Following the decolonization movements that swept the globe after World War II, between four and six million people were “returned” to Europe from the colonies. From an exporter of people, Europe turned to a site of immigration for the first time in the twentieth century.

Until now, these migrations have been overlooked as scholars have highlighted instead the parallel migrations of former “colonized” peoples. Europe’s Invisible Migrants corrects this bias. This multidisciplinary volume presents essays by prominent sociologists, historians, and anthropologists on their research with these “invisible” migrant communities. Their work explores the experiences of colonists returning to France, Portugal and the Netherlands, the ways national and colonial ideologies of race and citizenship have assisted in or impeded their assimilation and the roles history and memory have played in this process, and the ways these migrations reflect the return of the “colonial” to Europe.

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Most of the authors of this book first met at the April 9, 1999 conference, “Europe’s Invisible Migrants: Consequences of the Colonists’ ‘Return,’” which was sponsored by the Institute of French Studies, New York University. Before that time, we had been working on our own, isolated from each other by geography and disciplinary boundaries. Once together, we quickly found that our research covered much common ground. Conference attendees commented on the multiple ways that the papers intersected, and suggested that this represented an exciting moment of convergence in academic scholarship, one that may even represent the emergence of a new field of study, and one that certainly merited consolidation into a common text. We thus embarked together on the longer project of developing this book.

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In the wake of worldwide decolonization movements, an estimated five to seven million people were repatriated to Europe over a thirty-five-year period that began during World War II. This mass population movement represents Europe’s first important shift in the twentieth century from a site of net population exportation to one of immigration. It has now been sixty years since the first of these migrants, Italians from Libya, began to return “home” in 1940. It would be a reasonable assumption that considerable research has been completed on the long-term consequences of these migrations – the consequences for the migrants themselves, as well as for the host nations and their societies and economies, and, furthermore, that the results of this research has influenced wider theoretical developments in the social sciences. This is not the case. The subject is only now gaining the attention of more than a handful of social scientists. Previously, this work had been carried out by scholars of different disciplinary affiliations who for the most part were working within specific metropolitan contexts with little knowledge of each other’s work. As a result, their contributions also remain isolated from wider debates in anthropology, history, and sociology, and most notably from the rich and burgeoning literature on European immigration, integration and multiculturalism.

This book brings together for the first time work in English done by scholars who have explored the consequences to the migrants and the metropole of postcolonial return migrations to Portugal, France, and the Netherlands. Here I introduce the reader to the three decolonization experiences covered in the chapters that follow, presenting them first in the wider context of the array of European return migrations associated with post-World War II decolonization movements. I underscore analogous and contrasting features of the colonial and decolonization histories involved. Finally, we will consider reasons for the “invisibility” of
these migrants in academic literature to date, and the ways a considera-
tion of this new subject can challenge and advance current theory.

Migrations of Decolonization – An Overview

The decolonization migrations considered here occurred principally in
the decades during and after World War II. Certainly, mass migrations
had been tied to decolonization in earlier historical periods; across the
centuries of European imperialism, states often embarked on new con-
quests while granting independence to others. In addition, some colo-
nial officers and settlers did not leave the region following decoloniza-
tion movements, and those who did were not always bound for Europe,
such as the Belgians who left Central for South Africa (Salman 1994:198). However, the mass decolonization of much of the colonial
world that has occurred since World War II represents a sea change in
world history, and the resulting migrations to Europe are the focus of
this book.

What is the scale of this migratory phenomenon? This question is
surprisingly difficult to answer. Although some excellent work on
European decolonization has been published recently,\(^1\) most highlight
the political or economic aspects of this process, while the social and
demographic details require further attention or remain scattered in
separate sources. Furthermore, owing to the complexity of the various
decolonization experiences, the great geographical expanse involved,
and even the disparate kinds of migration patterns from each specific
setting, the precise timing of these return migrations remains elusory.
For instance, Italians began leaving Libya in the 1940s, while some of
those who initially stayed behind left at the time of the 1969 revolution
there (Rainero 1994:32). Similarly, British departures from India,
Kenya, and Rhodesia/Zimbabwe were neither immediate nor massive
affairs, but have been ongoing since at least 1945, the 1950s, and 1970s,
respectively. Furthermore, the destinations of the migrants varied so
widely – sometimes they traveled from former to current colony – as to
make generalizations difficult at best. Even when we limit ourselves to
people returning to Europe, research is difficult. Not knowing exactly
when people returned to a specific European nation makes it difficult to
work backwards from metropolitan censuses and other statistical data.
Finally, the migrants were often not identified as such in national immi-
gration statistics or censuses, making it difficult today to state the num-
bers involved with precision. For these reasons, the best sources to date

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have worked backwards from colonial records to provide low and high estimates of returning migrants. The most recent effort is reproduced here as Table 1 (see Appendix). This was not an insignificant phenomenon: overall an estimated 5.4 to 6.8 million people migrated to Europe over a forty-year period from dozens of locations in the decades following World War II.

