In and Out of Suriname

Language, Mobility and Identity

Edited by

Eithne B. Carlin, Isabelle Léglise, Bettina Migge, and Paul B. Tjon Sie Fat
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CHAPTER 1

Looking at Language, Identity, and Mobility in Suriname

Eithne B. Carlin, Isabelle Léglise, Bettina Migge and Paul B. Tjon Sie Fat

1 Introduction

Language in Suriname is a vigorous obsession and has been an emotive topic since colonisation by the Dutch. Today, Dutch continues to be the sole officially recognised and promoted language while the vast majority of the population speaks any number of the other 20 or more languages found in Suriname, though not necessarily including Dutch. Popular and official discourse on language, in the main, revolve around language ideologies that are steeped in the colonised mindset of ethnicised inequality whereby the importance of knowing Dutch is regarded as having gate-keeping functions in Surinamese society. The other languages tend to be associated with ethnic and social constructs that are not conducive to upward social mobility, but many of them are indispensable for managing everyday life and tend to have high covert prestige.

Previous scholarship on some of the individual languages of Suriname and on language in Suriname, has, in the main, focused on historical issues such as language genesis (see, for example, Arends 1995; Migge 2003; articles in Carlin and Arends 2002; Migge and Smith 2007 and in Essegbey, Migge and Winford 2013 for works on the creole languages of Suriname), the historical development of, in particular, Sranantongo (Arends 1989; Bruyn 1995; van den Berg 2007) and language description (Carlin 2004; Huttar and Huttar 1994; articles in Carlin and Arends 2002; Goury and Migge 2003; McWhorter and Good 2012). Earlier work presented in Charry et al. (1983) provides some useful information about how Dutch, Sranantongo and Sarnámi were practiced, including multilingual practices and contact patterns, language ideologies and their recent development. There are also a few articles that examine the linguistic context of Suriname based on statistical (census) and socio-historical data by St-Hilaire (1999, 2001) who has argued that Dutch is gaining ground in Suriname due to a policy of linguistic assimilation. Assimilation, however, for as far as it is taking place, has not proceeded at the same speed and in the same way for all Surinamese. Crucially, urbanised populations tend to have
a greater knowledge of Dutch and consequently contact between Dutch and the languages spoken by urbanised populations, as well as mutual contact between the latter is much more intense in the main urban hubs, and Paramaribo in particular, than in rural locations. However, linguistic diversity and contact, as we show in this book, are not solely characteristics of urban spaces. Outside of Paramaribo, the use of languages other than Dutch tends to be more the norm. While these previous works are clearly valuable, there is a need to update them with current data and to expand the focus of attention beyond the urban centres and mainstream cultural and linguistic contact situations to those languages and populations that are often considered to be peripheral in the Surinamese imagination, namely the languages spoken by rural populations and more recent immigrants.

This book aims, therefore, at revisiting the social and linguistic context of contemporary Suriname and shifting attention away from the purely historical and anthropological construction of Surinamese reality to look instead at language practices in Suriname through the lens of identity construction, mobility patterns, linguistic ideology and multilingualism. The three main themes we engage in this book, language, identity and mobility overlap in several aspects, though the link between language and social identity would likely seem the most obvious for most people. From an evolutionary point of view, the huge variety of living languages and varieties of the same language can be related to the human need to index group identity; language helps to bind us to those with whom we share primal group identity, and it separates us from outsiders and competing groups (Pagel 2012). In dominant Surinamese multiculturalist discourse, ethnicity and language are interchangeable; ethnic identity implies a distinct language used by a particular ethnic group, and languages are often thought to reflect monolithic ethnic identities. In practice, this is, of course, not the case because people who claim certain ethnic belonging, for example, Hindustani, do not necessarily also claim to speak Sarnámi as their main language or even at all.

Surinamese are generally multilingual. They creatively draw on a range of languages and language practices in order to (temporarily) invoke certain identities, stances, and relationships and to (re)negotiate existing social constructs. The types of languages that are practiced and their social functions are variable across individuals depending both on people’s aspirations and the social networks and contexts in which they interact. In the dominant Surinamese discourse of language and identity, which is reflected in state and non-state institutions, the media and education, and entrenched in historical ideologies and economic practices, mobility has come to be, paradoxically enough, a static notion, one that refers to the historical labour importation into
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Suriname, first from Africa and later from Asia, and migration from Suriname towards the Netherlands and elsewhere. Neither modern globalised migration nor fundamental motivations of human mobility, such as curiosity, *wanderlust*, and the like, that fall outside of the historical construct of the nation state, are recognised in Suriname as being mobility. For example, recent Chinese migration to Suriname is seen as a continuation of a uniquely Surinamese process that began in the mid-nineteenth century with the advent of Chinese indentured labourers installed to replace slave labour after the abolition of slavery, rather than as the result of the worldwide impact of Chinese globalisation. It is in this light that mobility patterns of, for example, Amerindians in the interior of Suriname and surrounding countries, or movements of Maroons along and across the Marowijne border are barely recognised as being mobility at all; rather in the former case they are seen as essentialist features of an imagined nomadic identity, and in the latter case they do not figure in an equally imaginary sedentary, tribal identity. The Maroon and Amerindian mobility patterns fall outside of the historicised peopling of mainstream, or urban, Suriname. However, these movements from village to village, from *kampu* to *kampu*, have always been basic to, and constitutive of, the historical peopling of the Guianas.

Methodologically, social science research in Suriname has been limited by the idiosyncrasies of the ethnicised view of the Surinamese state, where the nation is taken as the prime container category, an arbitrarily bounded context. In order to avoid methodological territorialism, namely “formulating concepts and questions, constructing hypotheses, gathering and interpreting empirical evidence, and drawing conclusions all in a territorial spatial framework” (Scholte 2005), this book takes social interactions and social actors as primary categories. Traditionally, post-modernist and post-structuralist approaches to Surinamese society are rare (for one example, see Tjon Sie Fat 2009a), and the use of ethnic groups as valid analytical categories in social science and linguistic research is seldom challenged. This book breaks away from the traditional notions of bounded ethnic groups and the tug of the urban centres to show interwoven social interactions that are constitutive of identity-making processes and ever-changing linguistic practices.

Identity Construction

Identity can be broadly defined as a person’s sense of belonging to or alignment with a specific social group, society or place, and identity construction as the ways in which people negotiate this belonging or alignment. Identities are generally variable, contingent, and emergent rather than immutable. People
claim membership in multiple groupings encompassing “(a) macro-level demographic categories; (b) local, ethnographically specific cultural positions; and (c) temporary and interactionally specific stances and participant roles” (Bucholtz and Hall 2010: 21). Dealing with the issue of identity is very fundamentally a methodological concern. The cultural studies approach to cultural identity, which includes, but is not limited to, ethnic identity, is very much anti-essentialist; subjects are not unified but fractured, made up of multiple, changeable, contingent, situational identities rather than a single, fixed one (Hall 1990). People are not their social identities; rather, they perform or enact social identities (Butler 1990). And in social interactions identities are constantly being (re)negotiated. The different identities are linked to, but are not determined, in an essentialist manner, by the various social roles that people engage in across the different contexts in which they generally interact/participate. Thus, an Amerindian activist can promote Amerindian identity politics in his own language in his community and in Dutch in Paramaribo while at the same time ensuring the upward social mobility of his children by insisting on their being educated in Dutch, and maintaining his inter-ethnic networking skills by the use of Sranantongo. By using the different languages in his repertoire he can easily shift between identities on the local, regional, and national levels in the various and often simultaneously occurring contexts.

Language is generally assumed to be one of the most salient markers of identity, as it links people to places, communities, and ways of being in the world. Its constitution lies in indexicality which “involves the creation of semiotic links between linguistic [or non-linguistic] forms and social meanings (Ochs 1992; Silverstein 1985)”. Commonly attested indexical processes involve: “(a) overt mention of identity categories and labels; (b) implicatures and presuppositions regarding one’s own or other’s identity position; (c) displayed evaluative and epistemic orientations to ongoing talk, as well as interactional footings and participant roles; and (d) the use of linguistic structures and systems that are ideologically associated with specific personas and groups” (Bucholtz and Hall 2010: 21). In other words, specific languages, ways of using a language, ways of talking about languages and/or linguistic properties become indices of social groups or identities through the processes of iconisation and erasure (Irvine and Gal 2000: 37). Social identities cannot be described independently of their temporal, social and spatial context. Thus, the way in which group boundaries are marked and negotiated through linguistic practices (cf. Barth 1969; Wimmer 2013), needs to be explored through both micro- and macro-level empirical social and linguistic research that focuses on people’s actions and people’s understandings or perceptions of their own and other’s actions. As shown in Léglise and Migge (2006) and Migge and Léglise (2013),
examining the perspectives of all social actors allows us to elucidate the complex links between social and linguistic behaviour.

With regard to ethnic identity, such a tendency to treat ethnic groups as emic rather than etic categories is called ‘groupism’ (Brubaker 2004). Ethnic groups are not bounded entities, rather they are social constructs that are invoked for specific purposes in specific contexts. Ethnic identities, just like any other identities, are therefore highly fluid, relational, and situational. For example, Maroons may identify with particular clans and ethnic groups in the interior of Suriname but may assume a more general Maroon identity in Paramaribo, where they easily access an even wider Afro-Surinamese identity. There is an absence of studies of Surinamese society that take as their focus identity as a fluid social construct, be that ethnic, gender, class or any other identity. Assimilation, hybridity, and ethnic intertwining, for example through mixed unions, are not reflected sufficiently in current scholarship on Suriname, particularly historical and ethnographic works, which still too often reflect the dominant ethnicised discourse which assumes ethnic identity to be a bounded measurable entity. These are not, however, just a fact of the recent past although it would seem that processes of urbanisation have led to an increase in intensity of ‘ethnic’ and social mixing. All the authors in this book have engaged with the challenge of avoiding methodological territorialism as described above, and have taken pains to highlight the tenuous link that exists between ethnicity and other social categories and constructs such as language.

Tjon Sie Fat, for example, discusses the mismatch between the idea of a monolithic Chinese ethnicity with an associated, and equally monolithic Chinese language, and the reality of increased linguistic variety as a result of immigration from many different areas in China since the early 1990s. A single label, ‘Chinese’, covers different regional backgrounds and dialects spoken by New Chinese migrants in Suriname. A similar mismatch between a popular label, Amerindian, and a complex reality is the background to Carlin and Mans’ discussion of the multiplicity of identities hidden underneath Amerindian ethnonyms in southern Suriname. They show that identities in the various ethnic hubs are more than simple lists of available labels. Rather, all relevant identities exist in a Matryoshka doll fashion, and previously dormant identities may become reactivated when context and locality change.

The mismatch between ethnonyms and language labels is also raised by Léglise and Migge in their discussion of language ideology among Surinamese schoolchildren. Their unique study shows how widespread and regionally variable multilingualism goes hand in hand with a variety of (situationally different) language names to make any straightforward pairing of language and ethnic identity untenable.
Van den Berg, Borges and Yakpo also give lie to the simplistic notion of language as identity in the context of Suriname. They challenge the notion that Surinamese languages reflect fixed pluriformity by offering indications that some, if not many, of these languages are changing and influencing each other structurally thereby making the use of several languages in the same context easier as greater structural similarity increases interchangeability.

Yamada reports on a local scheme to revitalise a low-prestige variety of Kari’na, itself of low prestige in Surinamese society, in order to strengthen Indigenous identity within established multiculturalist discourse in Suriname. Her case study focusses on Konomerume (Donderkamp), a village that is consistently identified as Kari’na but which also in fact has a sizeable population of migrants from Suriname and abroad, and a concomitant linguistic complexity.

In many of the contributions in this book, there is a definite suggestion of language as a marker of class identity. Dutch as a prestige language associated with whiteness, the Netherlands, education, upper class, contrasts with Sranantongo, which is associated with low prestige, blackness, lack of economic success, and also with migrant and minority languages which indicate marginality. However, there is no straightforward relationship between language and social identity. Close observation of people’s linguistic practices reveals a much more complex picture of identities and identity construction as people regularly claim different languages in the same, and across different contexts, and make use of one and the same language to negotiate different social identities (see the section on language ideology below).

3 Mobility Processes

The primary, literal meaning of mobility is human population movements. Human physical mobility may be defined as: “all forms of territorial movement by people. These movements take place at different spatial and temporal scales and reflect a wide range of underlying factors and motivations” (Alexiades 2009: 2). These movements may be individual or of groups such as households, ethnic groups, even nations, though the continuum of collective mobility, between the extremes of nomadism and sedentism, is what we generally refer to as mobility. Mobility may also be voluntary or involuntary, temporary or permanent, cyclical or unidirectional, and different forms may occur simultaneously. Migration is mobility in a more restricted sense, implying movement from fixed communities to fixed destinations, institutionalisation via migrant organisations, against the backdrop of a nation-state, and the implicit
notion that immobility is the neutral human condition. Transnationalism, by contrast, comes from the realisation that migration is not quite that simple, and that migrant networks and social fields transcend national boundaries under continuous mobility.

Five types of geographic mobility that overlap in part are relevant to a discussion of current linguistic developments in Suriname: mobility in the interior, urbanisation, transnational ties to the colonial metropolis, regional migration, new migration under globalisation.

Mobility may also be used in a metaphoric, non-geographic sense as social (upward and downward) mobility, and cultural mobility. In its more abstract sense, mobility refers to changes in human populations, such as movement between economic sectors, income levels, and social classes. In this sense, territorial movement becomes a subject of economic inquiry—how social mobility and economic change are linked to spatial movement and interaction between populations. Cultural mobility may also be linked to physical mobility; one can think of processes of acculturation, integration, and generational processes of assimilation that attend the reality of migration. These different forms of mobility are interrelated with issues of identity, and therefore language. For example, Léglise and Troiani (2011) show how Brazilians first travelled back and forth within Brazil, then between Brazil and French Guiana before finally settling there, and how this process is linked to opportunities, economic, social, and linguistic changes.

As is the case with language and identity, the study of human mobility is a study of changeable processes and complex networks. Social mobility can no longer be simply defined in terms of upward or downward mobility, nor can spatial mobility be reduced to immigration or emigration, nor should one conceive of identity and language solely in terms of migrant communities versus non-mobile settled groups. As one aspect of globalisation, modern migration (internal, regional, international, and anything in between) requires conceptual frameworks such as transnationalism theory that take into account that human mobility is neither unidirectional nor unbounded, just like the fluid social networks that enable it. Transnational social spaces should be the focus of analysis, not fixed categories of social groups or geographical locations (Faist 2000, Vertovec 1999). In this book we therefore also zoom in on social, cultural and linguistic contact patterns not only in the urban Surinamese setting but also between the ‘other’ players in Suriname, and reflect on how social categories other than ethnicity affect language practices.

The link between language and mobility is most evident in four chapters. Carlin and Mans remind us how historical mobility of the peoples who
currently live in southern Suriname had—and has—very little to do with the notion of the Surinamese state and its national borders. They show how mobility shaped group identities through the fusion and fission of earlier groups. Collomb and Lescure combine anthropology and linguistics to paint a picture of this development for the Kari’na people of the coastal Guianas. The historical impact of migration and trade on the Kari’na has resulted in lexical borrowings from Spanish, Dutch, Sranantongo and French, and to a lesser extent in emergent syntactic innovations.

Laëthier and Tjon Sie Fat reflect on modern migration and its impact on the ethnic landscape. Laëthier reports on regional migration networks in the French Caribbean, namely the Haitian undertaking to reach French Guiana. She touches on Afro-Caribbean ethnic variation, and the introduction of French Caribbean language and culture in Suriname and the role of Surinamese creole languages in French Guiana. Tjon Sie Fat raises the issue of broader South-South migration in his discussion of the impact of New Chinese migrants in Suriname. Parallel to the rising regional influence of the People's Republic of China as a superpower, is the emergence of the standard language of the People's Republic, Putonghua, as the Chinese intra-ethnic lingua franca in Suriname.

Here we see transnationalism by default, the incorporation of Surinamese Chinese into 'Global Chineseness', the globalised Chinese cultural identity fostered by the Chinese State through the medium of Putonghua. Whereas Tjon Sie Fat only touches on the transnational circuits of New Chinese migration, Laëthier relies on the transnational social fields that shape Haitian patterns of mobility, settlement, and identity. Haitian identity discourse is structured around the basic flow from Haiti to French Guiana, and Suriname is considered a transit stop on that route. De Theije describes the Surinamese case of a wider phenomenon of Brazilian garimpeiros, artisanal gold miners, who represent a fairly straightforward instance of transnational flows of people, money, and culture, linking transnational social spaces in Suriname and northern Brazil.

Van Stipriaan also describes developments in the Surinamese interior, and increasing flows of people, money and ideas within Suriname. He describes the historical development of the growing contact between Maroon homelands and Paramaribo. Globalisation is increasingly impacting the interior, where changing transport and communications technologies are symbolic of rapid social transformation. He notes that Maroon identities and social structure are shifting under the influence of Paramaribo. While Van Stipriaan's axis of mobility is mainly South-North, de Theije describes East-West mobility across the Marowijne River between Suriname and French Guiana. Various ethnic groups (indigenous, local, and foreign) are constructing and reconstructing
Looking At Language, Ethnicity, And Mobility In Suriname

Laëthier's Haitian case is also about crossing the Marowijne River, though the movement is predominantly eastward, to French Guiana. In their Surinamese sojourn and subsequent settlement in French Guiana, Haitian migrants find themselves reinterpreting Haitian identity in their encounters with various other Afro-Caribbean groups, in terms of race, ethnicity, and class. In contrast, Yamada describes immigration from the Surinamese coastal regions and Guyana to the relatively isolated village of Konomerume/Donderkamp and shows how it has resulted in a strongly hybrid community.

In this book the complex interplay between mobility, identity and language produces subtle and at times less subtle challenges to the idea of the nation-state and its national borders. This is most clearly apparent in de Theije's case of the Marowijne River, the official border between the Surinamese state and French Guiana, in fact the EU. Its role as the border between economically, socially, and institutionally mismatched polities creates opportunities in the informal economy and migration, and depending on the context and the actors involved, this may be constructed as smuggling and illegal migration. In Laëthier's contribution, migration via Suriname is an adaptation to institutional changes that affected earlier migrant networks and trajectories, and here too, as she shows, transit creates opportunities.

The challenges to the Surinamese state are also apparent in the cases involving minorities. Van Stipriaan shows how Maroon societies are being incorporated at an increasing pace by Surinamese society and also the state. Collomb and Lescure present the current division between Tyrewuju (eastern Kari'na) and Aretyry (western Kari'na) in terms of different social regimes, cultural policies, and institutions in the frontier regions on either side of the Marowijne River. Carlin and Mans essentially argue that Amerindian autonyms of southern Suriname are related to group identities that emerged far away from the Surinamese state in time and space, and make little sense in modern Surinamese national discourses that pose a monolithic 'Indigenous' category. Similarly, Tjon Sie Fat argues that the Surinamese state reproduces popular notions of ethnicity to recognise only one Chinese ethnic and therefore linguistic category.

4 Multilingualism, Ideology and Language as Boundary

Identity may emerge, for instance, from the construction of social borders and language may be one of many cultural boundary markers that populations
use to show what they are and what they are not (Barth, 1969). Such borders are not rationally and democratically agreed, and unequal power relations determine the way different groups will be included or excluded (Eriksen 1993). Identity does not require actual groups to exist, rather all group identities are primarily the result of human agents ‘doing’ identity. Potential social cleavages may become politically salient, and cultural dispositions such as a mother tongue may become ethnicised—in fact, ethnicity constantly arises and changes in the everyday interaction between individuals, and actors have different options available to react to existing social boundaries. As Wimmer states, people act in order: “[…] to overcome or reinforce them [social boundaries], to shift them, to exclude new groups of individuals or include others, or to promote other, nonethnic modes of classification and social practice” (Wimmer 2013: 46).

Language is also symbolic capital, and the ability to handle more languages—multilingualism—will increase one’s ability to compete for resources, regardless of whether or not those languages are pegged to one’s ‘core identity’ and irrespective of their status (see Bourdieu 1982; 1991). Suriname, like many other countries, does not officially promote multilingualism (Migge and Léglise, in press). Elite multilingualism is promoted for global languages such as English or Spanish associated with a high potential economic value. In contrast, the economic value of local languages is not officially recognised. Languages such as Portuguese and Chinese, even if they are not seen as prestige languages, do have a certain economic value in some contexts and localities linked, for example, to small scale gold mining in the interior (see de Theije and Heemskerk 2009 and de Theije, this volume) or the Chinese retail trade.

Mobility, particularly in the form of migration, results in pluricultural competence, which virtually always entails multilingual competence. According to Coste et al. (2009): “Receptiveness to pluricultural experience reveals the links between different forms of mobility: geographical mobility, of course, bringing a sustained and intense relationship with one or more languages, but also social mobility leading the plurilingual individual to social spaces other than those to which dominant socialisation modes predispose him; also cultural mobility, which may be defined as the ability to update, in life choices, perceptions of ‘elsewhere’ expressed in latent form in family history” (Coste et al., 2009: 21). The plurilingual individual’s strategies consist in keeping a statement of assets (for example, languages as social capital) up to date, and anticipating or controlling their fluctuations (Coste et al., 2009: 21).

Present-day Suriname represents a multilingual reality which is the result of past forms of mobility and is the setting for more recent mobility patterns.
under globalisation that result in what might even be called ‘super-diversity’ (term from Vertovec 2007). Super-diversity leads to super-diverse linguistic repertoires (Blommaert and Backus 2011, Blommaert and Rampton 2011). Such increasingly complex traces of contact and mobility are evident in the linguistic repertoires of the Surinamese population (for an example of the complex repertoires perceived by Surinamese children, see Léglise and Migge, this volume).

Language attitudes have an important impact on patterns of language use. Language ideologies have been defined as “the cultural system of ideas about social and linguistic relationships, together with their loading of moral and political interests” (Irvine 1989a: 255). “(Language ideologies) are beliefs, or feelings, about languages as used in their social worlds” (Kroskrity 2006: 498). This includes beliefs about the superiority or inferiority of a given language (variety) or beliefs about the (in)appropriateness of a language (variety) in a certain situation or among certain groups of speakers. Language ideologies have to be conceived of as multiple because groups of people tend to be characterised by various degrees of heterogeneity and therefore typically involve different kinds of positionality and produce different kinds of perspectives on the same issue. Language ideologies mediate between social structure and forms of talk, and play an important role in creating and representing social and cultural identities. They are always interested rather than neutral serving the needs and ideas of specific social groups (Kroskrity 2006: 501–510).

Languages too are not bounded entities but are “idealisations that emerge and develop due to socially and historically positioned processes” (Migge and Léglise 2013: 112). Language use and language naming practices conceal the fact that languages emerge, change, combine, fade, and do not obediently stay with the social groups with which we (as speakers or researchers) associate them as supreme and obvious markers of ethnic or class identity. The Surinamese case shows that languages cannot be taken for granted as stable entities neatly linked to historical migration and ethnic groups. If ever a simple link would have been possible between a language label and a newly-arrived migrant group, years of assimilation into the state system, hybridisation, and cultural globalisation will have turned such a link into an increasingly complex and changing web of localised meanings, as can be evidenced by the range of different significations of such apparently monolithic terms as Chinees ‘Chinese’ and Ingi ‘Amerindian’ in Suriname.

In conclusion, by extending the scope of language contact in Suriname to encompass processes of mobility and identity construction beyond the pale of the urbanised setting, this book offers a new and comprehensive picture
of language and culture in interaction in present-day Suriname and a situ- 
tionally nuanced approach to mobility, identity, and language practices and 
ideologies.

Note

**Onomastics and Spelling Conventions**
Where possible, we use the official Surinamese spelling of place and river 
names, that is, Donderkamp, Corantijn River, Commewijne River etc. unless 
quoting from an historical source; Marowijne River is used when mentioned 
from a Surinamese perspective whereas its French counterpart Maroni is used 
when referring to the river from a French Guianese perspective.

*Languages Spoken in Suriname 2013 and Mentioned in This Book*  
(in Alphabetical Order)
**Amerindian:** Kari’na, Lokono, Mawayana, Sikíyana, Trio, Tunayana-Katwena, 
Waiwai, Wayana  
**Asian:** Cantonese, Kejia, Putonghua, Sarnámi, Surinamese Javanese  
**Creole:** French Guianese Creole, Haitian Creole, Kwinti, Matawai, Ndyuka, 
Pamaka, Saamaka, Sranantongo  
**European:** Brazilian Portuguese, Dutch
CHAPTER 2

Language Practices and Linguistic Ideologies in Suriname: Results from a School Survey

Isabelle Léglise and Bettina Migge

1 Introduction

The population of the Guiana plateau is characterised by multilingualism and the Republic of Suriname is no exception to this. Apart from the country’s official language, Dutch, and the national lingua franca, Sranantongo, more than twenty other languages belonging to several distinct language families are spoken by less than half a million people. Some of these languages such as Saamaka and Sarnámi have quite significant speaker communities while others like Mawayana currently have less than ten speakers.1 While many of the languages currently spoken in Suriname have been part of the Surinamese linguistic landscape for a long time, others came to Suriname as part of more recent patterns of mobility. Languages with a long history in Suriname are the Amerindian languages Lokono (Arawak), Kari’na, Trio, and Wayana, the creole languages Saamaka, Ndyuka, Matawai, Pamaka, Kwinti, and Sranantongo, and the Asian-Surinamese languages Sarnámi, Javanese, and Hakka Chinese. In recent years, languages spoken in other countries in the region such as Brazilian Portuguese, Guyanese English, Guyanese Creole, Spanish, French, Haitian Creole (see Laëthier this volume) and from further afield such as varieties of five Chinese dialect groups (Northern Chinese, Wu, Min, Yue, and Kejia, see Tjon Sie Fat this volume) have been added to Suriname’s linguistic landscape due to their speakers’ increasing involvement in Suriname.

Suriname’s linguistic diversity is little appreciated locally. Since independence in 1975, successive governments have pursued a policy of linguistic assimilation to Dutch with the result that nowadays, “[a] large proportion of the population not only speaks Dutch, but speaks it as their first and best language” (St-Hilaire 2001: 1012). Increased urbanisation, improvements in the infrastructure and expansion of the education system prior to Suriname’s

1 Carlin (2001: 226) mentions four Amerindian languages, Akuriyo, Sikiyana, Tunayana, and Mawayana whose speaker numbers are very low, ranging from between 5 to 10 speakers.
civil war and in the new millennium have acted as important catalysts for this policy. Yet, assimilation to Dutch is by no means complete. St-Hilaire, for instance, argues that different population groups recognised within Suriname—Afro-Surinamese Creoles, East Indians, Javanese, Maroons, but also Amerindians and Chinese—have followed different paths of adaptation. At least until the 1950s, Afro-Surinamese Creoles “had wholeheartedly accepted assimilation to Dutch as a group ideal” (St-Hilaire 2001: 1005). In the 1950s and 1960s the cultural nationalist movement Wi Eigi Sani ‘our own thing’ partially called into question this consensus and although attempts to give Sranantongo official status failed, it raised a new awareness about Creole culture and Sranantongo (Gleason Carew 1982). “Creoles today consider Sranan[tongo] an integral part of their culture […] they [like other Surinamese] continue to use Sranan[tongo], particularly for joking and expressing strong emotions” (St-Hilaire 2001: 1012). East Indians, by contrast, appear to have a high rate of ‘ethnic language’ retention even though competence in Dutch—at the expense of Sarnámi—and use of Sranantongo among young people has been on the rise since the 1950s. The high rate of language retention is possibly due to low rates of intermarriage and the importance of ethnically-based networks. While ethnicity is commonly invoked in Surinamese social discourses, other factors such as education and place of residence play at least an equally important role in determining language use patterns. Notwithstanding individual patterns of variation, residents of Paramaribo tend to have greater exposure to Dutch and thus often also use it in a wider range of settings while those living in rural areas tend to make greater use of languages other than Dutch.

Despite somewhat entrenched dominant views about language, the Surinamese linguistic landscape is by no means static. Urbanisation and expansion of the infrastructure and education system have brought new languages to the urban areas and have considerably increased the presence of hitherto underrepresented languages. Expansion of the local infrastructure and education system are also slowly improving access to Dutch in rural areas. Social and economic change is affecting both the social distribution and attitudes to languages. Sranantongo and other formerly denigrated languages are more widely used in the public domain (e.g. advertising, radio) and Dutch and Sranantongo are making inroads into the home and local community setting. However, we lack precise information on these issues because Suriname’s contemporary linguistic context has not received much attention (but see St-Hilaire 1999, 2001). To date, research has mostly focused on the emergence and early development of the country’s Afro-Surinamese languages such as Sranantongo and the Maroon languages Ndyuka, Pamaka and Saamaka (e.g. Arends 1989; Bruyn 1995; Lefebvre and Loranger 2008; Goury 2003; Migge 2003; Winford and Migge
2007; Migge and Winford 2009; Smith 2001; Van den Berg 2007) and on documenting individual languages (Carlin 2004; Huttar and Huttar 1994). Both lines of research focus on monolingual and intra-community linguistic practices. In contrast, cross-societal communication and multilingual practices tend to receive little detailed attention (but see Migge 2007).

This chapter aims to take a first step towards improving our understanding of Suriname’s contemporary linguistic context. It is based on the results of a recent sociolinguistic survey carried out among primary school children in Suriname. Exploring children’s statements about their own and their families’ language practices, their language attitudes, their language learning desires and self-assessment of their linguistic competence, we describe the contemporary sociolinguistic situation of Suriname and identify pertinent issues for further research. Our study echoes previous research in so far as the majority of school children present themselves as multilingual. They state using the official language, Dutch, and one or more languages in a variety of interactional dyads. While Dutch is the only officially promoted language in the country, few children display openly negative attitudes towards other languages. In fact, many desire to learn and take pride in the use of both international and local languages. However, language use patterns and alignment with the different languages, including Dutch, continue to be stratified according to ethnicity, class, residency and gender.

In this chapter we consider two types of mobility, geographic and socio-cultural mobility. In our case, geographic mobility deals with urban-rural movements and movements into and out of Suriname, that is, intra-regional (within the Guiana region) and inter-regional or international (specifically involving countries from outside of the Guiana region) migration that may involve crossing of political borders. In relation to socio-cultural mobility we consider upward social mobility and social change in general. These different forms of mobility (geographical, social, cultural) are interrelated and are closely intertwined with micro- and macro-linguistic and sociolinguistic processes of change. Traditionally, geographic mobility leads to greater multilingual / plurilingual and pluricultural capitals (see the introduction to this volume). Thus (socio)linguistic change is driven by geographical and socio-cultural mobility, but at the same time it also plays an instrumental role in driving socio-cultural change which in turn tends to be linked to geographical mobility and change. The multilingual reality of present-day Suriname is the result of past processes of mobility and ongoing forms of mobility.

This chapter is organised into eight sections. We first present the sociolinguistic survey in Section 2. In Section 3 we discuss schoolchildren’s languagenaming practices, showing that in the case of some languages there is a
mismatch between official and auto-denominations that provides important insights into local language ideologies. In Section 4, we explore children’s linguistic repertoires demonstrating that multilingualism is the norm and that all languages have a variety of user communities. Examining their regional distribution in Section 5 and their functional load in Section 6, we show that while language use patterns are stratified according to factors such as region of residency, social domain and gender, the distribution of languages is not fixed and is subject to variation and change. In Section 7, we explore language ideologies and their impact on language learning and maintenance. We show that while Dutch has high overt social prestige, people in Suriname also value both local and international languages. However, views about local languages are subject to quite a bit of variation, both with respect to how they are evaluated by their speakers and others. Section 8 focuses on language practices showing that multilingual practices are sharply on the rise because they are positively identified with urbanity and modern ways of life. The final section summarises the findings and discusses their implications.

2 The Data for This Study: The School Survey

Although we already had a fairly good idea about the languages currently spoken in Suriname when we began to work on issues of language and mobility in the region, we lacked precise knowledge about language use patterns in contemporary Suriname. There were little or no data on the following types of questions: When and for what purposes are the various languages commonly used; how are they learned; how do people evaluate them; how do people use them and are they transmitted intergenerationally; how do inter-regional dynamics and social mobility impact on patterns of language use and views about these languages?

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2 The survey on the Surinamese linguistic situation (Léglise and Migge 2008–2010) is a subproject of the grant DC2MT entitled The dynamics of migration and cross-border mobility between French Guiana, Suriname, Brazil and Haiti; it was funded by the French national research agency (ANR) and by the inter-establishment agency for research for development (AIRD) and hosted at the Lim A Po Institute. We would like to thank Dr. Robby Morroy (IOL) and the Lim A Po Institute for helping us to get the project off the ground, and especially Astra Deneus, but also Silvy M. for their invaluable help with the data collection and Simon B. Sana with some of the on-the-ground logistics over the two years. Special thanks are also due to Dr. Duna Troiani (research assistant (ITA) at CNRS SeDyL) who meticulously entered the majority of the interviews into excel.
The language survey applied the same methodology that one of the authors has been using for the last ten years in her research on the language situation of French Guiana (see Léglise 2007) in order to allow for cross-regional comparison. The aim of this methodology is to understand language use patterns—or in Fishman’s (1964) terms, *Who speaks which language to whom, when, and why*. It involves triangulation of three types of data: elicitation of statements on linguistic practices from school children using a language survey, observation and recording of linguistic practices in various social domains, and elicitation of local discourses on language using semi-guided interviews with a range of social actors. The former data are analyzed using mostly quantitative methods while the latter two types of data are subject to qualitative treatments focusing on the analysis of actual language use patterns and language attitudes and ideologies, respectively. In this paper, we mostly analyze the data from the school language survey, but we also draw on the latter types of data at various points.

The language survey in Suriname was carried out between 2008 and 2010 among school children. It involved ten-minute interviews with about 3,000 upper primary school children (grades 5 and 6) in a number of rural and urban locations in the country, see Map 1. We set out to collect data in all primary schools around the country, but due to financial, logistical and time constraints we did not manage to collect data on the upper Suriname, upper Saramacca and upper Marowijne river for the time being. The children were mostly interviewed in Dutch by an Afro-Surinamese woman in her late 20s. In some locations interviews were also carried out by a woman in her 20s who is of Hindoestaans (Indo-Surinamese) descent and by one of the authors of this chapter. It would have been preferable if only one interviewer had conducted all the interviews, but logistical issues made this impossible. We did not notice any differences in terms of children’s responses across the three interviewers.

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3 The research project *multi-l-guy* (Léglise 2000–2013) was funded by the French Ministry for Culture (*DGLFLF*), and French national research institutions: *Centre national de la recherche scientifique* (**CNRS**) and *Institut de recherche pour le développement* (**IRD**) through the research unit *Structure et Dynamique des Langues* and *Centre d’Etudes des Langues Indigènes d’Amérique* (**UMR 8202 SEDYL-CEILIA**).

4 Collection of the latter types of data is still ongoing.

5 We intend to collect data in these locations in due course though. However, we feel confident that we have so far managed to access a representative set of locations in Suriname (e.g. smaller and larger towns and villages around the country).

6 The language label *Hindi* was more widely recorded by the interviewer of Hindoestaans origin than by the other interviewers suggesting the possibility that children speaking
The children were asked to talk about their language background, their language practices, their language attitudes and language competences. The survey included the following types of questions:

- Which language(s) did you speak before starting school \[if you speak several languages, in which language(s) did you learn to speak\]:
- Which other language(s) did you learn \(e.g.\) from grandparents, school, people in the neighbourhood:
- Which language(s) do you use when speaking to
  a) your mother: b) your father: c) your brother(s) and sister(s):
  d) your friends: e) your mother’s parents /your father’s parents:
- Language X, do you speak it well, very well, a little?
- Which language do you use most often when you are NOT at school?
- Which language(s) did your mother/father speak when s/he was a child? \(\text{your mother’s/father’s birthplace}\):

The aim of these guided interviews was to access on a large scale the (declared) language practices and ideologies of the country’s youth who make up a significant proportion of the society—an estimated 29\% of the population is under the age of fifteen.

Carrying out the survey in the school setting clearly has some drawbacks. By focusing only on children who attend formal education, the survey automatically also only selects children who have knowledge of the official language, Dutch, and who also use it. However, since school enrolment among primary school children is higher than 90\% (UNICEF), we submit that this way of accessing interviewees does not unduly skew the sample. Carrying out the survey in the official medium of education also inadvertently runs the risk of giving undue additional importance to this language to the detriment of other languages. We tried to minimise this issue by explaining to children that we are interested in hearing about all the languages that they speak and that our aim is not to test children’s competence in the official language, a common misconception.\(^7\) While children who found it difficult to express themselves Hindoestaans/Sarnámi might have accommodated to that interviewer’s assumed ethnicity. However, she also focused on schools/areas where Hindoestaans/Sarnámi speakers were prevalent.

\(^7\) Prior to carrying out the survey, the main fieldworker gave a short presentation to the whole class explaining the purpose and nature of the survey. In her presentation she purposely mentioned different languages spoken in Suriname, and especially those known to be spoken in the area in question in order to give children license to talk about them. The discussion
Figure 2.1 Locations of data collection of our survey.
in Dutch were given the opportunity to use other languages (most typically Sranantongo), we did not think that it would have been socially appropriate to carry out the survey in another language such as Sranantongo. It is locally accepted practice to do this ‘kind of work’ using Dutch, especially since the school is a prime domain for its practice, and because a systematic change in this practice would have created other kinds of asymmetrical relationships between locally used languages. Nevertheless we are aware that due to carrying out the survey in the school context, children are likely to echo to a greater extent the school’s views about language.

3 Language Names and Naming Practices

An interesting finding of the school survey was that in the case of some languages children used two or more different names to refer to them. This issue is rarely discussed in other works as it is common practice to employ the officially promoted names in the scholarly literature. Children overwhelmingly used Dutch-based names to designate European languages. Thus, Nederlands was used to designate Dutch, Frans to refer to French and Engels to talk about English. In the case of other languages, there was variation between Dutch terms and terms used among speakers of the language (sometimes called self-naming, ethnonyms or auto-denomination in the literature). For instance, one of the Amerindian languages was sometimes referred to by the Dutch term Caraïbs and at other times by its ethnonym, Kari’na. The Maroon languages that have distinct Dutch names and ethnonyms were typically designated using the former, e.g., Paramaccaans instead of Pamaka, and the language associated with Surinamese people of Indian descent was usually called by its Dutch name: Hindoestaans, Hindustaaani or Hindi. Table 2.1 shows that the officially promoted term, Sarnámi (Marhé 1983), was only used in a minority of cases (5) and that the term Hindoestaans was most commonly employed among the children in the survey.

focused on using the local indigenous terms known to us rather than official names or even alternated between official and locally used ones in order to avoid biasing usage of certain terms. Interestingly, children typically did not follow those choices in their responses, using Dutch-based names in the majority of the cases, see Section 3.
Children also alternated between Dutch-based language names and Dutch-based country and/or nationality names. For example, Brazilian Portuguese was referred to as *Portugees*, but also as *Braziliaans* and Brazil.9 In the case of the Maroon languages, there was some alternation between Dutch-based language terms such as *Saramaccaans* and Dutch-based terms that refer to their speakers, namely *Saramaccaner*, though the former clearly emerged as more important (Table 2.2). In some cases, the language-referring suffix *-s* was added to the latter form producing *Saramaccaners* (lit. ‘the language of the Saamaka’) or *Aukaners*.

Only in the case of two Maroon languages, Kwinti and Matawai, did children always cite the ethnonym, probably because a separate Dutch term does not exist (Kwinti) or is not very common (Matawai)—the term *Matuariër* was only used twice. This suggests that in the minds of children—and people in general—languages and their speakers and/or their presumed countries of origin are closely connected. This also highlights the fact that children’s statements about language are influenced to varying degrees by their views about their speakers and/or their country of origin.

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8 L1, L2, L3: Language cited as first language (L1), as second language (L2), . . . The total amount of figures treated statistically is 1555, involving 1555 declared L1s (sometimes several L1s are declared by the same pupil), 1530 L2s and 989 L3s. See section 4 for more details on L1, L2, L3.

9 This is probably the Dutch rendition of the Sranantongo name for Brazilian Portuguese, *brasyon*.

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### Table 2.1  Names used by children to refer to the language officially called Sarnámi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>L1</th>
<th>L2</th>
<th>L3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hindi</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindoestaans</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindoestani</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarnámi</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Some of the naming practices also provided insights into the relationship between languages in Suriname. The naming conventions for less widely spoken Maroon languages are a case in point. Although the members of the various Maroon groups traditionally use distinct terms to designate the different languages and value their separate identities, we found many cases where the Dutch-based names commonly used to refer to the two most widely spoken Maroon languages, *Aukaans* and *Saramacaans*, were also employed to designate the less widely spoken Maroon languages such as Kwinti, Pamaka, Aluku and Matawai respectively.\(^{11}\) This practice was common in coastal and urbanised areas. In the traditional villages, people used the Dutch-based ethnic names. For example, speakers of Kwinti and Pamaka initially presented themselves as speakers of *Aukaans* and only later explained that they are in fact speakers of Kwinti or *Paramaccaans* (see Section 7 for further discussion). A related practice was found in relation to Amerindian languages where children overwhelmingly made use of Dutch cover terms such as *Inheemse taal*

\(^{10}\) The spellings presented here are consistent with the ones used by our Surinamese field assistants who had been instructed to note down names in the manner in which they were presented by the children.

\(^{11}\) Aluku is also sometimes referred to as Boni in the earlier literature or in writings on French Guiana.
'Indigenous language', *Indiaan/Indiaanse taal* ‘Amerindian language’ and only invoked locally used names such as Kari’na, Arawak, or Arowak, Trio, Waraos upon further questioning. Finally, the commonly used ethnonym Ndyuka was rarely (3) cited in place of the Dutch-based name *Aukaans*. When it was used, it was employed to designate the varieties spoken by rural populations (upriver village dwellers of the Tapanahoni River or the Sara Creek) rather than those of coastal or urbanised populations suggesting that these practices are perhaps no longer considered mainstream. This functional differentiation of the terms Ndyuka and *Aukaans* is possibly indicative of ongoing processes of social change that are taking place within Maroon communities (see Léglise and Migge 2006 about French Guiana).12

Reference to Suriname’s lingua franca was most versatile. Children cited names like Sranantongo, or simply Sranan, its Dutch equivalent, *Surinaams*, its Sranantongo name, i.e. *Nengre*, or older terms like *Negerengels* and the less frequently used name *Neger(s).*13 Table 2.3 shows that the name Sranantongo and its abbreviated form, Sranan, are most widely used among children. It is interesting to note that the current Dutch-based term, *Surinaams*, was employed much less frequently than Sranan(tongo) despite the fact that children were interviewed in Dutch. This might be indicative of the fact that the term Sranan(tongo) has been successfully mainstreamed. The low figures for the pejorative term *Negerengels* could suggest that it is going out of use and possibly that overall attitudes towards the language are improving. In this regard, note also that it is also mostly used by people who claim Sranantongo as an additional language rather than by L1 speakers. It is equally of interest to note 12 Thoden van Velzen and Hoogbergen (2011: 6) tell us that Okanisi (or Aukaner/Aukaner) derives from the name of the Auka plantation from where in 1757 and 1760 peace-making missions of the Dutch set out to negotiate with the Maroons that at the time resided on the Ndyuka Creek and on the Tapanahoni River. The Auka plantation was located on the Suriname River in central Suriname about 90 kilometres from Paramaribo. These runaways were initially referred to as ‘the free blacks from Agter Auka’ and later on people used the term Aukaners to designate them. They eventually came to refer to themselves as Okanisi. The name Ndyuka also existed at the time but was mostly used to refer to a subset of the people who had come to settle in the area of the Ndyuka Creek at the foot of what is nowadays called the Lely Mountains. The Okanisi refer to this region by the name of Mama Ndyuka. Both names, Ndyuka and Okanisi, are still used today. For a while the term Ndyuka was disliked because it was used as an insult in the form of ‘Djoeka’ among urban dwellers in Suriname. In Suriname and French Guiana the name Ndyuka is commonly used among the members of that community.

13 This term appears to be a Dutch rendition of the Sranantongo/Eastern Maroon term for Sranantongo, namely *nengre* and *nenge(e)* respectively.
Table 2.3  Names for Sranantongo according to whether it was declared as L1, L2 or L3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>L1</th>
<th>L2</th>
<th>L3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sranantongo</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sranan</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surinaams</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negerengels</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nengre</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neger</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Takitaki</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>466</td>
<td>591</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

that another older pejorative term, Takitaki, which is currently widely used in neighbouring French Guiana to refer to Sranantongo and/or Maroon language (see Léglise and Migge 2006; Migge and Léglise 2013) was only used once during the Surinamese language survey.

In the remainder of this paper we use the language names most commonly used by the children in the survey to refer to the different languages without, however, suggesting that these names or the spelling used are the only, most widely accepted names or politically the best option.

4  Languages in the Repertoires

Despite the fact that Dutch is the only language that is officially promoted, the Surinamese children who participated in the language survey overwhelmingly presented themselves as multilingual (or plurilingual). 65% of the children interviewed said that they speak at least three languages, 15% claimed four or more languages and only 1% of the children said that they speak only one language.\footnote{Note that this is based on children’s self-reports and does not make any claims about levels of competence.} This suggests that multilingualism is not only a characteristic of the country, but also extends to the members of its population, who can be described as plurilingual. Following recent definitions proposed by the
Council of Europe, “[p]lurilingualism differs from multilingualism, which is the knowledge of a number of languages, or the co-existence of different languages in a given society […] the plurilingual approach emphasises the fact that as an individual person’s experience of language in its cultural contexts expands, from the language of the home to that of society at large and then to the languages of other peoples (whether learnt at school or college, or by direct experience), he or she does not keep these languages and cultures in strictly separated mental compartments, but rather builds up a communicative competence to which all knowledge and experience of language contributes and in which languages interrelate and interact.” (Council of Europe 2001: 4)

We use the term ‘linguistic repertoire’ (Gumperz 1982) to refer to the totality of linguistic practices, including different languages or language varieties, acquired by children. For practical reasons, we refer to them as L1, L2, L3 (and even L4 and L5) depending on when and how children learned them. L1s—children had the choice to state more than one L1—are usually acquired at home or during children’s primary socialisation. Children tend to cite languages learned later in life (e.g. at school, in the playground) or lesser-used languages in the home or community environment after first-learned languages or frequently used languages. They appear here as L2 or L3 (and sometimes L4, L5) depending on the interviewee’s chosen order. For example, it might be one of the languages that are used in the home or local environment but to a lesser degree. Obviously, order of importance and frequency of use are subject to change and are not always easy to identify making it sometimes difficult to neatly rank the status of languages in a person’s repertoire. For a discussion of these static categories, see Léglise (2013: 47–50). Although we use L1 / L2 / L3 for practical reasons, it is important to keep in mind that children do not have a “collection of distinct and separate competences to communicate depending on the languages [they] know, but rather a plurilingual and pluricultural competence encompassing the full range of the languages available” to them (Council of Europe 2001: 168).

Figure 2.2 demonstrates that alignment with Dutch (Nederlands) is strong among Surinamese pupils. 99% of the school children we interviewed stated that it is in their repertoire. This is, of course, unsurprising because the survey took place in schools, the main context in which Dutch is practiced and promoted throughout the country. All the children are taught through the medium of Dutch and are thus highly likely to declare it as being part of their linguistic repertoire. However, surprisingly 63% of the children stated that Dutch is their first language. In the light of the previous literature and observations on the ground this percentage appears to be rather high and may be the effect of
over-reporting conditioned by the context in which the survey was carried out (see Section 7 for further discussion).

Sranantongo was the second most frequently cited language in the survey, with 79% of children saying that it is part of their repertoire. In contrast to Nederlands, however, it is overwhelmingly cited as an additional language (L2, L3 or even L4). Only about 6% of children nationally claim it as a first language. These figures are in line with trends identified in previous statistics (e.g. Bruijne and Schalkwijk 1994 and national census data (A.B.S. 1967) cited in St-Hilaire 1999: 220–221) that showed that the use of Sranantongo as the principal home language has been declining since WWII. It confirms that Sranantongo is nowadays predominantly a linking language rather than the language of a particular ethnic group (Essed 1983)—descendants of Africans who did not flee slavery and who mostly reside in and around Paramaribo and on the coastal strip. All the other languages are cited much less frequently, but there are important differences from one language to another.

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15 These surveys only investigated language among other matters and generally only asked about the principal home language rather than investigated people’s linguistic repertoires and are thus much less detailed than the present survey.
Another result of the survey was that all languages appear to have a variety of user communities. Children claim them as their main or first language (L1), as a lingua franca or as a language for special purposes such as for communication with elders. Maroon languages for example and especially Aukaans, Paramaccaans and Saramaccaans are frequently cited as L1s, but they also appear to function as lingua franca or as heritage languages (L2–L5). Contrary to Charré et al. (1983), our survey demonstrates that Maroon and Amerindian languages are now also in contact with Dutch like any other language spoken in Suriname. Engels (English), Hindoestaans and Javaans for their part are most frequently reported as L2s even though Hindoestaans still appears to have a small but solid group of L1 speakers among schoolchildren. Arawak and Kari’na, as well as Portuguese, Spanish and French, are rarely reported as L1s but mostly as additional languages.

Table 2.4 presents the kinds of first and second language combinations that are most commonly found in children’s linguistic repertoires. It shows that the overwhelming majority of children who took part in the survey reported speaking Dutch and another language. Nearly twice the number of children who reported Dutch as their L2 (453) claimed it as their L1 (927). When compared with previous data these data confirm that the importance of Dutch continues to increase. By far the most commonly reported combination involved Dutch as L1 and Sranantongo as L2, again confirming the continued importance of these two languages in the Surinamese linguistic landscape. However, Dutch is also in contact with other languages of Suriname besides Sranantongo. Table 2.4 shows that other languages such as Hindoestaans, Maroon languages and Javanese also appear as important players in Suriname’s linguistic context, both as L1s (e.g. Maroon languages) and as L2s (e.g. Hindoestaans, Javanese). L1 and L2 combinations that did not involve Dutch were comparatively rare and often involved a Maroon language and Sranantongo or two Maroon languages.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>L1</th>
<th>L2</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nederlands</td>
<td>Sranantongo</td>
<td>435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nederlands</td>
<td>Hindoestaans/Hindi</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nederlands</td>
<td>Javaans</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nederlands</td>
<td>Engels</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nederlands</td>
<td>Aukaans</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nederlands</td>
<td>Saramaccaans</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2.4 (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>L1</th>
<th>L2</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nederlands</td>
<td>Arawaks</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nederlands</td>
<td>Caraïbs</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nederlands</td>
<td>Paramaccaans</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nederlands</td>
<td>Frans</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nederlands</td>
<td>Kwinti</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maroon languages</td>
<td>Nederlands</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aukaans</td>
<td>Nederlands</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saramaccaans</td>
<td>Nederlands</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paramaccaans</td>
<td>Nederlands</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwinti</td>
<td>Nederland</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindoestaans/Sarnámi</td>
<td>Nederlands</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sranantongo</td>
<td>Nederlands</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Javaans</td>
<td>Nederlands</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caraïbs</td>
<td>Nederlands</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aukaans</td>
<td>Saramaccaans</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saramaccaans</td>
<td>Aukaans</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sranantongo</td>
<td>Engels</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saramaccaans</td>
<td>Sranantongo</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5 Regional Distribution

The sociolinguistic survey also demonstrated that the languages of Suriname have partially different regional distributions. Being the official language of the country and the language of the state and the education system, Dutch is the only language that is cited all over the country. However, the proportion of children who claim it as an L1 or as an additional language varies from region to region. While just over 70% of children in Paramaribo (Figure 2.3) and in western Suriname (Figure 2.4) claim it as (one of) their L1s, this proportion reduces to just over 20% in the case of Brokopondo (Figure 2.5) and to just over 30% and 40% in the case of the eastern towns of Albina (Figure 2.6) and Moengo (Figure 2.7), respectively. The proportion of L2 users attains only 20% in Paramaribo and western Suriname and less than 10% of pupils claim it as an
L3 to L5. The figures sharply contrast with those obtained for central Suriname (the district of Brokopondo, Figure 2.5) where Dutch is claimed as an L2 by 60% and as an L3–L5 by roughly 10% of children. The figures for coastal eastern Suriname (Figures 2.6 and 2.7) closely resemble those for central Suriname. Taken together, the figures for the regional distribution of languages suggest that Dutch has different functions throughout the country. In the capital and western Suriname, it appears to mostly function as an L1 while in other parts of the country it is mainly used as a linking language.

Like Dutch, Sranantongo is also widely represented in the repertoires of children from all over the country. However, people’s orientation to Sranantongo is different in two respects. First, it is claimed to a somewhat lesser degree. In the capital, in western Suriname and in the border town of Albina more than 90% of children declared using Sranantongo for some of their interactions, see Table 2.5. This figure decreases to less than 60% in the case of the Brokopondo district and to just over 70% in the case of the eastern town of Moengo. Second, Sranantongo is overwhelmingly claimed as an additional language and rarely as an L1. In Paramaribo, for instance, less than 5% of children report it as their L1, while about 70% of children claim it either as their L2 (about 46%) or as their L3–L5. The figures for western Suriname are comparable; however, in central and eastern Suriname the number of children who claim it as an L3–L5 far outweighs those who say that it is their L1 or L2. 50% of children from Brokopondo, 60% in Moengo and 69% in Albina say that they use Sranantongo as an L3–L5. These figures confirm that Sranantongo functions as a lingua franca rather than as the main or community language of a specific social group in Suriname. The difference in representation of Sranantongo and Dutch in the repertoires of Surinamese children is indicative of different attitudes towards these languages and ongoing social change. We discuss this further in Section 7.

### Table 2.5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>L1</th>
<th>L2</th>
<th>L3–L5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paramaribo</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Suriname</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albina</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brokopondo</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moengo</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The remaining languages are much more strongly regionally stratified. *Hindoestaans* is reported by children attending school in Paramaribo, the Para and Wanica regions located around the capital and in western Suriname, particularly in the district of Nickerie. It was not cited at all in the Brokopondo area and rarely in eastern Suriname. In Albina 8% of children said that they speak *Hindoestaans* and in the Moengo area it was not represented at all. *Hindoestaans* is also predominantly claimed as an additional language. In western Suriname it was named by about 45% of children, but only just over 15% of these children said that it is their L1. The remaining children reported it as their L2 (about 17%) or as their L3–L5 (about 13%). In Paramaribo, by contrast, just under 20% of children cited *Hindoestaans* as being in their repertoire and of these only about 5% said that it is their L1, 3% that it is their L3–L5 and about 10% present it as their L2. Finally, in Albina all 8% of children who reported speaking *Hindoestaans* claimed it as an additional language, either as their L2 or L3. The other main Asian-Surinamese language in Suriname, Javanese, has a somewhat similar regional distribution as *Hindoestaans*, being mainly claimed by children in the Paramaribo area and in the Para, Wanica and Commewijne districts. None of the children in central and eastern Suriname made reference to Javanese. In Paramaribo, where over 30% of children said that they used it for some of their interactions, only about 1% of these children reported it as their L1. This contrasts with just over 20% of children who said that it is their L2 and just over 10% who claimed it as a L3–L5. In western Suriname, just over 10% of children who said that Javanese is in their repertoire claimed it as an additional language, as an L2 (4%), an L3 (6%) or an L4–L5 (1.5%). Finally, varieties of Chinese were claimed by next to none of the children who took part in the survey. This is somewhat surprising because we know that about 2% of the population self-identify as being of Chinese background and that most of them reside in Paramaribo. At this point it is not clear whether we simply missed Chinese-speaking children or whether these children, for one reason or another, reported having languages other than Chinese in their repertoire.\(^{16}\) This issue requires further investigation.

In contrast with Asian-Surinamese languages, the languages of the Maroons are marginally represented in western Suriname (about 7%), are comparatively underrepresented in the capital (about 35% across four languages), but clearly dominate in central and eastern Suriname. For instance, 50% of children in Brokopondo said that they use *Aukaans* and more than 80% said that they use *Saramaccaans*. Only about 8% declared speaking Matawai and 2% cited

\(^{16}\) It is possible, for instance, that we ‘missed’ Chinese-speaking children because they predominantly attend the Chinese school and/or other expatriate schools in the city.
Kwinti, two of the less widely spoken Maroon languages. This contrasts with eastern Suriname where more than 65% of children in Albina and nearly 100% of children in Moengo stated that *Aukaans* is in their repertoire. *Saramaccaans* does not appear to be widely represented in eastern Suriname since only 10% of children in Albina and 8% of pupils in Moengo reported speaking it. The other Maroon languages are not cited at all, but this does not necessarily mean that they are not used at all in these locations as some of the children who are speakers of less widely spoken Maroon languages such as *Paramaccaans* appeared to use the term *Aukaans* to refer to *Paramaccaans*. Children in Paramaribo reported using four Maroon languages, *Aukaans* (about 17%), *Matawai* (about 1.5%), *Paramaccaans* (about 1%), and *Saramaccaans* (about 15%). The more widely spoken Maroon languages, *Aukaans* and *Saramaccaans*, appear to have large mother tongue speaker communities in eastern and central Suriname, respectively. For instance, in the district of Brokopondo, nearly 50% of children said that *Saramaccaans* is their L1 compared with only 30% of children who reported it as an additional language, either as an L2 (20%) or as an L3–L5 (10%). The figures for *Aukaans* were a bit lower than those for *Saramaccaans*, but still point to the existence of a sizable native speaker community. Just over 20% of children in Brokopondo said that *Aukaans* is their L1 and nearly 30% claimed it as an additional language, either as an L2 (5%), and L3 (15%) or as an L4–L5 (10%). In eastern Suriname *Saramaccaans* appears to be marginally represented since few children claimed it overall and if they did, it was merely reported as an additional language—8% of children in Moengo and 10% in Albina said that *Saramaccaans* is their L4–L5. This contrasts with childrens’ categorisations of *Aukaans*. 52% of children in Moengo and about 46% in Albina reported speaking *Aukaans* as their main language (L1) and just over 40% in Moengo and about 15% in Albina said that they use it as an additional language.

In Paramaribo where overall speaker numbers were lower, about half of the children who reported speaking *Aukaans* or *Saramaccaans* declared it as their L1. Among those who claimed them as additional languages, 4% said that they speak *Aukaans* as an L2 and only 1% reported *Aukaans* as their L4–L5. *Saramaccaans* was claimed as an L2 and as an L3–L5 by 3% of children. The numbers for the other Maroon groups are very small (less than 2%), but in the case of both *Paramaccaans* and Matawai they were reported as L1s and as additional languages.

Amerindian languages were rarely mentioned by children throughout the entire country. None of the children we interviewed in Paramaribo and the towns of western Suriname said that they spoke an Amerindian language. In eastern Suriname, about 3% of children in Albina reported having Karina
in their repertoire as an L4. Arawak, Kari’na and lesser-used Amerindian languages were, however, cited in rural locations in eastern Suriname (Galibi), central Suriname (Powaka, Lebi Doti) and in central western Surinamese villages such as Matta, Pikin Saron, Bigi Poika, Konomerume/Donderskamp and Christiaankondre. Although many of these villages are predominantly inhabited by people of Amerindian origin, Amerindian languages were mostly cited as additional languages (L3–L2) rather than as L1s. This suggests that language attrition rates continue to be high in the case of Amerindian languages.

When comparing the regional distribution of languages obtained from the language survey with the distribution of (self-ascribed) ethnic categories identified by the 2004 national census (sic213-2005/02), some interesting patterns emerge. The census data and the survey data match up closely with respect to some languages. For instance, the census data show that the proportion of people who claimed Maroon (Maron) ethnicity in the district of Nickerie (123) constitutes a negligible minority compared with the number of people claiming Hindostaan ethnicity (21,921) who constitute the majority group in this district. The number of Javanese (Javaan) — 6,114 Javanese — is intermediate between the two groups. This is also mirrored in the results from the language survey where nearly half of all children in Nickerie reported speaking Hindoestaans, just over 10% reported speaking Javanese but less than 10% claimed a Maroon language (Figure 2.4). This suggests that there is a relatively close match between ethnicity and language identification and maintenance. However, there is some discrepancy between figures for ethnicity and language use in the case of residents of Paramaribo. In the capital, similar numbers of people claim Maroon and Javanese ethnicity — 23,343 Maroons and 29,188 Javanese — which matches up with the figures from the language survey; both Javanese and Maroon languages are each claimed by about 40% of children in Paramaribo. However, a different picture emerges in the case of Hindoestaan people. While 53,952 people claimed Hindoestaan ethnicity in Paramaribo — that is twice the number of people who claimed Maroon and Javanese ethnicity — less than 20% of the children in Paramaribo stated having Hindoestaans

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17 According to the census, there were 33,624 people of Surinamese nationality and 36,639 people in total living in the district of Nickerie in 2004. The third and fourth largest ethnic groups were people who claimed Creole (3,551) and mixed (3,273) ethnicity. For most districts, the census data list figures for the following ethnic groups separately: Amerindian (Inheems), Maroon (Marron), Creole (Creool), Indo-Surinamese (Hindoestaan), Javanese (Javaan), Chinese (Chinees), Caucasian (Kaukasisch), mixed (Gemengd). There are also categories such as others (Overige), ‘don’t know’ (Weet niet) and ‘no response’ (Geen Antwoord). sic226-2006–08: 27–29.
in their repertoire. This suggests that in the case of people of *Hindoestaan* ethnicity in Paramaribo, ethnicity and knowledge of the ancestral language do not go hand-in-hand which is suggestive of language attrition and of changes in the definition of membership in ethnic groups. Examination of the census category ‘mixed’ (*Gemengd*) in the national census also suggests that willingness to align with a specific ethnic grouping is undergoing change in Suriname and that this change is regionally stratified. While only comparatively few people claimed the ethnic category mixed in the district of Nickerie (3,273),18 this figure rises to 39,694 people in Paramaribo.19 Further research is needed on the issue of ethnicity and its relation to language, including regional variation.

Apart from Dutch, children also stated speaking other European languages such as *Engels* ‘English’, *Portugees* ‘Portuguese’ and *Frans* ‘French’. English was cited by children from all over the country. Figures 2.2–2.6 suggest that about 18% of children in Paramaribo, just over 30% in western Suriname, about 20% in eastern Suriname (20% in Moengo and 18% in Albina) and about 13% of children in the Brokopondo district said that English is part of their repertoire. In all of these locations it is mainly claimed as an additional language. Only about 4% of children in Paramaribo, 2% in western Suriname and Albina and about 1% in the Brokopondo district claimed it as an L1 though. In eastern Suriname and the Brokopondo district L3–L5 usage outweighed L2 usage while in Paramaribo and western Suriname it is cited to the same extent as L2 and as L3–L5. English is predominantly claimed in the western town of Apoera where almost all the children reported speaking it: 18 children out of 42 claimed it as an L1, 14 as an L2 and 7 as an L3.

Children only rarely reported using Portuguese. It appears as an additional language (L2 and L4) in western Suriname (about 1%), the Brokopondo district (about 3%), and in Paramaribo (less than 1%). Finally, while French is claimed as an additional language with a very low frequency in several locations such as western Suriname (L4: 1%) and the Brokopondo area (L4: 2%), its proportion rises to 10% in Moengo and 28% in the border town of Albina which is only a five minute boat ride from French Guiana. In Moengo, it is only cited as an additional language (3% L2, 3% L3, 3% L4–L5) while in Albina it was claimed by about 3% of children as an L1. A further 8% reported it as L2, 3% as an L3 and about 13% as an L4. In Section 7, we discuss the role of ‘foreign’ languages in the repertoires of children further.

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18 The total Surinamese population of Nickerie was 33,624 in 2004 (sic226-2006–08).
19 Compare this with the number of people who claim Creole (66,797), Indo-Surinamese (53,952), Maroon (23,343) and Javanese (29,188) ethnicity in Paramaribo. sic224-2006–06: 29–30.
Figure 2.3 The distribution of languages in Paramaribo, the capital of Suriname.

