caliphal policies and practices. Yet they did not go native in Baghdad—at least not entirely. Rather, the Barmakid family used their contacts and influence in the western and eastern lands of the caliphate to bring together two previously disparate worlds. Yahya ibn Barmak (d. 805), for example, commissioned translations of Sanskrit texts and patronized a versified life of the Buddha.35

Other indigenous winners during the first hundred and sixty years of caliphal rule in Afghanistan were the local rulers of Rob, a town lying a hundred and thirty kilometers to the southeast of Balkh, in Tukharistan. The Arabic documents from the Bactrian corpus attest the caliphal tax administration in this rural area, which required land surveys for the calculation of land-tax assessments and the issuance of tax receipts. The Bactrian documents contain the very first reference to the caliphate's kharaj tax on agricultural land and its produce, two decades before the next-earliest reference appears in the corpus of Egyptian papyri. As Geoffrey Khan has argued, the term kharaj stems from a Middle Iranian etymology, thus pointing to the Muslim adoption of elements of the pre-Islamic tax system of Khurasan.36 Influential landholders, who colluded with the Umayyads and early 'Abbasids and became their mawlas (clients), reaped rewards. A case in point is the Kamird-far family, to whom the bilingual Bactrian document corpus probably belonged. The family managed large tracts of arable land and orchards for which they were consistently taxed.

But, as might be expected, not all local rulers or members of the old guard won out or supported the Umayyad project. Rival local elites vied for influence with the Muslim newcomers or used the new overlords to help settle old accounts. The khar of Rob, for example, showed Qutayba ibn Muslim an alternative access route to the fortress where his nemesis, the apostate-rebel Nizak Tarkhan, was hiding.37 Along with his family and supporters, Nizak eventually met with an inglorious end: the Umayyads slaughtered thousands of them and ate bread made from flour milled with the copious amounts of blood that flowed from the massacre.38

The Umayyads in Afghanistan faced opposition again after they reinstated the poll tax on new converts. Rebellions broke out in the Balkh, Herat, and Sistan regions. The uprising of a rebel named al-Harith ibn Surayj was particularly popular in the areas around Balkh, lasting from 734 to 746. The Baghdad-based chronicler al-Tabari (d. 923) reported that al-Harith followed the doctrine of the Murji'ite, who professed that faith alone was sufficient to be a Muslim.39 This attracted support from those converts who were told that their conversion was not valid unless
accompanied by ritual acts. Al-Harith challenged the selection process for the governorship of Balkh, directly confronting the governor Nasr ibn Sayyar (d. 748) and even the caliph about the matter. Almost immediately afterward, the Umayyads were challenged again by rebels with strong support in Khurasan. This time the rebellion was led by Abu Muslim and the ‘Abbasids, who also sought to bring the caliphate into line with Islamic principles. In 749, they succeeded in overthrowing the Umayyad caliphate and establishing their own in its place.

Moving westward, Herat was only of secondary importance to the Umayyads compared with other Khurasani cities like Merv, Nishapur, and Balkh. As a result, we read very little about Herat in the sources on this period, though Herat’s status would certainly change by the time of the Timurids, as shown in the chapters in this volume by Nushin Arbazonad and Jürgen Paul. One popular account describes the rebel Ustadhsis leading a major opposition to the early ‘Abbasids from 767 to at least 770, during which he took control of Herat and Bushanj. Ustadhsis killed hundreds of Arab tribesmen and numerous ‘Abbasid leaders in the process. He had converted to the Zoroastrian reformist doctrines propounded by Bihafarid (d. ca. 748 or 749), which embraced practices and prohibitions inspired by Islam. Ustadhsis’s supporters are said to have numbered three hundred thousand.40 He eventually escaped to a fort in Badghis, and thereafter Khazim ibn Khuzayma, the general of the ‘Abbasid caliph al-Mansur (r. 754–75), defeated the rebels and arrested Ustadhsis.41

In the south, Sistan’s capital, Zarang, surrendered to the Muslim armies in 652/3. It subsequently became an important base from which Umayyad and early ‘Abbasid campaigns were undertaken in the east against the zunbils, local rulers of al-Rukhkhaj (Qandahar) and Zamindawar, as well as against the Kabulshah rulers of Kabul. Umayyad coins of the Arab-Sasanian type were minted in Zarang, and taxes were collected. The high tax burdens placed on the local population seem to have contributed to a rise in support for the Kharijites, who had fled from Kerman, in Iran, where they had earlier been defeated by the Umayyads.42 The Kharijites continued their militant campaigns in the small towns of Khurasan and Sistan of Afghanistan until the reign of the Saffarid dynasty between 861 and 1003. The vulnerability of the local population in Sistan and Bust to Kharijite attacks lent a raison d’être to the bands of local Muslim fighters known as ‘ayyarun. In time, these fighters gave rise to the Saffarid dynasty, which would go on to end non-Muslim control of Kabul.43

Control over Afghanistan brought financial gain to the Umayyads and ‘Abbasids alike. For example, according to Ibn Khurradadhbih (d. ca. 911), in the financial year 826–27, Khurasan alone contributed 44.8 million dirhams of kharaj tax to the caliphal coffers.44 The loss of this tax revenue to the Saffarid dynasty is frequently cited as having precipitated the overall demise of the ‘Abbasid caliphate.45 Control over the cities of Afghanistan, such as Balkh, also enabled direct access into the
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lucrative trade with India via the land routes of the so-called Silk Road. By tapping into existing mercantile networks, the caliphate linked up with the wealthy *kafir* (infidel, non-Muslim) lands of India and Central Asia, thus bringing such exotica as elephants from India and musk from Tibet to the Islamic world and beyond. The Muslim chroniclers tell us that such long-distance trade filled Afghan bazaars with horses, camels, dried fruit, wine, spices, sweets, and textiles.46

A NEW RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE

The transition to caliphal rule also brought the new religion of Islam to Afghanistan. So how did Islam embed itself in Afghan society? More specifically, who were its proponents, and how did they transmit their new religious knowledge? What was the rate of conversion to Islam, and what may have motivated people to convert? And what strategies may people have used to retain local practices within the syncretistic environment that the caliphate inadvertently created? The following section tackles these questions by considering the case of Bactria (that is, Balkh and Tukharistan). In Balkh, as elsewhere in the caliphate, the proponents of Islam were the Muslim scholars, or *'ulama*. Forty of the seventy *'ulama* of Balkh described in the *Faza'il-i Balkh* lived there during the first two centuries of Islam. They were an eclectic mix of Arabs and *mawla* converts who had come from all over the caliphate, from the Nile to the Oxus. The *'ulama* in the early days of Islam were not professional Muslims as such, since their pursuit of Islamic scholarship was largely a private vocation, or at best a part-time job. The forty Muslim scholars of Balkh, who are described in the *Faza'il-i Balkh* at variable lengths of between half a page and more than thirty pages each, studied and memorized the Quran and its exegeses, along with hundreds of Hadith. They did this while keeping their day jobs as merchants, landowners, and suchlike: to be an *'alim*, a religious scholar, required private wealth.47 This presents a great contrast with the lucrative later economy of Islam discussed in R. D. McChesney’s chapter in this volume, which reveals various options for earning a living through religion by the sixteenth century.

The knowledge acquired by Balkh’s *'ulama* was passed down through the scholarly generations known as *silsilas* (chains or lineages). The method of teaching was the *suhba* (disputation) carried out during a gathering (*majlis*) held in an informal setting such as a private home or a room in a mosque. This lack of educational formality gave access to Islamic learning to women, some of whom became scholars and teachers in their own right.48 The *majlis* gatherings provided the glue for the *silsila* lineages of students and disciples who continued the transmission of religious knowledge.49 This trajectory of Muslim education and professionalization shows that Balkh resembled other early Muslim religious centers farther west, most notably Damascus and Baghdad.50
As a corollary of their religious knowledge, a large proportion of Balkh's 'ulama distinguished themselves as pious ascetics (zuḥḥad). Men such as Ibrahum ibn Adham Mansur (d. 777/8) and Shaqiq ibn Ibrahim al-Zahid al-Balkhi (d. 809/10) were especially celebrated for their asceticism. A zahid (ascetic) was someone who was unconcerned with the world, but not necessarily someone seeking mystical communion with God. The latter could possibly be a Sufi. However, the Faza'il-i Balkh does not use the term “Sufi.” It is only from the fifteenth century onward in the Sufi hagiographical literature discussed later in this volume, in the chapter by Jürgen Paul, that these early mystics were retrospectively institutionalized as the founding fathers of Sufism. They are still remembered as such today.

Balkh's early Muslim scholars also included legal experts who advised and judged on the application of Shari'a in people’s daily lives. Their remit was both broad and specific, covering a wide range of issues that included diet, personal hygiene, inheritance, property, and marriage rights. Despite the fact that they were appointed directly by the caliph, the early qazis (judges) of Balkh were powerful and independent. The qazis presented themselves as protectors of the general populace against the corruption and impunity of political rulers. Their confrontational stance against the political establishment may have led to a purported disbandment of the qazi establishment in Balkh in the ninth and tenth centuries. In its stead, the political authorities installed a system of courts known as mazalim, which specialized in the redress of grievances. By this means, complaints by members of the public would be heard and judged directly in public by the political leader, whether the governor or the vizier.

While we can identify the proponents of early Islam, thanks to the written testimony left by the 'ulama who were the main authors of our primary sources, it is much harder to assess the effects of Islam on the wider population. Richard Bulliet has estimated that by the mid-eleventh century this part of the caliphate acquired a 90-percent Muslim population. However, his method of using personal names as indications of conversion is arguably problematic. Moreover, such quantitative data do not tell us about the qualitative nature of events. What motivated people to convert, and under what circumstances did they change their religion? Here the Bactrian documents provide a significant piece in the puzzle, giving us a direct and unfiltered look into people’s daily lives from the Umayyad period to the first two decades of Abbasid rule in the 770s. A study of the documents from both the Arabic and Bactrian language groups brings to life the case of Kamird-far (also known as Sa‘id) and Zeran over a five-year period from 750 to 755. It is to this case study that we now turn.

In Bactrian document BT I X, dated to the year 750 (E.B.D. 527), three out of four brothers (named Kamird-far, Wahran, and Mir) agreed to own homes and estates equally, and to “possess the woman [Bactrian zin] whose name [is] Zeran . . . , as
it is not necessary for us to destroy our house." The document provides crucial evidence that in Rob, Tukharistan, fraternal polyandry was practiced until at least this late in the period of Islamic rule. The corpus of Bactrian documents ends here, and we cannot know how long the practice continued. But if we are to believe some of the Arabic heresiographical literature, or al-Biruni’s *History of India* (completed in 1030), then fraternal polyandry continued to be practiced until the first half of the eleventh century, and possibly longer. That the practice had an early precedent is absolutely clear from the very first document in the Bactrian corpus. This is a marriage contract between two brothers and one woman called Ralik, dated to the year 333 (110 E.B.D.). The contract emphasizes that this practice “is the established custom in the land,” meaning that it was already in existence before the mid-fourth century. The document also includes a justifying clause about “the need to keep the house together.” Thus, the practice of fraternal polyandry attested in the mid-eighth century may well be a continuation of an age-old custom from this part of Bactria. The impetus behind the practice was principally financial. Bactrian households were taxed in house units, which necessitated minimizing the inheritance into one line, thus limiting it to one wife shared by two or more brothers.

However, the story does not end here. Arabic document 29 (dated to 755) may refer to Kamird-far, one of the three brothers who married Zeran. The reference here is to the marriage of a convert to Islam called Sa’id (the Arabic name for Kamird-far) with a woman called Zeran, a manumitted slave who bore him four children. If this is indeed the same Kamird-far as in document BT I X, then we may well ask what led to this sudden shift from fraternal polyandry. The answer seems to lie again in the fiscal system that gave rise to fraternal polyandry in the first place: because the caliphate changed its house-based tax system into a tax on individuals. Once this Muslim tax system came into being, it was no longer necessary to share wives.

The third question to be explored relates to the antiquity of early Islamic Afghan rituals, and specifically the extent of Islamic syncretism with preexisting Afghan religious practices. Even in the Muslim homeland of the Hijaz, syncretism has been the mainstay of Islam. For example, both Muslim and non-Muslim scholars agree that in the *hajj* Muhammad reinstituted a preexisting pilgrimage ritual. Several Western scholars also hold that the Prophet incorporated rituals from Arabian paganism, litholatry (that is, stone worship), and even Judaism. In Balkh, the situation was no different. The *Faza’il-i Balkh* makes reference to the veneration of multiple sacred sites, notably shrines built for the ‘ulama in Balkh between the eighth and the twelfth century. In the eyes of Shaykh al-Islam al-Wa’iz, the author of the *Faza’il-i Balkh*, what made these shrines sacred was not only the saintly body that lay buried in them but the pre-Islamic antiquity of the places where they were built. The author attributed to these places a history that went back as far as the Old
Testament. All twenty-seven of the shrines to ‘ulama located within the city of Balkh were concentrated in five particular points in the city. One by one, Shaykh al-Islam al-Wa’iz wove these sites into a narrative of sacred landscape. When superimposed on a map of medieval Balkh, the sites appear in a mandala-like constellation along the cardinal points of the compass and around a mound located at their spiritual (if not spatial) center.

It is not inconceivable that the Muslim sacred landscape of Balkh has a Buddhist past. Buddhism began to be institutionalized in the second century by the court of the Kushan king Kanishka I (r. ca. 127–ca. 140). Later, in the seventh and eighth centuries, Balkh’s landscape was described by Chinese pilgrims as being dotted with hundreds of Buddhist stupa shrines. Among Balkh’s Buddhist monasteries, the Nava Vihara was by far the largest. The Nava Vihara’s monks studied the religious teaching of the Shravakayana (Vehicle of Listeners), to which the Chinese pilgrim Xuanzang referred by the pejorative name of Hinayana (Lesser Vehicle). After the Islamic conquest, the monastery’s Sanskrit name, Nava Vihara (which means “New Monastery”), was Persianized to Naw Bahar and became the namesake of one of Balkh’s three sacred gateways.

In the hypothetical but very possible scenario that, during the first century and a half of Islamic rule, Muslims adopted existing sacred sites and added to them, Balkh appears as a highly syncretic sacred landscape. In this view, the Buddhist past was melded with origin narratives from Zoroastrian and biblical sources. For example, the oldest of the five sacred sites in Balkh that al-Wa’iz listed in his Faza’il-i Balkh is Gushtasp’s Mound (tall-i Gushtasp). He attributed to it the following biblical connection:

According to Anas ibn Malik . . . it is related by the Prophet (may God’s prayers and peace be upon him and his family) that Job the Forbearer (may God’s prayer’s be upon him) is at rest on Gushtasp’s Mound. At each gate there are seventy thousand angels praying for God’s mercy and praising and glorifying him, and the recompense for that will be bestowed upon the people of Balkh.

While the Buddhist meaning of Gushtasp’s Mound was lost by the time al-Wa’iz wrote this account, in the late twelfth century, its sacredness was retained. In Zoroastrian tradition, Gushtasp had been the royal patron of Zoroaster. Such a continuity of sacredness has many parallels elsewhere in the Islamic world. By comparison, when looking at dozens of Anatolian sanctuaries that were transferred from one religion to another, F.W. Hasluck concluded in the 1920s that narratives of sacredness perpetuate the idea that particular places—both natural and man-made—have a quality that outlives the vicissitudes of time. Naturally, Muslims did not adopt sites such as Gushtasp’s Mound without reconfiguring their symbolic meanings within Islamic language and imagery. But these sites nonetheless continued to be sacred and iconic.
CONCLUSIONS

This chapter’s study of Afghanistan’s early encounter with Islam has highlighted the fact that the historical development of Islam in the region varied between the areas to the north and the south of the Hindu Kush, and those between the east and west of the country. In the eighth and ninth centuries, the main interest of the Umayyads and ’Abbasids lay in the north and southwest, in Balkh, Tukharistan, Sistan, and, to a lesser extent, Herat. In order to ensure these regions’ political and economic allegiance to the distant caliphal capitals, the agents of the caliphate co-opted Afghan elites, including the Barmakids of Balkh and the *khars* of Rob. Islamization progressed over centuries in a slow and adaptive process, during which time Afghanistan saw the continuation of old religious practices within an Islamic language. By the tenth century, Afghanistan’s Islamic scholars in the north and southwest had developed scholarly and professional religious specializations in much the same way as elsewhere in the caliphate. But in the south and southeast (that is, in Kabul, Zabulistan, and Qandahar), Islamization did not begin until the tenth and eleventh centuries. Even so, this did not hinder the caliphate from establishing firm trade links with such *kafir* lands so as to tap into the high-value India trade.

Much as in other parts of the caliphate, early Islam developed in a syncretic environment in the lands that we now call Afghanistan. But unlike anywhere else in the caliphate, in Afghanistan Buddhism fused with Zoroastrianism, early Abrahamic traditions, and local cult practices, as well as with Islam. By looking at this unique context, this chapter has tried to test the models proposed by Levtzion.
and others. The conclusion must be not that Islam embedded itself in medieval Afghan society as a finished product but rather that the medieval people of Afghanistan gave early Islam some of its shape and color. For example, the early Murji’ite movement in Balkh (which according to the Faza’il-i Balkh was even known as Murjiābad, “Land of the Murji’ites”) enabled people to convert to Islam without abandoning their age-old religious practices and rituals. Meanwhile, the Muslim conquerors and their local clients developed power-sharing strategies that secured an economically viable and politically sustainable Muslim engagement in Afghanistan. From the very early stages of Islamic history, this cocktail of religious combinations led to multiple versions of Islam in Afghanistan, which form a fitting backdrop to the developments described in the following chapters.
This chapter sheds light on the foundational Timurid period in Afghan history during the fifteenth century, which saw important and enduring religious institutions founded in the capital city of Herat and other urban centers. The chapter focuses on how Timurid women of the ruling class patronized religious architecture with their own private funds. The most audacious of these female patrons was Queen Gawhar Shad, the wife and consort of the Timurid ruler Shahrukh (r. 1405–1447), who spent a decade as de-facto ruler of the Timurid Empire after arranging the coronation of her young grandson upon her husband’s death in 1447. Not only did Gawhar Shad dare to break the long-standing custom that prevented women from patronizing mosques by building two mosques; she also ensured that the mosques in question became not just ordinary places of worship but prestigious Friday mosques, serving as influential institutions at the intersection of political and religious power. In tracing the wider context of female religious patronage that surrounded Gawhar Shad’s endowment of these mosques, this chapter draws on original Persian records alongside contemporary European scholarship. In so doing, it provides an overview of the role of elite women in shaping the religious landscape of medieval Afghanistan and its surrounding regions during the Timurid renaissance of the fifteenth century.

Strictly speaking, using the term “Afghanistan” for the medieval period is problematic. As Nile Green explains in his introduction to this volume, the name “Afghanistan” refers to the nation-state that emerged in the nineteenth century: that is, almost four hundred years after the Timurid period, the focus of this chapter. At that time, neither the state nor the term “Afghanistan” existed. But insofar as the city of Herat was the capital of the Timurid dynasty between 1405 and 1507,
and has belonged to the nation-state of Afghanistan since 1857, it is meaningful to consider not only the religious buildings of Herat but also their patrons as part of Afghanistan’s religious history.

In the previous chapter, Arezou Azad has explored the first centuries after the Arab Islamic conquest of (much of) what is today Afghanistan. As she has explained, it was in this early period of Islam that we see the emergence of the first generations of native religious scholars, or ‘ulama, in the region. Characteristically, this first generation of ‘ulama were mostly self-taught and held other occupations alongside working part-time as Islamic jurists. However, by the fifteenth century, which forms the timeline of this chapter, Islam was no longer a new faith in the early stages of growth but had fully developed as the long-established religion of the Khurasan region surrounding Herat. It is also in this period that we see the particular strand of Sufi Islam consolidating its legitimacy through the system of the silsila (chain, dynasty), which traced the lineage of living Sufi masters back to the Prophet Muhammad. Jürgen Paul’s chapter in this volume describes this process in more detail, shedding light on the wider sociopolitical context in which the influence of Sufis was consolidated by Timurid elite support. This chapter complements Paul’s by explaining that through their patronage of Sufi khanaqah buildings, Timurid women of the ruling class played an equally significant role in solidifying the social and institutional power of Sufi Islam in medieval Afghanistan.

Although the Sufi khanaqah was a favorite type of building patronized by Timurid women, it was far from the only type of religious building they funded. We know from architectural evidence and historical records of the time that Timurid women’s engagement in shaping the religious landscape of the medieval period was more expansive in scope. So, for example, Timurid women were engaged in developing Islamic education through their patronage of madrasas. Similarly, Gawhar Shad, the most famous Timurid woman, supported normative Sunni Islam by funding the building of two major Friday mosques. As already mentioned, other Timurid women of the ruling class helped the solidification of Sufi Islam through their patronage of khanaqahs and mausoleum shrines. It is equally fair to say that as a side effect of the even-handed distribution of their patronage, Timurid dynastic women fulfilled a diplomatic function, creating stability for the court by balancing out the power of rival religious establishments. We should not, however, conclude from our Timurid example that the patronage of alternative religious buildings such as khanaqahs and madrasas was an activity exclusive to the women of this particular dynasty, because across the centuries, the ruling-class women of various Islamic dynasties engaged in the same activity, patronizing alternative religious buildings.

The practice was common in the medieval period. Seen in this light, it becomes clear that far from being exceptional, Timurid dynastic women fitted a wider cultural pattern of the period. However, where they clearly stood out among other ruling-class Muslim women of the time was in the figure of the already-mentioned
Gawhar Shad. The consort of the ruler Shahrukh in the first half of the fifteenth century and a de-facto ruler for a decade in her own right, Gawhar Shad famously disregarded an old tradition according to which only male rulers, the sultans, had the legitimacy to patronize the building of the prestigious Friday-mosque institution. Gawhar Shad broke this established pattern twice when she patronized the building of two separate Friday mosques in key Timurid cities, one in Herat and another in Mashhad (in what is today Iran). It can be safely assumed that Gawhar Shad was inspired by an earlier Turko-Mongol female aristocrat, Qutlugh Turkan Aqa (d. 1383), Timur’s older sister, who was known to have built a mosque in Samarqand. ²

Still, just how unusual it was for a female ruler to patronize the prestigious institution of the Friday mosque becomes clear when we bear in mind that even centuries later, mosques built with the funding of a female patron still remain a historical oddity. Finally, when we compare the types of buildings patronized by male Timurid rulers to the ones funded by their female counterparts, we encounter another differentiation based on gender. We find that whereas male Timurid rulers patronized both secular and religious buildings, female rulers limited themselves to the patronage of religious buildings alone. This fact further highlights the importance of women’s role in shaping the religious landscape of medieval Islam in parts of what is known today as Afghanistan.

THE SOURCES OF TIMURID FEMALE POWER

It is clear from the historical records of the time that Timurid women had an especially high status, and it was this status that in turn allowed them to commission the building of religious schools, khanaqahs and mausoleum shrines. This special status was based not so much on the position of women in Shari’a law as on the position of women in the Turko-Mongol sedentary societies that were in this period the heirs to the older and more egalitarian traditions of the Mongol kinship systems of the steppe. Traditionally, women played key roles in Turko-Mongol societies, particularly through the importance of genealogy and political marriages. This was particularly true of the early, foundational, period of the Timurid rule. To illustrate this point, we have to recall that Timur was granted legitimacy to rule only after he married the Chinggisid princess, Saray Mulk Khanum. Before his marriage, the rules of the political system of the steppe excluded Timur, because he was not related to Chinggis Khan (ca. 1162–1227). This absence of kinship amounted to his lacking in legitimacy to rule. It is for this reason that it was only after his marriage to Saray Mulk Khanum, a daughter of Qazan Khan (r. 1343–46), that Timur was given legitimacy to rule. More important, the legitimacy to rule was transferred to Timur after he was conferred the title of gurigan (son-in-law).³

Such was the significance of this title that to this date, the Persian sources that
refer to Timur call him Timur Gurigani as often as they use the better-known title Timur Lang. Saray Mulk, the woman whose marriage to Timur conferred to him both the title and the legitimacy to rule, subsequently became Timur’s favorite. Her name is frequently mentioned in Timurid historiography, in works written by the two main historians of the period, Yazdi and Mirkhwand. Another testimony to Saray Mulk’s standing in Timur’s eyes is the fact that even though she did not bear him any children, she was still given the task of supervising the education of Timur’s grandson, Prince Khalil Sultan, who later ruled over Transoxiana between 1405 and 1409.4

Historical sources from this early period provide further evidence that Timur entertained a close and special relationship to his female family relations. For example, the following passage from Mirkhwand’s Rawzat al-Safa illuminates the powerful emotional impact that the death of his elder sister, Qutlugh Turkhan Aqa, had on Timur:

The Lord of the Auspicious Conjunction [i.e., Timur], who in stability and calm had not an equal under the sky, became full of anxiety and restlessness and suddenly lost the reins of patience and control.5

As his elder sister, Qutlugh Turkhan Aqa had given Timur refuge in her house before his coming to power, and she is known to have later exercised great influence over him.6 Such deep attachment between the male ruler and his female family member was typical in the Turko-Mongolian societies. We find a later example of a similarly strong attachment to the women of the family in the figure of Timur’s descendant Babur, who as founder of the Mughal Empire became the ruler of northern India between 1526 and 1530. The following extract from the Humayun-nama, written by Babur’s sister Gulbadan Bigum, illustrates Babur’s careful attention to his influential female relations:7

And in the four years that Babur spent in Agra, every Friday he went to visit his aunts. One day, the weather was extremely hot, and my elder female relation [aka] said, “The weather is extremely hot: what if you don’t go to visit this one Friday? The ladies [biguman] will not be sad.” The king [Babur] said to my aka, “Mahum, I am surprised to hear this from you. The daughters of Hazrat-i Abu Sa’id Mirza are separated from their father and brothers. How can I not go and ask about their well-being?”

Not only is Timurid women’s special status evident from such historical records, written at the time of the Timurid rule, but it is also reflected in their ability to patronize both multipurpose religious buildings and minor arts such as textiles, embroidery, and metalwork, and different forms of entertainment such as music, magic shows, and poetry gatherings. Timurid women were also a source of inspiration for the aspirations of Timurid men to sponsor such secular spaces as palaces and gardens as well as mosques and shrines. Such indirect influence
becomes more evident if one bears in mind that these places were often named after favorite Timurid women. For example, the great Masjid-i Bibi, in Samarqand, was named after Timur’s wife Saray Mulk, while Timur and his descendants also built gardens in honor of their wives, places that were used to greet and entertain foreign visitors. Contemporary literary sources, such as poetry, historiography, and biographies of poets and saints further bear witness to the especially high status that Timurid women enjoyed. In these texts, women are represented as powerful and active agents participating in the cultural and political life of the Timurid society, whether as political agents like Gawhar Shad or as enthusiastic patrons of music and poetry like the Mughal empress Ruqiyya Bigum (1542–1626).8

An additional source of Timurid women’s power came from certain aspects of Islam. The patronage of the wealthy had played an important role in Islamic culture since the earliest days of the faith. The ethical basis of patronage in Islam is located in the principle of zakat (almsgiving), the obligation of humankind to do good, and the rewards of zakat.9 As a religious duty, patronage was required especially from rulers, who often demonstrated their piety through sponsorship of mosques and other religious buildings.10 The importance of patronage in the early Islamic period is reflected in the Madih of Ibn al-Rumi (d. 895), an ‘Abbasid poet who elaborated on the ethics of patronage by describing how patronage should ideally work.11 The Herat-born historian Khwandamir (ca. 1475–1534/37) presented in his Mukarim al-Akhlaq a detailed listing of the buildings endowed by Herat’s great literary patron Mir ‘Ali Shir Nawa’i (1441–1501).12 Khwandamir’s explanation of this patronage within the moral structure of Islam shows how earlier ‘Abbasid notions of patronage as part of zakat continued to be important in the Timurid period. Islam also facilitated female patronage of culture by allowing women a certain degree of financial independence, since the Quran specifically gives women the right to inherit property and wealth.13 Timurid women were special in that they had available to them two key sources of power, Islamic law and Turko-Mongol traditions. It was the combination of these two sources that enabled Timurid women not only to inherit wealth but also to make use of their wealth in funding the key religious buildings that became the focal points of the Timurid society’s public life. A detailed description of the types of buildings sponsored by Timurid women is provided in the next section.

FEMALE PATRONAGE OF MOSQUES

Given the greater influence that women traditionally had in Turkic and Mongol contexts, it is worth noting that other medieval Muslim women who commissioned mosques were from the Yemeni Rasulid and Ottoman dynasties, both of which were of Turkic ancestry.14 In a book dedicated to the history of Afghanistan’s
Islam, it is important to recognize that it was more likely such Turkic traditions at work in Timurid Herat than any specifically Afghan tradition. Whether in culture or kinship, whatever the source of their agency, Timurid women left an enduring mark on the religious landscape of the most important urban center in western Afghanistan. However, as noted at the beginning of this chapter, the patronage of mosques—especially of the prestigious institution of the Friday mosque—was traditionally the domain of the sultan. It was for this reason that despite their enthusiasm for architecture, medieval female patrons were reluctant to commission the construction of mosques. As a result, female rulers who built mosques were rare, representing an exception to the general rule. Timurid women were not an entirely unique exception in this time and place: between 1498 and 1500 the aforementioned Sufi, poet, and statesman Nawa’i sponsored the restoration of Herat’s Friday mosque, for example. Indeed, during the course of his long career, Nawa’i is said to have either built or repaired no fewer than 135 buildings. Nonetheless, women were an unusual minority as patrons. Given this background, the fact that the Timurid queen Gawhar Shad patronized the building of two Friday mosques is remarkable. Gawhar Shad built the mosques in the two key Timurid cities of Herat and Mashhad. The Friday mosque in Mashhad was completed in 1418/9, and that in Herat in 1432, later to be repaired by Nawa’i. The foundation inscription of the Mashhad mosque read: “Whoever builds a mosque for God, so likewise God will build a house for him [or her!] in paradise.”

As mentioned earlier, we have reason to believe that in this endeavor, Gawhar Shad was inspired by an earlier female relative, Timur’s elder sister, Qutlugh Turkan Aqa, who is credited with having built a mosque in Samarqand. Gawhar Shad paid for the mosques from her own private funds. In modern times, the buildings have come to be regarded as the culmination of the Timurid style. In addition to their sheer size, they are impressive for their luxurious internal decoration and for the fact that they were designed by the most gifted architect of the time, Qawam al-Din Shirazi (d. 1438).

The patronage of mosques was not only a means of demonstrating Gawhar Shad’s personal piety. It was also a way of exercising power and control over the religious establishment. So, for example, the site chosen for the mosque in Mashhad is full of political implications. Its proximity to the tomb of the eighth Shi’i imam, Riza (d. 818), implied Gawhar Shad’s goodwill and support for the Shi’i establishment. Yet the presence of the Sunni ‘ulama who were also employed at the mosque brought balance to this apparent Shi’i preference. In addition, Gawhar Shad commissioned Qawam al-Din Shirazi to build the dar al-siyada next to the Mashhad mosque, a gesture that demonstrated her respect for the Sayyid families, who drew power from their claim to be descendants of the Prophet Muhammad. From this we gather that Gawhar Shad’s patronage of religious architecture was about far more than acts of personal piety. Her financing of religious buildings had
strong political implications in terms of balancing out the power of rival religious groups; and this balance, in turn, strengthened her own rule.

If Gawhar Shad’s commissioning of Friday mosques was about more than a demonstration of her personal piety, according to Timurid literary sources of the time, the mosques themselves played multifunctional roles, representing far more than simply places of worship. Mosques played important social roles, because they were also places of religious education, places in which, as Jürgen Paul explains in his chapter in this volume, Sufi leaders and followers gathered and stayed. According to the Timurid court sophisticate Zayn al-Din Wasifi, mosques were also places where Herat’s literati assembled. Indeed, Gawhar Shad’s mosque in Herat became a focal point for the sociocultural life of Timurid society, a public space where the religious education of future generations took place alongside cultural activities (such as poetry recital and literary criticism) and religious activities (such as private and public worship), as well as the everyday social encounters of different people. According to Wasifi, at times the mosque was even used by Herat’s entertainers as a site to perform acrobatics. Gawhar Shad’s concern for the future of her buildings led her to transform her mosque in Mashhad into an endowment (*waqf*). Among the items of the endowment were a seven-chambered bathhouse built of baked brick, orchards, gardens, and five hundred sheep.

**FEMALE PATRONAGE OF KHANAQAHS**

Throughout the medieval Islamic world, female patrons showed great enthusiasm for the sponsorship of khanaqahs, buildings that served as residential lodges and teaching institutions for members of the Sufi orders. The fact that women were generally banned from sponsoring mosques is bound to have played a role in directing their attention toward alternative religious buildings such as khanaqahs. Indeed, from Egypt and Anatolia all the way to Transoxiana, female patronage of khanaqahs was a common practice in the medieval period, and Timurid women were part of this wider cultural practice. Again, there was a Turkic cultural context in that most of the female patrons known to have sponsored the construction of khanaqahs in this period belonged to Turkic dynastic elites.

This female patronage of Sufi khanaqahs occurred at a time when Sufi Islam was in the process of establishing itself in the region under the protection of the Timurid elite. Furthermore, as Jürgen Paul explains in the next chapter, Sufi Islam comprised many public events, and sites of Sufi rituals such as khanaqahs were places where followers of Sufi masters came together in large numbers. Given the wider social purpose of such buildings, it becomes clear that with their patronage of khanaqahs, Timurid women financed and thereby shaped the creation of public spaces that were far more than mere prestige projects. This is because it was in such buildings that networks of alliances were forged, connecting Timurid rulers,
Sufi spiritual leaders, and regular followers to one another, in the process shaping the sociopolitical dynamics of the Timurid-ruled medieval society.

All the Timurid women known to have sponsored khanaqahs belonged to the royal family. They included several generations of female elites going back to the lifetime of Timur himself. For example, Tuman Aqa, one of Timur’s principal wives, was among the women known to have sponsored the building of khanaqahs. She was a daughter of Amir Musa, whom Timur married after executing her father for supporting his rival, Amir Husayn. As such, Tuman Aqa was clearly a woman with an impressive ancestry, a fact that is reflected in the detailed description of her genealogy in her tomb complex at the Shah-i Zinda mausoleum complex, in Samarqand. In the Timurid court history Rawzat al-Safa, by Mirkhwand, Tuman Aqa is often described as accompanying Timur’s senior wife, Saray Mulk Khanum, and the rest of the royal entourage. Judging by the historical records of the time, Tuman Aqa was part of the entourage that accompanied the start and end of Timur’s military campaigns: she accompanied him when he set off on campaign, and welcomed him upon his return. In a pattern that reflected prior Mongol female participation in warfare, Tuman Aqa is also known to have accompanied Timur while he was on campaign.

As already mentioned, Timurid women often inspired the commissioning of secular and religious buildings. Hence, on the occasion of their marriage, in the

**Figure 8. Timurid mosque and shrine, Torbat-i Jam, 1913. (From Ernst Diez, Churasanische Baudenkämäler [Berlin: D. Reimer, 1918])**

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year 1378, Timur commissioned a garden for Tuman Aqa known as the Bagh-i Bihisht (Garden of Paradise). According to historical sources, both the Bagh-i Bihisht and Tuman Aqa's khanaqah were located in Samargand, but the exact date when she commissioned work on the khanaqah remains unknown. According to another Timurid source, the Zafarnama of Sharaf al-Din 'Ali Yazdi, Timur visited Tuman Aqa's khanaqah in the year 1399, after his campaign in India, and again in 1404 upon his return from Anatolia. After Timur's death, in 1405, Gawhar Shad's husband, Shahrukh, invited Tuman Aqa to Herat, where she was given the town of Kusuwiya as a siyurghal land grant, which was a privileged type of hereditary land grant giving fiscal immunity, administrative and judicial freedom, and the right to collect taxes from the land. Tuman Aqa is also known to have built another khanaqah at Kusuwiya. Unfortunately, these buildings have not survived, and we also lack information as to which Sufi orders they were built for. However, given the rise of the Naqshbandi order under the Timurids that is described in the next chapter, there is good reason to think that some of these khanaqahs may have been intended for the ascendant masters of the Naqshbandiyya.

Another Timurid woman known to have commissioned a Sufi khanaqah was Khanzada Bigum. Like Tuman Aqa, she was a woman of aristocratic ancestry, being a granddaughter of the Uzbek khan. Her marriage in 1373 to Timur's son Jahangir was described by the Timurid court historian Yazdi. According to another historian of the period, Mirkhwand, Khanzada Bigum informed Timur about Miranshah's obsession with drinking and reveling, upon which the latter lost his rule over Khurasan. Significantly, her khanaqah, which was built in Herat, is the only building known to have been commissioned by her. It is likely that it was built while her second husband, Miranshah, was the governor of Khurasan.

Little is recorded about Malikat Aqa and Zubayda Aqa, the other two Timurid women known to have sponsored the building of Sufi khanaqahs. Malikat Aqa was married to Timur's sons 'Umar Shaykh and Shahrukh, whereas Zubayda Aqa was a wife of the later Timurid ruler Husayn Bayqara (r. 1469–70 and 1470–1506). However, the best known of all Timurid women, Gawhar Shad, is also known (along with her husband Shahrukh) to have donated substantial lands to the great shrine of Ahmad-i Jam, to the west of Herat (and in present-day Iran). According to a recently discovered waqf document dated 1426, Gawhar Shah presented the shrine with villages, land, canals, shops, and mills. As Jürgen Paul shows in the next chapter, the shrine of Ahmad-i Jam (and the saintly family who controlled it) held enormous influence in Khurasan. Clearly, Gawhar Shad and her husband realized the importance of having such social and miraculous power brokers on side.

The obvious interest that Timurid women showed in Sufi traditions was in line with the religious culture of their dynastic kinsmen. Timur himself, for example, commissioned the huge shrine of Ahmad Yasawi (d. 1166) at Turkistan, where work was completed (or rather, abandoned) in 1399. Similarly, Shahrukh
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The famous shrine of the early Sufi Abdullah Ansari (d. 1089) outside Herat at Gazurgah, which was completed in 1429. Together, these shrines bear witness to the interest in and support for Sufi institutions among ruling Timurid men; their women echoed and expanded this pattern of religious endowments. Such acts of patronage made the Timurid period an era of great creativity in Sufi architecture, which developed from more utilitarian forms into aesthetic epitomes of the Timurid style.

From the male Timurids’ patronage of khanaqahs we can therefore draw the conclusion that Timurid women’s sponsorship of Sufi institutions was not gender-specific but was rather part of a wider pattern of Timurid religious politics. Nonetheless, it remains significant that from among a wider range of architectural possibilities secular and religious, Timurid women chose the khanaqah as their preferred focus of patronage. This preference for Sufi institutions by no means amounts to a rejection of the ‘ulama. For as we will now see, Timurid women also sponsored the construction of madrasas, in which the Arabic-based sciences of Quran interpretation and Shari’a formulation could be taught and promoted. Once again, there was political acumen in this choice of patronage, for the ruling dynasty needed not only Sufis and their increasingly popular fellowships on their side. It also needed the legal experts in religious law who might staff the Timurid bureaucracy or at least not declare the Timurids’ policies or cultural practices contrary to the Shari’a, something that remained very much a possibility in a period during which Timurid elites remained attached to the Yasa customary law of their Mongol ancestors.

Female Patronage of Madrasas

Female patronage of madrasas was widespread in the medieval Islamic world. The Turkic ruling women of the Mamluk Sultanate, which ruled Egypt between 1250 and 1517, were especially renowned for their passionate patronage and supervision of madrasas. However, women’s connections to religious education go beyond patronage of building madrasas. We know from historical sources that in the early and medieval Islamic periods, ruling-class women received formal education. For example, according to al-Sakhawi’s biographical dictionary of the leading figures of fifteenth-century Mamluk society, at least 411 out of 1,075 women listed in his work had received some degree of education. The Mamluk period also saw women emerge as scholars of Hadith. It was this education that presumably inspired them to sponsor and supervise madrasas. The Timurid world represents a similar picture of women’s involvement in education and educational institutions. Evidence from Timurid literature and paintings suggests that women from rich families received education. In Timurid miniature paintings, girls are often depicted studying in rooms beneath those occupied by boys, suggesting that both genders received their education in the same buildings, presumably madrasas.
As with Mamluk women, the interest of Timurid women in education was reflected in their patronage of madrasas. The most famous example of this was Gawhar Shad’s madrasa in Herat, which was completed in 1432/3. The college was built as part of the larger complex that included Gawhar Shad’s Friday mosque. An earlier example of this kind of mosque and madrasa ensemble was earlier endowed in Samarkand, where Timur’s principal wife, Saray Mulk Khanum, had commissioned a madrasa that was built opposite the Bibi Khanum (Lady Wife) mosque. The latter mosque was itself the Friday mosque sponsored by Timur and named after Saray Mulk, the Bibi Khanum herself. It seems possible that Gawhar Shad attempted to build a similar complex so as to bring herself into symbolic proximity with such a powerful female predecessor as Saray Mulk.

An interesting feature of the madrasa is that it was simultaneously used as a college and burial ground. The Timurid historian Mirkhwand reports that many Timurid royals were buried there, including Gawhar Shad’s brother Amir Sufi Tarkhan, Prince Baysunghur, Shahrukh, and Gawhar Shad herself. Indeed, this multiple usage of the same building was such that it gave rise to different names for it, such that Gawhar Shad’s Madrasa also became known as the Tomb of Baysunghur.

An interesting insight into the Timurid usage of madrasas as burial places is also given in Baburnama, the memoirs of the Timurid founder of the Mughal Empire. Describing his visit to Herat in 1506, Babur explained that his aunts, including Payanda Bigum and Khadija Bigum, were gathered at Bayqara’s Madrasa, where the Quran was read while the women visited Bayqara’s own tomb. Babur further explains that Khadija Bigum’s tent was set up in the southern part of the madrasa, further reinforcing the impression that Timurid madrasas fulfilled multiple functions. Babur also mentions having visited Gawhar Shad’s Madrasa in Herat during his tour of the city’s monuments, suggesting that it belonged among Herat’s places of special interest.

Apart from Gawhar Shad, other Timurid women—including Tuman Aqa, Malikat Aqa, Sultan Aqa (a wife of Bayqara), and Khanum Sultan Bigum (a daughter of Bayqara)—are also known to have sponsored the construction of madrasas in Khurasan. Little is known about these colleges, since none of them has survived. However, Tuman Aqa’s Madrasa is known to have been situated at Kusuwinya (where her khanaqah was also built) and to have been completed in 1440/1. Another interesting madrasa known to have been patronized by a woman during the Timurid period is the Parizad Madrasa, in Mashhad. According to Bernard O’Kane, the earliest reference to this building asserts that it was commissioned by a female attendant of Gawhar Shad. This attribution suggests that it was not only royal women who were involved in the patronage of madrasas but that wealthy women of other classes also patronized madrasas.

In patronizing madrasas, Timurid women showed the diversity of their interests in matters of spiritual and religious education. Far from restricting their
generosity to the sponsorship of khanaqahs, they allowed their private funds to be used for madrasas where future generations of learned Timurid men and women might receive their education. However, the usage of such madrasas as burial places indicates that these buildings were more than purely centers of education. Through their waqf endowments, they also offered their founders a protected place of burial without risk of future disturbance while at the same time avoiding the impious self-aggrandizement suggested by private mausoleums.

**FEMALE PATRONAGE OF MAUSOLEUMS**

In contrast to Gawhar Shad, who was buried in her own madrasa, Timur’s principal wives, his sisters, and his wet nurse were buried in the impressive mausoleum complex of Shah-i Zinda in Samarqand. The site gained its importance from the belief that the Prophet’s companion and cousin Qusam ibn ‘Abbas was the first to bring Islam to Central Asia and was then martyred—after which he picked up his severed head and walked into a wall at the site, where he stayed alive forever. For this reason, the site was given the name Shah-i Zinda, “The Living King.” Even though some buildings at Shah-i Zinda date back to the eleventh century, the major buildings were constructed for the ruling elite during the Timurid period, between 1360 and 1436. An interesting feature of this burial complex is its overall structure, with the royal tombs built on both sides of a long alley leading up to the shrine of the Prophet’s kinsman Qusam. In this way, the architectural form of the complex ensured that pilgrims to the shrine of Qusam, the Living King, also inevitably made a pilgrimage en route to the tombs of the dynastic Timurid dead.

The Shah-i Zinda complex is renowned not only for its beautiful architecture and bright ceramic tilework but also for the predominant role played by its female patrons. Unfortunately, the initial endowment document of Shah-i Zinda has not survived, making it impossible to know who originally endowed the land for the building of the dynastic mausoleums around the earlier tomb of Qusam. However, it seems most likely that Timur had given the land to his favorite female relations to allow them to be buried close to the venerated martyr and saint Qusam. For according to the contemporary chronicler Yazdi, Timur allotted land to his commanders (amirs) so that they could be buried close to his sons ‘Umar Shaykh and Jahangir. Considering the high esteem that Timur’s sisters, wives, and daughters-in-law enjoyed, it therefore seems likely that the land was allotted to these women for similar reasons.

One of the female Timurid mausoleums, dated from the mid-fifteenth century, is believed to have been the burial place of Timur’s wet nurse and her daughter. Soviet archaeological excavations reinforced this older assumption, since two female bodies were discovered there. The structure of this mausoleum is also interesting, consisting of both a large chamber and a smaller chamber with a cenotaph.
This kind of two-room building, with a smaller room adjoining a larger room (often called the ziyarat khana), corresponds to the mausoleums of saints from the Khurasan region around Herat. The female patron of this mausoleum may then have wanted to give a religious aura to her own place of burial, since the style at least seems to have been well enough known and venerated to be copied. Another mausoleum at Shah-i Zinda, that of Timur’s younger sister Shirin Big Aqa, is striking for two reasons. First, its high monumental portal (pishtaq) and superb mosaic-tile decoration, which indicate extreme wealth and are typical of the early or imperial period of Timurid architecture. Second, the inscription chosen for the mausoleum is highly unusual in its complete lack of the traditional references, whether Quranic or not, to the temporary nature of this world and the hope for a better life after death. Instead, the inscription consists of a quotation expressing the theme of man’s suffering in the world that is believed to have come from Socrates, known as Suqarat in Islamic tradition. The inscription suggests not only that Shirin Big must have been a highly educated woman but also that she must have had a certain freedom from the usual customs of orthodox funerary inscriptions.

The mausoleum of Timur’s elder sister, Qutlugh Turkhan Aqa, in Shah-i Zinda, is no less impressive. It too has a high monumental portal and was richly decorated on its exterior and interior using polychrome ceramics. Both sisters seem to have commissioned the finest craftsmen of their time. However, in contrast to Shirin Big, Qutlugh Turkhan’s inscription is rather traditional with its reference to the transitory nature of life. Another mausoleum of special interest was patronized by the same Tuman Aqa who also patronized a madrasa and khanaqah. Her mausoleum at Shah-i Zinda encompasses a complex of a mosque, tomb, and service room. The mosque and the service room were used as places where family members and professional Quran reciters (qari) prayed for the soul of the deceased. Tuman Aqa appears to have been a highly religious person, a fact emphasized by her patronage of other religious buildings.

A second female burial complex in Samarqand that was patronized by Timurid women is the Ishratkhana ensemble. This burial site was originally sponsored in 1464 by Habiba Sultan, the wife of Abu Sa’id (r. 1451–69), himself a grandson of Timur. It was originally intended to be the burial place of Habiba Sultan’s daughter, Sultan Khwand Big, but it later developed to become the burial place of many other Timurid women. Its richly decorated interiors and sophisticated construction plans indicate the wealth of the Timurid women who commissioned the mausoleums at this site. Habiba Sultan ensured the continuity of the Ishratkhana by transforming it into an endowment (waqf). Like Gawhar Shad’s endowment in Mashhad, Habiba Sultan’s endowment contained many additional items, including bronze vessels and decorated fabrics. This shows that the patronage of buildings also often brought with it the sponsorship of minor arts and crafts such as
embroidery and metalwork. Although it is uncertain whether the Ishratkhana site was chosen because it was also associated with a saint, in their eagerness to be buried in the proximity of a saint the Timurid women buried at Shah-i Zinda prove themselves to have been deeply rooted in Central Asian cultural tradition, with its vivid practice of the cultivation and veneration of shrines. However, in their choice of size, decoration, and inscriptions, these women often showed a great deal of individuality and personal taste.

The proximity of Timurid women’s tombs to the tombs of saints gave their mausoleums the aura of shrines themselves, a fact that, in addition to their luxurious decoration, impressive size, and multifunctional usage, made them highly popular among the masses as places of gathering, pilgrimage, and cultural reference. As such, these buildings were part of Timurid political propaganda reinforcing the
family's legitimacy to rule, as has been shown most comprehensively with regard to the Sufi shrine of 'Abdullah Ansari at Gazurgah, outside Herat. In their patronage of mausoleums as well as madrasas and khanaqahs, Timurid women acted in accordance with wider Timurid culture.

CONCLUSIONS

The types of buildings that were sponsored by Timurid women were in accordance with their dynasty's wider political strategies and cultural values. Like their male kinsmen, Timurid women were evenhanded in their patronage, funding buildings to cater to the needs of both Sufi Islam and the legalistic learning of the 'ulama. Some of these buildings, such as Gawhar Shad's Madrasa and her mosque in Herat, were highly popular among all classes of the Timurids and had such varied use that they were known to the public by different names. Thus, the buildings patronized by Timurid rulers were multifunctional, and those sponsored by female patrons were no exception to this rule. In terms of showing off wealth by using the most prominent architects and artisans (such as Qawam al-Din Shirazi and Ustad Shams al-Din) and expensive materials (such as mosaic tile and baked brick), Timurid women acted similarly to the men of their class. The sole distinction between men and women in their forms of patronage was that women seem to have mainly sponsored religious buildings, whereas Timurid men seem to have sponsored both secular and religious buildings. This in itself points to the importance not only of women to Timurid religious life but of religious life to Timurid women.

The historical evidence left by both stonemasons and scribes leads us to conclude that the high status that Turko-Mongol tradition granted to ruling-class females allowed Timurid women to play an important role in the religious life of their era. Partly this high status was a consequence of their Turko-Mongolian heritage. And partly it was a consequence of Shari'a laws of inheritance and property, which enabled them to have their own private wealth and in turn to acts as patrons. At the same time, the importance of almsgiving (zakat) as one of the main pillars of Islam further encouraged such patronage activity by adding a dimension of religious duty to the elite practice of patronage. These traditions later continued among Timurid women in Mughal India, as in the case of Princess Jahanara (d. 1681), the daughter of Shah Jahan and patron of various Sufis, who was buried at the Sufi shrine of Nizam al-Din Awliya (d. 1325), in Delhi. As the following chapters by Jürgen Paul, R. D. McChesney, and Waleed Ziad all show, Afghanistan's premodern versions of Islam were always shared with surrounding regions in South and Central Asia. The case of elite Timurid Islam was no exception.
Timurid rule in Herat spans the fifteenth century. From the time of Shahrukh ibn Timur (r. 1405–47) onward, the city was the capital of an empire that comprised large parts of Iran, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. Although under Husayn Bayqara (r. 1470–1506) toward the end of the century, Timurid territory shrank considerably, Bayqara still ruled over Khurasan and some adjacent regions. Two more Timurid sultans must be mentioned from the start: Abu’l-Qasim Babur (d. 1457), who succeeded in winning the wars beginning after Shahrukh’s demise, and Abu Sa’id (d. 1469) who ascended the throne, again, after some years of turmoil and fratricidal war. Under their collective rule, Timurid Herat became a brilliant center of Persianate culture. It was noted for its achievements in the arts (miniature painting and other arts of the book), architecture, poetry, historiography, and many other fields, surely including music (even if we do not know how Timurid princely music may have sounded). In various sciences, the Timurid era likewise produced lasting works; astronomy is only one example. In economics, Timurid Herat saw one of the most cogent attempts at rationalizing agriculture in the medieval Middle East, for example through accounting systems and systematic investment and development projects. Many of these projects took the form of pious endowments (waqf), and their beneficiaries were either well-established shrines in Herat and other cities (such as the shrine complex of ‘Abdullah Ansari at Gazurgah, a suburb of Herat, or the shrine of Riza at Mashhad) or such shrines as were founded in this period (most notably the shrine of ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib at Balkh, today’s Mazar-i Sharif).  

Sufis were nothing new in Timurid Herat. Over the previous centuries, ‘Abdullah Ansari (d. 1089), an outstanding master of Sunni Sufism, had posthumously grown into the position of the city’s patron saint. His shrine was a noted center of
pilgrimage in the Timurid period, as it is today. Greater Khurasan had been one of the regions where Islamic mysticism originated, paralleled only by Baghdad, with a distinct Khurasani tradition that was influential even in the post-Mongol period. Intellectual life in Timurid Herat had many facets, and Sufism was one of them, overlapping with other pursuits such as poetry on the one hand and the Islamic sciences on the other. The limits between Sufism, Islamic theology, philosophy, and the occult sciences were fluid. Nonetheless, the study of their mutual relations has only just begun.3

In the history of Sufism, the Timurid period is above all marked by the rise of the silsila (literally, “chain”) as a principle of legitimizing Sufi activity and teaching. The silsila in its ideal form is an unbroken chain of authorities linking the living teacher or shaykh to the Prophet; in later periods, a Sufi teacher who could not produce such a silsila was unthinkable. Thus, later Muslims—and also researchers—have been in the habit of thinking Sufi history in terms of the history of various groups or “orders” defined by a shared silsila. As many scholars have by now stressed, this is misleading for earlier periods until and including the Timurid century in eastern Iran.4

The authority of a Sufi teacher could rest on a number of foundations. The most important ones (besides the authority of his immediate teacher: the nuclear silsila, so to speak) certainly included: a hereditary status, with authority being inherited from father to son, sometimes together with the transmission of a sacred object, such as a robe or a hat; personal charisma evidenced by his teaching, ritual practices, and miracles; and the claim to be able to promote the adept quickly and safely through the stages of mystical knowledge.5 In the provinces, heredity (together with some kind of local principle) was the rule, with a given territory being the preserve of a given shaykhly lineage, often seated at a regional shrine. But teachers could also coexist in a given setting, above all in metropolitan settings such as Herat in the early fifteenth century. In such cases, they had to work out a balance of cooperation and competition. They marked themselves off by their type of legitimation on the one hand and by their style of ritual practice, doctrinal convictions, social profile, and political stance on the other. The successful shaykh would be the one who was best able to attune his individual abilities and profile to the demand in the intellectual and religious marketplace.

Thus, in the beginning of the fifteenth century, two forms of legitimation (and, consequently, two styles) dominated. The first group comprised hereditary lineages of shaykhs, often centered on the shrine of a founding figure. The paradigmatic case is the shaykhs of Jam, descendants of Ahmad-i Jam (d. 1149) who had developed over the generations into a far-flung family network. His shrine, located around two hundred kilometers to the northwest of Herat and today across the Iranian border, was a major center of pilgrimage, was visited regularly by Shahrukh and other leading personalities of Timurid Herat. Ahmad-i Jam’s shaykhly
family held large stretches of land in many places, but most of all in the province of Jam, where they were the most important single landowner. They wielded considerable political influence from the Mongol period on to the Timurid period and indeed later, and they remain influential even today. But they were by no means the only such family: they were simply the largest. Another case was the descendants of Abu Sa'id-i Abu'l-Khayr (d. 1049), who resided around his shrine at Meana, in what is today Turkmenistan. Another was the Chishti family, descendants of Mawdud Chishti (d. 1139), who seem to have been reduced to merely local importance by the Timurid era since none of their representatives are on record in the relevant sources. And there were many more.

By contrast, the second group of shaykhs did not inherit their charisma from their fathers or any forebear. Though many of them of course had identifiable teachers, in their case spiritual and genealogical filiation were separated. Personal charisma was therefore what counted most. In early Timurid Herat, there were quite a number of such Shaykhs. All of them were Sunni in orientation and respected the Shari'a, but there were nevertheless many differences in practice and outlook. They cooperated in many ways; went to see one another; and even passed disciples on to colleagues. But of course there was also competition for followers (particularly gifted ones), political patronage, other material resources, and prestige. It was in this setting of cooperation and competition that debates developed: about, for example, points of ritual practice (the vocal versus the silent zikr, “commemoration of God”) or about points of doctrinal importance (above all the teachings of Ibn al-'Arabi, in particular the Unity of Being [wahdat al-wujud], which seemed to blur the distinction between the Creator and His creation). In Timurid Herat, these ideas were hotly debated in the form of slogans. Whereas Ibn al-'Arabi’s opponents maintained that “Everything comes from Him,” his followers said that “Everything is He.” Vanguard intellectuals, many of whom were also Sufis, occupied themselves with the constitutional foundations of spiritual and political power or with speculations on the hierarchy of sciences.

**SUFIS IN TIMURID HERAT**

The towering figure in early-fifteenth-century Herat probably was Zayn al-Din Khwafi (d. 1435). He had traveled widely, and his principal teacher was an Egyptian master. His ritual practice included a stress on the vocal zikr; and he also made his adepts practice the forty-day seclusion (khalwat or arba‘in). In politics, he was used as a mediator between ruling figures, and he also saw it as his task to redress wrongs. His teachers would later be seen as belonging to a Suhrawardi silsila, though this is seldom stressed in Timurid sources. He lived outside the city in a village called Darwishabad, which he had made into a pious foundation. He did not found a hereditary line of shaykhs, but that was apparently because his son
chose to remain silent most of the time and therefore was unfit—and unwilling—to devote himself to the training of adepts. It was thus one of Zayn al-Din’s disciples who inherited his spiritual successorship and also the direction of the Sufi khanaqah convent that his master had established. The *silsila* later spread from Herat to Central Asia, India, and the Ottoman Empire.11

Another central figure was Baha al-Din ‘Umar (d. 1453/4), less prominent, but for some more attractive, possibly because of the less crowded and less noisy setting of his circle. Though he had been initiated by his maternal uncle, he should not be counted as a hereditary shaykh. Not much is known about his practice. In politics and social profile, he was close to Zayn al-Din and may have taken his place in political mediation after 1435. It is unclear who received his succession, if he was succeeded at all.12

The third man among those who dominated the spiritual and intellectual scene in Herat in the early fifteenth century was Qasim-i Anwar, originally from Azerbaijan (d. 1433); his name literally means “Dispenser of Lights,” a sobriquet his first master is said to have given him. He was noted mostly for his poetry; he wrote in the love-intoxicated style so well known from Rumi and Hafiz. He belonged to a small network of intellectuals spread over Iran and other countries. His credentials as a Sufi teacher were later disputed. Apparently, he studied with Sadr al-Din Ardabili (d. 1391/2), but no ties to the emerging Safawiyya in Azerbaijan are on record for the long period of his stay in Herat, where he arrived in the late 1370s.13 He was banned from Herat in the wake of the attempt at Shahrukh’s life in 1427, which was attributed to the Hurufi sect.14 He subsequently went to Samarqand, but must have come back to Herat not so long after he left. He then stayed in the capital for a while before he departed again, to spend his last year or years peacefully in Kharjird-i Jam, close to the shrine of Ahmad-i Jam, where his relations with the shrine family were apparently harmonious. Among his partisans and followers in Herat, some authors mention sons of amirs and other militarily relevant people. It is clear, however, that he was enormously attractive to many ambitious young men.15

Another banished Sufi teacher who must have made his presence felt even though he never spent much time in Herat was Ni’matullah Wali, who died in 1431 in Kirman, in what is now southeastern Iran. He also was noted as a poet and belonged to the same intellectual network as Qasim. He reportedly left Samarqand because, as the saying goes, “Two kings cannot stay in one place”—the other king being no less a ruler than Timur (r. 1370–1405).16 Another version has it that he was banished from Samarqand because Timur was told that Ni’matullah had won many (too many!) followers among the warlike Turks of Transoxiana and could thus pose a threat to the amir.17 Both Qasim and Ni’matullah were *sayyids*, those who claim descent from the Prophet Muhammad. Qasim was listed early on as one of Ni’matullah’s main followers, and Ni’matullahis today claim him as one of their numbers.18 Ni’matullah and Qasim must have cooperated quite closely, since
it seems that Ni’matullah chose not to establish a group at Herat because Qasim was there. This suggests that Qasim could be seen as his Herati representative.

The Sufi master on a par with the king—this idea results from the concept of spiritual hierarchy, which came into use in the Mongol period. The Pole (qutb) is at the top of everything, including secular rulers, and according to one author who wrote around 1425, the Pole has two vicegerents (khalifa), one on the secular and another on the spiritual side. According to this author, in his own time Ni’matullah was the qutb (the author uses the synonym ghaws); Shahrukh, his khalifa on the throne; and Qasim-i Anwar, his khalifa in spiritual matters.

It is evident that such reasoning could lead to religiously informed revolt of a millenarian or messianic type. Such a movement had indeed taken shape in 1423/4 in Badakhshan, where Nurbakhsh (another sobriquet that means Dispenser of Light), a young follower of the senior shaykh Khuttalani, proclaimed himself to be the Mahdi (the “Guided One,” who will usher in the Day of Judgment). This revolt was easily and quickly suppressed, but it probably lingered on in the memories of the ruling group at Herat. The dictum that “Rulers participate in supernatural knowledge” (arbab al-duwal mulhamun) seems to have been a popular adage to express the spiritual status of rulers. Timurid intellectuals of the network of which Qasim and Ni’matullah were a part indulged in speculations of this kind. It is not known whether Khwajagani authors contributed in any significant measure to the development of such ideas, though their treatment of ruling Timurids later in the fifteenth century seems to betray a feeling of superior legitimacy on their part.

In order to position Khwajagan in their context, one more Sufi group must be briefly mentioned. These were the Sufis of the Khalwati lineage, who had been represented in Herat since the late fourteenth century. They had a notable institutional basis in the Timurid capital, including a khanqaqah and a cemetery. They practiced a rather noisy form of the vocal zikr—the sources link them to noisemaking in general. This suggests that their social profile must have slanted toward the lower classes and marginal groups. Even so, their teachers were by no means disreputable, and very serious people went to visit them.