Migrants were leaving an array of colonial settings, each with unique histories, vastly varying demographic and geographical features, and diverse administrative arrangements with European powers. Colonial scholars often find it useful for comparative and heuristic purposes to distinguish settler colonies, colonies where substantial numbers of Europeans settled relatively permanently, from economic colonies and trading posts (sometimes referred to as colonies d’exploitation), which were typically inhabited by much smaller numbers of Europeans, principally administrators, soldiers, missionaries, and traders, and which often had quite different administrative relationships with metropolitan governments and associated systems of rule. This distinction is salient here because in general the decolonization episodes differed dramatically between these two ideal-types, particularly when we consider the degree of violence involved and certainly the scale of the resulting return migrations. The repatriations that have received the most scholarly interest thus far are those associated with settler colonies. Research on returns from other settings is still needed to determine whether or not non-settler colonial settings should be included in the same analytical framework as presented in this introduction.

Who exactly were the 5 to 7 million people who made up these post-war migrations? To answer this question we must travel back to the colonial past. This was a remarkably heterogeneous collection of populations due to the complexity of individual colonial histories and the distinct decolonization experiences of each setting. In the most general terms, at least two main groups are represented: those of diverse origins identified in the colony as members or close allies of the dominant “colonist” faction, and imperial subjects, local intermediaries, and soldiers of various origins incorporated into colonial armies, all of whom were brought to metropolitan countries after their defeat. Leaving aside the repatriated soldiers of colonial armies for now, who were the others? Clearly they were not all wealthy landowners; only a small subset of those repatriated owned land. We could refer to this group in the most general terms as “colonists,” but this term is problematic. A category forged in the colonial context, it is based on a simplified opposition that rarely matched social realities (see Stoler 1989; Stoler and
Cooper 1997). Perhaps to avoid reductionist “colonist/colonized” terms, previous scholars have described these populations as comprised of “Europeans” and “non-Europeans” (Miège and Dubois 1994:18). In this terminology, intended to approximate historical categories employed in the colonial context, “European” would be those granted this legal status by colonial powers prior to repatriation. However, this terminology too can be misleading or cumbersome because when we consider who exactly was granted European or equivalent status in the colony, we still find a very heterogeneous and colony-specific assortment of peoples which often included, along with nationals of the colonizing nation, nationals of other European nations, mixed offspring of European and indigenous unions, non-European or intermediate traders, native wives of European men, and subsets of the indigenous populations.

These migrations occurred over a period of several decades, involving a succession of distinct population transfers from many different colonial contexts, beginning in 1940 with the return of 9,000 to 15,000 Italian youths from Libya, followed by the forced repatriations of thousands of Italians from the then British-occupied East Africa during World War II (Rainero 1994). Dozens of distinct states and decolonization histories are involved. Further complicating any simple summary of this phenomenon is the fact that from each colonial site, migrations typically occurred over several years, in phases. While with hindsight it may seem obvious that the world was undergoing a dramatic shift during the era of independence movements, this was not readily apparent to most European powers or to many in the colonies at the time. During the early periods of what we now consider wars of liberation, many future migrants did not realize the enormity of the changes underway, and many tried to continue on with their lives, only to depart several years later. Consequently, the successive migrations from any one location often represented different sub-groups of colonial populations. In many settings, the Dutch Indies, French North Africa, and British East Africa for instance, the first to leave were those with few ties in the colony, including people who were in the colony temporarily and those who had arrived most recently, such as government functionaries. An intermediate group leaving somewhat later would include the more affluent, those more recently settled, and others who still had family or other close ties in the metropole. Many in this category thought they were only leaving temporarily. They often departed with just the items needed for a short vacation, only to find it impossible to return, and consequently some in this situation left all of their posses-
sions behind. Finally, in most cases, the people who stayed in the colony/former colony the longest were those of few means, people with the longest family histories there, and those with few or no ties to the metropolitan country; in other words, the people who had the most to lose by leaving.7

**Dutch, French, and Portuguese Migrations of Decolonization**

This book presents research conducted on the three cases of mass return migrations that have attracted the most scholarly interest thus far: those of the French from Algeria (a subset of whom often refer to themselves as *pieds-noirs*), the Dutch from the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia), and the Portuguese from Portuguese West and East Africa (Angola and Mozambique, respectively), often termed *retornados*. These cases all involve settler colonies with substantial European populations, and many commonalities stem from this fact. However, these cases also offer quite distinct colonial and decolonization histories, allowing for rich and interesting comparisons.