Figure 2.4 The distribution of languages in western Suriname (Districts of Nickerie and Coronie).
Linguage Practices and Linguistic Ideologies in Suriname

Figure 2.5 The distribution of languages in the Brokopondo district.

Figure 2.6 The distribution of languages in Albina and surrounding area in eastern Suriname.

Figure 2.7 The distribution of languages in Moengo and surrounding areas in eastern Suriname.
6 Social Functions of Languages in Children’s Repertoires

In Section 4 we showed that children all over Suriname presented themselves as bilingual or multilingual. They reported using distinct languages in different interactional dyads, but many of them also said that they use two or more languages in the same interactional dyad suggesting that interactional contexts are not always or typically identified with just one language. This suggests that the classic functional division of languages often invoked in the literature which designates certain languages such as Hindoeustaans, Javaans, the Maroon Creoles as home or community languages and others, notably, Sranantongo and Dutch (Nederlands) as official and/or out-group languages (see for instance Carew 1982: 2) does not match up with children’s perception.20 Following Fishman’s (1964) idea of language use in specific domains, we noticed a considerable weakening of the classic functional loading of languages which is probably the result of social change. Our analysis revealed several patterns. The most common pattern involved the use of Dutch together with one or more ‘home’ language(s) in one or more interactional dyads. For instance, an eleven-year-old girl from Kwakugron in the Para region told us that she speaks Matawai, Nederlands and Aukaaners. She speaks Matawai and Aukaaners only with her mother’s and father’s parents respectively. However, for all other types of interactions she stated using either Matawai or Aukaaners and Nederlands as shown in the figure 2.8 below.

There are, however, also a few cases where it is Sranantongo that alternates with a so-called home language. Take, for instance, the case of a twelve-year-old boy from Commewijne (Figure 2.9). He presented himself as trilingual, saying that he speaks Surinaams (Sranantongo), Javaans, and Nederlands. He stated using Javaans and Surinaams with his mother and father, Surinaams with his siblings and friends, Javaans with his maternal grandparents and Javaans and Nederlands with his paternal grandparents. It is interesting to note that Javaans functions as a linking language within the mother’s family—whereas Surinaams plays the same role with respect to the father, the father’s parents, siblings and friends. Interestingly, the number of languages used in the same interactional dyad appears to be greatest in interactions with the grandparents. This and many other examples show that children may use three or more languages in the same interactional context (see also Figure 2.11 below).

20 When reporting childrens’ language use, we use the language names that they used. The meta discourse mostly uses English labels to facilitate comprehension. If we were certain that two terms have the same denotation, we also indicate that by providing both names, e.g. one in brackets.
Figure 2.8 Languages used by a twelve-year-old girl from Kwakugron.

Figure 2.9 Languages used by an eleven-year-old boy from Commewijne.
In research on multilingualism, especially in settings that have been undergoing social changes involving processes of urbanisation and a significant increase in school attendance rates as in the case of Suriname, it is often assumed that ancestral or minority languages are practiced and promoted in interactions with the grandparent generation while the official or national language is used in interactions with parents, peers and outsiders. Our data show that there are indeed cases in our corpus where monolingual usage of an ancestral language is associated with interactions with the grandparent generation. For example, a ten-year-old boy from Nickerie (Figure 2.10) said that he uses Nederlands with his parents, Sranantongo with his friends, but only Hindoeestaans with his grandparents.

However, this classic distribution of languages does not seem to be the most common one as there are also a number of cases where it is the grandparent generation rather than the parent generation that appears to promote the use of the official language or where more than one language is also regularly used with members of the grandparent generation. In Figure 2.9, for instance, both supra-regional languages, Sranantongo and Nederlands, appear in interactions with the grandparents. Figures 2.11 and 2.12 are two examples of Nederlands-speaking grandparents. Figure 2.11 represents the language use

Figure 2.10  Languages used by a ten-year-old boy from Nickerie.
patterns reported by a fourteen-year-old boy from the Brokopondo district. He employs *Nederlands*, Sranantongo and *Saramaccaans* with his parents and siblings, Ndyuka instead of Sranantongo with his friends (together with the other available languages in their linguistic repertoire), but only *Saramaccaans* and *Nederlands* with both his grandparents.

Figure 2.12 represents another ten-year-old child from the village of Balin in the Brokopondo district who said that she uses only *Nederlands* with both sets of grandparents. The latter distribution of languages is not as uncommon as one might think and might be indicative of changes in educational patterns and language ideologies in Suriname. Until the 1980s, all languages other than Dutch had low overt prestige and upward social mobility was dependent on knowledge of Dutch. Parents therefore often adopted Dutch as their family language in order to give children a ‘head start in life’ and in order to create an aura of modernity for themselves. In the last thirty years this has been changing somewhat. On the one hand, Dutch has become more distinctly Surinamese through influence from other languages, most notably Sranantongo, and on the other hand, languages like Sranantongo, but increasingly also Maroon languages, have become more acceptable means of communication in domains previously reserved for Dutch (Charry 1983: 151). At the same time, it is also
possible that this non-traditional distribution is the result of educational problems (problems with teacher recruitment and training, strikes etc.) that have been affecting Suriname since the civil war in the 1980s. Many of the people who grew up in rural areas between the late 1980s and 2000 had little sustained access to education. Lack of access to Dutch and negative views about townspeople have in some areas led to a revival of traditional language practices.

Language use with siblings and with friends also does not appear to follow a single pattern either. In some cases children stated using the same languages with all of their family members and with friends. In many cases, interactions with siblings and friends are distinguished from those with elders. Figure 2.9 is a good illustration of this. Another example is shown in Figure 2.13. Here a thirteen-year-old boy from Nickerie reported using Nederlands with his parents, Hindoestaans with his grandparents and only Sranantongo with his peers.

This pattern could be taken to suggest that Sranantongo is the language of peer solidarity while Nederlands and Hindoestaans are languages of authority and distance appropriate for different types of interactional dyads. However,
patterns of language use reported by other children challenge this functional stratification of languages (see Figures 2.9 and 2.11 as counter-examples).

The survey also revealed differences in practices between different language communities. In the case of Sarnámi/Hindoestaans it is quite obvious that its monolingual use is most typically found in interactions between children and their grandparents (see Figures 2.10 and 2.13) suggesting that the latter are either more often quasi-monolingual and/or that they function as promoters of the ancestral language (and culture). Bilingual practices tended to be linked to interactions with parents suggesting that they often take on the role of language brokers who create a link between the ethnic and the national culture. Monolingual use of either Sranantongo, in the case of boys, and Nederlands in the case of girls and boys, or use of both these languages tended to be more typical of peer group interactions, including interactions with siblings while monolingual or bilingual use of Hindoestaans with peers appears to be quite rare. These findings support Marhé (1983) who argued that young Indo-Surinamese in the majority prefer to align with urban life-styles and a Sranan or national identity which is linked to Sranantongo and Dutch rather than a specific ethnic identity associated with Sarnámi/Hindoestaans. At this stage it
is not clear whether the greater use of Sranantongo and Dutch is necessarily only indicative of language attrition or might represent a case of age grading.

_Javaans_ is comparatively little mentioned by children throughout Suriname who participated in the survey. Analysis of the language use profiles of 135 children who said that _Javaans_ is part of their linguistic repertoire revealed three broad patterns. First, _Javaans_ is predominantly practiced with grandparents and in the majority of cases (93 out of 117) it is the only language used with them. The remaining children reported using it either in conjunction with _Nederlands_ (16) or with Sranantongo (8). Second, if _Javaans_ is used in the child-parent dyad at all, it is typically used with the mother and predominantly in conjunction with _Nederlands_. While only six children reported speaking only _Javaans_ with their mother, twelve said that they use both _Nederlands_ and _Javaans_ in this setting. Third, _Javaans_ is rarely used with peers and then typically with other languages such as Sranantongo or _Nederlands_ (see Figure 2.3). These patterns of language use involving _Javaans_ are indicative of a rupture of intergenerational language transmission, confirming St-Hilaire’s (2001: 1012) assertion that “Dutch and, to a lesser extent, Sranan[tongo] exert considerable assimilative pressure on the Javanese”. Javanese appears to be on its way to becoming a heritage language whose use will decrease in step with that of the oldest living generation.

Amerindian languages appear to be much more vulnerable than _Javaans_ though. Only very few children said that an Amerindian language is part of their linguistic repertoire and usually specified that they only have so-called passive competence in it; that is, they are able to understand (some) spoken productions but their ability to speak these languages is severely reduced. Those who reported speaking an Amerindian language had usually learned it from their grandparents, particularly their grand-mother, and also only used it in this interactional dyad. A very small number of children in a few rural locations also stated using an Amerindian language such as Kari’na with their parents, but in these cases it was used in conjunction with either Dutch and/or Sranantongo.

In contrast to Amerindian languages, language maintenance rates for Maroon languages appear to be quite high and the user communities of some Maroon languages appear to be growing. First, Table 2.6 shows that a relatively large number of the children who participated in the survey reported having a Maroon language in their linguistic repertoire and many of these children also said that it is (one of) their Lis.
Second, children stated using them in a wide range of interactional contexts such as with parents, elders, peers and siblings. Third, in both family and peer interactions they are frequently cited as the only medium of interaction, but children also stated using them in conjunction with other languages such as Dutch and Sranantongo, particularly in Paramaribo and eastern urban centers, and with other Maroon languages such as in the case of children interviewed in the district of Brokopondo. Fourth, Maroon languages, and Aukaans in particular, appear to also function as a peer group languages and/or a lingua franca nowadays. About 30% of children in our sample stated using a Maroon language, typically Aukaans, predominantly with friends often in conjunction with either Nederlands and/or Sranantongo. Some of these children had a parent of Maroon cultural background, but more than half of them did not. This suggests that intergenerational transmission is no longer the only way to learn a Maroon language. At least some of the Maroon languages are now also learned outside of the family context, most typically through interaction with peers. The same has been already shown for western French Guiana where Aukaans or Ndyuka, as it is called there, is the language of interaction among schoolchildren and Aukaans and Sranantongo are widely used as lingua francas (Léglise 2004 and 2007; Léglise and Migge 2006; Migge and Léglise 2013). In Suriname, this is particularly apparent among children in the Brokopondo district and among some children in Paramaribo.

Finally, while Sranantongo is rarely cited as a first language and then usually in conjunction with Nederlands, it is used in a broad range of interactions such as in interactions with grandparents, siblings and peers. However, there is quite a bit of variation in usage patterns across children and regions. Some children only declare it as a language for peer group interactions while
others report using it mostly with their parents and/or grandparents. Being Suriname's main vernacular, boys are more likely to align with Sranantongo than girls because its social connotations—as people usually declare—(peer solidarity, forthrightness, etc.) match up much better with local norms of boyhood: Only 4.5% of girls but 7% of boys claim Sranantongo as an L1, 23% of girls compared with 37.5% of boys claim it as an L2. When it is claimed as an L3 the differences are less stark: 33% of girls and 37% of boys claim Sranantongo as an L3. English is overwhelmingly claimed as an L1 by children who either themselves or whose parents originate from Guyana. Some of the children said that they use only Engels with both or one of their parents while others reported using it in conjunction with Nederlands when interacting with their parents. Interactions with grandparents, if they were accessible, i.e. lived in Suriname, tended to be in Engels too, but in some cases they were also carried out in Nederlands. In interactions with siblings, and particularly friends, Nederlands and/or Sranantongo appear to dominate, however.

7 Linguistic Ideologies

Language ideologies have an important impact on patterns of language use. They have also been defined as “the cultural system of ideas about social and linguistic relationships, together with their loading of moral and political interests” (Irvine 1989b: 255). They are beliefs, or feelings, about languages as used in their social worlds” (Kroskrity 2006: 498). This includes beliefs about the superiority or inferiority of a given language (variety) or beliefs about the (in) appropriateness of a language (variety) in a certain situation or among certain groups of speakers. Language ideologies have to be conceived of as multiple because groups of people tend to be characterised by various degrees of heterogeneity and therefore typically involve different kinds of positionality and produce different kinds of perspectives on the same issue. In addition, members of social groupings do not tend to be homogeneous with respect to their awareness of local language ideologies. Language ideologies mediate between social structure and forms of talk, and play an important role in creating and representing social and cultural identities. They are always interested rather than neutral, serving the needs and ideas of specific social groups (Kroskrity 2006: 501–510).

An important finding of the survey was that children in Suriname considered using several languages in order to carry out their everyday activities to be the norm. None of the children who claimed several languages registered discomfort at being multilingual. Being multilingual was presented as both
an asset and as a way of ‘fitting in’ and being able to connect with people. In contrast to that, a number of the children who reported using only one language—usually Dutch—often signaled unease about their monolingual status, even though they claimed the language with the highest overt prestige in the country. Respondents also displayed a favourable disposition to multilingualism in their responses to the question *Are there any languages that you do not want to learn?* Half of the children spontaneously responded with phrases such as *I want to learn all languages* or *I like all languages* rather than enumerating languages that they find undesirable. This can be taken as further evidence that knowing several languages is seen positively.

In addition to displaying a positive inclination to multilingualism, most of the children also asserted that they want to learn one or more languages that are not typically associated with Suriname. The same results were found in French Guiana (Léglise 2004), showing that international languages associated with the school context are widely presented as useful, suitable for learning and for preparing one’s own future. Among these, Engels was the most frequently cited one, but *Spaans, Portugees* and *Frans* also figured on children’s wish lists; a few children also mentioned other languages such as *Chinees* ‘Chinese’, Papiamento, *Italiaans* ‘Italian’ and *Duits* ‘German’. The reasons for wanting to learn foreign languages varied depending on the language involved. English and Spanish, the two main foreign languages taught in Surinamese secondary schools, tended to be linked to educational achievement and access to prestigious jobs later in life and, in the case of English, to travel abroad and communicate with non-Surinamese people. Interest in English and to a certain extent in Portuguese was also spurred by more immediate needs such as the desire to better understand the English and Brazilian films that are regularly broadcast in their original version on Surinamese television. Desire to learn Portuguese and particularly French was often linked to the world of friends and family. In the case of Portuguese, children wanted to know more about their Brazilian peers while French was seen to be useful for communicating with people on trips to neighbouring French Guiana. Maroon children in particular expressed an interest in learning French because they were curious to find out more about one of the languages spoken by their French Guianese cousins, aunts and uncles. Some of the children also linked English to the family context suggesting that they wanted to learn it in order to stay in touch with family members who live abroad, usually the USA.

Children throughout the country also manifested their desire to learn English and the high esteem in which it is held in other ways. First, many children initially claimed it as being part of their linguistic repertoire while at the same time admitting that their competence is not high. Second, children often
spontaneously rated it as the language that they like most and feel most comfortable with. Third, many children also asserted that they wanted to learn it better. English was also positively viewed among children who claimed it as (one of) their L1s. They stated using it in several interactional dyads, spontaneously selected it as their favourite language and overwhelmingly rated their competence as high. The only exception were L1 and L2 speakers of it who live in the western border town of Apoera. All of these children, who represented a clear majority of the children interviewed in that location, rated their competence negatively and expressed openly negative views about it. Given Apoera’s proximity to Guyana and the fact that most of the children or their families originate from villages in Guyana, their rejection of the language might be linked to children’s desire to assert difference to people from Guyana (and the village context) and positive alignment with Suriname.

In contrast to children’s desire to learn so-called non-local languages, few children expressed an interest in learning so-called local languages. It is not entirely clear where this lack of enthusiasm for local languages stems from because children evidently learn languages other than the languages that they use in the home environment. One possible interpretation is that local languages are seen as lacking in social capital because it is Dutch and foreign languages like English that are linked to social advancement. Another possible contributing factor is that children may find the ethnic positioning conferred by certain languages and/or their link to tradition in general undesirable or simply incommensurate with their (current) social and/or ethnic alignments. Evidence in favour of this argument comes from children’s responses to the question Which language(s) do you not want to learn? To take one example, a number of children supported their rejection of Hindoestaans with the following kinds of statements that highlight as problematic the ethnic positioning conferred by that language: this is not the language of my people, I don’t belong to this ethnic group and they are different from me. Although desire to learn so-called local languages was weak, many children—when asked—registered an interest in learning to write their ancestral language(s) or their L1(s) if they were not Dutch. Several children also said that their parents were teaching them reading and writing in these languages suggesting that literacy in languages other than Dutch is valued.

The survey strikingly demonstrated that Dutch looms large in Surinamese children’s imagination. It is not only the language that is most frequently cited, but children also did not have to be prompted about its use as children spontaneously reported having it in their linguistic repertoire. In fact, many children initially overstated their degree of usage, saying that they use it as their L1
but on further questioning usually scaled down its importance for carrying out their daily activities. For instance, children who initially reported using Dutch and another language with their parents often ‘admitted’ using only a few words from Dutch in these interactions upon further questioning. Children also overtly asserted a positive disposition towards Dutch saying that they like using it either to the exclusion of other languages in their repertoire or as much as another language in their repertoire that they habitually use. This view is equally found among children living in Paramaribo as among those residing outside of the capital. Unlike the former, children living outside of Paramaribo typically rated their competence in Dutch as low and expressed a desire to learn it better. There are several reasons for the importance of Dutch in children’s imagination. On the one hand, there is the fact that the survey was carried out through Dutch in one of the prime locations where it is habitually practiced and promoted, the school. On the other, it is the only language that children are accustomed to talking about in the public domain. Finally, association with Dutch in out-group formal kinds of settings carries positive association (sophistication, being part of modern urban society and for some, difference from the adult generation, see also Campbell 1983).21

In contrast to Dutch, Sranantongo appears to lack overt social prestige. Many of the children did not initially mention it when we asked them about the languages that they speak. Following further questioning, they confirmed using it, however, but acted as if there is no need to make this explicit. This might be taken to indicate that Sranantongo is an implicit or habitual language in Suriname. Children who stated using it (from the start) tended to link it to interactions with friends, siblings and in several cases also to interactions with fathers and older people. While a handful of children told us that their parents threatened them with corporal punishment for using Sranantongo and some girls, typically of Hindoestaan background, also expressed shock or offence at the idea of being associated with Sranantongo, most children did not voice overtly disparaging views about Sranantongo. Unlike Hindoestaan girls, particularly Javanese-Surinamese and Hindoestaan boys showed a strong desire to align with Sranantongo underscoring the fact that it has overtones of roughness, toughness and peer-group solidarity, which match up with local conceptions of young urban manhood. Finally, it is also interesting to note that relatively few children rated their competence in Sranantongo as low;

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21 Note that Hellinga already concluded in 1955 that Creoles and Asians increasingly preferred Dutch to their ancestral languages. He argued that this was reflecting the changing socio-economic situation in the post-war period.
according to Table 2.7 only one third of children rated their competence in Sranantongo as low, a figure which is comparable to the results obtained for other languages, see below for Maroon languages, for instance. This confirms that Sranantongo is a widely used language in Suriname. Note, however, that less than half of the children rated their competence in it as very high; this figure is higher than for other ‘ethnic languages’. The results from the survey do not allow us to conclude that Sranantongo currently functions as a symbol of a common Surinamese identity as suggested in some of the previous literature. It does, however, have a function that goes beyond simply linking people (lingua franca) because it, instead of Dutch, is used in political campaigning, joking and for doing ‘truthful’ or honest talk (e.g. criticism), suggesting that it expresses intra-Surinamese solidarity. Note, however, that this kind of solidarity function is ideologically much more strongly linked to men and particularly younger working-class urban men.

The social assessments of the other languages spoken in Suriname were variable across languages and also across speaker groups suggesting that it is not really possible to generalise across all ethnic or community languages. The differences in assessment patterns crucially dependent on a number of factors such as their speakers’ role in the public life of Suriname, the historical development of the speaker communities and children’s degree of knowledge and association with the languages and more crucially their speakers. This becomes very apparent when we compare views about Hindoestaans, Javanaans and Chinees, for instance. Children who stated speaking Hindoestaans as (one of) their L1s or as an L2 tended to assess their oral competence in it as good or very good suggesting a desire to align with the language. By contrast, children who said that they speak Javanaans also said that they speak it only as a L2–L4 and also overwhelmingly rated their competence as low, sometimes adding that they cannot properly communicate in it. Aside from actual degrees of competence, the low ratings strongly suggest that children do not want to
strongly align with it—they are willing to ‘admit’ belonging to this social entity, but at the same time they are at pains to stress their difference to the traditional stereotypical image. Similar differences between the two languages emerge with respect to children’s desire to learn to write *Javaans* and *Hindoestaans*. While a good number of the *Hindoestaans*-speaking children said that they want to learn to write *Hindoestaans*, there were very few Javanese-speaking children who wanted to do this. It is very difficult to determine Chinese speakers’ alignment with the language, since only very few children claimed Chinese as a language that they speak. However, given the fact that very few children were willing to say that they speak Chinese may in itself suggest that overt alignment with it may not carry positive connotations. Additional qualitative research is necessary to determine why only a tiny minority of children interviewed stated speaking Chinese.

Views about the languages among others, i.e. languages that a speaker does not report as having it in their repertoire, were equally heterogeneous. *Chinees* and *Hindoestaans* were quite frequently cited by others as languages that they did not want to learn. Several children explained that this is so because they associated these languages with specific ethnic stances that are incommensurate with their own (“I’m not from that group”), did not like the language and/or their speakers (“It’s not nice”), or because their speakers had been rude to them (“they scolded me”). In the case of Chinese, children often also said that they did not want to learn it because they thought it was too difficult. However, in contrast to *Hindoestaans*, there were also a number of children who wanted to learn it in part because it was perceived as difficult. Negative attitudes towards *Hindoestaans* have a long tradition in Suriname (see Speckman 1963) and anti-Chinese sentiments have also grown in recent years with the rise in Chinese immigration to Suriname (Tjon Sie Fat 2009b, this volume). In contrast to negative views about *Hindoestaans* and *Chinees*, the survey did not elicit negative views about Javanese. Neither those who said that they speak it nor non-speakers voiced any positive or negative attitudes about it. It simply does not appear to figure prominently in children’s linguistic imagination.

The survey confirmed that attitudes to Amerindian languages are predominantly low (Carlin and Boven 2002: 42–43). First, they were typically very reluctant to mention any association with these languages. Even in village communities where all or most of the people are of Amerindian descent, children often only admitted having an Amerindian language in their repertoire after follow-up questioning. In a number of cases, competence in a specific Amerindian language only emerged when discussing the linguistic repertoires of grand-parents. Second, children generally rated their competence as low or non-existent. For example five out of ten children who cited *Caraïbs* as their
first language and nineteen out of twenty-two children who cited Caraïbs and Arawaks as their second language declared that they spoke it only “a little”. Third, children used the Dutch generalising term inheemse taal ‘indigenous language’ when referring to the language and some children did not provide a more specific name following further questions either because they wanted to avoid ethnic positioning or because they may not know it. Fourth, while a few children said that they would like to learn the language of their ancestors, several children who were not of Amerindian descent openly displayed contempt (“I don’t like it”; “it’s not nice”). Taken together, these responses strongly suggest that the children of Amerindian descent that we interviewed want to distance themselves from Amerindian languages.

In stark contrast to views about Amerindian languages, Maroon languages were rated quite favorably by both speakers and others. First of all, Table 2.8 shows that children who said that they speak a Maroon language generally rated their competence in it as good or very good.

Second, while only some children spontaneously asserted that they want to learn to write the Maroon language that they speak, many children showed an interest in learning to write in that language when directly asked. Third, the survey only elicited very few overtly negative views about Maroon languages. Only a handful of non-speakers said that they did not like a particular Maroon language (or its speakers), found it ugly or felt that its usage ‘inhibits learning of Dutch’. Moreover, there were a few children who said that they would like to learn Aukaans. Interestingly, the survey also revealed some intra-Maroon issues. For instance, speakers of Matawai often held very low views about the closely related Saramaccaans and speakers of Saramaccaans and Aukaans did not always rate the respective other language all that positively, suggesting that they did not deem it desirable to learn it. It is clear that declared language practices function as symbolic boundary markers.

**Table 2.8  Children’s self-assessment of their speaking competence in Aukaans and Saramaccaans**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reported speaking it:</th>
<th>Aukaans</th>
<th>Saramaccaans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Very good</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As an L1</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As an L2</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As an L3 and 4</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As highlighted in Section 3, naming conventions for lesser-used Maroon languages showed some variability. Although there are six Maroon languages spoken in Suriname, children mostly made reference to only two of them, namely Aukaans and Saramaccaans. While their speaker communities are by far the largest, lack of mention of the others may also be related to other factors. When comparing responses in the traditional territories with those received in the urban and coastal regions, it becomes apparent, for instance, that the names of smaller Maroon languages are regularly cited in the former but comparatively rarely in the latter. This suggests that speakers of lesser-used Maroon languages might be using the name of the most closely related dominant Maroon language (e.g. Aukaans instead of Paramaccaans) as a cover or generalising term to refer to their own language in order to either accommodate perceptions of the interviewer (“she probably does understand these differences”) and/or in order to avoid ethnic positioning. Evidence in favor of the latter view is the fact that children often used names other than Aukaans (e.g. Ndyuka) in order to highlight a divergent (i.e. rural or traditional) variety. Thus by using the generalising term rather than a specific one, children might be projecting themselves as urban and/or modern Maroons.

8 Linguistic Practices

While carrying out the survey, we also observed actual language practices in Suriname and made some recordings of such practices.22 Here we will mainly report on the broad findings. Although Surinamese people are bilingual or multilingual, observation of usage patterns clearly shows that language use patterns are socially stratified. While rural populations in general freely use local languages such as the Maroon languages and Sarnámi/Hindoestaans within the extended family unit and as community languages, Dutch seems to be enforced for children in Afro-Surinamese urban families and in middle class families in these settings. In the case of middle class families, there is reciprocal use of Dutch in interactions between children and parents and parents also use Dutch among each other to a large extent and sometimes to the exclusion of other languages. Other languages, especially Sranantongo, may though be used by the parents in heated exchanges and during scolding (see Garrett 2005 for St Lucia). In non-middle class families, parents require their children to speak Dutch to them, but they may, depending on competence, use another

22 Collection of this kind of data is still ongoing.
language to address them. These rules seem to be much more strictly enforced with girls than with boys especially in the case of Sranantongo because its social connotations do not easily match up with images of respectable womanhood. However, in several cases, women reported that they were expected to use Sranantongo roughly from the age of fourteen or at the onset of womanhood. If they did not speak it, or if they spoke it badly, they tended to be ridiculed by their elders and scolded for being arrogant. Especially in urban public contexts, addressing someone who is senior, unknown or whom the speaker wants to impress (e.g. flirting) in a language other than Dutch is likely to cause offence or rejection especially in public settings. People who are not fluent in Dutch at least use a few commonly used introductory phrases—greetings and introduction to the purpose of visit—in Dutch before proceeding to present the main issue in another shared language such as Sranantongo. This suggests that Dutch functions as a language of respect in Suriname.

Our observations also confirmed those of other researchers (e.g. Breinburg 1983; Carlin 2001) who found that language use in Suriname is rife with code alternation phenomena. People frequently alternate between two or more languages. They draw on an ancestral language and Sranantongo and/or Dutch in order to negotiate social relationships, types of settings and to invoke certain kinds of positive identities and or social alignments. Example (1) is a case in point. Here three men are interacting in the village context. S and H are in their late 60s and position themselves as leaders of the local village community while B is in his late 30s and tends to position himself as a modern sophisticated young man. In (1) they are discussing current affairs in the Maroon language Pamaka.23

(1)

S:  

\[
\text{ma } u \text{ e kisi } \text{bosikopu}^{24} \text{ taki } \text{den } o \text{ doo?}
\]

but we \text{IMP}^{25} get message talk they \text{FUT} arrive

‘We keep receiving messages that they will arrive.’

23 Bold: Eastern Maroon Creole; underlined: Sranantongo; italics: shared Eastern Maroon Creole and Sranantongo; italics and underlined: Dutch.

24 They are both articulated with a [ʃ] rather than an [s], i.e. [kiʃi] which is indicative of Pamaka/Aluku.

25 \text{DEM}=\text{Demonstrative}; \text{DET}=\text{determiner}; \text{FUT}=\text{future marker}; \text{IMP}=\text{imperfective marker}; \text{LOC}=\text{Locational preposition}; \text{NEG}=\text{Negation}; \text{PAST}=\text{past marker}
While S and H are consistently using a monolingual and more traditional Pamaka style of speaking, B tends to code-mix with Sranantongo and to a lesser extent with Dutch, although he is well able to speak monolingual Pamaka. In this context, B’s consistent use of what could be termed bilingual or mixed speech functions to display his language competence and underlines his cockiness vis-à-vis the two elders—people are generally told things, but especially younger people do not ask about information.

Bilingual speech in many ways embodies modern Surinamese ways of being while monolingual speech is linked to somewhat negative stereotypes such as being traditional and backward, particularly among younger people. In many cases, the ancestral language serves as the matrix language and elements from other languages—most typically Sranantongo and Dutch but also sometimes (Jamaican) English—are inserted into this frame. This leads to the emergence of new varieties. These kinds of code-mixed styles are common among

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26 People in Suriname get acquainted with Jamaican English through popular music and Jamaican artists.
younger people, especially young men, and function as in-group markers. They function to assert powerful modern identities and to dissociate oneself from negative ethnic and social stereotypes associated with the monolingual use of (some languages), see e.g. Migge (2007).

However, there are also cases where Dutch and/or Sranantongo play a much more important role. Take for instance the broadcasting sector or theatre productions. Especially in the case of discussion programmes and call-in shows, it appears that Dutch and Sranantongo have fused to a certain extent as both languages provide not only lexical material but also structural patterns. Further research is necessary to determine the structural makeup of such practices. We also observed what is often referred to as situational or unmarked code-switching where people changed the overall language of interaction depending on a range of factors such as topic, context and interlocutors. For instance, Sranantongo or other local languages were usually used for intimate or family-related issues and other topical issues and people switched to Dutch or Sranantongo to talk about work-related issues and topics. A case in point occurred during observation at the Maroon Radio station Koyeba in Paramaribo. Two Maroon women were discussing the content of a broadcast on Surinamese receipts in Eastern Maroon varieties—the language of the broadcast—but switched to Dutch when discussing procedural matters for the programme such as which part should come first, who will press which button when and how long each part of the programme would be. In another instance, a teacher who hitched a ride with one of the authors, the field worker for the survey and another person who was driving the car, consistently used Sranantongo with the driver, Dutch mixed with Sranantongo with the field worker and English mixed with Dutch when speaking with one of the authors although she was using a mix of an Eastern Maroon variety and Sranantongo to speak to the other two during the same conversation. Equally striking was the non-reciprocal code-switching that was observed in another context. For instance, in a mobile phone shop, the customer spoke in Sranantongo while the female shop assistant consistently responded in Dutch to assert a high status female identity. Issues around code-switching in Suriname require more detailed attention.

There is relatively little data available on language practices involving Sarnámi (Hindoestaans), Javanese, Amerindian languages, Brazilian Portuguese, Chinese. However, observation during three events at the Javanese cultural centre suggests that speakers of Javanese typically code-mix between Javanese, Sranantongo and Dutch if they use Javanese and that Javanese rather than Sranantongo or Dutch often functions as the 'embedded' language. That is, elements from Javanese are inserted into Dutch or Sranantongo-based
structures. Sarnámi is also often used in a code-mixed fashion, but in this case, it is typically Sarnámi that functions as the matrix language and Dutch and Sranantongo as embedded languages. In urban ‘working class’ families Hindoestaans and Sranantongo are regularly used in the same context but also assigned different functions. By contrast, in middle class families it appears to be Dutch rather than Hindoestaans that is typically used and intergenerationally transmitted.

9 Conclusion

The first results of the language survey allowed us to assess existing descriptions of the linguistic landscape of Suriname in the literature and to add sociolinguistic detail to existing descriptions of the Surinamese landscape that tended to focus on historical usage patterns and on structural descriptive data (see Carlin and Arends 2002), and to update older descriptions (Charry et al. 1983). Our study showed that both multilingualism and plurilingualism are widespread in Suriname and that they are conditioned by a number of factors such as place of residence, ethnic alignment, social class, language ideologies and a host of contextual factors. Children who participated in the survey were generally happy to declare their linguistically diverse repertoires. While some languages such as Dutch and Sranantongo were frequently claimed by children all over the country, others, particularly Amerindian languages, were very little mentioned overall and yet others were primarily mentioned in some parts of the country, but not in others. The survey figures match up closely with census data for self-ascribed ethnicity categories in the case of some languages/ethnic categories and there are some mismatches with respect to others suggesting that especially in the main urban area, Paramaribo, membership in certain ethnic groups does not necessarily imply usage of and/or alignment with a particular ancestral language. This issue needs to be investigated in more detail based on qualitative data.

The survey also confirmed that languages in Suriname have different functional loads as they are used in different kinds of interactional contexts. However, most languages cannot be easily linked to only one or a small set of contexts because individual language use patterns show a fair amount of variability across different interactional dyads. For instance, in the case of many children, the official language of the country is no longer just associated with public and formal contexts, but is also frequently claimed as one of the languages for interactions with (some) family members and friends. However, the range of contexts or interactional dyads in which it is used, the degree of
its usage in each context as well as attitudes towards it varied considerably among the children that were interviewed. The findings confirm that Dutch has become an integral part of the Surinamese way of life and of a modern Surinamese social identity. However, variability across individuals in the ways that they draw on it also suggests that there is no such thing as a monolithic Surinamese identity or that Dutch serves a unitary function in Suriname’s multilingual and multicultural reality. More qualitative research is required to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the multiple functions that Dutch and Sranantongo serve. The survey also suggests that at least in terms of popularity, but maybe not in terms of actual competence, English is competing with Dutch.

Another important finding of the survey is that a number of the local languages continue to be valued and used by people in Suriname. While children voiced few overtly negative attitudes about any of the local languages, it is clear that they are assigned different social values. Some languages appear to be highly valued among their speakers (Maroon languages, Sarnámi), others appear to figure little in their speakers’ imagination (Javanese, Amerindian languages, and maybe some forms of Chinese). While the use of a number of local languages is continuing and maybe even expanding in some cases, children’s responses to our survey suggest that monolingual interactions are losing in importance; they appear to be increasingly associated with traditional ways of being. This finding in particular has important implications for research on the languages of Suriname since much of the research, following structural linguistic tenets, continues to focus on monolingual practices. The survey also highlighted that official, academic and lay conventions for naming languages do not always match up. In some cases there are important differences between them as in the case of Sarnámi and as in others, such as in the case of Sranantongo, they are quite heterogeneous. It is important to examine them carefully because they provide insights into people’s conceptualisations of linguistic spaces (Léglise and Migge 2006, 2007; Migge and Léglise 2013).

The results of the survey provide a first detailed and empirically grounded overview of the linguistic situation of Suriname, including people’s views about the languages spoken in the country. The findings suggest that while languages and language practices are still regionally differently distributed to a certain extent, rural-urban and cross-regional patterns of mobility among people, as well as participation in formal education continue to increase contact between languages that were previously not at all or only infrequently in contact. For instance, the official language is playing a more important role in rural areas and languages that used to be conceived of as ‘tribal languages’ are
gaining ground in urban areas and are affecting urban practices. The languages of some neighbouring countries such as Brazilian Portuguese are gaining a foothold in the country, adding new dimensions to Suriname’s multilingual and plurilingual realities. Greater social mobility has also led to greater access to and usage of Dutch-based practices throughout the country. It is no longer just the language of the elites, but is also available to and being used by others though arguably not always in the same ways. These processes have led to its greater social integration in Suriname as evidenced by the fact that all children acknowledge that it is part of their linguistic repertoire, but most likely greater social mobility has also given rise to a much greater range of types of practices. It appears that the question is no longer whether or not people speak Dutch, but how they draw on it and for what purposes. This needs further investigation.

The findings from the survey not only shine a light on the complexity of the linguistic landscape of Suriname but they also suggest that further qualitatively-oriented research is needed on issues such as

- the relationship between language and frequently invoked social categories such as ethnicity and social class in Suriname,
- the effects of mobility on language use,
- the effects of mediated language use in face-to-face interactions,
- the effects of multilingualism on language maintenance and
- the types of language contact patterns and their social and linguistic conditioning

in order to obtain an in-depth understanding of this context.
CHAPTER 3

Small-scale Gold Mining and Trans-frontier Commerce on the Lawa River

Marjo de Theije

1 Introduction

The fluvial border that separates Suriname from French Guiana abounds with multiple meanings and functions. This frontier lies between two very different countries: Suriname is a young nation with a turbulent colonial history, now home to over twenty different ethnic and language groups; French Guiana is a small piece of Europe in South America, though involving partially different languages and populations groups. The two countries represent very different political systems and highly unequal economic realities. As a consequence, crossing the border is like stepping from one world in the other. The visitor is faced with differences in official languages and currencies, and immediately senses the differing forms and stages of development and organisation of the respective nation states. These differences have become increasingly visible over the past decades, as both countries developed in distinct directions. However, the frontier is not only shaped by states. The inhabitants of the region, the people who use the river, who make a living, by and on the river, give meaning to the frontier and re-create what nations draw on maps. Despite all the differences between Suriname and French Guiana, the inhabitants of the border region are culturally very similar, sharing languages and family ties, and also participate in the same activities. Moreover, people use the frontier itself in creative ways, despite its main role as a barrier.

It used to be the case that the frontier barely existed for many inhabitants of the region, even as an imaginary construct, since their homes and customary lands were on both sides of the river. In addition, people have always had many cross-border relationships too. Nowadays, there are, in principle, more bureaucratic limits to free movement across the frontier. At the same time, however, we witness a lack of border surveillance, long stretches of the border remain unattended by the authorities on either side, and both Maroons and Amerindians, as well as newcomers to the region, move freely between the two
countries. Crossing the border, moving to the other shore, or moving upriver or downriver, is part of everyday life for most inhabitants of the region, the Pamaka, Ndyuka, Aluku/Boni, Kari’na, and Wayana. Surinamese children from several villages that themselves do not have schools study on the French side and go there every day on the ‘school boat’. Newcomers, mainly Brazilians, also move around and across the border with great ease. They, too, all have cross-border relations, and for them Suriname, French Guiana, and Brazil are all part of one and the same familiar Amazonian rainforest (Theije and Heemskerk 2009: 8–9). It is, as Ribeiro (2009: 314) defined, a single trans-frontier social space.

The meaning of this porous border is as varied as the actors. The Brazilian anthropologist who cannot cross legally from Suriname to French Guiana without a visa feels severely limited. The Maroon woman who paddles to her sister on the other bank of the river could not care less. For many people passing and living along the rivers of the French Guiana—Suriname frontier, the border is not an obstacle but rather an invisible line between national states that offers economic opportunities. For others the Lawa and Marowijne rivers (Maroni for French speakers) are just two of the many rivers in the Guyana Shield that one traverses to go into the forest, to the villages of the tribal peoples, or to the gold fields. For others it is their main economic resource: they mine gold from the riverbed, they transport goods and people across the river, or they catch fish from it, to sell or as food for their family (see also Piantoni 2011: 49–50).

In this chapter I describe how people live with the frontier between two states, more precisely the Lawa between French Guiana and Suriname. Cross-border movement in this region involves many different home locations, and an incessant process of motion and forming, changing and reforming of relationships, where borders became obsolete and the ‘migration’ process is a continuity of movement, and will benefit from an approach rooted in transnationalism theory (Glick Schiller et al. 1992). The specific social and cultural configuration of the movement along the Marowijne and Lawa Rivers has not been researched from the Surinamese point of view The ‘migrants’ in this border region include the Maroon and Amerindian inhabitants, as well as French, Surinamese, Guyanese, and Brazilian gold miners, sex workers from different backgrounds, and many merchants, vendors, hawkers from all the aforementioned countries, and many Chinese. They all are attracted by the small-scale

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1 The international airport, Albina, and South Drain (Nickerie) are the only border control posts, but the high costs of monitoring leave even these three posts without sufficient control services (Jubithana-Fernand 2009: 200).
gold mining activities in the region, on the river and on both banks of the border river, and along the many creeks and smaller rivers that drain into the Marowijne and Lawa. This brings me to the second objective of this chapter.

People do not cross these rivers empty-handed. Trade and commerce account for most of the traffic and transport. After the violent confrontation between Maroons and Brazilians in Albina on Christmas Eve 2009, the Surinamese public became aware of the magnitude of the commerce up the Marowijne River and beyond. The huge commercial buildings in Papatam, petrol stations and numerous transport boats, once obscured from the public in Paramaribo, were now exposed to the gaze of the nation. The northern part of the Marowijne River has always been the main gateway for traders and hawkers, and probably also for smugglers. In the past decade, this commerce has become much more intense as a result of increasing gold mining activities in the region. The place of action is an economic space where the normative and repressive roles of the nation states involved are largely ignored in a process of “grassroots globalisation”, or “economic globalisation from below” (Ribeiro 2009). To date, we have few studies of how the economic linkages and arrangements are shaped between the many groups and individuals in the Guianas. To come to a better understanding of the economy of this frontier, this chapter will provide ethnographic descriptions of instances of commerce and transportation across the Lawa River.

In the following sections, I focus on the complex movements ‘in and out of Suriname’ along the Lawa and Marowijne Rivers that form the frontier with French Guiana. These movements are, for a large part, a consequence of small-scale gold mining in the region, on both sides of the rivers. First, in Section 2, I provide an overview of the history of the recent gold mining boom. In Section 3, I focus on the ‘migrants’ involved in the gold mining enterprise. In Section 4, I describe the different forms of transport, trade, and hawking, as principal economic activities in the region. In Section 5, I focus on the trans-frontier part of the trade. In the conclusion, in Section 6, I return to the movements ‘in and out of Suriname’.

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2 The Surinamese public also became aware of the lack of State control over the area, with local policemen complicit in ‘illegal’ border crossings and even judging in disputes between ‘illegal’ traders.

3 I have been studying small-scale gold mining in Suriname since 2006, and up to my last research visit, prior to writing this article, to the upriver region in January 2012 I spent a total of 12 months doing actual fieldwork, mostly in the area around Benzdorp, Lawa region.
Gold Mining at the Frontier

In the interior of Suriname small-scale gold mining is the most important economic activity. In this sector many different stakeholders are active, from local inhabitants, Maroons from other places in the country, urban Surinamese, Brazilian garimpeiros, to foreign technicians and geologists from large mining companies involved in prospection activities. Local Aluku and Wayana are now emphasising the devastating impact that the influx of migrants caused by the mining activities has had on their territory and culture. The first migrant miners arrived in the region at the end of the nineteenth century. We can only speculate about their impact at that time.

The first gold deposits along the Lawa River were discovered by two Frenchmen in 1885 and caused a gold rush that involved not only the Aluku living in this area, but above all thousands of migrant miners. The migrants coming to the Lawa during the first gold rush were Creoles, some from Suriname, but most of them from the Antilles, Martinique, Guadeloupe, Saint Lucia, and other islands (Petot 1986: 121). Mostly foreign companies acquired concessions and hired personnel to carry out their operations. It must have been a real invasion, in a region that before was only inhabited by a few hundred Aluku Maroons and Wayana Amerindians. Suddenly the ethnic diversity of the (temporary) population grew tremendously: the discovery of the gold attracted thousands of foreigners and urban Creoles. The first rush only lasted a few years, but returned around the turn of the century when gold was discovered in the Inini Creek, a tributary of the Lawa upstream from the main Aluku area, but right in the middle of Wayana territory.

The Compagnie des Mines d’Or de la Guyane Hollandaise obtained the concession rights from the French discoverer of the gold reserves and produced gold in several left hand tributaries of the Lawa River until 1928 (Polak 1908: 723). In the decades that followed several other companies worked on the placer until 1963. The Sarakreek Goudvelden N.V., that operated from 1935 onwards, was the first to introduce a mechanised mining system with diesel load shovels and draglines. This company also allowed a limited number, on average 145, of small-scale miners to work on the concession (Fleming 2006).

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4 At that time the frontier between Suriname (the Netherlands) and French Guiana had not yet been settled; this was done in 1891 by a committee chaired by the Russian Czar, which established that the left bank of the Lawa was to be Dutch and the left bank French (Bilby 1989, 1990, Sicking 2006: 121).

5 A placer is an alluvial mineral deposit, in this case of gold, fit for open pit mining.
There is little mention in the historical sources of large participation of the local population in the actual mining activities, although it is plausible that some may have ventured into mining themselves (cf. De Beet and Thoden van Velzen 1977: 127; Bilby 1989, 1990; Crevaux 1883: 67–8). Bilby (1989) mentions an agreement between the Aluku and the French governor, recognising the right to intervene in the gold production in the so-called Contesté ‘the disputed area’, claimed by both the Dutch and the French. It is also known that the Aluku of the village of Kottika on the Lawa River introduced a tax on all gold shipped to the coast (Polak 1904). The local population was not much involved in the mining enterprise itself. Ndyuka and Aluku alike only used gold as a supplement to their family incomes, and only now and then would some members of the family go to a creek known for its gold and pan gold for a week or so. This gold would be used to do the Christmas purchases or to cover some unexpected expenses. None of the contemporary Ndyuka miners I interviewed in the Benzdorp region was raised in a mining camp. Only one Aluku miner mentioned he had lived close to a placer as a child, at Benzdorp in the 1960s, as his mother (who was living with a Kabiten ‘Captain’ of the French village Papaïchton—then Pompidou) had her kampu ‘camp’ there. The island Kawina Tabiki (now usually called Lawa Tabiki), right in front of the Benzdorp placer, was inhabited by Aluku and Ndyuka, but these did not generally work for the Sara Goudvelden N.V., the company that exploited the gold fields in the area between 1935 and 1963, nor for the Lawa Goldfields Ltd. that started a dredging operation in 1963. Instead, Creoles from Saint Lucia and Martinique and other Caribbean Islands formed the main workforce on the placer (Geijskes 1957 [1942]; Strobel 1998). In the 1950s and 1960s, Benzdorp had a police post, about 100 houses, built by the Sarakreek Companie for their workers, shops and bars (Helman 1980). The Aluku did not live there, however, as they did not want to be employed by others. In the 1960s Hurault learned that Aluku found gold mining a humiliating occupation (Hurault 1965: 91).

By the end of the 1970s, gold mining in Suriname received a new impetus, as the national Geological and Mining Service (gmd) introduced a technological innovation: small dredges on the rivers and creeks that suck gravel from the riverbeds in search of gold (Heemskerk 2000: 18). The active role of the gmd in the development of small-scale gold mining, especially under director Henk Dahlberg (see Dahlberg 1984), came to an end as a consequence of the civil war, which paralyzed the country from 1986 to 1992. The war, between the military government and the Maroon Jungle Commando, however, also caused the return of the importance of small-scale gold mining in the region, as south-eastern Suriname became isolated from the coast and men lost their access to jobs. The war was partly financed by operating the dredges that the
Small-scale Gold Mining & Trans-frontier Commerce

insurgents had confiscated from the government in the Marowijne River. For the first time gold mining became an economic activity of the local people, rather than foreign companies or public enterprises. Many young Maroons became acquainted with small-scale gold mining in this period (Hoogbergen and Krujt 2004; Theije and Heemskerk 2009, 2010), and continued working in this sector after the war had ended.

Thus, from the 1990s onwards, Maroons also started mining themselves, during and immediately after the civil war. Several Aluku began re-mining the old placer of Benzdorp, first manually but with the help of Brazilians soon with hydraulic equipment as well. They were very successful and others followed their example. Some set up operations in French Guiana, at the Mana River, and Dorlin. Two other significant changes took place in the early nineties. First, mining Maroons contracted Brazilian garimpeiros to work with them. The Brazilians started working on the dredges, but soon also in open pit mines in the alluvial deposits along the Lawa River, and its tributary creeks. The closing of mining sites in the Brazilian Amazon had made many independent miners available to the workforce in the neighbouring countries such as Venezuela, Guyana, French Guiana, and Suriname. The Brazilians, who had many skills and knowledge about mining techniques, introduced new mining methods and equipment to Suriname. Second, in the early 1990s the government started to grant concession rights for gold mining to several (non-Maroon) entrepreneurs from the city, as well as to the state company Grassalco (now State Mineral and Mining Company Holding). Large areas of mineable land came under their control, for which they tried to interest international companies to do the prospecting. Meanwhile, they invited garimpeiros to set up their own independent operations, against payment of 10% of the proceeds to the concession owners. Traditional land rights were largely ignored in this process and the Maroons who happened to be mining in the areas that were their customary lands, in time had to submit to the rules imposed by the concession holders. These two developments, together with the new direct involvement in mining of the riverine peoples, not only Maroons but also the Wayana Amerindians, have largely determined the face of the current gold economy in southern Suriname and French Guiana.

Small-scale gold mining is one of the main sectors of the economy of Suriname. Bauxite, gold and oil make up 95% of all exports of the country, with gold production increasing and bauxite drastically decreasing. In 2011 gold was the most important export product. The exceptionally high gold price is making a positive contribution to economic growth in Suriname. Moreover, after the government, the gold sector creates most jobs in the country (IMF 2010: 82). The gold sector has also had an indirect impact on the economy,
for example, the large trade in excavators, bulldozers, tractors, and ATVs (All Terrain Vehicles, quads), and of course the spare parts for all this machinery that is used to build the paths, to dig the pits and transport the people and goods (Fritz et al. 2009: 83). Gold mining also accounts for 75% of all domestic flights in Suriname (ibid: 83), and probably an even larger proportion of all river transport. Both the gold mining itself and the transportation of goods, machinery and people to the gold fields requires large amounts of petroleum products. It is estimated that annually about 15 million litres of diesel and 50,000 litres of grease are used in small-scale mining (ibid: 83). Moreover, in the interior, hardly any other economic activity exists. Research shows that 90% of households in the villages along the Tapanahoni, Marowijne and Lawa and the Brokopondo area are wholly or partially financially dependent on small-scale gold mining (Heemskerk 2009: 35). In addition, the Brazilians in the Surinamese small-scale gold sector spend much of their money in Suriname. Many Brazilians have their families in the city, and others spend most of their money on entertainment—in the gold fields or in town. Thus the money from the small-scale mining sector trickles through into almost all sectors and strata of the Surinamese economy.

3 Migrants at the Lawa

The small-scale mining sector has an extraordinarily transnational character. The dynamics of the activity are largely driven by global gold prices. When the international gold price rises, mining becomes more attractive. As a consequence, areas that were previously uninteresting because of minor finds will now be mined as the price per gram significantly increases. In addition, the sector can absorb more miners. Not only is the price of gold important, the oil price also has a major impact on business, as the biggest operational cost in small-scale mining is fuel. A second transnational influence, are the policies in other countries. The prohibition of mining in several Brazilian regions in the early 1990s caused a migration of garimpeiros towards the neighbouring countries to the north, that is French Guiana, Suriname, and Guyana.

A recent migration stream entering the Surinamese gold fields comes from French Guiana. On the French side of the Lawa River, Operation Harpie,6 aimed

6 <http://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/france/harpie/11-03-08-guyane-la-preparation-a-la-mission-harpie>: ‘Harpie is an interdepartmental operation which mobilises substantial resources of the Ministries of Interior, Defence and Justice. The armed forces have been strengthened by soldiers deployed from the mainland and the Caribbean.’
at ending small-scale gold mining, has been in force since early 2008, chasing end evicting the non-licenced miners. For this reason, an increasing number of individuals have relocated their base to Suriname. Several recent settlements along the Lawa River were founded, and grew considerably as a consequence of the repressive actions of the police and French military on the other side of the river. Operation Harpie was the follow-up of the police-only Operation Anaconda (2002–2008), whose purpose was likewise to combat illegal mining in French Guiana through the identification and destruction of gold mining equipment. It proved to be insufficient to end the mining activities, due to the difficult access to the region, and the fact that the miners appeared to be better equipped to move into the forest, and to hide from the police. The proximity of the national frontier also compounded the problem because across the river the migrant miners are hounded much less. Although small-scale gold mining in Suriname is only recently entering a process of formalisation, in the past two decades it was tolerated and on several occasions was even temporarily legalised. The 2008 Operation Clean Sweep (see note 7) in Benzdorp had no long-term consequences for the mining activities in the region, nor for the free movement of the miners and others. As a consequence, the migrants lead a more tranquil existence in Suriname, where they do not need to run from the military or police, and do not need to fear for the loss of their investments in equipment as they do in French Guiana. This calm and peaceful environment is what attracts people to live temporarily or permanently on the Surinamese side of the Lawa River where they find some respite from escaping from the French police.

Migration has always been a characteristic of the region. The Wayana and Aluku only arrived in the eighteenth and nineteenth century (Boven 2006). Formal frontiers were never any real barriers that stopped people from crossing the river or from moving to other parts of the region. Ever since their discovery, the gold fields of the Lawa played host to people from elsewhere. After the nineteenth century rush passed some migrants stayed in the region to continue as individual gold diggers on the French side. It was only on the Dutch side that some larger companies continued to produce gold (Ahlbrink 1956 cited in Boven 2006: 84). A French census from 1938 registered more than 1000 Creoles in Wakapou (the largest village in the region at that time, right opposite Benzdorp), Maripasoula and Inini Creek (Vaillant and Hurault 1960). Sarakreek Gold took over the exploitation of the Benzdorp placer in 1935 and introduced the first mechanised mining system in the Lawa area, in the Rufin Creek. This company admitted independent gold miners to work on their concession, at several different creeks. On average, 145 persons worked there per year, with a peak of 225 in 1941 (Fleming 2006: 7). This meant a renewed growth
of the surrounding activities too, and the French Creole village Wakapou, directly opposite the landing of Benzdorp, saw a significant increase in population (Vaillant and Hurault 1960). In the same years a new group of Creoles from St. Lucia arrived in the Inini Creek gold fields (Strobel 1998: 224). Dutch biologist Geijskes passed through the area in 1938 and found 270 Creoles, employees of what he erroneously calls the concession of the Compagnie de Mines d’Or de la Guyane Hollandaise, living in Benzdorp (Geijskes 1957 [1942]: 26). On his way back he mentioned finding 600 St. Lucians in the same place (ibid: 285). Little information is available on the decades that followed. When Surinamese writer Helman visited Benzdorp and Wakapou almost twenty years later, in 1955, he found the then largest gold company of the country fully operational, with a hundred or so small houses, a police post and customs office, as well as a partly mechanised gold operation. The coming and going of foreign gold prospectors continued for some decades, but by the 1970s gold extraction had come to a standstill. The next big change occurred as a result of the civil war, a.k.a. the War of the Interior (1986–1992).

As a consequence of the war, many Surinamese Maroons fled in great numbers from their villages to Paramaribo and to French villages across the Marowijne River, such as Gran Santi, Apatou and Saint-Laurent-du-Maroni, intensifying a process that had already been taking place at a slower rate in the previous decades. Many war refugees stayed in French Guiana after the war had ended, and this in turn attracted new migrants. Increasingly the economic differences between the two countries, caused a pull and push tension, bringing many Surinamese to French Guiana. In French Guiana wages are much higher, although the price of food, shelter, clothing and entertainment is higher, too. Noteworthy is also the social security system in French Guiana, which is much more generous than its Surinamese counterpart, so it became desirable to acquire documents for this part of Europe and so obtain access to these services. Another consequence of the civil war was that a generation of (refugee) children in Suriname were left without education and professional training, and are now unschooled with few opportunities on the Surinamese job market. These young men are now the main actors in the small-scale mining activity in the interior.

Around the same time, after the war, large numbers of Brazilian miners started to arrive in Suriname. There are records of garimpeiros working in Suriname since the 1980s, yet it was not until the early 1990s that the influx of mining-related people and knowledge grew to such proportions that it began to impact Surinamese society, and the regions with most of the mines, such as up the Lawa River. Today between ten and twenty thousand Brazilians are working in Suriname, virtually exclusively in the small-scale gold mining
industry and surrounding service economy (officially, the figures from the 2004 census (ABS 2006) are repeated till today). Most of these first gold fields were close to the French border, and initially many garimpeiros came over land, from French Guiana. Nowadays, most Brazilian migrants arrive on the Surinam Airways flight from Belém.

4 Commerce on the River: Maroon Transporters, Chinese Supermarkets, and Brazilian Hawkers

To set the context for this section, the reader may imagine a vast tropical rainforest with hardly any inhabitants and a very limited infrastructure. The people in this forest are there to work in the gold mining business. This demands a steady supply of food and fuel. The miners do not grow vegetables or staple foods. In the interior only a few Maroon women profit from the mining business by selling kwak(a) (granulated cassava meal), and some Maroon and Amerindian men sell fish or meat, but apart from that there is no local production to feed the thousands of miners in the mining camps. For this reason, everything is bought in the urban centres along the coast, mainly in Albina, on the lower Marowijne River, and in Paramaribo, to be commercialised again up river. Thus, the river, and the frontier, are a hustle and bustle of commercial activity, with many people making a living in gold mining-related sectors. With the intensification of gold mining activities and the influx of thousands of migrant miners, the dimensions of all commercial activities have increased. Albina is the place where all goods and people enter the boats to go upriver to the villages and mining camps in French Guiana and Suriname. Upstream many smaller places serve as transfer stations, where goods are waiting for buyers, or goods are put into smaller boats that bring the merchandise to the camps along the smaller creeks, or into the pick-ups and quads wherever overland transport is possible.

In the past things may not have been so very different. A century and more ago, the Ndyuka and Aluku reigned in the transport business (Thoden van Velzen 2003). De Beet and Thoden van Velzen (1977: 115) calculated that in the period 1885–1888 some 5,000 to 6,000 people arrived in the gold fields of the Lawa, and in 1901 there were again 5,000 workers. Although the numbers never rose to those heights again, from then on there have been continuous

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7 Although various initiatives have been taken to legalise the unregistered migrants, such as Operation Clean Sweep in 2008, this has not led to a better knowledge of the numbers of Brazilians in the country.
mining activities in the region, mostly carried out by migrants. Although they
did not venture into mining themselves, the gold rush had a large impact on
the economic and social situation of the Maroons, as they were the only ones
who knew how to manage transport on the rivers and creeks (see also van
Stipriaan (this volume)). De Beet and Thoden van Velzen show convincingly
that the Maroons “experienced a most spectacular economic upsurge” after
1880 (1977: 113). In the twenty first century the Ndyuka are still the carriers of
most of the cargo from the coast to the gold fields.

Food and fuel form the largest part of the trade. In Benzdorp and other
settlements some basic foodstuffs were sold in small shops, owned by locals
or Brazilian women. Because these shops are very expensive, and everything
is paid for in pure gold, most people send to town for their food, and have it
shipped, on their own costs, to the interior. For owners of mining operations,
who have to feed all workers three times a day, this means that every two or
three months they send for a shipment of foodstuff. In the larger mining settle-
ments women would start restaurants. The story of the founding of Benzdorp
revolves around the bar-restaurant of Dona Maria. Dona Maria started as a
cook working for gold miners, but she came up with the idea to start a bar
at the time of the soccer world championship of 1998. She bought a satellite
dish and television set and started to sell soft drinks and snacks. Soon she also
began to cook meals on Sundays and this was such a success that she left her
job with the mining crew and invested in the bar-restaurant, and later also a
brothel. In the beginning there were only a few other houses, but the location
of the bar of Dona Maria soon expanded into what is now known as Benzdorp,
the commercial and recreational centre of a large mining area. In general, beer,
liquor, and cigarettes are an important part of the market since bars and broth-
els are the centres of social life in the mining culture.

Over the last few years, Chinese merchants, who have been quick to move
into almost any place where there were no Chinese stores yet, entered the
mining area and some of the villages on the Marowijne and Lawa Rivers. This
development increased the volume and variety of available products, and
prices dropped considerably, but it also ruined business for small shops run
by local inhabitants and Brazilians. In the space of three years, between 2007
and 2010, Chinese entrepreneurs took over the entire commerce in the gold
fields on the Lawa River. In Benzdorp alone, I counted fourteen Chinese super-
markets in 2012, all selling basically the same products. Only some Brazilian
clothing stores and beauty salons have survived the competition with these
newcomers.

Fuel is essential for the mining enterprise and forms the largest part of the
production cost of gold. Fuel is bought in Paramaribo, transported by road to
Albina and from there on boats to landing places close to the mining sites on the Lawa River. Some miners organise this transport themselves, using the Maroon boat services between Albina and the Lawa River. Otherwise local entrepreneurs organise this part of the route, often with their own boats. Until two or three years ago, the Ndyuka were the main vendors of gasoline and diesel in the Lawa gold fields, and had quite a lucrative business. “Everything I have, here and in Paramaribo, I bought with the gold of Benzdorp,” said a 32-year-old fuel vendor who started a business eight years ago. “Before I had only three pairs of trousers and three shirts, and now I have everything, also my own house.” Growing competition from Chinese traders in the past few years, however, has caused most Ndyuka oil salesmen to give up this part of their trade.

Whereas all the trade described until now is located at permanent places, a major part of commerce in the interior is carried out by travelling salespersons. Mostly female hawkers (*selli uman* and *marreteiras*) also bring luxury goods such as perfumes, clothes, and cigarettes to distant places that are only accessible by canoe. They buy these goods in Brazil or Suriname and sell them in Suriname and French Guiana. Some settle temporarily in larger mining camps such as Benzdorp, sell there, and make short trips into the surrounding area to visit the small camps. Others are just itinerant workers while some stay on as cook or bartender in some place and try to sell their merchandise on the side. Sometimes they also do sex work. There is great variation in the way this commerce takes place. A cook may occasionally bring a box of perfumes and soap from Brazil (the Brazilian brands Boticário and Natura are very popular) to sell to the miners in her camp and to anyone else who might pass through. Or she may go to Paramaribo every now and then to buy such products at the local Surinamese market, and return to sell them for double the price in the Benzdorp and Antino area. If she sells it further up the river, the price may triple or rise even more. In January 2012 a perfume bought in Paramaribo for 50 US$,8 was sold for 5 grams of gold—at the time about 200 US$—in the gold fields of the upper Lawa River. Such goods are transported by airplane, which is relatively cheap since these goods are not that heavy.

Quite a few women travel from *garimpo* (mining site) to *garimpo* to sell the merchandise they bring from Paramaribo or Brazil. Hawking has become their main activity and source of income. Apart from personal hygiene products, clothes are the second most popular product. Experienced women have developed sophisticated business chains, flying to Belém (from Paramaribo), then by bus to São Paulo, to buy the clothing, then they ship it to Suriname, or bring

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8 In Paramaribo many imported goods are traded in US$ prices.
it by airplane, to sell to their compatriots in Suriname or French Guiana. The main problem these hawkers encounter is that they often sell on credit and are not always paid their due. For their business, the women often depend on hearsay about "rich garimpos" where they expect to find the buyers for their products.

All transactions are carried out in gold. Sometimes Euros or US Dollars are accepted, but the method of payment is generally in grams of pure gold that is later exchanged for currency (US Dollars or Euros). Most of the time, Brazilians sell the gold to an official gold buyer in Paramaribo, who also offers the service of keeping the gold for some time (as in a bank account) or transferring the converted amount to the bank account of their family in Brazil. The traders immediately feel rising gold prices on the world market when they sell their gold in the city. In the mining region, however, prices are set in gold, and these tend not to fluctuate. For example, a taxi ride on a quad was ten grams of gold in 2006, when a gram of gold was US$15, and continued to be ten grams in 2009, when a gram of gold was US$50. Thus, the use of gold as the main currency creates a certain stability for the small traders; at the same time, however, their business is also very vulnerable. In the past few years the arrival of new actors on the scene, the Chinese supermarkets that were opened in many places, have made the position of the smaller shops and itinerant traders much more difficult. Many traders have stopped because it was no longer profitable to compete with the new supermarkets. Whereas before many gold miners would bring most of the groceries for their crew from town, they now buy them in the Chinese supermarkets in the interior.