THE KHWAJAGAN SUFIS IN HERAT

In the early fifteenth century the Khwajagan presence in Herat was by no means prominent. The moniker “Khwajagan” literally means “The Teachers,” a reference to the spiritual descendants of Abd al-Khaliq Ghijduwani (d. 1179), who lived in the Bukharan oasis in the twelfth century. It was the name that this group of spiritual teachers used for themselves. Their better-known moniker Naqshbandiyya came into use only later, toward the end of the fifteenth century, and beginning in Herat. Transoxianian groups of Khwajagan, meanwhile, did not adopt the name Naqshbandiyya till the sixteenth century.
The Khwajagani current was deeply rooted in Transoxiana, in particular in the Bukharan oasis, and had only just begun to spread from there. Baha al-Din (later called Naqshband, who died in 1389) had left two major successors. Baha al-Din's first successor was 'Ala al-Din 'Attar (d. 1400), who migrated to Dihnaw, in Chaganiyan (today in Tajikistan), where his shrine is located. His son Hasan (d. 1426) must have operated from there, but he went to Herat for sufficiently long periods to make his presence felt. He was a very charismatic person, who can be credited with introducing into the Khwajagani current the important method of rabita ("bonding the heart with the shaykh"). Nevertheless, circumstantial evidence shows that he must have abandoned Herat years before he died, perhaps because he had foretold a victory which Shahrukh's army did not in the end win. His son Yusuf was no prominent figure on the Herati scene in the mid-fifteenth century. The 'Attar family thus became one of those local shrine-based Sufi hereditary lines typical of the period. The family capitalized on the charisma of a founding figure (or two founding figures: father and son, in this case) in very much the same way as the descendants of Ahmad-i Jam and so many others had done.

Baha al-Din's second successor was Khwaja Parsa (d. 1420). In contrast to 'Ala al-Din 'Attar, he stayed in Bukhara, but his son Abu Nasr (d. 1460) went to Balkh, where his shrine still remains a landmark today. For centuries, his descendants held the post of shaykh al-islam (chief prelate) in Balkh. Thus, again, the family became one of the established lines of hereditary shaykhs. Khwaja Parsa, however, is also noteworthy for his intellectual legacy. He has left numerous writings, and it is largely to his credit that the rather rural (if not rustic) Khwajagan of the earlier periods became intellectually attractive and thus fit for the metropolitan scene of Timurid Herat. Among his writings, he produced a great synthesis of earlier mystical texts, in which he wanted to compile the finest and most subtle sayings on every subject. In other treatises as well, he worked for the integration of diverse methods into Khwajagani practice.

After Hasan 'Attar had departed Herat (perhaps around 1415 or so), no Khwajagani representative of note plied the spiritual and intellectual market there. This was to change in the late 1420s, when two young men arrived from Samarqand: 'Ubaydullah Ahrar (d. 1490) and Sa'd al-Din Kashghari (d. 1456). Both had studied in Samarqand with Nizam al-Din Khamush ("The Taciturn," linked to 'Ala al-Din 'Attar), but were apparently not really satisfied. Ahrar did not take his oath of allegiance with Nizam al-Din but took it later instead with Ya'qub Charkhi, one of Baha al-Din's immediate disciples. Sources report that 'Ubaydullah and Sa'd al-Din were very excited to learn that Qasim had come to Samarqand (in 1427) and could hardly wait to meet the famous poet and Sufi. Both men must have followed Qasim to Herat. Ahrar is shown in the sources to have been in continuous contact with him, and his comments make it clear that Qasim left a deep impression on him. He went to see the other luminaries as well, but his preferences were
unmistakable: he respected Zayn al-Din but chose not to study with him; he liked Baha al-Din ‘Umar better; but his first choice was nonetheless Qasim.31

THE ASCENT OF THE KHWAJAGAN SUFIS IN HERAT

From the late 1420s onward, Khwajagani influence in Herat was on the rise. By the end of the century, through a combination of princely support and such leading figures as ‘Abd al-Rahman Jami (d. 1492) and the vizier and poet ‘Ali Shir Nawa’i (d. 1501), Khwajagani shaykhs would come to hold a hegemonic position comparable to what they had won in Transoxiana around the same time. How, then, did this ascent come about?

One of the legitimizing principles for a Sufi group was the claim that it could make its adepts succeed on the mystical path safely and quickly. The Khalwati Sufis, for example, claimed that they could make a perfect Sufi out of a beginner in a matter of a few days, so that the long period of working with and serving a master was unnecessary.32 The Khwajagan made another but no less comprehensive claim. They said that they were “the salt of the shaykhs”:33 that is, the really effective and necessary masters. Ahrar declared that the Khwajagani Sufi method is “a book into which all the methods of the Friends of God have been compiled.”34 Later, the Khwajagan said that “our path includes one thousand paths.”35 In Parsa’s writings, a tendency is clearly visible to integrate into Khwajagani doctrine and ritual practice everything that is seen as valid and valuable in other teaching traditions. Thus, even if preference was given to the silent zikr, the vocal form was not rejected. As for the practice of musical audition (sama’), Baha al-Din Naqshband himself is quoted as saying, “We do not perform this, but we do not forbid it, either.”36 Most notably, as a special feature of their method they claimed that they were able to “wind the end [of the Path] into the beginning,” meaning that the adept could experience closeness to God in the very first phase of his training (even though he still had to work with his teacher for years afterward).37 The ability to integrate a large number of ritual forms and to accommodate various doctrinal convictions (albeit within the boundaries of strict adherence to the Shari’a) worked greatly in the favor of the Khwajagan Sufis.

Another important strategy for a comparatively new player on the scene was to get public attention. Sufism was a public affair, and Sufis’ ritual gatherings could be public events. Thus, when Zayn al-Din Khwafi licensed two of his main disciples and gave them leave to teach in their home provinces, many people attended. Sa’d al-Din Kashghari, meanwhile, held his teaching sessions at the Friday mosque. People flocked to the suburban sites where Zayn al-Din Khwafi and Baha al-Din ‘Umar lived. Shahrukh himself and many of his amirs (commanders) were known to pay visits to Sufi masters. Shrine visits were increasingly a standard feature of Muslim religious life in the fifteenth century, as attested by the rise during this period of the literary genre of the “guide for pilgrims.”
FIGURE 10. Gold-leaf page from a Timurid Quran manuscript, Herat, ca. 1500. (Collection of Nile Green)
Popular preachers, many of them inspired by Sufi teachings, could draw large crowds. One of those preachers, Ahmad Samarqandi, was a follower of Zayn al-Din Khwafi, who saw Ahmad’s gifts and thus set him up as a preacher in the Friday mosque. (Note that Zayn al-Din was influential enough to arrange such things.) At first, Ahmad sang Zayn al-Din’s praise, but he also quoted Qasim Anwar’s poetry and did not stop doing so when Zayn al-Din forbade him to continue. Zayn al-Din was furious: he forbade people from attending Ahmad’s sermons, and after a short while Ahmad’s audience melted to just a handful of attendants. Ahmad was in despair; and then ʿUbaydullah Ahrar and Saʿd al-Din Kashghari came to meet him. Still a young man in his mid-twenties at the time, Ahrar decided to do something: together with Saʿd al-Din, he arranged for Ahmad to preach in a mosque in a minor quarter. After a while, people again flocked to listen to Ahmad, so that he had to move to a larger place, ending up again, of course, back in the Friday mosque. And, Ahrar commented, “After that, Saʿd al-Din and I were the talk of the town.”

Two points are at stake here. First, Ahmad and Ahrar, and probably many other young men, were not prepared to drop Qasim even though he had politically become persona non grata (the story is clearly set after 1427) and even if an authority like Zayn al-Din warned them against keeping his company and quoting his verses. Second, and possibly more important, Qasim was an admirer of Ibn al-ʿArabi (d. 1240) and his ontologically monistic teaching of wahdat al-wujud (Unity of Being). This doctrine had an enormous impact and stayed controversial for centuries. It was Khwaja Parsa who had introduced the Khwajagan to Ibn al-ʿArabi, and it seems that many of the major Khwajagani teachers of the early fifteenth century were in favor of wahdat al-wujud. But not so the Herati shaykhs, in particularly Zayn al-Din Khwafi, who remained adamantly opposed. Baha al-Din ʿUmar, in turn, was quoted as having outwardly rejected Ibn al-ʿArabi but as having given signs that he inwardly approved, so that Ahrar concluded that one should not divulge the secrets of God’s unity to the common people. Certainly, there were also legal scholars and others not following Sufi lines of thought who had their own questions about Ibn al-ʿArabi and found it unacceptable to abandon the clear divide between the Creator and his creation. It had at first been risky to openly support Ibn al-ʿArabi: even an unimpeachable scholar like Khwaja Parsa himself left out Ibn al-ʿArabi’s name when quoting him. Thus, the Khwajagan’s position in the debates surrounding wahdat al-wujud may have made them attractive to the younger generation. And in the end, their position prevailed: Ibn al-ʿArabi’s ideas became part of mainstream Sunni Sufism.

Another factor that may have favored the rise of the Khwajagan in Timurid Herat was their social profile. Certainly they were Shariʿa-minded, but then so were most of the other Sufi currents active there. What was more distinctive: the Khwajagan were also connected to the Malamati (blame-seeking) heritage of
Khurasani spiritual Islam. A pre-Mongol movement popular among the urban middle classes, the Malamatis proposed concealing their mystical states where others publicized them. Their main concern was sincerity (toward God) in their ritual, ascetic, and mystical endeavors, to the degree that nothing should be done in order to win people's praise. As a consequence, the ideal Malamati was a man who was outwardly active in his daily work (as a craftsman in the bazaar, for example) but who was inwardly in God's presence constantly. This was the social profile of the Khwajagan as well, as expressed in their two well-known slogans 

SOLITUDE WITHIN SOCIETY and THE HAND AT WORK, THE HEART WITH GOD.

Many of the Khwajagan's followers must have been middle-class (or lower-middle-class) working people, and some of them poor, or very poor, but determined to set themselves off against the likes of marginalized paupers, beggars, itinerant mendicant dervishes, and so forth. This was a very sober form of mystical experience indeed, in spite of admiration for the love-intoxicated poetry written by Qasim (and Rumi) and an intellectual curiosity that probed deep into the philosophical problems surrounding Ibn al-'Arabi's teachings. For the Timurid period, Malamati villages are on record in the vicinity of Jam. It has been suggested that if the Khwajagani teaching was successful there—as it eventually was—it may have been because of its links to the Malamati heritage.

One of the points that Khwajagani authors reproached in Qasim's behavior was that he was apparently unable (or unwilling) to make sure that his followers behaved according to middle-class morality and Shari'a-mindedness. The example usually given was the practice of "gazing at beardless boys" (nazar ila 'l-murd or shahid-bazi). The underlying idea for this practice was that since God is present in his creatures, His beauty manifests itself in material beauty, and foremost in the beautiful faces of young men. Hence, "gazing at beardless boys" meant contemplating God's beauty in its human form. But more often than not, sensual desire crept in. As a result, for strictly Shari'a-minded Sufis the practice was always beyond the pale. In one story (set at Samarqand), Qasim's followers are shown looking for handsome boys in the bazaar in order to practice shahid-bazi on them. Qasim's comment on hearing about this is quoted as being, "Where have these swine of mine gone?" Later Herati authors such as Jami chose to exonerate him for his followers' behavior. However, for his part, Ahrar made it unmistakably clear that he never tolerated anything of the sort. It is interesting that 'Ali Shir Nawa'i, in his Turkish version of Jami's collection of hagiographic notes, edited out all critical views that Jami still held. In his youth, Zayn al-Din Khwafi once worked with a shaykh in Azerbaijan who also practiced shahid-bazi, but he left him out of disgust.

Thus, in spite of widespread admiration for Ibn al-'Arabi and more or less wholesale acceptance of wahdat al-wujud, the Khwajagan refrained from drawing radical conclusions from his ideas. In this way, they stayed safely within the Sunni-Shari'a mainstream. They did not depart from behavioral rules that were
not only prescribed by God’s law but were also those favored by the urban middle classes. In the long run, the Khwajagan (and Khwaja Parsa, and Jami in particular) can be said to have contributed in no small measure to the integration of Ibn al-‘Arabi into Sunni mainstream thinking—albeit shearing his ideas of their more radical implications.

Another contested practice was hereditary shaykhhood. As we have seen, this was a widespread feature of the period’s religiosity, above all at provincial shrines—though hereditary families were also very influential in the capital. Even so, the majority of the major shaykhs active in Herat in the fifteenth century did not rely on heredity as a legitimizing principle. The Khwajagan were particularly outspoken on this point. Heredity was rejected, and at first the *silsila* was rejected as well, leaving personal charisma (including direct spiritual contact with deceased masters or the Prophet himself) as the main grounds of leadership, even if, of course, shaykhs also could identify their immediate teachers and therefore could pose as their spiritual heirs.50 Toward the end of the century, however, the *silsila* became the paramount principle. Moreover, Jami’s major work on Sufi biographies, the *Nafahat al-uns*, contributed to making the *silsila* mandatory.51

**WINNING PARTNERS AND FOLLOWERS**

In order to succeed, a group that relies on personal charisma as the basic principle of legitimate leadership should produce outstanding personalities. At first glance, this does not seem to have been the case with the Khwajagan of mid-fifteenth-century Herat. Ahrar left for his home town, Tashkent, in the early 1430s, after five years in Herat, and later allied himself to Abu Sa’id Mirza, the Timurid whom in 1451 he helped gain the throne in Samarqand, whither he followed him.52 Sa’id al-Din Kashghari stayed on in Herat, but he was not particularly active as a teacher because of his individual method of mystical absorption, which made him fall silent much of the time. On such occasions, it was hard to tell whether he was awake or asleep. Thus, he accepted only a limited number of formal disciples whom he initiated; about twelve are on record.53 But he must still have been very popular, and people certainly much admired him: he is often mentioned as a major influence in the biographies of his contemporaries.54 Besides, after the demise of Zayn al-Din Khwafi, in 1435, and Qasim, in 1433, as well as Ni’matullah, in 1431, there seems to have been more space for new teachers: Baha al-Din ‘Umar (d. 1453/4) was the only shaykh left from the older generation.

Some descendants of Ahmad-i Jam are conspicuous among Kashghari’s followers. One of those was Shams al-Din Kusu’i (d. 1459), who is reported to have wavered quite a while between several shaykhs (among them Zayn al-Din Khwafi and Sa’id al-Din Kashghari himself). Kusu’i decided in the end to follow
Zayn al-Din's method in the vocal zikr but to defend the teachings of Ibn al-'Arabi. Another follower was Ahmad Birjandi (d. 1452/3), who, though he was not a descendant of Ahmad-i Jam, still grew up in a family devoted to this shaykh. (He was named Ahmad after him.) He too ended up in Sa'd al-Din's circle. Another descendant of Ahmad's whom Sa'd al-Din initiated was 'Abd al-'Aziz Jami (d. 1497). And of course his most important follower was the great 'Abd al-Rahman Jami himself: Kashghari is quoted as having “hunted” him after sensing his enormous potential. Gifted young men did not go unnoticed in Herat, then, and there must have been competition over such persons among its Sufi teachers.

The Jami family and the Khwajagan thus became rather close. This is only one example of an old shrine family allying itself to younger charisma-based (and later silsila-oriented) groups and currents. In the case of the Jami family and the Khwajagan, things were made easier by their similar social profile, Shari'a-mindedness, and strict observance of adab (behavioral etiquette). Ritual practice differed in that the Jami family held the vocal zikr chant in high esteem, but this and other differences were bridged by Khwajagani flexibility and adaptiveness. There was also a tradition among the Jamis of freely choosing their spiritual orientation. That from the mid-fifteenth century (or even earlier) they started choosing Khwajagani shaykhs must have contributed in no small measure to the Khwajagans' success in Herat. For the Khwajagan came to be accepted as the main representatives of Shari'a-minded, middle-class Sunni Sufism.

POLITICAL OUTLOOK, PATRONAGE, AND SUPPORT

It is here that the issue of political outlook must be raised. For the most part, Khwajagani shaykhs in the Timurid capital were not influential enough to be employed as mediators along the lines reported for Zayn al-Din Khwafi and Baha al-Din 'Umar. There were some minor exceptions: Hasan 'Attar and his son Yusuf are on record in such roles, but only in a provincial (Badakhshani) context, and it was only later, during the reign of Abu Sa'id, in the 1460s, that Yusuf was employed on more important missions. Most important, Sa'd al-Din Kashghari seems to have continued the earlier Khwajagani attitude in politics, which was basically quietist. Moreover, times had changed with the death of Shahrukh, in 1447, and the political takeover of Abu'l-Qasim Babur. In spite of an interest in Sufism, the latter is not known to have patronized Sufis (though perhaps his reign was too short and preoccupied with warfare). On the contrary, Abu'l-Qasim Babur is reported to have encroached on shrine properties and pious endowments. The Jami shrine family, for example, lost important assets. Military followers of the new sultan were appointed to oversee the province, and this lucrative position only reverted to a representative of the Jami family in 1459, at the beginning of the reign of Sultan
Abu Sa’id. Against this background, Abu’l-Qasim Babur’s participation in Baha al-Din ’Umar’s funeral stands out as an act of respect and gratitude but not as an indication of any patronage of Sufis or shrines in general.

The tide changed again when Abu Sa’id Mirza took over in Herat. His more or less uncontested rule in Khurasan began in 1458. Abu Sa’id had won and consolidated his throne in Samarqand with the help of a coalition that included ’Ubaydullah Ahrar, who, in 1451, had moved to Samarqand together with Abu Sa’id and, in 1454, had decisively contributed to the successful defense of the city against Abu Sa’id’s aforementioned rival, Abu’l-Qasim Babur. At the same time, being close to the rulers did not mean turning sycophantic. Outspokenness and independence of mind were very much appreciated, and even the highest figures in the ruling circle were not spared criticism. Ahrar liked these qualities in preachers like Ahmad Samarqandi, and there are also other examples of Khwajagan standing upright before the throne.

In the following years, Ahrar set about restructuring the Khwajagan in the wider region around Samarqand. He established a center on the southern outskirts of Samarqand itself. Not only spiritual exercises were conducted there: it was more important as an administrative and economic center. Ahrar became one of the great landowners of the region and, like other such Sufi landlords, transformed many of his holdings into waqf endowments. His son or sons took over the direction of these endowments after his death, though his spiritual lineage did not pass through his sons but rather through one of his disciples. The endowments survived into modern times, while Ahrar’s shrine south of Samarqand is still visited by pilgrims today.

Ahrar’s model of spiritual and economic organization was never transposed to the Khurasan region around Herat, at least not within a Khwajagani context. Large religious endowments were known on both sides of the Amu Darya (the Oxus River). The endowments established by ’Ali Shir Nawa’i are famous, but he had no sons, and neither was he a spiritual teacher in his own right, with the result that his endowments did not function as the nucleus for either a shrine or a spiritual lineage. What this example serves to illustrate is that, despite the existence of land endowments, no Khwajagani Sufi center even remotely comparable to the one established at Samarqand was brought into existence at Herat.

Even so, Ahrar and his circle were major players in late Timurid Herat. This was linked to Ahrar’s style of political intervention. In his comments on the political activity of Zayn al-Din Khwafi and Baha al-Din ’Umar, Ahrar made it clear that he thought that both had missed the central point, which was to exert oneself to the utmost in order to uphold the Shari’a and to keep the Muslims from mischief. Ahrar combined all the previous styles of Sufi political intervention: he acted as a mediator between rulers, sought to abolish non-Muslim ways of government and behavior, and posed as protector of the Muslims, meaning above all those who chose to ally themselves with him. As a result, he thought it appropriate for his
followers to seek offices and mingle with rulers, something that earlier Khwaja-
gani masters had strictly rejected. Indeed, Ahrar himself paid frequent visits to the
Timurid rulers of Samarqand, while Jami advised ‘Ali Shir to continue his career
in spite of the hardships that the latter faced at court.70

With the advent of Sultan Abu Sa‘id’s reign (in 1451 in Samarqand and 1459 in
Herat), Ahrar therefore emerged as the leading figure of the Khwajagan, both in
Transoxiana and in Khurasan. Without doubt, he had a charismatic personality.
But he had much more to offer besides: he oversaw agriculture and trade on an
unprecedented scale, and he was close enough to the Timurid rulers to intercede
with them directly or indirectly.71 His political influence did not slacken even after
Abu Sa‘id’s demise in 1469, despite the fact that the sultan met his death in battle
with the Aq Qoyunlu Turkmen only after Ahrar had agreed to the campaign.

Ahrar’s activist political style manifested itself in manifold ways. Hundreds of
letters survive that he and his associates wrote to the Timurid court in Herat. Some
were addressed to the sultan Husayn Bayqara himself, but most of the letters were
addressed to his powerful vizier, ‘Ali Shir Nawa‘i.72 (Indeed, they only survive be-
cause ‘Ali Shir devotedly collected them.) In the same manner, ‘Abd al-
Rahman Jami wrote numerous letters that have survived (in Jami’s own handwriting) for
the same reason: his friend ‘Ali Shir likewise collected them in the same album.73
In their letters, Jami, Ahrar, and their associates touched on a wide variety of sub-
jects. Ahrar promoted his own interests (which included trade) and both Jami and
Ahrar wrote to the Timurid court to arrange things for friends and followers but
also with regard to larger issues.74 Thus, in a way, Ahrar’s center at Samarqand was
also the center of Khwajagani activities in Herat in those years and decades.

The political support that the Khwajagan had to offer by the mid-fifteenth cen-
tury may well have been instrumental in further strengthening their network. As
noted earlier, the administration of Jam province was returned to a member of the
Jami shrine family in 1459, and it has been supposed that this occurred after the
Jami family asked Ahrar for support.75 There are no letters written on behalf of the
shrine on record, and so this is speculative but not impossible. And there is anoth-
er caveat. Despite the clear rise of the Khwajagan—who were by now being called
the Naqshbandiyya in Khurasan—their political influence should not be overesti-
mated. Other groups seem to have remained of major importance throughout this
period. And in times of need, when Herat had to confront an enemy and had to
prepare for a siege, the city was represented not by Sufi shaykhs but by traditional
‘ulama and legal officials, such as the qazi and the shaykh al-islam.76

CONCLUSIONS

In Timurid Herat, the Khwajagan rose up from modest beginnings. They started
as newcomers, nearly as outsiders, yet at the end of the fifteenth century they had
become the paramount (if not sole) Sufi group in the erstwhile Timurid capital. They were able to succeed for a number of reasons. First, they were Shari’a-minded and kept to the middle of the road in their social profile. In this respect, they harked back to the pre-Mongol Malamatiyya with their preference for concealing mystical states rather than making a public show of them. Second, the Khwajagan were remarkably flexible in ritual practice and could accommodate a broad variety of methods in mystical training. This flexibility made it much easier for established shrine families such as the Jamis to ally themselves to the Khwajagan. Third, from the very beginning of the fifteenth century Khwajagani teachers actively promoted the ideas of Ibn al-‘Arabi, without, however, going to extremes. Ibn al-‘Arabi was mentioned only with caution, and the radical consequences of his doctrines were avoided in politics as well as in behavior, so that the Khwajagan always preserved their orientation toward Shari’a. Taken together, these three factors allowed the Khwajagan (and Sa’id al-Din Kashghari in particular) to build a solid following in Herat until the middle of the fifteenth century, a development in which the generational change that took place in the 1430s may also have helped. The affiliation of some members of the influential Jami shrine family is indicative of this development, and, of course, their choice further promoted the Khwajagani ascent. Fourth, and finally, with the coming of Abu Sa’id to power in the Herat of the late 1450s, the political situation began to play into Khwajagani hands, such that their prospects improved drastically. The Khwajagan (and ‘Ubaydullah Ahrar in particular) had already become Abu Sa’id’s partners in Transoxiana, and when this Timurid prince seized control of Herat, this alliance was transferred there too. As a result, the Khwajagan of Herat also now had access to the Timurid rulers, first to Abu Sa’id and then to Husayn Bayqara. It was access that the Khwajagan could use to promote their own group interests, including the interests of their non-Sufi followers and dependents. Local and interregional leadership were by this time combined as the Khwajagan center in Samarqand made its influence massively felt in Khurasan as well as in the surrounding Transoxiana. In all, it was through a combination of ritual flexibility, Shari’a-mindedness, intellectual appeal, and political action that the Khwajagan Sufis rose to power in Timurid Herat.

When the Safavid rulers of Iran took over the city in the early sixteenth century and enforced Twelver Shi’ism there, many Khwajagan left for either Transoxiana or India. Today, the main Naqshbandi lineage chain that emerged from the Khwajagan is not traced through Timurid Herat. Even so, the Khwajagani shaykhs of Herat in the Timurid period left a deep impact on the later Naqshbandiyya. Besides Jami and his works in prose and verse, they also passed on their admiration for Ibn al-‘Arabi and integrated him into mainstream Sufi thought. Moreover, their style of close involvement in politics also became a characteristic of subsequent Naqshbandi groups. And besides Transoxiana and India, there remained
Kabul and other places in what is today Afghanistan for shaykhs who had to leave Herat after the Safavid conquest. Ahrar had endowed madrasas and khanaqahs not only in his home town of Tashkent and in Samarqand but also in Kabul. However, as Waleed Ziad discusses in his chapter in this volume, it was from India that the renewed teaching of the Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidiyya would reenter Afghanistan and then Central Asia.
Shortly after 1500, three major regional powers—the Mughals, Safavids, and Uzbeks—seized control of the territories that today make up Afghanistan. Until around 1730, the Mughal and Safavid empires and the Uzbek khanate of Bukhara controlled and competed for eastern, western, and northern Afghanistan, respectively. Although the capitals of these states lay outside Afghanistan, the cities of Herat, Kabul, Qandahar, and Mazar-i-Sharif became important provincial outposts for the different religious groups that were patronized by these states. Twelver Shi‘ism thus flourished in Herat, whereas Naqshbandi Sufism was introduced to Kabul. Meanwhile, the presence of the purported shrine of the Prophet’s son-in-law ‘Ali saw Mazar-i-Sharif (Holy Pilgrimage Place) increase its fame a pilgrim center. Hundreds of smaller shrines developed around the graves of the holy all across Afghanistan, sometimes under the patronage of imperial elites. In the early eighteenth century, the rapid collapse and contraction of the Safavid and Mughal empires saw the rise of the Hotaki and Durrani rulers. These first Pashtun dynasties tried to embellish Qandahar into an imperial capital of their own, building royal and religious monuments that included a domed reliquary for the Prophet Muhammad’s cloak. Close connections nonetheless remained with established religious centers in surrounding states, and regional networks saw Sufis and ‘ulama from Afghanistan circulate between Delhi, Bukhara, Mashhad, and beyond. Hostels were established for Afghan pilgrims and Sufis as far away as Istanbul, Jerusalem, and Mecca. In terms of access to religious learning, a few works were written in spoken vernaculars such as Pashto and Uzbek. However, the main languages of learning remained Arabic and Persian. Though few people were literate, and no books were printed in Afghanistan before the 1870s, these languages of learning connected Afghans with their coreligionists far and wide.
The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, like other periods in Islamic history, were critical to the promotion, preservation, and advancement of Islamic culture in Central Asia. This chapter provides an overview of the process of transmitting and transforming religious culture during this period, with emphasis on how the material aspects were organized and exploited. The chapter draws on a sample of contemporary works that focus on the lives of notable individuals who contributed to the process of advancing the Islamic tradition—absorbing it, studying it, teaching it, and trying to earn a living from it. These works are more or less evenly distributed over the period: *Muzakkir-i Ahbab*, written in 1566 by Baha al-Din Hasan “Nisari”; *Nuskhah-i Ziba-yi Jahangiri*, written about 1625/6 by Sultan Muhammad Bi “Mutribi” Samarqandi; part 4 of volume six of *Bahr al-Asrar*, by Mahmud ibn Amir Wali (the biographies in it written by 1640); *Matlab al-Talibin*, which Muhammad Talib Juybari completed in 1663/4; and *Muzakkir al-Ashab*, which Muhammad Badi’ Samarqandi completed sometime around 1692. These works cover some five or six generations and represent different urban milieus and different regional attachments (Samarqand, Balkh, and Bukhara) in the Persianate Central Asian domain.

*Muzakkir-i Ahbab* focuses on Bukhara and foregrounds royals and their poetry in the first half of the sixteenth century, whereas *Nuskhah*, filled with anecdotes from the lives of some 292 poets of all backgrounds with excerpts from their compositions, focuses on both Samarqand and Bukhara and the life and the students of the author’s own principal mentor, Nisari Bukhari, the author of the *Muzakkir-i Ahbab*. The sections of part four of volume six of *Bahr al-Asrar* containing biographies foregrounds Balkh, its royal family, and notable individuals connected
in some way to the city, whether living or recently dead, and also provides some biographies of Bukharan notables both living and recently deceased. The *Matlab al-Talibin* has a very narrow focus, Bukhara and the Juybari family of Naqshbandi shaykhs, their wealth, those who were either employed by or in some way dependent on the family, and those VIPs who corresponded with or were in some way influenced by members of the family. The *Muzakkir al-Ashab* is almost all biographies of contemporaries whose poetic compositions appealed to the author, and it reflects the author’s strong patriotic feelings for Samarqand.

Explicitly or otherwise, all five works exhibit symptoms of patriotism. This was deemed a virtue, expressed aphoristically as “Love of homeland is a part [or half] of faith” (*hubb al-watan min [or nisf] al-iman*). Those who cited this phrase, like the author of *Muzakkir al-Ashab*, to rationalize, perhaps, their return home or their never leaving home also understood the force of maxims that recommended going abroad: “Knowledge can be acquired only by leaving home behind and parting from your brethren” (*la ‘ilm ila bi-muhajarah min al-awtan wa mufaraqat min al-ikhwan*) and “Seek knowledge even unto China” (*utlub al-‘ilm hatta al-Sin*). But seeking knowledge was not all that prompted leaving home. The biographical material shows that seeking work was also a great motivation to travel.

**THE REGION AND ITS POLITICAL FORMATIONS**

The territory of present-day Afghanistan was part of a large eastern Persianate region divided among three distinct and sometimes actively contending but for most of our period amiably coexisting states: the Baburid-Timurid (i.e., Mughal) state, centered in Agra and Delhi and controlling the region north and west up to the Hindu Kush, including the town of Kabul; the neo-Chinggisid state, centered in Bukhara, controlling the routes west to the Murghab River and south to the Hindu Kush, including Balkh; and the Safavid state, centered in Isfahan, controlling up to the Murghab and the western end of the Herat-Qandahar route, including the Herat oasis. The part of the region corresponding to the modern state of Afghanistan thus formed a marchland, *grosso modo*, between those three political entities. This configuration was remarkably stable through the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, with the exceptions of Qandahar changing hands a number of times between Mughals and Safavids, Herat taken for a decade (1587–98) from the Safavids by the neo-Chinggisid Shibanids, and Balkh occupied for one year (1646–47) by Mughal forces at the expense of the neo-Chinggisid Tuqay-Timurids. When there was no active military campaigning taking place, which was the case for most of the period, the frontiers between these three polities were open. Even when there was skirmishing, travelers could find their way around the trouble spots. Security from banditry was probably more of a perennial problem than any campaigning conducted by any of the political entities against another. Binding the region into
a whole were venerable trade and pilgrimage routes and, most important, a shared literary culture and a common religious and linguistic tradition with Persian and Turkic as lingua francas and Arabic as the language of religion and prestige.

**RELIGIOUS POLITICS IN THE REGION**

Two of the region’s powers, the Mughals and the neo-Chinggisids, espoused *sunna-jama’i* (i.e., Sunni) Islam. The third major power, the Safavids, promoted *ithna’ashari* (i.e., “Twelver” Shi’i) Islam. The apparent Sunni-Shi’i religious divide thus created had to be continually reproduced in the real world through public discourse, which, at times of political contention, was used to rouse and focus public sentiment into action. As a form of human behavior, this was not unlike the long-standing Ni’mati-Haydari factionalism and ritual fighting in Iran and the Ottoman Empire, the commemoration of the 1690 Battle of the Boyne by Orange-men in Northern Ireland, or even football hooliganism in modern Europe. All these phenomena arise from a primordial human impulse toward what has been called “bilateral factionalism.”

But the factionalism was balanced by popular religious practice with its shared communal values. There is a constant conversation between adherents of Twelver Shi’ism and Sunnism reflected in our sources, and much sharing of devotional practices but little evidence of sectarian fighting. A shared landscape probably encouraged sympathy, disillusion, and factionalism in equal measures, but our sources downplay the latter. This was expressed through reverence for the Prophet’s Family (*ahl-i bayt*); shrine visitation (*ziyarat*) to the shrines of Imam ‘Ali at Balkh and Imam Riza at Mashhad, which attracted both Sunni and Shi’i devotees; commemoration of the passion of Husayn on the day of ‘Ashura; and other shared holidays, whether the universal ones (such as ‘Id-i Fitr, ‘Id-i Azha, and Nawruz) or the local ones (such as Gul-i Surkh in Balkh), which all seem to have produced some level of harmony or at least tolerance of others’ beliefs. Sometimes this shared landscape produced unusual manifestations, such as a mode of belief that, we are told, the Shi’is called Sunnism and the Sunnis called Shi’ism.

Certainly there was no geographic separation of Sunnis and Shi’is and no noteworthy episodes of ethnic cleansing such as the modern world has become accustomed to. Shi’is lived in large numbers in what is now central and northeastern Afghanistan (in the former region mostly “Sevener” or Isma’ili Shi’is) and throughout India (notably in Awadh and the Deccan) and among the Pashtuns (particularly the Turis) of the northwest frontier of India. The Shi’is of Afghanistan and India continued to travel the pilgrimage routes to their holy sites in the west and transited what is now Afghanistan and Iran to make pilgrimage to Mashhad in northeastern Iran and to the *`atabat* cities (i.e., Najaf, Karbala, and Kazimayn) in Iraq. Sunnism, on the other hand, remained strong in eastern Iran at least until well
into the twentieth century, when the Qajar shahs were still appointing Sunni *qazis* for the Sunnis of Khurasan. In short, the complex reality on the ground belies any easy assertion of separation, isolation, or, as the great Persianist E. G. Browne called the effect of the conversion of Iran to Twelver Shi’ism in the early 1500s, the erection of a “barrier of heterodoxy.”

Woven through both Sunnism and Shi’ism and, in effect, defining the popular practices of both sects was the phenomenon of what we call “Sufism” today. People whom we may think of as Sufis are rarely referred to that way in the sources that we have. Common literary appellations for such a person would be *darwish* (mendicant), *zahid* (ascetic), *mujarrad* (celibate), *faqir* (mendicant), or someone of *faqr wa fana wa sidq wa safa.* Alternatively, an individual might be labeled *makhduum* (master) or *khwaja* (lord), the latter often a sign of affiliation to the Naqshbandi way. Instead of “Sufism,” this chapter uses the more cumbersome term “pir-muridism” (that is, the tie between *pir* [teacher] and *murid* [student], mentor and disciple, that entailed loyalty and duty on both parts) because it signifies better what was happening in daily life. Pir-muridism often contained a distinct economic component and expectation, that the master or mentor could provide access to a living either directly from his own resources or indirectly through the influence that he had over other disciples of his who did have the resources. Pir-muridism often was associated with a shrine, the geographic and cosmic focal point of the relationship, which gave it an institutional basis.

Pir-muridism had many franchises (so-called Sufi brotherhoods) in the sixteenth century, with names such as Yasawi, Kubrawi, ‘Ishqi, Naqshbandi, Khalwati, Qadiri, and Ata’i. In the eighteenth century pir-muridism seems to have been going through a slow, perhaps multigenerational, process of what Devin DeWeese refers to as “dis-ordering” and reformation of pir-murid affiliations. But through the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Sufi shrine centers and the families who controlled them (the Juybaris in Bukhara, Ahraris in Samarqand, Ansaris in Balkh and Herat, Dahbidis outside Samarqand, and the ‘Azizans of Karmina) were shaping the dominant elements of pir-muridism thanks to their considerable resources.

Historians of Islam in this period tend to focus on social connections and social action arising from shared interests and loyalties, and on the relations between those seen as predominantly religious and those seen as predominantly political. What gives rise to religious loyalties beyond intellectual appeal, what inspires individuals to make life-altering decisions and commitments expressed within a discourse about belief, is more difficult to ascertain. In this volume Jürgen Paul’s concise survey of the Naqshbandi Sufi affiliation in fifteenth-century Herat sees loyalty between master and disciple as a performance art embracing the vocal *zikr* chant, the wilderness retreat, and an opportunity to hobnob with and perhaps influence people of power, or so their own admiring memorialists want posterity
to believe. For the Naqshbandis in a much later guise, that of the Mujaddidi affiliation, Waleed Ziad’s chapter provides a detailed and subtle analysis of the intellectual foundations of belief and practice centered more or less in what are now the modern countries of Afghanistan and Pakistan. He offers an engaging approach in which the reproduction of a manual of practice is used to limn both the geographical extent of Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi ideology down through time and its power to remain vital and compelling even in the modern world. The strength of both studies is to bring out the intellectual appeal of their sources through their portrayals of model individuals and their clearly outlined steps to self-awareness, right belief, and personal salvation.

But these beg the question: How did people put food on the table? How did they support themselves in the process of (we assume) actually fulfilling the goals implicit in the texts that have come down to us? How did those recipients of the
tradition find time to reproduce it for posterity? In other words, how did those who transmitted the intellectual corpus of Islam either orally or through written texts find and exploit opportunities that would give them the time and the means to add to, enhance, and reproduce what they understood as the culture of Islam?

Some of the mundane aspects of life may be found in these same sources. The texts associated with, for instance, a Naqshbandi tradition, will sometimes reveal how life is lived, how money is obtained, how property is accumulated, if some larger moral or philosophical lesson can be drawn from that information. A good example would be the late-sixteenth-century biography of the first Bukharan Juybari shaykhs, Rawzat al-Rizwan. In its more than eleven hundred pages, story after story of the mundane aspects of the lives of Khwaja Muhammad Islam, known as “Khwaja Islam” (1482–1563), and his son Khwaja Sa’d al-Din, known as “Khwaja Kalan Khwaja” (1531–1589), are revealed, the stories meant to serve a moral purpose, to show these individuals both as human beings and as exemplary figures.

Unsurprisingly, the Juybaris were Naqshbandis living at ground zero of Naqshbandism, and, characteristic of some of the often most prominent community leaders, they were tenders of the shrine at Char Bakr, the shrine proving a useful vehicle for the circulation and redistribution of wealth.

Instead of foregrounding these idealized figures as powerful molders of public opinion and magnets for loyalty by virtue of their exemplary characters in society, this chapter takes a somewhat different approach, thinking of loyalties and social connections as arising from individual self-interest and need, and proposing that this can be captured to some degree anecdotally and aphoristically. If we take the stories and the often-cited Arabic maxims as the textual tip of a cultural iceberg representing the accumulation of what people generally believe to be true about aspects of life, then it is possible to begin to reconstruct the diversity of possible experience and how religion was incorporated in the individual’s daily life and work.

To personify the commingling of formal scholarly education and pir-murid practice as well as to introduce into the equation the human capacity for reinventing the self, two examples are offered here, namely Shaykh Baha al-Din ‘Amili of Isfahan (d. 1622) and his contemporary Mawlana Yusuf Qarabaghi (or Bukhari, d. 1621), as embodiments of the spirit of the age. Aspects of ‘Amili’s life and his writings, first as a Shafi’i Sunni then as an ‘Twelver Shi‘i (Shah ‘ Abbas named him shaykh al-Islam of Isfahan, as the leading Shi‘i theologian of the time), and his affinity for Sufism, not to mention all his writing in other areas—the natural sciences (his book on arithmetic remained a standard prerequisite for someone hoping for career in the Afghan administration as late as the end of the nineteenth century) and his work on the occult sciences—all stand as somehow emblematic of intellectual currents flowing in the region. Though less wide-ranging and less prolific than ‘Amili, Qarabaghi represents the same kind of catholicity of interest, whether it was in the transmitted religious and legal sciences, the natural sciences, or the
occult. Qarabaghi was perhaps the most widely recognized theologian of the first half of the seventeenth century in Transoxiana (Mawarannahr) and Balkh. Mutribi, one of our richest sources for the social history of Central Asia in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, knew Qarabaghi personally and calls him "one of the greatest of 'ulama." Mutribi wrote that:

[Mawlana Yusuf] wrote a gloss on Dawwani's commentary on the fourteenth-century al-Ijī’s al-'Aqa'id al-'Adudiyah [a work of Hanafi dogma] which is universally acclaimed. Despite his rank as a scholar (mawlawiyat) he also composes poetry [which is why Mutribi included him in the Nuskha]. Imam Quli Khan (the ruler of Bukhara from 1611 to 1641) has utter faith in his advice. At this time, which is 1034 Hijri (1625–26) he has built a khanaqah in the quarter of Safidmun (a village in the tuman of Rud-i Shahr, Bukhara) and there he spends his summers in spiritual exercises (riyazat) and teaching. He follows the Kubrawi path and has chosen the path of dervishism and he is a disciple (murid) of the followers of Shaykh Husayn Khwarazmi. At the time that I went to Hindustan (in 1622) due to our earlier sharing together the study of the Talwih, I went to see him.

The *Talwih* was a late-fourteenth-century commentary by Mas‘ud ibn ‘Umar al-Taftazani on an early-fourteenth-century work of jurisprudence (*fiqh*) entitled *Tanqih al-Usul*, by the Bukharan Hanafi legal scholar Taj al-Shari‘a al-Mahbubi (d. 1281). Although Mutribi accords Yusuf Qarabaghi an entry for his poetry, in the discussion that he had with him Qarabaghi admitted he wasn’t composing any more, citing his age. (He was seventy-six.) Among his many students, some had noteworthy careers of their own. One of them, Sayyid Mir ‘Iwaz, studied with Qarabaghi in Bukhara, was credentialed in Arabic grammar and syntax, theology, philosophy, logic, mathematics, astrology, and poetics, and then moved on to law, Hadith, and Quranic commentary. He came to Balkh, was “treated favorably” by the ruler, Nazr Muhammad Khan, and then had a midlife crisis, “withdrew into seclusion,” and went off on the *hajj* pilgrimage, spending several years in the Hijaz. In 1634 he returned to Balkh, where the khan appointed him to a professorship in the khan’s own madrasa and made him head of the ‘ulama.20

What the cases of Shaykh Bahā’i and Qarabaghi highlight is the importance of distinguishing “religion as an aspect of state policy in which adherence to a specific doctrine is a test of political loyalty, from religion as a set of personal belief and practices within a family or community context.”21 But in reality these are not discrete, separable categories. As major providers of the livings that people seek, states or at least political figures, people with power, inevitably influence the nature of personal belief and practice—not that there is a uniform set of practices or codes to which patronized individuals adhered beyond the universally prescribed five Quranic duties of all believers. To imagine an opposition, or an intellectual gulf between a scholar, say, and an itinerant dervish *qalandar*, may miss the variety and complexity of the experience of any one individual. And to apply, without
qualification, any labels to a person, as if they represent that person’s essence, will certainly miss the effect of the passage of time on an individual’s outlook. Qarabaghi is a good example of the effect of aging on changing priorities, whereas al-‘Amili, the polymath, exemplifies the vast intellectual landscape that any gifted individual might explore.

MADRASA AND KHANAQAH: ‘ILM AND MA’RIFAT

The intellectual development of Central Asians like Qarabaghi was shaped by two legacies driving the reproduction of Islamic knowledge, whether it was of the ‘ilm type (i.e., formal knowledge transmitted through the mudarris-talib relationship) or the ma’rifat type (i.e., experiential learning through the pir-murid connection). One legacy was the tremendous corpus of scholarly literature produced in the region in the fifteenth century that showed up in the collections of Central Asian libraries in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This was then reinforced by a madrasa-building boom in Bukhara, Samarqand, and Balkh that created brick-and-mortar institutions complete with waqf endowments that could support students, faculty, and maintenance over the long term, not to mention the libraries that helped ensure continuity and reconsideration of ‘ilm-type knowledge over the generations. The second legacy was shaped by the various pir-murid “Sufi paths” (tariqas). In a somewhat complementary fashion, this legacy was reinforced and institutionalized by the building of khanaqahs, a sixteenth- and early-seventeenth-century phenomenon in many ways comparable to the boom in the building of madrasas.

But this is somewhat peripheral to our subject, which is how such individuals made a living. (On the other hand, a skeptic may connect the changing interests of al-‘Amili and Qarabaghi to opportunity, if not opportunism.) Perhaps it isn’t really possible to trace the development of religious expression and practice, what people say and do, without following the money. At the very basic level a certain amount of money or wealth is obviously necessary to live. Then beyond that, to qualify as a believer (mu’min) there are the basic obligations of every Muslim, fulfillment of which requires some surplus wealth. Specifically, these duties are the payment of the prescribed alms (zakat) and the one-time pilgrimage to Mecca (hajj). Because of the region’s distance, both physical and psychological, fulfilling the hajj obligation tended to be something that people strove for yet rarely attained. In the late-seventeenth-century Muzakkir al-Ashab, only fifteen of 206 (or some 7 percent) of the poets profiled are identified as having fulfilled the hajj obligation. And these were all people of intellectual achievement, some just in the field of poetics but most with other scholarly credentials as well. Even among the ruling class, fulfillment of the hajj obligation was rare, although finances were not necessarily the determining factor. Of the eleven sixteenth-century rulers of Bukhara, none so far
as we know even attempted the *hajj*. Of the seven from the seventeenth century, four planned it, but only two actually succeeded in reaching Mecca; thus, for the two centuries a percentage (7.6%) very similar to the poets’ of notable individuals who actually made the *hajj*. Many must have set out with the object in mind and then failed to reach their destination because of financial or other obstacles along the way. Thus both the *hajj* and the payment of alms (*zakat*) make earning a living a prerequisite for fulfilling all of one’s religious obligations.

**WAYS OF EARNING A LIVING**

The ways these sources reveal how livings were acquired are not particularly unusual, and many of them would be familiar in our own lives. Perhaps the most obvious one was the conveyance of property between generations through inheritance or gift. There was a popular Arabic saying (at least amongst the literati) *Wealth and Status Are Both Heritable* (*al-mal wa’l-hal tawaruthani*). Although Islamic legal norms on inheritance are unambiguous and prescribe the division of an estate among two classes of heirs, seemingly leading to the dissolution of accumulated wealth, there were any number of ways to evade the prescribed fissiparous effects of estate division. Wealth could be transferred during the owner’s lifetime through a deed of conveyance (*tamlik-nama*); private trusts could be set up by someone of wealth naming the beneficiaries he or she preferred; and purely charitable trusts could be established, their administrations appointed, and a portion of the income from the trusts assigned to the administrators, often individuals who would also have been heirs to the estate.

The lives of the authors of our sources are good examples of the aphorism on wealth and status. The author of *Matlab al-Talibin*, Muhammad Talib Juybari, was the great-grandson of Muhammad Islam, the founder (in terms of property amassment) of the Juybari family of shrine keepers in Bukhara. Muhammad Talib’s grandfather, Khwaja Sa’d Juybari, had inherited the bulk of the Juybari fortune and immensely increased it in his position as confidant of the powerful Shibanid ruler ‘Abdullah Khan, the son of Iskandar Khan. He passed control of it on to his eldest son, Taj al-Din Hasan, from whom the latter’s eldest son, Muhammad Talib, inherited.26 The author of the *Bahr al-Asrar*, Mahmud-i Amir Wali, inherited his father’s status as a member of the Balkh court of the late-sixteenth-century Shibanids and earned his later position as royal librarian to the Tuqay-Timurid ruler of Balkh, Nazr Muhammad Khan, through his own merit but no doubt was helped by the fact that he came from a familiar family and had been admitted to study under the leading Hadith specialist of the day. The author of *Muzakkir al-Ashab*, Muhammad Badi’ Samarqandi, was the son of a *mufti* in Samarqand, and when his father died, he successfully petitioned the ruler of Bukhara for his father’s living.
THE PATRONS

But if inheritance and a good family background were not available, what were the options? First, one had to know who the people were who disbursed wealth and how to approach them. For simplicity’s sake we may divide the patrons into three classes: the royals, the members of the khanly families; the amirs, those mainly military figures who sustained the Chinggisid mandate in Central Asia and served the khans as local governors or local garrison commanders; and the handful of wealthy shrine-keeping families, the Juybaris in Bukhara, the Ahraris in Samarkand and Tashkent, and the Parsa’is in Balkh. Merchants do not figure prominently as patrons, though members of the Juybari family, primarily characterized in our sources as sacralized by virtue of their identity as shrine keepers and workers of miracles (karamat), were also heavily invested in commerce and could thus be considered merchants as well. That shrine keepers should have considerable means at their disposal should not be surprising, given the importance of local and regional shrines in Central Asia and the wealth gravitating to them in the forms of votive offerings or endowments.

The surplus resources at the disposal of the royal or khanly families and their military supporters ran the gamut of revenues collected from property taxes, customs duties, a range of miscellaneous fees, and rents from state lands. Unless he delegated the function, the khan reserved to himself appointments to a variety of positions that required religious learning—judges, muftis (legal advisors), imams (prayer leaders), khatibs (preachers, sermonizers), muhtasibs (market and morals enforcers, also sometimes known as ra’ises). There were also secretarial and ministerial positions in the chancellery (diwan-i a’la) and the secretariat (dar al-insha), requiring skills in accounting, bureaucratic administration, and the scribal arts. The Matlab al-Talibin has a chapter on the “tribe of attendants” serving Khwaja Sa’d al-Din Juybari, the men managing his far-flung property holdings. The work names forty-one employees of the Naqshbandi shaykh, six of whom formed a private chancellery for him, each manager with his own personal secretary and with some forty clerks at his disposal.27

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the royals were the neo-Chinggisid Shibanids and Tuqay-Timurids, respectively, and their military supporters were the leaders of “Uzbek” groups (i.e., the Durman, Nayman, Qushji, Barlas, Arlat, Qunghrat, Mangghit, Kanikas, Qataghan, Ming, Alchin, Ushun, etc.).28 These royal and military-elite (amiri) groups governed the principal metropolitan regions of Central Asia (i.e., Balkh, Bukhara, Samarkand, and Tashkent). As seen in Nushin Arbabzadah’s chapter in this volume, many of their individual members (and their womenfolk) liberally supported Islamic learning with money to build madrasas and khanaqahs. They also appointed the learned to positions in fiscal, judicial, and religious administration.
A principal duty of any ruler, besides providing justice, is contained in the maxim **Build Up the Country, and Improve the Lot of the Subjects (ta‘mir al-bilad wa tarfih al-‘ibad),** and erecting public buildings that advanced the cult were particularly esteemed as another maxim makes clear: **Whoever Builds a Mosque for God, God Will Build for Him Its Like as a Dwelling Place in Paradise (man bana masjidan lillah bana lahu Allah bayt al-janna mithlahu).**

Two of the most notable types of public works by which individual politicians as well as others sought to fulfill the charge to build up the country and achieve a promised reward in paradise were the madrasa, the religious academy, and the khanaqah, the Sufi meeting house, often built together at a shrine center along with a mosque. Such buildings were usually accompanied by endowments that provided for permanent administrative and custodial positions as well as student scholarships and, in the case of madrasas, professorships, and food and lodging for visitors in the case of the khanaqahs. Both in a way stood for the two strains of Islamic culture, the formal scholarly and the less formal spiritual tradition represented by pir-muridism.

Several members of the three classes of patrons stand out as builders of madrasas and khanaqahs: among the Shibanids, Muhammad Shibani Khan (r. 1501–10) built a double madrasa in Samarqand, which his daughter-in-law endowed;29 'Ubaydullah Khan (r. 1533–40), a nephew of Muhammad Shibani, sponsored a madrasa in Bukhara between 1530 and 1536,30 'Ubaydullah’s son, ‘ Abd al-‘ Aziz, built the khanaqah at the shrine (today known simply as Baha al-Din) of Baha al-Din Naqshband (d. 1389) in Qasr-i ‘ Arifan just outside Bukhara and dated to 1544/5, as well as the Walida-i Khan Mosque, on the Khiyaban in Bukhara.31 Both buildings still stand today. Later in the century, ‘ Abdullah Khan, son of Iskandar Khan (r. 1583–98), built madrasas in Bukhara and Balkh, the former of them still standing. Of the seventeenth-century Toqay-Timurids, Nazr Muhammad Khan (who reigned at Balkh from 1612 to 1642 and briefly in Bukhara, from 1642 to 1645) and his son Subhan Quli Khan (who reigned at Balkh from 1642 to 1681 and at Bukhara from 1681 to 1702) both built large madrasas in Balkh, though only the remains of the latter khan’s are still visible. Three of the main military supporters of the Shibanids and the Toqay-Timurids, Qul Baba Kukaltash, Nadr Diwanbigi Arlat, and Yalangtush Bi Alchin, left extensive records of their philanthropy and are remembered today for six madrasas that still stand in Bukhara, Samarqand, and Tashkent.32

Royals could also provide livings both directly through control of appointments to such judicial positions as qazi (magistrate), mufti (legal advisor), and qazi ‘askar (military judge, judge advocate); to madrasa-related jobs such as mudarris (teacher), mutawalli (endowment administrator), sanduq-dar (treasurer), and...
The Infrastructure of Religious Ideas

farrash-bashi (chief custodian); to mosque positions, especially those that were endowed, such as khatib (preacher, sermonizer), imam (prayer leader), imam-i jum'ah (prayer leader at a congregational mosque), hafiz (Quran memorizer and reciter), and farrash (custodian); and clerical and supervisory posts within the chancellery or the secretariat. Finally, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as in other periods, leaving a memorial and a good name exerted strong moral pressure expressed in the oft-cited Arabic saying Our Works Tell Who We Were, So Contemplate Our Works after We Are Gone (atharuna tadullu ilayna fa-unzur ba'dana ila'l-athar).

GAINING ATTENTION

How did a seeker of patronage gain the attention of such men? How did the support seeker make himself known to someone who could recommend him for remuneration of some sort? First, he might establish an affiliation with a pir who had access to a patron. Clearly Mutribi and his contemporaries believed that their pir, Nisari, could provide this access. Then there were literary and scholarly salons and debates. Reputation, scholarly promise, as purveyed by word of mouth, often led to an invitation to a salon, and these salons (known generally as majlis and mahfal) were often a pathway for gaining a salary. At them one demonstrated in a sometimes highly competitive environment one's academic knowledge, the ability to debate a theological question or, in the case of a poetry salon, one's extemporaneous ability, inventiveness, and quick-wittedness at poetry. Presided over by a well-to-do or well-known figure and sometimes attended by the khans and governors themselves, the majlis was a gathering where theological and juristic issues were discussed and debated. It served as the equivalent of today’s “job talk” and could lead to appointment to any one of the many positions that these patrons had control over. For a scholar, presiding over a majlis was a sign of prestige, and those hoping to make their own mark frequented these gatherings and might later refer to them as a credential when seeking an appointment.

A majlis was also a chance for a scholar (or poet) whose reputation had reached the ears of, or who was already known to, a local dignitary to exhibit his knowledge of the religious sciences or his literary artistry. The majlis might feature a munazara or scholarly debate on some point of theology or law. One such recorded debate also had an undercurrent of intercity rivalry, which might also have been present in other such debates. This particular munazara, which took place in Balkh under the auspices of the Shibanid ruler of the region, Kistan Qara Sultan (who ruled at Balkh 1526–47 or 1548), was held because the reputation of a young scholar named Amir Qasim “Shubha” (the provenance of the nickname shubha [obscure or arcane issue] probably coming from the munazara itself) in mastering the “speculative and transmitted sciences” ('ulum-i ma'qul wa manqul) had
reached the ears of “two of the greatest mubahisān (disputationists) of Transoxiana,” Mir Abu’l-Fath and Mir Abu’l-Fayz. They sought and received the permission of Kistan Qara Sultan to debate the young scholar in public. News spread, and scholars from all around flocked to attend, we are told. Amir Qasim, now worried, consulted his mentor, a Sufi named Mawlama Abu’l-Khayr, who rather than encouraging the young man told him that turning back their challenge would be extremely difficult. He then recommended that Amir Qasim solicit a certain judge, Qazi Salih, without whose help, the mawlana warned, victory in the debate would be impossible. Amir Qasim persuaded Qazi Salih to attend, in his corner as it were. The debate began, having a formal structure, a presiding referee, and a specific number of rounds of argument, rebuttal, and counterrebuttal, and Amir Qasim, confronted by a shubha, an arcane problem of law, proposed by Mir Abu’l-Fath, was reduced to citing Quranic verses, which turned out not to be an effective defense. At this point the referee called time-out and summoned another scholar, Mir ‘Abid, who happened to have been a student of the famous Sufi ‘Abd al-Rahman Jami (d. 1492) of Herat, and turned the matter of solving the shubha over to him. When he and the challengers had gone eight rounds of counterrebuttals without a winner he turned finally to Qazi Salih, who, we are told, instantly solved the problem and sent the challengers back to Bukhara in defeat. This so won the admiration of the people of Balkh, we are told, that they all became the qazi’s disciples.

This particular instance also illustrates the difficulty of separating pir-muridism learning from ‘ilm scholarship. Qazi Salih, a qazi by virtue of his knowledge of the law and therefore his solid grounding in the transmitted and speculative disciplines (manqul wa ma‘qul), is also called makhdum (lord, master), one of the ahl-i qulub (people of the heart, people of intuition), and as sahib-i karamat wa khariq al-‘adat (master of miracles and wonders). All these terms are generally reserved for types of individuals who, in English, tend to be grouped together and called Sufis. One could, of course, specialize in the ‘ilm (religious sciences) and become noted mainly as an ‘ilm scholar (i.e., one of the ‘ulama); or, conversely, one could shun formal learning and become known as a dervish, qalandar (antinomian), or malamati (blame seeker). But the figures who appear most virtuous and influential as their stories unfold are those who combine in themselves the qualities of both scholar and mystic.

THE BENEFICIARIES

Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the majlis or mahfāl was the institution that brought together those seeking credentials, those who could provide them, and those who had it in their power to grant appointments to salaried positions. In late-seventeenth-century Samarqand, for example, the Nayman amir
who governed Samarqand, ‘Abd al-Karim Bi, lauded as a second Hatim-i Tayy (an exemplary pre-Islamic Arab renowned for his extravagant generosity), held a weekly majlis for all the madrasa students of the city. He would bring in an established member of the ‘ulama and through presentations and a question-and-answer period would name one of the students talib of the week.34

One example of the process is found in the person of Mawlana Hasan Qubadyani, who studied in Bukhara and came to Balkh in the 1620s. As the Bahr al-Asrar puts it: “After the breadth and depth of his knowledge became known to all through the majlises in which he participated [emphasis added], he was appointed professor of the ‘Abdullah Khan Madrasa in Balkh.”35 He then had a short but influential career, being appointed to a professorship in two of Balkh’s madrasas and also turning out a substantial number of students who later gained prominence.36 Qubadyani then left Balkh to make the hajj pilgrimage but, according to Mahmud-i Amir Wali was persuaded by the Mughal emperor Shah Jahan (r. 1628–58) to stay in Hindustan, where he died in 1633.37

But then there were those who, following the Arabic aphorism “corrupted is the scholar who consorts with amirs” (sharra al-‘ulama man zar al-umara) refused to have anything to do with politicians, would seek no appointments, and preferred to live however they could, uncontaminated by the corruption that went along with power.38 Others liked to appear as ascetics “in the garb of faqr wa fana [poverty and self-annihilation]” but were great scholars.39 Mahmud-i Amir Wali likes to profile the subjects of his biographies in terms of their learning (or their shunning of formal learning), their spiritual side (if developed), and whether they accepted appointments—and if they did, whether they became known for avoiding contact with political figures, the khans, sultans, and amirs, “plying back and forth between the doors of the nobles.” A sixteenth-century figure, “Mirzada-i Muflis,” who, we are told, shunned the superficialities of scholarship instead concentrated on developing his spiritual side. However, he had no problem consorting with “worldly people” (abna al-zaman) and became a well-known personality “whose advice was sought by sages and kings.”40 Others, like Mawlana Jarullah (d. 1589) and Mawlana ‘Ali Beg (d. 1612), accepted professorships but refused to have anything to do with their patrons.41

Poetry was a common currency connecting people in literary networks, to which I have referred elsewhere as a “poetic economy.”42 The ability to versify and to do it spontaneously and in a group setting was highly valued and rewarded. A standard sort of intellectual competition at a literary salon required participants to complete a ghazal poem after the host provided the matla, the first verse.43 The best composition then was rewarded. Poetry being a universal calling, it was the rare poet who could make his living simply on poetry. There are, however, a few examples of poetry jobs. The wealthy Naqshbandi shaykh Khwaja Sa’d Juybari had a poet who composed and recited poetry for him when he traveled.44 So poets had
other identities as well—they were ‘ulama, students, artisans, politicians, royalty, laborers, servants, and slaves. What they tended not to be were women, at least those profiled in these sources. Although some 30 percent of the property owners of Bukhara (based on the names mentioned in the documents of the Juybari archive) were women and no doubt many of them composed poetry, none of them appears in our sources.

A speculative approach for the stipend or reward seeker was composing a eulogy (madh) about someone and presenting it to the prospective patron. This sometimes worked, but the sense one gets from the biographies is that it more often failed. In the 1680s the poet Mufid of Balkh, having established a reputation there as a eulogist (maddah), went to Samarqand to sell his services to the Dahpidi family but managed to offend people there with his verse and so returned to Balkh, where he presented a panegyric ode to the ruler, Subhan Quli Khan, in the hope of securing a living. The khan, like the others, was unimpressed, and Mufid, we are told, kept moving, eventually reaching India, where he was given an allowance by the emperor ‘Alamgir (also known as Awrangzeb, r. 1658–1707) and went off to live in Kashmir.

Mufid’s example may stand for the experiences of many seeking to find employment and reward for their learning. There are numerous examples of individuals who journeyed to India, lured by the mistaken belief that coming from Bukhara, Samarqand, or Balkh and possessed of a little learning guaranteed one a high judicial position such as qazi or mufti in the Mughal administration, or at least a professorship in a madrasa.

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has been based on several assumptions that have, it is hoped, been borne out. One is that personal cultural and economic factors such as family and peer support on the one hand or resistance on the other are clearly critical to earning a living, as was the concentration or even the availability of communal wealth that could be allocated to an individual. Cities and their immediate hinterlands were obviously the places where surplus resources concentrated, and thus to some degree they predict the location of shrine centers. Another assumption is that our sources represent only a fraction of the people seeking material support through the religion and that beyond what they tell us there was a vast spectrum of intellectual and spiritual attainment, ranging from the possessed (majzub baba) and itinerant (malamati or qalandar) to the greatest theological and legal minds of their time, overlooked by our texts. Obviously hundreds of thousands of people pass beneath the radar—slaves, tenant farmers, day laborers, nomads, soldiers, artisans, and shopkeepers. And those from these groups who do manage to earn a living from their religious credentials are rare.
A third assumption underlying this chapter is that in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the bulk of discretionary resources was allocated by a ruling class including the neo-Chinggisid khans and their families; their military supporters, the amirs; and wealthy landlords, many of them religious figures. A fourth assumption is that making religion pay was accessible to only a small percentage of the population directly but indirectly was a major economic force affecting all those who depended on the direct recipient. So when an individual is profiled, we should understand that behind that name is an invisible but real community of family, employees, servants, and sometimes slaves. A fifth assumption, much more problematic than the other four, is that the built environment is a reflection and a shaper of the way religion was experienced and how it could be made to pay. The madrasa and the khanaqah, as well as the mosque, were not simply testimonials to the piety of the sponsor but were very visible signifiers of what constituted beliefs that would be rewarded.
The Durrani period, between 1747 and 1823, is often discounted as an ephemeral Afghan imperial interregnum. Yet it had a decisive impact on shaping the intellectual and sacred landscape of South and Central Asia. As cities such as Kabul and Peshawar were revitalized by Durrani rule in the mid-eighteenth century, Hindustan’s centers of commercial and intellectual gravity gradually shifted westward. These burgeoning Afghan imperial capitals attracted Sufis and ‘ulama from Hindustan, eventually becoming fulcrums of reoriented intellectual-exchange circuits. The khanaqahs, shrines, and madrasas that made up these circuits provided instruction in an ensemble of esoteric and exoteric Islamic sciences. These institutions penetrated rural and pastoral communities from Swat to Badakhshan and Yarkand, as well as to such rising regional capitals as Khoqand in Central Asia and Hyderabad in Sindh. Among these networks, the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi Sufi order, which originated in seventeenth-century Hindustan, was arguably the most prominent.