**Dutch Migrations:** The Dutch empire had roots in the early seventeenth century, with trading posts and settlements ranging as far afield as New Amsterdam in today’s New York, the Caribbean, Dutch Guyana in northeastern South America, Ceylon, and multiple outposts in southeast Asia. By 1945 these territories had been reduced to three: the Dutch East Indies, the Dutch West Indies (Netherlands Antilles) and Dutch Guyana (or the Republic of Surinam on independence in 1975). The Netherlands tried to maintain these possessions after World War II, focusing on preserving its most important colonial possession, the Dutch East Indies, where Indonesian nationalist Sukarno had been campaigning for independence since the 1920s. After the region’s occupation by Japan during World War II and a declaration of Indonesian independence two days of Japanese capitulation in August 1945, the Dutch government sent troops to the Indies, in October 1945. A long conflict ensued that ended with the transfer of sovereignty on December 27, 1949.

Approximately 300,000 migrants arrived in the Netherlands from the Indies between 1945 and 1963, many leaving before Indonesian independence. This was a heterogeneous population. Since Dutch and other settlers and merchants from many backgrounds had been living in the Indies for centuries, a large proportion of those returning to the
Netherlands after World War II had been born in the Indies, and many were of mixed descent. People classified legally as “European” in the Indies in the 1930s included Asian wives of European men, Turks, Japanese, and descendants of Christian Africans recruited from West Africa in the nineteenth century to serve in colonial armies (Obdeijn 1994:51; see also Stoler 1989). At the time of the Japanese occupation in the 1940s, of the 300,000 individuals identified as having “European” status, approximately 80,000 had been born in the Netherlands or in the Indies of Dutch parents, 170,000 were “Indo-Europeans” of mixed ancestry, and 14,000 were people of various indigenous origins (Obdeijn 1994:52). Also migrating to the Netherlands with the Indies Dutch were colonial auxiliaries, including 12,000 Amboinese or South Moluccans, who had served in the Dutch colonial army and who arrived in the Netherlands in the early 1950s, and approximately 7,000 Peranakan-Chinese. This decolonization experience was traumatic. Not only did it follow several years of conflict, but the mass migration to the Netherlands also came at the end of the occupation of the Indies during World War II by the Japanese and the internment of thousands of Dutch in prisoner of war camps.

French Migrations: The French Empire also had its origins in the seventeenth century with the establishment of settlements and outposts in North America, the Caribbean, India, and islands in the Indian Ocean. After the decline and loss of most of these territories, a “second” empire was formed in the nineteenth century with colonies established across Africa, into Indochina and across the Pacific. By the end of World War II, this empire was extensive and extremely diverse. It included Algeria, which was incorporated into metropolitan France as three states or “départements,” Indochina (now Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia), which the French tried to reclaim after the Japanese occupation during World War II only to abandon in defeat in 1954, the protectorates of Morocco and Tunisia, and an array of more classic colonies d’exploitation stretching across much of sub-Saharan Africa. North Africa had the highest concentration of Europeans, and Algeria was France’s premiere settler colony. While nearly 450,000 “repatriates” arrived from Indochina, Morocco and Tunisia in the 1950s and 1960s (Dubois 1994a:85, 92), research on these migrants is in the early stages, and this book concentrates instead on the migrants from Algeria.

French and other Europeans settled in Algeria at the beginning of the French conquest in the 1830s, and migration from Europe tapered off by the early twentieth century. As a result a large proportion of the
over 1 million French who arrived from Algeria in the early 1960s were the 3rd- to 5th-generation in their family born overseas, not unlike the Indies Dutch. In contrast, however, there was very little intermarriage with the indigenous populations in Algeria and consequently a minute number of “mixed-blood” offspring. The origins of the “repatriates” were nevertheless multiple: more than half of the European settlers came from Spain, Italy, Malta, Germany, and other European countries, and became French citizens through naturalization laws in the late nineteenth century, and a sizable indigenous Jewish population was similarly naturalized in 1870.9 The association of these non-French nationalities with lower socioeconomic class status is an important feature of colonial Algeria that may have important implications for both the creation of pied-noir identity and pied-noir-metropolitan French relationships today. The reflux from Algeria occurred at the end of the long and traumatic French-Algerian war. Along with the French of Algeria, often termed “pieds-noirs,” came approximately 100,000 to 200,000 Muslim French who served with the French army during the colonial war10 and former members of the colonial administration (Dubois 1994a:96).

