Cars, Conduits, and Kampons
Cars, Conduits, and Kampongs

The Modernization of the Indonesian City, 1920–1960

Edited by

Freek Colombijn
Joost Coté
This book is dedicated to the fond memory of Saki Murakami.
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Preface

The origin of this book goes back to the conference on ‘The decolonization of the Indonesian city in (Asian and African) comparative perspective’, held in Leiden, from 26 to 28 April 2006. Most of the articles were first presented as a paper at this conference, but a few articles were added later.

We gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the conference received from the Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogs-, Holocaust- en Genocidestudies (NIOD) in Amsterdam, the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research, Section Social Sciences (NWO-MaGW) in The Hague, the Leids Universiteits Fonds (LUF) in Leiden, and the Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde (KITLV). The conference was one event of the research programme ‘Indonesia across Orders’, which was coordinated by the NIOD. This programme was funded generously by the Dutch Ministry for Health, Welfare and Sport (Ministerie van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn and Sport). We would also like to acknowledge the generous support of the KITLV, which has enabled our volume to be available as an open access publication.

We feel deep sorrow for Saki Murakami, who passed away before this book was published. Despite her young age, Saki was a central figure at the conference: witty, sunny, kind, and able to communicate in three languages with participants coming from three different continents. We dedicate this book to her fond memory.
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Modernization of the Indonesian City, 1920–1960

Freek Colombijn and Joost Coté

This book deals with people, technologies and, above all, place. It explores dimensions of a growing research interest in what has been broadly referred to as 'colonial modernity' (Barlow 2012). It focuses on the changing face of the Indonesian city in the mid-twentieth century that reflects the dramatic events of Indonesia’s history in that period and – it is argued here – was a causal factor in those events. It seeks to provide an empirical basis to explore the link between urbanization, modernity, and decolonization. Taken as a whole, the contributions to this volume present a case for asserting that Indonesian cities were not merely the backdrop to processes of modernization and rising nationalism (the canvass, in other words, on which more important historical processes were painted), but that the processes of urbanization, modernization, and decolonization were intrinsically linked. Focusing on specific aspects of these processes, this volume examines the multiple responses to innovations introduced by Western colonialism in what was the Netherlands Indies in the twentieth century. These innovations consisted of new technologies, ideas about new forms of social organization, and images that produced new material, cultural, and social conditions and relationships.

The innovations with which this volume is concerned manifested themselves in such urban contexts as the provision of medical treatments, fresh water and sanitation, the implementation of town planning and housing designs, and contingencies for coping with increased motorized traffic and industrialization. In the colonial context examined here, their introduction was motivated by, or at least rationalized as, efforts to deal with the historically unprecedented large concentrations of people in urban areas generated by new economic conditions. They represented the translation to the colony of existing or emerging policies and technologies already or simultaneously being implemented in metropolitan contexts, confirming the assertion that ‘colonialism and modernity are simultaneous expressions of capitalist expansion’ (Barlow 2012:624).

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1 Barlow’s work is not taken here as a model as it has specifically focused on the ‘semi-colonialization’ of China and ‘inter-Asian’ modernity in that region in particular but her recent article (Barlow 2012) provides a useful account of the concept’s genealogy.
Because these technologies reflect foreign principles and their specific reference was to centres of concentrated economic activity dominated by non-Indigenous agents, the novelty of such innovations had their greatest impact on the Indonesian inhabitants of urban centres. However, Indonesians so affected by exclusion from or inclusion in particular forms of modernization – such as the domestic staff who came to Kota Baru (Fakih, this volume) or the vendors who set up food stalls on the alun-alun of Malang (Basundoro, this volume) – could mock the ways of Westerners, attempt to subvert the new spatial order or find ways to use them to their advantage. For urbanites like the Indonesian staff employed by the oil refineries at Plaju (Tanjung, this volume), the new represented opportunities. For others, such as the residents of kampongs subjected to new building regulations and kampong improvement (Reerink, Wijono, this volume), modernization created unavoidable circumstances that demanded new behaviours that became the ‘normal’ way of life.

A recurrent theme in many of the contributions in this book is the way the integration of imported technical innovations often called forth novel social or organizational changes. This in turn often resulted in further technological changes specifically shaped by local circumstances, as noted previously by Joep à Campo (1994:25–26), Brenda Yeoh (1996), Howard Dick and Peter Rimmer (2003:37), Ian Proudfoot (2005), and Marieke Bloembergen and Remco Raben (2009) among others. Innovations once introduced, seemingly took on a life of their own. For example, the introduction of railways and steamships into the archipelago provided the impetus for the development of modern housing complexes, such as the so-called Uniekampong created specifically by Western shipping companies to bind together the labour force of dockers (Veering, this volume). Local adaptation of newly discovered principles of hygiene and sanitation led to significant intervention in housing in terms of the regulation of housing design, new architectural designs adapted to the tropical climate, and under the guise of kampong improvement, kampong construction. The introduction of cars necessitated the development of local driving regulations that recognized the differences in speed and function between cars and oxen and the creation of an associated new occupational category of chauffeur/driver (Khusyairi and Colombijn, this volume). Likewise, the introduction of bicycles led to the development of the becak which, like the

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2 The words ‘indigenous’, ‘Indonesian’, and ‘native’ are used as synonyms throughout this book, despite their different connotations; each of the respective authors has her or his own preference in this respect. Likewise, authors use Eurasian, Indo-European or Indisch interchangeably for people of mixed parentage.
automobile, generated new patterns of behaviour uniquely adapted to the specific conditions of colonial society.

Current literature rejects earlier assumptions of modernization in the colonial sphere as synonymous with Westernization, or that it manifested itself primarily in technological or material changes. However, considerable debate continues regarding the extent to which the colonial space witnessed or allowed for autonomous processes of modernization to occur. Despite its detailed and elegant account of modernity, the ironical perspective of Rudolf Mrázek’s, *Engineers of happy land* for instance, at base tends to sustain the view of modernity as an unnatural intervention in ‘traditional’ Indonesia (Mrázek 2002). In presenting detailed studies of specific aspects of such changes, the contributions in this volume share the broader critique of the economic and political dimensions of colonialism, but remain alert to the agency of colonial subjects in their responses to a European modernity. Recognizing the realities of the emerging contingencies associated with population densities, the economic demands generated by urban concentrations, and notions of acceptable levels of morbidity and mortality, the contributors to this volume explore the complexity of these historical circumstances. Their contributions are assembled here in three sections reflecting three broadly defined dimensions of the response to modernity, ranging from passive acceptance, via partial accommodation to selective appropriation.

Modernity did not only materialize in tangible forms such as technology, physical changes to the environment, or even in social structures, but manifested itself in ideas about modern society and the environment, in notions of progress, velocity, control over nature, and so on. Of primary interest to colonial advocates of modernity – and to contributors of this volume – is the aesthetic ideal of order, or structure. Town planning can be seen as an extensive endeavour by colonial authorities to organize urban space, to bring order in what was regarded as chaos. Town planning treatises explicitly equate order and regularity with beauty. Houses should stay within building lines; urban greenery is allowed, even desired, but only when planned and kept within bounds; and trees must be pruned and hedges trimmed, as town planner Thomas Karsten warned. Roads need not be straight but could extend in carefully designed curves (Van Roosmalen, this volume). The presence of Chinese graveyards scattered within the residential areas of Surabaya was considered,
among other things, an aesthetic problem (Husain, this volume). Contemporaries judged that the ordered lawns of Plaju formed a clear and beneficial contrast to the disorderly city of Palembang (Tanjung, this volume). In kampong improvement projects gutters and paths were straightened, houses in new kampons constructed in strictly defined relationship to neighbouring dwellings and road frontages. As the influential 1938 Explanatory Memorandum on Town Planning (quoted by Van Roosmalen, this volume) states:

Certainly the beauty of a city, or at least, at a lower level, its maintenance, orderliness, and comfortableness, are external signs of an internal order and harmony; they are a testament to the character of the society.

Even if regulations did not explicitly formulate order as an aesthetic ideal, they did perforce create regularity, standardization, and structure. Traffic rules required drivers and people to keep to the left. People who lived in municipal public housing had to pay the rent on a fixed date. Applications for a building permit used a standard form. The electric tram rode on a fixed timetable. If all these elements are usually associated with the Dutch colonial regime, they hardly differed from regulations later introduced during the Japanese administration and carried on after independence. A Japanese propaganda film depicting the perfect kampong showed inhabitants taking care of their environment such as the image of a man trimming his hedge (Kesehatan rakjat 1943). In the 1950s Indonesian government planning calculated the even distribution of medical doctors over urban and rural areas (Murakami, this volume). Those who enforced this order – town planners, medical inspectors, policemen, building surveyors, tram drivers, school teachers, government public servants – did so not only in the belief that these measures were essential for the efficient operation of society but because they recognized the beauty in the regularity. Ordnung muss sein.

At a discursive level, the idea of ‘progress’ (kemajuan) is even more central to the concept of modernization than is the notion that order is beautiful. Proponents of modernization strongly identified with this promise of progress. Michael Adas (1989) has argued that nineteenth-century European writers framed European colonization in terms of the triumph of science, reason, and modern technological inventions over superstition and tradition. This underpinned the belief in Western superiority which, as well as shaping European attitudes towards Africans and Asians, provided the rationalization for ‘modern colonization’.

As several of the cases presented in this volume show, in the context of the colonial city, the obvious antithesis to modernity in the eyes of European
urban administrators, was the kampong. In this equation the urban kampong stood for and was for many seen as an extension of, the native village, the cultural and social crucible of ‘tradition’. The kampong acted, as it were, therefore as the counterpoint to modernity. This raises questions as to who indeed was the imagined or actual audience for this discourse on order? Was the kampong used merely as a didactic device in this discourse or did the kampong merely provide for these modernizers a ‘field for action’, a space in which to work and act out the predilections of their professions? To what extent did the concerns of colonial modernizers replicate or differ from those of urban reformers in the metropole for whom the uneducated working classes and their disorderly homes, districts, and families offered comparable scenes of the ‘unmodern’?

What is clear is that, as the antithesis of the ideal of a modern city, the kampong was mostly defined in terms of what the kampong lacked. A kampong lacked piped water, building lines (or the building lines were not respected), a regular street plan, and sanitation: in other words, it lacked order. A Dutch author quoted by Mrázek (2002:77) describes the dwellings in kampongs as huts ‘with shutters but no windows, with no floors but earth, with no bathrooms, no washing place, and no water-closets’. The urban reformer, H.F. Tillema described – and photographed at length – the dwellings in kampongs as extremely smelly, filthy and squalid. Here hovels are built one on top of the other, without any sense of order, without taking the slightest account of hygienic requirements...the hovels [are] dank and dark so that cholera is rife there.

TILLEMA 1913, IN COTÉ 2002:334

Even the characteristics that kampongs did have represented a lack of something more positive: the dust and mud of the unsealed roads and paths produced a lack of hygiene and a lack of traffic flow; the bare-breasted women who washed clothes in the Molenvliet canal, and who figure as a recurrent theme in films about Jakarta (Berita film no. 18 1943; Nederlands Indië voor 1942 (14) 1939), lacked decency; the autonomy of the kampong administration meant being ‘sadly’ excluded from municipal administration and implicitly, therefore the kampongs lacked efficient administration. The persistent concern of administrators about the condition of the urban kampong and the efforts at kampong improvement represented, then, the symbolic celebration of modernity as the indispensable condition of humanity. Expressed in the

Indeed, until today scholars have found it difficult to define kampongs with a positive formulation (Colombijn 2010:102–104).
political context that was colonialism, by a self-righteous and self-serving minority, it represented a concern to protect its advantaged position.

Some urban reformers, such as H.F. Tillema, attributed the ‘backward’ conditions of the urban kampong to the attitudes, values and practices their uneducated and illiterate inhabitants brought with them from their traditional rural villages. Such characteristics and behaviours were both inappropriate and dangerous in the ‘foreign environment’ of the urban centre. Rather than expecting kampong dwellers to voluntarily change their ways, Tillema believed changes needed to be imposed from above. He therefore, for instance, spent time to design a ‘fool-proof’ toilet to ensure ‘the native’ would no longer ‘shit at random’, and recommended the appointment of housing inspectors as ways of solving the hygiene problem (Coté 2002). But similar criticisms were directed at the communities of poorer kampong-dwelling Europeans, largely of mixed parentage, whose economic and educational characteristics differed little from those of their Indonesian neighbours.5

Even for progressive, colonial reformers, modernity was not an undifferentiated condition. As the architect and town planner, Thomas Karsten, most famously argued, even in the modern city difference needed to be recognized, if not in racial terms then in terms of social class. This was, he believed, in the interests of orderly social planning which needed to be reflected in the type, scale, and quality of housing and calculated on the basis of an unquestioned, equally modern, calculus of differential socio-economic capacities. The aim of town planning, indeed, was to regulate the necessary diversities innate to the urban condition. This necessary ‘order of things’ was tangibly demonstrated at the Colonial Exhibition mounted in Semarang in late 1914. The exhibition was intended as a ‘tentoonstelling’ of all things modern: motors, cars, electric light, scientific agriculture, modern machinery, modern telegraphy, modern architecture and the latest in building materials such as asbestos sheets, galvanized iron and steel frames, all of which disseminated the promise of progress. The exhibition specifically modelled ‘modernity’ for the inlanders who passed through its turnstiles, presenting them with model housing constructed from wood and bamboo, didactical models of village agriculture, and modern entertainment in the form of a lunapark specifically erected to attract their attendance to this pedagogical wonderland (Coté 2006:12–13).

The efforts to modernize the city went beyond targeting its material aspects: ultimately modernization of the urban environment was intended to affect a change in human behaviour. Traditional behaviour was often seen as unruly

5 Kampongs were actually ethnically mixed neighbourhoods, and the population was more accurately described in terms of class than ethnicity (Colombijn 2010:73–180).
Modernization in a colonial context was therefore, in the first place, also a pedagogical activity in which professionals took the ‘traditional’ people by the hand. The drive to modernize the city and train indigenous people became the crucial form of legitimization for the colonial presence and therefore an important manifestation of the exercise of its power.

The upshot of its efforts to modernize and order the urban space, and discipline the behaviour of its inhabitants was that the state penetrated deep into ‘traditional’ places and institutions. This had real consequences on the ground. Quite often the colonial state concluded that objects or behaviours that lacked or protested modernity had to be removed from the cityscape. Sometimes the victims were ‘collateral damage’, as for example, the trees that were cut to widen roads or to install overhead wires, and dwellings that obstructed trajectories of road widening or drainage projects. In other cases objects that did not befit the modern cityscape were deliberately targeted to be removed from the cityscape: Chinese cemeteries, dairy farms, and complete kampongs became the victims of modernization (Barwegen 2006; Husain, this volume).

If this amounted to social engineering – and it is arguable whether the colonial state intended to produce changes beyond ensuring conformity to its rules – it was, of course, not always meekly accepted by the subjects of this experiment and was often successfully contested (Houben 2008:32; Stoler and Cooper 1997:21–22). The Chinese in Surabaya, for instance, continued to bury their dead in the city centre according to custom. Indigenous people invaded the well-organized space of the Malang alun-alun to set up food stalls. Dockworkers still left the Uniekampong whenever they wanted. The colonial efforts at ‘developing’ the indigenous people were inadvertently subverted by the countervailing weight of the limits placed on indigenous people to access to Dutch language education. As Van Roosmalen observes, the efforts of urban reformers were thus thwarted by the fact that not until the 1930s were town planning regulations translated into Malay. Even then municipal authorities depended on a small cadre of Western educated Indonesian intermediaries, such as Thamrin (Versnel and Colombijn, this volume) to mediate between the
kampong residents and the city government. In the most modern of modern colonial cities, it was not until 1938 that the VORL radio began to transmit programmes about urban planning in Malay in efforts to disseminate the principles of modern urban design to the radio-owning residents of Bandung.

The evidence suggests that colonial administrators who worked hard to modernize the cityscape and educate its inhabitants saw themselves as technocrats who worked for the purported public interest and aspired to work for the public good. Some few, like the architects Henri Maclaine Pont or Thomas Karsten, took time to study indigenous traditions to incorporate these into their planning proposals. For instance, Maclaine Pont advocated that new kampong designs should allow room to facilitate the indigenous custom of adding new housing near the parental home (Van Roosmalen 2008:70). Karsten warned that new houses should incorporate ‘the essence’ of traditional lifestyle in order to generate attachment to the more modern and hygienic dwelling. More generally, however, the apparent objectivity of science helped underpin unquestioned assumptions of class and race. In the most carefully considered plans a disproportionate share of urban land was reserved for the well-to-do and to accommodate the needs of a dominant economy, or the need of faster traffic.

Whether, as Karsten advocated (and as stated in the seminal Explanatory Memorandum on Town Planning, which is generally acknowledged as being largely his work), this class-based sociological approach actually resolved the obvious racial implications of earlier reforms (Nas 1986), or merely disguised them, became apparent after independence.

Beyond the question of the racist implications of colonial modernity, is the evident self-interest of the new breed of the professional directors of urban reform in the colony – the urban administrators, architects, town planners, doctors, teachers, and even the directors of the Uniekampong and the oil refinery at Plaju. To shore up their position as professionals vis-à-vis their European neighbours and ultimately their position in a colonial administrative hierarchy, they had to establish themselves as ‘experts’. It was their ostensible knowhow, their science, that legitimated their intervention in and policy recommendations regarding the kampong and the cities at large. Through strategic action they guaranteed the continued demand for their expertise and upheld (and directly contributed to) the universal culture of their professions. Activities like town planning, the issuing of licences to becak, the drawing-up of traffic rules, the system of issuing building permits, all ensured that these promoters of modernization were permanently engaged. The founding of local professional organizations like the Vereeniging voor Bouwkundigen in Nederlandsch-Indië (Association of Architects in the Netherlands Indies) in
1898 or the Vereeniging voor Locale Belangen (Association for Local Interests) in 1912, specialist journals for architecture (Indisch Bouwkundig Tijdschrift), health (Geneeskundig Tijdschrift van Nederlandsch-Indië) or local administration (Locale Belangen) and a technical college in Bandung confirmed, and where necessary defended, their privileged position as keepers of modern knowledge. However, the professionals did not have a monopoly on such expert knowledge. Van Roosmalen points to the role of citizen associations like Bandoeng Vooruit and Groot Batavia (founded in 1932 and 1938 respectively), which expressed opinions about the development of their cities. Even earlier, it was informal groups of concerned (European) citizens in Semarang who pressed their new municipal council to implement the proposals identified by the city’s medical officers. In the same city Indonesian community leaders demanded representation in these new forms of local level government.

If the modernity that has been the focus of this overview of recurrent themes in this volume has emphasized colonial times, the essays in this volume also make clear that the Japanese occupation (1942–1945), Proclamation of Independence (1945) or transfer of sovereignty (1949) did not form a fissure in the processes of modernization of the cities. The Indonesianization of the urban administration from 1942 onwards did not result in a drastic change in outlook, as many of its bureaucrats had been trained by the previous colonial regime and had internalized the dream of modernization. Town planning principles, for instance, only changed drastically after 1957–1958 when the remaining Dutch experts were expelled from Indonesia and replaced by Americans (Van Roosmalen, this volume). Changes at the oil refineries of Plaju, for instance, were very gradual. The rationalities supporting water supply delivery to the Jakartans changed after 1949, but the differentiation between those urban spaces with and without access persisted (Kooy and Bakker, this volume). Colonial regulations pertaining to town planning, traffic, sanitary measures and so on all remained in force well after 1949.

While the technical or outward aspects of modernity remained very much the same after Independence, the underlying political motives and societal goals of the state-led attempts at modernization changed. This becomes clear, for instance, in the debate about public housing. The seminal Congress on Healthy Public Housing, held in Bandung from 25 to 31 August, 1950 recommended a standard design that closely mirrored colonial, middle class examples. The model house would include a living room, a dining room, two bedrooms, and an annex with a kitchen, bathroom, and a toilet, all with sufficient window openings to allow in sunlight and fresh air. Whilst the design implied the living style of a ‘modern’ nuclear family similar to colonial notions of the ideal household, the novel proposal to provide a system of finance
through the establishment of cooperative housing associations reflected the new Indonesian sense of solidarity amongst citizens. The policy goal of building decent housing for the masses, in contrast to the much more restrictive targets of colonial building programmes, had the expressed aim of shattering the alleged sense of inferiority that Indonesians had sustained by living in too small houses during colonial times (Colombijn 2010:336–340).

One significant change after Indonesian independence is that the state ascribed more importance to a symbolic recognition of the Republic of Indonesia as a nation taking its proper place among the modern – and therefore autonomous – nations of the world. The construction of Hotel Indonesia and other modernist architecture, the erection of giant statues in Jakarta, and the hosting of events showcasing Indonesia’s participation in global sports are well-known examples of this symbolic policy (Brown 2008; Kusno 2000:49–70; Leclerc 1993). Kooy and Bakker (this volume) give the example of the new surface water treatment plant Pejompongan, which had as much the goal to be a symbol of a modern, national capital, than to provide clean water to the masses.

**Acceptance, Accommodation, Appropriation, and Rejection**

The foregoing discussion has emphasized modernity and urbanization as conditions that interfered with, controlled, and oppressed its targets or particularly advantaged, privileged, and benefited its adherents and practitioners. This largely confirms established critical studies of colonialism (for example Yeoh 1996), except that the particular prism through which the imposition of modernity has been examined in this volume has been the colonial city. But seen from the vantage point of the contributions to this volume, this apparent and typically too readily accepted dichotomy distinguishing between urban administrators and colonial professionals who championed modernization on the one hand, and kampong dwellers who were imposed upon or resisted on the other, does not represent the reality. For one thing, by definition colonial ‘reformers’ and ‘progressives’ were opposed by powerful interests within their own community and, as Stephen Legg suggests, by the ‘bottom line’ of colonialism: the reluctance to expend money (Legg 2007).

Perhaps more controversial in an age of postcolonial discourse is to assert – on the basis of empirical evidence – the voluntarily adoption of modern innovation by the targets of colonial intervention. One piece of evidence pointing to this is the use of public transport: statistics make clear that this was quickly adopted by the Indonesian communities on the periphery of urban centres as the number of passengers travelling third class on the rapidly
expanding tramway systems confirm. It is again exemplified by the uptake of housing made available by the Semarang municipality in the new residential districts of Sompok and Mlaten in the years immediately after the First World War, or who enrolled in the limited number of school places available to Inlanders. In these cases it can be assumed that these new opportunities appealed to precisely the same categories in the Indonesian community similar to those in the working classes districts of metropolitan cities who took advantage of comparable developments.

Modernity, of course, was not a package deal, which had to be bought or rejected in its entirety. People endorsed some elements and rejected others; some people wanted and were able to adopt more innovations than others (Eisenstadt 2000:15). The absence of a hegemonic response, indeed, need not necessarily be seen as evidence of colonial incompetence but needs to be examined as the evidence of agency. In the active condition of rejecting and accepting lay the seeds of decolonization. Accepting and rejecting can, by extension, be interpreted as resistance to the colonial project. For, as suggested above, it was not ‘modernity’ per se that was at issue, but the assumptions and processes in which it was presented. In a society that, over time, had successfully incorporated many foreign influences, the gradually accelerating penetration of Western modernity could be and was in fact often accommodated. However, as Dipesh Chakrabarty has argued in the particular instance of nineteenth-century Bengal, the colonized subject desiring modernity was faced with the problem of how to buy the package without its Western wrapping (Chakrabarty 2000).

The contributors to this volume reveal how selective the ‘customers’ of Western modernity were. And we argue in this volume that herein – in the acceptance and rejection of aspects of modernity most clearly manifested in the urban space – emerged also the counter-colonial process of defining an alternative modernity, one that the subaltern residents of the cities could own. This alternative modernity did not reject the fundamental ingredients of modernity – technology, the desire for material improvement, progress, a consciousness of the now and the future, a nostalgia for tradition – but challenged the assumption of exclusive ownership. Some of the evidence for this selective embracing of modernity that emerges from the contributions to this volume includes the circumstances where residents of some kampongs requested the intervention of the municipality to improve their neighbourhood, but demanded to maintain their autonomy or be allowed to share in the decision-making process (Versnel and Colombijn, this volume). Indigenous clerical employees of the oil refineries at Plaju eagerly adopted symbols of modernity like the wearing of a necktie, and participated in the modern leisure time
pursuits table tennis and dancing, but sported these as the accoutrements of a new Indonesian middle class (Tanjung, this volume). As Giddens (1991) and Bauman (2000:18–23) have noted in the case of comparable developments in the West, modernization led to abandoning fixed, traditional frameworks, and the need to make individual choices.

The gradual formation of ‘subterranean modernities’ that eventuated in revolutionary processes of decolonization was of course limited and bounded by the contingencies of the colonial environment. People were not free to make their choices. Many manifestations of modernity were accompanied by the creation of boundaries between modern and traditional spaces. The Kotabaru neighbourhood, for instance, was partially separated from surrounding kampongs by a railway and canal but there was also a social boundary constructed from the fear of its modern European inhabitants of a creolization of their cultural space. Conversely, adult testimonies report that in their youth inhabitants of surrounding kampongs were physically afraid to enter the area (Fakih, this volume). In Malang on the other hand, despite the fact that the alun-alun was marked out as a European and governmental space by lines of trees and imposing Western buildings, indigenous people were not at all hesitant to trespass across the symbolic boundary of the square (Basundoro, this volume). Was it because, despite its newness, it was nevertheless their alun-alun? In the more precisely defined properties of European enterprises, the purposely-built boundaries were specifically designed to keep selected individuals in and exclude others: a guarded gate sealed the oil refinery at Plaju. Practices of hygiene drew boundaries between what was modern and clean and what was traditional and dirty at the level of an individual house, a kampung or a whole city. The waterworks in Batavia, as in other colonial cities, had a certain reach, automatically distinguishing people who had access and people who were excluded from the served area. Across the board, different levels of Western education awarded a conditional pass to a graded set of sites of modernity, the upper reaches of which remained unreachable for Indonesians until with Independence the ultimate power to distribute such awards was snatched from those who had previously dispensed them.

The existence of boundaries was one modality of a crucial general feature of modernization: people had different access to the offerings of modernity. While the contingencies of colonialism played a significant role in the construction of such boundaries, evidence from the postcolonial era reveals how, whether intentionally or not, the embedded symbolism associated with the signs of modernity themselves continued after Independence. In her contribution, for instance, Murakami has sketched the consequences of the limitations of the Indonesian Republic’s health care system in providing modern health
services to its citizens despite its best intentions. Kooy and Bakker use the term the ‘splintered city’ to capture the unequal access of Jakartans to clean water. Almost inevitability, for quite pragmatic reasons, the boundaries of modernity under the autonomous Indonesian state closely replicated those under the earlier colonial state. The new water treatment plants constructed after Independence reached only certain parts of the city, as before, and merely reinforced colonial divisions in Jakarta. Another division existed between people with and without housing. Urban residents, especially recent migrants, without proper and affordable housing (by their own standards) often resorted to squatting on vacant urban land and building their own dwellings. The post-colonial city administrators almost panicked at the prospect of the seemingly uncontrollable spread of squatter settlements, which subverted their dreams of building a modern city, and by harsh measures tried to rein in, and if possible remove, squatter settlements. The ultimate effort to create a modern cityscape was the development of a satellite town, Kebayoran Baru, built from scratch and separated from all the riff-raff of old Jakarta by a safe five kilometre-wide corridor. This project was initiated by the Dutch, but endorsed and executed by the independent government (Colombijn 2010:207–224, 297–307; Van Roosmalen 2008:183–185).

Urbanization, Modernity and Decolonization

The colonial state was often not directly the most powerful advocate of modernization; more often than not it was the agents of modernization who acted in its name or, where necessary, appealed to higher authorities in the metropole or in the last resort to their centres of professional and scientific arbitration. The local responses to these interventions were ambiguous, be they resistant or accommodating, but inevitably the interventions came to be associated with the colonial state as the foreign locus of power. Processes of modernization thus became highly politicized so that control over their direction and over the instruments of modernization – which ultimately was the state – became the goal of a nationalist revolution.

The ironic connection between colonial modernization and nationalism has often been pointed out in relation to new administrative techniques that helped subjugated people to imagine the nation as an imagined community (Anderson 1991; Rappa and Wee 2006:9–10; Rigg 2007:59–60), stimulated the spread of new ideologies through both formal education and technical facilities that facilitated assembling a broad national movement (Coté 2006:36; Cribb 1994:2; Gellner 1983; Gillen and Ghosh 2007:120–122; Kahin 1952:30–35;
It is telling how prominently the different modes of transport, moving at different speed, figure in films of city life of that time (Berita film no. 18 1943; Dorp en stad 1949; Nederlands Indië voor 1942 (10) 1939; Nederlands Indië voor 1942 (14) 1939; Soerabaia 1929). Shiraishi 1990:8–29), or added to the mounting frustration of nationalist leaders that experienced a glass ceiling in their early professional careers (Duara 2004:4–5; Kooiman 2009:222–226; Tilly 1973). The material collected in this volume, however, emphasizes another connection between colonial modernization and nationalism. Modernization made the inequality more and painfully visible and could increase social inequality in the urban setting.

For instance, with the new options of steam tram, electric tram, bicycle, and car available, people who still went on foot, or by dokar (horse-drawn buggy) and carts pulled by zebus, had come to be perceived as being relatively more backward, or ketinggalan zaman (left behind by the times). This must have been visible to themselves as much as to other people. Subsequently, the different pace of movement, and the different range of travel gave people unequal opportunities to earn a higher income and gain more knowledge. Likewise, people who lived in sanitized kampongs or profited from water from the mains experienced improved health, which consequently increased their chances to appropriate a higher income, or at least reduce unproductive periods of illness. The relations between modernization and inequality are, of course, far more intricate than we sketch here, but the general point is clear: modernization sharpened social inequality in the cities. And where inequality followed ethnic lines, modernization fed nationalism and ultimately decolonization.

It is no coincidence that the confrontation between modernity and social inequality was most palpable in the cities. Urban centres represent places of concentrated humanity engaged in and confronted by a multitude of circumstances and opportunities. Cities, and especially the port towns, formed the primary point of contact between the colonized world and the West, through which foreign innovations entered the archipelago. In the view of the colonial state, the cities formed the centres where it was most urgent to modernize the human and material conditions. Opportunities for Western education, which were also identified by nationalists with progress and modernization, were also almost exclusively found in the city. Cities, as concentrations of people of all kinds, acted as incubators for many nationalist organizations (Coté 2006:7; Dick and Rimmer 2003:71; Houben and Schrempf 2008:13; Owen et al. 2005:263–265). As Adrian Vickers asserts:

> cities represented all that was modern, both good and bad. A sense of the modern, especially the need for progress, was important in forging
nationalism among Indonesians. [...] [N]ationalism was an idea that could only develop in the urban context.

Vickers 2005:60–1

Henk Schulte Nordholt puts in an important caveat against the teleological view that that modernization kindled nationalism. He argues that the rising indigenous middle class in colonial Indonesia was interested in modernization, but on the whole not in nationalism. Nationalism was too risky and a potential threat to their recently acquired standard of living. They strove for a certain lifestyle, or ‘cultural citizenship’ and not independence (Schulte Nordholt 2009:106–107). Indeed, for miners in the Copperbelt of Zambia, modernization was, among other things, ‘cars, suits, fine clothes, a decent necktie’ (Ferguson 1999:13). Advertisements in newspapers and journals from the 1950s promoted fashionable clothes and modern kitchenware. Also less tangible things and certain behaviour conveyed the idea of modernity: Western music, keroncong music – nowadays considered old-fashioned – American films, sprinkling daily speech with English or Dutch words, drinking lemonade, smoking cigarettes, modern sports like tennis and football, and, especially for women, the use of toothpaste and a fresh breath (Bogaerts 2012:235–236; Kusno 2010:168–181; Maier 1997; Schulte Nordholt 1997:20; Schulte Nordholt 2009:109–110; Shiraishi 1990:30). Recognizing the ambiguous nature of and response to modernity – the conditions created by the processes of modernization – suggests there exists a crucial linkage between urbanization, modernization and decolonization. A study of the Indonesian Revolution must necessarily conclude that the overthrow of the colonial state was undertaken by a combination of those who had appropriated and those who had resisted the processes of modernization. Without the popular resistance of the Indonesian masses, a minority indigenous Western-educated and acculturated elite could not have snatched control of the state. While for some, independence was the logical upshot of the ideal of modern society and the liberal thesis of equality and individual and national autonomy, it was the denial of these conditions of modernity that energized them. For others it was precisely because modernity made apparent the realities of traditional values, social structures, or ethnic – and in particular religious – identities, that the overthrow of the colonial state

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7 Ferguson’s study of the Copperbelt at a time of economic decline is, by the way, an important reminder, that modernization is not an inevitable, unilinear process. For the miners these emblems of modernity had become more something of a myth from the past seemingly gone forever than a physical reality. Modernization has erroneously become a teleological narrative with a certain outcome (Ferguson 1999; see also Houben and Schrempf 2008).
seemed to offer the possibility of a return to a neo-traditional state, be it Islamic or feudal, which would accord to them, at last, the promise of equality.

A City Tour

The contributors to this volume taken together have begun the task of tracing the empirical links between modernity, urban modernization, and decolonization. Less ambitious in avoiding the theorization that marks much of the present debate on (colonial) modernity, and consciously avoiding the ideological binaries that continue to obscure the investigation of colonialism, they begin to shine a light on real social processes. There is no claim here that ‘the story has been told’; the aim of these contributions is to contribute to the task of exploration in the belief that an understanding of the present world requires a more accurate accounting of the past. Collectively, the articles of this volume tell about the various interconnections between modernization – both technical and social – evident social inequality, colonial state intervention, resistance, and decolonization, which did not take place in a spatial vacuum, but were typical of, and bound to, the urban society in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.

The twelve contributions that make up this volume begin to sketch three scenarios. The first section, incorporating the contributions of Murakami, Kooy and Bakker, and Van Roosmalen take a big picture approach, stretching their view across the twentieth century – and thus across both colonial and national states to survey specific elements of modernization. They demonstrate the universality of many aspects of modernity across regimes suggesting that much of what is laid at the feet of colonialism was embedded within modernity’s project itself. This general conclusion can be applied to each of the later, more specific and detailed studies. The subsequent sections look more closely at specific sites in which Indonesians respond in specific ways to the changes that colonialism was introducing.

In the opening chapter of the section ‘State impositions and passive acceptance’, Saki Murakami discusses some of the dilemmas faced by the leaders of independent Indonesia in modernizing their country and decolonizing society at the same time. The government wished to develop a modern public health system based on biomedicine, but had to build on a system inherited from colonial times. It wished to decolonize public health care and put Indonesian doctors in the leading positions, but could still not do without the services of European doctors. Finally, it aimed at doing better than the colonial state by
distributing the provision of health care more evenly between urban and rural areas and between Java and other islands, but at the same time dreamed that the major urban centres could boast of the most modern facilities to boost national pride. For want of an abundant supply of doctors that would go voluntarily to peripheral rural areas or places outside Java, the state tried to provide health care more evenly by regulating the domicile of medical staff by law. This policy was frustrated by medical staff reluctant to give up the freedom of settlement and by residents of the major urban centres on Java who refused to give up anything of their prerogatives in health care.

In the following chapter, Michelle Kooy and Karen Bakker make the same point in a different context: that modern facilities were very unequally available for different groups. Rather than looking at differences between cities and the countryside, they focus on intra-urban differences. They analyse spatial patterns of water supply in colonial and postcolonial Jakarta. Until today, many households do not have access to the system of water mains. The ideal of development experts is an integrated, universal and homogeneous system of piped water supply, and the fact that Jakarta does not have such an integrated system is often interpreted as a retarded or lapsed modernity. Kooy and Bakker challenge this framework of ‘failure’ and, following the work of Stephen Graham and Simon Marvin (2001), instead propose the model of a ‘splintered city’. The splintered city concept abandons the Western ideal of a homogeneous, integrated urban space and offers an alternative analytical framework. In the splintered city of colonial times, the waterworks were concentrated in quarters where Europeans predominated (and a few kampongs) and thus reinforced the distinction between clean, modern Europeans and not so clean, traditional Indonesians. After Independence the state built new water treatment plants, which consciously served only the most modern parts of the city; this limited reach was not a failure, but part of a conscious strategy to create some modern exemplary neighbourhoods to give Jakarta its place among other world cities.

The next two chapters, by Pauline van Roosmalen, and Hans Versnel and Freek Colombijn, deal with various aspects of colonial urban planning and Dutch ideals of a modern city in late colonial times. Urban planning is, of course, a prime example of the modernization of the city because of planners’ claim to be able to rationally determine the best fit between means and goals. Their adoption of Western techniques such as zoning and the use of statistics, and the preoccupation with planning schemes implied a clear notion of progress. Planning was not only the product of the modernization of society, but also a major agent in the ongoing modernization of the city. In the view of planners the lower-class neighbourhoods, or kampongs, embodied the opposite of what the modern city should look like: clean, orderly, and prosperous.
Van Roosmalen shows that order was not merely a functional tool in planning, but an aesthetic ideal: order is beauty. Van Roosmalen makes a case for seeing planning as a terrain where decolonization was postponed. The influence of Dutch planning concepts did not decline until 1957, when the Dutch professors in planning at the Bandung Institute of Technology were replaced by Americans, who emphasized the pivotal role of the motorcar.

Hans Versnel and Freek Colombijn open the section on ‘Partial accommodation’ by zooming in on one particular aspect of planning and state intervention, namely kampong improvement. In the eyes of the city administrators the urban kampongs were chaotic, disorderly, and unhygienic, in short they disrupted the ideal of cities as centres of modernity. Versnel and Colombijn compare two men who used their social capital trying to improve the living conditions in the kampongs: J.J.G.E. Rückert and Hoesni Thamrin. Rückert was a Dutch bureaucrat, who combined many functions in the civil service, arguing for the need to reserve more of the state budget for kampongs. Hoesni Thamrin was an Indonesian politician, who operated in several representative bodies to which he was elected. Hoesni Thamrin demanded in heated speeches that the state do more for the kampongs. In other words, in this case it was an indigenous political leader who pleaded that the colonial state should modernize the allegedly traditional areas of the town, and penetrate deep into the kampongs taking over the administration of the previously semi-autonomous kampongs.

The next three articles form a counterweight to the previous studies of top-down interventions. The three articles by Farabi Fakih, Radjimo Sastro Wijono, and Gustaaf Reerink are case studies showing local residents’ response to, and sometimes active resistance against, state intervention. Fakih analyses the appearance of housing estates, which were inspired by the garden city concept for their layout and by Art Deco for their architecture. These housing estates formed islands of modernity in the cities. Beneath manifestations of modernity lay the fear of the opposite of modernity, the behaviour of indigenous people in the kampongs. Fakih focuses in on one such estate, Kotabaru built in Yogyakarta in 1919. Kotabaru allowed its residents, mostly Europeans, to escape from the social environment of the rest of the city. As we learn from oral history, the fear of the residents of Kotabaru of the kampong dwellers around them was matched by the fear of some of the indigenous people living outside the estate who barely dared to enter Kotabaru. Nevertheless, some indigenous people were permitted access to provide services for the residents, so that a significant degree of contact was nevertheless maintained between the residents of Kotabaru and the environs. After Independence, when middle class Indonesian professionals moved into the area, the contrast between modern Kotabaru and traditional environs persisted.
Radjimo Sastro Wijono, who has also interviewed former residents, sketches the life in two kampongs in Semarang. The progressive city government of Semarang, seeing that various measures to improve hygiene in existing kampongs fell short of expected results, took the initiative to build new, healthy housing complexes for low ranking civil servants. The local administration built the housing complex Sompok between 1920 and 1923, based on a plan drawn up by the Semarang-based planner Thomas Karsten. When people occupied the houses in Sompok and another Karsten designed kampong, Mlaten, they adopted new ‘modern’ habits as well. For instance, unlike the traditional Javanese house, which was not divided into rooms, houses in Sompok were, and this introduced a new notion of privacy. People had to become accustomed to using toilets and bathing facilities in Sompok, but once these facilities were appreciated, residents opted to have a private bathroom rather than making use of the existing public shared facilities even though they had to pay higher rent for this convenience. Thus, modernization led both to growing individualism and social class differentiation. While Karsten specifically intended the new residential district to be ‘multi-ethnic’, his housing estates were designed to house a definable socio-economic class, in particular to accommodate what he saw as the emerging Javanese middle class who could afford the rental level that applied.

The third article of this set, by Gustaaf Reerink, focuses on the relationship between state and kampong dwellers in Bandung between 1930 and 1960, that is, from Dutch colonial times, through the Japanese period, and the first decades of independence. Reerink builds his case partly at the level of the city of Bandung, and partly at the level of one kampong, Taman Sari, studied in detail. The municipal government characterized kampongs as informal slums and in 1927 launched a programme for kampong improvement. However, as Reerink argues, the municipal government never really gained effective control over the kampongs to effect its policies. During the colonial period, this lack of state control was the result of the so-called ‘desa autonomie’, a formal state policy of legal dualism that granted administrative autonomy to kampongs that lay partly or wholly within municipal boundaries. Thus, although urban kampongs gradually lost their autonomy, a process that continued after Independence, kampongs nevertheless managed to maintain a large degree of de facto autonomy. In the first years after Independence the government had more pressing matters on its mind than controlling the kampongs. In the 1950s so many people moved from the countryside to Bandung that the city government was overwhelmed by numbers and could do little against the many new residents that squatted on land and built houses without a legal permit. Building codes, consequently, were simply irrelevant to kampong residents and ignored.
All articles thus far have dealt with state interventions, but the next article by Arjan Veering, in contrast, deals with a project instigated by the private sector. Rapid technological developments in shipping and freighting required a new organization of the ports in the Archipelago. Fast and reliable loading of the ships became essential, and this required, among other things, a stable labour force. However, this requirement was jeopardized by the casual nature of the labour force and the enduring problem of scarcity of labour. Therefore the four main shipping lines of the time sought ways to create a stable labour force of dockworkers in the port of Tanjung Priok (Jakarta). They found a partial solution in the provision of housing in the so-called Uniekampong, established and managed by the shipping lines in 1919. The Uniekampong developed into a labour pool that, as envisaged by the shipping lines, broke the traditional organization of labour in the port. The labour pool was less casual and more disciplined than previous organizations of labour. Concern on the part of shipping companies to increase productivity were mixed with ethical motives to create better, more hygienic living conditions that existed in the kampongs where the dockers used to live. The Uniekampong provided better housing, linked to water supply, sewerage, electricity, and paved roads. Despite these facilities, dockworkers were not eager to live in the Uniekampong since in so doing they sensed that they would be sacrificing something of their independence.

The final section deals with four cases of ‘selective appropriation’. The first article, by Johny Khusyairi and Freek Colombijn, focuses on the modernization of traffic. Using material from Surabaya in the 1920s, their main argument is that people had uneven access to the means of transportation and, conversely, some new means of transportation accentuated social difference. Ownership of cars and, to a lesser degree, bicycles was obviously constrained by financial means. Various economic groups also used different means of public transportation. Low-income people tended to take steam trams, which served industrial, port, and market areas, whereas middle class people preferred the more comfortable electric trams that connected suburbs to the city centre. One consequence of the modernization of transportation was a considerable number of traffic accidents, often caused by differences in velocity of the participants. The propensity for accidents in part at least can be attributed to the uneven degree of modernization resulting in some people moving at a higher velocity than others. The accidents and more complex traffic situation invoked a response from the government to regulate the traffic.

The next three articles shift the emphasis from modernization of urban space (with nationalism and decolonization in the background) to nationalism and decolonization (with the modernization of urban space as backdrop).
All three articles analyse the transformations of urban spaces that were heavily loaded with symbolic meanings. Purnawan Basundoro discusses the contested meanings of the alun-alun in Malang. Traditionally an alun-alun was a square imbued with ritual meaning, but in Malang the alun-alun was built by the Dutch with another conception in mind. From its inception in 1882, the square was intended as a colonial space in which was located, as well as a mosque, a church, a jail and the official residence of the representative of the colonial government, the Assistent-Resident. Later were added newer emblems of European society, the sociëteit (the European club house), two banks, and a cinema. A second alun-alun, built in 1922 and designed by Karsten, while based on a traditional Hindu model but specifically designed to accommodate the needs of a modern colonial society, was even less frequented by the city’s Indonesian inhabitants. Ordinary indigenous people could not take part in the modern activities on the alun-alun, but they did resist the Dutch appropriation of this urban space. They encroached on the square and began their own activities, such as selling foodstuff from stalls. As Basundoro shows in his account of their various subsequent transformations, through the last decades of colonial rule, during the Japanese occupation and early years of Independence, while the buildings remained the same, the symbolic meanings given to the buildings and square and the use made of the public space changed repeatedly.

Ida Liana Tanjung depicts the symbolic changes taking place in Plaju during decolonization. Plaju is an oil town near Palembang; it is conventionally considered an economic enclave, but in the context of this volume is perhaps better called an enclave of modernity near the very old city of Palembang. By its image of modernity (the high-tech oil industry, the rational spatial planning of Plaju, the high percentage of technical experts living in Plaju, the cosmopolitan composition of its population, and facilities like a tennis court and swimming pool), Plaju is in many ways the opposite of an alun-alun. Nevertheless, Indonesians and Europeans to some extent contested the control of this space as they did with the alun-alun of Malang. Because of its economic importance, but also because of its symbolic function as showcase of modernity in the whole of South Sumatra, the oil town and refinery became a desirable object during the Second World War and Revolution. The area regularly changed hands and these changes in political control were followed by symbolic changes, such as changing street names. The symbolic Indonesianization of the oil town was a protracted process starting long before 1942 and completed long after 1949.

In the final article of this volume, Sarkawi B. Husain studies what happened to Chinese cemeteries in Surabaya in the 1950s. Finding a decent burial place for the deceased is for Chinese people arguably even more important than for
others. The Chinese cemeteries in Surabaya gradually became an irritant to urban reformers because they hampered orderly urban development, the more so because indigenous residents squatted on the graves. During the Dutch and Japanese times, the cemeteries were relatively quiet without serious problems. There was still ample building land in the city and the Dutch and Japanese resolutely protected the burial grounds and upheld public discipline. However, after Indonesia became independent, the conflicts between the Chinese and other residents about the use of urban space intensified. Indigenous people used the cemeteries increasingly for housing and resisted new burials taking place. After several incidents with intense negotiations the municipal administration decided to close most of the cemeteries, which were seen as no longer befitting a modern city centre.

Conclusion

Residents of Indonesian cities witnessed the introduction of modern technologies, organizational innovations, and new forms of social life at a staggering speed in the first half of the twentieth century: new means of transportation, the concept of a planned urban development, new notions of sanitation and hygienic housing, new models of urban administration, and the organization of health care, and so forth. Modernization was neither a phenomenon that happened naturally to a society, nor was it an unequivocally positive development as its proponents suggested. Modernization was an ideal striven for by certain actors and contested, perhaps detested, by others. Income, ethnicity, and gender influenced one’s opportunities to take part in or to be seen to actively resist, the processes and technologies of modernization.

This volume has aimed at exploring the implications of these broad cultural processes and material changes in Indonesia in the course of the twentieth century. It has sought to investigate how widely accepted theoretical ‘models’ that have been applied to studies of colonial and postcolonial states operated ‘on the ground’. Its contributors have implicitly and explicitly asserted the view that explanations of social, cultural and political change need to be grounded in empirical historical detail. At the same time, they remain convinced that such grounded historical explanations need to be directed by clear theoretical frameworks which must form the basis of historical explanation. Inevitably, detailed localized, empirical studies remain just that: individual samples of a possible larger history. The contributions to this volume therefore can be seen as pointing to a potential rich stream of research that will lay the basis for a better understanding of the rich social history of Indonesia’s twentieth century.
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PART 1

State Impositions and Passive Acceptance
Call for Doctors!
Uneven Medical Provision and the Modernization of State Health Care during the Decolonization of Indonesia, 1930s–1950s

Saki Murakami

Introduction

The prolonged period of war, which had begun with the Japanese invasion in 1942 and ended with the transfer of sovereignty in 1949, had an enormously destructive impact on the economy (Booth 1987:10). As this decolonization process had been fuelled by ‘anti-colonial’ feelings, the remaining non-Indonesian element had, if possible, to be replaced by Indonesians; this meant a structural change in most of the modern sectors of the economy and the state apparatus after 1949 (Lindblad 2008). However, ‘anti-colonial’ did not necessarily mean ‘anti-modern’ and opposition to the modern advances, which had come with the last phase of colonialism. On the contrary, more modernization, or the equal distribution of modernity of the late-colonial society to non-European segments of the society, was one of the nationalists’ objectives.

Two related objectives, political decolonization and the pursuit of modernity, produced a paradox: the desire to build a newly independent nation-state but with particular ‘modern’ characteristics adopted from the colonial state. Unquestionably, the most modern sectors tended to be those most dominated by the former colonial overlords and it was these modern sectors in which decolonization was most urgently needed. This chapter examines one such paradox of decolonization and modernity. I shall describe how the Indonesian national government attempted to decolonize the modern state by taking medical provision in the 1950s as a case study.

Despite its importance to an understanding of both the process of decolonization and the rise of the succeeding authoritarian state structure in Indonesia, the period of the 1950s has still not been thoroughly discussed for a number of reasons (McVey 1994; Vickers 2005). Especially when compared with issues related to the nation and nation-building, the question how the state was
(re-)established has been less well explored (Schulte Nordholt 2004). Health forms an important entry point for such an inquiry into the state.

The collective treatment of diseases had only become a function of the state quite recently, preponderantly during the latter half of the nineteenth century, in step with the development in modern biomedicine. In practice, this collective treatment in Indonesia has been dominated by modern medicine both before and after Independence. As will be shown, the newly independent nation-state pursued the standardization of public health care throughout the archipelago for two reasons: to enhance its standing externally and to build national solidarity. The rub was that this function of the state required scientific expertise and this had been dominated by the Dutch colonizers. In the process of decolonization they had to be replaced. In this respect, health can provide important insight into the complex nature of decolonization of the modern state.

The standardization, or equal distribution, of health care throughout Indonesia was composed of two elements: medical provision pure and simple and the nation-wide imposition of sanitary regulations. My choice has been to focus on medical provision, the appointment of new medical personnel and in particular doctors, throughout Indonesia as one of the tasks of public health administration. This is a convenient topic of study because the national elite in the public health sector made public statements on the matter and also the opinion of the general public made itself heard, in their demands made in printed mass media. The national elite in the health sector was characterized by a strong nationalistic predisposition and, as health was unquestioningly seen as beneficial, its members publicly demanded the standardization of proper medical provision in all regions of Indonesia and in all layers of society. Although the development of medical institutions and the provision of drugs were equally as important as the provision of medical staff, they are less suited to analysis as such research is hampered by the scarcity of reliable sources on these other important health-care issues.

The first section gives a picture of colonial medical provision: how did it begin, who were the personnel, and how were they distributed? After an examination of the complexity of providing medical personnel, a panoramic view of their distribution will be given. In the second section I shall discuss how national leaders, in attempts to distinguish themselves from their colonial predecessors, fostered health for the whole nation by instigating many projects to promote rural public health. Unfortunately, the number of human resources necessary to achieve this goal at the time was inadequate. The first state effort to solve the scarcity of medical staff in certain areas consisted of regulations designed to control the distribution of medical personnel. In the third section,
I shall argue that the legislation process failed to give due consideration to the complex demands, and thereafter show that the prescriptions on how to distribute medical personnel failed to have any real effect on the equal distribution of staff. The fourth section looks at the way government efforts concentrated on doctors, ignoring any attempts to expand the number of other qualified medical personnel in the short run as an alternative means to correct the structural dearth. Ultimately the shortage of medical personnel was not solved. The last section demonstrates that the inability or unwillingness of the government to change the situation was not criticized publicly by the population. Instead, public requests and complaints turned against individual doctors, putting moral pressure on them; these public demands in turn were seized upon to legitimize greater state control of medical personnel.

Colonial Medical Provision: Its Priorities and Geographical Distribution

Medical provision and health administration in general began to be institutionalized at the beginning of the twentieth century keeping pace with the general development of medical science, the expansion of both the European population and Western enterprise in the colony, the ravage wrought by several epidemic diseases, and the expansion of missionary activities. Up to the end of nineteenth century, medical institutions were pretty much limited to the military. The Burgerlijke Geneeskundige Dienst (BGD, Civil Medical Service) was subordinated to the Militaire Geneeskundige Dienst (MGD, Military Medical Service) until 1911 and military doctors were also expected to provide medical care for civil servants. By the turn of the century, this system was considered inadequate and inefficient, and voices were raised arguing for the need for a proper institution to provide medical care for the civilian population. Just at this time, private institutions also commenced undertaking medical work. Missionary doctors began to build a network of hospitals and clinics. Plantation companies in East Sumatra issued sanitary regulations and organized medical provision for their employees. Their successes made other companies realize the benefits in labour control, eventually even pushing the government to institutionalize public health care (Murakami 2003: 4–11).

The 1906 Subsidy for Private Hospitals Act paved the way for the granting of subsidies to private hospitals, allowed the purchase of land for the construction of hospitals, and regulated the management of indigenous patients or those who were entitled to free medicine (Indisch Staatsblad 1906/276). In the same year, the Commissie tot Voorbereiding eener Reorganisatie van den
Burgerlijken Geneeskundigen Dienst (Commission Preparing a Reorganization of the BGD) was constituted. At this point, the BGD had very few staff members of its own. It consisted of three Inspectors at the central level and 164 doctors at the local level in Java (Rapport der Commissie 1908:225–237). On the recommendation of the Commission, the Regulation governing the BGD was revised, making it fully independent of the Military Medical Service, assigning it a larger budget and eight staff members at the central level, including a director as of 1910 (Indisch Staatsblad 1910/648; Koloniaal Verslag 1911:147).

Soon after this reorganization, the BGD expanded rapidly because it was required to take measures to control the dreaded plague in 1911. The second Director of the BGD, Dr W.T. de Vogel, was convinced that preventive medicine was a prime state function, but actual medical provision should be entrusted to private institutions and local governments. The BGD followed this idea and transformed itself into the Dienst der Volksgezondheid (DVG, Public Health Service) in 1924. Even at that time, De Vogel foresaw the need to expand Western medical provision, primarily to make it easy to supervise the medical conditions, but he was also concerned with changing people’s sanitary habits (De Vogel 1917:7–12). With these requirements in mind, the central government continued to provide subsidies and to put its staff at the disposal of local governments and private institutions.

The negative corollary of the state priority accorded to preventive medicine, especially the control of epidemics, was the lack of attention paid to the medical providers. As a consequence, the actors in the health service were diverse. On the basis of the prevailing financial and management structure, medical institutions in the Netherlands Indies were divided into ten categories. In 1939 there were six central government hospitals, two provincial government

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2 Dr Willem Thomas de Vogel (1863–1955), who had a Eurasian background, studied medicine in both Leiden and Berlin. He was active in the administration as well as in the academic field. He played an important role in the expansion of the city area of Semarang as a member of the newly founded Municipal Council of Semarang in 1906. He was also active in the Bond van Nederlandsch-Indische Arsten (Association of Doctors in the Netherlands Indies), which played a role in pushing the government to reorganize the BGD systematically rather than simply by essaying a haphazard expansion of medical provision. In 1907 he co-founded the Nederlandsche Vereeniging voor Tropische Geneeskunde (Dutch Society for Tropical Medicine) and maintained a strong connection with the newly established Instituut voor Tropische Hygiëne (Institute of Tropical Hygiene) of the Koloniaal Instituut (Colonial Institute) in Amsterdam. He investigated the plague in Malang, malaria in Sibolga, as well as health problems in a more general sense. After retirement as the Director of BGD in 1921, he represented the Netherlands Indies government at the Office International d’Hygiène Publique at Paris until the outbreak of the Second World War.
hospitals, one other local government hospital with a subsidy, 60 unsubsidized hospitals, 62 hospitals in semi-autonomous indigenous states, 95 subsidized private hospitals, seventeen contract hospitals in semi-autonomous indigenous states (which were compensated for treating poor patients by the central government), 34 private contract hospitals, two contract hospitals under the auspices of other government services, and 238 unsubsidized private hospitals (Indisch Verslag 1940, II:80). Besides these hospitals, a growing number of clinics was set up and then there were doctors with a private practice. Most government doctors ran a private practice in their spare time to supplement their salary.

Not only hospitals, but also doctors were firmly placed into various categories. Legally, civil medical practitioners in modern Western medicine (doctors or geneeskundigen) were divided into two categories: those educated in medical faculties at university level with the Dutch title of arts and those educated in the colonial medical school with the title of Dokter-Djawa (Javanese Doctor) and later Inlandsche arts (Indigenous Doctor). When the first European doctors arrived in the Indonesian archipelago, the title ‘arts’ was not yet legally protected and medical qualifications in the motherland were still diverse. At that time, most doctors from Europe were surgeons. In the nineteenth century, most of the civilian doctors or doctors with a private practice had been retired military doctors. In the Netherlands, qualifications approved and protected by the central government were established in the medical reforms of 1865, and this qualification was also followed in the colony (Querido 1968:13–16, 31–33).

The establishment of the Dokter-Djawa School as a government response to the famine and the smallpox epidemics in the middle of the nineteenth century meant that medical education preceded the general institutionalization of health administration in the Netherlands Indies. Even after the foundation of the Dokter-Djawa School, medical personnel continued to be scarce throughout the nineteenth century: on average one civil doctor (whether he was a private doctor, medical officer working for the BGD, or a Javanese Doctor) to around 180,000 persons.3

Gradually, because of the continuing scarcity of Javanese doctors and the high cost of recruiting European doctors, medical education in the colony was extended both in length of time and quality and was opened to other ethnic groups. In 1901 the Dokter-Djawa School was renamed School tot Opleiding van Inlandsche Artsen (STOVIA, School for the Education of Indigenous Doctors). With this change, the title of Dokter-Djawa became Inlandsche arts (and later

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3 This calculation is based on Koloniaal Verslag (1854, 1896); and Boomgaard and Gooszen (1991:128–137).
Indische arts), and the salary and status of this category of doctors were raised. In 1913, the Nederlandsch Indische Artsenschool (NIAS, Netherlands Indies Doctors’ School) was established in Surabaya. As was the stovia in Batavia, it was financed and supervised by the central government. This expansion of the education of indigenous doctors followed the recommendations of the Commission Preparing a Reorganization of the BGD (Rapport der Commissie 1908:26). Soon after its new rival in Surabaya had opened its doors, stovia followed the example of NIAS and accepted non-indigenous students as well. Besides attending medical schools in the colony, even before the turn of the century indigenous and other Asian students began to study in Europe in order to obtain the title of arts.

Despite the upgrading of the Dokter-Djawa School to stovia and NIAS, Indische artsen were clearly distinguished from European-educated doctors bearing the title of arts in salary and status. On the initiative of Abdul Rivai, member of the Volksraad (consultative house of representatives), stovia was transformed into the Geneeskundige Hoogeschool (GHS) in 1927. The GHS offered medical education at university level and bestowed the title of arts on its graduates. The fact that, in contrast to GHS, NIAS continued to produce graduates with the title of ‘Indische arts’ and was dominated by indigenous students was perceived by indigenous doctors as a persistent racial discrimination (Vig 1939).

The education of auxiliary medical personnel was never formally or centrally institutionalized in colonial Indonesia. Mantri perawat or djuru rawat acted as (male) nurses in hospitals or as basic medical providers at clinics under the supervision of a doctor who visited the establishment several times a week. The impetus to train auxiliary medical personnel came from missionaries who began to develop networks consisting of one hospital with a doctor at the centre and clinics headed by mantri perawat in the periphery. Mantri perawat were trained by the hospitals that employed them; they were not allowed to provide independent medical care. This non-standardized and decentralized training was in sharp contrast to the education of doctors, which was tightly state-controlled.

Meanwhile, most of the indigenous population continued to use indigenous traditional healers to cure their ailments. It seems that the colonial government almost totally ignored them. De Vogel vehemently rejected indigenous medicine as unscientific and judged the efficacy of traditional medical practitioners in confronting the cholera epidemic in 1908/09 disappointing (Handelingen Volksraad 1921:890). Even though there were several studies of traditional medical practices and also calls for more thorough research, especially from Indische artsen, traditional medicine was clearly considered something to be studied rather than to be institutionalized (Astrohadikoesoemo
1940; Margoendiningrat 1940). Only traditional midwives attracted some interest, but only in as far as they could be supervised and utilized by offering them some short courses in hygiene.

On their side, traditional medical providers put up neither an organized reaction to the ignorance of the government nor made any kind of effort to modernize their own system, as happened in India, China, or in Japan.4

By the end of the colonial period, the Netherlands Indies had 1,400 doctors in total, supplemented by 211 European nurses and 1860 mantri perawat (Indisch Verslag 1941, II:78–79). Examining the distribution over the Residencies, we note that private doctors, who made up more than half of all the doctors, were concentrated mostly in Java and in some other centres of Western enterprise. Although government doctors were found throughout the Archipelago, the number of people per doctor varied enormously according to place. Dr P. Peverelli, the Director of the Municipal Health Service of Batavia, gave figures on the medical provision in each of twenty-six city municipalities in around 1937. It shows that 458 doctors (33 per cent of all doctors) were settled in autonomous municipalities (Peverelli 1938:6–8). The comparison between municipalities and the rural areas of the Residencies in which the municipalities were situated reveals a large urban-rural difference in medical provision (Table 2.1).

Of course, not everybody actually visited doctors to seek a remedy. A high number of persons per doctor, such as in the Residency of Buitenzorg outside the municipalities, was not an indication that many people shared one doctor, but conversely that the majority did not have a chance to see a doctor at all. Hence the differential access to medical care was even starker than Table 2.1 suggests.

Besides urban-rural differences and the huge discrepancies between Residencies (especially in the rural areas of these), we can also observe a relatively plentiful medical provision in some parts of the Outer Islands. As the colonial government was happy to allow private actors the lion’s share of the provision of medicine there, more doctors were concentrated in centres of economic activity. Consequently, besides churches or other charitable institutions, planters, plantations, and mining companies had been important private actors employing medical doctors. Certainly, the companies could restrict the medical care to their company employees, but this was not always the case. They sometimes offered their medical personnel to the government to

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4 Huard, Bussy and Mazars 1991:128–131, 226–241; Hashimoto 2003:113–120. This lack of action might be explained by the comparative lack of theoretical sophistication of the healers. Peter Boomgaard (1996:53–57) found that, compared to their equivalents in continental Asia, Indonesian indigenous traditional healers used more local knowledge and were little affected by influence from (other Asian) regional or naturalistic medical systems.
Table 2.1  Number of persons per doctor in urban and rural areas, around 1938

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Residency</th>
<th>Municipality within residency</th>
<th>Persons per doctor in the whole residency</th>
<th>Persons per doctor in the municipality</th>
<th>Persons per doctor in the residency without municipality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Batavia</td>
<td>Batavia</td>
<td>9,384</td>
<td>4,522</td>
<td>12,753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buitenzorg</td>
<td>Buitenzorg, Soekaboemi</td>
<td>58,237</td>
<td>4,185</td>
<td>190,909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priangan</td>
<td>Bandoeng</td>
<td>26,529</td>
<td>3,029</td>
<td>52,303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheribon</td>
<td>Cheribon</td>
<td>98,557</td>
<td>5,778</td>
<td>168,141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pekalongan</td>
<td>Pekalongan, Tegal</td>
<td>101,543</td>
<td>8,583</td>
<td>181,223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semarang</td>
<td>Semarang, Salatiga</td>
<td>26,243</td>
<td>6,306</td>
<td>43,748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kedoe</td>
<td>Magelang</td>
<td>87,480</td>
<td>14,750</td>
<td>99,117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soerabaja</td>
<td>Soerabaja, Modjokerto</td>
<td>14,907</td>
<td>5,405</td>
<td>24,673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malang</td>
<td>Malang</td>
<td>42,171</td>
<td>3,333</td>
<td>75,460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kediri</td>
<td>Blitar</td>
<td>96,448</td>
<td>12,400</td>
<td>117,460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madioen</td>
<td>Madioen</td>
<td>123,034</td>
<td>7,833</td>
<td>192,155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Besoeki</td>
<td>Probolinggo, Pasoeroean</td>
<td>90,579</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>118,312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sumatra's</td>
<td>Medan, Bindjei, Pematang Siantar</td>
<td>16,932</td>
<td>3,467</td>
<td>22,703</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oostkust</td>
<td>Fort de Kock, Sawah</td>
<td>59,697</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>81,883</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sumatra's</td>
<td>Loento</td>
<td>77,331</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>100,442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palembang</td>
<td>Palembang</td>
<td>25,526</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>27,450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Ambo</td>
<td>41,480</td>
<td>5,085</td>
<td>58,275</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Number of persons per doctor calculated on the basis of *Indische Verslag* (1938, 1941) and Peverelli (1938:6–8).
facilitate medical care for the surrounding areas, set up hospitals accessible for the neighbouring population, financed medical institutions of churches, or joined other local actors to provide medical care.\textsuperscript{5}

Unquestionably, indigenous economic activity often did not lag far behind the large Western enterprises in the Outer Islands, and their activity also affected health provision. Indigenous smallholder production of export crops had developed rapidly in the Outer Islands at the beginning of the twentieth century and made up about one-third of all exports in 1929 (Booth 1990:200–202). Rubber production led the way. Taxes collected on the basis of the rubber restriction scheme set up by the International Rubber Agreement of 1934 were often used for medical care in areas where smallholder rubber proliferated.\textsuperscript{6}

Therefore, the uneven distribution of medical care was not invariably defined by the urban-rural divide, as nationalist leaders were later to allege.

Summing up the colonial situation, we can point out three characteristics of medical care. Firstly, the health administration had become institutionalized with its principal focus on the prevention of infectious diseases; it left the bulk of medical curative care to local or private initiatives (although the state did support these initiatives by granting subsidies). This policy resulted in a great diversity of medical providers and an uneven geographical distribution. Secondly, Western-educated doctors enjoyed the highest status and a concomitant salary. Indigenous doctors had to struggle for a very long time to overcome the inferiority of their qualifications. Thirdly, while the proportion of doctors to the population differed greatly from place to place, the network of both government and private clinics based on Western medicine had penetrated the society to some extent. At least it was not completely alien to the population. After Independence, the nationalist leaders tried to redress these imbalances in care.

Rural Health and the Need to Phase Out Urban-Rural Differences after Independence

The point of departure for this section is how the ‘ideal’ national health system and the role of the state in this were imagined by national leaders in the health

\textsuperscript{5} Though self-gratulatory, Penris’ post-war account describes a fair picture of such a practice (Penris 1949). See further, for example, National Archief, The Hague (NA), Memories Ministerie van Koloniën (MMK) 124, Memorie van Overgave (MvO) Resident Bondowoso, C.E. Barre, 1931; NA, MMK 100, MvO Resident Madioen, V. de Leeuw, 1932.

\textsuperscript{6} See for example, NA, MMK 190, MvO Gouverneur Oostkunst van Sumatra, B.C.C.M. van Suchtelen, 1936; NA, MMK 225, MvO Resident Djambi, Ph. J. van der Meulen, 1936.
sector. In their policy statements, these leaders publicly advocated ‘rural health’, that is the concentration of more services in rural areas. In doing so, they often explicitly contrasted this goal with the situation in colonial times. Projects related to ‘rural health’ necessitated a more even distribution of doctors, but in reality the number of doctors in government service was decreasing, especially among those in rural areas.

In a speech to university students, Dr M. Soetopo criticized the Dutch for their long time tendency to concentrate on cities and explained the ‘philosophy of public health’ of the new nation. With these words, Soetopo referred to the directions decided at the Conference of Officials in Yogyakarta in 1947. Health was identified as one of the major requirements in the development of the nation and the state, and a national public health service was said to be essential to secure a healthy and happy life for each national citizen. As this public health service should cover the ‘whole of society’, as a logical corollary the state should expand its health service to villages (Soetopo 1957:4–6; Harian Umum 17-9-1957).

Dr Leimena, the first Minister of Health after the transfer of sovereignty, was also an advocate of rural health. He distinguished his national policy from that of the colonial government by emphasizing that the Indonesian government was trying to expand health care to the villages (desa) and he endeavoured to build a health organization, which hinged on rural health. He also

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7 Dr M. Soetopo obtained the degree of Indische arts from NIAS in 1924 and of arts from GHS in 1936, and went on to enjoy a productive career in both academic and research fields in Surabaya and Batavia. In 1947 he joined the newly formed Ministry of Health in Yogyakarta as Head of the Education Section. He served as Minister of Health in the Halim Cabinet of the Republic of Indonesia, a constituent of the short-lived United States of Indonesia. After the United States of Indonesia had been merged into the unitary state, Soetopo headed the Lembaga Penelitian dan Pembasmian Penjakit Kelamin (Institute for Research into and Eradication of Venereal Diseases) and contributed to the eradication of yaws until his retirement in 1958. After his retirement he remained active in many fields of health and was awarded a Doctor Honoris Causa by the Universitas Airlangga in Surabaya in 1968 (Pidato 1969).

8 Dr J. Leimena, a stovia graduate of 1930, became famous both as a politician and as a technocrat. As a Christian from Ambon, he joined the nationalist movement in the 1920s and became one of the founders of the Partai Kristen Indonesia (Parkindo, Indonesian Christian Party). In colonial times he had worked for Roman Catholic hospitals in West Java. After Independence, he served as Minister of Health for more than twelve years in twelve different cabinets between 1945 and 1959, and thereafter served other Ministers of Health without interruption until 1966. After 1966 Leimena worked for the Department of Health as Advisor for the Minister (Hitipeuw 1986).

9 Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, Jakarta (ANRI), Arsip Kabinet Presiden Republik Indonesia (Kabinet President RI) 636, Jawaban atas pertanyaan seksi kesehatan di DPR, 1-8-1951.
explained at a World Health Organization congress in Geneva that ‘since more than 70 per cent of the population in Indonesia lives in rural areas, proper attention has to be paid to the health services there’ (Leimena 1953:7). Another influential figure, the Head of Public Health Education, Dr R. Mochtar, commented as he was about to depart to the United States on study leave, that so far health activities had been limited to the cities and after his return, he would like to set himself the task of changing the organization of public health in order to expand health care right down to the level of hamlets (dusun-dusun) (Harian Indonesia 27-9-1950).

This growing interest in rural health was certainly stimulated by the nationalist ideals of standardized services throughout the nation, but international interests and academic trends also had an impact. Public health, developed mostly under urban conditions in Europe in the nineteenth century, had begun to expand to rural areas in the twentieth century, especially after the First World War. When the typhus epidemic in Eastern Europe posed a real menace to public health after the First World War, the League of Nations Health Organization organized the Epidemic Commission and later held the Intergovernmental Conference on Rural Hygiene for European countries in 1931, financed by the Rockefeller Foundation. Japan, China, and India pushed the League of Nations Health Organization to hold a similar congress for Asia, and their demand was realized as the Intergovernmental Conference of Far-Eastern Countries on Rural Hygiene, held in Batavia in 1937 (LNHO 1937; Dubin 1995; Balińska 1995).

Even before that intergovernmental conference, in 1924 the Netherlands Indies government had already commenced rural health care activities with the assistance of the Rockefeller Foundation. In 1935 the regentschap (district) Purwokerto was designated to become a model and training field for rural health staff.

In the theory of public health, of which the roots were in the United States, preventive medicine and curative medicine were strictly segregated fields in both budget and personnel. Dr Hydrick, an American doctor dispatched to Indonesia by the Rockefeller Foundation, basically stuck to this principle in his own project but the 1937 Intergovernmental Conference concluded that the integration of preventive and curative medicine was sometimes unavoidable if success was to be achieved (Hydrick 1937; LNHO 1937:3–15). Debating the tasks

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10 Dr R. Mochtar received the title of Indische arts in 1924 and, after having worked for the government in rural areas, became the Head of Medical Hygienic Propaganda in 1939. After Independence he served as the Head of Public Health Education until 1957 (Gunseikanbu 1944:330–331; Mochtar 1954).
of district doctors, indigenous doctors also considered a model in which both preventive and curative medicine were integrated in the person of the district doctor more realistic. They felt they should personally take the initiative in this respect (Mochtar 1938:55; Zahar 1938:60–67; Soemedi 1940). This tendency towards integrated rural health programmes was continued into the post-war period through a WHO initiative (Leimena 1955a:19; 1955b:6–7).

Against this background of the standardization of urban and rural health care as a national and nationalist ideal, the continuities in pre-war health care concepts and personnel, and international assistance, three model plans were developed to make ‘rural health’ an attainable goal. The first of these was the Bandung Plan, followed by the Purwokerto Project and finally the Bekasi Project.

The Bandung Plan was a project, which was modelled on the missionary method of a network consisting of a central hospital and dependent small clinics. The project pursued the aim of the ‘integration’ of preventive and curative medicine. This project, first initiated by the municipal government of Bandung in 1950, was strongly pushed by Dr Leimena who aimed to launch it in 1951. Under this project, both the urban and the rural area of Bandung, administratively different areas but bearing the same name, acquired more medical facilities financed by the central government (Harian Indonesia 21-7-1950; Antara 17-12-1953; Antara 1-6-1956).

In Central Java the Purwokerto Project, begun in the colonial period, was extended by the above-mentioned Dr R. Mochtar to the whole of Banyumas (of which Purwokerto is part), Yogyakarta, and Magelang. He, as had Dr Hydrick before him, emphasized the importance of health Education and the deployment of educated hygienists (djuru hygiene) in order to construct a hygiene organization from the district level down to the villages (Mochtar 1954).

The Bekasi Project was commenced in 1956 by the Division of Rural Health and Health Education of the Ministry of Health, headed by Dr Sulianti Saroso.\textsuperscript{11} The project received assistance from USAID (finance and staff), WHO (staff), and UNICEF (equipment) and it was carried out in rural areas in the vicinity of the national capital, Jakarta. This project highlighted public participation

\textsuperscript{11} Dr J. Sulianti Saroso was a much more recent graduate than other leaders of the time. She had graduated from GHS in 1942 and was awarded a WHO fellowship to study public health and mother and child health in Europe and the USA in 1949. After fulfilling several important public health positions in the Ministry in 1950s, she became Director General at the Ministry of Health after 1968 and played a leading part in building strong relationships with the WHO and developing the health centre concept (Apa & siapa 1989:277–278).
and consisted of both medical service in clinics and health education, hence combining curative and preventive medicine. The Bekasi Project also aimed to achieve the in-service education of public health field staff. Eight other rural areas were selected for the expansion of the project through the expedient of sending educated staff to work there. Unfortunately, the Bekasi Project has been poorly documented (Better health 1960; Depkes 1994:8–9; Antara 6-8-1957).