The reemergence of Kabul and Peshawar as sacred-intellectual entrepôts in the late eighteenth and the nineteenth century has been largely erased from historical memory. It seems that these developments have been eclipsed by Great Game narratives that relegate these regions to the status of frontiers or isolated buffer states saddled between British and Russian imperial spheres of influence. Yet two questions regarding the intellectual and religious developments of this period remain unresolved. First, what types of knowledge systems were transmitted from Hindustan into the Afghan heartlands and onward into Turkestan? Second, what were the mechanisms through which intellectual and devotional capital flowed westward and northward, in the process adapting to disparate regions of a politically decentralized Persianate ecumene?
This chapter attempts to address these questions through the lens of two manuals of Sufi practice composed in Persian at the turn of the nineteenth century. The tracts were compiled among two prominent branches of the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi Sufi order based in Kabul and Peshawar, respectively. The texts in question are the most widely reproduced writings of each suborder and right up to the present day are deployed by disciples within these Sufi networks. Remarkably, the most recent reproductions and adaptations of the texts were published within the last few decades in Waziristan and Malakand, the turbulent borderlands between modern-day Pakistan and Afghanistan. As we will see, the two texts provide us with the means to interpret broader questions regarding the transmission and transformation of religious-knowledge systems in the early modern world.

The first section of this chapter provides a historical overview of the establishment of the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi Sufi institutions in Hindustan and, eventually, in the Kabul and Peshawar valleys. It then introduces the two manuals by situating them into the broader exoteric and esoteric curricula imparted in the madrasas and khanaqahs of Kabul and Peshawar. The next sections of the chapter are situated in the field of the history of the book, specifically readership studies, which as yet remains an untapped mode of inquiry in Afghan religious contexts. In this respect, the chapter considers how the two texts were produced, consumed, taught, and compiled by synthesizing sciences, including cosmology, meditation methods, and systems of divine-energy transfer. Finally, the chapter turns to the dissemination of the texts by asking how they were reproduced and how they interfaced with other literary productions to form a distinctive yet integrated transregional knowledge system.

The following pages argue that these two Naqshbandi Sufi texts represent the development of a new, concise, manual genre that merged mystical theology and praxis. Before the advent of a regional print culture, these manuals served as easily replicable tools to facilitate the efficient transfer of complex knowledge systems in the form of a regularized curriculum. Such a curriculum could then be carried via appointed teachers, or deputies (khalifa; plural khulafa), in diverse cultural environments and locales well beyond the Afghan Durrani Empire. The chapter further argues that this genre emerged as a response to the sociopolitical realities of the late eighteenth century. The manual genre was specifically adapted to new urban centers and autonomous tribal polities that required a transregionally accredited intellectual and sacred infrastructure. Through such manuals, the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi Sufis helped foster a uniform yet flexible cosmological and methodological system that facilitated the exchange of human capital and texts across a vast territory and absorbed a host of localized practices and institutions. This can be likened to the ritual flexibility adopted by the pre-Mujaddidi Naqshbandi Khwajagan of fifteenth-century Timurid Herat, which Jürgen Paul argues in his chapter in this volume was critical to the growth of the Khwajagan
at that time. However, for the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidis, it was the works of the progenitor of the order—the mujaddid (renewer) Shaykh Ahmad Sirhind i himself (d. 1624)—that became the canonical texts of this later network.

RE-EVALUATING THE DURRANI RELIGIO-INTELLECTUAL SPHERE

The implications of these claims are far-reaching. As we will see, a critical look at the two texts and the networks that produced them opens new vistas in the nascent field of the religious and intellectual history of Afghanistan and its neighbors. For there remains a dearth of research on the religio-intellectual dynamics of the Kabul and Peshawar valleys between the early Mughal period and the twentieth century, leaving us with a hazily understood period of four hundred years. Even studies that do exist on the Afghan Naqshbandis (arguably the most widespread Sufi tradition in Afghanistan) are concerned with the order’s political involvements, at the expense of their day-to-day intellectual and social functions and pedagogies. To make matters worse, there remains an inadequate understanding of the institutional and curricular links between madrasas and khanaqahs during this long period.

In exploring these yet-uncharted domains, this chapter threatens to displace certain entrenched, binary categorizations among scholars regarding religious authority in the region. For example, let us consider Montstuart Elphinstone’s seminal account of Kabul during the first decade of the nineteenth century, which two centuries later still continues to inform our understanding of the Afghan religious sphere. In reference to Peshawar and Kabul, Elphinstone divided religious functionaries into three discrete categories. The first comprised “Moolahs,” a diverse array of religious officials responsible for educating youth, the practice of law, and the administration of justice. The second category comprised “holy men,” which included sayyids, dervishes, faqirs, and qalandars. Their domain was that of miracles, occult sciences, prophesizing, astrology, and geomancy. Finally, the third category comprised the “Soofees,” a minority “sect,” according to Elphinstone, who considered the world to be an illusion. In more recent literature, urban and tribal or folk Islam, along with Sufis and ‘ulama, are also generally treated as separate categories. Although there are merits to these categorizations, a study of Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi Sufis and ‘ulama reveals that these categories largely overlapped. Both Sufis and ‘ulama were intimately engaged in social and political functions; taught Hadith and jurisprudence (fiqh); partook in ascetic and mystical practices; and were revered as miracle-working holy men. Their literary productions, as we will see below, reflect a knowledge system in which mystical theology and praxis coexisted and complemented jurisprudence and scriptural study. This system appears to have been widespread in the Durrani period, which in this regard was not unlike the Timurid period as discussed by Jürgen Paul in chapter 3 of this volume.
Like Paul’s geographically wide-reaching account of the earlier Khwajagani Sufis, the case study in this chapter has broader implications for the historiography of transregional connectivity across South and Central Asia, albeit here for the eighteenth and early nineteenth rather than the fifteenth century. Primarily, this study situates Peshawar and Kabul into a broader zone of trans-Asian literary and intellectual exchange that stretched from Sirhind—the source of the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi tradition in present-day India—as far as Kazan and Istanbul. Moreover, as we will discuss below, religio-intellectual developments in Kabul and Peshawar can be interpreted as part of greater processes of categorization, formulization, institutionalization, and dissemination that were also under way in the fragmenting Mughal domains as well as Turkestan.

FROM SIRHIND TO THE KABUL AND PESHAWAR VALLEYS

For the last millennium, Sufism has formed an integral part of the religious and cultural landscape of the Kabul and Peshawar valleys. Indeed, the broader region that today comprises Afghanistan has been a fountainhead for the development of Sufi traditions that spread outward into Punjab and Bengal. The Naqshbandi order, which is the focus of our study, traces back to its eponymous founder, Khwaja Baha al-Din Naqshband (d. 1389) of Bukhara. Like other Sufi orders, the Naqshbandiyya developed a specialized set of pedagogies and meditative practices aimed at purification of the soul and spiritual wayfaring. Much like the Qadiri, Chishti, and Suhrawardi Sufi orders, the Naqshbandis stressed the interdependence of Sufism, Shari’a, and the Sunna (Prophetic Example), with an additional emphasis on religious learning and sobriety in mystical practices.

Whether in Afghanistan or elsewhere, among all Sufi traditions the key function of the teacher (known as a shaykh or pir) has been to guide disciples in their spiritual path. However, in their capacity as mediators, intercessors, and “friends of God” (awliya), Sufi pirs have historically performed a range of other social functions, both mundane and miraculous. As discussed in Jürgen Paul’s chapter, gifts and endowments from all segments of society and commercial endeavors enabled pirs to establish institutions that offered intellectual teachings, social welfare, economic aid, or mediatory services. To manage these institutions, along with their communities of disciples and students, the pirs appoint deputies, known as khulafa. This was equally true for the Naqshbandis as it was for other Sufi orders.

By the fifteenth century, Kabul had already become a locus of Naqshbandi activity as it radiated from Timurid Bukhara and Herat, so that Kabul came to boast numerous khanaqahs, shrines, and soup kitchens. It was, in fact, a Kabuli Sufi, Khwaja Baqi Billah (d. 1603), who was pivotal in transmitting Naqshbandi teachings through Kabul into Mughal-ruled Hindustan. The story of the
Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi branch of the order begins with Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi (d. 1624), one of Baqi Billah’s Hindustani disciples whose own disciples went on to transform the religious landscape across the Mughal and Ottoman empires. As his moniker suggests, in 1564 Sirhindi was born in the Mughal-ruled town of Sirhind, a prosperous commercial and intellectual entrepôt on the Delhi-Lahore highway. Several hundred years earlier, his family had migrated from the environs of Kabul (which is why Afghan sources insist on referring to him as Shaykh Ahmad Kabuli). Following his initiation into the Naqshbandi order, in 1599, Sirhindi returned to his home town of Sirhind, where he gradually attracted tens of thousands of followers. Eventually, he became known as the Mujaddid-i Alf-i Sani (Reviver of the Second [Muslim] Millennium). His writings addressed questions ranging from methods of meditation and spiritual training to theological matters surrounding prophethood and sainthood. He also devoted considerable attention to the primacy of the shari‘at-i Muhammadi (Law of Muhammad), which he defined as encompassing obligatory worship, religious duties and doctrines, and the Sufi path.

Sirhindi not only formalized a range of Sufi practices and epistemologies within the Hindustani context. Along with his sons, he also built a teaching complex in the Hindustani context. In the course of the next century, their institution grew to encompass several Naqshbandi Sufi madrasas, mosques, khanaqahs, and shrines in Sirhind. At the same time, their silsila (lineage) became known as the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi, distinguishing itself from the earlier Naqshbandi tradition and teachings that emerged from Timurid Bukhara and Herat, as shown in Jürgen Paul’s chapter. The leadership of the main khanaqah at Sirhind was passed on to members of Sirhindi’s biological lineage. At the same time, their various khulafa (deputies) appointed their own representatives, so as to expand the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi network as far as Bukhara, Hyderabad, and Istanbul.

It was, then, in the mid-eighteenth century, that the town of Sirhind became entangled in a protracted power struggle between the disintegrating Mughal Empire and ascendant political entities seeking to seize its domains. Having secured control over Iran and Khurasan, in 1738/9 Nadir Shah Afshar (r. 1736–47) invaded Hindustan. A decade later, his death, in 1747, resulted in a regional political vacuum, which was soon filled by tribal confederacies and local potentates. One such confederacy was the Durranis, under their dynastic founder Ahmad Shah. In the years after Nadir Shah’s death, Ahmad Shah Durrani (r. 1747–72) managed to subdue some of these querulous polities and establish a decentralized empire based at Qandahar (and later Kabul, Peshawar, and Herat) that afforded its political components varying degrees of autonomy. Caught in the midst of these transformations, Sirhind changed hands several times. It was finally occupied by the non-Muslim armies of the Sikhs in 1763. The Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi Sufis resisted the Sikh advances, and (possibly as a result) their institutions were devastated. Contemporary sources
relate that Sikh soldiers disinterred the graves of Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi saints, dismantled their monuments brick by brick, and then cast them into the river. The Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi pirs and their disciples fled Sirhind in waves, setting up new khanaqahs in areas where they were given refuge. Although as early as the seventeenth century the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi order had already been exported as far as Thatta, Bukhara, and Istanbul, it was at this time, in the wake of the Sikh conquest, that it expanded most rapidly westward, coming to administer more khanaqahs than any other Sufi order from Sindh to Kazan. While some Naqshbandi-Mujaddidis resettled in Rampur, Delhi, and elsewhere in Hindustan, many others were welcomed into the territories of the Durrani Empire, which at its greatest extent stretched from Kashmir to Sindh to Khurasan. Among these Sirhindi migrants were two notable figures, Khwaja Safiullah Mujaddidi (d. 1798) and Fazl Ahmad Ma’sumi (d. 1816, known as Jiu Sahib Pishawari). These two pirs were to become the progenitors of vast Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi suborders that carried Sirhindi’s teachings westward. Both men were primarily affiliated with the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi silsila, but like other Mujaddidis, they were also initiated into several other orders.

A descendant of Sirhindi and a distinguished poet, Khwaja Safullah was one of four brothers who were invited to settle in Qandahar, Peshawar, and Kabul. In circa 1776, he was designated as the principal pir of a Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi subnetwork

**Figure 12.** Manuscript seal of Fazl Ahmad Pishawari, 1225/1810. (From Risala-yi Asbaq-i Tariqa-yi ‘Aliya-yi Naqshbandiyya, Peshawar University, MSS 95/131)
comprising his brother’s khanaqahs and their satellite institutions. He personally founded a khanaqah in the Shur Bazaar, in the heart of the Durrani imperial capital, Kabul. There, he attracted a sizable following of devotees from across the social spectrum. This included the Durrani ruler Zaman Shah (r. 1793–1800), for whom Safiullah performed the coronation ceremony (dastarbandi). The khanaqah of Shur Bazaar soon became the hub for a network of subsidiary khanaqahs and madrasas in Yarkand, Badakhshan, Bukhara, Baluchistan, Sindh, and the Pashtun belt; they were managed by twenty-eight appointed khulafa. Chief among the latter was Safiullah’s niece Bibi Sahiba, whose family established a lasting presence in Qandahar, Kuhistan-i Kabul, Laghman, Sindh, and later in Tharparkar and Gujarat.

Concurrently, around 1776, Fazl Ahmad Ma’sumi, a descendant of Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi’s older brother, was welcomed in the Durrani winter capital, Peshawar. He traveled regularly to Bukhara via Kabul and Mazar-i Sharif and set up a khanaqah at the Masjid-i Mirakan, in Bukhara. Bukhara’s ascendant state-builder, Shah Murad (r. 1785–1800), became a devoted disciple of Fazl Ahmad and, eventually, his Khalifa. By the end of his life, Fazl Ahmad’s network encompassed several hundred such deputies, who supervised khanaqahs and madrasas from Balkh to Khoqand, Ghazni, and Kashmir. They were sustained by land grants and charitable waqf endowments from the Durrani rulers and their Barakza’i successors, as well as the rulers of Bukhara, Badakhshan, and Qunduz, and other regional authorities.

In such ways, Khwaja Safiullah and Fazl Ahmad were among the most prominent of several thousand Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi Sufis who established their presence in Khurasan, Turkestan, and beyond. Each set up new institutions, or affiliated himself or herself with older institutions (including shrines) with preexisting symbolic capital. These institutions were generously patronized by local rulers and governors, who in effect outsourced the intellectual and spiritual apparatus of their nascent polities to the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidis and other Sufis. Through these institutions, the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidis were effectively able to import to present-day Afghanistan and beyond a set of doctrines and epistemologies from Sirhind, which then interfaced with localized ritual practices, philosophies, and sacred historical memories. While the Sufis who migrated westward individually administered their own institutions and managed their own congregations, they nonetheless perceived of themselves as part of an integrated Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi network in which texts, poetry, students, and practices constantly circulated.

THE RELIGIOUS ECONOMY OF THE LATE EIGHTEENTH AND NINETEENTH CENTURIES

Yet two interlinked questions remain: Why were such pirs solicited by the Durrani and their contemporaries? And what incentives encouraged the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidis to accept their invitations? In addressing these questions, this section
alludes to Nile Green’s adaptation of a religious-economy framework in the context of Muslims in Bombay and the Indian Ocean. Thus, on the demand side, each of the newly formed states (whether the Durrani Empire, the Khoqand, Khiva, and Bukhara khanates, or a semi-independent regional polity) required an intellectual and spiritual institutional base. There were several reasons for this. Such institutions could generate state bureaucracies and judicial apparatus, and in turn attract further intellectual capital. Moreover, since most of these new ruling families lacked historical legitimacy, Sufis and their institutions could provide blessings and social capital that served to strengthen ruling dynasties. Subject populations likewise required a range of religious services. In a time of political turmoil, resettlement, and migration especially, there was high demand for blessings, faith healing, practical and spiritual guidance, and soup kitchens as well. Moreover, both states and their subject populations were in need of political and commercial mediation (as well as mediation at the supernatural level). This was best provided by an outside party with significant transregional, historically grounded symbolic capital across rural, tribal, and urban environments.

Among the vast number of players in the unregulated religious marketplace that emerged from Nadir Shah’s conquests, the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidis had distinct advantages. On the supply side, their khanaqah at Sirhind and its subsidiaries had by this time produced generations of scholar-mystics with expertise in Shari’a, jurisprudence, and Sufism. These scholar-mystics inherited the centuries-old symbolic authority of the Naqshbandi order and its Khwajagani predecessor in Central Asia. Moreover, they personified the academic rigor of an urban high-cultural institutional environment. Trained in Hindustan, these Sufis could therefore fulfill all three areas of demand. In return, having lost their center at Sirhind and many of the endowments that had earlier undergirded their network, the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidis had much to gain by way of material resources and a new support base to propagate their doctrines and methods.

INSTITUTIONS AND CURRICULA

Whether in Hindustan, Khurasan, or Turkestan, Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi institutions produced students versed in both exoteric and esoteric sciences (that is, in ‘ulum-i zahiri and ‘ulum-i batini). The pirs and their deputies often established new institutions and networks, or affiliated themselves with existing ones by supplementing earlier pedagogies. Fazl Ahmad’s khanaqah at Peshawar, for example, was affiliated with two of the city’s well-known congregational mosques and colleges for the exoteric sciences. Similarly, while in Sindh, Khwaja Safiullah selected leading ‘ulama from three principal scholarly families of the province as his deputies, namely Qazi Muhammad, of Nasrpur; Makhdum Ibrahim, of Thatta; and ‘Abd al-Wahid, of Sehwan. In effect, these appointments incorporated
the urban ‘ulama establishments of Sindh and Peshawar into Kabul’s Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi sublineage. Naturally, scholarly networks such as these possessed in-built local social capital with their own followings and patronage structures, as well as the ability to communicate Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi doctrine in a manner that was palatable to their constituencies.

In an ideal case, students first completed (or made substantial progress in) their exoteric education in the rational sciences under the tutelage of reputable scholarly ‘ulama. Only then could they seek initiation with a Sufi guide and embark upon their formal khanaqah education. In al-Qawl al-Jamil, Delhi’s eighteenth-century Sufi luminary Shah Waliullah (d. 1762) provides us with an indication of general pedagogies employed in the khanaqahs of the period. According to Shah Waliullah, after initiating the disciple the first function of the pir was to ensure that he was intimately familiar with Islamic doctrine. The second function of the teacher was to work on perfecting the disciple’s character by providing guidance on how to avoid duplicity, self-love, jealousy, grave and minor sins, and malice while developing in him an attraction to religious practices. In the process, the pir closely observed the disciple’s day-to-day social interactions, imparting the rules of etiquette (adab) along the way. Concurrently, a daily recitation (wird) was also issued to the student. Only when the disciple’s character and outward behavior had been significantly refined did the teaching of esoteric practices (ashghal-i batini) commence.

TWO NAQSHBANDI-MUJADDIDI MANUALS

This next phase, the asghal-i batini or esoteric practices, lay at the core of the khanaqah curriculum. Such teachings and practices were the subject of the two manuals under scrutiny here, which were composed, one each, by Khwaja Safiullah and Fazl Ahmad Ma’sumi. Over the next two centuries, the two manuals were reproduced in a variety of forms from Turkestan to Hindustan. This was more the case than with any of the other literary works that emerged from these two Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi suborders. As such, the texts provide key insights into the nature of the knowledge systems being transferred through the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidis’ networks, as well as the processes by which such religious knowledge was diffused.

The names of the two texts are Makhzan al-Anwar fi Kashf al-Asrar (1783; also known as Anwar-i Safi and Makhzan al-Asrar), by Khwaja Safiullah, and Risala dar Bayan-i Tasawwuf (ca. 1800; with various other titles), by Fazl Ahmad Ma’sumi. Both are concise texts that were structured as pedagogical manuals. As such, they represented a confluence of disciplines that were otherwise written, oral, experiential, or performed. The two texts articulated a concordance between the core cosmology of the Sufi path on the one hand and its associated mystical practices on the other. Tables 5.1 and 5.2 provide an overview of the manuals’ wide-ranging contents.
TABLE 5.1 Overview of Makhzan al-Anwar, by Khwaja Safiullah Sirhindi-Kabuli

<table>
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<td></td>
<td>The rationale for placing travel in the World of Divine Command above</td>
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<td></td>
<td>the World of Creation (Four reasons)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chapter 2</td>
<td>On the practices and zikr (recitations) of the Naqshbandi path through 5</td>
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<td></td>
<td>lata’if (subtle centers) in the World of Divine Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chapter 3</td>
<td>On the zikr of Affirmation and Negation (Five types)</td>
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<td>Chapter 4</td>
<td>On muraqaba (meditation) in the Naqshbandi tradition and its methods</td>
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<td>Chapter 5</td>
<td>On the perfections of Prophethood and Messengerhood, perfections of the</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Great Prophets, and the perfections that lie beyond these, and some</td>
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<td></td>
<td>notes on the gnosia of the Reviver of the Second Millennium (Shaykh</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Ahmad Sirhindi)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chapter 6</td>
<td>On the practices and zikr of the Qadiri path (Four types)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>On the various methods of muraqaba (meditation) of the Qadiri path</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chapter 7</td>
<td>On various zikr and meditative practices of the Chishti path</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chapter 8</td>
<td>On various zikr and meditative practices of the Suhrawardi path</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix</td>
<td>Prayer/ invocation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 5.2 Overview of Risala dar Bayan-i Tasawwuf, by Fazl Ahmad Ma'sumi Pishawari

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Element</th>
<th>Content</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>The process of initiation into the Naqshbandi, Qadiri, and Chishti orders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 1</td>
<td>On the practice of zikr: awareness of the heart; methods of aligning the heart to attain annihilation of the heart; zikr through the lata’if</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(subtle centers) and their association with colors, realities of Prophets, and points on the body; reaching the stations of lesser intimacy,</td>
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<td></td>
<td>travel to God, and the stage of knowledge of certainty</td>
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<tr>
<td>Section 2</td>
<td>On the practice of affirmation and negation: awareness of numbers; concluding the station of travel to God; reaching the stations of absolute</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>certainty or remembering and the eye of certainty; attaining annihilation of the ego-self; attaining subsistence in God; reaching the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>stations of istahlak and izmahlal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 3</td>
<td>Compulsory and supererogatory prayer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 4</td>
<td>Daily meditation and recitation exercises (awrad and waza'if) of the Qadiri and Chishti paths and their benefits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 7</td>
<td>Pointers on moral excellence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Intentions and Readerships

In the introductory passages of both manuals, the authors inform us (if in formulaic terms) of the texts’ purpose. They are meant to offer lessons, in an “ordered manner” and for the “benefit of wayfarers,” about the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi path that were detailed in the works of Ahmad Sirhindi and his successors. From
their tone and contents, it becomes clear that these didactic manuals are primarily intended for Sufi deputies who are guiding others in meditative practices. The almost-complete absence of marginalia supports the assertion that these were teaching aids rather than works to be critically commented upon or disputed. As discussed below, in establishing new teaching circles, Sufi deputies would likely have commissioned copies of these manuals, along with other documentary tools and earlier canonical Naqshbandi texts. Given the brevity of the two manuals, the cost of their reproduction would have been insignificant.

However, their readership extended beyond the deputies to include prospective students and disciples on the Sufi path. Patterns of reproduction indicate that the manuals were also engaged by a broader literate class—elite and nonelite—including Sufis in other orders and suborders. The opening chapter of Safiullah’s *Makhzan al-Anwar*, for example, contains an extensive, effusive eulogy of the Afghan Durrani emperor Timur Shah (r. 1772–93), highly unusual in a Sufi didactic text. This implies that among the text’s intended audience were members of the court, even the emperor himself, who, the biographies tell us, held Safiullah in great esteem.

The Question of Genre

The contents of both Safiullah’s *Makhzan al-Anwar* and Fazl Ahmad’s *Risala dar Bayan-i Tasawwuf* are clear, concise, and compressed. This is especially true as compared with the bulk of earlier Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi literary production, which comprised weighty and often intimidating collections of epistles, biographies, and specialized theological treatises. The two manuals form part of a broader *ma‘mulat* (practices) genre that was produced within the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi order so as to correlate with practical exercises the key metaphysical and ontological concepts that were earlier detailed by Ahmad Sirhindi and his successors. Prior to the nineteenth century, few tracts on *ma‘mulat* (practices) appear to have been dispatched from the Peshawar and Kabul valleys. Two didactic practical tracts had previously been written by Akhund Darviza (d. 1638), the Chishti luminary who famously challenged the Rawshaniyya movement, while two other such tracts had been composed by the early Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi and Qadiri *pir* of Peshawar, Shah Muhammad Ghaws (d. 1739).

However, the *Makhzan* and the *Risala* depart significantly from these earlier practical *ma‘mulat* tracts. They seem to make up a subgenre that, while not entirely novel, began to proliferate in the later eighteenth century. Earlier works on *ma‘mulat* contained similar pedagogical discussions, but these were packaged within biographies or contained more detailed expositions of metaphysical and cosmological concepts. Our texts, on the other hand, are far more compact—and therefore easier to reproduce. The two texts under scrutiny here, by contrast, presented complex esoteric topics without excessive detail and in a user-friendly manner. However,
the audience was still expected to have a basic grasp of Sufi technical vocabulary and, in particular, of the ontological frameworks of Ahmad Sirhindi and Ibn al-`Arabi (d. 1240), as well as Sunni doctrine and the science of divine-energy reception (‘ilm-i lata‘id). The terminology and tone of the two texts suggest that readers have already engaged in lessons or been exposed to the practices described.

In the decades that followed their composition, similar Persian tracts appeared from Khurasan and Hindustan. Notably, several manuals were composed at the celebrated Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi khanaqah in Delhi, which appointed deputies as far as the Ottoman Empire. Similar works were also produced by more localized suborders. For example, ‘Usman Padkhabi (d. unknown), a popularly venerated pir based in Logar, produced a treatise on ma‘mulat around 1820, while another such work was produced by Miyan ‘Abd al-Hakim (d. unknown), based in Qandahar.

THREE DISCIPLINES: SPIRITUAL TRAVEL, SUBTLE BODIES, AND MEDITATION

Both the Makhzan and the Risala engaged three core intellectual and experiential disciplines. These comprised Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi cosmology and its corresponding paradigm of spiritual travel; the science of subtle bodies and energy transfers; and the various practices of meditation. In the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi system, the authorized pir guides the spiritual seeker through meditative practices that channel divine energy (fayz) and enable spiritual travel (safar). The seeker advances through stations corresponding to successive emanations or manifestations in the Naqshbandi cosmological structure that generate higher levels of awareness. Intimacy is developed between master and disciple through the mechanisms of rabita (connection) and tawajjuh (orientation).

All three disciplines discussed in the Makhzan and the Risala were derived from Ahmad Sirhindi’s detailed and technical methodologies of sayr-u-suluk (mystical travel and wayfaring). These were in turn derived from earlier paradigms whose originators ranged from the aforementioned Ibn al-‘Arabi to ‘Ala al-Dawla Simnani (d. 1336).

Spiritual Travel

The principles of spiritual travel or wayfaring in the Naqshbandi-Mujadiddi path were in this way tied to Sirhindi’s cosmological frameworks, which were adapted from the teachings of Ibn al-‘Arabi (thus echoing what we have seen of the earlier Naqshbandi adoption of Ibn al-‘Arabi’s teachings in Jürgen Paul’s chapter in this volume). Sirhindi’s theory of determination (ta‘ayyu) begins with the absolute undifferentiated essence, beneath which are five intellects, the final being the world of corporeal bodies. In Sirhindi’s cosmology the finite world has an existence apart from God, but God is the only necessary being.
In doctrinal writings, the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi mystical path is expressed as a cyclical journey with an ascent and a descent. In the first stage, travel to God, the Sufi wayfarer travels through all that is created and contingent. This stage ends in the experience of *fana* (negation, annihilation), where everything except God ceases to exist. This is known as the lesser intimacy.\(^{41}\) According to the Naqshbandi cosmological structure in the second stage, travel in God, different emanations or manifestations can be distinguished within God, such as his names, attributes, aspects, and essence. This second stage culminates in *baqa* (subsisting) and is known as the greater intimacy.\(^{42}\) After this point, two stages of descent take the spiritual wayfarer back to the world of creation.\(^{43}\) Now the wayfarer regains consciousness of identity, temporality, and duality—that all is from God but remains separate from God. Thus, the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi wayfarer—by this point transformed into a living saint—returns to the created world in order to guide communities from a superior spiritual vantage point.\(^{44}\)

*Subtle Bodies*

Another discipline on which the two texts focus is the science of mystical physiology, which focuses on the *lata’if* (singular *latifa*). Variously translated as “subtleties,” “subtle bodies,” or “subtle centers,” the concept of *latifa* roughly corresponds to that of the *chakra* in Tantric Buddhism. These are metaphysical entities that act as vehicles to facilitate spiritual travel.\(^{45}\) According to Ahmad Sirhindi’s *Mabda u Ma’ād*, human beings (who exist in the material and the immaterial world) are composed of ten such *lata’if*.\(^{46}\) Each *latifa* is associated with a specific location on the human physical body and is a recipient of divine energy.\(^{47}\) Each *latifa* is also associated with a specific color and connected to a source of divine energy, which emanates from different stages in the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi cosmological structure. Further, the divine energy for each *latifa* is mediated by a particular prophet. Each *latifa* may also be associated with a character trait, so that spiritual travel through that *latifa* builds good character. For example, spiritual travel through the *ruh* (spirit) *latifa* helps develop patience and prevents anger. Hence, the role of the Sufi teacher using such texts as the *Makhzan* and the *Risala* is to give his disciples awareness of these subtleties and then activate the *lata’if* so as to allow the flow of divine energy that enables spiritual travel. Sirhindi did not outline the practices associated with the *lata’if*, though these practices were presumably transmitted during training sessions.\(^{48}\)

*Meditative Praxis*

The next discipline that the *Makhzan* and the *Risala* engage is meditative practice. There are three categories of meditation: *zikr* (the remembrance of God, being the first and simplest practice to activate the subtle bodies), *nafi wa asbat* (negation
and affirmation, in practice a breath-channeling exercise), and muraqaba (the visualization of the pir through meditation). Variations of these forms are practiced by other Sufi orders, particularly in the Persianate world. These practices, which emphasize methods of breathing and recitation, allow the spiritual wayfarer to traverse the different stages of the path toward God. As noted in Jürgen Paul's chapter, Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi practices tend toward sobriety: their zikr is generally silent, and most of their suborders refrain from using musical instruments.

Each method of meditation encompasses multiple forms of practice with varying degrees of complexity that are engaged as the seeker reaches successively higher stages of the cosmological structure. Initially, each practice is performed by engaging a specific subtle center as an energy receptor—for example, zikr in the subtle center of the heart (qalb). However, at higher stages, when all lata’if are activated, the entire body can travel as a united latifa. These and other associated practices are also expressed in terms of the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidis’ eleven guiding principles (known as the kalimat-i qudsiya). These principles were pioneered centuries earlier by the proto-Naqshbandi luminary ‘Abd al-Khaliq Ghijduwani (d. 1179) and Khwaja Baha al-Din Naqshband (d. 1389).

MANUALS AND MECHANICS OF KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER

In the ways described above, Safiullah’s Makhzan al-Anwar and Fazl Ahmad’s Risala dar Bayan-i Tasawwuf synthesized the three esoteric sciences of spiritual travel, subtle bodies, and meditation into an accessible guidebook that Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi deputies could carry with them to use in their satellite khanaqahs. The structure and tone of the two texts provide insights into how the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi Sufis were able to expand institutionally while maintaining pedagogical cohesion. In this way, the genre of the manual was essential in generating a synthetic system of theory and praxis in a time of political fragmentation, so as to facilitate knowledge transfer across what is today Afghanistan and beyond.

Step-by-Step Guides to Spiritual Progress

A noteworthy feature of the two texts is the matter-of-fact, step-by-step manner in which the stages of the path are presented, with benchmarks and pointers given for both the teacher and the disciple. It is for this reason, perhaps, that a later biography of Fazl Ahmad refers to his Risala as an “elegant text.” For the Risala first walks the teacher and disciple through the initiation process, outlining the recitations, prayers, and esoteric practices required to ascertain whether the student is suited to the teacher as well as to solidify the student-teacher bond. Then, Fazl Ahmad explains in his Risala, the teacher should systematically show the disciple
the location of each of the subtle centers (*lata’if*), and the training commences. At this stage, the disciple is instructed on how to perform *zikr* in the five *lata’if* and in the World of Divine Command, culminating in the station of lesser intimacy and the beginning of the annihilation (*fana*) of the ego-self. Having accomplished this arduous feat, the wayfarer begins negation and affirmation, which leads to greater intimacy, annihilation, and subsistence in God. For each exercise and stage on the path, Fazl Ahmad furnishes details that range from how to channel breath and the appropriate posture during meditation to the unveilings and character traits that the wayfarer should anticipate along the path.\(^{52}\)

Departing from earlier texts on *ma’mulat*, Fazl Ahmad provides an ideal time frame for spiritual progress through each stage of the journey. For example, he informs his readers that “after passing through three forty-day cycles of meditation or seclusion (*chilla*), the wayfarer begins his education in the spiritual subtleties.”\(^{53}\) Providing an indication to his reader-instructors, he mentions that “there are some disciples who are impacted in the first *tawajjuh* [here, “spiritual focus”], and some only later. However, in the case of those who are impacted later, this is not an indication of their [lack of] aptitude. Therefore the teacher should not withdraw his *tawajjuh* from them.”\(^{54}\) Safiullah’s *Makhzan* follows a similar pattern, albeit with theoretical discussions interspersed with practices and with additional experiential details that include visions and inspirations that should be expected so that wayfarers can better recognize stages on their spiritual journey.\(^{55}\)

While both texts thus outline the basic path of spiritual travel, neither their underlying terminology nor their cosmological structure (nor even the concept of *lata’if*) are specifically defined. Again, this implies that the presence of an educated instructor (or detailed companion texts) was required to impart the specifics. Essentially, the manuals formalized khanaqah pedagogies into written form, serving as a franchise guide for esoteric practices. This is evidenced in the case of Fazl Ahmad, for example, through firsthand accounts of his daily routine at his khanaqah, as detailed in Table 5.3.\(^{56}\)

**Standardization and Categorization**

The two manuals in effect formalized such practices so as to generate a transregional system of praxis that was bound together by a shared cosmology and terminology based on the earlier writings of Ahmad Sirhindi. The emphasis on cosmology, and on tracing spiritual states beyond what most adepts could attain, served as a means to conventionalize Sirhindi’s highly complex and synthetic cosmological system. Such standardization could then facilitate the exchange of the practices and sciences that functioned within this wider epistemological framework. The guidebooks concurrently articulated a multigenerational Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi canon based around Ahmad Sirhindi’s *Maktubat, Mabda u Ma’ad*, and
other associated texts. This in turn solidified the networks around the figure of Sirhindi, providing coherence and a sense of identity within the transregional Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi community.

As mentioned above, both the Makhzan al-Anwar and the Risala dar Bayan-i Tasawwuf provide comparative descriptions of the practices of other Sufi paths. However, these practices were reframed to conform to a Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi classification system, thus securing a form of epistemic hegemony over other Sufi traditions. The basic meditative practices and spiritual path of each order are presented as a valid system in which disciples are expected to partake. While no value judgment is made regarding the varying methodologies, the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi method is clearly proffered as the overarching course.

With regard to eighteenth-century Turkestan, Devin DeWeese has pointed to a process of bundling Sufi orders, specifically under the umbrella of the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidiyya. This had significant social and economic implications. Previously entrenched Sufi lineages with extensive landholdings were tied to localized kinship networks. Their incorporation into the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi order involved a realignment of the older Sufi orders away from communal structures and toward transregional supraethnic communities built around shared ritual practices and beliefs. The production of the two manuals under scrutiny in this chapter indicates that a similar process was under way in the Afghan Durrani Empire and its satellite polities in the eighteenth and the early nineteenth century.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hour</th>
<th>Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Late night / midnight</td>
<td>Tahajjud (supererogatory) prayers; muraqaba (meditation) or tawajjuh (guided meditation) with disciples</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Tahajjud Fajr</td>
<td>Sleep upon prayer mat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Fajr Sunrise</td>
<td>Sunna prayer in house, followed by leading compulsory prayer in congregation at khanqah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunrise</td>
<td>Quranic recitation, followed by namaz-i ishraq (sunrise prayer)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tawajjuh with individual disciples</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lessons and lectures on jurisprudence, Quranic commentary, and Prophetic traditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early Afternoon</td>
<td>Leading communal 'asr (afternoon) prayer, with additional recitations at mosque</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lectures on aspects of jurisprudence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lecture on Maktubat of Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Meditation in chillakhana (seclusion chamber)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late Afternoon</td>
<td>Leading communal prayer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dam (spiritual healing) for disciples and the broader community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunset</td>
<td>Leading maghrib (sunset) prayers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Breaking fast with disciples or family</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.3 A Day in the Life of Fazl Ahmad Ma'sumi
The various other Sufi orders that were considered in the two manuals reflect the sacred landscapes of their authors’ respective networks. Fazl Ahmad introduced Naqshbandi, Qadiri, and Chishti practices, which were the prominent Sufi traditions from the Peshawar Valley to Bukhara. Khwaja Safiullah, meanwhile, added the Suhrawardi order (to which he referred as the Suhrawardiyya-Kubrawiyya). This may have appealed to his disciples in Sindh, where the Suhrawardis had been established since the thirteenth century. In addition, Safiullah designated Naqshbandi practices as those of the Naqshbandi-Ahrariyya—that is, as being derived from Khwaja ‘Ubaydullah Ahrar (d. 1490), the celebrated Naqshbandi mystic of Samarqand. However, the Naqshbandi-Ahrari practices that Safiullah described were distinctively Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi. Classifying them as Naqshbandi-Ahrari may represent an attempt to appropriate the sacred landscape of Kabul, which featured significant Ahrari charitable endowments (waqfs) and prominent Naqshbandi shrines dating back to the Timurid period. Earlier Naqshbandi-Ahrari communities would likely have been absorbed into Khwaja Safiullah’s network through initiation and institutional affiliation.

In the two texts, the practices of each order are outlined as different dimensions of a unified and fluid system and framed through the employment of Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi cosmological terminology. Both Fazl Ahmad and Khwaja Safiullah describe the systems of *muraqaba* and *zikr* of the other orders in the same framework as the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidiyya: that is, as if they are supplementary practices. They also outline the structure of mystical physiology for each order, employing Ahmad Sirhindi’s terminology and concept of *lata‘if*. At the same time, readers are provided with a neat concordance between meditative practices and stages in spiritual travel according to Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi, earlier Naqshbandi, and universally recognized Sufi classification systems. This concordance may have helped translate the stages of the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi path to students previously exposed to pre-Mujaddidi Naqshbandi or non-Naqshbandi Sufi practices, in this way emphasizing compatibility with other Sufi teaching systems that were in circulation around Kabul and the Peshawar Valley. Such discourses would certainly have eased the incorporation of older Sufi communities into the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi superstructure.

*The Absence of the Vernacular*

Although the sections on comparative practices vary based on the geographic scope of the suborder, by and large the genre of the manual was not vernacular in the same sense as the biographies, poetry, or sacred architecture produced by the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidis. By the end of the eighteenth century, we find a systematic presentation of cosmology and praxis, where even the colors associated with the *lata‘if* are identical in these and other Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi manuals. The reason
for this is twofold. First, this type of text was intended for a transregional audience. These texts present basic frameworks and theories, which could then be localized to suit different audiences from Sindh to Badakhshan. Through other sources such as Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi biographies, poems, local chronicles, and shrine catalogues, we get glimpses into how these transregional practices were supplemented by (or reconciled to) vernacular devotional forms and philosophies. A stark example is that of Mir Ghiyas al-Din (d. 1768), from Jurm in Badakhshan; he was a notable deputy of Shah Safiullah's father and pir. Although Ghiyas al-Din provided instruction in Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi sciences, a chronicle called the *Tarikh-i Badakhsan* relates that he held sessions of vocal *zikr* two days a week, a practice that was deeply uncharacteristic of most Naqshbandi-Mujaddidis. Moreover, he purportedly trained four hundred antinomian (*qalandari*) disciples—probably remnants of an earlier Sufi community in Badakhshan—who engaged in ecstatic musical activities.

Reflecting these developments in Badakhshan, similar vernacularization processes were under way across Sindh. Here the disciples of Khwaja Safiullah deeply venerated the Sufi poet Shah 'Abd al-Latif Bhitai (d. 1752). Although Bhitai has often been regarded as an ecstatic poet (and so epistemologically at odds with the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidis), the descendants of Safiullah's deputies employed his poetry as a devotional tool and convincingly argued that his poetry was a localized reflection of Ahmad Sirhindi's epistemology.

**TEXTUAL REPRODUCTION AND CIRCULATION**

Both manuals were reproduced in one of three forms: as self-standing manuscripts; as part of miscellanies for the use of 'ulama, Sufis, or khanaqah libraries; or as sections of larger didactic texts or biographies. Their manner of reproduction and assembly provides a window into their use, circulation, and reception in the territories of the Durrani Empire and beyond. It also elucidates how Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi and affiliated Sufi lineages interfaced during this time and came to be regarded as a single continuous tradition across the politically fragmented Persianate world of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

The research underlying this chapter has located copies of Fazl Ahmad's *Risala* that were produced in Khoqand, Bukhara, Punjab, Erzerum, Kabul, and the Pushtun Belt (totaling eleven manuscripts and four printed editions), and copies of Safiullah's *Makhzan al-Anwar* produced in Sindh, Punjab, Kabul, and Logar (totaling eight manuscripts and one printed edition). Most of these date from the nineteenth and the early twentieth century. In most cases, it is not clear who commissioned these copies. However, two copies of the *Risala* bear the personal seals of Fazl Ahmad and his son at Bukhara and so were presumably copied at the behest of the father and son themselves.
Often these manuals were reproduced alongside more comprehensive tracts on Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi cosmology and the science of the subtle centers. For instance, the Makhzan often accompanied Sirhindī's discourses (particularly Mabda u Maʻād and selections from the Maktubat), earlier Naqshbandi classics (such as Risala-i Yaʻqub Charkhi or the discourses of ʻAbd al-Khaliq Ghijduwani), or anonymous Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi cosmological and philosophical tracts. Such evidence supports the assumption that the two texts were intended to be supplemented by earlier specialized literature on related subjects. The manuals were also often reproduced along with selections from poetic diwans. In several cases, for example, the Makhzan was copied along with ghazal and ruba‘i poems by Safiullah and his son ʻAbd al-Baqī (d. 1867). The two manuals were also regularly packaged together with texts from contemporary branches of the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi order, thus indicating how extensively literary production across various suborders became part of a transregionally shared tradition.

For example, we find the Risala of Fazl Ahmad packaged with discourses from the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi khanaqah founded at Delhi by Shah Ghulam ʻAli Dihlawi (d. 1824). It is clear that the two suborders were closely linked, because Ghulam ʻAli’s death in Delhi was announced in Fazl Ahmad’s satellite khanaqah miles away in Zakori (near Dera Ismail Khan) only days after it occurred. In two other manuscripts, Fazl Ahmad’s Risala accompanies the discourses of Sufi Allah Yar, of Bukhara (d. 1720), as well as a genealogy of the Dahbidi Sufis. These were among the principal Naqshbandi lineages of Bukhara and Samarqand, respectively, and their own networks occupied an overlapping religio-intellectual space with the khanaqahs of Fazl Ahmad in the same region. Tensions were certainly not unknown between these Naqshbandi suborders, especially since all three at various stages supplied the pirs of the ruling khans of Bukhara. The manuscripts, however, indicate that their teachings at least were considered compatible.

Perhaps the most surprising manuscript is a nineteenth-century copy from Bukhara or Khoqand that features four texts, namely the Risala of Fazl Ahmad, the Sharaf al-Sadat of the Hanafi jurist Shihab al-Din Dawlatabadi (d. 1445), an anonymous eschatological Qiyamatnama, and a theological tract of Bayazid Ansari, of Waziristan (d. 1585). One might assume that the juxtaposition of such divergent materials would evoke irreconcilable tensions. After all, Bayazid Ansari (or, more popularly, Pir-i Rawshan) had rebelled against the Mughal emperor Akbar and inaugurated a millenarian Sufi tradition that was declared heretical by virtually every Sufi of the Peshawar Valley. In the early 1800s, Elphinstone pointed out that his following had all but disappeared by this time. In the case of the manuscript, it appears that his works were still being reproduced by individuals who engaged Fazl Ahmad’s Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi discourses. This implies that the boundaries between orthodoxies and heterodoxies were far from clear-cut. It may not be too far-fetched to conjecture that a common thread of eschatology and
millennialism—with Fazl Ahmad representing Sirhindi’s millenarian tradition—brought these apparently disparate works together.

In other manuscripts, Safiullah’s *Makhzan al-Anwar* accompanied theological tracts from contemporary Sufi lineages in Hindustan, Sindh, and Khurasan. For example, a manuscript dated 1845/6 contains *Makhzan al-Anwar* along with *ghazal* poems by his son ‘Abd al-Baqi. The manuscript is particularly noteworthy, because it was copied by ‘Abd al-Rahman ibn Ni’matullah Hal’ai. The latter was a devoted disciple of the first Pir Pagaro (d. 1830), a Qadiri-Naqshbandi sayyid from inland Sindh who famously led the Hur rebellion against Sikh and British forces. This miscellany suggests that a disciple of a highly localized Sindhi sayyid lineage (among the most prominent landholding families of Sindh) considered Safiullah’s Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi discourses to be part of his own literary heritage.

Overall, the legacy of the *Risala dar Bayan-i Tasawwuf* and the *Makhzan al-Anwar* in the modern period attests to the effectiveness of the manual genre that emerged amid the crises and opportunities of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Since the late 1970s, the Kabul-based Shur Bazaar network has been shattered by severe political disruptions, most notably the assassination and incarceration of over a hundred descendants of Khwaja Safiullah in the wake of the Soviet invasion. The esoteric practices that were once woven into the fabric of literate society in the region are now under attack by both Taliban and Wahhabi preachers, and the khanaqah system has all but broken down among the Pushtun tribes along the Durand Line. Yet in the late twentieth and the early twenty-first century, after having been out of circulation for decades, the manuals have been revived in the most unexpected of places, including the Waziristan and Malakand Agencies of the Afghan-Pakistani borderlands discussed in Sana Haroon’s chapter in this volume. For example, Fazl Ahmad’s *Risala* was translated into Urdu in 1978 by his descendant ‘Abdullah Jan Faruqi and published in pamphlet form (alongside the edited Persian original) at Thana in Malakand Agency. This was part of an ongoing effort by the deputies of Fazl Ahmad to propagate the teachings of his lineage in an environment where skepticism of Sufi practices was steadily growing. The *Risala* was deemed appropriate for a lay reading public requiring basic methodology without burdening them with the intricacies of theology. To this end, Fazl Ahmad’s descendants established two publishing houses at their khanaqahs in North Waziristan and Malakand through which they publish biographies, poetry, and treatises in Urdu, Persian, and Pashto.

A second revival, this time of Safiullah’s *Makhzan al-Anwar*, occurred at a time when the region was being wholly destabilized by various factions of the Taliban. In 2006, a local Mujaddidi scholar called Qari ‘Abd al-Qayyum Logari took it upon himself to edit the *Makhzan al-Anwar*. Originally from Logar, he had taken refuge in Wachay Khora, in South Waziristan, from where he partnered up with a cottage publishing house in Wana to preserve the teachings of the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi
Rather than an edited original text, the Wana publication was intended as a didactic work introducing Sufi practices to a contemporary Afghan audience. Several things indicate this. For example, Qari ʿAbd al-Qayyum deleted the verses in the *Makhzan* extolling Timur Shah Durrani, which a modern audience wary of political authority might have deemed inappropriate. He also commissioned a descendant of Safiullah to write a preface contextualizing Sufi practices within Islam and stressing their compatibility with Shariʿa. Its defensive tone no doubt mirrors contemporary anxieties. In the case of both manuals, their modern publication was aimed at preserving Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi disciplines and pedagogies and presenting them to an audience at risk of being influenced by competing religious ideologies.

**CONCLUSIONS**

A key objective of this chapter’s survey of Safiullah’s *Makhzan al-Anwar*, Fazl Ahmad’s *Risala*, and the broader manual genre to which they belong has been to reorient scholarly attention toward these types of Sufi writings. Notably, these seemingly formulaic esoteric texts have been presented here as historical aids toward resolving long-standing disputes on the contours of Islam in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, both in Afghanistan and beyond. The manuals shed light on prevailing value systems and ethical premises of eighteenth-century Kabul and Peshawar and their expansive religio-intellectual orbits, all of them dominated by Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi establishments. Since the manuals were the most reproduced works of their respective suborders, we can surmise that contemporary ʿulama and Sufis were primarily concerned with intellectual, moral, and spiritual development at the individual level over social or political reform. Within this Weltanschauung, Shariʿa, jurisprudence, ethics, and etiquette were all necessary components of an ideal Muslim curriculum aimed at realizing the potential of humanity as the vicegerent of God and in which suprarational sciences were placed at the pinnacle.

The process of the standardization and widespread dissemination of the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi framework that was facilitated through these texts may be seen as an extension of larger regional developments during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries toward the standardization and transfer of Islamic knowledge. Earlier in the eighteenth century, Lucknow’s Farangi Mahal madrasa formulated the *Dars-i Nizami* curriculum to balance the revealed and rational sciences and then disseminated it across Hindustan and as far as the Ottoman Empire. Around the same time at the Madrasa Rahimiya, Shah Waliullah of Delhi institutionalized another prescribed syllabus that stressed the primacy of Hadith and employed a specific method of dialectics and textbook study.

As a corollary to this point, in certain aspects this chapter’s case study of two Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi suborders supports Albrecht Hofheinz’s adaptation of the
neo-Sufi hypothesis formulated several decades ago. In an attempt to interpret the nature of eighteenth-century socio-intellectual currents in the Muslim world, Hofheinz proposed that eighteenth-century Sufi practices did not represent a departure from earlier Sufi traditions. He argued instead that they were used in a broader context for much larger groups of people, resulting in institutionalization, increased literary output, and “emancipation from traditional authority.”

Hofheinz drew a parallel to the European Christian Pietist movement, which emphasized individual piety through ascetic and mystical practices while employing new media (including pamphlets and hymns) for mass propagation. Some of these features can be found among the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi networks of Peshawar and Kabul that we have studied in this chapter. However, unlike Pietism, Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi literary production and institutional growth was not premised on a reaction against traditional authority or legal scholasticism. Rather, it was a response to the sociopolitical realignments of the eighteenth century, as well as a strategy to benefit from the opportunities presented by imperial fragmentation and the rise of independent localized polities in the decades either side of 1800.

It is in this way possible to draw a parallel between this expansion of the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi order in the late eighteenth century and the rise of institutionalized Tantric Buddhist esotericism that had occurred in the same region a thousand years earlier. As in the eighteenth century, that prior period witnessed the rise of feudalism and political decentralization. Key developments took place in response, including the growth of monastic institutions, the codification of rituals with complex mandala images, and the production of new, synthetic, esoteric texts that imparted methods of reciting mantras while still relying on firm master-disciple bonds. Like the later Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi khanaqahs, the new Tantric institutions developed regional vernacular identities while establishing a core cosmology and set of practices. Mirroring the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi case once more, these institutions, texts, and practices ultimately facilitated the penetration of Tantric Buddhism from India to Central Asia and China.
Around the mid-nineteenth century, wars with the surrounding Sikh, British, and then Qajar states, together with the Russian conquest of Central Asia, saw Afghanistan emerge as a smaller, if more self-contained, political entity than in earlier periods. War had religious consequences as the three Anglo-Afghan Wars encouraged rural and tribal groups to conceive of themselves as mujahidin. From the 1870s, the term “Afghanistan” was adopted for the first time by the region’s rulers. With their capital now settled in Kabul, the Pashtun Barakza’i dynasty set about consolidating their control. Religion proved a useful instrument for the so-called Iron Amir, ‘Abd al-Rahman Khan, in the 1880s and 1890s. Shari’a was adapted to provide a state law code, and wars against the religious minorities of the central and northeastern highlands were legitimized as state-led jihad. In first half of the twentieth century, governmental attempts to reform and rein in religious authorities led to widespread rebellion, particularly among the tribesmen of the border with British India. But between the 1950s and the 1970s, state education among town dwellers helped spread a modernist and nationalist ethos that found expression in new political and cultural movements that included secular and socialist ideas. Even so, most of the population remained in the countryside. There, the nonliterate majority maintained their customary ties to local Sufi shrines and holy families, some of the latter as unlettered as their followers. Although few Afghans were able to afford the hajj to Mecca, the government did sponsor young men to undertake Islamic studies in Cairo, where they unexpectedly came into contact with the new ideologies of Egyptian Islamists.
In July 1880, ‘Abd al-Rahman Khan (r. 1880–1901) became the new amir of Afghanistan thanks to his own resourcefulness, some measure of luck, and the assistance of both the Russian and the British empires. His life experience had prepared him for the “Great Game” that he was entering, and the new amir seems to have fully understood the position of the political entity he was ruling over. ‘Abd al-Rahman’s Afghanistan was to serve as a buffer, or in the amir’s own terminology, “a curtain,” between the Asiatic colonies of Britain and Russia. As an active player in the Anglo-Russian “Great Game” that was being played out in South and Central Asia, the amir had chosen to side with Britain. As he wrote in 1885, it would have been “impossible for the people of Afghanistan to become friendly with the Russian state, because that latter is not abandoning its designs on India, for which it must step on this [Afghan] people.”

With his foreign policy in the hands of British control and guarantees to protect Afghanistan from any foreign aggression, ‘Abd al-Rahman channeled his energies into extending his authority over hitherto-independent or semiautonomous regions of the country. In the words of Barnett Rubin, under ‘Abd al-Rahman, “Afghanistan became a buffer state, in which an indigenous ruler began to build an internally autonomous state with only external colonial support.”

**IMPOSING HUKUMAT ON YAGHISTAN**

‘Abd al-Rahman was determined to impose the rules of government (a’in-i hukumat) on the entire domain that he had won the right to govern. Unlike previous Afghan rulers, this amir was intent on obliging those regions of the country that had either been
totally autonomous or had offered no more than a token allegiance to submit to the Afghan state centered on Kabul. ‘Abd al-Rahman referred to these areas as yaghistan.

For late-nineteenth-century British writers, “Yaghistan” referred to a specific geographical area corresponding roughly to what is today Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). According to Sana Haroon’s chapter in this volume, early-twentieth-century Indian Muslim activities also identified “Yaghistan” as India’s northeastern region’s nonadministered areas, which later became FATA. For ‘Abd al-Rahman, Yaghistan—literally “the Land of the Yaghi [Unruly, Hostile]”—meant any area not under governmental control and did not refer to a specific geographical locality.4

Describing the dialectics of state and tribe of the Ghilja’i Pashtuns, Jon Anderson explains the phenomena of yaghistan and hukumat as follows:5
Ghilza'i do not see “tribe” in relation to “state” but locate each as aspects of opposite, dialectically related realms which take temporal and transient shape in a continuous play of integration and disintegration. What they put in opposition are the activity and seats of government (\textit{hukumat}, where governing takes place) to the lands of freedom or unrestraint (\textit{yaghistan}), as points on a plane. \textit{Yaghistan} is where no man is above another, in contrast to \textit{hukumat}, where there are governors and governed.

This rather idealized concept of \textit{yaghistan} as an egalitarian and nonhierarchical society not answerable to any authority is what 'Abd al-Rahman was trying to uproot from all areas within his domain, replacing that with the notion of \textit{hukumat} by persuasion, if possible, or with brute force and terror, if necessary. The amir never doubted law and order as represented by an organized central state structure were right, and lawlessness and disorderly association of communities and tribes were wrong. The rule of law had to be established, and the state was to be the executive force to impose it, “so that the Afghan nation, aided by royal magnanimity, would reach great heights in intellect and knowledge and the same rank as other law-abiding and orderly states.”

The institutionalization of the state’s authority required a fundamentally different set of rules. For the first time in the history of the country, rules were codified and supervised by an extensive bureaucracy. In the words of the historian and subsequent president Ashraf Ghani, Afghanistan’s existing “mode of domination,” in place since 1747, was replaced. Previously, “most local power-holding families in most regions had managed to reproduce themselves socially and politically.” Now, a new mode materialized, “where political power resided in the institutions of a centralized state.” With a combination of unhindered sovereignty within established borders, ruthless application of violence, and “systematic use of Islam as an ideology of State-building,” the amir was able for the first time to exert “state sovereignty” throughout the country. Using sources published by the Afghan amir and court registers from Kunar, Ghani highlights 'Abd al-Rahman’s emphasis on the Islamization of the courts and, through them, the entire bureaucratic system of the country. This, he argues, introduced an understanding of the religion “that had very little in common with what passed as Islam before it, and [this] served as justification for the centralizing policies of the Amir.” Hasan Kawun Kakar, concurring with Ghani’s point, adds that the “overall effects of these laws were that for the first time the inhabitants of Afghanistan began to learn how to obey a sole monarch and a uniform set of laws.” However, as Ghani argues, while most of the population of Afghanistan adhered to the religion of Islam, for most of the Pashtun tribal confederations living in the country, the Shari’a did not serve “as its judicial basis, and no religious tradition enforced allegiance to monarchs.” For the first time in the history of the Afghan state, the Shari’a became the supreme law of the land, and state-appointed courts replaced all other, local means of settling disputes. Thus, the control of the legal system formed the basis for the amir’s policies of centralization,
This chapter examines some of the justifications, methods, challenges, and effects of the amir’s Islamization of the judicial system to introduce and consolidate the rule of a central authority over the entirety of his political domain.

Despite the dangers in drawing parallels between European theories of state building and the formation of states such as Afghanistan, in some sense ‘Abd al-Rahman’s concept of consolidating the administrative structure in his domain within fixed boundaries fits Max Weber’s political theories on the formation of the modern state. According to Weber, the “patriarchal and patrimonial systems of administration” were to be replaced by a technical and effective bureaucratic system, and “traditional authority” was to be exchanged for what he termed “rational” or “legal” authority. The Weberian notion of legal authority as the basis of the modern state is not entirely incompatible with the Islamic concept of the ruler’s authority, which stems from his position as the upholder of Islamic law. Consequently, the creation of ‘Abd al-Rahman’s state apparatus, cloaked in an Islamic archetype, is not far from the Weberian model. Moreover, in line with Weber’s classical concept that monopoly over the use of physical violence (Gewaltsamkeit) distinguishes “the state from all other institutional forms of domination in society,” ‘Abd al-Rahman sought to monopolize the enforcing power to establish his version of Islamic rational and legal authority over the society that he was trying to organize under a centralized state structure and within defined boundaries.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW JUDICIAL SYSTEM

According to the historian of the period Fayz Muhammad Katib, ‘Abd al-Rahman’s first administrative objective was to put an end to the bloodletting that the people of Afghanistan had committed against one another. He did this by granting a blanket amnesty for criminal activity that occurred prior to his reign. The main purpose of the decision for an amnesty was to end the conflicts that had occurred in the country as a result of the Second Anglo-Afghan War of 1878–80. The amir personally proclaimed that all cases of murder, personal injury, and theft that had taken place prior to his reign would not be investigated, as it would require a lifetime to settle them all and would distract him from other important state affairs. The amir added that, from the beginning of his reign onward, anyone committing an illegal act would be investigated. In his Siraj al-tawarikh, Fayz Muhammad goes on to dutifully add that, after this royal order, all cases that had resulted in animosities and rebellions were resolved, and the Afghans, Hazaras, Turks, and Tajiks, who previously had mistrusted each other, now came together peacefully.

However, after the new proclamation was enacted, the blanket began to have holes. The amnesty underwent gradual change as the judicial system of the country was being regulated through the imposition of a uniform system of law for the entire country. The amir began by excluding disputes based on inheritance.
Soon after, he instituted a systematic, retroactive statute of limitations on cases that could be brought before a judge through the publication, in 1885, of Asas al-Quzat (Fundamentals for Judges), by Ahmad Jan Khan Alkuza'i. This 140-page instruction manual for judges, containing 136 rules, bears the approving signature of the amir after each rule, illustrating his direct supervision and interest in the endeavor. The manual represents the first attempt by the Afghan state to extend a judicial system over the entire country and codify the Shari'a as the state law.15

Article 51 of Asas al-Quzat specifically states that only cases that had occurred within the previous fifteen lunar years could be litigated. The article allows for exceptions to this statute of limitation for cases involving inheritance and religious endowments, or where one of the parties had been absent during the original litigation. For all other cases older than fifteen years requiring judgment that fell outside these exceptions, the judges are obligated to forward them to Kabul in order for the amir to pass whatever judgment he may deem fair.

Based on his instructions to judges, it is plausible to conclude that 'Abd al-Rahman's initial general amnesty was intended to exempt his government in its early stages of existence from dealing with potentially explosive cases involving claims that arose during the years of the Second Anglo-Afghan War. The amir may also have been hoping to gain time to establish a framework for the judges in the country to be able to deal with cases before them in a systematic, comprehensive manner.