Portuguese Migrations: The Portuguese Empire was the first of the European maritime empires, with roots in the fifteenth century, and ranged from Brazil to West and East Africa and included settlements along the western Indian and Chinese coasts. It was also the last of these three colonial empires to be dissolved. Portugal in 1945 had no plans to decolonize its remaining territories, and in fact continued to encourage emigration to Portuguese West and East Africa (Angola and Mozambique) throughout the 1950s, in contrast to the Dutch and French cases outlined here. The migrations to Portugal that occurred after the decolonization of its African colonies consequently represent the most recent of the three cases, and involve individuals who were settled overseas for the shortest period of time.

Approximately 800,000 Portuguese “retornados” (or “returnees”) arrived from Angola and Mozambique between 1974 and 1976. In Portuguese colonies, the status of “indigenous” person was fixed by law in 1954, but these laws were not applied to the small colonies of Macao, those of the Indian territories (Goa, Diu and Damao), or Cape Verde, where the inhabitants were de facto Portuguese citizens and therefore able to migrate to Portugal regardless of origin (Dubois 1994b:221). Elsewhere, a distinction was made between the “non-assimilated” and Portuguese citizens. While race was not ostensibly the primary criterion
in this context, few African or “mixed-origin” people received a certificate of assimilado status. In Angola in 1956, only approximately 30,000 people of African origins received this status out of total populations of more than 4.3 million (Dubois 1994b:221), and what was probably a very small proportion of the “mixed” population of approximately 26,000.

There are some striking similarities between the three cases presented here. Because metropolitan states dedicated greater efforts to maintaining their colonies with the largest settler populations, the migrations all followed long and violent wars of decolonization, experiences that lent a particular tenor to the life experiences of the migrants both during their final moments in the colony and their settlement in the metropole. Many migrants left after having witnessed or participated in years of considerable brutality and disruption: conflict in the Dutch Indies with Indonesian nationalists lasted four years; strife in Portuguese West Africa started in 1961 and continued through the mid-1970s; and the French-Algerian war persisted for nearly eight years, ending in 1962. Consequently, departures occurred in the context of the utmost chaos. Government agencies in Europe were largely unprepared for the vast numbers arriving, and faced the monumental task of receiving daily thousands of exhausted migrants and providing them with food, clothing, shelter, and basic goods, with varying degrees of success, as is vividly illustrated in Jordi’s contribution to this book. Moreover, in each case, the migrants arrived at a particularly difficult time. Many of the Indies Dutch had spent the war years in Japanese concentration camps only to arrive in 1945 in a war-ravaged Holland where the government was already facing such severe housing and labor shortages that it was actively promoting emigration (van Amersfoort 1982:93). The pieds-noirs encountered a France that in 1962 was facing a severe housing shortage caused in part by the settlement the previous decade of several hundred thousand French “repatriates” from Vietnam, Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt. Many of the half a million people who crossed the Mediterranean over a brief four-month period in the summer of 1962 lived for weeks or even months in military barracks, dormitories, garages and barns. The city of Marseilles, which received over 60 percent of the pieds-noirs, was completely overwhelmed.

The scale and speed of this population transfer across the Mediterranean was equaled if not surpassed only a decade later with the return of approximately 800,000 “retornados” to Portugal from Angola and Mozambique between 1974 and 1976. This was a massive influx consid-
ering that the population of Portugal totaled 10 million at the time (Rocha-Trindade 1995:337). Moreover, Portugal, already the poorest of these three states, was in a serious recession at the time. The new government organization created to assist those “repatriated,” IARN, housed people in vacant public and private buildings, such as old convents or army barracks (Rocha-Trindade 1995:339) and appealed to migrants’ family members for assistance.13 Ovalle-Bahamón and Lubkemann’s chapters here provide vivid testimony from retornados of their experiences during this time, testimony which, in concert with Jordi’s findings for France, indicates a lasting legacy of mutual mistrust between some metropolitans and retornados that persists in parts of Portugal today.