Although the emphasis in each project was different -the latter two tended to focus more on public health education-, all of these projects were initiated by doctors with public health experience. Considering the fact that all these rural health projects were in areas relatively near to and accessible from cities and controlled by doctors based in the cities, the ideal of national standardization of health-care service in these cases meant the integration of the rural into the urban areas and not the distribution of medical services to outlying rural areas. At the same time, several mass preventive measurements against certain diseases, especially malaria and yaws, were launched, the majority of them in rural areas. These preventive rural campaigns required the presence of doctors for supervision and administration. Obviously, all these ambitious projects required more doctors if the project were to be expanded throughout the entire nation.

Unfortunately, in reality these plans were simply too ambitious to be realized for the whole nation. Exactly at the time when more doctors were needed to implement the new state ideals of rural health care, the number of doctors began to decline. Most of the Dutch or other European doctors went back to their home countries. The leading administrative and academic positions that fell vacant were filled by indigenous doctors, who consequently also gave up practice. Some of the indigenous doctors who had fought in the struggle for independence continued their career in the military and another group of doctors went into politics, both at the local and national levels. After the long period of turmoil of the Second World War and Indonesian Revolution there were fewer government doctors based in rural areas than there had been in colonial times. It is hard to obtain exact data for the whole nation at that time, but the Province Series published by the Ministry of Information provide information on several provinces. Although the reliability of the data is questionable and the method of categorizing in each province obscure, the Province Series does give the impression that the alteration in the number of doctors was spread unevenly and services with the exception of those in Jakarta and a few provinces in the Outer Islands were decreasing (Kementerian Penerangan 1953).

In short, the pursuit of rural health was thought to be the task of the state; more than an end in itself, it presented a way to legitimize the national
leadership. The goal of the pursuit of rural health required the standardization of medical provision throughout the country. Although national health-care leaders did not explicitly promote Western medicine, as colonial opinion leaders like De Vogel had done, they never contemplated indigenous or local medical practice as a frame of reference. The contents of their projects and the existence of international support reveal the continuance of the domination of modern medicine (or biomedicine), which is predicated on science, in this pursuit of rural health. The ambition to achieve rural health by Western standards was overwhelmingly great, but it was difficult to attain this goal with the limited number of trained personnel the state then had at its disposal.

Simple Solutions for Overwhelmingly Complex Problems

To solve the discrepancy between the government ambitions and the disappointing reality, national leaders realized the time had come to exercise more control over their medical personnel. Consequently, three laws were passed to regulate a more rational distribution of health-care specialists. These laws were the first laws issued by the Ministry of Health. In this section, I shall begin by describing the content of the laws and the legislative process, arguing that the complexity of the demand at the local level was actually accorded scant consideration in the legislative process. The preference was given to ‘national needs' and the discussion concentrated on the professional liberty of the specialists to set up practice where they wished.

Ever since the end of the colonial era, the task of assigning doctors had been in the hands of the central government. In 1940, out of 703 government-employed doctors only eighty-nine were employed by local governments (Indisch Verslag 1941, II:78–79). Hampered by the lack of doctors outside the major urban centres in Java, local governments repeatedly requested the central government for the placement of more doctors in their respective regions. Juggling with this problem, the Law to Give Authority to the Government for Distributing Doctors according to the Interests of the State (kepentingan Negara) had begun to be discussed even before the unitary state came into being (Antara 25-7-1950).

In June 1951, the government passed three acts. The first, Law 8/1951, required newly qualified doctors and dentists to work for the government for three years before being granted permission to set up as an independent practitioner. The second, Law 9/1951, prohibited the opening of new medical practices by doctors, dentists, and midwives in areas declared closed by the Minister of Health. The third, Law 10/1951, gave the government the authority to
requisition the services of private doctors temporarily in such ‘times of crisis’ (keadaan jang genting) as natural disasters, epidemics and other major calamities (Lembaran Negara 1951, No. 44, 45, 46). Law 9/1951 was implemented by the Ministerial Decision of 15 August 1951, prohibiting the opening of new medical practices in a number of the most important urban centres: Jakarta, Bandung, Semarang, Surabaya, Medan, and Malang; subsequently Makassar was declared closed in October 1951, Palembang in December 1954, and finally Tanjung Karang and Pangkalpinang in January 1955.12

It would be interesting to know why the Ministry decided these bills were necessary and on what grounds the said cities were declared closed to new practitioners. Unfortunately, no records of the internal discussions in the Ministry of Health have survived in the archives of the Ministry. Nevertheless, the discussion in Parliament does give some insight into the argumentation used to support the bills. The Ministry of Health presented each of the three bills first to a Committee from the national Parliament (Panitia Permusyawaratan), then to an Ad Hoc Committee (Panitia ad hoc), set up to discuss the bills for four days, and only then to the Plenary Session (Rapat Pleno) of the Parliament. No records have survived of the proceedings in either committee, but the minutes of the Plenary Session, of 20–21 June 1951, still exist. The following analysis of the argumentation of the Ministry is based on proceedings of that Plenary Session.13

In response to the questions posed earlier by the Ad Hoc Committee, Minister of Health Leimena explained that these drafts were based on the ideals embodied in Article 42 of the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia of 1950, which stated that the government should never cease to make a sincere effort to improve overall hygiene and public health. The Committee had asked for clarification about what criteria the government used to decide that a serious shortage of medical specialists existed in a region or, conversely, decided that a certain city had enough specialists. The Minister only answered that his choice of certain regions expressed the ‘reality’ of the local needs without giving particular numbers or other hard criteria from which to evaluate the demand at the local level.

The discussion in the Plenary Session showed the Parliament was basically prepared to go along with the government plans. The main point of discussion

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13 Perpustakaan Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat, Jakarta (Perpustakaan DPR), Risalah Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat 1951: Rapat 88 (20-6-1951) and 89 (21-6-1951), pp. 5183–5254.
was the question of whether it was fair that only newly graduated medical personnel be obliged to work for government, and that only medical specialists, and not other specialists such as lawyers, were required to fulfil this obligation, which restricted their professional liberty to exercise their specialty. The Minister did not give an unambiguously satisfactory explanation of the first point, merely considering it a psychological problem for the new graduates, which was less important than the ‘real’ needs. On the second point of friction, the Minister said that a basic law on the utilization of specialists (doctors, lawyers, teachers and so on) was being considered by other ministries. If such a basic law expressed the same idea as that in his bill, Minister Leimena argued a generic law for all specialists presented no problem but it would take five to ten years for it to reach the stage of legislation. Pending such a law for all specialists, it was better to pass these bills of the Ministry of Health first and make doctors ‘pioneers’ (pelopor). The term pelopor was coloured by its meaning derived from the vanguard of freedom fighters during the Indonesian Revolution; this positive connotation cannot have eluded the members of Parliament less than two years after the revolution. Finally, Leimena made a vaguely worded emotional appeal reminding his audience of the difficulties experienced by people far from cities and followed this by an evocation of the ‘spirit of Independence Day’ (semangat dari 17 Agustus 1945). On the second day of the discussion, these three bills were passed with the general consent of the members of Parliament.

The public reaction did not diverge greatly from the tenor of the parliamentary discussion. It seems that only those medical specialists mentioned in the laws were seen to be the interested parties. Only these specialists personally and their professional associations had previously been consulted. University students from the Faculties of Medicine in Jakarta and Surabaya sent the government the resolutions of a students’ meeting, which rejected the draft. They argued that restrictions placed only on newly graduated specialists and on new practices were not the right way to tackle the problems, because the former did not really solve the present shortage of specialists and the latter would protect vested interests. Nevertheless, they did basically agree on the need of a rational geographical distribution of specialists and requested the government consult more representative groups, not just the Ikatan Dokter Indonesia (IDI, Association of Indonesian Physicians).14 As had been the case with the

14 ANRI, Kabinet Presiden RI 633, letter Mahasiswa Fakultas Kedokteran Jakarta dan Surabaya kepada Presiden RI, surat pernyataan tanggal 17, 21-4-1951 tentang tuntutan supaya RUU pembagian tenaga-tenaga ahli kesehatan secara rasional ditinjau kembali; Antara 17-4-1951.
questions asked in Parliament, this request does not seem to have been considered grounds for making a policy change by the government.

It is difficult to say whether there was any reaction from the public over and above this or to discover how other specialist organizations reacted. Apart from the materials I obtained from newspapers and archives of requests, there seems to have been no reaction. Moreover, it appears that these laws were not widely disseminated through any concerted public information campaign. In the more than fifteen newspapers and Antara News Agency Report of the 1950s I checked, I came across only three reports that the bill had been passed. Moreover, I found only three newspaper reports, sometimes just in passing, about the closure of a city to new medical practices (Antara 15-8-1951; Merdeka 21-8-1951; Pemandangan 22-8-1951). All of these were news items pure and simple and there were no opinions or reactions reported.

Even though these laws authorized the government to utilize newly graduated doctors and to close several big cities to doctors who wished to establish a new practice so as to ensure an equal distribution of doctors throughout the country, their impact on the actual situation was minimal. At the moment at which it was passed, Law 9/1951 already contained a loophole: government-employed doctors were allowed to open a private practice to supplement their income. Hence, whenever government posts were expanded, a new opportunity to set up a new private practice opened up as well. In fact, in the 1950s there were many government projects to build new hospitals and to open new faculties of medicine or research institutes, which necessitated just such an expansion of posts. These activities were especially prevalent in provincial capitals, that is, precisely those cities closed to new practices. Furthermore, in response to a 1953 resolution by the Ikatan Dokter Indonesia, the exception was extended to retired government doctors who had worked for the government for more than fifteen years and had been granted an honourable discharge (Antara 2-5-1953).

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15 Antara 21-6-1951; Harian Umum 25-6-1951; Pemandangan 2-8-1951. Besides the Antara News Agency Reports (Antara), the following newspapers were checked: Berita Indonesia (Jakarta), Fikiran Rakjat (Palembang), Harian Indonesia (Bandung), Harian Penerangan (Padang), Harian Umum (Surabaya), Indonesia Berjuang (Bandjarmasin), Kedauratan Rakjat (Yogyakarta), Malang Post (Malang), Merdeka (Jakarta), Pedoman Rakjat (Makassar), Pemandangan (Jakarta), Soeara Rakjat Sumatera (Palembang), Suara Merdeka (Semarang), Trompet Masjarakat (Surabaya), Waspada (Medan). I was helped by Irwan Yudhi from Universitas Indonesia, Ida Liana Tandjung and Budi Kristanto from Universitas Gadjah Mada. I would like to convey my sincere appreciation to them.
Besides the loopholes in the laws, there was a second reason the laws intended to distribute doctors more evenly proved difficult to implement: the number of doctors who graduated each year was quite small in the 1950s. One professor reported that only three students from among 57 candidates actually sat their final examinations at the Faculty of Medicine in Surabaya and even the older medical faculty in Jakarta produced only 30 graduates per year at most (Harian Umum 7-2-1952). It was also reported that only 84 doctors were produced in the four-year period 1950–1953, just at a time most of government doctors were approaching retirement age (Harian Umum 7-12-1953). Even if most of the new graduates had been posted to rural regencies or had filled the vacancies caused by retirement, these were far from enough, as the students had anticipated in their above-mentioned resolution of 1951.

I have not found exact numbers to show the distribution of doctors for the whole of Indonesia in government materials from the 1950s. However, newspapers often reported that local governments, local parliament members, or non-governmental organizations had demanded more medical personnel or facilities and had complained about a lack of health specialists. Between December 1953 and August 1957, 27 requests for health specialists and medical facilities from local mass organizations were forwarded.16 So, in spite of the insistence of the national government that it fostered ‘good health for the whole society’ in contrast to its colonial predecessor, in reality people in some places complained there were fewer facilities and fewer medical staff than in the colonial period.

Some cases reveal the diversity and complexity of the problem well. In 1951, according to the Head of the Health Service of Malang, there were 47 doctors, both government and private, in the Residency of Malang, which came down to one doctor to 66,000 people. Of these 47 doctors, only three worked in the regentschap (district) of Malang, the rural area; in other words there was just one doctor to 400,000 people. Nevertheless, it was still thought that, compared to other rural areas, relatively speaking the regentschap had enough doctors. Before the war there had still been five doctors in the regentschap, two more than in 1951, and the newspaper concluded that now most doctors generally lived in town (Malang Post 16-7-1951, 3-8-1951).

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Another case, from the Kahayan Hulu District, South Kalimantan, was reported in *Indonesia Berjoeang* in 1954. The district consisted of three sub-districts and 110 villages (kampong) with a total population of 30,000 people, mostly Dayak, situated in the inland from where it was difficult to reach the city of Banjarmasin, at least by land transport. In 1934 the population requested the regional government (the Resident in Banjarmasin) to station a doctor (tabib) in the interior and the next year, in 1935, the request was granted. Then, with the profits they had obtained from rubber, the population built hospitals and a doctor’s residence. Subsequently, the upheaval caused by the Japanese occupation affected medical care, but another doctor did sustain medical care in the area. After Independence, when this other doctor opted to go into politics and moved to Banjarmasin, the area was consequently bereft of any physician. For years no heed (perhatian) was paid to people’s requests for doctors (*Indonesia Berjoeang* 3-8-1954).

*Trompet Masyarakat* (31-10-1955) reported the shortage in Blitar, East Java, in 1955. There had been five doctors in the colonial era, but now there were only two. The mayor said that the government’s efforts had failed to bear fruit because doctors did not want to open a practice there. He explained that, unlike the situation in colonial times when many Dutch people worked for plantations or sugar factories, Blitar was now considered a less profitable place than other big cities.

The final example is the Organisasi Patien Pejakit Paru-paru (Organization of Lung Disease Patients) at the Hospital in Pematang Siantar, North Sumatra. This organization requested the President, Minister of Health and other authorities to station doctors specializing in lung diseases there, as from before the war up to 1956 there had been only one or two lung specialists.\(^\text{17}\)

These four cases show the complexity of the demand on the ground, which was ignored by the promoters of ‘rural health’ in the national capital. Some rural societies lost their access to modern medicine, which in colonial times had been possible on the plantations (in Blitar) or in areas of smallholder export agriculture (in Kahayan Hulu). At some places, Pematang Siantar, for example, even specialist care had been provided to local population in colonial times and had since disappeared or diminished. The economic changes which accompanied the political decolonization and the other physical disturbances in the turbulent 1940s affected people in rural areas negatively. The national leaders, who discussed the matter collectively and simply, ignored the

\(^\text{17}\) ANRI, Kabinet Presiden 656, letter Penderita-penjakit Paru-Paru RSU Pematang Siantar to Presiden, Menkes, RSU Pematang Siantar, DPR Kabupaten Simelangun, DPR Kotapradja Siantar, 30-4-1957.
difference in impact from place to place. Nor was this the only fly in the ointment. Local variations in medical care were also the outcome of another factor. When the central government considered the question of where to place medical personnel, it demanded the local government or the community supplement the fringe benefits, especially housing. Inexorably, the financial condition of local governments, which differed greatly from each other, mattered. In some cases plans to post a doctor were cancelled because it was impossible for the local government to provide housing (Antara 17-10-1952; Pikiran Rakjat 13-1-1953; Harian Umum 24-6-1953).

As a consequence, feelings ran high as it was believed that doctors or other health specialists were still concentrated in an urban setting, perhaps even more than before (Malang Post 16-7-1951, 3-8-1951; Pemandangan 6-5-1954; Pikiran Rakjat 2-6-1956). As these cases show, the shortage in medical provision was felt more by those people who had already enjoyed its benefits in colonial times. The situation was made even more complicated because to boost national pride and to meet the need for premier medical care, more modern facilities were needed in administrative centres. Those places already touched by modernity refused to relinquish these facilities. How little changed in the 1950s becomes apparent from the national distribution of doctors recorded around 1964 (Table 2.2).\textsuperscript{18} Despite all the efforts made by the government, provincial capitals and other big cities received the lion’s share of the allocation of medical staff, and rural areas were hard done by. Indeed eleven districts were still completely without doctors.\textsuperscript{19}

In a nutshell, the newly independent Indonesian government gained formal state control over the distribution of medical personnel by law. The legislation process focused on the sole issue of whether doctors had the professional liberty to settle where they pleased; this professional liberty was challenged by full government control. The state control was legitimized by an appeal to ‘national idealism’. The upshot of this scrambled situation was that the state control of the distribution of medical personnel failed to achieve the ideal of

\textsuperscript{18} The list named Daftar nama dokter-dokter Dep. Kesehatan dan penempatan\textsuperscript{a}nya, found in the library of the Departemen Kesehatan, does not give the year in which the list was compiled. As it includes doctors of ‘Dwikora’, a slogan meaning the Confrontation with Malaysia after 1963, and as Sulawesi was already divided into four provinces, I assume this list was compiled around 1964. Dwikora doctors were included among those who were waiting for placement.

\textsuperscript{19} I counted the number of districts (kabupaten) on the list without the names of doctors. There is a possibility that districts that had never been allocated a doctor were not included on the list. Another source comments that there were thirty-three regencies without doctors even as late as 1969 (Sumbung 1972:58).
### Table 2.2 Distribution of doctors by province around 1964

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Number of government doctors</th>
<th>Doctors in provincial capitals and other cities</th>
<th>Districts without a doctor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Atjeh</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Banda Atjeh 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sumatera Utara</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>Medan 31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sumatera Barat</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Padang 13</td>
<td>Pesisir Selatan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djambi</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Kota Djambi 9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riau</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Pekanbaru 11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sumatera Selatan</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>Palembang 34</td>
<td>Muara Enim</td>
</tr>
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<td>Tandjung Karang 12</td>
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<td>Djakarta Raya</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djawa Barat</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>Bandung 56; Bogor 10</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Djawa Tengah</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>Semarang 74;</td>
<td>Bandjanegara</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Surakarta 31</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djogjakarta</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Kota Djogja 24</td>
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<tr>
<td>Djawa Timur</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>Surabaja 94; Kota Malang 35</td>
<td>Bangkalan</td>
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<td>Bandjarmasin 12</td>
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<td>Samarinda 7</td>
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<td>Bonthain</td>
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<td>Den Pasar 14</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>916</td>
<td></td>
<td>11 districts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Another 272 doctors were waiting for placement.

**Source:** Daftar Nama (1964).
‘rural health’. This failure was caused partly by the insistent call for (more) modernity in the major urban centres, which overrode and undermined the call for equality. Another cause, which contributed to the failure, was that the prescription demanding the even distribution of doctors was too simplistic in the face of the overwhelmingly complex reality. After all, the really alarming dearth of qualified personnel had to be solved if national leaders meant to achieve both modernity and equality.20

Seeking Other Solutions for the Shortage of Medical Personnel

If the problem really could be reduced to the shortage in medical personnel, the solution was obvious: the government should increase their number. In this section, I show how the government did indeed try to increase the numbers of personnel and on which groups of personnel it focused.

In some countries, especially in the early stages of state building, priority is given to quantity. Quality has often been allowed to go by the board. This is done by enlarging the scope for gaining qualifications by the expedient of simplifying the training, by including traditional providers or by institutionalizing auxiliary personnel. For instance, the government of Japan allowed traditional medical providers to obtain modern medical qualifications by simplifying the examinations to allow them to practise at the end of nineteenth century (Hashimoto 2003:117–120). In China, ‘bare foot doctors’ at the commune level enjoyed great fame in the 1960s and a similar system also existed in Vietnam (Purcal 1989; Beresford 1995).

Interestingly enough, despite the enormous dearth of qualified medical personnel, the Indonesian government did not choose to adopt such methods. One reason was that the national leaders in the health sector, who consisted mostly of doctors, absolutely refused to acknowledge other auxiliary personnel as legitimate medical providers. As I have said, the mantri were categorized as nurses who had no legal right to practise medicine independently, a restriction which had been carried over from the colonial period. In 1952, the Minister of Health, Dr Leimena, issued an announcement (maklumat) stipulating that medical practice was unconditionally a job for doctors whose professional position was protected by law. Nevertheless, it was possible to take some judicious measures (tindakan bidjaksana) on private medical practice provided by

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20 Also compared to the neighbouring former colonies, the number fell far short. Moreover, Antara reported that, according to the UN Statistical Yearbook, the Indonesian ratio of doctors to people, 1 to 71,000, was lower than in African countries (Antara 15-4-1957).
nurses, whose speciality was to care. He showed compassion for the economic difficulties suffered by nurses at the time, but stated in unequivocal terms that medical practice was the exclusive right of doctors. Doctors had followed a specialized educational training, and nurses or mantri should only be allowed to practise under a doctor’s supervision. One reason the Ministry found it difficult to pass on more responsibilities to mantri was the fact that auxiliary personnel were educated in local hospitals, and their training was not supervised by the central government.21

When this proclamation was reported in newspapers and on radio, the Persatuan Djuru Kesehatan Indonesisa (PDKI, Indonesian Nurses’ Association) reacted strongly. They perceived it as an insult and accused the government of unfairness in allowing government doctors to pursue private practice in office hours. The Minister hastened to make his excuses and to insist he had intended no offence. He was forced to apologize both publicly and in Parliament (Antara 7-2-1952, 20-2-1952, 21-2-1952; Harian Umum 25-6-1952). Even after this incident, the government continued to rely on the medical expertise of nurses or mantri to supplement local needs (Antara 15-2-1953). The point was that national leaders needed the nurses, but could admit them only in governmental institutions, as the leaders wished to protect the doctors’ market. The upshot was that neither the role nor the presence of nurses working as medical providers was to be either admitted or discussed publicly.22

If nurses were banned from acting as formal medical providers, were any other categories created for auxiliary medical providers on a local basis? This never seems to have been discussed. The Japanese occupation authorities did establish a school for auxiliary doctors (Hodjoi Gakko) and a (medical) technical college (Senmon Gaku) in Semarang to educate nurses and junior high school graduates for each role in 1944, but these two schools were closed at the end of Japanese occupation (Panitya Peringatan 1976:128).23 After the closing of the two Japanese schools, no such schools or plans were ever heard of again.

Only the school for assistant pharmacists, which was also founded in the Japanese period, raised some discussion in the 1950s. As there was no school for pharmacists in the Netherlands Indies, qualified pharmacists were also few and far between after Independence. In 1953, assistant pharmacists or assistants apprenticed to certified pharmacies were allowed to head a pharmacy

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21 ANRI, Kabinet Presiden RI 641, Menteri kesehatan, Maklumat II 19-1-1952 tentang praktek dokter oleh mereka yang tidak berhak (onbevoegd).
22 This ambivalence has continued to the present time (Sciortino 1995).
23 I have not obtained any further information on these schools so far. On the strength of its name, it is even unclear if the latter was expected to educate medical personnel.
independently for five years under the Law 4/1953 on emergency pharmacies and the schools to train assistant pharmacists were expanded. In 1959, after due consideration of the still unsettled situation, this law was extended for another five years. At this point in time, Indonesia had about 200 qualified pharmacists and 2,000 assistant pharmacists. To give these assistant pharmacists a chance to become qualified pharmacists, Faculties of Pharmacy opened special courses in which they could continue their studies. These special courses were seen as a transitional measure. I refrain from going into this discussion or the problems encountered in pharmacies, but this measure to establish proper courses for auxiliary personnel and to upgrade them in a time of transition would have seemed more rational had the government really meant to train and distribute enough medical personnel. In reality the measures were only applied to doctors.

Two government measures to solve the shortage of doctors were of some importance. The first of these was to employ doctors from overseas. Just after the transfer of sovereignty, the Indonesian government commenced recruiting doctors on a three-year contract basis (Antara 3-11-1950). Foreign doctors began to come in 1952 and at one point more than 300 foreign doctors were working for the government (Antara 12-3-1952, 5-2-1955). It is unclear when and how this policy was discontinued. Most of the contracted doctors seemed to have returned to their homelands after their three years had elapsed. It is highly likely the scheme stopped around 1957 when nationalistic sentiment increased and simultaneously the number of Indonesian medical graduates began to rise.

The policy of contracting foreigners was not always welcomed by society. The Ikatan Dokter Indonesia (IDI, Association of Indonesian Physicians) stated that the salary of foreigners should not be much higher than that of indigenous doctors and repeatedly expressed their discontent with the difference in treatment (Pemandangan 10-12-1952; Merdeka 8-12-1953; Antara 18-1-1954). In some places minor health staff went on strike or submitted petitions objecting to the policy or attitude of the imported doctors to them (Pikiran Rakjat 29-9-1953; Antara 5-5-1955, 11-6-1955). Generally speaking, however, the need for these foreigners weighed more heavily than the problems they created and there were never any drastic alterations in the policy to attract foreigners before it silently petered out. It was not so much the objections of Indonesian medical staff, but other factors which ultimately ended the recruitment of foreign doctors. Bringing in doctors was not cheap and their quality

24 Perpustakaan DPR, Risalah Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat 1959, Masa Persidangan II, Rapat 57 (27-5-1959), Rapat 58 (29-5-1959) and Rapat 59 (1-6-1959), without pages.
was not always guaranteed, because the doctors were not selected but had applied personally. Moreover, in due course it had become more and more difficult to obtain foreign doctors (Antara 25-10-1956).

The second solution to the shortage of doctors was to improve the efficiency of medical training in Indonesia and to raise the standard of graduates from Indonesian medical faculties. As mentioned above, the numbers of doctors produced per year were very small in the early 1950s. Although the number of medical faculties had increased from three in 1950 to twelve in 1963, this growth did not portend a quick end to the shortage of doctors, since it took time for qualified graduates to come through (Panitya Peringatan 1976:130-131). Consequently, from a very early stage, there were calls for the reform of medical education (Harian Umum 7-2-1952). The Ikatan Dokter Indonesia made resolutions to augment the quality of the medical training in both 1952 and 1953 (Pemandangan 20-12-1952; Harian Umum 7-12-1953). However, as the education of doctors was the responsibility of the Ministry of Education and Culture, the Ministry of Health could not change the curriculum.

A major change was initiated in the educational programme for quite another reason. The Universitas Indonesia (UI, University of Indonesia) decided it had to increase the numbers of its own lecturers, in particular as Dutch lecturers had begun to leave Indonesia just as student numbers were rising. After a few twists and turns, an ‘affiliation’ programme with the University of California was commenced informally in 1952 and was made official in 1954. To hammer out the new system, in 1954 the Faculty initiated a Panitia Kurikulum (Curriculum Committee) to change the system (Tjokronegoro 1956; FKUI 1960a:16–17). The biggest change introduced was that the length of the education was shortened from seven to six years. The programme was shortened by abolishing what was known as the free system (sistem bebas), inherited from Dutch times. Under the free system, students had been free to choose their own time of examination without any time limitation but, under the influence of American ideas, the free system was thought to be ineffective and promoting delays. In response, the Universitas Indonesia introduced a system of structural courses with a fixed schedule of examinations, which was called guided study (studi terpimpin) (FKUI 1960b; Pemandangan 6-4-1957; Antara 6-11-1958).25 Under the new scheme, in 1959 the

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25 Another result of this co-operation was that 112 staff members of the Universitas Indonesia were given the chance to study and be trained as lecturers in the USA, for a period of between three weeks to twelve months. Moreover, 38 American staff members from the University of California, including administrative personnel, spent a period of six years in Indonesia (FKUI 1960b). The languages of instruction were both Indonesian.
Universitas Indonesia could produce 158 doctors, of whom 98 had passed through the new system. A university spokesperson declared it was possible to produce more than 150 doctors a year ‘without lowering the quality’.26

It was not just the programme, which was altered; the relationship between students and professors changed drastically. One of the last graduates from the old system told me that in the Dutch system students could be arbitrarily disqualified by a professor as professors were 'like God'; but in the American system students and professors were ‘in one community’ and any students’ failure was attributed to the professors’ inability to teach properly. Although some students expressed dissatisfaction stating that the new system had increased the burden on students, on the whole it was seen as a success and it was gradually extended to other universities (Pikiran Rakjat 5-4-1958; Tumbelaka and Mardjono 1976:70).

Worthwhile though they may have been, these government efforts were as yet insufficient to satisfy the demand for new doctors and also failed to meet the ambitious plans. Even though the shortening of medical education from seven to six years bore fruit in the long run, much water had to flow under the bridge before the structure was changed drastically; Indonesia did not begin to benefit fully from the growing number of doctors until the 1970s.27 In the 1950s, the Indonesian government still seemed to be lacking in initiative or perhaps was unwilling to make structural changes.

The Popular Demand for Doctors: Ambivalent Consequences

How did society respond to the shortage of doctors? Remarkably, apart from the already mentioned ‘requests’ and ‘resolutions’ to increase medical provision in certain regions, little discontent about the inability of the state to do something about the medical services was voiced.28 It was the doctors, rather
than the government, who found themselves the target of public criticism and complaints. Subsequently, these critical public voices were picked up by doctors themselves or by government leaders urging the doctors to shoulder their ‘moral obligation’, echoing the call for doctors to become pioneers (pelopor) voiced by Leimena in 1951.

The first moral appeal to doctors was made in Surabaya in 1951. Several local newspapers criticized doctors of Chinese descent for allegedly often not answering a house call for a doctor.29 Although the root problem was the dearth of doctors itself, and indeed doctors were sometimes right in ignoring a call, as there was no urgency, these Chinese doctors began to organize a rota shift to cover the night hours (Harian Umum 20-10-1951). When the criticism began to heat up again despite the initiative of launching a rota shift, the Surabaya branch of Ikatan Dokter Indonesia also felt impelled to take action. The association sent questionnaires to 130 doctors in Surabaya, of whom about 80 practised privately, asking about their readiness to be on call at night and on holidays. Among the 35 private doctors who responded, only five declared they were willing to work night hours and 27 were prepared to be on call on holidays, but under several specific conditions (Antara 13-12-1951, 6-1-1952).

Another moral call to doctors was made in South Sulawesi. When the provision of medical services in South Sulawesi grew precarious, the Minister of Health, Dr M. Ali (Lie Kiat Teng), appealed to private doctors’ ‘moral obligation’ to work there voluntarily, and referred to the possibility that Law 10/1951 might be invoked to force them to do so (Antara 16-1-1954; Harian Umum 17-1-1954).30 Confronted by the Ikatan Dokter Indonesia, which construed the

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29 A disproportionate number of doctors had a Chinese background. Students of Chinese descent had been entitled to enrol in medical schools since the colonial period. In 1943 the Japanese authorities counted 163 doctors of Chinese descent out of 648 doctors in Java (Jawa Shinbunsha 1944:158). The 1964 list reveals that almost half the doctors on the list had a Chinese name (Daftar nama 1964).

30 Dr M. Ali or Lie Kiat Teng served as Minister of Health from October 1953 to August 1955 in the cabinet of Ali Sastroamidjojo and Wongsonegoro as a politician from the Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (PSII, Indonesian Islamic Union Party). As Minister he installed the Madjelis Pertimbangan Kesehatan dan Sjara (MPKS, Council for Consideration of Health and Islamic Law) and reminded doctors of their moral obligations. His ambivalent personal position as a Chinese Muslim politician is a possible explanation of his strong
reference to Law 10/1951 as a threat, Ali explained that the health of a nation of 80 million had to be the priority of the doctors (Harian Umum 21-1-1954). Moreover, at a meeting with the Semarang Branch of Ikatan Dokter Indonesia, Ali stated: ‘In some places the people themselves were threatening and harassing private doctors, fed up with suffering from the dearth in medical provision’. Ali continued by asking the Ikatan Dokter Indonesia representatives:

Can I say to the people that private doctors, especially those of non-indigenous descent, sincerely feel they are ‘citizens’ [warga negara] of the Unitary Republic Indonesia and feel that Indonesia is their mother country [tanah air]?

Merdeka 22-1-1954

This crisis in South Sulawesi seems to have been solved with the voluntary help of private doctors in South Sulawesi itself (Merdeka 16-2-1954). However, similar appeals to a ‘moral obligation’ continued and swelled to a larger proportion in the middle of the 1950s.

Yet more moral appeals were made to doctors. The mayor of Jakarta gathered private doctors in his office to ask them to work part-time for the government clinics to cover the lack of government doctors and only two doctors from around the 150 doctors present refused the request (Antara 21-10-1954). The Bandung Branch of Ikatan Dokter Indonesia, also spurred into action by the mayor, organized a rota shift for night and holiday hours (Antara 3-2-1955). Observing this rota shift, one of the readers of Pikiran Rakyat from Tasikmalaya complained about the ‘inhumanity’ of several doctors who had failed to respond to a call, when assistance for her child had urgently been needed; the child had died. She consequently urged the Ikatan Dokter Indonesia to supervise doctors more strictly (Pikiran Rakyat 30-6-1955). When similar complaints were made, some doctors tried to explain the situation from the doctor’s point of view and appealed to the understanding and morality on the part of patient. Yet their voice was too subdued to impress the public. Dr Ali Akbar, a member of parliament and also a medical doctor, supported a proposal to set up some kind of agency to supervise doctors’ morality.32 This proposal sparked off a

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31 The term ‘warga negara’ (state citizens) in the original was used only to refer to people whose loyalty was questioned, in particular the Chinese.

32 Dr Ali Akbar from West Sumatra was a prominent doctor from the Islamic community. After Independence he became ambassador to Saudi Arabia, 1950–1954, and then taught
discussion between members of Parliament and Minister of Health Leimena after a child of one of the members of the parliament lost its life under similar circumstances to the child in Tasikmalaya. Leimena admitted that there were doctors who forgot the Hippocratic Oath, but also seized the opportunity to explain the difficulty in building up the number of doctors (*Pikiran Rakjat* 11-11-1955, 16-11-1955; *Antara* 21-11-1955, 24-11-1955).

The inability of the state to solve the dearth of medical personnel in the short run had been transformed into a questioning of the morality of individual doctors by both the government and the public at large. What interests me is that the popular demands or discontent never really developed into a strong surge of public opinion criticizing the state. Instead, the public ‘complaints’ assumed the guise of public backing for, hence legitimized, state intervention in the professional freedom of the small community of doctors. By the end of the period of Parliamentary Democracy, it was already difficult to raise objections to such state intervention in the doctors’ freedom (as had been introduced by the legislation of 1951). The process of state intervention reached its apogee in the period of Guided Democracy with the passing of Law 9/1961 on the conscription of university graduates and the organization of ‘volunteer’ doctors of *Trikora* and *Dwikora* to be stationed in a war zone (*Antara* 26-1-1958; Depkes 1980:94). By that time Ikatan Dokter Indonesia, which had still threatened the government with a strike in 1954 when the Minister of Health had commenced appealing to moral obligations (*Antara* 18-1-1954; *Harian Umum* 22-1-1954), no longer raised a dissenting voice. Instead, Ikatan Dokter Indonesia co-operated with the government in formulating a moral code for doctors. This new strong, in a way arbitrary, control of health specialists was continued under the New Order. In conjunction with the steady rise in the number of doctors as a consequence of the reform of the curriculum of medical faculties described above, the firmer control gained over doctors finally enabled the state to achieve the ideal of having one doctor for 30,000 people at the sub-district level towards the end of the 1970s.

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33 *Trikora* was a slogan to mobilize people to wrest New Guinea (Irian Jaya) from the Dutch.

34 The Dewan Pelindung Susila Kedokteran (Council for the Protection of Medical Ethics) was established in 1959 by Ministerial Decision (Soerat Kepoetoesan Menteri Kesehatan No. 24790/UP/Kab 5-11-1959). The first ethical code was published by the Musawarah Kerdja Susila Kedokteran Nasional (Workshop on National Medical Ethics) in 1969 (*IDI* 1959; Musawarah Kerdja 1969).
Conclusion

In this chapter I have examined the decolonization of one modern state function, medical provision, in the 1950s. In their efforts to distinguish themselves from their colonial predecessors, national leaders in the health sector did not reject modern Western medicine, but criticized its uneven distribution and insisted on filling the gap with the emphasis on rural health. The professed goal of spreading the benefits of national independence to the whole population necessitated the integration of rural health projects into national programmes, by way of the more standardized distribution of medical personnel throughout the country. This tendency espoused by national leaders is not surprising, given their educational background, international support, and not least the rapid development in modern medicine at that time.

Nevertheless, the historical progress depicted in this chapter reveals a more complicated picture of modernity. The first point to consider is that, taking account of the voices complaining about the loss of or deficiency in medical personnel in various places, the uneven distribution of medicine in the colonial period was not determined simply along racial lines or the urban-rural divide, as the national leaders had vaguely suggested. Actually, the distribution of medical provision was a patchwork experience of modernity, which was influenced by the modern sector economy. A more careful examination of the relationship between the economic conditions and the exact status of medical provision in each place before and after the war years will be a necessary step in future research.

The second point, which emerges, is that national leaders in the health sector, who took over the state health administration from their colonial predecessors, inherited the standard already set by the colonial experience. The discussion of the quality of medical education and the scant consideration given to the possible employment of other medical providers revealed a strong conviction in the importance of scientific expertise. Western medical science was at top of the hierarchy and should be used to fill the voids in medical provision in outlying areas of Indonesia. Whether this choice was right or wrong, this claimed universality of science restricted the workable arena for national leaders to (re-)establish the state function in their own way.

As a consequence, state control of the placement of medical personnel was the most important measure taken. Voices initially raised to defend professional liberty were quelled in the course of the 1950s. Gradually strong state control over medical personnel, especially doctors, was justified by reminding the doctors of their moral obligation toward their patients. This aspect of the doctors’ calling was voiced by the population in the form of complaints, which
were subsequently picked up by national leaders as a jumble in sore need of reorganization. The shared assumption that the state should assume responsibility in medical provision and that medical personnel should sacrifice themselves for the sake of the nation had prevailed. In sum, the state function as a provider of medicine had been strengthened by the complex experience of modernity in decolonizing Indonesia.

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(Post)Colonial Pipes
Urban Water Supply in Colonial and Contemporary Jakarta

Michelle Kooy and Karen Bakker

Introduction

Like many megacities in the South, Jakarta's water supply system is highly fragmented. The formal water supply system reaches less than 50 per cent of the city's inhabitants; extending to mostly higher income areas of the city, the spatial distribution of the piped water supply system recalls a scattered archipelago rather than a homogeneous network (Bakker 2003). The majority of Jakarta's residents make use of a variety of highly differentiated sources – bottled water, vendor water, shallow and deep wells, public hydrants, network connections – to meet their daily water needs (Kooy 2008), often relying exclusively on water provided, managed, delivered outside of the network (Bakker et al. 2008; McGranahan et al. 2001; Surjadi et al. 1994). Indeed, a significant proportion of households with connections to the networked water supply system continue to rely primarily upon other sources of water supply given low water quality and low network pressure.

This fragmentation of access to water supply and sanitation has been characterized as one of the key development challenges for the South in the next century. Halving by 2015 the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation is one of the Millennium Development Goals established by the international community at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg (2002). The World Health Organization estimates that 1.1 billion people worldwide do not have access to safe drinking water, and 2.4 billion are without access to adequate sanitation (WHO 2004). An increasing proportion of users without access to adequate water supplies live in urban areas; despite residing in a metropolitan...
Various authors have explored why this fragmentation has emerged, and attempted to explain why it has proved to be so generalized and persistent in cities in the South (see, for example, Balbo 1993; Graham and Marvin 2001; King 1990). However, many of these analyses are predicated on the assumption of a modern infrastructural ideal of universalized, homogeneous provision of networked utility services; their central concern is with the ‘fragmentation’ which these supposedly universal networks are experiencing. In addition to presuming the existence of this universal network, most of the analyses applied to interpret the conditions of water access in Jakarta also presume the goal of universal access through a centralized networked system (Graham and Marvin 2001).

In contrast, this chapter chronicles the historical construction of Jakarta’s urban water supply system to illustrate how the city’s water supply has always been fragmented. Our analysis of the absence of an urban infrastructural ideal in Jakarta explains the persistent fragmentation of access in Jakarta as the product of (contested and contradictory) colonial and postcolonial government. We assert that the flows of water in the contemporary city of Jakarta must be understood as a historical product, both of colonial infrastructure and discourses. We are wary of any simplistic comparisons between the colonial past and present, but – in agreement with other scholars (for example, Myers 2006) – we believe that a postcolonial optic is necessary to unlock crucial elements of colonial legacies. Specifically, we argue that the optic of postcolonialism provides the understanding required for dissecting the power relations which continue to structure access to water supply and urban space in Jakarta, a dynamic which complicates Northern-rooted narratives of urban infrastructure, and also the developmentalist narratives of international aid and multilateral financial organizations.

We employ a framework of (post)colonial governmentality to explore the interrelationships between urban governance and infrastructure in Jakarta. This analytical framework is operationalized to understand how power operated through discourse and material practice to shape access to water supply in Jakarta, from 1920–1960. Documenting how relations of power were materialized and contested via hydraulic networks through the project of colonial government in the early twentieth century, and through later attempts of postcolonial governments to modernize selected spaces in the city through the provision of large-scale water supply projects. The case study that follows uses this framework to demonstrate how (post)colonial relations of rule both shaped, and were shaped by the material and discursive
differentiation of water supply networks, urban spaces, and urban residents in Jakarta.

Colonial Control: Governing Urban Water, Urban Populations, Urban Spaces

The history of Batavia’s urban water infrastructure begins with the rise of the sanitary city in the nineteenth century, in which a new discourse around water, identity, and citizenship emerged and was articulated to a new system of colonial authority. In the following chronology of the development of a modern urban water supply in colonial Batavia we begin with the construction of the artesian and piped spring water infrastructure prior to the 1920s. This is necessary, as it illustrates how the construction of the city’s water supply infrastructure was, from inception, intersected with constructions of the civilized and modern colonial subject. Governing water in the colonial period, implied and enabled new categorizations and divisions: most importantly, the delineation of the public into different categories of populations (European versus mixed races versus native; hygienic versus contaminated), which guided the pattern of provision of these first urban water supply systems.

By the end of the 1920s, after five decades of development of the city’s water supply system, only 7 per cent of the European colonial residents consumed 78 per cent of the city’s piped water supply.\(^2\) This is explained by the conflicting ethical mandate of the colonial government in the last years of colonialism: the mandate to uplift versus desire to dominate; the project to modernize but yet retain distinctions and hierarchical relations between authority and subject. These conflicting mandates explain why the construction of the first centralized water supply system intended for eventual universal coverage facilitated new fragmentations of populations and urban spaces.

Artesian Water Supply (1870–1920)

The problematic of urban waters and the unhealthy city plagued the colonial town of Batavia from its founding in 1619. High rates of mortality in the 1700s that demoted Batavia from the Queen to the Graveyard of the East were attributable to water borne disease (Abeyasekere 1987); however, prior to the nineteenth century there were no direct links made between the health of body

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\(^2\) In 1929, 6,926 kampong households were supplied with 24 L/s, while 10,392 European households were supplied with 84 L/s. The European population in Batavia in 1930 was 37,067, while the native Indonesian population was over 400,000 (Eggink 1930).
and consumption of a standardized quality of clean water, and concerns regarding the health of the city and its citizens focused more generally on the urban environment’s ‘killing vapours’, and miasmas (Blussé 1985). Flight from the contaminated spaces and surrounding populations characterized by death and disease was the only solution, and European residents repeatedly tried to escape the *ziektenhaard* (breeding ground for disease) by continually moving southwards away from the northern old city.

It was not until the mid-1800s that connections began to be made between healthy urban spaces, populations, and water supply, motivating the first significant governmental intervention into the production of a hygienic water supply, enrolling the governance of a new urban water supply within the government of a newly emergent city and its citizens, and marking the beginning of our genealogy.

In 1873 the central government, represented by the Raad van Indië (Council of the Indies) in Batavia, concluded a decade of commissions investigating the problem of water supply for Batavia by financing the construction of a series of artesian wells. From 1873–1876 seven wells were drilled, with all costs covered by the central government (Maronier 1929), and the architecturally elaborate communal hydrants located in the central areas of the city provided – free of charge – an emerging new class of European population with a secure, scientifically monitored water supply.

The production capacity of the artesian water supply system increased along with the influx of an entrepreneurial European population who brought with them domestic habits and habitats from the metropole. In 1920 at the end of the era of artesian water, there were 28 wells and 12 reservoirs with a capacity of 750 m³, providing an increasingly clustered European urban population with a modern water supply through individual house connections (Maronier 1929).

The new mentality of colonial government which arose in the late 1800s was central to the ways in which Batavia’s water supply was first problematized, and then addressed through interventions constructed as rational solutions. When the artesian water supply began construction in 1870, the management of the colony shifted from the *Cultuurstelsel* (Cultivation System) monopoly, a form of colonially administered market capitalism (Robison 1986). The purpose of colonial government subsequently altered from being an estate

3 In the last quarter of the nineteenth century the resident, ‘mixed blood’ or *Indische* population and their characteristic lifestyle was gradually eliminated in favour of a more rigid, racialized European population and domestic milieu (Milone 1967; Taylor 1983).

4 Between 1890–1920 the number of European men in the colony doubled, while the number of European women increased by almost 300% (Locher-Scholten 1997; Van Doorne 1983).
manager of a vast government plantation to that of facilitator of private sector participation. The provision of public infrastructure to facilitate private sector profits (providing the conditions for capital) thus justified the modernization of urban infrastructure, and inaugurated unprecedented government-led initiatives to combat public health issues threatening the image of the colony as a place for private sector investment (Argo 1999). The project of creating a modern city with all of the attendant infrastructure to support the influx of European bodies and European capital was begun, setting in motion a process that would change the urban landscape and the relationship between urban populations (see Milone 1967).

Paralleling the government’s new strategy for ensuring the colony’s economic security was a new level of concern for the health of particular kinds of colonial populations. Prompted by a scientific understanding of water introduced by recent application of microscopes and the study of bacteria, new connections made between water supply and human health began to rationalize government investments and initiated the development of new discourses around ‘safe’ water supply sources and water use practices. With the advent of new scientific technologies, the definition of water – its properties and potentials – became standardized, with the methodologies of analysis and scientific properties of water circulating through the professional journals of Europe. In the Netherlands Indies, an increasing uniformity of taste and understandings of quality was fostered by analyses of drinking water quality by military doctors (Moens 1873). Amongst the colonizers, previous appreciations for the distinct qualities of different waters (with specific properties of water linked to treatment of specific ailments, or religious rituals, see Hamlin 2000) were to be replaced by a more unified understanding of water as defined by a scientific analysis of its biophysical properties, since it was

questionable whether there has been enough care [by the European population] to purify the water [...] concern for hygienic water supply is often remarkably neglected by otherwise very civilized people and the inherent danger is very little respected.

Moens 1873:311

The shift from recognizing many waters of various beneficial properties, to only one scientifically defined nature for water with its quality determined

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5 From the 1870–1890s, the construction of railways, harbours, steam-powered trams for intracity transport, and electricity networks paralleled the construction of the city’s water supply network (see Mrázek 2002).
negatively (in other words, by what it did not contain) precipitated the development of centralized systems of water supply throughout the world (see Melosi 2000). Within the Netherlands Indies this new understanding of water also circulated a new discourse around modern identities and development that re-rationalized colonial authority upon the basis of technological mastery and increasingly racialized the previous class based divisions between urban spaces and urban populations (see Milone 1967). In other words, the colonial authority which imposed European domination upon an indigenous population was now constructed as legitimate because of its advanced technical and scientific knowledge about the relationship between water and health. As is further documented in the following paragraphs, the use of clean versus unclean water sources by European colonial residents in comparison with indigenous residents was seen to demonstrate the rationality of colonialism, and naturalize racial divisions.

With the influx of a new kind of European population leading the wave of private sector penetration of the colony (Gouda 1995), the development of increasingly homogeneous, modern, and distinctly European settlements were to be provided with a modern, hygienic water supply. As ‘science was giving completely different insights concerning hygienic requirements’ (Maronier 1929:230), traditional water supply sources (surface water) were now rejected as contaminated, necessitating their replacement by a centralized, controlled, and scientifically monitored artesian water network. Facilitating the emerging concentration, and isolation of new European neighbourhoods within the city centre (see Abeyasekere 1989), the new class of European colonials became increasingly removed – both physically, and temporally – from the unhygienic native populations who remained ‘in the past’, still crowded alongside the traditional surface water sources that they continued to rely on for all of their water needs (Argo 1999).

The connections established between knowledge of the scientific properties of water supply and an individual’s status as developed underpinned the construction of a new hierarchy of waters, and of water users. The continued use, and preference, of untreated surface water by native populations for drinking, bathing, and washing served to reinforce in a variety of ways the superiority and advanced knowledge of the purified and modernized European population and led to the production of a discourse linking undeveloped native bodies with surface water, disease, and contamination. The fact that ‘natives take pleasure bathing, washing, and defecating in streaming water [demonstrated] their insensitivity to cleanliness and order’ (Van Leeuwen 1920:198), and the recorded distaste of the native population for artesian water (Van Breen 1916) – a water supply that required a time consuming
and expensive process of aeration and cooling before consumption – seemed to affirm their evident lack of modernity, and their status of non-citizens within a modernizing urban landscape. Remaining reliant upon the traditional and unscientific properties of water (colour, clarity, taste, smell) to determine its quality, native water users were ‘not yet modern’, and actively excluded from membership within the public that the artesian water supply was built to serve.

The division of urban spaces and populations according to their racialized level of modernity and development was incorporated into the water supply infrastructure of the late nineteenth century. Intended to help define what was then a rather racially ambiguous European population (Stoler 1997), the artesian water supply provided a hygienic, safe water supply, and cleansed a problematic, heterogeneous European population that had begun to jeopardize the strategy of colonial domination based upon demonstrated racial superiority (Stoler 1997). By locating the artesian hydrants within the emerging concentrations of new kinds of European settlements, the provision of urban water supply was in line with the overall governmental strategy to both discursively and physically secure a more modern, more European, population. As subsequent phases of the development of the city’s water supply network channelled even more modern waters through later pressurized piped networks, the fragmentation between different kinds of urban populations, urban space, and water supply continued to be guided by the physical and discursive artefacts of the artesian hydrants.

Throughout the first decade of the twentieth century, the increasing advancement of European water supply from non-piped provision to private household connections was made possible by the initial construction of the artesian water hydrants and reservoirs within European spaces of the city, and high reservoirs and piped networks providing a pressurized water supply to European households contrasted with the emerging development of the ‘corporeal networks’ of native water vendors serving the native population, a pattern of provision still evident in present day Jakarta (Figures 3.1 and 3.2).

**Hydraulic Modernity: The Development of the Spring Water Network (1920–1945)**

The second phase of colonial intervention into urban water supply emerged after the composition of a demonstrably different European class of citizen was secure (Milone 1967; Van Doorn 1983); then the colonial administration turned to the task of constructing a new kind of native population. Seeking to address the increasing anti-colonial critiques calling for a more ethical and humane government of the Netherlands Indies (Gouda 1995), the 1901 Ethical
Figure 3.1 Water vendors in Batavia filling gas jerrycans with artesian water from a public hydrant (1918)
Source: Drost (1918: plate opposite page 54)

Figure 3.2 Water vendor in North Jakarta filling ‘pikuls’ of water from a public hydrant (2005)
Photograph: M. Kooy
Policy laid out intentions for new relations between the population and the state, partially materialized through the construction of a better quality and quantity of water supply that would increase the possibility of eventual universal distribution. Repositioning itself as a parental caretaker of the native population, the state was still authoritarian in nature, but now with the development of the native population into modern, self-productive citizens at the heart of its policies. The new priorities, purposes, and political strategies of government (both central government and the newly established municipal government of Batavia, in 1905) were embedded in the changing rationalities around urban water supply. Public health and economic efficiency (of water supply and of the population as a whole) became sometimes contradictory guiding principles determining decisions made about urban water: the selection of technology (high pressure versus low pressure networks; public hydrants versus household connections), water supply sources (spring water versus artesian water), and patterns of provision for different populations.

Although the transition between what was now described as an inadequate and antiquated artesian water supply system and a modern, centralized, high pressure, spring water supply stretched out over two decades, from 1900 to 1920, colonial chroniclers describe the technological shift as though it were a notable break with the past eras of water supply, indicating the significance invested in this material symbol of a new kind of government (Maronier 1929). With the transition to the spring water network, water production capacity increased to over 350 L/s, reservoir size grew from 780 m³ to 20,000 m³, the city network was extended by over 150 kilometres (Smit 1922), and best of all – the water from the pipes could be used straight out of the tap without need for purification, or cooling, as was the case for artesian water. The planned provision of 90% of European households with a supply of 140 L/capita/day (Van Breen 1916) enabled a new kind of life,

impacting to the Batavia house a more European character [...] as most bathrooms have nowadays a shower from which the fresh water from the tap may be showered over the body.

GEMEENTE BATAVIA 1937:70

Based upon scientific knowledge developed in the West, for Western cities, demonstrating technological mastery over the health conditions thought
Residents of the urban kampongs in the beginning of the twentieth century were not only native, but also included lower class European residents. Residential segregation between the planned European neighbourhoods and the urban kampongs were based on socio-economic class as well as race, although scholars such as Stoler (1997) have noted the imbrications of class with race by the colonial government in its concern to uphold the moral superiority of the European population.

The new colonial project of modernizing the native population, and the need to urbanize their traditional habits around water supply not considered conducive to the modern city supported both the construction of the spring water network and subsequent interventions of the colonial government into these problematic urban spaces. As articulated at the time, if it was ‘the intention of the Municipality to keep the population out of the kali’s [canals],’ there would naturally have to be an alternative supply provided – a hygienic supply would have to be ‘more easily placed under everyone’s reach’ (Van Raay 1915:142). Public health professionals in the Netherlands Indies believed that

> the first requirement for improving kampong conditions is seen as the adequate supply of good drinking water [...] adequate supply is important because every necessary reduction [in supply for natives] can lead to the use of suspect water,

Gomper 1916:11

and so previous plans for the spring water network only intending to supply to the European (profitable) areas of the city were revised, and the cost calculations increased from eight and a half to ten million guilders in order to extend the supply into kampongs (Van Leeuwen 1917).7

Identified as a crucial strategy for securing public health, and an important component of government’s mandate to develop a modern, productive, and efficient native population, the spring water supply to native communities was at first provided free of charge from public hydrants (1922–1926). However, as the financial health of the newly established municipal water supply company (1918) became strained by the high costs of construction of the spring water pipeline,8 the efficiency of the native population was targeted for

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7 Residents of the urban kampongs in the beginning of the twentieth century were not only native, but also included lower class European residents. Residential segregation between the planned European neighbourhoods and the urban kampongs were based on socio-economic class as well as race, although scholars such as Stoler (1997) have noted the imbrications of class with race by the colonial government in its concern to uphold the moral superiority of the European population.

8 The spring water supply network eventually went between two to five million guilders over its original budget (Eggink 1930). The total cost of the spring water network system was
improvement, and the payment for water supply was justified on the grounds that a new system of valuation around water supply would help to develop more economically efficient users. Water that was paid for would ‘gain more value in the eyes of the [native] population so that it is no longer wasted in despicable ways’ (Brandenburg 1924:153). When the municipality established a system of paid delivery in 1926, formally appointing existing native water vendors to sell water taken from the public hydrants at a determined profit margin (Eggink 1930), the introduction of new economic regulations around water supply through a system of ‘paid kampong water delivery’ were supposed to circulate a new understanding of water, and its economical value – a key aspect of a modern mentality – amongst the kampong population.

As the municipal distribution network was paid for by the city, and not the central government, this was important for the fiscally conservative municipal council who financed only two of the total nine million guilders needed to build the spring water network. The increasing costs to the municipality for its ‘free water’ supply budget as a result of increased use by native households was documented from 1920–1924; in 1920 the municipality spent only 54,000 guilders on ‘free water’, but by 1924, it paid out 120,850 guilders (Eggink 1930). However, after the regulation of 1926 charged a cost price of 60 cents/m³, native residents returned to their traditional habits, resulting in a corresponding decrease in demand for network water supply in native areas (Maronier 1929). As recorded by colonial engineers, there was a dramatic reduction in the demand for networked water in the kampongs after the implementation of the paid water delivery system; by 1927 the budget for ‘free of charge’ water had dropped from 120,850 guilders to only 6,000; by 1930, ‘concerning the free of charge water provision, so little is being expended that the amount of it is not expressed in the company’s budget anymore’ (Eggink 1930:63).

The use of hydrants and water vendors for kampong water supply was described as a merely transitional measure, an early stage in the development of universal water supply, because the willingness and ability to pay for direct connections of all kampong households was expected to follow from the adoption of sufficiently efficient and economically rational identities by the native population. The development of the native population into modern citizens whose health, economic productivity, efficiency, and aspirations led them into a higher socio-economic class would ‘stimulate water use from
house connections’ (Maronier 1929:236). At the same time, whoever was not motivated to maintain a sufficiently modern, economically rational, and hygienic lifestyle was subsequently displaced, as the necessity of recovering the costs of the expensive iron pipes that stretched 53 kilometres between the spring and the city meant that the occupation of these predominantly native urban spaces now modernized through the provision of piped water supply were only affordable to a certain class of urban resident. The provision of water supply services and other improvements to the kampong areas increased land values and house rents, and moved poorer families to the outskirts of the city boundaries, or to more undesirable unimproved kampongs (Van der Wetering 1939). The changing demographic composition of these improved areas into middle class housing areas (Abeyasekere 1989) was reflected in the decreasing number of hydrants, and increasing number of house connections within improved kampongs (see Maronier 1929). The poorer segment of the native population subsequently moved out from the modernized kamponds in the urban centre to the outskirts of the city, while those areas with piped water became populated by the new administrative middle class of salaried Indonesians, and Eurasians (Abeyasekere 1989; Van der Kroef 1954). As the ‘silent battle for living space’ (Van der Wetering 1939:315) continued to displace native communities for the building of new European residential districts and associated services (railways, tramways) (Wertheim 1956), the spatial separation of two increasingly distinct urban societies was also in part facilitated by the spring water network.

Reflecting the conflicts contained within colonial policy, the ‘raising up’ of a relatively small percentage of the Indonesian population entailed creating new divisions of urban populations, urban spaces, and access to services, along the new colonial hierarchy of modernization. Modern natives, with suitably economically rational and productive identities motivated to improve their socio-economic status occupied urban spaces provided with networked urban water, and the larger lower class of undeveloped Indonesians still reliant upon day labour and low paying wages remained in the un-serviced areas of the city, or moved outside of the municipal boundaries altogether (Van der Wetering 1939). Urban water supply also embodied other conflicts that became acute in the last years of the colonial government. The colonial project to modernize

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9 With the cost of a connection to the network set at 25 guilders, monthly fees for meter rental (0.5–1.5 guilders) and the cost of the actual water being 0.30 cent/m³ (Jaarboek van Batavia 1927), networked water supply was well out of reach for the average native resident, when ‘the largest category of the native city population can not pay a rent of five guilders/month’ (Van der Wetering 1939:325).
but yet retain distinctions and hierarchal relations between authority and subject explain why the construction of the first centralized water supply system intended for eventual universal coverage facilitated new fragmentations of populations and urban spaces.

With a design that planned for 140 L/day to be distributed to 90% of the European households in Batavia, in contrast to an expected delivery of only 65 L/capita/day to only 33% of the native population (Van Breen 1916), the European population consumed the vast majority of the water from the spring water network.\(^\text{10}\) Provided with a convenient supply of water piped directly into the home, and delivered at a higher pressure than through hydrants, European households naturally (or, as expected and designed) came to use the majority of this water supply. With the worldwide depression in the 1930s, and the drop in colonial economy because of falling sugar prices, the campaigns of kampong improvement ended, along with the Ethical nature of colonial government policies (Cobban 1974, 1988; Coté 2003).\(^\text{11}\) By the time the colony’s economy had recovered, and programmes of kampong improvement were resuscitated in 1938–1939, the Second World War had begun. Suffice it to say, up until the end of Dutch colonial occupation access to the city’s public services remained limited to Europeans and a very small section of the native population whose living standards had improved.\(^\text{12}\)

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\(^{10}\) In 1929 European households comprised only 7% of the population, but consumed 78% of residential urban water supply (see footnote 2).

\(^{11}\) From 1927–1931, 1.25 million guilders was spent on improving kampons in cities throughout Java, with the central government paying 50% of the costs; after 1931 government funding stopped, only to be revived again in 1938 when 500,000 guilders/year was again allocated to be distributed amongst all urban areas in the colony (Cobban 1974, 1988).

\(^{12}\) Although income disparities amongst the native population grew during the last years of the colonial economy, there is no doubt that it was disparities between rather than within ethnic groups that continued to be the most obvious as income gaps even increased during the 1930s. In 1939 a European made 61 times the average Native wage, while a Chinese worker earned eight times the average Native wage (Booth 1988).
events including Japanese invasion, the return of Dutch colonial government, and the subsequent War for Independence – the city’s spring water supply system was all but destroyed (Fischer 1959; Van der Kroef 1954). With a rapid increase in urban population, the capital city of Jakarta emerging as the centrepiece of the new nation of Indonesia, the postcolonial development of Jakarta’s urban water supply system was quick to follow formal independence.

As in the previous eras of the artesian and spring water networks, the physical changes to the city’s water supply system materialized the introduction of new relations of rule. With the construction of the first two large scale surface water treatment plants (Pejompongan I & II) replacing pure mountain spring water with treated surface waters (enabling a much larger volume of production at lower cost), a new nature of urban water supply was produced to flow through the new citizens and spaces of the postcolonial city. Physically, the transition from colonial water supply technologies – to the postcolonial placed the priority on water quantity over quality, in order to provide a larger volume of water for the growing Indonesian population migrating to the capital city of Jakarta. However, the (post)colonial water supply priorities also discursively represented the rescuing of surface waters (and their users) from the past and their connotations with contamination by treating them through Western technologies, thus reinforcing the transformation of colonial Batavia into independent Jakarta. By 1957, Pejompongan I was operational, adding 2000 L/s of treated river water to the network; Pejompongan II (completed in the mid-1960s) later added another 1000 L/s (PAM Jaya 1992a).

However, just as the new surface water supply continued to be distributed through the colonial piped network, the discourse embedded within previous layers of urban water infrastructure continued to guide postcolonial patterns of supply. Newly modernized surface water supply was still limited to a particular kind of urban population – the symbolically modern spaces and citizens of President Sukarno’s Jakarta. In short, urban water supply in postcolonial Jakarta came to reinscribe colonial patterns of provision within the postcolonial city.

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13 Population increased in Jakarta from 823,000 residents in 1948, to 1.8 million in 1952 (Abeyasekere 1989).

14 The spring water source did continue to contribute a small portion of the city’s water supply up until 1994; in 1957, after the completion of Pejompongan I the colonial spring water supply would have provided between 15–30% of the total production capacity (see PAM Jaya 1992a for details on water production capacity over the years).

15 See Leclerc (1993) for a discussion of the politics of Sukarno’s production of urban space.
At the outset, national government investment to increase the capacity of urban water supply by 3000 L/s could have been envisioned as the first steps of a new nation towards the democratization of urban water. Following the damage to the colonial water infrastructure during the wartime period, the existing system was incapable of meeting water demands from the rapidly growing population of Jakarta (Hanna 1959). The production of a new source of water to increase the volume of supply could be interpreted as a first effort of a new kind of government to serve its newly emancipated citizens, reclaiming public water as the government began to reclaim key industries and land from the colonial owners and its corporations (see Robison 1986).

However, this was not the case; the postcolonial centralized water supply network was important for its symbolic significance within a modern Jakarta, rather than its ability to provide water to city residents. Just as the first postcolonial investments into the city’s urban water supply reflected the rationality of the ‘city beautiful movement’ whereby President Sukarno envisioned national greatness to be expressed through the physical transformation of Jakarta (Geertz 1963; MacDonald 1995), the networked water supply remained limited to certain modernized areas of Sukarno’s ‘monumental’ Jakarta. Although not often recognized as a material component of this political programme, the geographical location of the water treatment plants, and the spatialization of networked water supply that they enabled demonstrate their material and discursive functions in this new rationality of rule, and reveal the mechanism by which colonial patterns of supply were inscribed within the postcolonial city.

Viewing the spatial relations between the urban water infrastructures and the other monumental structures of the ‘city beautiful’ movement, the significance of the water supply infrastructure to the national government project of an internationally modern Jakarta becomes visible, in a way that its subterranean presence usually obscures. With the location of the water treatment plants within the centre of the representative modern spaces of Sukarno’s Jakarta (Figure 3.3) the piped network mirrors the above ground highways and flyovers built to connect the modern elements of the city, and was neatly positioned by the government to channel the increased flows of water to follow the new flows of international traffic into modern areas of the city, simultaneously excluding the vast majority of un-modern spaces and populations from both spatial proximity to, and services from, the network.16 The significance of the

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16 The construction of the Asian Games complex and adjacent inner-city thoroughfare involved the removal of 47,000 kampong residents, moving them out of the central areas of the city needed for these modernist monuments and relegating them to the periphery (Abeyasekere 1989), beyond the boundaries of the water network. After the construction
Figure 3.3 Reach of primary and secondary water pipes, 1950s

Map drawn by Eric Leinburger

Note that water supply network does not reach a large proportion of the city, with gaps in coverage concentrated on the peri-urban fringe. Higher coverage is found along the modern 'spine' of the city stretching from Monas to Pondok Indah.
new urban water infrastructure to the image of the nation was such that the central government provided all of the money for the construction of Pejompongan I, the argument given that Jakarta's water supply was part of the national project, not just for Jakartans (PAM Jaya 1992b).17

With people from all corners of Indonesia coming to Jakarta (PAM Jaya 1992b), investments into a centralized water network serving the international centres of the city served the function of demonstrating a modern nation to the visitors; Jakarta was a ‘modern city, with modern ways and urban conveniences’ that (for some) drew the intended comparisons to other world cities, such as Paris (Van der Kroef 1954:157). Supporting the more frequently recognized components of Sukarno’s Jakarta – the Asian Games complex, Indonesia’s first international standard hotel (Hotel Indonesia), the high rise development along Jalan Thamrin-Sudirman, and the new upper class satellite city of Kebayoran Baru – the network water supply helped to brighten the beacon of Jakarta as it projected Indonesia upon the world stage.

The limited provision of piped water outside of this symbolically modern space in the centre of the city was therefore not a ‘failure’ of the government to invest in public infrastructure, but rather an integral part of a broader political strategy. As with the rest of the city’s monuments that were planned to ‘subsume the sober realities of life in Jakarta’ (Kusno 1997), the investments of the first postcolonial government into Jakarta’s urban water supply were intended to remind the nation (and Jakarta’s residents) not of what they currently were, but what they (and the kinds of modern identities) they should aspire to. In the light of this nationalist discourse circulating through urban water supply, the fact that the majority of the urban population could not afford to connect to the network, or could not afford to use the water even if they were connected to the network (Fischer 1959) was not a failure of government to achieve the modern infrastructural ideal. Rather, postcolonial rule in the first decades after independence maintained the splintered nature of urban water supply through its rationality for the modernization of Jakarta.

Recognizing the Pejompongan I & II water treatment plants as part of Sukarno’s modernist monuments illuminates the ways in which colonial discourses around modernity, urban water, and citizenship were inscribed into postcolonial Jakarta, and rescues them from their obscurity in the history of

\[\text{of Pejompongan I piped water was reported to be available to only 12\% of Jakarta’s population (Fischer 1959).}\]

\[\text{17 The central government later provided 50\% of the costs of Pejompongan II, with the government of Jakarta responsible for the other half of the US$7 million investment (PAM Jaya 1992b).}\]
Excavating this first layer of postcolonial infrastructure also allows us to trace the continuing fragmentation of urban space through water supply, as the tripling of water supply in the central, internationally modern, areas of the city was both produced by and productive of postcolonial distinctions between modern/un-modern urban spaces and citizens. With the additional 3000 L/s of postcolonial waters supporting the production of a ‘new space intended to be different from both colonial Batavia as well as the surrounding sea of poor urban neighbourhoods’ (Kusno 2000:52), the different natures of urban water circulating through selective areas in the city supported the government’s intended differentiation between these areas of the postcolonial city. Divisions established between the kampong and the modern city were reinforced by the national government’s consistent exclusion of kampongs from network access, leaving the majority of the non-modern residents to continue their historic (precolonial) reliance upon open wells and surface waters (Argo 1999).

In contrast to the kampong, where absence of piped water remained the norm, substantial investments were made to both rehabilitate and expand water supply into upper class residential areas of Jakarta. Recognizing certain kinds of residential areas of the city as part of the modern Jakarta (those that were planned, formal, and demonstrated rational spatial arrangements along orderly roads), the old colonial neighbourhoods in the central areas of the city were laid with postcolonial pipes, and new neighbourhoods constructed for the Indonesian elite in the south were immediately included within the modern strip of the city, connected both to each other, and to modern waters through the postcolonial network. Kebayoran Baru, the satellite town originally planned by Dutch post-war government in 1948, had already been fitted with 17 km of network pipes prior to postcolonial government, and pipelines from Pejompongan I were laid to channel its new waters into these modern urban dwellings now occupied by the Indonesian elite. In contrast, the migrants streaming into Jakarta during the 1950–1960s settled in open spaces of the city, with an increasing density gradually creating ‘vast block interiors

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18 Pejompongan I & II were each built at a cost of approximately $7 million US (PAM Jaya 1992b) but these significant investments are not addressed in either discussions of Sukarno’s monumental Jakarta (see Kusno 2000; Leclerc 1993; MacDonald 1995), or the history of public infrastructure in Jakarta (see World Bank 1974; Hamer, Steer, and Williams 1986; Chifos and Suselo 2000). The familiar argument that Sukarno’s government neglected public infrastructure in favour of public monuments ignores the construction of Pejompongan I & II as both public infrastructure, and a monument for the modernization of the city.
that became the sites of the unserviced urban kampong’ (Cowherd 2002: 173). In continuity with colonial patterns of provision, postcolonial urban water supply remained limited to modern areas of the city.

These patterns of provision remained the norm throughout the next three decades, as the subsequent New Order rationality of urban water supply both maintained and exacerbated the previous (post)colonial patterns of provision: layers of New Order infrastructure continued to benefit selectively targeted areas of the city, and the majority of the city’s poorer residents continued to rely upon non-networked water supply, as the New Order’s promise of development excluded these areas of the city (see Jellinek 1991; Kusno 2000).19 Public hydrants to provide access to clean water in kampongs, non-existent under President Sukarno, were still a rare occurrence in kampongs in the late 1970s (Argo 1999), and the few that did provide services repeated the discriminatory economic policy of the earlier colonial era. Until the mid-1980s public hydrants charged higher tariffs than those paid by the individual household connections to middle and upper income households, creating a perverse cross-subsidy from the poor to the middle and upper classes which persisted for the next two decades.20

Conclusions: Flowing from Past to Present

In documenting the genealogy of water supply in Jakarta, this chapter has argued that the city’s water supply network has been highly ‘splintered’ (Graham and Marvin 2001) since its inception, and the roots of this highly fragmented pattern of water access lies in the colonial era. This spatial fragmentation of supply continued to be a pattern of growth inscribed into the postcolonial development of Jakarta’s waters, and was therefore not substantially altered by the rise of the ‘modern infrastructural ideal’. Documenting how a contested and evolving process of social differentiation of classes and races was linked to the differentiation of water supply infrastructures and of

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19 In 1994, over 60% of the upper income population had direct access to network water supply through household connections, but only 10% of the kampong residents were directly connected (Azdan 2001; Cestti, Batia and Van der Berg 1994; Porter 1994; JICA 1997).

20 Until the early 1980s, household tariffs were 25 rupiah per cubic metre for the first 15 m³/month; public hydrants and water trucks paid 60 rupiah per cubic metre, more than double the tariff of households, and more than even small businesses, who paid 50 rupiah per cubic metre. Lower prices for hydrant water were only introduced in the mid-1990s (Kooy 2008).
urban spaces, we traced the legacy of the colonial constructions of urban water supply and citizenship within the postcolonial city.

We began our story at the moment of the first major colonial intervention into urban water supply – the construction of a system of artesian wells in Dutch Batavia in 1870 – and followed the development of urban waters through the first two decades of Indonesian independence. As illustrated, the direct and indirect exclusion of much of Jakarta’s kampong residents from access to piped water supply was articulated with both colonial and postcolonial practices of governance, which reinforced the spatial and social fragmentation of the city. In each period, the division of urban spaces, and the city’s inhabitants into categories of modern and non-modern served specific political economic ends: the reaffirmation of Dutch sovereignty and racial superiority, as concretized in the provision of artesian, and later networked water supply solely to colonial neighbourhoods; the success of Sukarno’s postcolonial ‘guided democracy’ as epitomized in water treatment plants serving as ‘monumental architecture’ connecting elite areas of the city.

Examining the urban water infrastructures of the colonial and postcolonial governments and the accompanying rationalizations and discourses that legitimated these interventions and prevented others, we have demonstrated how an ongoing fragmentation of Jakarta’s water supply accompanied its concurrent (and current) centralization. We explain the operation of these seemingly contradictory processes as the product of both colonial and postcolonial attempts to differentiate people by class and by race, and to create a modern governable subject. We argue that the project of producing modernized, liberal, productive, ethical and obedient colonial citizens within a hygienic and economic urban environment entailed not only physical re-workings of urban space, but also discursive re-workings of the rationalities supporting water supply delivery; the associated classification of types of urban citizens was actively translated into differentiated urban spaces which persist in the contemporary city. This imbrication of water and constructions of citizenship is a persistent feature of the urbanization of water supply, and is still visible in the contemporary project of modernizing urban spaces and urban citizens according to neoliberal rationalities.

This genealogy reminds us that we should be wary of viewing cities such as Jakarta through a Northern lens, and provokes the need for alternative analytical frameworks acknowledging the city’s (post)colonial construction. In Jakarta, fragmentation of utility services such as water is due not to the recent trends of ‘splintering urbanism’ characteristic of cities in the North, but is due rather to a model of urbanization with roots in the colonial era that has produced persistent patterns of differentiation of spaces, classes, and races. Using
a postcolonial perspective to interrogate the contemporary urban geography of Jakarta is – like in other cities of the South (see Myers 2006) – necessary in order to unlock the crucial elements of colonial legacies. The contemporary lack of access is not simply due to neoliberal trends in urban governance. Rather, the roots of disconnection and disenfranchisement are structured within patterns of governance that have been materially inscribed in the city’s infrastructure over the past century. This analysis underscores the limitations of conceptual frameworks predicated on an ideal-type of homogeneous and universal modern infrastructure networks, and reinforces calls for alternative theories of urbanization in the South.

References


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21 The involvement of the private sector in water supply, devolution of governance to lower orders of government, or deregulation of the water sector have all occurred in Indonesia over the past decade.


Netherlands Indies Town Planning
An Agent of Modernization (1905–1957)

Pauline K.M. van Roosmalen

Introduction

This chapter focuses on the evolution of town planning in the Netherlands Indies from the beginning of the twentieth century onwards and on the role this – at the time – still new discipline played in the modernization of the Dutch colony and independent Indonesia. What made development in the Netherlands Indies remarkable is that twentieth-century town planning, alongside other disciplines, contributed to a significant extent to the colony’s modernization. The chapter does not go into concrete town plans, but is in large part devoted to reflections on town planning by architects and local administrators, framed in the administrative context and against the background of the specific conditions in the Indies. Architects and town planners followed trends in their field back in the Netherlands rather closely, adopting, for instance, the idea that the city should be seen as a coherent entity, that general expansion planning and even regional planning were necessary to that end, that statistical data and a survey were indispensable for the formulation of large-scale planning, and that traffic was an important factor to be considered in the formulation of a town plan.