THE ELEVATION OF SHARI'A AS THE LAW OF THE STATE

'Abd al-Rahman's understanding of his function as the head of an Islamic community was similar to the traditional Islamicate ideals of society: that such a community “exists to bear witness to God amid the darkness of this world, and the function of its government is essentially to act as the executive of the Law.”16 In a biography of the amir, Sultan Muhammad Khan relates a dream that 'Abd al-Rahman had sometime before 1879, prior to leaving Russian Turkistan for Afghanistan. In this metaphorical dream, the then-Afghan exiled prince is brought before Prophet Muhammad and his companions and is asked what he would do if he is made king. 'Abd al-Rahman replies, “I will do justice and break the idols and instead place Kalima [the Muslim testimony of God's unity].” Upon giving this answer, continues the biography, he received approval and blessing.17

The administration of the law by the government meant that the amir could assume, directly or indirectly, the function of the judiciary and interpret the laws as he wanted. Sultan Muhammad in another work has written that, according to Islamic tradition, 'Abd al-Rahman not only could interpret Islamic law but could also make his own laws where the Shari'a did not provide conclusive commands. With some degree of exaggeration, Sultan Muhammad has added that in “all
criminal and political cases practically the chief part of the law has been made by the Amir, and so in cases of the Government revenue.” 18 This depiction is not so remote from the actual adjudication of cases that were settled by the Afghan courts during the reign of the amir, nor is it contrary to the practice of law throughout Islamic history. As the scholar of Islamic law N. J. Coulson argues, from the eleventh century onward, the Sunni schools of Islamic jurisprudence accepted two prerequisites for the holder of the office of caliph. One is extreme piety, and the other is possession of the faculty to understand and determine the divine law. Once these conditions were met, Coulson writes, the ruler “had the power to take such steps as he saw fit to implement and supplement the principles established by the religious law.” 19 Another Islamic legal specialist, Joseph Schacht, states that according to the doctrine adopted at the beginning of the ‘Abbasid rule, the caliph, though accepted as having absolute command of the community, “had not the right to legislate but only to make administrative regulations within the limits laid down by the sacred Law.” 20 Schacht points out the Muslim rulers’ workaround: they often enacted new laws under the guise of administrative regulations. Instead of calling them legislation, “they maintained the fiction that their regulations served only to apply, to supplement, and to enforce the Shari’a, and were well within the limits of their political authority.”

With the assumption of this discretionary power, which came to be known as siyasa (discipline or infliction), the sovereign in theory sought to complete the scope of the Shari’a and in practice began to “regulate by virtually independent legislation matters of police, taxation, and criminal justice, all of which escaped the control of the kadi [sic] in early ‘Abbasid times.” 21 The term siyasa in the evolution of the Islamic state came to be equated with “the exercise of political authority.” 22 In ‘Abd al-Rahman’s publications, the term siyasa (written in its Persian form, siyasat) is used in the same manner as it was by the ‘Abbasid caliphs.

The crux of the amir’s efforts was to establish a policy of administering justice based on the Shari’a that would serve as the law for all inhabitants of Afghanistan. He stressed that the royal decrees issued by him would reflect the divine commands; thus, according to Amin Saikal, ’Abd al-Rahman became “the first Afghan ruler strongly to invoke something akin to the divine right of kings as a source of political legitimacy.” 23 Therefore, deviation from his decrees was tantamount to disobedience of the divine rules. Early in the amir’s reign, whenever the excessive repression of the amir became the cause of concern on the part of leading ‘ulama, who still wielded considerable influence over public opinion, ‘Abd al-Rahman would justify his actions as necessary steps in propagating the rule of the Shari’a, which was, after all, the basic qualification required by the ‘ulama of the country.

For example, in 1882, the amir imprisoned some of the leaders of the Afghan resistance movement against the British invasion of 1878–79. This action put ’Abd al-Rahman on a collision course with the celebrated resistance leader Mulla Din
Muhammad Andari, better known as Mulla Mushk-i ‘Alam. The amir sought to justify the incarcerations through appeal to the Shari’a. Aware of the power of Mushk-i ‘Alam to raise a rebellion, the amir dispatched a mission of mediation to the mullah with a conciliatory message contained in a decree. The text of message is incorporated in its entirety, with very slight editorial changes to its original language, into the text of Siraj al-Tawarikh. ‘Abd al-Rahman justifies his harsh policies because of the need to uphold the Shari’a through governmental siyasat. The amir begins by asserting that he considers the people of Afghanistan well-wishers of the saltanat (kingdom) and followers of the Shari’a. Then ‘Abd al-Rahman writes that no one has been imprisoned without clear proof of his deviation from the divine commands and the path of the Shari’a. The amir then asks the following rhetorical question: Would God, his Messenger, and the elders of religion (which included the ‘ulama) be satisfied if a group of Muslims were to take an oath of allegiance to an amir who had rescued the whole of an Islamic country (Afghanistan) from the attacks of foreign troops and then rebelled against him? The amir ends by stating:24

Praise be to God, since the day that we set foot back into this kingdom we have neither been desirous nor covetous of anyone’s possessions and wealth. We have given, in the way of relief, to the subjects thousands upon thousands of rupees. Never before in the royal diwan were registered as many sayyids [sadat] and ‘ulama as we have registered. And thus, all our efforts are aimed at the progress of the nation and implementing the Shari’a commands. Consequently, in very little time much of the glory of Islam has reappeared, and many ills have been rectified. Muslim women, to a great extent, have become covered in the veil of chastity and in the robe of virtue and veil of modesty. The impertinent, thieves, and highway robbers have quit their abominable acts. Security has been established in all provinces and districts out of fear of punishment [bim-i siyasat] and the diligence with which the petitioners seeking justice are attended to. No one can engage in committing murder or initiating wrongdoing any more. In the event that someone commits a crime or treachery, the shar’i wrongdoing will immediately be punished according to the fatwa of religious scholars, based on the commands of God and the Prophet, and the crimes against the state will either be punished by torture and yasa [a term derived from the ancient Mongol code of law used in nineteenth-century Afghanistan to denote capital punishment] or requited by forgiveness and benevolence.

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SHARI’A AND CUSTOMARY LAW

The eastern and northeastern Pashtun-dominated areas of the country presented significant challenges to ‘Abd al-Rahman’s plans to impose a structured and centralized legal system in his country. In the prevailing customs of the Pashtuns, the state—in this case the amir himself—was not the arbiter, nor did he have any
control over the judgments. The presence of local laws prevented the imposition of *hukumat* on *yaghistan*.

In a royal decree dated September 20, 1889, the amir reprimands the governor of Ghazni, Sardar Shirindil Khan, reminding him that in the previous year twelve cases of murder had occurred in Katawaz, eighty kilometers south of Ghazni, and not one was brought before the court. According to information provided by the local khans, four people who were accused of committing adultery were killed, and the culprits in the other crimes—presumably the murders—escaped. The amir continues to inform Shirindil Khan that, according to his orders, the accused and plaintiff in every case should come before the court. Cases involving adultery should be litigated in accordance with the Shari’a, and a judge should send his finding to the amir. Finally, if a murder suspect evades judgment by fleeing, *diya* has to be collected from the felon’s tribe. Then the amir expresses his frustration at the lack of progress in creating a uniform legal system based on the Shari’a and writes: “Not one article of the Shari’a is progressing in Katawaz, and they [the inhabitants of Katawaz district] are fearless people, on whom the governor cannot impose discipline. They find Shari’a rulings unpleasant and propagate their Afghan [i.e., Pashtun] customs.”

The amir cites the unruly attitude of the inhabitants and the corruption and ineffectiveness of government officials as reasons for the failure of the Shari’a vis-à-vis Pashtun tribal customs. Alef-Shah Zadran, who conducted fieldwork in the mid-1970s on the traditional Pashtun legal system in Almarah, a village situated some twenty-five kilometers west of Khust proper, writes that the “Pashtuns are people who live by a body of *tsali* (codes)” that he calls the “Pashtuns’ Shari’a.”

Asta Olesen explains that “the Pashtun tribesman saw no conflict in the fact that ‘what is in the Qur’an is not in Khost—and what is in Khost is not in the Qur’an.’”

‘Abd al-Rahman did replace informal or customary laws with state-sponsored and codified rules and regulations, sometimes arbitrarily, especially when the informal rules allowed room for mischievous activities that either threatened the safety of the state or deprived the amir of revenue. However, the statement by Sultan Muhammad that in ‘Abd al-Rahman’s court system “very little” was “left to custom” was more idealistic than based in reality, as customary law prevailed in spirit and practice and became the dominant means of solving disputes in periods following the amir’s rule.

**THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE HANAFI SCHOOL AS OFFICIAL STATE DOCTRINE**

The imposition of the Shari’a as state law not only challenged the traditional codes of conduct and customary laws of the various tribal confederacies living in Afghanistan, but also it institutionalized the Hanafi school of jurisprudence (fiqh) as Afghanistan’s only religious rite. *Asas al-Quzat* lays out a strict interpretation of the application of the Hanafi *fiqh*. When presented a case, the *qazis* and the *muftis*
must base their rulings on those upon which Abu Hanifa (d. 767), Abu Yusuf (d. 795), and Muhammad al-Shaybani (d. 805) have agreed. If there are differences of opinion, then Abu Hanifa’s interpretation must be given precedence over the other two. Furthermore, in *Asas al-Quzat* there is no indication that the judges can base their judgment on schools of jurisprudence (*fiqh*) other than the Hanafi.

However, while officially following the Hanafi rite, there was evidence of flexibility. According to Kakar, in some areas of the law, the amir relied on the Maliki interpretation of the Shari’a, in particular with regard to *ta’zir* punishments, within the framework of the Maliki doctrine of *siyasa shar’iya* (governance in accordance with the Shari’a). This doctrine gives the sovereign the right to use any methods to discover where guilt lies and to apply the kind of punishment that fits the nature of crime and the character of the offender, even if it exceeds a comparable punishment under the *hudud* ordinances. Additionally, in *Ihtisab al-Din*, which served as the guideline for the supervisors (*muhtasib*) of religious and moral codes, it is stated that the *muhtasib* must not enforce the Hanafi rulings on those deeds that are considered permissible in one school and forbidden in another. The text gives the example of eating lizards, which, though not allowed in the Hanafi jurisprudence, is permissible in Shafi’i jurisprudence. This kind of flexibility was justified because of the importance of preventing discord among Muslims. Since there are no indications that in the nineteenth century there was a significant number of Shafi’i followers in Afghanistan, nor was eating lizards an issue in the country, the flexibility described in *Ihtisab al-Din* can be best viewed as an indication that the ‘ulama under the amir were aware of the permissibility of minor rituals included in other schools of jurisprudence under a state that officially adhered to the Sunni branch of Islam. On the other hand, the same flexibility did not extend to those segments of the population in Afghanistan who did not follow Sunni doctrines.

*The Position of Shi’is in the Amir’s Centralization Policies*

Prior to accession to amirship, ‘Abd al-Rahman generally held a favorable attitude toward the Shi’is and the Hazaras. Once amir, this continued. He then set out to centralize the country under an ecumenical state in which all Muslims were viewed as equals so long as they obeyed the commands of the *ulu’l-amr* and, particular to the Hazaras, that there be no “Yaghistan-i Hazara.”

In *Sarrishta-yi Islamiyya-yi Rum*, a publication dated 1886, the amir calls on his people to emulate the example set by the Ottomans in organizing a strong military force. He addresses his people as “O people of Afghanistan, who are Dur- rani and Ghilja’i and Persian-speakers and Hazaras and Turks, you all belong to Afghanistan, and are all believers and Muslims.” Likewise, in 1887, the amir, in a letter to a number of Hazara leaders, asserted that “if we were to think that there was a distinction between Afghan [Pashtun] and Hazara, both of whom have the
same qibla, belong to the community of one Prophet (peace be upon him), and are devotees of one Book, and separate them one from the other, then on the Day of Reckoning before the Lord of the Religion and the Book, we would be ashamed and have no answer.”

In the case of law, although the guidelines to the judges ordered them to pass judgment in accordance with Hanafi fiqh, there is no evidence to suggest that initially this rule was applied to Hazaras or that the central government had the power to enforce the judgments in the courts in the Hazara districts, where the population was predominantly Shi’i.

Beginning in 1891, ‘Abd al-Rahman’s ecumenical attitude and policies eventually gave way to a fierce hostility toward the Hazaras when he tried to impose the power of the central government on them. The amir declared jihad against the people of Hazarajat in 1892 and solicited fatwas from a number of Sunni ulama, which declared the rebellious Hazaras infidels. A massive propaganda campaign followed, encouraging people, mostly Pashtun nomadic groups, to kill and pillage the now-anathematized Hazaras.

At times ‘Abd al-Rahman tried to differentiate between those Hazaras who were loyal to him, and by extension to the state, and those who rebelled or resisted the centralization campaigns and thus remained yaghi. However, the amir did not trust the Shi’is in sensitive civilian and military positions, where their loyalty to the Afghan state could be questionable.

Contrary to the above-noted statement published by the amir in 1887, where the Hazaras were included as part of the people of Afghanistan, in a sermon to his people in 1894, ‘Abd al-Rahman addresses them in the following way:

Let it not be hidden from the wise and the learned of Afghanistan, be it Afghan, Tajik, or Turk, that in stating a few words I wish to enlighten those who are dear to me, the nation, and those who are of the same religion and creed (mazhab) as I . . . First, I declare to you all that the king who is from the people of Afghanistan, and the army that is from Afghanistan’s own people, will be one and of the same nature as the subjects of Afghanistan.

The term “Hazara” is explicitly omitted from this published address, and this omission is underscored by the phrase “who are of the same religion and creed as I.”

After the pacification of the Hazarajat region, the amir sought to apply the same version of the Shari’a throughout his kingdom by imposing Hanafi Sunni courts on the Shi’i-dominated parts of Afghanistan. Not only were Hanafi judges appointed in 1893 to Shi’i regions, but the amir also sanctioned forcibly educating the Shi’i Hazaras in Hanafi Sunni Islam in 1895. The amir also banned Shi’i religious ceremonies such as the Ashura, which commemorates the death of Husayn bin ‘Ali, the third imam of the Shi’is.

From ‘Abd al-Rahman’s policies toward his Shi’i subjects, Kakar deduces that the amir “wished to make his Muslim subjects adhere only to the Sunni faith of Islam, and thus bring religious unity among them.”
The only reference in the court manuals published during the reign of 'Abd al-Rahman to the status of non-Muslim minorities before the law is Rule 75 of Asas al-Quzat. It spells out the administration of the oath at the beginning of a court hearing. It says that Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians must take their oaths in accordance with their own religions. This, apparently, ensured the honesty of their testimonies. This rule on taking oaths, however, does not specify that any other law but the Shari'a can be applied to the cases involving non-Muslims. The only exception recorded by Fayz Muhammad Katib appears to have been in a case of embezzlement of government funds by Hindu civil servants in 1891. Instead of ordering the trial of the accused according to the Shari'a, the amir sent a royal decree to Diwan Naranjan Das, a Hindu financial officer for the southern zone of Kabul, and inquired about punishment for theft in the Hindu religious texts. He then proceeded to apply that punishment to the culprit rather than imposing the Shari'a punishment.

The exact number of non-Muslims in Afghanistan in the latter two decades of the nineteenth century is not known. There was a considerable number of Hindus scattered in the east and south, especially in cities such as Kabul, Jalalabad, and Qandahar. Hindus worked in the government, mostly as accountants, and a large number of them were traders. Few Jewish families lived in Herat, Kabul, and parts of Afghan Turkistan. The reference to the Christians most probably is to the few Armenians who lived in Kabul. There is information on one Armenian who served as the translator for John Gary, the British physician of the amir.

There is not much known about Zoroastrians in Afghanistan during the period in question, but a reference to them in Asas al-Quzat suggests that there still existed some remnants of that native belief. Another explanation for the inclusion in Asas al-Quzat of the Zoroastrians and Christians, two faiths that were not represented in any significant number in Afghanistan, can be that adherents of these faiths along with Judaism are accepted by Islam as People of the Book and therefore needed to be included in the original sources for the manual for Afghan judges.

Despite lack of reference to the position of Hindus in formal judicial texts, Amir 'Abd al-Rahman's court system included a commercial tribunal in Kabul for settling disputes among merchants to which at its inception in 1893 the amir appointed four Muslim and three Hindu magistrates. According to Katib, the amir ordered the members of the panchat courts (mahkama-yi panchat), each of whom is described as being a trustworthy and influential merchant, to solve any commercial dispute brought before them in consultation with one another. The term panchat (or panchayat) is Hindi in origin and refers to the council of arbiters that constituted of five or more village elders who could rule on civic disputes in a
community. In the twentieth century, the *panchat* or *panchayat* system of arbitration seems to have referred to practices among the Pashtuns of the tribal areas of British India as discussed in chapter 7 in this volume.

While not referring specifically to the existence of a commercial tribunal or *panchat* court, Frank Martin illustrates the amir’s handling of a commercial dispute sometime after 1895. In a rare glimpse into the functioning of the court, Martin recounts that an Afghan merchant petitioned the amir for help so that he could recover an amount of money owed to him by the British government for supplies he furnished to their army of occupation during the Second Anglo-Afghan War. The amir “thought the best way to do justice to the man, without committing himself to any decision, was to appoint six persons chosen from among the leading merchants in Kabul,” including Martin, to review the case. When the documents, all written in English, were presented to the committee, it was discovered that man had no claim. The presence of Martin on the committee may have been due to the fact that the lawsuit had been brought against the British government and, thus, the amir had wished to have a British subject present to ensure fairness. Another reason for Martin’s participation may have been that no one in the court was able to read the documents presented by the plaintiff, which, as Martin pointedly states, were written in English. From the information provided, the conclusion may be drawn that the amir wanted the *panchat* court to be a tribunal with international members, namely Indians and occasionally British, with the capacity to settle disputes between Afghan merchants and foreign states or when foreign tradesman had commercial problems with the Afghan government.

The elevation of Shari’a according to the Hanafi creed as the supreme and only state law of Afghanistan under ’Abd al-Rahman was institutionally enforced in most cases with the formal exception of commercial disputes involving non-Muslim parties in the dispute. This expedient system allowed the government in Kabul to ensure that commercial ties with British India were preserved and expanded, and that merchants could do business in Afghanistan with the confidence of legal protection. The minor rights granted to Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians under the law were according to the Muslim custom and had little practical impact as the number of adherents of those religions living in Afghanistan in the latter decades of the nineteenth century were minuscule.

THE ISLAMIZATION OF THE JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION AND WOMEN

The supremacy of Shari’a courts over local customs, as Ashraf Ghani argues, gave women the right to dispute legal cases for the first time in the history of Afghanistan. To enable female subjects to take advantage of their Islamic rights,
the amir instructed judges in the cities to designate one day or half a day each week, depending on demand, to women petitioners only. In the month of August 1893, an inn (sira‘i) in Kabul was designated exclusively for women travelers who had come to the capital from provinces to appeal their cases before the court.

There is abundant evidence all through primary sources showing women exercising their right to use the legal system. In *Siraj al-tawarikh*, there are several cases where ‘Abd al-Rahman, upon learning that women were treated as commodities, intervened to correct the situations according to the Shari‘a. For example, when a woman whose husband was out of the country was sold to another man by force, the amir ordered both the seller and the buyer to be punished severely and declared the transaction against the Shari‘a. Similarly, when two men settled their
dispute according to custom versus the Shari'a by exchanging their wives with one another, the amir angrily responded, “May God damn your father! Which sect, set of beliefs, community, or religion holds such an exchange and quid pro quo to be acceptable and lets tribal leaders perpetrate and decide such a thing?” The amir continued to add that in Islam “such an act is utterly forbidden.”

The amir’s response to a petition from a woman from Herat is illustrative of the impact of the new rights granted to women. After reviewing the woman’s request, the amir ordered the chief justice (khan-i 'ulum) to force the husband either to pay for his wife’s living expenses or to divorce her. In an editorial style, Katib adds that since ‘Abd al-Rahman, “in contrast with previous rulers of Afghanistan, had put this legal rule into effect (i.e., pay maintenance or provide a divorce) and made it effective throughout the country during his reign,” recording one case of many “indicates” the amir’s concern for Shari’a.

**ISLAM AS NATIONALISM**

‘Abd al-Rahman understood the composition of his state as a multiethnic, feudal patchwork of disassociated communities with no common bond other than a strong belief in the religion of Islam. The obvious difference between the adherents of Shi'i and Sunni Islam notwithstanding, the only tie between various communities and tribal confederations was Islam, as interpreted in accordance with local customs and with its laws enforced by locally appointed clergymen over which the central government had little to no influence. What the amir desired was to force on every community and tribal confederation within his domain a single interpretation of Islam that would derive from him.

In 1896, after the subjugation of the Hazaras was completed, the amir put into practice his long-standing aim of conquering the only non-Muslim region in the country and the last autonomous part thereof, a region northeast of Kabul known as Kafiristan (Land of the Infidels). While the justification for the conquest of Kafiristan was the spread of Islam, in practice, the amir’s primary concern was extending hukumat into the last yaghistan within his state. During the campaign to pacify the region, Field Marshal Ghulam Haydar Khan sent the following message to the Kafirs of Barikut:

> It is not the duty of the government to compel, force, or impose on them to accept, or take the path of, the religion of Islam. The obligation that does exist is this: that they render obedience and pay their taxes. As long as they do not disobey this command, they will not incinerate themselves with the fire of the padishah’s [king’s] wrath. In addition, they are not to block the building of the road [that was planned through their territory].

In the end, Kafiristan was subdued; most of its residents either by force or for economic reason—namely avoiding the jizya poll tax—were converted to Islam;
and the region later became known as Nuristan (Land of Light). ‘Abd al-Rahman’s final conquest was celebrated with the publication in 1896 or 1897 of a celebratory poem, and Katib bestowed upon him the nickname “Idol-Smasher.”

With the completion of military campaigns in 1896 aimed at bringing all hitherto-autonomous regions (i.e., *yaghistan*) under authority of the central government, the amir embarked on a plan to lay the foundation of a nation, if with less vigor and less tangible results than his state-formation schemes. In May 1896, in a tribal covenant (*ahdnama-i qawmi*) the Muhammadza’i—the amir’s own subtribe—bestowed upon ‘Abd al-Rahman the title “Light of the Nation and of the Religion” (*ziya al-milla wa’l-din*). Making use of the symbolism of this honorific title in furthering his nation-building aims, the amir ordered that thereafter, on every August 17 an annual national commemoration would be held in every corner of Afghanistan, known as the National Day of Unity (*jashn-i muttafiqiya-i milli*). While this was at best a symbolic attempt to unify the different nationalities living in the country, it did nevertheless serve as the precursor to undertakings by later Afghan monarchs to create a national state.

While the amir recognized his nation to be multiethnic in nature, he equated Afghan identity with the Pashtun identity. The nation-state that he established was based on the supremacy of the Pashtuns and as a Pashtun nation, notwithstanding the facts that ‘Abd al-Rahman participated—if somewhat reluctantly—in delineating his country’s boundaries and, as a result, relinquished Afghan sovereignty over half of the Pashtuns living in the northwestern part of British India. As seen in chapter 8, by Faridullah Bezhan, the merger of Afghanistan’s nationalism with Pashtun supremacy has continued to be part of Afghan reality and experience. As Amin Saikal has argued, the price of national cohesion orchestrated by ‘Abd al-Rahman was that Pashtuns were instituted “as an overlord vis-à-vis all others, and not only in the political and military aspects; such issues as the sense of ethnic superiority among Pashtuns . . . were great obstacles on the road to genuine national consolidation of Afghanistan, yet they formed the backbone of every Afghan monarch’s policy.”

CONCLUSIONS

Until the reign of Amir ‘Abd al-Rahman Khan, Afghanistan was a loosely governed country with many parts of it devoid of government (*hukumat*), areas that the amir often described as *yaghistan*, land of the unruly. With help from his British patrons, he demarcated Afghanistan’s boundaries, creating a defined geographical entity over which to exercise his sovereignty, despite formally acquiescing to relinquish control over a large number of Pashtuns. However, it was his clear determination to impose the ordinance of government (*a’īn-i hukumat*) on the entire state with internationally agreed-upon borders over which he was sovereign.
Among the strategies used by the amir in his state-building process was indeed the use of terror, intimidation, and forced exile, made possible by the creation of a strong, centralized, and surprisingly loyal national military. However, this chapter has tried to briefly illustrate how ‘Abd al-Rahman legitimized his drive for creation of a centralized and defined state through an Islamization process that began with the reorganization and expansion of the judicial system and how this process affected various segments of Afghan society. The amir inextricably linked the legitimacy of his rule (and the implicit illegitimacy of any others) to clearly understood Islamic notions of justice and governance, and he repeatedly insisted that any divergence from his rule was tantamount to deviation from Islam. Justice and good governance were effected through a visible and accessible system of courts. He consistently and repeatedly asserted the idea that if people obeyed the state (i.e., the amir), then they would not only ensure their own safety and security but also be afforded a defined, fair, and transparent system of judicial recourse.

As Amin Saikal has written, while the “substantive political, administrative, legal, economic and social reforms” of ‘Abd al-Rahman were undoubtedly “limited in scope, and were in accordance” with his “perceived political needs and resources available to him,” these reforms nonetheless laid “the basis for the institution of identifiable governmental, administrative and Islamic-legal systems.” And at the end of his rule, according to M. Nazif Shahrani, ‘Abd al-Rahman had “created an Afghanistan that had recognized international boundaries, was politically unified, and governed directly by a centralized authority, within the framework of fairly well-defined and universally applied administrative and judiciary rules and regulations.”

Writing a century after ‘Abd al-Rahman’s rule, Mohammad Hashim Kamali wrote that “Islam is the strongest unifying force within Afghan society.” However, when discussing the leaders of religious groups in Afghanistan such as judges, muftis, and the ‘ulama more generally, Kamali explained there exists no “organized system to determine the power and influence of the religious groups.” Kamali continues, the “absence of a centralized structure has meant that religious leadership in Afghanistan is almost wholly governed by local patterns and the personal attributes” of the ‘ulama and mullahs.

Thus, despite ‘Abd al-Rahman’s efforts to curb the power and influence of religious groups by ordering the clergy and the ‘ulama to pass a test of their religious knowledge and those claiming descent from Muslim Prophet Muhammad to prove their lineage, it seems localism and unregulated Islam have prevailed in Afghanistan and not ‘Abd al-Rahman’s vision of a centralized, regulated Islam answerable to the state, which according to some scholars is more natural for the country’s makeup. More studies of ‘Abd al-Rahman’s centralization policies and practices may be a useful tool for Afghanistan’s future models of governance and for determining the role of Islam in the country’s national and political fabric.
In 1914, Husayn Ahmad Madani (1879–1957) and ‘Ubaydullah Sindhi (1872–1944), two members of the Dar al-‘Ulum madrasa, at Deoband, in northern India, proposed that the Pashtun tribe represented the ideal of a Muslim society and could steer the fate of the Indian Muslim nation. They called for a jihad in the Indian northwest supported both by nationalist Indians and members of the Afghan court. Although it received a great deal of attention from the colonial authorities, this short-lived movement failed to accomplish anything. Moreover, through attention to treatment of the principle of tribalism in other vernacular Urdu and Persian texts, this chapter argues that the view of the tribe as a model for the Muslim nation as proposed in Jama‘at-i Mujahidin politics and in historiography was completely incompatible both with the participatory nationalist political discourses in the North-West Frontier Province of colonial India and with the Afghan nationalist project of knowledge production. This fact would be unexceptional were it not for that fact that the idea of Pashtun Islamic tribal valor was resuscitated subsequently during the 1978–85 mobilization of anti-Soviet resistance.

Because of this aftermath of the Jama‘at-i Mujahidin movement, it is useful to consider the inadequacies of the movement and the counternarratives to the idea of Islamic religiosity and valor as foundational principles of tribal order in the Pashtun highlands, both in the Jama‘at-i Mujahidin’s own time and in the later twentieth century.

A growing body of scholarly work identifies multiple coexistent patterns of Pashtun social and political organization in the Indo-Afghan borderlands, meaningfully complicating binary views of tribe and the state in eastern Afghanistan, and the role of religion in shaping a social order. I have argued in an early work...
that the definition and organization of community in the Pashtun region east of the Durand Line and the work of religious leaders among them were inextricably intertwined with the colonial cartographic demarcation of a military frontier. Magnus Marsden and Benjamin Hopkins’s *Fragments of the Afghan Frontier* knits together ethnographic and historical accounts of the frontier region, on both sides of the Durand Line, to argue that the region is marked by fluidity and that its strategic significance was conceptualized, actualized, and experienced in a variety of ways through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In a study of contemporary aspects of the *Pashtun Question*, Abubakar Siddique has argued that the lack of incorporation of Pashtuns into the economic and political fabric of the state has fostered religious extremism in the region. In this volume, Faridullah Bezhan has argued that from the first half of the twentieth century, the Awaken Youth Party rejected tribal politics and sought to unify a following among the eastern Pashtuns by appealing to shared ethnolinguistic priorities.

Lineage-based organization and religious authority coexisted and competed with other patterns of social organization and were selectively invoked by political actors and statesmen on either side of the Durand Line over the course of the twentieth century. This chapter usefully explores the use of the idea of tribal Pashtuns as lineage clans loyal to each other and to the instructions of their religious leaders, so-called Islamic tribes, in twentieth-century texts as an instrumentalist recognition of nonrepresentative authority. The instrumentalist use of this idea is exemplified through contrast with considerations of tribal organization and subjecthood in other Indian religiopolitical texts and in some Afghan texts exploring the geography of the Afghan state.

**ANTI-COLONIAL POLITICS AND THE VALORIZATION OF THE PASHTUN TRIBE**

Inspired by nationalist ideals, in 1915 several members of the Dar al-‘Ulum Deoband, Mahmud al-Hasan and three of his students—Huṣayn Ahmad Madani, ‘Ubaydullah Sindhi, and Muhammad Miyan—initiated the frontier-based Jama‘at-i Mujahidin movement. Its aim was to finance and organize militant activity in the North-West Frontier Province of colonial India in order to destabilize the British Indian Government and provide a convenient point for the Ottoman army to open a new front against the British during World War I. ‘Ubaydullah Sindhi argued that a struggle based on *ittihad-i Islam* (unification of Islam) was the only thing that could truly liberate India. This was the base that ‘Ubaydullah Sindhi had argued was essential for any Islamic intellectual or religious movement, a center of military organization from which a political and religious agenda could be promoted. Such unifying organization could not be carried out or administered in India proper because of the effectiveness of the British colonial intelligence...
system, and so the Deobandis took their Jama’at-i Mujahidin movement to the nonadministered Tribal Areas of the Indo-Afghan frontier, the region that they referred as Yaghistan, or “Land of the Free.”

Participants in the movement of the Jama’at-i Mujahidin saw themselves as closely connected to the political and social ambitions of Sayyid Ahmad Barelwi (1786–1831) and hence also to the Pashtuns and to the frontier region in general. Madani explained that “the revolutionary party based on Shah Waliullah’s and ‘Abd al-‘Aziz’s instruction and command was finally born in the nineteenth century through the splendor of Sayyid Ahmad Barelwi and his Jama’at (organization).” The significance of the new movement was both intellectual and geographic. The historical importance of the suba-yi sarhad (frontier province), as Madani referred to it, was that it was a space within which post-Mughal Indian Islam had made important political advances in working toward a free Muslim region. Thus, Sayyid Ahmad’s jihad in the late 1820s and early 1830s was intended to reclaim a space and dignity for the practice of the Muslim faith. Madani particularly pointed out that this program had Hindu-centered and anti-British concerns; it was not anti-Hindu. He emphasized that the movement had included Hindus and that the jihad was directed against the Sikh ruler Ranjit Singh (r. 1801–39), only insofar as Ranjit Singh was an extension of the East India Company’s power and influence. His concluding statement on the movement was that “the primary motive of this Jama’at was to remove foreigners from ‘Hindustan’ and to establish a democratic rule in the country.”

The historical casting of the sarhad (frontier) as a region where Islam itself had a tremendous potential to mobilize and lead formed the essential counterpart to the Mahmud Ghazniesque view of the frontier as an entry point for Islam. Deobandi historiography cast the Pashtun region (and specifically what were later dubbed the Tribal Areas) as a Muslim political space and saw the region as an integral part of the development of the ideas of the eighteenth-century Delhi Naqshbandi Sufi, Shah Waliullah (d. 1762).

Twentieth-century members of the Jama’at-i Mujahidin stressed the religious character of the Pashtun people in the Tribal Areas. Muhammad ‘Ali Kasuri wrote that the Pashtuns were true Muslims, and in their country women could walk unafraid as no man would even raise his eyes to look at them. He argued that there was no need for police or a judiciary as crime was dealt with immediately and justly by the village-level councils (panchayats), tribal social and political institutions. This brought the Tribal Areas close to the ideal of civilization and community expressed in the Prophet Muhammad’s time in Arabia. Kasuri said that the village councils (panchayat) expressed and pursued religious ideals, keeping an Islamic structure intact. This idea was widely shared. In a letter to Mawlana Mahmud al-Hasan, one of his deputies on the frontier calling himself the Bukhari Mulla declared:

The people of this country resemble the tribes of Arabia in their qualities of enduring hardships and of independence and brotherhood. These people are, of course, afraid
of being branded as kafirs (infidels). If a mullah (mawlawi) were to tell them that they would become kafirs if they did a certain thing, they would never go near it. The influence of the clerics (‘ulama) and shaykhs is due mainly to these characteristics.

Likening the Pashtuns to the people of Arabia, the Bukhari Mulla suggested that the structure of tribalism was a basic and sturdy model of social organization—the Pashtuns were both independent, yet committed to principles of brotherhood. This structure made them more devoted to their religious leaders, which in turn promoted more effective religious values and priorities.

Most importantly, the tribe was lauded as a functional military unit, as “stable as the mountains” themselves. The military strategy of the Jama’at-i Mujahidin required that religious and tribal leaders bring small lashkars (militias) into battle with the British. The Al-Mujahid newspaper called for the Muhmand, Wazir, Mahsud, Afridi, Swati, and all their clans and tribes to mobilize in support of one another. It was argued that it was only through such a compact between the ethnically connected segmentary groups that the structural and governmental independence of all could be achieved. During the British campaigns in the Afridi Khajuri Plains, near the Afghan border, in 1931, an editorial in the Al-Mujahid newspaper articulated an expectation of such combined military action by the frontier tribes who would launch on “ghaza [raids] and jihad on the border and in India.” So affiliated, the Pashtuns of the Tribal Areas and Administered Districts were two separate “bodies, with one life in them.”

Deobandi historical writings associated tribal Pashtuns with the passage of entry into India and its natural enclosure. ‘Ubaydullah Sindhi outlined the historical significance of the Tribal Areas and the Pashtuns that inhabited them in the Zati Da’iri. These, he said, were the pahari gawms, mountain nations, that had accepted Islam and aided Mahmud Ghazni (r. 998–1030) on his incursions into India. Sindhi highlighted this particular region as an area distinct from Afghanistan and
from the Pashtun communities south and east of the Peshawar Valley. Sindhi implied that as pahari, mountain people, these Pashtuns had a distinct ethos that separated them from Pashtuns in the lowlands east and west of them. Furthermore, these people had accepted Islam later than the Afghan Pashtun communities—in fact they had accepted Islam as a result of Mahmud Ghazni’s passage through the mountains and into India. This description had two implications: first, that these Pashtuns were a community by virtue of their altitudinal situation; second, that the Pashtun history in the Tribal Areas was directly linked to the narrative of an Indian Muslim past in India.

Mahmud al-Rahman Sahib Nadwi, who as a writer of the history of Hind (India) styled himself after the famous colonial Indian historian Sir Jadunath Sarkar (1870–1958), explained the Khyber region as the meeting point of the Indian and Afghan kingdoms. The areas east of Ghazni, Peshawar, and Kohat had been under the rule of a Lahore-based raja until the Samanid governor Alaptagin (r. 961–68) extended Afghan control over them. A long, drawn-out battle ensued that kept pushing the frontier between the Muslims and the Hindus back and forth between the mountains and the river Indus. The battle ended unresolved as the weather changed and both the mountains and the river Indus became uncrossable, leaving the people of the area in-between azad, free, and khud mukhtar, self-governing. In this narrative, the Pashtun region between India and Afghanistan could be understood only as a social and a political frontier—an area whose national belonging and imperial affiliation were contested by virtue of its geographical location.

As the furthest northwestern reach of the Indian subcontinent, the North-West Frontier Province was depicted as a point of entry of Islam into the subcontinent and as the location of the clash between the Hindu and the Muslim empires of old. Nadwi also posited the idea of an Afghan state against a Hindustani state—a theme that underlay the majority of twentieth-century historical accounts of the incursions into India of Mahmud Ghazni, whether in Urdu, Hindi, or English. The Pashtun tribes occupied the liminal space between the two monoliths, unconcerned by the politics of Delhi or Kabul; they were people of the mountains. The casting of Pashtuns in such ways assuaged nationalist insecurities about the shape and coherence of the polity they sought to liberate. The narratives of the past proposed by the Deobandis were in this way premised on contemporaneous concerns about the modern state and social identity and established the extent of the nationalist imagination. Like Indian politics, Indian historiography was not an evenly disciplined field but contested ground on which battles were fought over authenticity and validity. Articulations of historicity, the transmission of even contested knowledge, had the potential to reassure a community, establishing its past, its present, and its posterity.

The representation of the tribe as separate and distinct from settled society supported the military ambitions of the Jama’at-i Mujahidin, who were preparing to
liberate India through an invasion from the northwest. The Jama’at participated in and supported the mobilizations of lashkars (militias), which were deployed alternately in support of the Afghan king, in resolution of local disputes, or in a few instances, in attacks on colonial installations or across the administered border. Members of the Jama’at-i Mujahidin left India and made their way to Afghanistan, where they could operate in relative security; in Afghanistan, Muhammad ‘Ali Kasuri said, people would not look at him suspiciously when he talked about ‘Islami millat, Islami shari’a, or Islami ukhuwwat (Islamic nation, Islamic law, Islamic brotherhood). Members of the Jama’at-i Mujahidin received stipends and a hearing at the court and found positions as editors, teachers, and civil servants. Another among them, Haiji ‘Abd al-Razzaq, had moved to Jalalabad in 1916 and quickly won favor with Sardar Nasrullah Khan, the brother of Afghanistan’s ruler, Amir Habibullah Khan (r. 1901–19), and then with Amanullah Khan (r. 1919–29) on his ascendance to the Afghan throne. During the war of 1919, Amanullah Khan deputed ‘Abd al-Razzaq to organize an “army of the north-west frontiers of the samt-i mashriqi [eastern side]. Concerning the [manner of] union of the heads and chiefs of Dir, Swat, Chitral, and others around that area, we leave the matter entirely to your judgment.” By charging Razzaq with arranging a military front within the Tribal Areas, Amanullah avoided the appearance of rejecting the Durand Line. He cautioned ‘Abd al-Razzaq to “consider the welfare of [his] faith and [his] government: but to initiate the ittihad (unity) in his own right.”

Another member of the group, Sayf al-Rahman, was involved in quite a different capacity in Afghanistan. He had moved to Kabul in 1914 after spending a year in Swat, Buner, and Bajaur with the Jama’at-i Mujahidin at Mahmud al-Hasan’s command. The earliest document in his personal papers is a translation of a proclamation for distribution in Afghanistan decrying the Russian expansionism and calling for a jihad to protect the Ka’ba, the Ottoman Caliphate, and for the unity of all Muslims. Sayf al-Rahman had been personally approved and honored by Amir Habib al-Rahman in 1918 by a firman (order) inviting him to reside with the mustawfi al-mamalik (finance minister) at Jalalabad and granting him a personal cash allowance of nine hundred Kabuli rupees. The ruler Habibullah Khan treated Sayf al-Rahman as another of the line of Indian-educated scholars already residing in Afghanistan. In 1919, after Habibullah’s overthrow, his successor Amanullah Khan issued another royal firman granting Sayf al-Rahman and his brother and sister a “house, garden, and cultivating lands” under a three-year tax exemption. In return, Amanullah expected that Sayf al-Rahman and his brother would “pray for the [Afghan] government and employ themselves in aiding/assisting the government.” A subsequent firman in the same year, 1919, added an allowance of four thousand rupees. Amanullah Khan went on to appoint Sayf al-Rahman to the position of qazi-yi askari (military judge) and brigadier in 1919 and subsequently to the bench of the Kabul high court in 1922.
patronized Sayf al-Rahman as an Indian-educated religious scholar with little suggestion that he had any interest in his Indian nationalist aspirations. Rather, he looked to the Deobandi scholar to help formulate and put in place a new order that centered on administrative, military, and legal reform in Afghanistan. Sayf al-Rahman's work in Kabul served the Afghan nationalist cause, and although he remained nostalgic for India, he lived out his career in Afghanistan as a servant of the state, supporting state building and centralization rather than a policy of tribal mobilization.37

As Sayf al-Rahman's career trajectory suggests, the Jama'at-i Mujahidin was not a long-lived movement. In India, some of its leaders were incarcerated during World War I, while others dispersed during or shortly after 1919. ‘Ubaydullah Sindhi eventually drifted back to Sindh, where he set up a madrasa and continued writing on his understanding of Islamic revivalism. After the overthrow and exile of King Amanullah Khan in 1929, his successor Nadir Shah (r. 1929–33) continued occasional payments to the Mulla Chaknawari, Hajji Turangza'i, and other Indian or border-area religious figures who presented themselves at the Kabul court after 1931. Later, after the foundation of Pakistan in 1947, the Kabul government used links to the religious leaders in Pakistan's Tribal Areas to fuel the Pashtunistan secessionist movement.38 Badshah Gul of the Pakistan-side Muhmand areas publicly parted ways with the government and sought support and safety at the Kabul court.39 Meanwhile, the so-called Fakir of Ipi Mirza ‘Ali Khan (1897–1960) was reported to have been provided with a printing press by the Afghan government and maintained a headquarters of the Pashtunistan movement in Wana.40 But overall, Amanullah Khan's careful and uncommitted patronage of the Jama'at-i Mujahidin's networks, military strategy, and intellectual contributions demonstrates the lack of utility of both their conceptual and their strategic approach to engagement with the Pashtun lineage groups through religious authoritative figures. Subsequent development of political discourses in colonial India and in Afghanistan suggest how far outside the realm of Indian and Afghan normative politics and social-scientific thinking this proposition really was.

**Nationalist Discourses in Colonial NWFP**

After the reforms of 1919 that extended the remit of participatory politics by constituting legislative councils and broadening the franchise, two new political movements gained prominence in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). These were the Jam‘iyyat al-‘Ulama-yi Hind (an organization of religious scholars largely from the Dar al-‘Ulum seminary at Deoband) and the Khuda‘i Khidmatgar (the frontier branch of Gandhi’s Congress Party).41 Emerging out of a participatory political arena, neither organization could accommodate the notional construct of the tribe as a social model, as proposed by the Jama‘at-i Mujahidin, with
their political outlook. Their vernacular adaptation of the discourse of tribalism perpetuated the political exclusion of the so-called tribal population from representative politics.

In 1927, NWFP-based supporters of the Khilafat movement to support the Ottoman Empire invited the Jam‘iyyat al-‘Ulama-yi Hind to hold its annual meeting in Peshawar. This meeting marked the inception of a formal Jam‘iyyat al-‘Ulma presence and concern in the frontier region. The Jam‘iyyat al-‘Ulama-yi Hind’s concerns with the sarhad (frontier) were described in the Muslim Outlook newspaper as being a desire to counter “the wicked indifference of the bureaucracy in extending reforms to the NWFP” and to bring this Muslim-majority province into the mainframe of the emerging Indian (Hindustani) nationalism. Motivated by both a concern for mobilizing the Muslims of India and the greater anticolonial Indian nationalist cause, the Jam‘iyyat al-‘Ulma-yi Hind sought to secure Muslim presence in the emerging political space and devolution of powers within India. It championed the cause for separate electorates, as well as the extension of reforms to Muslim-majority provinces, positing the clerics (‘ulama) as the natural and appropriate leadership for India’s Muslims. The Jam‘iyyat al-‘Ulma-yi Hind looked to Muslims to express their piety in their legal subjecthood and civil conduct.

Mawlawi Anwar Shah’s presidential address in 1927 broadly addressed the political state of affairs in the NWFP, a statement that can be read to define the Jam‘iyyat al-‘Ulma-yi Hind’s primary political objectives and envisioning of the province. He described the Muslims of the frontier as part of a greater Muslim baradari or fraternity, a concept that had been proposed by ‘Ubaydullah Sindhi and Husayn Ahmad Madani in their considerations of India’s Muslim community. Mawlawi Anwar Shah believed that the British government undermined the social interests of the Pashtuns by treating the sarhad or frontier as a line of defense around India and trying to subjugate the Pashtuns in the interests of security within Hindustan. He argued that this marginalization had to be corrected by bringing the sarhad into the mainframe of political processes and by benefiting from the political reforms enacted elsewhere in India. However, he cited the colonial geography of India to separate Afghanistan from the North-West Frontier Province and include it as part of the greater Hindustani (or Indian) political world. He once again quoted the committee report that described the frontier as a fully legitimate and complete province of India, delimited by “nature, which has built a wall between Hindustan and extraterritorial invaders.” Imperial defense concerns influenced the Jam‘iyyat al-‘Ulma-yi Hind’s approach to the Pashtun question.

The Jam‘iyyat al-‘Ulma-yi Hind’s approach appears to have taken much from ‘Ubaydullah Sindhi and Husayn Ahmad Madani’s conceptualization of Pashtun qawmiyat (here, nationalism). But it departed from this earlier discourse of Pashtun participation in the anticolonial movement on one crucial point: the extent of the NWFP. While Sindhi and Madani had firmly and necessarily understood
the Tribal Areas to be part of the Hindustani-Pashtun political arena, basing
the movement of the Jama‘at-i Mujahidin there and describing the tribe as an ideal
social unit, Anwar Shah nonetheless described the qaba‘ili or tribal appendage of
the NWFP as an unjustified burden on the province and its resources. He believed
that the government would do better to allocate NWFP tax remittances to the
reform scheme and the costs of a legislative council. He considered it necessary
that the British allowed the “independent tribes” the chance to progress in peace
and security but described this as a relationship of mutual benefit between what he
referred to as the sarhad-i Hind (frontier of India) and the azad qaba‘il (indepen-
dent tribes) as two exclusive and separate formations, the former of which was at a
higher stage of social, civilizational, economic, and political development than the
latter. Anwar Shah did not preclude the incorporation of the Tribal Areas into the
more progressive Pashtun regions, rather suggesting that this ought to and would
come about gradually.

Anwar Shah’s position emerged from reflection on the cultural and social dis-
similarities between the so-called tribal Pashtuns and those of the settled district,
the same sort of thinking that had underpinned the proposals for basing the move-
ment of the Jama‘at-i Mujahidin in the Tribal Areas. Working for coherence and
mobilization of a Muslim electoral base, he could not accommodate the principle
of tribal hierarchy and informal dispute resolution into the Jam‘iyyat al-‘Ulama-
i Hind’s political agenda; nor could he propose the sort of cultural and political
reform in the region that would displace the authority of and make enemies of
the khans or the religious leaders who extended moral support to the Jam‘iyyat
al-‘Ulama-yi Hind’s agenda. Despite the religious underpinnings of the Jama‘at-
i Mujahidin’s acknowledgment of the Pashtun tribe, the Jam‘iyyat al-‘Ulama-yi
Hind’s politics was essentially incompatible with the principle of cultural difference.

Founded in 1929 in the context of Indian anticolonial liberation, the Khuda‘i
Khidmatgar (Servants of God, also known as the Red Shirts) was a Congress-
affiliated movement conceived as a nonviolent campaign of civil disobedience
with a view to attaining self-government. Along with their leader Khan ‘Abd al-
Ghaffar Khan of Utmanza‘i (1890–1988), the Khuda‘i Khidmatgar has attracted
a lot of scholarly attention for what has been perceived as a cultural anomaly:
the use of nonviolence to realize a Pashtun nationhood whose cultural code is
rooted in principles of violent retaliation and retribution. Ghaffar Khan was
at first closely involved with efforts to reform the local educational system by
setting up independent schools as alternatives to British missionary schools.
These concerns and personal acquaintances led Ghaffar Khan to participate in
the early years of Mahmud al-Hasan’s tahrik (movement). Yet Ghaffar Khan later
came to cleanly separate tribal politics mobilized by religious leaders from set-
tled district politics. They came together in purpose but not in the structure of
authority and leadership.
Ghaffar Khan accused the mullahs of the Tribal Areas of not having been able to set up madrasas, promote dialogue, or create consensus among the fragmented tribal groups of the region. The dispersed resistance of the Tribal Areas had not been integrated and cultivated by the Mujahidin movement into a more relevant and general political ideology and because a national unity did not emerge within the region, the British were triumphant in further dividing and ruling the weak qaba’ili (tribal) groups. For this reason, Ghaffar Khan said that it was impossible to integrate the politics of the Tribal Areas and the Administered Districts, as the Tribal Areas had little potential for social and political mobilization around a philosophy of social development, statehood, and self-government. He wrote:

When I saw the conditions of Afghanistan and the azad qaba’il [independent tribes], having spent fifteen years running to and fro between Hindustan, the azad qaba’il, and Afghanistan, I reached the conclusion that a revolution is not a quick process, nor is it so easy a task. A revolution is carried out with a cool heart; it requires knowledge and intellectualism. For a revolution we need scholars and intellectuals who can convince the people and bring them to the revolution . . . our qawm has no interest in economics, industry, agriculture, or education, and in addition is immersed up to its neck in custom and ritual, is occupied in the realm of militancy. Such a qawm cannot conceive a revolutionary spirit. First they must be liberated from these distractions [masatib], then a political consciousness must be created.

Both the Khuda’i Khidmatgar and the Jam’iyyat al-‘Ulama-yi Hind were deeply invested in electoral practices and participation in bureaucracy and legislature as a means of realizing an anticolonial ambition and saw the integration of the Tribal Areas and Administered Districts political landscapes was impossible within the practitional and discursive parameters of this emerging nationalism. This reluctance demonstrates the inclination to separation of political spheres along the line of authoritative leadership. Rather than a cultural delimitation, this was a structural containment of nationalism that largely relied on the message of self-discipline, class-consciousness, and a deeply individualized identity mobilized through the press and participatory politics. Neither the Jam’iyyat al-‘Ulama-yi Hind nor Ghaffar Khan saw a way to introduce their objectives of individualism, the cornerstone of political modernity, in the Tribal Areas as they saw the underlying pattern of mullah-led politics as irreconcilable with a settled-districts social order. Despite the religious and ethnic basis of their respective politics, they reaffirmed the cultural distinction between tribal and settled society in proposals for political reform and representative politics in the NWFP.

Through the period 1919–47, Pashtun political thinkers in colonial India described the tribal Pashtuns of the frontier region as backward, poor, and unequal to the national project because of the problem of administrative and social isolation
of the Tribal Areas. The Jam‘iyyat al-‘Ulama-yi Hind was cautious about the lack of exposure of the Tribal-Areas Pashtuns to the political process, and Khan `Abd al-Ghaffar Khan argued that the true revolutionary spirit was dependent on education and political and economic participation.

**GEOGRAPHIES OF AFGHANISTAN AND THE PASHTUN TRIBE**

Writing in the 1970s, the American scholar Leon Poullada argued that center-tribe relations were a foundational, albeit unstable, strategy of the modern Afghan state. This view was later endorsed by Thomas Barfield in his recent assessment of twentieth-century Afghan history as marked by tribal resistance. Barfield points, for example, to the creation of a Ministry of Tribal Affairs and strategies of conciliation through exemption of powerful tribes from military conscription as indicative of the state’s conciliatory approach to the tribal political formation. A variety of studies of late-nineteenth- and twentieth-century Afghanistan, including Amin Tarzi’s and Faridullah Bezhan’s chapters in this volume, have shown us that despite official strategies of conciliation, the discourse of the tribal social formation was not so stable as we may suppose. This section explores the ambivalence around the notion of the tribe in state-produced geographies.

Amin Tarzi’s chapter on Amir ‘Abd al-Rahman takes a critical look at the ruler’s identification and treatment of the Yaghistan, the regions outside direct government control. State control of communities in this region, most significant among them the Hazara, was rationalized and manifested through Islamic law. Tarzi demonstrates that ‘Abd al-Rahman institutionalized Hanafi Islam as the official state doctrine and used this to discipline dissenters, but he also admitted customary law and social practice, which remained the dominant system of dispute resolution. Religious propaganda and Islamic courts were instruments of such state control of communities that lay outside the ambit of governance, and with them, dominant patriarchal structures. Tribal community and religious principle, far from being demonstrably self-sustaining, were bolstered by the state in Yaghistan.

James Caron has called for attention to the underlying coercive relationship of the monarchy with rural elders, complicating the view of tribal conciliation to draw necessary attention to a social history of Afghanistan that does not rely on a narrative of resistance, rebellion, and modernization, or on the notional construct of the tribe. Such recommendations are reiterated in Christine Noelle-Karimi’s reflections on the limitations of the project of historicizing polities with regard to the writing of the history of Afghanistan. There is increasing evidence presented in recent histories that historical change was effected in twentieth-century Afghan history by technology, trade, and intellectualisms, and not by a resurgent Islamist tribal ethos. So-called tribal Pashtuns visited and lived with family and
friends, or resided for part of the year in their own summer homes in Peshawar, Bannu, Kohat, Kabul, and Qandahar. Others married and settled in Indian and Pakistani cities such as Bhopal, Jalandhar, Bareilly, and Lahore. From the 1930s or ’40s, Pashtuns from the eastern part of Afghanistan or the western, nonadministered, portion of the Indian frontier also used lithograph presses to reproduce poetry and memoirs, writing about class oppression, economic marginalization,
and profiteering. As mobile merchants, they traded in spices, ceramic goods, ammunition, sugar, wheat, silk, and currency.

In keeping with this trajectory of increasingly critical thinking about the relations of tribe and state, this section proposes a different point of comparison to understand the context of King Habibullah and King Amanullah’s engagement with the movement of the Jama‘at-i Mujahidin: the production of geographies of Afghanistan. A number of texts, recently made available through the New York University Afghan Digital Library Project, support interrogation of the early-twentieth-century Afghan state’s official use of the discourse of tribalism. In these texts, military advantages of tribal organization were acknowledged, but the idea that the tribe could independently derive a social order from Islam was indirectly disputed.

During his reign, from 1919 to 1929, Amanullah Khan directed the machinery of state into a full-scale effort at what Leon Poullada termed reform and modernization. Amanullah built up a bureaucracy, funded secondary and postsecondary education, supported the print press, and looked to overhaul the military and increase recruitment there. Between 1929 and 1978, Afghanistan’s ruling Musahiban dynasty continued to experiment with strategies of economic, military, and social reform. A new cotton-export industry was established in Kunduz in the north, the domestic tax burden was lowered and supplemented with foreign aid, and women of noble families appeared unveiled. Recently, Thomas Barfield has noted that the government was able to mediate domestic expectations and foreign influence in a manner that none of its rivals were ever able to, but Barfield has also indicated the complete inadequacy of these reforms, and has argued that the Musahiban dynasty began to decline by 1962. It is widely accepted that despite the state-sponsored modernization projects of the twentieth century, Afghan governments still had to contend with the remoteness of many regions throughout the country, the fact that much of the country still lived on a subsistence economy, and that government authority was limited by the radio and printing press that provided access to the population.

Geography textbooks were written in Persian to support the introduction of the subject in schools. The textbooks represented Afghanistan as a contiguous, bordered, governable, and productive economic space through descriptions of land, region, resources, and physical geography, administrative centers, and human geography. Each author used a different approach and language to describe the spatial, administrative, and social organization of Afghanistan but consistently represented the provincial divisions and administration as foundational principles of regional organization. Each text discussed lineage groups and accounted for famous or important tribes in some way, often with reference to their historic significance. But their discussions were not fleshed out through reference to authority, culture, or custom in a manner that defined how patrilineal authority was an organizing social principle.
The earliest of these texts, entitled simply Afghanistan, was written by the leading Afghan nationalist thinker and future foreign minister, Mahmud Tarzi (1865–1933). Published in 1903, the Persian text briefly described each of Afghanistan’s provinces, major cities, and natural resources. It also included a poetic tract on the geography of the country:

First know that this is the place of origin of our great tribe.
The tribe that is the tribe of great king,
The name of the tribe, tribe, Muhammadza’i.
Centuries ago, when it was a commanding headquarter,
The caretaker of Qandahar was Ahmad Shah Durrani.
He was a great king, known for greatness.
He established the Afghan government in Qandahar,
And expanded it to Hind and Sind.

In comparison to the varied people of Herat, with different aspects, opinions, races, and tribes, Tarzi described the Muhammadza’i tribe (qawm) as the base of command of Ahmad Shah Durrani (r. 1747–72), who established the Afghan government in Qandahar and, as the poem states, expanded it to India and Sind.57 In this rendering, the southern Pashtun tribe was the platform from which Abdali operated, while the Afghan state (even at its moment of inception) was the source of organization and political priority. Tarzi went on to speak to the glory of the capital: “Kabulistan was the name of this land. . . . Kabul was the capital of the government; Kabul was the pride of the nation; Kabul was and is what Islam anticipated.”58 While acknowledging a military logic to the tribal order, Tarzi asserted that the source of governance and Islam, implying law and legitimacy, could emanate only from Kabul.

A second such Persian text, Jughrafiya-yi Afghanistan (Geography of Afghanistan), was written by Muhammad Husayn and published in Kabul in 1923. It provided a detailed breakdown of provinces, their physical features, natural resources, major cities, and seats of government, no doubt as a manner of disseminating the vision behind Amanullah’s administrative reforms.59 Husayn described government as working through three administrative offices: the Supreme Government (in the Samt-i Mashriqi, Samt-i Junubi, Farah, and Maimanah); the Provincial Governments (in Kabul, Qandahar, Herat, Turkistan, and Qatghan-u-Badakhshan); and the town governments (which together served every district in Afghanistan). In this first discussion, lineage affinity was identified only insofar as it affected residence. For example, in Khost, the oldest city of Afghanistan, where the bazaars of the city were located in four different muhallas (quarters), the author explained that these quarters were distinguished by their inhabitants, Durrani, Ghilza’i, Kakar, and Parsi.60 After accounting for the physical and political geography of the country, the author described the people of Afghanistan as divided into qaba’il (tribes), and provided enumeration, location, and some history of these lineage
networks. In this case the tribe was treated as a marker of identity but not of political organization.

A third geography text was written by Muhammad ‘Ali Khan, a professor at the modernizing Habibiyya College, in Kabul, for the purposes of fourth-grade-teacher training. Published in Lahore in 1927, it listed the mountains, rivers, animals, commodities, administrative centers, major cities, and provinces in the country. Its section on human and social geography, “Distribution of People of Afghanistan,” had three unconnected sections. Muhammad ‘Ali Khan identified three major ethnic subdivisions: Afghan Aryan, Irani Aryan, and Mongol/Tatar stock. Without explaining the link between ethnicity and tribe, he then explained that the people of Afghanistan were also distributed among tribes and listed major tribal groups and subgroups, Durrani, Kakar, Afridi, Tajik, Mongol, Shinwari, Jadran, Muhmand, and Yusufza’i Kuhistan. In a final section, Muhammad ‘Ali discussed the national characteristics of the Afghans: they were inclined to war, independence of spirit, love of country, and a fierce commitment to family; they were simple and religious in outlook; they were deeply hostile to the rule of foreigners, innovations in education, dress, and as well to the study of alchemy and geography. Describing national traits rooted in language, relationships to land and ideas as the underpinnings of social identity, Muhammad ‘Ali Khan rejected a social-scientific scrutiny of tribe and highlighted broadly shared national traits in its place.

These texts all suggest that the idea that the tribal unit could produce a viable system of authority, order, and internal unity was troubling to those assembling a social-scientific framework for study or representation of the link between land, government, and society. Mahmud Tarzi stated that such order, both rightful kingship and religious influence, emanated from Kabul. Muhammad Husayn provided a detailed listing of tribes beginning with the Durrani but provided little commentary on how tribal identity interacted with religious, ethnic, or linguistic identities, which he also listed. This problem was even more pronounced in Muhammad ‘Ali’s discussion of tribal subgroupings, which was uneven. Jadran, for example, had no subgroupings at all, whereas other tribal groupings were comprised by pacts and not lineage descent. These texts, as outcomes of state-building projects, demonstrate a far more complex view of tribe and its relationship to state than that suggested by anecdotal accounts of court relations with Pashtun tribes, either through the movement of the Jama’at-i Mujahidin or after.

Although this brief foray into the production of geographies in Afghanistan does not establish that the field geography or the production of ethnolinguistic, physical, and topographical data materially changed patterns of relations between state and community, it certainly establishes that the notion of a tribal social order derived from Islamic principles was not endorsed by those engaged in the use of social-scientific approaches to produce knowledge about the country.
In Pakistan, a new body of Urdu literature emerged after 1978. This literature emerged as a surprising reversal of a decades-old policy of Pakistan state opposition to the Pashtunistan movement and as an outcome of Afghan, Pakistani, and American interest in arming an eastern Pashtun resistance to the Soviet invasion. The Institute of Regional Studies was at the forefront of these publication efforts, producing two sorts of texts: maps to support international understanding of the region and Urdu texts intended to be widely received in Pakistan. The shift back to a discourse of tribalism was broadly rooted in the idea that tribal loyalty to resistance leaders and Islamic faith-based resistance to communism was a mainstay of opposition to the Soviet occupation. “There are two forms of resistance in Afghanistan,” wrote one scholar affiliated with Quaid-i Azam University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology: “one is spontaneous, unorganized and uncoordinated; the other is organized by certain established groups. The unorganized form of resistance draws on primordial loyalties—family, kinship, sub-tribe, tribe and region.”

Another text from this period was written by Hayran Khattak under the title of Sarguzasht-i Mujahidin-i Afghanistan (Experiences of the Afghan Holy Warriors). It comprised a series of biographical essays about wounded mujahidin fighters. In his introduction, Khattak described the Pashtuns of the region between Chitral and Peshawar, and the Khyber, Gomal, and Bolan passes as inheritors of the legacy of the medieval Ghaznavid and Ghurid dynasties and the founder of the modern Afghan state, Ahmad Shah Abdali (r. 1747–72). The author then interviewed a number of Pashtuns from rural Ghazni, and Nangrahar, emphasizing in each case his purity, simplicity, and faith as his primary political motivation. In each case, the faith of the Pashtun was described as positioning his opposition to communism and the Parcham (Flag) party, inspiring his works on mujahidana (holy warriorism), and encouraging his valorous militancy. Urdu-language ethnographic and military studies of the frontier accompanied this narrative. A text endorsed and published by the chairman of the Pashto Academy described marriage rituals (at great length), circumcision, the call to prayer, naming and charitable practices, and principles of hospitality and blood feuds, concluding with a statement on the rules of war.

In 1984, a dictionary of Pashtun tribes was published by a retired lieutenant of the Pakistan Army, Muhammad Ahsanullah. Returning to Olaf Caroe’s model of cataloguing lineage groups, Ahsanullah produced an updated list of Pashtun tribes over the course of five hundred pages. A map illustrated this listing, indicating the
location of important tribal groups. The identification of tribe had been part of system of military understanding of the frontier since the colonial period; tribal groups were identified and hierarchized in relation to one another to determine which groups had the most strategically important control in the region, which subgroups relied on them, and to allocate allowances to them on this basis. The fact that this text was produced for a general public demonstrates the spilling over of the Pakistan-side Tribal Areas–specific military identification of social hierarchies in response to a general demand for information about Pashtuns.