Finally, it should be remembered that in each of these cases, the first waves of returnees arrived when large numbers of nationals were being sent to the colonies to fight in bitter colonial wars. When the largest mass repatriations occurred, these soldiers too were returning home. Metropolitans who had lost family members or friends in the colonial wars often blamed the returning colonists for their losses, and they and the soldiers were often further perturbed by the fact that these migrants sometimes received preferential treatment in the already tight housing and job markets. When we consider the difficulties the migrants faced in adapting to their new societies and polities, we should keep the legacy of the colonial wars in mind.

The Invisibility of Migrations of Decolonization in Today’s Academy

Given the scale and scope of these migratory phenomena and the degree of social and economic disruption involved, it is surprising how marginalized this topic has remained until recently. The reasons for its marginalization are numerous. The subject has escaped widespread attention in part because it is situated at, if not outside, the boundaries of several different academic disciplines and world regions. Colonial history and colonial studies have a temporal focus traditionally delimited by decolonization. While many of the important aspects of the migrants’ lives in the colony are the subject of recent and current research by colonial historians, the former colonists, by migrating to Europe, vanish from this field of study. Aside from a few far-sighted and comprehensive overviews,14 the “repatriates” also rarely figure in the burgeoning literature on immigration and integration in Europe.
Finally, due to the nature of the global diasporas that have comprised the life trajectories of these individuals, researchers necessarily must become experts in both colony and metropole, in the colonial heritages as well as the political and economic problems of contemporary post-war Europe, topics that are traditionally explored by scholars located in quite different disciplines if not distinct schools or academic departments. Disciplinary boundaries have therefore served as a hindrance to the recognition of this specific population and their experience as topics worthy of research.

Conceptual barriers have also worked to ensure that these populations remain invisible in today’s academy. In their landmark work calling for a new approach to migration history, Lucassen and Lucassen address the various “canyons” separating migration scholars both between and within disciplines (1999:10). Heuristically useful typologies have evolved into fixed dichotomies that now shape both theory and research, dividing migratory experiences and scholarship alike into distinct, mutually exclusive, camps. They call for our reconsideration of several of such dichotomies. These include the distinction between voluntary and involuntary migration, between which recent work suggests it is virtually impossible to neatly distinguish (1999:12), as well as the contrast commonly made in migration studies between “labor migrants” and “refugees.” Finally, the distinctions made by politicians between “good” and “bad” immigrant groups are also often implicit in research. I propose here that we reconsider yet another dichotomy common especially in work on Europe, that between “immigrant” and “repatriate.” It is in part due to the uncritical acceptance of this distinction that the migrants of decolonization have been disassociated from the wider literature on European immigration. I will also argue that this dichotomy has been so enduring because it stems from an often unchallenged “national order of things” (Malkki 1995), and because it overlaps neatly with or is informed by another, more covert distinction that shapes much of the migration literature today, that between “outsider” and “insider,” or that between “visible” and “invisible” migrants.

At first glance, the distinction made between “immigrant” and “repatriate” seems obvious and unchallengeable. Common usage of these terms would have us view immigrants as foreigners and repatriates as nationals returning home. However, to accept such a distinction uncritically is to reproduce discursive traditions forged by and for the maintenance of territorial nation-states. This is language that promotes the nationalist aim of assigning every individual to one and only one
nation, and which would have us distinguish absolutely citizens from noncitizens, those who belong from those who do not. But when we move beyond the nation-state vantage point and consider these as representing two kinds of migrants, are they really so different? When we take a closer look at the populations these terms denote, we find that there are many reasons for challenging and even collapsing this dichotomy as well.

The origins of the “repatriate” designation are revealing. At the time of decolonization and the arrival of the first “returnees,” the official and legal discourse of several former colonial powers began, independently so it appears, to identify the migrants simply as “repatriates,” a term that persists in much official discourse today. This may have been the most efficient course of action for most governments. Identified as such, the migrants fell under the purview of already existing government agencies designed to aid repatriating citizens, agencies which usually had at their disposal financial resources available on an emergency basis to help such individuals resettle. However, the identification of the returning colonists as “repatriates” masked a far more complex story, as government officials were well aware at the time. Dutch administrators noted for instance that of the four subgroups “repatriated” from Indonesia, only one could be considered “repatriates” in the strict sense of the word (Obdeijn 1984:52). This term, which refers to citizens being brought home from a foreign state usually through government assistance, is applied with difficulty to the migrants. As outlined above, subsets of all of the “repatriates” discussed here were never originally from Europe or the specific European nation-state in question. Many more were leaving the colonies before independence, and so were really people internally displaced from one part of the empire to another. Moreover, in contrast to classic repatriations involving the return of functionaries during political tensions or of prisoners of war, these migrations were often spontaneous, at least initially, and the role of the metropolitan governments was often minimal. In fact, both the French and Dutch governments attempted at different junctures to convince their nationals to stay in the colonies after independence, as the migrants will readily point out today.