The critical ingredient for the economic activities in the region is that all this is taking place at the frontier of Suriname and French Guiana. From a state-centred point of view most of the trade is not according to the Surinamese state’s norms and regulations since entrepreneurs do not pay import or export taxes, they do not have licenses for shops, so this trade is considered illegal, and is even labelled a criminal activity. This becomes apparent when police and military are sent to ‘bring order’, and a so-called (Operation Clean Sweep) is deemed necessary to control the economic activities in the settlements in the Benzdorp region, as happened in 2008. On the other side of the border, in French Guiana, this commerce is also illegal simply because the traders come from Suriname without any registration and without paying taxes. Furthermore, the French government is very committed to the eradication of illegal gold mining in French Guiana, especially in the National Park (Parc amazonien de Guyane). In this manner, therefore, commerce and hawking become smuggling. This state-centred approach does not give any insight into
the economy of the region, nor into the various actors’ points of view. I prefer to see this economic space along the Lawa River as a trans-frontier region and social space where a myriad of actors make a living and find opportunities for social mobility through specific commercial activities.

5 Trade in a Trans-frontier Space

On Christmas Eve 2010, Maroon inhabitants of Albina took to mass violence in response to the fatal stabbing of a Maroon by a Brazilian immigrant, after an argument over payment for a river transport. A crowd of 500 angry Maroons set upon the immigrants who were in the commercial area south of Albina. Supermarkets, hardware shops, hotels, restaurants, and petrol stations owned by Surinamese from Paramaribo and Chinese were plundered and torched, and their owners, employees, and customers beaten. Several Brazilians were injured and about twenty Brazilian women were raped. The looters took everything they could carry (Guimarães 2009a, 2009b, de Theije 2010). The money, over which the fatal fight evolved, was reportedly an overdue payment for smuggling between Suriname and French Guiana. This is a common and easy activity as there is little control on the river. The French Guianese have tried to introduce border controls in recent years to combat the transportation of supplies to illegal mining sites on the French territory, but they have to date not been very successful (Auriel 2012–2013). Moreover, on the Surinamese side of the frontier, there is barely any control so that people have been able to carry on the gold trade freely, and of course, the transportation of goods, fuel, and people. In the remainder of this section, the logic of trade in the trans-frontier space of the Lawa River is discussed.

The trans-frontier trade is a fundamental part of the economic activities in this region. Journalist Trommelen (2000) has told of his encounter with a Surinamese man who smuggled soft drinks from Suriname to French Guiana at the turn of the millenium. The man explained to him that the liquid in the small plastic bottles was produced in San Juan, Trinidad. From there it was imported to Suriname under the low Caricom tariff, brought to Albina, and then to Saint-Laurent-du-Maroni, finally ending up in Cayenne. Even with all the transport costs, by boat from San Juan to Paramaribo, 150 kilometers by car from Paramaribo to Albina, crossing the Marowijne by boat, 250 kilometers from Saint-Laurent-du-Maroni to Cayenne, the drink still arrived there cheaper than the locally produced soft drinks. And the smuggler still earned a good income.
The opportunities that the trans-frontier space offers are also attractive for French entrepreneurs. Three weeks before the Christmas riots in Albina, I visited a friend in Maripasoula in French Guiana (see map). He helped me understand some of the forms of commerce on the river. I was doing fieldwork in Antino, in Suriname, and used the office of the radioman on the airstrip where I overheard a conversation between police officers about a citizen who was smuggling fuel from Albina to ‘the French side.’ Apparently this concerned a large quantity, not just a few barrels to keep the canoe motor going for a while. However, the discussion concentrated on the fact that the officers knew the transaction was happening, but their superiors had not given them the explicit order to apprehend the citizen. As I was told by the Maripasoula citizen, this was an established and highly respected French fuel trader, who was a provider of government diesel supplies. By buying the fuel cheap in Suriname and bringing it to French Guiana without paying import taxes, he was making a nice profit.

Thus, while bringing goods from Suriname to French Guiana is profitable because the prices are much lower there, there are other factors involved in this calculation. The prices of products and fuel are relatively stable at the moment of purchase in Paramaribo or Albina, but between the time of purchase and the sale, there are many variables that play a role. The prices are established according to the real costs of purchase, the costs of fuel needed for the transport, the difficulty of manoeuvring the boat to a certain location, the risks of being caught by the French police or military, and the saturation of the market. The most influential variables are a result of Operation Harpie, aimed at suppressing trans-frontier trade and small-scale mining in French Guiana. The confiscation and destruction of mining sites, equipment, and merchandise drives the prices up. Merchandise can easily be lost and the boats can be confiscated, and when the drivers and passengers are taken prisoner, they risk time in jail, or deportation. The entrepreneurs engaging in this business take the risks into account when calculating the profit margins. Thus, the 30-year old Brazilian, Branca, made some trips into French Guiana to sell clothes and drinks. She paid 30 grams of gold and two barrels of fuel to have 1000 kilos of merchandise transported up the Waki River. In eight days she sold everything for 350 grams. At 35 Euros a gram of gold, her investment was about 1400 Euros and her profit (12,250–1400) more than ten thousand Euros in a week. However, after three or four trips, she lost her merchandise and had to run from the police. She spent nine days walking in the bush, with a small group of others, before they reached the Lawa River and could cross to the ‘safe’ Surinamese side of the frontier. At this moment in her life she prefers not to return to the risks of trans-frontier hawking, and is staying in Suriname with her new
husband and baby. However, she is not discounting the possibility of returning to that business one day.

The most important ingredient for small-scale mining operations is the fuel for running the pumps. The price for a barrel of fuel varies according to the distance and the season. In the dry season, when the rivers become difficult to cross, the price per barrel may double or triple. While a barrel of 200 litres in Paramaribo costs about 5 grams of gold, in an illegal mining site in French Guiana it may cost 50 grams, and in the dry season even more. The gold deposits are very rich and justify the immense investment. When it is too dangerous to bring the fuel by boat, the men carry it on their backs, in 40 litre jerry cans, walking many hours at night in the bush. These are called burros ‘donkeys’, in Portuguese, but they can earn up to seven grams of gold a trip. The danger and high rewards attract young men especially. Sitting on the porch in the evening, they recount their adventures. They all have been caught by the police at some time or another, but they enjoy telling their stories. One miner was arrested when he was carrying a small engine on his head, another had to take off his clothes, but they all agree that the French police are polite and treat them correctly. “If they beat me, I would stop doing this” one man said.

In the past few years several new settlements have sprung up on the Lawa River. One of these is Kabana-vo. A few years ago it was just a kampu ‘camp’ of an Aluku family, with three or four Surinamese and Brazilian families living there. From early 2008 this small settlement started to grow and a year later several hundreds of Brazilian and Surinamese people lived and worked in the place. During the day it is a slow-moving place, with some people hanging around in the bars and restaurants, at the hairdresser’s or in one of the shops. At night or during the early morning, however, Kabana-vo bursts with activity as it is the departure point for smuggling people and goods into the Waki Creek and other garimpos on the French side of the river. Boats are filled with merchandise and mining gear, and leave before dawn to cross the part of the river that is controlled by the French police when it is still dark. Jaw Pasi is a similar place, further up the Lawa River, in the customary territory of the Wayana Amerindians. Until 2009, Jaw Pasi was just a landing with three houses and a small grocery shop. It started growing after the French Operation Harpie began when it became more difficult for people to stay in French Guiana without residence and working permits. In the first year about thirty new houses were built, and about a hundred more or less permanent inhabitants settled. Most of them are engaged in some sort of trade, on either side of the river, many of them transporting drums of oil on their backs in the dark of the night. In the last eighteen months, several Chinese entrepreneurs have set up supermarkets there, and they have now forced the Brazilian shop owners out of the market, just as
happened a few years ago in Benzdorp and other places. They also compete with each other, and the prices are now considerably lower than they were before. As a result, the inhabitants who live from selling to illegal miners in French Guiana no longer purchase the merchandise and fuel in Paramaribo or Albina but rather directly at the local Chinese shops.

The arrival of the supermarkets also affects the local population. The Wayana Amerindians at Antecume Pata are happy with the new cheaper Chinese supermarkets on the Surinamese border of their river, and they see it as an improvement in the quality of their life to have better access to many products from the city. The most visible result of the increased commercial trade activities at the Lawa are the eighteen Chinese supermarkets in a row on the riverside right opposite Maripasoula. This settlement, called Antonio do brinco (Anthony with the earring, after the first Brazilian man to build a commercial house at this location), has grown rapidly in the past three years. The shops not only cater for the miners, but also for the residents of the French villages in this region. Thus French and Chinese can now be added to Sranantongo, Ndyuka, Aluku and Portuguese that already have a long history as commercial languages along the Lawa border. Also, at this new “shopping mall” the goods are no longer brought to the camps of the costumers; rather the supermarkets have their own canoes that take their customers from the French border to the Surinamese riverside, free of charge.

6 Conclusion

The movements in and out of Suriname are also movements in and out of French Guiana. In this chapter, the focus was on the movements for economic practices, but there are many other reasons to physically move between the two countries. The children who live on the Surinamese side of the Lawa go to school in French Guiana, because there are no schools in this part of Suriname. Everyone, adults and children, Amerindians, Maroons and Brazilians alike, also seeks medical help in Maripasoula because there are no doctors or hospitals on the Surinamese bank of the river. The Brazilian and Surinamese illegal gold miners believe there is more gold to be won in French Guiana than in Suriname, and in their wake go the traders and hawkers who bring fuel and merchandise from Suriname to French Guiana because it is much cheaper to buy it in Suriname. For the same reasons, the inhabitants of French Guiana living in this region prefer to do their shopping in Suriname.

The trans-frontier economic space described in this article is not a new phenomenon. More than a hundred years ago there was already trade across
the border and one author mentions gold prospectors who were expelled from Suriname because they had no legal documents and returned to French Guiana that way (Petot 1986: 123). The border has never been a complete barrier and the people who have to deal with it show a lot of flexibility in their economic practices. The frontier is intended as a means to control and thereby limit people’s movements, but in practice it creates many opportunities. As mobile social agents, the merchants, traders, miners, and hawkers described in this chapter develop different practices in response to the circumstances created, on the one hand, by nation-states, and on the other hand, by the practices of other agents within the trans-frontier social space, finally of course, by addressing their own specific needs.
CHAPTER 4

Movement through Time in the Southern Guianas: Deconstructing the Amerindian Kaleidoscope

Eithne B. Carlin and Jimmy Mans

The life of a person is the sum of his tracks. The total inscription of his movements, something that can be traced out along the ground. And the life course of a people, the totality of their ways, conventions, and conventionally encountered situations, is the sum of its 'tracks', the trails over its country along which experience is measured out. (Wagner 1986: 21)

1 Introduction

The immense linguistic diversity in Suriname had already existed for thousands of years before the European outthrust to the Americas. Different Amerindian groups had been present and moving around vast areas of Suriname and in and out of the neighbouring countries at a time when the borders of these present-day states did not exist as we know them today. After, or despite, colonisation by successive groups of Europeans, the fluidity of the frontiers remained for the Amerindians and led at any given moment in time to shifting constellations of population make-up within each of the three modern nation-states Guyana, Suriname, and French Guiana, and the contiguous areas of Venezuela and Brazil. In his influential ‘Individual and Society’ from 1984, Peter Rivière describes how Amerindian settlements in the Guianas seem to disintegrate and re-assemble in another location in like fashion, a process to which he cautiously ascribes the metaphor of a kaleidoscope. The key concept behind this Amerindian kaleidoscope appears to be the mechanism of residential mobility. Mobility here is defined as the sum of all movements (see Wagner 1986: 21; Ingold 2009: 36–37) and movement is regarded as any shifting from one location to another, as an interaction with the landscape, whether this be incidental, repetitive, or stable. It is generally in the case of the last-mentioned, whereby sustained and intense contact ensues, that a shift of ethnic identity

1 In keeping with the general practice of the English-speaking Caribbean and Guyana, the term ‘Amerindian’ is used here to refer to the indigenous populations. Where possible we use the ethnonym of the group.
Movement through Time in the Southern Guianas may occur. Identity, like mobility, is an interaction with the landscape, namely the social landscape. The aim of this chapter is, therefore, to show how shifting identities developed in tandem with, or as a result of, renegotiations of village formations and their repositioning in the landscape. To do this we deconstruct the histories and identities of two distinct but contemporaneously interacting Amerindian hubs of inter-ethnic activity, that is, ethnically complex and historically mobile groups: the Waiwai hub and the Trio hub. We show how residential mobility and repetitive contact between groups brought about processes of shifting ethnic identity.

In Section 2, we present an overview of the present-day Amerindian populations of the three nation-states and look briefly at the ethnic constitution of the groups in order to contextualise the setting in which the hubs developed. Identity in the Guianas in particular, and in Amazonia in general, necessitates using ethnic labels for discrete or overlapping ethnic groups. However, as we shall see in sections 3 and 4, the labels used to identify specific groups are problematic, in part because an ethnic label does not necessarily entail ethnic affiliation, rather, many ethnic identificatory labels are historical constructs which tell us little about the ‘real’ or perceived ethnicity involved. We focus in these sections, in particular, on the histories of the Waiwai and Trio hubs respectively, both spanning Suriname, Brazil, and Guyana. These histories neatly exemplify converging and layered processes of ethnic heterogeneity hidden under a semblance of uniformity brought about by onomastic practice, cultural similarities, and performativity. We look here at the reasons for this ethnic mixing [historical], the mechanics of ‘nested’ identities [synchronic] (see Carlin 2011), and the different outcomes of linguistic and cultural mixing. We show their importance both for the people themselves as regards their ethnic allegiance and for our points of reference for them, that is, the nomenclature. In section 5, we draw some conclusions as to what these insights can tell us about movements, localities, and the complexity of Amerindian identities.

2 The Amerindian Languages of the Guianas

Five different language families are represented in the Guianas, namely three of the larger linguistic families in South America, the Cariban, Arawakan, and Tupian families, and two isolates which constitute separate genetic units without any known relatives, namely Warao, and Taruma. The largest number of languages in Suriname and Guyana belongs to the Cariban family; in French Guiana there is an equal number of Cariban, Arawakan and Tupian languages, namely two of each. In Table 4.1, we show the distribution of the languages in
each of the three nation states, Guyana, Suriname, and French Guiana. The geographical location of the Amerindian languages is shown in Fig. 4.1 on p. 82.

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<th>Table 4.1 Distribution of Amerindians in the Guianas</th>
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<td><strong>Isolates</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

2 In this table, an entry in round parentheses () indicates an alternative name found in the literature, and an entry between square brackets [] indicates the presence of a small number of an ethnic group that mainly lives elsewhere. For ease of reference, the names given in these tables are those used in the scientific literature and refer here to both the language and the group speaking the language. In the native languages themselves, there would be an addition of 'language', e.g., Lokono dian 'Lokono language', Kari'na auran 'Kari’na language' etc. There are two exceptions, namely Trio and Taruma which in their respective languages would be Tarēno ijomi 'Trio language' and Kwase dzürzi 'Taruma language' (see below for more details).

3 Both the Akawaio and the Patamona in Guyana, and the Ingarikó in Brazil refer to themselves and their languages as Kapon and they are said to speak closely related languages. However, according to the Ethnologue (Lewis 2009), there are important differences in vocabulary between Akawaio and Patamona. For a discussion of the names, see Butt Colson (2009a:75–85).
The numbers of speakers of each of the languages given in Table 4.1 is not necessarily commensurate with the number of people belonging to the ethnic groups and ranges dramatically from 2 Mawayana speakers of an ethnic group of over 100, to approximately 2700 (Trio) in all three countries (Mans 2012: 21). The Amerindian languages and the number of distinct Amerindian peoples in the Guianas have apparently since time immemorial been reduced by the formation of conglomerations, whether for reasons of intermarriage, war, sickness, or emigration, resulting in new identities and new ethnicities, language shift and language death. In the main, two patterns of language loss can be observed: (1) Languages losing out to a more dominant Amerindian language, for example Taruma shifting to Wapishana and Waiwai; Waiwai shifting to Trio, and (2) Languages that are dying out because their speakers are shifting to either a national language or a lingua franca, for example, Kari'na and Lokono speakers shifting to Sranantongo and/or Dutch.

In the following we look at the former pattern in order to demonstrate the process through which languages are lost and identities shifted. With the exception of Wapishana, which is losing out to English in Guyana and Portuguese in Brazil, the languages in our relevant area are only minimally, and in some cases not at all, affected by the national languages and/or lingua francas. Within the Guianas there are several main hubs of ethnic and linguistic complexity, for example, the Kapon and Pemon groups in the Circum-Roraima area straddling the Guyana/Venezuela/Brazil border, the Trio and the Waiwai hubs of Suriname/Guyana/Brazil. We know relatively little about the languages of the Kapon and Pemon groups except that each makes up a group of closely related dialects, many but not all of which are mutually intelligible to some degree. In part the confusion lies in historical processes that are no longer transparent: according to Migliazza (1980), for example, the people who now call themselves Makushi are in fact the result of a fusion, between 1900 and 1950, of remnants of various groups of the area, namely: Sapara, Wayumara,

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4 Both the Makushi and Arekuna refer to themselves and their languages as Pemon although the two languages are not entirely mutually intelligible. Makushi is closely related to the Kapon languages. Other groups who also refer to themselves as Pemon are the Taurepan and Kamaragoto of Venezuela. For a discussion of the names, see Butt Colson (2009a: 110–113).

5 Although Akuriyo is seldom actively spoken nowadays, there are some rememberers of the language in two of the main Trio villages.

6 The major north and south Pemon dialects, Arekuna and Makushi, respectively, are mutually intelligible and only exhibit some minor dialectal variation. The degree of relatedness of the Pemon and Kapong languages, however, is still unclear (Audrey Butt Colson, pers. comm. 2012; see also Butt Colson 2009a, 2009b).
Maku, Paraviyana, Paushana, Jarecuna, Ingariko, Taurepan, and Wapishana, of which the last-mentioned group belongs to the Arawakan language family. Some of these groups still exist as separate entities speaking their own distinct languages. But as little as we know about these languages in the present, we are also not surprised by this kind of conglomeration. Such fusions of ethnically and linguistically distinct groups have been documented all over the Guianas since the seventeenth century, and took place most likely long before that as well.

In Suriname, there are three hubs, namely the Trio, Waiwai, and Wayana hubs, of which the first two, which straddle the border area of Suriname, Brazil, and Guyana, are the most striking in the light of their current convergences. As far as we know the linguistic consequences of these two main multi-ethnic hubs, Waiwai and Trio, are on the surface relatively straightforward; one dominant variety or language became the standard and the speakers of the original languages shifted, or are currently shifting, to the dominant varieties.

In the following section, we look more closely at the processes of residential mobility that have resulted in the heterogeneous nature of these two current conglomerations, deconstructing their kaleidoscopic configurations. We shall discuss not just the diversity of the groups making up conglomerations, but also what is hidden behind the autonyms and xenonyms that are used to designate these groups.

3 The Waiwai Hub of Convergence

While the Waiwai and the Trio groups currently converge in the predominantly Trio village of Kwamalasamutu in Suriname, originally the result of missionary activity in southern Suriname starting in the late 1950s, they have quite distinct histories and origins. In this section, we trace the migratory history of the multi-ethnic Waiwai hub, showing the extent of language contact, residential mobility, and shared history of the subgroups.

The people we refer to as the Waiwai inhabit the Mapuera-Trombetas-Essequibo-Sipaliwini area. They live in two villages in Guyana along the Cuyuwini, a tributary of the Essequibo, along the Mapuera River and its tributaries, the Anaaua and Jatapuzinho, in Brazil, along the Sipaliwini River.

7 The Wayana hub is found in the east of Suriname, French Guiana, and Brazil. This chapter deals only with the western hubs.
in the Trio village Kwamalasamutu, and are represented by a few families along the Corantijn River, in Tigrí/Casuela and in Sandlanding, closeby Apoera (see Fig. 4.1). According to Hawkins (1998: 25), there are approximately 1,800 Waiwai speakers in Guyana and Brazil. In Suriname there are approximately 250–300 Waiwai speakers.

The name Waiwai is a xenonym and according to folk etymology is a nickname used by the Wapishana—waiwai in Wapishana means ‘tapioca’—to refer to the light skin colour of their southern neighbours. The people referred to as the Waiwai represent a conglomeration of originally different groups that spoke or still speak separate languages; these are given in Table 4.2, using the names they are known by in the literature. The language called Waiwai should therefore be seen more as a lingua franca than as a standardised language.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language/group name</th>
<th>Linguistic family</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parukoto</td>
<td>Cariban, probably basis of present-day Waiwai language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shereo</td>
<td>Cariban, dialect of Hixkaryana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karafawyana10</td>
<td>Cariban, Waiwai group, residential among the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>‘Waiwai’ since the early 1980s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunayana-Katwena</td>
<td>Cariban, Waiwai group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taruma (Kwase dzirzi)</td>
<td>Isolate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mawayana</td>
<td>Arawakan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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8 See Mans (2012). Extensive anthropological work has been carried out among the Waiwai in Brazil (Howard 2001; Dias 2005), and in Guyana (Fock 1963; Yde 1965; Mentore 2005; Alemán 2005). For linguistic work on the Waiwai in Guyana and Brazil, see Hawkins (1998) and for the Waiwai speakers of Kwamalasamutu, see Carlin (2006, 2011).

9 If this etymology is correct then we can place the Wapishana in Guyana earlier than generally assumed (1769, see Rivière 1963: 115, Carlin 2011: 227) since a Dutch mining director, Salomon H. Sanders, who was dispatched to accompany the Dutch trader Gerrit Jacobs to the interior, reports meeting some Weij Weij at the headwaters of the Essequibo in 1720/21 (see Bos 1998: 79ff).

10 Among the Waiwai speakers of Suriname, this group is referred to as Karafawsana and their language is deemed the most elegant variety of Waiwai.
Our focus in the following is on two of the subgroups that came together to be known under the name Waiwai, namely the two groups that did not speak a Cariban language, and thus were farthest removed from the Cariban Waiwai core: the Taruma and the Mawayana.

As shown in Carlin (2011) the group we know as Taruma migrated northward from the Rio Negro to the Dutch territory of the Essequibo, at the latest around 1764, where they were in contact with both the Wapishana, presently living on the Rupununi savanna in Guyana, and the Manaos, a once powerful Arawakan group that dispersed or became extinct in the 1770s. The name Taruma, nowadays assumed to be a xenonym, was already used as early as 1657, when they were mentioned in connection with a Portuguese slaving expedition at the mouth of the Rio Negro. Today we can positively identify them with...
the people who, on the Essequibo, were referred to by the ethnonyms Coarse (Schomburgk 1843), Ujessi (Farabee 1918), Kuase (Fr. Cary-Elwes, see (Butt Colson and Morton 1982: 215), and Uassahy (Gillin 1945). While the Wapishana assume that the name Taruma was given by them—*taruma* ‘stinging ant’—this can only be the case if the Wapishana and Taruma were in contact already at the mouth of the Rio Negro, for which we have no evidence.\(^1\)

An alternative history of the Taruma put forth by Rivière (1966/1967) places the Taruma on the Essequibo much earlier, and suggests an Essequibo origin of this group. The other names given above are all derived from the Tarumas’ autonym *Kwase* ‘person’ and the predicative form *hujase* ‘I am a person’. Nowadays, there is one family living among the Wapishana who still claim Kwase (Taruma) ethnicity, and who still speak the language *kwase dzïrzï*.

The Taruma were traders who traversed the southern border area of Suriname/Brazil/Guyana bartering their wares. They were renowned for their cassava graters, hunting dogs, and their high quality pottery which was much in demand among the more northerly Wapishana and Makushi.\(^1\) Though travelling traders, the Taruma did have at least two (semi)permanent villages in the south of Guyana, as far as four or five days apart, between the Cuyuwini river and the confluence of the Kamoa River with the Essequibo. This latter location is slightly to the east of the present-day Waiwai village Kanashen (see Fig. 4.1). To the west of these villages lived the Parukoto (< Waiwai). It is also in this area that one encounters the most hydronyms of Taruma origin, for example, *Wakidiu* (*õã kichu*) ‘Sun River’, *Assimarikityou* (*assimari kichu*) ‘Anjoemara River’, *Kuasekidiu* (*kwase kichu*) ‘River of the People’.\(^1\)

By 1843, the Taruma were living near the Cuyuwini very close to the Mawayana, an Arawakan group who apparently were living, at their own request, under the chief of the Taruma. Until Schomburgk’s expedition in the late 1830s the sources are silent on the Mawayana ‘Frog People’\(^1\). We know that they hailed from the Mapuera-Trombetas region of Brazil, the homeland of the Parukoto group, and that they traversed the area up as far as the Essequibo where from the 1830s onward their previous repetitive and later sustained

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1. There is a tributary of the Rio Negro just north of Manaos called the Tarumã.
2. On the basis of their pottery, archaeologists Meggers and Evans postulated a Taruma Phase (see Meggers and Evans 1960; see also Boomer 1981; Plew 2005; and Rivière 1966/67).
3. The hydronyms given here are just a few of those found in Schomburgk (1845) and Butt Colson and Morton (1982), and as they are currently shown on maps. The original Taruma rendering is given in italics based on Carlin’s short fieldwork among the Taruma in 2005.
4. There is a mention of a group called Mapoyena in the Trombetas region by Fray Francisco de San Marcos in 1725, but we have no definitive evidence that these were the Mawayana (see Rivière 1963).
contact with the Taruma resulted in both groups joining the Waiwai. References to the Mawayana are found in Schomburgk (1845) as Maopityan and in Farabee (1918) as Mapidian: Mawayana is apparently the Arawakan name, the two versions given above are the calqued Wapishana name for the Mawayana, *mao* = *mawa* ‘frog’ and *pidan* (*pichan*) ‘person’ corresponding to –*yana* ‘ethnic group’. They were called Mawakwa by the Taruma, *mawa* + *kwa*(se) ‘frog’ and ‘person’. However, according to their own reports the name Mawayana is also an umbrella term subsuming at least three different groups, the Waɗayana, Jiwyana, and Buuyana, names which are not mentioned anywhere in the literature. The remaining Mawayana cannot recount the sequence of events that led to their being subsumed under the name Mawayana.

Some thirty years later in the 1870s, the Mawayana and Taruma were both trading together with the Wapishana and the Waiwai (Barrington Brown 1877: 247–51). In contrast to what would come about in the following century, these two co-residential and cooperating groups did not merge under one ethnonym, in spite of the dominance of the Taruma and the fact that Taruma men were marrying Mawayana women (Rivière 2006: 153), rather they co-existed as separate entities with separate identities speaking two unrelated languages.15 Co-residentiality is therefore not a priori a reason to relinquish one’s own ethnic or linguistic identity, the reasons seem to be more of a politico-economic nature where trade capability and mobility reinforce separate identity, whereas a weakened constitution undermines the economic clout required for self-assertion. We can assume a certain degree of passive knowledge of each other’s languages, or it is possible that a common language was used in their interactions.16 The most likely candidate is a form of Waiwai since the subgroups

15 The phonologies of Taruma, Mawayana, and Wapishana are similar in that they all have phonemic implosive consonants; Mawayana and Taruma share nasalisation processes; Mawayana and Wapishana share cognates for roughly half of their basic vocabulary. All three languages share with the Cariban languages cognates for their flora and fauna, probably indicative of an older layer of Arawakan or Tupian diffusion of these terms. The three languages also exhibit common loanwords for trade items. It is not possible to say what, if any, influence Mawayana and Taruma had on each other in the period they were together. We do know, however, that Mawayana borrowed some functional categories, including a first person plural exclusive pronoun, from Waiwai (see Carlin 2006).

16 The former situation finds its parallel in Palumeu in Suriname, half of whose inhabitants speak Trio and the other half Wayana. A certain degree of passive bilingualism exists, but active bilingualism is rare and only seems to occur among the children of mixed Trio/ Wayana descent, though it is not generally practiced as these bilinguals tend to stick to one or other of the languages. Likewise, a Mawayana couple that Carlin worked with in Kwamalamasutu steadfastly spoke different languages to each other, the wife spoke
Parukoto and Tunayana upheld intense trade relations with them. Moreover, the Tunayana, and their sister group the Katwena captured Mawayana women as their wives with some degree of regularity so we can assume some degree of passive bilingualism emerging from these unions.

From the early 1920s, the numbers of the Taruma and Mawayana had dwindled so much that the Mawayana and most of the Taruma became absorbed into the Waiwai group (see Butt Colson and Morton 1982), and some Taruma joined the much larger Wapishana group further north.¹⁷ It is interesting to note that at the time of missionary Fr. Cary-Elwes’ visits to the ‘Waiwai’ in 1919, 1922, and 1923, almost all the rivers he names in his diary are Taruma names given by his Taruma assistant who also spoke Wapishana. In the course of his communication with the Waiwai in the village Kabaikidiu, his assistant interpreted from Wapishana into Taruma upon which a few villagers translated into Waiwai.¹⁸ We can conclude from this that the languages were still spoken at that time and that the shift to Waiwai had not taken place. The entire area between the rivers Mapuera in the south, Cuyuwini in the north, Rupununi in the west, and Corantijn in the east was the locus of repetitive and in some cases intense sustained interaction between all these different groups, the Cariban Parukoto, Tunayana, Shereo, Pianakoto, the Arawakan Mawayana, and the linguistically unclassified Taruma, and nameless others.¹⁹

A process of assimilation and linguistic absorption that consciously began in the 1920s, partly due to Fr. Cary-Elwes’ urging the Taruma to intermarry with the Waiwai or else face extinction, was claimed to have reached its completion by the 1960s with the waiwai-isation of the Taruma and Mawayana. In their dealings with other Amerindian groups and with non-Amerindians they assumed ‘Waiwai’ identity and thus on the outside ceased to exist as separate identities with their own territory. Thus, a salient factor in sustaining group identity would appear to be locality, that is, identity is intricately bound up with one’s own space in the landscape. In good Amerindian spirit, however, these identities had only fallen dormant, not dead.

¹⁷ The Wapishana were also in the process of absorbing another smaller group who spoke an Arawakan language, namely the Atorai, of which, likewise, some few speakers still remain in Guyana.

¹⁸ See Butt Colson and Morton (1982: 229–230). The authors also note that unwittingly Cary-Elwes was actually in a Brazilian Waiwai village.

¹⁹ As stated above, trading also took place regularly with the Wapishana and the Makushi further north.
In the late 1950s an American missionary who had been working with the Waiwai in Brazil and Guyana recruited some ‘Waiwai’ to undertake with him the evangelisation of the Trio groups of southern Suriname. This group was made up of ethnic Tunayana, Katwena, and Mawayana. These three groups had been in contact with each other for nearly a century, now raiding each other for wives, now trading with each other. One of this small group was a Mawayana who was the product of a hostile meeting of the Trio with the Mawayana. The Trio had come to the Mawayana to trade but a few of their party were killed and their wives were taken by the Mawayana (Dowdy 1963: 231). So it was that this one Mawayana spoke some Trio before he arrived in Suriname. The missionary Leavitt, assisted by this small Waiwai group, founded the village Alalapadu where many Trio groups gathered before moving to Kwamalasamutu in the mid 1970s (see Section 4 below).

In Suriname this group of people, all of whom spoke Waiwai as a common language to each other, was, and still is, collectively referred to as Waiwai by the Trio with whom they now live in the village of Kwamalasamutu. The Waiwai-speaking group has grown both in numbers and importance over the last fifty years, and Waiwai has become an important language in this village. Over the years, the Waiwai-speaking group was augmented by a small group of Sikïiyana from Brazil. While to the outside world the inhabitants of Kwamalasamutu are referred to as Trio (see the following section for the formation of the Trio), as regards the structure and layout of Kwamalasamutu we can distinguish ethnic areas inhabited by the following groups: Trio, Akuriyo, Tunayana (Katwena), Mawayana, and Sikïiyana.²⁰

The Kwamalasamutu setting presents us with the perfect case to examine in situ the linguistic and identity patterns that are emerging, or being reinforced. The identity that is projected to and by the Surinamese government is somewhat ambiguous: on the one hand, all the people of Kwamalasamutu are referred to as Trio, yet on the other hand, the government recognises some of the different ethnic groups in the form of leadership roles, that is, several leaders (Captains) have been appointed, namely one each for the following

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²⁰ The Katwena often refer to themselves as Tunayana-Katwena. It is not entirely clear what the distinction between the two is now as they both seem to have spoken the same language. However, we know from the Mawayana that a distinction was made before in that the Tunayana (in Mawayana: Unnïyana) captured Jiwiyan women whereas the Katwena took Waɗayana women, both subgroups of the Mawayana. We know that Katwena is also an umbrella term since the Munupiyan ‘Rat People’ also claim Katwena identity. Farabee (1924) gives the Katwena (Katawians) as a subgroup of the Parukoto, but claims that a Tunayana (Toneyana) he met stated that his language was nothing like Parukoto. On this note Farabee, unfortunately not a reliable source for linguistic information, also mentions that the Sikïiyana (Chikena) language appears to be very close to Parukoto.
groups: Trio (one Paramount Chief and one Head Captain); Okomoyana (see below); Mawayana; and Tunayana (Katwena). The groups without a designated Captain are thus the Akuriyo and Sikïiyana, and several of the Trio subgroups. Indeed in the village a clear distinction is made between the different ethnicities, and not all have equal status, and not all are a desirable marriage partner. All inhabitants speak Trio, albeit with different degrees of competence. Many of the oldest generations of the non-Trio learned Trio as a third or fourth language; they remained speaking their original languages in the home. Outside the home the Waiwai-speaking groups of the generations 40–65 years old speak Waiwai with each other and Trio with all others; the generations below 40 often have at least a passive knowledge of Waiwai but more readily speak Trio to all villagers. The youngest generations are raised with Trio. Some few Trio have a passive knowledge of Waiwai but do not speak it themselves. In general the generations of the Waiwai-speaking groups and the Akuriyo above 40 years old, though fluent speakers, do not have the stylistic range and grammatical competence of a native Trio speaker. To illustrate, we give in Table 4.3 a summary of the language practices of the Mawayana (updated from Carlin 2006: 317).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generation of ethnic Mawayana</th>
<th>Languages spoken with whom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>oldest (±75 years)</td>
<td>Mawayana among each other (2 sisters); Waiwai with their own children and with other Waiwai groups; Trio with their grandchildren, great-grandchildren, and all other villagers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>second generation (±60 years)</td>
<td>Waiwai with their parents and their own children, and with other Waiwai groups; Waiwai and increasingly Trio with their grandchildren; Trio with all other villagers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since 2006 when this table was first published, two fluent speakers of Mawayana and one man with a good passive knowledge of the language have passed away. There may be as many as 130–150 self-ascribed Mawayana in Kwamalasamutu. The information in this table is based on Carlin’s own observations and on interviews with the Mawayana in the period 2002–2011.
Table 4.3 (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generation of ethnic Mawayana</th>
<th>Languages spoken with whom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>third generation (±40 years)</td>
<td>Waiwai with Waiwai speakers of older and peer groups; decreasingly Waiwai and increasingly Trio with their own children; Trio with all other villagers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fourth generation (±22 years)</td>
<td>Trio with everyone although some may have a passive knowledge of Waiwai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fifth generation (&lt; 20 years)</td>
<td>Trio only</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Tunayana-Katwena differ in one crucial aspect from the Mawayana practices as sketched here, namely some members of the third generation have started a linguistic and cultural awareness group and do speak their own language more to their children. Although given that the peers of these children otherwise speak the lingua franca form of Waiwai, this is not having much impact, and Trio remains the first and primary language of the younger generations. Thus while present-day Trio was a third or fourth language for all these Waiwai-speaking groups in Kwamalasamutu, its own history was in a sense similar to that of Waiwai in that it became a lingua franca for several smaller related groups in the first half of the twentieth century. Prior to the arrival of that small Waiwai-speaking group in Suriname in the 1960s, a merging of different ethnic sub-group identities under the umbrella term ‘Trio’ had already taken place, namely, in the perception of the present-day Trio, those of the Pirëuyana, Aramayana, Aramiso, Maraso, Okomoyana, and Akïjo. Several of these group identities, however, reappear in the historical sources as operating outside of this Trio hub. Further ethnic groups, as known from written historical sources, that we know were closely related to and interacting with these ‘Trio’ groups in the mid-nineteenth century were the Pianakoto, Arimikoto, Kirikirikoto, Saluma, and Sikïiyana. Nowadays some of these ethnic labels

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22 This group started up a foundation in the mid 1990s under the name Stichting Xarwoto in an attempt to preserve their language and culture.

23 For example, Kirikirikoto does not appear in the oral traditions of the Trio though written sources do suggest their presence among the Trio (Frikel 1960). In addition, there were people in Alalapadu in the early 1960s who claimed Kirikirikoto ancestry.
have become obsolete, others still have become dormant. This myriad of different parallel identities (linguistic, ethnic and dormant identities) have converged in certain localities where Trio is the dominant language, together forming the Trio hub.

4 The Trio Hub: Early Migrations and Trio Ethnogenesis

The Trio hub is now located in mid-southern Suriname and northern Pará, Brazil. In the 1840s, the German traveller and boundary commissioner for the British government Robert Schomburgk was the first European to meet ‘Drio’ in the Upper Corantijn (Schomburgk 1845: 84–85). He considered the ‘Drio’ to be a sister tribe of the Pianakoto (Pianaghotto), who were much like these but only differed from them by having ornamented their bodies with incisions, “like the South Sea Islanders” (Ibid.). He remarked that the ‘Drio’ were the only ones he had seen in the Guianas with these kind of bodily ornaments.24 From the late nineteenth century onwards, in the written historical sources, the Amerindian people from the above-mentioned area came to be known as the ‘Trio’ (e.g. Crevaux 1883, Coudreau 1893, de Goeje 1908, Käyser 1912, Schmidt 1942). It was noted, however, that many other peoples e.g., Saluma, Okomoyana, Pirëuyana, Sikïiyana, etc. were living in the same region as well (de Goeje 1906: 4). As we show below, the name Trio is an adaptation from the name of the original subgroup Tïriyo and thus presently refers to a much larger and more heterogeneous group; in Suriname and in the scientific literature the term Trio is used, in Brazil Tiriyó is used. The autonym of the Trio people themselves is Tarëno, literally, ‘the people here’, a direct clue to the ethnic make-up of what is now considered to be one ethnic identity. We demonstrate in the following the historical process that brought about this Trio identity. The first European to describe the Trio as consisting of different sub-groups is the Franciscan priest Protásio Frikel who travelled extensively through the northern part of Pará state, Brazil from the 1940s through the 1960s, a century

24 Later this has understandably been translated as ‘tattoos’ (de Goeje in Franssen-Herderschee 1905: 941), but could not been verified by later sources. Although some of the present day Trio have ‘tattoos’ on their body today, these should be seen as a recent coastal influence. One wonders if this could be a misperception of Schomburgk since actual ‘tattoos’ seem rare in this northern part of Indigenous Amazonia. It could be postulated that these incisions were the result of a ritual to restrengthen certain body parts. It has been reported to the second author that in the past incisions were made, for instance, in the hand or the arms of a man to bolster his arching skills.
after Schomburgk. He distinguished several subgroups that were unified under the collective name of ‘Trio’, namely, Aramayana ‘Bee People’, Pïrëuyana ‘Arrow People’, Okomoyana ‘Wasp People’, Arimikoto ‘Spider monkey People’, Kirikirikoto ‘Parrot People’ and Maraso, a sub-group of the Pianakoto or ‘Harpy Eagle People’. Moreover, he also added a group of ‘wild’ Trio groups to which he ascribed Akuriyo ‘Agouti People’, Wamá, Tiriyómetésem and Wayarikuré (Frikel 1960: 2).26

The most thorough study of these groups in the historical sources was carried out by Peter Rivière (1963: 166–176; see also 1969a: 16–26). From his findings we learn that the two groups that were mentioned in the earliest sources are the Aramiso and the Aramayana. The Aramiso (‘Aramisas’) were reported to be living on the source of the Marowijne river in the late seventeenth century (Harris 1928; Grillet and Bechamel 1698: 30–31, 53). In the eighteenth century they were on the Marowijne and as far away as the Camopi, a tributary of the Oyapock River. In this period we also have the first reports of the Aramayana (‘Armagotu’) who were living at the headwaters of the Oyapock River (see Rivière 1963: 172–173). Claude Tony ([1769] 1835 and 1843) was the last of the French sources to mention the presence of both Aramiso and Aramayana villages in French Guiana, although some Aramiso individuals were still encountered in the nineteenth century (Rivière 1963: 173). Rivière postulates that at the end of the eighteenth century both the Aramiso and the Aramayana had started to move their villages southwestwards into the Tumuc-Humac region, the former due to Maroons moving into their territory on the Marowijne River and the latter due to Wayãpí intrusions from the south (Rivière 1963: 172–173).

The Pianakoto are first known from reports in the second half of the eighteenth century but a first actual encounter was made several decades later by

25 The question remains what these animal group labels actually reference. Frikel thought that they could be both a xenonym in the form of a collective nickname, but also an autonym. Frikel gives an example for both. In reference to the name Pianakoto (Harpy Eagle People) he states that the Trio explained the ascribed name for this people as that they often have noses like eagles, and that their stare is as strongly focused as that of an eagle. On the other hand, he also states that this sub-group name could also have a deeper meaning for the people themselves. In general, he states, the Trio believe that their souls will live on after their deaths and that they will become what they once were. Frikel recalled a shaman (pïjai) saying to the soul of someone who had just died: “Pijana! Pijana-me tëkë!” which he translated as “Go and become an Eagle again!” (Frikel 1964: 97). A closer meaning is: “Eagle! Go, in the form of an eagle!” Frikel’s Trio spelling has been adapted here.

26 We now know that Wama was used to designate the Akuriyo, and that Tiriyometesem simply means ‘people like the Trio’.
Robert Schomburgk in the upper-Corantijn River. From then on Pianakoto were reported as living at the headwaters of the Trombetas (Pará) but they were also encountered on tributaries of the West-Paru River in the east (Coudreau 1887: 35; Coudreau 1900: 79; Guppy 1958: 37). In the mid-twentieth century Frikel encountered Pianakoto living in the same regions. However, some Pianakoto were also present in Surinamese since Schmidt encountered two Pianakoto brothers who were both leaders of Trio villages, one on the Sipaliwini River, the other on the headwaters of the Palumeu River. They stated that they had grown up at the headwaters of the Palumeu River. Schmidt also heard reports of a Pianakoto village on the Kuruni River, but in the 1940s apparently only these two Pianakoto brothers had remained (Schmidt 1942: 39). According to the historical sources the Okomoyana were likewise located both in an eastern as well as a western region, but predominantly on the Surinamese side of the north-south water divide. In the late nineteenth century, Coudreau describes the Okomoyana (‘Comayana’) as living on a tributary of the Marowijne River (Coudreau 1893: 79). This eastern Okomoyana group through time became affiliated with other, in Frikel’s words, ‘wild’ Trio groups (Akuriyo, Wama, Wayarekuré, Tiriyometesem) that were reported to be living in the same region of southeast Suriname. In the early twentieth century Farabee (1924: 214) also reports on a western Okomoyana group located on the Kutari River. In their own oral traditions the present-day Okomoyana show a long history on the Corantijn River and its tributaries (see Mans 2012; see also below).

The movements of the Akuriyo are poorly known. Historically this name has been used by coastal Amerindian groups, such as the Kari’na and Lokono, and hence also by the earliest European colonists, to refer to all the Amerindian groups of the deep interior. This changed when the actual Akuriyo were encountered in the late 1930s, and erroneously called Wama, and ‘re-discovered’ in the late 1960s (Carlin and Boven 2002: 32). According to Jara (1991: 21) the Akuriyo are made up of two subgroups, the Turaekare and the Akuriekare. A further group encountered in this area in the 1930s was also the Wayarikure who spoke a Trio-like language but may have actually been the eastern Okomoyana group or at least part of that (Rivière 1963: 174). Since they were contacted and resettled by missionaries in the late 1960s the Akuriyo have been more or less sedentary in the Trio villages. The Trio oral traditions, however, narrate a long history of sometimes violent interaction between the Trio groups and the Akuriyo, as well as an alliance between the Akuriyo and the Okomoyana.

Now we can move to the least known constituent groups of the Trio hub as known from the written sources, namely the Tiríjo and the Píreúyana.

See e.g., Schumann (c.1755) cited in de Goeje (1943); Stedman (1796); Rivière (1969a: 18).

Well, here at Samuwaka there were the Tarëno groups, the Tarëno groups, their name was Pïrëujana. This is an inclusive name, Pïrëujana, there were many Pïrëujana groups, Tïrïjo for example, there they called them Tïrïjo and Akïjo and other Akïjo peoples. Those ones, the Akïjo are like the Tarëno. Translation Carlin (2004: 14)

The oral histories suggest that the Tïrïjo were first of all a subgroup of the Pïrëuyana hub which would later become the Trio hub. Both identities are poorly reported in written documents probably due to the relative inaccessibility of their locations at the time, compared to most of the other above-mentioned groups. A first note on the Pïrëuyana in the historical sources is by de Goeje who heard, probably from the Wayana, that they spoke a language like Wayana and lived in very large houses on the (until now unidentified) Pletani River (de Goeje 1906: 4). A first note on the ‘Tïrïjo’ in historical sources, can be found in a letter from a post holder (Meyer) to the Governor dated to 1796 (Carlin 2004: 14). The name of this subgroup seems to be unrelated to the later collective ‘Trio’ identity subsumed under the autonym Tarëno which literally means ‘the people here’.

This onomastic practice stresses the importance of converging movements and localities in the construction of umbrella identities. As stated above, as to the origin of the name ‘Trio’ as we use it, it clearly derives from this former subgroup identity the Tïrïjo. This term was appropriated by non-Amerindian outsiders to refer to a collective of people who presently refer to themselves as Tarëno. Thus, we can say that the term ‘Trio’ is a Western historical construct, originally a native term that has become a xenonym. In turn this xenonym has become appropriated by the present-day Trio communities in their dealings with outsiders as they present themselves to others as Trio. Thus this collective has two autonyms, one for internal use only, Tarëno, and one for presenting themselves outside of the group, Trio.28

28 An additional complication is the fact that nowadays the term Tarëno is also used by the Trio as a general noun meaning ‘Amerindian person’, which seems to be replacing the noun wïtoto ‘(Amerindian) human being’. Once again, we see in this terminology that most Amerindian groups tend to see themselves as the only real Amerindians.
Currently the Trio live in five main villages and ten smaller settlements in Suriname and in one main village (Tiriyó Missão) and several smaller settlements in Brazil, see Fig. 4.1. Our focus is now on the Surinamese settlements: in the east they live in Palumeu, and Kassikassima on the Palumeu River and in Tëpu on the Upper Tapanahoni. Most Trio live in the west, in Sipaliwini village on the river of the same name, and in Kwamalasamutu and Alalapadu on the Upper Kuruni River. Close to Kwamalasamutu there are three small settlements on the Kamani and Kutari rivers. Further northwest there is one more village along the Kuruni River, and further west along the Corantijn they live in the villages Casuela, Amotopo, and Lucie. Even further downstream along the Corantijn, there are villages just below the Wonotobo Falls, and one close to Apoera, in Trio called Wanapan or Arapahtë and Sandlanding respectively (see Carlin and van Goethem 2009; Mans 2012). The largest and ethnically the most heterogeneous village of Kwamalasamutu, as described in Section 2.1, has witnessed several dynamic developments in the past two decades. Internal political and social tensions, dwindling forest resources per capita, and regional political strategies have all led to the changing face of the Trio community of Kwamalasamutu. Since this period we can observe movement away from this village to the west by different families and a re-awakening of dormant identities. In the following we focus on the history of the Okomoyana family of Amotopo, showing their movements in and out of Kwamalasamutu and the relation of these movements to identity-changing processes.

4.1 Awakened Dormant Sub-identities

Let us start with Anapi. Anapi was leader of the eponymous village close to the Tukuimín mountain and the great-great-grandfather of Paneshi Panekke, the present day captain of Amotopo. Not much is known about this village except that the existence of Anapi and his village were mentioned to the early Dutch explorers in the region (de Goeje 1906: 3; Käyser 1912: 46; see also Rivière 1969a: 318, no. 296). Another village nearby, Langoé, which was visited by de Goeje in 1907 as a Trio village, was allegedly a Rãgú village, Rãgú being a subgroup of the Pirëuyana, (Frikel 1957: 555). Éujari, who was a grandson of Anapi, told Rivière in the early 1960s that his father (Sawirapo or Tunawakka) was a Pirëuyana, as was the mother of his deceased son’s wife. The Trio stereotyped the Pirëuyana as always shooting arrows and having thin legs like arrow cane

29 On different maps, the river flowing through Kwamalasamutu is given now as the Sipaliwini, now as the Kuruni.
It is unclear what identity Êujari ascribed to himself, but Rivière stated that from his slender looks one could easily guess his identity.

Êujari himself became the village leader of Panapipa on the Upper Kuruni River (Wiiumi). This village was known as a large and good village, with a strong leader, (Rivière 1969a: 213, 233; Healy et al. 2003: 39) that attracted many people from the Sipaliwini basin, approximately two thirds of the later inhabitants of early Alalapadu as documented by Rivière in the early 1960s (see Mans 2012: 136–145). In the early 1960s, Êujari met with the American missionary Claude Leavitt and his small Waiwai group. Probably through Êujari’s mediation, his successor, Pesaihpë, decided to move with all the inhabitants of Panapipa to the missionary’s village, Alalapadu, which was situated near a Brazil nut grove on the Araraparú creek. In Panapipa, Êujari’s son had passed away, but together with his wife, an Okomoyana, and his grandsons, Paneshi and Pikuku, Êujari moved to Alalapadu where they met up with Peter Rivière.

Rivière’s observations were that all the inhabitants of the village had but one Trio identity. He asked the villagers about the sub-identities, the existence of which they confirmed, but which they considered to be something of the past. He states:

there is ample if not firm evidence to suggest that the Tumuchumac region has been an area of intertribal mixing, and the vital question is how important are these sub-groups or tribal remnants in the present composition of the Trio and whether there is any advantage to be gained in distinguishing them. It is possible to say with assurance that whatever the distinction may have been previously it is now virtually non-existent. The Trio, even if they are composed of previously independent groups who reached the area from different directions at different times, now think of themselves, with the possible exception of the Aramayana on the West-Paru, as a single group, having a common name, language and culture. (Rivière 1969a: 27–28)

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30 Another report to Frikel refers to bundles of arrow reed the Pirëuyana often carried around (Frikel 1957: 555; Rivière 1969a: 22).

31 The spelling of the village and the creek differ here because the village Alalapadu is known as and found on all maps with this spelling, but the original Trio spelling is that as given in the name of the creek.
After Rivière’s fieldwork, more Trio arrived in Alalapadu predominantly from the Brazilian side of the Tumuc-Humac. When Êujari’s grandson Paneshi grew up he married a Brazilian Trio. With the high number of Brazilian Trio arriving in Alalapadu, together with a positive birth rate, the village soon grew to approximately 500 inhabitants. After some time, its position along the small Araraparu creek appeared unsustainable for this large number of people. Together with the missionaries the people from Alalapadu moved to another locality where they founded Kwamalasamutu. The Waiwai had already been present in Alalapadu, but in Kwamalasamutu they grew to a group of approximately 200–300 Waiwai speakers, as we saw in Section 3, belonging to different ethnic groups.

Contrary to what Rivière encountered, researchers in the 1990s found that the people of the until then allegedly monolithic ‘Trio’ identity had ‘awakened’ their dormant sub-identities (see Fig. 4.1). Paneshi Panekke appeared to be Okomoyana, a sub-identity which Rivière was told in Alalapadu was extinct (Rivière 1969a: 20–21). Paneshi’s ascription to the Okomoyana sub-identity can be hypothesised along two lines. In the first instance his grandmother Tawirujë, the wife of his grandfather Êujari, apparently was an Okomoyana. A second Okomoyana line follows his stepfather. His mother, Aijatu (whose mother in turn was a Pirëuyana), was remarried to Sipi. He, in turn, was an Okomoyana since his mother (Paruparu), and possibly also his father (Imainan or Eemainan), allegedly came from Pehkëtë, the region of the Okomoyana ancestors below the confluence of the Kuruni and the New River, see Fig. 4.1 (cf. Mans 2012). Paneshi’s wife, Apëhpïn, appeared to have the Sakëta sub-identity. This Brazilian Trio sub-identity, Sakëta, is not mentioned anywhere in the historical sources nor in the Trio oral traditions. Together with the Aramayana they appear to have moved to Alalapadu shortly after Rivière’s fieldwork. At that time, the Surinamese Trio did not appear to know much about the Aramayana any more (see Rivière 1969a: 22–25). In Alalapadu, Paneshi’s grandfather Êujari passed away.

32 It is not entirely clear whether Pehkëtë is one spot, possibly a former village, or whether the name refers to the area just north of Tigri up as far as the confluence of the Lucie and the Corantijn.
33 The Aramayana are mentioned several times in the oral traditions, for example, in the story of the big flood, their leaders, and also those of the Maraso, are said to have followed the Pirëuyana to Kantani mountain to escape to higher ground (see Koelewijn with Rivière 1987: 150).
The above-mentioned awakened sub-identities became further enforced when in the 1990s, at the request of the Paramount Chief Asongo Alalapadu, the Okomoyana captains and stepbrothers Paneshi Panekke and Pepu Ipajari (son of Sipi) moved with their families from Kwamalasamutu to found new villages along the Corantijn, see map in Fig. 4.1. The Paramount Chief himself claims to have the Piropi sub-identity. Literally, the Trio word piropi means ‘chest’. Piropi as an ethnic ascription is a descriptive term that is said to refer to the core-group of the Trio, the real Trio. In Frikel’s survey in the mid-twentieth century, the sub-identity ‘Próupe’ is mentioned (Frikel 1957: 555), which he states is another name for the Piréuyana. That the Piréuyana represent the core of the Trio collective makes sense in the light of the aforementioned oral histories of the Trio.

The Okomoyana families moved to Pehkëtë where the Okomoyana ancestors are said to be buried. However, they were not the only ones to leave. From the mid-1990s different Trio families started to leave Kwamalasamutu, once again, at the request of the Paramount Chief. In the Western Trio Group, which came into existence as a result of the fissioning of Kwamalasamutu, one can now observe, for instance, that the new villages are being referred to, amongst themselves, as a Sakëta village (Kuruni), an Okomoyana village (Amotopo), an Aramayana village (Wanapan—Wonotobo Falls) and a Mawayana village (Casuela), a process that reinforces the distinct identities of the different localities.34

This is not to say that the inhabitants of any single one of these villages all have the same sub-identity, but it seems to reflect the sub-identity of the village leader or that of his family. It is, however, unclear how such a sub-identity is exactly inherited. Although its ascription seems fluid and arbitrary, it does refer back to the sub-identity of one of the ancestors. Some people are perceived to have a mixed identity, whereas others claim to have a single sub-identity while in essence they too are of mixed descent.

As the Trio hub case study has shown, the sub-identities had become dormant from Alalapadu up to Kwamalasamutu where they re-emerged. This is comparable to the Waiwai case presented earlier where the sub-identities apparently fused in Brazil and Guyana and re-emerged among the Waiwai speakers in Kwamalasamutu. In turn, in the fissioning off from Kwamalasamutu, new and dispersed localities were being inhabited and in the process these re-emerged sub-identities became reinforced and ever stronger.

34 In principle, these labels are not used outside of the Trio hub. We could postulate that the reinforced identities contribute to a higher sense of village autonomy.
Conclusions

As the two case studies have shown, the notion ‘Amerindian identity’ is neither a uniform nor a single category, rather an individual can ascribe to several identities and can uphold these as in a Matryoshka, or nested Russian dolls, fashion, that is, each individual is his/her own matryoshka doll.

As stated above, identity is an interaction with the social landscape. It is an ontological stance that is intricately bound to the greater physical landscape, the locality, and as we have shown, it is highly relational. Furthermore, it also involves ecological, cosmological, and historical knowledge systems. No one individual exists in a vacuum, rather ethnic identity is a negotiation that results in different outcomes depending on the self-positioning of the negotiators.

Approaches to identity in mainstream social and cultural anthropology are generally primordialist (objective biological or cultural ethnic identities), instrumentalist (political), or constructivist (socially organised mechanisms of identity), though these are not necessarily mutually exclusive categories (see Hornborg and Hill 2011: 2). However, in all three approaches lurks the danger of essentialising cohabiting groups whereas the social ontology of all perceived discrete ethnic units in the Guianas is, in a historical sense, complex and thus neither monolithic nor fixed. For example, as we have shown, what we perceive as ‘the Trio’ group in Kwamalasamutu, is much greater than the sum of its parts. Structurally, and politically, the result of the so-called fusions is not an absorption of cultures into one dominant culture, as has been claimed until now, rather the result is a multiplicity of non-hierarchical structures, within which there is a horizontal meshing together of groups. The political leadership towards the outside is then decided by consensus and/or local governments’ ideas of representation. It is precisely this multiplicity that allows the nested identities to co-exist.

For outsiders, the ethnic granularity of the Amerindian peoples in the Guianas is not immediately apparent, in part because of what Rivière (1969b; 1984) calls a core cultural invariant around which there is a great deal of variation. Outside of this core invariant ethnic differentiation is found, for

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35 In this chapter we restricted ourselves to the relationality of the social and physical landscapes rather than other dimensions such as the ecological and cosmological meaning and significance of these landscapes. This omission should not be interpreted as relegating less importance to these aspects.

36 Examples of the core invariant are such aspects of the social organisation as “lack of emphasis on descent, the importance of residence in ordering social relationships, bilateral crosscousin marriage, and a tendency towards matrilocal marriage” (Rivière 1969b: 162).
example, in material culture, bodily adornment, and myths. Another reason is that umbrella ethnonyms obscure the ethnic constitution and linguistic practices of a given group. On the one hand, language and modes of communication may be good indicators of ethnic allegiance. However, since languages can be abandoned, adopted or radically changed through contact, they are not always the most reliable indicator. Moreover, shared [biological] history and location [habitat] are also paramount to establishing ethnic identity. In Barth’s terms, shared language and history constitute boundaries of cultural identity (Barth 1998); we have shown here that these boundaries are fluid and that movement results at any time in a kaleidoscopic contortion (cf. Rivière 1984). Among the Guianan, or perhaps Amazonian Amerindians more generally, the primordial or biological identity tends to be buried deep under several layers of superimposed yet non-vertically perceived other identities. In particular, identity is multi-facetted and consists of spatial and temporal contingencies that comprise a people’s history.

In sum, both dormancy and emphasis of sub(group)-identities are the result of movements of people. Moving several subgroups into a large village together in which one language is or becomes dominant (that of its village leader), over time causes sub-group identities to become dormant towards the outside only. As we have shown in the case of Kwamalasamutu, when people move out of this village with their families, found a new village and become village leaders themselves, these dormant ethnic sub-identities re-emerge as the identity that is projected to the outside world, albeit without a separate linguistic distinction. In such cases, the link between language and identity is tenuous at best, and incongruous at worst. Proclaimed identities and ascribed identities (autonyms and xenonyms) are both the result of movements of people. A macro-identity comes into being when several groups are united by a shared locality and subsequently become conceptualised as, and present themselves as, a unit by another group.

As to why some of these particular identities fell dormant, three hypotheses can be put forth. First, given that both the Waiwai and the Trio ethno-genesis coincides with missionary activity in the relevant areas, it could be argued that missionary work played a major role in the homogenisation of these two groups, albeit in name only. It is not inconceivable that the first missionaries needed unity and peace among the inhabitants of the missionary villages, and of course a common language into which the Bible could be translated. Psychologically, therefore, the unity of the Waiwai and the Trio had to be stressed, thereby downplaying diversity or making it undesirable, not to say downright anti-social to live out any nested identity one might have. The
second hypothesis dismisses the first by claiming that this dormancy effect, as part of the cultural kaleidoscope, is subject of a deeper history beyond the reach of the missionaries. Nesting identities was possibly an indigenous strategy to help people fuse in times of necessity, such as when there was a threat of decimation through sickness, wars, etc. Moreover, the Amerindian world is a highly relational one in which co-residence generally trumps consanguinity, and in the social landscape, memory and forgetting form an essential strategy for easing Amerindian interactions. There is also an argument for our third hypothesis, however, namely that an overarching ‘Waiwai’ or ‘Trio’ identity never actually existed and that these should be seen entirely as recent historical constructs. Waiwai, presumably a xenonym, was taken over by westerners for ease of reference to a rather motley group of people with different languages and cultures. The practice was then continued by the people themselves. The name ‘Trio’, originally based on a misconception and subsequently applied by western explorers and scholars to the people speaking the Trio language, through time became adopted by the ‘Trio’ themselves as a point of reference in order to ease communication with these outsiders. In other words, both the Waiwai and the Trio consciously perform their Waiwai-ness and Trio-ness to the outside world. It is also possible, of course, that these three hypotheses are not mutually exclusive but that various factors from each have played a role together.

What we have shown is that locality, and thus also movement, play a major role in determining which contained identity is presented; a claim to one’s own locality results in the highest resolution of identity. As noted above, each of the smaller ethnic groups in Kwamalasamutu, the Mawayana, Tunayana-Katwena, Sikiiyana, and Akuriyo have their own ‘area’ within the village and thus also had the space (locality) to allow their nested identities to re-emerge. Thus of all the groups given above, a Mawayana in Kwamalasamutu will have the most ‘Matryoshka dolls’ in his/her set, the outer doll being Trio, the next one

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37 It is known, for example, that skills for manufacturing certain artifacts can easily be forgotten in order to perpetuate a social system of exchange. When peaceful trade relations turn sour, however, manufacturing skills appear to be easily recovered (Chagnon 1968; Rivière 1969a; Mans 2012). It could be argued that a similar strategy operates on a political level of village organisation.

38 When people from Kwamalasamutu are in Paramaribo, regardless of their ethnic affiliations, they present themselves as Trio, likewise the wares they sell there, such as decorative arts and crafts or other artifacts, are now all considered and labelled Trio. However, the differentiation in artifacts and patterns on basketry etc. does exist in the village Kwamalasamutu although only the homogenised artifacts are brought to the capital.
Waiwai, the following one Mawayana, and the next one Wadayana, Jiwiyana, or Buuyana. This is thus what it means to be a Mawayana, one is simultaneously Trio, Waiwai, Mawayana, Buuyana (or Jiwiyana or Wadayana). Through movements in the physical landscape and thus also in the social landscape, identities are renegotiated as much from the inside as from the outside.
CHAPTER 5

Setting up Frontiers, Crossing the Border: The Making of the Kari’na Tyrewuju

Gérard Collomb and Odile Renault-Lescure

1 Introduction

The European intrusion on the Guayana coasts adversely affected the mobility patterns of the native populations throughout this region, and caused a fragmentation of the ancient social and economic networks which linked the Amerindian groups, upsetting their social, economic, and also warlike relationships (Butt Colson 1973; Gallois 2005). Occurring simultaneously with a demographic collapse, these changes led to a creation and reinforcement of ethnic frontiers as an adaptive response to the changes that were occurring (see Whitehead 1993; Collomb and Dupuy 2009).

When European colonists arrived, the Kari’na formed a constellation of peoples speaking a Cariban language, settled on the coast between the Orinoco and the Approuague rivers. The members designated themselves as ‘Kari’na’. They had created a taxonomy of their ethnic environment based on relationships of social and economic exchanges and on war (Hoff 1995). Later, European struggles over land separated the eastern Kari’na, living in modern day Suriname and French Guiana, from the western Kari’na, found in contemporary Venezuela, close to the middle reaches of the Orinoco River and in Guyana, near the Venezuelan border. Among these eastern Kari’na, a group calling itself ‘Kari’na Tyrewuyu’ had settled on both banks of the lower Maroni (Marowijne) and Mana rivers, and on the upper reaches of the Iracoubo River in contemporary French Guiana, straddling the political border between Suriname and French Guiana. This region had long remained on the fringe of Dutch and French colonial settlements in the Guianas because in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the French colony was focusing its main activities on the area between the Approuague and the Kourou rivers, while further west, the Dutch colony had shown little interest in the lands near the

1 Many thanks to Diane Vernon and the editors for her reading of the English version.
2 We adopt here the Surinamese spelling, except for their French Guianese toponyms, citations and examples.
Maroni as most of its economic activity concerned sugar cane cultivated south and east of Paramaribo. These eastern Kari’na still thought of their social space as stretching up to the Essequibo and the Orinoco, but from the nineteenth century onwards they seldom went westward anymore to exchange goods or contract marriages. Their social and political life, and the processing of their ethnic identity, from then on took place in the territory between the lower Mana and Maroni rivers. Villages and/or families were frequently moving between the Dutch and French colonies, depending on the political developments of the time and/or, more frequently, in the hope of gaining advantages from one country or the other. For example, movement patterns were often based on considerations of the diversity and the quality of the goods offered by the Dutch and French colonial governments. Even if the idea of a border did not mean much to the Kari’na, they were aware that two ‘nations’ were competing for control of the Maroni river, trying to attract them to their ‘nation’ as hunters or as providers of goods for the colonial trade or, later, as a human presence against the people who were escaping from slavery. The Kari’na were thus keenly aware that they could benefit from this situation in various ways.