In the absence of moderating political and social-scientific discourses aimed at shaping participatory and accountable forms of government, an instrumentalist interest in the potential for rural Pashtuns to be mobilized revived a vernacular discourse of tribal organization and tribal motivation. This militarily-oriented ethnography had a number of similarities with the discourse of the Jama'at-i Mujahidin: it highlighted history, tribal valor, and the organizing principle of religious practice, pushed for an accounting of tribal groups, and produced representations of region alongside the identification of tribe. Only the reach of and response to the representation of the Pashtuns as religiously motivated tribal warriors differed dramatically in this latter instance.

Once again this body of writing displaced other emerging discourses about the community and state in Afghanistan. In 1972, an important mapping project, designed as a Ph.D. project by the American Thomas Eighmy, had integrated demographic data in geographic-survey information to define twenty-seven “regional cores” that were broadly comparable on the basis of physical characteristics and ethnolinguistic homogeneity. The project was a joint effort between the Afghan Cartographic Institute and the Afghan Demographic Studies Institute, which carried out its fieldwork between 1971 and 1975. Surveys carried out by the State University of New York for the Afghan Demographic Studies Institute distinguished a total settled population from a nomadic population. This was closely followed by a body of work on nomadism and community, beginning with Richard Tapper and Nancy Tapper, that complicated ideas about authority, ethnicity, and social organization.

These studies demonstrate a progression in state knowledge of routes, ethnic and linguistic characteristics, boundaries, and contestation of land limits under the influence of both Soviet survey standards and American demographic, ethnolinguistic, and population studies. Where the former documented the physical characteristics of the country, the latter focused on the human characteristics of settled and nomadic societies, shaping a new approach to thinking about strategies of social and political integration of the country.

Pakistani authors, charged by the military and a new American interest in Afghanistan with identifying Pashtuns who could forge a resistance to the Soviet invasion, once again invested the idea of the tribe with the additional implication that this was a viable and autonomous social formation inspired by Islam and culture.
The Jama’at-i Mujahidin, interested in mobilizing an anticolonial movement in the northwest frontier region, shaped a discourse of a valorous and independent Pash-tun tribe, motivated by religion and directed by both tribal and religious advisors. This discourse drew both on the historical representation of the Indian northwest as an entry point of Islam into the subcontinent and on the notion of the tribe in Islamic Arabia. The idea of the tribe as an independent social unit, guided from within by religious and cultural principles, was revived in writing in Pakistan after 1978 to enable and to motivate a response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

This was by no means the dominant approach to, or understanding of, the Pash-tun tribe in vernacular and local writings on either side of the Durand Line border. The discourse of the valorous tribe, motivated by Islam to defend the Afghan state and its own independence, was at odds with political and geographic discourses that identified economic and social factors as governing community behaviors. Geographies that established the contiguity of Afghanistan and political writings by nationalist Afghans and Indians defined subjecthood and political participation in relation to the center. Demographic studies also took up social organization, patterns of settlement, and Islam from an economic and state-centered perspective.

Taken in context, both the Jama’at-i Mujahidin and 1980s’ Pakistan-based writers identified a tribal order pivoting on an independent, self-organizing, religiously motivated Pashtun tribe, marking a calculated and intentional endorsement of lineage-based organization and religious authority. This approach was obviously and demonstrably incompatible with representative politics in the colonial North-West Frontier Province, as well as with social-scientific representations of the coherence and governability of the state and society in Afghanistan in the early part of the twentieth century. In the latter period, it superseded far more complex thinking about authority and organization.
Nationalism, Not Islam

The “Awaken Youth” Party and Pashtun Nationalism

Faridullah Bezhan

Wish Zalmiyan, the “Awaken Youth” Party (AYP), was the first political party to operate openly in Afghanistan. Emerging in the late 1940s soon after World War II, it enjoyed support from the intelligentsia and the tacit approval of a monarchical regime hostile to any oppositional voice. The AYP’s emergence depicts the stage that political development had reached in Afghanistan, as well as the political rhetoric of the opposition and the government between 1947 and 1953. Nationalism and constitutionalism made up the backbone of the AYP’s ideology. The AYP was the first political party to openly advocate these goals. Although they made the party popular with a segment of the ruling elite and the intelligentsia, they brought resentment from the religious establishment, for which Islam was the only ideology to be followed and the Quran the only constitution that the country needed. There were many grounds on which the AYP promoted nationalism and constitutionalism: the Constitutional Party (known as Jam‘iyyat-i Siri Milli or National Secret Association) of the early 1900s; the impact of World War II; the emergence of the Pashtunistan issue; changes in governmental ruling methods; and the establishment of a new Afghan cabinet.¹

This chapter examines how, in the aftermath of World War II, most members of the educated class leaned toward nationalism and constitutionalism as the driving forces for new political dynamics and the progress of the country. The AYP’s platform brought to the surface a new political reality in which a new generation of politically minded people were searching for new ideas in order to do away with traditional ones such as Islam and tribalism. The AYP’s platform also demonstrates how in the mid-twentieth century the rise and popularity of nationalism among the majority of the educated class, including the ruling elite, alarmed the
clergy. They discovered that they were losing their ideological dominance in the political process. It made some of them think about how to organize themselves in a changing world in order to regain their ideological supremacy by mobilizing the clergy class and others throughout the country for their cause. This led them to embark on the establishment of an Islamist party, and it was the beginning of political Islam in Afghanistan.

The AYP’s ideas of nationalism and constitutionalism were not completely new in Afghanistan. It was the Constitutional Party that had first introduced these concepts to Afghan political discourse in the early twentieth century. Benjamin Hopkins has noted that the country “now known as Afghanistan had no previous existence as a united, independent political unit” before the twentieth century. Although the concept of nationhood was very useful in terms of unity of the population, it was much resisted by power centers from the monarchy to the tribal chiefs and the religious establishment, because nationalism regarded people as citizens rather than subjects of the ruler, members of a tribe, or members of the universal Muslim community (umma). Moreover, the Constitutional Party advocated that sovereignty lay in the nation. Afghanistan was just a loose political entity in the early twentieth century, located between British India, Tsarist Central Asia, Persia, and China. It was only a geographical reality with fixed boundaries.

For the Constitutional Party, nationality and state were founded on territorially defined conceptions of the modern nation-state and a geographically distinct and historically unique Afghan nation. The party emphasized the independence of the country and focused on the unity of the people, regardless of their ethnoreligious affiliation or birthplace. This idea was completely new in the country. Although the party had operated only underground and had been completely suppressed in the early 1930s, its ideas still had currency on the eve of World War II in the minds of the Afghan elite.

AFGHAN POLITICAL DYNAMICS AND WORLD WAR II

Although Afghanistan did not participate in World War II, it had a significant place in international politics. Its strategic location on the borders of British India and Soviet Central Asia had turned it into an important place for the warring sides, especially for the Axis powers. Afghanistan was regarded as the gateway to India. The country, which had been isolated from the outside world since the early nineteenth century, had become engaged in international politics. During the war, the Axis in Afghanistan had made the idea of the return of Pashtun territories (called the Pashtunistan Issue) lost to British India as a result of the Durand Agreement of 1893 a reality for the royal family as well as for some nationalist intellectuals. Although the official policy supported the Allies, most young members of the royal family, including Zahir Shah (r. 1933–73) and Muhammad Da’ud (the
king's first cousin, the commander of central forces and later president between 1973 and 1978) were in favor of the Axis. This was a view shared by the majority of Pashtun nationalists, most of whom desired the establishment of a political party centered on the issue.

World War II and its aftermath once again brought the idea of nationalism to members of the educated class in Afghanistan who regarded it as the driving force that could guarantee the country's social, cultural, and economic progress. Moreover, they believed that Islam was the source of disunity between the various ethnoreligious groups such as Shi'i and Sunni, and an obstacle to the progress of society. The association of the religious establishment with tribal leaders and despotic rulers made it antagonistic toward sociopolitical development, and it was seen as supporting the status quo. In the eyes of most members of the educated class, the clergy was responsible for keeping the people, especially the rural population, backward, discouraging them from learning modern science and technology; instead it was responsible for spreading superstition. The war and its outcome had two simple messages: the supremacy of science and technology, and the staggering backwardness of the country. In order to make progress, there was a dire need for unity, the rule of law, and the spread of modern science. The educated class believed these shared interests would lead to unity among the population.

It is interesting that among most young members of the Musahiban royal family, the idea of change and progress also made them think about aligning with various social groups. Whereas in the past the Musahiban dynasty had relied heavily on the tribal leaders and the religious establishment to gain and consolidate power, now they began to lean toward the emerging educated class, which was considered the tool of change for the implementation of modern policies in a new, changing world. Until the end of the war, the Musahiban dynasty had been fiercely engaged in consolidating their power, which included eliminating members of the Constitutional Party. Now the young members of the family wanted to modernize society. But perhaps of equal importance, the Musahiban rulers understood that the educated class was the weakest in society, and therefore the government had little to fear from it, whereas because of the power of the tribal leaders and the religious establishment, the government was fearful of them.

Another factor in the alternation in the Musahiban dynasty's view was the international political change occurring soon after the war, namely the departure of Great Britain from the region in 1947. Each side of the political spectrum looked at it differently but with the same outcome. Whereas for the Musahiban dynasty the presence of Great Britain had been considered a form of patronage, in the eyes of Afghan intellectuals it was one of the main sources for the increase in the power of the religious establishment and tribal leaders. Three Anglo-Afghan wars during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries greatly damaged the power of the central government in Afghanistan but enhanced the power of the religious
establishment and tribal leaders to the extent that they became the most powerful institutions in the mobilization of people in defense of the country. In addition, because of continuous unrest among the British Indian tribes and their kinship connection with Afghanistan, British officers had used various means to appease some of the tribal leaders and clergy in order to further their politics in the area.\textsuperscript{11}

The AYP emerged against a backdrop of change in the method of rule after World War II, including the departure of the most powerful man, Prime Minister Muhammad Hashim, who had ruled the country with an iron fist between 1929 and 1946. He was replaced by his moderate brother, Shah Mahmud. This was accompanied by the release of political prisoners, allowing the emergence of political parties, the publication of independent newspapers, and a free national-assembly election.\textsuperscript{12} It resulted in the emergence of three nationalist democratic parties, the AYP, Watan (Homeland), and Khalq (Masses), who had an assertive presence in the assembly.

The emergence of AYP brought confrontation between two ideologies, Islam and nationalism, and two groups, the clergy and the nationalists. At the beginning the difference was hidden, but it soon became public and confrontational. This development marked the beginning of a long dispute that has continued to the present day and showed that in the mid-twentieth century, the most dynamic political party was nationalist rather than Islamist. Although it is beyond the scope of this chapter, the successful early struggle of nationalist politicians raises the question of what happened after the suppression of the nationalist parties in 1952, when they increasingly lost ground to extreme ideologies such as Islamism and Marxism—to the extent that in the last two decades radical political Islam has completely dominated the Afghanistan political landscape.

The emergence of the AYP received support from some elements of the royal family, who saw in it not only a political organization reflective of their worldview but one that could also be used in their aspirations to gain power. Muhammad Da’ud, the then-powerful Minister of Defense, was one of the main supporters of the AYP. In the words of one of his close aides, Shams al-Din Majruh, Da’ud was an ultranationalist Pashtun who aimed at reviving the Pashto language and culture and the supremacy of the Pashtuns, and he held strong beliefs about the liberation of Pashtunistan.\textsuperscript{13}

**WHY NATIONALISM?**

What was it in nationalism that made it the most appealing ideology to various sociopolitical groups, especially the ruling elite in mid-1940s Afghanistan? The fact was that it could unite different sociopolitical groups such as the ruling elite and the intelligentsia. Nationalism provided a real opportunity to claim the lost Pashtun territories in the south and east of the country. With the withdrawal of the
Raj, the Pashtun belt of British India could rejoin the motherland, which would lead to the emergence of a greater Afghanistan and thus provide new economic opportunities for the landlocked country, including, important access to the sea.\textsuperscript{14} To further its own ambitions, the royal family was compelled to allow political activities including the foundation of the AYP, even though they had little tolerance of criticism. This was a significant departure from the old methods of ruling, but the Musahiban dynasty used the situation for their own political ends. The establishment of the AYP served the aspirations of the Musahiban and the Pashtun nationalists well.

During the war the royal family tried to set up its national ideology, Pashtun nationalism, in more sophisticated and explicit ways. By allowing the emergence of the AYP, which was promoting this ideology, the government could now claim that Pashtun nationalism was the dominant ideology among members of the intelligentsia. This also provided the Musahiban with the opportunity to establish connections with the intelligentsia. It was the first time during their rule that they had found a common political language with any members of the intelligentsia. Nevertheless, the emergence of the AYP, along with its ideology, manifesto, structure, and even membership, remained in line with the government’s ideological and political undertakings. However, because of the autocratic nature of the regime and the intelligentsia’s lack of trust of the government, the establishment of the AYP took a unique course.

\textbf{THE FOUNDATION OF THE AYP}

Ghulam Muhi al-Din Zarmalwal (b. 1919), one of the AYP’s leaders, notes that prior to the formal establishment of the party, there were a few circles discussing its founding. They commissioned some individuals to travel around the country sounding people out, especially to the east and south, and cautiously contacted members of the educated class about the possibility of founding a political party.\textsuperscript{15} They took another initiative by publishing a book under the title \textit{Wish Zalmiyan}, to which fifty people contributed, among them the most outstanding of the elite, including members of the cabinet.\textsuperscript{16} It was a survey (\textit{iqtrah}) among the intelligentsia as to whether the name and the idea of the party were right. The publication of the book and its warm reception among the elite, and the change in the government political rhetoric, convinced the leaders that the time was ready to launch the party. The AYP was formed in 1947. The date of its first congress was one year later. Wali Zalma’i, a member of the party and a participant in the first congress, states that it was held in Kabul with the participation of twenty-two members on May 28, 1948.\textsuperscript{17} At this meeting three proposals for the organization were made, which showed the different leanings in the party and its rather loose structure.\textsuperscript{18} Some of the leaders wanted to establish an organization dealing more with cultural and
social matters than politics, whereas others wanted to begin with something less provocative than a political party such as an association. The party's move toward a more cultural orientation arose because literary associations had a rich tradition in the country and would arouse little reaction from sociopolitical forces such as the religious establishment, the tribal chiefs, and some members of the court who did not like political groupings. Moreover, it was in line with government ideology, and the majority of its leaders were literary men.

Other ideological factors also drove the AYP toward a cultural orientation, namely the promotion of Pashtun nationalism, the Pashto language, and reforming Afghan society. The party's focus on the promotion of the Pashto language and literature was a key factor in its attraction for Pashtun nationalists across the country, because Pashtun nationalism was inextricably linked to the Pashto language. As Fredrik Barth has noted, Pashtun custom is actualized through the Pashto language. In addition, because the majority of the AYP leaders were literary men who had held high positions in government cultural institutions, the party was more culture-oriented from its very outset. This was primarily because its members were authorities in these activities and, secondarily, they used the institutions to publicize their ideas. The government was also in favor of cultural rather than political activities. It feared that with the spread of political activities other politically minded people, who had little sympathy for the government's political and ideological views, would organize themselves in new and oppositional political parties.

The key ideological approach of the AYP was to reform Afghan society. In its view, sociocultural practices were responsible for holding people, especially the Pashtun tribes, from becoming a political force in the changing world. Although the Pashtun tribes had played the role of kingmakers throughout the nineteenth and the early twentieth century, only the chiefs received the benefits of this power, not the ordinary people. The mobilization of tribal people by claimants to the throne and tribal chiefs happened under the pretext of tribal rivalry or religious differences but resulted only in internal conflict with the other tribes and the spread of superstition and backward traditions. For the AYP leaders these were the most harmful features that had hindered unification of the Pashtun population and their rise to become the central component of the new nation. This is why the spread of modern education, the new ethical code of conduct, and fighting against backward traditions including superstition found prominent consideration in the manifesto of the party.

In order to reform social practices, cultural activities were the best means. For the AYP these were a tool to make people aware of the real situation that they were struggling with, as well as to encourage them to participate in the political process. Here literature, of which the AYP leaders were great masters, played an important role in the political awakening. Literature was the “primary activity” through which members of the party were able to carve out a public arena that their critiques would inhabit. In order “to create a critical social consciousness”
among ordinary people, some members of the party used their literary skills and wrote anonymous lyrics in the style of Pashto folk poetry which were sung by popular musicians.22

THE AYP AND ITS PROGRAM

Three key elements made up the backbone of the political orientation of the AYP: constitutional monarchy, Pashtun nationalism, and the freeing of Pashtunistan. The manifesto of the party was based on five articles, and included the following:23

Supporting the constitutional monarchy. The spread of modern education and enlightenment of the people. National unity through the following measures: making efforts to unite the Pashtuns; the abolition of special privileges and securing equality and removing difference among all ethnic groups of the great Pashtun land or Afghanistan; observing the right of minorities, and using Pashto and Farsi as means of communication; making every effort to revive and make Pashto a scientific language and writing and publishing in it and teaching it to all people of the country; loving and supporting the national government; struggling against corruption, bribery, and treachery, and avoiding being involved in them; fighting against superstition and bad social customs; being optimistic and expressing solidarity with others; having love for the nation; consuming local products as much as possible and avoiding being extravagant and sensual; making great efforts for the liberation and making of Pashtunistan.

Whereas the spread of modern education, promoting nationalism, freeing Pashtunistan, and supporting constitutional monarchy were the backbone of the party’s program, the rest of its agenda had more to do with ethical change than a real political program. The program was actually designed to attract the support of the government as well as to find a wider audience. For the party, ethical change was an important tool not only to reform Pashtun society both socially and culturally but also to bridge connections with the masses. It also aimed at encouraging and facilitating the participation of people in national politics. As long as the majority of the people were not engaged in politics, any kind of change in the political system, including in the method of rule, was temporary and reversible. In addition, for the people, especially the Pashtuns, to become a genuine ethnos, they needed to become interested in national issues.

However, the important point is that there was no reference to Islam in the AYP’s manifesto. The requirements for membership were Afghan citizenship, taking part in the party’s activities, accepting and implementing its decisions, and paying membership fees, but there was no mention of having to be a Muslim or adhere to Islamic doctrine.24 Having in mind the general sociopolitical and cultural environment of the time, this was a significant step toward the democratization of society, but equally it alarmed the conservative groups, especially the clergy.
THE AYP AND ITS LEADERSHIP

One of the unique characteristics of the AYP was that it was not founded around a single charismatic personality. Instead, several people contributed to its foundation, including Muhammad Rasul Pashtun (1900–1983), Ghulam Hasan Safi, Fayz Muhammad Angar (1915–79), ‘Abd al-Ra’uf Binawa (1913–84), Qiyam al-Din Khadim, Gulpacha Ulfat (1909–77), Tahir Safi, and Nur Muhammad Taraki (1917–78). According to Taraki, it did not have a president but was run by a seven-member executive committee, “none of whom was individually prominent.” They were Sidiqullah Rishtin (1919–98), Hassan Safi, Ulfat, Binawa, Rasul Pashtun, Angar, and Taraki. The committee was chosen by the congress. This multiplicity of leaders suggests that there was no one outstanding figure but a group of prominent men. But although apparently the reason could have been fear of possible persecution by the government, the leadership decided that the party should be led by a committee rather than by a single person.

The AYP’s leadership had three features: they were urban-based with roots in rural Pashtun areas; they had a reformist agenda; and they had close ties with the ruling class. Almost all the AYP leaders belonged to the Eastern and Southern Provinces (Nangarhar and Qandahar were their capitals, respectively), the two most important Pashtun cultural and political centers in Afghanistan. They were well-educated men who wanted to transform Afghan society from a tribal to a modern one. They had held high government positions and had connections with the establishment. Having in mind that senior government positions were mainly in the hands of members of the royal family and those very close to them who contributed to the empowerment and consolidation of Musahiban rule, these men generally were considered as the second tier of high officials, trusted by the establishment. These features, including connections with major sociopolitical forces, placed AYP’s leaders between the various sociopolitical worlds. Because of their rural roots, they understood the social mores of the people, and because of their education they had a modernizing worldview. Their connections with the establishment meant that they had a good understanding of the overall situation in the country, the policies of the government, and the real nature of the ruling class. These features were reflected in their political and ideological approaches. They sought change, but they were cautious about the limits and pace of their demands. Even their emphasis on the constitutional monarchical system, which had replicated the government polices, at least on paper, was taken with caution.

THE AYP AND ITS MEMBERSHIP

The AYP managed to attract various groups of elites from around the country. The membership was mixture of anticolonial elites, aristocrats, government officials,
Pashtun nationalists, middle-rank businessmen, and landlords, urban traders, and even military officers. Membership in the AYP depicted the nature of society, its political structure, and the social groups that were the driving force behind the political system. According to declassified Soviet documents, membership in 1951 reached a total of 825 and was distributed over the following provinces: Kabul (130), Qandahar (300), Paktiya (10), Nangarhar (150), Faryab (15), Baghlan (80), Pul-i-Khumri (30), Herat (5) and Mazar-i-Sharif (105). Nevertheless, these statistics show two important points: first, the high number of members in the AYP; second, the membership in Qandahar was more than double that in Kabul. The power bases of the party were Qandahar and Nangarhar, despite the fact that the party headquarters were in Kabul and most prominent members of the party lived in Kabul and had high positions in government departments. The main reason for the attraction of the AYP in Qandahar and Nangarhar was that most leaders originated from these provinces, and the issues it propagated such as Pashtun nationalism and the Pashtunistan issue were more appealing to people there.

**THE AYP AND CONSTITUTIONALISM**

One of the principal undertakings of the AYP was to advocate a constitutional monarchy, and it was the first political party in Afghanistan to do so publicly. From its emergence the AYP promoted a civic form of belonging and stood for constitutionalism, the drawing up and implementation of secular laws, the separation of the elements of power, and freedom of expression. In his article “Dar Kishwar-i ki Qanun Nabashad” (In the Absence of a Constitution in a Country), 'Abd al-Razaq Farahi (d. 1975), a leader of the party and in charge of its financial affairs, wrote that:\(^{27}\)

> When a country does not have a constitution or has but does not implement it, the destiny of its people is in the hands of a few powerful men. Here the success or failure of the people is not because of their talent, knowledge, educational background, or hard work but because of the favor of powerful men. Reaching any status is because of connections and therefore requires seeking opportunities and pleasing certain people by any means. . . . But when there is a constitution and the rule of law, the rights of the people are secured, and people are defended against injustice.

The AYP’s leaders tried to convince the royal family that they were not against their rule, with Farahi writing that “an Afghan loves his homeland, the nation, and the king.”\(^{28}\) For the AYP a constitutional monarchical system meant reforming the political system, especially the method of rule, the separation of different branches of power, a guarantee of freedom of expression, and the engagement of the majority of the people in the political process.\(^{29}\) The AYP did not want regime change, because the survival of the party was linked to the system; it could function only
in the presence of a constitutional government. So the AYP took a cautious approach toward constitutionalism. The party leaders were aware that emphasizing it too strongly might be seen as pitting them against the government. It could even provoke the government to end the breathing space and go back to dictatorship.

The AYP demanded other measures, including spread of modern education and an end to family, tribal, and religious privilege. It considered these as keys to the building of a new nation. Nur Muhammad Taraki, a leader of the party, stated that “we want a modern, national, widespread educational system. We want all ethnic and tribal privileges to be eliminated.” Such privileges sustained the power of the tribal chiefs, religious leaders, and members of the royal clan in sociopolitical and cultural matters, and prevented members of the educated class from playing a more active role and having a share in the political leadership. They maintained the status quo and prevented progress. Moreover, these privileges prevented the ordinary people from participating in politics, because they were represented by the tribal chiefs and religious leaders. But the spread of modern education was not the only solution. In another article, Taraki argued that “for the progress of society, the engagement of the ordinary people in sociopolitical affairs is essential.”

THE AYP AND NATIONALISM

The AYP vigorously propagated nationalism. It was the most significant issue that the party was formed on, and it could mobilize people around it. Nationalism was considered the most suitable ideology for a country with a makeup of diverse social groups. In the aftermath of World War II and the emergence of political parties, the idea became a hot topic in the media. According to ‘Ali Asghar Shu’á, “the centerpiece issue of the time was national unity and the equal rights of all citizens of the country.” In another piece, “Luzum-i Mujadila bi Tasubat Bija” (The Need to Fight against Prejudice), Shu’á emphasized that the most “damaging germs, which undermine the existence of our nation and kill its unity and ability, are ethnic, language, and the like prejudices.”

Ghulam Muhammad Ghubar provided a detailed description of terms such as “nation,” “nationalism,” “homeland,” and “state”:

When a group of people living within the specific boundaries of a territory share interests and losses with each other, that territory is the country, the people are the nation, and the institution that arranges sociopolitical affairs is the state. Traditionally, the elements that made up the nation, apart from shared territory and interests, were ethnicity, religion, and language. However, today two elements, ethnicity and religion, have lost their positions in the makeup of a nation. Even language is not an essential component of the formation of a nation. The Afghan nation is one that has been formed between the Sind [Indus] and Amu [Oxus] rivers because of a shared territory, interests, culture, history, and religion.
This was the most modern concept of the nation and nationalism, which suggested a civic type of nationalism. However, the authors of the above excerpts, published in AYP’s paper, were not members of the AYP. Ghubar and Shu’a’ were outstanding political leaders of the time, the former a member of the national assembly and the leader of the Homeland Party and the latter a member of the Kabul City Council and a Shi’i. While the AYP strongly believed in nationalism, it propagated one of a different type: ethnic nationalism, which fitted well with its program, power base, structure, and membership.

The AYP’s program emphasized the promotion and development of the Pashto language, defending the independence and sovereignty of the country, respecting the national heritage, spreading science and modern culture, and establishing good relationships between the people and the government, all of which were nationalist objectives. Its ideology, which reflected the outlook of the Pashtun nationalists, was also shared by the royal family. In fact, the party shared the Musahiban dynasty’s dominant ideological orientation (which continued until 1978). But the type of nationalism that the AYP was promoting represented an ethnos in which the Pashtun ethnic group was considered as the heart of the nation. The Pashtuns’ deep feelings of group commitment were expressed in altruistic values and actions, and included a sense of belonging to a common ethnic group considered superior to other forms of collective identification. Ethnic solidarity overrode all other types of individual and collective attachments such as class, politics, and regional affiliations. According to Anthony Smith, to speak of a genuine ethnos, this “sense of solidarity and community must animate at least the educated upper strata, who can . . . communicate it to other strata and regions in the community.” While the AYP aimed at uniting all ethnic groups under such a banner in Afghanistan, in fact this resulted in the fragmentation of society. Pashtun nationalism caused boundaries to be drawn between various ethnic groups and promoted cultural distinctiveness between the Pashtuns and the other ethnic groups. It also affected the distribution of power and access to economic resources.

But why did the AYP leaders, who seemed to be the modernizers of their time, promote Pashtun nationalism? Because they were Pashtuns themselves, with strong roots in eastern and southern Afghanistan, Pashtun nationalism seemed to them a normal political discourse to connect their two worlds, the rural and the modern. According to Zarmalwal, “all members of the party were Pashtuns and Pashto-speaking people.” Some members were in fact zealous Pashtun nationalists. For the AYP leaders, the Pashtuns who made up the majority of the population, who had ruled the country for the past two centuries, were the only group qualified to become the centerpiece of the new nation.

For the AYP, whose core leadership was in the hands of Pashtuns from Qandahar and Nangarhar, Pashtun nationalism seemed a natural approach, because Pashtun ethnicity and language were the decisive criteria for Afghan nationhood.
The criteria for Pashtun identity were Pashtun descent, speaking Pashto, conducting life in accordance with the Pashtun code of values (*pashtunwali*), and Islam. Pashtuns identified themselves as Muslim by birth, to the extent that most of the time Pashtunness and Muslimness overlap. All Pashtuns, whether settled or nomad, and regardless of tribal affiliation, believed in their common descent from Qays ’Abd al-Rashid, a contemporary of the Prophet Muhammad. *Pashtunwali* is “an ethnic self-portrait of the Pashtuns according to which the Pashtuns are distinct from other ethnic groups not only because of their language, history, and culture, but also because of their behavior.” However, although the AYP advocated Pashto as the national and official language, it did consider the other two specifically Pashtun elements as possibly counterproductive for nation building. The party had a very ambivalent attitude toward instituting *pashtunwali* as the national code of behavior. It wanted to introduce a new set of ethics, some of them based on some elements of *pashtunwali*, and its leaders never hid their admiration for it (as reflected in their publications). Descent was even more problematic for the AYP, because it institutionalized to the Pashtun model of tribal organization, based on nested sets of egalitarian clans and lineages defined by patrilineal genealogies stemming from a common ancestor. This was not how other ethnic groups regarded their history. According to Thomas Barfield, in the absence of government institutions such descent groups act to organize economic production, preserve internal political order, and defend the group against outsiders. The relationships between these “lineages rest on segmentary opposition, that is, lineages are supported by, or opposed to, one another based on their degrees of relatedness and the problems confronting them.” For the AYP, which wanted the unification of all Pashtuns as an *ethnos* in the new national discourse, descent could well cause disunity and confrontation. As discussed above, the party introduced a new ethical code of conduct that was a combination of traditional and modern values and shared interests.

**PASHTUN NATIONALISM AND THE ROYAL FAMILY**

The Musahiban promoted Pashtun nationalism in various levels because they had a great stake in it. They were Pashtun themselves; they had come to power with the help of Pashtun tribes in 1929; and their power base remained strong among the southern Pashtun tribes. In order to consolidate their monopoly on power and to mobilize people around their internal and external policies in a changing world, the Musahiban rulers transformed Pashtun nationalism into a collective national ideology. John Breuilly asserts that nationalism is, “above and beyond all else, about politics and that politics is about power.” The central task is “to relate nationalism to the objectives of obtaining and using state power.” The underlying goal of promoting Pashtun nationalism was the inculcation of the idea that the “royal
family and their Muhammadza’i clan in particular, and the Pashtun tribes in general, were the only legitimate rulers of Afghanistan.” The government decreed that the “Afghan monarch was always a Pashtun, and his right to rule was based on the Pashtun concept of legitimacy and on Pashtun consent.” Government in Afghanistan was “of the Pashtuns, by the Pashtuns, and for the Pashtuns.” In fact this idea had been significant in the Musahiban role in removing the Tajik ruler Habibullah Kalakani in 1929 with the help of the Pashtun tribes. According to Nick Cullather, Nadir Shah “established a monarchy based on Pashtun nationalism, with overtones of scientific racism.” He allocated “governmental positions to buy the support of the religious establishment and the tribes.” Under his rule, old “privileges for Pashtuns were renewed, and new ones were granted.” They also used all the resources, including those obtained from their foreign connections, to create a patronage network “calculated to strengthen Pashtun nationalism,” which they saw as an ideological buttress for their rule.

However, it was not until the outbreak of World War II that Pashtun nationalism came to play a significant role in organizing Pashtun intellectuals into a political grouping. In part this was because of the significant opportunities they enjoyed after the ascendency of the Musahiban to power in 1929, but it was also because of the government’s Pashtunization policy in the wake of World War II and the emergence of the Pashtunistan issue. Some members of the ruling class, especially in the south and east of the country, began to appease members of the Pashtun intelligentsia because of their political ambitions and ideological considerations. Zalma’i notes that when, in the 1930s, Muhammad Da’ud and Muhammad Gul Muhmand became Chief Civil and Military Officers of Southern and Eastern Provinces, respectively, they encouraged and supported Pashtun intellectuals to participate in cultural, social, and political activities under their patronage. Both of them were zealous Pashtun nationalists. For example, in Qandahar, the capital of the Southern Province, the Pashto Literary Association (De Pashto Adabi Anjuman) was established, and a magazine entitled Pashto was published. When Muhammad Da’ud became Minister of Defense, in the late 1940s, he supported the emergence of the AYP. Indeed, along with ‘Abd al-Majid Zabuli, the Minister of National Economy, he played a significant role in the foundation and promotion of the party, and the party supported him in his struggle to become Prime Minister.

With the emergence of the Pashtunistan issue after 1947, Pashtun nationalism received a significant boost. The two issues reinforced each other. The government instrumentalized Pashtun nationalism in order to “keep the Pashtunistan issue alive,” and this became the backbone of both the internal and especially the external policies of the government. The AYP’s advocacy of Pashtun nationalism and Pashtunistan established a good relationship between the party and the government. These issues were the mainstay of government strategy at the time and would be so in the decade to come. It was in the above context that the AYP
emerged. Thus the AYP’s program of nationalism fitted very well with the Musahiban government’s agenda.

Paradoxically the clergy had little sympathy for the Pashtunistan issue. They considered it a source of difference between Afghanistan and Pakistan, two Muslim nations, that would result in the weakening of Islam. In their eyes, regardless of birthplace or national boundaries, all Muslims were members of the umma and should treat each other as brothers, whereas the Pashtunistan issue made Afghanistan and Pakistan enemies. This view was reflected in a statement by the most prominent Sufi leader, the so-called Hazrat of Shur Bazaar, Fazl ‘Umar Mujaddidi (d. 1956), who traveled to Pakistan in December 1948. He preached friendship toward Pakistanis as coreligionists and called upon both countries to join in a religious war in Kashmir. Instead of promoting the Pashtunistan issue, he advocated “effective unity of the Muslim countries.” His stand was in line with Pakistani official policy and contrary to Afghan policy. The hereditary Sufi Hazrat was “strongly in favour of liaison with, not antagonism to, Pakistan.” Unsurprisingly, the government and Pashtun nationalists were annoyed by his remarks.

The Hazrat, Fazl ‘Umar Mujaddidi, was heir to the authority of the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi Sufis, whose ascent in eighteenth-century Afghanistan is discussed in Waleed Ziad’s chapter in this volume. His family remained extremely influential in the mid-twentieth century. Moreover, he was a very close supporter of the ruling Musahiban dynasty, had contributed greatly to their gaining power, and had served their government in various capacities, including as Minister of Justice between 1929 and 1932. But now Fazl ‘Umar stood against the government. Thus the course of events was speeding up the disappearance of earlier religious forms of consciousness, when religious leaders had been able to mobilize people for the national cause, as happened against the British during the nineteenth and the early twentieth century. The Hazrat’s remarks and the clergy’s stand on the Pashtunistan issue alarmed the Musahiban government, especially those who had a great interest in the issue, such as Muhammad Da‘ud. They realized they had no backing from the clergy on vital issues, whereas the nationalists, especially the AYP, were promoting the Musahiban’s agenda intensely. This had a great implication for the Musahiban’s approach toward the clergy and the nationalists, distancing them from the former and inclining them increasingly toward the latter.

However, there were some differences between the AYP and the government with regard to Pashtun nationalism. Whereas the former genuinely believed in it as the basis of their approach to nation building, for the latter it was a political means to an end. The government knew Pashtun nationalism would divide the intelligentsia and would cause suspicion among the other ethnic groups. The AYP’s advocacy of Pashtun nationalism undermined its other proposals, such as its advocacy of a constitutional monarchical system that did not consider the Musahiban as the
only legitimate rulers of the country, and the pluralization of power—that is, that executive power should be separated from the royal family. Some non-Pashtuns who believed that the government would not abandon its discriminatory policies toward the minorities established underground political organizations. Aiming to establish a republic, one of these parties, the Sir-i Ittihad or Secret Unity Party, staged a coup on March 21, 1950, but it failed.\textsuperscript{61}

However, although Pashtun nationalism made the AYP appealing among the ruling elite, it alarmed non-Pashtun political activists. It made most non-Pashtuns leave the party or cease formal association with it. According to Mirza Muhammad Ludi, a few of the most outstanding political leaders, such as Ghulam Muhammad Ghubar, Sidiq Farhang, and 'Abd al-Rahman Mahmudi, who had attended the party’s first congress, left because of its Pashtun nationalist orientation.\textsuperscript{62} They established their own parties, Watan and Khalq.

**PROMOTION OF THE PASHTO LANGUAGE**

One of the elements through which the AYP articulated nationalism was the promotion of the Pashto language, because in the discourse of nationalism language is perceived as the very embodiment of the national character and its genesis, the main marker of national identity. The word “Pashto” has a significant connotation other than merely referring to the language of the Pashtuns. The phrase Pashtu kawal (doing Pashto) means to exercise ideal Pashtun values.\textsuperscript{63} It is the core of Pashtun identity. According to Zarmalwal, one of the articles in the manifesto of the AYP demanded that in order to maintain national identity and promote the national language, all people of Afghanistan, especially students, civil servants, and military officers, were obliged to speak and write in Pashto.\textsuperscript{64} For the AYP, the promotion of Pashto was not just about the language but was aimed at all the distinctive Pashtun sociocultural values. Anthony Smith argues that the ideologies of “nationalism require an immersion in the culture of the nation—the rediscovery of history, the revival of its vernacular language.”\textsuperscript{65} Aneta Pavlenko and Adrian Blackledge say as well that “languages may not only be ‘markers of identity’ but also sites of resistance, empowerment, solidarity or discrimination.”\textsuperscript{66} It was in this sense that Pashtun nationalists, the AYP leaders, and the ruling class placed the Pashto language at the heart of Pashtun nationalism and tried everything they could to make it a distinct entity.

In the case of the Pashtuns, who were divided into various tribes, it was the Pashto language that connected them. Pashto was considered as an “indispensable attribute of Pashtun identity.”\textsuperscript{67} For the AYP’s leadership, the promotion of the Pashto language was both personal and political. It was their most important undertaking, because almost all of them were scholars, writers, or poets in the language, were Pashtuns and spoke Pashto, and also believed that it was the driving
force to attract Pashtuns. Thus Pashto symbolically mediated between the authoritative traditions and notions associated with Pashtun heritage and those who, across a broad area, maintained a sense of Pashtunness and participation in the larger “imagined community.”

For many Pashtun nationalists, the language itself was a presumed symbolic link between past and present. Therefore the promotion of Pashto was underlined in the party’s manifesto, which spoke of the party’s obligation to transform it into the medium of education throughout the country and to make it the national language. There is no doubt that language was the most important symbol of differentiation in a country where Islam was common to the vast majority of the people.

This notion of Pashto as the most important element of ethnic nationalist discourse began to be advocated by the government in the wake of World War II. In 1936, through a royal decree, the government endorsed Pashto as the national language and the language of education throughout the country at the expense
of Persian, which had held the position for hundreds of years. According to the decree, all civil servants and military officers were obliged to attend Pashto language courses (newly established for the purpose); otherwise they did not qualify for a monthly allowance. But upon successful completion they would receive a 10-percent increase in salary. In 1937, the government had established the Pashto Tulana (Pashto Academy) to conduct research into and publications on the Pashto language, literature, and culture and for the “Pashtunization of every aspect of life in non-Pashtun ethnic communities.” The aim was to promote Pashto as the only national language with a long history and fine literature, and to prove that Pashtun culture represented the national identity. The appointment of the leaders of the AYP to the key institutions to implement the policy showed the close ideological connections between the ruling class and the party. However, contrary to what Prime Minister Hashim claimed, the imposition of the Pashto language became a source of disunity, differentiation, suspicion, and antagonism among the different social groups. In fact, as James Caron has noted, supporting Pashto studies at the center “redirected the energies of talented intellectuals into a competitive arena, split between Persian and Pashto language communities.”

THE AYP AND THE PASHTUNISTAN ISSUE

The foundation of the AYP coincided with a new political sentiment aroused by the departure of Great Britain from the subcontinent in 1947, the partition of India and the loss of territories in the east and south of the country that were annexed to Pakistan. These territories originally had been removed from Afghanistan in 1893 as a result of an agreement between British India and Amir ‘Abd al-Rahman Khan (r. 1880–1901) that created the Durand Line, named after Sir Mortimer Durand, who negotiated the agreement. The agreement separated the territories and delineated the influence of the Raj and the Amir. The line passed through the tribal areas lying between Afghanistan and India, thus dividing the Pashtun communities. Upon the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947, it became the permanent border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. In June 1947 the Afghan government called for an independent Pashtunistan and denounced the 1893 agreement, and in 1949 a Loya Jirga or Great Assembly declared the Durand Line invalid. Since then successive Afghan governments have rejected it, saying that it was never meant to be a formal international boundary.

For the AYP the Pashtunistan issue made up of one of their five key concerns. It was considered a national issue rather than foreign policy. In an article “Zalmiyan se Ghuali?” (What Does Wish Zalmiyan Want?), Safi wrote: “Wish wants an honest approach toward the Pashtunistan issue. The nation’s whole power and effort should be channeled in the direction of the liberation and formation of Pashtunistan.”
In the eyes of the AYP leaders, who had a very strict pro-independence policy, despite the fact that the government had made the Pashtunistan issue the hallmark of its foreign policy, it did not do enough to achieve the area's independence. The party’s leaders wanted the government and the ordinary people, especially Pashtuns, to take an active part in the struggle for the liberation of Pashtunistan. In order to achieve its goal, the AYP even sent missions to work closely with the Khuda’i Khidmatgar (Servants of God Party, also known as the Red Shirts), discussed in Sana Haroon’s chapter in this volume. In a verse, “Pashtunistan pa Ga-tum” (I’ll Secure Pashtunistan), ‘Abd al-Habib Safi portrayed the sentiment of the party members toward the issue very well:

If I am an awakened youth [wish zalmi], I’ll make the name and fame of the nation;  
I’ll secure Pashtunistan for the nation;  
I’ll take Charsada [district], where beloved young men were martyred;  
I’ll secure Pashtunistan for the nation.  
If I am an awakened youth, I’ll open the jail’s gates to my brothers,  
I’ll liberate the imprisoned souls.  
I’ll secure Pashtunistan for the nation.  
If I am an awakened youth, I’ll take revenge for my brothers,  
Get a national reward.  
If I am an awakened youth, I’ll elude the bad traditions,  
Get rid of the prejudices;  
For my martyred brothers I’ll get flowers.  
I’ll secure Pashtunistan for the nation.

Pashtun nationalism and the Pashtunistan issue paradoxically prevented the AYP from becoming a national party and led to its ultimate collapse. Despite much publicity and the investment of an enormous amount of money by the government, the issues did not have much appeal to the community in general, among the educated class, or even among most Pashtuns. It was of little interest compared with economic and social issues. Moreover, these issues divided the Pashtun intellectuals. According to Olivier Roy, although some Pashtuns found in it an ideology that gave them “an opportunity to improve their social lot and the means of wresting the monopoly of power from the establishment,” the majority did not support it.

NATIONALISM VERSUS ISLAMISM

The AYP’s main undertaking was to modernize Afghan society through the introduction of new ethical codes, including the spread of modern education and fighting against the backward traditions that were impeding social progress. These measures brought resentment from the two most powerful sociopolitical institutions, the tribal leaders and the religious establishment, who saw in them not only
a challenge to their worldviews but also to their sociopolitical and cultural status and privilege. For example the clergy, who had a monopoly on the educational system as a source of both ideology and income, would lose both with the spread of modern education. Therefore, in order to maintain their authority, the tribal leaders and clergy sought to maintain the status quo. But for the AYP the establishment of a modern educational system around the country, including in rural areas, was a priority. In a piece in Angar, Babrak Ghishtili wrote: “Before anything else we need a proper modern educational system. We want the biggest portion of the national budget to be allocated for education, especially training teachers, equipment, and administration and the students’ welfare and health.”

These conflicting worldviews brought confrontation, especially between the clergy and the party. Until the end of World War II, the general policy of the government had been to appease the tribal chiefs and the religious establishment. The Musahiban government, which had taken power and consolidated its authority with the help of these two groups, granted them privileges such as exempting some tribes from military conscription and taxation, and gave land to the clergy as waqf (endowments). Some mullahs were appointed to high positions such as the minister of justice, ambassadorships, or editors of the main Afghan newspapers such as Anis and Islah. Mullahs were also exempt from conscription. They had total control of the judiciary. According to Richard Newell, the Musahiban achieved a large share of “stability from having successfully incorporated religious specialists into government service and by emphasizing the religious components of its authority.” In the area of education, the religious establishment “attained a controlling power.” After taking power, one of the first undertakings of the Musahiban was the establishment of the Jam’iyyat al-’Ulama or Association of Clerics (not to be confused with the Indian Jam’iyyat al-’Ulama-yi Hind discussed in Sana Haroon’s chapter). Apart from its other duties, this Afghan Association of Clerics was assigned the responsibility of adapting the syllabus to Islamic values. In this way the government not only accepted the monopoly of the clergy over traditional institutions such as madrasas but also over modern ones.

For the AYP to implement its program it had to challenge the tribal leaders’ and clergy’s domination of sociopolitical and cultural fields, as well as fight against a political culture that sustained their domination. However, the real problem was the influence of the clergy on the minds of the people, including on some of the ruling elite. But the changes that took place after World War II brought hope that some members of the ruling elite would join with the political parties to change the mindset and culture of the people. It was against this backdrop that the AYP promoted its modernizing ideas. The party’s leaders were aware of the difficulties that they were encountering. One of the main undertakings of the party was to fight against backward traditions, including superstitious practices, instead promoting the spread of modern education. One incident that brought the two sides
head to head was when the governor of the Eastern Province saw in a dream that a hair of the Prophet was located in the very place where a high school was under construction. On his orders a shrine was built there instead. In the article “Riyakar Ta” (To the Hypocrite), published in Angar on April 1, 1951, there was direct criticism of the governor:

All you do is only show. You have no any interest in the progress and happiness of the nation. You do only things for which some people applaud you; but you deceive them. While in public meetings you express your interest in modern science and knowledge, behind the scenes you make every effort to eliminate them. This is the method of criminals. This is because in reality in your view, science and enlightenment are the biggest sins. You suppress signs of progress anywhere in the country and instead strengthen the stand of the reactionaries.

But the opaqueness of the article meant it provoked little reaction. However when another article, “Da’wat-i Mardum bi Khurafat” (Inviting People to Superstition) was published a week later in Nida-yi Khalq, it brought a massive reaction from the clergy. Hassan Safi, a leader of the party, had brought the religious establishment and members of the educated class into outright conflict because he openly criticized the governor and the clergy for building a shrine in Jalalabad to venerate a hair said to belong to the Prophet:

Because of the building of the shrine, the building of the school next to it has been stopped. Even all its material had been used for the shrine. The question is, From the viewpoint of religion and the demands of modern life that oblige men and women to learn, do we need to build a school or a shrine? Our current condition is shameful. In order to open the eyes of people to the heartbreaking realities in the country and help them to salvage it from ignorance, backwardness and superstition, Afghanistan and especially the Eastern Province need modern schools. We hope that our great religious scholars ['ulama-yi kiram] and enlightened young people will fight against such superstitious practices.

The article led to public demonstrations in Kabul headed by the country’s most prominent religious leader, the Sufi Hazrat of Shur Bazaar, Fazl ‘Umar Mujaddidi. The Hazrat took exception to the article and tried to stir up a public outcry by accusing Safi of heresy (takfir aw rajim) and demanding that according to Shari‘a he should be stoned. A great uproar took place with many mullahs mobilized in support. The Hazrat even tried to mobilize his followers from the southern province of Paktia. In defense of Safi, members of the educated class, headed by the democratic parties Watan and Khalq, also staged massive public demonstrations. This brought conservative groups led by the Hazrat’s family into direct conflict with those in favor of reform. Safi was arrested, tried, and imprisoned until “the sign of repentance and reform appears on his forehead.” But the demonstrations continued. The religious establishment was not happy with what it considered a
light punishment, and so it tried other means. According to the Pakistani embassy in Kabul, on July 1, 1951.

‘Ulama from all parts of Afghanistan presented the following demands to the King: (i) Safi and his principal supporters should be tried again by a board of competent ‘ulama from Muslim countries such as Egypt, Iraq, and the Hijaz; (ii) that the independent paper Nida-yi Khalq was creating disaffection against the King and the people, and as such it must be banned; (iii) that writers who spread communist doctrines through their writings in local papers should be punished.

The ‘ulama’s demands highlighted first and foremost that any matter to do with religion was their domain: no other people or organizations were allowed to deal with Islam, let alone criticize it. Their demands were obviously directed at a larger scheme than merely Safi’s punishment, and for this reason they tried to engage ‘ulama from other Muslim countries. Because in their eyes Safi’s article represented the views of a political party, the issues needed to be addressed in a broader way rather than just punishing the author, especially after the massive demonstrations in Kabul in support of Safi. Moreover, the ‘ulama’s contention that anything that challenged their authority should be considered communist not only would provoke condemnation from Afghans generally but would also attract the attention of Muslims from around the world, thus making the case a global issue. By including the term “communism,” the ‘ulama were insinuating that the ideas behind Safi’s article were rooted in a larger conspiracy against Islam.

The confrontation between Islam and nationalism, and the failure of the clergy to achieve its goals, had paradoxically made some of the younger mullahs think about establishing their own political party, not only to propagate their ideas but also to compete with the nationalist democratic political parties. They had learned from the AYP that in order to achieve their goals and have a strong presence in the political landscape, they needed to organize themselves politically. Fazal-ul-Rahim Marwat has stated that young members of the hereditary Sufi Mujaddidi family “decided to form a political party that would work against the Communistically inclined” AYP. Other scholars have claimed that such an organization actually emerged as early as 1952. However, there is no evidence to prove this. In fact the clergy failed to establish an Islamic party at the time. But by establishing contacts and starting regular meetings they did begin the process.

This was not the first open confrontation in Afghanistan between the religious establishment and members of the intelligentsia. During the 1920s the clergy had mobilized people and led a rebellion against the government in the remote areas of southern and eastern Afghanistan. This time, however, the confrontation took place in Kabul through public demonstrations. It was a demonstration against a democratic nationalist party that advocated constitutionalism and nationalism instead of Islam. Both sides expressed their views through public demonstrations
rather than by taking up arms or engaging in an uprising. In reality the demonstrations marked the emergence of the intelligentsia as a new force in the country and ended in favor of the AYP. Although the government had imprisoned Safi, it generally aligned itself with the intelligentsia. It did not respond to the ‘ulama’s demands and clearly did not consider Safi’s article to constitute the spread of communist doctrine. Even Safi’s punishment was comparatively light, pardoning him from execution and not even imposing a lifetime prison sentence. Indeed, the term of his punishment was in the hands of the government. After two years in prison, he was released and appointed to the Afghan General Council, in Peshawar. This indicated a major shift in the government policy toward the ‘ulama, from appeasing and aligning with them to ending support for them vis-à-vis the intelligentsia. The government no longer relied on the clergy’s support to maintain power.

Nevertheless, the confrontation between the clergy and the AYP was not limited to the pages of the newspapers and public demonstrations. The party used other means, such as publishing books, to fight against the reactionary forces. For example, in 1948 AYP published a book entitled Hazrat Shur Bazar Suk Di? (Who Is the Hazrat of Shur Bazaar?), about the leader of the Naqshbandi Sufi Mujaddidi family and the most influential clergy in the country. In the book, not only was the Hazrat’s negative role in the political turmoil of Afghanistan in the early twentieth century discussed, but also how he and other clergy prevented the country from progressing. The book had to be distributed secretly.

However, whereas the AYP and other political parties of the period between 1947 and 1952 prevailed against the religious establishment, they lost the ground to the government. Their criticism of the government in their publications, through demonstrations, and especially in the national assembly caused the government to crack down on them in April 1952. In the new round of parliamentary elections, the government prevented the parties’ members from being elected and imprisoned most of their leaders, including those of the AYP. This was the end of an era. Although the government adopted some of the nationalist measures of the AYP, such as the Pashtunistan issue, the promotion of the Pashto language, and the spread of modern education, it showed little interest in constitutionalism. The crackdown on the party had a wider and deeper implication for Afghan political thinking. Never again would nationalism and constitutionalism become driving forces for political organization and mobilization. Instead, during the Constitutional Decade, between 1964 and 1973, a number of political parties emerged, but these mainly espoused radical imported ideologies such as Marxism and Islamism.

CONCLUSIONS

The rise of the AYP signified a period of change in Afghan politics after World War II. Its establishment demonstrated the desire for change by members of the
Nationalism, Not Islam

intelligentsia and the favorable attitude of some of the royal family, although underlying support for the party was actually rooted in a power struggle within the royal family. Nevertheless the party’s views were close to the rulers’ own worldviews. The royal family overall saw in Pashtun nationalism the consolidation of its power and a real chance for the liberation of the Pashtun lands lost to British India in the late nineteenth century, which now belonged to Pakistan. This situation was a key factor in the party’s moderate attitude toward government policies. However, the factors that prevented it from surviving were its desire to operate as an oppositional political party, the emergence of other political parties, and its approach toward Pashtun nationalism. In particular, its promotion of Pashtun nationalism and the Pashtunistan issue prevented it from becoming a truly national political party, and its later criticism of the government eventually led to a crackdown.

The emergence of the AYP, its wide membership, and its active role in the politics of the time showed that society was reaching a certain level of political maturity. The time of traditional ideology and political makeup was over. The party’s advocacy of nationalism and constitutionalism attracted quite a large number of people, not only in Kabul but also in the provincial capitals. It demonstrated that Islam and tribalism were no longer suitable to mobilize young people and to ensure the progress of the country.

The AYP’s popularity among different segments of society brought prominence to its ideology and leadership vis-à-vis religion and the clergy. By the mid-twentieth century, nationalism and the nationalists had become more successful in propagating their ideas, attracting a wider audience in society and playing a more prominent political and ideological role in the country than traditional forces such as the clergy were able to. Party members found their way into various levels of political leadership, from the national assembly and city councils to cultural institutions. They managed to advocate their ideas through different means: the national-assemble podium; public demonstrations; the pages of their newspapers and those of government-run periodicals; and traditional public ceremonies throughout the country.

All this marked the beginning of a new political discourse in Afghanistan that, although it inspired politically minded people, alarmed traditional political and ideological forces such as the clergy. Paradoxically the clergy learned that in order to compete with the AYP and other nationalist democratic political parties or have a chance to play a significant role in politics in the new, changing world, they too had to organize; and this led to the emergence of political Islam in Afghanistan.
In December 1979 the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan on the pretext of assisting Afghan communists who had seized power in Kabul. The ten-year Soviet occupation saw socialist institutions sponsor secularization in the cities while groups of mujahidin gained control over the countryside. With the financial support of the United States, Western Europe, and Saudi Arabia, and the logistical support of Pakistan, the mujahidin forced the Red Army into an unprecedented retreat. Yet the defeat of the Soviet Union came at the cost of the collapse of the Afghan state and the empowerment of Islamist ideologies. While Afghanistan descended into vicious civil war, Islamist activists from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan disseminated their Wahhabi, Salafi, and Deobandi ideologies by tape, booklet, and broadcast. The Islamic Republic of Iran responded by sponsoring its own form of Shi’i Islamism among the Hazaras. Millions of Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran, and increasingly across the developed world, found themselves exposed to myriad religious and cultural influences. In 1994, a new Islamist movement called the Taliban emerged from this refugee diaspora. Persecuting Shi’i Muslims, Afghan Sikhs, and Hindus alike, the Taliban (Madrasa Students) established an Islamic emirate based on the Deobandi Islam of the Pakistani madrasas that had reared them. Despite the collapse of their emirate after the U.S.-led invasion of 2001, the social and even political influence of the Taliban and mujahidin remained strong. The decades of jihad and the influx of transnational Islamism had changed both Afghanistan and its Islam beyond recognition.
The Afghan jihad of the 1980s and early 1990s is often seen through the exclusive lens of geopolitical manipulation and shrewd strategic jockeying. The United States, European nations, and Saudi Arabia channeled massive funds and sophisticated military equipment to the Afghan theater of war in order to secure their specific and not necessarily overlapping agendas. Pakistan also pursued its own goals by recognizing only certain supposedly official Afghan parties and by schooling a generation of mujahidin around Peshawar and the country’s tribal areas. Amid all these machinations, it seems, the leaders of the Afghan groups (many of whom were trained in Egypt) had neither the time nor the incentive for serious thinking. Scholars have pointed out that the journals of the various Islamist parties merely reprinted excerpts from writings by the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb or the Indo-Pakistan Abu’l-ʿAla Mawdudi without developing these ideas any further. Speeches and articles supposedly made no effort to take the historical, political, religious, or social context of Afghanistan into account.

An even more problematic aspect of this exclusively import-focused religious economy, as the existing literature describes it, was the fact that Afghans eagerly tried to please their influential donors and merely parroted their foreign masters. This was taken to an extreme by the Arabophone and closely Saudi-aligned party leader ʿAbd al-Rasul Sayyaf (b. 1946), who even went so far as changing his name to ʿAbd Rabb al-Rasul Sayyaf (that is, ‘Slave of the Lord [Allah] of the Messenger’ rather than ‘Slave of the Messenger [Muhammad]’) in order to suit Wahhabi sensibilities. In exchange for access to privileges, Afghan mujahidin and party officials willingly engaged in their particular sponsor’s dirty work, which involved arresting, torturing, and executing their opponents. The whole concept of an Islamic...
resistance, it has been argued, was nothing more than an impressive smoke screen for cynical, selfish leaders, most notable among them the head of Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan (Islamic Party of Afghanistan), Gulbuddin Hikmatyar (b. 1947). While paying lip service to the commitment of establishing an Islamic state, his party was in fact “responsible for prolonging the conflict by consistently destroying grounds for common cause within the resistance and within Afghan society more generally.”

The political and military organizations faced significant popular resistance in their efforts to cash in on their monopoly of representation, which according to observers pointed to the ineffectiveness of their Islamic rhetoric. Severe criticism has been leveled at these political players as a consequence of the infighting that engulfed the country after the Russian withdrawal and the collapse of the communist regime that the Soviet invaders left in their wake. After all, “actions speak louder than words and the post-1990s civil war belied the main actors’ pretensions.”

Such a dismissal of Afghan Islamic debates as lacking seriousness, intellectual vitality, originality, or even any engagement with the local context is striking, especially when compared with the experience of Arab fighters who spent time in the milieu of the Afghan jihad in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Peshawar, where most of the Afghan party leaders had their headquarters as well, was considered not only a very suitable environment for exploring novel ideas about jihad but even “the capital of the Islamic world,’ from the jihadi point of view.” Concepts formulated there quickly spread to other countries through books, audiocassettes, and visitors alike. Shuttling between Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Palestinian ideologue ‘Abdullah ‘Azzam (d. 1989) redefined joining the fight as the personal duty of Muslims worldwide. His experience also convinced him that the priority of a global jihad should be the reconquest of territories formerly held by Muslims but now lost. The Syrian Mustafa Sitt Mariam Nasar (b. 1958), alias Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, who is considered a former major strategist of al-Qaeda, described the deep impact of his stay in the following way:

Peshawar and Afghanistan became a true university. . . . This was a turning in Muslim history. People met, thoughts and perspectives met, and personalities met. Groups fought out their rivalries, and different thoughts and ideas competed. It was a kind of birthplace. Much of what you see today is a result of this period.

Young Saudis consequently learned in this environment to apply the “discourse of excommunication” to their own rulers. These substantial intellectual developments call into question the perceived wisdom that Afghan actors should have stayed only on the sidelines and remained locked out of the laboratory of jihad and Islam more broadly that their country was becoming. When, in mid-1987, the trickle of Arab volunteers became a flood, Afghans had been fighting in the trenches, suffering the consequences of violence, and writing about jihad for almost a decade. This chapter, therefore, argues that
in the midst of this chaotic situation Afghanistan's citizens did not trail behind their Arab guests in attaching bold and unprecedented Islamic meanings to their fighting and in rethinking how it should be waged. They came, however, to vastly different conclusions.

Three aspects stand out in this intellectual enterprise: First, Afghans emphasized the international calling and the global significance of their military and political efforts. They did not frame their war as a mostly nationalist struggle but considered it a pioneering effort with implications for all other Muslim contexts that would expand on the achievements of the Iranian Revolution. It is significant that this conviction about the historic global role of Afghanistan was also shared and promoted by those parties that are usually classified as patrimonial, moderate, or nationalist in the prevailing typologies. Scholars have hinted at these processes, namely the emergence of a new Islamic ideology displaying “maturation with implications for a much broader region than simply that of Afghanistan and its immediate neighbors.” Yet they have not explored them in any detail.

Second, the experience of the jihad gave rise to new conceptions of the individual, the family, and finally the nation devoted single-mindedly to such a task. While party leaders extolled the irreversible transformations that their countrymen had already undergone, they were keenly aware of the continuous efforts still required in order to establish a truly “monotheistic world view” (jahanbini-yi tawhidi). A new vision of society that was on display in the camps of fighters and refugees alike had to be channeled into a future Islamic state. This required patient and sensible Islamic outreach that built on proper conceptions of the enemy and provided significant roles for religious scholars and women.

Third, the time of struggle also sharpened discussions about both the structure of the current, camp-based polities and the future political setup of a liberated Afghanistan. In this context we can discern notable differences between Afghan solutions and ideological visions penned by Arab authors based in the borderlands straddling Pakistan and Afghanistan. In contrast to the foreign jihadis, the Afghans were pushing for significantly more inclusive forms of leadership that placed an emphasis on consultation and less on the unquestionable power of a specific commander and/or ruler (amir).

Before we proceed to the discussion of these three aspects, a short note on the source material and its selection for this chapter is appropriate. If Western libraries do stock jihad magazines produced during the 1980s and 1990s at all, these are mostly available in English and Arabic editions that were clearly meant for audiences beyond Afghanistan. Relying on these exclusively and regarding them as mere translations of internal Afghan debates provides at times a skewed picture of the inner workings of the parties. Thanks to the initiative of the Afghanistan Studies Centre at Kabul University (ACKU) in cooperation with the University Libraries of
the University of Arizona, however, researchers have now access to a large number of high-quality scans of a wide range of publications in Dari/Pashto and Urdu, as well as English and Arabic. Even though the entire holdings of Kabul are still not available online by now, the digital collection already dwarfs the amount of material located at other centers in Europe or the United States, most notably the University of Nebraska at Omaha, which was charged in the 1980s with devising textbooks for Afghan children in the refugee camps of Pakistan. This chapter, covering roughly the period from 1980 until 1991, relies on major journals published by five of the seven Afghan parties that formed the official backbone of the jihad. Thanks to outside funds, all the journals were lavishly produced. An abundance of color photographs depicted the party leaders, mujahidin in the field, wounded children, captured Russian soldiers, and the general devastation of the war then raging.

Islamist-Oriented Parties

- Hizb-i Islami (Hikmatyar); journal Shafaq (Dari/Pashto).
- Jam‘iyyat-i Islami (Islamic Association); journals Misaq-i Khun (Dari/Pashto) and The Mirror of Jehad (sic; English).
- Ittihad-i Islami-yi Barayi Azadi-yi Afghanistan (Islamic Alliance for the Freedom of Afghanistan); journal Al-Bunyan al-Marsus (Arabic).