Town planning not only played an important role in the modernization of the Netherlands Indies, but also in the social integration of the colony. In the plural society of the Netherlands Indies, ethnic boundaries hindered social interaction. State policy often targeted, explicitly or implicitly, one ethnic category. Town planners, in contrast, increasingly looked at the city as an organic whole, in which people from all ethnic and social backgrounds had to find a place. Town planners therefore championed not just the interests of European inhabitants, but increasingly also the interests of the indigenous population as well as ‘indigenous’ approaches to resolve problems. The result was the gradual emergence of a modern town planning quite specific to the Netherlands Indies: inspired by architecture and town planning trends in the Netherlands while adapted to local conditions.

The grounds that underpinned and steered Netherlands Indies town planning ran parallel to and to a certain extend accommodated and facilitated the
socio-political developments in the Netherlands Indies: the gradual transition from the Netherlands Indies, a colony that until 1942 was governed by the Dutch, to Indonesia, an independent state from 1949 onwards. The approach and application of town planning evolved analogous to this evolution. The colonial cities of the early twentieth century, in which rulers and the ruled lived and worked in accordance with their own cultural customs, evolved in the course of 50 years into Indonesian cities, in which different urban quarters were defined by social and functional rather than ethnic criteria. The course of this evolution is recorded in numerous discussions and debates in which the political and administrative context was often determinant.

This chapter also describes the gradual expansion of the domain in which the town planner was able to operate in the colony and, for a couple of years, in the independent republic. This expansion, spurred by locally imperative developments, was facilitated and sanctioned by the colonial central government in Batavia. The start of this evolution – and consequently of the emergence of Netherlands Indies town planning – was the Decentralization Act of 1903 (Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indië 1903/329). Until the enactment of this law, the Netherlands Indies had been centrally administered by the colonial authorities in Batavia. The creation of local councils, independent entities with their own administrative and financial responsibilities established in accordance with the Decentralization Act, changed all that. It was the establishment of these local councils that created the conditions for the development of a Netherlands Indies town planning practice. In the years following the proclamation of the Decentralization Act, the administrative scope of the municipalities expanded steadily, inwardly as well as outwardly. Town planning echoed this trend closely. The first and most prominent administrative and financial responsibility of the local councils – soon dubbed town councils – concerned the construction and maintenance of public works.

Obviously, the local administrators – and town planners – had to take the social and geographic circumstances of the towns in the Netherlands Indies into account. They were working in a multi-ethnic society to begin with. The major division was formed by a legal tripartite division into three broad ethnic categories. Besides a relatively small group of Europeans, the Netherlands Indies were inhabited by indigenous people and the so-called Foreign Orientals: Chinese, Arabs, and Indians. While there was no rigid segregation between the different ethnicities and they frequently came in contact with one another in the course of doing business and daily routines, the different ethnic groups by
and large lived in separate areas. Not that this geographical distribution was entirely exclusive: besides ethnicity, financial means were also a factor in settling in a particular residential area. It was thus possible for well-to-do Chinese, Indo-Europeans, and indigenous people to live in the European areas alongside the Europeans while, conversely, less well-off Europeans and Indo-Europeans lived in non-European areas. Another exception was formed by the indigenous people who were in domestic service and thus often lived on the property of their European and Chinese employers, or in the immediate vicinity. This, however, did not diminish the fact that the Netherlands Indies society was characterized by a hierarchy based on ethnicity, reflected in the layout of its cities and the design of its residential areas.

European districts generally occupied a relatively sizable portion of land, were usually situated in better areas (locations of higher elevation) and featured spacious accommodations (Figure 4.1). Housing and employment were normally kept separate in the European districts. The latter was also partially true in the considerably more densely populated indigenous quarters. The indigenous and other Asian areas consisted of small plots of land with small

![Figure 4.1 Batavia: European houses constructed in the 1920s](source: Nationaal Museum van Wereldculturen, Leiden, RV-10761-96. Courtesy of Nationaal Museum van Wereldculturen)
dwellings, narrow streets, and little public space. What distinguished indigenous quarters from Chinese, Arab, and Indian quarters was that the latter groups usually lived above or behind their businesses while many indigenous people, when being employed by Europeans or Chinese, worked in offices or homes outside their home districts.

Other characteristics of Netherlands Indies towns were their widespread configuration and low population density; these two aspects had profound consequences, in particular from a financial and social standpoint. Widespread built-up areas, after all, meant great distances. Great distances in turn required long infrastructure links and therefore considerable investments in construction and maintenance – investments which the municipalities, given the limited means at their disposal particularly in the early years, often could not afford.

Decentralization as a Stimulus for Town Planning

The expansion and consolidation of the colonial territory during the second half of the nineteenth century, the increase in the number of European private entrepreneurs and the resulting increased needs for houses, schools, hospitals, shops, and cultural institutions led to dramatic socio-economic changes and altered demands with regard to architecture and town planning. In addition, a new political course was initiated, that of the Ethical Policy. The essence of the Ethical Policy was that Dutch colonial policy should no longer merely benefit the interests of the motherland, but also the interests of the colony and its inhabitants.

One of the consequences of the introduction of the Ethical Policy in the archipelago was the decentralization of the administrative system. The Decentralization Act that was enacted to that end, ended Batavia’s century long administrative hegemony over the islands. To assist the Governor General in the elaboration and implementation of the Decentralization Act and to inform the relevant authorities about the objectives and consequences of the new arrangement, a Regeeringscommissaris voor Decentralisatie (Government Commissioner for Decentralization) and a Deputy Government Commissioner were assigned to the Department of the Interior. In accordance with a proposal by the Government Commissioner, a Local Councils Ordinance was enacted in 1905. This ordinance gave the central government the power to establish regional and local councils that, taking existing administrative hierarchies into account, would be able to administer a clearly demarcated territory, using their own financial resources, as they saw fit (Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indië
The denomination ‘local council’ (locale raad) was soon changed to ‘municipal council’ (gemeenteraad); for the sake of consistency the term ‘municipal council’ will be used throughout the remainder of this chapter.

As a result of the Local Councils Ordinance, the first local councils on Java were installed in Batavia, Meester Cornelis and Buitenzorg on 1 April 1905. These were followed a year later by the councils of Bandung, Blitar, Cirebon, Kediri, Magelang, Pekalongan, Semarang, Surabaya and Tegal on Java, Makassar on Sulawesi and Padang and Palembang on Sumatra. Over the following years, more municipalities followed.

One of the most evident consequences of the new administrative system was the direct confrontation of administrators with local issues. This confrontation did not immediately produce fully engaged local councillors and central civil servants – a considerable section of the civil service corps remained mistrustful towards the decentralized principle – but it definitely influenced the way in which cities were administered. The challenge facing the municipal councils was far from simple. Acute housing shortages, inadequate and poorly maintained infrastructure and an obvious lack of administrative experience, combined with limited financial, technical and legal resources, represented major obstacles. The problems were all the more serious because the central government, before decentralization, had done very little in the way of maintaining public works, and had passed on a severely neglected legacy to the municipalities (Woesthoff 1915:24).

An essential problem for the municipal councils, particularly in the early years, was the limited way in which the central government interpreted the decentralization principle. To leave the power of the central government and its civil servants as intact as possible, the operational scope of the municipal councils had been kept to a minimum: the construction and maintenance of roads, including the plants and trees lining them, sewers, water supplies, public slaughterhouses, and covered markets (Woesthoff 1915:228). In addition, municipal authorities were responsible for the provision of fire fighting, cemeteries, ferries, and the collection of refuse along public highways, streets, and squares. Although these tasks were too limited to allow an effective approach to town development and the budget was too limited to appoint the expert personnel to execute these tasks, the municipal councils were highly ambitious (Van der Zee 1927:22).

In addition to this already complicated situation, there were two more factors that severely handicapped the municipal councils in the exercise of their work. One of them was land ownership. As the Topographical Service and the Land Registry had already noted in the nineteenth century, the indigenous
people of the Netherlands Indies abided by an array of land rights of a complexity scarcely imaginable to Europeans. In addition, municipal territories often included many sizable private estates (particuliere landerijen). The consequence of this situation was that when a municipal council wished to carry out a building project on a piece of land to which it did not have legal title, it first had to establish the owner of the title to the plot in question and subsequently negotiate transfer of ownership – a costly and time-consuming procedure that seriously compromised the progress of projects (Van Roosmalen 2008:40).

A second serious obstacle that handicapped municipalities in their work was the lack of jurisdiction over the autonomous indigenous land (desa or kampong) within their municipal boundaries (Van Roosmalen 2008:28–29). This problem had arisen as a result of the enactment of the Municipal Ordinance of 1906 that decreed that indigenous lands fell under the jurisdiction of indigenous authorities, the autonomous desa. A situation that significantly hindered, complicated, and even harmed the execution of town plans and in worst-case scenarios forced town administrations to give up carrying out plans entirely. Although municipal authorities recognized that circumspection in interfering with autonomous desa was warranted – ‘what (responsibilities) had been acquired [could, after all,] never again be left to the kampongs’3 – they nevertheless attempted to persuade the central government of the need for a broader mandate by suggesting two alternatives: abolishing the administrative autonomy of indigenous communities or granting municipalities priority rights to land. Although it took the municipalities more than a decade, the government in 1918 revised the Governmental Code of the Netherlands Indies, which functioned as the Constitution of the colony, in order to empower municipal authorities to carry out public works projects throughout their municipal territory, including the autonomous desa.

Support for Town Planning

The Vereeniging voor Locale Belangen (Association for Local Interests) played an important role in the gradually more accommodating attitude of the central government towards the arguments of municipal administrators and town planners. The Vereeniging voor Locale Belangen, founded in 1912 at the

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3 ‘wat eenmaal tot zich getrokken [was, kon immers] nooit meer aan de kampongs worden overgelaten’. Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, Jakarta (ANRI), Departement Binnenlandsch Bestuur (BB) 1691, letter from the Regeringscommissaris to the Gouverneur-Generaal, 23-10-1905, No 857.
initiative of several members of the Semarang municipal council, was an umbrella organization for Netherlands Indies municipal authorities that served as a platform for local administrators and as an intermediary between municipalities and the government. A year prior to the founding of the association, its initiators had organized what they called a Decentralisatiecongres (Decentralization Congress): a congress at which national and municipal administrators could meet and exchange ideas about a variety of issues related to the local administration. The success of this congress marked the start of a series of annual congresses, organized from 1912 to 1942.

Held alternately in Bandung, Batavia, Malang, Semarang, and Surabaya, these Decentralization Congresses, along with the papers drawn up for these gatherings and the Association’s publication Locale Belangen (Local Interests), were one of the few opportunities for government and municipal civil servants, lawyers and planners to meet, trade experiences and exchange ideas about a broad range of subjects: policy, administration, finances, health and hygiene, housing, and not least, developments in town planning. As the long distances in the archipelago prohibited regular contact, the congresses and Locale Belangen were instrumental in exchanging information and debate.4

While a major part of the debate about town planning and public housing was carried out by professionals, well educated members of the public increasingly began to take an interest in the development of their municipalities as well. In Bandung, for instance, the association Bandoeng Vooruit (Bandung Forward) was founded in 1932: an association consisting mainly of prominent citizens endeavouring to promote Bandung as a place to live and work. Six years later, a similar association called Groot Batavia (Greater Batavia) was formed in Batavia. Among less well-educated people, notably the indigenous people, interest in town planning developments remained minimal: not out of indifference per se, but because other, more basic issues called for their attention and particularly indigenous people, due to a high level of illiteracy and extremely deficient knowledge of Dutch, were barely able to obtain information about administrative and related developments. Only in the 1930s, when publications of reports and articles in Malay became more common, and information was also disseminated over the radio, did this change somewhat.

4 Beginning in 1932 the Vereeniging voor Locale Belangen also published Locale Techniek (Local Engineering). Locale Techniek merged in 1934 with Indisch Bouwkundig Tijdschrift (Indies Architecture Journal), the organ of the Vereeniging voor Bouwkundigen in Nederlandsch-Indië (Association of Architects in the Netherlands Indies), founded in 1898. The merged publication was called Ibrt Locale Techniek. In 1938 the name was changed to Locale Techniek Indisch Bouwkundig Tijdschrift. Publication of the journal ceased in 1942.
In 1938, for example, the indigenous broadcasting company Vereeniging Oosterse Radio Luisteraars (VORL, Association of Eastern Radio Listeners) in Bandung broadcasted Malay and Dutch programmes entitled The Indies city as a social problem, Property rights in the municipalities and Town planning and kampong improvement (Inheemsche belangstelling 1938). Given these titles, VORL clearly aimed at involving all Bandung residents, indigenous and otherwise, in local affairs, including issue related to town planning.

Motives for Town Planning

The initial lack of interest and participation among the majority of the indigenous population in administrative and other municipal affairs did not mean that there was nothing to remedy in the kampongs, the neighbourhoods primarily inhabited by indigenous people. On the contrary, the epidemics of plague and cholera that continued to break out until the second decade of the twentieth century were often a direct result of the exceedingly unhygienic conditions in these neighbourhoods.

As in Europe and in other colonies, in the Netherlands Indies medical experts were first to call attention to the link between the epidemics, public health, and housing conditions. The leading figures in the Netherlands Indies were the pharmacist H.F. Tillema and the physician W.T. de Vogel. Both lived in Semarang and were members of the municipal council. While De Vogel and Tillema pointed out the causal relationship between housing conditions and public health, it was particularly Tillema who explained this link to policy makers and other professionals and tried to convince them of the need for improvement. In the many lectures he gave and the various books he wrote and published (at his own expense), Tillema demonstrated the relationship between construction, town planning, and public health on the basis of statistics, maps and photos of dwellings, estates, vegetation, and streetscapes. (Tillema 1911, 1913, 1915–1922; Tillema and Tillema-Weehuizen 1919; Figure 4.2).5 Tillema also repeatedly pointed out that, in order to bring about improvement, it was crucial that the

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5 Tillema financed these publications out of the fortune he earned from the sale of bottled mineral water. He had been a pioneer in developing a market strategy. Buoyed by his experience as a promoter and producer of bottle mineral water as an alternative to the often contaminated water from pipes or wells, Tillema was convinced that, if presented in the right way, the essence of the message about the causes and effects of hygiene, or rather the lack thereof, could be made clear to all and consequently public health would improve (Vanvugt 1993).
way in which houses and residential areas had been constructed up to the early twentieth century should make way for a modern and well-considered architecture and town planning – a change Tillema held to be urgently required, not just from an aesthetic but above all from a medical standpoint.

In their attempt to improve the insalubrious housing conditions in Semarang and other cities, De Vogel and Tillema generated ideas about the modern city. One way of doing this was by presenting the counter-image of the modern city: dirty, disorderly, and impoverished spaces, indigenous and traditionally built quarters inhabited and built by people seemingly ignorant about the hygienic and other shortcomings of their living environment. To overcome this ignorance, education and enlightenment were the first steps towards the process of modernization. It was this process that De Vogel and Tillema helped to instigate.

Although the arguments of Tillema and De Vogel found a receptive audience among the largely leftist-oriented municipal council of Semarang, it was not enough to win the battle. Convincing other municipal authorities and especially the central government required more time and more persuasion. As for the latter, an inadvertent boost for the advocates of improvement came from the kampongs, in particular, where over the years an argument that eventually convinced the central government began to emerge: the ‘warning signs of popular awakening’. Poorly maintained kampongs provided a fertile

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6 ‘waarschuwende verschijnselen der volksontwaking’ (Karsten 1930:159).
breeding ground for this ‘popular awakening’, which had started to crop up as a result of advancing democratization.

The opportunity seized by indigenous intellectuals, starting in the second decade of the century, to champion their own regional, cultural and economic interests and form indigenous political associations, in part fostered the discontent felt by many of the indigenous population. The signals of discontent inspired fear in the central government, leading it on the one hand to pursue a more politically conservative course, but on the other hand to enact measures to counter the indigenous opposition to colonial rule, through the facilitation of systematic urban expansions and improvements, including kampong improvements.

Such was not the situation immediately following the introduction of decentralization, however. As mentioned previously, municipal councils around 1905 were anxiously seeking ways to fulfil their responsibilities in the area of public works and urban development as effectively as possible. One of the solutions proposed in this regard, following the example of the Netherlands, was to introduce a Housing Act in the archipelago. However, after several attempts, at last in 1916 when a draft text for such legislation was finally presented to the central government for approval, the sitting Adviser on Decentralization indicated that he had little faith in the effectiveness of a proposal of this kind. First and foremost, this was because he felt that the housing question was less well-served by a separate Housing Act that primarily and perhaps even exclusively focused on the housing issue than by a housing policy imbedded in a town planning policy. Secondly, his doubts came from the conviction that the most effective element of the Dutch Housing Act, the right to declare houses uninhabitable, was not desirable in the Netherlands Indies due to the archipelago’s wholly insufficient housing stock and the fact that a substandard dwelling was still preferable to no dwelling at all. Thirdly, a Housing Act would not necessarily bring an end to the housing shortage, as evidenced by the situation in the Netherlands. Moreover, the Department of Public Works, due to a chronic shortage of personnel, would not be equipped to monitor compliance with such a law. Last but not least, the Adviser reasoned, the introduction of a national law was in violation of the decentralization principle.

Following the response of the Adviser on Decentralization, the 1916 draft for the Netherlands Indies Housing Act was put aside. More attempts to introduce a Netherlands Indies Housing Act in the archipelago only came to a definitive end when the central government, on 10 May 1926, issued a decree on the regulation of urban developments. This decree, which in reference to its listing in

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7 The Adviser on Decentralization (Adviseur voor Decentralisatie) was formerly known as Government Commissioner for Decentralization.
the appendix to the gazette, the *Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indië*, became known as Appendix 11272, was the first concrete step towards a systematic and integral approach and a legal basis for town planning projects. Appendix 11272 stipulated that municipal authorities could obtain priority rights on land and subsidies for, for example, the construction of roads and sewers, if they submitted a request to this effect, accompanied by an town planning proposal, to the central government (Jansen 1930:148).

Although this decree was a major step forward in terms of the systematization of the town planning practice in the Netherlands Indies, it was in no way the centralized regulation or town planning that municipal administrators and town planners had been advocating for so long.

The central government, however, was not yet convinced of the need for such a regulation in the mid-1920s. Indeed the government rejected the proposal to establish a commission that would consider the drafting of such a regulation, as, according to the government, there was really very little to do for such a commission (Poldervaart 1933:5).

A few years later, during which many, including political, arguments for town planning were put forward, the central authorities finally conceded. The threat of communist revolts in kampongs ultimately convinced the government in 1929 of the need to subsidize their improvement up to 50 percent of the costs. In 1930, two advisory commissions on building and town planning respectively were established. The findings of these commissions eventually culminated in an apotheosis in 1934: the establishment of a Town Planning Commission. It was this commission, of which the majority had also been a member of the two previous commissions, that formulated the legal foundation for town planning in the Netherlands Indies (Instelling Commissie 1934).

**Findings of the Town Planning Commission**

The assignment of the Town Planning Commission was two-fold: making an inventory of the fundamentals of urban development and formulating a legal
town planning regulation for towns on Java and Madura to replace Appendix 11272. The Town Planning Commission presented its findings in 1938 in the form of a Stadsvormingsordonnantie Stadsgemeenten Java (Town Planning Ordinance for Municipalities on Java), along with an Explanatory Memorandum. Although the ordinance would not be enacted due to the Japanese invasion of the Netherlands Indies the Town Planning Ordinance and its Explanatory Memorandum were milestones: earlier than in the Netherlands, they set out the methodological, procedural, and legal principles for town planning.

One of the findings of the Town Planning Commission presented in 1938 was that the situation in the Netherlands Indies at the time was typical of a country or society in development. Politics and town planning had evolved in Europe in a similar way in the nineteenth century as was happening now in the Netherlands Indies. In Europe, as a result of a liberalism and a withdrawing state, responsibility for town planning had been reduced to ensure a certain minimum level of quality for given technical details, such as street and mains construction, and the allocation of abundant funds to roads with a representative function (Toelichting Stadsvormingsordonnantie 1938:96). As this situation gradually changed, the unsystematic approach to town planning issues in Europe was gradually replaced by an integral approach. This shift had produced a rapid increase in town planning legislation and the gradual rise of town planning training and education.

The Town Planning Commission expected that developments in the Netherlands Indies would follow a course analogous to developments in Europe: in the Netherlands Indies too, ad hoc urban development, from which the state distanced itself as much as possible, would gradually make way for an integral town planning practice in which the state would play a central role. The Town Planning Commission saw indications of an evolution in that direction, first and foremost, in the fact that the Commission had been established and in the fact that Netherlands Indies municipalities were increasingly issuing ordinances concerning construction and town planning.

The Town Planning Commission emphasized that, if the issue of urban development were subjected to a centralized approach, the disordered development of towns and urban conglomerations would make way for harmonious towns, operating efficiently in technical, social, economic and political terms. Harmonious, in this context, was not limited to technical or social aspects: it was also explicitly related to the aesthetics of the urban landscape.

A conscious organization of the physical elements comprising a town plan to realize functional and visual coherence was a major departure from the way in which neighbourhoods and towns had been arranged until the early
twentieth century: incidental, unsystematic, incoherent and inefficient. Because the urban landscape expressed the essence of a society:

Certainly the beauty of a city, or at least, at a lower level, its maintenance, orderliness, and comfortableness, are external signs of an internal order and harmony; they are a testament to the character of the society, as are facial features to that of an individual.11

The transfer toward a more conscious organization, the Commission argued, should be given urgent priority (Figure 4.3).

According to the Town Planning Commission, modernization of the city was more than a functional reorganization; it was also an aesthetic ideal. Beauty, in the eyes of the town planners, was order. In addition, a well-kept urban landscape was important because it served a societal interest:

just as children raised in a disorderly and uncomfortable home become slovenly and indifferent, so too, in a people compelled to live in

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11 ‘Zeker de schoonheid, doch reeds, op lager plan, de verzorgdheid, de ordelijkheid en de behagelijkheid van de stad, zijn uiterlijke teekenen van een innerlijke orde en harmonie, zij vormen een getuigenis omtrent het karakter der samenleving, zooals de trekken van een aangezicht omtrent dat van de dragers’ (Toelichting Stadsvervormingsordonnantie 1938:64).
disordered and inhospitable towns, the tendency towards social discontent and disorder is reinforced. The assuredly largely ideal degree of harmony, harmfulness and aesthetic quality of our cities therefore also has a very concrete, indeed virtually political, actual significance.\(^\text{12}\)

The Town Planning Commission felt that urbanization in the Netherlands Indies in the 1930s was characterized by two kinds of problems: concrete elements (construction, traffic, municipal works) and problems of a more general nature such as aesthetics, property rights, and finances. Rather than just identifying these problems, which had been done in a number of publications over the years, the Town Planning Commission also examined their causes. According to the Commission, the first major causes of the identified problems were the mistrust among the population towards the new phenomenon of urbanization and the refusal of many town dwellers to abandon an agrarian mode of living. Furthermore, the layout of towns reflected the colonial policy (*Toelichting Stadsvormingsordonnantie* 1938:78, 80): the amalgamation of various spheres in the colony – indigenous and non-indigenous, an intermediate form (Chinese) and a mixed form (Indo-European) – had produced significant economic, social, legal, and technical differences.

On an administrative level, the Commission observed the lack of an integral approach and efforts to attune regulations to the various tasks and responsibilities of the authorities. It was because of incongruences like these, which had come about because the interconnection between various urban phenomena had not been recognized, that the development of towns had hitherto been less than harmonious (*Toelichting Stadsvormingsordonnantie* 1938:86).

A third cause of an inadequate Netherlands Indies town planning practice, according to the Commission, was the reserved attitude of administrators towards the work of planners. Aside from exceptions, the majority of the administrative apparatus still demonstrated a striking lack of enthusiasm to address urban issues that were in the general interest. The lack of enthusiasm, according to the Commission, was due to the absence of a ‘genuinely felt local

\(^{12}\) ‘zoals in kinderen, opgevoed in een onordelijke en onbehagelijke woning, slordigheid en onverschilligheid worden aangekweekt, zoo zal in een volk, dat moet leven in rommelige en onvriendelijke steden, versterkt worden de neiging tot sociale ontevredenheid en onordelijkheid. De zeker bovenal ideël belangrijke graad van harmonie, schadelijkheid en welstand onzer steden, heeft dus bovendien een zeer concrete, ja welhaast politieke, reële beteekenis’ (*Toelichting Stadsvormingsordonnantie* 1938:64).
patriotism which can be of such major significance to successful urban development'.13

Town Planning Procedures and Increase in Scale of the Plans

The draft for the Town Planning Ordinance described in six sections the methodological, procedural and legal aspects of town planning. To delineate the various concepts under discussion, the first section opened with a listing of definitions of terms and elements related to a town plan that were employed in the ordinance. The second section, entitled ‘On urban development prescriptions’, outlined the elements that should make up a town plan, the contributions and responsibilities assigned to various levels of the administration, the procedures to be followed in drafting and enacting a plan, the duties of inhabitants in terms of compliance with the implementation of a plan, the measures the state was empowered to apply to compel inhabitants to comply if necessary, the various kinds of permits required and, finally, the mandates available to municipal executives and municipal councils in extreme cases if inhabitants did not comply. The section also described the objective and function of a town plan and its attendant prescriptions. It was intended as a guideline for the development of a city or town in accordance with its social and geographical characteristics, seeking a balanced fulfilment of the needs of all sections of the population and the harmonious functioning of the city or town as a whole (Stadsvormingsordonnantie 1938:12).

With reference to public involvement and input, the ordinance stipulated, in part, that interested parties would be able to submit objections to a detailed plan before it was adopted by the municipal council. To provide inhabitants the opportunity to do this, designs were to be made available for inspection at the town hall to all citizens, including those in indigenous communities, for six weeks. The period of public inspection was to be announced in municipal newspapers or in any other locally read publication. The ordinance stipulated explicitly that the mayor, with or without the cooperation of the Resident, was to ensure that the announcement of plans be made in such a way that illiterate citizens would also be informed (Stadsvormingsordonnantie 1938:17).

The considerably more succinct third and fourth sections of the Town Planning Ordinance dealt with the financial aspects of urban development: compensation claims and the cost of tax levies. The fifth section described among others the

13 ‘werkelijk-gevoelde locale patriottisme, dat voor een gelukkige stadsontwikkeling [...] van zoo groote beteekenis kan zijn’ (Toelichting Stadsvormingsordonnantie 1938:81).
powers of the Governor General to void decrees, the responsibilities of the municipalities and the necessity of compiling an annual report. The final, sixth section stipulated that unless they were revised to comply with the ordinance, all current municipal decrees related to urban development would expire within five years, and all current town plans would expire within 10 years of the Town Planning Ordinance coming into effect. It also stipulated that the ordinance would come into effect on a date to be determined by the Governor General.

The jurisdiction of the proposed ordinance was subject to three restrictions. The first, in accordance with the operational scope of the municipalities, was that it did not apply to defence installations, railways and ports. The second restriction was that it would not apply to towns on Java that did not have municipal status (Stadsvormingsordonnantie 1938:9; Toelichting Stadsvormingsordonnantie 1938:105, 112). The second stipulation was motivated by pragmatic considerations. The physical and administrative differences between Java and the Outer Islands, as well as the differences between the mostly urban municipal towns and the considerably more rural regency towns, would have significantly hindered the formulation of a uniform programme. In addition, the Commission members felt that they were insufficiently knowledgeable about conditions in the Outer Islands. Should a need for a Town Planning Ordinance arise in the Outer Islands, however, the Commission was confident that a simple addendum to or revision of the ordinance would suffice to make it applicable to the municipalities in these areas (Toelichting Stadsvormingsordonnantie 1938:105–107). The third restriction was that the Commission had refrained from including regional plans in the Town Planning Ordinance. The reason for this was that the Town Planning Commission considered regional plans to be relating to a wider socio-economically cohesive area – which in the Netherlands Indies could be an island, for instance – and therefore well beyond the scope of a Town Planning Ordinance.

Before the Town Planning Ordinance was presented to the responsible senior official, it was discussed by various professionals (architects, town planners, legal experts, administrators) during the first Planologische Studiedag (Planning Workshop) – an initiative of a subcommittee of the Vereeniging voor Locale Belangen (Association for Local Interests). In general, attendants of the Planning Workshop praised the broad, rational and objective approach of the Town Planning Commission, the ordinance and its accompanying Memorandum.

There was also criticism, however. Many who attended the workshop particularly criticized the Commission’s lack of attention for elementary aspects of the modern planning practice: traffic, regional planning, and ‘planology’. They pointed out that, given the proved impact of motorized traffic on the development of urban areas and given the evident and irreversible nature of this trend,
it was incomprehensible the Town Planning Commission had barely taken these issues into account. To support their argument, the critics referred to the increasing numbers of buses, trams, and private cars which placed new demands on the layout, the construction and the cross section of roadways, while also increasing possibilities to easily cover greater distances and thus generate an entirely different use of space. The effects of the latter were already visible in the Indies towns where the financially well-off segment of the population increasingly settled further away from urban centres and developed a new form of leisure activity: going for a drive in the countryside. To avoid the already extensive towns and cities of the Netherlands Indies from continuing to spread in an unordered fashion, addressing the issue of traffic was of the essence in the late 1930s.

Equally baffling to critics was the lack of references to two recently introduced planning approaches: regional planning and what the Dutch called ‘planology’ (planologie). Regional planning had caught on in the Netherlands Indies starting in 1930, when it became clear that isolated town plans no longer sufficed, because the economic, social, and spatial development of municipalities was intricately linked to the areas surrounding them. ‘Planology’ by 1939 was a nearly 10-year-old interdisciplinary method that combined various disciplines related to analyse various processes that determined the organization, the use and the design of space: geography, sociology, town planning, and research (Bosma 2003:44–45). ‘Planology’ took an academic approach to the challenge of designing the physical space. Through planology, town, regional, national and even international planning would acquire the rational basis it currently lacked, but, according to the critics who attended the Planning Workshop, it so sorely needed.

A major problem that had faced planners in the early days of Netherlands Indies town planning was the lack of data about essential aspects that played a role in drafting a plan and that were also mentioned in the Town Planning Ordinance: the size and composition of the population, as well as growth, birth, and mortality figures. Towards the 1930s, efforts to remedy this had borne fruit after nearly 30 years. Based on reliable statistics on the demographics of the population, town planners in the early 1930s were finally able to estimate the population (breaking down the overall figure into smaller categories) and map urban areas.

Post-War Reconstruction

The professionalization and modernization in town planning in the Netherlands Indies during the interwar period came to an abrupt halt with the Japanese invasion of the archipelago (1942). In 1945, when the war was over
and Japan had surrendered, the geo-political situation was so different from
the pre-war situation that a continuation of pre-war developments in the
Netherlands Indies was far from self-evident. Yet, although the Japanese occu-
pation between 1942 and 1945 and the proclamation of the independent
Republic of Indonesia on 17 August 1945 (only two days after Japan’s surrender)
had fundamentally undermined the unassailability of Dutch rule in the archi-
pelago, Dutch administrators and town planners were undeterred to resume
work in the territories in which the Dutch colonial government had more or
less re-established its authority after August 1945: on Java Batavia and its sur-
roundings, on Sumatra around the cities of Medan and Palembang, and on the
islands that formed the ‘Great East’: Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Maluku and New
Guinea.

One of the major challenges facing town planners was the reconstruction of
towns destroyed or damaged by the war (Figure 4.4). Material damage was par-
ticularly severe in the Great East.\(^{14}\) Except for a few dozen houses, Balikpapan,
an important oil-producing town on Kalimantan, had been razed to the
ground. In Manado, in North Sulawesi, only ten to fifteen percent of the build-
ings were still in tact, while in the city of Ambon, the capital of the Maluku
Islands, only six to seven percent of the original buildings remained, of which
the majority had suffered damage. In and around large cities on Java and
Sumatra, war damage was primarily the result of neglect and looting.

Apart from an insecure political context, town planners in 1945 faced many
other problems as well: unfamiliarity with the challenges of reconstruction,
lack of materials and data, but most of all insufficient expertise and profes-
sionals. Of the pre-war contingent of architects and town planners, only fifteen
(out of about 80) were available in the immediate aftermath of the war.\(^{15}\) The
rest, including Karsten, had not survived Japanese occupation or had left the
archipelago. If reconstruction was to be undertaken as efficiently as possible in
spite of the enormous shortage of expertise, a fundamental organizational
revision was imperative. Proposals to this effect were submitted by architect

\(^{14}\) ANRI, Algemeene Secretarie 1891–1942 (AS) 926, ‘Rapport Technische Commissie
ingesteld door de Directeur van Verkeer en Waterstaat ten behoeve van de wederopbouw
in de Grote Oost en Borneo’, s.l., (January 1946); Het Nieuwe Instituut, Rotterdam (Het
Nieuwe Instituut), Thijsse thij d39, Jac.P. Thijsse, untitled note (‘Just to prevent…’),
s.l.,s.a.:2.

\(^{15}\) Het Nieuwe Instituut, Thijsse thij d39, Jac.P. Thijsse, ‘Verslag van de studiereis naar
Nederland en Engeland van 24 Augustus tot 31 October 1946 van het hoofd van het
Roosmalen (2008) about the number of architects in the archipelago.
W.B. Kloos, who was working in the Netherlands, and ComTech. Based on the proposals of Kloos and ComTech, a Planning Bureau (PB) was established as part of the Department of Transport and Waterways in 1946. A year later the bureau was renamed the Central Planning Bureau (CPB). The principal task of the (C)PB was the drafting and coordination of local, regional and national reconstruction plans. In addition, it was to formulate legal urban development principles for municipalities or areas that did have a town planning department.

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16 Kloos 1939, 1945; ANRI, Algemene Secretarie en Kabinet van de Gouverneur-Generaal 1944–1950 (AS&KGG) 923, letter Minister van Overzeesche Gebiedsdeelen to the Gouverneur-Generaal, 22-3-1946, No 5/191. Because the population density and population growth were greatest on Java – and consequently the issue of spatial planning most urgent – Kloos’ proposal focused mainly on Java. ANRI, BB 1683 contains a copy of this proposal, dated 5-5-1945. ComTech (Combinatie van Technische Diensten, Combination of Technical Services) was a group of private building companies founded in close cooperation with the Departement voor Burgerlijke Openbare Werken (Department of Public Works) in October 1945; it only accepted orders from this Department (Colombijn 2010:316).

Out of political and pragmatic considerations, the Great East was the region on which the (C)PB focused most of its attention. Not only were the towns of the Great East most heavily damaged, this was also the region where the Dutch were firmest in control. Although data and manpower were scarce, work proceeded rapidly: within four months all devastated areas and shortages had been inventoried and reconstruction plans for Makassar and Ternate were ready within seven months. Town plans and construction codes were next drawn up for Ambon, Balikpapan, Manado, Palembang, and Samarinda (Figure 4.5). In addition, the (C)PB drafted regional plans – the first in the archipelago – for the region of Minahasa, in North Sulawesi, and for the area southeast of Buitenzorg on Java.18

Figure 4.5 Samarinda: figures collected by the Balikpapan Planning Bureau for use in designing the urban development plan (1949): flood areas, war-torn districts, centres of malaria outbreaks

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18 The regional plans have not been located.
Figure 4.5 (Continued)
The (c)PB was well aware that the reconstruction plans were hampered by two significant limitations: they were based on incomplete demographic and economic data and, due to the unstable political situation, their life expectancy was uncertain, but short. In view of these limitations, the (c)PB emphasized that the plans were only provisional, and would have to be thoroughly revised as soon as the missing data were obtained and more definite future expectations could be determined.

While designing the reconstruction plans, the (c)PB also had to deal with an important issue in the short term, namely drawing up their legal basis. To fill this void, the (c)PB together with representatives from the Departementen van Verkeer- en Waterstaat, Justitie en Binnenlandse Zaken voor Oost Indonesië (Departments of Transport and Waterways, Justice and the Interior for East Indonesia), looked into the adjustments necessary to make the pre-war drafts of the Town Planning Ordinance and its Memorandum applicable to the post-war situation. The most important change needed concerned the nature of the projects to which the ordinance applied. Unlike in 1938, the Town Planning Ordinance in 1948 was no longer intended solely for carefully considered urban development, but also for the rapid reconstruction of areas affected by military conflict.

Another necessary adjustment, expanding the jurisdiction of the Town Planning Ordinance beyond Java to the Outer Islands, was a simple, but in this context also crucial, change that was effected without much discussion. Once adapted to current power balances, organizational structures and the extraordinary challenges of war damage, the pre-war Town Planning Ordinance and its Memorandum provided an outstanding legal foundation for post-war town planning.

After the colonial government in Batavia had approved the revised draft, the Town Planning Ordinance, drafted in 1938, was thus finally enacted in...
mid-1948 (Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indië 1948/168). The first town where it was put into effect was Banjarmasin on Kalimantan (Staatsblad van Indonesië 1949/331). Several months later, the Town Planning Ordinance was implemented on Java for Batavia and areas in its vicinity (Kebayoran, Pasar Minggu), Bekasi, Cilacap, Malang, Pekalongan, Salatiga, Semarang, Surabaya, Tangerang, and Tegal (Staatsblad van Indonesië 1949/241). On Sumatra it was first put into effect in Padang.

The consultations between the (c)PB and the departments also resulted in the drafting of a regulation that was necessary for the implementation of the Town Planning Ordinance, the Stadsvormingsverordening (Town Planning Regulation). The Town Planning Regulation set out which functions, building types and roads should be listed in an urban development plan and the minimum standards these elements should meet. The Regulation also defined how drawings and maps should be produced, what legends should be used and even the quality of the watercolour paint that planners were to use for their designs. A year later, in 1949, the Town Planning Regulation was also enacted (Staatsblad van Indonesië 1949/40).

**Developments Around the Transfer of Sovereignty**

The enactment of the Town Planning Ordinance marked a turning point in town planning in the Netherlands Indies – and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, for that matter. On the one hand the ordinance consolidated the way town planning and the town planning practice had evolved since 1905. On the other hand it formed the prelude to the future of town planning: rationalization and an expansion of scale.

Barely three months after the Town Planning Ordinance had been enacted, the colonial government appointed another commission in 1949 – this time charged with formulating a draft legislation for the spatial planning of non-urban areas. In order that the various spheres of influence and operational areas were coordinated as productively as possible, representatives of various departments sat on the commission along with the director of the (c)PB and two members of its staff. In mid-1951, less than three years after it was established and one and a half years after the Netherlands transferred sovereignty to Indonesia, the commission presented the draft for legislation on

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22 ANRI, AS&KGG 925, Ontwerp Stadsvormingsordonnantie, 15-10-1948.
23 See Van Roosmalen (2008) for the composition of this commission.
spatial planning, including an explanatory memorandum, to the Minister of Public Works and Energy (Pekerdjaan Umum dan Tenaga).²⁴

In its preface to the draft legislation, the commission outlined the arguments for the introduction of spatial planning. The most important argument was the profound impact of industry on spatial, economic, and social developments. If this impact was not managed properly, the line between city and countryside would blur, cities would expand uncontrolled while ribbon development and deforestation would occur on a massive scale. A situation that could be avoided if, with the application of a national plan, regional or local plans, and sector plans, land-use allocation was codified in a timely fashion, making it possible to properly manage spatial, economic, and demographic changes.²⁵

A second argument for the introduction of spatial planning was that, unlike in Europe where a large-scale reorganization of land allocation was an extremely complicated operation as all the land was already in use, a comparable operation in Indonesia would be simpler due to the still extensive use of land. The rapid introduction of spatial planning, according to the authors of the draft legislation, was therefore crucial. The longer the delay, the more intensive the use of land would become and consequently the more complicated the introduction of spatial planning would be.

Aside from an economic and pragmatic argument, there was, according to the commission, also an aesthetic argument for the introduction of spatial planning – an argument that had also been used in the 1938 Town Planning Ordinance. To realize a harmonious landscape, it was indispensable that all the factors that had an impact on the landscape should be rationally attuned to one another, something that could only be achieved if spatial planning was the underlying ordering principle to organize the factors and interests that impacted on spatial development.

As had been the case with the Town Planning Ordinance, enacting the draft for legislation on spatial planning took more time than drafting it. The chairman of the commission responsible for drafting the new legislation, Jac.P. Thijsse, in hindsight suggested two possible reasons for the problems with its enactment. The first reason could be that the draft was written in Dutch which


most responsible Indonesian officials in 1951 did not master sufficiently to fully grasp the content of the draft. The second reason could be that administrators realized that once the legislation was enacted, ‘the execution of this law will be very difficult owing to lack of competent personnel’.26 To sidestep this problem, Thijsse suggested, the minister probably deemed it better to have no act at all than to have an act he could not observe. A situation that echoed the arguments not to pass the Housing Act in 1916.

As the enactment of the Spatial Planning Act was delayed, the Town Planning Ordinance remained the legal and methodological basis for town planning, regional planning, and spatial planning in independent Indonesia until 1992 when it was finally replaced by a new Spatial Planning Act (Undang-Undang 24/1992 tentang Penataan Ruang).27 It was thus the 1948–1949 legislation, a legislation rooted in Indonesia’s colonial history, that for decades provided the independent republic with a fitting methodological and legal foundation for its spatial planning practice. The absence of an updated legal foundation for the spatial planning in Indonesia echoed the situation in the Netherlands Indies: as in colonial times, legal and methodological practice was only codified into law after the planning practice had more or less consolidated already.

**Prelude to a Definitive Rupture**

The political rupture that followed the Japanese invasion in 1942, the Indonesian Declaration of Independence in 1945, and the official transfer of sovereignty in 1949 initially hardly influenced the town planning practice in the newly established independent Republic. The explanation given by Thijsse concerning the deferred enactment of the Spatial Planning Act from 1951 were directly related to the Indonesianization that followed the 1949 transfer of sovereignty: Indonesians were appointed in the executive positions previously occupied by Dutch professionals, Indonesian replaced Dutch as the administrative language, and cities, towns, villages, and streets were being given Indonesian names. Notwithstanding the transfer of sovereignty and

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27 Fifteen years later, the 1992 Spatial Planning Act was replaced by Undang-Undang 26/2007. Correspondence author with Ir Hendropranoto Suselo (2-7-2007).
Indonesianization, the procedures for town planning as developed during the colonial era and formalized in the post-war period, remained unaltered. The use of pre-war practices was also consolidated and even regenerated when in the early 1950s, following the return of political order in the archipelago in 1950, many newly graduated Dutch architects and urban designers once again opted for a career in Indonesia, with or without being interviewed the Indonesian embassy in The Hague.28

During the early years of the Republic, the town planning practice thus hardly differed from the pre-war and post-war colonial system. What did gradually change in this period though, were the possibilities and the organization of higher (technical) education. At the Faculty of Engineering of the University of Indonesia (Universitas Indonesia), founded in 1950, Thijsse, who by then had resigned as head of the (c)pb, established the Architecture Section (Seksi Arsitektur) in 1951.29 As before the war, the curriculum was modelled on the curriculum of the Polytechnic in Delft. The Architecture Section consequently offered four courses: monumental architecture, utilitarian architecture, social housing, and planning. Much attention was devoted to the theory and design of applied mechanics, and hardly any to the theory and design of contemporary architecture and town planning.30 What was taught, at the initiative of President Sukarno, was Hindu-Javanese art and the history and construction of Hindu-Javanese architecture. The number of architecture students who graduated from the school was initially quite small: the first two qualified in 1956, five more in 1957 and another five in 1958. The number of alumni with a town planning specialization was even smaller.

Definitive Rupture

The collegial atmosphere in the Indonesian planning practice and education in the first half of the 1950s, attested to by Indonesian and Dutch participants alike, stood in sharp contrast to the precarious political relations

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30 Interview with Prof. Ir A. Sidharta, Semarang (28-11-2000).
between the two countries. The Netherlands found it difficult to accept that the Republic was charting its own course. The controversy over the constitutional position of New Guinea was the straw that broke the camel’s back. In late 1957, the 50,000 Dutch nationals living in Indonesia were forced to leave the country.

More than the transfer of sovereignty, it was this event that led to profound changes in town planning. The vacancies in planning departments and universities left by the forced departure of the Dutch were rapidly filled by Indonesians, but also mainly by American, German and Austrian professionals. The result of these changes soon became apparent, initially primarily in education, but soon also in the planning practice, and consequently in the design and the functioning of cities and towns.

One element of the growing modernization of Indonesia, and the role of town planning therein, was the increasing orientation of Indonesian planners towards American planning. At the Faculty of Architecture of the Institut Teknologi Bandung (ITB, Bandung Institute for Technology) more time was allotted to architecture, town planning, and landscape design. In addition, the Bagian Tata Pembangunan Daerah dan Kota (TPDK, Division of Regional and City Planning) was established at ITB. The name deviated from the customary order of terms, in which ‘city’ would be listed first, followed by ‘regional’. The TPDK, which opened its doors at the start of the 1959–1960 academic year, aimed to meet the growing demand for education and training in the planning field.

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31 Interviews: Ir Ardiman, Bandung (14-11-2000); Ir Harisanto, Bandung (19-12-2000); Ir Achmad Noe’man, Bandung (8-1-2001); Ir Kwee Hin Goan, Rotterdam (16-6-2003); Ir Adhi Moersid, Jakarta (5-1-2001); Prof. ir Purnomohadi, Jakarta (5-1-2001); Prof. ir A. Sidharta, Semarang (28-11-2000); correspondence author with Dr. ir Yuswadi Salya, Bandung (19-2-2007); Prof. William A. Doebele, Cambridge (29-6-2007); Ir Maarten Westerduin, Heemstede (17-7-2007). Alumni and correspondents recall, again not in full and with possible inaccuracies here and there, the following names: Kopeinig (architecture), Mrs. Lechner, Natt Messnig (architecture), Noffsinger, Mrs. Schonherr (interior design).

32 ITB had been created in early 1957 after the faculties of engineering, mathematics and physics were split off from the University of Indonesia and reformed into an independent institution.

33 The unusual appellation for this new ITB division was chosen ‘[i]n order to emphasize the importance of regional issues in a nation as far-flung as Indonesia’ (Doebele 2000:3).

34 Although the intention was for it to eventually become an independent institute for urban studies and research for South and Southeast Asia (Doebele 1962:95, 97), the TPDK has remained part of the ITB to this day.
There is no (complete) overview nor certainty about the teachers who worked in ITB’s Faculty of Architecture and the Division of Regional and City Planning. According to Doebele, teachers from the University of Kentucky worked exclusively in Yogyakarta. Oetomo and Watts, however, write that Walter Hunziker (Housing) and George Hinds (Urban and Regional Planning Process), both from the University of Kentucky, worked for the Division of Regional and City Planning. What is certain is that, through the United Nations Technical Assistance Program, the following instructors taught at ITB: Kenneth Watts (City Planning in Indonesia), George Franklin (British, urban planning for the Overseas Development Administration), Prof. Rosenberg (geographer from New Zealand, for urban geography, initials unknown), Dr F.W. Ledgar (Melbourne University, for urban and regional planning), Dr Väinö Kannisto (demographics), Prof. V. Milone (Stanford University, for urban design). Due to the suspension of diplomatic relations between Indonesia and the United States there was no instructor from Harvard in Bandung during the fourth year. During the seventh year – which was also the last year American teachers would be stationed in Indonesia – a Harvard instructor of Canadian origin taught at ITB. Doebele (1962); Oetomo (2004:55–56); Watts (1997:109–113); Private archive Prof. William A. Doebele, Cambridge, ‘A Few Reminiscences about the Founding of the Division of Regional and City Planning at the Institute of Technology Bandung’, 2000; correspondence author with Prof. William A. Doebele, Cambridge, 29-6-2007.

35 There is no (complete) overview nor certainty about the teachers who worked in ITB’s Faculty of Architecture and the Division of Regional and City Planning. According to Doebele, teachers from the University of Kentucky worked exclusively in Yogyakarta. Oetomo and Watts, however, write that Walter Hunziker (Housing) and George Hinds (Urban and Regional Planning Process), both from the University of Kentucky, worked for the Division of Regional and City Planning. What is certain is that, through the United Nations Technical Assistance Program, the following instructors taught at ITB: Kenneth Watts (City Planning in Indonesia), George Franklin (British, urban planning for the Overseas Development Administration), Prof. Rosenberg (geographer from New Zealand, for urban geography, initials unknown), Dr F.W. Ledgar (Melbourne University, for urban and regional planning), Dr Väinö Kannisto (demographics), Prof. V. Milone (Stanford University, for urban design). Due to the suspension of diplomatic relations between Indonesia and the United States there was no instructor from Harvard in Bandung during the fourth year. During the seventh year – which was also the last year American teachers would be stationed in Indonesia – a Harvard instructor of Canadian origin taught at ITB. Doebele (1962); Oetomo (2004:55–56); Watts (1997:109–113); Private archive Prof. William A. Doebele, Cambridge, ‘A Few Reminiscences about the Founding of the Division of Regional and City Planning at the Institute of Technology Bandung’, 2000; correspondence author with Prof. William A. Doebele, Cambridge, 29-6-2007.
American suburbs. Leafy avenues, enclosed shopping streets, and contemporary architecture have made way for boulevards, six-lane highways and retro architecture predominantly copied from Western models. This was not a change exclusively reserved for new districts. Numerous inner-city areas underwent similar transformations: streets were widened as much as possible while relatively modest dwellings and shops made way for large-scale, fully air-conditioned homes, high-rises, and shopping malls.

Beyond changes in the urban landscape, the introduction of American planning principles had an additional effect. Whereas town planners in the first half of the twentieth century made an effort to take local climatic, technical, material, and socio-cultural conditions into account, this town planning practice seemed increasingly irrelevant in the Indonesian Republic. Aside from a few exceptions, Indonesian town planners increasingly applied global design methods and measures. As a result, Indonesian plans, as well as the elements that make up urban development plans, are scarcely, if at all, typical or specific to their local, Indonesian context (anymore). This is a development that has not only reduced town planning in the archipelago to a superficial imitation of an imported principle, it has also robbed town planning of its autonomy and its role as an agent of modernization.

**Conclusion**

Town planning is premised on a belief in progress, modernization, and the engineering of society. Modernization and town planning, by definition, focus
on improvement. In this sense, town planning in the Netherlands Indies was a manifestation of the broader societal process of modernization and, simultaneously, one of the major agents of the modernization of Indonesia in the first half of the twentieth century. Town planning in the Netherlands Indies in the first half of the twentieth century evolved from an intuitive process scarcely supported by any data to a discipline based on rational, objective and legal principles. This process, the gradual professionalization of town planning in the Netherlands Indies, ran virtually parallel to the modernization of the archipelago. As agents of modernization, town planners defined what was modern. Kampongs formed the antithesis of modernization: unplanned, disorderly, unhygienic, and dangerous. Modern town plans and cities were orderly, harmonious, organic, and pleasing to the eye.

The necessity felt by many architects and town planners to raise what around 1900 was a fairly poor level of architecture and town planning in the archipelago to a higher level resulted in a campaign for recognition of architecture and town planning as professional disciplines, as well as a search for a systematic, rational method to design modern, harmonious cities, neighbourhoods, and buildings. The establishment of professional associations such as the Vereeniging voor Bouwkundigen in Nederlandsch-Indië in 1898 and the Vereeniging voor Locale Belangen in 1912, as well as the publication of professional journals such as *Indisch Bouwkundig Tijdschrift*, *Locale Belangen* and *Locale Techniek*, are a testament to that quest for professionalization. The formulation of the Town Planning Ordinance in 1938 was an important step forward: it paved the way for a legal, methodological foundation for a professional spatial planning practice.

It was not only town planning that modernized: the state apparatus, instrumental in creating the context for planners to work in, modernized as well. The shortage of data that had haunted planners in the early days of Netherlands Indies town planning was finally solved in the 1930s, when the state was able to provide reliable demographic statistics and detailed maps of urban areas. The modernization of the state also entailed the development of a legal foundation for town planning. The juridical underpinning of town planning culminated in the 1938 Town Planning Ordinance, which was finally passed in 1948.

The enactment of the Town Planning Ordinance in 1948 underscores the continuity in town planning practice before and after Indonesian Independence. A major change in thinking about town planning did not occur until the forced replacement of the remaining Dutch planners in 1957 and beyond. American planning and the pivotal role of the car became the new standard, with cars seen as the embodiment of modernization.
The attention for the car and suburbs in the late 1950s erroneously suggests that planning only concerned the residential areas of the elite. From the early twentieth century onwards, planners were concerned about all groups. Although attention initially was limited mainly to issues that mattered to a small segment of the population, the Europeans, colonial town planners did not accept the backward state of kampongs as permanent. Modernization was to be brought to everyone. Netherlands Indies town planning was consequently marked by a clear evolution. Almost immediately after the Decentralization Act of 1903 was implemented, town planners and administrators shifted their attention to living conditions in non-European areas as well. The planning area of urban development therefore expanded, from the residential quarter level to the urban level, and finally to the regional level, doing away over time with any distinction between European interests and those of indigenous and other groups. It was this evolution that turned town planning into a powerful instrument of modernization in the archipelago: besides properly managing the development of towns, it also contributed to a growing awareness among the local population about the scope of the colonial administration and the development opportunities of their country.

Town planning modernized society not only through interventions in the built environment, but also by educating and enlightening the population, particularly the indigenous people. Professional training programmes were established and non-European intermediaries were installed between the non-European population and the civil administration. In addition, radio programmes were increasingly broadcast in Malay, and Malay translations or summaries of Dutch articles on urban development appeared in publications. The gradual increase in interest and participation by non-Europeans concerning urban problems that resulted from these efforts belied the assumption, widely shared during the first years of decentralization, that non-Europeans a priori did not care about such issues. Nothing could be further from the truth, it turned out: the more access they had to the civil administration and the better they were educated, the more non-Europeans participated in the debates. The evolution of and the discourse about Netherlands Indies town planning therefore largely followed a course parallel to the democratization of Netherlands Indies society.

The gradual rationalization of Netherlands Indies (and Indonesian) town planning and its evolution into a systematic, rational, and even scientific discipline, as well as the increasing participation by non-Europeans in the town planning practice and the town planning debate, are evidence of the role of town planning as an agent of modernization in the archipelago.
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PART 2

Partial Accommodation
Rückert and Hoesni Thamrin
*Bureaucrat and Politician in Colonial Kampong Improvement*

*Hans Versnel and Freek Colombijn*

**Introduction**

One of the activities through which the modernization of the Indonesian city became manifest was the large-scale improvement of substandard housing districts. Usually referred to as kampongs, by the early twentieth century these areas came to be widely considered as unregulated and unplanned housing areas inhabited mostly by lower income people. Some kampongs originated from a village located close to a city’s urban boundaries and were subsequently absorbed as the city expanded. Other kampongs had evolved within the city boundaries, for instance, from original settlements of squatters occupying vacant land. Whatever the exact origin, most kampongs had developed gradually in a haphazard way since the late nineteenth century as the colonial economy and its urban centres expanded.

As interest in town planning and public health developed, it became increasingly apparent that the conditions in these unplanned and unregulated housing areas, exacerbated by an ever increasing population density, were unacceptable in a number of ways. Streets and alleyways were mainly unpaved and meandered amongst indiscriminately placed dwellings making access by strangers almost impossible. No two houses were the same and many occupied houses were considered derelict and unsuitable for living. Non-existent or inadequate water supply and sewerage facilities compounded these chaotic and unhygienic conditions. Local medical officers convinced city administrators that these kampongs were not only unacceptable in appearance but also downright dangerous to the health and prosperity of the city as a whole.

In the eyes of residents, however, the historical and village-like arrangements within kampongs provided a secure sense of familiarity, with established points of orientation linking them to the mosque, the pasar (market), warung (food stalls), and other landmarks. Kampong residents may have cared less about the poor physical condition of their living environment: in any case, if they did there was little they could do to change it and they had learned to make do. However, to the city administrators, intent on modernising and improving

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1 We are very grateful to Joost Coté for his translation and English corrections.
their city, these chaotic and uncontrolled kampongs were blots on the landscape.

The city administrators as well as the central colonial government considered the apparent chaos of the kampongs a problem for at least two reasons. First of all, the ostensible disorderliness represented the opposite of the ideal of modernity; kampongs not only challenged their aspirations of being enlightened administrators of modern, rationally planned towns, but also their ability to regulate the behaviour of their inhabitants. Secondly, these inaccessible kampongs with their unhygienic environment were considered breeding grounds not only of epidemic diseases but also of criminal behaviour. For these reasons, the administration at all levels considered kampong improvement both a necessity and a public interest. It was also self-evident that the authorities had to take the lead both because of the massive financial costs involved and the perception that ‘natives’ would not understand the rational and epidemiological factors underpinning their intentions. Thus kampong improvement became a policy characterized by a strong top-down approach typical of colonial reform policies.

The Netherlands Indies has been characterized as Beamtenstaat, a society in which political decisions were taken by leading civil servants based on allegedly rational and technocratic evidence: ‘the state as efficient bureaucratic machine’ (McVey 1982). The development of this Beamtenstaat was fostered by the perceived need to implement and control what was considered as desirable change, unchecked by any democratic representative bodies. Although the Decentralization Act of 23 July 1903, gradually established forms of local government, beginning with municipal councils, these only extended and deepened the role of the Beamtenstaat as municipal councils, at least initially, began with only appointed councillors and a civil servant acting as chairman. While councillors were gradually selected by elections (in which, however, income and other qualifications restricted active voting rights), as late as 1916 the mayors, who replaced local civil servants as head of the municipal administration, were still being appointed by the central colonial government. At the central level, the Volksraad, which first met in 1918, as a colony-wide representative body, could merely advise the colonial government, and did not have the competence to approve a budget or issue laws. Moreover, members were largely a mix of bureaucrats, and civil servants, a majority of whom were at first appointed by the central government. Nevertheless, despite the considerable

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2 Active and passive voting rights were restricted to persons with a minimal annual income of 600 guilders, and this criterion restricted the electorate to a minority.
level of state control of the local and central representative councils, heated debates did often take place.

Kampong improvement was one of those topics that attracted vociferous exchange of opinion in these emerging political arenas since kampong improvement was not merely a technical expression of the modernization of the city but directly facilitated the ability of colonial authorities to increasingly penetrate the lives of the kampong people. It also involved a new process in how administrative decisions were made and implemented. Equally significant, as it drew on a range of modern sciences, kampong improvement opened up new venues for ambitious men to exert political influence in an expanding state. These represented the new class of educated, professional, and public-minded individuals who articulated a modern future.

On the question of kampong improvement, there was no better example of one who embodied the Beamtenstaat than Johannes Jacobus Gerhardus Everwijn Rückert. Rückert was a first rate bureaucrat who also fulfilled political functions. He came to the Netherlands Indies in 1913 to start his colonial career in Semarang as director of the Department of Public Works. Later he became chairman of the Vereeniging voor Locale Belangen (Association for Local Interests), an association of professional people working for local governments and broadly supportive of decentralization of government. Rückert was appointed member of the Volksraad in 1927, while holding a position as civil servant at the Decentralisatie Kantoor, the office of the central government overseeing decentralization affairs.

It was generally assumed that elected members of municipal councils and the Volksraad – and professionals – would speak for the ‘common interest’ and not defend the interest of specific groups. This assumption that such men – and of course there were only men – because of their public or professional positions, and more generally, that appointed European colonial officials, would best interpret the common interest legitimized the gross over-representation of Europeans in municipal councils and the Volksraad. The same criterion determined that the selection of representatives of the Indonesian population to be appointed, both at the central and municipal level, was carefully controlled. However, as Indonesian political organizations evolved, and municipal councils became more representative, councillors increasingly came to consciously and openly defend the political interests of specific groups. This development was personified by Mohammed Hoesni Thamrin. He was elected councillor to the Batavia municipal council in 1919, and in 1927 became the first indigenous alderman (wethouder) in Batavia. In the meantime he had also been appointed member of the Volksraad, which provided him with a platform for espousing his moderate nationalist political ideas.
Combining his municipal and Volksraad responsibilities, he used his dual positions to promote the interests of Indonesians. In doing so, he was particularly outspoken in his views on the question of kampong improvement.

In this chapter, we wish to compare the ways these two men, Rückert and Thamrin, a European bureaucrat and an Indonesian politician, approached the question of how the kampong should be improved. Rückert’s natural allies were civil servants, including the persons gathered in the Vereeniging voor Locale Belangen, where he served as chairman. Hoesni Thamrin found supporters among the Indonesian community in his constituency, although as his position in the Volksraad was as an appointed, rather than elected member, it could not be said he represented them. One could have expected that their different functions and support base would have influenced their way of operating: Rückert, a strong technocratic approach and paying much attention to financial aspects; Hoesni Thamrin, the politician, politicizing discussions and making emotional appeals. Moreover, in beginning our research, we assumed that Indonesian politicians like Hoesni Thamrin would have been most keen on dealing and seeking compromises with potential allies to achieve their goals. In the end, however, we found the bureaucrat Rückert just as much successfully employing strategic alliances to achieve his goals as Thamrin. Regardless of the strategies each adopted to improve the kampongs, however, an examination of their efforts is instructive in providing insight into the processes underpinning the modernization of the Indonesian city.

The Emergence of the Kampong Question

Initially, municipal administrations had very few options to intervene in urban kampongs, due to the limitations set by the 1903 Decentralization Act and existing colonial laws protecting the administrative autonomy of so-called autonome desa’s or inlandsche gemeentes (villages with their own administration) located within the municipal boundaries. However, the autonomy of these inlandsche gemeentes, with their traditional rural characteristics located within the boundaries of modern urban centres, was perceived as standing in the way of efficient urban management. This, and the insalubrious conditions in the kampongs, formed an administrative challenge that was dubbed the ‘kampongvraagstuk’ (the kampong question) by colonial administrators. The abolition of the principle of kampong autonomy was considered a necessary condition to tackle the other half of the kampongvraagstuk, the chaotic appearance and the perceived unhygienic conditions of the kampongs (Reerink, this volume).
The condition of kampongs was in the first place discussed at the local level, in the respective municipal councils, but there were also a number of supra-local institutions where ideas about kampong improvement were exchanged between representatives of relevant professions increasingly employed by the newly established municipalities and concerned colonial bureaucratic figures. Of prime importance in this regard was the Vereeniging voor Locale Belangen. This association organized an annual congress (Decentralisatiecongres) to discuss issues related to local government and published a bi-weekly journal, Locale Belangen, in which new ideas were canvassed and old ‘chestnuts’ regularly debated.\(^3\) A considerable degree of consensus on these issues was also achieved through decisions and reports emanating from the office of the Regeringscommissaris voor Decentralisatie (Government Commissioner for Decentralization, later called Adviser – Adviseur – on Decentralization). The position of Adviser responsible for advising the central government in matters of local administration was a powerful civil service post in an era of colonial reform. The two, the professional lobby group, the Vereeniging voor Locale Belangen, with its journal and annual Decentralization Congress, and the government appointed Government Commissioner for Decentralization, contributed significantly to the emergence and definition of a colonial kampong improvement policy. The so-called Kampongverbeteringscommissie (Commission for Kampong Improvement) published its first, and as it turned out, last, survey on kampong improvement in 1939.

The abolition of the autonomous kampongs was not only prevented by juridical constraints, but also by financial limits. Already in 1907 D. Tollenaar, the then Government Commissioner for Decentralization, had pointed out the enormous amounts of money that would be required if urban authorities had to take over administration of autonomous kampongs once these were abolished and remarked that these high expectations could not be fulfilled. Tollenaar had made this observation in response to a request from the municipality of Batavia for a subsidy for the construction and maintenance of roads, bridges, water supply, and street lighting in the kampongs located within its city boundaries. At the time the central government rejected the request on the grounds that the municipality did not have the authority to intervene in these kampongs. In 1915 Tollenaar, this time in his capacity of head of the Binnenlandsch Bestuur (Department of the Interior), again pointed out the costs that would have to be incurred if kampong autonomy were abolished and

\(^3\) The literal meaning of Decentralisatiecongres is Congress pertaining to the decentralization (of central state competencies to local administrators); in practice the congresses could deal with any topic relevant for urban (and sometimes regional) administrations.
the central government held accountable for the cost of improving the kampongs.

A revision of the 1903 Decentralization Act solved at least in theory the juridical aspect of the kampong question in 1918. The 1918 revision amended the Decentralization Act and henceforward the autonomy of individual kampongs situated within municipal boundaries could be abolished by central government ordinance, with the kampongs being placed under the authority of the municipality. In practice however, the actual abolition of autonomous administration of kampongs, so long advocated, was not so easily achieved in individual cases. As H.J. Bussemaker, Mayor of Surabaya, stated in a paper for the Decentralization Congress of 1929, when kampong improvement would result in the abolition of the kampong autonomy, the loss of such autonomy should be compensated. He argued that this would mean giving a greater say to indigenous people in municipal politics, including the extension of voting rights in council elections. A similar point had already been made by the Mayor of Semarang in 1921 (Coté 2011).

Meanwhile, scepticism about the financial aspects of the kampong question continued. In October 1921 the Resident of Surabaya, S. Cohen, stated that nothing prevented the solution of the kampong question ‘but simply and solely and absolutely nothing else then the lack of money’ (Flieringa 1930:38). He held the opinion that it was not the abolition of the kampong autonomy that was the stumbling block, but the financial costs required to improve the kampongs, particularly if this were done on a large scale. Gradually, however, and even before the official changes to the law, the central government began to furnish money on a case by case basis from their annual budget to this end. In 1916 it contributed for the first time 8,500 guilders to costs for improvements in a kampong in Malang. The following year the central government granted a total of 102,000 guilders for the improvement of kampongs in Surabaya, Bandung and Malang. The view of the colonial government was that as a rule the municipality and central government had to share the costs of the public works in improved kampongs unless the municipality lacked the financial means (Flieringa 1930:43–45).

During discussions on the 1929 budget in the Volksraad, the colonial government decided to commit 500,000 guilders annually to finance kampong improvement. This amount would be available to meet half of all annually approved kampong improvement costs, the other half being the responsibility of the municipalities. The central government stipulated that a local

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4 ‘maar enkel en alleen en ook absoluut niet anders dan: gebrek aan geld’.

5 Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, Jakarta (ANRI), Departement Binnenlandsch Bestuur (BB) 1683, Memorie van Toelichting op de ontwerpbegroting 1929: Volksraad Zitting 1928–1929, Ond. 1/ Afd. IV / st.5, p. 72, post 463, onderdeel 500,000 guilders.
government needed to have sufficient income of its own to be eligible for central state support. If, for instance, a municipality did not levy Straatbelasting or opcenten,\textsuperscript{6} it would not receive a subsidy for kampong improvement. Contrary to previous views of the government, a note to this item in the budget explained that the question of funding kampong improvement was detached from the question whether or not the kampong concerned was still autonomous or part of the municipality (Kampongverbeteringscommissie 1939:53–64).

The discussion concerning the kampong question circulated within and beyond professional European circles. In 1927 the moderate nationalist organization Boedi Oetomo held a conference in Semarang in an attempt to involve kampong inhabitants in the question. Mohammad Yoesoef, chairman of the Semarang branch of Boedi Oetomo and member of the municipal council pointed out to the meeting that the question of kampong improvement had been dragging on for many years and had still not been resolved. He spoke enthusiastically about the intention of the Governor General, De Graeff, during an impending visit to Semarang, to also visit some kampongs. The meeting concluded that, in daily practice kampong autonomy no longer had much significance: they had ineluctably become part of the city, no longer owned property such as ambtsvelden (agricultural land owing to the position of village head) and their boundaries had become indistinct. The meeting then endorsed a motion proposed by Yoesoef, which was subsequently communicated to the Governor General, the Voksraad and the council, that

the kampongs should, as soon as possible, be transferred to the municipality of Semarang, and that, in anticipation of this being formalized, remediation of the worst conditions [in them] should be undertaken immediately by the municipality.\textsuperscript{7}

In a further minute, however, the meeting also added that the kampongs should be allowed to retain their autonomy.

A little earlier the Surabayan Indonesische Studieclub, a local Indonesian forum to discuss social and political issues, had reported in its periodical, Soeloeh Indonesia, the results of its survey on the development of housing in

\textsuperscript{6} Straatbelasting (literally street tax) was a direct tax levied from house owners depending on the length of their frontage along the street, and the quality of the street; opcenten were surtaxes on the income tax.

\textsuperscript{7} ‘de kampongs zoo spoedig mogelijk behooren te worden overgedragen aan de gemeente Semarang en dat in afwachting daarvan, reeds onmiddellijk door de gemeente de aller-ergste toestanden dienen te worden verbeterd’ (Locale Belangen 1-10-1927:760–761).
Surabaya between 1900 and 1925. Over this period it concluded the population had doubled but that proportionately, the availability of housing had declined tenfold. Recognizing that much had already been done in terms of improving hygiene conditions, it emphasized that the situation in the city’s kampongs was deplorable. Life for the indigenous residents was described as ‘moordend’ (killing):

[These conditions] not only represent a danger for the lives of indigenous people, but for society in general which must draw its labour force from the kampongs. Nursemaids who must care for the children, and cooks who are responsible for preparing meals, come from such environments and the danger of contamination from numerous diseases is no figment of the imagination.8

Improvement in kampong conditions meant not only reducing the chances of contamination but especially in ‘increasing the life expectancy of the better-off sections of society’.9 The same survey also concluded that over the last quarter century the position of the indigenous person had declined from one where he was a property and homeowner to one where he had become merely a tenant and day labourer.

The elevation of kampong improvement as a major policy issue was confirmed by a Conferentie inzake Kampongverbetering (Conference on Kampong Improvement) convened by the Government Commissioner for Decentralization, A.B. Cohen Stuart, in the Lodge of the Freemasons of Batavia in 1928. The participants included city mayors, municipal secretaries and directors of municipal services. The central government was represented by Rückert, who at the time was seconded to the Government Commissioner for Decentralization. The invitation list included only one Indonesian name: that of Hoesni Thamrin, who at the time was an alderman in the Batavia city council.10 In the following sections we will see in detail what these two men, Rückert and Thamrin, achieved in this conference.

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8 ‘Voor den Inlander niet alleen levert deze toestand gevaar, ook voor den samenleving in ‘t algemeen, die haar werkrachten uit die kampongs betrekken moet. Baboes, die de kinderen verzorgen moeten, kokki’s, die ‘t eten hebben klaar te maken, komen voort uit dit milieu en besmettingsgevaar voor vele ziekten is niet denkbeeldig’ (Soeloeh Indonesia cited by NRC 29-6-1926).

9 ‘verhooging der levenskansen van ‘t betere deel der samenleving’ (Soeloeh Indonesia cited by NRC 29-6-1926).

10 ANRI, BB 1395, Verslag Conferentie inzake Kampongverbetering, 11-2-1928.
The Bureaucrat: Rückert

During his colonial career in the Indies, Rückert had occupied many – often overlapping – positions in government departments and commissions. After being educated in the Netherlands, he began his career in the Indies in 1913 as assistant director for Public Works in Semarang. In 1927 he was appointed to the Volksraad and seconded to the Decentralisatiekantoor (Office for Decentralization Affairs) of the central government and later for a brief time he was mayor of the city of Meester Cornelis (Jatinegara). Central to his career, however, was his involvement in the Vereeniging voor Locale Belangen. Rückert found a progressive environment in Semarang. Semarang, the third largest city of the Netherlands Indies at the time, had the reputation of being a pioneer in urban development, planning, public housing, and kampong improvement, and it was no coincidence that the board of the Vereeniging voor Locale Belangen resided in that city. There was indeed an unusual concentration of people with advanced ideas and professional interest in urban development in Semarang. The entrepreneur H.F. Tillema, while resident there, galvanized attention on the conditions of the city’s health and hygiene conditions and on his return to the Netherlands in 1914 spent much of his fortune on compiling and publishing his masterwork Kromoblanda on housing problems and sanitation (Tillema 1915–1923). Earlier Dr W.T. de Vogel, the regional health authority and like Tillema member of the municipal council in Semarang, had sought to address the city’s health problems by convincing the council to engage an architect to draw up plans for an extension of the city. J.E. Stokvis, a socialist and editor of the influential progressive daily De Locomotief from 1910 to 1917, used his paper to advocate colonial reforms, including improvement to the condition of indigenous housing. In recognition of his interests and influential position, Stokvis was elected as the first chairman of the Vereeniging voor Locale Belangen and held this position from 1912 to 1917. In 1923 he was elected to represent the ISDP (Indische Sociaal-Democratische Partij, Indies Social-Democratic Party) in the Volksraad. The activities of these two ‘amateurs in urban development’ was reinforced by the arrival in 1914 of Thomas Karsten, a private architect soon to gain a colony-wide reputation for his ideas on town planning. The activities of men as these ensured that in the first decades of the twentieth century, a climate had evolved in Semarang, which favoured the activities of reformers. Many of their progressive ideas were incorporated in municipal planning and implemented. Rückert was certainly able to make use of these progressive forces in Semarang and he himself, while not a member of a political party, was later associated with the progressive think tank, De Stuw. He even signed a petition organized by this group of
colonial progressives, dated 12 January 1930, calling for a Commonwealth of the Netherlands and Indonesia (Jonkman 1971:71–75).

Rückert’s rapid rise to prominence was in part due to one of the first major projects he was assigned to as the bureaucrat responsible for overseeing the major urban development projects: the planning and construction of a vast new housing development in the hills overlooking the city, Nieuw Tjandi, on which he worked closely with the architectural firm headed by Thomas Karsten. In 1919, after having been appointed director of the city Department of Public Works two years previously, he was promoted to chief city engineer with responsibility to prepare a development plan for Semarang’s future expansion. Working again with Karsten, Rückert was responsible for integrating the various sectional plans into one organic whole. These were implemented in stages in the years after 1925 and the main elements of this blueprint remained the guide for the city’s growth even after Independence.

In the meantime, after a reorganization of the city’s technical services, Rückert was appointed director of Municipal Housing Service, a multi-faceted role which included responsibility for city expansion, overseeing housing and business development, and supervision of building construction. This new position provided him with the power to oversee and implement the broad vision that he had earlier developed for Semarang.

Rückert became an important national opinion leader when he became member of the board of the Vereeniging voor Locale Belangen in 1921. He was elected chairman the following year, a position he held till 1931 when he resigned after a serious disagreement – more of which later. As chairman, he not only led the organization but was also member of the editorial board of its fortnightly publication, *Locale Belangen*. This periodical, because of its practice of including relevant government documents, such as advisory reports, and regulations, was widely seen as a mouthpiece for the government. Although on occasions the journal did discuss state policy critically, this perception was especially generated by the prominence given to articles on decentralization written by government officials and advisers, which were regularly included without editorial comment. Rückert, however, in his capacity as chairman but no less in his capacity as editor expressed his criticism of policy or policy proposals at times, even in areas in which he himself was involved.