During the first half of the nineteenth century, French Guiana and Suriname entered a new stage of their colonial development. In French Guiana, an agricultural settlement was implemented in the western part of the colony, and from 1858 on, a penal colony (*le Bagne*) developed in the lower Maroni region, giving rise to the creation of the town of Saint-Laurent-du-Maroni, opposite the town of Albina on the Surinamese side of the Maroni River. In the Dutch colony, in the course of the eighteenth century, a dense network of plantations had been developing on the Suriname and Commewijne rivers, an area which was mostly off-limits for Amerindians. They, therefore, had to restrict their activities to the Marowijne region, on the Surinamese side of the Maroni River. However, this area was also of interest to the escaping slaves or Maroon populations (Ndyuka, Aluku, Bakabusi sama) who fled to or settled in the forests west of the Marowijne/Maroni River. The two population groups therefore became competitors. These co-occurrences, that had previously prevented the Tyrewuju from maintaining a distance from the colonial places, materialised at a moment when the Kari’na Tyrewuju were at their lowest demographic level, reduced to only a few hundred people. They became more and more limited in their collective mobility, and their economy became more dependent on the colony’s activities. From this period, their contacts with other Amerindian groups diminished sharply, and in the second half of the nineteenth century they ended up in a new world that they had to share with other, culturally different populations, namely French and Surinamese Creoles, Maroons, and Europeans. The history of the Kari’na, their ethnic identification (either self-
constructed or ascribed) and their territorial inscription thus became more or less inseparable from the European colonial expansion in the region, a situation obtaining till the present day.

The data on which this chapter is based are taken from the field of language contact, and consist of both the observation of linguistic practices and changes induced by contact, and ethnographic field work among the Tyrewuju communities in French Guiana and Suriname (Collomb 2008). The overall aim of this chapter is to over-ride the ‘in/out’ categories associated with the border, and to focus on the different levels in which these processes occur, in a dynamic relation between the centre and the margins. In Section 2, we distinguish two main Kari’na dialects and deal with the diversity of borrowings into Kari’na over time, due to the history of mobility and contacts with European and creole languages. In Section 3, we turn our attention to symbolic features in which the Tyrewuju built a shared world that they set in the lower Maroni area. In Section 4 we continue with the notion of shared identity giving examples of a Kari’na narrative of mobility through the area. In Section 5, we examine how, more recently, the Tyrewuju have had to learn to compromise and deal with the new institutions of states and their political borders, both in French Guiana and Suriname, and how this has changed their former mobility into present migrations. The linguistic practices reveal this new stage of their history, through new processes of changes, including morphosyntactic changes and code mixing, in relation to the status of the different languages used in both countries. Finally, in Section 6, we draw some conclusions about the completed and ongoing linguistic and social changes showing differences in generational perspectives.

2 Language as a Marker of Identity, Loanwords as a Marker of History

Linguists have identified two dialects within the Kari’na language3 spoken today in Suriname and French Guiana: an eastern dialect spoken on both sides of the Maroni, on the Mana river, and eastwards, up to Iracoubo, and a western dialect, used in the centre and in the west of Suriname (Hoff 1968; Renault-Lescure 1985; Courtz 2008). The border between these two dialects can be drawn along the west (Surinamese) bank of the Maroni River. These dialectal variations reflect the history of the contacts, migrations and mobilities of the Kari’na people.

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3 Named Carib language (Hoff 1968; Courtz 2008), Kari’na (Carlin 2002) and Karinja (Yamada 2010).
A first significant example of these mobilities can be found in the way the ‘Galibi Pidgin’, a Kari’na-based lingua franca, spread in earlier times. This language is assumed to have accompanied raiding warriors and people travelling for exchanges throughout the mainland coast and the Lesser Antilles islands in the pre-Columbian period. One can see evidence of its presence in the Amerindian language spoken in Dominica at the arrival of the first settlers (Taylor and Hoff 1980; Hoff 1995; Renault-Lescure 1999), as well as its traces in the memories of the Amerindians of Amapá (Brazilian Guiana), non-native speakers of Kari’na today (Tassinari 2009). This lingua franca was also the language spoken in the Jesuit missions on the Guayana coast during the eighteenth century, and it is likely that words from this pidgin were borrowed by European and creole languages during the first contacts, to designate elements of an unknown world.

During the seventeenth century, a new vocabulary, related to the contact with Europe, appeared in Kari’na which has the tendency to borrow from various contact languages rather than use other methods for forming neologisms. It should be emphasised that these borrowing strategies are parallel with other strategies, used in other non-linguistic contexts: to appropriate, to resist or to take control of the structures set up by the Whites. This is thus not only a linguistic strategy but a political, administrative, and economic one as well. Such a pragmatic attitude, combined with a multilingual social environment, highlights a capacity for resistance by the Kari’na throughout their history (Renault-Lescure 2002). This propensity of the Kari’na for borrowing words gives us a key for understanding some characteristics of their history made of mobilities and contacts with other Amerindians and with colonial populations, and this feature is still evident in the present-day language.

The first period of contacts with the Europeans and their languages (Spanish, Portuguese, sometimes English, Dutch, and French), quickly led to a set of borrowings which spread along the coast of the Guianas, from the mouth of the Orinoco up to the Approuague in eastern French Guiana. These loan-words describe the objects of the first period of contact with the West, marked by violence and by the development of trade (e.g., alakapusa ‘musket, rifle’, from Spanish arcabuz, and kasulu ‘glass bead’, from Portuguese casulo). In

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4 Taylor and Hoff 1980. ‘Galibi’, perhaps derived from the word ‘Kali’na’ (see Hoff 2002: 53) was a name used, till quite recently, to refer to the Kari’na people in French Guiana.
5 Antonella Tassinari, Personal communication.
6 First occurrence in a colonial lexicon 1654 (Boyer 1654).
7 First occurrence in a colonial lexicon 1644 (Biet 1896).
the languages from which they are taken, these words are nouns, and they are directly integrated into the class of nouns in Kari’na.

Later, the contacts with these languages declined, replaced by contacts with the new languages evolving in the colonies with the development of slavery, namely Sranantongo, an English-based creole, in Suriname since the second half of the seventeenth century, and Créole, a French-based creole language spoken in French Guiana. In this period the Kari’na speakers acquired some degree of bilingualism, and had more socioeconomic relationships with the new Surinamese Creole society. For this the reason, a lexicon formed of words borrowed from Sranantongo entered all varieties of the Kari’na language, the western (spoken in the centre and west of Suriname) and the eastern (spoken in French Guiana and eastern Suriname). The lexical items in question relate to material goods and other concepts associated with non-Amerindian products or practices (Renault-Lescure 2009), for example:

- kapiteni < kapten ‘chief’;
- kontere/kontele8 < kondre ‘country, town’;
- kereke/keleke < kerki ‘church’;
- wenkere/wenkele < wenkri ‘shop’;
- perere/pelele < brede ‘bread’;
- areisi/aleisi < aleisi ‘rice’;
- puruku/puluku < bruku ‘trousers’;
- panki < pangi ‘cloth, skirt’;
- karasi/kalasi < grasi ‘glas’;
- suma < suma ‘person, somebody’;
- mati < mati ‘friend, black person’;
- sinesi < sneisi ‘Chinese’;
- juru/yulu < yuru ‘hour’;
- tori/toli < tori ‘story’9

On the other hand, during the next period of contact, one notices a reinforcement of the dialect boundary between western and eastern areas: newly borrowed words from the French Guianese Creole now only entered the eastern dialect (Tyrewuju) since intense social relationships with the Guianese Creole population were upheld by the Kari’na on both sides of the Maroni River. Such a situation draws a picture of an increasingly multilingual environment for the Tyrewuju, contingent on their mobility and the ability of some people to speak different creole languages:

- muperu/mupelu < monpè ‘father, priest’;
- maso < maso ‘nun’;
- konpe < kompè ‘comad’;
- nuisuwe < muchwè ‘handkerchief’;
- paran/palan < palan ‘long-line’;
- tiriko/tiliki < triko ‘tee-shirt’;
- pisukuwi < biskwi ‘biscuit’;
- bidon < bidon ‘oil can’;
- rakere/lakele < lakle ‘key’;
- buton < bouton ‘button’;
- rabaret[y]/labalet[i] < labalet ‘catapult’10

8 Where necessary we indicate the two spellings used in Suriname and French Guiana.
9 See Hoff (1968) and Yamada (2010).
Later some variations between borrowings from Sranantongo and Guianese Creole entered the linguistic practices of the Tyrewuju as shown in Table 5.1:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tyrewuju</th>
<th>&lt; Sranantongo</th>
<th>Tyrewuju</th>
<th>&lt; Guianese Creole</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘milk’</td>
<td>meriki/meliki</td>
<td>melki</td>
<td>dilet[^i]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘tin plate’</td>
<td>berekyry/berekili</td>
<td>breki</td>
<td>buwet[^i]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘beer’</td>
<td>biri/bili</td>
<td>biri</td>
<td>labye</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘school’</td>
<td>sikoro/sikolo</td>
<td>Skoro</td>
<td>lekol[^i]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘shovel’</td>
<td>sikopu</td>
<td>skopu</td>
<td>lapel[^i]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3 Setting up Frontiers: “We are Tyrewuju from the Mana and the Maroni”

At the end of the nineteenth century, the Kari’na Tyrewuju (henceforth Tyrewuju) came more and more under pressure from the colonial administrations on both sides of the border between French Guiana and Suriname. Nevertheless, in this new context, the social patterns of Tyrewuju society were still in place, with the familial residential unit forming a ‘village’ which usually gathered around a founder (generally an elderly man), his extended family, as well as some other nuclear families, possibly not directly related to him but recognising his leadership (Rivière 1984).11 Within and between these small villages on the Iraçoubo, Organabo, Mana rivers and on both banks of the Maroni, the extended families had woven a dense network of kinship and alliance ties, a sort of ‘Tyrewuju country’. It is from this place, from this network settled onto the border, that one can understand the production of identity referents for the Tyrewuju, the construction of a ‘self’ and of ‘others’, and the definition of frontiers. If they are historically present in the Kari’na world, the Whites, the Blacks and the other peoples who arrived more recently, neverthe-

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11 Productive activities are carried out, goods are circulated and collective works are organised from within this residential settlement. It is also from here that the great manioc beer festivals (Omankano, Epekotono) take place on the occasion of a mourning, providing a meeting point for kin groups and allies living sometimes far away from the village.
less represented a sort of ‘radical otherness’ such that it was not necessary to identify as such.

When it comes to the notion of a collective identity, Tyrewuju scholars have put forward a narrative which depicts the singularity of the group and designates a set of families as being the focal point of this identity. This narrative, which is still known and told by the elders in the villages, relates the way in which the shamans of the village of Ulemali Untɨ (located on the river Mana) in the first half of the nineteenth century, tried to bring the dead back to earth by realising what is called *epa’kano*:

*Epa’kano* was what the Whites call a ‘miracle’ . . . Everything was ready for what was going to happen, people from all the villages gathered there, they came from as far as Iracoubo. The dead, those who are above, were about to come down . . . But the transgression of a taboo by a woman from the village impeded the shamans’ powers, and *epa’kano* failed: ‘Everything has stopped forever, and those from the sky have gone away . . .’ People began to die, and those who survived are dispersed . . . They went to settle in Alusiaka, in Palewasinke, in Yalimapo, in Kupali Yume . . . Later on, other families, having heard about *epa’kano*, came from far away in Suriname. But they arrived when everything had already stopped! (Collomb 2000: 151).

Drawing on shamanic thought influenced by the Jesuit evangelisation in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the whole text has a strong spiritual and symbolic feature, but we consider it here as a narrative telling about a refounding of the Tyrewuyu world, from a ‘focal point’, the Mana River. After the demographic collapse and the political divisions caused by the European presence, the place where these miracles occurred would become the origin of the families that created the current villages all over the area. The different versions of the narrative, in French Guiana as well as in eastern Suriname, recall that these people from the Mana were the performers of *epa’kano*, even if some also came from more eastern villages (Iracoubo) to participate. After the failure, they left Ulemali Untɨ and they created the villages that we know today, or that one could know in the recent past, on the banks of the Mana and the Maroni rivers.

The narrative, thus, emphasises the legitimacy of these families, and establishes a strong opposition between them and the families who came from the west, metaphorically designated as having arrived “when everything had already failed”. As the elders explain today, these families are the ones who progressively came from what the Tyrewuju designate as *aretyrɨ* ‘the west’ to join the Mana and the Maroni, during the second half of the nineteenth
century and throughout the twentieth century. These people from the west, settled in the villages with the other families and aggregated to them; but the narrative definitely refers to them as allochtonous, thereby establishing an implicit hierarchy. This assertion is corroborated by the naming system of the Kari’na in this area: the syntagm ‘Kari’na Tyrewuju’, claimed as a self-designation by the Kari’na of the Maroni, is thus opposed to ‘Murato’, the name given to people from the centre and the west of Suriname whom the Tyrewuju consider to be intermixed with the Maroons (Hoogbergen 1992). This occurs regardless of the phenotype since different degrees of interbreeding also occur among the Tyrewuju, but these are not considered as discriminative.

Even today the epa’kano narrative contributes towards legitimising the pre-eminent status claimed by these autochthonous families, as evidenced, for example, by the present political layout in the Amerindian village/district of Awala-Yalimapo. When one considers individual and familial strategies, alliances and alliance reversals, one can see that local politics often follows quite precisely not only the limits of the kinship networks, but also the division between the ‘autochthonous’ families and the families who “have come from Aretyry”. The ideological frame which shapes this political life stresses the pre-eminence claimed by the founding families (Collomb 2000).

One can make the same observation for some features of Tyrewuju social life throughout the twentieth century. For example, examining the migrations from and to Galibi, on the Surinamese bank of the Maroni river, Kloos (1971) showed that, for the period between 1923 and 1968, most of the long-term movements (with the exception of children’s trips for schooling in Paramaribo) took place within this small area around Galibi, most of them being the result of a residential shift after marriage. In contrast, mobility based on kinship and alliance remained extremely limited westwards, marriages with the members of Kari’na villages located beyond the west bank of the Maroni remained exceptional or, more precisely, only women came from Aretyry to marry Tyrewuju men on the Maroni, a social ‘hypergamy’ strategy, partly in contradiction with the traditional uxorilocal post-marital residence rule.

4 The Feeling of a Shared World

Until recently the political border was not understood by the Tyrewuju as a limit, but rather as an interface between two political and economic sets, French Guiana and Suriname, with which the Tyrewuju have played throughout their modern history. The frontiers which they knew were different: they were social and symbolic. They were, for example, those built through the epa’kano narrative, which gives the different groups a role and a place, and
defines a ‘self’ and an ‘other’. In accordance with what the narrative stresses, this area of the lower Mana/Maroni was, for the native families, and remains till today, a common world that straddles the political border, indisputably distinct from a western Kari’na (Murato) world. For the people of the Maroni area, those Kari’na villages located in the centre and west of Suriname form a geographically and socially distant set, as was already noticed by Peter Kloos in Galibi: “These Caribs call themselves tele:wuyu, a word that is often translated as ‘real Caribs’ and they feel proud to belong to the real, pure Caribs, and not to the mula’to of West Surinam who are of mixed Carib-Negro descent” (Kloos 1971: 84). With these ‘other’ Kari’na, relations were largely loose, and frequently of a shamanic nature, fraught with mutual aggressions, the memory of which people on both sides guard.

During the twentieth century, up to the 1970s, Tyrewuju individuals and families circulated within this area, for marriages (due to the uxorilocal rule, men were generally moving), or because of rivalries or disputes within the villages. Another motivation has been, of course, closely linked to the possibilities for work, but there was no clear incentive to settle for long on either the French or the Dutch side, rather the strategy was simply to take advantage of any opportunities alternately offered by one country or by the other. By looking at some examples of these moves, one observes both the shared feeling of being in a common world, a common area, and the strategic uses made of the Dutch/French border, for social or economic reasons, mainly by men seeking work:

A man, 67 years old. A long time ago, his family left the Maroni for the Cottica; later, his father married in French Guiana and crossed the Maroni. This man was born in Amanapotɨlɨ (Mana). Then his family again crossed the river and settled in Galibi. Later, they moved to Kuwasi. He married there, then he came back to Galibi for four years, and later to Mana again. A few years after, he decided to go to Cayenne, where he stayed three years. Then the family went to Saint-Georges on the Brazilian border for two years. Finally, he came back again to Mana, where he lives now. Most of his relatives live in Galibi, but come sometimes to Mana to stay several months at his home, some others to Kourou where their children live and work.

A man, 60 years old; born in Galibi (son of a former ‘capitaine’). He came to Kourou to work for several years on the construction of the launching station. Then he came back to Galibi. He crossed again to French Guiana on the occasion of the war (his Kari’na wife was French) and settled close to his wife’s relatives in Yalimapo. Most of his family stayed in Galibi and in Paramaribo; two sisters work in the Netherlands, he visited them several times.
Some major changes occurred within the Maroni area in the second part of the twentieth century that have progressively inscribed the political border between French Guiana and Suriname into the daily life of the Tyrewuju. In 1946, the French colony became a so-called Département, a French territorial subdivision, a change which meant a complete integration within the national institutions and the removal of the former colonial distinction between the categories ‘French citizens’ and ‘Indigenous people’. On becoming French citizens, the Amerindians soon underwent a policy of cultural and social integration. Acquiring the right to the welfare system introduced a new source of income for the families, with important consequences for Amerindian economies and social systems. In Suriname the process has been somewhat different, because that colony received a semi-autonomous status within the Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1954, and then became independent in 1975. However, as was the case in French Guiana, this resulted in a monolithic citizenship that did not take into account minorities and multicultural rights, and since the 1960s, the Tyrewuju have progressively become linked to the larger Surinamese society, through its legal system and economy (Kloos 1971).

In the meantime, the development of the educational system, both in French Guiana and in Suriname has contributed to instilling into the young Tyrewuju the principles, structures, and the symbols of distinct national cultures, memories, and identities. In each country access to primary education has been different. In Galibi, for example, the school was founded in 1925 in the village itself as an extension of missionary activities (Kloos ibid.); the children stayed with their families and received a more traditional Kari'ina education. In French Guiana, from 1946 on, the children were sent to religious boarding schools and thus were separated from their families and without a traditional education for longer periods. However, in both countries, during the second half of the past century, the schools have come under the control of the national educational systems, and accordingly the contacts with the official languages have become more intense. In the meantime the contacts with Sranantongo and Guianese Creole, changed as the speakers’ attitudes towards these languages changed—speaking Dutch or French is generally seen as a key to social mobility.12

12 In this regard, we need to point out that Sranantongo has a different relationship to the official language (Dutch) from that of Guianese Creole to French. In addition, in Surinamese society, Sranantongo also has an important symbolic function in interethnic communication, besides being a marker of class, educational level, and social position.
Since this time, both in French Guiana and in Suriname, the villagers have been gradually included in new political spaces, even if this has long remained marginal for most of them. So, as voters, the Tyrewuju became actors in the alliances established between the political parties in Suriname, and in the clientelistic political strategies that shaped the political life in French Guiana (Collomb 2001). This growing involvement in administrative and political institutions has had important consequences for linguistic practices, which are needed in order to deal with new social worlds.

To fit into this new context, the Kari’na continued to borrow nouns from creoles and official languages (lexical strategies), and extended this practice to other strategies, borrowing adjectives and verbs, grounded on morphosyntactic processes. For the adjectives, the invariable borrowed form is followed by the attributive suffix -me, in a structure with a copula, for example, from Sranantongo pina ‘be poor’ or ‘to suffer’ we get Kari’na pina-me man ‘s/he is miserable’, and from French Guianese Creole mègzolèt ‘skinny’, we get mègzolèt-me man ‘s/he is skinny’.

The strategies are different for verbs—depending on the creole. Two parallel structures have thus been constructed, one used by Tyrewuju on the left (Surinamese) bank of the Maroni (the invariable borrowed form suffixed by the verbalising morpheme -ma, which results in a verb), the other by those on the right bank (the borrowed form followed by the postposition pokò ‘occupied with’ and a copula). The new processes which are thus created are frequently used today, resulting in the formation of a new dialectal frontier, depending on the languages in contact:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sranantongo</th>
<th>Guianese creole</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>begi-ma ‘to pray to [God]’</td>
<td>priyé pokò [copula] ‘to pray’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literally: to be occupied with prayer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This dialectal frontier coincides with the political border. In addition, this process is intensified by the bilingualism introduced by education, and especially in French Guiana by the decreasing knowledge of Creole caused by switching to French. Such ease in introducing new forms of ‘ready to wear’ constructions has important consequences of allowing, by the insertion of alien forms at will,

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13 They also developed ‘ethnic’ organisations, which were also political tools, dealing specifically with national and international institutions: by 1982 the Association des Amérindiens de Guyane française (AAGF), had been created in French Guiana and some years later, in 1992, the Organisatie van Inheemsen in Suriname (OIS) in Suriname.

14 The copula, or linking verb, is ‘to be’ (defective forms) with intransitive meaning or ili ‘to give, to put’ with transitive meaning. Examples are from Alby and Renault-Lescure (2012).
new linguistic practices and the installation of code-mixing patterns. These phenomena are made more complex by their variations depending on individuals, their life histories, their mobility and language abilities, and in relation to speech situations and contexts. In the following we give some examples of interactions in French Guiana:

(a) Excerpt from a family conversation recorded in Awala in 2000

- Marie-France ene ne katu wi’take kokolone oya la’a itopa Daniel a’ta
  If possible, I’ll see Marie-France in the morning, if Daniel has got nowhere to go
  iyonpo mo’ko wati yalopo’san chauffeurili
  because he is taking me, he is my driver
- […] Odile ‘wa téléphonner pokolitake15 lolipo wikai […]
  I said, I’ll try to phone to Odile
  anukutipwa auti numeroli […]
  I don’t know her phone number at home

(b) Excerpt from a Council meeting recorded in Awala in 2003

- A.[…] amikon architecte antikapipamu matan moko kinika’san
  Some architects don’t make it, but he makes it
  […] signer pokolilili o’wa man oluwa . . . .
  You have to sign three . . .
  oti . . . les autres apparaître pokolitake eipa nan16 otipokol . . . .
  Er . . . the others are not appearing, why?
  bien sûr que pratiqueme wati man pratiqueme anepolipawa . . . […]
  Clearly, it is not practical, I think that it isn’t practical

Another substantial change occurred in 1986, when the civil war broke out in Suriname between the government and the Ndyuka ‘Jungle Commandos’. Some Amerindians took part in the fighting, on the side of the government, and for this reason the Tyrewuju were threatened in their villages on the left bank of the Maroni. The civil war precipitated the arrival, on the French bank of the Maroni, of many people trying to escape the fighting: Ndyuka families near Saint-Laurent-du-Maroni, Amerindians in Awala-Yalimapo and in other Kari’na villages. This civil war period also broke the former economic and social balance between French Guiana and Suriname: from then on, the eco-

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15 Future form.
16 *Eipa nan*: negative form of the copula.
omic collapse of Suriname contrasted with the relative wealth of the French départements, where the French Kari’na were benefiting from the welfare system. These events and their consequences have reinforced the reality of a political border on the Maroni, mainly strong-armed from the French territory. On the one hand, the French administration has increased its control over the arrival of immigrants, but on the other hand, the very existence of the border has opened the way for smuggling and for trafficking goods, for example, construction materials, rice, petrol, Haitian migrants, involving, among others, Amerindian people from villages in French Guiana.

The arrival of more than one thousand Kari’na from Suriname in French Guiana in 1986 and 1987, and their settlement in the French villages, has to be understood in this context. A massive migration, caused by the war, took place, a move that was completely different from the ancient habits of individual mobilities from one side to the other. Most of them came from the villages on the Surinamese bank of the Maroni, and they settled in the French Tyrewuju villages where they had kinship links. But the importance of this sudden population increase, apart from disturbing the classic social rules for creating residential units, is that it disrupted for several years to come, the economic, social, and political life of the villages to which they moved. In the villages that received them, these newcomers were called ‘refugees’ or ‘Surinamese’, a term applied to the Maroons who had crossed the Maroni en masse to settle near Saint-Laurent-du-Maroni (Piantoni 2009). Once the emotions stirred by the civil war lessened, the Kari’na refugees were faced by indifference. More than twenty years after their arrival, these families are still regarded in the French villages as ‘refugees’—providing the basis for a phonetic joke willingly given today in French by the Tyrewuju: réfugiés/refusés ‘refugees/refused’. Although the kinship links allow some day-to-day exchanges between individuals and family groups, the ‘Surinamese’ Kari’na are nonetheless also considered as ‘foreigners’, and they are, as such, seen as potential economic competitors with the ‘French’ Kari’na, or as social and political competitors, if one takes into account the family strategies and internal struggles in the villages.

However, if we consider this situation in the 1990s, by which time it had stabilised, it appears a little more complicated. Again, one can notice at work, at least partly, the logics of autochthony (which are also the logics of kinship): this category of ‘refugees’ or ‘Surinamese’ is still built on the basis of the belonging—or not belonging—to the Mana/Maroni families. Among the ‘Surinamese’ migrants, a few families, who came from Galibi and from other places in the lower Maroni (north of Albina)—villages which were part of the

This is more or less one quarter of the population.
classic ‘Tyrewuju common world’—have been fully integrated and have settled near the places where close relatives live. The other Surinamese families on the other hand, many of whom came from Bigiston (a large village that was in the heart of the conflict, south of Albina, which had been completely evacuated) have settled apart from the French villages, or have founded their own villages. These ‘Surinamese’ Kari’na who came to French Guiana are all the more Surinamese by not belonging to the Maroni family sets. And one can notice that the leaders of these families—the ‘true’ refugees and the true foreigners—are excluded de facto from the Amerindian political organisations, which are generally run by leaders from the Mana/Maroni. Nor do they, de facto, very often enjoy the participation of the Maroni families they invite to their mourning ceremonies.

The linguistic consequences of these new migrations still have to be investigated. But we can notice in the language practices of ‘Surinamese’ migrants in Awala-Yalimapo some interesting processes. Among the oldest Kari’na who arrived in French Guiana in 1986 with their nuclear families, the need to speak and to learn French doesn’t really exist. Furthermore, their language practices in Kari’na show no use of inserted words from Sranantongo or Dutch, due both to their determination not to be seen as ‘Surinamese’, and their need to be understood in a francophone environment. They really live in a Kari’na area, maintaining family relationships on both sides of the Maroni. Their language production is similar to that of their peers, either on the French bank or on the Surinamese bank, in a wish to speak the same language. The linguistic repertoires of younger migrants, on the other hand, often married to people from Awala-Yalimapo, show Guianese Creole—or even more so, French—insertions of nouns and adverbs, adjectives and verbs, in the typical code-mixing from French Guiana (Alby and Renault-Lescure 2012). An example is given in the following:

_Awala, 2009, Interview with a woman born in Galibi, who arrived in French Guiana in 1986:_

_Iloke lo itopa wei, refuser poko silii molokon_

_It is for this reason that I didn’t go, I refused all things_

_[…] jamais itopa wa […] handicapéme man, da noki ko nenetan_

_[…] I have never gone […] He is handicapped, so who will watch over him?_

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18 This wish is sometimes masked by ‘purist’ linguistic ideology.

19 Directly integrated, as nouns.
Without making explicit claims, what can be observed among these young migrants, as has been described by Rey and Avenne for African migrants in Italy, is perhaps already, an attempt “to rebuild a linguistic identity, based on the pattern of the host society” (Rey and Avenne 1998: 129). In these villages, one can see the ‘Surinamese’ Kari'na seeking integration in French Guiana, within the frame of a shared space between the east and west banks. Their search for a better standard of living in French Guiana, for a welfare that they could only observe from their former villages, cannot really console them with that important rupture with Suriname—an expression of the new border which they have now to deal with:

I live well here in Awala Yalimapo; it's a nice village. How could I say it better? Life is pleasant here. This does not mean that I left Suriname, that I do not want any more to go to Suriname! No! On the contrary, I go to Suriname. I have a lot of family in Galibi, really. My parents live in Langamankondre [Galibi]. I have some family in the Netherlands, and also in Paramaribo . . . (Awala-Yalimapo, 2009, translation from Kari'na).

For them, the future is explicitly linked to a life plan for children, in which French is seen as the key determinant for success in school and for having access to paid employment:

For me, it's because of the war that I came in '86. I lived in Suriname, I saw that the educational system was not good. I took my children with me to come to French Guiana. I took my children because I wanted them to learn French to talk to White people. I come from Galibi and when I go back, I see the situation of the children there, and I say to my children that if they had not come to Awala, they would still go fishing and hunting to survive, they must absolutely learn and get into the school [ . . . ]. If I stayed in Galibi, I could work, but my son will grow up, he must have future opportunities (Awala-Yalimapo, 2009, translation from Kari'na).

6 Conclusion

For the Tyrewuju, those Kari'na settled between French and Dutch colonies, between Suriname and French Guiana, the political border has, for a long time, been rather less a limitation than a piece of the contextual data that accompanied a history grounded in a double process: on the one hand, an effort to define or to move ethnic boundaries which allow an identification of ‘self’ and
‘other’, and, on the other hand, a strategy to manage and to take advantage of a political, cultural, and economic differential between the ‘colony of Cayenne’ and ‘Suriname’. We have shown that these representations, rooted in history, are still present today in Tyrewuju culture and social life, making much less interesting the binary categories associated with the ‘border’ (‘in/out’, ‘legal/illegal’). A better understanding comes from focusing one’s attention on the different levels at which these processes take place, and on the dynamics at work between the centre and the margins. In the meantime, if one now considers the situation on one side of the new ‘divide’, for example in French Guiana, one can observe that the social and political systems that grounded the ‘politics’ of the ancient Tyrewuju have been largely weakened by the increasing articulation of Kari’na society with the national (French) social, political and economic system. The elders still keep in mind the narratives and the rules which organised the Tyrewuju ‘ethnic set’ within the villages on the Maroni and the Mana, but the younger generation (50 per cent of the Amerindian village population is younger than 20 years old) is aiming for a greater place in Guianese society, and tends to build new forms of collective identification. The young political leaders today, who are no more the former Capitaines, have opened the way for other strategies: one is to take part in the Guianese political system, shedding their historical situation on the margins, and to play a role in the building of a forthcoming ‘Guianese nation’—a question in debate nowadays in French Guiana. Another strategy is to shake off the status of ‘minorities’ which is theirs in the French nation, and, using current political concepts, such as ‘indigenous people’ or ‘First Nation people’, built on the basis of universal values legitimated by international institutions (Collomb 2006).
CHAPTER 6

Mobilities into (and out of) Konomerume (Donderskamp)

Racquel-María Yamada

1 Introduction

This chapter explores mobility, language practices, and identity among residents of Konomerume, a predominantly Kari’ňja community, ethnically, on the banks of the Wajambo River in Suriname. I examine mobilities among residents of Konomerume, a predominantly Kari’ňja community, ethnically, on the banks of the Wajambo River in Suriname. I examine mobilities among

1 I would like to acknowledge the kindness and professional courtesy extended to me by the editors and other authors of this volume. Their patient reading and thoughtful suggestions have improved this work immeasurably. I would also like to express my deep gratitude to members of the Konomerume community with whom I have had the amazing privilege of working for so many years. I take full responsibility for any errors, omissions, or oversights.

2 Residents’ auto-designation for the community is Konomerume. Outsiders, including the Surinamese government, refer to the community as Donderskamp. I use community members’ designation throughout. There is a bit of a “chicken or egg” question regarding the name of the community. Most outsiders’ accounts attribute the name Donderskamp to a Dutch missionary, Father Peter Donders, who worked in Suriname in the late 1800s. Elders in the community, however, claim the name Konomerume predates Donders. It should be noted that Dutch donder and Kari’ňja konomerume both translate to ‘thunder.’

3 The term Kari’ňja is the auto-designation of people who are either speakers of the language or who self-identify as ethnically Kari’ňja. This particular spelling also reflects the practical orthography developed in Konomerume. Community members and I have developed a practical orthography that represents more phonetic detail than other orthographies. For example, a regular process of palatalisation following /i/ is represented with digraphs with a second element, /j/, indicating a palatalised consonant (see Hoff 1968: 43 for a detailed discussion of palatalisation in Kari’ňja). In some cases, as in §6.2.1 example (5), a prefixed /i-/ palatalises the following consonant and then elides. The practical orthography represents the word as it is pronounced. In addition, the /r/ spelling represents the Aretyry dialect—in Tyrewuju, the name is pronounced [kali’ňja]. The language name has been spelled in various ways depending on the particular orthography employed. Different spellings include Cariña, Kari’ña, Kali’ña, Kalihna, and Kalinya, among others. The language is known variously as Carib, Carib of Suriname, Galibi, and Maraworno. A language name or spelling that is more common in one region or context may be less common in another. I employ Konomerume community members’ spelling and designation throughout. C.f. §6 for further detail on dialects.
migrants to Konomerume and describe reasons for and types of movement. In addition, I describe differences among migrant groups in terms of language practice (who speaks which language to whom and why (c.f. Fishman 1991)), language attitudes (including attitudes toward different Kari’nja dialects), integration (the extent to which migrants participate in the community at large), and identity (especially as it relates to language revitalisation). I adopt here Fishman’s (2010) conceptualisation of identity and its relationship to both language and ethnicity as highly contextualised and dependent on “circumstances and contrasts that play upon it, modify it, and create or recreate it (2010: xxviii).” As such, I explore migrants’ language practices, attitudes, integration, and identity from both insider and outsider perspectives.

Finally, a discussion of implications for the identification of dialect areas is included. This chapter represents a small-scale look at mobilities within an individual community and how they relate to language practices, identity, and attitudes. In addition, I discuss the implications of migration, attitudes, and contact linguistics on the identification of dialect boundaries and posit a sub-dialect area based on initial sociolinguistic findings.

In part 1, I describe Konomerume in terms of location and demographics. This is followed by some background information on the project itself and how data were gathered in parts 2 and 3. Part 4 begins with a description of types of mobility as they relate to the Konomerume situation. I then assess particular groups of in-migrants to Konomerume, including their motivations for migration, language practices and attitudes, and their level of integration into the community. I organise the individual groups in progression from least well- to most well-integrated. Part 5 examines tensions between speakers of the two Kari’nja dialects spoken in Suriname: Aretyr and Tyrewwiju. This is followed by a brief description of the Aretyr documentation, preservation, and revitalisation program in Konomerume. In part 6, I explore social and linguistic indicators of dialect boundaries and use these factors to posit a potential subdialect area. Finally, part 7 provides conclusions and a description of directions for future research projects in Konomerume and elsewhere.

2 Demographics

Konomerume is located in the Sipaliwini District of Suriname, on the banks of the Wajambo River. The Wajambo River flows in a roughly east-west direction, meeting the Coppename River to the east, and the Nickerie River to the west. The Nickerie River provides access to the Corantijn River,4 which forms the

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4 This is the Surinamese spelling for this river name.
border between Suriname and Guyana. In Figure 6.1, the approximate location of Konomerume is indicated with a black star.

According to 2004 census data (Suriname General Bureau of Statistics Census Office), the community is comprised of approximately 349 residents (including in-migrants), most of whom self-identify as ethnically Kari’nja, with a small percentage self-identifying as ethnically Lokono or Warao.\footnote{Kari’nja, Lokono, and Warao are names for both languages and ethnicities. It is common for someone who is not fluent in either language to say, “I am Lokono and Warao.” The conflation between language and ethnicity has led to occasional tension between speakers and non-speakers with more than one accusation such as, “How can you call yourself Lokono when you don’t even speak the language?” A full examination of what constitutes identity in these}
languages Kari’nja (Cariban) and Lokono (Arawakan) are both highly endangered. Warao (isolate) is no longer spoken in Suriname. The primary language of communication in Konomerume is Sranantongo, a so-called English-lexified Creole language that also functions as Suriname’s lingua franca. Dutch, the official language, is learned as a second language in the community elementary school. For those who have learned Dutch, there is a wide range of fluency. Elementary school teachers, community leaders, and those who travel regularly to Paramaribo have a greater command of the language than members of the community at large.

Konomerume represents a geographic and social border between Kari’nja and Lokono in the Coppena/Wajambo region of Suriname. Konomerume was originally composed of two villages—one Lokono and one Kari’nja. Intermarriage eventually led to the merger of the two communities. The nearest community to the west, Tapuripa, is primarily Lokono, and that to the east, Cornelis Kondre, is primarily Kari’nja. Most Konomerume residents who claim Lokono heritage are not fluent in the language, though approximately 3–4 middle-aged adults are fluent native speakers who only occasionally use the language. Residents who are ethnically Warao, all migrants from Guyana, do not speak the Warao language at all. Of the two indigenous languages spoken in Konomerume, Kari’nja is dominant and has both more speakers and more non-speakers who self-identify as ethnically Kari’nja.

The Kari’nja language has been identified as **highly endangered** (UNESCO 2003) with approximately 7,430 speakers worldwide (Lewis 2009). In addition to Suriname, Kari’nja is spoken in French Guiana, Guyana, and Venezuela. Two dialects have been identified in Suriname, Tyrewuju and Aretryry. Aretryry, spoken in the central and western regions of the country, is the nonprestige variety. Of the 1,200 Kari’nja speakers in Suriname (Carlin 2001), the vast majority speaks the prestige dialect, Tyrewuju.

In Konomerume, four groups of Kari’nja speakers are roughly delimited along age lines. Elder native speakers, aged 65 and above, still use Kari’nja daily as the primary language of communication amongst themselves. Middle-aged speakers, who are approximately 40 to 65 years old, are native speakers who no longer use the language daily. They primarily use Kari’nja with their elder parents, and Sranantongo or Dutch amongst themselves and with their...
children. Younger adults, aged 20 to 40, are “understanders.” Most understand the language but do not speak it. Currently, children are not learning the language natively, but there is an effort to revive the language through formal lessons in the community elementary school, and expanded contexts of use. These facts place the community at Stage 7 of Fishman’s (1991: 87–111) Graded Intergenerational Disruption Scale (GIDS). Since elders still speak the language with each other, middle-aged adults speak Kari’nja with elder parents, young adults understand but don’t speak the language, and very few children are addressed in the language, the gap between speakers exists between the middle-aged and young adult generations.

3 Background and Methodology

Data for this chapter were gathered primarily through open-ended ethnographic life-story interviews conducted jointly by myself and the former Konomerume village chief. My interviews were conducted in Sranantongo, and the chief conducted his in Kari’nja. Our work for this project fulfilled multiple purposes in the community. In addition to providing data on migration and language attitudes in Konomerume, recorded interviews represent part of the documentary corpus of Kari’nja. Further, interviews with community elders provided place names and descriptions of the boundaries of traditional hunting, fishing, and gathering areas. This information continues to be used as part of a greater effort to establish land rights for members of indigenous communities in Suriname. Interview data were supplemented with census figures from the 2004 census.

Since 2005, I have been working with members of the Konomerume community on documentation, description, preservation, and revitalisation of the Aretyry dialect of Kari’nja. Based on the Community Partnerships Model of social science field research (Yamada 2010), our work is collaborative and inclusive. Community member partners and I share the workload for any project we undertake together. For this project, community members conducted interviews and operated recording equipment, and have used text data in support of other projects.

Originally, I had planned to compare Kari’nja migration patterns across political and dialect borders. However, a dearth of cases made this untenable. None of the speakers interviewed in Konomerume knew of any cases of Kari’nja migrants to Guyana or Venezuela, and community members and I were able to identify only two individuals who had migrated to Tyrewuju-speaking
communities. One had met her future husband while attending intermediate school in Paramaribo and then migrated to his home community of Galibi, Suriname. The other moved to Maná, in French Guiana, for similar reasons.

I then decided to interview the largest group of migrants to Konomerume, those from the Guyanese community of Orealla, on the Suriname/Guyana border. However, interviews revealed patterns that applied to other migrants to the community. Furthermore, there were both similarities and differences in language practices, attitudes, and identity based on community of origin. Thus, I broadened focus to include mobilities among all migrants to Konomerume in terms of reasons and types of movement, differences in language practices, acceptance by community members with more established histories in Konomerume, and identity among different groups.

4 Types of Mobility

A goal for this project was to examine migration into Konomerume as it relates to language practice (who speaks which language to whom and why) and the extent to which migrants are integrated and accepted into the community. Indicators of community integration and acceptance are qualitative rather than quantitative. Evaluation of integration is based on self-reports, observed participation in community socio-cultural events, and the holding of leadership or decision-making positions in the community. Level of acceptance by other community members is based on self-reports and ethnographic interviews with community elders.

Texts of life story interviews revealed three primary types of mobility, each of which differs in terms of language practices, the migrants’ own identity, and their acceptance and integration within the community. Furthermore, each mobility type differs in terms of traditional migration parameters of space, time, motivation, and socio-cultural factors (Lewis 1982; Boyle et al. 1998). As defined by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 2010), migrants to Konomerume include guest workers, return migrants, and those with existing family ties in the community at the time of migration. Each of these is described in the sections that follow.

4.1 Guest Workers

Members of two different guest worker groups have settled in Konomerume. The first and most recent group is also the smallest. These are workers employed by the local lumber mill, Bromet Lumber. Located approximately an hour from Konomerume by dugout canoe, Brometville hosts guest labourers from Brazil as well as supervisors from other parts of Suriname. The Brazilian labourers
are typically temporary migrants who have come to Suriname for economic reasons. All are young adult males and many are supporting families back in Brazil. Most intend to return there. They often travel to Konomerume for recreation on the weekends and occasionally develop relationships with young women in the community. However, even those who have taken partners in the community are solidly outsiders. Few acquire more than the most elementary Sranantongo, and none are fluent in Dutch, Kari'nja, or Lokono. They commute between the community and the lumber mill and usually only come home to their partners in Konomerume on the weekends. Their partners speak to them in Sranantongo with some code switching to Dutch. They respond in rudimentary Sranantongo. These young men communicate with each other in Brazilian Portuguese and occasionally teach a few words of Portuguese to their partners. Although they attend weekend social events, they are viewed more as guests than as active participants. They rarely contribute to food or drink gathering and preparation, do not participate in cultural rituals, and rarely interact with community leaders or elders. They do not hold positions of leadership in the community and are not invited to community meetings. Their overall impact on language attitudes and practices in the community is minimal.6

In addition to Brazilian labourers, Bromet Lumber employs supervisors from other areas of Suriname (typically, from Paramaribo). Housed at Brometville, supervisors are longer-term residents than labourers. Most have completely relocated to Brometville, though some maintain second residences in Paramaribo. Two different supervisors from Brometville have taken partners in Konomerume. They are better integrated in the community than the temporary Brazilian labourers and are fluent in Dutch and Sranantongo. Neither claims indigenous heritage, but their status as Surinamese affords them a greater degree of acceptance in the community. One encourages his wife and in-laws to speak Kari'nja with his mixed-ethnicity children, and his wife has been actively involved with Kari'nja revitalisation. Although he lives at Brometville during the workweek, he has built a house in Konomerume where his wife and children reside (and to which he returns on weekends and holidays). He is a long-term resident of the community and supports community development by providing scrap lumber for community projects, running a small store, and hosting cultural events.

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6 Members of this group do have some economic impact on the community during the time they are in Suriname in that they occasionally contribute to individual families’ household expenses. However, there have been no identified cases of them having an impact on migration in that none has taken a partner back to Brazil. When they leave, they leave as they arrived: alone.
The second group of guest workers to arrive in Konomerume includes those who came from Guyana beginning in the 1960s. At the time, a project to build the southern East-West Highway from Apoera to Paramaribo drew guest labourers from Guyana who both worked to build the road as well as on barges transporting sand and/or lumber via the Nickerie, Wajambo, and Coppenname rivers to Paramaribo. They arrived in the country as guest workers and then took partners from and settled in Konomerume. Few have returned to Guyana since settling in Suriname. All of these migrants came to Suriname from Orealla, Guyana, an Amerindian community that lies across the border from Apoera along the Corantijn River. Some are originally from other parts of Guyana, but all came through Orealla as an intermediate stop.

Primarily of Warao or Lokono heritage, members of this group do not speak an indigenous language. All members of this group are middle-aged adults, an age group that has retained Kari'ňja in Konomerume. Since none of the Guyanese migrants speak an indigenous heritage language, indigenous language attrition likely happened earlier in parts of Guyana than in Suriname. All are native English speakers who acquired Sranantongo while working in Suriname. They speak Sranantongo with their families and amongst themselves, with some occasional code switching to English. Members of this group self-identify as outsiders, but most are well integrated in terms of participation in socio-cultural events. Although some hold formal positions of leadership in the community, other community members nonetheless identify them as outsiders. Their status as outsiders is evidenced by in-group descriptions of their social missteps. Drinking alcohol during social and cultural events is common and occasional drunkenness is generally accepted. However, if someone of Warao heritage behaves badly after drinking alcohol, it is not uncommon to hear, “Oh, you know how they are,” as though Warao are more likely than Kari’ňja to engage in inappropriate behaviour while drunk.

4.2 Return Migrants

Members of the young adult generation, return migrants include those who moved to Paramaribo for educational or economic opportunities and then returned to Konomerume. There is a K-6 elementary school in Konomerume, but students who are successful and want to continue their formal schooling must relocate to Paramaribo. This places a tremendous burden on families who must find safe, affordable housing in the capital as well as pay school fees. Living far from their immediate families in an unfamiliar environment, children who move to Paramaribo for school struggle to succeed. Families are often unable to shoulder the financial burden of supporting a child in the capital and many of them return to Konomerume after one or two years.
Some youth who are unable to continue their schooling leave school and find jobs in Paramaribo. Commonly, young men have gone to work for “the shrimp boats,” usually foreign-owned industrial trawl fisheries (FAO 2006). They spend months at sea (FAO 2000a), often working around the clock (FAO 2000b). Most young men who do this work are unable to sustain it for more than a couple of years, and many return to Konomerume.

Return migrants include youth who moved to Paramaribo to continue their formal schooling and were unable to continue for financial or other reasons. Members of this group may or may not have spent a period of time working in Paramaribo prior to returning to Konomerume. Some members of this group relocated to Paramaribo for financial reasons, taking menial jobs there, but found town life more challenging than life in Konomerume. Return migrants are native Sranantongo speakers who acquired Dutch at school. Many understand Kari’nja, but none speaks it natively. Since the revitalisation movement that has been underway in Konomerume for the past five years, many members of the return migrant group have been working to reclaim Kari’nja. They have led the push to include Kari’nja in the elementary school curriculum, and they form the bulk of young adult learners in the Kari’nja classes described in §5.2. As return migrants, they are well accepted and well integrated into the community. They have positive attitudes toward multilingualism, and are working to revitalise Kari’nja. Most speak Sranantongo amongst themselves and Dutch, Sranantongo, and some Kari’nja with their children.

4.3 Family Reunification

Although this group overlaps somewhat with the return migrant group, there are decided differences between the two groups in terms of age and motivation. Family reunification migrants are all members of the middle-aged and elder generations, and many were raised in other communities before migrating to Konomerume. As such, they did not “return” to their immediate families as return migrants have, rather they relocated to Konomerume in order to be nearer to extended family members. In some cases, these migrants are elders who have migrated to Konomerume to be nearer to their adult children (as opposed to return migrants who are children returning to their parents). Some have spent time living in Paramaribo before migrating to Konomerume. This group has proved the most interesting in terms of what it reveals about social correlates of linguistic dialect borders.

Members of this group come from several communities in Suriname including Cornelis Kondre, Tibiti, Goede Hoop, Pikin Saron, and Bigi Poika. All came to Konomerume because of family ties. Some came to visit extended family members and stayed; others came with the intention of relocating. Those
from Tibiti relocated to Konomerume in the late 1980s when the civil war in
Suriname (DeVries, 2005) caused their community to disband.

Migrants to Konomerume who came because of family ties are all Kari’ñja
speakers, and all took partners who were either Kari’ñja or of mixed Kari’ñja/
Lokono heritage. They have strongly positive attitudes toward Kari’ñja and con-
tinue to speak the language amongst themselves and to their adult children.
All have also acquired Sranantongo and some are marginally fluent in Dutch.
The communities from which they migrated are similar to Konomerume in
terms of ethnic and linguistic background of community members (all come
from other Kari’ñja communities to the east of Konomerume), level of Kari’ñja
endangerment in the community, and availability of formal schooling.

Interviews with members of this group revealed that they form two sub-
groups based on geographic region of origin. Members of the two subgroups
originate from either the Konomerume region or outside of the Konomerume
region. Migrants who come from communities along the Wajambo and
Coppename rivers (Cornelis Kondre, Tibiti, and Goede Hoop) form the “in-
region” group, and those from communities along the Saramacca river (Bigi
Poika, Pikin Saron) form the “out-region” group.

There is a lot of fluidity throughout the space that makes up the in-region
group of communities. There are strong family ties from one community to
another. Members of this subgroup in Konomerume are solidly insiders who
hold positions of influence and power. They are well-respected elders
who have a solid sense of place. In most cases, I would not have known they
were not originally from Konomerume if I had not asked.

Members of the out-region group are also ethnically Kari’ñja who are native
speakers of the language. Although they are also well integrated in the commu-
nity, they self-identify as outsiders, regardless of the length of time they have
resided in Konomerume. They rarely vote during community decision-making
meetings and will preface contributions to such meetings with comments like,
“l am not from here, so I really shouldn’t speak, but . . .” This particular quote
came from an out-region group member who had, at that time, lived in the
community for over 35 years, married a member of the in-region group, and
raised nine children in Konomerume. Other community members’ response
was to reassure him that he could, by now, be considered an in-region member
of the community. However, had he not prefaced his statement in such a self-
derecrating way, it is likely he would have faced grumbles of dissatisfaction
such as, “He’s not even from here! Why is he speaking up?”

For family reunification migrants, region of origin plays a greater role than
expected in integration and acceptance in the community. Kari’ñja heritage
does not guarantee community acceptance. Coming from the Wajambo/
Coppenname region seems to be a better predictor of a migrant's potential for full integration into and acceptance by the greater Konomerume community.

5 Dialect Tensions

As stated in §3, one of the original motivations for this chapter was the examination of mobility across dialect borders. The dearth of cases made such a study untenable. However, initial data gathering brought to light the issue of dialect tensions between Tyrewuju and Aretyry. It is possible that Kari’nja migrants have not crossed dialect borders because of the deep-seated acrimony between speakers of the two dialects represented in Suriname. In this section, I examine the tension between the two dialects and then describe a movement to revitalise the nonprestige variety.

5.1 Aretyry versus Tyrewuju

The deep and multi-faceted tension between the prestige Tyrewuju dialect and non-prestige Aretyry is evident in both outsiders’ perceptions and in Aretyry Kari’njas’ own intuitions. Both the Surinamese government and foreign nationals who travel to Suriname to conduct research tend to focus their energies on Tyrewuju. Although Aretyry Kari’nja participate in the Association of Indigenous Village Leaders in Suriname (henceforth, the vIDS), both formal and social positions of leadership and power within the organisation are predominantly maintained by Tyrewuju. The development of a Kari’nja math program for elementary school students (supported by the vIDS) was initially directed primarily at Tyrewuju children. Additionally, the most commonly used name for the Aretyry dialect, Murato, is considered pejorative by speakers. From “mulatto,” meaning ‘of mixed African descent,’ the term itself indicates that Aretyry is somehow a bastardised version of the more conservative Tyrewuju. This sense of Aretyry being somehow “less than” is widespread enough that even those who are purportedly linguistically savvy hold this bias.

The negative perceptions held by people in positions of power and influence in Suriname has led to a sort of inner turmoil for Aretyry speakers as well.

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7 It has since expanded in scope to be more inclusive and is being used in Konomerume.
8 It should be noted that this is an impression not supported by linguistic facts. In fact, Tyrewuju Kari’nja employs more innovative constructions than the more conservative Aretyry.
9 I have had personal interactions with two different university-schooled leaders who expressed a clear bias against Aretyry based solely on impressionistic accounts rather than on actual language data.
as semi- or non-speakers who self-identify as ethnically Kari’nja from Aretyry-speaking areas. On the one hand, they maintain that they have a right to speak and promote their own dialect of Kari’nja. Many have argued for the legitimacy of their variety of the language, and proudly proclaim themselves Aretyry—different from, but not inferior to, Tyrewuju. On the other hand, it is tremendously difficult not to fall victim to outsiders’ negative assertions about the dialect. There seems to be, for many Aretyry, an insecurity stemming from a deeply ingrained sense that Tyrewuju is somehow “better” than Aretyry. This is evident in Aretyry speakers’ fawning characterisations of Tyrewuju as “deeper” or “more real” than Aretyry. For example, one Aretyry speaker whose daughter moved to Galibi with her Tyrewuju partner once bragged to me that her grandchildren were being raised to speak “flawless, true Kari’nja,” as opposed to the presumably flawed version that she, herself, spoke.

Aretyry speakers’ reverence toward Tyrewuju as a prestige variety is tempered by a preference for hearing Aretyry. I have heard more than one Aretyry speaker mock Tyrewuju speakers for sounding “like babies.” This characterisation is due in part to the [l] ~ [r] alternation between the dialects (Aretyry has [r] where Tyrewuju has [l]). According to some Aretyry speakers, using an [l] where they would use an [r] represents an early stage in Kari’nja acquisition.

Despite Aretyry speakers’ insecurity in some cases, there is a strong and overarching pride in “Aretyryness,” manifest in the Konomerume revitalisation project described in the next section. Speakers and non-speakers alike were adamant that the variety to be preserved and revitalised in Konomerume be Aretyry. One of the leaders of the revitalisation movement told me that, in his opinion, Tyrewuju have plenty of resources to preserve their own variety of the language, and Aretyry deserves the same amount of focus and attention. “We are not from Galibi,” he said. “Why would we want to speak like them?” (F.M., personal communication).

5.2 Aretyry Revitalisation
Since 2005, Konomerume community members and I have been working to document, preserve, and revitalise the Aretyry dialect of Kari’nja. My role in revitalisation is that of consultant, trainer, and materials developer. At the request of community members, I have developed and delivered training workshops on principles of Kari’nja linguistics, language teaching methodology, curriculum planning, and materials development. I have also written grants that have provided technological resources for documentation and materials development. Community leaders now have the capacity to accomplish most such tasks on their own.

Interestingly, it is migrants in the Family Reunification and Return Migrant groups who have been both the strongest supporters and the most involved
participants in revitalisation. They have spearheaded most projects and seen to it that they come to fruition. Perhaps their greater exposure to Tyrewuju and experiences with discrimination while in Paramaribo have led members of these groups to be the strongest asserters of Aretyry identity. They tend to be the most vocal about the legitimacy of the dialect, and have been most willing to work toward its revitalisation. That is not to say that those who have not lived elsewhere and then migrated to Konomerume are unsupportive, but rather that those who have tended to be more proactive in their support are Aretyry in-migrants to Konomerume.

To date, we have developed pedagogical materials that include a multiple-language dictionary, several “Books on Tape” (interlinear glossed texts of spoken Kari’nja with accompanying CD recordings), a one-year introductory, elementary school-level Kari’nja curriculum with teaching activities and materials, and classroom decorations in the language. The village elementary school, overseen by the Roman Catholic church, allows teachers 30 minutes of “flex time” per day. It was decided two years ago that this time would be spent on Kari’nja. Teachers have used this time to pilot the curriculum and make changes, as well as to introduce the Kari’nja math curriculum developed in cooperation with the VIDS. In addition to the elementary school courses, there are classes available for adults. Taught by fluent native speakers of the middle-aged group, the classes are aimed primarily at young adults who have children enrolled in the elementary school. The goal is for parents and children to support each others’ learning. This system was developed in the hope that children and their parents could support each others’ Kari’nja learning and motivate a return to intergenerational communication in and transmission of the language (Fishman 1991).

From the outset, speakers were adamant that Aretyry be the variety documented and taught in Konomerume. As young adults have gained more experience and developed fluency in the language, they have become more passionate advocates for their own dialect. The pride of “Aretyrynness” has found its way to this younger generation. They are more confident in their status as Aretyry Kari’nja worthy of an identity independent of Tyrewuju, and they are less accepting of negative characterisations of their dialect and identity.

6 Dialect Variation

One of the motivations underlying the Aretyry revitalisation movement is the emerging understanding among community members that Aretyry is a conventionalised, rule-governed variety of Kari’nja that is just as worthy of revitalisation as the prestige Tyrewuju. A subgoal of my own research into
the language is to describe the patterns of Aretyry on their own merit in an attempt to understand the differences and similarities between the two varieties. Furthermore, I hope to continue to validate Aretyry’s status as a standard version of Kari’nja proper rather than some sort of bastardised “mulatto.”

One important facet of dialect variation is the treatment of borrowings. Aretyry and Tyrewuju treat loanwords slightly differently. An examination of these phenomena serves three primary purposes. First of all, it strengthens our descriptive understanding of the two dialects. Secondly, this knowledge may shed light on earlier migration patterns. Finally, an enriched awareness of the linguistic differences between Aretyry and Tyrewuju may also shed light on previously undescribed variation in the Kari’nja dialect continuum in Suriname and beyond.

Treatment of loanwords is by no means the only point of divergence between the two dialects. One expects to find variation in all linguistic systems: phonological, lexical, semantic, and syntactic. For the present study, borrowing phenomena provide an ideal starting point because they have been well described by Renault-Lescure (2009, Rose and Renault-Lescure 2008, Colomb and Renault-Lescure this volume) for Tyrewuju. Future research will examine additional aspects of variation.

6.1 Dialect Areas
Kari’nja communities in the Coppename/Wajambo (“in-region”) and Saramacca (“out-region”) areas have been described as forming part of the Aretyry dialect area (Courtz 2008; Hoff 1968), which is said to span from just west of Paramaribo to the Guyana border. The Kari’nja-speaking communities to the east of Paramaribo and into French Guiana are said to form the Tyrewuju dialect area. However, community members from the Coppename/Wajambo and Saramacca river regions note differences in their respective speech patterns. Those from Konomerume describe the variety spoken in the Saramacca region as “deeper” and “more Galibi-like” than that spoken in the Coppename/Wajambo region. Although both are purportedly part of the Aretyry-speaking area, initial sociological observations suggest that there may be a previously unidentified subdialect spoken in the Saramacca region.

Although a full dialect survey is outside the scope of this paper, work for this project revealed an interesting morphosyntactic difference between Aretyry and Tyrewuju Kari’nja. In §6.2, I examine loanword phenomena in Aretyry and Tyrewuju. Renault-Lescure (op. cit.) provides a description of the Tyrewuju system. My own recorded data of Aretyry form the basis for comparison. Future research will examine identified differences between the Aretyry and Tyrewuju
dialects, such as that described in §6.2, with a goal of identifying potential differences evidenced between the Kari'nja spoken in the Saramacca river region and that of the Coppename/Wajambo.

This line of inquiry into dialect borders is a direct outcropping of migration-focused research in Konomerume. That is, had Saramacca region Kari'nja speakers not migrated to Konomerume, speakers' impressions of their different speech patterns may not have come to light. Future research will seek to determine whether differences in loanword phenomena can aid in the description of the variety of Kari'nja spoken in the Saramacca region. Should that variety employ more Tyrewuju-like loanword morphosyntax, it may represent a separate link in the Tyrewuju-Aretry dialect chain. Interest in identifying this separate sub-dialect began with social evidence (speaker intuitions), and will be described based on linguistic evidence (loanword phenomena, among other structural facts). A possible intermediate dialect between Tyrewuju and Aretry is the subject of ongoing research and planned future published work.

6.2 Loanword Phenomena

Courtz (2008) notes differences in loan words in each of the four identified dialects of Kari'nja. According to Courtz (2008), this is due to different majority languages in each of the countries where Kari'nja is spoken: Spanish in Venezuela, English in Guyana, Dutch and Sranantongo in Suriname, and French in French Guiana. However, in addition to differences in borrowed lexical items, different mechanisms of borrowing may also play a role in distinguishing different dialects.

Code switching between Kari'nja and Sranantongo (and, to a lesser extent, Dutch) is not uncommon. This differs from borrowing in two fundamental ways. Borrowings tend to incorporate smaller units, typically single lexical items, while code switches tend to involve more complex phrase- or clause-level constructions. In addition, borrowings are more fully adapted to the Kari'nja system phonologically and morphologically. Code switches maintain the phonological shape and morphological inflection of their source. For example, the borrowings in (2) and (3) exhibit a change from Sranantongo [l] to [r] in Kari'nja. In addition, epenthetic vowels in both examples illustrate Kari'nja (not Sranantongo) phonotactic constraints.

Renault-Lescure (op. cit.) describes morphosyntactic loanword phenomena in the Tyrewuju dialect as spoken along the Suriname/French Guiana border. She identifies four mechanisms of borrowing: noun to noun, objects of postposition poko, suffix -me, and suffix -ma. In the sections that follow, I compare Renault-Lescure's description of the Tyrewuju mechanism to cognates in Aretry.
6.2.1 Noun to Noun

According to Renault-Lescure (Rose and Renault-Lescure 2008), nouns are borrowed directly into Kari’ni’ja as nouns, and may then be inflected with Kari’ni’ja nominal morphology. This is illustrated in (1).10

(1) 
zapato (Sp.) > Kari’ni’ja sapato ‘shoes’11
perro (Sp.) > Kari’ni’ja pelo ‘dog’ (op. cit.: 361)

For nouns, the Aretyry dialect has a similar process of borrowing. Nouns in the source language are borrowed as nouns into Kari’ni’ja, regardless of source language. Borrowed terms are subject to Kari’ni’ja phonotactic constraints and are altered to fit the Kari’ni’ja system. Once borrowed, nouns participate fully in Kari’ni’ja nominal constructions and take the full range of person-marking prefixes in conjunction with a suffix that marks a noun as possessed. This is illustrated in examples (2) and (3). In (2), parata, ‘money,’ is the object of the postposition, pokö, ‘occupied with,’ and in (3) lars, ‘boots’ is part of a possessed noun phrase construction, ‘your boots’.

(2) Parata12 pokö waty mang.
   money about NEG 3.COP
   ‘It’s not about money here.’ (FM-MA 00580)

(3) a-rarsy-ry13
   2-rubber.boots-pssd
   ‘your rubber boots’ (MCO2 00225)

6.2.2 Object of Postposition pokö

Source language verbs are borrowed into Tyrewuju Kari’ni’ja as nouns and are not further derived when so-borrowed. This is illustrated in (4).

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10 Examples from Renault-Lescure use the orthography and glosses from their source. All other examples use the practical orthography and glosses developed and used in Konomerume.


12 From Spanish plata ‘money’.

13 From Dutch laars ‘boots’.
The available Aretyry corpus does not include any similar examples of uninflected source language verbs in a pokö construction. In one case, a borrowed verb (derived with -ma, as described below) is the object of the postposition pokö, but it is part of a possessed noun phrase construction. The pokö construction may not be a productive borrowing mechanism in Aretyry.

6.2.3 Suffix -me
According to Renault-Lescure (2008), the predicative suffix -me in Tyrewuju is affixed to adjectives or terms that form nouns or verbs through zero derivation in the source language to form nouns in Kari’nja. Renault-Lescure compares the Kari’nja construction illustrated in (6) with the same construction with a borrowing from French, (7).