Traditionalist-Nationalist, Patrimonial Parties

- Mahaz-i Milli-yi Islami (The National Islamic Front); journal Mahaz, published under the same name in both Urdu and Dari/Pashto
- Jabha-i Milli-yi Afghanistan (The National Front of Afghanistan); journal Najat (Dari/Pashto)

With over a hundred periodicals put into circulation until 1988 from Peshawar alone, these journals have been selected both with an eye toward availability but also according to their importance for the specific party. Yet this choice does by no means imply that these magazines are the only voices that should be listened to in future explorations of the messages emerging from the Afghan jihad. A potentially fruitful avenue for further research, for instance, consists of the numerous travelogues and memoirs written by Afghans and Pakistanis alike. The following pages are able to draw on only some of these firsthand accounts. As a body of literature, they have not been studied in depth beyond the narrations left behind by Arab fighters. These Arabic accounts were often used along with interviews in order to clarify the early history of al-Qaeda, but with less concern for the various Afghan agendas at play. Finally, this chapter takes an exclusive view on the Sunni actors involved in Afghanistan. Investigating the intellectual production of Afghanistan’s Shi‘i parties and ‘ulama remains a major desideratum.
So far, these groups and individuals have mostly been discussed with the intention of identifying their closeness to Iran and her revolutionary ideology. Scholars have also pointed out the initial successes of local Shi‘i Afghan forces in wresting the Shi‘i-dominated areas of the Hazarajat in central Afghanistan from the communist regime. They established a quasi-independent administration and managed to keep the territory under their control out of the war before their own infighting began.\(^{21}\)

Rolf Bindemann and David Edwards are perhaps the only authors who have attempted to shed some additional light on changes regarding conceptions of religious authority among Afghanistan’s Shi‘is. Focusing on the Hazara community,
they noticed for the second half of the twentieth century a clear movement away from the spiritual guidance exerted by local descendants of the Prophet Muhammad (sayyids), who acted as Sufi masters (pirs). Instead, religious scholars trained in Iran and Iraq managed to push for the imitation (taqlid) of leading jurists based in the Middle East. Such processes also influenced how the Hazaras was structured and led. Supported by Iran, Shi‘i ‘ulama traveled the Hazara-jat, established local cells, and spread discourses that revolved around religious law, thus gaining increasing prominence during the 1980s.\(^\text{22}\) The precise mechanisms and local dynamics of these shifts in religious authority remain still mostly unexplored, however.\(^\text{23}\)

GLOBAL ISLAMIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE AFGHAN JIHAD

The first argument that this chapter makes relates to the global Islamic implications that Afghan mujahidin attributed to the struggle against Russian troops and their local allies. It builds and expands on recent observations by Robert Crews, who has drawn our attention to how the jihad was endowed by its participants with an almost-cosmic significance that had changed the course of history.\(^\text{24}\)

Burhan al-Din Rabbani (d. 2011), the leader of the Jam‘iyyat-i Islami, claimed that from its early stages the Afghan uprising had sought to transcend its local context. In his recollection, the Jam‘iyyat handed out leaflets to pilgrims in Mecca during the hajj of 1975, warning them about the danger that Afghanistan was on the “verge of falling into the lap of communism.” The group worked in vain to establish contacts with foreign powers in order to secure outside help. The world back then took no notice of the impending peril.\(^\text{25}\) Being left alone and ignored in their appeal, however, was a divine blessing in disguise. It enabled the Afghan nation to ultimately stun global opinion, as the Urdu journal Hijrat put it, published by an early and ultimately faltering alliance of parties: Afghans responded to the call of jihad at a time when beyond antiquated rifles they had no access to modern military equipment. They met the enemy practically empty-handed.\(^\text{26}\)

From the beginning, the mujahidin followed a different logic than the materialists (madd parast) who believe that military strength is directly proportional to one’s access to tanks or fighter jets.\(^\text{27}\) Consequently, there was no event in history comparable to the Afghan people’s heroism, faith, and determination. Other nations may have resisted their invaders, too, but from a military point of view there was always some sort of balance. The present jihad provided an entirely different picture: one poor, underdeveloped, unaided nation set against the “great devilish superpower of the time.”\(^\text{28}\) Not even advanced industrial states, with their sophisticated armies, would have been able to achieve similar victories on the battlefield. This was why, as Rabbani declared on another occasion, Western journalists
had begun encouraging their generals to learn from the Afghan experience. Military academies had to catch up, too. These institutions still studied in great detail how the Egyptians had managed to break through the Israeli defenses, the Bar-Lev-Line, on the Sinai, in 1973. Yet they would be well advised to focus their attention on how the mujahidin were in the process of overcoming the military buildup of the Soviets, who had established the equivalent of dozens of such Bar-Lev lines in every trench.29

All this demonstrated that the Afghan uprising was a unique case and a “purely ideological confrontation.” Other conflicts on the globe were waged in the name of access to resources or in order to obtain material gains. The Afghans would need only to surrender to the Soviets if they were after high-quality health care, education, or material comfort. Rejecting these lures, the fighting was instead about the preservation of Islam’s exalted position: “If Afghans become victorious in their struggle, Inshaullah [sic], it will be a start of the revival of Islam, a cornerstone of the next Khilafat Ilahia, led by Afghans.”30 To a certain extent, the country thus simply regained its fundamental role in the worldwide Islamic revival that had been started by a self-styled and eagerly embraced Afghan, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (d. 1897).31 Egyptian writers like Hasan al-Banna (d. 1949), the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, emphasized al-Afghani’s essential contribution to the religious reawakening of their country.32 In the course of the twentieth century, Islamic movements had seen a rise beyond their Egyptian cradle, however. The Muslim umma had entered an era of liberation from the “global arrogance” (istikbar-i jahani) and the spread of unbelief between the nations. Afghanistan had come to occupy a position of centrality within this development (Afghanistan darin zamina haysiyyat-i markaz-i in balandigi ra bi-khud girifta ast). The integrity of the Ka’ba, the birthplace of Islam, and the pilgrimage were defended at the Hindu Kush. Whereas the hajjis offered financial donations, the Afghans gave their lives. Whereas the pilgrims performed the ritual ablution in the water of the sacred well Zamzam, the mujahidin washed their clothes for the pilgrimage to the hereafter (ahram-i ‘alam-i bala) in blood.33 Such ideas about the exalted role of Afghanistan in God’s salvation history, as expressed here inter alia by the Hizb-i Islami, stand in marked contrast to statements published in the early years of the uprising. Back in 1978 or 1979, party discipline had trumped any particular commitment to the nation and its history.34

Crucially, the global significance of the jihad was also heralded by the publications of the Mahaz-i Milli-yi Islami, an organization that has been labeled as “the most nationalist party and the closest to the old regime” of all the Peshawar-based groups.35 It was led by the Qadiri Sufi master Sayyid Ahmad Gilani (b. 1932), who had served as a religious counselor to the deposed King Muhammad Zahir Shah (d. 2007). Before the war, Gilani had overseen a network of twenty-eight representatives (khulafa) all over the country, had held court every day (darbar),
and had also sponsored a regular and substantive public kitchen (langar).\(^{36}\) The party program of the National Islamic Front specified that a “source of inspiration” (manba’-i ilham) for all its activities were both “the clear religion of Islam and nationalism” (din-i mubin-i Islam wa watankhwahi). The Mahaz stood for the defense of national sovereignty and territorial integrity. The party was opposed to the dictatorship of any individual or family.\(^{37}\) A future free Afghanistan would take its national interest into view first of all.\(^{38}\)

Yet despite this seemingly straightforward focus on its own backyard, the deputy party leader Dr. Faruq A’zam (b. 1943) was eager to underline the worldwide ramifications of the Afghan jihad. This particular struggle had increased the desire (hawsala) of Muslims everywhere to obtain their rights and express their demands in strictly Islamic terms. In particular, A’zam credited his countrymen with transforming the formerly exclusively secular Palestinian resistance. He recalled a rather sobering journey to Palestine that had enabled him to have meetings and conversations with Yasir ‘Arafat (d. 2004) and Abu Jihad, alias Khalil al-Wazir (d. 1988), of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); George Habash (d. 2008), of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP); and Nayif Hawatma (b. 1938), of the Democratic Front of the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP).\(^{39}\) According to A’zam, he did not notice any Islamic symbols on the flags he encountered. The Palestinian jihad was not waged in the name of religion. During his conversations with the aforementioned leaders, each of them expressed his desire to establish a non-Islamic system (ghayr Islami nizam). Today, however, one needed only to watch television in order to realize that the banners under which the Palestinians fought openly displayed the slogans ALLAHU AKBAR, THERE IS NO GOD BUT GOD, and MUHAMMAD IS HIS MESSENGER.\(^{40}\)

Clearly, this change of heart was nothing but a direct outcome and a blessing of the Afghan jihad (ap logon ke jihad ki barakat he). Following the example set by the mujahidin, the Palestinians for the first time had begun to perceive Islam as the path of salvation and happiness (wahan ke logon men pihli martaba yih ihsas payda ho giya he ke Islam najat awr kamrani ka rasta he). They had consequently abandoned their previous foreign ways.\(^{41}\) Going beyond the reception of their cause in the Middle East, the various Afghan parties also promoted an even more comprehensive shared conviction, namely that the fall of the Berlin Wall and the political transformations in Eastern Europe were direct consequences of Afghanistan’s battlefronts as well.\(^{42}\) In the light of what was at stake, then, it is not surprising that internal violent confrontations between groups such as the Hizb-i Islami and the Jam’iyyat-i Islami were presented as tragedies that played with the fate of Muslims worldwide and should be of concern to all believers.\(^{43}\)

Considering the transnational implications of the jihad in Afghanistan, it is also important to note how deeply the uprising was steeped in Shi’i imagery and how profoundly it was influenced by the Iranian Revolution. Sunni Islamist groups
across the Muslim world had initially displayed fascination or even enthusiasm for Khomeini’s successful Islamic transformation of a previously oppressive and authoritarian system of government. Under the impression of the Iran-Iraq War, however, Arab countries as well as Pakistan witnessed a massive backlash against Shi‘i Islam and the steady rise of sectarianism since the early 1980s.\textsuperscript{44} The situation in Afghanistan presented itself in a different light. It might well be the case that the context of the war and the prospect of overthrowing the regime in Kabul made it possible to prolong a more accommodating attitude at least toward Shi‘i ideas and symbolism.\textsuperscript{45} Burhan al-Din Rabbani, for example, repeatedly made the case that those whom he called “the Shi‘i brothers” needed to be included in a transitional government.\textsuperscript{46} Openly anti-Shi‘i rhetoric was rare and mostly confined to the religious scholar and leader of the Society for the Preaching of the Quran and the Sunna in Afghanistan (\textit{Jama‘at al-Da‘wa ila al-Qur’an wa-l-Sunna}), Mawlawi Muhammad Husayn (aka Jamil al-Rahman, d. 1991). He managed to briefly establish a Salafi emirate in Kunar in 1991, but it never achieved recognition as one of the official Afghan parties.\textsuperscript{47} With a strong focus on creed (‘\textit{aqida}), Muhammad Husayn emphasized the long-standing doctrinal and fundamental differences between Sunnis and Shi‘is (\textit{khilafatuna ma‘hum . . . fi-l-usul}). The latter had always detested the true Islamic religion (\textit{din}), harbored treason in their hearts, and worked toward damaging the belief in God’s unity (\textit{tawhid}).\textsuperscript{48} Sharing political power with the Shi‘is, who hated the Prophet’s companions (\textit{sahaba}), cursed them, and always led Muslims astray, would imply that such an administration could not possibly qualify as an Islamic government (\textit{hu-kuma islamiiyya}).\textsuperscript{49} The marginality of such anti-Shi‘i statements also calls into question the suspected Saudi influence on the \textit{jihad} more broadly.\textsuperscript{50} Instead, we notice how many Shi‘i symbols, filtered through the Iranian Revolution, were appropriated by the various Sunni groups fighting in Afghanistan. An anonymous contribution in \textit{Shafaq}, for example, located the many sacrifices of the Afghan nation in the context of ‘Ashura, which was recurring every day in Afghanistan, with every part of the country being turned into Karbala (\textit{dar Afghanistan har ruz ruz-i ‘Ashura ast wa har zamin sar-i zamin-i Karbala}).\textsuperscript{51} The same journal also featured an article in Dari written by the Pakistani Shi‘i politician and journalist Agha Murtaza Puya, who adopted a deliberately ecumenical style.\textsuperscript{52} After elaborating on the importance of martyrdom in Islam, Puya underlined that proper commemoration of Husayn went beyond mourning ceremonies and flagellation. His example required from us instead that we follow him on the path of self-sacrifice: \textsuperscript{53} Today, the blood of the exalted Imam Husayn and his \textit{mujahidin} friends has once again and at a different Karbala come to a boil in martyr-trained Afghanistan. The members of the fighting Afghan nation [\textit{millat-i mujahid-i Afghan}] are the true inheritors of Husayn [\textit{warisan-i bar haqq-i Husayn}]. . . . They have embarked on an
uprising and *jihad* against the apostates of the age and responded with “Here we are” [*labbayka*] to Husayn’s call “Is there anyone who comes to our aid?” [*hal min nasir yansuruna*]. They bring about the salvation of Islam and the Muslims from the bloody claws of the enemies of humanity [*dushmanan-i bashariyyat*].

Sunni *jihad* commanders adopted Shi‘i-sounding names like Friend of Husayn (Husayn Yar) in order to express their commitment to the cause of the Prophet’s grandson. Afghanistan fought against a different Great Satan than Khomeini’s Islamic Republic, namely Russia, which pursued everything in its power to forestall the establishment of a purely Islamic government in Kabul and thus create a second Iran (*ta ke us khite men dusra Iran na ban ja’e*). Burhan al-Din Rabbani admired how far Iran had come in constructing a societal environment that inculcated a spirit of revolution (*inqilab*) despite all pressures exerted by outside powers, economic problems, and the war against Iraq. At the same time, he expressed his hope that a future Islamic state in Afghanistan might serve as a model of Islamic revival promoted by the country’s western neighbor (*yiki az panagaha wa payagahayi-yi nahzathayi-yi Islami dar pahluyi-yi jumhuri-yi Islami-yi Iran qarar girad*). Already Afghanistan had in some sense taken over the role of her erstwhile model and was acting as a revolutionary university for all other Islamic upheavals in the Muslim world.

**INDIVIDUAL, FAMILY, NATION: CHALLENGES OF FOSTERING A NEW AFGHAN MUSLIM BEING**

The Peshawar-based parties made it clear that this global role for Afghanistan was directly attributable to the transformations that their nation had already undergone. Their countrymen had stepped up to the challenge of being turned into a collective body of *jihad*. Building on the promise that this struggle would blot out all their previous sins, they had adopted a Sufi-inspired indifference toward the importance of clinging to their own lives. Since it did not matter whether one was killed through a conventional bullet or an atomic bomb, the Afghan people had made up their minds to either “smash the teeth of the Russians” or “become extinguished” (*khud fana ho jayegi*) while trying to do so. While war was hell to those who fought for an unjust cause, for the *mujahidin* heaven lay under the shadow of the swords.

This deep conviction came to the fore in various social settings, especially in the camps that were home to fighters and refugees alike. Young people, whose minds had been occupied by vain thoughts and the pursuit of illicit pleasures, today persevered for months in the trenches. They bravely faced the spring tide of blood and willingly embarked on the journey to their eternal resting place. Reports about everyday life in the camps focused on the voluntary nature of all contributions, on the willingness to take on additional work, and how much love prevailed among
the brothers. The connection between the Afghan refugees, designated as muhajirun (pious emigrants) in the image of the Prophet’s companions, who had left persecution in Mecca for Medina, and their Pakistani hosts, the ansar, analogous to the Medinese “helpers,” was closer than during the first Islamic century, presumably because they were all of the same blood (hamara khun ek he). Ordinary Afghans endured witnessing the killing of their closest family members without revealing the secret that they were sheltering mujahidin under their roofs. In short, the transformations of the country and its people had been so profound that there could be no simple return to prewar society nor the restoration of Zahir Shah to the throne after the cessation of hostilities.

Despite all these successes, however, the various Afghan parties remained deeply aware of the tensions between the achievements already realized and the necessarily ongoing jihadi cultivation of individuals and society. Temptations lurked on multiple levels. Afghans, for example, needed to be constantly reminded that God presided over a perfectly balanced order of the world, in which no leaf, cobweb, or full-fledged jihad remained outside his purview, as Hikmatyar put it in a series on Quranic exegesis. To a certain extent, the mujahidin parties had become victims of their own vastly improved capabilities for publishing an increasing number of professional journals and reaching wider audiences. Burhan al-Din Rabbani recalled the dearth of Islamic books available for access during his time as a student. Many of his fellow activists had been martyred in their efforts to distribute these banned publications, to let them circulate from hand to hand and from house to house.

Today, however, with unlimited material available, the young generation was content to browse the pictures on the cover and take a cursory look at the table of contents. In this way, they clearly fell short of developing a revolutionary personality (shakhsiyat-i inqilabi) and might even be prone to communist overtures, because the Russians had significantly stepped up their efforts of indoctrination. One possible solution tried with the Mujahidin War College combined training courses in artillery, infantry, and engineering with a focus on Shari’a and ‘aqida (creedal convictions).

Another palpable danger was the possibility that discipline could break down once significant conquests had been made after the withdrawal of Russian troops. Local commanders were urged to closely monitor the conduct of their fighters so that they would not engage in despicable actions (sharr pasand) and destruction (takhrib) or slander the good name of the mujahidin by selling looted items on the black market. In particular, the jihad depended on the common people. They should not be alienated by administering forms of Shari’a justice that were too harsh. Commanders should step in to guarantee the safety of ordinary Afghans who had willingly (apni marzi par) surrendered and come over to the mujahidin—those were not the enemy. Instead of following a tough line, the fighters, leaders,
and missionaries of the Islamic resistance should display patience, leniency, and sincere devotion.\textsuperscript{73} Even harsh language would cause only resentment.\textsuperscript{74} Sayyid Ahmad Gilani underlined repeatedly that a future Islamic system was only feasible if it took the particular Afghan beliefs and customs (\textit{millat ke `aqa'id awr riwayat}) into account.\textsuperscript{75} This emphasis on local solutions and forbearance was not only promoted by Gilani’s traditionalist Mahaz-i Milli-yi Islami, however. Also the supposedly Wahhabi-affiliated ‘Abd Rabb al-Rasul Sayyaf put it bluntly in a warning issued to Arab Muslims who were contemplating whether or not to make the journey to Afghanistan. These potential volunteers should not repeat the mistake of some of their predecessors. If they came to the country in order to issue declarations of unbelief (\textit{takfir}), they were not welcome. This would be a stab in the heart of the Afghan believers and would do serious damage to the belief in God’s unity.\textsuperscript{76}

They [the Afghans, SWF] truly bear the attacks of airplanes on their heads and the advances of tanks on the bellies of their children, their old men, and their women. For over seven years, they have been living under a heavy downpour of bombs and bullets and amid the firing of artillery and rockets. Yet, it is more shocking for them to endure the stab of being charged with unbelief (\textit{kufr}). How can you declare them to be unbelievers? They have completely sacrificed life and property on the path of spreading the doctrine of \textit{tawhid} while you sit in your comfortable house with your family. If you see something objectionable, then there are gentle ways and a prudent method [\textit{turuq latifa wa-uslub hakim}] to set the situation right.

One solution for overcoming this inherent tension between the “already” and the “not-yet” was to provide a greater role for the ‘\textit{ulama} within \textit{jihadi} activities and the formation of a new society.\textsuperscript{77} The religious scholars were mistaken to believe that they were too precious for the Muslim community and hence should not advance to the front lines because of the risk of being killed. Even the Prophet himself, who bore the entirety of God’s law and revealed knowledge (\textit{yahmil al-shari’a kullaha wa-l-‘ilm kullahu}), went into the battlefield. If the ‘\textit{ulama} participated more actively on the fronts, “their ink would bear fruit from their blood”: if they died waging \textit{jihad}, this would significantly increase the impact of their writings in society.\textsuperscript{78} Equally important were women who nourished the \textit{jihadi} family (\textit{al-usra al-mujahida}). The wives of fighters encouraged their sisters in the camps to take their role as educators of their children seriously. They should supplicate themselves in gratefulness to God for granting them the honor of residing in the Land of \textit{Jihad} (\textit{dar al-jihad}).\textsuperscript{79} One woman described how in her early days in Peshawar, she and her female friends had discussed the shared hope that their respective husbands might enjoy a long life before finally being martyred. She had now realized, however, that this would mean being stingy about her husband, because he naturally leaned toward the elevated honor of achieving either victory or martyrdom.\textsuperscript{80}
Removing misconceptions about the enemy played an important part in fostering a novel Muslim personality, too. The magazines under consideration devoted significant efforts to demonizing the communists and used foreign visitors to propagate such a view. A group of Pakistani Deobandi ʻulama, for example, were shown around in liberated areas with particular attention paid to mosques that had supposedly been used as toilets, stables, or sites for heavy drinking. The Afghan guides frequently pointed out examples of mutilated Qurans where the works of Lenin sat neatly ordered on the shelves. The emphasis of articles discussing communism was on the long-standing, consistent antireligious policies of the Soviet Union that informed Russian actions in Afghanistan in the present. If the 1930s had witnessed the execution of religious leaders, the torture of ordinary Muslims, and the destruction of places of worship, such afflictions were commonplace behind the contemporary Iron Curtain. Even subscribing to authentic Islamic beliefs could entail prison sentences. All public religious activities supposedly remained outlawed.

With the Russian withdrawal, it became more difficult to insist on such a line of reasoning, especially given President Muhammad Najibullah’s (d. 1996) propaganda offensive, the announcing of a substantial policy of national reconciliation, and palpable overtures toward Islam. There was an increasing number of voices questioning the possibility to continue on the path of jihad, since this was threatening to turn into a brotherly conflict between Muslims (baradar kushi). The solution adopted in jihadi magazines was to insist that those Afghans who supported the Russians were not truly human. Retribution against those who spread dissension (fitna) was demanded by God, and there could be no peace with such corrupt elements:

We are Islam’s followers, and Islam gives us the order that such people do not deserve mercy. They are beasts of prey cloaked in the appearance of a human being. They are the true enemies of humanity. The only mercy they deserve is to erase their evil from the page of existence [safha-i hasti] like a wrong word that gets blotted out.

Given the remaining intensive cooperation between the Russians and the Afghan regime, one particular Quranic verse, which usually does not occupy a position of prominence in jihadi thought, was highlighted. Quran 4:76 states that:

The believers fight in the way of God, and the unbelievers fight in the idols’ way. Fight you, therefore, against the friends of Satan; surely the guile of Satan is ever feeble.

This verse established in the view of the author the necessity to continue the jihad against the puppets, favorite children, and treacherous friends of the Russians, namely the communist regime in Kabul. The clear-cut foreign backing and the initially radical antireligious policies after the coup of 1978 rendered it fairly easy for the Afghan parties to justify why they were engaged in a jihad against an
enemy who called himself Muslim.\textsuperscript{87} For Arab \textit{jihadi} thinkers based in Pakistan and Afghanistan, by contrast, the situation was far more complex. They had to labor hard to make the case that their plans to overthrow the significantly less openly communist and atheist regimes back home were located squarely within the boundaries of the Shari‘a. For this reason, these ideologues sifted through the Islamic scholarly tradition in order to come up with a seemingly solid consensus for their actions. Their goal was to identify impeccable mainstream figures beyond an exclusive reliance on marginal and controversial figures like the medieval Damascene jurist Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328).\textsuperscript{88}

THE \textit{MUJAHIDIN} IN POWER: DEBATING THE LIMITS OF AN INCLUSIVE POLITY

Discussions about leadership bring to the fore another stark difference between Arab and Afghan conclusions drawn from the \textit{jihad}. The Arabs were fascinated by the reality of the camps and built on their experiences in Egypt, Jordan, or Syria, where a mass uprising on the scale of Afghanistan was only a very remote possibility. These foreign guests therefore envisioned the establishment of tightly controlled and secretive guerilla organizations that might be set up in their home countries. Unquestionable hierarchy was key in this context.

Such an attitude manifests itself, for instance, in the influential \textit{jihad} manual \textit{al-‘Umda fi i‘dad al-‘udda li-l-jihad fi sabil Allah} (The Essential Guide of Preparation for \textit{Jihad} in the Path of God). It was published in 1988 by the Egyptian surgeon and writer Sayyid Imam al-Sharif, who spent nearly twelve years of his life in Pakistan. Al-Sharif argued for a leader’s absolute authority, regardless of whether he was the commander of a \textit{jihadi} camp (\textit{amir al-mu‘askar}) or the future ruler of an Islamic state. \textit{Al-‘Umda}’s author did not envision elections but saw the pledge of allegiance (\textit{bay‘a}) as a sufficient instrument to restructure society from the bottom up. While consultation (\textit{shura}) was required for both the \textit{amir} and the caliph, they were not restricted in their choices by the advice received from any consultative body.\textsuperscript{89} Al-Sharif’s reading was very much in line with medieval and modern mainstream positions. Classical Islamic political thought considered consultation merely a recommended practice. Most traditionalist and Islamist thinkers writing about the subject in the twentieth century classified \textit{shura} as obligatory but did not conclude that its outcome must be implemented by the ruler.\textsuperscript{90}

The Afghans, by contrast, advocated a model of political organization that put a much stronger emphasis on consultation and its binding character. An article on the Islamic principles of government, printed in the Jam‘iyyat-i Islami’s journal \textit{Misaq-i Khun} in December 1980, underlined that the Prophet had relied on the opinions of experts in areas regarding which he had received no revelation. Religion provided no room for egoism and tyranny. Consequently, a ruler
or commander could expect obedience only so long as he operated within the framework of Islam (chaukat-i Islam). He had no special rights that would set him apart from the common believers. Instead, it was incumbent on him to weigh all the opinions presented and to choose the view that was correct and true (ra’i sa’ib wa mustaqim). After the disastrous battle of Uhud, in the year 3/625, God had commanded the Prophet that he should continue listening to those who had defied his orders. This implied that a ruler was not allowed to use the pretext of serious misconduct to exclude one of his subjects from the right of consultation and to rely solely on his personal views.91

During a party convention in 1987 Gulbuddin Hikmatyar argued even more explicitly that he regarded the implementation of majority decisions reached by the Hizb-i Islami’s consultative body as mandatory (wajib al-ta’mil). His position as the party’s leader required him to submit to the bills and stipulations (lawa’ih wa muqarrarat) passed by the shura.92 By adopting a general stance in favor of consultation, Hikmatyar clearly went beyond Mawdudi, who had gone back and forth on the subject but insisted on full obedience to the caliph. The latter in Mawdudi’s view was not obliged to accept the consultative council’s majority opinion and could even take a decision that defied a unanimous vote by this body.93 Hikmatyar’s comment also seems to clash with the often-noted authoritarian nature of the Hizb-i Islami more broadly. The party, it has been shown, demanded total submission from its members, and its organizational structure appears to have been modeled on the example provided by the Pakistani Jama’at-i Islami.94 Referring to a party pamphlet from either 1978 or 1979, the anthropologist David B. Edwards noted the expectation to accept95 the policies and procedures of the party leadership without question, even if this requires obeying orders that are abhorrent to the member (such as killing members of one’s own family) and even if this requires the sacrifice of the member’s own life.

Yet for Hikmatyar tight top-down control and the importance of shura were not mutually exclusive. Quite the contrary: in his view consultation was contingent on the centralized setup of the Hizb-i Islami. Only because the party administration closely monitored its individual units and provided a conducive Islamic setting, it was possible to take the risk of collective deliberation (asl-i shura) on all levels. Election campaigns, for example, were not permissible within the party. No individual was allowed to put his name forward as a candidate for the position of amir.96 Instead, the members of the party’s small authoritative council (shura-yi muqtadar) vetted candidates for the offices both of the central consultative body (shura-yi markazi) and of the leader himself, taking into account their piety, knowledge, and conduct during the jihad. This selection process, necessary to guarantee Islamically appropriate candidates and free from any interference by the current amir, was followed by general and fair elections among the party’s
Hikmatyar suggested applying a less tightly controlled template to fill the political void in Afghanistan. Local shuras in liberated areas should elect their representatives, who would then, along with delegates sent by the various parties, choose the future ruler of Afghanistan.

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has considered three aspects of the lively multilingual debates waged among Afghan ideologues, party leaders, and intellectuals in the shadow of the jihad that ultimately turned the country into a synonym for political instability. Afghans extolled the global significance of their fighting and suffering. They focused on the
continuing transformation of their society that seemed on the cusp of ushering in a new, palpable model of Islamic communitas. Party leaders advocated Islamic political models that were not necessarily democratic but insisted far more on a popular, inclusive character than any of the plans springing from the Afghan Arabs’ experience. This discussion has thus disentangled the various jihads at play in Afghanistan and made the case that the country’s citizens and its leadership in exile did not content themselves with importing religious models from Egypt and Pakistan or with simply playing along with the rulebook of their foreign masters.

The major reason why these ideas voiced by Afghan protagonists of the jihad have not received more attention so far has to do with the fact that they apparently all denote paths not taken for the country. The infighting among the various parties after the fall of Kabul in 1992 seriously damaged their reputations and exposed them in the eyes of many researchers and Afghans alike as empty rhetorical shells. However, one of the implications of this chapter is that the subsequent takeover of the country by the Taliban in the mid-1990s did not entail a complete break with the Islamic discourses circulating widely during the jihad of the previous decade. In particular, evaluations of the original Taliban movement of 1994 as having only limited horizons and exclusively local concerns that were gradually widened by both Arab fighters and the Pakistani intelligence services are hard to accept. Such a view reinscribes a false notion regarding the isolation of the madrasas in Pakistan’s tribal areas, which educated many of the religious students who went on to form the Taliban. Their movement did not require foreign intellectual aid in order to start “mouthing Islamist critiques formulated elsewhere . . . to explain the frustrations of the people of Afghanistan.”99 Instead, the Taliban clearly tapped into the sense of a worldwide mission for Afghanistan that had developed during the 1980s and 1990s.

The dramatic public pledge of allegiance in 1996 by a large congregation of ‘ulama to Mulla Muhammad ‘Umar (1962–2013) — clad in the famous mantle attributed to the Prophet Muhammad that is housed in Ahmad Shah Durrani’s mausoleum in Qandahar—as the Commander of the Faithful speaks to such more comprehensive, even global leadership claims.100 Furthermore, the Taliban’s drive to remake society by going against customary Pashtun practices and establishing an Office for Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong (Idara-yi Amr bi’l-Ma’ruf wa-Nahi ‘an al-Munkar) was not unprecedented, even if their vision was significantly farther-reaching.101 Burhan al-Din Rabbani during his tenure as Afghanistan’s president, between 1992 and 1996, had already established such a body, giving thus practical expression to a reformist agenda debated throughout the jihad.102 The question of the Taliban’s attitude toward Shi’i Islam is intriguing, as well. As we have seen, often-repeated claims about the rise of anti-Shi’i sectarianism as a direct result of the Afghan jihad do not fit together with the evidence presented here. Expressions of hatred against the Shi’is were muted, and the
fighting itself was deeply imbued with Shi‘i symbolism. Scholars have thus made the case that the Taliban’s sectarian agenda was directly shaped by the Pakistani environment, where organizations like the Sipah-i Sahabah-i Pakistan (Army of the Companion of the Prophet) thrived.103

Yet the emerging picture has not been particularly clear. Massacres of Shi‘i Hazaras and the choice between conversion, migration, or death after the Taliban capture of Mazar-i Sharif, in 1997, stand in contrast to a more permissible attitude that allowed Shi‘is to continue their practice of mourning ceremonies within the confines of their mosques. Similarly, we are faced with diverging accounts of the structures of Taliban leadership, the importance of their various shuras, and the limits of authority exerted by Mulla ‘Umar.104 More research into primary sources and works published by the Taliban is urgently required. Future studies of such materials may well bring to light many more continuities between Taliban thought and the jihad of the 1980s than we have so far uncovered.
Female Sainthood between Politics and Legend

The Emergence of Bibi Nushin of Shibirghan

Ingeborg Baldauf

On the first day of ʿId al-Qurban in late February 1996, nineteen-year-old unmarried Bibi Nushin suffered an untimely death on barren land near Janagalbagh, on the western outskirts of Shibirghan. Her grave is near that place. Bibi Nushin was killed because she—or her family—turned down a marriage proposal. A short time afterwards, apparitions that indicated the elevated spiritual rank of the deceased person appeared in the environs of the burial place. After several miraculous healings took place, a modest mausoleum was built above the grave. By the summer of 1996, the location was regularly attracting crowds of pilgrims, the larger part of whom were women and young girls.

—Oral Testimony, Northern Afghanistan, 1996

By both the local population and in Afghanistan more widely, northern Afghanistan is considered the “holiest soil on Earth.” Not only are the famous seventy-two Mashaʿikh-i Balkh (Shaykhs of Balkh) interred there. So are thousands of other saintly persons who lived and died in the area over the centuries in a process of regional sanctification whose earliest stages are described in Arezou Azad’s chapter in this volume. Any study of the particularities of a given sanctuary reduces the research gap concerning “spatially distinctive cultural traditions of Islamic populations” in local contexts of saint cult and pilgrimage (as opposed to the well-investigated global significance of the hajj) that had been identified by scholars interested in mobility induced by religious belief.1 Such regional studies add to our understanding of the “irresistible need of believers to localize the numinous and to inscribe into space, through rites, their expression of piety.”2 Beyond these more general goals, this chapter aims to describe how a process unfolds that in most cases we find ourselves confronting only the historical results of, a process that
sets the preconditions for all manifestations of localized piety: How is the sanctity of a person identified and negotiated; how does a sacred place come to be a *lieu de mémoire* and then almost fall back into the condition of a “place of oblivion”? And how does all this relate to the manifold needs and interests of believers and others? The following pages attempt to answer some of these questions by relying on the immediate observation of the rise and further development from 1996 to 2009 of a single sanctuary in northern Afghanistan, namely the pilgrimage place (*ziyarat*) of Bibi Nushin.

Although detailed studies on minor Afghan pilgrimage places may still be scarce, the amazing concentration of all types of sanctuaries in Afghanistan is well attested from before 1979, from *ziyarat* to *qadamja‘i* (memorial) and *nazargah*, from modest one-pole, one-flag locations to grandiose mausoleums. The civil war of the 1980s to the early 2000s, however, caused another high tide of flagstaffs and “hands of Fatima” to rise over the hills and flatlands between the Band-i Turkistan and the Amu Darya, just as it did everywhere else in Afghanistan. This was testimony of a “formidable army of shadows” whose martyrdom at the hands of the respective inimical infidels entitled them, as it were, to the time-honored special rank of *shahid* (martyr) but who at the same time came to represent a novel regional type of “the perfect Muslim”—neither an omnipotent tribal leader, nor Sufi, nor learned man, but rather a fighter in and victim of the *jihad*. The little space reserved for females in this heroic universe was that of a “passive and pitiable witness to the barbarity of the adversary.” And yet in 1996 it was the resting place of Shahid Nushin (Martyr Nushin), as young Bibi Nushin was named by many, which (insofar as travel was possible in that warlike situation) attracted crowds from all over northern Afghanistan and beyond. The crowds of visitors were second in number only to the pilgrims at the famous Timurid-period shrine of Hazrat ‘Ali in Mazar-i Sharif. Who, then, was Bibi Nushin, and what had happened to turn her into a saint?

Bibi Nushin’s story is not easy to tell. It includes sober elements in line with everyday experience and totally different ones, wondrous elements that can be explained only by the exceptional logics of dogma. The latter make the story partly sound like a legend. As happens with all seductive rumor, some people purported the story to be factual truth, whereas others said they were just recounting from hearsay, and again others openly uttered doubts about the veracity of their account but were spreading it all the same. The introductory core text above is pieced together from fragments that by the fall of 1996, when we collected them, had not grown into a master narrative and to the best of my knowledge have not done so until this day. We have to navigate an archipelago of glimpses and hints, now consistent and now contradictory, hoping to understand how these snippets, in lieu of a full-fledged narrative, are “at work in ordering experiences [and] negotiating collective values.”
In the fall of 1996, Bibi Nushin’s resting place consisted of a whitewashed, vaulted cenotaph covered with colorful quilts, mounted on a little concrete platform fenced in with iron bars and sheltered by a provisional timber roof. An embroidered panel of fabric indicated her name and the date of her martyrdom (shahadat). The little mausoleum was all decorated with flags and ribbons and covered with colored stones, coins, small bills, and other little votive gifts. Women and girls of all ages were huddling up against the fence, and many others were squatting and walking all around the place. On our first visit, Bibi Nushin’s father, a man in his fifties, was present at the gravesite, collecting gifts in cash and kind from some visitors, talking to people and handing out money to women who appeared to be in bitter need. He had been away from home for a business trip when the killing happened. Upon his return home for the ’Id al-Qurban he learned the sad news and went to see the spot that people indicated as Bibi Nushin’s burial place. Local residents told him that this was a water-bearing zone and that accordingly the peace of the grave would be disturbed and the quality of local water reserves damaged. They asked him to put her into a fresh grave a little farther away, which he did. This is all Nushin’s father told us. He did not mention how and why she had died, nor did he venture a guess about who may have been involved. However, when subsequently we inquired with visitors and others, women and men, there was much more that they had to tell.
THE REVELATION OF A SACRED PLACE

Shepherds who kept their flocks in the environs of Bibi Nushin’s burial place reported to her father that three or four nights after the reburial flames appeared above the grave. It is said that many a holy site in northern Afghanistan has been revealed by flames (a reminder of Bactria’s Zoroastrian past) and flags (janda and ‘alam in Persian, or bayragh in the local Turkic idiom), the most famous being the Janda-i sharif, which is wound around a tall pole and put up at the mausoleum of Hazrat ‘Ali in Mazar-i Sharif on every New Year’s Day. Flames appeared in order to bear witness for Bibi Nushin, which her father and others transformed into a metaphor of victory: “They killed her, but she has raised her flag [Turki: bayraghini kötardi].”

Bibi Nushin manifested herself to numerous persons in dreams and waking visions, which at an early stage of the cult around her grave added significantly to her fame. One gentleman arrived from as far away as Kabul, all in tears, after the saint had spoken to him in a dream. One lady in her dream had an apparition of the mausoleum as a big and beautiful ziyarat and consequently made a habit of visiting the burial place with her daughters while it was still a rather modest site. Another lady in a dream vision was advised by her spiritual guide (pir) to seek help at Bibi Nushin’s place. Dreams and visions are at the core of many an etiological legend of mausoleums in and around the city of Mazar-i Sharif, of which the most prominent is the grave of Hazrat ‘Ali, which according to the early-twelfth-century Andalusian traveler Abu Hamid al-Gharbati was first revealed to villagers of al-Khayr, in the province of Balkh, in dream visions of the Prophet himself. The Qumayr ruler of Balkh consulted the learned men of his day, and they confirmed the authenticity of the revelation. Only one religious scholar (‘alim) refuted this “absurd” claim, as he called it, saying that the saint had died at distant Kufa and could not possibly be buried here. The following night the saint’s family appeared in his dream and dragged him to an open grave containing the remains of the saint. When the Qumayr learned that news, he hurried to the site in the desert, and indeed they found the tomb with the undecayed remains of his shroud, two marble plates, and a red brick—not a flag—with an inscription attesting that this was indeed Hazrat ‘Ali. As a result, he had a splendid mausoleum built at the site.

The vision mausoleum (Arabic: mashhad al-ru’ya) constructed in direct response to a dream or vision is a timeless phenomenon in the Muslim world. Yet even the authority of the dreamed Prophet in the case of Mazar-i Sharif did not subdue all doubt from the start. To legitimize the extraordinary claim that was raised in Seljuq time at Balkh it took corroboration by the saint’s own family in a second dream and finally the discovery of a grave vested with unchallengeable evidence. Having Bibi Nushin’s resting place acknowledged as a sacred site in 1996 was no doubt a claim of less importance, but the issue caused hot debates among
the local population all the same. Accusations of fraud were in the air at an early stage during the discovery of Bibi Nushin’s place, because the gravesite of another young girl was on people’s minds. Only some years earlier—that is, in the late 1980s or early 1990s—the father of a girl who had attended a school in downtown Shibirghan near the road to Mazar-i-Sharif spread word about his daughter’s martyrdom and encouraged people to venerate her grave, which was located next to her school. However, this would-be shahid was found to be happily alive, and the whole fraud came to light. The story was recounted by a middle-aged gentleman who by contrast confirmed the authenticity of the martyrdom (shahadat) of Bibi Nushin. In debates on the sacredness of the place, my coresearcher and I often heard that God Almighty had Himself revealed unmistakable signs (ayats), like the flames that appeared to shepherds and neighbors.

When Nushin’s father first came to see the grave, according to one gentleman to whom he had said so, a man on horseback emerged out of nowhere. The tall horseman alerted the bereaved father that this was not her proper burial place and told him where to put her to rest. Any northern Afghan listener will understand who that horseman was: Hazrat Khizr, the Lord of the Wastelands (Turki: dasht egasi) and helper in need. If this immortal saint (al-Khizr), who enjoys veneration in Central Asia that is second only to that of Hazrat ‘Ali, so cares for a person as to find her a proper resting place, that person obviously holds a special and elevated rank. Khizr’s intervention is well known from elsewhere in the region: Near Kashgar, just a few days on horseback east of Shibirghan, he is reported as having been instrumental in the revealing of a local saint’s burial place as well.

The intervention of the great saint was but one of a number of numinous signs. When Bibi Nushin’s father unearthed her body, “her blood had not coagulated” and “delicious scents arose” from her remains. According to one local man’s account, the body had not been buried at all, but when her father came to collect it, “for so many days no wild animal had touched her.” In yet another account, the inviolability of Bibi Nushin and her burial place is evidenced by the fact that somebody tried to flatten her grave off with a bulldozer—but the bulldozer broke, just as many other bulldozers and road-construction machines had broken in recent times all over northern Afghanistan, thus revealing hitherto insignificant plots of land as actually being the burial places of saintly persons. And there is the startling assertion by one gentleman who told us that it was Bibi Nushin herself who changed burial places: since her initial grave was inconvenient, she walked some distance until she found her ultimate resting place:

This person died and then continued to walk. Who, for all reasons, would walk to his grave on his own feet?! Nobody does so, unless he is a saint.

The legend-like story of the walking dead who roams the lands in search of his or her adequate resting place, widely spread over the Eurasian continent, is in
northern Afghanistan present in the legend about Sayyid ‘Alijan (see note 21, above), a companion of Hazrat ‘Ali who was decapitated, so the story goes, when fighting in the desert near Balkh.21 He walked up to his present burial place with his head under his arm. According to dogma, shahids are not dead in any trivial understanding of the word (Quran 2:154), and so their bodies display features that are otherwise the preserve of the living, and they can do things that otherwise only the living can do. In Bibi Nushin’s case the motif of the walking dead was retold by a fifty-year-old native of Aqcha who was at that time custodian (mutawalli) of the mausoleum of Muzrab Shah Palvan at Shibirghan. He explicitly grounded his story in the exceptional logic of the dogma: God grants this kind of sign (ayat) only to saints (awliya) and martyrs (shuhada), notions that in local belief are closely intertwined. According to this logic, Shahid Nushin must therefore be a saint.

No matter how much the stories about the revelation of Bibi Nushin’s burial place as a sacred site may differ in detail, out of dozens of people who talked among themselves or to us not a single one cast severe doubt on the veracity of what had happened around the grave or on the meaning that was to be made of all that. There seems to be no negotiating of signs (ayat) worked by God or saintly interventions like the one performed by Khizr. What caused a controversial debate was rather the point from which the whole story departed: the killing, its prehistory, and its immediate aftermath.

NEGOTIATING SAINTHOOD

Bibi Nushin was young and unmarried (or that is at least what most people say), and she (or more probably her father) received a marriage proposal from an influential military commander from Shibirghan that she (or her father) turned down. According to many local people, Nushin already had a suitor of her own age. One educated lady in her early thirties, who maintained that she had inquired extensively into the case, provided this account of the killing:

First the girl and the youngster had arranged a date at that particular spot. From one of the commanders—from somebody’s side, that is; it could have been from within their kin—a marriage proposal was put forward. But she was in love with that boy; she liked him a lot; she had dated him, so that they would meet in that cornfield and chat together. . . . Exactly at that time the man who wanted her came along in his jeep; he was passing by on the asphalt road. When they saw this, when they realized that the jeep was making a turn and was approaching them, the girl and the boy threw themselves in the cornfield; they hid, and out of the field the boy fired at the jeep. In the jeep there were the commander and his driver. The commander was in the car with wooing in mind. The boy fired his gun on the jeep. He killed the driver, and the commander’s hand was cut off—did he get stuck in the door, or what?—anyway, it was cut off somehow. The boy hid away in the cornfield and ran away. The girl also
escaped. The commander remained alive and said, “I won’t leave these people alive; I will kill them no matter how.” Later, when he had recovered, he came back and snatched the girl and the boy, both of them, and he took them away and killed them.

Bibi Nushin’s father did not tell why or how his daughter was killed. Nor did most other people have a story about her death. They simply held that the girl was shot dead. One woman, who referred to “sources from the family’s neighborhood,” suggested hanging or other means by which the girl had been put to death. Different versions of the events immediately preceding the killing were told: A group of informants set the killing in the context of a fighting scene: Bibi Nushin was spending the evening outdoors together with a young man, obviously an admirer or lover of hers, when a jeep approached and a lethal shootout began, initiated by either the lover or the other party. Others told a story without any lover, in which consequently the fighting scene was missing, and the girl, without any second person at her side, was straightaway executed near her later burial place.

The variant told by one middle-aged adherent of the saint bore the stylistic traits of a legend:

They marched the woman and her child off from her family home on the eve of the ‘Id festival and killed her out in the wilds of the desert. God the Pure may know how deeply she implored them, how much she cried, “Don’t kill me!” That woman—... but God Almighty has found it easy to grant her a high spiritual rank [martaba].

This variant does mention a second person but transforms it in ways that not only leave Bibi Nushin’s honor beyond doubt. After all, why should a young girl be out with a lover at nighttime? But this variant also added one more tragic motif to the story: there was her young child together with Bibi Nushin! Nothing more was told about the child, but the mere mention makes it hard to remain indifferent to the story, as does the hint that it was the eve of the great religious holiday that was profaned by the cruel event.

Some variants that include the fighting scene also contain motifs that enhance the plot in favor of Bibi Nushin, and it is, again, just as in the mother-and-child variant, anything but certain that these motifs are factually true. The folklorist’s observation that “floating motifs creep into any orally repeated report, no matter how firmly grounded in historical fact” seems to describe very aptly the genesis of these stories, although the assumption that “yet, under given conditions, the historic kernels endure and are identifiable” is not really supported by our materials, which do not lay any kernel patent beyond all doubt.

After having suffered physical death, Bibi Nushin is numinously protected from further intrusion: the jeep driver tries to overrun her body, but his car is beaten back and turned over. According to other stories, the servants of the commander tried to remove her body but were incapable of drawing close, let alone touching
her. Thus the dead girl remained out in the wilderness until her father came and buried her, but no animal touched her body. Although Bibi Nushin had suffered a violent death, at a postmortal stage she proved invulnerable to namahram persecutors and respected by wild creatures.26 (Note that a namahram is a male who, in Islamic law or local custom, is not allowed to be in the company of any woman not related to him by blood or marriage.) This condition prevailed well after word of her sainthood had begun to spread over northern Afghanistan and her mausoleum began to attract pilgrims from near and far.27 As her father said, ill-wishers (whose identity he did not reveal) attempted to destroy the modest mausoleum by overthrowing the sepulcher and flooding her burial place, attempting to extinguish her memory (Turki: nam-nishanini nist-u nabud qîlmaq). All such attempts—including bulldozer attacks—ended in failure and were finally given up.

Whereas Bibi Nushin enjoyed postmortal triumph, her persecutors and murderers were punished in due course: The jeep driver died instantly. The person who killed her was paralyzed. The eye of the marksman lost its light, and his trigger finger was left deformed.28 The hand of the commander who had kicked off the whole tragedy was severed—or something like that. (See above.) One gentleman made a point of conveying that the commander suffered a well-deserved lethal stroke soon after the event—an account on which he insisted even when confronted with an eyewitness who had seen the commander in good spirits shortly before their conversation. What needs to happen will happen, and the logic of legend outdoes any profane eyewitness report, at least in the opinion of believers.

BETWEEN CHASTITY AND VIOLENCE

Skeptics, however, also entered the arena. In the fall of 1996 some features of the Bibi Nushin cause were hotly debated, particularly issues of morality and guilt. Both of them revolved around the killing. Did Bibi Nushin at all meet the moral standards required from a saintly person, a martyr (shahid) or saint (awliya)?29 The purported lover caused irritation in many minds. A group of elderly gentlemen from Shibirghan, all knowledgeable in Shari’a law and well acquainted with time-honored arguments for and against saintly cult, raised cautious objections against the possibility of a girl of dubious virtue as achieving an elevated spiritual rank (martaba). In Nushin’s father’s story there was no lover of his daughter, with or without his own consent; but does that mean that there had been no lover in real life? One pilgrim lady, when I asked her whether Bibi Nushin may have had a boyfriend, strictly ruled out that possibility. Another group of men agreed on a diplomatic view: “They were just talking. What’s wrong with them sitting together, then?!” The topos of the lover is a piece of gossip in that it “communicates what the group norms are”—female modesty and sexual abstinence are in that kind of talk suggested as criteria for sainthood. In the end, however, none of our
interlocutors insisted on a strict position with regard to Nushin’s possible lack of moral perfection—perhaps out of some general tolerance toward relationships inherent in the local custom of *qalligh* (see note 23, above), perhaps in remembrance of the greatest regional female saint, Rabī’a-yi Balkhi, who was ready to die for the love of her servant, or perhaps because people’s anger about the crime committed by Bibi Nushin’s murderer or murderers simply outweighed all moral reserve.

Not morality but violence was people’s prime concern while negotiating Bibi Nushin’s sainthood, and, remarkably, the violence argument worked both ways: that is, in her favor as well as her disfavor. One pilgrim lady in her forties, accompanied by a daughter of marriageable age, was cursing the murderer and all other commanders, “who think that they have the right to claim all girls and young boys
as they please and persecute and kill them if they refuse.” Many deplored the killing as arbitrary, wicked, and exceptionally cruel. However, some others, according to whom the girl was actively involved in the shooting that left her dead and the commander and his party heavily injured or dead as well, questioned the legitimacy of people’s assertions of her martyrdom. One lady, who believed that the boy had fired first, put it like this:

How could she possibly attain the rank of a martyr [daraja-yi shuhada] after one man was killed and another one injured? How would it be possible for her to regain her purity?

A native of Badakhshan who lived in Mazar, had studied at state and religious schools, and was serving as a high-ranking officer in General Dostum’s army, suggested, “She won’t be granted a spiritual rank [Turki: daraja almaydi]”; and in a discussion about the shootout that we observed at the mausoleum of Mulla Aka, somebody said, “No one is saying she is a martyr [Turki: shayt boldi dean yagh]!”

Were people so fed up with violence that they refused to tolerate even the petty violence inflicted by a victim of aggression? Or did they envision passive and pitiable victimhood as the only proper role for a woman, thus blaming Bibi Nushin for breaking the rules of the game?

It seems as if Bibi Nushin did not conform to the socially accepted patterns of female sainthood in Central Asia: She was neither the self-sacrificing mother (although the Nushin-with-child motif pushes the story in that direction) nor the perfectly immaculate female who rejects the headstrong male out of disdain for anything sexual, like those virgin saints who refused to succumb to mighty power holders or all the Qïrq Qïz and Chil Dukhtaran who are venerated in the region (among them the Forty Virgins of Sherabad, near Dehdadi, halfway between Shibirghân and Mazar-i Sharif). Guilty of the death and mutilation of her aggressors, Nushin may be likened to Maryam of Kashgar, in Chinese Turkestan, who killed twenty-five enemies and is nonetheless sainted. But that girl had observed complete seclusion from the eyes of namahram (illicit companions), which Nushin had obviously failed to do. Public opinion, if we may call it that, in the fall of 1996 was still pending between disapproval of Nushin’s moral conduct and her involvement in violent action on the one side and compassion for her victimization by an unjust, self-serving, brutal strongman on the other.

Human desire to negotiate sanctity, morality, and guilt through the prism of Bibi Nushin’s comportment in matters of sexuality and violence played an important role in public debate. However, neither of these concerns would have mattered in the absence of one central phenomenon: the numinous and miraculous that radiated from Nushin’s sepulcher. No matter what stance people were taking toward her as an accomplished or deficient human being—it was godly sign (ayat), reinforced by saintly intervention on behalf of Bibi Nushin, and miracles
(karamat) ascribed to her blessing power (barakat) that caused these ponderings and judgments in the first place and rendered them meaningful in public conversation about shared values.35

BIBI’S POSTHUMOUS MIRACLES

The earliest miraculous healings reported from Bibi Nushin’s mausoleum occurred a short time after her death. Several persons who had been blind for many years regained sight after spending some time in the vicinity of the grave, and even “the eyes of people blind from birth would open” on the spot. Lame people were found walking again and “threw away their crutches,” as we were told by many informants, among them a middle-aged man who claimed to have been cured of paralysis and who out of gratitude now did service at the gravesite. We were shown several abandoned crutches on the flat roof of a nearby shack. People suffering from intestinal disease found relief, and even two persons ill with cancer were reported to have been restored to good health. From earlier studies we know that such fundamental ailments as blindness and paralysis were by convention the preserve of the greatest saint of the North, Hazrat ‘Ali, in Mazar-i Sharif.36 Now Bibi Nushin proved equal to that long-established saint. Her most important miracles (karamat), however, were related to an even more fundamental issue of the human condition: procreation.

The greatest miracles that Bibi Nushin’s intercession with God were (and still are) reported to bring about are successful conception, pregnancy, and childbirth in otherwise hopeless cases. For example, a young woman who despite three days in labor was unable to deliver her child was taken to Bibi Nushin in a carriage, accompanied by her mother and a few old midwives; she gave birth on the spot after having visited the grave.37 Dozens of women who failed to conceive made the pilgrimage to Bibi Nushin’s mausoleum and subsequently got pregnant. The most prominent lady who was helped in this way was the second wife of General Dostum, who in those years ruled over the northern provinces, with Shibirghan as his main stronghold and place of residence in mid-1996. As the story goes, after long, unsuccessful medical treatment—even at such distinguished locations as reproduction centers in Turkey—she finally sought Bibi Nushin’s help and became pregnant shortly after her visit to the grave. This story was very widely known and retold, matched only by, if any, the stories about miraculous healings of the blind. Bibi Nushin’s wide acceptance as a saint was mainly grounded in her supernatural power to promote people’s most urgent need, namely the need for life to go on.

The proof of the saint is in the miracle: miraculous signs granted by God, the numinous intervention on her behalf by Khizr, and many successful miracles that she was believed to have caused all contributed to the firm belief (‘aqida) and wholehearted faith and devotion (ikhlas) that made crowds of people metaphorically
and literally “turn around her [grave].” Many interlocutors said that Bibi Nushin grants people’s wishes (Turki: murad beradi), whereas others, who keep closer to dogma, said that “it is God who grants, while the martyr or the pilgrimage is [only] the catalyst [for God’s action].” Many sick had recovered, and many positive results (natija) had been brought about; and for that reason the number of people who took refuge with Bibi Nushin (muraji’) rapidly increased over the first months after her death. Of course not all this went uncontested. Some people conceded a placebo effect of the pilgrimage act but insisted on rational causes for the actual healings. We heard a local intellectual poking fun at Bibi Nushin’s would-be wondrous deeds in a Doctor Eisenbarth mode: “The blind are walking, and the lame regain sight [Turki: kör yuri:di shal achiladi],” he declared. There was suspicion that Bibi Nushin’s father paid people money so that they would pretend to have been miraculously cured. One or two men went so far as to say that the whole thing was a fraud, invented by her father for business or by others for unknown different ends.

THE MAKING OF A SHRINE BUSINESS

Muslim shrines have at all times been at the center of business, petty or big, and in the Persian and Turkic idioms of northern Afghanistan they are bound together in the phrase ham ziyarat ham tijarat: “Pilgrimage is an occasion for doing business” or “A shrine is tantamount to a business.” In emergencies, people took refuge at Bibi Nushin’s shrine spontaneously. However, even after only a few months in existence a more standardized and ritualized cult was already developing around the mausoleum. On Wednesday and Saturday nights “four or five thousand or even more” pilgrims would turn the steppe around the mausoleum into a large, crowded camp “so that one could not see the ground between all the people who lay to rest there, side by side.” According to Nushin’s father the visitors mostly arrived in groups of a dozen people; they would wail and moan, pray, and recite the Quran. The ritual practices that we observed included circumambulating around the mausoleum, touching the tomb or at least its fence, bringing along roosters, goats, and even sheep, slaughtering them on the spot, and handing the raw meat out as alms (kham talash); others sacrificed and cooked the animals, offering food to needy persons present at the grave. Some pilgrims’ offerings consisted of cuttings of more or less precious cloth; some of these for a time used to cover the tomb, and some cloth were cut up into small pieces that were dealt out to the pilgrims as sacred stuff (tabarruk) through which some of Bibi Nushin’s barakat could be transmitted to people less lucky who were not able to make the pilgrimage.

Other pilgrims offered substantial votive gifts (nazr) in rice and wheat, some of which Bibi Nushin’s father readily passed on to pilgrims in need. We observed him presenting a substantial monetary gift (10,000 Afghanis) to a widowed pilgrim
who had been squatting at the fence for hours and now and again thinner bundles of bills to others.43 However, since we had no clue how much money he collected in all, it is difficult to estimate how significant these acts of redistribution actually were. Gossipers said that he was making a fortune. Although elsewhere in the region the tenders of saints’ graves (mutawalli) hold certificates that entitle them to collect votive gifts (nazr), Nushin’s father did not mention any such document.44 It was not possible to get information whether he had a partner with whom to share the revenues—a relative, a representative of the local administration or political power, or other. The shrine economy also included a little bazaar for provisions, devotional gifts, and various goods that women prefer to purchase, which would be set up in the vicinity of the mausoleum on pilgrimage days; on in-between days peddlers would offer their wares. Cars, horse taxis, and trucks were nearby waiting for customers.

Obviously at least part of the revenue was used for the maintenance and development of the pilgrimage site. In the summer and fall of 1996, the location was modest but in good shape and well kept. Bibi Nushin’s father proudly mentioned that when the initial sepulcher was turned into a little brick mausoleum resting on a concrete basis, fenced in and protected by a provisional timber roof, it was General Dostum’s brother Qadir himself who contributed workforce and cash. Independently of written documents, the shrine enjoyed the protection and legitimation of the local ruler. Or vice versa.

THE POWER OF SAINTS AND WARRIORS

Some people denied that Bibi Nushin could have been a saint at all. Many more, however, were convinced that she was one and concluded from the karamat she caused to unfold that she must have been a powerful saint at that:45

Women who were previously unable to conceive get pregnant here. She is a friend of God [Persian: dust-i khuda], a person who is great before God [pesh-i khuda kalan].

As a saint who could rescue lives and help new life to come into being Bibi Nushin enjoyed the devotion (ikhlas) of people in many minor concerns as well. Pilgrims told us they were addressing her for prosperity, for a car, for a good job, for a good spouse for themselves or a relative, or for overall support and protection in their daily lives.

Protection was a problem of particular virulence in the decade of civil war. Although ‘Abd al-Rashid Dostum maintained a quasi statehood in his realm, personal security did not exist for the commoners.46 We can read that pilgrim lady’s curse as an outcry of the powerless: the reproductive potential of females was deemed to be at the arbitrary disposal of those who held more guns and were closer to the ruler, and so was all young male human capital, whether for pleasure or for
armed service. General insecurity and in particular the lack of rights of women (and men) toward power holders was condensed in the story of Bibi Nushin's martyrdom—but then she had “raised her flag” and proved much more powerful than her murderer (or murderers).\textsuperscript{47} All regular power hierarchies were overturned when this young female nobody came out victorious. She even granted offspring to the ruler of the day, who in his turn put his brother at the service of the saint, as it were.\textsuperscript{48} Who was powerful, then? The age-old Central Asian dictum that sultans cannot do without protection from the Friends of God seems in 1996 to have applied in Shibirghan as well.\textsuperscript{49}

General Dostum had in the mid-1990s been in control of Mazar-i Sharif and the noble shrine of Hazrat ‘Ali. He contributed to the regilding of the cupolas of the rawza (mausoleum) and made others contribute;\textsuperscript{50} and it was on his initiative that new gold-embroidered covers were produced for the cenotaph of the saint.\textsuperscript{51} However, the saint apparently refused his protection. In March 1996, General Dostum presided over the opening of the New Year (Naw-Ruz), the ceremony of the raising of the flag (janda-balal), which is otherwise the prerogative of the king or president of Afghanistan. But shortly after that, Dostum lost power, and his Junbish movement had to yield control of the mausoleum to their inimical allies, the Hizb-i Islami. Unlike the jihadi party leaders investigated in the chapter by Simon Wolfgang Fuchs in this volume, General Dostum never aspired to religious merit or credit, and the Muslim allusion in the name of his Junbish-i Milliy-i Islami-i Afghanistan can be regarded as simply an attempt to avoid stepping out of line with his allies during the 1992 coup d’état. But, as the Bibi Nushin episode shows, respecting local religious belief and custom was certainly an integral part of Dostum’s populist agenda.

It was around the same time that General Dostum lost control of Mazar-i Sharif that the fame of Bibi Nushin began to rise. Moreover, it happened in Shibirghan, Dostum’s perpetual stronghold. The association of the martyr saint and the lord of Shibirghan was mediated by the ruler’s wife, and it proved successful from the start. I have not been able to find out if the miraculous conception antedated the General’s (brother’s) contribution to the mausoleum-development effort or vice versa. In any case, the connection between saint and ruler was clear enough, and many of my local interlocutors mentioned it one way or another. One may say that there is a big difference between a patron saint like Hazrat ‘Ali, who has for centuries granted protection to those overseeing the huge irrigation system of the Eighteen Canals (Hazhdah Nahr), and someone who had to yield her burial place to a single ditch. After all, that tall horseman may have been not Hazrat Khizr but merely the local water administrator (mirab). But under certain circumstances, a somewhat minor saint who sided with a somewhat minor ruler appeared perfectly good enough for increasing their mutual power by sharing it.
Although two or three local informants gave other opinions, there was wide consensus among our interlocutors that the man behind the murder of Bibi Nushin had been La’l Muhammad of Shibirghan. La’l Qumandan was one of General Dostum’s commanders striving for more power in the internal political turmoil following the assassination in the late spring of 1996 of Rasul Palvan, the influential commander of General Dostum’s 511th division. This happened while Junbish-versus-Hizb enmity aggravated a fraught situation; and meanwhile the Taliban were approaching all the time. The accusations against La’l Qumandan were just rumor, but it was a rumor with great credibility among the populace. The murder of a young girl initiated by a commander would in 1996 not have caused great excitement outside her family and neighborhood. However, what then happened—or was said to have happened—around her burial place earned Bibi Nushin great attention, and the involvement of General Dostum with the emerging saint inspired second thoughts among some of the general’s opponents. “As a matter of fact,” one gentleman said without going into further detail, “rumors [Turki: gaplar] say that there were some political feuds.” He was obviously insinuating that the allegations of murder against La’l might have been forged by pro-Dostum people in order to raise feelings against the commander and rid themselves of a possible local rival. From sympathizers of the (anti-Dostum) leftist ethnicist Guruh-i Kar I have even heard allegations saying that the entire cult around Bibi Nushin may have been staged, relying on people’s credulity, in order to instrumentalize for political ends the common people’s desire for scandals, saints, and miracles. In that case there may never have been a dead girl at all—or even a girl named Nushin, for that matter.