Rückert obtained another key function in 1923 when he was appointed to chair a commission to enquire into reorganization of the financial relations between the central and local governments following plans to extend the principle of decentralization. The commission was dubbed Commissie Rückert (Rückert Commission). Whether Rückert owed his position to the fact that he was chairman of the Vereeniging voor Locale Belangen, or because of his
prominent role in local government is not clear. The commission was disbanded in 1925 when new regional governments were created at the provincial and sub-provincial (regency) level and a new commission – Commissie voor de financieele verhouding tusschen het Land, Provincies, Regentschappen, Gemeenten en andere Locale Ressorten (Commission on Central-Local Financial Relationships) – was established to deal with the new circumstances. Rückert was however retained as adviser to this new enquiry. In this capacity he complained in Locale Belangen that the work of the commission was hampered by a lack of manpower given its task to report on the affairs of the entire archipelago, and to attempt to standardize all local budgets in order to make them comparable. Rückert was publicly praised for his work on these commissions in the pages of De Locomotief by his friend, the former paper’s editor J.E. Stokvis who by then was a member of the Volksraad representing the Indies Socialist Party. In the meantime Rückert had also become chairman of the Sociaal-Technische Vereeniging (stv, Social-Technical Association) which, amongst other things, organized two very influential public housing congresses. The first congress was held in 1922 and was held, appropriately, in Semarang. This congress discussed a series of position papers amongst which was an influential paper by Thomas Karsten, in which he called strongly for the adoption of guidelines for kampong improvement. Rückert’s work in leading this influential gathering of experts was warmly praised by Semarang’s mayor, D. de Iongh. After the conference, Semarang’s public was invited to inspect a housing exhibition, which had formed part of the congress. The exhibition drew 142 European, 52 indigenous and 29 Chinese visitors (Sociaal-Technische Vereeniging 1922:48).

In 1927 Rückert attempted to further expand his network of influential contacts by applying for one of the seats in the Volksraad. However, both the municipal council of Semarang and De Iongh, Mayor of Semarang, at first refused to nominate him on the grounds that he could not be missed from his office in Semarang for any length of time. During subsequent negotiations, the Semarang council eventually dropped its opposition, coming to see the advantage that might accrue from having a strong spokesman in favour of decentralized government in the Volksraad. Eventually Rückert was also offered the opportunity to be seconded to the office of the Government Commissioner for Decentralization, headed by A.B. Cohen Stuart. The creation of this new, and costly position that Rückert would occupy, that of Hoofdambtenaar ter beschikking van de Adviseur voor de Decentralisatie (Principal Officer responsible to the Adviser for Decentralization) evoked considerable debate in the Volksraad, but ultimately also the Volksraad approved of Rückert’s appointment with a narrow margin of 22 to 20 votes. His position would involve
responsibility for the technical aspects related to the financial relations between the central and local governments, kampong improvement, and the abolition of kampong autonomy in urban areas (*NRC* 25-11-1927, 7-12-1927).

Half a year after this appointment, Rückert tabled a motion in the Volksraad on kampong improvement; it was supported by Stokvis and the moderate Indonesian nationalist Soejono. The motion, put forward during the debate on the Netherlands Indies budget for 1929, urged the central government to contribute financially not only to construction work involved in kampong improvement, but also to contribute to the costs of maintaining such kampong improvement works. It proposed concretely that the central government should pay half the costs associated with local kampong improvement. In speaking to his motion, Rückert pointed not only to the poor housing conditions which he had himself seen during his travel to municipalities, but also emphasized the danger of epidemics, such as cholera and the plague, which could infect inhabitants outside the kampongs. He also pointed out that better health would benefit employers and he emphatically stressed the possibility of disorder breaking out amongst kampong inhabitants: ‘Until now the kampong population has remained calm, but the source of unrest, the continuous threat to peace and order, persists to exist in the so neglected kampongs.’ It was an argument that was designed to carry weight since the colony had only recently recovered from the shock of the communist-inspired uprisings of 1926 and 1927, which, despite their actual small scale, left a strong impression on the European residents.

In fact Rückert’s personal opinion was that all costs related to kampong improvement and their subsequent maintenance should be funded by the central government, not just half so that his motion can therefore be seen as a compromise. Rückert and his supporter Stokvis had earlier argued that, since kampong improvement was a new budget item for which existing municipalities did not have the means to provide, it was the central government that should pay. As it turned out Cohen Start, the Government Commissioner for Decentralization representing the government in this debate, indicated the

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11 *Tot nu toe is de kampongbevolking rustig gebleven, maar de bron van onrust, de voortdurende bedreiging van rust en orde blijft bestaan in de zo verwaarloosde kampong.* ANRI, BB 1395b, 26. It is worth noting that the year before Stokvis had written critically about the argument that kampong improvement was necessary to reduce the risk of infection of Europeans by their indigenous servants. Such a motivation was painfully selfish, according to Stokvis (*Locale Belangen* 16-5-1927:349-50). The argument had originally been advanced by councillor Tillema in his early publications on health and sanitation in 1911 and 1913.
government was prepared to favourably consider the proposed principle were it not for the fact that the dire condition of the colony’s finances made this impossible. The proposal should therefore first be sent for advice to the Commission on Central-Local Financial Relationships.12

When the motion was put to a vote it did not, as was often the case in the Volksraad, divide along racial lines. It was accepted with 28 votes in favour and eleven against, but did not gain the unanimous support of the council’s indigenous members. Hoesni Thamrin voted in favour but like the other Indonesian members, had not participated in the discussions. Why Thamrin had stayed on the sideline is not clear. One possible reason was that he did not want to further divide the Indonesian group on this issue more than it clearly already was. It was also likely that he fully shared the political views of the motion’s supporters, Stokvis and Soejono, and had nothing further to add to what they had presented.13

The debate on this motion shows perhaps better than anything else how Rückert’s various roles had become totally mixed up. The Volksraad member, Rückert, debated with the representative of the government, Cohen Stuart, to whom civil servant Rückert was seconded as principal officer. The principle of freedom of speech in the Volksraad also applied to Rückert, so in principle he was free to criticize the state policy; in reality this double role of civil servant-member of the Volksraad gave rise to awkward situations (Jonkman 1971:60).

During the debate among the Volksraad representatives, the motion was opposed by Fruin, representative of the Politiek Economische Bond. Fruin deemed Rückert’s motion premature pending a proposal to be formulated by the Commission on Central-Local Financial Relationships, the more so as, according to Fruin, that commission ‘has a highly competent member in the person of our fellow representative, Mr Rückert’.14 When the Volksraad reconvened Rückert thanked Cohen Stuart, in daily life his direct superior, for his preparedness to accept the principle but pointed out that it remained unclear from Cohen Stuart’s reply when this would be implemented if they had to wait

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12 ANRI, BB 1395b, 32–33.
13 Hoesni Thamrin had a good relationship with Stokvis and corresponded regularly with him until Stokvis returned to the Netherlands for health reasons. It is known that Soejono, although he was a senior member of the Volksraad, greatly admired Thamrin as Chairman of the Comité voor de Inlandsche Meerderheid in de Volksraad (Committee of the Native Majority in the Volksraad).
14 ‘een zeer bekwaam werkend lid heeft in de persoon van ons geacht medelid, de heer Rückert’. ANRI, BB 1395, Handelingen van de Volksraad, zittingsjaar 1928–1929, Onderwerp 1, Afd. IV, Stuk 34, Begroeting van Nederlandsch-Indië voor 1929:45.
for an advice from the Commission on Central-Local Financial Relationships. With fine irony he suggested that, even the most optimistic person could see that it would be some time before the Commission on Central-Local Financial Relationships would have its report ready. Rückert of course knew what he was talking about because he was adviser to the very commission that was investigating these relations! The upshot was that civil servant Rückert, as member of the Commission on Central-Local Financial Relationships, gave advice to the government about a Volksraad motion, tabled by representative Rückert (Rückert 1930:172).

In the end, despite the fact the motion received a positive reception from Cohen Stuart during the debate in the Volksraad, the central government failed to act on it. The final regulation related to subsidies for kampong improvement only included costs for construction, and not maintenance as the motion had proposed. A decade later, around the time of the Kampongverbeteringscommissie, F.H. van de Wetering (1939) observed that people could not count on the government to maintain improvement works. This commission had recommended that the costs and maintenance of improvements should, as far as possible, be left in whole or in part to those who would benefit from them, alluding to the so-called ‘profitbeginsel’ or the principle of self-interest. (Kampongverbeteringscommissie 1939:24). Thus, despite his best efforts and wide connections, the inevitable conclusion in this respect must be that there was a limit to the power of Rückert.

The combination of multiple functions may have helped Rückert to gain power, but ultimately it also created an insoluble conflict of interests, which finally forced him to resign as Chairman of the Vereeniging voor Locale Belangen. The government had announced a salary cut of five per cent for all civil servants as one of the measures to meet the budget deficit caused by the Depression. Rückert supported the decision because he thought it a reasonable response to the current economic difficulties. The majority of members of the association of city mayors and secretaries of which he had been a member since 5 May 1931 due to his appointment as acting mayor of Meester Cornelis, were, however, opposed to the economy measure. The Vereeniging voor Locale Belangen also did not share his opinion, influenced no doubt by the fact that

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15 For a complete overview of Rückert’s position it should be added that he also exerted influence in two precursors of the Commission that drafted the very influential Town Planning Ordinance of 1938. These precursors were the Bouwbeperkingencommissie (1930) and the Grond- en Woningcommissie (1932), together with among others Karsten and Hoesni Thamrin. Rückert had pleaded to appoint a commission for urban development in the Volksraad.
there were two mayors in its executive. Given this opposition it seemed to Rückert that it was best if he resigned from the Vereeniging voor Locale Belangen before discussion on the 1932 budget began so that it could more clearly represent the views of the majority of its membership regarding the economy measures (*Locale Belangen* April 1931:344–345; May 1931:447; *Het Vaderland* 17–7–1931:344–345). In any event, he had already decided to return to the Netherlands in 1932. Rückert did however retain his membership of the editorial board of *Locale Belangen.*

To sum up it can be said that Rückert was an important figure in the decentralization process in the Netherlands-Indies, in particular in relation to its financial aspects. He made effective use of his extensive ‘old boys’ network in his bureaucratic and administrative functions. In the decision-making processes related to kampong improvement he played a significant role and here too he exploited an extended lobby network. Although as member of the Volksraad it might have been expected that he would have played a more political role, here Rückert chose to act more in line with his bureaucratic and administrative function, emphasizing the technical and practical aspects of issues. In this he contrasted to Hoesni Thamrin. The calm, business-like orations of Rückert, apparent, for instance, in his address in relation to the motion on the funding of the maintenance of kampong improvements, were in sharp contrast to the heated speeches of Hoesni Thamrin in which he regularly described the scandalous conditions in urban kampongs and in so doing severely criticized colonial government policy. This might explain why Thamrin did not participate in the debate on the Rückert motion: there was little political emotion to be generated from this technical approach to the issue.

**The Politician: Thamrin**

One reason why the municipal administrations found it difficult to work in the kampongs was the lack of communication with the indigenous residents, the majority of whom had little formal education. Culture and language barriers stood in the way of smooth communication. On their side, many indigenous residents found the town hall somewhat intimidating when they had to do business there, or with its agents. As Bob Hering (1996:61) remarks, kampong people knew the municipality mostly through ‘soesah [nuisance] measures’,

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16 Rückert later pursued a successful career as mayor of Enschede in the Netherlands. He left office in 1946 and died in 1949.
like building lines and the building inspection. Kampong people nevertheless were quick to request the technical services of the municipality to solve minor problems. Cultural differences hampered mutual understanding, and the municipal administration, based on urban Dutch models, was much more comprehensible to European and wealthy non-European residents acculturated in Western ways than to the majority of Chinese and indigenous residents. Thus those individuals who could act as intermediary between the town hall departments and the kampong people played a crucial role. Hoesni Thamrin was an important, arguably the most prominent, of these intermediaries. He fulfilled a crucial role in explaining the administration's intentions to the kampong people, but equally, played a key role in translating the feelings of the kampong people to policy makers.

One occasion where Thamrin's role as the voice of the kampong people was evident was in 1925, at the second of the two congresses organized by the Sociaal-Technische Vereeniging focusing exclusively on kampongs. Together with two other indigenous councillors from Batavia, Thamrin presented a paper, in which they explained why the kampong population expressed not the least interest in municipal affairs. More directly, he argued that the kampong community regarded the intervention of the municipality as contributing to their financial burdens. Thamrin had made the same point in the Batavia council on various occasions (Flieringa 1930:116–119).

Hoesni Thamrin's upbringing made him ideally equipped to act as an intermediary. He was born on 16 February 1894 in Sawah Besar in Batavia, where his father, Mohamad Thabrie, was *adjunct-hoofdjaksa* (assistant public prosecutor). Already in 1919 Hoesni Thamrin had been elected to the Batavia city council at the youthful age of 25 by the small political party, the Kaoem Betawi, which participated in the elections of the city council in 1917 for the first time. The Kaoem Betawi, of which Hoesni and his father were leading members, was a small political party of well-to-do people, which took its name from that of the original population of Batavia. Although Hoesni Thamrin was legally categorized as an ‘Inlander’, in the colony’s legal tripartite division of the population, he also had European ancestors. This, and his father’s prominent position, ensured that he was raised in a European oriented environment, which included a European education. After attending a Christian pre-school in Pasar Baroe, he was sent to an exclusive Dutch elementary school in Mangga Besar (Instituut Bosch), at which time he took on the name of Jacob. Following this he went to an even more prestigious school, the Koning Willem III Gymnasium in Salemba to complete his secondary school education. Here as in his previous schools, teaching and learning were entirely in Dutch and he mixed with well-off Dutch and Eurasian schoolmates.
After a short period as apprentice at the office of the Resident of Batavia, Thamrin moved to the accounting department of the Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij (KPM, Royal Packet Navigation Company). During this period he came into contact with Daan van der Zee, who encouraged him to go into politics. Van der Zee, a member of the ISDP, worked at the town hall of Batavia and in 1920 was appointed to the position of town clerk one year after Thamrin became member of the municipal council. Van der Zee put Hoesni Thamrin in touch with his social-democratic friends, including Schotman and Stokvis. Their regular meetings were held in the Maison Versteeg & Rikkers, a well-known restaurant in Noordwijk, Batavia, noted for its wide garden and terrace in a French style. Thamrin did not become member of the ISDP, but sympathized with the social-democratic aims of this party. His relationship with Stokvis, the former chief editor of the newspaper De Locomotief in Semarang, alongside whom he sat in the Volksraad, was particularly important to Thamrin and remained of great influence to Thamrin even after Stokvis left to stay permanently in the Netherlands.

Thamrin’s political position was that of a ‘cooperative nationalist’. This position was entirely acceptable to the progressive groups in the European society such as the membership of the ISDP who were also strong proponents of the need to improve the conditions of the Indonesian population. He was, moreover, financially independent and thoroughly at home in European society, and could afford to devote all his time to politics. Although his party had only one seat in the Volksraad, Thamrin himself played a very active role as he was a member of many of the Council’s advisory committees including the Technische Commissie (Technical Committee), the Belasting Commissie (Taxation Committee), the Commissie voor Begraafplaatsen (Cemeteries Committee), the Kampongcommissie (Kampong Committee), and the Financiële Commissie (Finance Committee).

In the beginning of his term, Thamrin more often than not supported proposals put forward by other members rather than presenting proposals of his own, while he sharpened his political skills during question time. After a cautious beginning however, Hoesni Thamrin gradually developed an eloquent style of debating which impressed both political friends and opponents. He was very polite in his addresses, his voice was soft but emphatic, but he could also be sarcastic; for instance in April 1923 he called the meagre municipal resources made available for kampong improvement so far merely an amount to appease the municipal conscience (Hering 1996:53). He consistently stood up for the interests of the ‘Betawi wong tjilik’, the original ordinary inhabitants of Batavia. His concerns were to get improvement in methods of rice distribution, the maintenance of drainage systems, the supply of fresh drinking water,
and action to prevent the constantly reoccurring floods, which annually attacked Batavia.

Despite Thamrin’s eloquence, multiple public positions and connections, Batavia’s, indigenous community had limited clout. In municipal elections, each ethnic category (Inlanders, Vreemde Oosterlingen, and Europeans) had a specific number of seats assigned to them in the council but it was not until the elections of 1938 that the municipality introduced the so-called ‘pariteits’ or parity principle. This finally gave the indigenous community an equal number of seats to those of ‘other Asians’ and Europeans combined. In fact, of course, this still left the indigenous people heavily under represented given their majority share in the total population (De Vletter, Voskuil and Diessen 1997:21). Moreover, because the indigenous councillors often did not vote as a block, they typically did not make the most of the fact that they occupied half of the council seats.

Thamrin himself, however, often succeeded in gaining support from European councillors in his battle to gain improvements in urban kampongs, in particular from social-democratic councillors who shared his view that the municipality’s responsibilities extended to their maintenance. In pursuing his declared role in the council of looking after the interests of the kampong people, he questioned why it prioritized the development of the elite neighbourhood of Menteng at the expense of the kampongs such as Kramat and Kwitang. One of the specific issues he raised was the question of the municipality’s responsibility for kampongs located on private estates (particuliere landerijen). At the meeting of 21 March 1921 Thamrin proposed that owners of private estates had to financially support the improvement of kampongs on their estate. It had been common practice for such landlords to provide and maintain the drainage systems in their estate kampongs in earlier times, but this custom had been lost (Gemeenteblad 1921/77). Unable to force private estate owners to undertake this responsibility, Mayor Meyroos also resisted the idea that the council – or indeed the central government – could be held accountable for the improvement of roads and drainages in the kampongs on the private estates.

In this debate Thamrin found strong support from councillor Van Marle. According to Van Marle the Council could not eschew responsibility for the kampongs simply because they were located on privately owned land. The might of this small group of landlords, he argued, had to be broken because their neglect threatened the health of 80 per cent of Batavia’s population and made it impossible for them to lead a decent life. Van Marle further drew attention to the glaring contrast between the condition of the main thoroughfares of Batavia and the roads and footpaths in the kampongs: the former he
declared, acted as camouflage for the dirty kampongs and impassable kampong roads. At a council meeting in February 1922 Hoesni Thamrin supported Van Marle’s demand that work on improving Batavia’s kampongs was an urgent necessity. Van Marle had compared Batavia to a painting in a beautiful frame, which depicted fine villas and broad avenues while the kampongs represented the worthless canvas on which these beautiful scenes were painted. Thamrin immediately proposed that a budget of 100,000 guilders be set aside for kampong improvement by introducing economies in other budget items. He proposed that this money could be spent on ‘flying brigades’ of a hundred coolies, which would travel from kampong to kampong. Amongst other things these brigades would be required to clean out drains to ensure better drainage (Hering 1996:52).

Initially Thamrin’s proposal was rejected. The mayor argued that tax revenues raised in the kampongs were insufficient to pay for the kampong improvement, and he was not prepared to use more than 30,000 guilders out of the municipal budget for kampong improvement. In 1923 however the council approved the introduction of a new tax on real estate that made more funds for kampong improvement available. A list of kampongs that needed to be improved was immediately drawn up – including Sawah Besar, an area where Thamrin owned property – but the central government disallowed the introduction of the new tax. In the end Thamrin’s earlier motion to spend 100,000 guilders on kampong improvement was unanimously accepted, in part in an attempt to demonstrate to the central government the need for new taxes. The council also voted to establish a special commission to draw up plans for kampong improvement, which, would draw on the knowledge and experience of indigenous officials (Hering 1996:51–55).

At the end of 1923 Thamrin was again successful in diverting funds for kampong improvement. His proposal was to spend the so-called Jubileumfonds (a fund reserved to mark the silver jubilee of the reign of Queen Wilhelmina) on kampong improvement instead of on a memorial statue. The existing Kwitang-Kramat fund (created to help victims of a blaze in the Kwitang and Kramat kampongs in 1913) was added to the Jubileumfonds and the municipality also voted further money to this fund. In 1924 it was agreed that the target of the combined funds would extend to the whole of Batavia (and not just the two kampongs that had burnt down) and the scope enlarged to include public housing in general.\footnote{From 1927 the Jubileumfonds was under control of Mayor and Aldermen, to whom Thamrin belonged by then (Eggink 1930:91).} Another of Thamrin’s initiatives to raise funds ultimately failed. The council had endorsed a proposal by Thamrin to contract a loan of 2.5 million
guilders, of which 740,000 guilders would be devoted to kampong improvement and 600,000 guilders for road repairs. However, elected deputies in the West Java provincial council rejected this loan on technical grounds. The term of the loan was 46 years, deemed too long, and it was uncertain the project would be able to finance the repayment.

An unintended consequence of Thamrin's original proposal to devote the Jubileumfonds for kampong improvement was a process of gentrification and the gradual expulsion of the original kampong population. Kwitang, which before the fire had been an ordinary kampong, had in the process of rebuilding become too 'beautiful' (mooi) – hence too expensive – for the kampong inhabitants themselves. The former mayor, Meyroos, commented in an interview in 1933 that the new houses were being rented out to the 'kleinen man' (little people) in the European community and thus Kwitang had become a European neighbourhood. He added, however, that perhaps this was not so bad as there was also a need for cheap housing for the European community (NRC 11-5-1933). Meyroos might have had a point, but he ignored what may have become of the original inhabitants of the kampong.

It is unclear what Hoesni Thamrin thought about this replacement of kampong people by a predominantly European, lower middle-class. However, he definitely pleaded against overly expensive works where he argued a balance should be struck between sustainability and permanence. So for instance, in relation to kampong Sawah Besar where he himself owned property, he pointed out that roads that had been constructed without the appropriate foundations nevertheless remained perfectly serviceable after sixteen years. Although roads were later much better made, using for instance coral as foundation, which ensured better drainage and general serviceability, these were much more expensive to construct and thus limited the reach of the budget expenditure (Hering 1996:61).

A new opportunity to exert influence opened up for Thamrin after the government of Batavia introduced the position of aldermen (wethouders), and, in October 1926, proposed to appoint Thamrin to one of three such positions. Ironically, it was precisely in this month that Thamrin had elicited a great deal of criticism from European councillors for his suggestion that a connection existed between the endless stream of complaints by indigenous residents about housing and living conditions and the communist uprising of that month. This analysis did not go down well with his European colleagues who believed that the indigenous kampong residents loved law and order and were loyal subjects of the Dutch colonial state and that Thamrin's suggestion slandered them. Mayor Meyroos attempted to soften the effects by asserting that while he endorsed Thamrin's view on kampong improvement, he judged the
recent communist uprising not a suitable subject to be discussed in the municipal council. Thamrin clarified (or perhaps adjusted) his point by saying that he had not suggested a connection did exist, but that communists might find supporters in the kampongs if nothing was done about the living conditions. On an earlier occasion he deplored the fact that there was so little contact between the kampong community and the municipality. He pointed out that for the vast majority, that is the constituency of the Kaoem Betawi, the whole contact it had was through the imposition of taxes and the 'soesah' (nuissance) occasioned by the directives of Rooiwezen (Building Line Surveyors) and Bouwpolitie (Building Inspectors). Only indigenous intellectuals, Thamrin argued, had frequent contact with the municipality. Whatever the European councillors may have thought about Thamrin's explanation, he was elected as the first indigenous alderman in Batavia. He took up this new position in November 1926 and received, as his portfolio, responsibility for kampong improvement and public housing as well as supervision on the operation of markets, cemeteries, slaughterhouses, food inspection, fish auctions and Indigenous affairs.

Three years later, on 29 October 1929, Thamrin stepped down, because he felt bypassed when a European colleague, Van Zalinge, was appointed loco-burgemeester (deputy mayor). According to Thamrin, this honourable position rightfully fell to him, being the alderman with the highest seniority. Mayor Meyroos, however, declared in a meeting of the mayor with the aldermen, where Thamrin was of course present, that Thamrin could not be appointed to the position because it could only be occupied by a European, as the Indies municipalities were modelled on Dutch municipal administration.

The affair brought to a head a simmering discontent. In an extensive letter setting out his motivations for resigning, Thamrin declared his decision was based not only on the fact that he had been by-passed for the position of deputy mayor which was rightly his on the grounds of seniority but in particular because he felt he was not being treated with equality. Racial discrimination was being practiced in Batavia, he declared. In other municipalities indigenous deputy mayors had been appointed. In support of Thamrin, the entire indigenous fraction of the council resigned. Many councillors, and also Mayor Meyroos regretted Thamrin's decision and in the media the resignation was depicted as a great loss for the council and for the city as a whole. In the end the situation was resolved by the early retirement of Van Zalinge due to his impending return to the Netherlands so that finally, Thamrin was appointed deputy mayor and resumed his role as alderman on 14 January 1930.

In the meantime Hoesni Thamrin had also been appointed member of the provincial council of West Java, which had resulted from the administrative
reforms of 1925 and had been inaugurated by the Governor General in January 1926. This provided him with a base from which later, in 1935, he was elected to the Volksraad with the support of Boedi Oetomo to represent the West Java electorate. In 1939 he was re-elected as representative of Parindra (Partai Indonesia Raja) – in the West Java constituency. Despite his membership of the Provincial Council, Thamrin could not prevent that body rejecting the 2.5 million guilders loan proposed by Thamrin and accepted by the municipal council of Batavia as mentioned above. Thamrin could not help either that the central government rejected an appeal from the municipal government to revoke the decision of the Provincial Council.

Thamrin had of course already been a member of the Volksraad prior to his election, since 1927 when, at the age of 33, he had been appointed (not elected) representative for the Kaoem Betawi. In the Volksraad he led the Fraksi Nasional (Frani), which consisted of ‘cooperative’ representatives of the indigenous population. Even though the Kaoem Betawi had only one seat in the council, Thamrin was able to consolidate his position by gaining membership of the College van Gedelegeerden (Board of Delegates) on 27 June 1931. Led by the chairman of the Volksraad, this College van Gedelegeerden met on a weekly basis unlike the full Volksraad, which only met in two plenary sessions a year. Obviously the college had a significant influence on the decisions arrived at by the Volksraad. Further adding to Thamrin’s growing political position was his election in 1939 by 45 of the 59 Volksraad members as first deputy chairman of the council.

For a long time Thamrin combined his work as alderman with his membership of the Volksraad. Physically this was not so difficult since the town hall, situated on the south side of the Koningsplein, was quite close to the Volksraad building located on the eastern edge of the square. But in practice, Thamrin had to juggle two quite different roles: as alderman he was an administrator while in the Volksraad he was a politician. In the Volksraad Thamrin focussed particularly on broader policy issues alongside economic and financial questions (Jokman 1971:213). Where he saw exploitation of the indigenous population he made extensive use of his right to question and carried on extensive debates during budget discussions in which he was often supported by his socialist colleagues, such as the ISDP member, Stokvis. But here kampong improvement was not a major topic. It was in the municipal council where Thamrin made his mark in the debates on kampong improvement (Hering 1996:123).

Another forum where Thamrin exerted considerable influence was in the Town Planning Commission, which prepared the Town Planning Ordinance. This commission, installed in 1934, drafted the very influential Bill on Town
Planning and its extensive Explanatory Memorandum (Van Roosmalen, this volume). While Thomas Karsten, also member of the Commission and appointed for his established reputation in town planning, emphasized the town planning aspects, Hoesni Thamrin would have been more interested in those aspects that directly affected the poor housing and living conditions of kampong inhabitants. It is quite likely that the Commission’s observation that:

the government has been unable to resolve the kampong problem; this is in part due to the fact that it has insufficient knowledge of the conditions and the existing life circumstances that pertain there

stemmed from Thamrin.\(^{18}\) However, Karsten and Thamrin would have seen eye to eye on the underlying problems of the urban kampong.

It is perhaps surprising that Hoesni Thamrin was not a member of the Kampongverbeteringscommissie (Commission for Kampong Improvement). However, this would have put him into serious conflict with his position as alderman since the commission had the responsibility of advising the central government how it should distribute the 500,000 guilders amongst the various municipalities. More immediately, it may have been because Batavia was already represented by its mayor, Van Heldsingen, the chairman of the commission.

From outside the commission, Thamrin must have been pleased that it had made clear that in its view, any improvement plan had to be appropriate to the existing situation: that is, the basic principles applied to kampong improvement had to ensure that the character of the kampong would be maintained. Roads, for example, had to replace existing roads and could not, ‘Hausmann-like’, break through a kampong at the cost of existing houses (*Stadsvormingsordonnantie* 1938:26–29). The commission argued that the period of individual experimentation had delivered sufficient evidence for best practices now to be applied, even though too little was as yet generally known about what had been done in the past and what approaches had worked. It had dawned on many people that kampong improvement had to be implemented in an austere manner. The commission was critical of negative attitudes that still persisted regarding kampong improvement, the limited interest shown in previous years, and about the fact that numerous other and less

\(^{18}\) ‘*de overheid de kampongproblemen niet beheerscht; dit wortelt voor een deel in hare onvoldoende kennis omtrent de daar gegeven omstandigheden en geldende levens-eischen*’ (*Toelichting Stadsvormingsordonnantie* 1938:33).
urgent projects were given priority over the improvement of the living conditions in kampongs (Kampongverbeteringscommissie 1939:21).

The combination of different positions in one person and the existence of Old Boys networks bore the risk of nepotism and self-enrichment. Thamrin, for example, combined his political work with a business in the exploitation of land and housing. In February 1928, shortly after he had taken up his duties as alderman, the municipality published a report about one of Thamrin’s transactions as businessman. He had purchased the building material that had become available after the market hall of Pasar Tanah Abang was taken apart and it was rumoured he had misused his position as alderman to strike a bargain. Thamrin had ordered a municipal civil servant to ask the Hollandsche Beton Maatschappij, which was doing the demolition job, when the building material would become available and how much the material would cost. When the Hollandsche Beton Maatschappij and the civil servant agreed on the price of 1,200 guilders, the company had erroneously assumed that it was the municipality that purchased the scrap material. In reality Thamrin had bought the building material in his capacity of private entrepreneur, intending to recycle the material to build small dwellings. The potential scandal blew over when the company declared it had not received a higher bid from any private side and did not want to make a fuss about it. Despite the fact that the whole affair was reduced to a misunderstanding and Thamrin was immediately rehabilitated, a newspaper drew the conclusion that it had become sufficiently clear ‘how difficult the position of alderman is, who at the same time has an interest in land and housing policies’.19 However, in the view of European leaders so few indigenous leaders that enjoyed trust in both the indigenous and European community were available at the time, that a strict prohibition on the combination of public and private functions was impossible and therefore reputations of persons like Thamrin could not be damaged light-heartedly.20

Thamrin died after a short illness on 11 January 1941. His funeral was attended by the chairman of the Volksraad, Jonkman who observed:

Thamrin was buried as a sovereign, amid great public interest and condolences on the side of the Indonesians community. They gathered at the

19 ‘hoe lastig de positie is van een wethouder, die tegelijk belang heeft bij grond- en huizenpoli-
tiek’ (Het Vaderland 14-2-1928).

20 Nevertheless, Thamrin definitely trespassed the limits of European forbearance when together with other Parindra leaders he met a Japanese delegation to discuss the future of the Netherlands Indies in January 1941. This move was considered treacherous during the Second World War (De Graaff 1997:321–323; Jonkman 1971:212).
mortuary, along the road and at the cemetery. I myself went to the mortuary with the secretary of the Volksraad. We joined the funeral procession and participated in the ceremonies at the cemetery.21

After the funeral Jonkman commemorated Thamrin and praised him for his collegial manner and his contribution to the friendly atmosphere, which characterized the Volksraad. Commenting on Thamrin’s political opinions, Jonkman declared that ‘A competent opposition is a cornerstone of democracy’ (Jonkman 1971:213–214).22

Hoesni Thamrin lies buried at the Karet cemetery in a place now called the Golden Triangle. Ironically it is an area where office towers have replaced kampong houses and in the process destroyed investments made in kampong improvement in the 1970s, which were named after Thamrin to honour him. The Golden Triangle is a prime example of the displacement of kampongs, against which Thamrin had fought during his lifetime. It is equally ironical that his name has been used for Jalan Thamrin, one of Jakarta’s main thoroughfares, for which many kampong houses were also demolished.

Conclusion: Spiders in a Network of Relationships

The poor living conditions of the kampongs formed one of the many concerns of the late colonial government. The government’s attempts to modernize the kampongs have been extensively analysed elsewhere.23 We have focused on the strategies of two men working on kampong improvement, Rückert and Hoesni Thamrin, who were both spiders in a network of relationships. Rückert combined at one moment the functions of Principal Officer seconded to the Government Commissioner for Decentralization (but formally still in the service of the municipal administration of Semarang), chairman of the Vereeniging voor Locale Belangen, and appointed member of the Volksraad. This combination of functions became most apparent when he debated as Volksraad

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22 “een bekwame oppositie [is] een steun der democratie”.

representative with the government representative, the Government Commissioner for Decentralization Cohen Stuart, who in daily life was his superior. Hoesni Thamrin was alderman of Batavia, member of the Volksraad, member of the Provincial Council of West Java and member of the commission that prepared the Bill on Town Planning. The combination of functions was not always successful. A Volksraad motion proposed by Rückert (and two others) that the central government would bear 50 per cent of maintenance costs of kampong improvement was accepted but not implemented by the government. Thamrin in vain tried to have the 2.5 million guilder loan proposed by the Batavia municipal council approved by the Provincial Council of West Java.

Although not always successful, the combination of functions in different state organs enabled both Rückert and Thamrin to develop a tightly-knit Old Boys network. The same names appeared time and again in these debates, even though in the course of these years some of the Europeans concerned with kampong improvement took their furlough or returned permanently to the Netherlands: Tillema, De Vogel, Stokvis, Karsten, Van der Zee and others. They did not only meet at official gatherings, and Thamrin, for instance, was a regular visitor at Maison Versteeg & Rikkers, a café where leaders of the ISDP often met in Batavia. Despite Thamrin’s sociability, for the European Rückert it must have been much easier to move in high government circles and interact with European intellectuals than for the Indonesian Thamrin. Sometimes we get a glimpse of the informal gatherings at the club (sociëteit), on the tennis court, and around the dinner table where Old Boys networks are forged. For example, the participants of the 1922 Congress on Public Housing (organized by the Sociaal-Technische Vereeniging) went on a sightseeing tour to the hills in the hinterland of Semarang on the afternoon of the first day. A new suburb, Nieuw Tjandi, was being developed there. The trip ended at the home of Koreman, architect and member of the board of the Sociaal-Technische Vereeniging, who occupied a house at the northern edge of the area. The congress report sketches the social gathering: ‘For a considerable time the visitors, while nipping from a cool drink, enjoyed the beautiful sunset, so that many found it difficult to take their leave’.24

The combination of different positions in one person and the existence of Old Boys networks bore the risk of nepotism and self-enrichment. Two conflicts of interests severely damaged the position of both Rückert and Thamrin.

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24 ‘Geraamte tijd bleven de bezoekers onder een koele dronk genieten van een prachtige zons- ondergang, zoodat voor velen het scheiden moeilijk viel’ (Sociaal-Technische Vereeniging 1922:48).
Rückert was forced to step down as Chairman of the Vereenging voor Locale Belangen when he defended a five per cent salary cut of civil servants in the Volksraad. Thamrin’s cooperative stand with the colonial government finally clashed fatally with his nationalist aspirations when he met Japanese representatives to discuss the future of the colony during wartime.

The dilemma Thamrin faced was that his constituency existed of lower middle-class indigenous people, but he was a well-to-do businessman himself. Moreover, despite being a nationalist, he needed the support of Europeans in both the municipal council of Batavia and the Volksraad to gain majorities for his proposals. At the end of the day, the combination of functions that had made Rückert and Thamrin successful brokers in kampong improvement, also badly scratched their positions.

The final conclusion must be that the two men were also remarkably similar in tactics. We had started from the assumption that they offered an interesting comparison between a European appointed civil servant and an Indonesian elected politician. It has turned out that the differences between the civil servant and politician were smaller than we had envisaged. As councillor (a political function) Thamrin was elected alderman and assumed executive responsibilities, and the civil servant Rückert became an appointed member of the Volksraad and lobbyist as chairman of the Vereeniging voor Locale Belangen. The main basis of their power was the combination of various functions.

At a deeper level they shared the same view on the modernization of the city. The simultaneous decentralization of urban administration and the rise of an interventionist attitude provided scope for vigorous people to take on the question of the abolition of kampong autonomy and to address the question of kampong improvement in a top-down manner. Modernization of the city, including eradicating blots on the cityscape, had to be led by the government and be under firm control of the government. The alternative strategy, namely to empower the kampong residents, and to give them more instead of less autonomy, plus the funds to improve their neighbourhood according to their own priorities, was never even considered.

References


Kotabaru and the Housing Estate as Bulwark against the Indigenization of Colonial Java

Farabi Fakih

Introduction

With the passing of the Agrarische Wet (Agrarian Law) in 1870, which provided the legal structure for a more liberal economic development of the Netherlands Indies, the number of foreign companies and Europeans arriving in the colony steadily increased. By 1930, the European population in the Indies had grown to around 300,000 in a total population of approximately 60 million. In the cities, their ratio was much higher; in some cities, Bandung is a good example, the European population amounted to as much as twelve per cent while even in other, more native cities, as for instance Yogyakarta, it had amounted to around 4 per cent in 1930 (Volkstelling 1930 1936, VIII:2, 78–81).

The upshot of the emergence of European communities at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century was the creation of small civil societies within the cities. These were composed mostly of European men, educated in Europe, who possessed technical and managerial skills. This was one reason why these colonial cities became the first sites of autonomous local administration in the Netherlands Indies. Another reason was the need for local authorities to address the crises in housing and sanitation. The centralist bureaucratic structure of colonial government clearly hampered the capacity of the cities to provide its citizens with such amenities essential to modern living as paved roads and clean water. The Decentralization Act of 1903 changed this situation radically and the first cities to acquire some form of autonomy in 1905 were Batavia, Meester Cornelis, and Buitenzorg. Legal autonomy in the understanding of the Act meant the creation of a gemeente or municipal government, with a town hall and, initially, an appointed municipal council composed mostly of European men who could make recommendations to the central government through the channels of the regional bureaucracy. This sort of advice pertained to the allocation of funds disbursed to the city. It also authorized the collection of local taxes (such as the Dog Tax) to generate local funds for its own use (Schrieke 1918:184–217).

This was also the period in which the peculiar modern fetish for hygiene and cleanliness appeared on the scene in the Netherlands Indies. The concept of bacteria and viruses and their association with disease and the environment...
The Housing Estate as Bulwark Against Indigenization

was becoming more generally understood. Uncovering the secrets of the deadly tropics and how white men could avoid succumbing to the diseases that lurked there became popular knowledge. In 1913, W.J. van Gorkom, a well-known doctor in the Netherlands Indies, published a book about the requirement of hygiene in the cities of the Netherlands Indies, especially the colonial capital, Batavia. Van Gorkom urged Europeans to put the information acquired about health and hygiene into practice in their cities. He was especially concerned about health in the native quarters in the cities and the necessity of creating a municipal board of health to tackle these matters (Van Gorkom 1913:156–165).

This recommendation coincided with the movement towards greater urban autonomy; cities had to be able to take control of their own space so as to improve the hygiene of the city for the benefit of everyone. The emergence of a new type of European, often newly arrived from the Netherlands and well educated, who was punctilious about not being seen in a sarong, who lived in European-style houses, read newspapers containing articles about travel, European theatre and the latest fashion from Paris, was a significant shift from the older type of colonialist (Mrázek 2002:129–154). The older type of European in the Netherlands Indies had grown up in the land in which they had been born and who had had a much closer relationship with indigenous people. In the older cities, the spatial structure meant that, of necessity, European and indigenous urbanites generally rubbed shoulders with one another.

Modernity and its fetishes produced a new type of city design, which allowed for greater space and separation. This in turn meant that their inhabitants could distance themselves further from the land. Dirt roads were paved and the traditional linear Indies town development, which had provided opportunities for significant contact with kampong people (because kampons were usually located behind main roads lined by European houses) (Wertheim 1956:171), was discarded in favour of one, which consisted of compact, insular housing estates producing a concentrated European environment. This development also exerted an important influence on the emergence of the housing market. There were now enough people constituting a middle-class in the Indies to represent a housing market sufficient to motivate developers to embark on the construction of housing estates. My purpose in exploring the history of one such housing estate, Kotabaru in Yogyakarta, in this chapter is to see how the development of housing estates affected the idea of the house in the Indies, how it intruded on the relationship between the Javanese and Europeans, and how, with the establishment of the government of the Republic of Indonesia in Yogyakarta, the colonial era estate continued to
influence relations between those living in the former Europeans, housing estate and the surrounding kampongs.

**The Discourse of the Netherlands Indies Housing Estate**

Most of the new housing estates present in most of the cities of the Netherlands Indies (but especially in cities which had been granted municipal autonomy) were built in the course of the 1920s. The Nieuwe Wijk (Kotabaru) housing estate in the city of Yogyakarta was begun in 1919. Other examples were Menteng and Gondangdia in Batavia, Nieuw Tjandi in Semarang, Gempol in Bandung, Djati Oeloe in Medan, but there were many more (Flieringa 1930). These new housing estates formed part of the changing shape of cities in the Netherlands Indies. Designed using contemporary town planning technology and incorporating many of the contemporary modern amenities of European cities, including mains delivering potable water, paved roads and footpaths, they were usually rounded off with the provision of a wide range of sporting and educational facilities.

These new housing estates grew at a time when the idea of the garden city, promoted by such people as Ebenezer Howard in England and Frederick Law Olmsted in the United States was gaining ground (Tafuri and Dal Co 1986:22–33). The architect Thomas Karsten, one of the main town planners in the Indies, designed housing estates which took account of the contours of the land and constructed curvilinear streets to accentuate the atmosphere of the European countryside, but still working within a strict plan of regulated space that provided for the needs of what he saw as the differing socio-economic categories of a modern society that he believed the Netherlands Indies would become (Coté 2004:19). The idea of using nature, particularly trees in urban landscapes, to conjure up an image of nostalgic romanticism for the then fading old rural life of Europe but now integrated with modern technology, was gaining ground. The houses themselves were now being designed according to the new ideas about what constituted modernity; in Bandung especially, houses were being designed with a decidedly modern Art Deco style. The old Indies-style houses, with their main galleries and front and back verandas, their outhouses and spacious living arrangements were being replaced by compact, two-storey houses, very European in style and design, with a modern bathroom and even some air conditioning.

Modernity arrived in the Indies city in full force via various new discourses such as those associated with the idea of hygiene and health, but it also came as part of the burgeoning sense of European-ness in white colonial society in the Indies (Locher-Scholten 1997). This new awareness was probably
accelerated by advances in modern communications technology and modes of travel. The pervasiveness of Hollywood in colonial Dutch-language newspapers indicates the development of a sense of closeness with the West and consequently such images transmitted by the media demolished the sense of insularity of Indies life. But this sense of connectedness to the West also produced a different sense of insularity within the Indies. The new housing estates can be considered to have represented islands of modernity; places in which the presence of the non-modern, that of the Javanese and their kampongs, was relegated to a well-concealed background. By looking at one housing estate, the Kotabaru housing estate in Yogyakarta, it is possible to see that its design went beyond the intention to establish a romantic sense of old rural life; it was a deliberate attempt to disconnect it physically from the rest of the ‘native’ city.

I shall come back to this later, but at this juncture I am interested in looking at the ideas some Europeans fostered about their living space. It was difficult to find former European inhabitants to interview and I was therefore compelled to try to find other sources. A good fount of information is housing advertisements. In what follows I shall examine a series of housing advertisements in an effort to analyse the spatial discourse about housing current in late colonial Indonesia.

As the purpose of advertisements is to sell dreams, they tend to be quite explicit in their message. Housing advertisements, therefore, can provide a rich source for understanding a wide range of the elements, which composed the European perspective in the colony. Only a preliminary glance can be attempted here and this should be the subject of a much deeper research. They represent an interpretation of part of a much more extensive European discourse which first and foremost encompassed the idea of the house and then went a step further to include the idea of who the house-seekers were and where they wanted to go. Unfortunately the use of housing advertisements seems to have stopped after Independence. I have not yet been able to find any advertisements for privately constructed housing estates placed in the newspapers in the 1950s and 1960s. Only after the end of the 1960s, during the New Order era was there a return to housing estates and with this, of the reappearance of their advertisements in newspapers and magazines.

The series of advertisements I want to use for this purpose is related to the Villa-Park Tretes in Tretes, not far from the city of Surabaya. Unlike the majority of housing estates developed by local governments, this one was developed by a private company named Woning-en Administratie Bureau van Vloten. Created by the Surabaya-based real-estate developer C.F. van Vloten Augustijn, Tretes was widely advertised in the newspapers and in Van Vloten’s own fortnightly catalogue of vacant houses. Located at around 900 metres above sea
level on the lower slopes of Mount Arjuno, in the environs of the city and connected to it by a good road and a bus service, the villa estate contained around 100 villas for sale or for rent (fwd 1935a, 1935b). The principal target group of this housing estate was Dutch families living in Surabaya, who wanted a chance to live in the cooler climate of Tretes. The housing estate offered electricity, water mains, a swimming pool, restaurant, schools and a sporting field, which appear to have been the kinds of amenities expected to be on offer in these types of housing estates. It also offered a daily bus service to Surabaya.

One such advertisement for Villa-Park Tretes was published in the Dutch-language newspaper *De Indische Post* on 26 March 1936. It pictures a boy smiling at the camera wearing a type of traditional clothing worn by a German boy, suggesting a rural idyll. He is placed alongside a letter that he has written to his readers. Written in rhyme, the letter runs as follows:

Tretes, 26 March 1936
Dear Girls and Boys!
I am a nephew of BUNGALOW BILL,
I can ride and swim, as much as I like
And climb mountains, and wander through valleys
And I can go to the SPORTPARK without having to pay
In VILLA-PARK TRETES, at the edge of the forest
BUNGALOW BILL has built a LOG CABIN for me,
I have a [illegible] there, dressed in hiking clothes
And I go to the VILLA-PARK SCHOOL, Oh what a joy it is to learn!
It is an unforgettable spot here,
You learn all sorts of things here people need to know
And when I am grown up, I shall hang out the signs
And I want to become a builder of bungalows myself!
Of course, I shall also open a school myself
And for the children of the future, learning will become the watchword
But what I actually would like to ask you here
Is: shall I see you all show up in TRETES for EASTER?
Well, that's all done and dusted! Goodbye
From me and of course from BUNGALOW BILL
A firm paw
From your Billy Ketjil1

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1 The original poem reads: ‘Trètès 26 Maart 1936 Beste meisjes en jongens! Ik ben een neef van/ BUNGALOW BILL, Ik mag rijden en zwemmen Zooveel als ik wil, Ik klauter op bergen En zwerf..."
Billy Ketjil is a very happy boy, because he lives on the Villa-Park Tretes housing estate. The Villa Park offers amenities where he can play all day and attend a good school. And this is not all; he can play wearing his hiking gear (bergklimmerskleeren) and can smile at the camera in the guise of a boy from the German Alps.

The idea of escaping to the cool, healthy mountains away from the debilitating tropics and the concomitant fear of the effect of the heat and disease had a very long history in European discourse on Indies. Almost every major city in the Indies had a local mountain retreat where Europeans holidayed and recuperated. In the 1920s such places were transformed into destinations to which ‘ordinary’ Europeans flocked at the weekend. Modernity now offered the mountain as a place where families could relax all day long. They could rent or even own a house in such a resort and yet remain in easy reach of the city via a daily bus service which would transport the working father to the hot, tropical city below while his wife and children continued to enjoy the clean, fresh, healthy mountain air.

Almost all the advertisements show a sketch of what was on offer as a potential client’s future home. None bears any resemblance to the traditional European Indies house; instead they were modelled on and reminiscent of traditional European houses, even traditional European mountain chalets. One advertisement ran:

One misses one's own fireplace as strongly in the tropics as one misses the sun and blue sky for a significant part of the year in Holland. But...in Tretes one has to forfeit neither one nor the other. So buy or rent one of these Cosy Bungalows there. They are only to be found in Villa-Park Tretes.
Another declared:

High in the Cool Mountains, your family will discover health and happiness. Build or rent your own Bungalow in the mountain village closest to Surabaya [of all mountain resorts], in the Villa-Park Tretes.

Yet another advertisement stated:

Forest and sun and the high mountain air will ensure your family’s health and happiness. Buy or rent for temporary or permanent residence one of these enormously cosy bungalows in the Villa-Park Tretes.2

The texts were accompanied by drawings of an open fireplace, a chalet with pine trees, and a Dutch-looking villa.

The idea that air and coolness were important to health was a major element in the discourse of the housing estate. This was the time when climate was believed to have an influence on any number of matters. People even believed that living in cooler climates encouraged intelligence. In a sense it was another version of today’s air-conditioned lives of the Indonesian middle class who, equally apprehensive about battling tropical heat, cocoon themselves in the modern amenity of technological cooling.

Modernization and the Fear of the Kampongs

What was not explicitly expressed in these advertisements was a fear of the Javanese. In fact, the Javanese did not exist for the Europeans. If one did not know the geographical location of Surabaya or Tretes, one might have thought the estate was in Europe. Only in one of the advertisements referred to above

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2 The original texts (all from issues of De Indische Post in 1936) are: ‘DE EIGEN HAARD mist men in de tropen even sterk als men in Holland gedurende een groot deel van het jaar de Zon en de Blauwe Hemel ontbeert. Maar...OP TRÊTÈS mist u het een, noch het ander. Koopt of huurt dus een der knusse bungalows, zoals alleen VanVloten die bouwt in HET VILLA-PARK “TRÊTÈS”; ‘HOOG in de KOELE BERGEN vindt uw gezin gezondheid en geluk – Bouwt of huurt Uw eigen Bungalow in het dichtst bij Soerabaya gelegen bergdorp, in het VILLA-PARK “TRÊTÈS”; ‘BOSCH EN ZON en HOOGGE BERGLUCHT schenken uw gezin gezondheid en geluk. Koopt of huurt voor tijdelijke of permanente bewoning een van die intens gezellige Bungalows in het VILLA-PARK “TRÊTÈS”.

was there a fleeting recognition of the tropics. Sketches of American-looking houses and German-looking bungalows or a European fireplace hint at what the Europeans were thinking when they read these advertisements. They were published in the company of articles on film stars such as Greta Garbo and Jean Harlow or advertisements for ship sailings or what was on at the Capitol Theatre in downtown Surabaya (such as *Call of the Wild* with Clark Gable, Loretta Young, and Jack Oakie).

European colonial society was composed of Europeans, whether *trekkers* or *blijvers*. The *trekkers* were those Europeans who had migrated to the Indies with plans to return to Europe; the *blijvers* had grown up in the Indies and planned to remain there (Van Doorn 1994:23–24). Many of the latter were of mixed parentage with familial links in Javanese society and had lived in the colony for generations (Bosma and Raben 2008). Although somewhat simplistic, these were expressive terms and, confronted with newspapers filled with references to the outside European world, whether in the USA, Australia, or Europe itself, one is forced to draw the obvious conclusion that increasingly, the European community in the Indies was dominated by the *trekkers*.

Modernity in the form of segregating people on the basis of a ‘racial’ category and modernization in the Indies, as Locher-Scholten (1998) has shown us, was providing many forms of refined racism. Although not necessarily excluding rich Javanese or Chinese, the entirely Dutch-focused advertisements for Villa-Park Trêtès were clearly responding to European ways of thinking. Therefore it is safe to suppose that these advertisements were published only in Dutch-language newspapers. Even the image and appeal of the little boy was chosen to expand this sense of exclusiveness, underlying the assumption that this housing estate was intended for Europeans.

Modernity, represented here at many levels, was not liberating people from the segregation of the past; quite the opposite in fact: it was evidently developing new ways and forms of segregation defined by the logics of the market and technology. Fear is not highly apparent in these advertisements. As we have seen, instead the Javanese is conspicuous by his absence, as is the indigenous kampong of the old city. However, it is precisely the social and environmental exclusiveness suggested by the advertisements that reveals the new fear of the kampong. It is a fear, which had been submerged by the manifestations of modernity.

**Kotabaru and Its Relationship with the Surrounding Kampongs**

The bulk of my research was conducted on Kotabaru, where I have had the opportunity to interview fifteen people who had lived there or in one of the
neighbouring kampongs at one time or another. The interviews aimed to probe in detail the nature of the relationship between the kampong and the housing estate. The interviews themselves were difficult, because I needed to obtain information about what my interviewees had felt and understood in the past, typically when they were children. This knowledge of the past is now cluttered with, and obscured by, knowledge of the present and, in some cases, this hampered the respondents’ ability to make definitive statements. I shall try to explain what I have obtained from the interviews I conducted, but before I do so, I need to explain the history of Kotabaru itself.

The Nieuwe Wijk, or Kotabaru, was built around 1919 and at the time was located right at the edge of the city (Dingemans 1926:109–112). The city of Yogyakarta is a relatively new city, founded in 1756 as a result of the splitting of the Mataram kingdom into the two principalities of Surakarta and Yogyakarta in 1740 (Noorduyn 1986:89). The city was unique in that it was still the seat of a sultanate and was endowed with privileges, which few other cities in the Netherlands Indies enjoyed. Every new Sultan had to negotiate his power with the Dutch upon his succession to the throne (Houben 1994:75). With each succession, the Sultan inexorably felt his grip over his city weakening. The situation was certainly changing for Yogyakarta in the second half of the nineteenth century. The train service arrived here in the 1870s, its lines slicing the city in two. Yogyakarta was increasingly industrialized to accommodate the expanding sugar industry. Much of the outskirts of Yogyakarta was transformed into sugarcane plantations, equipped with their own sugar factories. The consequence of this expanding industrialization was that more and more Europeans arrived in the city. The yellow pages of a telephone directory issued in 1938 reveal that Yogyakarta offered a number of amenities which the European populace could enjoy; including some jewellery shops, a piano shop and several motor car dealers (Interlocale telefoongids 1938:247–260). The Europeans also had the European Club (sociëteit) at their disposal. This had a room for gentlemen and organized plays and dances.

Under the prevailing national agrarian law, Dutch as well as other foreigners were not allowed to own land, but on the orders of Resident Canne and the Sultan, a commission on land was formed (Commissie voor het Grondbedrijf) resulting in the Sultan’s Law 1917/12, which permitted the sale of the Sultan’s land to foreigners. In fact, in 1925 the former intricate Patoeh system of landownership was completely dismantled. Yogyakarta was becoming a modern

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3 Respondents: Ms AD, age 77; Mr DS, age around 70; Ms E, age 55; Ms I, age around 50; Ms L, age 72; Mr N, age 56; Mr PM, age 78; Mr P, age 40; Ms R, age 66; Mr S, age 84; Ms SUK, age 75; Mr S, age 39; Ms SZ, age 76; Ms S, age 71; Mr TS, age 59.
city and it was shedding many of its feudal laws. Two years later, work on the Nieuw Wijk was begun. It was designed by Thomas Karsten and its purpose was to provide for the housing requirements of Europeans, allowing them to obtain land and a house. It was also designed to avoid land speculation, which was becoming a problem in some cities in Java at the time. Like Tretes, Kotabaru was in a way an insular piece of ground. It had the best schooling facilities in the city; it also boasted a sports park, including a swimming pool.

A bird’s eye view of Kotabaru reveals that, at the time it was built, it was bounded on the west by the Code River, on the south by the train lines, and on the north and east by farmlands. Its curving streets betray the garden-city concept– the introduction of a village atmosphere into the housing estate. Within its borders it contained a public hospital (the Petronella Hospital, today the Bethesda Hospital) and a military hospital. Barracks for the soldiers stood in the vicinity of the military hospital. It also had a complete set of schools: Kweekschool voor Inlandsche Christelijke Onderwijzers (Training College for Indigenous Christian Teachers); a Normaalschool voor Inlandsche Onderwijzeressen (Training College for Indigenous Female Teachers); the Keucheniussschool (a Christian high school); an AMS (High School for Girls), a Christelijke MULO (Meer Uitgebreid Lager Onderwijs, Christian Advanced Elementary School); and a State Europeesche Lagere School (European Elementary School). Furthermore, a seminary and Protestant church were also established in Kotabaru. There was even a museum of antiquities. In the centre, there were tennis courts and a football field.

At first glance, it can be seen that the designer maximized a sense of being somewhere else than in Indonesia. The riverside of the housing estate, a respondent informed me, was once lined with trees, obscuring the other side of the river from view. The train lines were an effective means to disconnect the area from the rest of the city to the south. Kotabaru itself was designed with newer types of houses. Although not the types of highly modernized houses which could be found in Menteng (Batavia), or the Art Deco styles in Bandung, there was a definite difference from the previous, more hybrid Indies-European houses which then existed in other parts of the city. Technically it was possible to live in Kotabaru without having to venture outside it.

Apart from the Kotabaru housing estate itself, there were several small kampongs, which encircled the area, including the kampongs west of the river and south of the train lines. Before Independence there were two kampongs located to the west of the Code River, kampong Gondolayu, located just north of what is now known as Jendral Sudirman Street, and to the south of what is now the Kampong Code, and kampong Terban. On the southern side of
Kotabaru (but north of the railway lines), where present day kampong Krasak is located, was once a cemetery and there were also some housing estates and a kampong south of the train lines, including kampong Pengok and the European housing estate, Batjiro. These various kampongs held a special position within the spatial hierarchy of the area. As will be seen, although the Kotabaru housing estate was built to provide for a sense of being somewhere else, it was the kampong that provided for the essential services, which sustained it.

The kampong inhabitants that provided the essential services required by those living in the housing estates included housekeepers, gardeners, chauffeurs, and even delivery boys who ran the messages. I have interviewed a number of persons who had lived in the kampongs surrounding Kotabaru during the 1920s. When asked what their strongest memory was, one male respondent, Mr S, replied that his strongest childhood memory of Kotabaru was a feeling of fear. He never had the courage to venture into the housing estate. When I asked why, his answer was:

because my parents forbade me to go there. Kotabaru was a Dutch place was it not? First, I was afraid of the Dutch. Secondly I was afraid of their dogs...Well, you know everyone was afraid of dogs.

Another informant, Mrs SZ, lived in kampong Klitren Lor, east of the housing estate, and adjacent to the military barracks. When asked if she had ever gone into a Dutch house, she answered: ‘Never, I was afraid. Those who did go into their houses were either their maids or their mistresses’. She elaborated:

I was afraid [of venturing into Kotabaru], I was fine if I was at the border. That was because I was a girl. It was scary to go into Kotabaru, because the sinyos were often naughty. I heard that many kampong kids had fights with the sinyos. That’s why people here were afraid of entering Kotabaru.4

Other respondents I talked to recalled that people were afraid to venture into Kotabaru because the white children there liked to harass the Javanese. Peasants going to their fields would rather go right around it than traverse its borders.

I received quite a different response, however, from Mr PM, born in Kampong Terban in 1928, whose mother was cook in one of the girls’ schools and whose

4 ‘Sinyo’ possibly used here generically to refer to Dutch children, or more precisely refers to Europeans of mixed descent.
father worked as an attendant at a petrol station in Kotabaru. For him, playing in Kotabaru was not scary at all ‘because, to be honest, the Dutch kids there were not as nasty as the ones near the Fort’ (interview with Mr PM). He and his friends often went there to steal fruit.

The responses generated by Kotabaru amongst residents of the surrounding kampong, therefore, could be quite diverse, ranging from a sense of fear to a confidence that this estate presented new opportunities. The childhood memories of my respondents in turn seemed to depend on the extent to which adult kampong residents had established a linkage with the neighbouring European estate. Thus, it is notable that Mr S, who recalled only a sense of fear with regard to the European estate, also believed that no one from his kampong, Gondolayu, worked in Kotabaru, whereas Mr PM, who recalled confidently entering the district averred that many people from Terban worked in Kotabaru before Independence. He recalled people, presumably neighbours, working as maids, gardeners, launderers, or drivers for the Dutch. These connections resulted in an asymmetrical relationship between the kampongs and Kotabaru. Where, as in the case of Kampong Terban, that connection was often at the level of providing domestic or other service, it generated an ambiguous relationship, which, as Locher-Scholten has suggested, was both close and distant (Locher-Scholten 1998). If Mr PM’s childhood memory is typical, familiarity with Kotabaru – presumably provided via his parents’ reports of European privilege and behaviour gathered as a result of their close but subservient relationship – generated in the child a confidence, which extended to a readiness to steal. On the other hand, again, according to Mr PM, Europeans almost never crossed the boundary of the housing estate into the kampong, the only occasion he could recall was when his mother’s employer visited their house when his mother was ill.

Another level of relationship with Kotabaru operating amongst nearby kampong dwellers, was the relationship with the Roman Catholic church located within the European estate for those who had converted – or who may have been considered potential converts – to Catholicism. They were visited quite regularly by Roman Catholic priests and their Javanese church assistants from the seminary in Kotabaru, Mr PM recalled. Mr PM’s family was part of this community which is likely to have played a part in his parents obtaining responsible positions in Kotabaru. This level of familiarity no doubt also contributed to Mr PM’s confidence in associating with the white and Eurasian children of the estate compared to the childhood recollections of the other respondents cited above.

The relationship between the indigenous people and the Dutch was always ambiguous. There can be no denying that there was a sense of mutual fear.
Despite this, they were inextricably linked within a colonial relationship. Even the European woman who had to venture into the kampong had some sort of relationship with the Indonesian woman she was visiting. The ambiguity is depicted in Breton de Nijs’ novel *Vergeelde portretten* (*Faded Portraits*) in describing the matriarch of the house, Ms De Pauly or Aunt Sophie, and her maid, Midin. Aunt Sophie was a formidable lady, who feared that her family was becoming ‘Javanized’ and insisted that her family behaved in very European ways, in their manners and tastes while simultaneously believing in many of the traditional Javanese beliefs about good luck and ghosts. Midin was one of the family’s maids who had an uneasy relationship with Aunt Sophie. Every time Midin disagreed with Aunt Sophie, she would escape to the kampong until her money ran out when she would return. Although each seemed to dislike the other, they were both bound together in a strange colonial relationship (Breton de Nijs 1999). The relationship was thorny but nevertheless emotional and quite real and it was a relationship that was changing as a result of modernization itself. As Elsbeth Locher-Scholten has shown, because of books such as Catenius van der Meijden’s *Ons Huis in Indië*, modernity made people less easily ‘touchable’. The overriding concern of modernity with hygiene and cleanliness translated into cleanliness from the ‘pollution’ of ‘verindischen’ (becoming indigenized). This was also what Aunt Sophie was most worried about.

The housing estate formed part of an onrush of modernization and the concomitant formalization of relationships. Housing estates formed a way of protecting Dutch people from the process of ‘verindischen’. Kotabaru formed a secluded zone, designed to be separate from the city. This fear of indigenization was not immediately evident in the advertisements discussed above, but it lurked behind the advertisements. Fear formed the backdrop to the desire to build secluded housing estates. The same fear might explain the obsession some Dutch-language newspapers, such as the *De Indische Post*, had with travel, Hollywood films, and Paris fashion. These items in *De Indische Post* lift the tip of the veil of the desire of European colonials to escape from the Indies. Similarly, advertisements for housing estates show houses, which were not in the Indies at all; they showed chalets straight from the Alps, houses reminiscent of Europe. This ‘running-away-from’ tendency was perhaps a form of self-protection: the housing estate can be seen as an evasion; modernization as an attempt to escape from the colonial encounter. Encountering was a form of pollution and housing estates provided the seclusion which precluded such a danger: they enabled people to live in one city but not have to meet its colonial reality. The irony was that to preserve this illusion of separation, it was necessary to have Javanese to fetch daily necessities for the modern, European neighbourhood.
The Postcolonial Discourse of the Housing Estate

The Kotabaru housing estate was taken over by Japanese authorities during the Second World War. With its Dutch occupants gone, they began to offer the houses to Javanese on lease. Some of the houses were also commandeered by the Japanese military forces. Practically all the indigenous people who came to live on the housing estate were middle to upper class. A number of them were schoolteachers, which at the time was a very respectable, well paid occupation. But the new occupants who came to settle there during the Japanese occupation and the subsequent Revolution also included many upper class Javanese, regents, and aristocrats from other parts of Java who sought to reside in the formerly European-owned houses.

Although a small battle was fought in Kotabaru during the Japanese occupation, few buildings were destroyed so that after the war practically all the houses were still intact. Although there were few physical changes, there was a definite social change in the housing estate. There were no more Europeans walking their dogs in the morning or the afternoon. And, although many people were traumatized by the events of the war, especially because Kotabaru had been the main place of residence of the Japanese army of occupation, there was an unequivocal sense among kampong dwellers according to those I was able to interview that the spatial meaning had changed.

Almost all the respondents who had lived in Kotabaru after Independence came from a middle or upper class family and had enjoyed a good education. Three of the respondents were academics from the local Universitas Gadjah Mada. Their parents had been fluent Dutch speakers and all had enjoyed a good education, some even in the Netherlands. They had been subject to a fairly strict upbringing that instilled in them a blend of Dutch and Javanese manners. Since upper class Yogyakarta people already had a house or dalem (residence of a high official) in the city and had not needed to move to Kotabaru, almost all of the new residents of the estate had been born outside the city of Yogyakarta.

When Yogyakarta was declared the capital of the Republic of Indonesia in 1945, it became a highly desirable location, particularly given the instability elsewhere in Java. Many people holding high positions in the new government, as well as regents from other regencies in Java, professionals including doctors and lecturers, teachers as well as some high-ranking army personnel, came to live in the city. Many of them were highly Westernized, holding parties and wearing Western-style dress as they were photographed posed in front of their cars. Even before Independence, they had already been enjoying a life-style, which was beyond the ken of ordinary people in the archipelago (Figures 6.1
and 6.2). Their manners, the way they brushed their teeth everyday or dropped into a bookshop indicated that they were a prototype for the present-day, middle class Indonesian.

For many who formed this Indonesian middle class, living on a housing estate was something very new. The Javanese lower classes lived in kampongs, but the Javanese middle to upper classes had also lived in kampongs in colonial times. The Javanese nobility of Yogyakarta lived in dalem, which were

Figure 6.1 A party in an Indonesian-owned house, circa 1930
COURTESY OF FORT VREDEBURG, YOGYAKARTA

See, however, Colombijn (2010) for an alternative view on this matter.
essentially kampongs with a big house in the middle (O’Connor 1983:10). Around the houses of the nobility clustered the dwellings of abdidalem, people who functioned as their servants. The abdidalem provided the owners with various services; some mundane, others imbued with more complex social and cultural meanings. Interestingly, after Independence, the houses of Kotabaru
gradually began to assume some features of a *dalem*. Their new occupants brought their dependants along with them, as seemingly people from noble families especially could not do without followers. As a result of this influx, the house and yard surrounding these houses became increasingly cramped. Outhouses and many of the internal rooms were used to house the dependants.

By turning each house into a kind of small version of a *dalem*, by allowing followers to live with them in the relatively large houses, the newcomers fractured Kotabaru into small territorial units. Simultaneously, they changed the dynamic relationship between the surrounding kampongs and Kotabaru itself. The organic sense of relationship which had existed during colonial times between the kampongs (especially Terban) and Kotabaru was gone. The mother of Mr S, for instance, had complained to him that ‘beginning with the Japanese era, jobs had become scarce. People had to find ways to make a living’. This was why Mr PM said:

Some had commenced selling fried snacks, some sold fried peanuts, and in the morning some people had begun to sell pecel [salad with peanut sauce]. My mother, who had grown used to cooking for the boarders in the girls’ school, took up selling pecel then. She used to sell on that slight elevation over there, the one being built on, in the morning. There was a yard there back then.

As the traditional Javanese way of life remained strong, people from the kampong began to undertake the essential traditional rituals which were common in villages in Java, but which could not be performed by the residents of Kotabaru. When a person died on the housing estate, for instance, someone had to initiate the one week of prayer and the other rituals related to a death. When a person was to be married or circumcised, quite a number of people were required to execute these complex rituals. To ensure the success of these traditional Javanese rituals, people had to gather, pray and chant. It would have been impossible for the new people from the housing estate to do this. The housing-estate dwellers were mostly professionals, who were unlikely to have had the time to spend on performing what they may have regarded as the tedious essentials required by the traditional ceremonies and indeed may have lost the knowledge of how they were to be performed. The kampong dwellers had to do this for them.

At the same time, apart from the ritual occasions, contacts between Kotabaru and the kampongs declined; within the residential area people also became less close. The spatial arrangement of the houses had made the
neighbourhood as a whole less organic. Each family became an island unto itself. People met friends and other people at work and not in their neighbourhood. Although this situation has become the common state of affairs today, it must have been revolutionary at that time. The change must have produced a certain type of new Indonesian. The big houses and their big spaces were totally different to the narrow footpaths and snug lanes of the kampongs; where intimacy was prevalent, and the border between one house and another was never clear. When asked about how close she was to her neighbours, a respondent who had lived in Kotabaru all her life answered:

Yes, we were close, but not as in the kampongs. That’s because houses in Kotabaru were large. It wasn’t as it was in the kampongs, where you’d meet your neighbours after waking up. It was different there, there was more privacy. So the relationship patterns were a bit different (interview with Ms E).

Conclusion

The development of housing estates can be seen as part of the greater process of modernization in the Netherlands Indies. The rise of housing estates was also a part of the greater spatial changes taking place in the Indonesian cities. The former spatial formation of the Indies cities, which had placed Dutch houses side by side with native kampongs, had generated regular interaction between the Dutch and the Javanese. Modernization resulted in an ever-widening distance between and among the ethnic categories. The housing estate presented a closed space; a new form of urban site outside which the Europeans (at least the women and children) did not have to venture. Or perhaps they only crossed the boundary when they wanted to attend a ball at the sociëteit or urgently needed to buy something in one of the European or Chinese shops. In a way, the situation resembled that in today’s gated communities. This fear of the outside was not a fear of crime, but the fear of indigenization. The latent fear of Europeans of indigenous people was to some extent reversed where some indigenous people living in the surrounding kampongs feared Kotabaru. Others, however, went there daily to work for the middle and upper class residents of the housing estate, and did so again after Independence.

During the Japanese occupation, the Europeans living in Kotabaru had either been interned or had fled the city and their vacant houses were occupied by Indonesian professionals. The change in life-style was less radical than the shift from European to Indonesian residents might have suggested.
The new occupants were people who had already become acculturated to a Western way of life. Nevertheless, they introduced a new style of habitation. They considered their house to be in many ways similar to a *dalem*. Many began to open up their houses to relatives or other followers in the traditional spatial way of giving land or space to dependants, thereby binding them in a new semi-feudal relationship. As a corollary of the new social structure taking shape on the housing estate, their relationship with the kampongs surrounding Kotabaru was obliterated. The daily work relationship between servants and the lady of the house of colonial times was replaced by a more traditional relationship; one which involved the employment of kampong dwellers in the traditional ceremonies which members of the Indonesian middle class in Kotabaru were unable to perform, but to which they had been accustomed in their childhood.

The change in social relationships prompted other changes as well. During the 1950s, some areas of Kotabaru degenerated into seediness. The area near the Code River became a place where prostitutes gathered. Inhabitants of Kotabaru were reluctant to sit in their front gardens for fear of falling victim to a crime. The fear which many Javanese harboured of walking into Kotabaru during the colonial days was transformed into a fear of the streets of Kotabaru itself. As a consequence of the loss of a sense of community, Kotabaru was deprived of its basic sense of boundary. Although still known as a fashionable, upper class district, the boundaries of Kotabaru became blurred. Few people today know where the boundaries are, as if Kotabaru has finally become fully incorporated within the city proper and has become a regular part of Yogyakarta.

**References**


Public Housing in Semarang and the Modernization of Kampongs, 1930–1960

Radjimo Sastro Wijono

Introduction

As one of the major colonial urban centres in Java, Semarang was one of the first cities in the Netherlands Indies to gain a measure of municipal autonomy under the Decentralization Act passed in 1903. The newly established municipal council rapidly developed itself into a think-tank, which elaborated a colonial discourse concerning urban health, sanitation, housing, and the indigenous urban inhabitants. The kampong became a prime focus of attention of the municipal administrators (Nas 1998; Coté 2002; Versnel and Colombijn, this volume). Faced with a rapidly expanding urban Javanese community, a tragic recent history of cholera and plague epidemics, and a burgeoning commercial sector, members of the new municipal council of Semarang and its specialist committees urgently began to examine the best ways to set about reforming living conditions. The initiatives the council implemented over the next decade provided important guidelines for the development of public health policy, town planning, and public housing followed by many other cities in Java and other islands in the colony.

The pressing health and sanitation issues and the desperate need for adequate housing inevitably led urban reformers to advocate innovations which implied a multitude of underlying new ideas and practices. In their turn, these had an impact upon the cultural and domestic practices of indigenous urban kampong residents as well as on traditional methods of house construction. No less important in their impact were the specialization of tasks in the building process and the diffusion of new materials and new skills which were increasingly required for the mass housing projects that were being undertaken (Nas and Boender 2002).

Hygiene ranked very high on the list of priorities of urban government officials who were concerned with the effects of regular epidemics of the plague, cholera, and typhoid, which occurred with increasing incidence in the latter years of the nineteenth century (Tillema 1913). When theories about the specific causes of such epidemics became more widely understood in the colony, policies were developed which directly challenged indigenous practices in traditional house construction, in particular the pitched roofs and thatching.
which, it was held, sheltered rats and other vermin. In many cases, such houses were torn down or re-roofed using such new materials as corrugated iron. Moral arguments, articulated by philanthropic and religious interests working in urban Java, and by missionaries in more distant parts of the archipelago, were often linked to more ‘scientific’ ones. To the anxieties about the insanitariness of traditional housing was added a concern about the domestic arrangements their architecture implied. These, for instance, allowed the cohabitation of several families in one house or several generations of one family in a single space. Intentionally or not, new designs, new materials, and new practices often challenged traditional beliefs and rituals related to family relations, childrearing, or nutrition.

When ideas and regulations concerning better housing ran counter to the existing norms and values of indigenous residents, they can be characterized, in part, as a ‘civilization offensive’ against Javanese and Chinese domestic traditions and as an attempt to bring habitation styles and domestic life in general into line with European traditions and recent European scientific discoveries. In part, they were also simply the result of a general diffusion of new ideas, techniques, and materials, such as taking account of sanitation, or the use of corrugated iron roofs, and bricks and concrete in construction. These municipal programmes introduced significant changes into the character of public settlement and in this sense a house as a residence became a catalytic element of modernization.