The cognate construction in Aretyry uses what I analyze as an attributive postposition me, as illustrated in (8). However, this construction represents a marginal case of borrowing and may, in fact, be an example of code switching. The purportedly borrowed terms do not conform to the phonological system in Kari’nja, whereas terms borrowed via other mechanisms typically undergo

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14 From Guianese Creole verb pentiré ‘paint’.
15 From Sranantongo seti ‘set’.
16 Cf. note 1 regarding orthographic conventions and phonological processes.
17 From French adjective pur ‘pure’.
some sort of phonetic modification to better conform to the Kari’nja system. Although -me represents a common pathway to borrowing in the family, the available Aretyry examples all include non-Kari’nja phonology in the object of the postposition. Example (8) includes a voiceless consonant cluster /st/ not normally found in Kari’nja.

(8) ...\textit{bestuur}\textsuperscript{18} me\textsuperscript{\textprime} jako...

\begin{verbatim}
bestuur   me  w-e’i  jako
leadership  ATTR  IS-COP  when
\end{verbatim}

‘When I was in the leadership...’ (MCO2 00009)

6.2.4 Suffix -ma

Finally, Renault-Lescure (Rose and Renault-Lescure 2008: 362–364) describes the process for borrowing verbs in the Tyrewuju dialect. The primary mechanism for borrowing verbs into the Tyrewuju dialect is via the verbalising suffix -ma. This process is employed to borrow terms in the source language that may be interpreted as either nouns or verbs depending on context (with zero derivation from one word class to the other in the source language). All -ma borrowings to Tyrewuju were ambiguous in the source language and could be interpreted as either nouns or verbs. Tyrewuju Kari’nja borrows the terms as nouns and derives verbs with -ma, as illustrated in example (9).

(9) tamusi \textit{si-begi}\textsuperscript{19} -ma-e

\begin{verbatim}
tamusi  si-begi\textsuperscript{\textprime} -ma-e
God  1A-prayer-verb-pres
\end{verbatim}

‘I pray God.’ (Rose and Renault-Lescure 2008: 362)

Initial evidence suggests that a similar borrowing mechanism in the Aretyry dialect works in a more liberal manner. Although a cognate verbalising morpheme -ma also provides a pathway in Aretyry, both nouns and verbs from the source language may be so-borrowed. In the Tyrewuju situation, all of the verbs so derived could be interpreted as either nouns or verbs in the source language. Since the verbaliser -ma in Kari’nja derives verbs from nouns, Renault-Lescure analyses the borrowings as having been borrowed as nouns from the source language and suffixed with Kari’nja -ma to form Kari’nja verbs. While this analysis works for Tyrewuju, it appears that the mechanism operates slightly differently in Aretyry.

\textsuperscript{18} From Dutch \textit{bestuur} ‘administration’.

\textsuperscript{19} From Sranantongo \textit{begi} ‘prayer/pray’.
In the Aretyry dialect, source language nouns and verbs are both suffixed with Kari'nja -ma to form Kari'nja verbs. Although some tokens are of the variety found in Tyrewuju—that is, those where context defines whether they are nouns or verbs in the source language—there are others that cannot be interpreted as belonging to any other word class than verb in the source language. Like example (9) for Tyrewuju, begi in example (10) could be interpreted as either a noun or a verb in Sranantongo. Example (11), too, illustrates a borrowing that is ambiguous in the source language. In these two cases, Aretyry appears to behave exactly as Tyrewuju does.

(10) moro te’ne tamushi shibégimaje jumy.
    moro te’ne tamushi si-bégí-ma-e jumy
    that actually god 1a3o-pray-vzr-prs.tns intns
    ‘That’s why I pray to god a lot.’ (UrMaHeAl 00046)

(11) waijo maro kynishotumanon.
    waijo maro kyni-sotu²⁰-ma-non
    salt with 3a3o-salt-vzr-prs.tns
    ‘She salts it with salt.’ (FF MaAl 00073)

Although (10) and (11) represent examples that are similar to Tyrewuju, the examples that follow are somewhat different. That is, the borrowed terms in examples (12) to (15) are unambiguously verbs in the source language. The borrowed term in (16) is either a verb or an adjective (zero-derived) in the source language. Verbs are borrowed as verbs into Aretyry Kari’nja and then “Kari’nja-ised” with the verbalising suffix -ma. Furthermore, borrowings are also subject to phonological and phonotactic constraints of Kari’nja (as can be observed in example (15) with an epenthetic vowel [y] before the suffix -ma). The suffix -ma represents a less restricted pathway in Aretyry than that observed in Tyrewuju.

(12) Kynishetimjanon wo’to apoítjo’me.
    kyni-seti-ma-non wo’to apoî-to’me
    3a3o-set-vzr-prs.tns fish catch-purp
    ‘He sets it in order to catch fish.’ (FF MaAl 00006)

²⁰ From Sranantongo sowtu ‘salt/to salt’.
²¹ Prosody indicates that this is not the nominalising suffix -ry. An affix would have caused a shift in stress not present in this example.
Example (11) is an interesting case because in the postpositional phrase *waijo maro*, the speaker uses the non-borrowed noun *waijo* ‘salt.’ However, in the verb phrase, the speaker employs borrowed *sowtu*, which may be interpreted as either a noun or a verb in Sranantongo. This suggests that in the Aretyry
dial ect, verbs from the source language are borrowed as verbs and derived into Kari’nja verbs with -ma. This hypothesis is further supported by examples (13) through (15) which cannot be interpreted as anything other than verbs in the source language.

The Aretyry case may represent an extension of the pathway found in Tyrewuju via analogy. That is, the process that allowed Tyrewuju to borrow nouns from the source language and derive them into Kari’nja verbs was extended to all borrowed verbs in the Aretyry dialect. In the Aretyry dialect, nouns, adjectives, and verbs from the source language are borrowed and derived into Kari’nja verbs with -ma.

Future research will examine loanword phenomena in the Saramacca region in order to confirm speaker intuitions that Saramacca region Kari’nja differs from both Aretyry and Tyrewuju. Additional Aretyry systems will be compared with both Tyrewuju and the Kari’nja spoken in the Saramacca region. In addition to the loanword phenomena described here, prosodic, morphosyntactic, and semantic features of non-verbal predication will be examined. Yamada (2010) describes the Aretyry system, and Alby and Renault-Lescure (2012) describe that employed in Tyrewuju. Future research will compare the two systems with each other as well as with Saramacca river region Kari’nja.

7 Conclusions

Homogeneity is often assumed of small indigenous communities (Morrill 2008). Outsiders believe members of small interior communities all think, speak, and react alike and share a single indigenous identity. As the Konomerume case demonstrates, even a small, relatively stable community is not without complexity. People migrate from one community to another for economic and/or educational reasons and their mobility has effects on members of the host community in terms of language practice, language attitudes, integration, and identity. These effects are in addition to the impact of migration on migrants themselves. In the Konomerume case, residence in Paramaribo prior to settling in Konomerume correlates with an expanded pride in and identification as Aretyry. This is, perhaps, a reaction to discrimination against this non-prestige variety of Kari’nja.

This chapter presents initial case-study evidence in favor of a previously undescribed dialect area. Members of the middle-aged and elder native speaker generations, Family Reunification migrants to Konomerume form two distinct subgroups. In-region migrants from Kari’nja villages along the Wajambo and Coppename rivers are fully integrated and completely accepted
by other members of the community. Migrants from Kari’nja communities along the Saramacca River form the out-region group. Although they are well integrated and well accepted, they are nonetheless considered outsiders to the community and are subject to particular social rules. They are invited to participate fully in the community with the caveat that they acknowledge their outsider status when participating in community decision-making. Both in-region migrants and established Konomerume residents note that out-region migrants speak a different variety of Aretyry Kari’nja. These social impressions may or may not be borne out by linguistic facts, but will be the subject of future research. This research will begin with an examination of loanword phenomena before progressing to other markers of dialectal difference in an attempt to paint a richer picture of the similarities and differences between all varieties of Kari’nja spoken in Suriname.
CHAPTER 7

Maroons and the Communications Revolution in Suriname’s Interior

Alex van Stipriaan

1 Introduction

From the first until the last day of slavery, enslaved people liberated themselves by escaping from the plantation colony and setting up new, independent communities. These escapees, who came to be called Maroons, settled in the tropical rain forest of Suriname’s interior, far away from the seat of colonial power in Paramaribo. Yet they stayed tied to the colonial economy in several ways. The general impression people have is that Maroons lived in total isolation in Suriname’s interior until quite recently, about one or two generations ago, but this must now be largely discounted as a myth. This is certainly true in the case of Maroon men.1 Women, on the other hand, remained comparatively isolated until quite recently as gender-based labour division and traditional notions of womanhood mostly linked women to the domestic sphere and the village context.

This chapter examines the extent to which contact with the outside world formed part of the Maroons’ existence, and how contact has influenced Maroon lifestyles throughout history.2 Crucially, I explore how Maroons’ adoption of new communication technologies is impacting patterns of communication with the wider world and among the Maroons themselves. This contribution does not simply deal with how objects are being adopted by subjects, rather it focuses on what happens to people and their context when they use new technologies and also how new technologies are transformed due to their use in specific social contexts. In their study of the impact of the cell phone in Jamaica, Horst and Miller (2007) call this the “communicative ecology”, that is, the wider sphere which is influenced by new technologies. They emphasise the fact that a cell phone can save one’s life because it is possible to call immediately for a car or ambulance to bring a sick person to the hospital.

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1 See Van Stipriaan (2011) on which this chapter is based.
2 The outside world here means outside of Suriname’s interior, therefore, contacts with Amerindians will not be discussed here.
Cell phones also provide the opportunity to almost simultaneously mobilise a transnational network of relatives to help pay the hospital bill.

Another important observation is that when people adopt new technology or new media “[they are] used initially with references to desires that are historically well established, but remain unfulfilled because of the limitations of previous technologies” (Horst and Miller 2007: 7). Recent developments among Maroons who live in Suriname’s interior seem to confirm this. However, the pace at which changes have occurred, and the subsequent consequences, differ. The coming together of a number of new technologies almost at the same time and the resulting explosion of communication was quite revolutionary. In order to properly understand the impact of contact and especially the role of new technologies in the changes that took place in communication patterns among Maroon villagers residing in the interior of Suriname, I discuss them with respect to distinct historical periods. I distinguish three principal historical periods of communication based on differences in degrees of intensity of contact and intensity of change in patterns of communication. The relevant periods are: (1) Diplomatic and economic communication with the city, 1760–1890, (2) Acceleration of communication and transport, 1890–1960, and (3) Transport and communication revolution, 1960-present. The posited periods also involved demographic and geographic changes as illustrated in Tables 7.1 and 7.2.

Not much is known about demographic growth of Maroons before the twentieth century. Obviously, marronage from slavery was the main growth factor before 1863, the year of slave emancipation. Since then natural growth was constantly increasing due to more stable circumstances as well as, eventually, improved health care. Today population increase of the Surinamese population is just over one per cent yearly, whereas that of Maroons is three to four times as high, as a consequence of high birth rates (Census 2004). Table 7.2 shows how, despite high natural growth the population in the traditional Maroon territories is decreasing, due to out-migration. Two thirds of all Maroons now live outside their former territory, a majority among them even outside Suriname.

Obviously, mobility was a crucial factor in Maroon history. Mobility was involved in their ancestors’ enslavement in Africa and their enforced transportation across the Atlantic to Suriname. In Suriname, sooner or later they escaped from slavery and settled outside of the plantation area in the tropical rain forest in (temporary) camps and villages. The period and direction of their flight from the plantations eventually turned out to be a decisive factor in the formation of the six different Maroon groups. The first groups that escaped

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3 In this article, revolution(ary) should be conceived of more as a process involving definite change rather than as a sudden event, as, for instance, the Industrial Revolution.
### Table 7.1  Number of Maroons in Suriname 1680–2004 (incl. Paramaribo)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Ndyuka</th>
<th>Aluku</th>
<th>Pamaka</th>
<th>Saamaka</th>
<th>Matawai</th>
<th>Kwinti</th>
<th>Total*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>c. 1760</td>
<td>c. 5,000</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1863</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. 1900</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>7,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>14,600</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>1,650</td>
<td>8,900</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>27,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>32,000</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2,800</td>
<td>32,000</td>
<td>3,900</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>72,600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* If the total number is higher than the sum of the six Maroon groups it includes a category ‘unknown’.

Sources: Price (2002); Dragtenstein (2002); census (1964 and 2004); Koloniaal Verslag (1863); Teenstra (1842).4

### Table 7.2  Number of Maroons outside traditional territories5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Traditional Territory</th>
<th>Greater Paramaribo</th>
<th>French Guiana</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>Total Maroons outside trad. terr.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>c. 1990</td>
<td>c. 40,000</td>
<td>c. 15,000</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>c. 5,000</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>39,700</td>
<td>32,900</td>
<td>c. 40,000</td>
<td>c. 10,000</td>
<td>c. 122,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on: de Bruijne (2007); Price (2002); census (2004).

To the east gave rise to the Ndyuka or Okanisi (see Thoden van Velsen and Hoogbergen 2011) who settled along the Marowijne and Tapanahoni rivers. Those who chose a more southerly direction eventually became the Saamaka (see Price 1983) who settled along the Suriname River and, in the case of their offshoot, the Matawai, along the Saramaca River. In order to stop guerilla attacks on the plantations the colonial authorities felt pressed to settle peace

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4 Note that the total population of Suriname in 1863 was ca. 60,000; in 1964: 324,000; in 2004: 493,000.

5 Note that today a considerable group of at least several hundreds up to possibly even a few thousand Maroons also live in France (Thomas Polimé and Bettina Migge pers. comm.).
with these three groups at different times during the 1760s. The other three communities, the Aluku in the southeast, who since the 1960s have mainly taken up residence along the Lawa river in eastern French Guiana, the Pamaka who settled along the middle reaches of the Marowijne River in the east, and the Kwinti who reside in the Matawai territory came into being somewhat later.6 During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, mobility increased due to population growth, the scarcity of natural resources in the traditional territories, and the emergence of new opportunities for making a living. As a result, new Maroon villages came to be established somewhat closer to the colonial economy than before, as in the case of the Ndyuka villages that emerged along the Cottica River from the nineteenth century onwards. Another more traumatic form of mobility involved the disbanding of some villages due to religious differences, a phenomenon that increased in the course of the twentieth century. Some Saamaka villages, such as Botopasi, split up because part of the population was christened over time while the other part continued to adhere to their own religion. The split in Botopasi, for example, led to the founding of Pikinse very close by. Mobility in itself was thus not a new phenomenon among Maroons since it has always been one of their survival strategies. Indeed, as will be shown in this chapter, the communication revolution, which was to a certain extent also a transport revolution, was part and parcel of the exponential increase in mobility since the mid-twentieth century (Table 7.2). However, already long before that time there was substantial temporary mobility between Maroon territories and the colony.

In Section 2, I deal with the first period, followed by accelerated communication due to gold mining activities and the construction of the railway line in Section 3. In Section 4, I look at the vast technological changes that have taken place in the most recent period and have impacted the lives of the Maroons, followed by some conclusions in Section 5.

2 Diplomatic and Economic Communication with the City (1760–1890)

As stated above, Maroon societies came into being when enslaved Africans who worked the Surinamese plantations liberated themselves, and settled in the interior. However, from the relative protection of that forested hinterland,

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6 The Ndyuka are also called Aucaners or Okanisi; Saamaka are also known as Saramaka (Saramaccans), and Aluku are often called Boni, after their famous eighteenth-century leader.
they launched raids on the plantations. Apart from liberating other enslaved from plantations and augmenting their numbers, these attacks were also vital for the Maroons. Firstly, to ensure they had enough women, and no less importantly, to obtain tools they needed to survive. Being aware of the latter need, the colonial authorities agreed to pay an ostensibly humiliating tribute to the Maroons in the form of tools. This agreement was anchored in the peace treaties set up with the Ndyuka, Saamaka and Matawai. These tools were evidently required in large amounts, since the first delivery sent to the Ndyuka in 1761—a journey of twenty days each way—required no fewer than 265 slaves to carry the tribute (de Groot 1997: 190). After the peace treaty in 1762, the Saamaka received 3,750 axes, hewers, machetes, hackers and ordinary knives, 78 rifles, 15 barrels of gunpowder, 750 gross of shot, 150 razors, 150 scissors, 156 chisels and drills, 1,500 sewing needles, cotton, thread, salt, oil, medical instruments and combs (de Beet and Price 1982: 203–204).

The tribute payments from the colonial authority made further raids unnecessary and created a certain dependency relationship between the Maroons and the colonial economy. More important still in terms of Maroons’ contact with the colonial society was the vibrant trade that the Maroons themselves initiated in the late eighteenth century. Silvia de Groot (1963: 48) estimated that by around 1850, the Ndyuka exported goods worth around 36,000 guilders a year and imported around 15,000 guilders worth of dram, sweets and (cooking) bananas. The profit was spent on consumer items in Paramaribo.

It was around the mid-nineteenth century that Herrnhutter missionaries reached the Saamaka. While they did manage to convert some Saamaka to Christianity (see Lenders 1996), most attempts at religious conversion initially failed. It was not until the twentieth century, when missionary efforts in the interior intensified and education became part of their evangelising activities, that Catholic and Protestant missionaries gradually succeeded in converting more Maroons. Despite low levels of conversion in the initial period, missionaries nevertheless increasingly provided a link between the Maroon world and the colony.

While slavery continued, Maroons were forbidden to settle near the plantations. They were, however, allowed to come to Paramaribo. Maroons have, therefore, had a presence in Paramaribo since the first days after the signing of the peace treaty of 1760. Sometimes no more than just a few Maroons, often between 30 and 50, were present in Paramaribo. Some were so-called ostagiers, sons of leading Maroons who stayed as political hostages in the colonial capital to guarantee peace. One of them, a Ndyuka named Jeboa, was even sent to the Netherlands in 1667 “to be able to see there the greatness of the whites” (Vrij 2007: 25). Besides such hostages, Maroon delegations were constantly
coming and going. During the first year of the peace treaty no fewer than seven such delegations, totalling some ninety men, came to the city. Three of these delegations came to hand over 27 newly escaped plantation slaves, for which they received a bonus payment, so-called *vanggeld* ‘catch money’, that is, payment for capturing escaped slaves. This suggests that from the beginning there was also an economic or financial incentive to go to the city.

Of course, Maroon leaders were not always very eager to hand over new fugitives from slavery, and this was often the cause of intense and drawn-out negotiations and conflicts between Maroon leaders and the colonial authorities. Nevertheless, extradition was by no means exceptional, be it sometimes under coercion. For instance, in 1834 sixteen Saamaka, including two leaders, were arrested in order to force the Saamaka to hand over the ‘notorious gang leader’ Pasop (from Dutch *pas op* ‘watch out!’) along with eight of his men.\(^7\) Despite severe discord among the Saamaka, they eventually handed over Pasop and his men and received a bonus payment in return. The same year a Ndyuka “patrol of 46 Bush Negroes” in the Marowijne region chased a group of nine fugitive plantation slaves. Five were killed, four handed over, and a bonus payment of 900 guilders was paid. Moreover, the Ndyuka *Gaannman* ‘paramount chief’ and the leader of the Maroon patrol, major Guiany, each received an extra fifty guilders “for their cooperation and good will”. Not much later a group of Maroons who had settled along the Sara Creek chased the escaped slave population from the timber estate Victoria back to their plantation and received 800 guilders in bonus payment. Thus, that year alone a few thousand guilders that were earned from capturing enslaved flowed to Maroons in villages in the interior.

Apart from these, more or less diplomatic contacts involving an economic impact, there were also Maroon ‘refugees’ in Paramaribo. These were people who had committed some crime or evil in their home territory and who had taken refuge in the colony. Others came to the city and stayed for longer periods to trade or to work for money. That this sort of contact could be complex and even paradoxical is shown by the fact that in 1781, with the outbreak of the fourth Anglo-Dutch War, some fifty Maroons, Ndyuka as well as Saamaka living in or around Paramaribo, applied to the governor to fight against the British. Forty-six of them were hired, supplied with weapons, and, for the usual pay, were stationed as soldiers at Fort New Amsterdam which was strategically positioned at the mouth of the Suriname and Commewijne rivers (Vrij 2007: 33). This also illustrates, by the way, how well Maroons were informed

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\(^7\) Examples taken from Den Haag, Nationaal Archief, Gouverneursjournaals, Gouverneur Generaal der W-I Bezittingen, 1828–1845 (1.05.08).
about the (international) political situation. After 1830, some of the Ndyuka clans moved to the east of the plantations, near the Cottica River. From there, they supplied the colony with timber. Thoden van Velzen (2003: 22) estimates that in the mid-nineteenth century half of the male population of the Ndyuka were involved in the colonial economy, mainly in the lumber trade. De Groot (1963: 48) estimated that around 1,200 Ndyuka visited the colony each year in this period.

Lumber remained crucial even after the abolition of slavery and the Maroon monopoly continued to grow, mainly because the so-called timber plantations, where wood had been worked on a commercial basis, practically disappeared after 1863. While the lumber trade was officially subject to regulation, in practice Maroons were left to their own devices. It is not hard to imagine that since that time Maroon timber production increased and, consequentially, interaction with the colonial economy and influx of consumer goods as well. However, it was not until 1919 that the government determined that south of the east-west line crossing the first river rapids, the lumber trade was free;8 north of this line the Maroons had to pay compensation (see Scholtens 1994: 57–58, 182).

The discussion above suggests that Maroons were in regular contact with the city from the 1760s onwards, enabling them to acquire products from there for their everyday needs. It was with some surprise that expedition leader A.J. van Stockum noted in 1905 in Maripaston, some 50 kilometers southeast of Paramaribo, that “Communication with the city […] is easy here, and that is certainly why all the household utensils, crockery etc. consist of things made in Europe” (quoted in Luijt 2008: 47). For most Maroons, however, communication with the city was mainly a one-way affair involving Maroon men going to the colony and coming home with colonial goods. The general impact of these contacts must have been rather superficial until the end of the nineteenth century. Only a few missionaries and so-called postholders (representatives of the colonial government who had to see to it that the Maroons did not harm any colonial interests) who lived among the Maroons, could exert some influence, but due to their small numbers and their overall lack of clout, their impact was not substantial.9 One-way contacts were not simply confined to trade relations,

8 This was the informal border where military checkpoints had been positioned and where until 1863 Maroons had to report if they wanted to go to the city.
9 The mere existence of this institution of postholders, actually ambassadors of a kind, in combination with the peace treaties that were renewed several times, meant a de facto recognition by the colonial state of the political and territorial autonomy of Maroon societies. And this is exactly what later governments of Suriname, to the present day, have been trying to undo, thus, it has often been subject to bitter disputes.
but also involved diplomatic ties that existed between the traditional Maroon hierarchy and the colonial regime. In the early twentieth century, Paramaribo began trying to exert more control over the interior, with a particular eye to exploiting the raw materials that are found in Maroon territory. One way of achieving this was to pay granmans a salary and to summon them to the city at regular intervals. When Gaanman Amakti went to Paramaribo in 1916 to swear an oath of loyalty to the Dutch queen, he was accompanied by an entourage of no fewer than forty people (van Lier 1919: 63).

3 Accelerating Communications and Transport (1880–1960)

At the end of the nineteenth century, relations between Maroons and the outside world changed following the discovery of gold in the interior of Suriname. Since the colony’s early days, stories had circulated that Suriname’s soil contained gold and over time several attempts had been made to verify this. When gold was found in exploitable amounts in neighbouring French Guiana in the mid-nineteenth century, the search also began in Suriname (see also de Theije, this volume). Dozens of expeditions were organised to look for mineral resources and to map Suriname. These large-scale expeditions which continued to explore the country until well into the twentieth century led to more intensified contact between Maroons and urban society. Expeditions were headed by Europeans and escorted by about a dozen European military personnel as well as a team of around twenty freight bearers and other miscellaneous personnel recruited from among the colony’s population. However, it was Maroons who generally took care of inland transport and served as guides (see Wentholt 2003; van Stipriaan 2009a).

Gold was indeed discovered and by 1875 concessions for over 52,000 hectares had been issued to nine prospectors. By 1877, almost 300 kg of gold had been mined, rising to around 1,000 kg annually after the turn of the century (Benjamins and Snelleman 1914–17: 310–320; see also Hoogbergen et al. 2001). Soon after, another boom product emerged in the interior: balata, or natural rubber, tapped from the bolletrie that grows in the wild. In 1885, slightly over a ton was exported and this rose to more than 1,100 tons in 1911 (Benjamins and Snelleman 1914–17: 67–73).

All these economic activities were enormously labour-intensive and again it was the Maroons who guided the way, provided the transport, and were part of the work force. Around the turn of the century, between one and two thousand labourers were employed as balata bleeders, as they were known, and in the peak years, between 1910 and 1915 this number rose to as many as 5,000 to 7,000.
In that same period, between 4,500 and 5,500 people also worked in the gold fields (Heilbron and Willemsen 1980: 1: 101 and 11: 84). Most of these were from the city, while some had come from abroad. At the same time, however, considerable numbers of Maroons were also increasingly participating in these activities. For instance, when the balata boom collapsed in 1931 and the **Balata Compagnie** closed down, 309 of the approximately one thousand workers who were made redundant were Maroons (Scholtens 1994: 94).

However, considerably more Maroons found employment in cargo shipping on the Marowijne river, as their skills and expertise gave them a complete monopoly. Cargo shipping reached its peak between 1890 and 1920 during the boom years of gold and balata production. Much of this activity took place in eastern Suriname and neighboring French Guiana and mainly involved Ndyuka, Pamaka and Aluku Maroons as well as a large number of Saamaka.\(^{10}\) Maroons were able to earn significant sums of money. It is estimated that on average, a **bagasiman** ‘shipper’ earned about four guilders a day, with an average annual income in the years 1880–1920 of between 1,800 and 2,500 guilders, a considerable sum in those days (Samuels 1944: 60; Thoden van Velzen 2003: 25).\(^{11}\)

Cargo transport also contributed significantly to the penetration of the money economy into Maroon society due to the large numbers of people who directly or indirectly benefited from the money earned through this trade. Scholtens (1994: 62) estimated that between 1,000 and 2,500 cargo shipments were carried out per year involving at least two or three Maroons working on each boatload. This means that hundreds of Maroon households—probably even more, since many men had more than one wife—benefited from the shipping industry.\(^{12}\) This work did not only involve constant contact with the urban population, but it also benefited the colonial economy since most of the money was spent on products from the city because the internal economy among the Maroons was still principally based on barter. This claim is supported by an interesting description recorded by Samuels from the turn of the century. According to this description, Maroons earning on average 1,800 guilders, purchased the following kinds of goods: eight painted drums and/or varnished chests full of hammocks, curtains (to protect against bats) and several hundred pangis ‘cloths’; two rifles (breechloaders) with attributes; 400 kg salt; ten cases of kerosene oil; 40 liters of rum; five cases of soap, three barrels of

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\(^{10}\) Around 1920, there were already approximately 2,000 Saamaka in French Guiana, mainly attracted by the growing cargo trade (Scholtens 1994: 81).

\(^{11}\) In the city, a craftsman earned between one and two and a half guilders a day, a contract worker on a plantation might only earn 60 to 80 cents a day (Scholtens 1994: 62).

\(^{12}\) Scholtens (1994: 89) estimates the total number of Maroons in 1945 at 19,000.
biscuit, a barrel of flour, a barrel of bacon, a barrel of salted meat; pots, pans, plates, bowls, glasses; chairs, tables, a lamp, and amusements such as a clock or music box (Samuels 1944: 60).

Transport was fundamentally transformed in the early twentieth century. In order to make the goldmines more accessible, it was decided to lay a railway line to the Lawa, extending for some 220 km. Between 1903 and 1912, 173 kilometres of tracks were laid from Paramaribo via Koffie Djombo (renamed Lelydorp in 1908), Republiek in the Para district, and Kwakugron on the Saramacca to Kabel on the Upper Suriname. At Kabel, people and goods crossed the river by cable—the cable, spanning 300 metres and capable of carrying 6,350 kg, brought people and goods in a cabin gliding along it, across the river to the train waiting on the other side. The second track ran via Kadjoe to Dam on the Sara Creek. The plan had been to continue the tracks another 50 km to the Lawa region where most of the gold was mined, but this section was never built due to the costs involved. The cost of the track that was built had already amounted to almost nine million guilders, a substantial sum considering that at the height of mining, only around a million guilders worth of gold was being mined each year. Meanwhile, hundreds, perhaps as many as 800 to a thousand workers had been employed in the construction of the railway. Most workers were brought in from outside, yet many Maroons also found employment here too (Van der Veen 1992: 16–19).

With a rail line linking the Upper Suriname region with the coast, movement between the interior and the city became theoretically much easier, particularly for some of the Maroons of central Suriname. Apart from the daily trains to Onverwacht in Para, a train went twice a week to Gros (102.6 km from Paramaribo) and another to Kabel station. A connecting train stood ready on the opposite bank of the Suriname River bound for Dam. Including a wait of between an hour and ninety minutes to cross the river, the journey from Paramaribo to Dam, which used to take twenty days, now took 10½ to 11 hours (Van der Veen 1992: 16–19). Yet not everybody was able to profit from the railway line as the train was expensive. In the 1930s, a single ticket from Kabel to Paramaribo cost ten guilders (Spalburg 2005: 171). In fact the train was not intended for Maroons, but for freight and for people from the coast involved in raw material extraction in the interior. After the gold and balata booms collapsed the train was used to transport agricultural produce and the section between Dam and Kabel was abandoned. Maroons would ride the trains, as Hermanus Adams of Botopasi (born in 1926) recalls, however noting that despite the train to Kabel, the journey from the city to Botopasi still took on average seven days (Corinde 2010: 46).
In this period, Maroons who went to the city only did so about once a year, generally by korjaal ‘dug-out canoe’ to buy produce such as oil, tools, clothes and household utensils. Most would stay for one or two weeks at most, if they had a place to stay, as was required. Some stayed with relatives or friends, others hired ramshackled former slave shacks, and later on the authorities provided a poor shelter for Maroons in (Nyu) Combé, located not far from the main market place (cf. Van Stipriaan 2009b: 148–149). Not all Maroons went to town to trade, however, some also went to find temporary work, or to continue their education. Moreover, the city was not the only place that Maroons migrated to. In a pattern repeated throughout Surinamese history, the decline of the gold and balata sectors in the second quarter of the twentieth century was soon compensated by the rise of a new booming natural resource, bauxite, used for the production of aluminium (see Van Stipriaan 2009b and c; Bruijning and Voorhoeve 1977: 44–50). Bauxite had already been found in Suriname around 1900, and the first shipments of ore from Moengo on the Cottica River took place in 1922. Moengo was then a deserted Ndyuka Maroon village and the region was very much in the interior. At that time, there was no road to Paramaribo and all transport was by river. The village quickly grew into a mining town with a couple of thousand inhabitants who were all directly or indirectly working for the bauxite industry. A large number of (Ndyuka) Maroons figured prominently in the workforce. In 1940, Billiton began mining bauxite between the Suriname River and the Para Creek near the old Onverdacht plantation. At first, this did not involve many Maroons, but it brought industrialisation closer to the Saamaka region. Nevertheless, despite the train, Maroons continued to use traditional modes of transport such as korjaal or rafts of timber logs for sale to travel to the city. This economically driven contact with the city and other population groups invariably involved only men. Women, by contrast, remained in the villages, and were the main beneficiaries and consumers of the goods bought with Maroon men’s earnings. It was also women who adapted urban products for domestic and social use.

Transport and Communications Revolution: 1960–Present

Major developments between 1940 and 1960 brought massive changes to the Maroons of Suriname’s interior. During World War II, the crucial importance of bauxite for the aircraft industry brought Suriname into closer contact with the global economy. An international airport was built in the district of Para. At the same time, not far away, an enormous bauxite processing plant was built
at Paranam, enabling Suriname to export semi-finished products. Plans were also made for the construction of factories to manufacture the end product itself, aluminum. At the time, the only problem that hampered these plans was the lack of a substantial energy supply. In order to overcome this difficulty, the so-called Brokopondo agreement was signed in 1958 between the colonial government and Suralco, the Surinamese subsidiary of the American multinational Alcoa, Suriname’s largest bauxite producer. This led to the construction of a dam in the Suriname River for the production of hydro-electric energy.

Building the dam involved flooding an area that contained twenty-seven Maroon villages, mainly inhabited by Saamaka, and thus around 5,000 to 6,000 people, who had not been given a vote in the matter, were displaced. Between 1964 and 1965, most of these Maroons migrated to new villages, known as transmigration villages, situated north of the dam and thus nearer to Paramaribo. Only a minority of the displaced people preferred to resettle further south, in the traditional Saamaka region. A contemporary remarked “We didn’t want to go there, because we would become dependent on the city” (Anema 2006: 35–36; my translation). This is precisely what eventually happened since there were few economic opportunities in the transmigration villages and the city was indeed near, accessible via a direct road from the dam at Afobaka. Ironically, the construction of the dam had for a while provided many Maroons with paid employment.

For those who relocated to the south, the city seemed to be quite far away. In addition to the huge new lake of around 1,600 km², which was too dangerous to cross in a dug-out canoe, the dam itself blocked the river route to the city, so that boats and, equally importantly, rafts of timber that were to be sold could no longer be floated down in the traditional way. At the same time, however, an infrastructure began to form linking more and more of the interior with the urban economy.

In 1959, Operation Grasshopper was launched, creating seven small airstrips to facilitate access to the interior for geographic and economic expeditions whose aim was to map the country and to chart its natural resources. The possibilities and ease of air travel to the interior were immediately obvious. More airstrips were quickly built in other places as well and many villages became accessible by plane. Air travel proved especially important for health care, missionary work, government business, and NGOs, gold mining and tourism. Regular flights, provided by two commercial airlines, started flying to and

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13 Airstrips were built at Palumeu, Tafelberg, Kabalebo, Kuruni, Kayserbergte, Ulemari and Sipaliwini.
from the city and even the health service got its own aircraft. Although tickets are still expensive, today a substantial number of passengers are Maroons.

Roads began to be built in the interior in the 1940s. Initially, these were designed for the transport of lumber. By 1973, the system of unpaved forest roads capable of carrying vehicles of up to twenty tons covered more than 1,100 kms (Bruijning and Voorhoeve 1977: 94). In the 1940s, a road had already been built from Paramaribo to Zanderij where the international airport was located. Around 1960, with the construction of the dam, a road had also been built to Afobaka, with secondary roads to Brownsweig. The Afobaka road has since been extended along the lake to Atjoni, with several additional side roads. The 1960s also saw the construction of an east-west link in the coastal region, running from Albina to Nickerie, making the Cottica area, including Moengo, accessible by road. More recently the unpaved road network has also been extended to the Pamaka town of Langatabiki. Plans are currently being made to continue the expansion of the road network into the Saamaka and Ndyuka regions, via Palumeu to the Brazilian city of Santarem and maybe even to Manaus. Paved roads will then connect both Asidonhopo and Diitabiki (see Van Dijck 2009). There could hardly be a more direct link with the urban environment.

Despite the growing importance of roads, waterways continue to provide the key transport infrastructure for Maroons. Yet here too, revolutionary changes have taken place. In the early 1950s, the outboard motor was introduced into the interior. At first, few Maroons could afford these new motors, although the advantages were immediately obvious to all. The need to earn money to buy an outboard motor provided an extra incentive for people to look for work outside the Maroon region. In time, outboard motors became an integral part of Maroon life. A journey to the city that might once have taken several days or even a couple of weeks could now be completed in a matter of days or even hours. A person could leave Asidonhopo at seven in the morning and be in the centre of Paramaribo by three thirty in the afternoon, with the time becoming shorter as more of the road from Atjoni to Paramaribo became paved. This compares favourably with travel times a few centuries ago. For instance, in 1762 it took Lieutenant Vieira and his men twenty days to bring the peace gifts to the Saamaka.

Just as the car typifies the city, the outboard motor now typifies the interior. Today, a Maroon man should have at least a 15 hp motor, however that is still considered child’s play. Real status starts at 40 hp, and anything above that, up to around 115 hp, earns genuine respect. Outboard motors are much more than a means to maintain contact with the outside world. They have changed the perception of time and space. Once, a daughter who went to live in her husband’s village would disappear from sight; today, her mother can visit her
regularly. Women used to stay for extended periods of time on pieces of family land that were often far away to tend to their crops, since it was impossible to commute back and forth. Now, with the ease of travel, they tend to remain for much shorter periods of time and travel home more frequently. In theory, no child now lives too far away to attend school. A wide network of school boats brings children to and from school. Outboard motors have also benefited tourism. Each year, thousands of tourists stay at the dozens of eco-lodges along some of the rivers, ‘bringing’ the outside world to the interior. Transport, always a key source of income for Maroon men (see above), is therefore still of major importance. Boats may have changed, but the dangers of rapids, rocks, and waterfalls still remain and even today only Maroon—and Amerindian—men know how to traverse their own rivers.

Boat design has been adapted to accommodate outboard motors. While they were once tapered at either end or curved up, they are now cut square at the stern (Saamaka model) or have a hole in the stern to accommodate the outboard motor. The boats can also carry much more. Ten-metre boats did exist, but most of them were smaller. Today, a boat of 15–18 metres long is a common sight. The largest boats, with the most powerful outboard motors operate in the Marowijne-Tapanahoni region, where they transport goods including gasoline and oil as well as heavy machinery, such as bulldozers, needed mainly for the gold mining activities in the area. A boat’s capacity is generally measured not in length but in the number of (oil) barrels it can carry. A forty-barrel boat is no longer exceptional, especially not in eastern Suriname. It is an indication of the important role gasoline now plays in the interior following the introduction of the outboard motor and, shortly afterwards, of generators to supply electricity. Oil barrels have become an everyday sight in villages and houses, as have fuel stations along the rivers.

At the same time, outboard motors have raised the cost of living and have created new divisions in society. Once, a husband would provide a wife with a boat. In theory this still applies, but it may not always be a boat with an outboard motor. Men generally keep the motor for their own boat and rarely have money for more than one. In addition, outboard motors are a male concern; women are rarely seen operating a motor, although this is now changing. Women are, therefore, all the more dependent on men. Women can often be seen standing by the waterfront waiting to be taken to their distant fields. Unless a boat is already full, or chartered for tourists, it is considered good manners to offer a waiting woman a lift. There is also a social division between men with an outboard motor and those without one. From a rough estimate based on a headcount in several Saamaka villages, one in three men appears to own an outboard motor; among the Ndyuka the percentage appears slightly higher,
although it is still no more than half. Boat transport is expensive, but below the Langa Tabiki-Atjoni line it is vital. In 2010 a 15 hp outboard motor cost around six thousand Suriname dollars, and a 40 hp motor cost between ten and twelve thousand dollars.\footnote{At the time of writing there are roughly four Surinamese dollars to one euro.} A 40 hp motor uses around one litre of gasoline per four-five kilometres; a litre costs around five Surinamese dollars. The distance from Asidonhopo to Atjoni is about 100 kilometres. It costs around nine hundred dollars to hire a boatman for the journey. Passengers pay around seventy dollars per head (including a large amount of baggage). In eastern Suriname, the cost of cargo boat transport is generally paid, or at least calculated, in gold. Thus, renting a large cargo boat of around fifty barrels from Diitabiki to Albina might cost 90 grams. When the first outboard motors appeared in the early 1960s, the trip still took three days (Hansen and De Wagt 1967: 94); now the distance is covered in about one day.

Outboard motors have brought other changes to Maroon cultural and social life. ‘Motorist’ has become a new profession; mechanics repair and maintain motors, and boat-making is increasingly becoming a much more specialised profession than before. Some men lease boats, and women make pangis ‘cloths’ to protect motors. Alongside the traditional motifs with which boats used to be decorated and which are now in decline, boats are now decorated with industrial paints and global popular culture has also begun to intrude. At the same time, boats continue to have a unique quality since most now have a name on their hull, often reflecting something of the linguistic humour inherent to Maroon culture, like the one I saw on the upper Suriname River called Ting No De, which could mean ‘there’s no time (left)’, or ‘time does not exist’.

Comparable developments have been observed in Africa where a similarly dialectic process of appropriation is going on with new technology (Gewald et al. 2009: 16). The way people there relate to new technology is nothing like the way they relate to dead objects like cars or outboard motors. The new technology is appropriated, integrated and attributes meaning to all kinds of transactions and activities, although this may differ between the sexes. Maroon men giving personal names and messages to boats is an example of this dialectical process. And at the same time, for example, traditional textiles used for Maroon clothing which are all named—mainly by women—after social events, now receive names referring to new technology, like Sitangaali ‘rocket’ after the European space centre opened in French Guiana in the 1960s, or Tumumbi ‘automobile’ (Price and Price 1999: 98).

Motorised transport is a booster of change. Not only does it change the concept and consciousness of distance and time, it also brings new opportunities.
It has given birth to the rise of (eco-)tourism and the construction of a relatively large number of tourist resorts and eco-lodges along the upper rivers in Suriname’s interior. A new status symbol next to the outboard motor are quads, the four-wheel motor bikes used by men working in the, once again, booming gold fields. Whereas until recently korjalen ‘canoes’ were the only mode of transport and rivers the only roads in the interior, today more and more motor bikes and quads are used to travel along small bush paths to neighbouring villages or gold digger camps. This greatly increases the reach of small entrepreneurs such as bakers and carpenters, although this development has so far not (yet) resulted in the rise of local markets. Motorised transport and the improved infrastructure has also substantially facilitated traffic in drugs and illegal gold.

At the same time, motorisation has stimulated migration enormously, even to transnational levels. It is so much easier now to follow the call of the city or to go to the euro-economy of French Guiana, and it is also easier for migrants to visit their home villages and show off their relative affluence. It almost makes migration the only natural thing to do these days (see Goossens 2007). The communication and transport revolution also helped many thousands of Maroons escape the violence of the War of the Interior (1986–1992) which devastated large parts of the interior. Yet while it probably saved a large number of lives, it was also instrumental in on-going depopulation of Maroon villages because many of these refugees never returned to their home villages.

Perhaps just as important as the technological transformation of mobility in Maroon society, is the arrival of wireless communication. It has existed since the 1960s although it remained extremely limited for many years. Radio transmitters were introduced, especially at medical and missionary posts and airstrips, when Operation Grasshopper was completed. Over the years, private individuals were allowed to use the transmitters to contact people in the city in emergency situations, as in the event of a death. Thus an operator at a medical post would contact the main office in the city, where contact would be made with the telephone company which then connected the caller to the desired phone number. Back at the medical post, the caller had to wait until the recipient called back in order to exchange a brief message.

By the 1960s, it was also possible to receive national radio broadcasts from Paramaribo on transistor radios in the interior. These radios were consumer items with status, the sort of item a Maroon who had worked abroad for a long period would bring home. In the late 1990s, satellite dishes began to appear in Maroon villages, bought by wealthy Maroons who, like city dwellers and people in the Brazilian prospectors’ camps in the interior, used them to receive Brazilian television stations, bringing TV and video culture to the interior. A
rather hilarious example of the changes this has brought was observed by a Dutch engineer, Menno Marrenga, who has lived in several Saamaka villages for the past several decades, where he runs technical workshops. One day, he writes, when he is asked to come to a village to repair a generator, he has to work there with a “bleating radio” which tells him all day that there is only one God, “one God in virtually all musical styles, from kaseko to rap and reggae—which was moaned, groaned, screamed and chanted, hour after hour” (Marrenga 2011: 37, my translation). This particular radio station had obviously been hired by one of the upcoming charismatic evangelical churches. Missionary activity among Maroons, particularly the Saamaka, is a long-standing phenomenon. Some of these evangelical denominations, often with American roots, have become very popular among Maroons, in particular since the civil war, probably also because the gospel is brought to them by Maroons themselves who are easily able to link up with local knowledge and habits, notwithstanding the fact that they are rigidly opposed to Afro-religious practices (see Van der Pijl 2008). This has more than once resulted in frictions within the village communities.

To continue Marrenga’s story, when the generator is finally repaired, he wants to go home, but instead has to watch DVDs with a group of young villagers. Until only five years ago, he then observes, children enjoyed themselves by making music or playing football. Since the advent of the DVD, the whole extended family is now gathered around the DVD player watching action and war movies or porno, enjoying watching how whites are alternately killing each other or having sexual intercourse with each other in a variety of positions. But even that new tradition has already changed. Today, he says, it is only video clips of “dance, dance and dance by boys in sagging pants and girls in flashy bras, including young Maroons” (Marrenga 2011: 37, my translation). This suggests that this video culture and urban popular culture, in general, have increasingly become appropriated by Maroon youth and are now part of daily life in the interior as well. Urban music by Maroon musicians, such as I Ta Ves or King Koyeba, American movies dubbed into a Maroon language or Sranantongo, as well as local productions can be heard everywhere. The fast and smooth incorporation of these new media is more than a top down process, it is also a new means for Maroons to tell their own stories.

**Telephone**

In the 1990s Telesur, the national telecom provider, began installing public, and for a number of officials also private, telephones in parts of the interior. This development soon began to accelerate. Because of the scarcity of these telephones no real telephone culture emerged, but it did enable large groups
to contact people in the city (and beyond) directly. Then at the turn of the twenty-first century, technical innovations allowed radio telephones to be set up in the interior. Some Maroons recognised the commercial possibilities and opened phone shops (telefonu) in the interior. A few villages had more than one of these shops, in which calls to numbers in Suriname could be made for a dollar a minute and abroad for between five and ten dollars. Some people made a lot of money at the time. And suddenly the world was much closer. Within a couple of years, this rage subsided as a new, foreign provider introduced a mobile phone service: Digicel decided to capture the interior before attempting to exploit the cities. Soon a network of transmission poles had been set up covering the area and using a strategy akin to dumping—sixty dollars for a cell phone with ten dollars free credit—the interior switched *en masse* to mobile telephony. Telesur, realising that they could not afford to ignore the new phenomenon, moved quickly to catch up lost ground. Today, it is possible to use a mobile phone in practically every Maroon village. Although this development is still recent, the changes it has brought are already evident and more will doubtless follow. Because one thing is clear, the next stage, which has already started, is the arrival of internet.

The main problem with all these innovations and concomitant changes is that they are increasingly expensive, and this is particularly true for villagers since there is little paid employment in the villages. In order to earn money, the men go to the goldmines, the city or abroad, mainly to French Guiana or to the Netherlands. One major difference today is that villagers are now finding it far harder to return home once they have left, a trend that started with the migration that followed the construction of the dam at Afobaka, increasing exponentially with the flight from the interior during the War of the Interior and that continues to the present day. Yet, although most of the people who leave do not return, they continue to seek contact with their home village and vice versa. Villagers need their contacts in the diaspora, they need money from abroad to help them survive financially. Mobile phones are a solution, but also part of the problem. Phones enable people in the interior to keep in touch with distant relatives and to re-establish dormant contacts. However, many Maroons have accumulated debts through excessive use of these phones, which may indeed be a universal problem. Contacts abroad are necessary in order to pay for the phone. Whereas people who came to the interior would once bring bags of rice, tinned foods, bread and drink, today the most valued gift a person can bring is phone credit. Households cut costs wherever they can and sometimes entire pensions are reserved to be able to buy phone credit. However, phone calls are not just to ask for financial aid. The main purpose is to maintain social networks, which traditionally involves extensive, elaborate linguistic forms
and tori 'stories'. Of course, in the end, the network is crucial for survival and is, therefore, related to money. However, as Horst and Miller (2007: 165) observed for Jamaica, “the cell phone is not central to making money, but it is vital to getting [to] money”. In order to reduce costs, a new cultural phenomenon has evolved—and not just among the Maroons—the missed call (popular speak: *misscall*). A caller phones a number and quickly hangs up, hoping that the recipient will return the call and so pay for the conversation.

In effect, the oral culture is becoming digitalised. Women no longer have to go to the waterfront to exchange stories while they do the washing; they can phone. Daughters and relatives in other villages who would once have made regular trips to exchange news, now phone. If visitors come while the husband is out hunting or working in the forest, the wife can phone him. Women are no longer cut off from the village when they go to tend their crops. People who need to travel can call a boatman to book a ride. While people used to communicate easily from their dugout to the riverbank—voices carry far and clearly across water—these days people use a phone. Even during a serious *kuutu* ‘meeting’ participants can often be heard talking on their phone, while speakers are regularly interrupted themselves by their own phone. When a death occurred it used to take weeks for people to gather in the village; these days, everyone knows of the death within a matter of hours, even relatives abroad.

Mobile phones also play a vital role in male-female relations, since the complex stratagems that were once necessary to arrange a clandestine meeting are now a thing of the past: a phone number is enough. At the same time, social controls have also increased, since it is now possible to call and check what a person is up to at any given time. In a culture in which jealousy and adultery play such a central role, phones are a complicating factor. This phenomenon was observed in African societies too. De Bruijn et al. (2009: 19) discovered that the mobile phone “encourages people to lie. No exact information is exchanged, or lies told, about the place or situation of the person called” leading to “a lack of trust in a phone relationship”. On the other hand, they claim, it enables women to organise their lives more independently while still taking the societal norms seriously. They may now date a man without others knowing about it. The mobile phone opens up a new social space for communication between the sexes, which provides women with more (surreptitious) control over communication with men, outside of traditional moral constraints. These same developments were told to the author by Maroons in the interior of Suriname.

Accessibility by phone has even intensified political involvement. In addition to the crucial role that the interior plays in elections, due to the low quotas in rural constituencies, mobile phones provide an excellent way to attract voters, both as a means of communication and in the form of gifts.
and administrative leaders in the interior now maintain regular contact and
discuss with party operatives and leaders in the city. This has allowed Maroon
leaders in the interior to be more directly involved with national politics and
has enabled them to exercise political pressure. They can now also phone
experienced associates abroad for advice on political matters.

It is not only men who are in physical contact with the outside world. These
days women also go to the city to buy products and maintain their networks.
This is not just due to the dramatic changes in communications, a major
contributor was the War of the Interior that sent entire communities on the
move. Women became less dependent on men as a result and acquired a much
clearer insight into the way that the outside world works and how they can
participate. At the same time it is enlightening to read again one of Menno
Marrenga’s observations in ‘his’ Saamaka village today. “This morning I heard
Jaaja calling her sister by mobile phone to arrange to see each other at the riv-
erside to do the washing up. This sister lives thirty metres away from her house
and so they could have heard each other without their mobiles. And that is not
Jaaja’s only telephone conversation of the day. Her daughter lives in Bendikwai,
a village much further up the river. Formerly they met once or twice a year, now
they call every day. Jaaja wears her phone on a string around her neck, also
when she is busy washing on the riverside. She has to be reachable at all times,
suppose her daughter calls?” (Marrenga 2011: 34, my translation).

Jaaja uses at least one prepaid telephone card per day and instead of once
or twice a year she now travels to her daughter every month. The problem is,
says Marrenga, that this ever-increasing consumption pattern is not compen-
sated for by ever-increasing income from production. And it is not just tele-
phones and outboard motors that have dramatically increased the cost of
living, but people are also buying refrigerators, televisions, DVDs, zinc roofs,
etc. As a result, people in the interior have become more and more depen-
dent on those who work in the gold mines or in town and abroad. The mobile
phone, of course, facilitates sustaining their network of dependency relations.
That might actually be the most crucial function of the cell phone, and at the
same time the best explanation for all these telephone conversations. It is not
the actual contents of the conversation, it is, what in Jamaica is called the “link-
ing up” that counts. Horst and Miller (2007: 173) even state about the Jamaican
situation that “the potential of the cell phone that is most fully realised lies in
its ability to facilitate this social networking”. It seems that among Surinamese
Maroons that is no different.

Like many Maroons in Suriname’s interior, the phone has also become
an integral part of Jaaja’s social life. The culture of orality no longer requires
face-to-face interaction. Although a substantial number of Maroons are still
illiterate or only partially literate, using the phone has greatly increased their knowledge and use of ciphers. Ciphers and numbers have become more than a means to count or to trade, they are now related to people, they form new identities. It is not enough anymore to know someone's name(s), you also have to know his/her mobile number. People write telephone numbers on their walls just to remember, their own or the numbers of relatives and acquaintances. Of course, mobile phones contain contact lists, but to use these one has to be able to read, and many Maroons are not sufficiently literate. Literacy is also the main reason why text messaging is not increasing as much among Maroons and other so-called oral societies as in other parts of the world, even though it is much cheaper than calling (see de Bruijn et al. 2009). Eventually, use of the mobile phone might be an incentive for people to acquire literacy skills. However, it raises some crucial questions such as, in which language will Maroons send text messages? Dutch is the official language taught in school, but many Maroons are afraid to use it because they know their command of that language is inadequate. However, if they were to use it as their digital language, it could eventually replace their own in their oral communication, that is, their language would ‘dutchify’ at a much quicker pace than it is now, much like French is now encroaching rapidly on Maroon languages spoken in French Guiana. The other possibilities are texting in one of the Maroon languages. However, only very few people have learned to write in a Maroon language, though that is changing somewhat in French Guiana where writing in the vernacular is taught in some schools. Finally, Suriname’s lingua franca Sranantongo, is a possibility too, but it carries the same disadvantages and it is also the language of townspeople who often look down upon them. It will be interesting to see what developments will occur here and what choices will be made. At least among younger Maroons in the more urbanised areas texting seems to be on the rise. Bettina Migge (personal communication) observed that even though people do not learn to write in any creole language in school, people do use it in writing. However, this writing system is often closer to Sranantongo than to Maroon languages. A lot of these young people are doing multilingual texting. For them, not being proficient in Dutch is not really an issue because if they have had some schooling they are at least able to transpose literacy practices to their own linguistic sphere. Could this result in a new kind of language?

15 Observation of the author.
16 At the same time, it is also true that Maroons, particularly in town, are appropriating Sranantongo for their own purposes, to link themselves to urbanity.
On the other hand, the importance of voice to ear contact still remains intact, because particularly in the personal and cultural sphere, not everything can be transposed to another language, and the problem of orthography still remains. Saamaka, for instance, unlike Sranantongo, contains tonal diacritics, which means having to use non-standard symbols. Furthermore, and maybe even the most important point here is that oral communication is much more valuable in sustaining one's social network—the Jamaican ‘link up’—than an impersonal text message. That choices have to be made, therefore, is certain. Before long the internet will play a much larger role in this new communication technology, and that will lead to the development of more reading skills than the telephone could ever do.

It is conceivable, however, that for some time to come the mobile phone will remain much more important than the use of the internet, even with a Blackberry internet is more complicated to handle and above all much more costly. Not surprisingly, there seems to be a clear relation between one's level of education and financial situation on the one hand and the use of internet on the other (cf. Horst and Miller 2007: 148–166). Again, Menno Marrenga in one of his columns (2012) underlines this with observations of his personal communication revolution in Suriname’s interior. Years ago he tried to establish a postal service by boat—with outboard motor—along the river. Today, in order to be able to receive e-mail from the rest of the world he needs a new computer—many times the price of a cell phone—, more powerful batteries, and solar panels as well as ADSL, if only because the rest of the world does not write letters anymore and sends increasingly ‘heavy’ files with color pictures and intricately designed headings.

5 Conclusions

Clearly, Maroons have always been in touch with the city, and urban society has always played an important role in their material existence and survival. Maroons never lived in complete isolation, if only because all their weapons, metal goods and textiles always came from the city and were paid for with money earned through the colonial economy. After the abolition of slavery, people came in increasing numbers from the city when the interior’s rich natural resources made it a far more attractive place. This chapter reviewed the nature and extent of contacts and the general impact of various means of communication rather than changes resulting from education and missionary work, or, more recently, the impact of the many thousands of Brazilian prospectors in the interior (see de Theije 2007; Hoogbergen, Kruijt and Polimé 2001).
In any case, it is clear that between 1870 and 1940, large numbers of Maroons worked with and for people from the city and seamlessly integrated all kinds of products obtained from the urban economy into their domestic life. The tools and weaponry they used improved significantly over time, they started to use kerosene oil and soap, trains became familiar to some, many adopted the techniques and rhythm of working in gold mining, balata bleeding or lumber cutting enterprises in the interior, while others moved to the coastal area to work temporarily in bauxite mining and other industrial or urban activities. It seems that the observation by Horst and Miller (2007: 7) quoted in the introduction, about the relative ease with which people adopt new technologies and new media, applies to Maroons too, because “[they are] used initially with references to desires that are historically well established, but remain unfulfilled because of the limitations of previous technologies”. However, the most direct interaction and communication of the Maroons with others took place outside the home and outside the village.

All this changed dramatically with the transformation that occurred in transport and communications after World War II, which may be described as little short of revolutionary. Links between villages and the outside world increased steadily and increasingly involved women, while the men, even more than before, were forced to become more involved with the outside world in order to earn the money to pay for these changes. The two most far-reaching changes, transforming the dimensions of time and space for Maroons, were the introduction of the outboard motor in the 1950s and 1960s and the more recent introduction of mobile telephony. The construction of the dam, the new gold mining boom and the migrations triggered by the War of the Interior provided the context in which the impact of these changes became irreversible. It is not unlikely that in the near future the Afobaka-Atjoni and Moengo-Langatabiki roads will be considered to have been the third revolutionary change opening up the interior, in this case by vehicular transport.17

The way the outboard motor and more recently mobile phones have been integrated into Maroon society in Suriname's interior suggests that the result of an intensification of contact and communication with outsiders need not be catastrophic. Nevertheless, for change that is sustainable, it is necessary for people to be able to earn enough to pay for the new lifestyle. And for some that may mean joining the two-thirds of Maroon society that no longer live in the Surinamese interior. This will make the dependency of those who stay behind

17 The Afobaka-Atjoni road is already functional and is used intensively, while the Moengo-Langatabiki road exists but has not yet been surfaced.
on those who have left and on new means of communication to sustain those relations ever more important.

Undoubtedly, the new means of transport and communication have served as vehicles for increased income differentiation and, thereby, also increased individualism. Those who can afford one or more outboard motors can make more money than those who do not have any. Those who deal in gold, or drugs or any other commercial product for the urban or the world market, cannot do so without the easy availability of small airplanes, powerful outboard motors and, of course, cell phones. Many of those who have been able to save some money settle in urban areas outside of traditional Maroon territory, among other things to give their children a proper education, can do so more easily, because now they have the communicative means to stay in touch with the home village on a regular basis. These new technologies are very much used to strengthen the social network, but at the same time make individuals more independent as well. This undermines traditional hierarchies of gender, generation and politics, because it is used for personal gain more than for the kinship group. At the same time, it strengthens the bonds with the original ‘home’ in new ways, contrary to the almost definite goodbye of migrating Maroons of former times. These developments are exactly in line with what Horst and Miller (2007) define as the new “communicative ecology”, referred to in the introduction of this chapter.

Obviously, like almost everywhere in the world, there is a new connectedness among Maroons which offers new opportunities, but which has its negative aspects too. New means of communication are both part of infrastructure and infrastructure itself for new lifestyles, which are shaped by increased consumerism, as well as a lack of income. Traditional kinship connectedness is now helped by new communication systems that allow communication over long distances. This communication helps to satisfy increasing demands of those from ‘back home’ with the aid of their relatives ‘abroad’ who want to stay connected with ‘home’. This may lead to asymmetrical expectations as well as to misunderstandings because people ‘back home’ do not understand the difficulties confronting migrants, while the relatives abroad at times forget the hardships of those who stayed behind. The result is like that which de Bruijn et al. (2009: 16) have observed for Africa: “The mobile phone that compresses distance also brings distance home to people and may lead to more of them moving to the purported world of infinite abundance that they have been deluded into internalising”. Adoption of new technologies of communication might still be relatively easy, but it is not always easy to come to terms with their effects. At the same time, the way that outboard motors, and even more so, cell phones have quickly become part of everyday Maroon life reveals that
indeed it is much more than the adoption of objects by subjects, it is about the contradictory way new technology becomes part of a “communicative ecology”, a wider context which is influenced by the new technology and influences, in turn, new technology and its use (Horst and Miller 2007). The contradictory part, of course, is clear. The outboard motor made communication with urban areas much easier, but at the same time stimulated migration; the cell phone creates opportunities for women and men to meet unobserved by the elders, but also刺激ulates a habit of lying to each other. In effect, the revolutionary pace of the new technologies of communication leads to much-improved connections, but it also brings about greater degrees of disconnectedness.
CHAPTER 8

On the Linguistic Consequences of Language Contact in Suriname: The Case of Convergence

Kofi Yakpo, Margot van den Berg and Robert Borges

1 Introduction

Suriname is often represented as a stratified mosaic of cultures and languages. The layers correspond to cultures and languages that entered Suriname via multiple migratory movements in different time depths. With languages from two major indigenous Amerindian families, several Afro-Caribbean English Lexifier Creoles and further dialectal varieties of Indo-European languages belonging to the Germanic cluster (English, Dutch) and the Italic cluster (French, Portuguese), Suriname already boasted an extraordinary linguistic diversity by the end of the eighteenth century. The Dutch labour trade of the last decades of the nineteenth and the first decades of the twentieth century added additional layers of complexity to the picture. After the abolishment of slavery in 1863, indentured labourers from North-Eastern India, Java, and Southern China brought their languages with them, adding representatives of major linguistic families of the world, namely Indic (Sarnami), Austronesian (Javanese) and Sino-Tibetan (Hakka or Keija). In the decades since the independence of Suriname in 1975, patterns of (circular) migration between the main city and plantations and villages along the coast and in the interior of Suriname, as well as between Suriname and the Netherlands have emerged. More recently, a new wave of Chinese immigrants has resulted in a sizable Cantonese and Mandarin speaking community. Furthermore, communities of Brazilians and Haitians are being formed, supported by the gold sector and through domestic/agricultural work, respectively. This mosaic of cultures and languages is often commemorated as an example of respect and tolerance; different ethnic and religious groups, each with their own unique cultural and linguistic characteristics, co-exist peacefully in a multicultural and multilingual society.

In this chapter, we challenge this somewhat static view of Suriname’s cultural and linguistic diversity. The linguistic data that we present will show that languages in Suriname do not merely co-exist and that Suriname should not be characterised as a form of stable bilingualism and diglossia, where so-

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called minority groups maintain their languages for (informal) in-group communication and use the language of the dominant majority contact group for (formal) out-group communication. From the last quarter of the twentieth century onwards, changes can be observed in the distribution of languages across functional domains, as some of the languages are being used in more and other domains as before, resulting in what has been described in the literature as leaky or encroaching diglossia (Ferguson 1959; Dimmendaal 1989). In addition to changes in language use, changes in the linguistic systems of the languages are observed (Charry, Koefoed and Muysken 1983; Carlin and Arends 2002). Furthermore, a new code appears to be emerging; one that bears some resemblance to the mixed Sranantongo—Dutch language practices of people of Surinamese descent in the Netherlands (Breinburg 1983). We will focus on a particular outcome of linguistic change, that is the results of convergence. Due to convergence, (partial) similarities increase at the expense of differences between the languages in contact (Weinreich 1954: 395). In line with Matras and Sakel (2007) and others, we define convergence in more concrete terms as the adaptation of an element in language A to match the scope and distribution of an element of language B that is perceived to be its functional equivalent. We will show that Sranantongo has experienced a shift from primarily postpositions to prepositions in line with Dutch. Urban Ndyuka speakers are shifting their modal categories in the direction of Sranantongo. Sarnami is experiencing a shift to primarily SVO word order in line with Sranantongo and Dutch.