CONCLUSIONS

The Bibi Nushin narrative complex has never grown into a complete and consistent story. In future, a process of scripturalization may level out inconsistencies and contradictions in the story, but no formal hagiography seems to have been written down. When I revisited northern Afghanistan in 2002, and many more times over the following decade, the collective correctives had already ruled out many details of the fragmented legend. Most people from Faryab to Takhar whom I asked knew of the saint, and many had visited her place once or repeatedly. Yet there were many who didn’t know her name and would simply call her “that girl” (Persian, in dukhtar; Turki, u qiz) or “the martyr” (shahid). The whereabouts of her death and the revelation of her sainthood were no longer mentioned. There was still some uncertainty as to whether she had been a girl or a married woman. In 2002, verses embroidered on a curtain tied to her iron fence were addressing her as shahid ma-dar (martyred mother). Be that as it may, she was remembered by everyone as a person of unyielding virtue who resisted the desires of a military commander.
If “what continues to be social relevance is stored in the memory while the rest is usually forgotten,” then supremely important female chastity and its long-term triumph over male violence seem to be all that continues to matter in local society. And if this is not the case in real life, then it becomes the case in a vision shared by many local people. Within this timeless discourse, however, debate has changed over the last twenty years. The hottest topic in the discourse on morality in 1996, as we remember, was about Bibi Nushin as possibly having had a lover. Her entitlement to an elevated spiritual rank, without which there could have been no saint or miracle, was viewed as depending on that issue. The sheer factuality of her *barakat* and *karamat* silenced those voices that were questioning her purity, and her obvious rank and power tacitly questioned the relevance of the moralist argument as such. Collective wisdom seems to have rated societal demand for strict female chastity higher than God’s possible forgiveness of a love affair; in order not to put this at stake the lover motif was simply dropped from the story, and the debate has come to an end. Taliban reign over the region (1997–2001) and the illiberalism that came with it may have streamlined public discourse. After all, in 1996 it had been possible to hold and exchange divergent opinions on *qallīghs* and boyfriends.

In 1996, I was spared being told one more rumor, which my male colleague picked up at the gravesite: Bibi Nushin had been raped by the commander. Was this motif part of male discourse (not shared with a woman) expressing concerns about a powerless father’s or brother’s (and so on) ultimate loss of control over the sexuality of females and hence the honor of the family and the integrity of the male self? There may be no way to verify such an assumption ex post facto. In 2002 the Nushin story had been reduced to its core, as I said above; but there was one additional motif unheard of before: The violator had been not the commander but Bibi Nushin’s own paternal uncle, who first tried to seduce her and then (in a reversal of the omnipresent Yusuf and Zulaikha motif) hurried to silence her for good. It was a gentleman not from nearby but from a village in the Saripul province who related that rumor in 2002.

At the time, I was making inquiries on behalf of an NGO, and I realized that this position of mine caused some interlocutors to use more drastic language and talk about weird themes that I had not heard before. Sexualized violence within the scope of the *mahram* (licit companion) was one such theme. At first, I thought that this new motif might have been put forward in imitation of novel NGO discourses and investigative Internet journalism, scandalizing the worst of the worst. But then I remembered the words of that lady in her thirties in 1996, much like a slip of the tongue: “From one of the commanders—from somebody’s side; could have been from within their kin—a marriage proposal was put forward.” Knowing that my interlocutor was very close to the elites around General Dostum, I had been inclined to read her casual mention of a possible murderer from outside the
General’s entourage as seeking exculpation for him. However, if one puzzles the pieces together, the possibility of friendly-violence again gains plausibility. The fact that trespasses by a mahram would have been very much taboo in northern Afghanistan before 2002 made it easy to rule out such a story, no matter how factually true it may have been. The previously unspeakable violence against women and sexual relations more broadly that is at the core of the next chapter, by Sonia Ahsan, have only been brought into public debate during the post-Taliban era through the intervention of international actors. But in the north of Afghanistan before 2002, it was at least possible to use such a story to cast suspicion on a notorious power holder.

Here again, it is not possible to establish factual, historical truth. In the condensed legend that circulated in the 2000s, the figure of the evil commander held an important place. And in 2006, when the alleged murderer at last died from a stroke and was publicly mourned by General Dostum’s followers, I heard someone applying the cynical phrase bir ganda kam (literally, “one bad [man] less [on Earth]”). The oppressed who were siding with Bibi Nushin never saw the establishment of worldly justice, and it took a long time for the opportunity for ultimate punishment to arise. Meanwhile, however, people had seen Shahid Nushin, Martyr Nushin, being raised to an elevated rank by Almighty God. As a protector saint she was more powerful than the most powerful men at place. Although there exists only a modest textual tradition about her life, martyrdom, and miracles, the
ritual practices at her mausoleum indicate that, in the 2000s, her saintly power was considered even stronger than it had been earlier. Back in 1996, Bibi Nushin had been credited with easing and healing ailing lives and with securing the overall continuation of human life through her intervention in conception, pregnancy, and childbirth. In springtime 2004, 2005, and 2008, when I visited her mausoleum (which itself was physically almost unchanged after the Taliban period), I found wheat and other grains spread all over her grave. This was significant sign of her status, since the practice of casting a handful of grain for fertility of the soil is more commonly found at the memorials of Hazrat Khizr, the immortal Muslim saint who opens the agricultural year everywhere from the Balkans to Central Asia.56

In addition to Bibi Nushin’s miraculous intervention in saving existing lives and in the generation of new human life, she is now invoked when the material basis of life is at stake. These are the fundamental concerns with which pilgrims go to address her. Her involvement with the ruler of the bygone era of the 1990s doesn’t seem to matter any longer. Believers visit the place time and again; they care for its cleanliness and modest beauty, and they perform rituals, make sacrifices, and give small donations, as we can guess from the traces they leave. Bibi Nushin’s mausoleum has developed into one more of the many thousands of pilgrimage places that make the old Bactrian lands in northern Afghanistan the holiest soil on Earth.
When Muslims Become Feminists

Khana-yi Aman, Islam, and Pashtunwali

Sonia Ahsan

I have sinned a rapturous sin
in a warm enflamed embrace,
sinned in a pair of vindictive arms,
arms violent and ablaze.¹

The khana-yi aman, often translated as “shelter” or literally “home of peace,” is a form of safe house in Afghanistan that was instituted to host women who are undergoing criminal trials for sexual transgressions or moral misconducts and who are on their way to or from prison. The khana-yi aman is one of the first institutions in post-Taliban Afghanistan to allow women to access the public without a male supporter and to register their protests without the threat of immediate retaliation. It is an exceptional space where women designated as promiscuous or adulterous wait to die or to be circulated back into the honor system of pashtunwali (Pashtun customary law) and Islam.² By some accounts, there are approximately twenty such spaces across Afghanistan, mostly funded by nonlocal international and NGO sources.³ Despite the outside funding, the shelters or khana-yi aman are managed by local women and operate under the aegis of the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, which authorizes their rules, guidelines, and policies.

In the media, the khana-yi aman is posited within the conflict between a Western feminism epitomized by individualism and freedom and an Afghan social ethos characterized by patriarchal codes of honor.⁴ The khana-yi aman has drawn global scrutiny, perhaps because the actions that lead the women there cloud the distinction between what is deemed lawful and local, and what is seen as dangerously close to prohibited and outside. This chapter is based on ethnographic accounts documented at a khana-yi aman in Kabul during fieldwork undertaken during 2011 and 2012.⁵ The chapter explores the narratives of accusation and rejection that surround sexually promiscuous women in Afghanistan, as well as how
some women construct, inhabit, and navigate their marginalized worlds. Focusing on the life stories of five women who ended up at the khana-yi aman for varying reasons, the narrative histories drawn on in this chapter elucidate the anxieties and ambivalences that undergird conversations across Afghanistan about Islam, sexuality, gender, and transgression. The precarious life histories of the women who administer and inhabit the various khana-yi aman illustrate how unfamiliar and dangerous forms of sexual expression may be rendered culturally and Islamically intelligible through clever social maneuvers.

Drawing on my ethnographic work, the chapter traces the positioning of a particular khana-yi aman in Kabul within the broader institutional framework of politics, Islam, and feminism in Afghanistan. The khana-yi aman situates itself cumbersomely into this contested framework as it appropriates the vocabulary of Islam toward a modern politics of feminism. The khana-yi aman demonstrates that the production of gendered knowledge regarding a proper Islamic moral ethos has to do with modern systems of power and their enactment in everyday life as much as it does with specific interpretations of Islamic texts. Hegemonic discourses undoubtedly shape cultural stances but cannot completely explain the attitudes and relations that are manifest in everyday life. There is a possibility of transformation by inhabiting the norms toward different ends than they are intended for. The state does not recognize some khana-yi aman practices as Islamic, and through this refusal, women lay claim to a hegemonic religious discourse that has historically excluded them. That is to say that there are always schisms between the societal ideals of Islam that the community has imagined for itself and how these norms are enacted in everyday practices. For example, the khana-yi aman women create religious subtexts that are attached to the dominant Islamic discourses but nonetheless potentiate spaces for different forms of communal relations. For instance, as the ethnographic data reveal, while enacting their sexual promiscuity, deemed as un-Islamic, the women pray five times a day and fast during Ramadan. By rendering marginal the conventional practices of praying and fasting, the women create spaces in the Islamic honor system within which they can fashion their own worlds.

INHABITING PROMISCUOUS PERIPHERIES

The Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben has argued that the state of exception inextricably entwines the logic of inclusion to the logic of exclusion. Thus, the state is bound not by the social bond “but rather on the dissolution, the unbinding it prohibits.” The women at the khana-yi aman were outliers regardless of the community to which they belonged. This loss of belonging underscores the failure of integration for promiscuous female actors across communal groups. These ostracisms, ambiguities, and ambivalences render the khana-yi aman a zone of
social abandonment, in that it disrupts and unbinds the social logics that undergird principles of honor and sexual propriety. The topographical differentiation of gender, piety, and class is suspended when women enter the khana-yi aman, since as noted by a resident called Huma, they become collective whores living in exile there. Although modes of interpretation varied, the narrative motifs surrounding each inhabitant’s life story shared the cultural scripts of promiscuity, abandonment, and marginality.

The margins are the places of abandonment and instability where the honor discourse is constantly disintegrated. Applying to the khana-yi aman concepts that have emerged in recent academic studies of abandonment brings nuance to the binaries (normal/abnormal, legible/illegible, inclusion/exclusion, legal/illegal, center/periphery) that have dominated the study of the Afghan state and its presumed margins. Examining sexually promiscuous actors purported to be outside the boundaries of Islamic morality and honor helps us realize that this is precisely where the discursive systems of Islam and pashtunwali are placed in negotiation and contestation. Far from concealing the perversity of sexually promiscuous actors and their actions, the khana-yi aman reveals and illuminates the robust nature of a vibrant political configuration that allows for difference and conflict. Rethinking the concept of the margins in these terms moves us away from prevalent descriptions of the Afghan state as fragmented, failed, and unstable to an understanding that ultimately lawlessness and illegibility are constitutive of any political project.

ISLAM AS AN OBJECT OF FEMINISM

The relationship between what is understood as feminist politics and what has come to be theorized as Islam has been increasingly the focus of anthropological scholarship and academic debate. Conceptualizing the relationship between Islam and feminism not only engenders the framework for analyzing everyday life in Afghanistan but also reveals the attitudes and beliefs that undergird the relationship between feminist politics and everyday Islamic practices. The khana-yi aman fits into this contested framework, because it appropriates the vocabulary of Islam toward a politics of feminism. Since the refuge enables women to initiate nikah (legal marriage contracts) and talaq (legal divorce contracts) without consent from their relatives, it is viewed as promoting communal anarchy by disrupting the most essential societal unit in Islam: the family. In this sense, the khana-yi aman underlines the old Afghan struggle between feminist activism and religious reform. When the Afghan ruler Amir ‘Abd al-Rahman Khan (r. 1880–1901) imposed restrictions on underage marital unions and bride prices, he legitimated these reforms as “an attempt to align customary social practices with the prescriptions of Islam.” Thus, even when major reforms were initiated, they
were meticulously sourced to specific interpretations of Islamic principles. More recently, the main method used to consolidate power by the Taliban was to implement stringent measures against sexual transgression. Individual indiscretions in the private realm now necessitated social retributions in the public. However, the conflict surrounding the khana-yi aman is not merely limited to visibility of women in the public but is a fundamental threat to social cohesion and communal harmony. The familial conflicts that embattle the lives of the women who end up at the shelter lead to unanticipated and unpleasant consequences. Running away brings shame and embarrassment to families and forces them to negotiate with the women via the family courts. A khana-yi aman administrator called Wahida told me that the intention was not to disrupt family values or damage the family reputation but to achieve legislative ends, invariably via divorce or marriage. Although the legislative ends of marriage and divorce are not outside the bounds of Islamic principles, they still threaten to disintegrate traditional Islamic notions of the family.

It is for these reasons that the relationship of the Afghan state with the khana-yi aman unfolds on the registers of Islam, law, and sexual ethics. Promiscuous relations have rarely been meaningfully integrated into any Afghan or Islamic symbolic system, as familial relationships are configured around the traditional, monogamous, heterosexual marital unit. Symbolic anthropology has taught us that all familial units are somehow fictional, albeit rendered intelligible within their own symbolic universe. Reading cultures as webs of significance, interpretive anthropology would have us focus on making visible the underlying structures that make social actors and their social actions manifest. Since kinship relations pivot on the marital unit, which forms the basis of institutional configurations, its analysis saturates most works of anthropology.

Moreover, most institutional configurations map the social contract onto the sexual contract. The mapping of the social contract onto the sexual contract allows the state to order and organize appropriate gender relations as it regulates feminine bodies in the public. Female sexual fidelity is a primary attribute undergirding marital unions and familial relations. Since the familial unit grounds itself on the chastity and sexual propriety of the female, promiscuous women are unfit to be mothers, wives, daughters, or sisters. These normative conceptions of propriety and morality are embedded in various social and historical texts that seek to produce the ideal woman at the center of the Afghan family. Such narratives assign the capability for legitimate procreation as a feminine obligation. Thus, the khana-yi aman is closely linked to moral corruption and parental disobedience. This connection was made palpably public when the Afghan Minister of Justice gave these comments about the shelter: “Mostly they were encouraging girls, saying, ‘If your father says anything bad to you, don’t listen to him; if your mother says anything to you, don’t listen. . . . There are safe houses for you where you can stay.”
What safe houses? What sort of immorality and prostitution was not happening at those places?”¹⁸ Even the Afghan Ministry of Women’s Affairs, which has the ostensible responsibility of protecting the shelters, has severe perceptions of the moral degradation seemingly encouraged by the shelter’s staff. These suspicions translate into close monitoring policies such as psychological tests and monthly medical examinations.¹⁹ In addition, the extensive examinations instituted by the government in order to regulate access to the khana-yi aman now include virginity tests conducted on admission.²⁰ This insistence on regulating and disciplining feminine bodies at the shelters is based on apprehensions that women are being misled about their Islamic rights and obligations.

The staff at the khana-yi aman told me that these measures were taken by the government to appease the Taliban, since gender rights were the foremost bargaining chips to be used in governmental negotiations. Feminists often accuse the government of threatening the shelters every time it seeks to appease the Taliban or conservative social elements. However the vulnerability of the khana-yi aman’s social position within Afghanistan may be traced back to a pre-Taliban era when the Afghan state reluctantly began instituting religious reforms but refused to actuate practical transformations regarding gender laws. Nancy Dupree has explained this reluctance in terms of political expediency, as a way of appeasing the conservative elements in society and tapping into their social clout.²¹ The concerns of many contemporary feminists have echoed this sentiment by pointing to the perilous sharing of power and precarious negotiations conducted between the Taliban and the Karzai government (2001–14). Even when women are afforded a seat at the table, the shelter is the first institution that comes under attack and the one that many female politicians are eager to forsake.

Islamic discourse has a distinct potency for influencing and mobilizing political activism in Afghanistan.²² Even women’s-rights organizations, such as the Afghan Women’s Network, have tactically deployed Islamic discourse to advance feminist agendas. But modern institutional formations proximate to the khana-yi aman have triggered negative reactions, particularly since such establishments are viewed as contradicting Islamic principles of morality. The administrator Wahida emphasized that the way she understood Islam was not as a static or homogenous entity but as a means of fashioning oneself toward one’s highest ethical self. Since religious conservatives often introduce Islamic theology in political negotiations as a means to implement unfavorable laws toward women, the strategy of invoking Islam for opposite ends is an astute one. Although not venturing too far from the prescriptive codes of Islamic moral behavior, the khana-yi aman has demonstrated unexpected maneuverability in nuancing and expanding strict interpretations of Shari’a family law, specifically as they pertain to sexual comportment and gender organization in the public. In these political negotiations surrounding the khana-yi aman, Islam emerges as a discursive tradition that connects and creates
the formation of moral selves or, in the words of Nile Green, as a “body of terms, concepts, and categories for rendering the world knowable, but which however influential and even hegemonic is never the sole frame of reference for any society.”

**INVERTING SECULARISM, SUBVERTING ISLAM AND PASHTUNWALI**

Conventionally *pashtunwali* has been read as a centralized discourse expounding the rules of conduct for ordinary Afghans. Reading *pashtunwali* from its extremities, from within the worlds of the women, demonstrates its pervasiveness and persistence and why, despite attempts to reconcile it to state apparatuses, it continues to persist as separate and distinct, and is mobilized effectively within marginal spaces such as the *khana-yi aman*. *Pashtunwali* enacts principles of self-mastery—such as *milmastiya* (Pashto: hospitality), *nanawatai* (Pashto: protection’), and *sabat* (Pashto: loyalty)—that would lead to a properly cultivated being through an individualized personal ethic. *Milmastiya* is one of the ways of transforming monetary capital into social capital. The *hujra* (Pashto: communal area) is the primary space for enacting *milmastiya* and is an exclusively masculine domain.

This narrative of hospitality is intricately entwined with shelter or protection (*nanawatai’*), in which turning away those who ask for shelter is akin to having no dominion over women’s mobility. Both behaviors are marked by social embarrassment and as such are better avoided to maintain respect in society. In appropriating these principles of self-mastery for purposes radically other than are usually intended, *khana-yi aman* women seek to disrupt the ethical formation of *pashtunwali*. Thus, inhabitants of the shelter orient the discursive practices of *pashtunwali* toward ends that were not anticipated in the hegemonic male discourse. It is in this maneuver of inversion that the ingenuity of the *khana-yi aman* can be seen.

The uncomfortable positioning of the shelter within Afghan society, where it is at once hidden and visible, underlines the anxieties and apprehensions surrounding conversations of gender and sexuality. The *khana-yi aman* delimits the parameters of signification that are available to female actors by befuddling the frequent representation of the Afghan woman as docile and obedient. The women find tactics and maneuvers that complicate and challenge hegemonic discourses of both Islam and *pashtunwali*. Moreover, they agitate the continuity and stability with which they have been positioned within various social and political formations. The *milmastiya* (hospitality) practices in which the women of the *khana-yi aman* participate bind them together in complex ways. With regard to Yemen, Ann Meneley has shown that Muslim women can exchange and accumulate social capital through complex social relations called *khuruj*. As she explains, “*khuruj* is a competitive practice in that one’s family’s place in the community—their
honour—must continually be recognized by regular visits from those with whom one has connections.” These social relations pivot on hospitality practices that cultivate the female subject position and condition feminine culture. At the khana-yi aman, for example, there are elaborate rules for sharing food and space regardless of the inhabitant’s social status. Women participate in practices of hospitality, friendship, and refuge that condition the formation of their community and protect it despite its marginality.

Gestures and statements made at the khana-yi aman seek not only to dismantle the gender hierarchies that are inherent in Islamic jurisprudence but also to disintegrate identity politics that have long characterized what it means to be a Muslim woman, a Pashtun, and an Afghan. By deliberately abandoning any form of respectable or Islamic politics, the khana-yi aman opens up radically unprecedented possibilities for feminism. While various forms of female discontent in Afghanistan and other Muslim societies have been studied, rarely have these forms destabilized the hegemonic discourses in any meaningful manner. The everyday life of the khana-yi aman both represents and disrupts the moral orders that it inhabits. The khana-yi aman stands apart from other forms of social discontent as the only form of feminist struggle that actively seeks to reject honor distributions in their current formations. There is in this disavowal both a reification and rejection of the power hierarchies in which the shelter is situated: the women residents accept the accusations leveled against them while rejecting those moral judgments as the only arbitrators of their moral worth. Khana-yi aman supporters form the only movement that promises an uncertain future. In embracing accusations of selfishness, narcissism, and anarchy, the khana-yi aman reimagines the possibilities of communal belonging. Promiscuity, then, becomes the mechanism not of achieving equality with men but of reimagining equality itself.

Most feminists and activists outside the shelter viewed the women who ran it with suspicion and repulsion. I befriended Nahida, who managed an NGO for gender equality and yet was quick to separate herself from the “whores of the khana-yi aman.” After emphasizing her Muslim identity, she began underscoring the disparaging woes of modern secularism, the foremost among which was the promiscuity of women. Elevating herself above the riffraff whom she considered the khana-yi aman women to be, Nahida underscored the difference between piety and promiscuity, affluence and depravity. In her comments, she noted that her economically respectable family and followers of Islamic precepts of piety would never indulge in sexually permissive actions. Here, promiscuous behavior was tied to economic disenfranchisement. Nahida’s statements reveal the dominance of negative stereotypes that are associated with promiscuous women, who are automatically relegated to a lower-class status. Slowly, I started to understand the political potency of the verbal and physical expressions of rejection, which were deliberate attempts to situate the shelter at the margins of society. The
ethnographic excerpts from female parliamentarian Nurzia provided later in this chapter demonstrate that more than economic disenfranchisement and social impoverishment bound the women of the khana-yi aman. Some women there, such as Nadia, who had left her abusive husband, were hoping to join the female police force for gainful employment. Ironically, one of the purposes of the female Afghan police force trained by the American army was to enforce laws against sexually promiscuous women! Women like Nurzia and Nadia are therefore caught within power networks that reinforce each other in organizing hierarchical gender relations. In finding ways to negotiate these power networks, the khana-yi aman women face tremendous obstacles and have to navigate complex subject positions to find spaces for political action.

THE ETHNOGRAPHIC PERFORMANCE OF PROMISCUITY

Many inhabitants at the khana-yi aman admired the poetry of Furugh Farukhzad (Forugh Farrokhzad, 1935–67), and conversations were often interspersed with verses from her popular poems. The epigraph to this chapter is one of her poems. Passionate love that relinquished the world for the sake of the beloved had a coveted status among young girls, most of whom had studied classical poetry and could recite their favorite verses with fervent enthusiasm. Whether we understand this experience of love as a historical effect of reading Persian literature or as a product of popular cinema, it inevitably conditioned their subjectivity to dissent with reckless abandon. The life story was often told of Rabi’a bint Ka’b al-Quzdari (fl. ca. 914–43?), the beloved semilegendary Afghan poetess who tragically gave her life for the love of a Turkish slave. The emphasis was placed on how her life had been ended by her own brother Haris, who found the relationship intolerable and set out to punish both Rabi’a and her lover, Baktash. Since most women were at the khana-yi aman because of analogous violent confrontations with their own close kin, such historical narratives resonated in deeply meaningful ways.

The khana-yi aman has organized itself around the cultural logic of love, hospitality, and friendship, in which the shelter readily accepts even those who may disintegrate its very foundations. The administrator Wahida emphatically emphasized how she would take these women back again even if their love adventures met with failure, even if they destroyed the shelter. Huma, another inhabitant, explained that:

We are stuck, first with our fathers, then with our husbands. Our brothers stifle us. Why can’t we choose whom to marry? Who says our fathers, brothers, uncles know us best? They don’t. We know we are used by our fathers and brothers to gain respect in their communities. We are not stupid. Don’t listen to those outside. We came here
ourselves. We are not stupid. Here, look around me. These women here are my father, my brother, and my uncle, my god, my religion. I don’t know anyone else, anything else. We are seen as whores just because we dared to step outside. Our transgressions bind us.

Homosocial bonding has a long history in Muslim societies. Among the Taliban, male connectedness was promoted to form cohesive communities and build trust among its members. Such homosocial bonding was also ever-present at the khana-yi aman, where women inversely connected with each other in many ways, from their shared precariousness to the doctrinal discourses that marked them as dangerous. The norms that shaped the everyday routines of the khana-yi aman community were in some ways gendered, and they reproduced the gender hierarchies outside the shelter. These included wearing the burqa when stepping outside the shelter buildings. But in many ways the norms and routines of the khana-yi aman challenged and inverted the gender organization of everyday life in Afghanistan. Some women admitted having adulterous affairs or participating in other illicit actions that would have caused moral panic in another institution. When socially rebellious actions were discovered, the shelter’s staff handled them in an uncannily calm manner. The marginality of their actions drew the khana-yi aman women together and strengthened their bonding.

When I first obtained permission to live at the shelter in Kabul, a staff member called Halima escorted me to the building. We walked past a garbage dump, jumped over several gutters, and finally stopped in front of a nondescript gate. The building was locked from the outside, so she asked me again if I was willing to step inside. Everything had to be done quickly so as not to raise the suspicions of the neighbors, who didn’t have much information about the khana-yi aman. Halima explained that I could not bring any visitors to the shelter and that I must stay there for lengthy periods of time. Short-duration stays were discouraged. Every woman who entered had to relinquish all her worldly belongings, right down to the clothes on her back. Families would often direct their anger both at their daughters and at those who were trying to help them at the khana-yi aman. Amara, one of the managers, spoke of an instance when she was waiting in the car for one of the shelter’s inhabitant to obtain identity documents when she realized that there was a gun pointed at her head. The man holding the gun was the girl’s father, who accused Amara of corrupting his daughter and humiliating his family. Amara’s driver saw the encounter through the rear-view mirror and stepped on the gas before shots could be fired. Amara and other staff members told me that such incidents were not unusual. It was for these reasons that the women were not allowed to have cell phones or any communication with the outside world. This was taken very seriously: the khana-yi aman was constantly under attack. Indeed, as I later came to realize, it was not uncommon to wake up to the sound of shooting and gunfire. On
one such occasion after the predawn meal (suhur) during Ramadan, I woke up to loud banging noises and shattered glass. As I sat up on the floor, a supervisor who lived at the khana-yi aman called Gulala'i gestured me to go back to sleep. Later that day, the guard told us that the British consul nearby had been bombed.

When I first arrived at the shelter, a female doctor, Huma, gave me a tour of the building. Huma had received her medical training in Pakistan and lived with her extended family, who thought she was working at a woman’s clinic. I asked her how she knew about the khana-yi aman. “I read the newspaper,” she laughed. “My husband doesn’t read anything, but I am educated.” Even as they sought to help them, Huma and the managers had a certain disdain for the actions of the women. The four lawyers who fought the women’s cases were young and enthusiastic, willing to go to extraordinary lengths to win their day in court. But they too shared a certain contempt for the actions of the promiscuous women at the khana-yi aman.

It was often implied that they were “mentally unstable” and in need of religious and psychological counseling. Indeed, the rehabilitation program at the shelter included mandatory psychological counseling and Islamic classes. Every word and sentence used to describe the women marked them as socially other to a mythical system of Islamic honor. A female psychologist would make weekly visits and counsel the women. Yet these sessions were complemented by Quran circles in which women would read and discuss specific Quranic verses and Hadith.

In Ramadan, after the breaking of the fast (iftar), we would make a circle and reflect on the difficulty of a summer Ramadan; we would exchange anecdotes about how we all ended up at the khana-yi aman; we would narrate ongoing administrative and court encounters; we would go over details of pending court proceedings and predict their outcomes; we would comfort those with particularly difficult cases. On one early morning in Ramadan, I sat with Huma and Amara in one of the bedrooms on the first floor when Suhaila came in, visibly upset. She was holding the strands of the threads and pearls that she used to weave handicrafts. A brilliant craftswoman, she used these to weave miniature handcrafts either for her own amusement or for sale to outsiders. She sat down and protested at having to continuously answer the question why she was here. I remembered reading her file, which said that she had run away with her teacher, that she was jailed while she was pregnant, and that her husband and child had died in prison. Amara gestured for everyone to leave the room. Huma motioned me to stay. Suhaila continued:

I am tired. I say I am tired. I am so tired. I lied. I have lied. My husband did not impregnate me. My father’s brother did. My father’s brother raped me. My father didn’t want to go after his brother so he forced my qalin-bafi ustad [carpet-weaving teacher], Muhammad, to marry me. I liked Muhammad. I did. We used to joke sometimes. My father threatened him, and he had to marry me. The child was not his. The child was not Muhammad’s. My uncle knocked at the door one day when I was home alone. I opened the door. He came in, hit me, and raped me. I lost con-
When I woke up, no one was there, and I was wearing clean clothes. Did my father punish me for joking with Muhammad? Then we were jailed, Muhammad and I, because I was pregnant at the time of marriage. We both went to jail. The baby died. The baby died in my arms. My baby died in my arms. Muhammad left me. He is not dead.

As Suhaila said this, her entire body shook with the vigor of her words. She formed her words in chants as she rocked her body back and forth, her head sideways.

"Yes, I speak to him. I speak to him when the moon comes out. The moon gives him my messages." Then she continued, now reciting poetry in Dari Persian:

Life upon me has brought cruelties, while upon others it brings tranquilities.
The best days of my youth were spent under the locks of a prison.
The magnitude of my sorrows saturates my soul.
Youthful looks conceal the decrepit depths of my soul.
Happiness did not visit me in my youth.
The fate of my youth was thus destined.
The storms of tears fill the sorrows of my heart.
The laughter on my lips obscures the secrets of my soul.
Life has rendered you sinful unto me.
The prison of my youth has separated me from you, you from me.

Showing no intention of interrupting Suhaila’s chants, Amara held her in a tight grip as she rocked back and forth. Huma and I sat on each side watching the pearls scatter across the carpet. Amara gently tugged at Suhaila's hair and placed her head on her shoulder. As they moved with the rhythm of the verses, we all cried. Huma and I began picking the scattered pearls and placing them back in Suhaila’s hands. Then Amara started speaking, softly but forcefully, moving the pearls in Suhaila’s hands. She said:

You are not answerable to anyone about why you are here. Look at me. This is your home. We are your family. We are your friends. If anyone asks you again, send them to me. You can weave the pearls of your life story any way you like. You have the permission to tell the story of your life the way you want.

Then she added with a smile, "Now, whose turn is it to cook tonight’s dinner?"

A few hours later, I saw Suhaila peeling potatoes on the front verandah for that evening’s dinner. She saw me looking at her, smiled, and waved at me with a nonchalance that turned the earlier melodrama into a fantastical memory.

In Afghanistan, narratives of poetic protest are often read within the gendered paradigm of self-sacrifice according to which demonstrating continuity is imperative for social cohesion. The stories of all the women at the khana-yi aman underlined a break in such continuity and cohesion, a failure of conciliation and negotiation. Suhaila’s verses ostensibly communicated self-sacrifice, despondency,
and resignation, which in conjunction with her bodily gestures suggested expressions of wretchedness and abandonment. But her presence at the shelter signifies more than self-sacrifice and resignation. It can also be read as a rebellion and revolt against systems of gender organization. Her poem questions her subjugation through social norms while also noting the complicity of her family in perpetuating societal standards based on Islamic ideals of honor. These blatant gestures of running away and confrontation do not fit into the archetype of continuity and cohesion. Instead, they register a defiance that is rarely visible in public.
Such capacity for resilience and rebellion is central to understanding the subjectivity of the *khana-yi aman* women. Suhaila’s story was hardly unique there: it resonated with other narratives of violence that I heard and witnessed. After meals, it was customary to sit in circles and recount stories of love and violence. These often led to deep conversations about women’s position vis-à-vis the legal justice system in Afghanistan. Some women would sit beside the circle and knit or watch television. All the women recounted their stories of love, violence, and abandonment with trepidation and anticipation. Rahmin had circled her house ten times before she found her way onward. “I kept seeing my husband’s shoes through my *burqa* and I knew I was back in the same place. It took me two hours to orient myself. I did not know what was out there, but I knew I could no longer bear what was in there.” Suhaila told the story of love but had been in fact been raped and subjected to unthinkable violence. By highlighting the rigor of the norms undergirding gender organization in her family, norms that caused her to run away, Suhaila underlines the marginality and abandonment she experienced. The fact that her child had died in her arms and that she was forced to bury him in jail expresses the sense of emotional and physical captivity that imprisoned her youth. The poem communicates her marginal positionality within the gendered social and cultural order, a positionality that limits her emancipatory capacities and that places restrictive demands on her youth.

Another resident, Gulnaz, came to the *khana-yi aman* directly from jail. As I made my way to the shelter from the main office one day, I saw several journalists lined up outside the office. Such visits were common when the life story of a particular *khana-yi aman* inhabitant gained international attention, as did occasionally happen. This time it was the story of Gulnaz, who had been imprisoned for adultery and had given birth to a daughter while in jail. This story circulated news outlets and made headlines worldwide. President Karzai himself announced a pardon for Gulnaz in a rare and bold political act that eventually saw her released from jail. Although the case of Gulnaz shared many details with other life stories of those at the shelter, it was not unusual that only a few women here received global attention. I had the opportunity to spend time with Gulnaz while she was at the *khana-yi aman*. She spoke of her circumstances with a measured poise and a composed pragmatism that would elicit admiration from the most hardened souls. Not unlike Suhaila’s, her rape had become public because of her pregnancy. Although it was not clear if it was a condition of her release from jail, she said that she had agreed to marry her rapist. I asked her if she felt afraid or insecure about this decision, and she replied, “I am not afraid of the consequences of my decision, or what the future holds.” She noted how the system must account for her and would eventually take care of her.

One morning Gulala’i called me, hardly able to hide her excitement. She told me to come to the shelter immediately as she had a big surprise in store for me.
“Come quickly,” she said impatiently; “Someone very special is at the shelter today.” She hung up before I could ask any questions. I cut short my break and hurried to the khana-yi aman. As Gulala’i opened the door, I could hear excited chatter from one of the rooms on the first floor. “A parliamentarian is here. A real parliamentarian,” Gulala’i laughed as she led me to the room. As she opened the door, she whispered in my ear, “And we thought we were the only wretched ones!” Nurzia was perhaps the most influential woman I encountered at the shelter. On this exceptional occasion I saw the bed in use. Nurzia sat perched high on it like a queen. I joined the captivated circle of admirers on the floor. Nurzia immediately had the awe and respect of all the women, who would often gather around her bed asking questions about her role in parliament. As Nurzia had helped a woman who had just obtained permission to marry her lover with her bridal clothes and makeup, she educated the rest of us on the art of dressing well and commanding respect. Gulala’i introduced me as a researcher from the United States, and Nurzia immediately turned her attention to me. “I am proud to be an Afghan. Do you understand? I do not want to belong to any other country.” She went on to narrate the violence she had experienced. She said she had spent her youth focusing on her career but eventually decided to settle into a marriage. Then, the way her husband treated her came as a surprise. “One day, my husband held a knife to my throat and banged my head several times into the wall.” She said her family had proposed reconciliation with her husband, which is why she ended up at the khana-yi aman. “My male family members are friends with him and on his side,” she said.

In order for their voices to be heard and for the khana-yi aman lawyers to fight their cases, the women must leave their homes and enter the domain of the public. When they run away from home they leave behind the private realm (dakhili) or the family (khanawada). This entrance into the public marks the beginning of something new and unprecedented in Afghanistan. Their ostracism exemplifies a severe form of punishment and discloses the breakdown of negotiation. The anxious conversations surrounding these promiscuous actors reveal the unlikelihood of their integration while continually working toward assimilation. They also demonstrate the hardships faced by sexually aberrant persons as they seek to reintegrate in the social and cultural order. The fact that reintegration is rendered impossible by their illegitimate actions reveals the limits of the social scripts available to women for sexual expression. The burden that the khana-yi aman places on the hegemonic discourses forces us to reevaluate the explanatory frameworks through which promiscuity and illegitimate sexual relations are understood in contemporary Afghanistan. Running away consigns the typically concealed acts of rebellion and defiance to the realm of the public, where they must be registered and accounted for in unprecedented ways. It is this exceptional status of the khana-yi aman that announces the possibility of something new in Afghanistan.
Ostensibly, the fact that the families were present at the family-law court already signifies a failure of familial negotiation. However, when I witnessed these public confrontations, it was apparent that unlike the state regulations that consolidate and confine the scripts of gender relations and sexual expression, the family negotiations in court involved labyrinthine bargaining entreaties and protracted melodramatic performances that unlocked the space for dissent and difference. Husbands whose wives had initiated divorce would often be accompanied by their cousins, relatives, parents, and first wives. Parents whose daughters had run away to get married would often bring multiple family members for support. Everything was available for contestation and debate in these lengthy negotiations. During the deliberations, families would come in with presupposed notions about honorable identity, such as “ghayrati [honorable, prideful] father” and “nang [honorable, prideful] brother.” As the conversations continued, all these assumed identities became visible before being questioned, negotiated, or challenged. By forcing family courts to account for worlds and attitudes that they had not anticipated, the presuppositions and frames of reference that undergird relations of gender and sexuality were shaken to the core.

CONCLUSIONS

The ways in which khana-yi aman inhabitants and administrators mobilize restricted legal resources to achieve favorable juridical ends and maneuver positive social outcomes enable them admittance into a public to which they have typically been denied access. Within these seemingly ordinary maneuvers lies the extraordinariness of the khana-yi aman. Elsewhere it has been argued that admission to the public does not necessarily result in sexual progress and gender equality. For example, Afsaneh Najmabadi has shown that when women accessed the public realm in Iran, the sexual richness and complexity of their linguistic expression vanished and became rescripted into bodily restraint and chastity. Deniz Kandiyoti has made a similar argument with regard to Turkey. While the shelter engenders the public by opening a space for feminine representation, close ethnographic observation reveals a similar trajectory of co-option and coercion by the Afghan state. When state representatives call the khana-yi aman women prostitutes and the khana-yi aman itself a brothel, their rhetorical tactic is to subjugate certain forms of sexual expression by marking them as threatening. However, the modalities of action displayed at the shelter in Afghanistan are qualitatively different from those of Turkish or Iranian narratives. At the khana-yi aman, the women challenge hegemonic discourses by manipulating the very techniques and apparatus of power that seek to subjugate and position them as inferior.

Power apparatuses are inextricably tied to sexual relations. In this way, the sexual promiscuity of the khana-yi aman women may be read as a capacity for
action that disrupts the relationality through which Afghan power hierarchies operate. The shelter thus enables us to engender Afghanistan’s history by creating a space for rupture and irregularity, because it forces us to question traditional representations of sexually rebellious actions. These traditional representations explain moral aberrations through unchanging and continuous schemas that place undue emphasis on conformity and continuity. The khana-yi aman creates a space of negotiation and difference where kinship connections that accentuate lineage and procreation can be negotiated and reproduced. What counts as kinship can be reoriented toward unknown horizons. On the one hand, running away to the shelter creates a radical rupture with the familial unit by directly inserting the authority of the Afghan state. On the other hand, the gesture of refusal and the vigorous social drama that it entails in public repositions khana-yi aman women as active agents involved in a process of self-determination. Since the shelter’s residents actively inhabit the cultural repertoire of rejection and refusal, they show that Afghan women are not voiceless or passive victims deprived of agency, unable to influence the social hierarchies that implicate them.

Given the unpredictability of their stay there, the associations that women forge with each other at the khana-yi aman are transitory. The shelter has a permanent side for cases that last for more than three years, and a transit side for shorter litigations. It is this transitory nature of the alliance that gives it its political potency and renders it unlike other institutions that enable female bonding, such as dormitories and workplaces. Most of the women whose life stories are shared in this chapter have now moved out of the shelter, as a result either of reaching a resolution through court proceedings or of attaining settlements through personal negotiations with their families outside the courtroom. Other institutions that allow women access to the public (such as dormitories, schools, and workplaces) enact restrictions on proper comportment and gender interaction that may not challenge the social order. In these other spaces, gender hierarchies are reified by making women the protectors of their own moral propriety. Not unlike the Iranian women about whom Afsaneh Najmabadi has written, in these other Afghan cases access to the public sphere is entwined with self-policing of sexual chastity. This holds true for most public institutions in Afghanistan. The only exception I found was the khana-yi aman. Although it adheres to broad rules of gender interaction (for example, its residents sometimes wear a burqa in public), the shelter does not place limitations over allowed or prohibited sexual actions.

The women I met there were at once free and imprisoned, driven to the shelter by individual choice and yet bound by the social logics of culture and community. Taking an ethnographic stance toward the khana-yi aman enables us to move away from the binaries of lawful/prohibited, individual/social, or freedom/oppression that dominate studies of gender in Islamic contexts. Even though the shelter was a closely monitored space when I studied it during 2011 and 2012, it nevertheless
provided runaway women with an opportunity to construct a new lifeworld in which they could obtain legal, economic, and social resources to design their own destinies. Within the confines of the *khana-yi aman*, women expressed themselves freely; they danced and played music; they debated controversial issues; they watched television; they took part in contested conversations. Relative to wider society, the *khana-yi aman* symbolizes what is, relative to the rest of society, an open space where women choose between multiple subject positions and show remarkable maneuverability to negotiate their futures. For these reasons, it fosters anxieties about imperial influence and exploitation of Afghan women, which in turn push it further toward the peripheries of society.

This chapter’s attempt to reconsider the question of the Afghan state through its peripheries not only maps the rationalities and administrative realities of bureaucratic politics. It also highlights the gaps and ruptures where the state has failed to integrate and socialize its subjects. Today the study of margins is more relevant than ever as anthropological scholarship has moved away from culture or society as the foremost explanatory paradigm to explain institutional forms, personal behaviors, social relations, or self-representations. By contrast, the anthropology of difference and suffering focuses on the schisms and silences that interweave hegemonic states and force them to account for dissolution, abandonment, and violence within their territories. The focus here on the *khana-yi aman* dislocates the question of how to maintain order in orderless societies to emphasize instead how to study failure, disintegration, and anarchy as constitutive parts of any political project. The *khana-yi aman* forces the Afghan state to account for its failures and to confront its peripheries.
August 2004: I am back to Dahmardayi Gulzar. I had spent time there in the second half of the 1990s when I conducted fieldwork for my Ph.D. This small valley overlooking the left bank of the river Arghandab, which flows down to Qandahar, is part of the district of Jaghori in Ghazni province. It is bordered by mountains and closed downstream by a gorge. It is virtually an ethnic and religious enclave for the Shi'i Hazaras and is surrounded by regions populated mainly by Sunni Pashtuns. During my stay, I meet my old acquaintance Liaqat 'Ali. I go with him and his wife to the tomb of one of their relatives, who in summer 2001 had been killed by Pashtun nomads when he took some sheep to a summit above Dahmarda. Like any other burial in the region, the grave is marked by only a few stones. But this one is also topped by colored banners known as 'alam. Liaqat 'Ali's wife turns her back on me and squats. She seems to scratch the ground near the 'alam. Does she perform a quick ritual? Does she collect some soil that is blessed by its proximity to the *shahid*, the martyr? I do not dare to explicitly ask Liaqat 'Ali to explain to me how the burial place of a simple shepherd is in the process of becoming a shrine.

During my previous stays there, Dahmarda had been the scene of deep internal tensions. Two factions struggling for local preeminence had come to arms. In 1996, several skirmishes and targeted killings had caused the deaths of a dozen men.’ But these events are not invested with a broader political significance: they do not echo what my interlocutors in Dahmarda and elsewhere see as their long history of marginalization by the Afghan state. For many of them, there is no real rupture between the Muhammadza'i dynasty in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and the Taliban of recent times. And for many of my interlocutors, Pashtun nomads
have always been a proxy for successive governments in Kabul given the task of keeping the Shi‘i Hazaras in a state of political and economic subjection. Any feud over grazing rights between local sedentary farmers (who pool a few sheep and take them to higher-altitude pastures not far from their settlements) and nomads (who seasonally bring their herds to the central region, spending winters in the lowlands) must be placed in this sensitive historical and political context.

Between the sixteenth and the nineteenth century, the region of Hazarajat, in central Afghanistan, largely escaped the control of the great regional empires of the Mughals and Safavids. It was only during the second reign of Amir Dust Muhammad, from 1842 to 1863, that the central powers in Kabul extended their control over Bamiyan and imposed taxation on some peripheral areas of the region. But it was the series of campaigns launched under ‘Abd al-Rahman Khan between 1891 and 1893 that eventually put an end to the autonomy of Hazarajat. These campaigns were accompanied by a whole series of massacres and atrocities and a profound religious polarization between Sunnis and Shi‘is, the former being associated with the rulers in Kabul, the latter being seen as resisting the central power. The conflict led to a number of population transfers: whole regions (especially in what is now Uruzgan province) were emptied of their population and occupied by newcomers. The former inhabitants went abroad (to British India, Iran, and Russian Central Asia) or to the north of the country (to Mazar-i Sharif, Shulgara, Chahar Kint, and Dara-yi Suf). To this day, the painful memory of these events is recalled and kept present in political songs.

The subjugation of the Hazarajat region by ‘Abd al-Rahman not only disorganized the social fabric of the Hazaras. It also opened up the region to Pashtun nomads, whose seasonal presence has ever since been perceived as the visible sign of inequity. Relations between the two communities have always been difficult, with their religious divide compounded by their divergent economic interests. The Pashtun nomads are not only herdsmen but also traders. As a consequence, moneylending and commerce gradually gave them ascendancy over the Hazara farmers, who were sometimes forced to sell their possessions to repay creditors or to become tenants on land that they previously had owned.

According to the anthropologist Robert Canfield, religious labels have been highly prominent in Afghanistan and have often overlapped with ethnic designations. The religion of the Hazaras marks them off from the Sunni majority without drawing them closer to their fellow Shi‘is. In fact, the Shi‘is of Afghanistan are subdivided into quite different groups because of their history, socioeconomic conditions, religious traditions, and identity markers. As a result, they can never really be said to have formed a single cultural, social, and political entity. There are well-established and fairly prosperous Shi‘i communities in several Afghan cities, such as Herat, Qandahar, and Kabul. But such town dwellers do not want to be associated with the burdensome connotations—geographical remoteness, cultural
backwardness, political marginality, material poverty—that have long been attached to the label “Hazara.”

During the whole of the twentieth century, the Shi‘i Hazaras felt they had been treated as second-class citizens by the Afghan state. Hazarajat was shaken by a number of revolts, most notably one in the second half of the 1940s led by Ibrahim Big, *bacha-yi gawsawar* (son of the cow rider), who fought against a tax on clarified butter that the Hazaras had to pay on every animal in their possession, even on horses and donkeys that could not be milked. Popular tales recount the exploits of honorable bandits (*yaghi*) such as Yusuf Big, who fought against arbitrary rule and reputedly eluded the authorities for nineteen years in Shahristan before finally being captured and executed.\(^9\) Several other figures are also celebrated as heroes who rose up against government oppression, including Fayz Muhammad Katib (‘Abd al-Rahman’s secretary who wrote an account of the bloody conquest of Hazarajat), ‘Abd al-Khalil (the young man who assassinated King Nadir Shah in 1933), Sayyid Isma‘il Balkhi (an important Hazara religious scholar who was imprisoned between 1949 and 1964).\(^10\)

After the communist coup in 1978 and the ensuing war in the 1980s, Hazarajat regained its old autonomy. The region was largely spared by the occupying Soviet forces and witnessed only a few major military operations. Nonetheless, factional struggles often took a deadly turn, and wrenching internal tensions led to major changes in sociopolitical structures. In a first phase, young clerics, often of humble origin, were trained in Iran and returned to supplant the old tribal and religious elites. Then a process of unification took place around the ethnic discourse of the Hizb-i Wahdat, a powerful political movement that came into being in the late 1980s.\(^11\) The war thus saw the emergence of a new elite and a new political consciousness that spurned any return to the status quo ante. Previously excluded from power, the Hazaras desperately sought national recognition and international attention. Their hopes were raised enormously in the post-9/11 climate that brought about American intervention and the fall of the Taliban. Their role in Afghanistan’s post-Taliban governments appears greater than at any time before. Today their political leaders refuse to accept a return to the old power structures, but they are aware of how fragile their achievements are.

For many Hazaras today, their painful history mirrors the tragic destiny of Imam Husayn, the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad who was killed in Karbala in 680 by the forces of the Umayyad caliph. During the Hazaras’ years of war and forced displacement, the commemoration of this event during the month of Muharram has grown in importance.\(^12\) In the Muharram sermons (*rawza*), the sufferings endured by the Hazaras are constantly compared with those endured by Husayn and his family. The thirst that tortured the imam’s companions and the prevention of their getting water from the Euphrates is compared with the blockade that the Taliban imposed on Hazarajat from the summer of 1997 to the autumn
of 1998. The profanation of Husayn's body is paired with the tragic end of ‘Abd al-‘Ali Mazari, the Hazara leader who was captured and killed by the Taliban in March 1995. More generally, the fate of the sacred victims of Karbala is compared to the various massacres suffered by the Hazaras, such as the one in Afshar Mina, a district of Kabul, in January 1993, perpetrated by troops allied to the Tajik leader Ahmad Shah Mas'ud, or the one in Mazar-i Sharif in August 1998 at the hands of the Taliban. Recent political and military events thus echo the sacred history of Shi'ism. Hazara believers become guilty of nonassistance, for which they must atone. They mourn their martyrs and relive their sufferings to the point of lacerating their own bodies. They suffer for Imam Husayn but also express their readiness to fight for a return to justice.

Articulated around the evocation of past injustices and protests against exploitation, Shi'ism has thus served as the language of political mobilization among the Hazaras. Since the 1980s it has been both a tool of resistance against the central power in Kabul and against domination within Hazarajat. Through the example of the Hazaras, the brief points made in this afterword illustrate several of the themes that this volume has explored in more general terms. The various chapters are organized chronologically from Afghanistan's initial Islamization to the present period. As such, the chapters offer a historical journey through Afghanistan's Islam from the eighth century to the post-2001 reconstruction efforts conducted under the guidance of a U.S.-led international coalition. In this way, we see how multiple and multiplex Islam has been across time and space. Sufism, state-sponsored Islamic institutions, transnational networks of activists, women's religiosity are all facets of how Islam has been experienced in Afghanistan. Both elites and subaltern groups have made appeals to Islam; it has been a means to legitimize central power and a vector of rebellion; it has shaped the circulation of ideas and control of material resources. Islam may have been a unifying factor, but it has also been used to create boundaries between groups.

As Arezou Azad's chapter has demonstrated, if what is today Afghanistan was transformed by the arrival of Islam, then Islam was also transformed by the pre-existing social and cultural context. In his chapter, R. D. McChesney has described the materiality of religion through the allocation of resources, thus revealing the underlying economy of Islam. Whereas Jürgen Paul has analyzed the close association developed between Naqshbandi Sufi leaders and the Timurid ruling class in Herat during the fifteenth century, Amin Tarzi has shown how the establishment of official Shari'a courts under 'Abd al-Rahman Khan helped the state to achieve legitimacy during the nineteenth century. At that time, Shi'i Islam was positioned in a structural opposition to the central state; Shi'ism was an expression of subversion.

Whereas Waleed Ziad has examined the circulation of knowledge between the different polities of India and Afghanistan at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century, Sana Haroon has documented the violent
expressions of religious activism among Pashtuns much before the late twentieth century in order to show the inadequacy of accounts conceived in terms of tribalism for grasping the multiple forms of political mobilization. With case studies spanning more than five hundred years, Nushin Arbabzadah, Ingeborg Baldauf, and Sonia Ahsan have each shown how women have striven to render their social and political engagements intelligible in Islamic terms and, in so doing, have gained a place in the public landscape despite often adverse conditions. For his part, Faridullah Bezhan has explored the vibrant political debates that revolved around the modernist notions of nationalism and constitutionalism in the mid-twentieth century. But times had changed by the 1980s, as Simon Wolfgang Fuchs documents through writings produced for the anti-Soviet jihad. Although the Afghan resistance was far from ideologically unified, Islam became the primary idiom of politics.

Through an emphasis on scholarship focusing on written sources in languages used in the territory of Afghanistan, and a concomitant emphasis on an ethno-graphic approach that documents what people say and do in their own terms, the preceding chapters have revealed the ancient and multiplex genealogy of political Islam. As Nile Green pointed out in the introduction, although Afghanistan is often described as an ethnic mosaic, it may also be seen as a religious mosaic. As much as and even more than in the past, today Islam is a contested arena, even though most actors claim to have a monopoly on purity and truth. Now, even more than a few decades ago, references to religion structure the very field of political expression in Afghanistan. Through the exploration of Afghanistan’s Islam in its longue durée, the various contributions to this volume have ultimately shown its modernity. If in the past Islam has been a vector for establishing state legitimacy and expressing tensions in collective society, in Afghanistan today Islam has to be understood in its plurality within the public arena, where its various forms coexist with similarly plural normative models of state and society introduced by foreign troops, United Nations agencies, and nongovernmental organizations.
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3. On Afghanistan’s Jews, see the discussion and sources later in this chapter and notes 163 to 169.


6. For example, Geoffrey Khan (ed.), Arabic Documents from Early Islamic Khurasan (London: Nour Foundation/Azimuth Editions, 2007).


9. Ibid., pp. 61, 66, 106.


16. On the Bust madrasa, see ibid., p. 92.

17. Ibid., p. 94. The argument is made in *extenso* throughout the cited volume and in briefer form in Christopher I. Beckwith, “The Sarvāstivādin Buddhist Scholastic Method in Medieval Islam and Tibet,” in Akasoy, Burnett, and Yoeli-Tlalim (2011; above, note 13).


19. Strictly speaking, Vaissière’s specific focus is on the earliest ribat in Panjikent, in what is now Tajikistan, but his wider discussion of Soghdiana and Bactria has implications for Afghanistan.


32. Henry Corbin, “Nasir-i Khusraw and Iranian Ismailism,” in Richard N. Frye (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Iran*, vol. 4 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975); and Alice C. Hunsberger, *Nasir Khusraw, the Ruby of Badakhshan: A Portrait of the Persian...


43. For overviews of Herat under Timurid rule, see Terry Allen, Timurid Herat (Wiesbaden: Ludwig Reichert, 1983); Dietrich Brandenburg, Herat: Eine timuridische Hauptstadt
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85. Baiza (2013; above, note 77), chapters 4 and 5.
86. Ibid., pp. 101–2.


98. Thierry Zarcone, Sufi Pilgrims from Central Asia and India in Jerusalem (Kyoto: Center for Islamic Area Studies at Kyoto University, 2009), pp. 3–4, 9, 11, 15, 18, 25, 27, 32, 36, 53–54, 85, and especially 92–98 on the Jerusalem lodge.


114. Canfield (1973; above, note 75).

115. Ibid., p. 117.


136. Ibid., pp. 169–70.


147. Ibid., p. 32.


151. One exception, for the Qizilbash, is a short article by Louis Dupree, “Further Notes on Taqiyya: Afghanistan,” *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 99.4 (1979), pp. 680–82. The Qizilbash are, however, becoming the focus of diasporic Afghan scholarship. See, for example, Ahmad ‘Ali Muhibbi, *Qizilbash wa Hazara dar Labila-yi Tarih-i Afghanistan* (s.l. [Germany]: s.n., 2011).


156. For example, Dhavalikar (1971; above, note 154), p. 331, noted that the sixth- or seventh-century Ganesh statue found in Gardiz “is presently worshipped by the Hindu residents of Kabul in Dargah Pir Rattan Nath near the Pamir Cinema.”


160. A 1937 account by René Dollot of the chapel’s activities has been published in Ambassade de France en Afghanistan, *Une ambassade à Kaboul* (Kabul: Ambassade de France en Afghanistan, 2008), pp. 67–70.


for a much later date, 1300: see Eugen L. Rapp, “The Date of the Judaeo-Persian Inscriptions of Tang-i Azao in Central Afghanistan,” *East and West* 17.1–2 (1967), pp. 51–58. I am grateful to Shaul Shaked (personal communication, November 6, 2015) for clarifying the reasons—particularly the type of dating system—why Henning’s earlier date is the more convincing.


167. Ibid.


170. This statement is based on research conducted by the Pew Foundation. See in particular the summary chart: http://www.pewforum.org/2014/04/04/religious-diversity-index-scores-by-country/ (accessed June 30, 2016).

171. Edwards (1996, 2002; above, notes 81 and 137). One may also include here the work of Ashraf Ghani (1978, 1982, 1983; above, notes 78 and 79), which stands at the intersection of historical and anthropological studies.

1. **THE BEGINNINGS OF ISLAM IN AFGHANISTAN**

1. This chapter uses the term “Afghanistan” to denote the territory that is today circumscribed within the boundaries of the Afghan nation-state. The term “Afghan” is used in the same vein, without ascribing to it any modern ethnic value.

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and a more recent summary of the scholarship on Islamization in Arietta Papaconstantinou, “Introduction,” in Conversion in Late Antiquity: Christianity, Islam, and Beyond; Papers from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation Sawyer Seminar, University of Oxford, 2009–2010 (Farnham: Ashgate, 2015).

3. Peshawar and the Northwest Frontier Province constitute a fifth region, which Thomas Barfield has aptly referred to as Afghanistan’s “phantom limb.” It was handed to Pakistan when the British departed. See Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), pp. 47–54.


5. Some inroads are being made through the study of documents and rock graffiti. See, for example, Robert Hoyland, In God’s Path: The Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 100 ff.


9. For further details, see Arezou Azad, “The Fada’il-i Balkh and Its Place in Islamic Historiography,” Iran 50 (2012), pp. 79–102. Some of the local histories have continuations up to the near-present.


13. For discussions of early Islamic local histories, see Richard Frye, “City Chronicles of Central Asia and Khurasan: Tārix-i Nisapur,” in Zeki Velidi Togan: armağan: Symbolae in


17. Al-Ṭabari (1879–1901; above, note 8), vol. 2, pp. 1181, 1206–7, 1219; Al-Wa‘īz, *Fada’il-i Balkh*, ed. ‘Abd al-Hayy Habibi (Tehran: Intisharat-i Bunyad-i Farhang-i Iran, 1350/1971), p. 34. Étienne de la Vaissière has recently argued that “the title barmak derives directly from paramaka, a title that broadly means ‘excellent’ or ‘superior’, without any need to go to the more distant pramukha [i.e., an important figure in the monastic hierarchy, as attested in Khotanese texts].” See Étienne de la Vaissière, “De Bactres à Balkh, par le Now Bahar,” *Journal Asiatique* 298.2 (2010), p. 531.


des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres, 151.4 (2007), pp. 1847–74. Also relevant are the early Islamic accounts of the Naw Bahar that refer to the temple of the mughan (Magians: i.e., Zoroastrians). Such terms were used rather inaccurately by medieval Islamic scholars, like Ibn al-Faqih and al-Wa'iz al-Balkhi, as catchall phrases for the followers of religions that were not ahl al-kitab (Christian or Jewish “people of the book”). Terms on Buddhism were imprecise and greatly corrupted. For an excellent excursus on this historiographical phenomenon, see Daniel Gimaret, “Bouddha et les bouddhistes dans la tradition musulmane,” Journal Asiatique 257 (1969), pp. 273–316.

21. “Wakhsh, the king of gods” (BT I O and U, dated 440 e.B.d./663 a.D. and 490 e.B.d./713 A.D., respectively), a god called Ram-set (BT I P and Q, dated 446 e.B.d./669 a.D. and 449 e.B.d./672 A.D., respectively), and “Kamird, the king of gods” (BT I T, dated 478 e.B.d./700 A.D.). (For e.B.d., see below, note 54.) All documents are published in Sims-Williams, Bactrian Documents from Northern Afghanistan, vol. 1. For a more detailed discussion, see Arezou Azad, “Living Happily Ever After: Fraternal Polyandry, Taxes and ‘the House’ in Early Islamic Bactria,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 79.1 (2016), pp. 33–56.


29. Sakastan was the “Land of the Sakas,” referring to the Scythians, an Indo-European people who lived in the lands of what is now Afghanistan and northwestern India. One of the earlier designations of the region had been the Avestan “Land of the Haetumant”: i.e., Land of the Helmand River, appearing in the early Greek geographical sources as Erymanthus. Bosworth (1997; above, note 28), p. 681.


33. The first date is given by al-Tabari (1879–1901 [above, note 8], vol. 2, part 3, pp. 1490–91); the second appears in Balkh’s local history: al-Wa’īz (1350/1971; above, note 17), p. 35.


36. Khan (2006; above, note 7), p. 96. The group of Arabic documents contains tax receipts issued by caliphal governors and financial agents; land survey reports; contracts of slave manumission; and dowry attestations. The Bactrian-language contracts set peace agreements between feuding parties, the purchase of land or goods, slave manumission, gifts, leases, declarations of trust (or impost?), loan receipts, and marriage.


38. Al-Wa’īz, *Fada’il-i Balkh* (1350/1971; above, note 17), p. 34.


40. The Kharijites were the earliest religious sects of Islam, who formulated questions relative to the theory of the caliphate and to justification by faith or by works, and carried out continual insurrections until their virtual extinction in Iraq by the Ṣaffārids. G. Levi Della Vida, “Khāridjites,” *EI*, vol. IV (Leiden: Brill, 1997), pp. 1074–77.

42. C. E. Bosworth (1968; above, note 30).

43. D. G. Tor, Violent Order: Religious Warfare, Chivalry, and the ’Ayyār Phenomenon in the Medieval Islamic World (Würzburg: Ergon in Kommission, 2007); Bosworth (1997; above, note 28), p. 683. A local ’ayyar leader in Sistan, Ya’qub ibn Layth (d. 265/879), rose to become the founder of the Saffarid dynasty, which ruled over a vast empire for 150 years and included Sistan, Khurasan, Kerman, and Fars (in Iran) and Makran (in India).