This mission civilisatrice through the medium of housing was an early form of globalization, or more precisely, the implementation of Western conceptualizations of health and hygiene in all the colonies. This process was promulgated more rigorously in some areas than in others, which might be one explanation for the great regional differences in the present-day condition of vernacular architecture in Indonesia. Since the first generation of Indonesian architects and town planners were trained during this energetic period of professional development and experimentation, they largely persisted in following this pattern in the immediate postcolonial period. Consequently, in the process of decolonization, architecture and town planning in Indonesia, as elsewhere in South-East Asia, continued to be largely inspired by such Western models without any significant reference to national (traditional) architecture, except for aspects of surface decoration (Colombijn 2010: 281–97, 336–348; Dumarçay 1987:70–71; Van Roosmalen, this volume). In subsequent years, Indonesian architects and planners turned to the latest overseas – increasingly Asian – models in their efforts to meet the demand of expanding and aspiring urban lower and middle classes, constructing Indonesian versions of gated communities and high-rise apartments.
The subject of this chapter is how these developments in housing and the concomitant social changes worked out in public housing built by the municipality (gemeente) of Semarang in the last decades of colonial rule. It begins by identifying the main trends in public housing, which appeared especially in two municipal housing complexes in Semarang, Sompok, and Mlaten. This is followed by an analysis of how the new housing introduced the residents to some aspects of modernity. Next the changes which inevitably occurred during the transfer to independence and those which appeared earlier during the Japanese interregnum will be sketched. The chapter will conclude by arguing that modernization, both as a conceptual notion and as physically embedded in the urban landscape, was such a powerful element in the late colonial period that the city experienced very little change in its built form with the end of colonialism. The only real change was a dramatic burst in population growth.

Organizing Public Housing in Semarang

In the first half of the twentieth century, Semarang was the administrative centre of central Java and it was the commercial hub of the region. It was the centre of a rail and communications networks, infrastructural services for a thriving sugar industry, and a busy seaport (Stevens 1986; Suryo 1982). Between 1905 and 1920, the population, which was ethnically mixed, swelled from 96,000 to 158,000 and by 1930 it had grown to 218,000. The expansion of the population was primarily attributable to the influx of Javanese from the hinterland, attracted by the work opportunities the city provided. It was also home to a significant Chinese population, whose leading figures dominated the commercial and financial sector and also had control of much of the land. In 1905, 78 per cent of the population was indigenous, fifteen per cent Chinese, five per cent European and two per cent was made up of Arabs and other Asian peoples. In 1930, the indigenous population continued to dominate, but its share had shrunk slightly (Semarang 1919; Volkstelling 1930 1936, VIII:2, 78–81).

The perceived poor condition of the urban kampong of the Javanese and Chinese residents of Semarang at the beginning of the twentieth century encouraged the municipal administration of Semarang, from its inception, to develop programmes of kampong improvement (kampongverbetering) and public housing (Westerveld 1910). Semarang was rich in citizens who contributed to this spate of early urban housing reform in Java in the first half of the twentieth century. It was also the home of the progressive colonial newspaper, De Locomotief, which had been at the forefront of calls for colonial reform in the latter half of the nineteenth century, and of a variety of religious and
philanthropic organizations. By the end of the second decade of the twentieth century Semarang had become known as the ‘red city’, a reference to its role as the home of an organized indigenous labour movement which had grown under the influence of a group of radical European self-proclaimed socialists (Shiraishi 1997).

Among the progressive figures in the town was the colonial architect and town planner, Thomas Karsten, who assumes a central place in colonial town planning. Karsten commenced his colonial career in Semarang in 1914 and the influence of his work and writings soon spread throughout the Indies (Sumalyo 1993). Another significant Semarang figure was H.F. Tillema, a pharmacist and businessman. A resident of Semarang, Tillema played a central role in calling for improvement in housing and living conditions for both the European and indigenous inhabitants of Semarang and later in the whole of the Netherlands Indies (Coté 2002). Tillema pointed to the link between technical elements of housing construction and the improvement of health conditions of the indigenous population. Tillema (1922, V:ix) considered the traditional house to be an important breeding ground of illnesses and stressed that it was essential to improve the housing conditions to keep the houses plague free, including to ensure good light and ventilation, and to take care of proper sewage and garbage disposal. On the wider scale, he also stressed the importance of adequate town planning ordinances to regulate the overall arrangement of residential areas.

Semarang was also blessed with a number of well-trained, committed professionals, including doctors, such as Terburgh, municipal town engineers such as Rückert (Versnel and Colombijn, this volume) and Plate, who went on to contribute more broadly to the urban development of Java, and leaders such as the Semarang mayor, De Iongh. In conjunction with the businessman Tillema and the architect Karsten, these men all made their reputations at the beginning of the twentieth century by tackling the problems of the city of Semarang.

These new technocrats helped convince councillors that overcrowding in the densely settled Javanese and Chinese kampongs represented a health hazard to the European community and that these health problems related directly to business confidence and investment in the city. Although the lives of Europeans were directly affected by the health of their Javanese neighbours, it was the latter who were most prone to be the victims of the high incidence of cholera and typhoid and who were most affected by the high child mortality rates. It was they who had to cope with the lack of fresh water, inadequate sanitation, overcrowded dwellings and over-populated kampongs.

By the middle of the second decade of the century, the answer to the problems that beset Java’s cities was clear to the city government: they could only
be solved in the longer term by taking the initiative to build new, healthier housing complexes, and separating these from the industrial and commercial areas of the city. Therefore, the municipality Semarang made public housing a priority and embarked on a programme, which can be seen as one of the success stories in the history of the city. The city administration set to work devising a myriad of rules and regulations to enforce building regulations, impose proper sanitary habits, and maintain traffic flows and orderly environments. Indeed, it did not try to avoid grappling with the entire issue of settling large numbers of poor people in an orderly and regulated way. Through the work of highly qualified bureaucrats and technocrats, and pushed through by the progressive principles of its municipal leaders (including Javanese and Chinese representatives), the municipality developed seven public housing complexes. One of these, Complex Sompok, will be examined in more detail here.

After some years of debate, the Semarang municipality commenced its first large public housing project 1916. Its aim was to supply the needs of its citizens by producing large numbers of low cost houses by resorting to mass production on a commercial basis. This would have the added advantage that it would generate income for the city. It contracted Thomas Karsten, who had arrived in Semarang in 1914, as the city planner to develop this project. Karsten was concerned about producing buildings and urban environments which would attempt to integrate European and indigenous elements and is widely credited with having succeeded in doing so. His ideas about architecture and town planning, in particular the arrangement and integration of the city into different zones, ensured that his name assumes a central place in the history of colonial and Indonesian architecture (Sumalyo 1993).

The Complex Sompok was developed in two stages: in 1919 Karsten finished the design and between 1920 and 1923 the local government completed the construction of the housing complex (Liem 1931:261). By the end of 1918, an area of 9,900 sq m suitable for the construction of thirty-three units had been surveyed, plus another 5,785 sq m to accommodate four houses designated as so-called European houses. At the end of 1919, the Council had prepared another 28,000 sq m for 156 kampong dwellings, and 12,078 sq m for another eight European residences (Gemeente Semarang 1918).

Conspicuous in this early experimental period of public housing were the more progressive attempts to combine elements of traditional indigenous architecture with the principles of modern Western health, hygiene, and construction. Remarkably, these modern, Western ideas were only just then being developed and applied in urban housing projects in Europe. The idea of incorporating traditional elements in modern architecture had already been tried by a number of Western architects working for colonial administrations in
South-East Asia, but had only rarely succeeded. The names of G. Grolier, working in Phnom Penh and Maclaine Pont in Java are amongst those colonial experimenters who did succeed to some extent in achieving this aim. But in Indonesia it is Thomas Karsten who is credited with having been most successful in integrating European and indigenous elements in houses designed for a modern indigenous urban population.

In developing his kampong house design, Karsten paid due respect to Javanese domestic tradition and simultaneously accommodated the latest technical innovations related to modern concepts of health and sanitation. Despite needing to develop affordable mass housing, he also emphasized the necessity of ensuring diversity in the style and structure of the houses. To ensure a variety in housing style in this huge complex, Karsten devised a number of house ‘types’, built to size and cost specifications suited to what he perceived to be the needs of families of different socio-economic levels. Of the eighty-one new houses which had been built by 1919, twenty-one houses were of Type II, forty of type IV and twenty of Type V (Figure 7.1). Type II houses were provided with a simple bathroom, washroom and privy. Type V houses had an additional space which consisted of kitchen, with adjacent bathroom and privy. This additional space was connected to each group of four houses in

**Figure 7.1 House type V in Sompok**

SOURCE: FLIERINGA (1930:183)
such a way that one septic tank served every eight houses (in two clusters of four). Some of the more expensive designs included a gravel-based septic tank. Each house had a brick wall 0.8 m high and 0.3 m wide separating it from the next, avoiding the use of traditional bamboo plaited walls which were brittle and decayed too rapidly. These houses were rented out by the Gemeentelijk Woningbedrijf (Municipal Housing Corporation) for rents varying according to the different size houses: Type II cost 494 guilders, Type IV, 703 guilders, and Type V 773 guilders per year (Gemeente Semarang 1919). The most expensive type had the added $4 \times 4$ m space and shared use of a gravel-based septic tank.

The council supervised these pioneering developments closely and intervened in Karsten’s initial plans when it felt that the houses were too close together. In 1918, it removed one house from every group of four in Karsten’s initial design. At the end of the same year, the council also decided to provide the cheaper houses with detached kitchens. These were to be constructed from bamboo to cut the extra costs. By the end of 1919, detached kitchens made of bamboo were common (Gemeente Semarang 1919).

The municipal government benefited in its building activity from the stable economic conditions at the time and the good income it received from taxes. Therefore, the years 1916–1922 formed a period of initiative and development. In one year alone, the municipal council built 519 houses in Sompok at a total cost of 480,000 guilders. So successful was the public housing project that very quickly it used up all the available land, including that of the existing kampons of Kintelan and Lempongsari. While the new project housing did not destroy the old kampons, new municipal houses were built in the interstices between the old houses, producing strange juxtapositions. For instance, the old housing of kampong Lamper Lor remained in the midst of new housing of kampong Jeruk and Rambutan.

The insertion of new kampong housing into the area of old kampons introduced new divisions in terms of the built environment and in terms of the nature of the population. The complex Sompok, also known as Kampong Gemeente, for instance, was devoted to housing lower-ranking civil servants. Sompok was also distinguished from the older kampons onto which it abutted by its layout with regularly placed parks (*plantsoenen*). The green image of Kampong Sompok was strengthened by the decorative neighbourhood names, taken from fruit trees, such Kampong Manggis, Jeruk, and Rambutan (*Gedenkboek* 1931).

By the end of 1929, the Municipal Housing Corporation of Semarang had built 1782 houses (Rückert 1930:167–170). This was a relatively small number given the population growth over that time and municipal housing provided for only a small proportion of the housing needs of the total population.
Despite this criticism, Semarang had made a greater effort than any other city in the Netherlands Indies in providing public housing (Colombijn 2011). Besides Sompok, public housing in Semarang also included the housing development in Candi Baru, Kintelan, and East Semarang. After 1916, a separate technical department was created to oversee this development and the housing department became an institution, which assumed a range of social functions related to public housing. Its duties included surveying and constructing roads, implementing policies related to health and sanitation for housing and its environment, and designing and implementing infrastructure for traffic, industry, trade, and other facilities. Generally speaking, its tasks were aimed to meet the demands of designing a better life in the present and future.

In 1924 responsibility for housing development was taken over by a limited liability company, NV Volkshuisvesting. The central government furnished 75 per cent of the capital and the municipality 25 per cent. Similar companies were founded in other large cities of the colony (Flieringa 1930:140–143, 150–153; Rückert 1930:169). The bulk of the houses of the NV Volkshuisvesting were rented, at costs of between three and 35 guilders per month and some houses were sold. This housing company operated smoothly and successfully until 1930 with a capital in 1929 of 1.4 million guilders. In that year, just before the onset of the Depression, the company was able to sell around 580 houses, eighteen stores and six shops (Rückert 1930:163–169).

However, during the Depression, NV Volkshuisvesting suffered a severe setback. Many occupants moved out of these houses to other dwellings with lower rents or moved back to the village. After Independence, responsibility for new and existing public housing and the exploitation of urban land for housing was taken over by the Dinas Djawatan Gedung-Gedung Kota Besar Semarang (Semarang Municipal Department of Buildings). In 1950, it allocated a significant number of houses to veterans of the War of Independence.

Some Problems in Public Housing

Two key issues remained a problem throughout the twentieth century. The first was funding for public housing. Municipal autonomy also meant financial autonomy and, although the central government did provide some financial support, one of the motivations behind decentralization had been to encourage local government to develop its own sources of funding through differing forms of taxation. Initially the central government was not prepared to support the provision of urban public housing financially. When it changed
its policy later, the amount was never sufficient to cover all the needs of Semarang. From time to time, municipal councils sold public land to private developers to raise money to add to that received from the government in the form of loans and during the colonial period, the local government of Semarang was able to service its debts. After independence the municipality continued building housing complexes to meet public housing needs, especially those of its own civil servants. Limited financial resources forced public housing authorities to co-operate with private companies and to run lotteries as a means of raising funds. The political instability, which persisted for much of the early period of the Republic, added to its funding problems. The provision of fresh water was another onerous financial burden associated with the housing project.

The other main, recurrent problem was land availability. Land was obviously crucial to solving the housing problem. One of the initial problems facing the Semarang council was formed by the legal issues surrounding the acquisition of land. In the case of Sompok, there was a major disagreement about the compensation to be paid to private owners for the acquisition of land needed for the construction of the drainage canal through the complex. Indeed, its construction was delayed because the owner of the land was still waiting for compensation. A similar problem arose about the acquisition of land required to construct the access road to Sompok (near the existing Jomlang-Tegalsari crossroads). Again, the landowner affected, Mrs Kastelyn, questioned the need of the expropriation and the amount of compensation offered for her land. Small landowners whose land was expropriated for the construction of housing generally had reservations about the financial compensation (Gemeente Semarang 1917). This led to protracted legal battles between the council and landowners who did not want to sell their land.

In January 1918, the Semarang council decided to establish a commission to investigate the issue of land ownership and the definition of public land. This commission established a basis for assessing land prices. By 1918 it established the principle of differential prices, with land for housing along main roads set at between 1 and 5 guilders per sq m and land set back from a main road at \( f0.5 \) per sq m. Initially, the inhabitants did not want to let their land go at these prices, but eventually they were forced to accept the compensation being offered (Gemeente Semarang 1918).

Learning from such experiences, the municipal administration and the NV Volkshuisvesting later ensured they settled the price and the matter of the possession of the land before elaborating their development plans. In the case of Candi Baru and Mlaten, this involved making an initial down payment (panjer) based on accurate surveys made at the time of the transaction.
Kampong Sompok as a Gateway to Modernity

Despite the modest nature of the houses being constructed by the municipal council, the public housing estates imposed a dramatic intervention on the lifestyle of those Javanese who were selected – or opted – to rent there. The areas were clearly destined not to be for ‘ordinary’ Javanese. As one interviewee expressed it when remembering the pre-war inhabitants of Sompok:

Complex Sompok was one of the colonial housing complexes. They were usually the preserve of the well-off families. Another example was kampong Blimbing. We could not live there, because we did not have the money to rent. Today, Complex Sompok can be compared to Perum Tlogosari [a middle class neighbourhood] (interview with Said, 77 years old, 2004).

The new estates were often the subject of newspaper articles. For instance, two contributors described the conditions in the housing complex in and around the kampong at length in the Malay language magazine *Oedaja* (Soedarso and Amaloedin 1928). These new, innovative projects often featured in the promotion of the ‘modern’ Netherlands Indies. For instance, a book on tourism, *Nederlandsch-Indië*, contained pictures of the modern housing in Candi Baru (see also Figure 7.2). The latter photographs remove any lingering doubts that the new buildings represented a significant departure from the urban kampong at the beginning of the twentieth century, such as those shown in the photos taken by Tillema twenty-five years earlier.

Another interviewee emphasized what he remembered about the houses:

The condition of the house was good, because the local government always ensured that the area around the housing complex was kept clean. They cleaned the small river in the housing complex periodically. The houses were small, 6×4 m, but the back and front yards were well laid out. So it was very beautiful. In the past there were small paths and parks, which were also beautiful. People often spent their time strolling in the park. The Europeans usually chose [to live] in the houses on the main road (interview with Soeparno, 61 years old, 2004).

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1 At the risk of stating the obvious, I should perhaps emphasize that, of course, conversely traditional Javanese domestic practices influenced European domestic life in many ways, such as the habit of taking baths daily (Soekiman 2000).
The houses into which these better-off indigenous residents of Semarang moved were indeed quite different from those they were used to. Most came from inner city kampongs, where the houses were more or less similar to the traditional rural village houses, which had evolved as part of Central Javanese culture. After moving to the modern housing of Sompok, interviewees recalled they felt like a ‘modern person’. The house was distinct from a traditional one: it had a bathroom, clean water, and electricity. Moreover, the housing estate provided a beautiful park and street lighting. Colonial health regulations required that the traditional palm leaf (atap) roofing be replaced by tiles as a plague prevention measure. Public health had been a major concern for the municipality and it therefore lay at the core in the design of houses.

Generally speaking, the facilities of the housing estate also created a new cultural environment. The new configuration of house and locale created a new perception of the house and the new environment inaugurated a broader change in society as a whole: from what might be termed a paguyuban society (Gemeinschaft) to a patembayan society (Gesellschaft); in other words it transformed from a traditional to a modern society (Budihardjo 1986:69). This change is vividly remembered by a former resident:

Yes, I still remember Sompok housing. It was a gemeente housing complex. The people who lived there were officials of the colonial
government and the [ordinary] indigenous inhabitants were not allowed to settle there. Only civil servants could reside there. The estate was controlled and cleaned by the municipal council, we could not put rubbish anywhere; there was a privy and also sewerage. Today, the well is still there but the privy is not. The sewerage was over there. In front of Mrs Lestri’s house there was a drain, [through which] the water flowed swiftly (interview with Said).

In contrast to a European house, which had several rooms, each with its own function, there were no divisions in a traditional Javanese house. The division of the house into rooms introduced the concept of privacy through spatial arrangement. Initially these internal divisions made the inhabitants feel uneasy since, in Javanese culture, a house was a micro-model of the cosmos and belief system. Over time, however, people absorbed the hybrid influences introduced by the internal arrangement of the new houses.

Another novelty to which the residents of the Kampong Gemeente had to adjust was the integral role of the bureaucracy in their housing. In order to be allocated a house in a public housing estate, people had to register with the municipal offices and municipal officials would consider their application before deciding whether to select them or not. The function of bureaucracy, as Max Weber has argued, was to guarantee the impartiality of rule and to define the relationship between task and responsibility. In terms of the Weberian Idealtype, civil servants needed to work as professional and neutral agents, immune to outside interests, and focus on the effectiveness of their work in realizing the goals set by government. In that sense, the housing bureaucracy as a whole also became a machine, which embodied the modern intentions of the municipal government.

One of the effects of the new bureaucratic procedures was increased discipline. Tenants of public housing were now required to pay their rent according to a strict time schedule. Failure to pay meant that they had to leave the municipal kampong.

When I was child...in the colonial era, before Japanese occupation...my father worked for the government, so my father was assigned a house in Kampong Gemeente (Manggis, Jeruk, Blimbing). The houses were rented, so we had to pay the bill every month (interview with Soenarto Padimin, 75 years old, 2004).

Privies formed another area in which the inhabitants of the public housing complexes were faced by new experiences that challenged traditional
attitudes and demanded new ‘modern’ behaviour of them. The municipality reported in 1919 that many times the inhabitants complained about the system of closed drains running behind the houses. Privies were constructed along these drains, and at the upper end of the drain there was a facility for washing clothes and bathing in the water flowing through this drain. The drain with the privies strung along it and a bathing and washing facility at one end had been provided for each row of houses in order to improve sanitary conditions in the municipal kampong. The municipal administration intended to accustom its inhabitants to leading a more hygienic life. The inhabitants rarely used the bathroom, because they preferred to take a shower in the open. The inhabitants also preferred to put faeces in a hole in the ground and heap earth over them, rather than use the privies. In the face of obvious resistance, the municipal council hired a person whose job it was to clean the privies and gutters to ensure that kampong cleanliness was maintained (Gemeente Semarang 1919).

Later inhabitants began to appreciate the toilets. In complex Mlaten, for instance, shared facilities were built for bathing, washing, and privies (Figure 7.3). It turned out that many people were willing to pay slightly higher rents in order to have a private bathroom. This willingness was indicative of a growing individualism (Westbroek 1932:16).

Perhaps there were less drastic changes in furnishing the house. One European observer remarked in the late 1930s that, even in traditional kampong houses, typically consisting of one room (in rural areas), people were inclined to adopt Western habits. Somewhat disparagingly, he continued that, if people could afford them, the Javanese were

![Figure 7.3](image_url)
convert[s] to European furnishings at their very worst. Wardrobes and “whatnots,” china cabinets, occasional tables, and Nottingham lace curtains are his delight. He does not feel his home complete without an immense iron double bed for the heads of the family.

PONDER 1990 [1942]:84–85

Class Distinctions

The attractions of the new modern housing developments were hard to ignore and many people wanted to live there. However, not all people could afford the relatively high rents. The majority of those who could were the new class of State officials who could afford the rents. Mrs Sutopo provides the following picture of such a family, which seems to be typical of the occupants in the 1930s:

At the time our family was quite prosperous. My husband’s first salary was 174 guilders per month. From this, we used ƒ15 for renting the house, ƒ2 for electricity, ƒ1.50 for paying the housekeeper, ƒ5 for the driver, ƒ5 for paying for a sewing machine, ƒ3 for paying for a generator (dynamo), side-dishes (lauk pauk) 20 cent per day or ƒ6 per month, and 40 kati rice of 2.5 cent each. We could save 100 guilders each month. [...] We were able to resist going to any meetings, let alone parties. We even did not go to the cinema. We only played tennis, which was our favourite way of keeping healthy.

SUTOPO 1981:305

An official receiving a salary 174 guilders per month could be classified middle class. On such a salary, they could have afforded to go to the cinema, one of the characteristic pastimes of the modern family in 1930s, but this woman specifically identified her family as abstaining from both political and ‘modern’ activities. Indeed, while the modern surroundings and secure income made many new activities possible, this did not mean that traditional aspects of Javanese life disappeared. As the following account indicates, in the domestic environment of the middle class home, many aspects of traditional female-centred life continued:

One day at 11 a.m., I had finished my work. The three of us were sitting on the veranda [...]. Emmy pretended she was at the market with a little basket filled with coloured leaves and various flowers she had plucked in the
schoolyard. Because of the heat, my grandmother had discarded her *kebaya*, and just wrapped a cloth chest (*kemben*) around her. The long cloth decked her torso. She had her favourite game, *dakon*. I was finishing a piece of embroidery around a leg of my trousers.

**Sutopo 1981:303**

Such reminiscences suggest that the lifestyle of these middle class families was a combination of traditional and Western culture. The clothing of the grandmother and ‘playing market’ suggest a traditional orientation. Embroidery, on the other hand, was a popular domestic activity borrowed from European women (and popularized in the new Indonesian language women’s magazines of the day). Mrs Sutopo’s family was from a *priyayi* (Javanese upper class) background. People from this new *priyayi* class thought they needed to demonstrate their commitment to Western culture to support and promote their prestige in the colonial society. They betrayed this way of thinking in their outward appearance, in the activities they undertook in daily life, in the discipline applied to work and so on.

Sompok also included families of a distinctly lower social class. These lived in kampong Manggis, Jeruk, and Rambutan. In Complex Mlaten social divisions could also be discerned and here lower class families lived in the kampong Krakatau, Hawa, and Hiri. The everyday classification of people, apart from being defined by the quality and style of houses they inhabited, was also based on lifestyle and what they ate. These class distinctions were recognized in the new housing complexes:

Some people employed by the municipality were lower class. Yes, they lived in those houses over there in Kampong Manggis. Today, though, the houses in Manggis have been extended. Then, a government employee used to live in Kampong Manggis; he cleaned the gutters and could buy a house in Manggis. As for the higher class, they lived in Lamper Sari. My house was in Kampong Jeruk. [...] The houses there were beautiful. Now all the houses are beautiful and they have been sold by their former owners (interview with Said).

All in all, housing design and the selection of who lived in which kampong played an important role in establishing new class distinctions in Semarang. It should be noted that not all residents were indigenous. A 1932 survey in the housing complex of Mlaten revealed that 1899 people occupied 663 houses built by the NV Volkshuisvesting Semarang. Of these people, 1180 were indigenous, 505 Chinese, 207 European, and seven were classified as other (Westbroek 1932:16).
A Micro-view of Decolonization: Sompok in the Mid-Twentieth Century

Towards the end of the colonial period, the intensity of state intervention declined. The kampong took on a life of its own. Inhabitants were increasingly accustomed to the experience of employment in modern offices and the consumption of modern media. Despite rising nationalist politics to which urban intellectuals were attracted, in many ways the lives of new urban kampong dwellers came closer to that of the Dutch. Although a social and cultural distance remained, expressed for instance in terms of address, the urban population as a whole became more integrated by the use of terms such as tuan, nyonya, sinyo whereas in the village, older terms of respect, such as nDoro, Den, jeng tended to survive.

Typical of many reminiscences of an older pre-war generation is the following:

Yes, we lived here, got married here, and have stayed to the present. Well, people said that the Dutch were colonial, but they were kind. We did not have any complaints. Yes, we are good persons and we have stayed here for years. We never fight and we have always got on well with the neighbours, because all of other the people are good, too (interview with Bisirkulin, 77 years old, 2004).

Good relations between indigenous people and the colonial overlord can also be seen in mixed marriages. For instance, in 1940 a person from an old kampong married a member of the Koninklijk Nederlands-Indisch Leger (KNIL, Royal Netherlands Indies Army) living in a nearby boarding house; the relationship continued after Independence:

When I was a child, my life was wonderful because my sister married a soldier of the KNIL. At that time their position was good. Sometimes people even called me a friend of the Dutch. [...] Sometimes we were helped by those KNIL people. They were like us, indigenous inhabitants. They often gave us food, like bread. In the 1950s I liked to hang around with sinyo-sinyo [European or Eurasian youths]; when they were playing, I just watched (interview with Margono, 70 years old, 2004).

Relations between people in the housing complex and the surrounding older, unplanned kampongs intertwined. For instance, people living in Sompok employed personnel from the older kampong to do domestic chores. As one of the former domestic aides recalls:
We had good relations there. They [middle class people in Sompok] had a housekeeper who was one of us and sometimes we also asked to go with them. At that time, there was the Dutch Meneer Mengrut. He lived with his housekeeper and she gave birth to a baby. Nowadays the child is living in Holland. Mr Mengrut has died (interview with Soeparno, 70 years old, 2004).

**Kampongs during the Japanese Occupation and Beyond**

The arrival of Japanese soldiers brought significant changes to the inter-class and inter-ethnic relationships, which had developed over the past two decades in Sompok and Mlaten. During the first days of the occupation, the Europeans fled from their houses. Many indigenous people from the surrounding kampong took advantage of this to steal goods from the empty houses in Sompok.

Indigenous attitudes towards the Japanese were mixed. Semarang-born novelist Nh. Dini recalls how one day five Japanese soldiers suddenly appeared standing in the field that separated their house from a river. The kampong people gathered to watch them and so did, from behind their fence (pagar), Dini and her family. The soldiers were speaking angrily. Two of them broke down the fence without warning and came into their backyard. They took the iron clothesline. The second time they came and took the clothesline, Dini watched them from nearby. “These people were the army which my father called the liberator from the [Dutch] colonizer!” (Dini 1979:9).

The social differences grew smaller, at least on the surface. The Japanese treated the Javanese as equals, especially if they were willing to co-operate with the new overlords. Dini was keenly aware of the changing social relations, and not only because her father, who continued to work for the railways, earned less and less.

The social system kept in pace with the propaganda [proclaiming] that all people were of the same status, with the slogans “Japan-Indonesia together,” “Co-Prosperity in Great East Asia” and the like. It took my mother a long time to get used to being called “Bu,” a title addressed to her by the neighbours in the kampong who had once addressed her with [the more respectful title of] “Den” of “nDoro.”

DINI 1979:10–11

Conditions changed dramatically when the Japanese military government designated the modern housing complexes of Sompok (Lamper Sari) and Mlaten
(Halmahera) as an internment camp for Europeans. These complexes, once the sites of modern humanity, became places of inhumanity. The kampongs were sealed off from neighbouring housing by a high bamboo fence. The houses, designed for modern Indonesian families, were now all occupied by Dutchmen. Women and men were separated. Lamper Sari (Sompok) was designated for women and children, and Halmahera (Mlaten) was occupied by men. These kampongs were eventually to house a large majority of all European civilians in Central Java. By January 1944, Lamper Sari was the biggest women’s and children’s internment camp in Indonesia, with up to 8,000 internees (Fenton Huie 1992:69). The small, two-room houses in Lamper Sari were occupied by twenty to twenty-five internees each. Sanitary conditions in the modern houses collapsed completely; government officers no longer supervised the cleaning of the complex. The hygiene deteriorated alarmingly and this breakdown caused the death of many internees.

As the Europeans were gradually concentrated in two parts of Sompok and Mlaten and thus removed from other parts of Sompok and Mlaten, indigenous people had the opportunity to enjoy the modernity more directly. They could go into the modern houses without feelings of humility or inferiority. Meanwhile, the European internees, increasingly suffering from a lack of food, exchanged their possessions for fresh food (eggs, chicken, fish, meat, rice and so forth) brought by inhabitants of neighbouring kampongs. Through this exchange, items of modernity were disseminated among the indigenous people, such as clothes (jackets, shirts, shoes), cameras, jazz records and the like. At least at the beginning of the Japanese rule, the boundary between the internment camp and the neighbouring kampong assumed the appearance of a market.

The Japanese period thus had two contradictory effects on the modernization of kampong life. With the disruption of the municipal apparatus, modern ideals of cleanliness, hygiene, and order had to be dropped, especially in the parts that functioned as internment camp. Simultaneously, however, the consumption of modernity spread to a new group of indigenous people who purchased at bargain prices modern consumer items hitherto unaffordable to them. This paradoxical situation ended when the Japanese army surrendered.

Social changes continued after Independence. Many of the new residents of kampong Nangka and Mangga were civil servants. After 1958, the proportion of indigenous residents increased when the Dutch were forced to leave Indonesia as a result of political conflicts between Jakarta and The Hague. Especially Kampong Lamper Sari had many newcomers because the military took over the houses from the Dutch. Although distinctions remained, the Sompok area and its residents came to be increasingly integrated into the surrounding
kampungs through a cultural dialogue that, in time, created a common community characterized by individualism, efficiency, and functionality.

**Conclusion**

Housing plays an important role in developing a city and constitutes the largest area of the modern city. Arguably, it is in terms of housing that the modernizing influence of colonialism in the Indonesia city was most prevalent. In Semarang, as in other colonial cities, the colonial municipality was an important modernizing agent. It intervened directly in the process of housing by town planning and by the development of public housing complexes such as those of Sompok and Mlaten. In the process, the face of the city changed.

The public housing projects gave rise to the formation of new urban spaces, new communities, and new habits. Modern housing had an effect on sanitary behaviour (for instance, the use of showers and toilets), the discipline to follow the calendar in order to pay the rent on time, interaction with neighbours, and self-esteem. However, the continued interaction of the residents of the new housing projects with older urban and rural communities ensured that a dynamic process of multifaceted cultural interaction continued to produce, over time, a specifically modern Indonesian urban identity. People adopted some of the changes without ever giving up all traditional values and practices. As a consequence, modernity in the twentieth century Indonesian urban kampong developed as a homegrown, hybrid way of life.

In this hybrid form, modernization was a powerful force. Since modernization, both as a conceptual notion and as a physically embedded part in the urban landscape, was such a powerful element in the late colonial period, housing experienced very little change in its built form at the end of colonialism. After decolonization, modernization might have changed pace, but not direction.

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From Autonomous Village to ‘Informal Slum’
Kampong Development and State Control in Bandung (1930–1960)¹

Gustaaf Reerink

Introduction

‘In the colonial period, Taman Sari was so different. You wouldn’t recognize the place’. Ibu Darsum throws me a meaningful look. She is not happy about the current condition of her kampong, Gang Bongkaran, located in kelurahan Taman Sari in the northern part of Bandung.² Like so many people her age, she is full of appreciation when she speaks nostalgically about the past, as if everything has been deteriorating ever since she was born.

We sit in front of her house over a cup of tea. Her house is impressive neither because of its size nor its quality, but it is by far the best in the neighbourhood. It even has a small flower garden in front. People in the kampong insisted that I should talk to her. She could assuage my curiosity about the history of Taman Sari. At eighty-four, she is one of the oldest residents in the neighbourhood. More importantly, no one has resided in Taman Sari as long as she has: Ibu Darsum was born, raised and has grown old here.

Indeed, Taman Sari must have been a very different place before the Second World War. Today it is a settlement of precarious substandard buildings, suffering from a lack of adequate infrastructure and proper access to public services, and tends to be rather informal in terms of land tenure and land use. Most residents live in one of the many small houses built alongside the

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² The concept ‘kampong’ has different meanings, depending on the area in Indonesia in which and by whom it is used (Krausse 1975:31–35). In West Java the word means low-income, urban or rural settlement (Silas 1983:214). A kelurahan is the lowest administrative unit in Bandung, usually consisting of several kampongs.
Cikapundung River. Their dwellings can be reached by alleys, some of which are so narrow that they are called ‘gang cinta’, love alleys, because people have to get pretty intimate to pass one another.

My curiosity about the history of Taman Sari was triggered when I saw a map of Bandung dating from the 1930s. At the time the area was already covered by small kampongs, but it was primarily depicted as a city park. Informed of the contemporary conditions prevailing there, I was struck by this radical change in land use. Spurred on by this curiosity, I settled in Gang Bongkaran in Taman Sari for a period of participant observation. Later I conducted oral history research, in close collaboration with two students from Universitas Padjadjaran, among a number of the older, well-informed residents. Finally, I organized a survey in kampongs in Taman Sari and six other kelurahan. This chapter is the result of this oral history research, the survey, as well as literature research. Although this chapter draws on data mainly acquired from Taman Sari, the purpose is to reach some general conclusions about kampongs and their dwellers in Bandung.

This chapter is a discussion of the factors underlying the development of kampongs in Bandung in the twentieth century. It analyses the legal, spatial, and socio-economic characteristics and dynamics of these settlements from the colonial times, through the Japanese occupation and Indonesian Revolution to an independent Indonesia. Finally, it assesses the impact of the main policies on kampongs adopted by consecutive colonial and Indonesian governments. Consequently, the paper explains how and why kampongs in Taman Sari and other kelurahan in Bandung have developed into the settlements they are today.

The basic argument informing this chapter is that neither colonial nor Indonesian governments ever succeeded in exercising effective control over kampongs and therefore could not develop, standardize, and regulate these settlements to conform to their policies. During the colonial period, this lack of state control was a consequence of village or kampong autonomy (desa autonomie), which formed part of the official colonial policy of legal dualism. After Independence, kampongs actually retained their autonomy, despite the effort to decolonize. Taken in combination with various historical events

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3 I settled and carried out participant observation in kelurahan Taman Sari from September 2004–February 2005 and in kelurahan Cibangkong from September–December 2005. Oral history research was conducted in kelurahan Taman Sari from September–December 2005. In total, about twenty residents were interviewed in five neighbourhoods. The survey was organized between September and December 2005 among 420 households in seven kelurahan in Bandung, including sixty households in Taman Sari.
since Independence, the lack of state control has resulted in kampongs developing into the kind of settlement the government itself qualifies as informal slums.

The structure of this chapter is mainly chronological and after a description of Taman Sari in colonial times, it is further subdivided into the three periods discussed: colonial times, the Japanese occupation and Indonesian Revolution, and Independence. It ends with some concluding remarks, in which reference is made to the contemporary characteristics of kampongs in Bandung.

**Rural Villages in a Colonial City**

The presence of the autonomous kampongs in Bandung has everything to do with the encroachment of the city on its rural environs. Rural villages were swallowed by the expanding town. Between the late nineteenth century and the end of colonial rule, Bandung developed from a small settlement of about 10,000 inhabitants into a modern European colonial city with 200,000 residents. Just as other cities in the colony the expansion of Bandung was largely the outcome of a new era in colonial policy, the liberal period, which introduced legal reforms and subsequently a radical increase in commercial activity stimulated by the new plantations in the hinterland of Bandung (Voskuil 1996:31). From 1854, private planters could lease land from the colonial government and from 1870 this actually was a commercially attractive proposition. The natural conditions of the Priangan region around Bandung proved ideal for the cultivation of tea, coffee, and quinine. Tea planters were the most commercially successful and they spent their money in Bandung, or ‘het Parijs van Java’ (the Paris of Java) as it was also called on account of its sophisticated options for entertainment. More prosaically the city also functioned as a transshipment point for their plantation products.

Later, the economic function of Bandung extended beyond being simply a hub of the plantation economy. The city began to attract people from outside the region, notably after railway connections opened it up in 1884 (Kunto 1984:161–162). Another reason for the development of Bandung was the 1916 decision of the colonial government to move a number of government agencies from Batavia to Bandung. In 1918 the colonial government began to amplify plans to make Bandung the capital of the Netherlands Indies but this never materialized, principally because finances proved a stumbling block. Nevertheless, however ephemeral, such plans contributed to the success of the city government in attracting new European residents. A last but no less important reason for Europeans – in the 1920s and 1930s the majority of them
pensioners – to settle in Bandung was its pleasant climate (Voskuil 1996:34–35).

Rural-urban migration of Indonesians also contributed to the expansion of the city. The status of land in the Priangan region around Bandung was rapidly undergoing a change from being an attribute of the community bound by genealogical or territorial ties to that of a private commodity. By the beginning of the twentieth century, the region already had a reputation for large-scale landownership. Over time, the size of the land holdings increased and more land was alienated to become the property of (absentee) landowners, including members of the menak (noble) families, well-to-do villagers, merchants, and hajji. The upshot of the concentration of land ownership was a growing group of landless peasants (Van Dijk 1981:363–373). In addition to the concentration of land in a few hands, the growing population pressure and a decline in employment opportunities in rural areas left many peasants with no option but to uproot themselves and go to the city (Jellinek 1991:4). With an expansion in its economic activities and concomitant growing labour demand, Bandung proved an attractive destination.

The city was ethnically divided, the railway forming a clear dividing line. The cooler part north of the railway was mostly reserved for well-to-do European citizens, who lived in old, ‘Indies’ houses surrounded by large yards. Although the Europeans formed only twelve per cent of the population, they occupied more than half of the urban land (Wertheim 1956:180). Consequently, the northern part was relatively spacious. In the many kampongs in the southern part of Bandung, conditions were very different. The majority of the Indonesian population was packed into these settlements and the area even declined as more land was allocated for urban infrastructure and European districts. Indonesians formed 77 per cent of the population of Bandung, but occupied only 40 per cent of the land (Voskuil 1996:39–40; Wertheim 1956:180).

The expanding city engulfed many indigenous desa (rural villages), which soon lost their rural character and developed into urban kampongs with an almost entirely residential function (Flieringa 1930:36). Kampongs at the urban fringe, for the time being retained a rural character, both in physical appearance and social-economic functions. The rural mode of life included primitive sanitation, which, in combination with the high population density constituted a public health risk (Wertheim 1956:175–176).

The urban kampongs were allowed a high degree of autonomy (desa autonomie), which meant that the population could apply its own customary or adat law, administration, and justice. This autonomy was justified by the supposedly divergent economic and social needs of the different ethnic groups in
the colony.\footnote{Article 71 of the 1854 Regeeringsreglement, which functioned as a Constitution, acknowledged the autonomy of indigenous villages and general principles of village administration were laid down in the Inlandse Gemeente Ordonnantie (Indigenous Village Ordinance) of 1906. The autonomy was confirmed by Article 128(3) of the subsequent 1925 Indische Staatsregeling, which served as the new Constitution.} In the early twentieth century, seventeen such autonomous villages existed within the perimeter of Bandung. After the boundaries of the Bandung Municipality were expanded, the number of these villages increased to forty-four in 1942.

Soekadjadi, a part of Taman Sari, the area where I conducted fieldwork, was one such village. Taman Sari lies in the more spacious, northern part of Bandung and at first sight this area appeared strictly European. It is located in the valley of the Cikapundung, the main river flowing through the city, and contained between two main roads, the Lembangweg and Van Houten Parkweg (currently the famous Cihampelas ‘Jeans’ Street and Taman Sari Street). A large part of the area was covered with the private back gardens, full of trees and fishponds, belonging to the predominantly European, middle class people living in houses on the two main roads. On the east bank of the River Cikapundung, alongside the Van Houten Parkweg, was a European cemetery. This land as well as the land alongside the Cikapundung River was municipal land.

Soekadjadi was hidden behind the façade of European property. The area around Gang Bongkaran, where I interviewed Ibu Darsum quoted in the vignette at the beginning of this chapter, was one of the village hamlets behind the main roads. One of the residents I interviewed remembers that in the early 1930s there was a handful of houses clustered along this alley. Most houses were owned by Dutch people, but there also lived some Indonesians who had bought the land from Dutch residents. These Indonesian residents of Taman Sari were relatively well-off compared to the majority of indigenous residents. Most of them were farmers and grew vegetables for the urban market, but some had made a fortune in trade.

Behind the façade of ‘European’ houses along the main roads, Taman Sari had a rural character. Plots were generally large. Every household owned at least a sawah (wet rice-field) or an orchard, often planted with cacao trees. There were fishponds too. This land was garapan land, of which rights of ownership had, in line with customary law, been determined by opening and cultivating it. The houses were constructed in a traditional manner, with a raised floor, walls made of wood and plaited bamboo, and a bamboo roof. Paths were dirt roads of sand or pebbles. Parts of the area were swampy and muddy. The Cikapundung River was so clean it was used for drinking water. Contemporary names of kampongs in Taman Sari still reveal the rural character of the area.
For instance, the word *maung*, part of the settlement name Liang Maung or Cimaung, means ‘wildcat’ in Sundanese, the regional language. This animal was just one of the wild species which were said to live in the area. Several informants claimed that the area retained its rural character until the late 1930s. In the Explanatory Memorandum of the 1938 Town Planning Ordinance, the Cikapundung Valley was referred to as ‘one of the few examples of natural scenery having been converted into scenes of natural beauty’ (*Toelichting Stadsvormingsordonnantie* 1938).5

The municipal government of Bandung felt increasingly compelled to improve conditions in the kampongs, but village autonomy restricted its freedom to act. In 1919 it launched a social housing programme, in which hundreds of houses were built for low-income residents for a couple of years. People could either rent a house or buy it on the basis of a hire purchase system. Despite this building programme, the municipality could not provide houses for the entire population (*Bandoeng* 1929:42–48). In practice, only the lower middle-class groups benefited from it, since the dwellings built under the programme remained too expensive for the masses residing in kampongs (*Toelichting Stadsvormingsordonnantie* 1938:34–35). Private real estate firms never showed any interest in participating in such housing programmes, unless forced to do so (*Toelichting Stadsvormingsordonnantie* 1938:74). For most low-income people, particularly Indonesians, kampongs remained the only option to find a dwelling.

In 1926, the city government reserved the southern part of the city for the indigenous population (*Bandoeng* 1929:37–39). This ordinance was meant to protect the indigenous residents against further inroads on their land by the development of the urban infrastructure and European districts, but in fact this measure only sharpened ethnic divisions (Voskuil 1996:39–40).

In the meantime, the central colonial government still refused to grant permission to intervene in the kampongs to municipal administrations, as long as the kampong autonomy remained in force. However, the Bandung administration did not bother to wait for formal approval from the central government before taking action in the kampongs. In 1927 it launched on its own initiative a kampong improvement scheme (*kampongverbetering*), although this meant it legally infringed on the kampong autonomy. The municipality improved roads, constructed drainage and sewerage facilities, provided electricity, and built hydrants and public baths (*Bandoeng* 1929:36).

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5 A translation of excerpts from the *Toelichting Stadsvormingsordonnantie* can be found in Wertheim (1958).
Kampong improvement became easier in 1929, when the colonial government officially abandoned the idea that the villages could only be improved if their autonomy were abolished (Van de Wetering 1939:3). At the same time, it also began to reserve a fixed amount of the state budget to subsidize municipal initiatives to carry out improvement projects in kampongs (Stadsgemeente Bandoeng 1938:1–28). The kampong improvement activities received further legal backing by the Kampong Verbeteringsordonnantie (Kampong Improvement Ordinance) in 1934. Municipal governments had from now on the right to intervene in kampong matters of which the consequences extended beyond the kampongs, including housing and hygiene, especially in kampongs located in the crowded urban centre. Although this change of policy was based on considerations of hygiene and humanity, underlying political motives were not far from the surface. It was feared that bad living conditions would drive the urban poor into the hands of the nationalists, whose stated aim was to overthrow the colonial government (Van Roosmalen 2004:194).

Despite these various state efforts, the effect on the improved kampongs remained limited. Only a few of the problems could be tackled, in particular drainage and the construction of pathways. Projects were limited in scope and progress was slow (Toelichting Stadsvormingsordonnantie 1938:32–33). In some cases, kampong improvement only led to gentrification: the lower income residents were forced out by incoming more well-to-do residents able to pay higher rents in an, after improvement, more attractive neighbourhood (Wertheim 1956:179). Another well-intended policy with negative consequences was the state attempt to limit the building of new, poorly constructed dwellings. The effect of this policy was a growing shortage of affordable kampong housing, with the result that several families could be forced to share one house. Consequently, living conditions deteriorated (Toelichting Stadsvormingsordonnantie 1938:33).

In short, despite these measures, the municipal administration never managed to take full control of the kampongs. As the Law on Village Autonomy restricted municipal intervention in the kampongs, the municipality could still not intervene in all matters within its territories. As late as 1938, the Government Commissioner for Decentralization admitted that it remained

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6 Van de Wetering (1939:7) criticized the Bandung municipality for not fulfilling its moral obligation to spend as much on kampong improvement as it received from the national government for that purpose.

7 See also the reference to the political consequences of the kampong conditions in the Explanatory Memorandum on Town Planning (Toelichting Stadsvormingsordonnantie 1938:32; Wertheim 1958:39).
hard to delineate the exact competences of the municipal authorities to intervene in the kampongs. Moreover, the municipal administration also experienced great difficulties in enforcing regulations that were legally applicable in the kampongs with village autonomy, such as the Building Code. The kampongs continued to develop at a more rapid pace than the municipal authorities could control with the said Building Code (*Bandoeng* 1929:41). On top of all other problems to gain control of the kampongs, during the Depression, enforcement of regulations was often limited by the financial constraints imposed on the municipal budget (*Kampongverbeteringscommissie* 1939:42).

By the end of the colonial period, experts acknowledged that the government had failed to improve the physical conditions in the kampongs. Kampong residents were still resisting compliance with government regulations (*Toelichting Stadsvormingsordonnantie* 1938:33). The unfortunate living conditions in the kampongs was one of the reasons to install a Town Planning Commission, to which the task was assigned to formulate central instructions for town planning. The objective of the Commission was to reach an integrated town planning approach. The Commission argued in the Explanatory Memorandum on Town Planning that kampongs would form a complete unity with the rest of the municipality, however, just as other neighbourhoods, with their own identity, which requires that they be treated in a similar manner.

*Toelichting Stadsvormingsordonnantie* 1938:95, my translation

**Neglected Settlements in an Occupied City**

Between 1942–1949, Bandung was confronted with both an influx and an exodus of migrants. The influx of migrants could be mainly attributed to rural-urban migration. After the Japanese occupied Indonesia in 1942, the living conditions in the West Javanese countryside quickly deteriorated. Jobs on plantations disappeared, farmers were forced to deliver large quantities of rice, and rural people were recruited as forced labourers (*romusha*), and to these specific difficulties was added the general problem of a significant price inflation (Smail 1964:12). In three years the Indonesian population of Bandung

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8 He made this statement in response to questions posed by a member of the Volksraad during a session on the abolition of the autonomy of a number of villages in the town of Malang (*Handelingen* 1937–1938:207–211).
almost doubled, from about 200,000 to 400,000 (Van Bruinessen 1989:3). The Japanese tried to force the Indonesian population back to the countryside, but this attempt was only partly successful (Wertheim 1956:185).

Detailed data are absent, but it is clear that a large proportion of the refugees settled in existing kampongs or created new settlements. The Japanese administration allowed and even encouraged people to squat on private land (Colombijn 2010:207). The 1940s was the first decade in which the population of Taman Sari grew considerably, although still not as rapidly as would be the case in later decades. New houses and a mosque were constructed.

A vast reversed flow of migration occurred during the Indonesian Revolution. As soon as Allied troops arrived in Bandung in 1946, the city was effectively divided into two parts, with the railway line again as boundary, the northern part being guarded by British troops and the southern part by the Indonesian Republican Army. In March 1946, following an ultimatum issued by the British who wanted to put an end to the division, the Republican Army evacuated the Indonesian population to the countryside south of Bandung and set fire to large parts of the city. This event is known as Bandung Lautan Api: Bandung a Sea of Fire. By the end of March, after four months of utter confusion, an estimated half a million people had moved out of the city. For a year and a half the southern part of Bandung remained a ghost city, with people only occasionally visiting the area. Only the northern part of Bandung remained populated, mostly by Europeans and Chinese (Smail 1964:148–152).

The migration history of Taman Sari was similar to that of the city as a whole during the Revolution. Most of the few Indonesian residents of Taman Sari also fled to the countryside, to nearby towns like Tasikmalaya and Sumedang. Their houses were occupied by the Dutch military. The Dutch, Indo-European, and Chinese population generally stayed put. Indonesian residents only returned in 1949–1950, after the Dutch had transferred sovereignty to the Indonesian Republic.

The subsequent changes of power of the 1940s had consequences for urban policy making. In the turbulent years of the Japanese occupation and the struggle for independence, state intervention in kampongs continued to be limited. The Japanese introduced the tonarigumi system in 1943. Tonarigumi were neighbourhood associations designed to control and, if deemed appropriate by the Japanese, mobilize the Indonesian population. These associations were the predecessor of the neighbourhood associations that still exist today in Indonesia under the name of Rumah Warga (rw) and Rumah Tetangga (rt). After the Dutch resumed the administration of the city, they made ending the unlawful occupation of government land by migrants top priority. In 1948, the returned colonial government promulgated an ordinance making any
such occupation a criminal offence.9 In the same year, the central government finally laid the foundations for future intervention in kampongs, by enacting the Town Planning Ordinance that had been drafted in 1938. By this ordinance, the municipalities were required to draw up the blueprint for a town plan, detail plans, and a municipal building code. The municipalities were given the right to determine plan elements down to the level of individual plots (Niessen 1999:223–226; Van Roosmalen, this volume).10

Informal Slums in an Independent City

The first years after transfer of sovereignty to the Indonesian Republic in 1949 were as tumultuous as the period of the Indonesian Revolution. It was a time of struggle, uncertainty, and quick transformations, particularly for the population of West Java, where an armed rebellion against the central government took place. In this period Bandung experienced the most significant population growth in its history fed by various incoming flows of migrants. At least until the national census of 1961, Bandung was growing fastest of all major Indonesian cities (Hugo 1981:81). During the first decade after the transfer of sovereignty, the population grew from about 200,000 to over 1,000,000 inhabitants.

The first group of migrants to arrive in the city after the Dutch had transferred sovereignty to the Indonesian Republic were the civil evacuees and soldiers who had left Bandung in 1946 (Hugo 1981:84). Informants offered testimonies of the difficulties they faced when returning to their homes in Taman Sari. Some learned that other Indonesians had occupied their houses and land. Others found their houses partially demolished by the residents who had remained in Taman Sari. The cacao trees in the orchards had been chopped down and the fishponds were empty.

Arguably the most visible consequence of the political and the economic decolonization in cities like Bandung was the exodus of the European population. It seems that the first affected Europeans still managed to sell their
property, although at prices below the market value. The nationalization of Dutch enterprises in 1957–1958 forced the Dutch to leave the country. They had no option than to simply vacate their houses, which were occupied by government officials and the military. Often these houses were later sold to well-to-do Chinese.

The movement known as the Darul Islam Rebellion which raged in the countryside of West Java had a great impact on the development of Bandung. From 1949 to 1962, in what the local people call the ’zaman gerombolan’ (gangster period), many people fled from the countryside to the city. Caught between the two fires of the Darul Islam and the Republican Army, the principal concern of ordinary villagers was to escape the violence. The uprising was particularly violent in East Priangan, around Tasikmalaya and Garut. Each year hundreds of innocent people were killed and thousands of houses were burned down. As early as in 1951, more than 100,000 people were evacuated. An average of 250,000 people annually fled their homes between 1955 and 1962 (Van Dijk 1981:104–106). Since the towns and cities were relatively safe, most evacuees sought refuge there, not least in Bandung. The atrocities only ended in 1962, when the last prominent leaders of the Darul Islam movement were arrested.

In the same period Bandung also began to feel the effects of labour migration. The city became the seat of the provincial government and it resumed its role as a centre of education. The industrial sector focused on processing agricultural products and making textiles, and service industries were also developed. The international Asia-Africa Conference in 1955 created new job opportunities, including many jobs suited for low-skilled people. Not surprisingly, however, the new demands for labour lagged behind the growing number of people moving into Bandung (Hugo 1981:84–85).

By the late 1950s, net migration into Bandung became negligible and in the early 1960s it was even negative (Van Bruinessen 1989:4). The number of migrants moving to Bandung dropped considerably and many people moved back to their home villages after safety had been restored in the West Javanese countryside. However, many others stayed, even when initially they had planned returning to their village of origin after peace was restored, because the employment prospects in the countryside were poor.

Many of the migrants to Bandung, notably those who had sought refuge, settled in kampongs. The vast flow of evacuees was disorganized and many of them were unable to find a formal job and were therefore forced to seek their livelihood in the informal sector.\(^{11}\) There was a growing shortage of

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\(^{11}\) According to a survey conducted by the National Labour Agency, only 62.7 per cent of males of twelve years and older were formally employed (Hugo 1981:85).
housing. In 1959 there were twelve persons for every house in Bandung (Hugo 1981:85). Hence, the refugees had no other choice but to build their own houses, often without municipal permission. In 1964 an estimated minimum of 11,000 houses were ‘rumah liar’, houses built without a legal permit (Hugo 1981:85).12 This is a very cautious estimation. By that year hundreds of thousands of people had migrated to Bandung and the city had reached a population of over a million, a figure which gives an impression of the vast scale of the developments discussed.

Some of the migrants moved to one of the many existing kampongs, others created new kampongs by squatting on vacant land. The departure of the European population offered an opportunity; the vacant plots gave migrants the space to build their own houses. Consequently, the ethnic and socio-economic division between the northern and southern parts of Bandung steadily faded away. Other migrants occupied municipal land alongside railway lines and riversides, and did not even shun graveyards.

The Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI, Indonesian Communist Party), which was becoming increasingly influential as an opposition party, supported unlawful occupation of vacant land. This strategy tallied with the party’s political objective of organizing a strong power base among lower-income groups.13 The closest I get to evidence of direct support of the PKI for illegal occupation of land is a general reference in a book by Siregar, stating: ‘In the city, the illegal occupation of land continued and, to a limited extent, it was even encouraged by left-wing political factions’ (Siregar 1990:113). Despite the paucity of written accounts, several informants confirmed that the practice did occur in Bandung, but after half a century of anti-communist state propaganda (since 1965), people are reluctant to talk about the role of the PKI, afraid they might be deemed accomplices. It is certain that the PKI forged alliances with specific workers’ groups, for instance with the strategically important Serikat Buruh Kereta Api (SBKA, (state) Railway Workers’ Union). This union was particularly strong in Bandung, where the company’s main office was

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12 Unfortunately Hugo gives no reference for this figure. Considering the cautiousness of this estimation, it would not be surprising if it were derived from documents of the municipal government.

13 In terms of political support, the strategy proved successful. By the end of the 1950s the party had built up a strong, organized base among urban workers and other non-peasant groups. In later years, the party tried to gain support from the peasant population, among other means by organizing a campaign for land reform in the countryside, as well as drafting and backing bills on this matter, and later by initiating the unilateral action (aksi sepihak) to occupy land in an unlawful manner (Mortimer 1972).
The actions of the Railway Workers’ Union included the occupation of railway company land, and once the unionists began to occupy their employer’s land, other workers followed.

The process of land occupation was incremental, which is typical of countries in Asia and Africa and unlike the large-scale invasions of vacant land common in South America. First a small number of squatters occupied the land to test whether the owner or caretaker of the land, which could be either a government agency or a private party, intervened. If they were left alone, other people would follow their example. Often they needed approval from an (informal) community leader before they could do so. This form of social screening meant that the growth of these settlements was incremental, a prerequisite for the survival of the community (Wibowo 1983:4–5). Too many people moving in at the same time would probably have lead to disputes about the scarce means of livelihood.

Taman Sari was one of the kampongs that were a target of squatters in the first years after independence. The area also proved an attractive destination for refugees fleeing from the violence of the Darul Islam rebellion. According to various informants, many of the current residents settled in this period, coming from places in West Java like Cipendeuy, Malangbong, Garut, Tasikmalaya, and Sumbang. Initially they would organize as separate communities. Liang Maung, for instance, consisted of three separate areas, Kidul, Sisi Gawir, and Mesjid, each populated by refugees from three different places of origin. Many of these refugees stayed, even after the countryside had become safe again. With the inflow of new migrants in later years, the three communities became mixed and unified.

Taman Sari attracted many migrants because there was plenty of land available there. Here too the Dutch residents were leaving. Their houses were usually occupied by the military in the late 1950s. A single Indo-European family stayed. Few of the original landowners – regardless of ethnicity – had actual control over their land, and newcomers encountered few obstacles when illegally occupying it. Many newcomers would first rent a house or room and then occupy land, subdivide it, and build their own house. It seems that some bought the land from the Dutch and some had it given to them, for instance because they had been employees of the former owners. Most former orchards and rice-fields that had been left uncultivated for some time, and also plots

14 The SBKA was not the only railway union, though. The other union was the Persatuan Buruh Kereta Api (PBKA, Railway Workers Association), which was backed by the Partai Sosialis Indonesia (Indonesian Socialist Party) and General Nasution’s Ikatan Pendukung Kermerdekan Indonesia (IPKI, Alliance of Supporters for Freedom of Indonesia).
owned by absentee landowners, were simply occupied without permission from the owner. It did not matter in such cases whether the owner was European or Indonesian. If someone later claimed a right to the land, the occupants sometimes agreed to formally buy or rent it. As it so happened, these claimants were not always the rightful owners and could be swindlers. One informant recalls that a European owner guarded his land strictly and threatened potential squatters at gunpoint when they showed signs of wanting to occupy the land. Other private owners had more consideration for the exhausted refugees.

Newcomers also occupied public land. Some people took land alongside the Cikapundung River. The municipality, which was responsible for the riverbanks, was not as strict as some private landowners and consequently some migrants preferred this land. In later years, when population density in the city further increased, newcomers reclaimed land by narrowing the course of the Cikapundung River. The European graveyard, which had been cleared in the 1950s and was used as orchard land and playing field, was not a target of squatters. It is likely that potential squatters had not dared to settle on this land, where spirits of the deceased were believed to roam around (Van Bruinessen 1988:40).

I have not heard stories of the involvement of the PKI in the occupation of land in Taman Sari. Communist involvement is indeed an unlikely scenario, since a small number of newcomers managed to take control over large plots of land and they had absolutely no interest in a free distribution of land in small parcels.

Apparently, the people occupying the land had good connections with the municipal government and the army. The occupants enclosed these plots, subdivided them, and let or sold them to later newcomers. One such entrepreneur who played a central role in the allocation of former European land to newcomers was the kampong head of Liang Maung. His real name was Pak Karta, but one of the informants remembers that he was usually called Pak Apung, a contraction of kepala kampung (kampong head). Pak Apung remained in charge of the area until around 1960.

Taman Sari did not only attract migrants because of the available land, but also because it was located quite strategically in relation to employment opportunities. Most migrants found work in the informal sector; becoming a petty trader was particularly popular. Migrants from each region developed their own specialization in trade. Their modest incomes and dependence on customers forced them to settle near markets.

With the first influx of migrants, Taman Sari finally began to develop from a rural into an urban residential area. Rice-fields and orchards steadily gave way
to housing. The first buildings were constructed of temporary or semi-permanent building material. Vacant plots were scattered around these first dwellings and later filled in. A new layout of the area took shape: a labyrinth of small alleys giving access to more or less permanent constructions.

Despite the enactment of the Town Planning Ordinance in 1948 and legislation against unlawful occupation, which remained in force after the transfer of sovereignty in 1949, the government failed to exercise effective control over the kampongs. In the first years after Independence, the government was too occupied with other pressing matters and besides it did not have the wherewithal to intervene. Although there was a social housing programme, kampong improvement activities continued only on a very limited scale (Colombijn 2010:203–206).

The government could not curb rural-urban migration, which, as discussed earlier, was the major cause of the expansion of kampongs and concomitant deterioration in the living conditions. Land reforms in agricultural areas to keep peasants on the countryside also enjoyed little success. On 1 March 1954, the municipal government declared Bandung a ‘closed city’. Each newcomer had to obtain a vb (Vestigingsbewijs, residential permit). The regulation remained in force until 1964, although it was a vain measure. Its only effect was that migrants were deflected from registering as permanent residents (Hugo 1981:85).

The formal autonomy of the kampongs, which hampered the municipal government exercising effective control, gradually became untenable. In the 1950s there were increasingly strong calls to abolish kampong autonomy. The object of these calls to abolish kampong autonomy was the 1906 Indigenous Village Ordinance, together with the 1907 Regulation on the Election of Village Heads. The latter ordinance stipulated that only the original residents of the villages were allowed to cast their vote during an election of a village head. Since the villages which were included in the cities had attracted many migrants who did not have active voting rights, this stipulation was considered unfair. The ordinances were only rescinded in the 1960s and village autonomy finally came to an end in 1964.\footnote{17}

\begin{enumerate}
\item\footnote{15} The municipal government also had a political rationale for introducing this policy. It could check that no Darul Islam members were among the newcomers (personal communication with retired senior official, 20 July 2006).
\item\footnote{16} Inlandse Gemeenteordonnantie and Reglement op de Verkiezing, de Schorsing en het Ontslag van Hoofden van Inlandsche Gemeenten op Java en Madoera.
\item\footnote{17} Personal communication retired senior official, 20 July 2006; see also Otto (1991:214).
\end{enumerate}
The abolition of village autonomy was an important symbolic step, but because this measure had not been bolstered by a consistent set of policies affecting kampongs, in practice its consequences were negligible if not completely ineffectual. The enactment of two pieces of agrarian legislation exerted potentially more affect on the legal position of kampong dwellers. The best known piece was the Law 5/1960, Undang-Undang Pokok Agraria (UUPA, Basic Agrarian Law), which was passed in 1960 with the purpose to unify land law. Land rights based on adat (customary) law, which were still widely applied in the kampongs, would now have to be integrated into a unified system of land titles. Integration of kampong land held under adat law into the unified system required the surveying and certification of all plots of land by the administration. For various reasons, however, few kampong dwellers troubled themselves with the registration of their plots.

The other piece of agrarian legislation relevant to the kampongs was a government law enacted in 1961. It stated that every person residing on either privately or state-owned land without permission of the owner would be considered an unlawful occupant, who could be evicted at the discretion of the Regional Head. Unlike the 1948 ordinance on the illegal occupation of land, the 1961 law covered a prohibition on the occupancy of state as well as private land. Before the 1961 law, private legal owners could base a legal attempt to evict squatters on civil law, but this new law made eviction easier, because the authorities carrying out an eviction order could be called in by land owners without having obtained a court order first. The 1961 law could better prevent unlawful occupation of private land, because to do so was henceforth a criminal offence. The Elucidation to the 1961 law stated that the government was sympathetic to unlawful occupation, given the shortage of land for people, and yet, in the interests of the orderly development of the state, the use of land had to be regulated in an organized manner.

The passing of the two pieces of agrarian legislation of 1960 and 1961 actually affected the legal position of kampong dwellers more than the abolition of the village autonomy had done. From that moment many kampongs were classified as informal settlements, whose inhabitants had at best weak claims to the land if not no legal claim at all.

Nevertheless, these legal initiatives formed no reason for residents to fear the intervention of the municipal government. Only one of my informants

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18 Law no. 51/1960, Undang-Undang Larangan Pemakaian Tanah Tanpa Izin yang Berhak atau Kuasanya (Law on the Prohibition to Use Land without Permission from the Rightful Owner or the State). The Military Commander had enacted similar regulations as early as 1957.
could give an account of an eviction case in Taman Sari on the basis of unlawful occupation or the lack of a building permit in that period, so apparently this eviction order seems to have been a rare, ad hoc affair. Throughout Bandung, the political power of the PKI influenced the relatively strong position of illegal occupants. By the end of the 1950s and beginning of the 1960s, two out of six aldermen in Bandung were member of the PKI. If legal owners went to court to have squatters evicted, they usually lost the case. The PKI received support from at least one member of the District Court (Pengadilan Negeri). Efforts by officials to evict people generally led to protests. By their actions the officials were giving their own interpretation of President Sukarno’s ‘hukum revolusi’ (revolutionary law).

The common practice was not eviction therefore, but a process in which newcomers to Taman Sari actually received permission to settle in the area, not only from the informal kampong leader, but even from local state officials. Obviously, the granting of this permission did not mean that the settlement of the newcomers in Taman Sari complied with state regulations. As an official of the kelurahan explained, the sheer number of migrants into Bandung forced the municipal government to allow them to settle in the area, even though the land did not belong to the settlers and even though the bulk of it was not destined for residential purposes in the town plan.

**Conclusion**

Kampongs in Bandung have by and large developed without too much state intervention. Urban kampongs came into being toward the end of the nineteenth century as Bandung began to grow significantly, engulfing many rural villages. Due to legal dualism between town and village administration, the kampongs retained a high degree of autonomy, even when they were fully located within the municipal boundaries. The arrival of more Europeans in Bandung led to the allocation of kampong land to the development of middle class housing meant for Europeans, and, as a consequence, the densification of settlement on the remaining kampong land. The primitive sanitation in the dense kampongs constituted a risk to public health.

This sort of development worried the government of Bandung, which from 1919 took measures to try controlling the growing density and increasing dilapidation of kampongs. In that year the administration initiated a social housing programme. In 1927 it began a kampong improvement programme. However,

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19 Personal communication retired senior official of the Bandung municipality, 20 July 2006.
as its hands were tied by the law on village autonomy, the municipal govern-
ment had little room for intervening in the kampongs. The measures it did
implement bore little effect. By the end of the colonial period, it was widely
acknowledged that the colonial government had failed to control the growing
density and appalling living conditions of the kampongs.

The Japanese occupation and to an even greater degree the struggle for
independence led to the destruction of houses and infrastructure, especially in
South Bandung. Indonesians fled the city and for years the southern part
remained a ghost town. Neither the Japanese nor the returned colonial govern-
ment nor the Republican government paid much attention to the develop-
ment of kampongs in that period.

The loose administrative control of kampongs from the Japanese invasion
into the first decade of Independence coincided with a vast migration flow of
people from the West Javanese countryside who were fleeing rural living con-
ditions during the Second World War and later ran before the Darul Islam
rebellion. The PKI supported the formation of new kampongs on squatted
land alongside riversides and railway lines, and on graveyards. The kampongs
became informal slums.

The municipal government again proved incapable of preventing or curbing
developments it did not wish to take place. It lacked funds for kampong
improvement programmes or a social housing programme. When it announced
a ‘closed-city’ policy in 1954, the measurement was utterly ineffectual. In 1960,
only after these social and demographic developments were done and dusted
did the national government try to put an end to legal dualism and integrate
the kampongs into the municipal administrative apparatus. In practice, how-
ever, the measures had no effect largely because of the prevailing political con-
ditions. The municipal government simply lost its grip on the kampongs.

Comparing colonial and postcolonial attempts of the municipal govern-
ments to administer the kampongs, we can conclude that both administra-
tions had very little control. But the reasons for this lack of control during
these periods differ significantly. In colonial times the municipal administra-
tion was reined in by the principle of kampong autonomy. After Independence,
the municipal administration was overwhelmed by the sheer numbers of
migrants settling in kampongs, often with support from the PKI.

After 1960 the conditions in the kampongs would further deteriorate. The
kampongs absorbed vast numbers of labour migrants. From the 1970s, the gov-
ernment initiated new measures to exercise control over kampongs, such as
the Kampong Improvement Project (KIP) and various land titling programmes.
Certainly, as a result, infrastructure has improved, as did people’s access to
public services. Nevertheless, most contemporary kampongs are settlements
with precarious substandard buildings, a lack of adequate infrastructure, poor access to public services, and informal arrangements for land tenure and land use. Even the Indonesian government implicitly admits that it has failed to control kampong development in Bandung, classifying these settlements as ‘informal slums’ (Departemen Pekerjaan Umum, 1999:32–44).

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Breaking the Boundaries
The Uniekampong and Modernization of Dock Labour in Tanjung Priok, Batavia (1917–1949)

Arjan Veering

Introduction

Who does not know them, the wharf-labourers of Tanjung Priok, the sturdy, robust blokes, who animate the docks? There are no men working harder and more tirelessly than the dockers of Tanjung Priok.2

The harbour workers of Batavia were extolled in this fashion in an advertisement for Abdijsiroop, a cough syrup, published in the Dutch newspapers in Java in 1907. These labourers were the epitome of toughness and strength as they had to endure very harsh working conditions. ‘They are constantly exposed to the elements and many among them catch a cold, mostly left unattended because they just keep on going’.3 This advertisement packed a punch, as it not only confirmed the tough reputation of the harbour workers, but also drew attention to their tough working conditions. Their health and hygiene situation was a delicate issue as diseases, malnutrition, and bad housing hampered the development of a stable docker population in the seaport of Batavia. Of course, no panacea was readily to hand.

The lives of the dockers were played out against the background of a modernization process in an isolated area of Batavia, namely the port of Tanjung Priok. The port was constructed in the last quarter of the nineteenth century...
as the first deep-water ocean harbour in the archipelago. Rapid technological developments in transport and shipping as well as the new economic impetus injected by a growing world market required a fundamental shift in the organization of labour in the ports, and consequently in the living and working conditions, which in their turn changed the use of urban space in the dock areas. This chapter focuses on the rise of the Uniekampong, which was a compound for dockworkers, established in 1919 by the main shipping companies in an attempt to answer to the perpetual scarcity of labour in Tanjung Priok.

The Uniekampong developed into a central labour pool and left its mark on the labour issue in the port, as it deliberately broke through the traditional organization of dock work. Casual labour was gradually replaced by more permanent forms of labour. This process of decasualization, which took place in many other ports in the world in the same period, involved a centralization of the labour market, disciplining and registration of the labour force, regular payment and a guarantee of income, as well as an improvement in working and living conditions (Weinhauer 2000:582).

The Uniekampong marked not only a radical break in the organization of labour, but was also an embodiment of new perspectives on labour conditions and housing. From the early 1900s, housing received growing attention from the authorities and companies and, after 1910, the port authorities showed a heightened interest in the living conditions of the Priok population. Ethical motives aside, employers like shipping companies also took more interest in the working and living conditions of their men because they recognized that social improvements could result in a higher productivity.

The purpose of this chapter is to describe this interplay between economic, social, and physical-spatial modernization in the port of Tanjung Priok, specifically exemplified by the case of the Uniekampong. The research is based on archive material in the Netherlands and Indonesia, supplemented by newspaper articles. The core of the data is formed by the Uniekampong papers in the collection of the Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij (KPM, Royal Packet Navigation Company) in The Hague. The remit of the labour inspection did not extend to work in the docks and when the situation in the port had to be described, this was done in general terms.

This chapter aims to provide a contribution to Indonesian historiography in which dock labour, like other ‘industrial’ labour, has so far been underrepresented. In a predominantly rural society, most labour studies have focused on...
the agricultural sector. This bias in scholarship was also a matter of sources. The colonial government showed less interest in the industrial labour as well as the service sector, and as a result only scattered information from this period has survived. John Ingleson was one of the first scholars to look at dock labour in Java, focusing on strikes and union activity (Ingleson 1983:476). In his PhD research, the Indonesian researcher Agust Supriyono dealt specifically with labour questions in the port of Semarang and the development of labour unions (Supriyono 2008). In his study of the KPM, à Campo gives a brief but illuminating account of the organization of labour in the ports (à Campo 1992:518–520).

The Port of Tanjung Priok

Tanjung Priok was the new harbour of Batavia, built between 1877 and 1883 as an alternative to the existing, outdated harbour in central Batavia. At that time, the harbour of Batavia consisted of a roadstead, the Reede, and a harbour canal, the Havenkanaal, which had been formed by the water between two long piers at the estuary of the Ciliwung River. Ships had to anchor in the roadstead in front of the river estuary, as the sea, just as it was along the entire northern coast of Java, was very shallow near the shore. Sandbanks obstructed the entrance to the harbour canal and smaller boats, the prauwenveren (proa ferries, lighters), had to transfer the goods between the ships in the roadstead and the warehouses ashore. A proa was a flat-bottomed boat with a loaded draught of 4 to 8 feet (1.2 to 2.5 metres) and a loading capacity of 10 to 50 koyang. The transfer of cargo onto prosas was a time-consuming, precarious process. During the wet monsoon, it was often hazardous if not downright impossible for the prosas to ply between roadstead and town (Bruining 1852; De Meijer 1893; à Campo 1992:406; Knaap 1996:20).

The transfer of cargo by smaller vessels for a fee called lighterage is often considered a characteristic of ‘primitive ports’, but in fact the system could also be found in large, well-equipped ports such as London, Colombo, and Singapore, mostly in combination with the loading and unloading on the

5 Some researchers have focused on non-agricultural labour, like Erman (1995, 1999) on the mining industry.
6 The harbour is nowadays known as Sunda Kelapa and is still in operation, used mainly by traditional inter-island shipping.
7 A koyang is a unit of measure, depending on the kind of cargo. A koyang rice is equal to 1,668 kilograms, a koyang salt 1,863 kilograms.
wharfs (Morgan 1958:68–69; Dharmasena 1980:81–82; Dobbs 1999). Batavia, however, was fully dependent on the lighters.

The rise of steamships changed the appreciation of proas. Steamships were less hindered by weather conditions than sailing ships and sailed all year round, many of them according to a fixed schedule. Operational speed and reliable times of departure and arrival were essential. Furthermore, shipping companies preferred fixed berths for their steamers, so ports had to adjust to the new style of shipping, meaning deeper harbours, longer wharfs, and mechanical facilities to guarantee efficient loading and unloading of the ships. The process of loading and unloading by proas was slow and expensive and caused the steam shipping companies a major headache. Something needed to be done, but as the owners of the prauwenveren held an oligopoly, they felt no great urge to adapt to the new demands of the maritime sector.

However, in the 1870s it was decided to build a new harbour for Batavia. Planning, location, and budget were the subject of long, heated debates in the Netherlands Indies, in which colonial administrators, Dutch members of Parliament, shipping companies, commercial traders, railway companies, engineers and even Prince Hendrik, brother of King Willem III, were involved. In 1883 at Tanjung Priok, about 9 kilometres east of the existing harbour canal, a completely new port would be opened. Tanjung Priok had the first deep-water basins in the archipelago in which steamers could tie up directly alongside the wharf (Veering 2006:59–82).