Language change may result from language-internal processes such as grammaticalisation for example, or it may be contact-induced. As a contact-induced phenomenon, it is intimately connected to bi- or multilingualism. Thus it may not be surprising to find language change in Suriname. Carlin and Arends (2002: 1) observe that “hardly any inhabitant of Suriname is monolingual, yet not everyone is multilingual in the same languages, nor to the same extent”. Indeed, 89% of the participants in a recent survey of the Nederlandse Taalunie claimed to speak more than one language regularly, 40% more than two (Taalpeilonderzoek 2011). However, multilingualism is not a sole prerequisite for language variation or language change. For example, the multilingual society of India is often cited to illustrate that multilingualism can be a strategy for minority language maintenance (Fasold 1993). However, this does not mean that the minority languages are not influenced by the languages with which they co-exist. Gumperz and Wilson (1971) study the longstanding multilingualism in the village of Kupwar, located in Maharashtra obliterated the differences between the languages in contact, resulting in a high degree of translatability between the Dravidian language Kannada and the Indic languages Kupwar Urdu and Marathi. In other villages, differences between these languages are
not obliterated. The linguistic competence of many of the Kupwar residents are said to involve three distinct lexicons but a single grammar. As the distinct lexicons are maintained, social/ethnic identity can be marked via the use of different languages. Thus the languages are maintained.

The data collected by Kofi Yakpo, Robert Borges, and Stanley Hanenberg in Suriname in 2010 and 2011 suggests that the present language situation in Suriname differs from that of India, in that it is best characterised in terms of leaky or encroaching diglossia and language shift, rather than type of language maintenance found in Kupwar (cf. Yakpo and Muysken, in prep.). But instead of a shift to the language of the socially dominant group, as that type of shift occurs most frequently, the actual changes in the linguistic landscape of Suriname are more complex and differ across ethnolinguistic groups, functional domains and geographical locations. While Surinamese Dutch and Sranantongo are clearly expanding in terms of speaker numbers and language domains, their linguistic systems are also changing. Sranantongo as a person's second or third language differs in a number of ways from the variety of Sranantongo that is spoken as a first language (Migge and Van den Berg 2009). Furthermore, new codes appear to be emerging in which codeswitching and language mixing are so profound that the matrix language of the speaker may be difficult to determine, while other languages, such as Javanese and Mawayana, may be headed for extinction.

In the following sections, we will discuss the notion of convergence in some more detail. (section 2). We briefly address our data collection methods in section 3. In section 4, we discuss the language situation of Suriname in terms of language shift and language maintenance scenarios. Our linguistic data are presented in section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper and spells out how the present language situation in Suriname can advance our thinking on multilingualism in relation to language change and language maintenance.

2 On the Notion of Convergence

In the previous section we described convergence as the adaptation of an element in language A to match the scope and distribution of a perceived functional counterpart in language B. But convergence has been described in various sub-disciplines of linguistics in a number of different ways. Kouwenberg (2001) compares the use of the notion of convergence in historical linguistics and creole studies, noting that it is used mostly as a descriptive concept in historical linguistics and in an explanatory manner in creole studies, “where it is interpreted as referring to multiple sources of creole forms or patterns and/or to multiple causation” (Kouwenberg 2001: 243). In studies on Second Language
Acquisition, it is used to refer to the linguistic outcomes of a mostly psycholinguistic process in a bilingual or multilingual situation; the term convergence is applied to the new forms that result from putting elements together that were already present in existing language varieties. For example, “Quechua-Spanish bilingual children are observed to produce past tense forms that are associated with mirative features not manifest in non-contact Spanish, and in a Quechua condition, the children evince discourse-oriented background/foreground distinctions analogous to those marked by aspectual morphology in Spanish. These patterns emerge from convergence in the shared functional category of Tense, which is differentially specified for features of evidentiality in Quechua and for Aspect in Spanish” (Bullock and Toribio 2004: 92). It presupposes that speakers are at least bilingual and further, that they are able to exploit their knowledge and awareness of the properties of the grammars of the languages involved. Thus, convergence has been described as the “enhancement of inherent structural similarities found between two linguistic systems” (Bullock and Toribio 2004: 91), or as the “most parsimonious grammar that serves both languages” (Muysken 2000: 167).

In the field of contact linguistics, convergence refers to a multilingual situation in which languages change in ways that make them more similar. Here, convergence is the diachronic process that explains the emergence of new structures that do not have a single source but that were already present, albeit less prominently, in both languages. Furthermore, convergence may lead to new structures that may resemble both languages to some extent rather than a one language completely (Thomason 2001). Convergence is further used to explain situations that emerge when one language adopts structural features of another language or when the languages in contact adopt an identical compromise (Winford 2003). In this paper, we adopt a broader view of convergence as the operation of contact-induced changes that render some of the languages of Suriname more alike. Admittedly, this makes any instance of unidirectional borrowing a potential case of convergence. However, we continue to employ convergence for two reasons. One is the wish to differentiate the process (borrowing) from the medium or long-term result (convergence). The other is to point towards the complex nature of borrowing processes in Suriname that arises from the co-existence of two dominant languages, namely Dutch and Sranantongo, and their interaction as donor or source languages. Due to this circumstance, it is often difficult to attribute instances of contact-induced change in languages other than these two to a single source, and in some cases the changes may represent compromises between these two dominant languages. In this view, convergence is situated among other processes of language contact, in particular language attrition, language shift, language death and creole formation, that are sociolinguistically motivated. Convergence is
particularly useful as a term to characterise what we see as the emergence of a linguistic area in Suriname, with its characteristically diffuse directionality and various types mutual structural accommodation of the languages involved.

Winford (2007) succeeds in bridging the above mentioned fields of contact linguistics and second language acquisition studies via an adaptation of Van Coetsem’s work, in which two types of cross-linguistic influence, borrowing and imposition, agentivity and a bilingual speaker’s linguistic dominance (proficiency) are cleverly combined to provide a unified framework of contact-induced language change:

The direction of transfer of linguistic features is always from the source language to the RL, and the agent of transfer can be either the recipient language or the source language speaker. In the former case, we have borrowing (RL agentivity), in the latter, imposition (SL agentivity). Also highly relevant to the distinction between borrowing and imposition is the notion of language dominance. As Van Coetsem (2000: 84) explains, difference in linguistic dominance is the main criterion for distinguishing between recipient language and source language agentivity. In the former case, the recipient language is the dominant language of the speaker, while in the latter case, the source language is the dominant language. (Winford 2007: 27)

When this framework is applied to the various situations in which convergence has been observed, the following types can be observed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Agentivity</th>
<th>Mechanism</th>
<th>Languages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type A</td>
<td>Most content morphemes and some function items are incorporated from a source language into a recipient language</td>
<td>recipient language agentivity</td>
<td>borrowing</td>
<td>Media Lengua, Ma’a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type B</td>
<td>Most content morphemes come from one of the languages, but there is a more intricate mixing of structural features from both languages</td>
<td>recipient + source language agentivity</td>
<td>borrowing; imposition</td>
<td>Michif, Mednyj Aleut</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The question is then, what types of convergence can be encountered in Suriname? In the following sections we will report on contact-induced change in three languages of Suriname, namely Sranantongo, Ndyuka and Sarnami in three language contact constellations that are typical for Suriname: contact with Dutch as the agent and another language (in this case Sranantongo) as the undergoer of a linguistic change (section 5.1), (section 5.2) contact between Sranantongo, Dutch and a third language (in this case Sarnami), and lastly contact with Sranantongo as the agent and another language (in this case Ndyuka) as the undergoer of change (section 5.3).

3 Methods and Data

The linguistic data on which this article relies was gathered in Suriname in 2010–11 as part of the ERC project “Traces of Contact” at the Centre for Language Studies at Radboud University Nijmegen. The corpus contains recordings of the following eight languages of Suriname: Four English Lexifier Creole languages, namely Sranantongo, Ndyuka, Kwinti and Saamaka, three languages of Asian
origin Sarnami, Javanese, Hakka and finally Surinamese Dutch. Comparative data has been collected in India, the Netherlands, West Africa and Mauritius. The corpus consists of a total of about a hundred and fifty hours of data. All language examples in this paper that come without a bibliographical reference stem from our own field data.

The recordings include elicited speech gathered through the use of visual stimuli such as pictures, picture books and video clips, as well as more naturalistic discourse ranging from semi-structured interviews to unguided conversations. Additionally, some fifty sociolinguistic interviews were conducted on Sranantongo on the backgrounds of speakers and their attitudes vis-à-vis the languages they speak. Our corpus is well balanced in that it represents speech from various parts of the coastal area and the interior, from members of the different linguistic communities, and from an age range of fifteen to ninety years.

4 Socio-historical and Linguistic Aspects of Multilingualism in Suriname

This section addresses the socio-historical context of multilingualism in Suriname. We discuss key historical events leading to the rise of linguistic diversity in the country, as well as the face of multilingualism in contemporary Surinamese society. We look at language maintenance and language shift, and aspects of language use, demography and the relative status of the languages of Suriname. The combination of these socio-historical factors renders a scenario that is particular to Suriname, in which linguistic diversity and societal multilingualism coincide with language use patterns favouring the two “big” languages Sranantongo and Dutch. We hypothesise that this scenario in turn produces the kind of linguistic convergence that we go on to describe in section 5.

Since the 1980s, most studies on language contact in multilingual societies follow a scenario-based approach. Languages are not entities that exist on their own accord; “...the history of a language is a function of the history of its speakers, and not an independent phenomenon that can be thoroughly studied without reference to the social context in which it is embedded” (Thomason and Kaufman 1988: 4). Two scenarios are generally distinguished, that is a scenario of language maintenance or stable diglossia, and a scenario of language shift. The former refers to a scenario in which linguistic minorities maintain their languages alongside the language of the majority, while the linguistic minorities shift to the language of the majority in the latter scenario. The shift may be caused by several factors, that include the expected positive change in the socio-economic status when an ethnolinguistic minority group
shifts to the language of the majority group and further, the diminishing status of a minority language, the demographic strength of the minority and its geographic distribution, whether or not the language receives institutional support, if it used in mass media and/or education (Appel and Muysken 1987). In the following sections, we will discuss how these factors contribute to the language situation in Suriname, but first we will give a brief overview of some important historical time periods in which population movements and recompositions had such profound demographic, cultural, social, economic, political, and linguistic consequences that they dramatically changed Suriname’s linguistic landscape.

**Early Colonial Period (1500–1850)**

1. After the arrival of the first European explorers and traders on the Caribbean coast of the Guianas (including the territory we now know as Suriname) in the early sixteenth century, contact with the European invaders led to the dramatic decline of the indigenous American population of the area through the genocidal combination of imported disease, warfare, and enslavement (see Carlin 2002). We can assume that the degree of depopulation of Suriname paralleled that recorded for other parts of the Guianas and North-Eastern Brazil, where an estimated 95% of the indigenous population perished in the first 50 years after contact and conquest (see Wright 1999: 364). The linguistic consequences of depopulation, population movements, and subsequent contacts with the coastal populations and later Maroons have been a long-drawn process of language shift and death of the indigenous languages in Suriname (cf. Carlin 2002).

2. The total number of enslaved Africans brought to Suriname between 1651 and 1826 has been estimated between 215,000 and 250,000 (Oostindie 1993; Voyages Database 2009), resulting in deeply transformative demographic changes on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition to the Trans-Atlantic trade, enslaved Africans and their descendants entered Suriname via trade with other Caribbean colonies including the Dutch Antilles, the French West Indies, as well as English and Danish colonies (Van Welie 2008).

3. As long as enslaved Africans were brought to Suriname, individuals and small groups chose to flee the plantations and form free Maroon societies in the interior (see Price 1983; Dragtenstein 2002; Thoden van Velzen and Hoogbergen 2011). Although these movements were not very substantial in numerical terms, they were decisive for a recomposition of Surinamese society along coast-interior axis in terms of geographical, economic, socio-cultural and linguistic characteristics. The geographical detachment of the Maroons from the coastal belt led to linguistic divergence of the maroon creole languages from the
common coastal creole varieties referred to in the literature as “Proto-Sranantongo” or “Early Sranan” (cf. Van den Berg 2007), and the formation of a western and eastern cluster of maroon creole languages.

Late Colonial Period (1850–1970)

(4) Economic transformations in the Atlantic world and the struggle against slavery by the African-descended population of the Americas and European abolitionists led to the gradual erosion and eventual abolition of the institution of slavery in the nineteenth century. Before slavery was abolished in Suriname in 1863, the Dutch colonial government sought to ensure the availability of cheap labour for the plantation economy by importing Asian indentured labourers. About 2000 migrants arrived from Java and Southern China between 1853 and 1875 (see Tjon Sie Fat, this volume). Following that, agreements were brokered with the British for the provision of cheap labour from India in 1870 (Hoefte 1987). Through these arrangements, 34,304 (male and female) labourers were shipped to Suriname from India between 1873 and 1916 (Marhé 1985: 7). The linguistic result was the koineisation of several closely related languages spoken in the present-day Indian federal states of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and Jharkhand (Damsteegt 1988).

(5) A second response was the transfer of workers from the Dutch colony of Oost-Indië, i.e. Indonesia, with 32,956 Javanese arriving in Suriname between 1890 and 1940 (Hoefte 1987: 3). The Chinese indentured labourers were by now being complemented by chain migrants from Southern China; this pattern continued up to the present (Tjon Sie Fat 2009a: 66–68). The linguistic results are the establishment of Javanese in Suriname, as well as the Southern Chinese languages Hakka and Cantonese.

Postcolonial Period (1970–Present)

(6) In the years leading up to full independence in 1975, there was a mass emigration of Surinamese citizens. Some forty thousand Surinamese, mostly Afro-Surinamese and Indo-Surinamese from the Paramaribo district, migrated to the Netherlands in 1975 (Choenni and Harmsen 2007). In 2010, some 345’000 individuals were classified as “Surinamese” in the Netherlands by the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics (2011). One consequence of this demographic development has been the establishment of patterns of circular migration between the Netherlands and Suriname for motives as diverse as business and work, family and leisure, and arts and culture. This process has given rise to a transnational social space, in which goods, people, ideas, and language practices are continuously exchanged across the Atlantic, and further, to transnational communities (cf. Gowricharn 2009; Oostindie and Schoorl 2011).
second consequence has been the establishment of Sranantongo as an important and highly visible heritage language in the Netherlands and its acquisition of local characteristics. A third consequence is the decline of other Surinamese languages in the Netherlands through language shift to Dutch, and to a lesser degree, Sranantongo (as well as a leveled Maroon language in certain settings). In particular, Sranantongo may be developing into a supra-ethnic identity code for Dutch people of mostly Afro-Surinamese descent in the Netherlands, even though the second Dutch-born generation more often than not has little proficiency in the language. The vitality of Sranantongo in the Netherlands seems to be mainly subscribed to the Surinamese-born and the first generation of Dutch-born Creoles, as they are numerically dominant (Choenni and Harmsen 2007). Furthermore, cultural organisations contribute to the vitality of Sranantongo in the Netherlands. The society Ons Suriname, for example, organises the annual Sranantongo dictee, a spelling competition intended to promote the correct use of Sranantongo. In addition, transmigration may have a positive influence on the vitality of Sranantongo in the Netherlands as transmigrants may be influenced by the language practices that they encounter in Suriname. On a different note, Sranantongo is an important lexical source for youth language in the Netherlands (Hardenberg 2003).

(7) A second migratory movement out of Suriname was triggered by the civil war, which ravaged large parts of the interior between 1986 and 1992 (see Vries 2005). Violence and economic deprivation led to refugee movements to the Netherlands and the United States, among other places, but mostly across the border into French Guiana. At least 10,000 Surinamese left the country for its eastern neighbour. This led to the firm establishment of the Maroon Creoles Saamaka and Ndyuka/Pamaka in French Guiana (Migge and Léglise 2013). Furthermore, heightened cross-border mobility (ibid.), the economic take-off in the interior after the war and circular migration between the interior and the coast (van Stipriaan 2011, this volume) are factors that have also been leading to increased contact between the various Maroon Creoles and Sranantongo, and convergence between these languages (Migge and Léglise 2013: chaps. 7–9).

(8) Suriname’s increasing integration into regional and global economic networks has also been reflected in the emergence of new migratory currents into Suriname; next to an older pattern of migration from neighbouring Guyana, newer currents include substantial labour migration from Brazil, particularly into the artisanal mining sector in the interior (de Theije, this volume), Haitian (non-) transitory migration since the beginning of the twenty-first century (Laëthier, this volume), reinvigorated migration from increasingly varied locations in China (Tjon Sie Fat, this volume) and last but not least a not insignificant reimmigration of Dutch citizens of Surinamese extraction and
Europeans of non-Surinamese origin from the Netherlands and elsewhere. These new immigrant languages are now participating in the multilingual dynamics of present-day Suriname and have further added to the diversity of the language situation. These newcomers also learn Dutch and particularly Sranantongo. Thus these languages are growing in terms of speaker numbers on the one hand. On the other hand, variability increases and new language practices emerge that are associated with the newcomers.

(9) The dynamics of the processes described above, in particular those in post-colonial times, may be summarised as an increase in physical mobility of people and goods, an increase in communicative density, an increase in outward orientation and many of the other factors that have been described for other societies of the South under the heading of “globalisation”. This constellation has given Sranantongo and Dutch a decisive edge in the processes of the linguistic scenario described above.

The linguistic consequences of the developments outlined above are summarised in Table 8.2 (the numbers in Table 8.2 refer to the numbers in the preceding three paragraphs):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Linguistic outcome</th>
<th>Languages concerned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>Decline of indigenous languages</td>
<td>Within 3 decades: Akuriyo, Tunayana, Sikïiyana, Mawayana (Carlin 2002: 43)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>Creation of a coastal creole language</td>
<td>Language creation</td>
<td>Proto-Sranantongo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>Differentiation of Maroon creole languages</td>
<td>Divergence</td>
<td>Saamaka, Matawai Ndyuka, Paamaka, Aluku, Kwinti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4)–(5)</td>
<td>Arrival of Asian indenture languages</td>
<td>Diversification</td>
<td>Sarnami, Javanese, Hakka, Cantonese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>Creation of Indian koine Sarnami</td>
<td>Convergence</td>
<td>Bhojpuri, Awadhi, Magahi, Maithili</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>Strong influence of Dutch on Sranantongo in Netherlands</td>
<td>Divergence</td>
<td>Sranantongo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>Decline of Surinamese languages in Netherlands</td>
<td>Language shift</td>
<td>Affects all languages of Suriname</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>Koineisation of Maroon languages</td>
<td>Convergence</td>
<td>Western and Eastern Maroon Creoles</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.1 On Language Use and Language Attitudes in Suriname
Recent census data and surveys present interesting perspectives on language use in Suriname. The 2004 census of the General Bureau of Statistics Census Office of Suriname is the only census so far to list Surinamese households of all districts by language use. Households were asked to name the “language spoken most often” and the “second language spoken”. The resulting figures are reproduced in 8.3:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Linguistic outcome</th>
<th>Languages concerned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>Arrival of new immigrant languages</td>
<td>Diversification</td>
<td>Creolese, Brazilian Portuguese, Cantonese, Mandarin, Haitian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9)</td>
<td>Sranantongo and Dutch acquire an ever-growing number of L1 and L2 speakers</td>
<td>Convergence,</td>
<td>Affects all languages of Suriname</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.3 Languages spoken in households

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Language spoken most often</th>
<th>Second language spoken</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Speakers</td>
<td>In %</td>
<td>Speakers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>57,577</td>
<td>46,6</td>
<td>29,163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sranantongo</td>
<td>11,105</td>
<td>9,0</td>
<td>45,634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarnami</td>
<td>19,513</td>
<td>15,8</td>
<td>8,121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Javanese</td>
<td>6,895</td>
<td>5,6</td>
<td>6,846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maroon languages*</td>
<td>18,797</td>
<td>15,2</td>
<td>2,493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>6,501</td>
<td>5,3</td>
<td>4,030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No 2nd language**</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>23,754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>3,075</td>
<td>2,5</td>
<td>3,422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>123,463</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>123,463</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: SIC 213-2005/02. Zevende algemene volks- en woningtelling in Suriname, landelijke resultaten, volume 1, demografische en sociale karakteristieken (7th general population and household census in Suriname, national results, volume 1, demographic and social characteristics). Paramaribo: Algemeen Bureau voor de Statistiek)

* Named: Saramaccan, Aucan, Paramaccan in the census, **NA= Not applicable
Table 8.3 displays a clear bias towards Sranantongo and Dutch. These two languages are the only ones that manifest significant differences between “most often” and “second language” uses. Sranantongo and Dutch are the only languages to function as lingua francas, i.e. out-group mediums of communication, in a significant way in addition to their use as community languages. But how do the surprisingly high figures of 47 per cent for Dutch as a “most spoken” language come up? Why do speakers appear to have no allegiance to Sranantongo as a “first” language (9%) and almost exclusively name it as a second language (37%)?

First of all, it appears that Dutch, in particular Surinamese Dutch, has indeed been making further inroads into Surinamese society. Dutch is the dominant language of instruction in school, and the extended reach of Dutch-based audio-visual media and the formation of a transatlantic Surinamese area after independence due to emigration, remigration, and transmigration have contributed to this development. Sranantongo is also expanding, but this fact is only reflected in the correspondingly high second language allegiance. A large proportion of Surinamese actually speaks Sranantongo as a second or third language on a daily basis, but will not admit to this when asked. When Surinamese are asked about the languages they use, they name the languages they prefer. The figures in Table 8.3 suggest that the discrepancy between actual patterns of use and language attitudes appears to be the most accentuated with respect to Dutch and Sranantongo. We attribute the low percentage of Sranantongo as “language spoken most often” to the differences in prestige that Dutch and Sranantongo enjoy, which leads to an overrepresentation in the case of Dutch and under representation in the case of Sranantongo.

Two recent surveys confirm these suspicions. Kroon and Yagmur (2010) list the following top fourteen home languages in a large sample of primary and secondary school students across Suriname in a 2010 study supported by the Nederlandse Taalunie (the Dutch language standardising agency of which Suriname, the Netherlands and Belgium are members). Table 8.4 conflates first and second (or third, or fourth) language uses by giving total percentages. The language names in Table 8.4 are the ones used in the source:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Spoken as home language</th>
<th>In %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>20.137</td>
<td>88.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sranantongo</td>
<td>13.761</td>
<td>60.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarnami</td>
<td>6.853</td>
<td>30.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the Taalunie survey, Dutch figures once more as the top runner of all home languages. In the three districts of the interior put together, the score for Dutch as (one of the) home languages is much lower, but with 27% (Kroon and Yagmur 2010: 43) still scores higher than expected. In fact, such high scores for Dutch as a home language in the interior do not tally with the admittedly impressionistic observations made by us and other linguists who have worked on the languages of Suriname (e.g. Renata de Bies, p.c.; Hein Eersel, p.c.; Bettina Migge, p.c.). They therefore seem unlikely indicators of actual language use in the three districts of the interior. Another hint towards the attitudinal nature of these figures is the surprisingly high score for English. Even abstracting from a strong presence of Creolese (the English-lexicon creole of Guyana) in Guyanese immigrant families in Suriname, a figure of 20 per cent seems excessively high. The figure for English is therefore more likely to reflect the high and growing prestige of English in Suriname rather than actual practice in Surinamese homes.

Contrary to Kroon and Yagmur 2010, Léglise and Migge (this volume) explicitly point to the attitudinal nature of the figures rendered by their recent survey conducted amongst school children. Here too, we find the usual combination of unexpectedly high scores for Dutch, surprisingly low, but still significantly high scores for Sranantongo and more balanced scores for all other languages.

Of course such subjective speaker assessments in themselves have a highly objective information value. They tell us something about language attitudes, as mentioned above. But we suspect that the high scores for Dutch also tell us something about the perceived presence of Dutch in multilingual interactions in households. This presence may range from the use of single Dutch

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Spoken as home language</th>
<th>In %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>4.606</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Javanese</td>
<td>3.497</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ndyuka</td>
<td>2.561</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saamaka</td>
<td>2.200</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paamaka</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arawak</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aluku</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carib</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
lexical items, through light to heavy code-switching with Dutch, to a largely monolingual use of Dutch. The same holds for Sranantongo even if its perceived presence in household interactions is lower. The national census data, the Taalunie and the Léglise and Migge survey (this volume) therefore give us valuable insights into the nature of multilingualism in Suriname, even if their use for determining actual language practices is limited by their very nature.

The situation with respect to the other languages listed in Table 8.3 and Table 8.4 is similar. For example, Sarnami is seen as an in-group language par excellence. This is confirmed by official census data from 2008 from the districts of Paramaribo and Wanica, that aligns ethnic and language background (cf. 2007/2009–08). The data show a minute percentage of members of other self-classified ethnicities claiming Sarnami as a “mother tongue”, namely 0.5 percent for people who claim Javanese ethnicity and a gaping 0% for those who self-identify as “Kreool” (Afro-Surinamese except Maroon).

However, the data on “mother tongue” background alone could allow the conclusion that Sranantongo is also chiefly an in-group language. It also gets exceedingly low scores as a mother tongue, namely 1% and 2% respectively for those who self-identify as “Hindostaan” (Indo-Surinamese) and Surinamese Javanese respectively. Even more surprisingly, Sranantongo even gets a low score of 13% as a mother tongue within the Afro-Surinamese group—with more than 80% claiming Dutch as a “mother tongue”. The situation is similar, though not as striking, with those who identify as “Hindostaan” (Indo-Surinamese)—here 24% claim Dutch as a “mother tongue”. Although a strong allegiance with Dutch and a symbolic rejection of Sranantongo as a primary language may be typical of these two (peri-)urban districts, our own research in the district of Saramacca for example, revealed older patterns of multilingualism beyond the Sranantongo-Dutch axis. Quite a few people with whom we conducted extended sociolinguistic interviews claimed that their parents or grandparents above fifty years of age had a good command of Sarnami and Javanese although they did not self-identify as the corresponding ethnicity. Beyond that, and quite to the contrary of what may be deduced from the national census and survey data presented so far, our sociolinguistic interviews in all districts of Suriname except Sipaliwini and Marowijne revealed very positive attitudes towards Sranantongo, when the language of interaction between interviewer and interviewee in sociolinguistic interviews was Sranantongo rather than Dutch.

Even if such qualitative data may not easily be compared to quantitative data, our observations point to the complexity of the relationship between language attitudes and actual practices. The analyses of the census and survey
data, as well as our own observations show that use patterns are only partially coterminous with ethnic identification.

4.2 On the Impact of Demographic Strength of Ethnolinguistic Groups and Their Geographic Distribution on Language Use

While it is often true that the demographic weight of an ethnolinguistic minority group in a geographical location in relation to the majority group determines the degree of language use and maintenance within the minority community (Fasold 1993), it is not the case for Suriname. Until the 1970s, Afro-Surinamese were the numerically dominant group in Suriname and the historical standard-setting role of the Afro-Surinamese population with respect to both Surinamese Dutch and Sranantongo is referred to by Blanker and Dubbeldam (2005) and de Bies et al. (2009) among others. In the years before and after independence, the Indo-Surinamese population became the numerically dominant group. The population census of 1972 lists 142,917 (37.6%) as “Hindostaans” (Indo-Surinamese) and 119,009 (31.4%) as “Kreool” (Afro-Surinamese). The census of 2004 lists 135,117 (27.4%) as “Hindostaans” and 87,202 as “Kreool” (17.7%) (Algemeen Bureau voor de Statistiek, Paramaribo 2005). Despite the relative numerical decline of those self-identifying as “Kreool”, the language that is originally associated with this group is expanding, see the previous section. There are more speakers of Sranantongo in Suriname than there are people who self-identify as “Kreool”. At the same time, Sarnami, the language of the numerically dominant group of Indo-Surinamese, seems to be losing ground. Thus, Suriname shows that the size of an ethnolinguistic group is not an exclusive indicator of language use and maintenance.

Given the absence of any systematic geo-linguistic survey of the languages of Suriname, it is equally difficult to assess the degree of geographically determined variation. The only language for which we have conclusive evidence for the existence of a geographically defined variational space is Sarnami—Marhé (1985) lists a number of lexical and grammatical features that differentiates between a western, Nickerie-based variety and the variety spoken further east along the coast. In our corpus, many speakers however mix features from the two ends of the supposed variational space. For example, the same text produced by the same speaker may contain the past tense morpheme /-is/ as in u á-is ‘s/he came’, next to the functionally equivalent /-il/ as in u á-il. Marhé (ibid.) classifies the latter morpheme as typical for Nickerie Sarnami, while the former is seen as an exponent of the eastern variety. This points to the difficulty of determining discrete linguistic boundaries in a society such as Suriname, with a small, increasingly mobile population, characterised by dense and
multiplex social networks. This is equally relevant for the possibility of an urban-rural divide, for example as posited by us in the following section with respect to Ndyuka. Although we use this opposition as an analytical frame, we contend that the urban-rural linguistic boundary has become brittle, and is better seen as a multivariate space in which language, linguistic practice, locality—both geographically and in terms of speaker perception—and mobility—both socio-geographically and in terms of communication technology (e.g. mobile phones, see Van Stipriaan, this volume) interact in various ways (see Pennycook 2010; Lawrance 2007).

4.3 Institutional Support and Education

Few countries have followed the example set by South Africa, which established the possibility to use one’s native language in institutional settings as a fundamental human right for all citizens in its constitution of 1996. In Suriname, the debate on language policy is highly politicised which has made government support for any language other than Dutch a difficult matter (Gobardhan-Rambocus 1989, 2006). In March 2011, a steering committee was formed to prepare the ground for the foundation of a language council. At present, however, there is little government support for any of the Surinamese languages and multilingualism is not officially supported. On the other hand, foreign financed agencies have been active in Suriname. The Nederlandse Taalunie (Dutch language union), the Dutch language standardising agency, is present in Suriname. Although the Nederlandse Taalunie does not exercise the type of cultural diplomacy known from larger agencies such as the Alliance Française, the British Council or the German Goethe Institute, the Nederlandse Taalunie does have a considerable degree of soft power in its capacity to influence perceptions about the present and potential roles of Dutch in Surinamese society through personal and institutionalised networks with Surinamese intellectuals and academics and its capacity to finance and disseminate studies such as Kroon and Yagmur (2010). This is all the more the case given that there is no department of modern languages or linguistics at the Anton de Kom University, the national university of Suriname, that could galvanise and organise local expertise on language issues. Likewise, The Summer Institute of Linguistics was present from 1968 to 2001 and through its dictionary and bible translation projects, has made an important contribution to the standardisation and normalisation of Surinamese languages like Sranantongo, Sarnami, Ndyuka, and Saramaccan.

The socio-demographic turn after World War II led to increased access to education, economic advancement and participation in the political sphere by other ethnic communities than the old Afro-Surinamese elite, particularly
the big three communities of Indo-Surinamese, Javanese and more recently, Maroons. One possible consequence of a growing assertiveness of the other communities is that formerly marginal(ised) speech features in both Dutch and Sranantongo, considered to be characteristic of non-core, hence non-Afro-Surinamese practices might be moving to centre-stage and losing whatever stigma they might have had. In fact, we might have to consider the possibility that adstrate and substrate effects in the Sranantongo speech of the non-Afro-Surinamese majority may be encroaching upon the Sranantongo variety spoken by the Afro-Surinamese community itself.

Nevertheless, we would like to point out that so far, the presence of Afro-Surinamese language practices and features is highly visible in the Sranantongo and Dutch spoken by all ethno-linguistic groups of Suriname. Even a cursory glance at de Bies et al.’s Dictionary of Surinamese Dutch (2009) shows the preponderance of Sranantongo loans and calques. This “standard-setting” role, so far, is probably due to a “founder effect” (see Mufwene 1996), in which for the longest time, Afro-Surinamese language practices have dominated the linguistic space of Suriname, and which successive waves of “late-comers” have adapted to.

The dimensions and the flexibility of language use patterns are perhaps best captured in the words of one of our participants, a 53 year old working-class male, who self-identifies as “Hindostaan” (Indo-Surinamese):

*Luku doorgaans te mi de na wroko, nanga mi chef yere, mi e taki Nederlands, af en toe Neger-Engels. Ma te mi de nanga mi collega, werk-collega dyaso, mi e taki Nengre. Yu abi wantu Hindustani, dan mi e taki Hindoestaans nanga en.*

A consequence of the entrenchment of Sranantongo and Dutch in far more domains than other languages of Suriname, as well their usefulness as languages of wider communication, as well as their overt and covert prestige, is that these two languages function as “attractors”. They exert influence on the other languages in a non-reciprocal or unbalanced way. Sranantongo and Dutch provide lexical items and grammatical structures to the other languages of Suriname and to each other, and by this process act as agents of change and targets of convergence and language shift.

---

1 “Look, usually, when I’m at work, with my boss, right, I speak Dutch, sometimes Sranantongo. But when I’m with my colleagues, I speak Sranantongo. When there are a few Indo-Surinamese, then I speak Sarnami with them.”
4.4 Mass Media

Language use in the public domain via mass media can have varying degrees of influence on language shift and language maintenance. While the impact of language use on radio and television on language maintenance in Suriname has not yet been systematically researched in detail, it appears that most ethnolinguistic groups are represented by at least one radio/tv station. Paramaribo has some 30 radio stations and 15 television stations, Nickerie has 12 radio stations and 4 television stations. Four radio stations are located on the banks of the Boven-Suriname river and the Tapanahoni river and even Galibi has a radiostation (Ramnath 2012).

While in the 1970s and 1980s, literary activity in particularly Sranantongo was booming via prose, poetry and plays, it is less booming nowadays. Schrijversgroep ’77 is still active though, hosting monthly events in Tori Oso and distributes prose and poetry in various languages via their website (http://www.schrijversgroep77.org/). On the other hand, Suriname has a vibrant musical scene in which rappers and spoken word artists use Dutch, Sranantongo, Ndyuka and other languages of Suriname. Furthermore, messages on various discussion boards on websites such as Waterkant, Anda Suriname, Suriname.nl and Culturu.com among others, show that even though Dutch is the only language of instruction in the schools of Suriname, this does not prevent the people of Suriname from writing in languages other than Dutch.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Station name</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Language choice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SRS</td>
<td>Public national station</td>
<td>Nation-wide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apintie</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Nation-wide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RP The Hot One</td>
<td>Rapar Broadcasting Network</td>
<td>Paramaribo, Nickerie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RP Noer</td>
<td>Rapar Broadcasting Network</td>
<td>Paramaribo, Nickerie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RP ACME</td>
<td>Rapar Broadcasting Network</td>
<td>Paramaribo, Nickerie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Ishara</td>
<td>Rapar Broadcasting Network</td>
<td>Nickerie</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ramnath 2012
Many of these messages are mixed, they include Dutch and Sranantongo, Saramaccan, Sarnami, Ndyuka, etc.

5 Convergence in Suriname: Linguistic Data

In the previous sections, we discussed various historical and social factors that have contributed to shaping the linguistic landscape of Suriname. The preceding discussion revealed a scenario characterised by a complex layering of historical and contemporary social, political and economic processes that have placed the languages of Suriname into particular relationships to each other. In the current section, we will present some linguistic data that may be taken to reflect the workings of the social forces outlined in section 4. The languages covered in the following are Sranantongo, Sarnami and Ndyuka. In the following, we focus on two domains, namely constituent order of locative phrases and basic clauses, as well as the expression of tense, mood and aspect. The data presented in this section seems to indicate that these languages have been undergoing quite substantial change in recent times. We hypothesise that these changes are contact-induced and reflect the influence of the two most widely spoken languages of Suriname, namely Sranantongo and Dutch. At the moment, these changes seem to occur within a context of language maintenance. We do not, however, discard the possibility that some of these changes may be reflective of an ongoing language shift. This may be the case for Sarnami, for example.

5.1 Locative Constructions in Sranantongo

In this section, we cover contact-induced change in phrasal constituent order in Sranantongo. We conclude that contact with Dutch has led to the consolidation of locative constructions in contemporary Sranantongo, which resemble their Dutch counterparts more than those found in earlier varieties of Sranantongo.

Sranantongo and the other creoles of Suriname have long been noted for their use of postpositions in the expression of spatial relations (see, e.g. Muysken 1987). In the following sentence, the Sranantongo locative element ondro ‘under(part)’ co-occurs with an additional locative element, the general locative preposition na ‘LOC’. Unlike its English and Dutch counterparts ‘under’ and onder, Sranantongo ondro also appears in a post- rather than a pre-nominal position. Postpositional locative constructions in Sranantongo (and in the Maroon creoles) have been convincingly argued to have arisen due to
the influence of patterns found in the Gbe substrate languages of the creoles of Suriname (Bruyn 1996; Essegbey 2005):

(1) *a buku de na a tafra ondro.*
    \[\text{def.sg book be.at loc def.sg table bottom}\]
    ‘The book is under the table.’ (Sranantongo)

Postpositional locative elements already occur in historical records in such complex locative structures, as found in (2):

(2) *sinsi a komm na hosso inni.*
    \[\text{since 3sgcome loc house inside}\]
    ‘since she entered the house.’ (Sranantongo; Schumann 1781)

Structures such as (2) above are best seen to involve a possessive/modification relation, instantiated by the juxtaposition of the Ground (*hosso* ‘house’) and the following locative element (*inni* ‘inside’), the latter of which functions as the possessed/head noun. This kind of spatial relation may also be realised through the inverse constituent order without a change in meaning (cf. Essegbey 2005: 237); the locative noun precedes the Ground NP in a prepositional phrase introduced by the general locative preposition *na* ‘LOC’, as in (3). Such pre-Ground structures have also been recorded in the language since earliest times (see Essegbey and Bruyn 2002, Van den Berg 2007). Note the optionality of the locative preposition *na* in (3):

(3) *a buku de (na) ondro a tafra.*
    \[\text{def book be.at loc under def.sg table}\]
    ‘The book is under the table.’ (Sranantongo)

The grammaticality of both pre- and post-positional structures notwithstanding, post-positional structures are totally absent in our field data. We must conclude that the development towards prepositional structures has been completed, at least in the varieties that we have studied, and across all types of text genres in our corpus. This means that locative constructions involving postpositions are no longer in use by the vast majority of speakers. This is confirmed by grammaticality judgments submitted to a sub-section of our language informants. Five speakers below twenty-five years of age perceived post-positional structures to be wrong, and highly unusual at best. Three speakers of around fifty years of age were familiar with postpositional structures but said they would not use them. One speaker of ninety years expressed a preference
for post-positional structures but conceded that these would be considered unusual by younger speakers.

We assume that language contact with Dutch is primarily responsible for the consolidation of prepositional locative constructions in Sranantongo. For one, all informants from whom the present data was collected consider themselves to be fluent speakers of (Surinamese) Dutch. Secondly, the data was collected in Paramaribo and adjoining areas, hence within the (peri-) urban zone that we have identified as the focal area of language contact in Suriname, and the area within which Dutch is most widely spoken alongside other languages. With respect to the linguistic factors that speak for convergence towards Dutch, prepositional structures are the only option in Dutch, at least in the expression of core spatial relations like ‘under’, ‘in’ or ‘on’. Perhaps a contributing cause is also a typological pressure to align constituent order in locative constructions with Sranantongo’s SVO word order. Compare the following Dutch constructions.

(4) *de jonge-man gaat de ballen in een doos zetten.*
the young-man goes the balls in a box put
‘The youngster goes to put the ball into a box.’ (Surinamese Dutch)

(5) *een muis slaapt onder de boom.*
a mouse sleeps under the tree
‘A mouse is sleeping under the tree.’ (Surinamese Dutch)

On a side note, example (4) features a typically Surinamese characteristic, namely the use of *zetten* as a general placement verb—Speakers of Netherlands Dutch would rather use verbs like *plaatsen* ‘to place’, *stoppen* ‘put (inside)’ or *doen* ‘put’, lit. ‘do’. Example (5) does not, however, feature any specifically Surinamese structures or lexical usages.

A closer look at prepositional structures provides another indication of the contact-induced changes in the expression of spatial relations in Sranantongo. We have seen that the general locative preposition *na* ‘LOC’ is optional in prepositional structures, cf. (3). The co-occurrence of *na* with a following locative element (the Region or Search Domain element) varies greatly, however. In our corpus, the omission of *na* with the locative element *ini* ‘in(side)’, as exemplified in (6) is about four times more frequent than with *tapu* ‘upper(side)’.

(6) *a gi en wan sani ini wan batra.*
def.sg give 3sg.indp indf thing in indf bottle
‘She gave him something in the bottle.’ (Sranantongo)
For us, the absence of *na* in sentences like (6) is an indication that *ini* is further along the road of a categorial reanalysis than *tapu* (and other locative elements like *ondro* ‘under(side)’ and *baka* ‘back, behind’). In other words, *ini* is losing its nominal characteristics and becoming a preposition modeled along its Dutch cognate *in*. There is no doubt that this contact-induced reanalysis is facilitated by the phonological similarity of the Dutch and Sranantongo forms.

Sranantongo has had both prepositional and postpositional structures from the earliest period of its documented history. The change towards uniquely prepositional structures in contemporary Sranantongo is therefore one of degree rather than outright innovation. Supporting evidence that postpositional structures might, however, have been at least as common as prepositional ones, and possibly even more common in Early Sranantongo comes from Ndyuka, a language that split off from Early Sranantongo in the eighteenth century. In our recordings of contemporary Ndyuka, spatial elements (except the general locative preposition *a* ‘LOC’) are only found in the postpositional slot, as is the case with *tapu* ‘(on) top (of)’ in (7). The nominal character of these “adpositions” transpires in (8), where *tapu* is used as a common noun in object position:

(7) wan man anga wan uman sidon a wan tafaa *tapu*.
    one man and one woman sit LOC one table top
‘A woman and a man are sitting at a table.’ (Ndyuka)

(8) a wan booko a dalati di lontu *tapu*.
    3SG want break DEF.SG wire SUB surround top
‘S/he wants to break the wire that goes around the top.’ (Ndyuka)

There is one exception, however. The only Ndyuka spatial elements that appears both in the pre- and the postpositional slot is *ini* ‘in(side)’ as shown in (9) and (10) respectively:

(9) ne a todo komoto *ini* a gaasi bataa.
    then 3SG frog go.out inside DEF.SG glas bottle
‘Then the frog came out of the glass bottle.’ (Ndyuka)

(10) Ma mi tyai en komoto na a bakaa go a
    but 1SG carry 3SG come.out LOC DEF.SG outsider go LOC
    ngoni kiiki *ini*.
    Ngoni Creek inside
‘But I brought him from town into Ngoni Creek.’
(Ndyuka; Huttar and Huttar 1994: 188)
Example (9) suggests that ini is more preposition-like than the other spatial elements in Ndyuka (except, of course the locative preposition (n)a) for two reasons. Firstly ini may be employed without being preceded by the general locative preposition na, and secondly it may occur before the Ground rather than only after it. In other respects, ini nevertheless behaves more like a nominal element than a preposition. For example, ini can occur independently, just like tapu in (8) above without a following noun specifying Ground, cf (11) below. This is the reason why we gloss ini as ‘inside’ rather than ‘in’ (see also Bruyn 1995: 241–253).

(11) da a man teke den san poti a ini.
    then DEF.SG man take DEF.PL thing put LOC inside
    ‘Then the man took the things and put them inside.’ (Ndyuka)

We can conclude the following from the behaviour of spatial elements in Sranantongo and Ndyuka:

(1) At an earlier stage of its history, Sranantongo featured postpositional structures as the default option, with prepositional structures constituting an alternative option. Through sustained contact with Dutch, the use of pre- vs. postpositional structures shifted in favour of the former in Sranantongo; the shift has been completed in contemporary Sranantongo, which has all but discarded postpositional structures;

(2) Ini ‘in’ is the most preposition-like of all spatial elements in contemporary Sranantongo (except na ‘loc’) and in contemporary Ndyuka. In Sranantongo, the categorial shift of ini towards preposition has, however, progressed further than in Ndyuka.

One possible explanation for (b) is that the ongoing reanalysis of ini as a preposition in contemporary Sranantongo was facilitated because ini might already have had more prepositional characteristics than other locative elements in Early Sranantongo (see Bruyn 1995; Van den Berg 2007). While locative elements such as tappo ‘top, on top of, upside’ and bakka ‘back, at the back of, behind’ among others are found as prepositions as well as postpositions in various eighteenth century sources of Early Sranan, ini occurs more frequently before the Ground than after it in the same sources. Further evidence for this is the observation that ini is also more preposition-like in Ndyuka, which split off from Sranantongo in the early eighteenth century. Sranantongo has, however, had longer and more intense contact with Dutch, and this is probably why ini is even more preposition-like in Sranantongo than in Ndyuka. An alternative explanation for (b) is that Ndyuka ini acquired its preposition-like
characteristics through contact with Sranantongo and Dutch in more recent times rather than through inheritance from the period of its split off.

5.2 Basic Word Order in Sarnami

We now turn to changes in basic word order in Sarnami. Our analyses suggest that basic word order in Sarnami is converging with word order in Sranantongo and Surinamese Dutch. As observed for Sranantongo in the preceding section, our informants were multilingual without exception, considering themselves to be fluent in Dutch, and to a slightly lower degree in Sranantongo, alongside Sarnami. Besides speakers from Paramaribo and its surroundings, our pool of Sarnami speakers also includes a substantial number of informants (about a third of the total) from the Nickerie district, the second largest agglomeration of the country. The fact that most Sarnami speakers from Nickerie, a largely mono-ethnic Indo-Surinamese district, also profess to be competent in Sranantongo shows how far Sranantongo has gone to become an ethnically neutral national lingua franca, albeit without the institutional support enjoyed by Dutch.

Like other Indic languages, Sarnami main clauses normally have a Subject—Object—Verb (SOV) order (Marhé 1985: 26), compare (12):

\[(12)\] 
\[
\text{ego manai} \quad \text{ego dosu lá-il hai}
\]
\[
\text{INDF person} \quad \text{INDF box bring-PSTP be.PRS}
\]
\['A person has brought a box.' (Sarnami)\]

Word order is nevertheless quite flexible in the Indic languages, and may vary in accordance with syntactic and pragmatic factors. In most Indic languages, speakers may also use a Subject—Verb—Object (SVO) order if they want to emphasise the Object, as in the following Hindi sentence:

\[(13)\] 
\[
\text{Mohan ne de dī apnī kitabē fyam ko.}
\]
\[
\text{name erg give give.PERF.PL refl.poss.f book.f.pl name dat}
\]
\['Mohan has given his book to Sham.' (Hindi; Kachru 2006: 160)\]

We also find SVO basic word order in Sarnami, as shown in (14). A closer look at the Sarnami texts in our corpus, however, show that SVO is common in contexts where an emphasis of the Object is unlikely. Yakpo and Muysken (2014) compare a corpus of narrative texts in Sarnami and its closely related Indian sister languages Bhojpuri and Maithili, and find a statistically significant difference between the Suriname and India data in the frequency of SVO in main
clauses: The average frequency of 36% of SVO basic word order across a sample of Sarnami texts is nine times higher than that of a corresponding sample of Indian sister languages.

\[(14) \text{tab u dekh-il ego hol jamin men.} \]
\[\text{then DIST see-PSTP one hole ground in} \]
\[\text{‘Then he saw a hole in the ground.’ (Sarnami)} \]

The high frequency of SVO in the Sarnami corpus appears to be the result of convergence with Sranantongo and Surinamese Dutch. In Sranantongo, SVO is the only acceptable basic word order in main clauses. Compare the following sentence:

\[(15) \text{dan a boi si wan olo.} \]
\[\text{then DEF.SG boy see INDF hole} \]
\[\text{‘Then the boy saw a hole.’ (Sranantongo)} \]

Dutch is generally considered a mixed word order language in which the occurrence of SOV and SVO is conditioned by syntactic factors. We could therefore assume, a priori, that word order in in Surinamese Dutch does not necessarily exert as strong a pressure towards SVO in Sarnami as Sranantongo. A number of factors, however, point towards Dutch as a donor language of SVO along-side Sranantongo. For one part, Surinamese Dutch, like Netherlands Dutch, features SVO basic word order when the predicate is ‘simple’, i.e. consists of a single word, cf. (16).

\[(16) \text{het jongetje ziet een gat in een boom.} \]
\[\text{the boy sees a hole in a tree} \]
\[\text{‘The boy sees a hole in the a tree.’ (Surinamese Dutch)} \]

Secondly, word order is SAuxOV in Dutch main clauses featuring complex predicates consisting of an auxiliary verb and a participial main verb, as in (17). Here the main verb (gezien ‘seen’) is clause-final, but the object (een gat ‘a hole’) follows the inflected verb (the auxiliary heeft ‘has’):

\[(17) \text{het jongetje heeft een gat in een boom gezien.} \]
\[\text{the boy has a hole in a tree seen} \]
\[\text{‘The boy has seen a hole in a tree.’ (Surinamese Dutch)} \]
In contrast to Dutch, Sarnami is much stricter in its SOV order. A Sarnami sentence analogous to (17) normally features a clause-final Aux (hence SOVAux), as can be seen in (12) (with *ego dosu* 'a box' and *hai* 'is' as O and Aux respectively), the object therefore precedes the inflected verb.

A third characteristic pointing towards convergent pressure towards SVO in Sarnami from both Sranantongo and Dutch is the situation in Dutch with respect to subordinate clauses. While Netherlands Dutch has SOV order in most types of subordinate clauses, Surinamese Dutch has been shown by de Kleine (2002) to show considerable variability between SOV (cf. (18) and SVO (cf. (19)) in such clauses. The presence of SVO in Surinamese Dutch subordinate clauses is in itself a structural feature borrowed from Sranantongo (ibid.):

(18) *want* ze weet dat ik niet van die dingen *hou.*

because she knows that I not of those things like

‘Because she knows I don’t like such things.’ (Netherlands Dutch; de Kleine 2002: 125)

(19) *want* ze *weet ik* *hou* niet van die dingen.

because she knows I like not of those things

‘Because she knows I don’t like such things.’ (Surinamese Dutch; de Kleine 2002: 125)

An exploratory analysis of our data also points to word order correlations with SVO basic word in Sarnami, even if these observations require further in-depth investigation. Our Sarnami corpus seems to feature a higher number of relative clauses that follow rather than precede their head nouns, as in the following example:

(20) *u* *ego dosu* lá-il *hai* [jau*n* pe thará *hoi* sake]

DIST a box bring-PSTP be.PRS rel on upright be can

‘He has brought a box that he can stand on.’ (Sarnami)

In Sarnami’s next relatives in India, both preposed and postposed relative clauses orders appear to be roughly equally common. Example (21) from Maithili, one of the contributing languages of Sarnami, shows a preposed relative clause. This order comes along with the correlative structure so typical of Indic; the postposed main clause contains the correlative marker *se*. Such correlative structures as in (21) are infrequent in the Sarnami data investigated so far, and surpassed in frequency by postposed structures of the type provided in (20) above:
Relative constructions involving a single relative pronoun and a post-posed relative clause also represent the most neutral type of structure in Sranantongo and Dutch, compare (22) and (23) respectively. We therefore assume the preference for such structures in Sarnami to once more be a consequence of convergent pressure from Sranantongo and Dutch:

(22) kande na a lespeki [san a barba e tyari kon].
   bring come perhaps foc def.sg respect rel def.sg beard ipfv
   ‘Perhaps it’s the respect that the beard brings along.’ (Sranantongo)

(23) een vrouw gooit een bijl op de bord [die dan vervolgens in stukken breekt].
   a woman throws an axe on the plate rel then afterwards in pieces breaks
   ‘A woman throws an axe on the plate, which then breaks into pieces.’ (Surinamese Dutch)

To sum up, Sarnami and its Indian relatives both manifest sov and svo in main clauses. In the Indian languages, svo is a pragmatically marked word order employed to signal focus of the object. However, Sarnami shows a much higher frequency of svo than the Indian languages. We have interpreted this as an indication that svo is no (more) a pragmatically marked word order in Sarnami, and is instead competing with sov as an unmarked word order. We see this change in progress in Sarnami to be induced by contact with Sranantongo and Dutch. A similar picture emerges in relative constructions, where postposed relative clauses modelled on Sranantongo and Dutch seem to be more common than other, typically Indic structures. We are therefore witnessing multidirectional convergence, in which both Surinamese Dutch and Sranantongo are contributing to contact-induced change in Sarnami. At the same time Dutch seems to have borrowed structures from Sranantongo as well, as shown with respect to word order in subordinate clauses.
5.3 *Expression of Tense, Mood and Aspect in Ndyuka*

While there is considerable overlap in TMA forms among the Surinamese creole languages, the semantic realms covered by these forms do not always coincide. The meanings of modal auxiliaries, in particular, are quite variable among the creoles. Here the focus will be on the area of epistemic probability, as well as deontic possibility and permission. These are the modal categories that correspond among the Surinamese creoles despite being conveyed by different forms (Migge 2006: 34; Migge and Goury 2008: 309; Migge and Winford 2009). Due to an increasing number of Maroons in the city, their knowledge of Sranantongo, frequent interaction with Maroons from other ethnic groups as well as non-Maroons and perhaps the inclination to establish an identity independent of their traditional ethnicity (see Migge 2007; Migge and Léglise 2013; Léglise and Migge, this volume), Maroon languages have come under influence of each other and Sranantongo. Ndyuka speakers themselves are also aware of Sranantongo’s influence on their language. One informant explained that the closer you get to the coast, the more ‘developed’ the language is. Others describe the influence more defensively; coastal Ndyuka is *moksi* ‘mixed’ or *basaa* ‘mixed’. An urban dwelling informant describes the difference in terms of “modern” Ndyuka along the coast versus a more traditional variety in the interior. Language attitudes aside, speakers are well aware that there is a difference between urban and rural varieties, though it is often difficult for informants to pinpoint particular features, while several informants claimed to switch between varieties depending on their environment. Table 8.6, where the Sranantongo and Rural Ndyuka columns are adapted from Migge (2006: 34), and Migge and Goury (2008: 399), illustrates how the modal categories of Urban Ndyuka (our data) have been influenced by Sranantongo:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modal category</th>
<th>Sranantongo</th>
<th>Rural Ndyuka</th>
<th>Urban Ndyuka</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive potential</td>
<td>sa</td>
<td>sa</td>
<td>sa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative potential</td>
<td>kan/sa</td>
<td>poi</td>
<td>poi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive possibility</td>
<td>kan</td>
<td>sa</td>
<td>kan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative possibility</td>
<td>man/kan</td>
<td>poi</td>
<td>poi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive permission</td>
<td>man/kan/mag</td>
<td>sa</td>
<td>kan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative permission</td>
<td>man/kan/mag</td>
<td>poi</td>
<td>man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive physical ability</td>
<td>man/kan</td>
<td>sa</td>
<td>kan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative physical ability</td>
<td>man/kan</td>
<td>poi</td>
<td>poi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Examples from naturalistic and elicited speech of city-dwelling (Paramaribo) Maroons recorded in 2011 demonstrate that the modal categories of Sranantongo have encroached upon those of urban Ndyuka. The following two examples contrast the rural Ndyuka form *poi* (<Portuguese *pode* ‘3SG can’) in (24) with the form *man* (<Dutch/English *man* ‘man’) in (25). Both forms may express negative permission (the former only in combination with verbal negation), in this context, they thus share the same function. Although *man* is also attested in upriver Ndyuka and Pamaka (Bettina Migge, p.c.), it has probably only been further entrenched in the speech of urban Ndyuka informants and appears to be preferred over *poi*. Compare the corresponding Sranantongo example in (26):

(24) mi be taigi den pikin kaba, yu á poi waka

1sg pst tell def.pl child compl 2sg neg mod walk
go a busi
‘I told those kids they may not go into the forest [alone].’ (Rural Ndyuka)

(25) i no man oli en moro.

2s neg mod hold 3sg.indp more
‘You may not keep it anymore.’ (Urban Ndyuka)

(26) un no man taki soso Sranantongo.

1/2pl neg mod talk only Sranantongo
‘You [pl] may not talk only Sranantongo.’ (Sranantongo)

The following examples illustrate the phenomenon with respect to the expression of physical ability. The conventional form for expressing this modal category in rural Ndyuka is the preverbal particle *sa*, as shown in (27). Urban Ndyuka speakers, however, freely employ the Sranantongo derived auxiliary verb *kan* instead, as in (28). Compare the Sranantongo use of *kan* in (29):

(27) a taanga, a sa diki wan ondoo kilo.

3sg be.strong 3sg mod lift one hundred kilo
‘He is (very) strong, he can lift 100 kilos.’ (Rural Ndyuka; Winford and Migge 2004: 30)

(28) i kan go meke wan film.

2sg mod go make indf film
‘You can go make a film.’ (Urban Ndyuka)
It is important to note here that the phenomenon presented cannot be described as a change that is complete; variation is the norm. Many of our urban informants were recorded using both rural Ndyuka forms next to urban forms, though this was not necessarily the case with upriver speakers. With two geographic points of reference in our Ndyuka sample, Paramaribo and the upriver Tapanahoni, the data suggest that Sranantongo is the main source of urban features in Ndyuka, but contact with highly intelligible eastern Maroon varieties should not be ignored. In fact, it is often difficult to determine the origin of a particular feature, such as the case of man in examples (24)–(26). Pamaka in not represented in our sample, though Migge and Goury (2008: 309) tell us that man is also employed for several modal categories in that language. Kan on the other hand appears to be an addition to the repertoire of urban Ndyuka originating from Sranantongo. Admittedly, etymologically iffy features such as man might weaken our argument for an urban influence on Ndyuka. However, it should be noted that the breakdown of traditional Maroon social systems in Paramaribo and urban centers along the Marowijne have set the stage for the blurring of some of the socially salient differences among Maroon varieties and opened the gates for influence from Sranantongo. It remains to be seen whether we are witnessing a diachronic change in progress. It is nonetheless certain that the causes of the variation we have registered can only partially be explained in terms of geography or urbanisation. Contextual factors, such as speaker and interlocutor identities, social setting, and language attitudes, also play a significant role in determining the distribution of linguistic variables, such as the modal forms described here (cf. Léglise and Migge, this volume).

6 Conclusion

The complex multilingual setting of Suriname cannot be regarded as a case of stable bilingualism or diglossia. We have presented examples of contact-induced changes in three languages of Suriname, namely Sranantongo, Ndyuka and Sarnami, in three language contact constellations that are typical for Suriname where Dutch and Sranantongo act as sources of change and targets of convergence and language shift:
(1) Locative constructions in Sranantongo are now more similar to Dutch than they were before. This case exemplifies contact with Dutch as the agent and another language (in this case Sranantongo) as the undergoer of a linguistic change (section 5.1).

(2) Word order changes in both main clauses and relative clauses are currently in progress in Sarnami, the undergoer of linguistic change in section 5.2. They exemplify multidirectional convergence, as both Surinamese Dutch and Sranantongo function as sources in this case. Note that Surinamese Dutch is not only the source but also the recipient when it comes to word order changes, as it seems to have borrowed structures from Sranantongo, as shown with respect to word order in subordinate clauses.

(3) The observed increase of similarities in the urban Ndyuka modal system with the Sranantongo modal system at the expense of the differences between the Ndyuka and Sranantongo systems illustrate the role of Sranantongo as the agent and another language (in this case Ndyuka) as the undergoer of change (section 5.3).

Some of the examples presented in this paper may well be regarded as pragmatic outcomes of ad-hoc strategies of individual speakers in response to the communicative challenges of the multilingual discourse setting, as well as identity performance, etc. Other examples, however, suggest that these pragmatic outcomes have become regularised and that language change has occurred (Sranantongo ini), may be occurring (Sarnami word order change) or that a new code has emerged, as in the case of Ndyuka. Our study suggests that social constraints and communicative norms that control language use in Suriname are changing. These changes may be influenced by increased speaker mobility along a geographical dimension (improved infrastructure; the emergence of the peri-urban region, and transmigration), as well as a social dimension (schooling; new (social media) and technologies), resulting in more multilingual encounters. Like all socio-cultural phenomena, language is expected to change. Future investigation will reveal how social and linguistic constraints on convergence and relaxation of norms conspire in the case of the changes that we have observed and how they contribute to the emergence of new practices.
CHAPTER 9

They Might as Well Be Speaking Chinese: The Changing Chinese Linguistic Situation in Suriname under New Migration

Paul B. Tjon Sie Fat

1 Introduction

This chapter presents one of the most obvious local examples, to the Surinamese public at least, of the link between mobility, language, and identity: current Chinese migration. These ‘New Chinese’ migrants since the 1990s were linguistically quite different from the established Hakkas in Suriname, and were the cause of an upsurge in anti-Chinese sentiments. It will be argued that the aforementioned link is constructed in the Surinamese imagination in the context of ethnic and civic discourse to reproduce the image of a monolithic, undifferentiated, Chinese migrant group, despite increasing variety and change within the Chinese segment of Surinamese society. The point will also be made that the Chinese stereotype affects the way demographic and linguistic data relating to Chinese are produced by government institutions. We will present a historic overview of the Chinese presence in Suriname, a brief ethnographic description of Chinese migrant cohorts, followed by some data on written Chinese in Suriname. Finally we present the available data on Chinese ethnicity and language from the Surinamese General Bureau of Statistics (ABS).

An ethnic Chinese segment has existed in Surinamese society since the middle of the nineteenth century, as a consequence of Dutch colonial policy to import Asian indentured labour as a substitute for African slave labour. Indentured labourers from Hakka villages in the Fuitungon Region (particularly Dongguan and Baoan)\(^1\) in the second half of the nineteenth century made way for entrepreneurial chain migrants up to the first half of the twentieth

\(^1\) The established Hakka migrants in Suriname refer to the area as fui²tung¹ on¹ (惠東安), which is an anagram of the Kejia pronunciation of the names of the three counties where the ‘Old Chinese’ migrant cohorts in Suriname come from: fui²jong² (惠陽 Putonghua: huìyáng), tung¹kon¹ (東莞 PTH: dōngguǎn), and pau³on¹ (寶安 PTH: bǎoān). For the informants in Suriname the term referred to the nineteenth century districts of Dongguan, Huiyang and Xin’an in the Hong Kong periphery, currently corresponding to areas in Dongguan.
century, who developed an ethnic ownership economy based on retail trade and their own adaptive institutions. Using T'sou's definition of a ‘Chinese language community’, a thriving Chinese-speaking group was in existence in Suriname by the early twentieth century; there were Chinese cemeteries (implying that Chinese script was used on gravestones and Chinese was spoken during funeral ceremonies), commercial and socio-cultural associations, Chinese religious institutions, Chinese-language education (written Chinese, taught in Kejia), Chinese-language media, and at least two consecutive generations with a basic knowledge of the ancestral dialect (T’sou 1987: B-16a).2 Assimilation produced a generational cleavage within the community between those born in China (Tong’ap) and those born in Suriname or of mixed heritage (Laiap).3 In the 1960s acculturated Fuitungon Hakka chain migrants came via Hong Kong, while the latest migrant cohorts arrived since the 1990s after the People's Republic of China (PRC) instituted economic reforms and eased restrictions on emigration.

By the start of the 1990s Chinese migration to Suriname sharply increased, and the impact of the ‘New Chinese’ in a society where ethnic Chinese had

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2 This chapter is about the Sinitic languages in Suriname, and so the non-Han component of Chinese migration to Suriname will not be considered. In any case, the Chinese Koreans are the only substantial group of ‘ethnic minority overseas Chinese’ (少數民族華僑華人, a political term used in the People’s Republic of China to gain some measure of State control over the transnational links of non-Han migrants from the PRC and their foreign coethnics) in Suriname. Ethnic Koreans are one of the 56 Minority Nationalities recognised by the PRC, and the majority live in Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture in Jilin Province, situated within the territories of the early medieval kingdoms of Goguryeo and Barhae. Originally forestry workers, they link up with the South Korean fishermen in Suriname and the South Korean migration network in South America (especially to the Southern Cone region). But as PRC citizens who are fully competent in Chinese spoken and written language, to Surinamese they are generally indistinguishable from other Northeastern Chinese migrants.