44. The amount of 44.8 million dirhams was collected by the Tahirid governor Abu’l-’Abbas ’Abd Allah ibn Tahir for the Abbasid treasury as kharaj in Khurasan and other provinces under his authority in 211–12/826–27. Rob and Samangan accounted for 12,600 dirhams, which indicates that they were relatively small in size. Balkh, on the other hand (together with Khuttalan and Sa’d Khurra and its mountains) accounted for 193,300 dirhams of kharaj. Abu al-Qasim ’Ubayd Allah Ibn Khurradadhbih, Kitab al-Masalik al-Mamalik, ed. M. J. de Goeje, part 6, Bibliotheca Geographicorum Arabicorum (Leiden: Brill, 1889), pp. 24–28, 34–39; Qudama b. Ja’far, Khuraj (1889; above, note 8), p. 190.


47. For references to the wealth of Balkh’s ’ulama, see al-Wa’iz (1350/1971; above, note 17), pp. 64, 73 n. 3, 77, 215, 297, 347.


49. Two sīsīlas are listed in Arezou Azad, Sacred Landscape in Medieval Afghanistan: Revisiting the Fada’il-i Balkh (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), annex II.


57. Tibet provides a useful comparandum. Melvyn Goldstein argues that Tibetan fraternal polyandry is the “lesser evil;” a compromise strategy, stimulated by the need to pool human resources to meet excessive activity requirements of living in a harsh environment at high altitudes, in a semiarid land with limited rainfall, and to discharge the obligation of high tax burdens. Goldstein argues that through fraternal polyandry landholdings maintain their economies of scale in relation to labor costs, and brothers share the property within a “stem family.” Melvyn Goldstein, “Stratification, Polyandry, and Family Structure in Central Tibet,” Southwestern Journal of Anthropology 27.1 (1971), pp. 64–74; idem, “Pahari and Tibetan Polyandry Revisited,” Ethnology 17.3 (1978), pp. 327–32.


60. This is a reference to early forms of Buddhism that must have continued in Balkh. Xuanzang (1906; above, note 23), vol. 1, p. 46. Later phases of Buddhism, notably the Mahayana and Vajrayana, do not preclude the use of early forms of Buddhism. For a more detailed discussion of Balkh’s sacred landscape, refer to my Sacred Landscape in Medieval Afghanistan (2013; above, note 49).

62. The text uses four Quranic terms to refer to the angels’ prayers corresponding to the four gates of the city: *istighfar*, *takbir*, *tahmid*, and *tahlil*.


2. WOMEN AND RELIGIOUS PATRONAGE IN THE TIMURID EMPIRE


16. Ibid., p. 97.


25. Ibid.

26. For references to Tuman in the *Rawzat al-Safa*, see Mirkhwand (1339/1960; above, note 5), pp. 207, 208, 236, 239, 240, 243, 244, 264, 325.


32. Yazdi (1336/1957; above, note 29), vol. 1, p. 183.
36. On Ansari’s shrine, see Maria Subtelny, “The Cult of Abdulāh Ansārī under the Timurids,” in Christoph Bürgel and Alma Giese (eds.), *Gott ist schön und Er liebt die Schönheit: Festschrift für Annemarie Schimmel* (Bern: Peter Lang, 1994).
38. Isogai (1997; above, note 19).
42. For descriptions of educated women, see Mir Nizam al-Din Fakhri Amiri Harawi, *Jawahir al-‘Aja’ib* (Lucknow: Munshi Nawwal Kishur, 1873), passim; and Gulbadan Bigum (1966; above, note 7), pp. 183, 191, 200.
45. Ibid., p. 238.
47. Ibid., p. 133.
50. Marefat (1993; above, note 2), p. 34.
52. Golombek and Wilber (1988; above, note 2).
54. On women and craftsmen in Timurid Samarqand, see Raziya Mukminova “Craftsmen and Guild Life in Samarqand,” in Golombek and Subtelny (1992; above, note 1); and eadem (1997; above, note 43).
55. For more on Timurid shrines, in Central Asia and Herat respectively, see Haase (1997; above, note 49); and Lisa Golombek, *The Timurid Shrine at GazarGah* (Toronto: Royal Ontario Museum, 1969). On Safavid women in the shrine-city of Mashhad, see Zarinebaf-Shahr (1998; above, note 23).


57. On these popular uses, see Wasifi (1350/1971; above, note 20), pp. 389–91.


3. THE RISE OF THE KHWAJAGAN-NAQSHBANDIYYA SUFI ORDER IN TIMURID HERAT

1. For Timurid rule in general, see Beatrice Manz, *Power, Politics and Religion in Timurid Iran* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), for the first half of the century, in particular the reign of Shahrukh; and Maria Eva Subtelny, *Timurids in Transition: Turkopersian Politics and Acculturation in Medieval Iran* (Leiden: Brill, 2007), for the second half, in particular the reign of Husayn Bayqara.


7. Manz (2007; above, note 1) stresses the cooperative aspect; in this study, competition will be the main subject.

8. Hama az u ast—that was the position of Zayn al-Din Khwafi; and hama u ast, as Qasim-i Anwar said: see below, note 39.

9. Binbaş (2014; above, note 3); Melvin-Koushki (2014; above, note 3). Both point out that interest in such things as the symbolic value of the letters of the Arabic (Persian) alphabet was not merely abstract speculation but could lead to serious consequences in political thought. Melvin-Koushki makes it clear that the “science of letters” was pursued within a
Shari‘a-conforming framework and that those active in this science had nothing to do with the Hurufis.


14. İlker Evrim Binbaş has discussed this event and its consequences: İlker Evrim Binbaş, “The Anatomy of a Regicide Attempt: Shāhrukh, the Ḥurūfīs, and the Timurid Intellectuals in 830/1426–7,” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 2013, pp. 1–38. He comes to the conclusion that it is not altogether clear whether the Hurufis really were behind the crime.


19. Jean Aubin, “De Kûhbanân à Bidar: La famille Ni‘matullahi,” Studia Iranica 20 (1991), pp. 233–61 (here pp. 236–37). Besides the Ni‘matullahis themselves, Aubin apparently is the only author to have stressed the link between Qasim and Ni‘matullah—this link, however, is much more important than the “primordial” teaching that Qasim received in Ardabil.

20. Binbaş (2014; above, note 3), pp. 291–92; idem (2013; above, note 14), pp. 14–15. Binbaş comments that this was “one of the most striking formulations of dual kingship written in late medieval Islamic history,” and he sees the danger that Qasim posed for Shahrukh and his regime in the new constitutional thinking going with such formulations.

21. The connection to Shaykh Khuttalani was later to be seen as a link to a Kubravi silsila.

23. Binbaş (2014; above, note 3), p. 290; idem (2013; above, note 14), p. 24. Ilham (“inspiration”) is the form of supernatural (divinely inspired) knowledge available after the end of Revelation. However, there also is a Turko-Mongol tradition that sees rulers as directly participating in supernatural knowledge.

24. DeWeese (2011; above, note 4); Jean Aubin, “Un santon quhistâni à l’époque timouride,” *Revue des Études Islamiques* 35 (1967), pp. 185–216. Aubin states that Khalwati shaykhs were viewed with suspicion by the authorities because they were known to recruit (or suspected of recruiting) among unruly elements.


27. Ibid., pp. 230–35.

28. This is Parsa’s *Fasl al-khitab*; see Paul (1998; above, note 25), pp. 45–52.


32. DeWeese (2011; above, note 4).


41. In the entry on Ibn al-'Arabi in his Nafahat, Jami states that most of the exoteric scholars vilified him, and only a minority of those scholars and “a group out of the Sufis” praised him: Jami (1375/1997; above, note 38), p. 545. And regarding Parsa, he adds that whenever Khwaja Parsa, in his Fasl al-khitab, quotes “one of the great possessors of gnostic knowledge,” Ibn al-‘Arabi is meant: ibid., p. 547. See also Paul (1998; above, note 25), pp. 49–51.


43. Khalwat dar anjuman or dast ba-kar wa-dil ba-yar, respectively.


50. This is the gist of Baha al-Din Naqshband’s answers to the questions of Mu’izz al-Din, ruler of Herat: DeWeese (2006; above, note 5), p. 267.


54. Mahendrarajah (2014; above, note 6), p. 247, has a diagram of Sa’d al-Din’s disciples.


56. Ibid., p. 227.

57. Mahendrarajah (2014; above, note 6), pp. 295–300.


59. See the discussion in Mahendrarajah (2014; above, note 6).


66. This is the quality of istighna, “independence of mind,” which I have discussed in Paul (2011; above, note 11). A quote from a sermon by Ahmad-i Samarqandi: ibid., p. 243.
68. Subtelny (2007; above, note 1), with a list of endowments in Timurid Herat.
74. On trade, see Gross (2001; above, note 71).
75. For the text of the decree returning the province’s administration, and an analysis of it, see Mahendrarajah (2014; above, note 6), p. 114. On Ahrar’s purported role, see ibid., p. 261.

4. EARNING A LIVING


5. Gulchin-i Ma’ani, *Tarikh-i Tazkira-ha-yi Farsi*, vol. 2 (Tehran: s.n., 1350/1971), p. 236, gives the date of composition as 1093/1682 on the basis of the numerical value of the letters in the title, but this was more likely the date when work began or was in progress, because the author was emulating Nisari’s *Muzakkir-i ahbab*, the numerical value of whose title is taken as the date of the work.

6. Much of what is said here has already been said by such scholars as Maria Szuppe, Maria Subtelny, Sholeh Quinn, Stephen Dale, Mansura Haider, Muzaffar Alam, et alii. It is hoped that the focus here on material aspects, incentives, and disincentives may make a further contribution to understanding the texture of cultural life in the area that was to become Afghanistan.


9. Shi’ism in Afghanistan would be notably bolstered in the early eighteenth century with the conquests of the Iranian Afsharid Nadir Shah. His brief incursion left behind colonies of Iranian Shi’is, known in Afghanistan generically as Qizilbash, who, as mid- and high-level bureaucrats, were the backbone of the Afghan central and provincial governments for nearly two centuries.


13. This is a phrase that requires some explanation. *Faqr*, a state possessed by the *faqir* (fakir), signifies a needfulness of God and stands in opposition to *ghani*, a state of nonneedfulness, or wealth. *Fana* is the ultimate immersion or annihilation of the self. *Sidq* implies utter integrity; and *safa*, a state of purity of mind and body.


15. Devin DeWeese, “‘Disordering’ Sufism in Early Modern Central Asia: Suggestions for Rethinking the Sources and Social Structures of Sufi History in the Eighteenth and
Notes

Nineteenth Centuries,” in Bakhtiyar Babajanov and Yayoi Kawahara (eds.), History and Culture of Central Asia (Tokyo: University of Tokyo, 2012).


24. For Balkh, nine new madrasas can be identified as being built between 1529 and 1661. Only traces of the last, the Subhan Quli Khan Madrasa, still survive. For Bukhara, records exist of at least eleven madrasas built between 1530 and 1670. Of these, seven still stand—the Mir-i ‘Arab Madrasa; two by ‘Abdullah Khan (d. 1598), one at Char Bakr and the other on the Khiyaban; one by ‘Abd al-Aziz Khan son of Nazr Muhammad Khan, facing the Ulugh Big Madrasa; the Qul Baba Kuakaltash and the Nadr Diwanbegi Arlat madrasas at Lab-i Hawz; and the Juybari Madrasa, along the Rud-i Shahr canal. In Samarqand, of seven madrasas built during this period, three survive, the Nadr Diwanbegi Arlat Madrasa, at the shrine (rawza) of Khwaja Ahrar, and two by Yalangtush Bi Alchin (the Shayrdar and Tillakar madrasas, on the Rigistan). Of some seventeen khanaqahs recorded as being built during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, I know of only four that still stand: three at Bukhara—the great khanaqah at the shrine of Baha al-Din Naqshband Allah Khan (built in 1544/5), the Nadr Diwanbegi Arlat (ca. 1630), on Labb-i Hawz, and the khanaqah at Char Bakr—and the khanaqah at Karmina, between Bukhara and Samarqand, at the shrine of Hazrat Qasim Shaykh ‘Azizan. (Images of all these buildings may be found through a Google search.)


30. This madrasa, better known as *Mir-i ’Arab,* which still stands today opposite the Masjid-i Kalan and was functioning as a madrasa during the Soviet period as late as 1977 when this writer visited it, was built for Shaykh Abdullah Yamani (”Mir-i ’Arab”) with resources provided by ‘Ubaydullah Khan. See G. A. Pugachenkova and L. I. Rempel, *Vyidaiushchiesia pamiatniki arkhitektury Uzbekistana* (Tashkent: Gos. Izdatel’stvo Khudozhestvennoi Literature UzSSr, 1958). See also Nisari (1969; above, note 1), pp. 37–38.


32. For a brief synopsis of the work of the khanly patrons, their amirs, and the shaykhly patrons, see McChesney (2010; above, note 22).


34. Nisari (1969; above, note 1), ms. 58, fol. 252a.


36. Ibid., fols. 364a, 365a, 365b.

37. Ibid., fol. 350b.

38. Ibid., fol. 347a.

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid., fol. 347a.

41. Ibid., fols. 347a–b (Mawlana Jarullah), 349a (Mawlana ’Ali Big).


44. The man, Khwaja ’Ubaydullah, was the brother of Khwaja Mirakshah, who presided over a circle (halqa) of dervishes at the Juybar khanqah (apparently not the khanqah at Char Bakr): Juybari, *Matlab al-Talibin* (above, note 4), ms. 37657, fol. 94a.

5. TRANSPORTING KNOWLEDGE IN THE DURRANI EMPIRE

1. In this chapter, I will refer to the geographic designations employed in contemporary Persian sources, namely Khurasan (Mashhad to Peshawar, encompassing most of modern-day Afghanistan), Turkestan (Central Asia, including northern Afghanistan), Sindh, and Hindustan (Punjab and North India). The term “Afghan” will denote the Pushtun/Pathan ethnic group.

2. A khanaqah is a center for the teaching of Sufi sciences and associated ritual practices, generally featuring a soup kitchen and lodging facilities for pilgrims.


4. Elphinstone’s own terms for the latter were “Derweshis,” “Fukeers,” and “Kulunders.”


12. A Sufi would claim a primary genealogical affiliation and methodology (e.g., Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi) while pursuing a course of esoteric studies in another Sufi tradition.


18. Fazl Ahmad was the son of Niyaz Ahmad Sirhindi (d. ca. 1764), a fifth-generation descendant of Shah 'Abd al-Razzaq, the elder brother of Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi. Ma'sumi (2004; above, note 10), vol. 1, pp. 329–49.
26. Although al-Qawl al-Jamil was composed in Delhi, the biographies of both Fazl Ahmad and Khwaja Safiullah indicate that the protocols it described were also followed within their khaqanahs. See Shah Waliullah Dihlawi, “Al-Qawl al-Jamil fi Bayan-i Sawa'i al-Sabil,” in Rasa‘il-i Shah Waliullah Dihlawi, vol. 1 (Lahore: Tasawwuf Foundation, 1999).
27. In several manuscripts of Risala dar Bayan-i Tasawwuf, sections are redacted and supplemented with discussions on supererogatory prayers. However, the general framework is the same.
29. The tone of both tracts is decidedly pedagogical rather than defensive or rhetorical. The texts, for example, do not provide sources for meditative practices or reference scripture to justify practices from an orthodox point of view.
30. For example, the Ganj Baksh *kitabkhana* houses a template *ijazatnama* (in the name of “khalifa falan falan”) designating Fazl Ahmad and his son at Bukhara, Ghulam Qadir, as the source of the *ijazat*. This document was presumably used by *khulafa* to issue diplomas and permission to teach to their own representatives. *IJazatnama* and *Shajrah-i Mujaddidiyya*, citing “Abd al-Qadir, khalifa of Fazl Ahmad Ma’sumi,” early nineteenth century, MSS 8901, Kitabkhana-i Ganj Baksh, Islamabad.


34. A similar manual, Shah Abu Sa’id Mujaddidi’s *Hidayat al-Talibin*, issued from Delhi several decades later, indicates that this type of text was provided to students for educational purposes and as blessings (*tabarrukan*) when they traveled. See Abu Sa’id Dihlawi, *Hidayat al-Talibin* (Patiala: Samana Publishers, 2005), pp. 2–3.

35. Concise *ma’mulat* manuals had been produced earlier in Sirhind and elsewhere: for example, ‘Abd al-Ahmad Wahdat Sirhindi, *Kuhl al-Jawahir* (Istanbul, 1309/1892), MSS, Maktaba Mujaddidiyya (original in private library, Istanbul); Mir Numan, *Risala-i Suluk* (Hyderabad: Al-Mustafa Publications, Old University, 2002). The eighteenth- and nineteenth-century works contain far more comprehensive, instruction-oriented descriptions of practices (from initiation onward) with experiential details. Further, they often include comparative sections on practices associated with other orders.


39. A detailed diagram of the cosmological framework can be found in Buehler (2011; above, note 11), pp. 32–36.


42. In Mujaddidi texts, this wayfaring is also represented by traversing successive spheres through the cosmological structure.

43. Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi (2001; above, note 41), pp. 27–30.


45. The concept of the *lata’if*, as Arthur Buehler notes, can be traced to Junayd al-Baghdadi and Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, but the Kubrawiyya order produced the first detailed expositions on the subject. Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi provided the most systematic treatment on the concept, further systematized by his successors. See Buehler (2011; above, note 11), pp. 106–9.

46. Five are located in the *’alam-i khalq* (world of creation), which are the four elements (fire, earth, air, water) and the *nafs* (ego-self). Five are located in the *’alam-i amr* (the world of divine command). These are the *qalb* (heart), *ruh* (spirit), *sir* (secret), *khafa* (hidden), and *akhfa* (most hidden) and are known collectively as “the five jewels.” Khwaja Safiullah Mujaddidi (1845; above, note 31), fols. 8a–9a.

47. The position and color association of each *latifa* varies according the pedagogy of the teacher. According to Fazl Ahmad, the *qalb* is two finger-widths below the left breast, the *ruh* is two finger-widths below the right breast, and so forth. Fazl Ahmad Ma’sumi Pishawari (1246/1830; above, note 28), pp. 3–8; Khwaja Safiullah Mujaddidi (1845; above, note 31), fols. 12a–14b.


49. *Nafi wa isbat* is the recitation of *la ilaha* (negation) *il-allah* (affirmation) while holding and channeling the breath through specific parts of the body. This is repeated multiple times (always an odd number of times) in single breaths. *Muraqaba* is a purely meditative exercise of visualizing the presence of the teacher, concentrating on the place of heart, and imagining it to proclaim *Allah*.

50. These are: awareness of breathing; awareness of steps, or one’s own path; travel in the homeland; solitude amid the multitude; remembering; returning; protecting; keeping in memory; awareness of time; awareness of numbers, and awareness of the heart. See Fusfeld (1981; above, note 38), pp. 85–90.


52. Fazl Ahmad Ma’sumi Pishawari (1246/1830; above, note 28), p. 12.

53. Ibid., p. 2.

54. Ibid., p. 5.

55. The additional discussions in *Makhzan* suggest that it also served as an abridged reference work for Mujaddidi cosmology.


57. Khwaja Safiullah Mujaddidi (1845; above, note 31), fols. 33a–42b; Fazl Ahmad Ma’sumi Pishawari (1246/1830; above, note 28), pp. 18–20.

58. Devin DeWeese, “‘Disordering’ Sufism in Early Modern Central Asia: Suggestions for Rethinking the Sources and Social Structures of Sufi History in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries,” in Bakhtiyar Babadjanov and Yayoi Kawahara (eds.), *History and Culture of Central Asia* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo, 2012).

59. Khwaja Safiullah Mujaddidi (1845; above, note 31), fol. 40b.
60. Ibid., fol. 7a.
62. Khwaja Safiullah Mujaddidi (1845; above, note 31), fols. 33a–42b; Fazl Ahmad Ma'sumi Pishawari (1246/1830; above, note 28), pp. 18–20.
64. Interview with Maqsud Ahmad Qazi of Nasrpur, Matiari, Feb. 12, 2015.
65. Fazl Ahmad Ma'sumi Pishawari and Anonymous, Risala-i Asbaq-i Tariqa-i Aliya-i Naqshbandiyya (dated Peshawar, 1225/1810), MSS 339 (95/131), Peshawar University; Fazl Ahmad Ma'sumi Pishawari and various others, Majmu'a (Bukhara, early 19th c.), MSS 2572, IVANRUz, Tashkent.
66. Regarding earlier Naqshbandi classics, in two cases we find the wasiyatnama of 'Abd al-Khaliq Ghijdavani, which undoubtedly served as a model or prototype for an initiatory certificate. For anonymous texts, see, for example, Khwaja Safiullah Mujaddidi and Anonymous, Majmu'a (Kabul, 1299/1882), MSS, Archif-i Milli, Kabul; Khwaja Safiullah Mujaddidi and Anonymous, Makhzan al-Anwar (bound with a risala on cosmology and lata'if; Sindh, mid-19th c.), MSS, University of Sindh Central Library, Jamshoro.
67. Various, “Majmu'-i Rasail, property of Mullah 'Abd al-Wajid Sadar Qazi” (Bukhara, early 19th c.), MSS Inv. Nr. 500, IVANRUz, Tashkent; “Majmu'a, property of Habibullah Khwaja Sudur” (Bukhara[?], 1272), MSS 2900, IVANRUz, Tashkent; Fazl Ahmad Ma'sumi Pishawari (1246/1830; above, note 28). One compilation also contains Shah Waliullah’s tracts on comparative Sufi practices.
69. Various; Fazl Ahmad Ma'sumi Pishawari and others, Majmu'-i Rasail, early 19th c., MSS 12288, IVANRUz, Tashkent. The latter manuscript, from Khoqand, may have been produced by Sufi Allah Yar's disciples. Nasir al-Din Hanafi al-Bukhari, Tuhfat-i Za'irin (Bukhara: Novo Bukhara, 1910), pp. 71–72; Mulla Juma'a Quli Khumuli, Tarikh-i Khumuli, fols. 322b–328a, IVANRUz, Tashkent.
70. Elphinstone (1839; above, note 3), vol. 1, pp. 331–32.
71. Shihab al-Din Dawlatabadi and others, Majmu'-i Rasail (Khoqand, 1283/1866), MSS 9310, IVANRUz, Tashkent.
72. Within the compilation, Hala'i had composed his own work, made up of panegyrical poems and numerological tables all referring, in abjad, to the death date of Pir Pagaro (1246 a.h.): ‘Abd al-Rahman Hala'i, “Risala on Sibghatullah Rashidi (Pir Pagaro I)” (Jamshoro, Sindh, 1845), MSS 34307/3, Sindh University Central Library, Jamshoro.


6. ISLAM, SHARI’A, AND STATE BUILDING UNDER ‘ABD AL-RAHMAN KHAN


12. For additional sources on Islam and the concept of state in Afghanistan in the nineteenth century, see Nile Green’s introduction to this volume.


18. Mir Munshi Sultan Mohammad Khan, The Constitution and Laws of Afghanistan (London: John Murray, 1900), pp. 126–27. Note that in Mir Munshi’s biography of ‘Abd al-Rahman, the author’s name is written “Sultan Mahomed,” while in his work on the constitution and laws of Afghanistan, his name is written “Mohammad.”


21. Ibid., p. 54.


24. Amir ʿAbd al-Rahman’s royal decree dated December 13, 1882, addressed to Sardar Shirindil Khan, the governor of Ghazni. I am eternally grateful to Professor Robert D. McChesney for introducing me to his copies of court documents and decrees from eastern Afghanistan, which became the foundation of my doctoral dissertation at New York University under his guidance. A longer version of this decree is included in the text of Siraj al-Tawarikh; see McChesney and Khorrami (2013; above, note 14), pp. 58–59.

25. Amir ʿAbd al-Rahman’s royal decree dated September 20, 1889, addressed to Sardar Shirindil Khan, the governor of Ghazni.

26. Alef-Shah Zadran, “Socioeconomic and Legal-Political Processes in a Pashtun Village, Southeastern Afghanistan” (Ph.D. dissertation, State University of New York at Buffalo, 1977), pp. 205–6 (emphasis Zadran’s). According to Zadran, “some members of other ethnic groups in Afghanistan profess, at least half-jokingly, to believe that the Pashtuns accept one half of the Quran” (ibid., p. 61).
29. Sultan Muhammad (1900; above, note 18), p. 127.
30. Alkuza’i (1303/1885; above, note 6), pp. 102–4.
33. Perhaps one of the sources for *Ihtisab al-din* was indeed the Ottoman Mecelle: see Ahmed (2015; above, note 15), pp. 285–89. While Ahmed does not mention *Ihtisab al-din* specifically, his argument would logically extend to all legal rules and regulations.
35. See, for example, McChesney and Khurrami (2013; above, note 14), pp. 286–88.
36. Amir ‘Abd al-Rahman, *Sarrishata-yi Islamiya-yi Rum* (Kabul: Matba’-yi Dar al-Saltana, 1304 [1885 or 1887]), p. 2. In the recorded history of Afghanistan this statement represents the first instance when all major tribal confederations and ethnic groups living in the country are addressed as belonging to a specific political entity called Afghanistan.
44. Alkuza’i (1303/1885; above, note 6), pp. 74–75.
47. For more on the panchat court, see Tarzi (2003; above, note 1), pp. 181–85.
51. Ibid., pp. 1156–57.
52. Ibid., p. 1567.
53. Ibid., pp. 1356–57.
54. Ibid., pp. 1456–57.
55. Ibid., p. 1562; Mirza Shayr Ahmad Jalalabadi, Fathnama-yi Kafiristan wa Sal-i Tarikh An (Lahore: Matba’-yi Kuh-i Nur, 1313/1896). The people of Kafiristan made wooden statues, some of which were brought to Kabul as trophies, prompting Katib to use the term “Idol-Smasher” in relation to ‘Abd al-Rahman and recalling Mahmud of Ghazni, the early-eleventh-century ruler who in Afghanistan is celebrated as the “Idol-Smasher” for his conquests in India and his destruction of Hindu temples. In connection with the wooden idols sent from Kafiristan to Kabul by Field Marshall Ghulam Haydar Charkhi, Katib wrote: “These [idols] were kept as souvenirs of the conquest of Kafiristan and from this point on it is fitting to remember His Majesty [‘Abd al-Rahman] by the nickname ‘idol-smasher.’” Quoted from the translation by McChesney and Khurrami (2013; above, note 14), vol. 3, p. 1186.

7. COMPETING VIEWS OF PASHTUN TRIBALISM, ISLAM, AND SOCIETY IN THE INDO-AFGHAN BORDERLANDS

4. Ghulam Rasul Mihr, author of a three-volume series on Sayyid Ahmad’s jihad and its impact, uses this term. See Ghulam Rasul Mihr, Sayyid Ahmad Shahid (Lahore: s.n., 1952); idem, Jamaat-i Mujahidin (Lahore: s.n., 1955); and idem, Sar Guzasht-i Mujahidin (Lahore: s.n., 1956).
5. Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman describes a meeting with ‘Ubaydullah Sindhi in which Sindhi argued the need for a jihad to liberate India. See Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman, Pathway to Pakistan (Pakistan: Longman, 1961), pp. 31–32.


7. Ibid., p. ii.


9. Ibid.

10. Ibid., p. 190.

11. Ibid., p. 447.


13. Ibid.


20. ‘Ubaydullah Sindhi’s description of Mahmud Ghazni’s invasions as part of an Indian Muslim past was not solely employed in the Islamic narrative. Peter Robb argues that the notion of the “perennial Muslim nation” was one used equally by British intellectuals and “Hindu chauvinists.” See Peter G. Robb, “Muslim Identity and Separatism in India: The Significance of M. A. Ansari,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 54.1 (1991), p. 116.


22. Ibid., p. 130.


25. There has been excellent scholarship on competing histories. Avril Powell, for example, highlights the “space” for “autonomy, evolution and inconsistency” in school-textbook evaluations of the precolonial past. See Avril Powell, “History Textbooks and the Transmission of the Pre-colonial Past in North-Western India,” in Ali (1999; above, note 24), p. 133.


27. Haroon (2008; above, note 1).


34. Firman from Amanullah Khan, Rajab 19, 1337 (1919), p. 16, Obaidur Rehman Collection, Peshawar.


36. Obaidur Rehman Collection, Peshawar, p. 136; and Letter from the Ministry of Justice, Jed 17, 1300 (January 7, 1922), Obaidur Rehman Collection, Peshawar, p. 129.


38. On payments to the Mulla Chaknawari et al., see Haroon (2008; above, note 1), p. 118.

39. Ibid., p. 183.


41. Note that the spelling of Jamʿiyyat in Urdu is distinct from that of the Jama’at used for the other organizations under discussion in this chapter as these are two different words.

42. The quotation is from Anonymous, “Jamʿiyyat ʿUlama-yi Hind ka Millat Nawaz Ijlas,” Muslim Outlook, December 8, 1927, p. 5.

44. Mawlawi Anwar Shah, quoting Denys Bray and Boulton’s Report in Mawlawi Anwar Shah (1927; above, note 43), p. 44.
45. Ibid., p 39.
47. Ibid., pp 103–5.
48. Ibid., p. 159.
55. For an evocative and engaging reading of poetry written by Malang Jan, a rural Pashtun in 1940s or ’50s Afghanistan, see Caron (2011; above, note 52).
57. Mahmud Tarzi, Afghanistan (Kabul: s.n., 1330/1903), pp. 20–21, available as New York University Afghan Digital Library (hereafter ADL) 0246: http://hdl.handle.net/2333.1/9ghx3fpk.
59. Muhammad Husayn, Jughrafiya-yi Afghanistan (Kabul: s.n., 1923), ADL 10153: http://hdl.handle.net/2333.1/905qftzp.
60. Ibid., p. 80.
61. Ibid., p. 122.
62. Muhammad ‘Ali Khan, Afghanistan (Lahore: s.n., 1306/1927) ADL 710: http://hdl.handle.net/2333.1/4mw6m94t. The text was published with the approval of the government minister Fayz Muhammad Khan.
63. Ibid., p. 66.
64. The first entry in Muhammad ‘Ali Khan’s bibliography (see above, note 62) is the Encyclopaedia Britannica. The twelfth edition (1922) did not provide such a broad-ranging study of Afghanistan, focusing instead on the minute details of Anglo-Afghan relations, but
it did provide such narratives in entries for Czechoslovakia, Germany, and Austria, among many other European states.


68. Muhammad Shu’ayb Parishan Khattak, Sarhadi Qaba’il ke Rasm aur Rawaj (Peshawar: Parishan Khattak, Chairman Pashto Academy, 1979).


8. NATIONALISM, NOT ISLAM


10. For the close relationships between Britain and the Musahiban, see Ghubar (1999; above, note 4), pp. 92–99.
16. It was edited by ‘Abd al-Ra‘uf Binawa and published by the Pashto Tulana in 1326/1946.
20. This fear was genuine. Indeed, in 1949 two liberal political parties emerged, Watan (Homeland) and Khalq (Masses). They were opposition parties and advocated substantial political and social change, including limiting the power of the royal family. For Watan, see Faridullah Bezhan, “The Rise and Fall of the Liberal Hezbe Watan or Homeland Party in Afghanistan, 1949–52,” *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 44.4 (2015), pp. 410–26.
p. 193. Marwat claims that the membership in the party was about five thousand, which must be an exaggeration. See Fazal-Ul-Rahim Marwat, “The Impact of Wikh [sic] Zalmiyan Movement on Afghan Politics,” Central Asia 36 (1995), p. 52.


29. See, for example, A. Muhib, “Tafkik-i Quwa,” Ulus 2.19 (1952), p. 3. In an editorial, Gulpacha Ulfat highlighted the separation and independence of the three branches of power, the role of the government, and the rights of the people. See Gulpacha Ulfat, “Nazar-i bi Usul-i Asa-i Dawlat-i ’Ala-yi Afghanistan,” Ulus 2.34 (1952), pp. 1–2. In another article, “Ghayr Qanuni Ijra’at” (Unconstitutional Undertakings), he criticizes the weekly meetings in the provinces under the auspices of the governors, which made big decisions, including imprisonment of people for long periods of time. These meetings merely substituted for the courts. See Gulpacha Ulfat, “Ghayr Qanuni Ijra’at,” Ulus 2.28 (1952), pp. 1, 4.


41. Roy notes that a Pashtun “defines himself in opposition to everything which is not Pashtun. The shari’a, on the other hand, attempts to transcend specific groups such as tribes, qawm and other asabiyya in the universality of the umma.” See Roy (1990; above, note 38), p. 36.


48. M. Nazif Shahrani, “The Future of the State and the Structure of the Community Governance in Afghanistan,” in William Maley (ed.), *Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban* (University Press, 1998), p. 233. According to Schetter, the main reasons for the predominance of Pashtun-biased nationalism were that “the Pashtuns constituted the most numerous ethnic category, and the Pashtun tribes of eastern Afghanistan were considered as the militarily strongest forces in the country. Furthermore, the royal family was Pashtun, and the word ‘Afghan’ was used in Afghanistan as a synonym for Pashtun.” See Conrad Schetter, “Ethnoscapes, National Territorialisation, and the Afghan War,” *Geopolitics*, 10.1 (2005), p. 7.

It was due to this perception that after the collapse of the Taliban in 2001, in the UN-sponsored Bonn Conference, of December 2001, the international community decided to install Hamid Karzi as the interim head of state. At the conference ‘Abd al-Satar Sirat was initially chosen to lead the interim government, but he was asked by the Americans to step aside in favor of Karzai because of his ethnicity. Karzai is a Pashtun from Qandahar, whereas Sirat is from the minority Uzbek ethnic group, in the north.


56. For details, see Bezhan (2014; above, note 14), pp. 197–209.


61. For details, see Bezhan (2012; above, note 9).


70. For an overview of Islam in Afghanistan, see Green’s introduction to this volume.

71. Bezhan (2012; above, note 9), p. 450. Thus at this time Persian had been banned as a medium of instruction in Afghanistan’s official educational system. However, just after World War II and severe criticism from the outside world, especially the U.N., in the late
1940s Persian was allowed to be used as a medium of instruction in non-Pashtun areas. See Ghubar (1999; above, note 4), p. 206.


75. In 1947 the Pashtuns on the Indian side of the Durand Line were asked in a referendum to choose between becoming citizens of India or of Pakistan. The Congress Party had demanded that they should be allowed to vote for independence as well, but this was rejected by Lord Mountbatten in order to “avoid complications.” See George Montagno, “The Pak-Afghan Detente,” *Asian Survey* 3.12 (1963), p. 620; and Mukulika Banerjee, *The Pathan Unarmed* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 187.


77. To affirm this abrogation, a Pashtunistan Day was officially celebrated each year in August, a major square in Kabul was renamed Pashtunistan Square, symbolic postage stamps were issued, a daily program was aired on national radio, and many other forms of publicity, including publications of books, were organized. For details, see Bezhan (2014; above, note 14).


79. Basirki (2000; above, note 18), p. 20. The AYP sent Basirki to Pakistan to talk with the Red Shirts’ leadership. He held extensive meetings on the issue with Abdul Samad Achakzai (1907–73), the leader of the Pashtun nationalist movement in Baluchistan. See ibid., pp. 20–22.


81. The government even established a Department of the Frontier. It was soon upgraded to a ministry, to handle Pashtunistan affairs exclusively.


83. Basirki reports that the party also tried to found a private national school (*milli maktab*), to be taught by members of the party on a voluntary basis. See Basirki (2000; above, note 18), p. 61. Perhaps they intended to establish a model school, but the suppression of the party in 1952 stopped the project.


85. For details, see Ghubar (1999; above, note 4).

93. Ibid., p. 54; and Zarmalwal (2006; above, note 17), p. 62.
97. For the Mujaddidi family and their role in Afghan politics during the twentieth century, see Olesen (1995; above, note 91); and David B. Edwards, “Charismatic Leadership and Political Process in Afghanistan,” *Central Asian Survey* 5.3–4 (1986), especially pp. 287–92. The current leader of the family, Sibghatullah Mujaddidi (b. 1926), explained the role of the family in Afghan politics in the course of the twentieth century to Edwards in 1983 as follows: “The idea was that our family was going to act as a controller on the government of Afghanistan. We were going to be in the capital so that we could control the governments, the kings and ministers and others. And nearly all the time we were advising.” See ibid., p. 287. If this was true, then the AYP’s direct confrontation with the family was a very bold move.

9. GLOSSY GLOBAL LEADERSHIP


15. Robert Crews, in his excellent work *Afghan Modern* (2015; above, note 1), which has also informed some of the arguments below, argues (for example) that by 1991 the *Mujahideen Monthly*, published by Hikmatyar’s Hizb-i Islami, came to collapse “the Soviets and Americans together into a single enemy with a common future.” Yet, if one pays attention
to the party’s publication in Dari/Pashto and Urdu, it becomes obvious that its equally anti-
Soviet and anti–United States stance has been consistent throughout the 1980s. See Crews
(2015; above, note 1), p. 267. For an example of an earlier equation of the United States with
Russia, see ‘Alam al-Din Asir, “Agar mi-khwahid az istismar najat yabid, biya’id ba isti’mar
fursat na-dahid,” Shafaq, 2nd series, 3.3–4 (Mizan–Aqrab 1366/October–November 1987),
16. To search their holdings, many of which are digitized, see either http://acku.edu.af/
17. These books “glorified the killing of Soviets in the name of jihad. Children learned
arithmetic by adding and subtracting guns, tanks, and bullets. The letter ‘jm’ was for ji-
had, and ‘mm’ was for mujahidin, who ‘fight the infidels.’” See Crews (2015; above, note 1),
pp. 256–57. For an example of such a textbook from September 1987, see http://www.
18. Classifying the parties is notoriously difficult. The labeling adopted here is a modi-
fied, simplified, but by no means fully successful attempt to reconcile the typologies offered
19. For an excellent, detailed overview, an evaluation of the importance of specific
publications, and details about their physical appearance, see Jan-Heeren Grevemeyer and
Tahera Maiwand-Grevemeyer, Afghanistan: Presse und Widerstand (Berlin: Das Arabische
Buch, 1988). For an argument about the importance of pamphlets and periodicals circulating
among students in laying “the groundwork for the establishment of a new kind of ‘imagined
community’: the authoritarian political party,” and for establishing new self-conceptions as
being Afghan Muslims, see David B. Edwards, “Summoning Muslims: Print, Politics, and
20. For a recent example of such a body of literature, see Hamid and Farrall (2015;
above, note 5).
21. See for example, Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan (Cambridge: Cam-
Political Dissent in Afghanistan,” in Juan Ricardo Cole and Nikki R. Keddie (eds.), Shi’ism
and Social Protest (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986); and Sayed Askar Mousavi,
The Hazaras of Afghanistan: An Historical, Cultural, Economic and Political Study (Rich-
mond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 1998), pp. 181–86. Scholars have also noticed an increasing
Iranian desire during the 1980s to establish groups under their direct leadership, regarding
the Afghans as too retrograde and not reliable enough. See Zalmay Khalilzad, “The Iranian
Revolution and the Afghan Resistance,” in Martin S. Kramer (ed.), Shi’ism, Resistance, and
Revolution (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987). For a related discussion of the significant agen-
cy that even supposedly unwavering Pakistani supporters of Iran’s export of the Revolution
in the region have displayed, see also Simon Wolfgang Fuchs, “Third Wave Shi’ism: Sayyid
‘Arif Husain al-Husaini and the Islamic Revolution in Pakistan,” Journal of the Royal Asiatic
22. Rolf Bindemann, Religion und Politik bei den schi’itischen Hazâra in Afghanistan, Iran und Pakistan (Berlin: Das Arabische Buch, 1987), pp. 34–48. Edwards has characterized
the beliefs held by Hazaras prior to the twentieth century as an “insular, self-contained faith that emphasized veneration of shrines and uncritical reference for sayyids as bearers of karamat (miracles) while downplaying formal theology and the purely historical significance of shrines and sacred descent in Shi’ism.” See Edwards (1986; above, note 21), p. 204.

23. Bindemann writes that he was unable to collect any more detailed information on the precise development, timing, and extent of the shift from the master-disciple relationship to the taqlid of a jurist. See Bindemann (1987; above, note 22), p. 36.


26. This trope of “empty hands” as describing the first months and years of the jihad is recurrent in the journals related to the Afghan jihad. See, for example, Sayyid Ahmad Gilani, “Sirf hamari shara’i t par qa’im honiwal ‘uburi hukumat taslim ki ja’igi,” Mahaz 2.1 (February–April 1988), p. 7.


39. A‘zam does not provide a particular date for his travels. We may speculate that this journey happened sometime in the late 1960s or early 1970s, when he pursued a Master’s degree in agricultural economics at the American University in Beirut. See http://www.afghan-bios.info/index.php?option=com_afghanbios&id=2935&task=view&total=3240&start=418&Itemid=2 (accessed on January 21, 2016).


44. For an exploration of the transformation of these discourses in the context of Pakistan, see Simon Wolfgang Fuchs, “Relocating the Centers of Shi‘i Islam: Religious Authority, Sectarianism, and the Limits of the Transnational in Colonial India and Pakistan” (Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 2015), pp. 254–309.

45. Incorporating ideas and a generally accommodating attitude, it has to be said, did not ultimately translate into the acceptance of Shi‘i parties as equal partners, their inclusion into an envisioned transitional government after the Russian withdrawal, or the recognition of their military contributions during the jihad. See for a discussion, embedded in the context of rivalries between Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, Rubin (2002; above, note 1), pp. 248–55; and Andreas Rieck, “Irans Politik im Afghanistankonflikt seit 1992,” in Schetter and Wieland-Karimi (eds.), Afghanistan in Geschichte und Gegenwart.


50. Even though another party leader, Mawlawi Muhammad Yunus Khalis, has been charged with expressing extreme anti-Shi‘i positions, Kevin Bell holds that “there are few textual clues that offer insight into this part of his thinking.” See Kevin Bell, Usama bin Laden’s “Father Sheikh”: Yunus Khalis and the Return of al-Qa‘ida’s Leadership to Afghanistan (West Point: The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2013), p. 11 n. 56. For a critique of the foreign/local dichotomy, according to which Arab fighters were trying to impose their version of Islam on the Afghans, on the grounds that it “ignores the specific power relationships between Afghans and their guests while at the same time making unacknowledged judgments about what constitutes ‘correct’ or ‘authentic’ religious practice;” see also Li (2012; above, note 10), p. 30.
52. For more information on him, see Andreas Rieck, The Shias of Pakistan: An Assertive and Beleaguered Minority (London: Hurst, 2015), p. 420 n. 347.
65. Dr. Faruq A’zam (1986–87; above, note 61), p. 11.
66. For a moving account of one such instance and the assurance that this report was not a carefully crafted piece of fiction but rather a faithful rendition of one example among hundreds of such events in Afghanistan, see "Khadim-i mujahid," *Shafaq* 3.2 (Sawr 1366/April 1986), pp. 61–64.


84. For a detailed account of the rhetoric and instances of internal killings among the mujahidin parties, see Pohly (1992; above, note 3), pp. 340–86.

85. Dr. Sami’ullah (1989; above, note 56), pp. 20–21.


87. For the initial radical adoption of Soviet symbols, slogans, and policies by the communists in Kabul, see Edwards (2002; above, note 4), pp. 57–94.


96. This is also the view held by Mawdūdī. See Badry (1998; above, note 90), p. 288.

97. It has to be pointed out that Hikmatyar does not elaborate on how the authoritative council comes into being. See Hikmatyar (1366/1987; above, note 92), p. 19.
98. Ibid., pp. 23–29. For a similar approach of gradual elections but with a focus that local commanders should be the ones to elect local representatives, see “Liqa ma’ mawlawi Amanullah,” Al-Bunyan al-Marsus 31 (Ramadan 1410/April 1990), pp. 14–16.


101. For an extensive discussion of this important concept within Islamic thought, see Michael Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).


104. For a statement by a Taliban spokesman emphasizing the absolute authority of Mulla ‘Umar, which made consultation unnecessary, see Rashid (2000; above, note 100), p. 102.

### 10. FEMALE SAINTHOOD BETWEEN POLITICS AND LEGEND


4. The basic materials for this chapter were collected during fieldwork carried out in the spring and fall of 1996 (together with Lutz Rzehak) and in several follow-up visits between 2002 and 2009.


7. Ibid., p. 181.
8. On the cognitive dissonance that people experience if cognitions do not coincide with their hypotheses about the world, and on legend as a genre that bridges the gap between the laws of nature and the miraculous, see Hans-Peter Ecker, *Die Legende: Kulturanthropologische Annäherung an eine literarische Gattung* (Stuttgart and Weimar: Metzler, 1993), particularly pp. 138 and pp. 143–45.
10. On these and other main features of narrative, see Birgit Neumann and Ansgar Nünning, *An Introduction to the Study of Narrative Fiction* (Stuttgart: Metzler, 2008), p. 8.
11. Information given by a middle-aged male relative of Nushin’s father and by a pilgrim lady who visited the mausoleum with her daughter of marriageable age. In the following, unless specified otherwise, all information is from anonymous men and women from Shibirghan.
12. For the *ziyaratgah* (pilgrimage place) of Mir ‘Abbas Agha in the city center of Mazar, which was in the 1990s revealed to the mausoleum keeper in dreams about flame apparitions, see Lutz Rzehak (2004; above, note 5), pp. 215–16. A red flag was later unearthed at the spot.
17. The same respondent mentioned another newly established *ziyarat* devoted to Khwaja Mukhtar at a stone’s throw from Bibi Nushin’s shrine. He had known Mulla Mukhtar during his lifetime and remembered him as a pious person (*taqwadar*). Since we were shown the location by several people, it had obviously not turned out to be a fraud.
18. For example, Khizr is venerated at Chashma-yi Ḥayat, in Samangan, northern Afghanistan (Hatch Dupree [2003; above, note 13], p. 526).
20. Thus asserted by several pilgrim ladies and gentlemen from downtown Shibirghan. Centlivres (2001; above, note 6), p. 179, mentions the same incorruptibility of blood, the
scent, and red flowers sprouting—rather than flames or flags emerging—from the place of martyrdom as being indicative of a person's rank as a shahid.

21. Compare Rzehak (2004; above, note 5), p. 228; major saints' graves revealed through the rejection of infrastructural measures like road building and the conversion of graveyards into construction sites are, for example, Muzrab Shah Palvan (i.e., Mizrab-i Khwarazmî), whose traditions belong to the Abu Muslim cycle of epics (cf. Irène Mélikoff, Abû Muslim le “porte-hache” du Khorassan dans la tradition épique turco-iranienne [Paris: Adrien Maisonneuve, 1962], p. 78), which in a matter of months from its rediscovery around 1985 developed into the major pilgrimage place of downtown Shibirghan; also Avliya-î Bang-i Millî, the nameless Saint of the National Bank, whose mausoleum in the back yard of that bank, near the Balkh Gate (Darwaza-î Balkh) in Mazar-i Sharif, was prevented from being flattened in the day of Amanullah Khan; Sayyid 'Alijan, several blocks from the Rawza-î Sharif on the road to Dehdadi, and Mir Miranjan next to the eastern gate of the Rawza, both safeguarded in the 1960s. The motif of resisting the bulldozer is well known all over previously Soviet Central Asia (see David Tyson, “Shrine Pilgrimage in Turkmenistan as a Means to Understand Islam among the Turkmen,” Central Asia Monitor 1 [1997], p. 21) but also from elsewhere in the Muslim world (e.g., Julia Gonella, Islamische Heiligenverehrung im urbanen Kontext am Beispiel von Aleppo (Syrien) [Berlin: Klaus Schwarz, 1995], p. 27 and p. 452). Before there were bulldozers, it was a harnessed battle horse that, in being repelled from a certain place, helped to reveal a saint's burial place (Tazkira-î Khwaja Muhammad Sharif [above, note 19], fol. 47r). On inviolable burial places in Central Asia more generally, see Devin DeWeese, Islamization and Native Religion in the Golden Horde: Baba Tükles and Conversion to Islam in Historical and Epic Tradition (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), pp. 181–83.


23. According to local customs, young people engaged to be married may spend time together. The bridegroom is allowed to visit his future bride (Turki: qallîgh) according to strictly ritualized procedures, and finally they may even have children together, thus circumventing costly wedding ceremonies and bride price. However, there was no mention of Nushin and the boy as being engaged, so that their rendezvous was clearly immoral.

24. The small child (bacha) may have slipped into the story erroneously in oral transmission: In local idiom, a young child and an unmarried young man are both denoted as bacha.


28. Communication by pilgrims, relatives who tended the mausoleum, and outsiders.
29. In local idiom, the plural awliya (saint) is used as a singular instead of its proper, Arabic-derived, grammatical singular, wali.
31. Bibi Nushin’s possible offense loses much of its extravagance when put into an “all-Turkestani” perspective. According to a Naqshbandi tazkira from eastern Turkestan, even the immaculate conception of a son did not prevent A’la Nur Khanım, the daughter of Satuq Bughra Khan, from being ascribed saintly status. See the Catalogue of Lund University Library, Jarring Prov. 504, entry no. 5 available at http://laurentius.ub.lu.se/jarring/catalogue/504_1.html (accessed December 2015).
32. “Mulla Aka” is a reference to the shrine of Ibn-i Yamin Jawzjani, located in downtown Shibirghan.
34. On the motif of namahram eyes, see Baldick (1993; above, note 33), p. 193.
35. Muslim hagiography often insists that people who deny the karamat of a given saint will face punishment—which then causes them to repent. About written traditions to this effect, see Jürgen Paul, “Constructing the Friends of God: Sadid al-Din Ǧaznawi’s Maqamat-i Žinda-pil (with some remarks on Ibn Munawwar’s Asrar al-tawhīd),” in Stephan Conermann and Jim Rheingans (eds.), Narrative Pattern and Genre in Hagiographic Life Writing: Comparative Perspectives from Asia and Europe (Berlin: Dr. Brandt, 2014), pp. 209–11. In our case, hesitators and deniers were not reported as being punished; only enemies who actively trespassed against the saint would suffer punishment.
37. Communication of an elderly man at the gravesite.
38. In the local Turki idiom girdini qaṭara qïladï. Interestingly, ʻaqida (which is related to the mental aspect of trust) was applied only by deniers and hesitant informants, whereas believers would use ikhlaṣ (which denotes belief turning into trustful practice).
39. Turki berish khudadan, sabab bir shayd bôldï ya bir ziyarat bôldï.
40. The standard topical study on this phenomenon in northern Afghanistan is Robert D. McChesney, Waqf in Central Asia: Four Hundred Years in the History of a Muslim Shrine, 1480–1889 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991). Some observations on recent documents that legitimize financial claims are provided in Rzehak (2004; above, note 5), p. 222. See also Grant (2011; above, note 27), p. 675, on Soviet objections to shrine veneration because of the entangled nature of cult and business.
41. Communications by a male high-school teacher from Shibirghan and a pilgrim lady, respectively.
42. Persian dad u bidad mikunan, du’a mikunan, quran mikhunan.
43. Even if the ten thousand had been Dostum Afghans only, which were worth half the Kabul currency, that would have been enough to feed a modest family for many days.
44. For a detailed description of the mutawalli of Mir ʻAbbas Agha, in Mazar-i Sharif, and the legal and financial issues around that ziyarat and several others in that same year, 1996, see Rzehak (2004; above, note 5).
45. Quoted from an elderly male pilgrim; dust-i khuda equals wali allah or, in the local idiom, awliya.


47. Christian Giordano, “Gérer l’exemplarité en (re)mettant l’histoire à jour: Les saints, les héros et les victimes,” in Centlivres (2001; above, note 6), explores the fascinating notion of “loser exemplarity” (exemplarité perdante, pp. 128–30), which in the Balkan region is virulent in counterbalancing all that well-known “heroic, warrior, and masculine sanctity” (p. 130). Bibi Nushin is a victim and a hero, but her heroism is not a female-victim response. It relies on exactly the same discourse of victory through power as its masculine counterpart. The idea of victory through failure seems to be too far from the non-Christian imageries prevailing in Afghanistan.

48. The fact that General Dostum already had two children from his first marriage was not mentioned in that connection.

49. For this dictum, see Paul (2014; above, note 35), p. 214.

50. Personal communication (2005) by a journalist who had observed the process of collecting donations and by the gentleman who was put in charge of purchasing the necessary amount of beaten gold from abroad.

51. Communication by a lady who had contributed to the financing and embroidering of the covers, Mazar-i Sharif, March 1996.

52. Regardless of official statements to the contrary, the relationship of General Dostum and La’l Qumandan was never really mended until the latter’s unexpected and somewhat unexplained death in 2006.

53. A comparable case of contradictory truths about the shahadat of a local saint is reported by Grant (2011; above, note 27), who concludes his study on an Azerbaijani pir indicating that this saint was shot by a firing squad in Siberia in 1937, “or, as different accounts would have it, maybe not” (p. 678).


56. For an example from the region, see Adkhamzhon A. Ashirov, Drevnie religioznye verovanyia v traditsionnom bytu uzbekskogo naroda (po materialam Ferganskoi doliny) (Tashkent: Avtoref. Dr. Ist. Nauk, 2008), p. 27.

11. WHEN MUSLIMS BECOME FEMINISTS: KHANA-YI AMAN, ISLAM, AND PASHTUNWALI

1. The epigraph to this chapter is an English translation of Gunah (Sin), a Persian poem by Furugh Farukhzad (Forugh Farrokhzad, 1935–67) frequently quoted by the women at the khana-yi aman and here cited in the translation of Sholeh Wolpé, Sin: Selected Poems of Forugh Farrokhzad (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2007), p. 3. Since Farukhzad was the preeminent Iranian poet to write about gender, feminism, and rebellion, the women at the khana-yi aman often recited her poetry.
2. I use the term *pashtunwali* to describe the prescriptive and descriptive rules and laws that govern Pushtun societies. *Pashtunwali* circulates both as an unwritten code of tribal law and as a written set of rules that were taken into account when writing the constitutions of Afghanistan and northern Pakistan.


4. There have been numerous articles and news stories in recent years about the precariouslyness of the shelters in Afghanistan. See, for example, Rubin (2015; above, note 3).

5. I thank the Wenner Gren Foundation, the American Institute of Afghan Studies, and the A.M. Foundation for generously funding the ethnographic research on which this chapter is based. Note that the names and some of the biographical details of *khana-yi aman* inhabitants and administrators have been modified to protect their privacy.


9. For an anthropological discussion of the state and its peripheries, see Veena Das and Deborah Poole (eds.), *Anthropology in the Margins of the State* (Santa Fe: School of American Research Press, 2004).


11. It must be noted that although the word *ṭalaq* was used to describe the divorce contract, technically the women were initiating *khula*, which involved entirely different processes than the traditional *ṭalaq*. Women were able to initiate divorce proceedings under the *khula* rules after undergoing the mandatory waiting periods (*ʿidda*). One of the roles of the *khana-yi aman* was to serve as a surveillance space to monitor the chastity of the women while they awaited their divorce to be finalized. However, as I note further in the chapter, this role was constantly challenged by the participants and the staff, exacerbating the public ambivalence surrounding the *khana-yi aman*. To understand the different ways in which divorce may be initiated in Islam, see Kecia Ali, *Marriage and Slavery in Early Islam* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2010). The work of Ziba Mir-Hosseini has also made important contributions in this regard.


13. For the regulation and disciplining of feminine bodies in the public and private realms in the Taliban era, see Juan Cole, “The Taliban, Women and the Hegelian Private Sphere,” *Social Research* 70.3 (2003), pp. 771–808.

15. For an overview of interpretive anthropology, see the works of Clifford Geertz, which ask us to consider cultures as texts and thick description as a mode of ethnographic exposition.

16. For an excellent discussion of the mapping of sexual and social contract, see Das (2007; above, note 6), p.19.


19. Ibid.


25. *Milmastiya*, approximately translated “hospitality,” is a central precept of *pashtunwali* by virtue of which no visitor (not even an enemy) can be turned away. *Milmastiya* is tied to the concept of the *hujra*, which is a guesthouse where friends and enemies congregate. *Nanawata’i*, approximately translated “sanctuary,” “shelter,” or “protection,” is linked to *milmastiya* in that a guest (or even a sworn enemy) cannot be refused entry based on his religious or political allegiance. *Sabat*, approximately translated “loyalty,” must similarly be extended to families and friends.


27. Ibid.


33. See above, note 18.


35. Foucault understands historical rupture as a redistribution or reorganization of the prior elements of the epistēmē. In other words, the rupture relies on the existing rules but reconfigures them in ways that allow for irregularities and aberrations. For a discussion of epistēmē, see Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Random House, 1970).


38. This is a preoccupation of ethnographies of Afghanistan, which continually seek order in chaos. For the anthropology of order in supposedly orderless societies, see, for example, E. E. Evans-Pritchard, The Nuer: A Description of the Modes of Livelihood and Political Institutions of a Nilotic People (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1940). For an analogous approach to Afghanistan, particularly the Pashtuns, see Olaf Caroe, The Pathans (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958).

AFTERWORD


5. It should be noted, however, that the British travelers Moorcroft and Trebeck recorded the presence of Pashtun Ghilzi’s nomads in the Behsud region as early as 1824. See William Moorcroft and George Trebeck, Travels in the Himalayan Provinces of Hindustan and the Panjab from 1819 to 1825, vol. 2 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1979 [1st ed. 1841]), p. 384. Some twenty years later, J.P. Ferrier mentioned that hostility between Hazaras and Pashtuns discouraged the latter from crossing Hazarajat. See J.P. Ferrier, Caravan Journeys and Wanderings in Persia, Afghanistan, Turkistan and Beloochistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1976 [1857]), pp. 220–21.


10. Fayz Muhammad Katib was a Hazara from the region of Ghazni. Though he collaborated with the Kabul government, he is valued by today’s Hazara intellectuals as a witness to the atrocities committed at that time. See his monumental work The History of Afghânistán: Fayz Muhammad Kâtib Hazârah’s Sirâj al tawârîkh, ed. and trans. R.D. McChesney and Mohammad Mehdi Khorrami, 6 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 2016).


All terms are of Ab (Arabic) origin except those marked P (Persian) or Pt (Pashto).

'alim (pl. 'ulama): “Learned One,” exponent of Shari‘a (q.v.) and other normative discourses.
amir al-mu‘minin: “Commander of the Faithful,” title claimed by modern Afghan kings from ca. 1880 to 1924 and by the Taliban leader Mulla ‘Umar from 1996 to 2013.
awliya: “Friends [of God],” Sufi masters venerated as living or dead saints.
baraka: “Blessing, abundance,” the sacred power of the prophets and saints.
brurqa: “Cloak,” enveloping outer garment worn by women; see also chadri.
chadri, chadur (P): “Shawl,” cloak covering woman’s head and hair, but leaving the face uncovered.
darwish (P): “Door Dweller,” a mendicant or itinerant Sufi; a dervish.
fqir: “Poor man,” a mendicant or Sufi.
fiqh: “Comprehension,” Islamic jurisprudence based on interpretation of the Quran and Sunna (qq.v.).
Hadith: “Reports,” originally oral accounts of the sayings and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad.
‘ilm (pl. ‘ulum): “Knowledge,” textual religious knowledge, particularly of Quran and Hadith (qq.v.).
imam: “Leader,” a prayer leader; honorific given to seven or twelve descendants of Muhammad’s family among the Shi‘a.
khana-yi aman (P): “House of safety,” women’s refuges founded from late 1990s.
khanaqah (P): Residence of Sufis, a Sufi lodge.
kitab: “Book,” text written in Arabic or other Islamic language.
madrasa: “Place of study,” college for the study of the Islamic sciences.
majlis: “Gathering,” meeting of poets or students, usually around a patron or teacher.
mawlama: “Our Master,” honorific title given to ‘ulama (q.v.) and, less commonly, to Sufis.
mawlawi: “My Master, honorific title given to ‘ulama (q.v.) and, less commonly, to Sufis.
milmastia (Pt): “Hospitality,” element of pashtunwali (q.v.).
mufti: “Legal-decision maker,” member of ‘ulama (q.v.) qualified to issue a religious opinion (fatwa).
Mujaddidi: “Renewers,” name of branch of Naqshbandi (q.v.) Sufi order founded by Ahmad Sirhindi (d. 1624) in Mughal India.
mullah (P from Ab): “Master,” honorific title given to a Muslim scholar or teacher who serves as a religious (and sometimes sociopolitical) leader. Shown as “Mulla” when used with a proper name.
mutawalli: “Someone entrusted,” legal term for the administrator of a waqf (q.v.) endowment; in practice the custodian of a religious property.
namus: “Virtue,” what must be defended to maintain honor, particularly the chastity and reputation of kinswomen.
nanawatai (Pt): “Sanctuary,” protection of a person from his enemies; element of pashtunwali (q.v.).
nang (Pt): “Honor,” defense of the life or reputation of relatives; element of pashtunwali (q.v.). Naqshbandi (P): “Patterned Belt,” name of an influential Sufi order founded by Baha al-Din Naqshband (d. 1389) of Bukhara.
pashtunwali (Pt): “Way of the Pashtuns,” traditional Pashtun honor code; also known as pakhtunwali.
pir (P): “Elder,” a Sufi master.
qazi: “Magistrate,” member of ‘ulama (q.v.) formally appointed as a judge.
risala: “Treatise,” a short text or epistle on doctrinal matters.
sama’: “Listening,” Sufi practice of listening to music or sung poetry.
sayyid: “Lord,” blood descendant of the Prophet’s family.
Shari’a: “Way,” Islamic law, formulated through interpretation of the Quran and Hadith (q.v.).
shaykh: “Elder,” title of respect for a Sufi master or senior ‘alim (q.v.).
sibila: ‘Chain,” “Dynasty,” a Sufi line of succession, often family-based.
Sunna: “Way,” the body of traditions describing the life of Muhammad.
tafsir: “Exegesis,” a written commentary on the Quran.
talib (pl. in Ab tulaba; pl. in P taliban): “Student,” pupil of a madrasa (q.v.); as a proper noun in the Persian plural, the name given to an Islamist movement founded in mid-1990s Pakistan.
tariqa (pl. turuq): “Path,” the Sufi way; a Sufi order.
‘ulama: “Learned Ones,” exponents of Shari’a (q.v.) and other normative discourses.
wali (pl. awliya): “Friend [of God],” Muslim saint.
wafq (pl. awqaf): “Causing a thing to stand still,” an inalienable endowment of land, built property, or the revenues thereof, granted to a religious institution; regulations are covered by Shari’a.
zahid (pl. zuhhad): “Ascetic,” practitioner of zuhd (q.v.).
zikr (pl. azhkar): “Remembrance [of God],” the ritual chanting of the Sufis.
ziyarat: “Visit,” pilgrimage to a Sufi or other saintly shrine.
zuhd: “Asceticism,” self-denial and discipline of the flesh.
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