The new harbour works at Tanjung Priok were ambitious in their scale and design and cost 20 million guilders, making it one of the largest infrastructural projects of the century. The new port consisted of an outer harbour, protected by two piers and an inner harbour basin. Ships could moor at the western wharf in the inner harbour, load and unload their cargo using cranes, and store it in seven large godowns. Mooring stages were constructed at the Eastern Wharf, specifically for the unloading and storing of salt, tin, and coal. In 1891 a dry dock constructed by the private Droogdok Maatschappij Tandjong Priok provided professional repair facilities. Being located at a distance from Batavia, a good connection with the town centre was imperative: railways, a land road, and a shipping canal for proas all led directly to the commercial centre of Batavia (Veering 2008:211–213).

The growth of Tanjung Priok is unquestionably attributable to the strong economic development of its direct hinterland of West Java (Cool 1920) and its growing role as transit port for products from the Outer Islands. One crucial factor in the development of the transit function was the founding of the KPM in 1888. The services of the KPM, initiated, stimulated, and supervised by the colonial government, were closely tied up with contemporary military and
administrative expansion, as well as the economic integration of the Outer Islands into the global market economy (à Campo 1992:635). The archipelago-wide network of KPM was centred in Batavia, where all its main shipping routes called. The KPM had transit contracts with the Dutch international shipping lines, the Stoomvaart Maatschappij ‘Nederland’ (SMN, Steam Navigation Company ‘Nederland’) and the Rotterdamsche Lloyd (RL), which gave Tanjung Priok its important role as transit port. These three Dutch companies, KPM, SMN and RL, dominated port operations, as they accounted for more than fifty percent of all shipping in Tanjung Priok. Tanjung Priok was also a port-of-call for smaller packet boat services like the Java-China-Japan Line and various other international shipping firms. In short, the port was a link between the inter-island and the international shipping networks. The colonial government promoted Tanjung Priok as the ‘national’ harbour of the Netherlands Indies, not least projecting it as a counterweight to the rising influence of Singapore in the Java Sea. In this respect, the development of the KPM and Tanjung Priok ran parallel, as both were used by the colonial government to tighten its grip on the archipelago, both politically and economically (Veering 2008:235).

Tanjung Priok was not the only port that was modernized in the Netherlands Indies. In the 1910s, the Dutch government in The Hague sent two harbour experts, who had played a decisive role in the development of the harbours in the Netherlands, to the archipelago. The two experts, Jacob Kraus and Gerrit de Jongh, sought large-scale, technological solutions for the capacity deficit of all major ports around the Java Sea (Cool 1920; Kraus and De Jongh 1910; Veering 2008:222–230). The expansion of the harbours in the Netherlands Indies coincided with worldwide port development, which had been generated by the rapid transformation of shipping from sail to steam. The most striking aspect of the process was the perpetual search for space: deeper basins, more and longer wharves, increasing storage space. Physically the harbours were increasingly separated from the rest of the towns, as room for their expansion was only found at the outskirts of the towns. Economically the ports grew increasingly independent of the towns and the traditional ties with the urban commercial establishment loosened (Veering 2008:236).

Changes in Dock Work

In the second half of the nineteenth century, the way dock work was carried out changed fundamentally as a result of the shift from sailing to steamships. This change occurred irrespective of whether a port relied on lighters or offered
wharves at which ships moored. In the era of sail, the loading was carried out under supervision of specialized sailors, who were responsible for the rigging of the ship and for the stowage of the cargo. The riggers were assisted by casual labourers who carried the goods to and from the ships. With the coming of steamships, the specific skills of the riggers became obsolete and, to their dismay, they had to accept ordinary dock work or their jobs were taken over by less skilled labourers, often from other trades (Mol 1980).

In the late nineteenth century, both the shift to steam power, and the use of iron instead of wood to build vessels resulted in a greater carrying capacity and higher speeds. In this period, the job of stevedore was introduced to take care of the loading of the ships and to supervise the dockworkers. Most of the stevedores were hired by shipping companies, who were glad to hand over the tasks of monitoring the loading and hiring workers. The growth of the volume handled in the ports created a need for more labour and better equipment, and the stevedore was indispensable in this process. The shipping companies pressed to achieve a rapid handling of their steamers, which had to be on their way again as soon as possible to recover the high expenses of steam shipping (De Goey 1993:4–25).

These technological innovations in shipping were not matched by similar improvements in cargo handling. Clearly, in view of the increase in cargo transshipped through the ports, manpower was no longer sufficient. Although cranes and other mechanical devices were in use, technological progress was slow to catch on and the labour-intensive nature of dock work remained unchanged until the introduction of the container in the 1960s (De Goey 1993:25; Green 2000:575–576). The pace of this mechanization process also depended on the type of cargo: grain was very suitable to mechanical loading, whereas other goods like tea or rubber still required to be handled manually. Even the bucket ladder used to move grain required a team of dockers and a division of tasks in weighing, bagging up, and carrying the grain.8

In the traditional harbour of Batavia, the loading and unloading of ships had been the task of the specialized crews of the proas. Working with lighters was a complicated task: the shipper had to align his proa alongside the ship in the roadstead so that the freight could be transferred between the two vessels. The consignment had to be stowed carefully, because a flat-bottomed, badly loaded tambangan was in ever-present danger of capsizing. The boat’s crew therefore had to be skilled and experienced, in both stowage and navigation, especially during the wet monsoon when they had to navigate the crashing

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8 NA, KPM (2.20.35) 201, Minutes Priok meeting 21-1-1913.
waves and the tricky breakers at the entrance of the harbour canal (Bruining 1852:201).

The opening of the new harbour works at Tanjung Priok fundamentally changed the loading business. The major difference was that ocean-going ships could now load and unload directly at the wharves, and could fall back on the use of mechanical support. The skilled lightermen were therefore replaced by harbour workers, whose main asset had to be muscle power. This labour remained largely uncontrolled, as it was even in Australia where it was said ‘A man could buy himself a coil of rope and call himself a stevedore’ (Tull 2000). The heavy cargoes and the long working hours, not to mention the high accident rate, meant that men ran the risk of physical disability. In general, working on the docks was demanding, and dangerous.

Dockworkers in Batavia

As is the case with many urban workers, information about the Priok dockers is very limited. One matter that is difficult to determine is the size of the labour population in Tanjung Priok. No official statistics pertaining to it were kept during the colonial era. The only figure available is from November 1948: a report by the Department of Social Affairs estimated the number of persons working in Tanjung Priok at 11,000 (Arbeidstoestanden 1949:3). In his article on the port strikes in the 1910s and 1920s, Ingleson mentions that Surabaya had a 10,000-strong workforce (Ingleson 1983:457). As Tanjung Priok was a port comparable in size to Surabaya, it seems feasible to estimate that the number of workers in Tanjung Priok was also about 10,000, perhaps somewhat fewer during the economic crisis of the 1930s.

Labour in the dock area was not restricted to the loading and unloading of the ships. Port operations involved an entire bureaucratic and technical apparatus: the Havenbedrijf (Port Company) combining the work of both port authorities and port operations, the Dry Dock Company Tandjong Priok, the KPM workshop, customs and immigration, police, railways, the post office, and the vemen (storage companies). Most European personnel did not live in Tanjung Priok, but in the Batavian suburbs of Weltevreden and Meester Cornelis. They commuted daily on the special trains running to and from the harbour.9 Many of the Indonesians in the ‘steady’ workforce also lived in

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9 NA, KPM (2.20.35) 198, VB 86 Batavia, 10-3-1917. See also Volkstelling 1930 (1933), and De Vletter et al. (1997).
Batavia, although labourers working for the storage companies tended to live close to the docks.

The labourers on the wharves were better paid than those working on board, loading and unloading the ships. The latter were paid a daily wage and formed the floating workforce in the port. They were at the bottom of the social hierarchy. The stevedoring work was organized by smaller companies and individuals.

For a long time the labour organization in Tanjung Priok depended on the personal skills, authority, or tact of a few European labour brokers who mediated between the shipping companies and the indigenous labourers (*NISHM* 1939:2). A few strong men reigned on the waterfront. An account of the labour situation in the early days of Priok referred to a certain Janus Hagenaar who enjoyed a ‘glorious career’ as recruiter and supervisor.

We still remember how he ruled the docks of Priok with his cane, and how he, gesticulating expressively, got the most out of the troop of coolies, who at the time, and even long after, were given, the less pleasant name of the “sore legs battalion”.

If mediators like Hagenaar were absent or made a mess of their work, shipping companies immediately suffered from a shortage of labourers.

In contrast to most ports, where employers in the harbour could easily choose from a surplus of workers, Tanjung Priok had to contend with an acute shortage of labourers. In Tanjung Priok there was heavy competition among the shipping companies for the available dockers. The need for labour was so pressing that any unexpected additional job would have an impact on the available labour in the subsequent period. This could, for instance, happen when a crew of dockers had to do a night shift to handle a particular vessel and other ships suffered a standstill the next day because of a lack of labourers.

Traditionally, dockworkers came from Banten (Bantam), a Residency at the west end of Java, or to a lesser extent from Tangerang, a district also west of Batavia. The Census of 1930 reports that it was ‘common knowledge that

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10 *Wij herinneren ons nog, hoe hij de kade van Priok met zijn rietje regeerde, en hoe hij uit het troepje koelies, destijds en zelfs nog langen tijd daarna, betiteld met de min fraaie naam van het “zeere beenen bataillon”, met groot gebaar haalde, wat eruit te halen viel* (Rietdijk 1921:59).

11 *NA, KPM (2.20.35) 201, Minutes Priok meeting 22-2-1912.*

12 *NA, KPM (2.20.35) 201, Minutes Priok meeting 21-1-1913.*
people from Banten and Tangerang worked in Priok.\textsuperscript{13} They worked in the port for a few months only and then went back to their villages. At least 75 per cent of the workers left Tanjung Priok within one year (Rodenwaldt and Essed 1925). Circular migration was an established way of life in Banten. The majority of the young men travelled to Batavia or South Sumatra to work, but returned for the rice harvests or religious holidays, or when they had earned sufficient money to buy and cultivate their own piece of sawah land. These migration patterns assured an influx of money and goods into Banten.

The ‘work ethic’ of the Bantenese caused the port enterprises a headache, because do what they could, the port enterprises could not get a grip on the indigenous labourers.\textsuperscript{14} M.C. Koning, principal agent for the KPM in Batavia between 1911 and 1919, was looking back on his work twenty years later still full of incomprehension about the attitude of the dockers:

> Those who were acquainted with the mentality of the native in those days also remember that little was needed to have him interrupt his work. The work was frequently halted for a celebration; the reasons for a slama\-tan were insignificant. When a coolie thought he had earned enough money for the time being to allow him to give free rein to his innate laziness, he left his job without a qualm and disappeared, only to turn up again when his purse was completely empty. Also, the moment the rice crop had to be harvested, the coolies left for their desa and remained there until the work in the sawah was done.

\textit{NISHM} 1939:8

The casual dockworkers were not employed directly by either the harbour management or the waterside companies, they were taken on indirectly through a mandur (foreman) who had been enlisted by a labour broker or sometimes a stevedore or shipping company. This system of indirect recruitment was an established practice in many ports in the world, and was also

\textsuperscript{13} The figures in the Census show that 12,424 people from Banten and 13,070 from Tangerang lived in the district of Batavia. A small group of harbour workers originated from Parungpanjang in the Bogor district. Unfortunately the Census does not specify numbers of the dock labourers (Volkstelling 1930 1933).

\textsuperscript{14} The migration routines of the Bantenese also caused problems at home. While the Bantenese had the reputation of hard workers outside their own region, in Banten they seemed ashamed to perform coolie labour. A colonial report depicted the Bantenese as abstemious, thrifty, and pious, but on their home ground they were said to be bone-lazy, fanatical, and rebellious. \textit{Verslag van de Commissie} 1927:1–3; Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, Jakarta (ANRI), Memorie van Overgave Bantam 1931.
commonplace in various industries in Java. The *mandur* was often village-born or had strong ties with the area from which his family originated. He used these networks to recruit labourers from his home village and region. This use of networks explains the concentrated origin of dockworkers from just a few areas.\(^{15}\) The advantage for the employers was that they did not have to deal with all the indigenous labourers, but could organize everything through a few foremen.

**Shortage of Labourers**

Around 1905 shipping traffic had developed to such an extent that the small-scale organization of labour was no longer satisfactory. The port of Batavia ran short of wharf and storage space and the limited number of dockworkers was an acute problem. The upshot was congestion and the shipping companies were driven into strong competition for port facilities and labour. In an attempt to overcome this problem, the main shipping lines in Priok – KPM, SMN, RL, and Java-China-Japan Lijn (JCJL) – combined to establish three cooperatives in 1911 and 1912: the Kolenmaatschap (Coal Partnership) for coal business, the Unieveer (Union Ferrry) for lighter work and transport, and Stuwadoor Maatschap (Stevedore Partnership) for stevedoring (NISHM 1939; à Campo 1992). Although the integration of these port processes did indeed improve the handling of ships, it could not solve the shortage of labour. This arrangement was broken by JCJL when it decided to hire a Chinese broker, the firm of Wing, to bunker their ships. Wing attracted 200 Priok labourers by offering high wages. After that the three cooperatives had no other option than to raise their wages and the competition for labour only intensified.\(^{16}\)

Another possible solution to the labour issue was to hire Chinese workers. The JCJL ships regularly brought coolies from China to work in the plantations of Deli (East Sumatra), and the company sometimes sought Chinese labourers for dock work in Tanjung Priok. Chinese labourers were also recruited from Singapore. The advantage of Chinese workers was that they, unlike the indigenous labourers, did not desert the dockside when work was at its height. Precisely in August and September, when shipping of cash crops was at its peak, there was always a massive exodus of the indigenous workers to Banten,

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\(^{15}\) This was the case not only in Tanjung Priok, but also in Surabaya, where most dockers were Madurese, and in the harbour of Semarang, which attracted workers from Kudus, Demak, Juana, Kendal, and Jepara (Ingleson 1983:457).

\(^{16}\) NA, KPM (2.20.35) 201, Minutes Priok meeting 22-2-1912.
going home for the rice harvest. Lebaran (the end of the Islamic fasting) was another critical moment, because many Bantenese went back to their villages to celebrate.

Both these drawbacks to the employment of indigenous labourers did not apply to Chinese workers but, nevertheless, hiring them was not considered a permanent solution for the labour problem. The employers objected to the fact that the Chinese workers frequently went on strike and displayed strong group solidarity. Sometimes, the Chinese workers had already mutinied on the ships before they had arrived in Batavia (De Telegraaf 28-7-1910). Another perennial problem was that Chinese immigrants suffered from the change in environment, especially as the conditions in Priok were very harsh. Once in Batavia, the physical condition of the immigrants rapidly declined, and therefore, in the words of KPM agent Koning,

they performed even more badly than those skinny Chinese and natives who had been working in Priok and at least always carried on, despite being weak, exhausted, and miserable.17

In later years, the 1920s and 1930s, Chinese immigrants were often suspected of being communist revolutionaries, and port employers were no longer falling over themselves to hire new Chinese dockers (Politiek-politionele overzichten, 1982, 1988:16).

The mechanization of dock labour was another alternative to solve the labour shortage. To choose this option would certainly make the port enterprises less vulnerable to fluctuations in labour supply and speed up the handling of cargo. In Tanjung Priok some cranes were available, both on the wharves and on the barges. Large vessels were equipped with either their own cranes or winches with a lifting capacity of up to five tons each (à Campo 1992:420). Despite these advantages, the options for mechanization were very limited, mostly because the cargo was still rarely standardized.

The possibilities of mechanization were promising in the case of coal. The handling of coal was a bottleneck in Tanjung Priok, as it was still done by manual labour only. Long rows of workers carried coal onto the vessels along gangplanks in baskets. The representatives of the shipping companies, meeting to discuss the matter, considered the various opportunities for mechanical coal loading. A technical committee visited several European ports to study the mechanical loading devices used there. In the end, the Rotterdam system was chosen as the most appropriate. In 1913, after protracted bickering between

the various parties, two lighters, provided with steam cranes, were ordered, each with a capacity of 1,200 tons. Not long after, in early 1914, the Union companies (KPM, SMN, RL, and JCJL) established a new enterprise to run the coal trade in Tanjung Priok: the Nederlandsch Indische Steenkolen Handels-Maatschappij (NISHM, Netherlands Indies Coal Trading Company). The ambition was to compete with Singapore, where many Java-bound vessels used to take in coal (NISHM 1939:10–11). The NISHM had a 1,000 foot long wharf, equipped with four electrical coal transporters with grabs, each with a capacity of 100 tons per hour. The new loading facilities did indeed improve the handling of the vessels, and the process required less labour. However, the unflagging increase in shipping traffic still meant that a sizeable workforce had to be available, now made even more urgent as the NISHM expanded its activities to tug boat and lighter services and stevedoring. In an attempt to rationalize one aspect of dock work, the Union companies had paradoxically produced a new competitor for labour on the waterfront.

Living and Working in Priok

Most dockers lived in the old quarter of Batavia, and not in the quarters near the port. Every morning they had to walk an hour to the station, from where they travelled thirty minutes by train to the dockside. At the end of the day, they made the same trip in the opposite direction, giving a total travelling time of three hours per day. Every evening port employers posted the number of dockworkers needed for the next day, based on a calculation of the number of ships in the harbour and the expected arrivals. When a ship arrived unexpectedly, or when for some other reason more dockers were required, it was almost impossible to form a new gang and, considering the travelling time from Batavia, it would hardly be worth trying (Rietdijk 1921:60). It was in the best interests of the employers for the labourers to move to the waterfront as their immediate presence would increase the flexibility of cargo handling.

One of the main problems encountered in establishing a steady workforce in the docks was the poor living conditions in Tanjung Priok, or Batavia for that matter, and the appalling accommodation available to the labourers. In many cases, the foreman or the broker provided the migrant workers from Banten with a place to stay in one of the pondok (boarding-houses) in old Batavia.

18 Company brochure ‘NV Nederlandsch-Indische Steenkolen Handel-Maatschappij’, Amsterdam, no date. Unieveer and the Kolen Maatschap were incorporated into the NISHM.
People lived cheek by jowl in these shabby lodging houses, which were built very close to each other. Fires could easily destroy a whole quarter (Abeyasekere 1987:70–71). During the wet monsoon, heavy rains transformed the kampong area in central Batavia into a quagmire. When this happened, most of the workers did not show up at Tanjung Priok, after having spent all night in the wet and, if the bad weather persisted, many migrants returned to their home villages. In 1918 a severe flood forced many people to flee to Banten with as immediate consequence a lack of labourers, despite the offer of the harbour authorities to use godowns as temporary accommodation in Tanjung Priok. It took months before this situation had fully recovered (Rietdijk 1921:60).

Publicist and photographer H.F. Tillema described the city kampongs of Batavia as the ‘Augean stables’, afflicted by poverty and decay (Vanvugt 1993; Coté 2002). He was horrified by the sight of the pondok,

which form the sleeping accommodation of the Javanese from the country. Distressing dwellings they were, places where people were exposed to all sorts of infections, both physical and moral! Prostitution was rampant; malaria, typhoid, dysentery, etcetera, etcetera had no trouble finding easy victims.19

Sometimes workers just found a spot in the harbour to spend the night, saving a trip up and down to Batavia and keeping their train allowance. To observe them Tillema made a nocturnal trip to the harbour at the invitation of the director of the Department of Health. At midnight a small group, armed with a camera, left for Priok.

It was a lugubrious expedition. Most of the experts had taken quinine tablets before departure. This to prevent [them] catching malaria on this excursion. [...] The small heaps, which you will notice only after looking carefully, are sleeping persons, lying on the coal, exposed to the notorious mosquitoes of Tanjung Priok. “Sheer suicide”, said one companion. “Now one can see how much the authorities here lack any insight into hygiene”, remarked another. [...] Deeply impressed by what we had seen, we returned home.20

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19 ‘dat zijn slaapgelegenheden voor den Javaan van buiten. Droevige verblijfplaatsen waren het, plaatsen waar de menschen blootgesteld waren aan allerlei infecties, physieke en moreele! Prostitutie vierde er hoogtij, malaria, typhus, dysenterie enz. enz. vonden er gemakkelijk hun prooi’ (Tillema 1919:3).

20 "t Was een lugubere tocht. De meesten ter zake zeer deskundigen hadden vóór hun vertrek een paar kinine-tabletten ingenomen. Dit om van het bezoek geen malaria op te doen. [...] De
Tillema had the opportunity to discuss the situation with the KPM directors during a visit to the KPM headquarters as preparation for writing his critical pamphlet Kampongwee. Tillema and the KPM directors discussed the living conditions and studied photographs of the facilities in Priok. Thanks to the minutes of a board meeting of the shipping companies, it is still possible to discover what happened on this visit. It seemed Tillema and the KPM were on the same wavelength on this point.

Very scant accommodation of a more permanent nature was available in Tanjung Priok. Not much is known, unfortunately, about the housing situation in and around Tanjung Priok in its very early days. The port had been constructed in an isolated area, surrounded by swamps and mangroves. Only a small fishing settlement had been forced to make way for the construction works. Only after the turn of the century did the colonial port authorities begin to show an interest in the living situation of the Priok population. As a consequence, one by one the existing kampongs were relocated to better, specially prepared terrains, such as Kampong Pedjongkoran and Kampong Kodja. The inhabitants were paid an allowance to move their dwellings, which they simply took apart and rebuilt at the new location. The port authorities constructed roads and pathways, installed the waterworks and an electricity grid, and built a central market.

Establishing the Uniekampong

Housing and hygiene had appeared on the agenda of the Priok meeting of the shipping companies several times, but initially to no purpose. In 1916 the KPM management in Batavia decided to take the labour issue into its own hands by setting up a koeliekampong (coolie kampong). The stevedoring companies had

hoopjes, die u na aandachtige beschouwing zult opmerken, zijn slapende menschen, liggend op de steenkool, blootgesteld aan de steken der beruchte muskieten van Tandjong Priok. “Je reinste zelfmoord,” merkte een der tochtgenooten op. “Nu kan men eens zien hoezeer het hygiënisch inzicht hier nog bij de autoriteiten ontbreekt,” merkte een ander op. [...] Diep onder den indruk keerden wij terug’ (Tillema 1919:2).

NA, KPM (2.20.35) 314.1, Minutes meeting Verenigde Nederlandse Scheepvaartmaatschappijen 22-12-1921.

Private companies, such as the Hollandsche Beton Maatschappij (a construction works) and the Dordtsche Petroleum Maatschappij (an oil company), also rented areas for the accommodation of their labourers, who were permanent employees not directly involved in the actual dock work.
not been able to supply dockworkers in sufficient numbers for all the shipping companies and, above all, the labourers were in such poor physical condition that they could barely undertake the arduous task of loading and unloading the ships. The director of a stevedoring company linked to the KPM had suggested in a report that the workers be accommodated properly, in the vicinity of the dockside. The purpose of the Koeliekampong was to house the workers who lived downtown in the ‘most appalling conditions’, in a new kampong with better living conditions in order to bring down the death rate among them and improve their physical condition.23

What we wish to achieve with our coolie kampong is an end to the unfortunate conditions prevalent in the slums in downtown [Batavia], where the Bantenese are living. Undernourished people live in insalubrious conditions and the result is, according to the harbour physician, a death rate of 25 per cent, while those who do not perish deliver an inferior working performance as a consequence of their poor physical shape. While a veem coolie shoulders a bag of copra on his own, we need four persons to do so, which is why handcarts are being used. When one considers what is achieved in pikols in Makassar, the difference in speed of cargo handling is the first thing which strikes the eye.24

Initially the KPM wanted to co-operate with the other shipping companies, RL, SMN and JCJL, to establish a common housing complex. This plan was stymied by the Priok agents of these other companies who were determined to establish their own kampong, but it turned out their plans were never executed.

In September 1918, the KPM opened the Koeliekampong. The local management in Batavia envisaged accommodation for 700 labourers, but the KPM board of directors in Amsterdam restricted the experiment to 400 labourers. The directors in the Netherlands feared the kampong would not attract enough labourers to fill so many places.25 As will be discussed in detail in the next section, the Koeliekampong was actually a success in many ways.

23 NA, KPM (2.20.35) 314: 623–632, Minutes April 1921.
24 NA, KPM (2.20.35) 198, VB 86 Batavia 10-3-1917. A pikol is a unit of weight, roughly the equivalent of 62.5 kg. This death rate of 25 per cent is hard to believe but if correct it is indicative of both the terrible living conditions and the dire economic need of the workers.
25 NA, KPM (2.20.35) 198, VB 72 Batavia to Amsterdam 25-8-1916, VB 78 Batavia to Amsterdam 4-11-1916; VB 110 Amsterdam to Batavia 2-11-1916, VB 113 Amsterdam to Batavia 28-12-1916; VB 152 Amsterdam to Batavia 28-1-1919.
Seeing the apparent success of the Koeliekampong, at least for the KPM as employer of the dockworkers, the other shipping companies quickly came round. In March 1919, it was decided to establish jointly a limited liability company, to run the kampong and labour pool, NV Uniekampong (Uniekampong Ltd). The Uniekampong would be the primary ‘supplier’ of dockworkers for the companies involved in the union. The main partners in the Uniekampong were the KPM, the Nederlandsch Indische Scheepvaart Etablissmenten (NISE, the local representative of the RL), and Scheepsagentuur, the representative of the SMN and JCJL in Batavia.26 According to the statutes (Acte van Maatschap), the stated goal of the NV Uniekampong was to guarantee the availability of workers for the loading and unloading, storing and transporting of cargo’s shipped in vessels operated by the Uniekampong members.27

In a radical break with the past, the Uniekampong was to house 4,000 dockworkers, many more than they had ever hired before. Although the participating shipping companies were allowed to attract other labourers, this suggestion was strongly discouraged as such a practice would only drive up competition for labour. After registration at the Uniekampong the dockers received a special pass and a European staff supervised the premises.

The relation between Uniekampong and the dockers can be characterized as semi-casual: fixed, but not permanent employment. The establishment of a labour pool was part of a general development of the gradual decasualization of dock work then occurring in various ports all over the world. The militant reputation of dockers was to a large extent based on the effects of casual labour. Port employers began to realize that steps had to be taken to alter the dockers’ casual way of life fundamentally (Weinhauer 2000:580–581).

Unquestionably, the Uniekampong served the economic interest of the four participating companies. With a 60 to 70 per cent share in the total shipping movements in Tanjung Priok, the four companies hoped to diminish the mutual competition on the labour market, and thereby control and bring down wages. A point of attention was to make sure all partners had their rightful share of the labourers. The NV employed an ‘administrator’ – in later years

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26 Other partners were Java Pacific Lijn (through Scheepsagentuur), Java Bengalen Lijn and Java New York Lijn (only those ships ran by RL and SMN). At the same time the partners established the NV Uniekampong, it was decided to dissolve the now redundant Stuwadoor Maatschappij. NA, KPM (2.20.35) 197. It is remarkable that neither the colonial government nor the local authorities were involved in the project. Since the Decentralization Act of 1903, municipalities were responsible for a great variety of tasks, including sanitation works, public housing, and kampong improvement.

27 NA, KPM (2.20.35) 197, nr 7a: Acte van Maatschap, July 1919.
his title was upgraded to ‘director’—who looked after the fair distribution of workers over the various participant companies; he was also responsible for the staff and workers, and for costs and income.28

Nevertheless, the establishment of the Uniekampong was certainly inspired by ethical considerations too. The management of the Uniekampong demonstrated its engagement with the dockworkers, although in a highly paternalistic manner, aspiring to ‘educate’ the workers in matters of food, hygiene, and money. In an article in a nautical magazine, Rietdijk, first director of the Uniekampong, stressed that the ‘ethical approach’ converged with practical economic interests:

The brilliant improvement in the living conditions of the native workers is the ethical side, the benefit [we derive] from the improved performance of the workers who are better looked after is the practical.

Rietdijk 1921:61

Ethical or not, the Uniekampong was in no sense comparable to the European working-class housing projects which were built in the Netherlands Indies in the early twentieth century. The name ‘Uniekampong’ can be deceiving, as it was not really a kampong in the sense of a town quarter (Van Roosmalen 2008:278–295). The housing complex displayed certain features of a tangsi (an army camp or barracks), as the labourers lived together in large communal buildings, although some did have private rooms.

Life at the Koeliekampong

The first Koeliekampong, the precursor of the Uniekampong opened by the KPM in 1918, was located directly next to Pedjongkoran, one of the largest kampons in the Priok area. On its other side, the Koeliekampong bordered directly on Zandvoort Beach, a place where the colonial elite of Batavia used to come for some fresh air and relaxation. The complex was built under the supervision of the Algemeen Ingenieurs- en Architectenbureau (AIA) and consisted of eight pondok for in total 500 to 600 workers and 48 mandur (foremen).29 It was

28 As an extra warrant that no contracting party was slighted, a supervisory board, with three members from KPM, NISE, and Scheepsagentuur, controlled the functioning of the Director and the Uniekampong. NA, KPM (2.20.35) 197, nr 7a: Acte van Maatschap, July 1919.

29 AIA was founded in 1916 by the Dutch architect Frans Ghijsels, who among other things had designed the KPM building (Scheepvaartgebouw) in downtown Batavia.
still a very modest affair as the *pondok* were constructed of wood and plaited bamboo. The construction of the Koeliekampong had cost the KPM around 150,000 guilders in January 1919.\(^{30}\)

The workers slept on *baleh-baleh* (wooden beds). According to the camp files, in 1919, one year after the opening, the number of beds in the eight *pondok* had already risen to 768. The workers could sit on long wooden benches or directly on the concrete floors. On the northern side, each building had an open gallery and a corridor. For every two *pondok*, there was a common kitchen, constructed of brick. Here the workers prepared rice, which was distributed by the management. The night watch had a bamboo shed from where he set off on his nightly rounds. Apart from the *pondok*, there were five separate houses where the chief *mandur* lived with their families. These houses had a private kitchen and steps made out of brick instead of wood.

Several hygienic measures were introduced. There were four buildings providing washing facilities, including tap water and water closets, in the kampong. Water was drawn from an artesian aquifer and channelled to the drinking water taps. Waste water flowed through sewerage pipes into septic tanks. Ill or wounded workers were taken to a special shed, the ‘ziekenbarak’ (sick bay).

The European staff lived in two semi-detached houses, each with its own kitchen, washing place, and rooms for the servants. The director’s accommodation – with two doors onto the front porch – had a bathroom with a shower and a washing place. This house was connected to the kampong office, where the European staff worked. However, most of the European staff lived in Weltevreden in Batavia and came to work by bus, which made five return trips a day.\(^{31}\)

The Koeliekampong had a central kitchen for daily meals, to supplement the portions of rice that were distributed to be cooked by the workers themselves. Workers had to buy their other daily necessities at the *toko* (small shops) in the complex or they could eat at one of the *warung* (food stalls). The *toko* and *warung* were all housed in two specially assigned buildings and the shop-keepers rented the space from the kampong management. For recreation there was a cinema, complete with a projector, a screen, and wind fans on the roof used for cooling the spectators. The whole terrain had electric lighting. This was not ‘luxury’, but a necessity; good lighting was important for crews returning from the docks at night. Moreover, a properly lighted complex was paramount to camp security. The Koeliekampong had its private security force, which strictly guarded law and order in the complex.

\(^{30}\) NA, KPM (2.20.35) 197, nr 12.
\(^{31}\) NA, KPM (2.20.35) 314.1: 623.2, Minutes Priok meeting 1-4-1919.
As a whole, the first Koeliekampong can be considered ‘a society by itself’. As said, the KPM began modestly with only 400 labourers, as there were doubts about whether the kampong would indeed attract enough labourers. During the first year, the kampong was a demonstrated success and had already accommodated 600 people. In fact, it attracted even more workers, up to a thousand. Despite the overcrowding, health conditions were much better than elsewhere in Batavia or Tanjung Priok. In the old dock quarters, several people died daily from diseases; in the KPM complex only eight people had fallen ill.

From Koeliekampong to Uniekampong

The Uniekampong regulations stated that the ‘NV’ would provide housing, food, and medical care for indigenous men who were willing to work for the NV member companies. Workers living in separate accommodation were allowed to bring along their family, if the total number of people did not exceed the maximum set for that accommodation.

The system in the Koeliekampong – which was borrowed from that used by the Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij in North Sumatra (à Campo 1992: 519) – was adopted by the partners in the Uniekampong, but the complex had to be expanded enormously to accommodate 4,000 workers in place of the original 400. Furthermore, the construction of the pondok was improved and more ‘durable’ materials were used: more brick and concrete, less wood and bamboo. In the period between 1919 and 1921, new pondok were built, as were new lavatory and washing buildings and six new kitchens. Again the AIA was the main engineer and contractor.

Each pondok was designed to accommodate ninety persons. Some large pondok were specially assigned for use by families, the others were for single men. KPM had been pleasantly surprised that some workers brought their families along to the Koeliekampong. These workers formed a small, steady core of the inhabitants. In the Uniekampong workers with families were accommodated in more private sections. However, the population of the Uniekampong consisted mainly of boedjong, young unmarried men, from Banten who worked on the waterfront for a limited period only.

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32 NA, KPM (2.20.35) 198, VB 72 Batavia to Amsterdam 25-8-1916, VB 78 Batavia to Amsterdam 4-11-1916; VB 110 Amsterdam to Batavia 2-11-1916, VB 113 Amsterdam to Batavia 28-12-1916; VB 152 Amsterdam to Batavia 28-1-1919.

33 NA, KPM (2.20.35) 197, 7b, 12-6-1919.
According to the Uniekampong regulations the pondok were already ‘fully furnished’ for living,34 but this furnishing was very modest indeed, with baleh-baleh for sleeping and long wooden benches. The mandur lived in separate rooms at each end of the building. Just as in the Koeliekampong, the chief mandur lived in private houses, close to the pondok. The separate houses and rooms were not furnished. Three new godowns for toko and warung were constructed, and a new office building was erected for the expanding European staff. A Decauville track was laid to make transport by train from the Uniekampong to the Tanjung Priok railway station possible, and the workers were transferred to and from the docks by ferry. A landing stage was constructed to this end and in 1921 a small harbour was dug at the cost of 30,000 guilders.35 The expansion costs of the Uniekampong up to July 1920 were just over 365,000 guilders, although not all construction work had been finished by then.36

Food was supplied from a central kitchen but the menu was very basic: rice, fish, and eggs. The people were expected to prepare additional food in one of the smaller kitchens near their pondok. The Pasar Kodja containing many more toko and warung were also nearby to supplement the mostly Chinese-owned shops on the Uniekampong. The regulations stated that food had to be distributed three times a day, in the morning, the afternoon, and the evening, at the same time every day. Under exceptional circumstances, breakfast could be distributed one hour earlier and dinner at night could be delayed two hours at the most. When workers were already or still working on the docks, the shipping company employing them was obliged to pick up the food at the Uniekampong kitchens and bring back the utensils afterwards. Medical check-ups were obligatory for every worker. The Uniekampong had its own medical doctor, after 1929 two. The workers were also strictly instructed to keep their accommodations clean.37

The Uniekampong also offered shared facilities. On their own initiative the dockers, of whom the majority were Muslim, had established a mosque in the Uniekampong. A vocational school educated the workers’ children to succeed them in the dock trade. For recreation, there was a football pitch and the cinema, which both also attracted people from outside the kampong.

After a few years the press praised the Uniekampong as an example of how to cope with workers under modern conditions. The comments, for instance in

34 NA, KPM (2.20,35) 197, 7b, 12-6-1919.
35 Arsip Burgerlijke Openbare Werken, Citeureup (bow), H2/3/25 (1933), 6-10-1932.
36 NA, KPM (2.20,35) 197, 16a.
37 NA, KPM (2.20,35) 197, 7b, 12-6-1919.
the Deli Courant, reflect the ‘ethical policy’ of the colonial government in the early 1920s. In the Netherlands, the daily newspaper De Telegraaf claimed that the success of the Uniekampong contrasted markedly with the bad employment records of the plantations.

Could it be that here [at Uniekampong] the psyche of the coolie was explored for the first time, that he was considered a human being and not merely a muscleman, who can be ordered around? Could it be that an attempt was made to fulfil his needs and desires and not ignore his inner self?38

The gradual modernization attracted new business as well. For instance, the establishment of a production plant of the American car company General Motors in the 1920s contributed to the transformation of the Priok area. And, as roads and railways were improved, this rather remote port area was drawn closer to the city of Batavia.

The Inhabitants

The number of 4,000 dockers proved far too ambitious. It was hard to find so many workers, but the shipping companies had also come to realize that a work force of this size was excessive. In 1921 the KPM directors in The Hague complained that the Uniekampong had grown much larger than intended, and hence had become much more expensive.39

The Uniekampong was governed by a strict hierarchy, closely resembling the strata in the work force. The labourers were divided into the categories chief mandur, mandur, assistant-mandur, A-coolies (very experienced), B-coolies (experienced) and C-coolies (hardly or no experience).40 The ‘coolies’, the actual dockers, worked six days a week, a maximum of twelve hours per day, starting at six in the morning and ending at six in the evening. This maximum did not include the travelling time to and from the docks. Overtime

39 NA, KPM (2.20.35) 197. Minutes meeting in The Hague, 22-12-1921.
40 There was also staff to run the complex itself, such as Ambonese guards, and European security staff.
(hours worked before or after six) was paid out calculating it at 1.2 hours per hour. Wages were paid to the workers directly by the shipping companies.\footnote{NA, KPM (2.20.35) 197, 7b, 12-6-1919.} This was a measure to eliminate the dominant position of the \textit{mandur}, who had traditionally distributed the income to the whole gang.

Shipping companies had to ‘order’ dockers at least one day in advance. Even after the Uniekampong was up and running there was a never-ending debate about the distribution of the best workers. Shipping lines reverted to the practice of hiring skilled dockers of their own accord, bypassing the Uniekampong. SMN and JCJL tried to establish their own stevedoring crew, which would be experienced in the stowage of their specific vessels. The upshot was that the best workers were attracted away from the Uniekampong, leaving the less experienced behind. On their part, the other companies accused the KPM of enjoying certain privileges in the Uniekampong. Eventually, it was agreed that each company would be allowed only a small group of fixed dockers, 50–100 workers at the most.

One of the fears which beset the companies was that bringing the workers together might provide the ideal breeding-ground for labour organizations and communist aspirations leading to social unrest. One of the directors pointed out that in ‘Dutch ports similar [workers] concentrations had resulted in the organization of labourers which had harmed the employers significantly.’\footnote{NA, KPM (2.20.35) 314.1:623–632, Minutes Priok meeting, 3-9-1919.} In the other two major harbours of Java, Semarang and Surabaya, the 1910s and 1920s were turbulent decades. Protracted strikes had ground both the other ports to a standstill in 1913, 1918, 1921, and 1925. Although the aspect of dockers’ resistance in Tanjung Priok still needs to be studied in more detail, it seems that strikes and disturbances did not occur as frequently and, when they did, it was on a smaller scale, than in Semarang or Surabaya. The Havenarbeidersbond (Harbour Workers’ Union), established in Semarang in 1919, admitted that its section in Tanjung Priok was not particularly active. It could never attract any substantial support there, nor did its successor Sarekat Pegawai Pelabuhan dan Lautan (SPPL, Union of Harbour Workers and Seamen) (Ingleson 1983:461, 464–465). The relative peace prevailing in the Uniekampong, and Tanjung Priok as a whole, is striking.

The fear that bringing workers together was asking for social unrest, was balanced by the expectation of the shipping companies owning the Uniekampong to have more control over the labourers when they lived in the Uniekampong. In contrast, the \textit{pondok} communities downtown remained largely impenetrable for the companies. When unrest flared up among the
workers’ population, the director of the Uniekampong had a signalling and mediating role. Director Zeeman was certainly very closely involved with the labourers’ daily concerns and actively promoted their interests in the board meetings.

The Uniekampong files do not contain any references to any serious uprisings or strikes before 1942. Even during the tense November of 1926, when communist uprisings set North Banten, the home region of most dockers, alight, the Priok waterfront remained quiet, much to the surprise of the port employers. The limited degree of communist support among harbour workers might have been the reason the rebellion was geographically confined.

The absence of strikes did not automatically imply a lack of opposition, as workers resistance was often manifested in other, less confrontational forms, which were very effective indeed. The most common form of individual protest was just to leave the Uniekampong, and find another employer in the docks. As most workers were closely tied to their mandur, just leaving was not always an option, and discontent was often voiced or even inspired by the foremen. The pressure the mandur could exert was very effective, and many times the employers had to accede to their demands. The Uniekampong is an example of a working population, albeit perhaps through their foremen, which was conscious of its own power and the scope it had to negotiate with their employers. In these negotiations, the bargaining power of the dockers fluctuated together with the economic ups and downs of the harbour.

**Economic Ups and Downs**

In the 1920s, the shipping companies flourished in the climate of rapid economic growth and expanding world trade, especially in colonial products like tea, coffee, rubber, or sugar. Conditions had a positive effect on the Uniekampong as well, as there was ample work for the dockers.\(^\text{43}\) As a consequence, competition for hard-working and (more or less) skilled labourers was savage, and the workers could easily find jobs elsewhere in the docks or in the old harbour of Batavia. The Uniekampong had a rather high turnover of inhabitants. The better housing offered in the Uniekampong was not enough to overcome the old practice of circular migration. In the harvest periods, many of the workers continued to return to their villages, just at the time that the loading and unloading of ships reached a peak. Port employers sometimes had to

\(^{43}\) A second Uniekampong complex, for 800 workers, was established in Belawan, the port of Medan in 1927. NA, KPM (2.20.35) 19-12-1927.
use ‘wage tactics’ to bind the workers, but the good living conditions in the Uniekampong definitely helped to some extent to build a stable labour force.

The Depression had an enormous impact on the Uniekampong. Dockworkers all over the world were a very vulnerable group, as world trade, and the whole shipping industry imploded. From the 1930s, the Uniekampong had to cope with serious budget cuts and the level of services diminished. Director Zeeman, who had held his position since the early 1920s, was trying to find all sorts of ways to lower the costs, from trying to convince the colonial government to reduce the charter charges for the ferry harbour to finding cheap alternatives for electricity. Pieces of land, which were rented from the Port Authorities for any future expansion, were handed back in 1934. One of the two medical doctors had to leave again, also because there were on average only 25 patients per day.44 One year later, the cinema had to stop its shows as it had run out of silent films, the electricity net was changed from high to low voltage (a cut of 70 guilders per year), and the water tariffs had dropped a bit. Some toko and almost all warung were left empty by their owners, as they could not afford the rents. There were simply too few customers left, as the working population had diminished drastically since the onset of the crisis.

The Depression completely reversed the balance of power between employers and workers in the harbour, and the strong bargaining power the workers had enjoyed in the 1920s disappeared. The shipping companies with a share in the NV Uniekampong were eager to cut their overheads, including the costs of the ‘expensive’ Uniekampong. The number of workers was reduced drastically to 1,550, and the shipping companies pushed the director to lower this number even more. However, Zeeman claimed that sending away workers would hardly yield a cutback, as the colonial government obliged employers to pay laid-off workers enough to live on. Instead Zeeman lowered the wages of the most skilled labourers like winch operators, who had been extremely hard to get just a few years before. He convinced the supervisory board not to lower the wages of the regular labourers by pointing out their long working hours. He also successfully argued that it was unnecessary to save on the wages of the regular labourers because of the falling rice price, which already meant the daily cost of food for the Uniekampong had decreased.45

When the supervisory board repeated its pleas for lower wages in the following years, Zeeman explained that the wages in the Uniekampong had already been relatively low, on average 37–38 cents per day, back in the 1920s. Since

44 NA, KPM (2.20.35) 197/221, Minutes Jaarvergadering Uniekampong Tandjong Priok, 7-6-1934.
45 NA, KPM (2.20.35), Minutes Jaarvergadering Uniekampong Tandjong Priok, 6/7-5-1931.
1922 the wages had not been raised once, even though competing employers had raised the wages of their workers since 1925. Lowering the wages would mean the Uniekampong could no longer hire good labourers, and, worst of all, the *mandur* might desert the premises. One member of the supervisory board acknowledged the dilemma: ‘The Uniekampong has got some good *mandur* now. There is a possibility that the good coolies will go elsewhere if their wages are cut’.46

Unfortunately, the official sources, like the minutes of the Priok meetings, do not provide many details about how workers responded to the Depression. Some left the premises and tried their luck elsewhere or returned home. Many dockers preferred to stay – at least for a couple of months – in the relative security of the Uniekampong.

The workers that stayed had to put up with deteriorating housing during the Depression. By the early 1930s, the *pondok* were ten to thirteen years old and badly in need of renovation; the KPM representative was shocked by the dilapidated housing. However, maintenance and replacement investments were put on hold as a consequence of the economic crisis. In 1932, a new ‘model’ *pondok* was built, but financial constraints meant that the project was not pursued beyond this pilot. In 1935 renovation was again on the agenda of the board. The representative of the SMN and member of the supervisory board, W.P.J. Koper, reported that he had seen with his own eyes that the accommodation had almost ‘run its course’ and would have to be replaced within five to ten years. Koper stated that the quality of the housing was ‘sub-standard’ and as an example he mentioned the small ‘rooms’ the workers had created in the *pondok*, using paper and *sasak* (plaited bamboo), as the only divisions.47

**Thinking about Further Modernization**

In 1937 the worst of the economic crisis was over and an ambitious modernization plan was drawn up, not only to upgrade the Uniekampong, but the premises would be extended as well. This modernized kampong was designed for 2,409 coolies, winch men and tractor drivers and their *mandur*. A new office building, a games hall, *toko* and *warung*, a new mosque, and a new hospital were all part of the plan. New housing for the European staff, namely for the doctor, the director and the supervisory staff, was also included. A completely new layout was drawn up for the actual Uniekampong, with 57 smaller *pondok*,

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46 NA, KPM (2.20.35), Minutes Jaarvergadering Uniekampong Tandjong Priok, 27-5-1932.
47 NA, KPM 314.1:623–632, Minutes Priok meeting, 24-7-1935.
each for thirty men. Next to every three pondok (=90 men), a house for the mandur was planned. All buildings would be constructed of brick, in long rows of three. Total cost of the modernization plan: 781,000 guilders. The plan reflected a new optimism in the Uniekampong. At the time this plan was drawn up, 1937, the Uniekampong housed 900 workers, but with the worst of the crisis over, the shipping companies were counting on extra work for 600 labourers.

The building plans gave rise to a discussion between the administrators in Batavia and the Board of Directors in Amsterdam on the layout of the new site. The Board held the opinion that the space between the pondok was insufficient and formed a threat to health, safety and hygiene. Batavia replied that the existing Uniekampong was laid out ‘extremely spaciously’ (uitermate royaal) with a distance of at least 15 meters between the pondok. Although the inter-space between the buildings in the proposed layout was only 11.5 to 12 meters, the plans were approved by the local medical staff of the KPM. A government official of the Department of Health also approved the layout, even though he made a critical remark on the building density. The KPM director in Batavia, E. Straatemeier, pointed out to the Board in Amsterdam that if a broader inter-space were applied, the construction of 15 pondok would have to be cancelled. The consequence was that the total capacity of the new Uniekampong would be 2,000 instead of 2,400 workers.\footnote{NA, KPM (2.20.35) 198, Letter from director KPM Batavia to Board of Directors in Amsterdam, Batavia, 22-8-1937.} The Amsterdam Board persisted in its opinion. It had consulted its own expert and decided to set the interspace at 14 meters at least. Moreover three open spaces, so-called ‘lungs’, should be left open. A lower capacity was no problem as the Uniekampong had some vacant land in reserve that could be built when necessary.\footnote{NA, KPM (2.20.35), Letter from Board of Directors Amsterdam to Directie KPM Batavia, Amsterdam 27-12-1937.}

The construction plan was never executed. The threat of war compelled the KPM-management in Batavia to take special measures. One of the seven measures taken was to cancel the construction of a new Uniekampong. The imminent war had driven up the prices of building material to a level far higher than projected. The management deemed construction ‘not urgent’ and with some makeshift renovation work the Uniekampong could last for at least another five or six years. The full reconstruction could be postponed ‘until normal times would return’.\footnote{NA, KPM (2.20.35), 1/11/1939 Confidential letter from Dir. Batavia to Amsterdam, 6-12-1939.} The Amsterdam office consented: it pressed Batavia to
continue the improvement of the Uniekampong, but at a slower pace.\textsuperscript{51} The Japanese invasion would put the plans on ice indefinitely.

Although the plans were thus never executed, they are interesting, because they reveal something of the way Dutch entrepreneurs thought about accommodation of labourers. One point worth noting is the growing concern for social and hygienic aspects. Perhaps even more striking is the central, top-down, and paternalistic approach. The letters of the Director explicitly point to the wish to ‘centralize’ matters in the kampong. The Batavia management was overruled by the Amsterdam head office – there is always a bigger boss – which gave precise building instructions.

**The Uniekampong During the Years of Turmoil**

In April 1942, one month after it had overran the Dutch forces and occupied the Netherlands Indies, the Japanese army began to use the Uniekampong as a prisoner-of-war camp for British and Australian soldiers. The Dutch had dismantled the port facilities just before they surrendered and now the British and Australian soldiers were used to do repair work in the harbour and at the airport. Six months later, the camp was expanded by adding the adjacent Kampong Kodja for Dutch prisoners. A total of 5,000 people lived in the barracks in this period. In November 1943 the camp was abandoned, although forced labourers at the General Motors factory might have been housed in the Uniekampong in 1945. Very little is known about the Japanese period and it is unclear what happened with the Indonesian workers in the Uniekampong. The restored harbour facilities in Tanjung Priok served mainly military purposes, and commercial shipping was at a minimum.

After the Japanese surrender in August 1945, Tanjung Priok came under direct control of the British military, before the newly proclaimed, independent Republic of Indonesia could occupy the area. The harbour became the main landing stage for Dutch troops, which hoped to restore Dutch rule in the archipelago and squash the Indonesian Republic. Meanwhile European enterprises tried to re-establish their activities in the Indies, but the volume of trade was still very low. In March 1946 the British military authorities transferred the control of the Uniekampong back to the four shipping companies that had set up the compound.

The Uniekampong had been severely damaged during the Second World War. Most labourers had to sleep in the open air; the fresh water tank fell apart

\textsuperscript{51} NA, KPM (2.20.35), Confidential letters Amsterdam to Batavia 17-11-1939 and 22-12-1939.
through corrosion. In five months twelve pondok for 120 men each were repaired, as well as the housing for Dutch officials, and the central office. One of the former houses was used as a hospital with 40 beds. The sewerage system was renewed and a new water supply installed. In August 1946 a ceremonial meal (slametan) was held to re-inaugurate the Uniekampong. By the end of the year 1946, 2,200 labourers were living in Uniekampong again, together with a large number of women and children. New pondok were under construction.\(^{52}\)

The restoration works were completed in 1947.\(^{53}\)

Perhaps even more important than the physical restoration, was the reconstruction of the social network of dockers. The labourers were brought together by ten mandur that had already worked for the Uniekampong before the war; the three best men were appointed as head mandur. The workers were undernourished and in bad physical condition. They received a daily ration of 500–600 grams of rice, with corned beef or dried fish. Midday food was distributed by the Uniekampong on the dockside.\(^{54}\) In May 1947 the nourishment was improved when the Uniekampong’s new kitchens were finished; according to the annual report better prepared meals resulted in a better physical condition of the workers and their families.\(^{55}\)

The shipping companies pursued an ambivalent policy with respect to the labour relations. On the one hand, the employers tried to restore the colonial hierarchy in the Uniekampong and the system of ‘semi-casual’ labour of binding labourers via their foremen. On the other hand, the companies seized the opportunity to break the strong position of the mandur, for instance by paying wages directly to the workers (Arbeidstoestanden 1949). The Uniekampong was able to attract a flood of new workers, and by September 1947 their number had risen to 4,384 workers, women and children not counted. That year the Uniekampong hired its workers for 112,173 man-days per month, meaning that there was almost full employment.\(^{56}\)

With such a massive influx of workers, it comes as no surprise that few of them had dock experience. The shipping companies complained about the skills of the workers. The KPM noted that mostly starved children and adult men were looking for a job on the docks, ‘in the hope to satisfy their hunger by stealing or robbing a bit’. It was with great relief that the Uniekampong management saw the return of many pre-war inhabitants in August 1947,

\(^{52}\) NA, KPM (2.20.59), Annual report KPM Batavia 1945–1946.
\(^{53}\) NA, KPM (2.20.55) 1948, note 23-8-1948; NA, KPM, 2.20.59, Annual report KPM Batavia 1947.
\(^{54}\) NA, KPM (2.20.59), Annual report KPM Batavia 1945–1946.
\(^{55}\) NA, KPM (2.20.59), Annual report KPM Batavia 1947.
\(^{56}\) NA, KPM (2.20.59), Annual report KPM Batavia 1947.
following the ceasefire of the first Dutch offensive (*politionele actie*) against the Indonesian Republic.\(^{57}\) It seems that many workers had awaited the course of the violent clashes between the Dutch and Indonesian nationalists before returning to Tanjung Priok. Their return was hampered, though, by the fact that the ceasefire line ran between Tanjung Priok and Banten, the area where the majority of dockers originated from. Only after the second Dutch offensive of December 1948 and January 1949 were Tanjung Priok and Banten united in one hand, of the Dutch. Any mention of Republican influence on the workforce is conspicuously absent in the records of the Uniekampong during the whole War of Independence.

As earlier remarks show, already in 1937 a complete overhaul of the Uniekampong was deemed necessary, but the plan was not executed. During the Second World War and the early years of the Revolution, the buildings had become totally worn out. In 1948 shipping companies decided to renovate the Uniekampong completely and this time the plan was executed. Considering the fact that more than 4,000 labourers and their families were living on the premises, the situation was very pressing, and already the same year the decision to renovate was taken, construction of new *pondok* and restoration of existing ones started. By the end of 1949 the Uniekampong renovations were completed, for the sum of 3,600,000 guilders.\(^{58}\)

In the closing months of Dutch rule in the archipelago, the Uniekampong was perceived as the epitome of modernization, far removed from the appalling living conditions of dockers of the beginning of the twentieth century. In 1949, a survey conducted by the Department of Social Affairs spoke highly of the Uniekampong as a model for dock labour, to be followed by other ports of Indonesia. Especially the effort to break the power of the *mandur*, for instance by paying wages directly to the workers, was hailed as a tool of modern employment. The provision of food, drinking water and medical care were also exemplary. Almost 50 per cent of the total dockworker population in Tanjung Priok lived in the Uniekampong at the time, most of them with their families (Arbeidstoestanden 1949).

### The 1950s: Decolonization of the Uniekampong

After the transfer of sovereignty by the Dutch to the Indonesians, in December 1949, the effective decolonization of Indonesia had in many ways yet to begin

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\(^{57}\) NA, KPM (2.20.59), Annual report KPM Batavia 1947: 14, 130–132.

\(^{58}\) NA, KPM (2.20.59), Annual report KPM Batavia 1949: 147.
(Bogaerts and Raben 2007; Lindblad 2008). The inter-island shipping and the KPM, and indirectly the Uniekampong, formed a major bone of contention between Indonesia and the Netherlands, and the matter could not be solved at the Round Table Conference in 1949, which set the terms of the transfer of sovereignty. The KPM and the government of Indonesia opened negotiations in 1950, exploring the possibility of a joint Dutch-Indonesian venture for inter-island shipping. The talks took place in an emotionally charged atmosphere, because the KPM had a strong symbolic meaning for both sides. The Dutch owners still had to come to terms with a bitter defeat and almost desperately tried to safeguard their economic interests; for them it was hard to hand over an emblematic company like the KPM. The Indonesians, for their part, realized the strategic importance of inter-island shipping, the main form of archipelago-wide transport and communications, and an instrument of welding the archipelago into a nation. It was unacceptable this activity was monopolized by a foreign company, let alone a former colonial company (Dick 1987:14–15; Lindblad 2008:115–118). Already in 1950 the Board of the KPM acknowledged it did not have a future in Indonesia, put its investments in the former colony on hold, and shifted its attention to activities outside Indonesia.

The Indonesian authorities also tried to take control of the ports, because these were considered of strategic importance to the economy as well. On the whole, harbour facilities were in poor condition after years of political and military strife. The Indonesian government, lacking financial means, could hardly improve the situation. Newspapers in the early 1950s reported on an endless flow of complaints about the ‘congestion’ in the ports. For want of storage space, goods waiting transportation inland were rotting on the quays.

The waiting time of ships in the ports was exacerbated by the workers’ unrest, not only in notoriously ‘red ports’ like Surabaya and Semarang, but also in smaller harbour towns. Tanjung Priok, that had been mostly unaffected by labour unrest in the past, also became the stage of strikes, sit-downs and other protests in the 1950s. For instance, a big strike paralysed Tanjung Priok in April 1950. The mandur of the Uniekampong demanded several improvements from the director of Uniekampong, but the two sides did not reach an agreement. The combined union of sailors and dockers (Serikat Buruh Kapal dan Pelabuhan) supported the demands and not much later the Uniekampong workers went on strike. The action became all the more effective, because the workers of the second major labour pool on the docks, Trioveer, also went on strike, although for their own reasons. The combined strike became a direct threat to the distribution of food and commodities in the archipelago, and therefore the Ministry of Labour mediated between employers and workers. Only after a strike of nine days the employers gave in: they raised the wage of
the dockers and also agreed to hand out extra rice portions to the families of the labourers. On 13 April 9,000 dockers made a final protest march in Tanjung Priok, before resuming their work again.\textsuperscript{59}

Tensions rose again over the handling of the cargo by Dutch stevedoring and transport companies. The government wished to ‘Indonesianize’ the economy and one of its measures was to transfer cargo activities to Indonesian owned enterprises. In 1954 the Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinet put a ruling – PP 61 – into effect that only Indonesian companies would get permission for stevedoring and cargo handling.

For the KPM and the three other participating shipping companies this ruling was the signal to retract from the Uniekampong. If the shipping companies no longer held the handling of cargo in their own hands, it did not make sense to maintain a labour pool at the Uniekampong. Masjumi, an important Islamic political party, showed interest in buying the Uniekampong, but actually it was only interested in taking over the economic activities, and not the care for the labourers. It was not interested in the physical infrastructure and buildings at the Uniekampong either. The negotiations between the KPM and the Masjumi leadership, including Minister of Finance Wibisono, dragged along. The KPM directors had assessed the assets of the Uniekampong worth eighteen million rupiah, but had already accepted the idea they would not get more than four to five million rupiah. When the Masjumi leaders scented another buyer had unexpectedly entered the arena, they quickly reopened the negotiations with the shipping lines that owned the Uniekampong. The Minister of Finance ultimately offered a price of eight million rupiah, but against a backdrop of mounting political and economic tension between the two countries, the deal was eventually not struck. The KPM main office in Amsterdam had in vain put pressure on the directors in Jakarta to round off the deal.\textsuperscript{60}

In December 1957 Indonesian-Dutch relations reached a low over the status of West Papua. Indonesian labourers occupied the KPM office in Jakarta, the first seizure of Dutch companies with the open backing of the government (Lindblad 2008:180–182). Early 1958 it was clear that the shipping companies had to give up all involvement with the Uniekampong: the KPM had left Indonesia and the activities had been nationalized by the Indonesian state. NV Uniekampong was liquidated: the shipping companies paid compensation to the labourers and had to accept the total loss of the fixed property. The Uniekampong itself moved into Indonesian hands; for a long time to come it continued to be known as ‘Uka’.

\textsuperscript{59} Java Bode 4-4-1950; De Locomotief 14-4-1950.

\textsuperscript{60} NA, KPM (2.20.35) 198, 26-11-1956.
Conclusion

The rapid technological and economic transformations in the late nineteenth century also set in motion the modernization of the labour organization. This process, which was going on both in the Western metropoles and in their colonies, was clearly visible worldwide ‘on the docks’. The industrialization and rationalization of the economic system required a modernization of transport and infrastructure. These required new ways of managing shipping, loading, unloading, and of labour relations. Without a reorganization of the labour system the investments in steam shipping, fixed shipping routes, connecting rail and road links could never pay off.

The major problem troubling dock labour was the use of casual labourers. As circumstances changed and the need for a more stable work force increased, port employers began to realize that, as Weinhauer has noted, the casual way of life of the dockworkers had to be altered fundamentally. This decasualization included the registration of the dockworkers, the centralization of the labour market increasing the productivity of the workers, guaranteeing a weekly or monthly income, and improving the living conditions of the workers (Weinhauer 2000:580–581).

The Uniekampong can be seen as an attempt by the major shipping lines to create a labour pool, a stable and reliable workforce for the port of Tanjung Priok. The Uniekampong offered housing, food, medical care, and a certain level of guaranteed income to the dockers. Both ethical aspirations and economic motives lay behind the idea of establishing a steady labour pool. Along with the changes in the organization of labour, modernization extended to the construction of the complex itself. Better housing, water supplies and sewerage, electricity, paved roads, and a cinema all pulled the dockers into modernity. In 1949 the Uniekampong was hailed a model of a modern complex.

From the perspective of the workers, the Uniekampong formed a break with existing patterns of cyclical migration and labour recruitment. Much to the dismay of the European employers, labourers were not overly enthusiastic about living in the Uniekampong, afraid as they were to sacrifice their relative independence. The contra-cyclical fluctuation in the size of the labour force is telling in this respect. During the boom years of the 1920s, the Uniekampong continually struggled to attract sufficient numbers of labourers, whereas during the Depression of the 1930s more workers sought security in the Uniekampong, just when the shipping companies tried to reduce the labour force. After the Indonesian independence the shipping companies tried to restore their grip on the Uniekampong and even intensified their top-down attempts to control
dock labour. The rise in protests and mass strikes in the 1950s however marked a fundamental change in the workers attitude—obviously influenced by the new political reality in Indonesia. Instead of deserting the premises, labourers strove for better working and living conditions.

In sum, the modernization of shipping elicited a concomitant modernization of labour in the ports. The Uniekampong was one of the strategies devised to achieve these goals, simultaneously changing both the physical structures in the docks and the social life. Many dockers did move to the Uniekampong and adjusted their lifestyle, but they were never fully controlled, and whenever it suited them best, just as easily left the Uniekampong again. After Independence the Dutch shipping companies were step by step forced to give up their top-down attempts of modernizing the labour force.

References


*Verslag van de Commissie ([1927]). Verslag van de Commissie voor het onderzoek naar de oorzaken van de zich in de maand November 1926 in verscheidene gedeelten van de residentie Bantam voorgedaan hebbende ongeregeldheden, ingesteld bij het Gouvernements-besluit van 26 Januari 1926, no ix*. [s.l.: s.n.]


PART 3

Selective Appropriation
Moving at a Different Velocity
The Modernization of Transportation and Social Differentiation in Surabaya in the 1920s

Johny A. Khusyairi and Freek Colombijn

Introduction

Driving through the bustling streets of Surabaya today, or walking along the pavement amid the noise of roaring motorcycles and cars, it is hard to imagine that once upon a time it was people on foot or in a horse-cart that set the pace. Faster forms of urban transportation, like horse trams, electric trams, cars, and bicycles, exerted multiple effects on the city. Roads had to be adjusted to accommodate the more rapid road transportation: a wider carriageway, a hardened surface, and, where possible, curved bends instead of abrupt right angles. Sometimes trees were felled to make room for wider roads or parking bays. The improved means of transportation permitted the well-to-do to live in suburbs, leading to a profound change in urban space itself. Tram and railway lines imposed another transformation on urban space. In Surabaya crossings of road and railway on unequal levels were constructed.

People acquired new habits, as they grew accustomed to the new forms of transportation (Giddens 1990:102). New technologies of transportation (and communication) have overcome physical distance, the ‘time-space compression’ (Harvey 1989), and open up new opportunities of social interaction. Most conspicuously, the rapidity of movement increased and for many people not used to it, this speed was an exciting sensation (Porath 2002:788). The horse tram of Batavia barely affected the velocity of travel, but it did discipline people into thinking in terms of clock time, regular departure schedules, and correct procedures for boarding and alighting (Proudfoot 2005:364). People’s radius of action increased, making it possible to venture beyond one’s own ward on a regular basis. People living in the suburbs with office jobs in the centre began to commute, albeit still within city boundaries (Van Roosmalen, this volume). The soundscape changed, as roaring motors pushed the old sound of azan and church bells into the background (Colombijn 2007). Traffic had to be better regulated to reduce the risk of new kinds of accidents, and new rules were drawn up to this end. Policemen were stationed to regulate the traffic at the busiest crossroads.

Fascinating footage from 1929 gives an image of the changes taking place in Surabaya. One shot shows a pedestrian with a pikulan (carrying-pole) trying to
cross a street, but not succeeding because of the constant flow of cars. Sometimes he ventures a few steps forward off the pavement, but then has to retreat to avoid a car which is hugging the kerb. After more than a minute, he takes a dash and safely reaches the other side of the street. Another shot shows a very busy crossing at Pasar Besar, the majority of the users are either cyclists or car-drivers, but there is still a scattering of horse-drawn carriages and bull-ock carts. In the middle of the crossroads a policeman is standing on a slight elevation, endeavouring to keep some order. People (driving on the left) are supposed to keep the policemen on their right, but some try to take a short cut, see the policeman the last moment and suddenly swerve to the left so as to pass him on the correct side. The flow of traffic is severely hindered by the tram, which every now and then halts in the middle to allow passengers to get in or out. A third scene shows how joined in a coordinated effort up to four policemen try to direct the traffic (Soerabaia 1929). A photograph of thirty-one cars parked in Tunjungan, one of the main thoroughfares in the city, taken around the same year is an equally graphic record of the modernization of the street scene (Broeshart et al. 1994:36).

New forms of transportation were expensive and consequently people's access to them was unequal. The passage of the pedestrian with a pikulan sketched above was hampered by car owners. Even the cost of a tram ticket could be prohibitive and reminded people of their relatively low economic standing (Proudfoot 2005). Trains, trams, and railway stations (including the distinction between the classes of carriage) were a place where it was possible to mark out class differences, or be forced to accept one's inferior position.

Accepting the notion that people did not simply consume transportation, but that transportation also had a productive capacity, it is obvious that unequal access to transportation increased, or reinforced, social inequality. The better off people profited most from positive income effects of new forms of transportation. Again, pre-war (unpublished) footage from Surabaya allows a glimpse of this inequality. This shot shows traffic travelling at different speeds. At Tunjungan private cars dominate the scene almost completely and the speed of the traffic is high. In contrast, in a narrow street a cart with one axle and giant wooden wheels pulled by a zebu slows all the traffic down. A private car does not have the room to overtake the cart and has to adjust its speed to the pace of the zebu. Cyclists, pedestrians, and horse-drawn carriages give the traffic a chaotic appearance and no traffic rules are directly discernible in the images (Nederlands Indië voor 1942 (10) 1939; see also Broeshart et al. 1994:89).

Traffic not only emphasized differences, it also had a democratizing and emancipatory effect. Rudolf Mrázek, who tellingly opens his Engineers of
happy land with a study of roads and traffic, evokes the images in which all passengers on the electric tram in Batavia, regardless of class, were subject to the same rhythm and the same shaking. A committee investigating the use of trains in Java in 1904 discovered to its surprise that the number of passengers in first and second class had risen by 4,000 and 33,000, respectively in the previous three years, but the number of third class passengers had jumped by no fewer than 550,000! The committee also reported its finding that the lower class indigenous people travelled by train more eagerly than the indigenous aristocrats and that they especially appreciated the 50 kg free baggage allowance, allowing them to carry goats, hens, clothes and other goods. As Mrázek observes, the adoption of the train by lower class people contradicted the notion that modernity would trickle down from the European elite, to the masses via the indigenous aristocrats (Mrázek 2002:10–13).

This chapter analyses the degree to which modern transportation accentuated social inequalities. At what rate were new forms of transportation introduced and who profited from them? Who were included and excluded by ‘modernization’? The new traffic, especially the growing differential velocity of movement, caused traffic accidents, and therefore an analysis of who were most often victim of these accidents is also called for. Finally, the new ways the state attempted to discipline the mass movement of modern transportation will be examined.

Throughout this chapter we wish to argue that class difference made more impact on the choice for particular forms of transportation than ethnicity. Our analysis goes against the current, hegemonic historiography that colonial society was foremost, if not exclusively, dominated by ethnic differences, cast in a racial discourse. While, of course, ethnicity was very important and racial discrimination visible in many places, we believe that in some aspects of colonial society, for example housing (Colombijn 2010), a focus on income rather than ethnicity gives more insight in the social dynamics.\(^1\) We believe this is also the case with traffic. Even the best scholars can too easily interpret social differences in ethnic terms, missing out on class. For instance, Howard Dick (2002:350) aptly points out one discriminatory side-effect of the cutting down of trees to widen roads: ‘[t]he shady, peaceful streets of the 1900s gave way to sun-filled streets of wall-to-wall bitumen, far less pleasant for those on foot’, and then continues with: ‘which is to say, the Indonesian population’. Why is going on foot one-to-one associated with Indonesians? Were there no

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\(^1\) Ethnicity remains important as an antecedent variable explaining unequal chances to appropriate a higher income.
Europeans who could not afford a car and had to walk? Or took a stroll because they liked it? How about the Indonesians who passed through the ‘wall-to-wall bitumen’ roads in their own car? The contention of this chapter is that financial means rather than ‘racial’ categories were the deciding factor in people’s actual choice in their mode of transport.

Constraints imposed by space and available data means that one other social dimension, which was probably as important as income, has had to be skipped. The use of modern means of transportation was gendered. Men had more access to the new means of transportation than women and consequently profited more from the modernization.2

Surabaya in the 1920s is an excellent case to study urban traffic. As the capital city of the province of East Java it was the second largest city of the Netherlands Indies at the time, and offered a great variety of forms of transportation. The city was also very well connected to destinations farther away by its port, railway, and airfield. The 1920s formed an optimistic decade between the economic disturbances of the First World War and the Depression.

Private Means of Transportation

The first major road construction undertaken by the colonial state was the notorious Grote Postweg (Great Post Road). By 1890 the intercity road network in Java already covered a fair area and after this period more investments were made in improving the surface (asphalting was introduced in the 1920s) rather than any in further extension of the network (Knaap 1989:26–27; Nas and Pratiwo 2002).

The roads in Java (at least between cities) were built by the indigenous people, who were obliged by law to work a certain number of days per year on the roads. In 1914–1916 forced labour was abolished and replaced by a poll tax on the indigenous people (Knaap 1989:27). The forced labour was actually a form of double discrimination: the roads were built with the input of the indigenous people, while non-indigenous people, who enjoyed higher incomes on average, had more opportunity to buy the vehicles to travel on the roads. A motor vehicle tax was only introduced in 1928 and later replaced by a heavy excise duty on petrol (Knaap 1989:27). Indigenous people who wanted to be exempted from forced labour on the roads could pay so-called rodigelden, at least in Padang (West Sumatra). By the early twentieth century the rodigelden had become a regular tax on the indigenous population, used for road construction, none of

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2 Age is another factor that influenced chances to use particular forms of traffic, but this point is perhaps so obvious it is unnecessary to be spelled out.
whom then still laboured on roads. The humiliating *rodigelden* were finally halved in 1937 when more progressive European members of the municipal council sided with their indigenous colleagues, but they were still not abolished before the Second World War (Colombijn 1994:93–101).

The potential of roads was, of course, enormously expanded with the introduction of cars and bicycles. The motorcar made its appearance in Java in 1894, two years earlier than in either Singapore or the Netherlands. It was a Benz, owned by Susuhunan Pakubuwana X. In 1900 there were fifteen motor vehicles (including motorcycles) in Java, ten years later the number of registered vehicles had risen steeply to around 1,000. By then cars were mass-produced, but their precarious reliability combined with a lack of passable roads still confined their use largely to cities. The number of motorized vehicles peaked at 104,000 in 1929: 68,000 cars, 16,000 trucks, 15,000 motorcycles and 6,000 buses (Dick and Rimmer 2003:66; Knaap 1989:28, 85). Traffic counts in Buitenzorg (Bogor) in 1920–1921 and again in 1928 also show a spectacular increase in the share of cars in the traffic (Van Roosmalen 2008:139).

Howard Dick (2002:349) provides figures pertaining to the introduction of the car in Surabaya. The first automobile arrived in 1890. By 1911 about 500 cars had been registered, by 1920 this number had risen to 2,000 and in 1939 there were 6,657 cars, including 466 taxis. Another source records that there were over 3,400 registered cars in 1927 (SBS 1928). While registered car ownership for the whole of Java and of the Netherlands Indies peaked in 1929 and never fully recovered from the economic crisis (Knaap 1989:85), the Depression did not have a similarly lasting effect on car ownership in Surabaya. By the end of the 1930s, the impact of the Depression on car ownership in Surabaya had totally vanished. Why this happened is not certain. East Java, the sugar industry in particular, certainly suffered in the economic malaise and intuitively, but apparently erroneously, we had expected that the car ownership in Surabaya would have reflected the downturn in the fortunes of the rural hinterland.

The numbers of bicycles in Surabaya also showed a rapid increase, doubling per decade: from 9,000 in 1917, to 18,000 in 1925, to 36,000 in 1937. In this case, it is easier to explain why the use of bicycles continued to increase during the Depression: cheap Japanese imports offset declining wages. Third-class passengers on the tram swapped the tram for a bicycle (Dick 2002:349). However, a report carefully compiled by the local Office of Statistics shows that bicycles were already by far the most popular means of transportation before the Depression (Table 10.1).³

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³ *Kosong, keretek* and *dokar* were horse-drawn carts. *Dokar* were used for the transportation of persons and *keretek* perhaps too; a *kosong*, presumably was used for goods.
Howard Dick (2002: 349) writes ‘60 percent of private motor vehicles’, but from the context it can be gathered that he refers to cars only and not to motorcycles.

Ownership of the various means of transportation was unequally divided. Dick (2002:349) states that the bicycle was particularly important to indigenous people, who were finding some new employment at the urban fringes: in the port and at the naval base in the north and on the Ngagel industrial estate in the south. However, it can be assumed that the use of bicycles was also common among the Dutch, who were used to this vehicle in Europe.

More details are known about the relationship between ownership of cars and ethnicity. Of the registered vehicles in Java, 34 per cent were owned by Europeans, 28 per cent by indigenous people, 24 per cent by non-indigenous Asians (Vreemde Oosterlingen), and the remainder either by companies or the government (Knaap 1989:28, 85). This disproportionate share of the Europeans and non-indigenous Asians reflects their over-representation in the higher income groups. Compared to the whole of Java, car ownership in Surabaya was even more skewed, as Europeans owned 60 per of the private cars. Assuming an average family size of five, Howard Dick states that by 1939 on average there was almost one car for every European family, one for every five Chinese or Arab families, and one for every 30,000 indigenous families (Dick 2002:349).