3 The word Laiap (lai2ap7 泥鴨/坭鴨, lit.: ‘Mud Duck’) derives from the Kejia name of an old duck breed in Guangdong Province, the offspring of a male fan1ap7 (番鴨, lit.: ‘foreign duck and a female of a local pond duck breed referred to as tong2ap7 (唐鴨, lit.: ‘Chinese duck’, i.e. local duck breed). Early on, the local-born children of Chinese migrants were often born of Creole mothers; local-born eventually became synonymous with mixed ancestry. Laiap is considered something of a racist slur by Kejia-speakers.
been gradually assimilating, triggered an upsurge in anti-Chinese sentiments. As an aspect of new globalised migration, New Migrants from China are literally found all over the globe. Compared to earlier Chinese migrants, the New Migrants typically have new types of transnational ties with the PRC as their homeland, through modern mass media and mass transit. The New Chinese in Suriname hail from every imaginable region in the Chinese world, but the vast majority arrived from the coastal provinces of the PRC, from Hainan in the south all the way to Liaoning in Manchuria. The majority in Suriname are from southern Zhejiang Province.

Whether globalisation of the PRC economy drives migration to destinations like Suriname or whether it is New Migrants from China who are introducing PRC products to new markets, New Chinese socio-economic positioning had a clear impact on the image of Chinese in Suriname. Their often large supermarkets came to represent the most concrete sign and outcome of New Chinese migration and of the growing influence and power of the PRC in the region. The Surinamese public tends to misunderstand the PRC’s presence in Suriname in terms of globalisation and geopolitics and conflates the PRC, Chinese migrants survival strategies and ethnic Chinese as ‘China’/‘Chinese’. As a consequence Chinese migrants and ethnic Chinese in Suriname need to choose their positioning strategies with the general image of monolithic Chineseness, in which ‘China’ and ‘Chinese’ are inextricably intertwined.

Since the arrival of the New Chinese, the linguistic and cultural landscape within the Chinese segment of Suriname has become more complex. Up to then ‘Chinese’ and Fuitungon Hakka culture and language were virtually synonymous in Suriname, as in other locations in the Caribbean such as Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. In Suriname, these ‘Old Chinese’ had to contend with at least five languages: the dialect of their ancestral villages, Sranantongo, Dutch, Mandarin (initially Guoyu, later Putonghua (PTH)), and English. The New Chinese added their own local languages to the mix, and their transnational orientation increased the importance of PTH and English (being world languages). However, most Surinamese were ignorant of any fundamental change, such as the shift of the main symbol of self-identifying Chinese ethnic identity—Chinese language—from Fuitungon Kejia to PTH, the official language of the People’s Republic of China. Why does Suriname seem blind—or

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4 ‘Mandarin’ is an English rendition of the Portuguese translation of Chinese guānhuà (官話): “the language of the officials.” That language was a koine, a melding of various Chinese varieties, dominated by Northern Chinese dialects. This koine led to the twentieth century standards of Guoyu and Putonghua, which are less koines but lingua francas more clearly related to Northern Chinese (South Coblin 2000).
rather deaf—to the changing Chinese linguistic ecology, and what exactly is it that is people are not seeing and hearing?

First we will look at language and identity among the Hakka of Suriname, the ‘Old Chinese’, and then familiarise ourselves with the New Chinese migrants and the languages they brought. To complete the picture of what Chinese language in Suriname entails we will also explore written Chinese. By critically observing the way Chinese ethnicity and language are handled in census and demographic statistics, we hope to understand how the Surinamese State deals with changes in the multicultural—and ethnopolitical—landscape. Finally, we will consider the link between Chinese language and instrumental ethnic identity.

2 The Chinese We Used to Hear: Hakka/Kejia

Up to the arrival of New Migrants in the early 1990s, Chinese language and culture meant the language and culture of migrants from the Fuitungon region in the Pearl River Delta, people who have tended to self-identify and have been identified as Hakka. During the 1960s a form of Hakka nationalism developed among certain ethnic Chinese intellectuals in Suriname, in response to earlier cultural and political policies of the Republic of China, the memory of nineteenth century Hakka-Punti conflicts in the migrant homelands in Southern China, the low esteem that Hakka culture and language had in the eyes of more recent migrant cohorts (the ‘Hong Kong Chinese’), and the drive to acquire recognition of the Chinese of Suriname as authentic Surinamese citizens. In their politics of identity the close link between Chineseness and Hakka identity was paramount, and the general awareness of the existence of Hakka in Suriname is due to their influence.

‘Hakka’ is used here loosely to refer to group identity, while following current practice in Chinese linguistics the ‘Hakka dialect’ is called ‘Kejia’, in order to distinguish between politics of identity and recognition and the rise and fall of this linguistic variety in Suriname. One should also recognise that Hakka ethnic identity is a social construct with a surprisingly recent history, and that Kejia as a linguistic category is less clear-cut than would seem to be the case.

2.1 Hakka

The term ‘Hakka’ (客家) basically means ‘outsider’, and originated in nineteenth century Guangdong Province when local Cantonese speakers (labelled pun³ti³ in Kejia: ‘of this place’, i.e. the established) were confronted with migrants from outside the province (haak³ga¹, Cantonese: ‘guest households’,
i.e. outsiders). The notion of Hakka as an ethnic identity linked to their dialect, Kejia, arose during this time (Cohen 1995). The element 客 (kè in PTH) is actually fairly common in local Chinese expressions which refer to ‘Chinese not from around here’ (Prager Banner 2000: 43). The origins of the people currently labelled Hakka can be traced to migrations from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries of poor households in Southern China, towards peripheries of economic centres in river drainage basins, enabled by the introduction of New World crops. Hakka identification was thus fundamentally contrastive, in the sense of day-to-day competition between the established and outsiders (one possible translation of the term ‘Hakka’). Hakkas are the exception to the Chinese rule of defining varieties of Han-Chinese culture and language as fundamentally regional. Even so, Hakka identity is strongly linked to areas in Guangdong province where Kejia varieties dominate, such as Meizhou.

Kejia varieties and Hakka identity are easily conflated (i.e. Kejia dialects are the languages spoken by people who identify or are identified as Hakka and Hakka are people who speak Kejia), often without sufficient linguistic arguments. Modern Hakka identity discourse can be traced to the politics of recognition conducted by Hakka intellectuals in the early twentieth century, basically in the aftermath of the nineteenth century conflicts. One of these intellectuals, Luo Xianglin, is most often quoted as an authority on the roots of Hakka identity (Lozada 1998: 93). He declared that the Hakka are Han, that they came from the north, that Hakka have unique cultural markers, and that Kejia is particularly close to medieval Northern Chinese language (Luo 1933). Read as a credo his book stresses that Hakka roots are primordial and respectable, meaning that they do not extend to non-Han groups such as Miao, Yao, Zhuang, and She, and are older than the Guangdongese conflicts.

It is safe to say that the idea of a Hakka group is currently taken for granted by most people, despite the fact that it is virtually impossible to frame Hakka ethnicity in unambiguous terms. There is no easily accessed Hakka identity (on the one hand ambiguity through cultural and linguistic shifts, assimilation and contingent identification makes easy definitions of Hakka-ness impossible, on the other hand no uncontested universal Hakka identity exists). When it does surface one should not be surprised if it is instrumental. In Suriname, Hakka identity currently does not produce any ethnic or cultural capital beyond the realm of Chinatown politics and Chinese business networks, and

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5 For the link between Hakka migrants and pengmin (棚民 ‘shack people’) labour migrants, see Leong 1997. Charles Mann (2011: 180–187) presents a very readable explanation of the role of maize and sweet potatoes in the spread of Hakkas in in the hills of Guangdong Province based on current Western and Chinese sources.
power dynamics among the elites of various Chinese regional backgrounds. With regard to broader Surinamese society Hakka ethnic identity is virtually meaningless. Anthropological and linguistic field workers risk taking ‘Hakka’ as a ontological category instead of a social construct that links a vague ethnic identity with an almost equally vague linguistic category, and thus risk missing continuous processes of assimilation and language shift that are characteristic of Chinese groups overseas.

2.2 Kejia
Kejia is a Chinese dialect group, one of up to 11 that have been identified, namely: Northern Chinese (Mandarin), Jin, Hui, Xiang, Gan, Wu, Min, Kejia, Yue, Pinghua (Chappell 2001: 6). The essentialist bias in the various discourses of Chinese identity is projected onto the issue of Hakka language, and so Hakka identity requires a single language, but in fact there is no unambiguous characterisation that can take account of all known Kejia varieties (Sagart 1998, Prager Banner 2000). Kejia varieties can be placed on continuums between Kejia, Min and Yue (Lau 2003). PRC linguists conventionally name the Kejia variety of Meizhou Muncipality in Guangdong province as a standard representative of the Kejia dialect group, mainly because Kejia has long been the dominant language in the Meizhou (ancient Jiayingzhou) region. This qualification combines with the high status accorded to speakers of Meizhou Kejia by other Kejia-speakers to produce the image of Meizhou Kejia as ‘real Kejia’, ‘pure Kejia’, even the only Kejia dialect.

The Kejia varieties of the Fuitungon Hakka migrant cohorts in Suriname, Fuitungon Kejia, come from the hilly areas where Dongguan, the Shenzhen sez/Baoan, and Huiyang meet (Li 1997: 3). These varieties are mutually intelligible; the lexicon of Huiyang Kejia has evidently been more influenced by Cantonese (Zhang 1999), and linguistic data from local publications indicate that tones are an important difference (Baoan Difang Zhi; Dongguan Difang Zhi; Zhang 1999, Xie and Huang 2007). Fuitungon Hakkas in Suriname usually describe the different varieties as ‘accents’. Not surprisingly, a local Kejia variety has developed in Suriname, with features such as reduced tones, archaic vocabulary items, Sranantongo loanwords, and often showing code-alternation practices involving Dutch and Sranantongo (Tjon Sie Fat 2002). Kejia had been the only form of spoken Chinese in Suriname for a long time, and its low status had been irrelevant until the introduction of Cantonese as a public medium in the 1970s.

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6 Fuitungon Kejia: Sinitic > Kejia > Yuetai > Xinhui.
7 Also called ‘Laiap Hakka’.
What is clear is that during the last decade or so Kejia has lost its place as essential Chinese lingua franca to PTH—which lowered the already low status of Kejia even further. The newcomers refuse to learn Kejia, and Hakka who do not learn PTH are considered ‘incomplete’; the inability to speak PTH is a symptom of Chinese who are out of touch with modern China. PTH thus also exposes a generation gap among the Tong’ap. The latest Fuitungon Hakka immigrants have learned PTH in school, and are thus able to communicate with non-Hakka immigrants. While newcomers recognise the usefulness of Sranantongo as inter-ethnic lingua franca in Suriname, they are ambiguous about Dutch, explaining that the role of English in the world is rather like that of PTH in China, and that learning Dutch is not worth the investment of time and money—like learning Kejia. Dutch is the dominant local language, rather like Cantonese in Guangdong Province, a view bolstered by the relatedness of Dutch and English. But unlike Cantonese, Dutch in Suriname functions as a guānhuà (官話), an official language, a language one needs at all formal levels of society. In PTH and Kejia Sranantongo is called a tūhuà/t’u3wa3 (土話 lit.: ‘earth speech’, local patois)—in many ways rather like Fuitungon Kejia.8

Fuitungon Hakka’s resentment about the inferior status of Kejia in Suriname is very rarely voiced. In 2004 the newspaper of the Chung Fa Foei Kon socio-cultural organisation printed a short text titled ‘Kejia Is Quietly Going Extinct’. The writer, a Fuitungon Hakka whose name read Luo Quan in PTH, complained about the continued disrespect of the ancestral Kejia dialect in favour of Cantonese and PTH in public settings:

Last year was the 150th anniversary of the arrival of the First Hakkas in Suriname. From Huiyang, Dongguan and Baoan, but mostly from Dongguan and Baoan, those first Hakkas came to endure hardship and create their businesses and institutions out of nothing. Those first

8 This hierarchical view of language is reflected in the Chinese-language media in Suriname. Various Surinamese radio and television stations carried a number of Chinese-language broadcasts, notably the daily China Central Television slot on the State TV broadcaster STVS. In July 2005, a Chinese-language radio station (Viva-953 on FM radio, of the Suriname Chinese Media Groups Foundation/蘇理南華語創作媒體) started broadcasting in Cantonese and PTH (Zhonghua Ribao 中華日報 12 July 2005, 蘇理南中文電台, FM 匯聚 953 頻道致蘇理南僑胞的公開信 (Open letter to the Chinese of Suriname from Chinese-language radio on 953 FM); XNRB 4 July 2005, announcement by ‘Suriname Chinese Media Groups Foundation’). In February 2008, a Chinese TV station (SCTS on channel 45, of Stichting Kong Nge Tong Sang TV) which re-broadcasts programmes from the PRC in PTH, was opened in Paramaribo This TV channel basically developed out of the STVS Chinese-language slot. <http://surinaams.caribiana.nl/Cultuur/car20080208_sctv-chinees>.
Chinese set up Kong Ngie Tong Sang (more than 120 years old), Chung Fa Foei Kon, Fa Tjauw Song Foei, and later also Hua Cu Hui and Chung Tjauw Fu Li Foei.

Kejia is spoken at the monthly general meetings of the associations, and during the rosca meetings as well. Why? Because they and their ancestors are Hakka, so they all speak Kejia. But certain people, even though their ancestors, their parents, they themselves and their descendants are all Hakka, often do not speak the language they use at home, even rejecting it as though any other random language can raise their status.

During this year’s Moon Festival only Minister Jong Tjien Fa [former Minister of Trade and Industry, 2002–2005] uttered one line of something I would not have dared to call Kejia. Besides this, the three masters of ceremony only spoke Cantonese, Mandarin and Dutch, but not a syllable of Kejia could be heard during that Moon Festival which was organised by Hakka for all Chinese in Suriname. Someone remarked that this indicated assimilation. I said it was self-alienation, that your own self is authentic. This is so sad!

You must have surely seen how Zhejiangese and Fujianese address people from their hometowns in their own dialect. But only we Hakka like to speak another dialect, especially Cantonese. If you or your children cannot or will not speak your own language, is that not foolishly suppressing your own roots, is that not aiding in the extinction of Kejia? I would hereby like to press upon you, you who work in education and in society, that it is time to take this issue seriously!

(Zhonghua Ribao 中華日報, 2 October 2004: ‘客家話正在悄悄地消亡’ (Kejia is quietly going extinct))

Language is the most important issue between the smaller, but more visible and deceptively concrete domain of the China-born (Tong’ap), and the much larger, but diffuse Laiap sphere. All Old Chinese have at least a basic command of the lingua franca variety of Sranantongo, but few Tong’ap are proficient in Dutch, the formal language of the Surinamese State. Laiap seldom speak other Chinese varieties than the local, Surinamese variety of Kejia. Migrants from the Fuitungon region who arrived in the 1980s and 1990s are also fluent in Cantonese and PTH, but very seldom in any Western language. In short, immigrants are generally illiterate in Western languages, and Laiap are virtually all

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9 Rosca: rotating savings and credit association. The traditional Fuitungon Hakka rosca is called fu3ts’en2会錢.
illiterate in Chinese. So the Tong’ap and Laiap worlds do not meet on Chinese terms, but Laiap have become gatekeepers for Tong’ap vis-à-vis the Surinamese State.

Fuitungon Kejia does not define the distinction between Old and New Chinese, as it is not the only Kejia variety spoken in Suriname since Taiwanese and PRC immigrants have introduced different varieties of Kejia. From the 1980s, people from Chixi in Guangdong Province have established a chain migration network (see below under ‘Southerners’); they do not imagine ‘Hakka-ness’ as defined by and limited to the geographical territory of China.

Asked if Chixi Kejia and Fuitungon Kejia are mutually intelligible, one Chixi Hakka informant in her early thirties answered: “Of course. They’re completely the same. We’re all Hakkas, we all speak Kejia.” This contrasts with the response of a Kejia-speaking Laiap woman of about the same age: “Yes, I can understand them. But it’s different. The tones are different. They are Hakkas, but they’re not like us.” Chixi Hakka children, whether born or raised in Suriname, are fully integrated in Paramaribo society from a young age and are for all intents and purposes Laiap. They speak any combination of Kejia, Yue, Mandarin, Dutch, Sranantongo, and English, unlike their parents, who generally only speak Chixi Kejia and PTH.

3 The Chinese We Hear Now: New Migrants and Their Languages

Of the 11 Chinese dialect groups, five, namely Northern Chinese (‘Mandarin’), Wu, Min, Yue, and Kejia, are now spoken in Suriname by substantial numbers of people mainly from the PRC Provinces of Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning, Shandong, Zhejiang, Fujian, and Guangdong. Chinese dialects are considered markers of regional identity in Chinese cultural contexts, and among New Chinese immigrants in Suriname, this simplistic two-way conflation of language and identity does work to locate various immigrant cohort ‘communities’ in the ethnic landscape, for the time being at least. For instance, speakers of Wu varieties from Wencheng, Lishui, and Wenzhou can be reasonably sure that they share similar networking loyalties and socio-economic adaptive strategies in Suriname, and that their languages are effective barriers to outsiders.

One can safely assume that all New Chinese migrants are native speakers of some variety of Chinese, and as PRC citizens they also all have learned PTH in school. In the Surinamese context one could describe PTH as the latest

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10 Chixi Kejia is unclassified in the Language Atlas of China. Dongguan Kejia may be classified as: Sinitic > Kejia > Yuetai > Xinhui > Dongguan Kejia (> Laiap Kejia).
incarnation of the Mandarin koine that prescribed the position of Overseas Chinese with regard to the Chinese polity and the concept of shared Chinese identity. Early Fuitungon Hakka migrants brought with them attitudes towards Mandarin, Cantonese and Kejia that reflect the low status of Kejia. Mandarin is still called $tsin\text{`}n\text{`}\text{`}ng\text{`}i\text{`}\text{`}\text{`}/tsin\text{`}ng\text{`}i\text{`}\text{`}$ (真語/正語 lit.: ‘true language’/’proper language’), and Cantonese was called $p\text{`}ak\text{`}\text{`}\text{`}wa\text{`}\text{`}$ (白話, lit.: ‘white language’, meaning ‘vernacular’). During the 1930s and 1940s, the resinicisation project aimed at rallying Overseas Chinese support for the Republican Chinese cause was also implemented in Suriname (Tjon Sie Fat 2009a). The newest Mandarin standard, Guoyu, was taught as the national language of a modern Chinese state rather than as the bureaucratic language that distanced Hakka villagers in China from representatives of imperial power. PTH replaced Guoyu in Suriname only with the arrival of substantial numbers of speakers in the 1990s, and the ‘resinicisation’ drive of the PRC embassy in Paramaribo, which promotes PTH as the universal language of all ethnic Chinese.

However, PTH does not reliably function as an ethnic marker from a Chinese point of view. It is a national and international lingua franca that transcends the various internal ethnic and class boundaries that abound in Chinese cultural contexts. The PRC authorities are also promoting PTH in the belief of a magisterial progression from tool for national unification, marker of globalised Chinese cultural identity and loyalty, to important world language. In Suriname it is not reliable as a conversational barrier, though the number of non-Chinese who can understand PTH is small. To non-Chinese in Suriname, PTH is indisputably ‘Chinese’, which places anyone able to speak it squarely in a ‘Chinese’ camp. In fact, the main linguistic impact of New Chinese within the Chinese language community in Suriname is the increasing importance of PTH as an intra-ethnic lingua franca. Not only is PTH a prestige language that signals globalised Chinese identity, but it is also a symbol of the growing power of the PRC and thus ethnic pride through PRC patriotism.

The position of New Chinese in the broader context of Surinamese society is also reflected in the languages they do not speak. Immigrants in Suriname can get away with not speaking Dutch, on the condition that they learn Sranantongo, which, even though it is not a prestige language and some Surinamese tend to treat it with even near disrespect, is the medium of informal communication and thus signals the lowering of barriers. In 2003 a common criticism levelled at Chinese immigrants was that they did not speak Sranantongo—which was hardly surprising, as many were fairly recent immigrants who had not yet learnt basic Sranantongo. The charge of arrogance probably involved the common perception that all Chinese speak Sranantongo, but even so Chinese immigrants (who were seen as profiteers) were singled out as problematic. The
increased discomfort with Chinese immigrants was often expressed by oblique statements, such as, “They should learn the language”.

3.1 The Northerners
By the early 2000s the largest group of native speakers of Northern Chinese in Suriname consisted of about 100 Shandongese, a slight majority of whom came from Qingdao. Although there might have been individual Shandongese immigrants in Suriname in the early 1990s, there has only been a sustained presence of Shandongese in Suriname since the middle of that decade. Economically, the Shandongese in Suriname were a heterogeneous group, ranging from street vendors to importers. Shandongese and other Northerners are well aware of the prestige they have in Suriname among the Hakkas and other Southerners and Easterners as native speakers of Northern Chinese varieties which are quite close to PTH. Most other native speakers of Mandarin varieties in Suriname are from the Dongbei region (Manchuria). Their presence is the result of PRC technical cooperation projects and resource extraction projects. During the 1990s, a group of about 50 construction workers from Nanjing worked in Paramaribo under temporary contracts; a smaller number entered a decade later and set up a construction company catering to ethnic Chinese clients. About 50 people from the Dongbei region work in Suriname in logging and construction, as workers and administrators. People working in the timber industry are virtually all from Jilin Province. The China Dalian International Cooperation (group) Holdings Ltd., based in Dalian in Liaoning Province, which started out an extensive road rehabilitation project in Paramaribo during the 1990s and early 2000s, used construction workers from Nanjing and higher level expatriate staff from Liaoning Province. Dongbei people not involved in logging or construction work in supermarkets owned by Chinese from other backgrounds, and a few individuals own their own businesses.

3.2 The South-Easterners
In Suriname, the unflattering Kejia term for New Chinese migrants during the 1990s and early 2000s, *tset’kong’tsai* (浙江仔, ‘those people from Zhejiang Province’) reflects the fact that the largest New Chinese group is from the southern part of Zhejiang Province. The majority—possibly more than half of

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11 The formula was even repeated by the then President Ronald Venetiaan in a speech during the celebration of the Chinese Lunar New Year on February 1, 2003 in a socio-cultural organisation in Paramaribo, when—speaking Sranantongo at the advice of his hosts—he urged new Chinese immigrants in Suriname to ‘learn the language as quickly as possible’. In that particular context, the implied language was Sranantongo.
FIGURE 9.1 Hometowns of Chinese migrants in Suriname.
an estimated 1,000–2,000 people\textsuperscript{12}—are from Wencheng County in Wenzhou, with smaller numbers from Lishui. The Wenzhou dialects are speakers of varieties of Wenzhou dialects,\textsuperscript{13} along with different sub-varieties from what is spoken in the Wencheng area, such as Daxue, Rui’an, and Huangdan.

Wenzhou migrants seem to have found Suriname in the 1990s as a natural extension of their European networks, possibly by using the migrant networks of the Fuitungon Hakka. Zhejiangese entrepreneurial chain migration is basically a variation of the Old Chinese system, with ethnic entrepreneurs sponsoring coregionalists or relatives to come to work in their businesses in Suriname. As a result, most Zhejiangese in Suriname are self-employed owners of supermarkets and ‘wholesale enterprises’. The Wenzhou system is closely tied in with the rapid development of Zhejiangese exports, and it is common among New Chinese, particularly Wenzhou people, in many parts of the developing world. However, Zhejiangese migrants tend to copy local, tried and proven Old Chinese positioning strategies in Suriname, such as socio-cultural organisations, roscas and political patronage (Tjon Sie Fat 2009a). Their particular version of entrepreneurial chain migration has strongly influenced the economic landscape of Suriname.

There were apparently no Fujianese in Suriname before the early 1990s.\textsuperscript{14} Current numbers are impossible to estimate; a few hundred to over a thousand. Although the Fujianese migrants seem to be encouraging the mystery surrounding their presence in Suriname, they publicly—in the local Chinese-language media—refer to themselves as Fujianese (福建人) and have now organised themselves accordingly (e.g. the ‘Fujianese Hometown Association’ 福建同鄉會 in Paramaribo). Other than the indisputable fact that there are New Chinese from Fujian Province in Suriname, very little can be said about them. Most Fujianese are said to run supermarkets, but a small group of successful entrepreneurs have reached out into other areas such as logging and mining.

\textsuperscript{12} There are no formal data on the sizes of the populations of the various regional groups, from either the government or the Chinese organisations. New Chinese and Fuitungon Hakka informants hazard guesses at my request, and tended to agree on the relative sizes of the groups. In any case, the numbers are estimates, are in no way accurate, and might even be conservative given what is known about the numbers of Chinese citizens entering Suriname (see the Tables and Figure 9.3).

\textsuperscript{13} Sinitic > Wu > Oujiang > Wenzhou.

\textsuperscript{14} Strictly speaking, the few Peranakan Chinese in Suriname from Indonesia (all of whom have since remigrated to the USA or Europe) could be said to have had a Fujianese background.
Linguistic identification is difficult, as many Min varieties are mutually unintelligible and Fujianese therefore tend to use PTH as a lingua franca. We do know that all major dialect groups are present in Suriname: Minnan, Minzhong and Minbei. In 1991 a Shanghai Chinese informant spoke of migrants from the Jinjiang Area in Fujian Province. In 2002 a Hainanese informant was certain that Fujianese made up the vast majority of New Chinese immigrants in Suriname and that most of these Fujianese were from Sanming in Fujian Province. Minzhong-speaking migrants from a few villages in Xianyou County formed a remarkable subgroup. Has there been a shift from one Fujianese migrant hometown to another over the years, or have there always been smaller numbers of people or even individuals from other areas in Fujian?

Taiwanese, who are geographically and linguistically linked to Fujian Province, are present in Suriname in small numbers. Taiwanese in Suriname are like New Chinese in the sense that they are not Fuitungon Hakkas, but their presence has nothing to do with renewed migration from the PRC in the late 1970s. The Taiwanese presence in Suriname can be traced back to the founding of the Surinamese branch of the Kuomintang in Paramaribo (1943), in line with the policy of the Chinese Nationalist government to increase its influence among Overseas Chinese. The Kuomintang government in Taiwan funded a printing press for a Chinese language newspaper in Suriname, Lam Foeng (南風 ‘Southern Wind’) (Man A Hing 1988). Taiwanese taught Mandarin in the Chinese school on the premises of the Kuomintang club/Fa Tjauw Song Foei. But by the time the People’s Republic of China was the first foreign state to recognise the newly independent Suriname in 1975, the role of the Kuomintang was over.

In 2003 there were five Taiwanese families in Suriname, with a total of about 20 persons. One family had been there for more than twenty years, fully integrated into Surinamese society, with children who were indistinguishable from Laiap. The four other families arrived in Suriname around 1997, as missionaries of a Taiwanese syncretist ‘Daoist’ lay group that is active among non-Chinese

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15 The group would be called Henghua (PTH: Xinghua, the name of the older administrative entity that included the current counties of Xianyou and Putian in central Fujian) in Singapore. Henghua migrants are common in Southeast Asia, but comparatively rare in the New World (Fujian Sheng Zhi: 183–188). Associations on the basis of Henghua identity are even rarer there. Xianyou County is not a major migrant sending area. According to the Xianyou Xian Zhi, 7,914 people of a population of 914,756 in 1992 were migrants, mostly entrepreneurial migrants.

16 The island of Taiwan lies across the Taiwan Straits from Fujian Province. The majority of Taiwanese speak Southern Min (Minnan), which is also spoken in southern Fujian, around Xiamen.
in Latin America and the Caribbean. All speak Guoyu (the national standard of Taiwan), Minnan, and at least one individual spoke Hailu Kejia.  

3.3 The Southerners

Guangdong Province has obviously provided the vast majority of Chinese migrants to Suriname—the Fuitungon Hakkas. Non-Fuitungon New Chinese from Guangdong, however, are a minority. Apparently, most come from Guangzhou City (Canton) and Taishan (Toisan) in the Siyi Region. The majority of native speakers of Yue varieties would seem to be from Guangzhou; in fact, numbers of Guangzhou migrants seem to have been substantial enough to warrant the foundation of a ‘Guangzhou Hometown Association’ (廣州同鄉會) at some moment before 2007. Varieties of Yue spoken in Suriname include Hoisan, Standard Cantonese (Guangzhou), Hong Kong Cantonese, Guangxi Yue.

Hainanese migrants form the next prominent group among the New Chinese from the South, with one estimate of about 500 Hainanese (or 100 families) in 2003. Most are from Wenchang, in the North-east of Hainan Province, with smaller numbers from the provincial capital Haikou. The first Hainanese in Suriname apparently arrived as partners of Fuitungon Hakkas, sometime in the late 1980s. Hainanese copied the local Fuitungon Hakka strategy of corner shops and supermarkets, as well as riding the rollercoaster of Zhejiangese commodity export. The dominant language of Hainanese in Suriname is Hainanese, also known as ‘Wenchang dialect’. It is quite different from other Min varieties spoken in Suriname by the Fujianese and the Taiwanese.

To outsiders, Hainanese in Suriname are not clearly distinguishable from Tong’ap. They copy Fuitungon Hakka attitudes to local positioning, and are Chinese migrants in a very broad sense, with very little ‘traditional culture’ for non-Chinese to observe. Although Hainan Province is home to four offi-

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17 This brings the number of reported Kejia varieties in Suriname to four: Dongguan, Chixi, Meixian and Hailu.
18 Siyi 四邑, ‘four counties’, refers to the former counties of Taishan, Enping, Kaiping and Xinhui in the west of the Pearl River Delta.
19 The Guangzhou Hometown Association is mentioned first in the Dutch-language Times of Suriname, 28 April 2007, ‘Communique “Fa Tjauw Tjoen Foe”’.
20 Sinitic > Yue > Siyi > Taishan; Sinitic > Yue > Guangfu > Standard Cantonese, Dongguan Yue, Guangxi Yue.
21 Sinitic > Min > Qiongwwen > Wenchang.
22 Sinitic > Min > Puxian > Xianyou.
23 Sinitic > Min > Minnan > Taiwanese.
cial nationalities and at least eight languages in four distinct language groups, all Hainanese in Suriname call themselves Han Chinese. The more robustly assertive Wenzhounese are much easier for Fuitungon Hakkas to identify and dislike than the Hainanese. Hainanese have one stable organisation in Suriname, the Hainan Hometown Association (海南同鄉會).

Though they are minority among the Southerners, the Chixi Hakkas mentioned earlier are remarkable because they have developed a separate ethnic economy based on urban agriculture in Paramaribo, copied from their hometown. They are chain migrants, sponsoring relatives to come to Suriname to escape the poverty of Xiangling village and provide a better future for their children, who are assimilating into Surinamese society.

4 The Chinese We See: Written Chinese

Written Chinese (中文) is a potent marker of Chinese ethnic identity. In Chinese cultural contexts Chinese literacy is treated like the hallmark of universal Chineseness, the result of at least a basic education in Chinese script, Mandarin, Chinese literature and history. The extent of Chinese literacy in Suriname remains unclear, with subscriptions to local Chinese-language newspapers the only publicly accessible data, though numbers of subscribers do not say much about literacy levels among the various subgroups according to assimilation, regional background, educational background, etc. In any case, written Chinese is very much alive in Suriname, from the ability to make

24 The four officially recognised ethnic groups of Hainan are Han (i.e. ethnic Chinese), and the three minority nationalities of Li, Yao, and Hui. These speak, respectively, Sinitic (Wenchang, Haikou and Yue), Tai-Kadai (Lingao, Hlai, Jiamao, Cun), Hmong-Mien (Kim Mun) and Austronesian (Tsat) languages.

25 There are about 200 Chixi Hakkas in Suriname, as well as about 300 Hoisan-speakers from other Taishan districts. Although Hoisan (or Taishanese: Sinitic > Yue > Yue Hai > Siyi > Taishan), is related to standard Cantonese, the two languages are not mutually intelligible.

26 Chinese in Suriname are typically diglossic in the sense that the spoken varieties may be syntactically radically different from the written language. Hakka children spoke a southern language, but learned to write in what was very much a northern variety; written Kejia did not exist to them. However, modern written Chinese is virtually identical to the standard language of the PRC, Putonghua, and though diglossia still applies to the relationship between the non-Mandarin varieties and the written language, the current situation in which people need to learn what is basically the written form of Putonghua and read aloud in the sounds of that language, more closely resembles bilingualism.
simple lists to poetry submitted to the Chinese-language newspapers. Written Chinese is also a very effective ethnic barrier in Suriname, separating an ethnic in-group from a larger out-group of people who are either not Chinese or ‘not Chinese enough’.27

The Chinese school in Paramaribo is the main generator of local Chinese-language literacy. The tradition of Chinese schools in Suriname started with reading and writing classes for children of Chinese immigrants (教童會 jiàotóng-huì: ‘association for the instruction of youths’) organised by socio-cultural organisations. Around the Second World War the Kuomintang promoted ‘resinicisation’ of Overseas Chinese in Suriname through a Chinese school facilitated by the Fa Tjauw Song Foei socio-cultural organisation. Republican Chinese curricula were intended to ‘reconnect’ migrant loyalties to the Motherland and Overseas Chinese communities elsewhere in the world. The limited size of the Chinese group meant limited funding and interest in the effects of this Kuomintang resinicisation programme, and eventually the Fa Tjauw Song Foei school faded into oblivion.

The current Chinese school (Zhōngwén Xuéxiào 中文学校, in the Kong Ngie Tong Memorial Building 廣義堂記念樓; in Paramaribo) is run in a more professional manner.28 It functions as an expatriate school providing primary education, accredited by the PRC (with plans to extend the programme to secondary education and further). It is a language centre providing courses in PTH and written Chinese (the school is attended by New Chinese, Tong’ap and Laiap children, and even small numbers of non-Chinese students), as well as continuing the tradition of the jiàotónghùi reading and writing classes for Fuitungon Hakka children. (Re)sinicisation is less clearly an ideological goal of this school, as its focus on the PRC is basically pragmatic; the rising power of the PRC means that its language is a valuable asset. However, the curriculum stresses the PTH standard of the PRC as a unifying symbol of global Chinese identity, and spreads the PRC’s view of its history and multiculturalism. One consequence is that the school has transcended token literacy in Chinese

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27 It is also a growing commercial opportunity. By early 2012 (‘Old Chinese’ Kejia) individuals involved in language services for the Chinese organisations set up Oriental Media for translation work (Dutch and Sranantongo into written Chinese, Putonghua, Cantonese and Kejia) and video productions for the Chinese-language newspapers and local sctv broadcaster. (De Ware Tijd daily, 5 March 2012, ‘Oriëntal Media slaat brug tussen Chinees en Nederlands’).

28 Its ties to the Fuitungon Hakka socio-cultural organisations are not particularly clear-cut. In practice it is jointly run by Kong Ngie Tong Sang, Chung Fa Foei Kon and Fa Tjauw Song Foei.
script, to promote written as well as spoken PTH in all contexts of Chinese life in Suriname.

A memorandum of understanding on the installation of a Confucius Institute on the grounds of the Anton de Kom (ADEK) University of Suriname in 2011, was signed by outgoing Chairman of the Board of the University Alan Li Fo Sjoe and PRC Ambassador Yuan Nansheng in August 2010. The Institute is now operational. The global network of Confucius Institutes (孔子学院) was started in November 2004 by the PRC government as a means to extend its soft power across the globe, and in this sense Confucius Institutes are like other institutions for ‘international cultural diplomacy’, such as the French Alliance Française, and the German Goethe-Institute (Ostler 2010: 245). However, the goal of Confucius Institutes extends beyond mere promotion of Chinese language and culture abroad, into ‘mainstreaming’ local opinions at the highest levels in accordance with PRC viewpoints on many issues, such as the unity of China (Tibet, Taiwan and Turkestan), the role of Chinese overseas, the PRC as leader of the Developing World, etc. Though ADEK University initially misunderstood it to be a ‘sinological institute’ funded by Zhejiang Normal University (浙江師範大學), all sides agreed that PTH language courses are the main justification for accommodating a Confucius Institute.

Chinese texts exhibit traces of language change in Suriname, though very little in the form of letters, poetry, diaries, etc. older than thirty years or so survives. Hence, Chinese-language newspapers are the main source. Initially renditions of Surinamese terms were produced in traditional orthography (i.e. predominantly columns of unabbreviated characters read right to left) and reflected the Kejia background of the authors. Some local names have full written Chinese equivalents, without reference to the sounds of the original names.30

1. Meerzorg (town across the Suriname River from Paramaribo)
   Chinese transliteration: 對面海 (“opposite sea”, i.e. “across the water”)
   Kejia pronunciation: tui³ men⁵ hoi³
   PTH pronunciation: duì miàn hǎi

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29 De Ware Tijd 18 August 2010, ‘Confucius Instituut in aantocht; mondje Mandarijn vrijwel “noodzaak”’.
30 In the following examples the Kejia transcription uses superscript numbers that link the 6 tones of Kejia to the 8 tonal categories of Middle Chinese: 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8. PTH pronunciations are in the official pinyin orthography which uses diacritical marks for the four tones of PTH: “‘”’, corresponding roughly to Middle Chinese categories 1, 2, 3+4, 5+6 (7 and 8 are realised as any of the four tones).
2. Henck Aaronstraat (street in downtown Paramaribo)
   Chinese transliteration: 銀行街 (“bank street”, referring to the head office of De Surinaamsche Bank)
   Kejia pronunciation: nyun² hong² kai¹
   PTH pronunciation: yín háng jiē

The influx of 'Hong Kong Chinese' in the 1960s led to an increase in Cantonese dialect influence. Currently, written Chinese in Suriname is in line with PRC standards, which means that the mixed orthography of horizontal lines and vertical columns has given way to a more unambiguously PRC standard of horizontal lines of abbreviated characters reading left to right. This also means that Surinamese terms are transliterated based on PTH readings. The following are examples of older Kejia-based transliterations of local names:

3. Parbo Biri (Sranantongo, “Parbo Beer”)
   Chinese transliteration: 巴波啤利
   Kejia pronunciation: pa¹ po¹ pi¹ li³
   PTH pronunciation: bā bō pí lì.
   Current standard: 巴波啤酒, PTH pronunciation: bā bō pí jiǔ, lit.: “Parbo beer”

4. Albina (border town on the Marowijne River)
   Chinese transliteration: 阿明那
   Kejia pronunciation: a¹ min² la³ (> na³)
   PTH pronunciation: ā míng nà

5. Nickerie (border town on the Corantijn River)
   Surinamese Dutch and Sranantongo pronunciation: [ni’keri]
   Chinese transliteration: 日計里
   Kejia pronunciation: ngit⁷ (> nyik⁷) ke⁵ li¹
   PTH pronunciation: rì jì lǐ

6. Zanderij (location of the J.A. Pengel International Airport)
   Surinamese Dutch pronunciation: [zandə’rei]
   Chinese transliteration: 山低乃
   Kejia pronunciation: san¹ tai¹ lai¹
   PTH pronunciation: shān dī nǎi

7. Wanica (district name)
   Chinese transliteration: 完里加
Kejia pronunciation: wan² li¹ (> nyì¹) ka¹
PTH pronunciation: wán lì jiā
Alternative Chinese transliteration: 完宜加
Kejia pronunciation: wan² ngi² (nyì²) ka¹
PTH pronunciation: wán yì jiā
Alternative Chinese transliteration: 完尼加
Kejia pronunciation: wan² li² (> ni²) ka¹
PTH pronunciation: wán ní jiā

Most of these transliterations are considered established written Chinese in Suriname. All newer transliterations are based on PTH pronunciations, as in the example in Figure 9.2, were Wanica is transliterated as 瓦尼卡 and read
as wǎ ni kǎ. Here too there is no real standardisation in practice, and different transcriptions of the same names can occur in the same newspaper alongside untranscribed names in Latin script. Examples are names of prominent Surinamese individuals and place names:

8. Venetiaan (Ronald Venetiaan, former Surinamese president)
   Surinamese Dutch: [fɔneiˈʃaːn]/[fɔneiˈʃən], deliberate pronunciation: [ˈfeineitsiaːn]
   Chinese transliteration: 菲里西安
   Kejia pronunciation: fui1li1 (nyi1) si1 on1
   PTH pronunciation: fēi lǐ xī ān
   Alternative Chinese transliteration: 费内西恩
   Kejia pronunciation: fui5li1 si1 en1
   PTH pronunciation: fèi nèi xī ēn

9. Bouterse (Desi Bouterse, current Surinamese president)
   Surinamese Dutch: [ˈbɒutərsə]
   Chinese transliteration: 鮑特斯
   Kejia pronunciation: pau1 t'it8 su1
   PTH pronunciation: bào tè sī [pau˧ tʰs˥˩ si1]
   Alternative Chinese transliteration: 鮑特瑟
   Kejia pronunciation: p'au5 t'it8 sit7
   PTH pronunciation: bào tè sè [pau˥˧ tʰs˥˩ sɤ˥˧]

10. Marowijne (district in the north-east)
    Surinamese Dutch pronunciation: [maroˈweinə]
    Chinese transliteration: 馬羅韋納
    Kejia pronunciation: ma1 lo2 wui2 lap8 (nap8)
    PTH pronunciation: mǎ luó wéi nà

31 The use of 里 seems to indicate the influence of Southern Chinese pronunciations, where syllable-initial [n] and [l] are allophones of /n/. A more unambiguously PTH transliteration might have been 菲尼西安 (fēi ní xī ān). Literary pronunciations in Kejia are no longer relevant in Suriname, while colloquial Kejia renditions of local names lack a stable written basis.

32 Once established in the text, transcribed names may be abbreviated to the first character. ‘Former president Venetiaan’ then becomes 費前總, from 費內西恩前總統 (Venetiaan-earlier-president).
The shift away from Kejia dialect is also apparent in the decreasing use of local expressions associated with Hakka (chain) migration, such as:

11. **Suriname**
   - Written Chinese: 洵南
   - Kejia pronunciation: sun² lam² (> nam²)
   - PTH pronunciation: xún nán
   - Current international standard orthography: 蘇里南
   - Kejia pronunciation: su¹ li¹ lam² (nam²)
   - PTH pronunciation: sū lǐ nán.

12. **來埠** lit.: “Come to the port city (= Paramaribo)”, i.e. “(fresh chain migrants) coming to Suriname”
   - Current standard usage: 來蘇里南 lit.: “Come to Suriname”

5  **The Chinese the Government Doesn't Hear: ‘Chinese’ in Official Data**

There are many reasons why Chinese languages have gone unexplored in Suriname. The Chinese segment has always been a numerical minority and successful assimilated Chinese were efficient gatekeepers between immigrants and Surinamese society, which meant that no Chinese variety was ever an inter-ethnic contact language. Orientalist stereotypes of Chinese as the ultimate, abject Other also combine with Surinamese multiculturalist discourse to feed the notion that Chinese ethnicity and Chinese language are equivalent, monolithic and obvious; ‘Chinese speak Chinese’. Surinamese views of culture are clouded by post-colonial fixations, in particular the multiculturalist discourse that informs Surinamese ethnopolitics, and its patriotic populist nation-state counter-discourse of Surinamese nationalism (cf. França 2004; Tjon Sie Fat 2009a). As a result, there is a rather schizophrenic notion that ethnicity, and thus culture and ‘ethnic languages’, are potentially divisive but equally emblematic of Surinamese multicultural identity.

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33  This transliteration survives in names of old local institutions, such as the Chinese-language newspaper 洵南日報 ‘The Suriname Daily’ and the Chinese cemetery 洵南華僑公山 ‘Overseas Chinese Cemetery of Suriname’. Unlike the current, purely phonetical, standard Mandarin-based transliteration of ‘Suriname’, 洵南 carries a number of poetic allusions that reflect the experience of chain migration: ‘the promise of the south’, ‘the distant south’, ‘quiet weeping in the south’.
Language is a very important marker of ethnic identity in Suriname, where up to the late 1940s the various languages and language varieties predictably defined ethnicity and class (Eersel 1983). In popular discourse the language situation in Suriname is generally described as a set of nested domains, rather like Russian matryoshka dolls, with oneself at the centre. Languages such as English that enable contact with the region and larger globalised reality dominate the outer shell. The middle spheres contain (Surinamese) Dutch in formal citizenship and (lingua franca) Sranantongo for the informal realm of social interaction. The innermost domains of ethnic community and family life contain the ‘ethnic languages’ which are first and foremost ethnic markers within the context of Surinamese multiculturalist ideology—*apanjaht* thinking (França 2004; Tjon Sie Fat 2009a).

Both the multiculturalist and popular multilingual views of language treat local languages as intimately tied to ethnic groups. This informs the way linguistic data is collected by the State. The conundrum Surinamese state institutions find themselves in is how to avoid atomising society while collecting the widest range of relevant data possible. The *Algemeen Bureau voor de Statistiek* (ABS, General Bureau of Statistics) is the only institution in Suriname that regularly collects ethnic and linguistic data at the national level. Ethnic categories and linguistic categories in ABS publications have gone unchallenged, despite the fact that they are very vague. The ethnic categories are fundamentally racial, reflecting Surinamese multiculturalism, and its underlying Caribbean racial black-white dichotomy. The linguistic categories also derive from Surinamese multicultural discourse and were not selected from a need for sociolinguistic information.

Sarnami Hindi and Javanese are the only two language labels that are relatively unproblematic; Sarnami Hindi refers to Sarnámi, and Javanese refers to the local variety of Javanese. One could argue that the need to fine-tune the categories of the pluricentric Dutch and English languages is not relevant for the purposes of household surveys, but the fact that the language labels ‘Amerindian’, ‘Bushnegro/Maroon dialects’ and ‘Chinese’ are solidly linked to the ethnic categories of ‘Amerindian’, ‘Maroon’ and ‘Chinese’ only serve

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34 The 2009 household survey of the ABS contains a category labeled *Blank* in Dutch, translated as ‘Caucasian’. A footnote to the label states that “‘Caucasian’ [was] formerly designated ‘European’. Even clearer, Dutch *Creool* is rendered as ‘Creole (Negro)’. ABS 2009a: 88: Table 13.

35 ABS 2009a, p. 88: Table 13. has ‘Bushnegro’, whereas Table 14 has ‘Maroon dialects’. ‘Bushnegro’ was used as a language label in the 1998 and 2011 ABS Household Survey reports, while ‘Maroon’ was used in the 2009 publication.
to reinforce the view of language as an ethnic boundary marker. Indeed, the Amerindian language label does not take into account the fact that seven different languages belonging to two distinct, and mutually unintelligible language families, Cariban and Arawakan, are spoken in Suriname. The same holds for Maroon and Chinese categories, and fine-tuning the Maroon and Chinese language labels might help social planners understand internal and international migration patterns.

Only with the 7th General Census, held in 2004, did the ABS survey second language use. In a strongly multiethnic and multilingual society such as Suriname, language use reflects the importance of cross-cutting social networks. Livelihoods in the highly informal Surinamese economy depend on the ability to foster ethnic loyalty and thus ethnic identity, for which an ethnic language is an important tool, but also on the ability to form alliances across carefully constructed ethnic barriers, which at a minimum implies the common use of a lingua franca. One would not expect Sranantongo, for instance, to be claimed as a mother tongue by informants who are not firmly identifiable or who do not self-identify as Afro-Surinamese, but the importance of the language as a national lingua franca would likely emerge from questions about the most used language outside of the household. As long as the majority of Surinamese view language as a fundamental ethnic boundary marker and believe that ethnicity is essential and inheritable rather than constructed and changeable, it is unlikely that the Surinamese State will be able to reduce its self-imposed deafness to language.

Table 9.1 presents the only public data available on Chinese language in Suriname spanning multiple years in a region where most (self-identified) ‘ethnic Chinese’ reside, namely the Municipal District of Paramaribo and the periurban District of Wanica. Consistent, clear-cut Chinese categories do not emerge from the data, which in any case are not highly significant because of discrepancies due to methodology. The data seem to indicate that numbers of Chinese speakers and ethnic Chinese (both undefined) are steadily increasing.

The 2004 Census (ABS 2005, 2006a, 2006b) counted 7,804 ethnic Chinese in the districts of Paramaribo and Wanica, of which the vast majority (7,151 or about 92%) lived in Paramaribo. By comparing the District data numbers with the national census figures one gets an idea of why Chinese demographic data for Paramaribo/Wanica can represent the whole country; 89% of the 8,775 ethnic Chinese counted in Suriname lived in Paramaribo/Wanica according to the census. At both national and district levels the percentage of PRC

36 Data from household surveys: ABS 1999: 100–102 (Table 13A, Table 13B, Table 14); ABS 2009a: 88–89 (Table 13, Table 14); ABS 2011a: 73–74 (Table 13, Table 14).
citizens among the ethnic Chinese was about 40%, which says little about actual migrant numbers, only that Chinese immigrants make up a substantial part of the ethnic Chinese segment.

Table 9.2 is an extract of Table 9.1, and shows overlaps between Javanese and Chinese ethnic categories with regard to Chinese as a mother tongue. It might
have been an artefact of methodology, but in 1996 there were suddenly 77 Chinese who spoke Javanese and 149 Javanese who spoke ‘Chinese’. In 2005 and 2006 there were respectively 15 and 35 ethnic Chinese who claimed to be mother tongue speakers of Javanese. According to the data, no ethnic Chinese ever claimed to be a mother tongue speaker of Sarnámi or an Amerindian language, but in 2007 there were 31 ethnic Chinese who claimed to speak a Maroon language as a mother tongue.\(^{37}\)

Table 9.3 gives numbers of households (not individuals) with regard to first-language and second-language speakers of ‘Chinese’ in Paramaribo and Wanica in 2003–4, without reference to ethnic category.\(^{38}\)

The ‘Chinese’ ethnic and linguistic categories in ABS publications reveal the problem with the inherently essentialist view of ethnicity in Surinamese multicultural discourse that makes ethnic language an unambiguous marker of ethnic category: what are ‘ethnic Chinese’, what is ‘Chinese language’, and what is the relationship between the two? The ‘Chinese’ language label used by the ABS is static, and does not take into account the reality of the rapidly changing linguistic situation among local-born and immigrant ethnic Chinese. No distinction is made between varieties of Chinese that could be labelled as indigenous or immigrant languages. Kejia, in particular Laiap Hakka, could rightly be labelled a Surinamese language, but Mandarin is linked to immigrants, like Brazilian Portuguese. Even so, one assumption does hold water; PRC immigrants speak PTH, so get hold of their numbers, and one has the majority of PTH speakers. However, without reliable migration data, nothing is certain.

\(^{37}\) Data from: ABS 1999: 100–102 (Table 13A, Table 13B, Table 14); ABS 2009a: 88–89 (Table 13, Table 14).

\(^{38}\) Data from the 2004 census: ABS 2006b, Table 1 ‘Number of households according to primary spoken and second languages’; ABS 2006c, Table 1 ‘Number of households according to primary spoken and second languages’.
# Table 9.3  
First and Second Languages in Households: Paramaribo and Wanica, 2004 Census

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2nd language in household</th>
<th>1st language in household</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dutch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sranantongo</td>
<td>28,302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarnami</td>
<td>5,995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Javanese</td>
<td>3,938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous language</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maroon language</td>
<td>1,248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Chinese’</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>1,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>5,972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>47,492</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Born of a collection system shaped by ideological preconceptions, it is no surprise that the available data seem to confirm ethnic stereotypes. That does not mean that they are useless. The data on Dutch/Sranantongo versus ‘Chinese’ do seem to indicate that processes of assimilation are ongoing (see Tables 9.1–9.3), with monolingual Chinese-speakers a minority, and most being bilingual or even trilingual, very likely reflecting the dichotomy between Tong’ap and Laiap among the Hakka. Despite the data gap between 1997 and 2006 in the Household Surveys, numbers of Chinese speakers and ethnic Chinese in the main districts of Paramaribo and Wanica would seem to be steadily increasing, while other ABS data suggest that the trend for Chinese nationals entering Suriname seems to have levelled off since the early 1990s (see Figure 9.3 below).³⁹ Many questions remain unanswered. Were Chinese migrants quickly remigrating in the early 1990s? Were settlement patterns more stable in the 2000s? Which Chinese languages are becoming established, which are dying out?

³⁹ Data from: ABS 1999; 2005; 2006a; 2006b; 2006c; 2009a; 2009b; 2011a; 2011b.
When Will You Hear Chinese? Language and Performativity

Besides on television, Chinese language can be heard by Surinamese in Chinese businesses and anywhere ethnic Chinese and Chinese migrants congregate, usually Chinese restaurants and Chinese community events such as Chongyang, Lunar New Year, and Moon Festival celebrations. The programmes on TV Channel 45 are in PTH, and to a lesser extent in Cantonese and Kejia (particularly in translations of local news reports). Public events are mediated in PTH and regional languages, and in Cantonese when there is a Hakka majority. However, most non-Chinese do not attend Chinese public celebrations, and are outsiders to Chinese-language media. One can safely claim that Surinamese do not hear Chinese, but see Chineseness. Why?

Current social constructionist approaches to social identities refute the notion that personal identities are subcategories of fixed, primordial groups. Instead, ethnic groups for instance—the commonsensical idea that groups of people exist ‘out there’, which Brubaker (2004) prefers to call ‘groupness’—are brought into existence by the performative nature of ethnicity in Suriname, much as what Butler (1990) observes with regard to gender identities; identity is not about fixed categories, but arises in the performance of it by individual
subjects. In her analysis of gender development, Butler sees performativity—types of authoritative speech, with the power to frame objects which they are meant to describe—as the way in which identity is passed on or brought to life by discourse.

To Butler, gender is like a script which is made a reality by repeated performance. Gender is therefore an expression, not of what someone is but of one's acts, and as social distinctions such gender, ethnicity, class, and body always intersect, no ‘doing’ of one identity happens in isolation from any other. In any case, the notion of performative scripts allows us to analyse ethnic ‘groups’ as events, and to distinguish between groups arising organically or as political projects of organisations which claim to represent ethnic interests (Brubaker 2004: 11–13). At the individual level personal identity is also situational, instrumental, and multiple, and Chinese identity is just one of many self-concepts that individuals derive from perceived membership of social groups, relevant to positive self-esteem. In this psychological sense ‘Chineseness’ is dynamic, constantly adapting to provide consistency and guidance for the individual's actions, while the ‘truth’ of one’s personal experience is irrelevant.

This is not to say that social identities are expressions of free speech. One can observe that there are limits to the freedom to choose identities. In the case of Chinese in Suriname, there is a gap between the identity one performs (calling oneself Chinese) and the identity one cannot shake off (being called Chinese). Different identities are not equal when race, gender and class are about power relations, so the question as Shimakawa (2004) puts is: does everyone have equal access to agency in choosing positional, multi-situated identities? Writing on ‘Asian’ identity in the USA, Shimakawa sees the process of Othering: “...the seemingly contradictory, yet functionally essential, position of a constituent element/sign of American multiculturalism and radical other/foreigner” (Shimakawa 2004: 151). Shimakawa uses Kristeva’s concept of abjection to approach US Asian ethnic performativity: a state as well as a process in which things about oneself that are considered objectionable are jettisoned to produce ‘perceptual and conceptual borders around the self’, ‘...the condition/position of that which is deemed loathsome and the process by which the subject/“I” is produced’ (Kristeva 1982, quoted in Shimakawa 2004: 150).

Shimakawa reads Asian Pacific Americanness as an effect of ‘national abjection’; the production of national identity through the designation of things deemed un-American. In a similar vein, the prevalent way of thinking about Chineseness in Suriname is based on the defining of Surinamese by national abjection of ‘Chinese’. This appears ambivalent because it is based on the binary set of Chinese stereotypes produced by a dominant negative discourse that defines speech about Chinese in terms of contamination and threat,
accompanied by its positive twin that produces positive images of Chinese. But as a performatve act (an illocutionary speech act), the use of the word ‘Chinese’ in the Surinamese media describes as well as prescribes Chinese as irregular migrants, associated with organised crime, exploiters, pandemics, and more recently, neo-colonisers. The lack of differentiation in the word meant that all Chinese in Suriname were, are, or might be problematic (Tjon Sie Fat 2009a).

Stepping away from performativity, one may also consider how Chinese in Suriname are othered, and Gerd Baumann’s conceptual framework for that process is helpful here (Baumann 2004). He identifies three grammars of identity and alterity, grammars in the sense that they provide prescriptive, normative rules for identifying oneself by positioning others: orientalisation, segmentation, and encompassment. Orientalisation, “constitutes self and other by negative mirror imaging: ‘what is good in us is lacking in them’, but also adds a subordinate reversal: ‘what is lacking in us is (still) present in them’. It thus entails a possibility of desire for the other and even, sometimes, a potential for self-critical relativism.” (Baumann 2004: x). In Suriname, this negative mirror imaging produces a double set of Chinese stereotypes, with the negative stereotypes dominating (Tjon Sie Fat 2009a: 381–383). Here too Chinese emerge as the constitutive other to a vaguely defined ‘Surinamese identity’.

The discourse of ‘Chineseness’ thus makes speaking, reading, and writing ‘Chinese’ a performatve act. Compared to the other canonical ethnic groups in Surinamese multiculturalism, Chinese appear more closely linked to their ethnic language—‘Chinese’. But Sranantongo is strongly associated with ethnic Chinese, as shopkeepers needed to use the (pidginised) lingua franca version to communicate with their clients. “They don’t speak the language” reflects the observation that under renewed immigration there are now Chinese shopkeepers who do not speak Sranantongo.40 On the one hand, patterns of language acquisition among immigrants have changed, with more people than there are opportunities to learn the ropes of shopkeeping—including learning basic Sranantongo—in existing supermarkets. On the other hand, the basic pattern of Chinese linguistic adaptation still holds; non-Kejia speakers from China are pioneering their own socio-economic niches as though there were no earlier Chinese migrant cohorts, and are slowly creating their own contexts for chain migrants to learn Sranantongo. It should be noted that exclusive use of Sranantongo without Dutch marks class identity. No matter how successful

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40 Remarkably, the only people in Suriname who would correct my Sranantongo, which I do not speak fluently, were Chinese migrants (Tong’ap). Anyone else would keep a polite silence, ridicule mistakes, or turn out to be unsure about correct forms.
Chinese immigrants may become, Sranantongo will limit their acceptance by all Surinamese classes.

Chinese literacy and fluency in any form of spoken Chinese have different effects with regard to performativity. Writing and reading Chinese characters serve to distinguish Chinese from non-Chinese in a way that is understandable far beyond the local context of Suriname. Basic Chinese literacy is probably the most effective Chinese ethnic marker in Suriname, but written Chinese goes further as a way of ‘doing’ class identity within the ‘Chinese language community’. The ability to write fluently, in a calligraphic hand, using the most obscure characters, in a literary style, implies a profound knowledge of classical Chinese culture, the culmination of high-class education. Speaking Chinese is an act of performative class, ethnic and gender identity. It helps racialise the speaker in Surinamese multi-ethnic contexts as a ‘Chinese’, but the variety of Chinese spoken identifies the regional background of speakers within a Chinese context. Some dialects create sub-ethnic niches in Suriname, such as Wenzhounese, which in Suriname is spoken only by people from the Wenzhou area.

Recent immigrants bring with them prevailing attitudes towards dialect in the PRC, basically that PTH should dominate in public settings, Chinese or otherwise. In short, Chinese sub-ethnic identities are not performed in public. This was the case for Hakka identity for much longer in Suriname, and Kejia still takes second place to Cantonese in public settings; Kejia is still a peasant language, Cantonese signals urban modernity. It is unclear what exactly the relationship is between the other ‘dialects’ and the high-status PTH medium is in Suriname. In practice it is very difficult to hear any Chinese variety other than PTH in any public gathering; publicly, Chinese identity is modern, unified, mainland, and Mandarin-speaking. The link between Chinese and gender is more subtle. In the past, writing Chinese characters was men’s work in Suriname, while good (immigrant) mothers taught their children to speak proper Chinese, while now a high-pitched speaking style in PTH adopted from PRC media culture distinguishes female from male presenters at community events.

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41 Chinese dialects can be heard via the Surinaamse Chinese Televisie Station [sic]/廣義堂蘇里南電視臺, the Chinese-language broadcaster on local channel 45. News is broadcast in PTH, Kejia and Cantonese, and TV series are in PTH if from the PRC, Cantonese if from Hong Kong, and Minnan if from Taiwan.
Conclusion: They Might as Well Be speaking Chinese . . .

What do Surinamese know about Chinese language in Suriname? Despite quantitative data, admittedly limited, the State knows basically nothing beyond what popular sentiments provide. Though the notion that Chinese language is varied is absent from State data, many educated Surinamese will know about Kejia and its link to the ‘Old Chinese’, and be aware of Putonghua/Mandarin and its link to the New Chinese. But the chance that anyone will be knowledgeable about other varieties of Chinese in Suriname is slim. The idea that Chinese ethnicity is fundamentally a matter of ethnic identity, and that it is obvious, monolithic, and racial infuses all levels of Surinamese society; Chinese language is then simply an ethnic marker in Surinamese multicultural discourse, and requires no further definition.

This view of Chinese language as an ethnic boundary marker is actually based on fact. In Suriname speaking any Chinese language results in an identity statement differentiating between Us and Them, between ‘normal’ Surinamese versus the ultimate Other, or between ‘us Hakka/Wenzhounese/Northerners/Southerners/Old/New/Tong’ap, etc. versus any ethnic Chinese outgroup, depending on who speaks, who observes, and who the statement is aimed at.\(^{42}\) Besides this role as a boundary marker, PTH in Chinese contexts also clearly serves to construct a larger Chinese identity linked to the PRC and modernity, beyond the day-to-day construction of Chinese ethnic identity in multicultural Surinamese society. Then again, it is in the interest of ethnic Chinese stakeholders in Surinamese ethnopolitics to maintain the image of a monolithic ethnic constituency. Ethnic subcategories are not accommodated in local ethnopolitics, if only because they might provide rival political entrepreneurs with a platform for power-sharing negotiations.

One advantage of recording sub-ethnic, regional and/or regional backgrounds would be a better understanding of social developments in Suriname. In the case of Chinese migrants, regional backgrounds are related to migration patterns and economic positioning. For instance, Fujianese migrants are easily linked to illicit or illegal migration or even people trafficking in the international press, but in Suriname this association is not clear. Wenzhounese migrants, very likely the largest group of New Chinese migrants, were instrumental in creating the system of supermarkets selling cheap Chinese commodities as a

\(^{42}\) These performative identities are very much instrumental. One should note that processes of assimilation and integration, with regard to Surinamese society as well as to globalised Chinese identity, mean that in practice Chinese identities in Suriname are converging.
migrant survival strategy in Suriname (Tjon Sie Fat 2009a). At the moment the development of the transnational network of commodities and Wenzhounese migrants can't be tracked in Suriname. The relationship between Chinese dialects and regionality is such that linguistic data would help quantify regional backgrounds and vice versa. It is a matter of guided analysis of existing data (for instance copies of migrants’ passports at the various government institutions) and fine-tuning data collection with regard to language and regional origin (for instance at the ABS).

Mobility has resulted in a mix of Chinese languages that might otherwise not be in contact in the PRC, and has introduced new linguistic hierarchies. Northerners and Southerners use PTH as a lingua franca in Suriname, Old Chinese find that they can no longer ignore PTH, New Chinese find that they ignore Sranantongo at their peril, and all know that Dutch is essential for their children's schooling and social mobility.43 A local variety of Kejia, often little more than an accent, developed and is dying out in Suriname, heavily influenced by Sranantongo, and strongly linked to local hybrid Chinese identity (Laiap). It is interesting to imagine what other forms of language contact has been going on in the more than twenty years of resurgent Chinese migration to Suriname, and what linguists would uncover in the field, who are knowledgeable with regard to a wide variety of Chinese 'dialects' and are able to negotiate both the Surinamese ethnic landscape as well as understand the shifting performativity of Chinese identity on Chinese terms.

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43 The process of integration is right on track among the New Chinese migrant cohorts. In August 2012 I met a university student whom I had gotten to know as a ten-year-old who had arrived with her family from Taishan in Guangdong Province a few years earlier. She was now indistinguishable from the fully assimilated Laiap generation of the Old Chinese.
CHAPTER 10

The Role of Suriname in Haitian Migration to French Guiana: Identities on the Move and Border Crossings

Maud Laëthier

1 Introduction

Caribbean societies are defined by a historical heritage marked by the colonial relationship and by slavery, and by the dynamic character of the social and cultural constructions that emerged from these. Yet, today, their designation as ‘creole worlds’ underlines a diversity or a ‘new’ unity.1 The migratory movements that have affected them for about thirty years have altered their socio-demographic configurations and have contributed to the emergence of new social and political forms. Understanding these migratory dynamics is of the utmost importance for revealing social re-compositions, new forms of political mobilisations, and identity redefinitions.