Dick’s calculations are a little hard to swallow. If one in every 30,000 indigenous families had a car, that would make one car per 150,000 Indonesians, or two or three cars for the entire indigenous population of Surabaya, which cannot be correct. It is also unlikely that on average there was almost one car for

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**Table 10.1** Number of registered vehicles in Surabaya in 1927

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kind of vehicle</th>
<th>Number of vehicles</th>
<th>Number of vehicles per 1,000 persons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Private cars</td>
<td>3,435</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buses</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trucks</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motorcycles</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bicycles</td>
<td>22,360</td>
<td>88.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosong</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dokar &amp; keretek</td>
<td>1,952</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pushcarts</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SBS (1928); population figures as of 1 January 1928 from the same report have been used for the calculation of the last column.

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Howard Dick (2002: 349) writes ‘60 percent of private motor vehicles’, but from the context it can be gathered that he refers to cars only and not to motorcycles.
every European family, as obviously many European families belonged to the lower income groups and could not afford a car. Should it therefore be assumed that quite a few other European families owned two cars or more?\footnote{ Trusting that Dick did not make an error in his calculation and that his raw data compelled him to make his claims about unequal car ownership, some doubts can be raised about the reliability or validity of his original data.}

Although Dick’s estimate of the degree to which Europeans were over-represented as car owners can be questioned and by and large it can be assumed that ethnic status is too readily equated with a particular income group (Colombijn 2010:96–97), it is obvious that cars were still accessible to only a small proportion of the people. There were fewer than fourteen cars per 1,000 residents in 1927 (Table 10.1). If it is assumed, rather arbitrarily, that in the course of the year each car was used by six different people, only one in twelve residents would have had a personal experience of sitting in a car (and far fewer would have enjoyed the experience of driving a car). Cars were within the reach of only a thin upper layer of the total population and the spread of motorized vehicles therefore increased the difference between people who had the financial means to consume new forms of modernity and those who did not. The most important modern means of private transport was still the bicycle, not the car.

**Public Transportation**

When people did not have the means to purchase a vehicle themselves, they could still experience modern means of transportation by taking public transport. The first railway from Surabaya went to Pasuruan and was opened in 1878, with a branch to Malang inaugurated the following year. More regional railways were opened later and, by 1894 or 1899 (sources disagree on the year), it became possible to travel by train from Surabaya to Jakarta (via Yogyakarta and Bandung). Two companies, the Staatsspoorwegen (State Railways) and Nederlands-Indische Spoorwegmaatschappij (NIS, Netherlands Indies Railway Company), exploited the railways around Surabaya. They each ran different, mutually detached stations (Staatsspoorwegen the Gubeng and Kota stations, and NIS Pasar Turi) and debates about connecting the lines at one new station proved fruitless. Taxis and horse-drawn carriages (dokar) profited from the fact that there were two main railway stations (Kota and Pasar Turi) and many passengers needed a vehicle to cross the one kilometre separating the stations to continue their journey by train. The companies engaged in fierce competition
on the westbound lines, until they agreed on a division of freight and passengers in 1926. Further cooperation was forced upon them when a regular air link was established between Batavia and Surabaya in 1929. In a successful attempt to meet the challenge of air transport, the railways managed to set up a jointly operated rail connection between Surabaya and the capital of the colony, which ran the 900 km in one day offering luxurious carriages (Broeshart et al. 1994:27; Dick 2002:420–422; von Faber 1936:274; Knaap 1989:29).

In urban life, trams played a bigger role than interregional railways. Trams were introduced into Surabaya between 1889 and 1891 (the exact year differs from source to source). These trams were operated by the Oost-Java Stoomtram Maatschappij (OJS, East Java Steam Tramway Company). It is not certain whether these first trams in Surabaya were steam trams, or trams that loaded steam at fixed points. Between 1913 and 1916, a new steam tramline was built skirting the city centre along its west side. In 1923 and 1924, the OJS opened four new electric tramlines, running from Wonokromo in the south to the port of Tanjung Perak in the north. As this line was a double track, an enormous advantage over the steam tram, trams could always pass each other and could operate far more frequently, running at least one every ten minutes. An additional advantage of this high frequency was that the tram could be shorter (and yet serve the same total number of passengers) and caused less disruption to the other traffic (Von Faber 1936:276–280; Dick 2002:260, 348; Dick and Rimmer 2003:68; Knaap 1989:29). From maps from the late 1930s (Atlas 1938:23a; Van Diessen and Voskuil 1998:116–123) and common parlance (Von Faber 1936:275), we can infer that by then at least, the NIS trains were functioning as an urban steam tram system for the section within the city boundaries.

Both the steam and electric trams played an important role in transportation. In 1927, 11.4 million passengers used the electric tram (an average of 45 trips per urban resident in a year!) and 5.2 million passengers the steam tram (an average of 21 trips per person) (SBS 1928). Photographs testify to the fact that the tram had become a regular and important part of the street scene in Surabaya in the 1920s (Broeshart et al. 1994). Dick and Rimmer (2003:68, 70) call attention to the fact that the electric tram seemed to be an enormous improvement compared to either its horse or steam counterpart: no more piles of horse manure or belching smoke. The overhead electricity cables were an eyesore to progressive urban planners (Karsten 1939), but perhaps not to the general public.

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6 Unfortunately, there seems to be a typo in the statistical report, which says that 52,237 passengers took the steam tram; from the revenues (in guilders and cents) mentioned a line below in the report we can infer that the digits were wrongly placed; the figure of 5.2 million passengers agrees with the revenues of that year.
Different kinds of passengers used the two types of trams. The steam tram connected the port area, to the rural hinterland of Surabaya, circumventing the city centre, running through the kampongs on the western side of the city and inner-city neighbourhoods around Pasar Turi station. In contrast, the main electric tram line, although also starting in the port area, cut straight through the city centre: passing in front of the governor's office, and carrying on through the main business and shopping streets, Pasar Besar and Tunjungan. It subsequently took a route through the most chic streets of the city, Palmenlaan and Darmo Boulevard, to its terminus in the south of the city near the zoo. A shorter east–west line served new residential areas of the city, which were connected to the shopping area around Tunjungan (Atlas 1938:23a; Van Diessen and Voskuil 1998:116–123).

These routes suggest that probably the steam tram predominantly served the lower income groups of the population, whereas the electric trams tended to cater to middle and upper class people. Furthermore, six commuter trains carrying market traders also arrived at Pasar Turi every morning. Depending on their place of departure and the specific goods brought into Surabaya from those places, the trains were nicknamed 'grass train', 'palm-wine train', 'chicken train', and so on. Coolies working in the port area and the factories also helped to contribute to the daily bustle at Pasar Turi (Von Faber 1936:273). Although it is perhaps merely a historical conjuncture and not a causal relationship that the construction of new middle class suburbs coincided with the emergence of the electric tram, the fact remains that the more well-to-do-residents used the more modern form of public transport.

The association of the steam tram with lower income people and the electric tram with those with higher incomes was definitely not absolute. In 1925, overly conscious of their social standing, first class steam tram passengers complained there were not enough carriages and they had to stand in the first class carriages. From the point of view of comfort it was not ideal, the first class was positioned directly behind the locomotive, so they suffered from the smoke. The first class passengers asked for more carriages and demanded the third-class carriages be positioned directly behind the locomotive (Pewarta Soerabaia 8-1-1925).

The contention of this chapter is that financial means rather than 'racial' categories were the deciding factor in people's actual choice in their mode of transport, but ethnic sensitivities definitely did play a role in the question of which means of transportation was deemed appropriate. Even though they might hold themselves aloof from interaction in the tramcar, the public was ethnically mixed, people sat side by side, on the same level, on the same benches. In 1870, discussing the possibility of starting a tram in Surabaya, the
editor of a Dutch newspaper commented that people should be aware of the unseemliness of a white lady sitting next to a coolie. It would also be galling if a coolie on a tram were to overtake a white man struggling by on foot (Proudfoot 2005:138–152).

The competition between steam tram, electric tram, bus, and taxi was a common phenomenon throughout Southeast Asian cities (Dick and Rimmer 2003:70), and Surabaya formed no exception. In 1924, the OJS also began to operate buses to those inner-city neighbourhoods where investment in the construction of tramlines was not warranted, but the service was not profitable and was discontinued the next year. In 1927 a new private company started a bus service running parallel to the steam tramway and in 1929 another company began to operate a bus line duplicating the route of the electric tramway. To counter this competition, the OJS felt compelled to operate buses on the same route, which competed not only with the other company, but also with its own electric trams. A price war was the result. In an attempt to economize, the maintenance of the buses was neglected. After one year the private bus company threw in the towel. In 1931 the council approved a bylaw, which gave the OJS the preferential right to exploit bus lines. The rationale of the bylaw was primarily to protect the profitability of the electric tram, which was considered to be in the public interest, but it was also to eliminate the existence of dangerously ill-maintained buses. The municipal bylaw gave the OJS a de facto monopoly on bus transportation. In 1931, the OJS operated regular buses to six destinations in the city (Von Faber 1936:283–286).

Taxis reveal a very similar story of stiff competition, cannibalistic economic behaviour, and municipal qualms about the quandary of allowing a liberal market and low prices versus regulating the market to ensure minimal safety standards. About 400 taxis were operating in Surabaya in 1925 and the number more than doubled to 843 registered taxis in 1929. Of these taxis 56 per cent were owned by Chinese, 22 per cent by indigenous people, 16 per cent by Europeans and 7 per cent by Arabs. An overwhelming majority (95 per cent) of the drivers was indigenous (SBS 1929; Soerabaiasch Handelsblad 4-3-1930).

It is tempting to interpret the over-representation of Chinese taxi owners as confirmation of their proverbial proclivity for business. Conversely, an equally plausible explanation of this over-representation lies in a miscalculation of the economic conjuncture by Chinese car owners. The taxi business in Surabaya was boosted by the economic slump directly following on the hausse after the First World War. The war had disrupted trade between Indonesia and continental Europe and suspended demand was rapidly fulfilled in the period 1919–1921. When most needs had been satisfied, the mood changed again and both importers and exporters were stuck with unmarketable stock. Many people
who had optimistically purchased a car during the high conjuncture had to sell it and reverted to using taxis. Other car owners began to operate their private vehicle as a taxi to recover the costs (Von Faber 1936:281). It is possible that many of the Chinese taxi operators of the 1920s were traders who had incurred economic losses in 1922–1923.

In any case, the fierce competition resulted in diminishing profit margins. Taxi drivers had refused a municipal proposal to install taximeters in 1920, preferring to bargain for the fare (Pewarta Soerabaiaia 6-11-1920). This freedom to bargain backfired on the taxi operators when people who operated taxis as a part-time business especially accepted very low taxi fares in the customer market. The professional taxi operators, organized in the Soerabaiaschen Bond van Autoverhuurders (Sobova, Surabaya Association of Car Rental Firms) asked the municipal administration to restrict competition in 1922 and again in 1924. On both occasions, the council rejected this submission, giving priority to the interests of the customer (who included, of course, the councillors themselves). A first municipal bylaw on taxis in 1925 regulated the inspection of taxis and the fares they could charge and the testing of drivers, but only for registered taxi companies. This regulation actually disadvantaged regular companies in their competition with wild taxi-drivers. In 1926, a revised bylaw was imposed on all taxis and to some degree at least controlled the rowdy driving styles and ill-maintained cars of many wild taxis. Municipal attempts to set fares continued to be ineffectual because both drivers and customers ignored the municipal decrees. During the Depression, the regular taxi firms again faced stiff competition from wild taxis, which undersold trips (Von Faber 1936:281–282).

To complete this overview of public transportation, the least commonly accessible but yet the most modern form of transportation was flying. Surabaya was the scene of the first successful flight in Indonesia, in 1911. As already briefly hinted, in 1929 the Koninklijke Nederlandsch-Indische Luchtvaart Maatschappij (KNILM, Royal Netherlands Indies Airlines) established a regular service between Surabaya, Batavia, Bandung and Semarang. The airfield was moved several times. Between 1938 and 1940, a modern airfield (with an air traffic control tower, arrival and departure lounges, and two runways at right angles to each other) was finally built at the north-western end of the city (Broeshart et al. 1994:27; Van Diessen & Voskuil 1998:116; Knaap 1989:31).

7 Rudolf Mrázek (2002: 243) reports in a footnote that another taxi drivers' union, B.A.T.O.J.A., was established in 1928, which united both indigenous and Chinese drivers. It is worth noting that a shared professional interest overcame ethnic differences.
Traffic Accidents

The introduction of new mechanical forms of transport inevitably led to many accidents. From the vantage point of current knowledge about traffic safety, the greatest cause of traffic accidents was the variation in the speed of the disparate vehicles. The different velocity is, as already mentioned, abundantly clear in the old films. The old footage we have studied already abound in cases of near accidents. Pedestrians crossing a street choked with cars were especially at risk. Often the person on foot ran across the street, only just managing to avoid a fast approaching car (Soerabaia 1929). Apparently, pedestrians still found it difficult to assess the speed of the approaching motorized vehicle properly.

The urban administration issued three-monthly reports about the number of traffic accidents, but unfortunately not all of them could be traced, but a summary report for 1927 has survived (Table 10.2). The incidence of reported accidents rose rapidly from 1,384 in 1927 to 2,048 the next year, and 2,349 in 1929. The number declined again to 1,922 in 1930 (SBS 1931:5). The Municipal Statistical Office attributed the declining number of accidents to the installation of traffic lights and the setting up of driving schools (SBS 1931:3, 15), but it is also conceivable that the fall was positively influenced by the declining use of motorized vehicles in the Depression.

The number of people killed or injured correlated with the number of accidents: from 316 in 1927, the figure rose to 536 in 1929, and dropped to 533 in 1930 (Tables 10.2 and 10.3). It is intriguing that Europeans were over-represented in the number of victims and Chinese under-represented (Table 10.3). This difference is tricky to interpret. Perhaps Europeans made more use of modern means of transportation and consequently ran a higher risk of being involved

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kind of damage</th>
<th>Number of accidents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lethal accident (met doodelijken afloop)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seriously injured (zwaar lichamelijk letsel)</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slightly injured (licht lichamelijk letsel)</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material damage only (alleen materiële schade)</td>
<td>1,068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,384</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SBS (1928)
in accidents? Perhaps on average, because of an unwarranted sense of superiority, Europeans were more reckless drivers? It is also conceivable that European victims were more dutifully registered, whereas Chinese tried to avoid being included in any registration. The reason is a mystery.

The traffic accidents created a demand for ambulances. The appearance of this specialized vehicle was both a response to the modernization of the city and a sign of its modernity. When exactly the ambulance was introduced into Surabaya is not known, but the actual number must have been small, because when just one had to be repaired, its absence was immediately felt in the city. A local newspaper backed the call for more ambulances, printing the story of how an accident victim died in the street, because bystanders had waited three hours in vain for an ambulance (Pewarta Soerabaia 2-12-1920, 3-12-1920). It was not uncommon, however, for ordinary vehicles, including horse-carriages, to transport the injured victims of traffic accidents to hospital (Pewarta Soerabaia 5-2-1925).

A comparison of the news reported in the Soerabaiasch Handelsblad and Pewarta Soerabaia shows how different layers of the population diverged in their thoughts about the modernization of the traffic. Given the fact that literacy was not yet general and that both newspapers served the middle class or elite, the Dutch language used in the Soerabaiasch Handelsblad restricted its readership to Dutch people and upper-layers of the non-Dutch middle class. Pewarta Soerabaia was Chinese-owned and the majority of its readers were probably found among this ethnic group and among lower middle class people of mixed background. Three monthly samples of both newspapers were taken from the years 1920, 1925 and 1930.

The Soerabaiasch Handelsblad protected the anonymity of the European citizens. Both the European responsible for an accident and the victims were

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Indigenous</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>Other Asians</th>
<th>Europeans</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 1928–1930</td>
<td>1,254</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>1,520</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Share in accidents, 1928–1930</th>
<th>Share in population, 1930</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>82.5</td>
<td>79.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 1928–1930</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SBS (1930:15); SBS (1931:15); Volkstelling 1930 (1936:2, 78–81).
designated Mr, Mrs or Miss (de heer, mevrouw, mejuffrouw) followed by their initials. Such a precaution was not deemed necessary if Chinese persons were involved; their full name was usually given, without the honorific Mr, Mrs, or Miss. The indigenous persons involved in accidents were faceless and described anonymously as ‘an indigenous woman’.8

Pewarta Soerabaia carried more frequent reports of traffic accidents, gave more details, and its discourse leaned more towards how problematic modern traffic could be for the ordinary citizen. Although it also used initials or such designations as bumiputera (indigenous), at least after 1925 it usually gave full names: ‘driven by Haji Abdoelrahman’, ‘Wagimin, a car-driver’, ‘a child of Mr Von Elgg’, ‘J.P. van der Wal on a bicycle’.9

Not surprisingly, most accidents were caused by driving errors (Table 10.4). According to the Soerabaïasch Handelsblad (2-3-1920), speeding was the most important cause of accidents. This conclusion was, however, as much a moral judgement as a factual conclusion. The head-on collision between two cars, the incident that led the newspaper to draw this conclusion, happened at 5.30 a.m. and the dawning light might have interfered with the driver’s vision. What was worse, one of the cars was driving on the wrong side of the road.

The bulk of the vehicles involved in accidents were private cars and carts drawn by animals, either horse-drawn carriages or ox-carts. Pedestrians and cyclists, who made up a larger share of the traffic, were far less accident-prone

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**TABLE 10.4 Causes of traffic accidents in Surabaya, 1928–1930**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cause</th>
<th>1928</th>
<th>1929</th>
<th>1930</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Driving errors made by the driver of vehicle</td>
<td>1,832</td>
<td>2,109</td>
<td>1,619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Errors by pedestrian</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skids, technical defects of the vehicle, uncontrolled horses</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other and unknown causes</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,049</td>
<td>2,349</td>
<td>1,842</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SBS (1930:17); SBS (1931:17).

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8 Soerabaïasch Handelsblad 7-2-1920, 1-3-1920, 2-3-1920, 13-2-1925, 18-2-1925, 12-3-1925, 5-3-1930, 11-3-1930, 12-3-1930.
A contributory cause of the fact that cars and carriages were involved in accidents was the difference in their speeds. Many accidents described in the newspapers involved vehicles with a different velocity. For instance, a car approached a dokar from behind at such a speed that impact was inevitable. The dokar was flung aside by the impact and the female passenger was wounded on her knee and in her mouth (Soerabaiasch Handelsblad 19-3-1927). In another incident, a car driver, ‘who did not seem very skilled yet’ (jang rupanja belon begito pandei djalankan) collided with two horse-drawn carriages (a dokar and a kosong) in one crash (Pewarta Soerabaia 7-2-1920). In yet another accident, a car driver hit a pushcart when he attempted to overtake a pedestrian. He was driving too fast and failed to take into account the width of the cart and the narrowness of the road at that point (Pewarta Soerabaia 4-3-1930). The last example concerns a kosong making a turn. The driver made a warning indication with his whip before he began the manoeuvre. A car that was about to overtake him drove at such speed that impact seemed unavoidable. The driver still tried to control his horse, but in vain. The car crashed into the kosong, which was launched into the air by the impact (Pewarta Soerabaia 10-12-1920).

Although in all these examples the car-driver seemed to be largely to blame for the accident, the Soerabaiasch Handelsblad (2-3-1920) was of the opinion that driving a carriage is more difficult than driving a car. Cars were machines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 10.5</th>
<th>Vehicles and pedestrians involved in accidents in Surabaya, 1928–1930</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number (%)</td>
<td>Number (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private cars</td>
<td>1,746 (43.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animal drawn carts</td>
<td>856 (21.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bicycles</td>
<td>622 (15.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pedestrians</td>
<td>256 (6.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trucks</td>
<td>125 (3.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trams</td>
<td>186 (4.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motorcycles</td>
<td>131 (3.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>buses</td>
<td>54 (1.4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The number of pedestrians includes people pushing a barrow and people disembarking a tram. SOURCE: SBS (1930:17); SBS (1931:17).
and therefore easier to control. Horses, on the other hand, could become nervous and difficult to control. Nevertheless, in reality uncontrollable horses did not pose a serious threat (Table 10.4).

The unwillingness to take responsibility for accidents complicated the disciplining of traffic users. A coachman, for instance, ran down a woman pedestrian with his carriage and fled. The woman died in the street, but the driver did not manage to escape, as a telegraph officer who witnessed the accident ran after him and caught him (Pewarta Soerabaia 8-1-1925). In the case of the car crashing into the kosong about to make a turn, the chauffeur began to stop his car to check on the victim. A white person sitting in the car, presumably the owner of the car, shouted at the chauffeur to drive on. Subsequently, the chauffeur left the kosong behind unattended. The newspaper concluded bitterly:

> It is only to be hoped that tomorrow or the day after, people who are so cold-hearted and inconsiderate will meet an even crueler retribution, because for people like them no punishment is more severe than that meted out by God.10

### Regulating Modern Traffic

The accidents and the introduction of more up-to-date means of transportation demanded new regulations to govern the modern traffic. Traffic regulations had existed in Surabaya since at least 1888. The Resident of Surabaya issued traffic rules to be used on main roads and for the use of vehicles or horses, their purpose being to keep the roads clean and the traffic running smoothly. Animals had to be well trained and drivers had to prevent the horse soiling on the street, keep an eye on their animal, and use their whip to give signs when they wanted to overtake another carriage or make a turn (Resident Soerabaia 1889). The rule that a driver keep an eye on his animal suggests that at the time such care could not yet be taken for granted and the driver could get around while dozing on the box.

Such carelessness was clearly no longer possible when motorcars appeared on the scene. The newspapers often attributed accidents to a lack of skill, and this dearth was attributed to the fact that many car-drivers did not

---

10 ‘Tetapi diharep sadja soepaia besok atau loesa, orang-orang jang begitoe kedjem dan jang tiada mempoenjain perasa’an manoesia, bisa dapanen pembalesan jang lebih hebat, sebab orang-orang demikian itoe, tiada mempoenjain lain hoekoeman jang lebih berat daripada hoekoemannya Allah’ (Pewarta Soerabaia 8-1-1925).
have a driving licence. The need to issue driving licences as a means to ban incompetent drivers from the streets was debated in the newspapers. Should people driving buses and trucks be required to hold a separate licence? Should drivers not be subject to a psychological test as well – in itself a conspicuous sign of modernization! – as were the engine-drivers on French trains, in order to discover whether they showed an inclination to speed? Berlin was mentioned as an example of a city where drivers not only had to perform the basic functions required to drive the car at the test, but were also obliged to take a course of at least six lessons, in which they were taught the traffic regulations (*Pewarta Soerabaia* 2-3-1920, 10-2-1930; *Soerabaiaisch Handelsblad* 2-3-1920, 14-2-1930).

The newspapers, and perhaps the general public too, demanded that the state play its part in improving the driving skills of the chauffeurs. The state itself also gradually became convinced that it had to play a bigger role in regulating the traffic. In other words, the new technology forced the state to modernize itself. The problem was that most contemporary policemen did not know how to drive a car themselves and therefore could neither give a driving test, nor issue a driving licence. As a reporter from *Pewarta Soerabaia* (15-12-1920) remarked: ‘The police does not understand how a car is driven’¹¹ and therefore he thought it was a change for the better that, as of December 1920, the responsibility for issuing licences was taken away from the police. Henceforward driving licences were issued by a commission led by two managers of a taxi company, Cobbe and De Hoog. In contrast to the police, they were able to prove they were competent to drive a car. Perhaps this solution made sense, because Cobbe and De Hoog possessed the authority an ordinary policemen lacked. The solution was definitely not only in the interest of the road-users at large, it was of great assistance to the taxi company. The owners could earn extra income from issuing licences and they were handed the means to protect their business on a plate by helping their own drivers to get a licence, and perhaps to keep others out of the business.

In 1920 the city police department proposed that the municipal council install simple signs with ‘Stop’ and ‘Go’ (*vrij*) at every junction to lighten the work of the traffic police. The council accepted the idea, but policemen still had to be present to work the signs. The municipal council was also open to other ideas from the police department, namely a speed limit and a scheme to prevent the overcrowding of narrow streets (*Pewarta Soerabaia* 29-10-1920; Van Diessen 2004:134, 148). The editor of *Pewarta Soerabaia* was dissatisfied, as he thought the new measures did not go far enough. The newspaper launched a

¹¹ ‘[P]olitie toch tiada mengerti djalannya motor’.
debate about the trucks that obstructed the flow of traffic, especially when they were loading and unloading. The newspaper asked for a regulation banning trucks from narrow streets and regulating their loading and unloading (Pewarta Soerabaia 1-11-1920).

As stated, the different speed of motorized vehicles and horse-drawn carriages posed a risk, and the passage of the tram along public roads also created problems. In 1925 all vehicles were prohibited to stop on the tramlines (Pewarta Soerabaia 20-1-1925, 17-2-1925), but the editor of Pewarta Soerabaia remarked that this prohibition unjustly put the blame for the problems on other road users. ‘Sooner or later the tram will claim lives, because when it comes from Kepatian and crosses Tambakbajan Street it neither rings its bell nor reduces its speed’ (Pewarta Soerabaia 30-1-1925).[^12] The tramlines were also subjected to another regulation, not related to the traffic safety. This regulation prohibited horse-drawn carriages and taxis to wait for passengers in front of the railway station. Now that railway passengers had to walk longer distances to find a taxi or carriage, more often than not they preferred the tram that stopped in front of the station. Cogently, this regulation was issued at a time the tram company had lost its competition with the taxis (Pewarta Soerabaia 9-2-1925). The direction the modernization of traffic took was inextricably connected to particular interests.

### Conclusion

Modern transportation was the outcome of technology-driven modernization, but simultaneously stimulated the wider modernization of society. The spread of tramlines, motorcars and bicycles elicited the need for other inventions like traffic lights, ambulances, strict timetables, as well as the rationalization and standardization of traffic rules. Hence, the urban landscape was profoundly changed in various ways, not just restricted to the appearance of the cities but also inevitably affecting the behaviour of their inhabitants. In the words of Alexandre Freire (2009), the new means of transportation were ‘consumption icons of a social transformation’. These transformations occurred very rapidly in Surabaya in the 1920s and outmoded forms of transportation gradually became obsolete. By 1940 it was recognized that ox-carts slowed down the flow of traffic and therefore posed a dangerous threat. New traffic rules made

[^12]: ‘Ini tram besok atawa loesa aken mengambil korban djiwa manoesia, sebab apabila djalan di Kepatian lwatin straat Tambakbajan, tida maoe kasi bel atawa djoege tida maoe koe-rangin djalannja’.

The modernization of transportation in Surabaya (Soerabaiasch-Handelsblad 7-3-1940).

The benefits of new forms of transportation were not distributed evenly. The choice of public or private transportation and the form this public transportation could take (steam tram, electric tram, taxi) or private transportation (car or bicycle) was to a considerable degree influenced by income. Conversely, the means of transportation determined the mobility of a person and a concomitant lifestyle and chances to appropriate a certain income. There was a strong association between income on the one hand and range and speed of movement on the other. In short, the mobilization of the transportation reinforced social inequality.

However, even though people from different social classes were obliged to move at different velocities, they definitely all seized the opportunities offered by the new means of transportation. Lower-income people did not lag behind their well-to-do counterparts in this respect. It is therefore important to bear in mind that the modernization of transportation also emancipated lower-income people. They had fewer opportunities to use modern means of transportation than rich people, but this did not prevent them increasing their mobility and pace of life by recourse to the new means of transportation. Rich and poor moved at different velocities, but they all did this in the highest gear.

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The Two *alun-alun* of Malang (1930–1960)

Purnawan Basundoro

**Introduction**

Arguably the most prominent characteristic of a typical town in Java is the presence of an *alun-alun* or town square. In general an *alun-alun* is a large open space; ordinary citizens often think of it as a field in the centre of the town. In some cities the *alun-alun* takes the form of a square studded with shady trees. An *alun-alun* is usually imagined as the core of the Javanese town, in part because it typically forms the ‘heart’ of a whole network of streets. But more significantly, the *alun-alun* carries symbolic significance because, traditionally, it was located directly in front of the palace (*kraton*), or regional *kabupaten*, the traditional seats of Javanese power. The traditional model on which all such *alun-alun* drew and in terms of which they were imagined was the Kraton of Yogyakarta. This was located on an imaginary line, which connected the Southern Ocean, the southern *alun-alun*, the palace itself, the northern *alun-alun*, and Mount Merapi on a north–south axis.

In the traditional configuration, on one side of an *alun-alun* would stand the royal audience hall (*sitihinggil*) or the residence of the Regent (*kabupaten*). If we were to compare the palace or the residence of the *bupati* to a private house, the *alun-alun* would be its front and sometimes also its back yard. The discussion of the role of the *alun-alun* in the development of Javanese cities is, therefore, very important, because it formed the centre from which the development of a town was initiated.

People’s views of the *alun-alun* are many and various. Traditionally a banyan tree planted on the *alun-alun* was associated with mystical powers, as for instance the two banyan trees exactly in the centre of the *alun-alun* in Yogyakarta and Surakarta. When one of the banyan trees in the middle of the *alun-alun* of Yogyakarta collapsed in 1989, many people grew anxious and interpreted the falling of the tree as an ominous sign. Shortly afterwards the ruler of Yogyakarta, Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX, died and his death reinforced the belief of many people in the magical properties of the tree.

Among modern people, whose historical appreciation of the Javanese town may not be very strong, an *alun-alun* may simply be understood as a public space which can be used as a playground, as a place for dating, practising sports, selling things, even for herding cattle or as a place for conducting ceremonies on such special days, such as the celebration of Indonesian
Independence. For Muslim citizens, it can also be the large space needed to hold Eid prayers, such as those observed at the end of the Ramadan.

A glimpse back in history shows that the *alun-alun* is definitely not just an empty space, which can be used for various profane activities. At certain periods in the past, it has been a potent symbol pregnant with meaning. The most general and powerful significance associated with the *alun-alun* has been as a formal space closely related to official (royal) ceremonies, a function which it developed during the periods of traditional kingdoms. There is also evidence that the *alun-alun* has had spiritual meaning. This connection with royal spiritual power is drawn from the physical proximity of the *alun-alun* to the residence of a ruler. Even in the Muslim state of Mataram – in contravention of the strict monotheism of Islam – the *alun-alun* was one of the elements used in the cult of the glorification of the king (Moertono 1985:84).

The *alun-alun* has also been a meeting ground for a ruler and his subjects. It is on the *alun-alun* that all the king’s guests had to wait before being admitted into his presence (*seba*). Therefore, the *alun-alun* is also called the *paseban*. The common people, who are the *kawula* or citizens of the kingdom, also think of the *alun-alun* as being the symbol of democracy because at this place they can stage a protest against the bureaucratic apparatus of the kingdom or even against the ruler himself. Such protests took the form of a *pepe*: that is, the practice of lying or sitting in the full sun until their ruler approached them.

Because it was a space imbued with special significance in terms of the concept of Javanese power, *alun-alun* attracted the attention of the Dutch colonial government when it sought to establish its authority in Java. This newcomer also wanted to use the *alun-alun* as a representation of its recently won power in Javanese territory. It therefore signified its ascent to power by symbolically appropriating this public space and building the accommodation for the Dutch Resident or Assistant-Resident on the *alun-alun* opposite the palace or the Regent’s residence. The most obvious example of this is in Yogyakarta, where the house of the Dutch Resident (nowadays known as Loji Kebon) and the outward and visible sign of the Dutch military presence, Fort Vredenburg (or Loji Besar), were built exactly opposite the palace. The erection of these colonial buildings on the *alun-alun* could be interpreted as a symbolic conquest of the *alun-alun* area (Surjomihardjo 2000:21). With the encroachment of these new symbols of power around the *alun-alun*, the power of Javanese traditional leaders began to wane, or even in some instances to disappear completely.

During the colonial period, the weakening of the authority of traditional power-holders inevitably affected the people’s interpretation of the *alun-alun*. It was no longer regarded with respect as an official space belonging to the
government, but was transposed into a public space, which was accessible to anyone, high or low. Relegated to the secular sphere, the alun-alun also functioned as an urban park whose subsequent development was inextricably linked to the growth of the town as a whole. In this process, the change in the meaning accorded to the alun-alun, from a place where official activities were held to a park or an open public space, transformed it into an urban concept, which has continued to develop in more pragmatic modern times.

One of the cities in Java where people's interpretation of the alun-alun was affected by the changing balance of power is Malang. In Malang the changing meaning of the alun-alun under the impact of the rise and demise of the authorities did not end with the formation of Dutch colonial power, but continued into the Japanese period, the Indonesian Revolution and Independence. Malang occupies a special place in this respect, the more so because, as we shall see in detail shortly, it had two alun-alun.

The key question this chapter will now focus on is: What changes have occurred in Indonesia during 1930–1960 which have influenced the interpretation of the alun-alun of Malang by the inhabitants of the town and, conversely, to what extent has reference to the symbolic power of the alun-alun exerted an effect on the perceptions and interpretations of it by the townspeople of Malang? Specifically, it attempts to answer two subsidiary questions: How have the people of Malang interpreted the meaning of the alun-alun over time? And, on the basis of their perception and interpretation of the alun-alun, what (changing) activities have been performed on it?

Malang: A City with Two alun-alun

The main alun-alun of this town, called Aloon-Aloon, was established in 1882 (Kota Malang 1954:13). The shape of the Aloon-Aloon is unusual and diverges from those in traditional Javanese cities (Figure 11.1). At a first glance it does look as if it fulfils the typology of the typical Javanese alun-alun but a closer look at the location of its principal buildings reveals that it is an aberration and did not accord with the basic principles of the lay-out of a traditional town in Java, which always places the alun-alun in the ‘forecourt’ of the palace (kraton) or the house of the Regent.

The Aloon-Aloon was laid out under colonial rule and the way it was planned reflected the requirements of the Dutch government (Figure 11.2). The fact that it complied with Dutch priorities is betrayed by the buildings, which originally occupied the spaces around the Aloon-Aloon. The house of the Assistent-Resident was located on the southern side, facing the Aloon-Aloon. The mosque is
to the west, as is the house of the caretaker of the mosque (*kauman*). On this same side stands the Protestant church. On the eastern side, there was a jail. At the north-west corner near the church stood the Sociëteit Concordia, the club which once formed the social centre of colonial society. The Regent's residence was situated somewhat removed, to the east. Significantly, it was not oriented towards the Alun-Alun, but faced south towards the main street, Regent Straat (*Kotapradja Malang* 1964:12). The layout of the Alun-Alun, therefore, explicitly reveals that from its inception it was intended to be an official space, but more broadly, to be a means of imposing a colonial image on Malang. As the exemplary traditional centre of the town, the Alun-Alun was used as a primary venue to shape that image of colonial administrative authority.

The Dutch did not see exercising power as a goal in itself, and from their overriding economic point of view, the arrangement of the colonial town had to be focused on the economic requirements of the colonial government. The strong link between colonial political power and the control of crucial sectors of the economy was clearly signified in the establishment of the Javasche Bank and Escompto Bank in 1915. Both banks were built on the Alun-Alun, the centre of administrative control, on the northern side to be exact (Handinoto and
Figure 11.2  Aloon-Aloon in Malang during the Dutch period

Key to numbers, clockwise, starting in northwest corner: 12 Sociëteit Concordia; 14 Escompto Bank; 15 Javasche Bank; 16 jail?; 17 Regent’s office; 1 Regent’s residence; 18 Bioscoop Grand; 21: Bioscoop Globe; 3 Resident’s office; 1 Resident’s residence; 6 Hotel Palace; 5 European girls’ school; 4 mosque; 20 Protestant church.


Soehargo 1996:52). Besides its function as a representation of the political and economic power of the colonial government, the *alun-alun*, finally, also became the centre of the town in another sense: it formed the nodal point in the network of urban streets. Thus, in the course of the nineteenth century, the
alun-alun became the centre of what a number of writers have defined as the ‘Indische’ town (Soekiman 1996; Nas 1986). As the centre of government, it assumed the role as symbolising the authority of the colonial government.

After 1900, in Malang as in other cities in Netherlands Indies, the migration of people from the Netherlands increased significantly and this new generation of Europeans wanted to give the town a more Western air. They wanted to move the town centre away from the alun-alun. This desire was reinforced after the town of Malang was granted municipality (gemeente) status in 1914. Eventually, in 1922, the Malang municipal council created a new square and moved its offices to this area. This square was named JP Coen Plein, after the founder of the VOC Empire. Nowadays it is known as the Alun-Alun Bunder; the word ‘bunder’ (round) refers to the circular shape of the square. The relocation of the municipal offices there signified that henceforward Malang possessed two alun-alun. Both alun-alun were then open spaces but a fountain erected in the middle of the Alun-Alun Bunder was intended to give the impression that this area now did duty as an urban park.

The plan to move the centre of government and urban life away from the old Aloon-Aloon reflected the desire to define a European-dominated centre as the sole locus of authority. The Dutch administration considered the Aloon-Aloon unsuitable as the centre of a modern city since it was already occupied by the indigenous people from late afternoon to well into the night. Thomas Karsten, the prominent architect and town planner, was assigned this task. Planning for the design of a new alun-alun commenced in 1917, soon after Malang was granted municipal status (Handinoto and Soehardjo 1996:65).

The layout of the Alun-Alun Bunder was intended to encompass the beautiful environs of the town. This beauty was derived from the mountainous scenery with which Malang was surrounded, the main highlights being Mount Kawi to the west, Mount Semeru to the east, Mount Arjuna to the north, and the valley of the Brantas River, which flowed through the town. In the 1920s the beauty of this mountain scenery could no longer be appreciated from the Aloon-Aloon as many buildings blocked the vistas. Thomas Karsten envisaged a new angle of vision and the Alun-Alun Bunder was the result. The Alun-Alun Bunder helped to promote the reputation of Malang as a garden city (Hall 1993:87–135).

When designing the Alun-Alun Bunder as the new municipal centre, Karsten took account of Javanese traditions. His design for the Alun-Alun

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1 In the remainder of this chapter I refer to it as the Alun-Alun Bunder and not as JP Coen Plein, also for the colonial time, to emphasize that I treat the two places as belonging to one category of alun-alun.
Bunder, providing an open area in front of the government buildings, was based on the design principles of the Kraton of Yogyakarta or Surakarta. The design of the Alun-Alun Bunder complex was based on a similar north–south axis which linked the Southern Ocean, the town hall, the Alun-Alun Bunder itself with a water fountain in the centre, and Idenburg Straat, in an imaginary line straight to Mount Arjuna in the north. This layout of the Alun-Alun Bunder also paralleled the layout of municipal buildings in Semarang, which had also been inspired by the Kraton of Yogyakarta. Even the internal division of the town hall of Malang into rooms replicated the kraton.\(^2\) Where the kraton had its siti hinggil, the audience hall in which the ruler welcomed his high-ranking court servants, the town hall had a room in which the mayor (burgemeester) met the councillors. Just as the Sultan of Yogyakarta would be seated so that he looked north, in the direction of Mount Merapi, the position of the mayor was such that he looked north in the direction of Mount Arjuna when he met the council.

Although unquestionably based on traditional Javanese design and philosophy, the Alun-Alun Bunder was in other respects a thoroughly European complex. Named after the fourth Governor General of the voc, Jan-Pieterszoon Coen, it celebrated Dutch might. Unlike the Aloon-Aloon, local, indigenous people did not gather there. Unquestionably the reference to Jan-Pieterszoon Coen and the shape of the new square were significant, but the actual physical location of the Alun-Alun Bunder was also brimming with significance by repositioning Malang as a town within the conceptual design of the traditional Javanese town. The explanation for this apparent ‘traditional step’ can be found in the fact that the Alun-Alun Bunder was designed by Thomas Karsten, an architect with strong democratic-socialist tendencies. Karsten was opposed to the direction adopted by contemporary colonial policies and was interested in the potential and resources offered by the form of traditional Javanese building (Bogaers and de Ruijter 1986:71–88; Coté 2014; Van Roosmalen, this volume). Through the medium of a colonial town design, Karsten expressed his criticism of contemporary colonialism and whether or not his idea was wholly realized, the presence of the Alun-Alun Bunder and its municipal buildings was an endeavour to return to the original idea of the Javanese town which had been destroyed by nineteenth century colonial design.

As a result, the two alun-alun in Malang were both spaces imbued with strong symbolic meanings. So far, the analysis has been confined to the design of these spaces and the discussion of urban symbolism has so far

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\(^2\) The town hall of Malang was designed by H.F. Horn (Pauline van Roosmalen personal communication).
been somewhat one-sided, as only the symbolic meanings attributed by the powerful have featured. In what follows I attempt to redress this imbalance by discussing the way various groups in society have attributed meanings to the two alun-alun. When all is said and done, all urban residents have their own interpretation of the urban symbols. They can ascribe meanings quite different from that intended by the people who originally created these spaces. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to go a step beyond describing the alun-alun as a consciously created symbol and examine how those symbols have been shaped, altered, and maintained and understood.

The Struggle for the alun-alun of Malang in Dutch Times

Those who conceived the plan for the development of the Aloon-Aloon might never have thought that the alun-alun which they constructed as the symbol of colonial superiority would in the end be conquered so quickly by the people they colonized. The conquest is clearly represented in a black and white photograph of the Aloon-Aloon originally taken in the late nineteenth century (Figure 11.3). Vendors of food and drink (verkoopers van eet en drinkwaren) have invaded the area. They are sitting under the banyan trees, which were then between ten and twenty years old. The shade of the leafy trees planted in a row at the edge of the alun-alun pervades the square with a sense of coolness. It is in the shade of these banyan trees that the ‘conquest’ of the alun-alun by the vendors has been affected. Behind their angkringan (small cupboards situated on poles), they can be seen diligently serving their customers, who are seated in front of the angkringan on plaited mats. By comparison to these dozens of indigenous food and drink vendors and their customers, the colonial power seems very small. Even, the Assistent-Resident’s office seems to fade into the distance.

The presence of the indigenous people who gathered around the alun-alun every evening created a binary opposition to the situation outside the alun-alun, which was still completely dominated by European colonial power. Every evening until deep in the night the fight against colonialism was staged on the alun-alun, even though it did not take the form of physical warfare. In the period of ‘rust en orde’ (law and order), more open armed resistance would have been futile because the state would have suppressed it by the force of its superior modern armaments.

As discussed above, the development of the original Aloon-Aloon was intended to present an image of colonial power by manipulating the symbolic meaning traditionally applied to this open space. The spatial arrangement of
the colonial town was consciously adapted to be the centre of the colonial administration as well as representing, at the local level, its unchallenged economic power.

This may have been so in theory, but in the case of Malang the attempt to build colonial prestige on the vestiges of the original Javanese town by appropriating the *alun-alun* failed. Although in physical terms the Aloon-Aloon was reminiscent of the Javanese spatial arrangement, it failed to encapsulate the actual idea and significance of the Javanese concept of *alun-alun*. From the outset, by locating it to the west of the seat of traditional Javanese authority, (that is, in an inappropriate position), the Aloon-Aloon was perceived by indigenous residents to be the square of modern power. Colonial power in Malang was never perceived as being represented through the medium of the open space called the Aloon-Aloon. In fact, the reverse was true: the Aloon-Aloon became a representation of colonization and was transformed by the colonized people into the vehicle of their opposition to colonialism.

The colonial image was expressed in the form of various buildings erected next to each other around the *alun-alun* (Figure 11.2). A variety of colonial
activities took place inside the rooms of these buildings but significantly, not on the alun-alun itself. With the exception of the Great Mosque on the western side of the alun-alun, all the edifices surrounding it were buildings, which served the needs of the colonial state. This colonial image was reinforced in 1912 when a Protestant church was built on the western side of the alun-alun, on the Aloon-Aloon Koelon Straat, to the north of the mosque. The presence of this church exuded an impression redolent of Christian (Western) domination of the Muslim (indigenous) people whose Great Mosque of Malang had been built in 1875, several years before the alun-alun was developed. The tall church spire seemed – as was, no doubt, intended – to overwhelm the mosque to its south, which now appeared diminutive in comparison. The domination by construction continued in 1915 and 1916 when two Western edifices were erected almost simultaneously on the northern and southern sides of the alun-alun. One, the Javasche Bank, was built in Aloon-Aloon Lor Straat, designed by Hulswit & Fermont and Ed. Cuypers and opened in December 1915. The other, the Palace Hotel, opened some months later in 1916 at the southwest corner. The ground plan of these two buildings revealed a strongly symmetrical pattern that was immediately apparent in their appearance. The gate of the Palace Hotel consisted of a double tower, which strengthened the impression of the colonial desire to take charge of the centre of the alun-alun. In 1929, the Escompto Bank was established to the west of the Javasche Bank. The colonial image was reinforced even more strongly by the prominence of these two Western economic institutions.

Nevertheless, the colonial image, which these buildings exuded, paled in comparison to the even stronger image radiated by two other buildings on the alun-alun: the Sociëteit Concordia and the Bioscoop Rex. These two buildings, a social club and a cinema, were essential to the décor of a Western life-style. The many European social activities, which were held at the Sociëteit, including dancing, pool games, playing cards, and many other pastimes, sharpened the awareness of the indigenous people of Malang that they were dominated by an alien group. The social distance was reinforced by the fact that they were warned not to enter the area. The Bioscoop Rex embodied this distance with its ‘living screen,’ which was at that time the most modern form of entertainment devised by Western technology. Those two entertainment venues were obviously far beyond the reach of indigenous people, especially those from lower social classes. For the poor it was impossible even to imagine being able to set foot in these places.

However, if the indigenous people could not take part in the colonial social activities inside the buildings surrounding the alun-alun, they could at least defy the Western life-style. They might be unable to enjoy the delicious food
served in the renowned Oen Restaurant opposite the Sociëteit Concordia, but food and drink vendors from their own ranks appeared like clockwork on the southern section of the alun-alun, selling their merchandise from dusk till late at night. While European people relaxed in the Sociëteit Concordia, the indigenous people could also enjoy themselves, not in the sociëteit, but in front of it on the alun-alun. They could drink coffee and eat peyek or gulai sold by people from Ponorogo. As European people enjoyed the art of dancing to the music of the waltz or were entertained by the comedies on the ‘living screen’, indigenous people could delight in the art of dance in a ludruk (Javanese folk theatre) performance presented at the north-eastern corner of the alun-alun behind gedek (panels of plaited bamboo).

Cultural resistance grew even stronger when religious ideology entered the arena. To those indigenous people of Malang who were obedient to Islamic teachings, such European areas as the sociëteit or bioscoop were prohibited territory. In their eyes, the goings-on of the European people were sinful and the area was considered haram (forbidden), a place to be avoided. People in those areas were indulging in pleasures banned by Islamic doctrine, such as being drunk, gambling, dancing, and so on. So, it was on the alun-alun that the indigenous people could have fun and enjoy the entertainments permissible under the tenets of Islamic teachings.

As indigenous people encroached on and began to conquer the alun-alun, the government itself began to neglect and then intentionally undermine the meaning of the place as a symbol of colonial power it had originally ascribed. The authorities began to regard the square as simply a common open space devoid of any overly potent associations. This change in view was revealed to the full light of day when a tramline, which connected Malang to Dampit, was developed. From Blimbing Station the tramline ran via Lowokwaroe, Tjelaket, and Kajoetangan Straat, the main streets of European economic centre in Malang, towards the alun-alun. Approaching the alun-alun area, instead of being routed around it, the tramline continued straight through it, dividing it diagonally from the north-west to the south-east corner (Figure 11.2). Furthermore, a tram stop was constructed exactly in the middle of the alun-alun under the banyan tree, to allow tram passengers to get on and off (Van Schaik 1996). The existence of a profane tram stop under the banyan tree even undercut the symbolic image of the alun-alun as an official space owned by the government. This spot was thronged with people every time a tram stopped with passengers wanting to get on or to alight. The banyan tree, which was once considered sacred in the context of Javanese culture, was deprived of its aura as the crowd of modern-day tram passengers used it casually as a tram shelter.
Other evidence that the alun-alun no longer really held any significance for Europeans or for the municipal government in Malang was its exclusion from the Malang urban development plan. Following the decision to classify Malang as a municipality (gemeente and later stads-gemeente) in 1914, an urban development plan (bouwplan) was drawn up. The plan, which divided Malang into various development zones, was implemented progressively in eight stages, from Bouwplan I to Bouwplan VIII. Not one of the eight development zones related to the Alun-Aloon. Generally these section plans focused on the needs of the European people. For example, Bouwplan I, which was commenced in 1917, provided a housing area for European people in the Oranjebuurt, the neighbourhood around Tjelaket. Bouwplan II, approved in 1920, concentrated on the area near the Alun-Alun Bunder, with the objective of developing it into the new centre of municipal government. This area was then generally known as the Gouverneur-Generaalbuurt (Governor General Neighbourhood), because all the streets in this area were named after Governors General of the Netherlands Indies. Bouwplan III pertained to the European cemetery. Bouwplan IV involved the construction of a housing complex for middle class people and was located west of Tjelaket and Lowokwaroe. The goals of Bouwplan V to Bouwplan VIII were similar and were overwhelmingly concentrated on providing housing for Europeans. The Alun-Aloon, which had been effectively usurped by indigenous people, was not included in any of the bouwplannen (Jaarverslag 1940 1941).

After the construction of the Alun-Alun Bunder and the municipal buildings were completed, neither the colonial nor the municipal government planned any public festivals on the Alun-Aloon. In the years 1937–1939, for example, the municipality organized several huge festivals to celebrate events related to the Dutch royal House of Orange: the marriage of Princess Juliana and Prince Bernhard, the birth of their first two children, and the fortieth anniversary of the reign of Queen Wilhelmina. The festivals centred on the Alun-Alun Bunder, not on the Alun-Aloon (Van Schaik 1996:42).

Nevertheless, the Alun-Aloon was not totally ignored by Europeans. In 1938 it was reported that people from the nearby Roman Catholic Church (located to the north of the Sociëiteit in Kayoetangan Straat) had attempted to hold open-air church services there on Sunday evenings. One elderly resident recalled that the Roman Catholic priests would come and set up tables loaded with books and pamphlets and chairs under the banyan tree on the eastern side of the alun-alun (interview with Azis Salim). After everything was ready, a Catholic priest dressed in his white alb would begin to preach the ‘good news’ of Christ and read from the Bible. Initially his presence attracted an audience of local people to whom assistants distributed pamphlets expounding on
Christianity. Young children in particular were attracted by the arrival of the priests on the *alun-alun*. In their eyes, they must have appeared like sellers of medicinal herbs; but the sound of a loud voice in an open public place will always attract children's attention. In any event, those children were probably more attracted by the pamphlets distributed by the preacher and his assistants. In 1938 paper was still a great rarity for children in Malang. It was not long, however, before people realized the purpose of this activity was to convert them and they stopped coming.

The activity of Roman Catholic priests was an attempt to re-empower the *alun-alun*. The priests expressly positioned themselves in the eastern part of *alun-alun*, opposite the Great Mosque, which was located on the western perimeter. Both the location and the mission of the Catholic priests was an attempt to create an opposition within the confines of the *alun-alun*. Muslims regard the mosque as a place to pray and it is central to the religion and the community of the local people. When war broke out, for instance, the mosque was used as a place to discuss the strategies with which to attack enemies. The priests who attempted to preach Christianity on the *alun-alun* were seen as infidels by the local Muslims. In fact, this attempt to propagate Christianity was soon halted because it attracted only young children. In any event, according to Azis Salim, my main informant on the matter, evangelization vanished with the arrival of Japanese to Malang.

Even sporting activities, so much part of the European life-style and which required a large open space, were not held on the *aloon-aloon*. The Fifth Development Plan for Malang included a huge sports park consisting of a stadium, a hockey field, two soccer fields, nine tennis courts, a clubhouse, and a swimming pool (*Stadsgemeente Malang* 1939). At the time it was constructed, the stadium was probably the best and biggest in Indonesia. This sports area was a propitious focal point as European people could enjoy the beautiful panorama of Mount Kawi to the west as they participated in or watched the various sporting activities. Mount Kawi was named ‘De Liggende Vrouw’ (The Sleeping Woman) in Dutch, because when it is viewed from far away, it resembles a recumbent woman sleeping.

### The Arrival of the ‘Older Sibling’

On 8 March 1942, the Japanese Army entered Malang. The arrival of thousands of Japanese soldiers was received with mixed feelings by the citizens. The indigenous people had high expectations of them as ‘older siblings’ who would relieve them of the colonization by the Dutch. At the time, Indonesians were
obsessed with Joyoboyo’s prophecy, which predicted that *kate* (tiny) people would come from the East to release them from the suffering caused by colonialism.

In contrast to the indigenous people, Chinese people, especially women, were terrified by the Japanese arrival. They had learnt that previously the Japanese had attacked their mother country, sought out attractive women to slake their lust, and were very cruel. By the time the Japanese soldiers arrived in Malang, many attractive Chinese women had exchanged their fine clothes for *pating srediwil* (ragged clothes), scratched or disfigured their faces with make-up, and tousled their hair in an attempt to camouflage their features. By taking these actions, they hoped to elude the attentions of Japanese soldiers and avoid being raped by them (Berdoeri 2004:185).

Remarkably, upon arrival in Malang, the Japanese soldiers first set down, not in the Alun-Alun Bunder, which was clearly the seat of the government and the mayor (*burgemeester*) but in the Aloon-Aloon. The situation there when the Japanese soldiers arrived was described expressively by Tjamboek Berdoeri in his book *Indonesia dalem api dan bara*.

> When I arrived on the alun-alun [the Aloon-Aloon], the large field was thronged with more people than I had ever seen before. Japanese soldiers who were all busy preparing things to fill their stomach occupied the Resident’s front garden. Some were cooking porridge; others were opening their backpacks to take out chopsticks and bowls. In short, the scene they presented was as if Malang was being visited again by a large hobbyhorse troupe, whose members were first finishing off their own affairs before sticking poles into the ground to set up tents. [...] Some Japanese were taking off their clothes and allowed their navels to peep from above the waistband of their trousers at the audience who had come in swarms to behold those new guests. Some were wearing dirty trousers, which plainly showed that they had been everywhere, pulling in the belts again and again to keep them from sliding down.3

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3 Koetika saja sampe di aloon-aloon, ternjata jang itu lapangan loewas penoeh sesak sama riboean orang, seperti jang belon perna saja liat. Pekarangan depan dari roemah Resident di tempatin oleh serdado-serdadoe Djangep jang itoe waktoe lagi repot boeat masing-masing sediaken barang boeat tangsel peroetnja. Ada jang masak boeboer, ada jang boeka bangkelannja oentoek kelearkan soempit serta mangkoknja. Pendek kata, marika itoe waktoe kasi pemandengan begitoew seolah-olah Malang lagi ketamoean komedie-koeda jang besar dan jang personeelnja lagi beresin doeloe kaperloennja sabelonnja marika moelai dengen tantjepken tiang-tiang dalem tanah boeat pasang tendanja. [...] Ada jang boeka
This short description vividly sketches the scene on the Aloon-Aloon thronged with people who had come to witness the initial arrival of the Japanese. Normally, it would have only been crowded in the evenings, but now, during the day, it was suddenly occupied as if by an audience attracted by a group of hobbyhorse players who were just getting down off their vehicles. The Japanese decision to regroup on the Aloon-Aloon raises the question of why they did not go straight to the Alun-Alun Bunder where the town hall was situated. Its buildings would have been more comfortable as a place for the soldiers to rest after their battles and long journey. There were more rooms, including many bathrooms, and better furnishings than were available in the house of the Resident located there. They could also have gone to Rampal, an area in Malang occupied by the colonial army during the Dutch colonial period. But instead the Japanese soldiers chose the Aloon-Aloon as the first place to visit.

The Japanese commanders probably understood that the Aloon-Aloon belonged to the people; that the people of Malang had a stronger sense of belonging to this alun-alun than to the colonial Alun-Alun Bunder, which had been an elite place from which Malang urban life had been controlled in Dutch times. This psychological connection was manipulated by the Japanese, who desired to be regarded as the ‘older sibling’ and so decided that the ‘younger siblings’ should be visited first. From the Japanese point of view, the Alun-Alun Bunder and its environs needed first to be cleansed of the presence of the Dutch enemy who had been reigning over their younger sibling. This would be done after the younger sibling had been greeted.

Another interpretation of the Japanese decision to go to the Aloon-Aloon might be that the Japanese military wished to well and truly sever all links with the evidence of Western colonialism. Therefore all such Western symbols as the Alun-Alun Bunder were to be avoided. In general, the Japanese policy was to suppress evidence of Dutch colonialism by such measures as banning the use of the Dutch language as a spoken and written vehicle of communication throughout Indonesia. All schools that had previously used Dutch as the language of instruction were required to switch to Indonesian.

The Japanese, then, also planned to make use of the symbolism attached to the alun-alun, in their case in an attempt to embrace Malang and make the idea of a Greater East Asia a reality. The next action the Japanese army took

badjoe dan biarin sadja poesernja maen-mata dari atas kepala-tjelananja sama publiek jang dateng bergroemoetan boeat liat itoe tetamoe-tetamoe baroe. Ada jang dengen tjelana jang mesoem kiatatanja djalan kian-kemari sembari saben-saben tarik saboeknja soepaia djangan terlalu mobrat-mobrot.
was to replace the Dutch mayor of Malang, J.H. Boerstra, installing in his stead Raden A.A. Sam, previously the Regent of Malang. During the Japanese occupation he held three positions simultaneously: Regent, Resident, and mayor. This was a clever strategy on the part of the Japanese to empower the indigenous people, since it would have been quite possible for them to replace the Dutch mayor with a Japanese candidate, a choice which they eschewed.

In June 1942, a very symbolic event took place when an official ceremony was held to welcome the arrival of an important detachment of the Japanese Army to Malang. An official photograph of this occasion taken from the veranda of the home of the Resident shows a number of prominent Japanese soldiers, including the local commander Colonel Kato, either seated or standing around the Resident, Raden A.A. Sam. Other indigenous officials are seated slightly to the rear or to the side (Figure 11.4). Not visible in the photo but a fact known from reports of the occasion, were the thousands of Japanese soldiers lined up on the central part of the alun-alun in front of the high-ranking officials (Van Schaik 1996:52). The event was intended to demonstrate the warm relationship between the inhabitants of Malang and the Japanese army.

Figure 11.4 Resident Raden A.A. Sam and Japanese officials, 1942
SOURCE: VAN SCHAIK (1996:52; COURTESY OF MALANG STUDIO, MALANG)
Initially, the Aloon-Aloon could be said to have been used to demonstrate the love affair between the indigenous residents and the Japanese soldiers. Later, this romance faded as the people of Malang began to suffer because the Japanese soldiers treated them even more brutally than the Dutch had done. One interviewee, mbok Satiah, a rice seller on the corner of Kayoetangan Street, remembered:

I was still about eight years old in the Japanese period. The Japanese soldiers were very brutal. Once, they arrested a man without any explicit reason. The man was beaten and dragged to the alun-alun. Some Japanese soldiers dug a hole a metre deep in the southwest corner. He was forced to get into it and was buried up to his neck. It was exactly the same as the stoning to death law in stories about the Prophet (Interview with mbok Satiah, 22 February 2005).

By what seems a strange twist of fate, during the Japanese occupation, the Aloon-Aloon was used as an arena in which the brutality perpetrated by Japanese soldiers against their younger sibling was publicly exposed, after having first being used as a symbol to demonstrate common interests between older and younger siblings. This brutality was never exercised on the Alun-Alun Bunder, so that it would seem that that public space was allowed to remain a centre of a sacred and untouched authority. It is not easy to comprehend the meaning of the brutality displayed by the Japanese soldiers in the example above, but unquestionably the Aloon-Aloon was transformed into an unruly space, akin to a deserted garden or wilderness in which the law of the jungle prevailed. During the Japanese period in Malang the Aloon-Aloon degenerated into a place robbed of its worth, degraded by the actions of Japanese soldiers but also in the perception of the people.

Mbob Satiah was keenly aware of this phenomenon. During the Japanese period, she also recalled, there was a well-known soto (soup) seller who traditionally hawked what people believed to be beef soto on the southern part of the alun-alun. One day, as he was busy serving many buyers, his son ran up to him and shouted: “Daddy, they are running away!” “What are running away?” his father asked. The boy’s answer shocked the customers and made them nauseous: “The cats which are going to be slaughtered for soto are escaping. The cage door was unlocked.” The soto seller was immediately reported and the Japanese soldiers came and dragged him away. His life ended then and there (Interview with mbok Satiah, 22 February 2005).

The alun-alun, therefore, became debased, a location where different groups exploited one another and where the exploiters were not always
necessarily foreigners. The acts of brutality showed no respect for religious feelings. When local people were forced to perform *seikere* on the *alun-alun*, the act of taking a bow towards the sunrise to honour *ameterasu omikami*, this constituted a brutal assault on their religious belief. Even though the *alun-alun* was surrounded by houses of worship, most prominently a mosque and a church, those religious symbols could not offer ‘succour’ to their members who suffered at the hands of Japanese soldiers. One example was the experience, which befell a hajji on the southeast corner of the Aloon-Aloon. The incident took place soon after the arrival of the Japanese army in Malang. One day a man dressed as a hajji rode his bicycle from the north side of Jalan Aloon-aloon Wetan pedalling in a southerly direction. His bicycle was decorated with two flags: the Japanese and the Indonesian. Coincidently, a Japanese soldier happened to be standing with a rifle on his shoulder on the corner of the *alun-alun*. Catching sight of a hajji riding the bike with the two flags, the soldier stopped him. Without uttering a word, the soldier pulled off and tore up the red and white (Indonesian) flag. The Japanese soldier, possibly ignorant about the Indonesian flag, saw only that it had the same colours as the Rising Sun, but its design was incorrect. The hajji, seeing that one of the flags had been torn to tatters by the soldier, thought that he was not supposed to decorate his bicycle with any flags so he also he pulled off the Japanese flag as he was in a hurry to save himself from a beating by the soldier. However, the Japanese soldier, now believing that his flag was being insulted by the hajji, hit him with the butt of his gun. Feeling proud of what he had done, the soldier walked away leaving the hajji rubbing his head to ponder his experience of true samurai blood (Berdoeri 2004:195–6).

During this period, the *alun-alun* was also deemed a strategic place on which Japanese collaborators and ‘betrayers’ could express their thoughts. This became apparent during the latter part of the Japanese occupation when it clearly emerged who the traitors and those people who longed for the past were. Novelist Tjamboek Berdoeri describes one occasion when a man he considered to be a *hankan* (traitor to his country) or collaborator, delivered a speech on the *alun-alun*. It seemed that the man was a Eurasian even though he looked Indonesian. He loudly criticized everything, which could be linked to full-blood Dutch people who had suppressed Eurasian people and had refused to care for them. Consequently, he was grateful to the Japanese army, which had come to save them (Berdoeri 2004:226). This act of defiance was deliberately staged on the *alun-alun* because it was an open public space, commonly visited by local people and symbolically the place ‘nearest’ the Japanese soldiers.
Independence

Independence ushered in a euphoric period for Indonesia. Independence was a magic word, which led people to believe they could do anything they wished: they were free. An indigenous person could feel free to break a Chinese shop window for instance. If he did so, the very frightened owner would hand over everything that was demanded in order to save his life. Independence also meant freely taking over anything colonial and destroying colonial symbols. Independence was freedom. In this period the Alun-Alun Malang and its environs was transmuted into an area where the euphoria of this freedom could be expressed.

In August 1945, shortly after the Proclamation of Independence, signs of this freedom of expression began to appear in Malang. Slogans were written on the walls of colonial buildings on the Alun-Alun. There was a big handwritten sign on the wall of the Nationale Handelsbank, next to the Palace Hotel, which read “Freedom is the Glory of any Nation”. There was even a bigger slogan below it saying “Indonesia for Indonesians!” (Kota Malang 1954:23).

A more formal attempt to take control of the alun-alun space was in the form of changing the names of the buildings in the area. The name of Palace Hotel was changed first to Hotel Merdeka (Freedom Hotel) and later to Hotel Pelangi (Rainbow Hotel). Bioscoop Rex was changed to Bioskop Ria (Cheerful Cinema). Sociëteit Concordia was changed into Gedoeng Rakjat (House of the People). These name changes were intended to show that, having gained independence, all residents of Malang had in principle now the right to enjoy the entertainment offered by these facilities.

The ‘liberation’ of the Gedoeng Rakjat and its transformation into a public meeting place assumed even more symbolic significance when the newly established government of Indonesia in Jakarta chose the building as the venue in which to conduct the first meeting of the Komite Nasional Indonesia Poesat (KNIP, Central National Committee of Indonesia). The KNIP was founded as an organization to represent the Indonesian people, to fill the gap before a representative parliament could be directly elected. Between 25 February and 5 March 1947, the Gedoeng Rakjat entered history as the first place in which the people’s representatives of the KNIP gathered. No fewer than 1500 people from throughout Indonesia visited the building to participate in, or just to witness first hand, the enactment of Independence.

The alun-alun and the surrounding buildings were not subjected to any physical changes. Nevertheless, the perspective of them among the Indonesian people and the way they treated these buildings had totally changed. Whereas previously in the colonial period the alun-alun and buildings had been
separated from one to another – the *alun-alun* for the common people, the buildings (except the mosque) for the colonial elite – with the coming of Independence, the *alun-alun* and the surrounding buildings were closely linked together. The opposition between the people's space and the space of the colonial power had been obliterated. Nevertheless, it proved no easy matter to maintain this new spatial unity.

On 22 July 1947, as part of the large-scale First Dutch Offensive (Agresi Pertama, or Eerste Politionele Actie), Dutch soldiers launched an attack on Malang. The response of the inhabitants of Malang was to prevent the newly gained symbolic unity between square and buildings from falling apart in this very critical situation; their reply was to set fire to all the colonial buildings to prevent the Dutch from reoccupying them. The Great Mosque of Malang was the only building around the Aloon-Alloon spared from the Republican forces' scorched-earth policy. According to a report by the contemporary local authorities, about a thousand buildings were burnt down (*Kotapradja Malang* 1964:19). This number seems an exaggeration but certainly all the colonial buildings around both the *alun-alun* were razed and the report by the Kotapradja indicates that a large number of buildings throughout the town were also destroyed as a result of this policy.

The newly returned Dutch government struggled to regain control of the town in a military and administrative sense, and in its endeavours it again did not overlook the value of symbolism. Symbolic control included an attempt to reappropriate the Aloon Alloon. On 2 October 1947, only two months after the Dutch army had seized the town, Major-General M.R. de Bruyne officially dedicated a monument to commemorate the deaths of marines and Koninklijk Nederlandsch-Indisch Leger (KNIL, Royal Netherlands Indies Army) soldiers at the hands of Republican forces. The monument was in the form of a five-sided conical pillar on which were inscribed the names of the slain Dutch soldiers and a line from the Dutch national anthem (Van Schaik 1996:80). The monument was a symbol that the Aloon-Alloon was once again ruled by the Dutch. To emphasize this message, the monument was built exactly opposite of the mosque.

The arrogant action of erecting a monument in front of the mosque, the holiest place in the town as far as the Muslims in the Indonesian population were concerned, was interpreted as a huge insult. Angry as they were, the local people could do nothing about it, as they were faced by soldiers armed with guns. Understandably, when sovereignty was returned to the Indonesian Republic, one of the first actions taken by the municipal government was to demolish the monument. This event symbolized the return of the Aloon-Alloon to its authentic owners.
The Struggle for the Alun-Alun Bunder

In the meantime, how did the Alun-Alun Bunder fare through this tumultuous period? As described above, on its arrival the Japanese occupation force made its first appearance on the Aloon-Aloon, rather than on the Alun-Alun Bunder. Although intent on erasing all symbols linked to the Dutch colonial regime, no action was taken against the Alun-Alun Bunder by Japanese soldiers. It was only after Independence that attempts were made to 'decolonize' the Alun-Alun Bunder and assert the Indonesian people's full rights to all areas in Malang. As a sign of this right, a monument to liberty was erected in the middle of the Alun-Alun Bunder where previously the fountain had stood. This monument had a dual function. It served as a remembrance monument and as a tetenger (symbolic marker) from which central point the area described by the radius was officially 'ours'. Unlike the Aloon-Aloon, the Alun-Alun Bunder had been dominated up to the very last seconds of Dutch colonialism in Malang, and a physical sign that the alun-alun was no longer under Dutch control was essential.

Malang lay within the region controlled by the Republic and to commemorate the first year of Independence, a ceremony was conducted on 17 August 1946, to lay the foundation stone of the Independence monument. A model of the monument was unveiled on the occasion (Figure 11.5) and the event was attended by Doel Arnowo, hero of the Battle of Surabaya (November 1945) and assistant to the governor of East Java at that time. Soenarko, Resident of Malang, also attended. The monument was almost completed by the time Dutch forces seized Malang in the First Dutch Offensive (Agresi Pertama), July 1947.

In the Dutch return to Malang there was more at stake than a simple military campaign; they also found themselves embroiled in a fierce symbolic struggle to recapture the town. The Dutch were perceived as acting as the tiger in Javanese mythology, which makes an area previously staked out by the urine of the tiger's enemy sangar (neutral). In the eyes of local people, Dutchmen actually resembled fearsome, rapacious tigers while they conceived of themselves as the wild bulls ready to combat the tiger by wielding their sharp horns effectively. In this metaphor, the potency of the enemy of the tiger was represented by its ability to demolish the monument, and this proved to be the only means the Dutch tiger had at its disposal to make the monument sangar. Before demolishing it, Dutch soldiers had already used a subtler way to dominate the monument by swathing it in a huge Dutch red, white, and blue flag. The peak of the monument was topped by a European crown representing Queen Juliana, handily symbolizing the return of Dutch sovereignty without
having to construct a new monument. However, I believe this attempt to transform the existing monument and thereby create a new orientation in the town did not succeed, because the structure hidden under the Dutch flag and crown still belonged to the Indonesians.

It is easy to imagine that the erection of the Independence monument in the centre of the Alun-Alun Bunder fired the courageous imagination of the Malang youth with the belief that, as long as the monument remained standing, they would never be defeated even though the Dutch army was equipped with the most up-to-date guns. With such a firm belief entrenched, the only recourse available to Dutch forces to break the spirit of the Malang resistance was to demolish the monument, which they did on 23 December 1948. The Dutch destruction of the Indonesian monument was in a way their ‘revenge’ for the Indonesian burning of the town hall on the same alun-alun as part of the Republican scorched-earth strategy of July 1947. The destruction of the

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4 For an image of it, see Van Schaik (1996:122).
monument on the Alun-Alun Bunder marked the peak of the symbolic battle between the Dutch soldiers and the Indonesian inhabitants of Malang. For some years, the burning down of the municipal buildings and the destruction of the Independence monument left the Alun-Alun Bunder a no-man's-land, a deserted area disfigured by ruined buildings.

The period after the recognition of Indonesian sovereignty emerged as the most crucial time in the history of Indonesia. Five years after the Proclamation of Independence, Indonesia faced tremendous difficulties in every aspect of life. The erection of the new monument was greeted warmly by the local community as it seemed to symbolize the reassertion of Indonesian rights, which had tended to fade. The Japanese occupation and the War of Independence had engendered many social, economic, political, and security problems. The long war had brought the people suffering and hardship, hitting housing and jobs particularly hard (Pewarta Soerabaia 24-3-1952). In Malang the depths to which the Aloon-Aloon had sunk was demonstrated by the presence of prostitutes on the Aloon-Aloon. Under the banyan trees in the centre of the Aloon-Aloon, a host of prostitutes would sell themselves at night (Pewarta Soerabaia 24-3-1952). According to research undertaken later in 1968, these prostitutes were those who charged the lowest prices (between 50 and 100 Rupiah) (Survey sekitar 1970:29). Their clients risked contracting syphilis or gonorrhoea. The prostitutes’ trade also challenged the mosque located on the western edge of the alun-alun.

Bambungan (squatters) who occupied the area or simply wandered around there were another indication of how the Aloon-Aloon had fallen in people’s estimation.

Although the Aloon-Aloon was used as a ‘cattle market’, as people referred to the streetwalkers’ area at night, during the day it was used as an ordinary market. On the southern side, what remained of the burned out house of the former Assistent-Resident was occupied by many traders. The place was called Pasar Atoom (Atom Market) in imitation of the name of a big market in Surabaya. Perhaps the traders in Malang secretly hoped that one day their market might be as big as that in Surabaya. Flower-sellers occupied the western part of the alun-alun, stretching from in front of the church to the mosque. In fact, until 1960s the alun-alun was the biggest outlet for flowers in Malang.

The presence of the traders on the alun-alun was a continuation of the old tradition of the popular rule over the alun-alun. In the colonial period, the ordinary people had had to fight against the colonial authority for control of the alun-alun. After Independence they still had to fight against the municipal government. In 1952, the traders in Pasar Atoom were expelled because the government decided to renovate the former Assistent-Resident’s house and turn it into offices. Eventually, this plan fell through (Pewarta Soerabaia...
The Two \textit{alun-alun} of Malang

16-7-1952). In fact, in September 1952 an intercity bus stop was built on the area (\textit{Pewarta Soerabaia 1-9-1952}). The bus stop only served to reinforce the impression that the Aloon-Aloon was no longer a sacred place.

The Era of Politics

The euphoria of freedom was more than just a time to display slogans splashed on the walls of public buildings, stopping public transportation by force and getting in without paying a cent, or for yelling such heroic words as “Life or Death”. It was also the time to take action by joining organizations or political parties, something which would have seemed beyond people’s wildest dreams in the colonial period. Independence signalled the arrival of grassroots politics, which no authority could suppress. In this period, open spaces were essential because politics was public and without an open public space, politics could not have been public. Open spaces within the town essentially meant the \textit{alun-alun}. Hence the \textit{alun-alun} became a crucial element in the political euphoria in the 1950s and 1960s.

In Malang, the Aloon-Aloon was designated the chosen open space where competing ideologies could battle each other for dominance, as it was the place which belonged to the local people. It was only in the 1950s that an attempt was made to breathe new life into the area. On 1 May 1950, around the time of the anniversary of the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI, Indonesian Communist Party), a group of party members erected a large, twice life-size statue on the plinth of the original monument, which had remained intact. Even though it was not a permanent statue it seems to have elicited a response from the authorities. A month later, on 9 June 1950, a Liberty Monument Committee was established to organize the erection of a permanent monument (Suwardono and Rosmiayah 1996:24). The committee worked hard for three years to raise the money to rebuild the damaged monument, a task that was finally completed in the middle of 1953 (\textit{Pewarta Soerabaia} 16-5-1953). Local newspapers such as \textit{Pewarta Soerabaia} reported the physical details of the monument in their headlines. The description in \textit{Pewarta Soerabaia} on 16 May 1953 indicates that it did not differ greatly from the original design of 1946. It featured six bamboo spears tied together in an unbreakable bond.

The \textit{Java Post}, of 19 May 1953 published a poem by R. Dirman Sasmokoadi to celebrate the monument:

\begin{center}
Malang Monument of Liberty  
Who on this earth is not proud of
\end{center}
Approaching to behold  
The glorious monument  
Celebrating Indonesia's Independence  
Standing tall in a peaceful field  
In the round pool adorned with lotuses  
Surrounded by beautiful buildings  
Exactly in the centre of the city of HOPE  
It is our monumental jewel  
Celebrating Indonesia's Independence  
Freedom in its true meaning  
Standing, prosperous to the end  

R. Dirman Sasmokoadi

On 20 May 1953, a ceremony was held to mark the unveiling of the monument by President Sukarno. It was witnessed by thousands of people, but their presence was probably more motivated by the arrival of the president, than purely by any thoughts about the liberty monument. The person of Sukarno was more charismatic and more symbolic of Indonesia's Independence than the monument. The *Java Post* of 21 May 1953 reported: “At 4:45 the president began to deliver his speech in front of the people. There were no posters by the people.” The lack of placards can be read as the absence of protesters. It was proof that this time the people in Malang were looking forward to greeting President Sukarno. Later, in the years in which the president was involved in conflicts with the military and various political parties, his arrival was often greeted by large demonstrations. This time, it seemed, the president had come to confirm the undisputed victory of the Indonesian people and the role of Malang in the struggle against the Dutch.

On the eve of the 1955 general election when parties were struggling for support, the political atmosphere intensified enormously. For example, on 29 January 1955, a mass organization operating under the banner of the old Javanese doctrine Djawo Dwipo held a parade called ‘Ngruwat Pusoko Djowo’ (Purifying the Heirlooms of Java) (*Java Post* 28-1-1955, 29-1-1955). The parade commenced at Jodipan Wetan, proceeded via various streets through to the Aloon-Aloon and ended again at Jodipan. Actually, the main focal point of the parade was the Aloon-Aloon as the ritual of Djawo Dwipo was centred there. When the parade reached the Aloon-Aloon, people gathered in the centre of the square, where they sang a religious song dedicated to Djawo Dwipo and danced. The ritual was to declare ‘Penuntun Kawruh Kasempurnaning Gesang’ (Leaders towards Knowledge of the Perfection of Life). The organization later claimed that the event had been attended by almost a million people, 986,000
to be exact. In fact, only a few thousand out of the total of less than one million citizens of Malang bothered to turn up (Java Post 28-1-1955). Political rhetoric had conjured up a nonsensical reality. The Djawo Dwipo organization, which represented abangan (non-orthodox Muslim) power in Malang, wanted to re-empower the alun-alun as a place for the people.

Another leader who attempted to use the alun-alun of Malang was Bung Tomo, who had led the Republican troops against the British in the Battle of Surabaya in November 1945. On 24 September 1955, he visited the Aloon-Aloon as the spokesperson for the campaign of the Indonesian Party. His exclaiming “Allahu Akbar” (God is great) and his highly emotive appeal might have galvanized Surabaya but did not win much support in Malang (Java Post 25-9-1955). His campaign attracted only a few people and he failed to gain significant numbers of votes in the general election. Amazingly, in 1955 there were no Islamic parties making use of the Aloon-Aloon to propagate their programmes and ideology. The outcome of the 1955 general election proved that Malang was dominated by abangan people; the Indonesian Communist Party emerged as the local victor. The liberty monument on the Alun-Alun Bunder became a dominant symbol of the town of Malang. For any charity event, small pins bearing a picture of the monument were often sold to raise money. In fact, on 14 July 1970, it became the central element in the coat-of-arms of Malang, replacing the old symbol of an eagle.

**Conclusion**

In the past hundred years, the two alun-alun of Malang have been the focus of processes of signification and spontaneous actions. History has revealed how the people in Malang have attempted to retain their control of these spaces. Each alun-alun exuded a different significance for the local people. The indigenous residents claimed their rights to the Aloon-Aloon by a silent invasion long before Indonesia gained its independence and Malang was freed from Dutch domination. This was different in the case of the Alun-Alun Bunder. Created as an elite area under Dutch colonialism, which revived briefly during the Dutch attempt to regain control after Independence was proclaimed, the Alun-Alun Bunder continued to be the focus of official symbolic representation of power. After the transfer of sovereignty, it became a symbol of the

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5 In fact, Islamic groups did attempt to use the Aloon-Aloon after the 1955 general election. On 10 March 1957, thousands of Muslims gathered there to protest against Sukarno’s concept of a National Board (Pewarta Soerabaia 11-3-1957).
power of a liberated nation and urban community. The control of the symbolism of this public space was constantly contested and associated with repeated periods of struggle.

References


The Indonesianization of the Symbols of Modernity in Plaju (Palembang), 1930s–1960s

Ida Liana Tanjung

Introduction

The process of decolonization, the transfer of power in a political or economic sense, is almost invariably accompanied by a change of symbols. When there is a transfer of power, it stands to reason that there will be a change in meaning of the symbols, which express the identity of the new party in control. Such symbolic changes help to communicate the political and economic changes to the society. The decolonization of Indonesia was accompanied by symbolic actions such as the Proclamation of the Independence of Indonesia in 1945, the displaying of the Indonesian flag all over Indonesia, and somewhat earlier, the ban on Dutch symbols during the Japanese occupation. The replacement of the symbols of the old regime by the new regime goes beyond the political and also embraces cultural symbols (Wertheim 1999:121).

As centres of political, economic and social activity, colonial cities produced colonial symbols on a large scale in Indonesia. Most colonial symbols were ‘decolonized’ following Independence in a process, which followed a similar pattern in almost all Indonesian cities. Most notable in this process was the destruction and replacement of the old colonial symbols, for example, statues commemorating a Dutch hero. These were typically destroyed and replaced by a monument commemorating heroes of the Independence struggle. This process of eradication was by no means complete, however, and not all colonial symbols were wiped out by the new regime (Colombijn 2006; Basundoro, this volume). Sometimes the new regime did nothing but attach a new, Indonesianized meaning to the old form. A good example is when a building of the former colonial state was allocated a new function by the Indonesian Republic, or when a street or urban quarter was simply given a new name. Therefore, if we want to understand the decolonization of colonial symbols, it is not sufficient to look at the creation of new symbolic objects; it is just as important to interpret the mutation in the meaning of existing symbols.

This interpretive approach to urban symbols is rooted in accepted theories of symbolism and signification. The locus of the symbolic meaning of an object always lies outside the object and is never inherent in the object itself. People can give new meanings to a ‘symbol-carrier’ (also called ‘signifiant’), even when the
symbol-carrier itself does not change (Nas 1993:14; Ahimsa Putra 2002:2; Dillistone 2002:19; Nas, Jaffe and Samuels 2006:3, 7). In principle all objects can become a symbol. Social anthropologists have taught us that people’s behaviour and physical elements created by people have symbolic meanings, as long as they can be associated with life events. Symbolic meaning is also just not restricted to material objects, it can also be found in gestures and behaviour, texts, and, what is important in this chapter, a certain area or neighbourhood. An area can become identified with a certain ethnic or social group. Often such particular visual elements of an area as architectural details or perhaps one particular building become a symbol for the whole area and its people (Dillistone 2002:22; Taal 2003:26).

In this chapter I will analyse the changing symbolic meanings of one urban area, namely Plaju, an oil company town in South Sumatra. Plaju presents an interesting subject for research because it was an economic enclave, geographically proximate to but socially distant from the city of Palembang. Palembang stretches along both sides of the River Musi, but the main parts of town lie on the west bank (called the Hilir or Ilir side). Plaju is located on the east bank (called Hulu or Ulu), about ten kilometers and slightly downstream from the centre of Palembang, but still within easy reach by boat (Manurung et al., 1956:256). It was only some time after Independence, in 1965, that a bridge connected both banks, thereby opening overland transport between the city centre and Plaju. This raises the question of whether political changes, which were clearly felt in Palembang, the capital of the province of South Sumatra, reverberated in the company town, lying in relative isolation across the river. One particular question raised in this chapter is whether this company town lost some of its social exclusiveness as a result of decolonization.

Another interesting aspect of this question is that the decolonization of colonial symbols in Plaju was an unusually protracted process, as the Europeans who worked in the oil refinery continued to play a leading role after Independence. The Indonesianization of corporate enterprise (Lindblad 2008)

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1 Some confusion exists about whether Plaju was in fact part of Palembang at the turn of the century (Nas 1995:37; McGee 1967:55; Taal 2003:66). In a sketch of Palembang in 1667, which was a major power at the time, Plaju was part of the city (Hanafiah 1998:77). A nineteenth-century map of Palembang, however, places the urban boundary on the east bank of the River Musi at kampong 14 Ulu (De Clercq 1877:474), which excludes Plaju. Plaju was still not on the list of kampong names of the east bank (Seberang Ulu) of Palembang in 1934 (Hanafiah 1998:363).

2 A strong local symbol at the time was the name Sriwijaya. Sriwijaya referred to a once powerful ancient state, which had its centre near Palembang. After considerable debate, and pressure from President Sukarno, the local university and later a large fertilizer factory were named Sriwijaya (Vlekke 1959:27; Taal 2003:2; Fikiran Rakyat 3-6-1960, 13-6-1960, 20-8-1960).
proceeded at a slower pace than did the decolonization of political symbols. This raises the question of how the slow pace of economic decolonization interfered with the symbolic decolonization in Indonesia. European managers of the oil refinery, the central Republican government, and the local government of Palembang all had an interest in this oil company town. The upshot was that they were constantly in conflict with each other. They were in competition to take control of such urban symbols in Plaju as houses, buildings, and street names.

In short, Plaju is a special case, because it was relatively insulated from national, political changes in two ways: its geographical isolation from Palembang and the continued presence of Western managers. The company town was also special in a third way: it was not only, and perhaps not in the first place, a symbol of European might, but a symbol of modernity. Its attraction for Indonesians may have relied less on the wish to uproot the Dutch from Indonesian soil, than the desire to acquire its modernity.

The theme of this chapter is a discussion of the decolonization of colonial symbols in Plaju, where this process apparently ran a different course than in other cities in Indonesia. The work is based on a survey of literature and newspapers about Palembang and Plaju, and interviews which took place during a two-month period with retired refinery staff in Plaju and Palembang. Before moving on to understanding the symbolic changes, it is essential to sketch the simultaneous social changes that took place at the time.

Origin and Development of the Oil Company Town Plaju until the Second World War

In 1897 Jan Willem IJzerman, head of the Muara Enim Petroleum Maatschappij, planned to establish an oil refinery in Plaju. At the time Plaju was nothing more than a small kampong. The Musi Ilir Petroleum Maatschappij also built a
smaller refinery in Bagus Kuning, a village near Plaju. Both these refineries, which covered an area of about 100 and 21 hectares respectively, became property of the Anglo-Dutch Royal Dutch Shell in the first decade of the twentieth century. They were operated by the Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij (BPM, Batavian Oil Company), a subsidiary of Royal Dutch Shell (Bartlett et al., 1986:46; De Bruyn Kops 1919:124; Lindblad 2002:105). To improve production, BPM closed the Bagus Kuning refinery in 1909 and focused on oil refining in Plaju. The Plaju refinery had the advantage of producing marketable secondary products and its location near a good river infrastructure ensured refined products could be efficiently transported to Java and Singapore by big ships (Pertamina 1995:3; Purwanto 1997:90). In 1912, Standard Oil (later Standard Vacuum or Stanvac) started a refinery at Sungai Gerong, directly downstream from Plaju.

When it established the Plaju refinery, BPM also built houses for its labourers. These were located near the refinery but separated from the indigenous kampong Plaju, from which the refinery had derived its name. These houses would form the beginning of the company town Plaju. At first the houses were built in Malay style on piles, not markedly different from the kampong houses. A house on piles (kolong house) was ideal in the local environment, because the river at Plaju was still tidal. Moreover, during the rainy season, the River Musi used to flood the lower areas, which temporarily would transform the area into a swamp (lebak) (Peeters 1997:37; Stibbe 1919:332). The existence of swamps and wetlands meant that houses could not be built directly on the land. The draining of swamps would have been an expensive undertaking, as soil and pebbles had to be imported from outside Palembang. It was only after the oil industry in South Sumatra made spectacular progress in the second decade of the twentieth century and Plaju grew into the biggest refinery in Sumatra (Zed 2003:71) that BPM started to build on the ground in Plaju and abandoned the method of construction on piles. The new Plaju complex was equipped with various convenient facilities, including a water supply, a tennis court, swimming pool, club, hospital, and shopping mall (Nas 1995:140).

Colonial cities were home to a diversity of people of different ethnic, social, cultural, and religious backgrounds (Yeoh 1996:1). Typically social stratification was based on the tripartite ‘racial’ categorization of the Netherlands Indies in which Europeans were the upper class, Chinese the middle class, and the indigenous people the lower class. Plaju also formed a multi-ethnic society, but one in which the composition was somewhat unusual. The oil industry, which was supported by large capital investments and advanced technology from foreign oil companies in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States, attracted many Westerners to this small place. Expert staff was recruited
from the Netherlands, Britain, the United States, Canada, Russia, Rumania, Japan, Germany, Poland, and other European countries (Purwanto 1997:92). These Europeans, Americans, and Japanese were all classified as ‘European’ in the colonial legal tripartite division. Compared to companies in Palembang, the refinery of Plaju stood out because of the number of European technicians it employed. In 1926 208 European employees worked there and in 1929 this number had increased to 475 (Zed 2003:79).

While Europeans worked as experts, Indonesian and Chinese labourers, generally referred to as Asian Labour, did the rough work. However, there was no recruitment of contract labourers in Java and China as had been done earlier for the plantation in East Sumatra, and the tin mines of Bangka, and Belitung. Some of the Asian Labour came from South Sumatra; the rest came from outside South Sumatra. These people had actively looked for a job in the oil companies and after they had been taken on were categorized on the basis of their qualification, as skilled manpower or semi-skilled manpower. Between 1924 and 1926, 80 per cent of the workers in the oil industry came from South Sumatra, and 20 per cent from outside, primarily from Java and China (Zed 2003:77–79). Unlike the indigenous population in Java and perhaps Palembang, which was vertically divided into status groups (Wertheim 1959:138–141), the Indonesians in Plaju were not further subdivided.

This socio-ethnic categorization of the oil company was reflected in the spatial layout of Plaju. The European settlement was deliberately located at quite some distance from the refinery so that its inhabitants would not be disturbed by industrial noise and pollution. The Indonesian settlement was located in the vicinity of the refinery. It is not entirely unclear where the Chinese settlement would have been. However, according to retired staff members of the refinery, there was a Chinese school in front of the Plaju hospital, on the main street and I presume that the Chinese settlement was not far from that school.4

The type of housing in Plaju revealed the cultural origin of the inhabitants. Most of the European houses were of what can be described as Indies architecture, which was a hybrid style of modern architecture from the Netherlands adapted to the tropical climate in Indonesia (Handinoto 1996:163; Figure 12.1). The houses were neat and had a spacious yard embellished with flowers and green lawns; the BPM employed gardeners to maintain the greenery. One contemporary observer, Broersma (1921:35–37), admired this ‘petroleumstad’

4 Interview, April 2005. At least until the 1930s, there was one Chinese primary school, which had 350 students (Rivai 2001: 70). The Dutch destroyed it together with the refinery during the Second World War; later the location was used as a tennis court according to a map of the Plaju complex in 1956.
Kerchman (1930) and Sandra Taal (2003) also described Palembang as a dirty city with slums. However Broersma’s favourable opinion could not count for the whole of Plaju as the condition of the Indonesian settlements was less salubrious. Indonesian labourers lived in barracks that were equipped with a common kitchen and bathroom. Each barrack block was inhabited by more than one family and was colloquially named by their residents after a tree or bird in the area, such as Tangsi Burung (Bird Barrack) and Tangsi Duren (Durian Barrack). The reason the residents used the name Tangsi Burung was, allegedly, because the building looked like a birdcage and the name Tangsi Duren was used because of the many durian trees around the house.

Besides housing, BPM also provided various facilities in Plaju for the refinery staff, but again, differences existed between the various categories of employees. A club (*sociëteit*), swimming pool and tennis court were facilities

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5 Kerchman (1930) and Sandra Taal (2003) also described Palembang as a dirty city with slums.
that conveyed an image of modernity, but these facilities were located in the European area. The function of these facilities and their location emphasized colonial social distinctions between indigenous and European people. The company also built shops to fulfil the basic requirements of the refinery employees, but the European shop was quite different from the Asian shops, as the Europeans required different goods. The European shop was known as Civo Laut (Sea Civo), because of its location at the Musi River and because most goods – like alcoholic drinks, clothes, and canned food – had come from overseas. Asian employees did not dream of shopping at Civo Laut and BPM had provided them with a shop of their own which was called Civo Darat (Land Civo). Here one could buy various Asian necessities like rice and clothes. Vegetables and fish were commonly bought from merchants from outside Plaju who were generally passing through by boat.6

Early Indonesianization of Plaju’s Modernity, 1930s

In the 1930s, the oil industry was growing rapidly in South Sumatra; there were about 35 oil-mining concessions in the area. The oil industry activity was not just restricted to the actual oil fields. Huge pipes hundreds of kilometres in length, connecting hundreds of drill towers, oil pumps, and storage tanks, covered the area before finally reaching the refinery in Plaju (Zed 2003:79–80). The company did not want to only rely on water transportation between the refinery and the oil fields, and this concern led BPM to build a road network in South Sumatra as well. The development of the oil industry had thus an enormous influence on the whole region. Local communities could use the roads and attend schools that were also established by BPM. BPM established 42 schools throughout South Sumatra before the war (Rivai 2001:70).

Therefore, from the people’s point of view, the oil industry in Plaju was a symbol of modernity and prosperity. Working at one of the oil companies around Palembang became a dream for many educated youth in the 1930s, although they had to compete with people coming from outside South Sumatra (Zed 2003:80). The increased participation of educated Indonesians in the oil industry in the 1930s caused a shift within the Indonesian labour force, as now also indigenous people became part of the staff of BPM, as supervisors, technicians or administrators (Purwanto 1997:92). Previously these positions had only been occupied by European staff.

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6 Interview, April 2004.
The Indonesianization of the staff of the refinery had, as corollary, the early decolonization of colonial symbols in Plaju, long before political independence was achieved. For example, before the 1930s the sociëteit (club) was a colonial symbol of European modernity and a space that could only be used by European staff (Figure 12.2). After the entry of Indonesians in the higher echelons of the refinery, another club was opened for the Indonesian staff, Sociëteit Kranie. For the Indonesian staff, the sociëteit was not only a social club, but also formed a way of becoming acculturated to the new culture and it was a symbol of their newly won status. The Indonesian staff at the refinery conveyed their status and new identity in their behaviour, as they started playing table tennis, dancing, and gambling.7 Because of the dancing, both the European sociëteit and the Indonesian sociëteit were better known as kamar bola (ball room).

In their desire to take part in modern life, the Indonesian staff also tended to use Dutch, although typically mixed with Indonesian. A local newspaper reported the following: ‘When they spoke, Malay was mixed with some Dutch,.

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7 Interview, April 2005.
although clumsily, because they had not really mastered that foreign language.8

In religious matters, however, Indonesians of course chose their own path and did not follow the European attendance of Christian services. A mosque was erected in the Indonesian part of Plaju, funded by the profits of the night market (Han Po 11-6-1931). A church, incidentally, was not erected in the European area of Plaju until the 1950s. For years, religious services were held in a school and eventually in the photo and film club Het Brandpunt (Dunia Minyak December 1956).

Remarkably, not only did Indonesians adopt Western manners, the European staff also copied elements of Indonesian behaviour. In the 1930s, BPM implemented a policy of conscious hybridization. It recommended that traditional clothes (sarong and kebaya) and the Malay language should be used by Europeans in the household in order to become more aware of the Indonesian culture in their daily lives (Pattynama 2004). Plaju was a special case in this respect. In 1930 the BPM announced to its European staff that they should learn Indonesian as fast as possible in order to become more connected to their Indonesian co-workers. The BPM would raise the salary of everybody that could speak the language (Pertja Selatan 23-1-1930).

The blending of lifestyles in Plaju also became apparent in housing. The BPM had built brick barracks for their labourers using a vernacular style of roof while Indonesian staff occupied houses not far from those barracks (Figure 12.3). Meanwhile, BPM used local architectural elements (again a peculiar, vernacular shape of the roof) for houses that were intended for the European staff creating houses that looked quite similar to those built by the N.V. Volkshuisvesting in Kali Salak, Surabaya, in 1927 intended for middle class Indonesian households (Handinoto 1996:115).

Even Indonesians who were not employed by the BPM took part in the modernity of the refinery, although this gave rise to some misgivings on the part of the European management. Not all Indonesian labourers could be housed inside the complex and they were forced to look for accommodation outside, for example in the nearby Kampong Bali and Kampong Plaju. As a consequence, the increased interaction between the refinery labourers and the kampong residents made the company town more accessible to the kampong people. Concerned that this might affect the safety of the refinery, BPM

8 ‘Marika kalau ngomong-ngomong sedikit-sedikit hindia dicampoeri dengan bahasa Belanda meskipoen kakoe, sebab memang tidak pandai bahasa asing itoe’ (Pertja Selatan 23-1-1930).
management decided to establish a front gate and a guard post in 1934. Henceforth, Indonesians had to have a token from BPM as a kind of identity card to enter the refinery compound. This was reported by Pewarta Palembang as follows: ‘All workers, both coolies and clerks, in short all Asian personnel, were given a token by BPM; and not just that, they were also photographed; hence the regulations were tightened’.9

Although the BPM kept the kampong inhabitants out of the refinery, it could not prevent them from benefiting from the modern goods available in its stores. Refinery workers received an allotment from the BPM in the form of clothes, rice and kerosene. Typically, some of these goods were sold to kampong residents with the result that their appearance became increasingly similar to that of a refinery worker. Nevertheless, some differences remained. A son of a refinery worker remembered that when he went to school, he wore shoes

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9 ‘Segala penggawe-penggawe baik dari koeli maoepoen krani-krani, pendeknya seantero dari aziatisch personeel masing-masing mereka oleh BPM diberikan tanda penning dan tidak itoe sadja, tapi masing-masing mereka djoega diportret, maka djoega dikeraskan peratoeran’ (Pewarta Palembang 3-11-1934).
and his kampong friends did not, because their fathers were not refinery workers.10

The modernity of the oil company town of Plaju was not only apparent in terms of its outward appearance, but also evidenced by awareness of its inhabitants of how to live hygienic, healthy, and neat lives. So, when the local newspaper reported that Plaju had been infected by cholera and typhoid (Pertja Selatan October 1930), the BPM was not amused, since that news damaged the modern image of Plaju. BPM complained to Pertja Selatan that because both cholera and typhoid were associated with slum areas, these diseases could not possibly have infected Plaju. In the next issue Pertja Selatan amended – or rather self-censored – its previous chapter, reporting instead: ‘In BPM (Plaju) there has never been outbreaks of cholera, typhoid or influenza, because of the surveillance of public health, which is provided for its inhabitants’.11

Various efforts were undertaken by the BPM to maintain this clean and healthy image of Plaju. For instance, the BPM also established a big hospital on the compound, the first hospital in Seberang Ulu, the south side of the River Musi.12 Refinery workers who had intentionally scribbled on a public bathroom wall were sacked (Pertja Selatan 13-3-1930). From the point of view of the directors, the graffiti defiled the clean image of the company. From the perspective of the labourers, however, their deed can be seen as an act of resistance: a way of appropriating public space. It was a symbol of the Indonesianization of Plaju, albeit a symbol of the weak, who had no other outlet to express themselves and who were denied access to the consumption of modernity.

Plaju During the Japanese Occupation and the Struggle for Independence

In the Second World War Palembang was the main Indonesian target of Japan, because half of the oil production in the Netherlands Indies flowed through that city. On 14 February 1942, 600 paratroopers landed at one of the airfields of Palembang and around the two refinery complexes at Plaju in a surprise attack. The Dutch authorities had planned to damage the refineries to put them out of

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10 Interview, April 2004.
11 ‘Di BPM (Plaju) tidak pernah ada penyakit cholera, typus dan influenza, karena boeat djaga kesehatan pendoedoek telah dikabarkan/disediakan tempat oentoek keperloean’ (Pertja Selatan 1-11-1930).
commission for six months, in the expectation that by then the Japanese would have retreated. In effect they miscalculated, not only about the time the Japanese would stay, but also the speed of the Japanese advance on Plaju. In the chaos of their retreat, the refineries of BPM and Standard Oil were only slightly damaged. The Japanese soon restored the oil installation, which was in full swing within half a year (De Jong 2002:35–36).

After their conquest, the Japanese quickly suppressed all symbols of Dutch rule such as the flag, portraits of Queen Wilhelmina and other members of the Royal Family, images with the words ‘Nederland zal herrijzen’ (the Netherlands will rise again), V-badges and buttons with a W on them worn by officials. Furthermore, the use of Dutch or English language in public was prohibited and Japanese or Indonesian had to be used instead (De Jong 2002:69). BPM was renamed Dai Ici Seiyuzo (Alumni Pendidikan Tehnik Minyak Plaju 1999:6) and the names of buildings and streets in Plaju were replaced by Indonesian ones. Naturally, the Japanese did not destroy the colonial buildings, housing and facilities, but reused them for military purposes. As the oil refineries at Plaju and Sungai Gerong were a strategic place, they became two of the four headquarters of Japan in Palembang (Taal 2003:71) (Table 12.1).13

The only legacy of this Japanese period that has remained in Plaju until today is the oil engineering school, a symbol of Japan’s lack of expertise needed to run an oil industry at that time. When Japan took over the oil refinery they were short of competent experts. Most of the staff, who worked for the Japanese

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Number of students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1942–1943</td>
<td>Minaraiko</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sekiyu Ko Yoseijo</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943–1944</td>
<td>Minaraiko</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sekiyu Kogiyo Gakko</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944–1945</td>
<td>Sekiyu Kogiyo Gakko</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Alumni Pendidikan Tehnik Minyak Plaju (1999:15)

13 The other two Japanese headquarters in Palembang were Talang Semut (a former European settlement), and the airport to the north of the city.
in the oil projects in Indonesia had been taken directly from school and lacked practical experience. Therefore the Japanese recalled staff who had formerly been employed at the oil installations, in order to get them back in operation as quickly as possible. In April 1942 the Japanese brought about 300 oil workers from Java to Palembang to work at the refineries (De Jong 2002:50). However, most of the staff that worked for the Japanese had only been ordinary labourers during the Dutch era, and as a result Japan later decided to establish an engineering school in Plaju to upgrade the skills of these labourers, as well as to train all young people from the Palembang region who had previously attended a Hollandsch Inlandsche School (HIS, Dutch Language Elementary School) or Meer Uitgebreid Lager Onderwijs (MULO, Advanced Elementary Education). Many of them came from the environs of Palembang (Bartlett et al., 1986:56; Alumni Pendidikan Tehnik Minyak Plaju 1999:15). In total, almost 1,200 people followed the oil engineering education during the Japanese years. Although the quality of the lessons was not as hoped for, the oil engineering school was the first attempt to train Indonesian people in the oil industry (Bartlett et al. 1986:57).

After the Japanese surrender and the proclamation of the Indonesian Republic, Plaju was taken over by the young Republic. The management was transferred to one department of the Palembang Residency, the Mine and Oil Division, headed by Dr M. Isa. Isa was the former chairman of Partai Indonesia Raya and the founder of the militant oil labour organization Persatoean Pegawai Minyak (PPM, Union of Oil Workers) that sided with the Republic and which, after Isa became head of the Mine and Oil Division, was headed by Salam Faiman. To celebrate the transfer to the Republic the oil labourers of the Plaju refinery organized a big party in restaurant ‘Asia’ (Zed 2003:338–339).

The new Republican leaders were initially euphoric about controlling the biggest refinery in Palembang but they soon had to face the return of the BPM, coming on the heels of the Allied forces that sought to regain control of the oil industry. Consequently the Plaju refinery became a contested area. On the one side there was the government of the Indonesian Republic in Palembang and the oil workers association PPM, and on the other side, the BPM (Shell) that was the owner of the refinery before the Second World War (Basundoro 2004:7). The conflict was solved by the so-called ‘olie diplomasi’ (oil diplomacy). The district head of Palembang, Dr Ak Gani, proposed a division of tasks to the allied forces, which resulted in an agreement about oil production quota. On behalf of the Republic, PPM would hold the concession, while BPM (Shell) became the actual operator of the refinery (Zed 2003:359–360). This successful diplomatic effort by Ak Gani in fact represented the first step towards the
nationalization of the most important economic resource of South Sumatra. However, because of financial constraints, complete nationalization could not be carried out entirely at that moment. The Republic needed the foreign company as investors. During the first year of the Revolution, the installations at Plaju were guarded by a Japanese battalion, Asano Butai. In August 1946 the Japanese finally transferred the guarding of Plaju to the Allied forces (Mangkualam 1986:72; Zed 2003:360). In the next month, on 23 September 1946, the management of the Plaju refinery was transferred back to its initial owner, namely the BPM (Manurung et al., 1956:126).

After the transfer of sovereignty to the Indonesian Republic by the Dutch in 1949, the BPM lost something of its political protection and the company had to become more responsive to public demands. This became clear, for example, in a land dispute in 1956. In 1956, a plot of land located in Kampong Ladang Plaju, but owned by the BPM, was sized by the government and given to the kampong residents. On other occasions kampong residents took the initiative to request the government to take over BPM assets, and those requests were not limited to land. In one case the local government was urged by residents to take over the wall that surrounded the BPM complex, because according to the residents, this wall was very disturbing to the people living next to it (presumably because their free passage was blocked). Consequently, the municipal council ordered BPM to demolish its wall and to give the debris to the kampong residents so that they could pave a path. Although this time the local administration did not back the kampong residents, and the request was refused by the BPM, the request was unmistakably an effort of the local population to break into the exclusiveness of the Plaju complex.

The Entry of the Army in Plaju

One unforeseen consequence of the struggle for independence was a struggle for housing and land between the state, corporate enterprise, and the various groups of armed forces. The BPM and Stanvac oil companies each gave up between 50 and 60 houses to the Dutch army during the Revolution to protect Palembang against Republican forces (Colombijn 2010:259–260, 341–343). The main object of the army was to take possession of the so-called ‘Rumah Pintu Besi’ (Iron Door Houses), whose doors were made of iron (Figure 12.4). The Iron Door Houses were located at 60th, 61th, 63th, 64th, and 65th Street,

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14 Title deed, reg. no 292/1956.
just outside the refinery, but were still considered part of the oil complex. They were among the first houses that were built by the BPM for European employees, especially house number 1 to 7.

The transfer process of the Iron Door Houses to the military began when Plaju came under control of the Allied Forces in late 1945. The Allied Forces initially claimed some of the houses of BPM that were strategically located in front of the Plaju complex. After the Allied Forces left Palembang on 9 November 1946 (Zed 2003:413), the Koninklijk Nederlandsch-Indisch Leger (KNIL, Royal Netherlands Indies Army) took over the Iron Door Houses. Later, the Indonesian army took over the European houses that were occupied by the Dutch Army, including the Iron Door Houses, but not other houses in Plaju. The other European-style houses in Plaju continued to be occupied by European and Indonesian employees who held the higher functions in the refinery’s administration and operation. In other words, the European style

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15 The upshot of the Dutch return was mounting violence perpetrated by both Republican and Dutch forces in Palembang from November until December 1946. The violence reached its climax in what Palembang residents call Pertempuran Lima Hari Lima Malam (the Battle of Five Days and Five Nights), taking place around 1 January 1947 (Mangkualam 1986:111–166; Zed 2003:415).

16 Interview April, 2005.
houses in Plaju expressed both change and continuity in the political domain (Evers 1993:83). The transfer of the Iron Door Houses to indigenous occupants symbolized the liberation of Indonesia and the Indonesianization of urban space. On the other hand, the return of Europeans to Plaju in 1945 and continued occupancy of houses by oil company staff reflected a continuation of the image of Plaju as an exclusive settlement, which continued to exist at least until 1965.

The significance of the presence of the army also became increasingly apparent. In a land dispute case in 1952 W.G.J. Vesseur, representative of the BPM in Sumatra, lodged a complaint to D.I Pandjaitan, Commander of the Territory II/Sriwijaya South Sumatra Division. The complaint concerned the army’s use of land of the former NV Nomura Oost. This former plantation belonged to the Japanese rubber export firm Nomura Shokusan Company, which was taken over by Lee Rubber, the biggest rubber export company in Palembang, which had its main office in Singapore (Zed 2003:387). The BPM had purchased the land belonging to NV Nomura, which was located next to the Bagus Kuning complex, in 1951. Its is probable that the BPM controlled only a part of this land, the other part of the Nomura land being in the hands of the Indonesian Army. The Army had built a barrack, which crossed the boundary with the Bagus Kuning complex. Vasseur proposed to the Army either of two options: either to pay rent for the use of the land and buildings, or to demolish the barrack, so that BPM could erect a border wall. The commander of the Sriwijaya Division rejected both options and suggested instead that if BPM wished to build a wall around its compound, it should be built at at least five metres distance from the barrack. The land dispute continued for years, until the nationalization of BPM in 1958–1959, when the BPM was finally forced to transfer a large part of its assets, including the land of NV Nomura, to the Army.

Changing Names of Streets and Buildings in Plaju

The gradual Indonesianization of the higher echelons of the staff of the refinery, which started in the 1930s and continued at a faster pace in the
1950s, was reflected in the changing symbolic landscape in Plaju. Names of streets and places have significant symbolic meanings, which provide information about the ideas and interests of the names they record (Yeoh 1996:221). When New Guinea was excluded from the territory of the Indonesian Republic in 1949, many Indonesians felt very disappointed, and as a result the dislike of the Dutch reached a point that all associations with the Dutch colonial past had to be wiped out. One form of this process of erasing the remnants of Dutch colonialism was the changing of street names and names of buildings. This, as Sandra Taal (2003:154) has argued, was of particular significance because unlike for instance statues, streets are found everywhere.

According to Peter Nas (1993:30) street names can convey so-called collective, historical and projective memories. Projective memory applies particularly to streets laid out as a grid, in which streets are merely numbered and do not get a more individual name. In Plaju, street naming was based on such a system, which was appropriate for a new town, enabling it to be expanded systematically in the future. In colonial times, the BPM had named all streets in Plaju Weg (Road) followed by a number (Weg 1 until Weg 71).

After Independence, the municipal governments changed most Dutch names in their respective cities. Many local administrations chose to name the main streets after national heroes from the Revolution or earlier times and as a result almost every Indonesian city has a uniform pattern of names that emphasize national identity (Taal 2003:155). However, this was not the case in Plaju, because the company town was out of reach of the nationalist municipal government of Palembang. As the names in Plaju were changed by the company and not by the government, there were no streets with names of heroes. All that the company did was change the Dutch ‘Weg’ into the English word ‘Road’, in order to adapt to the current political situation after Independence that tended to be hostile towards Dutch companies and to reflect the company’s part-English ownership (Table 12.2).

In contrast to the projective system, Asians tend to name streets and places after the peculiar characteristics of their kampong and landmarks related to daily life experiences. For example, in Singapore the Armenian Street (as it was called

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21 One exception is Captain Abdullah who was killed in Plaju in 1947, in the War of Independence. A street in Plaju was named after him and a statue dedicated to him and his soldiers was unveiled in the 1970s (Mangkualam 1986).
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<tr>
<td>Weg 23 Melati Road 23</td>
<td>Djl. Melati (Djl. 23)</td>
<td>Jl. Melati</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Weg 23 a Kamboja Road 23 a</td>
<td>Djl. Kamboja (Djl. 23 a)</td>
<td>Jl. Kamboja</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weg 24 Tjempaka Road 24</td>
<td>Djl. Tjempaka (Djl. 24)</td>
<td>Jl. Cempaka</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Weg 24 a Kemang Road 24 a</td>
<td>Djl. Kemang (Djl. 24 a)</td>
<td>Jl. Kemang</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Weg 25 Mawar Road 25</td>
<td>Djl. Mawar (Djl. 25)</td>
<td>Jl. Mawar</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Weg 26 Teratai Road 26</td>
<td>Djl Teratai (Djl. 26)</td>
<td>Jl. Teratai</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Weg 27 Terusan Road 27</td>
<td>Djl. Terusan (Djl. 27)</td>
<td>Jl. Teratai</td>
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<tr>
<td>Weg 30 Beringin Road 30</td>
<td>Djl. Beringin (Djl. 30)</td>
<td>Jl. Beringin</td>
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<tr>
<td>Weg 31 Antara Road 31</td>
<td>Djl. Antara (Djl. 31)</td>
<td>Jl. Antara</td>
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<tr>
<td>Weg 32 Bakaran Road 32</td>
<td>Djl. Bakaran (Djl. 32)</td>
<td>Jl. Bakaran</td>
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<td>Weg 33 Utama Road 33</td>
<td>Djl. Utama (Djl. 33)</td>
<td>Jl. Utama</td>
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<td>Weg 34 Rengas Road 34</td>
<td>Djl. Rengas (Djl. 34)</td>
<td>Jl. Rengas</td>
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<td>Djl. Upaya (Djl. 35)</td>
<td>Jl. Upaya</td>
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<td>Weg 37 Durian Road 37</td>
<td>Djl. Durian (Djl. 37)</td>
<td>Jl. Durian</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Weg 39 Kelapa Sawit Road 39</td>
<td>Djl. Kelapa Sawit (Djl. 39)</td>
<td>Jl. Kelapa Sawit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Weg 40 Pengantingan Road 40</td>
<td>Djl. Pengantingan (Djl. 40)</td>
<td>Jl. Pengantingan</td>
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<td>Weg 41 Permai Road 41</td>
<td>Djl. Permai (Djl. 41)</td>
<td>Jl. Permai</td>
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<td>Djl. Kenari (Djl. 46)</td>
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<td>Djl. Tembesu (Djl. 47)</td>
<td>Jl. Tembesu</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Weg 48 Djati Road 48</td>
<td>Djl. Djati (Djl. 48)</td>
<td>Jl. Jati</td>
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<tr>
<td>Weg 49 Tjemara Road 49</td>
<td>Djl. Tjemara (Djl. 49)</td>
<td>Jl. Cemara</td>
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<td>Weg 49 Lamtaro Road 49</td>
<td>Djl. Lamtaro (Djl. 49)</td>
<td>Jl. Lamtaro</td>
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<td>Weg 50 Lontar Road 50</td>
<td>Djl. Lontar (Djl. 50)</td>
<td>Jl. Lontar</td>
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<tr>
<td>Weg 51 Waru Road 51</td>
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<td>Jl. Waru</td>
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<td>Weg 55 Kenanga Road 55</td>
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<td>Djl. Rampai (Djl. 70)</td>
<td>Jl. Rampai</td>
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<tr>
<td>Weg 71 Bakung Road 71</td>
<td>Djl. Bakung (Djl. 71)</td>
<td>Jl. Bakung</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: ARSIP UP III PERTAMINA PLAJU, MAPS OF PLAJU FROM 1949, 1956 AND 1959
by the British overlord) was called Seng Po Toa Chu Au (Behind the big house Seng Po) by the Chinese inhabitants (Yeoh 1996:229–231). In the same vein, after 1949 ‘Asian’ names were added to the road numbers in Plaju. For instance, Road 31 became Antara Road 31, because it ran ‘between’ (antara in Indonesian) the refinery and the housing complex. Road 30 was renamed Beringin Road 30, because a banyan tree (waringin or beringin) stood there. This Asian way of nomenclature introduced after Independence confirms the impression that the public symbols of Plaju were gradually Indonesianized. The Indonesianization of Plaju was different from other places, however, because no names of heroes were imposed by the state; the place making was bottom-up based on local characteristics of the landscape.

Mounting tension over New Guinea resulted in the nationalization of Dutch companies in Indonesia in 1957–1958 (Mackie 2002:405). Because of its partly-British status, the BPM escaped nationalization, but the massive departure of Dutch staff caused instability in the company. Within six months the company replaced almost all its Dutch managers and staff with English and American personnel or promoted Indonesian workers to more responsible positions (Bartlett et al., 1986:116). In short, BPM wanted to rid the enterprise of its Dutch image and promote instead both an international and local image. Around 1955, the company’s name BPM became Shell Petroleum. Other oil companies in Indonesia followed this example; the Nederlandsche Koloniale Petroleum Maatschappij (a subsidiary of Standard Oil) and Nederlandsche Pacific Petroleum Maatschappij changed their names into Stanvac and Caltex Pacific (Basundoro 2004:15).

The naming policies of the foreign oil companies could eventually not stop the progressive nationalization, which was given juridical footing by the implementation of Law 44/1960 (Bartlett et al., 1986:173). Shell and other foreign oil companies were forced to accept a gradual take-over by the Indonesian state. This transfer would take almost five years (1960–1965). During that period, names of streets and places in Plaju were further Indonesianized. All English names carrying the word ‘Road’ were replaced by the Indonesian word ‘Djalan’ and after 1965 the projective system of giving names was abandoned completely. In this way names of streets inside the complex were soon no different from street names in the kampongs outside the complex.

At the same time as the street names in Plaju were changed, names of buildings were replaced following a similar pattern. Dutch names of important buildings were changed into English and later into Indonesian names (Table 12.3).
Conclusion

Plaju was a symbol of modernity in the early and mid-twentieth century, both because of the capital-intensive industry and the modern facilities offered to the labourers and white-collar staff. At first, the symbols of modernity were very much also symbols of Dutch colonialism: the modern villas, club, tennis court, etcetera were exclusively used by Europeans. The Indonesianization of the oil refinery started in the 1930s, long before political independence was achieved, when Indonesians gradually entered the middle echelons of the refinery. They did not only get better-paid jobs, but also appropriated various symbols of modernity. For instance, they established a social club of their own, where they experimented with a modern lifestyle (such as ballroom dancing) and spoke a hybrid language containing Dutch words. At the same time, also the European staff became Indonesianized, when they were stimulated to learn Indonesian and wear Indonesian dress (sarong and kabaya).

After Independence, the Indonesianization of the refinery progressed: more Indonesians were promoted to top ranks and British and Americans also replaced Dutch personnel. The Indonesianization of Plaju also took other forms, as when the Indonesian army occupied a considerable number of houses. The Indonesianization of Plaju took also a symbolic form, because names of streets and important buildings were changed into Indonesian. In the case of Plaju, it is significant that the process of name change occurred more slowly than in most other places, and more importantly, that names were first changed from Dutch to English and only in a second phase from English to Indonesian. For company directors, it was more important to avoid a Dutch image than to adopt an Indonesian appearance. For the same reason, new Indonesian street names refer only to local situations and not to national heroes.
In short, the Indonesianization of the oil refinery in Plaju was exceptional compared to major cities in Indonesia, firstly, because it started relatively early before 1945, and secondly, because it progressed relatively slowly after 1945. The explanation for this slow process was probably the relative isolation of Plaju. The political storms in Palembang were only a breeze by the time they reached the refinery. The company, throughout its own name changes, remained in control of the refinery until the mid-1960s. The municipal government of Palembang tried to include Plaju in its jurisdiction and even built an office for the kampong head in front of the gate of the Plaju housing complex (Manurung et al., 1956:190). The establishment of this office as a symbol of the Palembang municipality, and by extension the national state, did not affect the exclusiveness of Plaju.

According to Wolfram-Seifert (cited by Taal 2003), the exclusiveness of the Plaju refinery came to an end when the Ampera Bridge was built in 1965. Even then, however, Plaju was not totally integrated into the city of Palembang. The refinery came under the direct control of the central government in Jakarta and as a result the newly created symbols had a more national rather than regional character. For example, the name of the refinery changed from PT Shell Indonesia into PN Permina and after the fusion in 1965 with Pertamin it was eventually renamed Pertamina (Taal 2003:79). Furthermore, most of the refinery workers were recruited from outside Palembang with the result that people from Palembang did not regard the area as a part of Palembang. The Indonesianization of the symbols of modernity of Plaju did not entail a further integration of the refinery into Palembang.

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Chinese Cemeteries as a Symbol of Sacred Space
Control, Conflict, and Negotiation in Surabaya, Indonesia

Sarkawi B. Husain

Introduction

‘Hidup hanya menunda kekalahan’ (Life simply means postponing defeat), said Chairil Anwar in his poem Derai-derai cemara. Everybody will die one day. Yet, is that the end of everything? It is for the individual who is dead, but not to his or her remaining family and relatives. Death can sometimes stir up a hornet’s nest of problems. Funerals might be obstructed, graves might be robbed, tombstones might be destroyed, and cemeteries may be relocated, having to yield to city development. These problems represent the fate that has befallen Chinese cemeteries in Indonesia. In Yogyakarta, for instance, a Chinese cemetery abutting the housing complex of the Gadjah Mada University (UGM) had to be relocated because the land was needed for a campus mosque. In Makassar, a Chinese cemetery had to make way for an office for the governor of South Sulawesi.

As Surabaya developed in the 1950s, Chinese cemeteries also had to be closed. The urban population grew rapidly after independence. Squatters were looking for land on which to build a dwelling, and both the municipality and real-estate developers needed land for housing estates. The threat posed to tombs in the middle of housing areas was especially high on two counts. Firstly, on the practical level, they were considered excellent building land for housing.

Secondly, the graveyards conflicted with the desire of the urban government to give the city a modern appearance, one which befitted the newly won independent status of the country. The scattered graveyards violated the aesthetics of order and regularity, which also in colonial times were in the eyes of planners a sign of modernization (Van Roosmalen, this volume). The cemeteries thus ran counter to the desired modern image of Surabaya. Chinese cemeteries in particular were deemed inappropriately located in the centre, because in a sense they encapsulated the problematic relationship between the politically dominant, indigenous majority and the economically powerful, but politically weak, Chinese minority.¹ Two excerpts of the reasons given by the Surabaya

¹ According to the statistics of February 1959, the population of Surabaya consisted of: 1,003,312 Indonesians; 125,747 Chinese; 12,268 Europeans; 8,703 Arabs; 2,191 Indian/Pakistanis; and 117 Stateless persons (Surabaja Post 25-3-1959).
municipal government for its decision to close cemeteries in 1958 refer to the aesthetics (*keindahan kota*) and the fact that the cemeteries are no longer up-to-date with a modern city.

In view of the latest developments, it is inappropriate to have cemeteries such as those on Jl. Tambaksari Street, Embong Malang, Pandegiling, etc. in the middle of the city. [...] Moreover, if the aesthetic quality of the city is to be maintained, it is essential to close down the cemeteries.\(^2\)

[...] Because they are no longer consonant with current conditions in the city, the cemeteries in the city should be closed. This is in order to enlarge the city [...] On that particular vacant land, decent houses, which would enhance the aesthetics of the city will be built.\(^3\)

For its part, in view of the significance of graveyards in their culture, the Chinese community was extremely upset by the closure of its cemeteries by the municipality. The reasons for closing the cemeteries and using the land for housing complexes reflect the insensitivity of the local government to the existence of a cemetery, which was more than just a resting place for the deceased; it was a potent symbol of respect for the ancestors (Figure 13.1). In the eyes of Chinese people, a cemetery is redolent with a sacrosanct significance and function. Any negligence in caring for the ancestors' tombs could have fatal consequences for their children and grandchildren. Quite apart from any sacred significance, a tomb is also a cogent reminder of people's social-economic status; the reason rich people are willing to buy a large piece of land in which to bury their parents.

In Chinese culture, a tomb has enormous importance as it is believed that the soul of the deceased remains in contact with surviving family members. In order to show proper respect to the ancestors, it was necessary to construct a tomb as soundly as possible. In Chinese culture, respect for parents is called *Hao* and this is shown to living parents every day, but respect for the

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\(^3\) “[...] karena sudah tidak sesuai lagi dengan keadaan kota, maka makam-makam didalam kota itu harus ditutup. Ini untuk keperluan perluasan kota [...] Diatas tanah yang kosong itu lalu diberdirikan rumah-rumah yang baik dan jang sesuai dengan keindahan kota’. (Surabaya Post 25-3-1958)."
dead is paid differently. Confucianism teaches a tradition of strong kinship ties in which the family forms the basis for preserving customs and culture, and enormous respect is paid not only to the living parents but, by extension, also to the ancestors (Herlianto 2001:5; Moerman 1929:128–136).

Therefore, having a child, particularly a son, is of enormous importance to a Chinese family. A son is needed to continue the patrilineal lineage and to bring blessing (hokky), and also eventually he will replace his father in his role as guardian of the ancestors’ ashes. Given this situation, a parent’s tomb is thought of as the focal point of kinship ties among family members and relatives. Therefore, there is an annual celebration in the cemetery on Cengbeng Day, when relatives gather, pray, and make offerings at the ancestors’ tomb.

The preparations for a Chinese funeral can be complicated because it is essential that a tomb have good feng shui, that is: it should be located on a hill in the vicinity of flowing water (Figure 13.2). Bearing this in mind, many Chinese opt for cremation and preserve the ashes in an ash house in order to avoid tombs with bad feng shui and, of course, excessive expenses. Moreover, special account has to be taken of the orientation of the tomb, the tombstone,
and the date of the funeral. The Chinese believe that whether the *feng shui* is good or bad will become evident in a year’s time revealed in potential tangible influences on the son. At all costs, the Chinese usually strive to avoid changing the location of a cemetery considered good or, at least, not bad. However, if there are indications manifested through bad effects, a *feng shui* expert will immediately be summoned to examine the tomb to establish the reasons for the pernicious influences, and if possible, see if it can be upgraded to eliminate the atmosphere of calamity.

The measures taken by the city government in closing several Chinese cemeteries in Surabaya in the 1950s severely disturbed the sacredness of the tombs and eroded respect for ancestors. Instead of being a sacred symbol of the relationship with the ancestors, these cemeteries were unceremoniously transformed into building land, contested between parties with disparate interests. The relocation of cemeteries for city development and dwellings, office buildings, mosques, and other purposes sent palpable signals, which could not be ignored, that a cemetery as a sacred symbol had to bow to economic and political symbols (Nas 1993). This chapter examines the ways in which Chinese cemeteries in Surabaya were disturbed and the Chinese using them felt threatened as the city was modernized, and how their role in Chinese society was superseded by other symbols.
Chinese Cemeteries during the Colonial Era and the Japanese Occupation

In the face of rapid population growth, the position of a cemetery as a last resting place became crucial. In the colonial era, cemeteries were located in the residential areas of each community group in Surabaya. The European cemetery was close to the Krembangan church, in the vicinity of the European area around Jembatan Merah. The Arab cemetery was located in the Arab quarter, Ampel. The principal Chinese cemetery was in the Chinese quarter, located between Handelstraat (now Jalan Kembang Jepun) and Chinesche Voorstraat (now Jalan Karet) (von Faber 1931:314–319), but Chinese graves were found in at least ten different locations in Surabaya.

In the last days of the colonial era, matters relating to the Chinese cemetery were regulated in the Verordening op de Algemeene Begraafplaatsen voor Chinezen in de Stadsgemeente Soerabaja. This regulation was issued on 7 February 1940 and ratified two months later. The decree set out the conditions pertaining to such matters as the burial permit, the digging of the grave, transportation of the corpse, tombstone, as well as the maintenance costs of the cemetery.

In contrast to the period after independence, the Chinese cemeteries raised very few problems during the colonial era and the subsequent Japanese occupation. There are several possible explanations for this relative lack of problems relating to cemeteries. One possible reason might have been the discipline exercised by the determination of the Dutch and Japanese colonial governments to protect public places. Another possible reason is that the Chinese population had more political clout before 1942; for instance, they were entitled to reserved seats on the municipal council. Arguably most importantly, there was less population pressure and more other available land.

During their occupation, the Japanese did interfere with the Muslim cemeteries, which lay scattered throughout the town. On 1 August 1942, the Japanese government announced the closing of some Islamic cemeteries, including those at Simolawang Gang II, Oendaan Wetan, Kalisari Gang I, Kambojastraat, Ketabangkali, Djagalan Gang IV, Djagalan Gang V, Kawatan Gang 12, and Plemahan Gang V (Penoetoepan 2602 [1942]). The following year, on 30 June 1943, the municipality decided that as of 1 July 1943 cemeteries in certain neighbourhoods (kampungs) would be out of bounds. The cemeteries closed at that juncture were Soerabajan, Kedoengkliner Gang VII, Wonoredjo Gang III, Kedondong Lor, Pandegiling Gang I, Koepang Pandjaan, Kedoenganjar Gang

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4 AKS, box 1827, no. 45.887, Bijvoegsel van het Provinciaal Blad van Oost-Java Serie B, no. 4, 1-4-1940. There were separate regulations for other ethnic or religious groups.
Kuburan, Petemon Gang Kuburan, Garoeda Gang 2, and Dinojo Aloen-Aloen Gang IV.\textsuperscript{5} No explanation was given for closing the cemeteries, but it might even then have been related to the need of space to pursue measures to improve the already obvious dearth of housing.

Insofar as the Japanese were concerned about Chinese deaths, it was not about the cemeteries, but their custom of keeping the dead body above the ground for some days. Although the Japanese Government still allowed Chinese people to keep deceased relatives at home for several days, this was on the condition that the corpse was in a closed coffin and that they complied with orders issued by the Eisibutyo (Head of City Health Office).\textsuperscript{6}

\section*{The Chinese Cemetery during the Early Days of the Republic}

After independence, Chinese cemeteries became increasingly vulnerable. Conflicts, once latent, between the Chinese and the local community began to emerge. These contentions were essentially about space and land as homeless people used the cemetery land to build houses on; they turned the cemeteries into kampongs. This practice already occurred in colonial times (Figure 13.3), but now became more common. The sorts of incidents which vented the latent tension could assume many forms and included burglaries, the obstruction of the Chinese funerals, and various swindles, to mention just a few. On 27 January 1958, for example, three pieces of limestone worth 600 rupiahs each were stolen from Kembang Kuning Chinese cemetery (\textit{Surabaja Post} 28-1-1959). Chinese associations regularly submitted complaints to the municipal government when such problems arose. Importantly, these associations offered families a formal vehicle in which they could organize themselves and draw strength from unity; taking care of the elaborate, expensive burials was just one of the tasks assumed by these associations. In this section, I shall indicate a number of cemetery-related disturbances with which the Chinese had to deal in the early years of the independent Republic of Indonesia.

On 28 March 1951, the Giok Yong Kong Hwee association sent a letter to the Surabaya municipal government enumerating the disturbances experienced by its members. These incidents had taken place on 24 and 25 March 1951. On 24 March, Tan Ing Tjiauw, who had just buried his child in Banju Urip, was forced to sign a letter by a group of people before they would let him go home. On 26 March, some of these people came to Tan Ing Tjiauw’s house and again

\textsuperscript{5} Aks, box 231, no. 4185, letter Surabaya Shityo, no. 1076/B, 30-6-2603 [1943].

\textsuperscript{6} Aks, box 127, no. 1934; box 133, no. 1975.
asked him for money. What exactly happened remains unclear, but it would seem that Tan Ing Tjiauw was intimidated and felt compelled to pay in order to be left in peace. Another disturbance in the cemetery in Banju Urip occurred on 25 March when people from the local community prevented Njoo Hian Liong from burying the body of his daughter. Njoo Hian Liong then requested the Hok Kian Kong Tik Soe association to allow his daughter to be buried in the Kupang Gunung cemetery.7

The municipal government promptly responded to the letter from the Hok Kian Kong Tik Soe association and issued an official announcement, dated 12 April 1951, stating that the land in Banju Urip was a cemetery: as this status had now been confirmed, no building permits for this land were to be issued by the municipal administration. Thus, on 2 May 1951, the Dewan Pemerintah Daerah (DPD, Executive Board of the Local [Municipal] Administration) of Surabaya sent a letter to the Kepala Kepolisian Urusan Dalam Kota Surabaya (Chief of the Surabaya Police) with the request that the requisite measures be taken to prevent disturbances at Chinese funerals and to prosecute offenders properly according to the letter of the law. In the opinion of the DPD the offences against the Chinese should be regarded as criminal acts as stipulated in the Criminal Code, which stated:

7 AKS, box 1496, no. 32.896.
Any individual who deliberately disturbs people who enter a cemetery for legitimate purposes or who obstructs a funeral will be sentenced to a maximum of one month and two weeks’ imprisonment or a fine of a maximum of 120 rupiahs.8

The police responded to the request from the DPD, by interrogating the persons involved in the particular incidents and these people promised henceforward to refrain from any further actions. The Dinas Perkembangan Kota (Urban Development Office) cleared the burial ground of the huts, which had recently obstructed people who were holding a funeral.9 These examples of cases would seem to warrant the conclusion that the municipal administration upheld the historical rights of the Chinese cemeteries against the invasion of land-hungry squatters.

Ongoing Conflicts: The Closure of Chinese Cemeteries in the Late 1950s

In the course of the 1950s, the matter of squatting became an issue of steadily growing proportions in Surabaya (Purnawan 2005; Colombijn 2010). The problem of demolishing illegal dwellings was a serious matter, as the Pakis incident of April 1956 shows. The attempted demolition of illegal houses in Kampong Pakis resulted in four deaths and two people injured. Furthermore, as a direct response to this demolition, thousands of people went on strike in May 1956 and a number of communal and political organizations called for an end to the demolitions, demanding the prosecution of the state apparatus (military). The upshot of this event was a prohibition on demonstrations in the area of Surabaya City proper. This prohibition was issued and then officially proclaimed by the commander-in-chief of the army.10

Against the confused background of the spread of squatting, the mounting population pressure and the hints of a deterioration in Chinese-indigenous
relationships, the municipality of Surabaya somewhat cut back of its previous efforts to defend the cemeteries against squatters. In 1958, the Dinas Pekerjaan Umum (PU, Public Works Office) proposed the closure of several Chinese cemeteries in different areas of the town. The Public Works Office argued that these closures were essential because cemeteries should not be located in the middle of the city. Such a location was deemed inappropriate and was thought to affect the appearance of the city adversely. The proposal was sent to the Dewan Pemerintah Daerah Peralihan (DPDP, Interim Executive Council of the Local Administration) of Surabaya, which discussed the matter with a specially instituted commission, Panitia Penyelesaian Tanah Makam Tionghoa (Commission for the Settlement of [the Disputes about] Chinese Burial Grounds), which included representatives from the Chinese community in Surabaya. After reaching an agreement with the Panitia Penyelesaian Tanah Makam Tionghoa, on 11 March 1958 the DPDP of Surabaya publicly announced the planned closure of seven Chinese cemeteries.11 People were given a period of up to six months after this proclamation was issued to submit a written request to hold a funeral in one of the cemeteries or lodge an objection to this plan.12 The DPDP also designated three cemeteries which were to remain open and where burials could continue to take place. The three cemeteries threatened with closure were those to the south of Jalan Banju Urip, to the west of Jalan Kembang Kuning, and the cemetery in Banju Urip, Kupang Gunung, and Kembang Kuning.

Closing seven cemeteries to burials dealt with just one aspect of the problem; the urban administration also tried to solve the problem, which formed the other side of the coin: squatting in cemeteries. Therefore, as well as the announcement of the closure of the cemeteries, the DPDP declared that henceforward it was prohibited to erect dwellings within the confines of a cemetery. Furthermore, to ensure that the announcement was put into effect, the DPDP added another rule, stating that any individual in breach of the prohibition on the construction or use of buildings in one of the ten Chinese cemeteries (seven closed, three still open), would be liable to punishment under a regulation of the Central Military Sovereign dated 4 December 1957.13 This ordinance covered the prohibition on the use of land without the possession of a legal

11 These cemeteries were: Jalan Kembangjepun; Jalan Tambaksari (Karanggajam); Jalan Teratai/Jalan Mendut; the south and north of Jalan Embong Malang; south and north of Jalan Pandegiling; the north of Jalan Banju Urip; and Jalan Cokroaminoto.
12 AKS, box 118 no. 1824, letter Dinas Pekerjaan Umum to Dewan Pemerintah Daerah Peralihan, 7-2-1958; Surabaya Post 14-3-1958.
13 Regulation of Central Military Sovereign dated 4 December 1957 No. Pert/P.M./014/1957.
permit from the landowner or the authorities. Naturally enough, the prohibition on squatting in cemeteries did not end the practice; the municipality now faced the task of finding land to accommodate the people who had built illegal dwellings in the cemeteries and were now evicted (*Surabaja Post* 14-3-1958).

Despite, or perhaps because of, the measures taken by the local administration, on 16 March 1958 another conflict erupted between the local community and Chinese people who had gathered to bury a relative. This case is interesting for two reasons. First, the intervention of security officers who were guarding the funeral prevented the local people from making trouble, however it simultaneously stirred up anger and subsequent reprisals against the city government. Second, the conflict occurred on day five after the announcement on the closure of seven Chinese cemeteries. The announcement might well have triggered the conflict.

The conflict began as Liem Kie Seng prepared to bury his female relative, Liem Kiem Nio, in the cemetery belonging to the Hwa Kiauw Bian Hap Hwee association, south of Jalan Banju Urip. The reason the local community halted the funeral was its objection that the tomb was located very near one of its houses. The people asked Liem Kie Seng to move the location of the tomb away to a distance of 100 metres from the house. This request was rejected by the children of the deceased, Liem Kiem Nio, on the grounds of Municipal Ordinance No. 770200/8, dated 13 March 1958, which permitted the funeral. Furthermore, it was impossible to postpone the funeral any longer. To avoid further incidents, the State Police Sector I joined members of the Military Police Unit 55 to provide an escort for the funeral procession.

In the next phase of the incident, the local people, represented by the heads of the neighbourhood associations and the Panitia Penutupan Penguburan Jenazah Bangsa Tionghoa (Committee of Chinese Cemetery Closure, a committee formed by the people of Banju Urip) took the matter to the provincial government. They sent a letter to DPDP of East Java, dated 1 April 1958, in which the residents complained about the unjust and discriminatory decision of the Surabaya Municipality DPDP in the case of the funeral of Liem Kiem Nio. Her tomb was located on the border of Kampong Banju Urip Kidul and very close

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15 The exact family relationship between Liem Kie Seng and Liem Kiem Nio is unclear.

16 *AKS*, box 118, no. 1824.
to people’s dwellings: only 25 metres from houses and wells for drinking water. The local people had not been able to do anything to prevent the burial because the police had protected the funeral party.

In its letter to the DPDP of East Java, the local community argued that the incident was an unequivocal indication that the decision of the DPDP of Surabaya had been unfair. Whereas the interests of Liem Kie Seng had been thoroughly taken care of by the granting of permission to hold the burial, the interests of the Banju Urip people had been completely ignored. The unfortunate incident had stirred up feelings of deep resentment in the community of Banju Urip, for two reasons. Their first grudge was that the funeral of a Chinese person (Liem Kiem Nio), who was of no significance to the state or the people, had been protected by state institutions, and this was not one of its official tasks. The letter is not fully clear on this point, but people felt that perhaps the police had protected the funeral above and beyond the call of duty and had actually been privately hired by the relatives of Liem Kie Seng. Whatever the truth of the matter, the people believed that the police and military had other, more urgent tasks to perform than escorting a funeral. The second cause of resentment was that the incident supported the popular feeling that democracy was consciously being violated by a small group of people to sustain their own vested interests, at the cost of public interests. The letter of the neighbourhood people did not make explicit which minority group allegedly violating democracy they had in mind, but almost certainly from the context they were referring to the Chinese.

The frequent reference to the word ‘democracy’, and the ‘destruction of democracy’, is significant in the socio-political period of 1957–1965, when Indonesia was ruled by what was known as Guided Democracy. This was a politically shaky period. In 1958, the perceptibly growing centralizing power of the Government was seriously contested in the PRRI/Permesta Rebellion (Ricklefs 1991:396; Surabaja Post 22-2-1958; 3-3-1959). At the local level, in 1957 and 1958 local municipal politics livened up, because, in contrast to the Parliament, municipal councils were elected bodies and, secure in the knowledge they had been chosen by the voters, dared to speak out. As a partial consequence of the national elections of 1955 and municipal elections later, the Indonesian Communist Party, plus other political parties and labour unions, emerged as champions of the squatters. People no longer just accepted any arbitrary decision issued by the government; they dared to resist (Colombijn 2010).

17 AKS, box 1852, no. 46.935.
In reaction to the letter sent by the neighbourhood leaders of Banju Urip, the DPDP of East Java sent a letter, dated 9 June 1958, asking the DPDP of Surabaya to submit a report setting out details of the situation. In a letter, dated 31 July 1958, the mayor of Surabaya informed the DPDP of East Java that the problem was solved after the local community had been provided with the necessary explanation. Whether tension on the ground had really been dissipated by this exchange of letters remains an open question. The real answer is perhaps not, as another major conflict broke out within months.

The next major conflict, again involving the police, erupted on 14 July 1958, when two members of the Chinese burial association, Hwa Kiauw Bian Hap Hwee, were digging a grave. When the local community noticed the work in progress, its members obstructed it, with the result that the relatives of the deceased had to go to the Public Works Office of the Surabaya municipality to try to repair the situation. The family received a letter of notification from the head of the Bagian Makam (Cemetery Division) of the Public Works Office, M. Kasno, stating that the cemetery was not one of the seven cemeteries, which had been closed, so the burial could proceed.

Because the community did not comply with the letter of notification from the municipal government and continued to hinder the funeral, the Chinese family sought help from the police. Anticipating possible riots, the police made sure that it had backup from the Military Police. Despite the forces arrayed against it, the community was determined to obstruct the funeral. They presented a common resolution stating their arguments for doing this. This resolution confused both the police and the military police, who consequently offered the Chinese family insufficient help to ensure the safe procedure of the funeral. In view of the situation and as it was growing dark, the board of the Hwa Kiauw Bian Hap Hwee burial association hurriedly offered another burial place, which was accepted by the relatives, although the deceased could no longer be buried alongside his wife's tomb as requested in his will.

The board of the Hwa Kiauw Bian Hap Hwee association claimed that this incident had contravened the state regulations and had violated the moral right of the family to hold a funeral in accordance with its own traditions. Therefore, the committee urged the government to take the measures necessary to ensure against any recurrence of the unfortunate affair. It argued that steps to prevent any future disruptions should include ensuring that the local community was provided with detailed information via the heads of the urban kamponds (kepala Rukun Kampung, or RK). This would ensure three matters:

18 AKS, box 1852, no. 46.935.
19 AKS, box 118, no. 1824.
funerals taking place in legitimate cemeteries would no longer be obstructed; funerals would no longer have to be escorted by the police as this caused resentment in the community against the security forces; and there would be a stop to the illegal use of burial land and illegal buildings in the cemeteries.\textsuperscript{20}

The municipal government responded positively to this request by the burial association, to the effect it sent a letter to the kampong heads. The letter, dated 2 September 1958, stated three points. The first of these was that those Chinese cemeteries not listed for closure in the decree of 11 March 1958 were legally designated cemeteries in which funerals could be held. The second made clear that the obstruction of the funeral of two Chinese people on 14 July 1958 in the legally designated Chinese cemetery in Kupang Gunung had broken the law and was irresponsible. Finally, to avoid similar incidents in future, all heads of the kampong associations were requested to inform their communities about the legal position of Chinese cemeteries.\textsuperscript{21}

Still unsettled by the ongoing disturbances at the Chinese cemeteries, the Panitia Perhimpunan Makam dan Tanah Makam Tionghoa (Committee for the Protection of Chinese Cemeteries and Burial Land), a Chinese lobby group, sent a letter to the Surabaya municipal government dated 9 September 1959. The letter enumerated five points. First, the situation in the cemeteries had not improved despite the announcement by the DPDP that seven Chinese cemeteries had been designated for closure and the subsequent prohibition on erecting buildings on designated cemetery land without a permit in the before-mentioned 1957 regulation of the Central Military Sovereign.\textsuperscript{22} Second, the dismantling and moving of illegal houses in Chinese cemeteries had not yet been completed, as the heads of the kampongs (kepala RK) were aware. Third, illegal buildings in the cemeteries, some of them even built of brick, were mushrooming. Fourth, the community was still denying the legitimate use of the still open cemeteries by the Chinese. Fifth, it was impossible to hold a funeral in the proper Chinese manner as people were forced to separate spouses in death. Referring to the latest incident, the letter mentioned that one funeral had had to be moved to another cemetery in order to prevent an escalation in the conflict between the police and the local community.\textsuperscript{23}

The Surabaya DPDP forwarded this letter to the Chief Inspector of the Surabaya City Police with the request that any further destruction of the Chinese cemeteries be prevented in accordance with the agreement made in

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{20} AKS, box 118, no. 1824.
\bibitem{21} AKS, box 118, no. 1824, letter DPDP Surabaya to Kepala RK, 2-9-1958.
\bibitem{22} Regulation of Central Military Sovereign dated 4 December 1957, No. Pert/P.M./014/1957.
\bibitem{23} AKS, box 118, no. 1824.
\end{thebibliography}
the previous month between three parties: Komando Militer Kota Besar (KMKB, Military Command of a Municipality), the police, and the DPDP of Surabaya.24

Despite the best efforts undertaken by the Surabaya municipal government to deal with the disturbances at Chinese cemeteries, none of its actions was very successful; the destruction inexorably continued. On 15 July 1961, Tan Hong Lian (a government medical doctor) sent a letter to the mayor of Surabaya in which he complained about the destruction of his family’s tomb in Banju Urip. The extent of the destruction was so serious it had lead to the exposure of a coffin. Responding to the complaint, the mayor forwarded the letter to the Chief of the Surabaya Police Sector I so that the necessary measures could be taken.25 The latter’s reaction is unknown.

**Negotiating a Solution**

As a response to the plan to close seven Chinese cemeteries and to the opportunity offered by the DPDP to object, various Chinese people submitted a special consideration to the municipal government. On 28 March 1958, for instance, the Lam Yang Tjo Soe association, chaired by Han Twan Hwie, wrote a letter to the DPDP requesting permission to use two graves it had bought on Jalan Mendut.26 On 12 May 1958, the association sent another letter informing the authorities that there were thirty-two tombs still unused. In this letter, Han Twah Hwie requested that funerals on this land should be permitted to go ahead without any unnecessary obstacles.27

On 3 September 1958, Tjoa Ping Khie sent a letter requesting that he and his wife be given permission to use the Chinese cemetery in Banju Urip for their future funeral. Tjoa Ping Khie had bought the grave space for himself and his wife five years prior to the announcement that this cemetery would be closed. The municipal government consented to the latter’s request.28
As said, in the municipal proclamation of 11 March 1958, Chinese people were given a six-month period in which to submit a request for dispensation for those among them who wanted to bury relatives in one of the seven cemeteries. This provision was a prudent decision as many Chinese had already bought land for their tombs long before the Government issued the announcement. Nevertheless, the granting of dispensation became a source of conflict between the local community and the Chinese who wanted to hold funerals. In the opinion of the people living around the cemeteries, commencing with the proclamation on 11 March 1958, the Chinese funerals could no longer be held in the designated graveyards.

Tjoa Ping Khie, who had successfully obtained permission to be buried with his wife in the future, had to bear the brunt of this when he applied for dispensation to use the Chinese cemetery in Banju Urip. The community rejected the dispensation granted by the municipal government for the following reasons: Banju Urip was transformed into an orderly residential area, although the most of the houses situated there did not have a formal permit from the Surabaya municipal government and consequently the land use for funerals was illegal. Second, a recent confrontation with a person from Malang who was renovating his parents' tomb had caused an unexpected incident. In the opinion of the local community, to avoid further incidents, the municipal government should take three steps, namely: the Banju Urip cemetery should remain closed (no more dispensations should be granted); the designation of Banju Urip as a cemetery had to be withdrawn; and the dispensation granted to Tjoa Ping Khie should be nullified.29

The government repudiated the objections made by the community and permits or dispensations continued to be issued to Chinese families, for instance that given to Han Tjing Tjwan on 12 September 1961 to bury a relative, Mrs Han Tjong Khing, in Tambaksari.30

Eager to find a solution, the DPDP invited the Panitia Penyelesaian Tanah Makam Tionghoa (Committee for the Resolution of the Chinese Cemeteries) to a meeting on 21 January 1959. This same committee had been consulted prior to the seminal proclamation of 11 March 1958, stipulating that seven cemeteries had to be closed and squatting had to end. In this meeting of 21 January 1959, Amiruddin (member of the DPDP Surabaya), and Soedarmadji (member of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Peralihan, Interim Municipal Council) represented the administration. The eight-person strong delegation from the

29 AKS, box 1852, no. 46.935.
30 AKS, box 1846, no. 38.178.
Committee for the Resolution of the Chinese Cemeteries was led by Ong Ing Sien.

The goal of the meeting was to find a solution for the community, which was using Chinese cemeteries as a dwelling place. The meeting also revealed that a few indigenous people were knowingly making a profit by buying and selling cemetery land. In the meeting, Ong Ing Sien pointed out that the problem with Chinese cemeteries did not stop with the illegal acquisition of land; it also extended to the obstruction of Chinese funerals by the local community. Therefore, he called on the local government to end the problem once and for all by requesting the military to take resolute measures.31

According to Oon Tjing Tiauw (secretary of the Committee for the Resolution of the Chinese Cemeteries), one of the most difficult matters experienced by Chinese people was the illegal use of the empty spare tombs; tombs prepared for future burials were now occupied by local people. To retrieve the tombs, the Chinese people had to pay compensation. Therefore, he hoped that, anticipating Cengbeng Day on 5 April 1958, the local government would immediately remove all illegal dwellings from the cemeteries. Tho Boon Hwan, another member of the committee, proposed that the local government should relocate the tombs to a public cemetery, or the government should provide housing for the community.32

Three conclusions emerged from the meeting between the municipal administration and the Committee for the Resolution of the Chinese Cemeteries. First, while a solution was sought, the building of illegal dwellings would be halted. With the support of the authorities, the committee would set up border demarcation signs or build fences around the cemeteries. Furthermore, the committee was required to locate the troublemakers. Second, the local government would discuss the provisions concerning the cemeteries with the police. Third, the local government would discuss the security of the cemeteries on Cengbeng Day with the police.33

Conclusion

For many people who have special traditions linked to the burial of a relative, the cemetery is a ‘sacred space’ and a site of great importance. Cemeteries are particularly important to Chinese people, as the cemetery is more than the last
resting place of their deceased relatives; its significance is far greater: it symbolizes respect for ancestors and underlines social status. The problem is that cemeteries require a large area of land, which often leads to conflicts about urban space. In colonial times, conflicts about Chinese burials were still largely contained by the state.

The frequency and intensity of conflicts increased in the course of the 1950s, for several reasons. The major reason was that many economic migrants had poured into Surabaya and empty urban space was in extremely short supply; these migrants invaded the Chinese cemeteries, occupied tombs, and built houses in the burial grounds. The municipal administration had less authority than its Dutch and Japanese predecessors had had and therefore less power to stop the squatters. The squatters, in contrast, had gained strength since colonial times, because they enjoyed the backing of grassroots movements, including political parties. Being the authorized owners of the cemetery, the Chinese community could not tolerate the squatters, let alone the constant disturbances, which disrupted funerals, but the Chinese had less political clout than they had had in Dutch times.

The response of the local administration to mounting tensions was to begin by closing seven Chinese cemeteries, but at the same time to give better protection from squatters to the three remaining Chinese cemeteries. In other words, slowly but surely the Chinese cemeteries were removed from the centre of the city. The untidy appearance of a Chinese cemetery was not suitable in a modern town. The idea that a cemetery, full of significance for the next of kin, was something valuable became increasingly obsolete in the modernizing city.

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