In this context, Haiti is one of the countries, or even the country, from where emigration is most significant. Haitians are currently among the most numerous migrants in several Caribbean countries and especially in the French Overseas Territories. This is the case in Guadeloupe, St Martin, and in French Guiana where Haitians constitute 30% to 50% of the immigrant population.2 Migrants are also present in Martinique and Suriname, both of which function as points of entry to French Guiana.

This chapter deals with the migratory processes from Haiti to French Guiana. Indeed, migration sometimes reveals itself as multiple and/or successive experiences of mobility that integrate, connect and prioritise various places. To investigate migrations is indeed to talk about movements in space, between the places of departure and the places of arrival, but it is also about

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1 In this usage, which is common in the francophone literature, ‘creole world’ refers to notions of ‘hybridity’ and cultural mixing in society (see Jolivet 1982, 1997).
2 Guadeloupe and French Guiana are the French Overseas Departments where the presence of migrants is the most significant. Haitians constitute respectively 44% and 30% of the migrant population of these two regions. In St Martin, migrants represent more than 30% of the population, half of which come from Haiti (see INSEE 2006a et b).
grasping the ease or the difficulties of travelling and when relevant, taking into account the places passed through. In this chapter I will consider how the establishment and the functioning of Haitian migration networks to French Guiana reveal the role played by Suriname in circulatory migration. However, to talk about migrations is also to consider the social organisation of a new norm. New forms of socialisation and social transformations are also at the heart of the question. The viewpoint developed here will thus focus on two aspects: the forms of insertion of the new migrants and the corresponding identity constructions.

Our analysis proposes three steps that will lead us from Haiti to Suriname and French Guiana. The first step aims at understanding the logic at the basis of the mobilities from Haiti. The second step will show how these mobilities develop in Suriname through the migrants’ organisational modes. The multiplicity of trajectories, the gradual construction of the paths and their reconstructions will show how Suriname has become a place of transit and also of more or less long-term settlement. Moreover, we shall discover how this country is simultaneously the centre of cross-border mobilities. Thus, the last part of the discussion will position us on the Guianese side of the border. The migrants’ insertion into the economic and social situation of the west of French Guiana shall be enlightened by a discussion of the relationships that have developed between Haitians and members of the major social groups that they encounter in present-day French Guiana. We shall also consider the identity constructions that shape individual and collective memory in the migrant condition.

My aim is to report the facts of mobility and to work out how they link up in the articulation, at different levels, of the Haitian migrant experience. From this double perspective we shall show how multiple networks and territories invested by migration trajectories come to light through an approach that re-interrogates the alternative between settlement and circulation and between

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3 The data presented here were collected from surveys carried out in 2008 and 2009 in French Guiana and Suriname within the ANR research project: “Circulatory migrations dynamics and cross-borders mobilities between French Guiana, Suriname, Brazil, Guyana and Haiti” (IRD/AIRD). These data complement other data collected in French Guiana and Haiti since 2001. Part of the survey results were presented at the international symposium “Transit migration in Africa. Local and global dynamics, political management and actors’ experiences” held in December 2009 at Nice Sophia Antipolis University, see M. Laëthier (2011b). The terms by which the routes through Paramaribo are experienced are based on this first analysis.
the individual and the collective in the act of migration. The social and territorial universes crossed in Suriname and in French Guiana will bring us onto the path of what could be called 'mobility fields', produced by the appropriation of territorial practices and the creation of representations.

2 Leaving Haiti for French Guiana

In Haiti, as well as in many other countries, emigration has been, for several decades, a known reality, practiced and fantasised. However, Haitian emigration takes on a character of its own: few countries in the history of what can be called, after Roger Bastide ([1967] 1996), the ‘Black Americas’, have experienced such poverty and such political turmoil, suffered from such an acute and known marginalisation and undergone such a massive emigration. Indeed, despite the haziness of official estimates, Haitians may number more than two million living outside of Haiti compared to a local population of about ten million (IHSI 2003, 2008).

Vwayaje ‘to travel’ is, in the Haitian context, the word used to talk about migration. To ‘travel’ means to migrate. To migrate is chèche lavi ‘to seek a life’ which, as a leitmotif, punctuates the discourses on the desire to migrate, as if all the reasons for departure were contained in it. ‘To travel’ is first of all ‘to seek a life’. The idea, that by crossing borders one can achieve fulfilment, is very vivid and foreign countries appear as a break away from what is known. This is illustrated by the expressions peyi bondye ‘God’s country’ or peyi beni ‘blessed country’ to refer to them.

One of the central points contained in the expression ‘to seek a life’ is first the possibility of another social experience. A condition that contains in itself another principle, another notion, namely that of equality. An equality of condition. Which equality is it about? Social equality? Economic equality? Political equality? ‘To travel’ with its imagination and representations does not separate these dimensions. The equality contained in ‘to seek a life’ is this possibility of resembling ‘others’. To be on the ‘other side’—abroad, is the possibility to experience this fundamental quality of fellow beings without it being questioned. It is the possibility of not being stigmatised because of a social condition considered inferior within the ‘Haitian system’. The belief is shared that ‘to travel’ means an end to persistent unfair conditions. But it does not constitute an escape from a social hierarchy and it is not a search for formal equality that would derive from the refusal of the existence of differences of functional positions within the social body. In short, it is not so much to think
of oneself as equal but the possibility of being in a context that acknowledges one’s equally.4

Yet, ‘to travel’ also refers to having succeeded in leaving. I will not question, within this contribution, the migratory process and the stories related to it. Nevertheless, I have to recall certain facts that I analysed elsewhere and that are necessary to bear in mind (see Laëthier 2011a), namely I will briefly discuss the way the departures are organised and the journeys conducted since they make the arrival in Suriname and French Guiana meaningful.

3 Networks, Routes, and Migration Projects

Haitian migration to France was taking place as early as the 1950s, but from the 1970s onwards it extended beyond the hexagonal borders. New migratory flows linked to new migrants, from rural areas and not belonging to the highest social strata, appeared and from then on the French Departments of America were included in the destinations. However, the highest number of migrants are found in French Guiana.

The first migrants to arrive in French Guiana left from the southern departments of Haiti, namely the South, Nippes and Grande Anse. At the end of the 1960s, there were only a few hundred people but, gradually, networks emerged based on family and on relationships in their villages of origin (relations I call inter-knowledge relationships). By the end of the 1970s, the number of arrivals had risen. It may be recalled that within the explanations of migratory movements, an intermediate scale operates between the macro-economic and the micro-sociological level (Faist 1997) that shows the importance of networks and families in the decision and the realisation of migration. In the case of Haitian migration, socio-economic situation and individual aspirations are decisive elements for mobility but they are not sufficient conditions for its continuation. At their crossing, mobility has indeed to be related to the existence of the networks that shape it: migration is first and foremost a part of family strategies. The migration’s unity resides in the networks based on inter-knowledge relationships (Laëthier 2011a).

4 This topic proposes the analysis of social imaginaries and migratory imageries, as a universe of representations, in which the tension is expressed between a quest for equality at an individual level and the egalitarian ideal as a principle part of society and from which the relationships of its members fuel. The article by D. Vidal (2009) on the way this issue arises within the identity constructions of female domestic workers in Rio de Janeiro is in this regard particularly enlightening.
Since 1980, however, institutional barriers have thwarted movement and redirected the routes. Indeed, until that time, an entry visa to French Guiana was not compulsory. A stricter immigration policy led to a decrease in the number of arrivals. This trend was, however, temporary as migration networks through neighbouring Suriname started to take shape. New routes and migratory patterns emerged from the countryside of southern Haiti, where most of the migrants come from, through Port-au-Prince, to Paramaribo that do articulate, however, with the previously established networks.

The new ‘Surinamese route’ is followed by those who cannot obtain a passport, visa or any of a number of other documents, for example, a written invitation by a relative who is already lawfully residing in French Guiana. They then resort to migration networks, also named filon ‘vein’ in Creole. Of course, there is another more legal filon for entry into French Guiana: the migrant may buy a short-term visa mentioning the ‘French Departments of the Americas’ and then simply overstay. But the cost is very high. A cheaper alternative is the ‘Surinamese route’ with the rakêtè, the smugglers. These smugglers work with ‘agencies’ (ajans), networks of intermediaries who are distributed along the route. In the rural villages of southern Haiti it is not uncommon to encounter agents who work for the smugglers and a lot of people know them or their agencies. However, most of the ‘business’ is negotiated and organised from Port-au-Prince. The Surinamese embassy is the place where one has to obtain the entry permit to Suriname issued with the same name as the one mentioned on the passport one is travelling with. But the efficiency of the network depends on the continuum of intermediaries. Thus, in Paramaribo, the taxi driver waiting at the airport enters the scene, then the hostel keeper where the migrants stay. For those whose journey is organised as far as French Guiana, the taxi to Albina and then the boatman enabling the crossing of the Marowijne all play their part. The intermediaries and beneficiaries of the illegal networks are numerous.

We specified above that from an institutional and normative point of view, the emergence of Suriname in circulatory migration originating in Haiti is linked to obtaining an entry permit. This is still the case although changes are taking place. Entry permit requests are not often granted and so migratory routes are reoriented. Faced with the impossibility of getting a permit or of using one obtained by another person, some people travel through Peru and then Brazil to enter French Guiana. New migration networks and trajectories emerge and other borders are crossed. While the rate required by the smugglers is, for the time being, the same as the one imposed on the ‘Surinamese route’—since 2000 the price has been between US$2500 and $3000—the conditions of these new routes are, however, quite different. It is widely acknowledged that
to travel along these routes means to travel in bad conditions, so acutely long, difficult, and clandestine is this journey. For this reason, it is generally known that in order to travel to French Guiana, it is better to go through Suriname.

This raises another theme I shall return to later: the migration project. Let us consider briefly the networks supporting the migratory movement. We mentioned that Haitian immigration, originally composed of people who arrived from the 1960s onward, was maintained by family and inter-knowledge networks. These networks have acquired a certain ‘autonomy’ and they have an influence on the costs of migration, the maintenance of links and the migrants’ choice of networks. Thus, some migrants explain how the decision to leave was taken hastily; certainly the individual project to leave the country had already been expressed but its realisation was made possible by the family having already settled ‘on the other side’; ‘to seek a life’ is not only ‘to seek one’s life’. Furthermore, networks allow universes of norms to be crossed; they represent a valuable support for the newcomers who can benefit from emotional or material support, and sometimes from possibilities of regularisation. We shall also consider how migrants adjust to economic demand and have access to some socio-economic spheres, this access being determined by the presence of compatriots.

However, if the inter-knowledge networks definitely became migratory resources, when the act of migrating is a part of family strategies, including both migrants-to-be and non-migrants, this must not cause us to lose sight of the fact that mobility is an initiative too. Migration is determined by collective strategies and from this point of view the group controls the individual but the individual’s choice also directs the migratory practice. Thus the call to migrate has the coherence and strength of social logic but it also possesses the plasticity of a creation; a continued process of creation in the series of steps by which it is defined. Indeed we have to try to achieve an analysis of mobility that takes into account the modality of the social links that shape it, while allowing the individualising logic, applied in the timescales of mobility. This conversation between collective choice and individual orientation makes the migration project feed on the migratory act. We thus follow the perspective put forth by E. Ma Mung (2009) that shows how the notion of ‘migration project’ enlightened by the notion of ‘migratory process of creation’ allows us to consider jointly ‘know-how’ and ‘can-do’ as two dimensions of autonomy in the migratory processes—considering that we accept the use of the theme of

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5 See the study by D.T. Gurak and F. Caces (1992), where they put forward two main uses of the networks: adaptation and selection.
autonomy in the analysis of migrations. The notions of ‘migration project’ and ‘migratory creation’ articulate, thus organising what we shall call after E. Ma Mung (2009: 27), the ‘external conditions’ and the ‘interior inclinations’. In this respect, the transits through Paramaribo show how the choice and the implementation of resources are subject to continuous development. Migration is not only pre-organised travel (Cohen 1997; Ellis et al. 1996; Fawcett 1989; Hammar et al. 1997; Kritz et al. 1992), it is also a more conjunctural construction that nevertheless articulates ‘know-how’ and ‘can-do’. The analysis is thus directed to the identification of migrants as subjects (individual and/or collective) and actors operating on a context and transforming it to their own advantage. ‘Passing through’ and ‘being in transit’ then appear to be conditions that prompt analysis questioning the phenomena of mobility as much in the intermingling of their collective and individual dimensions as through the shift from and/or the combination of one type of migration with another.

4 Along the Road: Suriname

We shall focus here on how the different ways of passing through affects the migratory experience and the links with networks on the French Guianese side. In this context the emergence of Suriname, and especially of Paramaribo, in circulatory migration raises a first question concerning the fact that Paramaribo is seen as a transit area and Haitians as transit migrants.

Unless they come from Venezuela by road, Haitians leaving their country can enter Suriname only by arriving at the international airport of Paramaribo and therefore it is necessary to be in possession of a visa. It is thus with a valid temporary visa that Haitian migrants enter Surinamese territory. However, as mentioned above, the emergence of new ‘routes’ indicates that Suriname is undertaking practices of normalisation and a stricter policy on issuing visas and carrying out controls. Yet, at the same time, to regularise a stay after having entered Surinamese territory by registering as a foreign resident is still a rather

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6 On the place awarded to the migration project as a notion within the analysis of migrations, see, as indicated by E. Ma Mung, the works by Paul-André Rosental (1999) and Florence Boyer (2005a, 2005b).

7 Circulatory migration means mobilities of goods, people and information that constitute a link between spaces where migrants live. Circulatory migration is equivalent to the places linked by migratory networks as they are defined by Gurak and Caces (1992) or Faist (1997). See Dorai et al. (1998) for a discussion of this notion.
simple administrative procedure in comparison to what we know in France.\textsuperscript{8} Thus, some migrants in French Guiana apply for a residence card in Suriname so that they can then be sent back to there rather than all the way to Haiti, in the case of deportation by French authorities. This administrative frame allows Suriname to be labelled an ‘area of transit’, but one has to let go of any strict notion of transit as linear mobility, and its experience as such by the migrants involved. Paramaribo can be a stepping stone or it can become a place for a long-term, or temporary, sometimes unplanned settlement, or it may also be a place to where those who have successfully migrated to French Guiana may, if they wish, return (see case discussion below). The facts of mobility comprise a wide range of experiences, the heterogeneity of which have to be taken into consideration.

When functioning as a stopover, the city is a passing through or relay point that migrants quickly leave. Within a few days after their arrival, they leave the hostel, managed by fellow-countrymen, where the smuggler gathered them. However, it is not uncommon to encounter migrants left out by smugglers with neither money nor documents. These migrants came with what is called the ‘rubbing off’ (\textit{dekolaj}); the passports they travel with are real, with real entry permits, but with the photograph of the traveller stuck over that of the former owner of the passport, without the original name changed. The illegality of this practice appears relative: one travels under a false identity but with authentic documents and entry permit. However, if migrants have given their own passport beforehand to the ‘agency’ and the smuggler does not give them back to them, migrants are left without any proof of identity. Such document fraud is common, even when smugglers, aware that this type of story can only play against them, accept a ‘contractual’ requirement to return the papers as well as payment, in instalments (often in two steps), of the total amount to the migrant or by one of his or her relatives in Suriname or French Guiana. In Paramaribo, the persons deprived of their savings and with no identity papers then rely on the solidarity of their compatriots. Among them, some are waiting for an amount from their relatives settled in French Guiana when the ‘travel’ was planned via Paramaribo, others join their family there, and yet others were formerly settled. It is through these persons that the newcomers ‘learn about’ the city. But ‘city’ is not the appropriate word. Admittedly, \textit{foto} (Sranantongo: ‘city’) is the word used to refer to Paramaribo and its outskirts, but even though some live in the city centre near the Central Market, most of the migrants live outside. The areas to the West of Paramaribo, between

\textsuperscript{8} In addition to the payment of a tax in order to be granted a residence card for the Surinamese territory, the presence of family members is compulsory.
Kwattaweg (Landsboerderij) and Nieuw Weergevondenweg (Tammenga/Bomaweg) to Jarikaba and the town of Uitkijk, are the places where Haitians live. Some have been there for a long time, others have just arrived and others are about to leave. Underlying these modalities that give meaning to circulation and migratory experiences, these places are designated by the migrant themselves as ‘Haitian fiefdoms’. One gets to know the pastors from several churches, the smugglers’ houses, the shops where Haitian foodstuffs and cooking products can be found. Moreover migrants also get in contact with compatriots who may help to find informal and often short term work. The economic logic is indeed emphasised by socio-cultural factors while the inhabited areas are closely linked to the activities carried out. Precisely, the newcomers rely on those migrants who have settled and who play an important role in the circulation of information and in employment. Those who are considered to be settled are the compatriots who arrived in Suriname during the first years after the country’s independence (late 1970s) when a workers’ migration was organised. In relation to this point, we wish to underline that the routes of the settled migrants also take on their full meaning within the links they established on the other side of the border, in French Guiana. Let us quote Okès’ case, about fifty years of age, from Croix des Bouquets and who arrived in Paramaribo in 1977 with a work contract. He explains:

> They didn't pay, so we decided to stop working in the cane fields. We broke the contract. At the beginning, we wanted to go back home, to our country. We thought we had nothing to do here. And then... Well, we stayed. I worked elsewhere, I did farming. Life was good.

But, as early as 1983, Okès made several journeys to French Guiana:

> I knew that on the other side, there were many Haitians. They passed through here. But then the compatriots, those who came at the same time as me, they didn't want to stay either. All of them were going there, to the country of France with the others. Well... I said to myself: “why not me?"

In 1986, Okès joins compatriots settled in Cayenne where he then meets his wife-to-be. She is also Haitian. Soon, a first child is born, then a second. Okès regularises his situation; he obtains a residence permit thanks to a legal job and the fact that he has become a father; his wife being herself in regular employment. However, in 1995, Okès decides to come back to Suriname for a longer period:
Yes, my wife and children stayed. French Guiana is better for them but not for me... Actually I never wanted to stay permanently. A friend from my village was keeping my house and fields here. It's complicated over there. Here Haitians are left alone. Yes, of course, I often go to Guiana and, you know, I've got papers, I'm no 'illegal Haitian'... My wife and children are there and I also go there to sell. Oh yes, it's interesting over there for selling. I farm, I carry my products and I sell in French Guiana. I sell as far as Cayenne. I know who to sell to. But to live, I'm fine here. (Translated from Haitian Creole, Paramaribo, 2009).

Okès lives close to Uitkijk, where he built his house. His farmland is nearby, on land that he cleared himself. He sometimes employs Guyanese people, or 'English',9 and a lot of compatriots who are passing through Suriname on their way to French Guiana.

Many other examples could be given, showing that like Okès, routes are not linear, and that as we will see, settling and passing through, become meaningful in the links with French Guiana. For the settled migrants and the newcomers the migratory routes are redefining. They are redefining at the scale of the individual and of the group; kinship groups and also 'fellow' groups within which the relationships are often based on shared regional origins (which I refer to here as 'inter-knowledge relationships'). However, if the origin of the Haitian departmental scale is similar to the one observed in French Guiana, on a communal scale, differences appear for the migrants who arrived during the past decade. Thus, for the department of the South in Haiti, the migrants coming from Saint-Louis du Sud, from the Cayes or from Fonds-des-Blancs and from the surrounding communal 'sections'10 are more numerous. An increasing number of migrants from Léogane, Port-au-Prince, Cabaret or from Croix des Bouquets, in the Western department has also been observed. However, whether they be individuals, kinship groups or fellows' groups, the routes and mobilities also articulate with other elements of contexts, and primarily to

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9 Haitians, like other residents of French Guiana, refer to citizens of Guyana as 'English'. Note, however, that in French Guiana this naming has long been used to designate all the inhabitants of the former English colonies such as the Saint Lucians or the Dominicans (Jolivet 1982).

10 Most of the places migrants principally come from so far are: Aquin, Vieux-Bourg of Aquin, Asile, Fond-des-Nègres, Bouzi, Morisseau, in the Southern department and the Nippes department. Please note that the 'communal section', formerly called 'rural section' is the smallest entity of the administrative division of the Haitian territory. It refers to a group of several 'houses' composing micro-territories where people, who are generally related, live.
economic conditions. From this point of view, the strategies and the singularities revealed are as social as they are spatial.

5 Individuals, Groups, and Spaces: Insertion within a Border Setting

Selling agricultural products and textiles is the first activity of migrants. Carried out within a family system, these activities involve both the long-term ‘settled’ people and those whose migration project includes an impending departure. These activities are informal, they are not very lucrative but the possibility to practice them as one did in Haiti, is often put forward as a reason to practice them, as we shall see. However, numerous migrants also work in sugarcane or banana fields, as in the area of Jarikaba where the settlements are linked to a nearby factory. At the beginning of the 2000s, the factory’s closing prompted an exodus to French Guiana. For men, temporary employment as construction workers or taxi drivers are among the other options. Women work less often as domestic servants than they do in French Guiana. According to what is said here by the Guianese women, this kind of work is the ‘English’ women’s field, not that of Haitian women. “Here, Haitians are not the lowest ones” is often repeated. The Haitian vendor activities are seen as being practiced ‘freely’ and without hierarchical constraints. They are not in the situation of those not envied, but it is nevertheless asserted that some work carried out here would not have been done in Haiti for fear of being mocked. These misgivings [about the type of work one is forced to do] also inject meaning into the processes of identity construction, in the differentiation migrants develop with regard to groups they live among. In Paramaribo, Haitians sell their products to Creoles and Hindustanis and sometimes work on fields owned by Javanese, with whom they also trade. Exchanges thus take place in Sranantongo as in the case of exchanges with people from Guyana. Even though it is necessary to know Sranantongo, most Haitian migrants only have a limited knowledge of that language. At times it happens that Haitians who were born in Suriname and attended school there or those who have been there since the 1960s, start off conversations in Dutch if they do not know their interlocutor. These cases are, however, not frequent for two reasons. First, these interactions among men usually take place in Sranantongo. Second, and probably most importantly, if the interlocutor is not interested in maintaining a relationship characterised by social distance, the conversation will soon be continued in Haitian Creole. Essentially, interactions among Haitians generally take place in Haitian Creole. It is often the sole language spoken by them, even by those who have already spent a considerable amount of time living in Suriname. Haitians who live
outside of the centre of Paramaribo typically know Sranantongo. It is the lan-
guage that they use for most of their exchanges, including those that involve
commercial activities. Yet, the previous example suggested that activities
related to trading are also carried out within a frame of adaptive strategies
developed by migrants from Paramaribo to Saint-Laurent-du-Maroni and
sometimes Cayenne. In addition to the trading of agricultural products, people
also re-sell goods bought or transformed/manufactured in Suriname. Let us
consider the example of those women, ‘resellers’ (revandez) or ‘saleswomen’
(machann) as they call themselves. These “resellers” travel to French Guiana to
sell their goods and they often involve other compatriots who help them and
travel with them. Clothes, shoes or cosmetics are then resold at local markets or
in door-to-door trade to compatriots. Other women, whose administrative and
financial situation allows it, trade on a larger scale: they go from Paramaribo to
Caracas and sometimes from Caracas to Miami going through Port-au-Prince.
These retailers carry out cross-border trade based on a commercial system
that again replicates strategies known in Haiti. Some ‘resellers’ do not live in
Suriname, rather they live in western French Guiana or in Cayenne. Once or
twice a month these ‘resellers’ go to Paramaribo to acquire their products.\textsuperscript{11}

Going back and forth rarely lasts more than two days. Each one of them knows
the ‘taxi’ which will bring her to Saint-Laurent, including the ‘Bosh’—the word
used to designate a person of Businenge origin, see below—boatman who will
safely transfer her and her products across the Maroni and the other boat-
man who, on the way back, will carry the goods across, slightly detouring to
avoid possible controls during which one’s products may be seized (see also
de Theije, this volume).\textsuperscript{12} In discussions about language, the newcomers say
that they speak \textit{Takitaki}. Those who live in Suriname use Sranantongo and
generally refer to it as speaking Sranan. At times it happens that they use the
term Ndyuka, Bosh or even \textit{Takitaki}, if they know that term. In western French
Guiana, \textit{Takitaki} is the term used by Haitians to refer to the language they need
to know to some extent for exchanges with people of Businenge origin. In fact,
Sranantongo is often mixed up with what is called \textit{Takitaki} and Haitians liv-
ing in Suriname are perceived as being more fluent in this language. However,
\textit{Takitaki} is also used to designate not only what is referred to as Sranantongo in
the literature, but also what is locally referred to as ‘the language of the river’

\textsuperscript{11} These migrant women use the argument of the absence of hierarchy related to their

\textsuperscript{12} With police controls more frequent, women who live in a regularised situation in French
Guiana know that they had better possess a visa. Depending on the type of short-term
visa, one or several entries into Surinamese territory is allowed.
and the varieties of Nengee. It is seen as ‘the language of the Bosh’, ‘the language of the Saramaka’ and ‘the language of the Ndьuka’. This is well documented by scholars working in French Guiana (Collectif 2000; see Migge and Léglise 2013 for an analysis). A reseller who does not speak Takitaki as she calls it will not go out to sell her merchandise without a Haitian woman who considers herself competent in that language. At times both sets of interlocutors—the Haitian and the Businenge person—interact in French Guianese Creole if both of them speak it. There are also boatmen or sellers of Businenge origin who know some words in Haitian and thus communicate with Haitians by mixing French Guianese Creole and Haitian. However, in practice, what constitutes the border is not just the Marowijne/Maroni river, but also the road leading from Albina, the border town on the Surinamese side, to Paramaribo where police control the space. In this case, the use of the word border does not so much refer directly to a property of the State, but rather to the practices of some of its agents, the policemen, and the representations migrants have of them. It appears that the road is not a border or an obstacle but a space for negotiation which is underscored by the existence of corruption. By their economic activities, Haitians become cross-border migrants, defining, in their way, a ‘local transnational space’.

But, regarding economic situation, administrative status, and social advantages, the situation experienced in Suriname is often compared to what is known—and expected—of French Guiana. Let us consider the case of this man.

Here, it’s true you can settle there and sell your products. In Guiana, it’s not easy like this. But with the Euro, you earn, here, you manage but you don’t earn. And there are other problems. Suriname has no social security system and little is done for Haitians. Now people think Haitians are rich; they plant vegetables and all they can, then, they sell, so they are rich. The Coolies don’t help us. If you are sick, you go to the hospital and you have to spend all your money. Otherwise you can die, they don’t take care of you. In Guiana, it is different, with the French. On the other side [in French Guiana], the Euro is better than the Surinamese currency and you can be cared for. It’s better. Well... it’s true there is no work, you need papers. Without papers, you don’t live. Here you manage, even if you don’t have papers. (Translated from Haitian Creole, Paramaribo, 2009)

Such narratives are frequently found. Representations and practices attached to the living conditions in Suriname and in French Guiana produce contrasting images that are also ambivalent. From the Surinamese viewpoint, it is the
economic and social issue that turns migrants into ‘leavers’. Seen from French Guiana, it is the issue of papers. In western French Guiana, the papers’ issue takes on a singular meaning within the relationship established with other migrants and especially with the Maroon groups, even if it is a ‘common’ issue among all the migrants. Having papers means, then, resources and uses, and constitutes trademarks. From this point of view, being migrant is stated differently in French Guiana than in Paramaribo. The scattering within the two national spaces takes on its meaning according to the differences of regulations, economic potentialities or social advantages of both countries. But the perceptions of these differences and the practices they create also depend on the symbolic and imaginary value attributed to the two national spaces. For those who arrive, or who are, in French Guiana, the symbolic value attributed to French Guiana as a ‘country of France’ enters within the identity definitions Haitians construct of themselves; it gives another meaning to their mobility. They have different expectations when going to Paramaribo or to French Guiana, in short, because of their perceptions of France, they dream of better social success in French Guiana.

6 From Suriname to the Guianese West

In French Guiana, Haitians principally settle in Cayenne. Their presence is more important and older than in the western part of the department where the first numerically significant arrivals date back to the beginning of the 1990s. However, since this period, migrants continue to settle in the towns of Saint-Laurent-du-Maroni and Mana, and there are relatively large numbers of migrants there from the early 2000s. Among them, some obtained a residence permit but a lot of them have not yet engaged with the administrative system in order to regularise their situation. And, contrary to general belief, this not only affects those newly arrived. ‘Illegal’ migrants only rarely move to other parts of the department. The main reason for this is the presence of a permanent gendarmerie roadblock at Iracoubo, a village along the only road to Cayenne, whose purpose is to control the flow of migrants and smugglers from the western to the eastern part of French Guiana. The border is, again, not to be considered as a line geographically separating two states but as a limit separating territories within a single national space; a limit that shapes as

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much the identity compositions as the modes of recognition among compatriots (Laëthier 2011b).

### 7 Being a Migrant and Circulating

Having arrived in western French Guiana, migrants’ economic integration takes place in a certain socio-spatial continuity with Suriname. Unlike what happens in Cayenne, migrants are less likely to be confined to jobs in the domestic services sector involving activities such as cleaning and building. Most people work in the agricultural sector and in trading. They grow agricultural products and sell them to French Guianese Creoles, Chinese and especially to people of Hmong origin. Family-run slash-and-burn farming usually takes place in fields owned by French Guianese Creoles. In some cases Haitians are tenant farmers or sharecroppers. In other cases, migrants’ farm land for which they do not have titles belongs to the state. Haitians living in the municipality of Saint-Laurent-du-Maroni who have regularised their status try to legalise their occupancy by applying for a licence for agricultural development. Some migrants occasionally return to Suriname to work after meeting compatriots in French Guiana who are settled in Suriname and who will inform them of work opportunities as they arise. The following example illustrates this point.

Estève is a 38 years old man. Originally from Saint-Louis-du-Sud, Estève left Haiti in 1995. He stayed for five years in Suriname after coming with the help of ‘agencies’. His ‘travel’ was not planned as far as French Guiana, but as he wanted to settle there, he went there several times. After two deportations to the border because he had no residence permit, Estève settled in the area of Jarikaba. This is where his wife Elvesia joined him in 1999. The year after, Elvesia’s father, who lives in Mana and has a residence permit, helped the couple to come to French Guiana. However, Elvesia was not able to get a residence permit based on family reunification procedure. As for Estève, he applied several times for regularisation; all his applications were rejected. The couple and their two children, born and going to school in Mana live along CD 8 in a wooden

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14 From 1977 onwards, the French government organised the settlement of the Hmongs, refugees from Laos, in the villages of Cacao and Javouhey. Specialised for a long time in vegetable farming, the Hmongs have been supplying Cayenne’s market since their arrival. Nowadays Hmong have shifted from growing to selling agricultural products, with Haitians taking over the farming niche.
house without running water and electricity that was built by Estève. The land belongs to a French Guianese Creole man who lives in Cayenne. When Estève does not have enough cash to pay the rent, he pays in agricultural products. His slash-and-burn fields are behind his house and he goes there every day. But Estève sometimes goes to Foto too for a ‘job’ obtained through one of his compatriots.

There are many Haitians living along CD 8\textsuperscript{15} in similar conditions to what Estève and his family experience; they go to Suriname from time to time for work but continue to live permanently in the French region where their children attend school. It is not unusual to visit a family and to be told: “So-and-so went to Suriname. You’ll find him next week”. We will return to this issue when we discuss how Haitians in this part of French Guiana construct their identity.

Apart from trips for work and trading, Haitians from French Guiana also go to Paramaribo for other reasons. Regular migrants fly to Haiti or the United States of America via Paramaribo’s airport as tickets are cheaper than from French Guiana. Irregular migrants also travel via Paramaribo to Haiti when the need arises, for example, in order to attend a funeral or to organise one for a relative, or to be treated by stronger ‘magic’.

There are also migrants, who after having settled in western French Guiana choose to go back and settle in Suriname. Okès’ example is a good illustration of this case. However, few conceive of such a return as permanent. If they are offered a job or are able to obtain residency papers for French Guiana, they usually return there. Indeed, hope is permanently sustained in this field, or at least people try to convince themselves by convincing their interlocutor, as though otherwise the legitimacy of their presence is at stake. For these migrants, men more than women,\textsuperscript{16} travel frequently; they go back and forth repeatedly and thus a certain familiarity with the places and countrymen develops.

Each migration project is a “strategic, pragmatic and contextual procedure” as Boyer (2005b: 52) reminds us, after J. Lévy and M. Lussault (2003). They underline the long duration of a migration project that contributes to its permanent redefinition. The migration project is individual and part of a collective experience of time (of a given time period), it adapts several times

\textsuperscript{15} From Mana, the departmental road called CD 8 leads to Cayenne and CD 9 leads to Saint-Laurent-du-Maroni. At the time of the civil war in Suriname, two ‘refugee’ camps were opened along this road for the PPDS or Persons Provisionally Displaced from Suriname. The camps were officially closed in 1992, but many former PPDS stayed or settled nearby. Few Haitians live along the CD 9.

\textsuperscript{16} With the exception of the ‘resellers’ mentioned above.
to the context. It involves several scales where migratory ‘know-how’ and ‘can-do’ (re)combine. ‘External conditions’ and ‘interior dispositions’, to reuse the terms by E. Ma Mung (2009), combine together, creating a sort of (what I would call) migratory capital that evolves.

From this point of view, the data suggest that each migrant’s experience is to a certain extent unique and gives rise to new types of contact and non-linear mobilities. Whether they are migrants settled in Suriname, migrants planning to go to French Guiana, migrants coming from Suriname and currently living in French Guiana, with or without a legal administrative status, or migrants who return to Suriname after a shorter or longer stint in French Guiana, itineraries are made up of multiple mobilities that do not fit into a single category of mobility.

Migrants’ economic integration often leads to a certain degree of homogenisation. But the collective subject that is established in interaction with other groups, develops mobilities that produce many experiences opening onto a non-static situation. Between constraints and initiatives, this double movement shows how migrants organise the ‘external conditions’. Thus, in the west of French Guiana, migrants construct ‘mobility fields’ (Laëthier 2011b), where through forms of territorialisation, mixing mobility and anchoring, the border area is extended and diverted. International and cross-border migration thus combine within the migratory experience. They encounter other mobilities, other circulations, and other groups before which there is a need to think of oneself as migrating and circulating.

Does that mean that the border becomes a ‘non-place’ (Augé 1992) where spatial, cultural and social distances vanish? It certainly entails geographic proximity, and proximity of social spaces, but the border does not seem to be a ‘non-place’. If its functionality makes a shared experience out of it, it may be because there are other borders within the formal border: identity boundaries that become resources from which the occupied space is organised. In this sense, for Haitians, the constructed and lived ‘mobility fields’ contribute to the creation of a feeling of belonging for the formerly settled and the newcomers. But the emergence of a certain shared ‘identity’ does not mean that there will not be confrontation with the new value system. It even reinforces the difficulties encountered in relation to the irregularities within which identity representation also takes shape. We will now consider the various modalities through which Haitian identity is experienced that impact the migratory experience and the experience of others that they encounter during their travels between Suriname and French Guiana. The question of identity construction allows us to look at the issue of the border in a new light. We have so far examined how migration and mobilities are influenced by state borders, that is how
they and their permeability impact on migratory routes, and social and economic borders that exist in the places where migrants settle. Yet, migrants are not only ‘border crossers’, but are also ‘boundary builders’. They build identity boundaries shaping a new collective entity taken out of a whole, the one of the ‘other strangers’, being, in the context of the West of French Guiana, the Businenge groups.

8 The Meaning of the Identifications

More than thirty years of migration have reinforced the socio-cultural heterogeneity of French Guianese society. Demographic growth is partly linked to these migratory movements that also deeply affect inter-group relationships. In this context, signs of recognition and of belonging to the group go with the idea of ‘community’, being a support and a resource taking part in the individual and collective relationships. The idea of a common and unique ‘origin’ that merges culture and nationality, distinguishes each group from the other. As is common in the daily practices of identity construction, the notion of an origin, imposed from the outside, also enters into the processes of self-construction of the migrants. These appear as many elaborations marked by the imposition and re-appropriation of acts of identity and naming coming from others (an ‘exo-identification’). Thus, in French Guiana, Haitians identify themselves as a singular entity and are characterised by the idea of Haitian nationality. It is a matter of belonging to a ‘Haitian nation’. This elaboration is thought of as a merging of other identifications that find a coherence according to the levels of interaction in which they arise. First, within the group itself, is the feeling of belonging to a local and localised identity. National identity is expressed in terms of regional belonging: one is Haitian from Leogane, from Saint-Louis-du-Sud, from Cabaret, etc. Then, without however contradicting the territorial label, Haitian identity acquires a historical dimension: Haitians and Haiti meet in the past. This dimension of the ‘nation’, considered in its historical continuity, is what is invested in migration. It is from that perspective that the Haitian reference is called up in social exchanges to be asserted as a ‘community’ within society. The sharing of this ‘identity’ does not prevent one from valuing invisibility outside the group and the inhabited places where this identification operates. The ‘origin’ is not—so far—developed as a communitarian identity discourse; it does not lead to collective speech. In general, in the relationships experienced with the different groups, it is only when xenophobia is denounced, when hostility is felt, when extraneity is strongly
felt, that an ‘identity’ is expressed. This point comes as a reminder, if needed, that identifications cannot be understood outside the social context in which and by which they are created. We should also keep in mind that the different levels of identifications can take on differentiated forms that force us to abandon a paradigm of identifying migrants as a coherent and stable unit (Laëthier 2011a).

9 Wording Other Boundaries

In western French Guiana, Haitians interact with Creoles, Metropolitans, Hmongs, and Maroons locally referred to as ‘Businenge’. Yet, ‘Haitian identity/alterity’ is most strongly articulated in relation to ‘other strangers’ and first of all with reference to members of the different Maroon communities who are locally often cast as originating from Suriname despite the fact that some of them have been part of the French Guianese landscape for a long time. The reason for this is that in Saint-Laurent-du-Maroni and in Mana, unlike what was experienced in Suriname, Haitians generally live in the same neighbourhoods as Maroons. Haitians and Maroons do not live in the same houses or larger compounds and generally assert that their relationships are ‘good’ and that there are no ‘major problems’. However, it is noticeable that although they live in close proximity, they never really mix with each other socially. It is said that those who have problems are “[Haitian] men who go looking for a woman among the Bosh” and that anyway, there is no “nation more racist than the Haitian one”. However, social relationships produce an ethnicised mode of relationship, and from this point of view, boundaries do exist. For instance, Haitians re-appropriate cultural stereotypes about Maroons—stereotypes obeying the same logic as those stigmatising Haitians—that cast their language in a pejorative manner, as gibberish. The pejorative expression takitaki is currently used to refer to the English-lexified creoles ideologically linked to Maroons. Following the same logic, some migrants assert that they will send their children to a private school as soon as possible in order to minimise contact with so many ‘Bosh’ and with their language. In a similar vein, some migrants justify their move to French Guiana by emphasising that they want to send their child to a French and French-speaking school.17

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17 Parents have great respect for school and school titles are invested with great value. Prospects of upward mobility and prestige of the diploma are strong among people, who, when they could go to school, had to leave the educational system prematurely.
Although Haitians know that there are several ‘Bosh nations’, as they call them, they rarely differentiate them because they do not perceive differences between them. Only the term ‘Saramaka’ states a distinction. However, when Haitians talk about ‘Saramaka’, they mostly use the term to designate boatmen and to refer to a part of Suriname, the Saramacca District, where they rarely go. Indeed for them, Suriname is divided into Albina, Foto and the ‘Saramaka country’ which refers to all the rest of the territory. ‘Saramaka’ country appears to be what is called in Haiti ‘the outside country’ (peyi andeyò), that is to say, the rural world, the world of the farmers which is highly stigmatised. When Haitians define Maroons as nèg ki sòt nan bwa, literally ‘Negroes from the woods’, they are not referring to their knowledge of the historical process of maroonage or to their knowledge of the terms Bush Negroes/Bosnegers. They are expressing that ‘Bosh’ are ‘people from the outside country’. But they soon remind us that, in the country they left, they are the moun andeyò ‘people from outside country’.

It is known that stressing how far on the ‘outside’ those constructed as ‘other’ are, leads to the elaboration of boundaries within which to differentiate oneself. But the process takes on a singular aspect here. Differentiation involves another construction: a construction that specifies a relationship established with ‘France’, considered as ‘nation’ on one hand, and as ‘State’, on the other hand. The construction of a ‘Haitian identity/alterity’ operates at a collective level and joins the process of national identification.

Haitians often feel that they have greater rights to French residency papers than Maroons because Haiti has historical ties with France and also because French is one of the official languages of Haiti. By contrast, Suriname, the imagined home of Maroons, only shares physical or geographical proximity with France, making Maroons ‘less French’ than Haitians. Thus apprehensive feelings towards the colonial period and the sufferings related to it—denounced in other situations—are momentarily backgrounded. The telling of a memory, through which the migrants appear to be representative of the only nation of the Caribbean that claimed its freedom and gained its

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18 In Haiti, as early as the nineteenth century, social relationships were structured by stigmatising the rural world, viewed as a sign of inferiority.

19 Among the migrants, Haitian Creole is by far the most widely-spoken language. Even if French and French Guianese Creole appear in their language repertoire, they are not practised to the same extent as Haitian Creole. With a family member or a fellow citizen, regardless of age, date of arrival or professions, it is Haitian Creole that is typically spoken. (Laëthier 2007).
independence is backgrounded. However, the enhancement of the Haitian past, that is found in the speech of many migrants, sometimes in an explicit and incisive form condensed in the following sentence: “All black nations await something from us for we are the first people to have become independent”, does not appear. The proximity to France, as stated here, can also be used to denounce the current precarious social and political situation of Haiti because of the independence that was taken ‘without thinking’, and in addition, doing ‘magic’. This construction of the past and the functions that it comes to serve in migration fuels the different discussions around an eventual independence of French Guiana and the treatment of foreigners that would ensue. For some, however, this reconstruction of the past reinforces the idea that Haitians would be forced out of French Guiana if it were to become independent, precisely because of the great proximity of Haitians with ‘France’. For others, it would not be foreigners like them who would be expelled.

The discursive delimitation of a boundary (Poutignat and Streiff-Fenrat 1995; Barth 1969) that is set within the common extraneity, also evokes the question of papers and the possibility of regularisation both linked to the important contribution that Haitians are making to the economic development of French Guiana. The economic dimension is invoked in order to prove that farmers play an important role in the development of the department. While Haitians acknowledge that other social groups also contribute to the development of French Guiana, they cast themselves as “the great workers of French Guiana”. This dovetails with their purported respect for and knowledge of “French customs in such speeches, but expresses a lack of understanding of the precarious administrative and social situation of Haitians in French Guiana. One of the arguments aimed at denouncing the Haitian presence that is frequently put forward by Creoles and Metropolitan French people in contact with them, is the fact that they are mostly responsible for the ecological degradation of the department because they practice intense slash-and-burn agriculture.

Other ‘moral’ and cultural criteria can also reinforce the border. Take, for instance, comments about the incidents of violence attributed to Maroons. Among Haitians, their presence is indeed seen as destabilising because they are presumably linked to increasing crime and violence, and the frequent use of ‘bad magic’. The latter issue in turn is often used among French Guianese Creoles to rally against Haitians. This argument underlines Haitians’ frustration with French authorities which are reluctant to help them obtain a residence permit.

These identity positionings should not, however, be overestimated. On the one hand, as they now appear, the relationships and the representations that
rule them are also linked to the limited number of interactions with the everyday life of the “others” such as metropolitan French people, Maroons etc. There is no real relating of the groups in situations allowing a strong inter-subjective engagement. Interactions are mostly brief and superficial and thus do not contradict the described positionings. Let us consider the case of ‘Bosh taxis’, illegal taxis that are used in the absence of proper public transport, which Haitians living along CD 8 and CD 10 make frequent use of. These taxis allow them to go to Saint-Laurent-du-Maroni or to the town of Mana to ‘conduct business’ or to attend worship services. They allow them to connect with others. Between them, the Surinamese route appears sometimes as a shared migratory route. Sometimes, it is the fact that they are both extraneous to this land that constitutes a common shared experience. It demonstrates all the ambiguity of their relationship.

Besides, enhancement of the Haitian past condensed in the experience of Independence appears as an argument playing contradictory roles. Thus, faced with the political and social situation in which Haiti finds itself nowadays, the reading of the past is reconsidered as a regret that Haitians, unlike Maroons, do not manage collectively. Thus, it is stated that among Haitians, there are no “chiefs as among Bosh or [Amer]Indians” or also that work and its productions are not shared. The societal individualism assumed here is denounced and appears as a negative characteristic of the ‘Haitian nation’ since its Independence. As shown by Jolivet (1997), this image contradicts the view that French Guianese Creoles have of Haitians—and of Maroons; they assume that the latter are close-knit communities and regret that this sense of community has been lost among French Guianese Creoles. Could this issue not also serve to highlight the proximity of Haitians with French Guianese Creoles and not simply just with ‘France’?

The views presented here are characteristic of the adult first generation of Haitian immigrants to French Guiana (and Suriname). Data recently collected among younger people of Haitian extraction who have been only or primarily socialised in French Guiana suggest that they do not have the same identity reference as their parents did. Generally speaking, young people born in French Guiana try to distance themselves from the majority of practices and values that they associate with their parents’ culture and with the past in Haiti. They do this by claiming to be/identifying as Guyanais ‘French Guianese’ or Haitian-born in French Guiana.

Finally, in a multicultural context where, for most of the groups present, the colonial relationship shapes the question of origins, let us keep in mind that the dynamic dimension of identification opens the way to the possibility of establishing a distance but also a proximity between the groups. From this
last point of view, the question arises about the existence of identifications whose core would become a historical conscience, a conscience of the originality marked by the act of resisting: enhancement of the freedom conquered by fights for independence in the case of the Haitians, and by marronage as a means to conquer autonomy in the case of Maroons.
CHAPTER 11

Epilogue: The Aesthetics and Politics of Multilingualism among the Saamaka

*Richard Price and Sally Price*

This wide-ranging book, which deserves to take its place on the shelf right next to the *Atlas of the Languages of Suriname* (Carlin and Arends 1992), places mobility, multilingualism, multiethnicity, and identity formation firmly in historical perspective. By exploring the specific statuses (legal, cultural, social) of the various peoples who live in or move through Suriname, the essays highlight the ways in which language and ethnicity have contributed to the country's exceptional diversity. They take us through remnants of its colonial past, the challenges faced by particular groups at particular historical moments, and on into the very present. We would stress that Suriname was a Dutch colony for more than three hundred years and that its institutions and official ideology continue to reflect that legacy. None of the languages (and peoples) discussed in this book—except for Dutch—are recognised or promoted by the State (and as a result some of them are highly endangered). In trying to understand the linguistic situation in twenty-first-century Suriname from the perspective of ethnicity, identity, class, and nation-building, this history continues to weigh heavily.

The chapters are diverse, from a large-scale survey of multilingualism and identity among children (Léglise and Migge) to fairly technical linguistic descriptions that nonetheless give the lie to an equivalence of language and ethnicity (Yakpo, van den Berg and Borges, and Yamada), to rich ethnographic accounts of transnational commerce and mobility along the Marowijne (de Theije), complexly shifting ethnic identities, attributions, and nomenclature among Amerindians (Carlin and Mans), analyses of centuries-long migration and transnational mobility by the Kari'na (Collomb and Renault-Lescure), descriptions of the modern globe-spanning migration of Chinese (Tjon Sie Fat) and the multi-sited, circulatory migration of Haitians (Laëthier), the linguistic practices and identity among hybrid Amerindian migrant groups in Western Suriname (Yamada), and the role of new communicative technologies among Maroons (van Stipriaan).

We take the opportunity to participate in this already-rich pepperpot by signaling a few supportive reflections from our own long-term association with
Saamaka Maroons, pointing particularly to the role of play and the aesthetic enjoyment of multilingualism, since it has not been dealt with in any depth in previous chapters.

The ethnic diversity and multilingualism of the people of Suriname, as demonstrated in this book, runs counter to the official assimilationist, monolingual (Dutch)-promoting attitudes often expressed by the State. During a 1992 trial before the Inter-American Court for Human Rights (*Aloeboetoe v Suriname*), one of the justices, Judge Julio A. Barberas of Argentina, questioned Suriname’s representative, Judge Advocate Ramón de Freitas, about the linguistic competence of Saamakas, who had brought this case against the State after a number of young, unarmed Saamaka men had been assassinated by Suriname’s military.

**Judge Barberis:** If, as you said, the national law now applies to Saramakas, how were they made aware of it? Is there a Saramaccan translation of the civil code?

**De Freitas:** The official language of Suriname is . . .

**Judge Barberis:** That’s the reason for my question! Answer me yes or no. Is there a Saramaccan translation of the civil code?

**De Freitas:** No.

**Judge Barberis:** Right. Well then how can the Saramaka population be acquainted with the laws of Suriname?

**De Freitas:** By means of Dutch, which they learn in school.

**Judge Barberis [skeptically]:** Most Saramakas speak Dutch?

**De Freitas:** They speak Dutch as far as I know, but especially since 1986.1

Given that 1986 marked the beginning of the Suriname Civil War, during which those few schools that had existed in the interior of Suriname were closed for many years, the claims of de Freitas become especially ironic—as well as mendacious.

Fifteen years later, in the yet more important case before the same court, *Saramaka People vs. Suriname*, language again played a key role. The lawyers for the State consistently argued that Saamakas had now become “assimilated” and were no longer culturally different from other Surinamers—linguistically as well as in other ways.2 The first dramatic moment came when

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1 From the official transcript of the trial. Further details can be found in R. Price 2011.

2 The State had long viewed whatever rights it granted to Maroons and Indigenous people as temporary protections conceded by the State for a transitional period during a period of their assimilation into the larger, and inherently superior, Surinamese society and economy (Kambel and MacKay 1999).
Saamaka Headcaptain Wazen Eduards took the witness stand. The president of the Court, Judge Sergio García Ramírez of Mexico, addressed the Saamaka dignitary.

**PRESIDENT GARCÍA RAMÍREZ** (speaking in Spanish): Mr. Witness, do you swear or solemnly declare upon your honor and conscience that you will speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?

**HEADCAPTAIN WAZEN EDUARDS** (leaping to his feet in his bright yellow Saamaka cape and stretching both arms toward heaven, speaking in Saamakatongo): I stand before you and the Great God. I have come here today to talk about the poverty and oppression of my people which has been caused by our brothers from the city. We all came over from Africa together. We are brothers yet our particular rights have been violated. We are deeply aware of the injustice. I stand before you and before the Great God because he is the one who made all the birds, all the animals, all the things in the entire world. He is the one we are standing before today. I speak nothing but the truth. There is nothing aside from the truth that I have to tell you today.

This surprising outburst in Saamakatongo—everyone had expected a simple “Yes”—suddenly made clear to the Court that it was dealing here with a people who, despite the claims of the State, were culturally distinct and that language was undeniably a part of their distinctiveness.

And in its landmark judgment of 2007, which recognised the Saamaka People as a legal entity, recognised their traditional territory as belonging to them (rather than to the State), and required the State to make various changes in its laws regarding Maroons and Indigenous Peoples in Suriname, the Court insisted on these peoples’ rights to “enjoy their culture” and to pass it on to their children. Indeed, a great deal of recent international jurisprudence makes clear that the freedom to use one’s language is one of those fundamental human rights.4

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3 During the proceedings Sally Price sat next to each Saamaka witness in the box and served as official simultaneous interpreter between Saamakatongo and English, Spanish, and Dutch. For a detailed account of the 2007 trial, see R. Price 2011.

4 See, for example, UN Human Rights Committee, Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which says, in effect, that minorities should not be denied the right to enjoy their culture.
When in 1968, Maroons of the interior were for the first time invited to partici-
pate in national elections, the ruling party, led by Afro-Surinamers (“Creoles”) who needed their votes to counter the demographic rise of the Hindustani population, created and promoted the label “Boslandcreolen” in order to erase the identititarian difference between Creoles and Maroons that was so clearly reflected in the traditional term “Bosneger.” (In that case, the new term did not stick.) A more recent example of the political power of linguistic and eth-
nic labels concerns the creation of the term “Bushinenge.” Aluku Maroons, who constitute a privileged minority of the Maroon population in French Guiana, with French citizenship and representation in the Conseil Régional and Conseil Général, began promoting this term in the 1980s in order to seem to be speaking for all Maroons. The term, with its very un-Saamaka “sh” sound, is opposed by Saamakas in French Guiana, who correctly understand it as an attempt at political appropriation.

Today, there are some 80,000 to 90,000 people whose first language is Saamakatongo. That language (like all languages) is in constant flux, and Saamakatongo now includes lexical items and ways of speaking adopted during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries from external sources such as Sranantongo, Ndyuka, French, Dutch, and more recently Brazilian, Chinese and Russian—the latter because of the new Soyuz base in French Guiana, where many Saamakas are employed. But even beyond that, and in addition to all the second languages mentioned in this book, Saamakas master, to variable extents, an array of ritual languages and generation-specific play languages not unlike Urban Youth Languages found elsewhere (Kießling and Mous 2004) that expand their linguistic repertoires enormously and add to the intellectual and aesthetic pleasure of language use.

Saamakas’ appreciation and cultivation of multilingualism has always been an important part of Saamaka life. Indeed, as Kamau Brathwaite has argued (1971: 237), “It was in language that the slave was perhaps most suc-
cessfully imprisoned by his master, and it was in his (mis-) use of it that he perhaps most successfully rebelled.” Saamakas, like other Maroons and their slave ancestors, have always used languages for purposes of secrecy.

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5 See R. Price 2013b for the latest figures on Maroon demography. For Saamaka children born in the Netherlands or the United States, Saamaka is often a second or third language. Saamaka parents in Rotterdam, for example, have sponsored Saturday morning classes in Saamakatongo so that their children do not abandon the language.

6 Or even discretion. In order to explain the identity of a Haitian sitting near us at a wake, a Saamaka told us, when we inquired, that he was a “Baka seibi” (an “After-seven” person). This spontaneous label was easily understood by anyone who spoke Saamakatongo (but not
ritual languages, like those used by other Maroons, are known by specialists who have spent years learning them. They include Apintii drum language, the Papa language sung at funerals, the language of Komanti warrior spirits, that of Wenti sea spirits, that of Apuku forest spirits, and several others. Much of their lexicons draw on a variety of African languages but they also use words from other Maroon languages as part of their practices of disguise and play. For example, the speech of Saamaka Komanti mediums is heavily infused with borrowings from Ndyuka, and Ndyuka Komanti mediums incorporate words from Saamakatongo in their speech.⁷

Maroons are inveterate transnationals and the ability to get along in a foreign language is a central value. Since the 1860s, Saamaka men have travelled in large numbers to French Guiana to work as canoemen. (As early as 1887, one group of 100 Saramaka men was reported to be returning home from a nine-year-long stay in Mana.⁸ Today, one-third of Saamakas, men, women, and children, live—often illegally, from a French perspective—in French Guiana.) Men who have spent time working there have always enjoyed showing off and amusing themselves in their home villages in Suriname by conducting boisterous conversations in French Creole.

Since the late nineteenth century, these groups of migrant men, once they returned to Saamaka, have created *akoopinas*—play languages that only members of the in-group can understand—through selective manipulation of the various languages to which they were exposed. The creation and use of *akoopinas* dates at least from the late nineteenth century, and may go back even further. During much of the twentieth century, a number of *akoopinas* were in use at any one time in different villages along the Suriname River, and the practice has been reported among other Maroon peoples as well.⁹ A Saamaka friend once told us about an *akoopina* from Santigoon (Santigron), a village located near Paramaribo that includes a mixed population of Saamakas and Ndyukas, by saying, “It rearranges in Ndyuka; it rearranges in Sranan; it rearranges in Saamakatongo. So it is mixed.... and it also has things of its own.” And he pointed to the way the perceived “sweetness” of particular words influenced the choice of which language to draw on:

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by the Haitian), since eight (*aiti*) comes after seven (*seibi*) and is pronounced identically by Saamakas to “Haiti.”

⁷ For further discussion as well as hundreds of examples of words, songs, and phrases in these ritual languages, see R. Price 2008.


⁹ For further discussion of *akoopinas*, see R. and S. Price 1976.
When you say *mbaku*, that's from *kumba*, which is how Ndyukas say “navel.” If you reversed it in Saamakatongo, it would be *gonbi* (from *bingo*), but when you are really talking the language, you must say *mbaku*, because it's the language with the sweetest name for a thing that you must take. If Saamaka is sweeter, you use that; if Ndyuka, you use that; if Sranan, you use that.

Although most *akoopinas* have been used for relatively brief exchanges, there was one, which originated in the mid-nineteenth century in the village of Kampu and was passed on exclusively to residents of Kampu for at least a hundred years, that people used for extended conversations. In the 1960s all men and boys in the village as well as a few of the older women were said to speak it fluently. It was based on syllable rearrangement of French Guiana Creole, though many of its speakers had no knowledge of French Creole itself. Examples we were given included “Téku vé-utu” meaning “Where did you find it?” from Creole “Koté u tuvé?” Or again, the word for “family,” which in normal Saamakatongo is the same as the word for belly/womb, became, in this *akoopina*, “tivan”—a distortion of “vanti” (Saamakas' pronunciation of French Creole *vant*, which derives from French *ventre*).

Saamakas' fascination with foreign languages also enlivens popular songs. In 1968 an eleven-year-old boy sang for us a *seketi* song that evokes a Brazilian greeting, apparently heard by men during labor trips to Kourou, where their coworkers constructing the European Space Center included Brazilians. Combining linguistic bits from these encounters with regular Saamakatongo, the song embellishes them with typical *seketi* flourishes such as the ideophonic *nyelele* and a rhetorical allusion to royalty:10

*Sinyolu, nyenlele, miii*  
*Senhor, nyenlele, child*  
*Sinyolu, un yei no?*  
*Senhor, y’a hear now?*  
*Sinyolu, bondia-o,*  
*Senhor, bom dia*  
*We, ma o yei moo e.*  
*Well, I won't understand the rest.*

Di mi naki te mi dou  
When I travelled till I arrived  
A Degaa konde,  
at Degras village  
Potugei bakaa ko ta bai  
a Portuguese whiteman called out  
Da mi odi u sembe.  
and gave me someone's greeting.  
We, nono,  
Well, now,  
We, a bai da mi odi u sembe.  
Well, he called out someone's greetings

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10 This is one of 45 song texts discussed in S. Price 1984: 172–187.
In recent decades, one of the primary contexts for sharing language and creating cross-ethnic group solidarity is the flourishing urban pop music scene, which encompasses not only greater Paramaribo but extends to Rotterdam, Amsterdam, and other sites in the Netherlands. In a series of fascinating articles, Kenneth Bilby has documented the influx and influence, since the late 1970s, of young Maroon musicians on the urban scene (see, for example, Bilby 1999, 2001; Bilby and Jaffe, 2009). He writes: “Almost every major trend in grassroots kaseko [traditionally, the Creole—and national—dance music par excellence] since the mid-1980s has been pioneered by Maroon players; most recent kaseko hits in Suriname have been by bands made up primarily or entirely of Saamaka and Ndyuka Maroons” (Bilby 2001: 304). Or, again stressing the international and multilingual influences on Suriname’s pop music varieties, as played by bands composed of Maroons and Creoles, he writes:

In any random selection of kaseko, kawina and aleke recordings made during the last ten years, one is liable to detect strains of Jamaican reggae and dancehall, French Antillean zouk, Central African soukous, Haitian kompa, Dominican merengue, South African mbube, Trinidadian soca, North American funk, hip-hop, and house, Brazilian samba, or any number of other foreign styles. (1999: 267)

And discussing what he calls “the cosmopolitan openness displayed by kaseko and kawina bands,” he offers that

A good example is “Mani Mani” by Bigi Ting. Prefaced by a bit of Brazilian samba-style drumming, the piece then kicks off in typical aleke style with a section in the Ndyuka language; eventually the melody changes, and the lyrics (quoting a number of hit songs by other Surinamese bands) begin to shift back and forth between Sarnami Hindi, English, Ndyuka, and Sranan; this part of the song alternates with yet another section consisting of an aleke version of James Brown’s “Sex Machine,” rendered in an approximation of African-American Vernacular English (over typical Ndyuka aleke drumming). (1999: 217 and 290 [note 16])
What better example could we wish for of multilingualism from below, the peoples’ insistence on their right to use, play with, and develop new linguistic (and musical) resources, across every imaginable border?

The everyday predominance of multilingualism, with children routinely speaking three and four languages, as demonstrated in the chapter by Léglise and Migge, fits squarely with our own, less systemically elicited, impressions among Saamakas. Two of the households in which we have spent time in recent years have impressed upon us the enjoyment as well as the everydayness of both multilingualism and cross-ethnic group relations. In St. Georges, on the French Guianese border with Brazil, sharing a meal with Léon (who was brought up by his Saamaka father rather than his Creole mother), his Creole wife Julie, a Brazilian son-in-law, and various others, conversation around the ample dinner table weaves effortlessly in and out of Saamaka, French Creole, French, and Portuguese, with everyone participating. And at our friend Tooy’s house in Cayenne, the mixture tends instead to be Saamaka, Ndyuka, French Guianese Creole, Haitian Creole, Sranantongo, and French, reflecting the various ethnicities of the people who happen to be present on a given day.

Finally, a note about words into text. Although Saamakatongo, like the other Maroon languages, is primarily a spoken language, the development of an orthography for it began soon after the 1762 peace treaty with the Dutch Crown, when German Moravian missionaries first arrived in Saamaka territory. From 1765 until 1813, thirty-seven Moravian men and women attempted to bring their brand of Christianity to the Saamaka.11 Writing biblical texts in the Saamaka language was part of this effort, which culminated in a remarkable Saamakatongo-German dictionary (Schumann 1778). Since that time, there have been other attempts to develop an orthography for Saamakatongo—by the linguist Jan Voorhoeve and the R.C. priest Antoon Donicie in the 1960s, by the SIL field linguists Catherine Rountree and Naomi Glock in the 1970s and 80s, and by amateur linguists in French Guiana during the past decade.12

During the past several years, working with Saamaka linguist Vinije Haabo, we have developed a new orthography and recently published a book that uses it.13 Written at the formal request of the Saamaka People, and using the new orthography with their approval, we hope that this book will serve as the new

11 See R. Price 1990, which explores the relationship between Saamakas and missionaries during the second half of the eighteenth century.
12 See, for example, Donicie and Voorhoeve 1963, Rountree, Asodanoe and Glock 2000, and Lienga 2013.
standard for turning the spoken language into written text.\textsuperscript{14} The orthography, which does not use diacritical marks, mimics the one that Saamakas use on their Blackberries, iPhones, and Androids. For speakers of the language—as, for example, speakers of French—it turns out that diacritics are not necessary either for reading or writing the language.

Hats off, then, to this fine collection on language, mobility, and identity! In its anti-essentialist efforts to focus on interwoven social interactions that are constitutive of identity-making processes and changing linguistic practices, it opens the door to a variety of new paths for research and understanding. But in all the emphasis on shifting and contextualised identities, we should never forget that for some peoples, in some circumstances, a notion of ethnicity as fixed and immutable continues to matter. At the 2007 trial before the Inter-American Court, when Suriname’s attorneys were trying to assert that Saamaka identity was on the wane and that the authority of the \textit{gaama} [paramount chief] could not possibly extend to Saamakas who lived abroad, the State’s own witness Saamaka Headcaptain Albert Aboikoni (a former representative to Suriname’s national assembly) eloquently countered this claim. Speaking in Dutch, he answered them, saying with emotion: \textit{Als woon je op de maan, je ben een Saramaccaner. De gaama is ook gaama van jij}—Even if you lived on the moon, you would still be a Saamaka.

\textsuperscript{14}  The Saamaka People have purchased 3000 copies for distribution in their schools.


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