These migrants closely resemble other immigrant or refugee populations in many ways. Like many refugees, they left the colony suddenly, at the chaotic end of a specific political order, usually without the possibility of return. Like many labor migrants, most were migrating to a place that they had never seen. While they may have shared the language and an understanding of metropolitan legal and school systems, as
reproduced in the colony, once they arrived in the metropole, they
needed to learn a whole new way of life. They had to adapt to a new terri-
tory and climate, form new social relationships, learn new standards of
behavior, and change careers. What the repatriate label masks most of
all is the fact that many had no ancestral connection with their new host
country. This was the case for the more than half of the “French” set-
tlers of Algeria who were originally from other European countries, and
thousands of Jews from across North Africa. When they “repatriated,”
they were migrating to a country to which they belonged legally, but to
which they had no family ties. Many Indies Dutch faced a similar experi-
ence, as Willems’s contribution eloquently illustrates (see also
Dieleman 1993:119). And while Portugal continued to encourage emi-
gration to the colonies as late as the 1960s (Dubois 1994b:221), the gov-
ernment later determined that at least 220,000 of the “repatriates” had
no clear family ties in Portugal (Ibid:231). Even those falling more
neatly under the classic “colonist” rubric, such as the ethnically French
from Algeria, had been overseas for so many generations as to find little
attachment to their purported home (hence the widespread use of
“pieds-noirs” by many French of Algeria, who consider Algeria, not
France, their home). Large numbers of all of these groups in fact found
themselves so ill-at-ease at “home” that they re-migrated (Rocha-
Trindade 1995:339). Thousands of pieds-noirs left France after repatri-
ation for La Réunion, New Caledonia, Canada, and even California, and
approximately 18,000 Indonesia Dutch re-migrated to the US (van
Amersfoort 1982:870). Willems’s chapter provides a fascinating look at
the role played by the colonial legacy in the lives of Indies Dutch settled
in Australia.

So why the persistence of the repatriate term, at least in official dis-
course? This may be tied to the fact that for many states, the end of
imperial rule was embarrassing and wholly unexpected. Those in power
may have wanted to avoid terminology that would link the migrants to
the colonial context and which could thus serve as constant reminders
of their failures in colonial wars, or of the end of colonial rule.18 In this
post-World War II era, precise definitions for the “refugee” were being
inscribed in international law, and as a result this term became unsuit-
able for the colonial migrants.19 Other terms such as “deportee,”
“expellee,” or “displaced person” may have been avoided owing to their
recent usage for specific populations in the aftermath of World War II
or more generally with a situation out of control. However, the identifi-
cation of this mass migration phenomenon in official discourse as
simply a process of “repatriation,” a relatively coded and neutral term
(Henry 1996:152), denies the drama of this historical break which represented the beginning of the end of the era of European imperialism. Politicians, faced with the unprecedented problem of the spontaneous arrival of thousands of people with legal statuses equivalent to those of citizens and hence a legal right to settle, may have wanted to downplay or gloss over the many distinctions between these migrants and the wider population. By identifying the migrants as “repatriates,” governments were claiming them as unquestioned members of the nation, a stance that may have been viewed as essential in order to stave off or minimize potential reactions against their settlement by the metropolitan public.

Labels and political exigencies aside, why is it so easy for scholars to overlook these migrations of decolonization? Here we confront the second of our problematic dichotomies. The literature on immigration, integration and multiculturalism in the “new” Europe has resulted in innumerable conferences, books and special journal issues. While not always overtly identified as its main focus, much of this scholarship has highlighted labor and economic migration and migrants. The recent history of these migrations has by now been well explored. Following varying resettlement programs after the end of World War II, postwar reconstruction efforts soon employed much of the available local labor, and many European countries began to face real labor shortages. The more industrialized and/or war damaged countries – Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Switzerland and the UK,20 with varying periodicity, degrees of government intervention, and source countries, began to import labor. In the 1950s and 1960s, the permanent settlement of this labor was not a serious consideration as workers were ultimately expected to return to their country of origin. Following the recession in 1973, many European nations tried to encourage these migrants to return home, with somewhat limited success. With family reunification programs and the long-term settlement of some immigrant populations, children and grandchildren have been born in the new host countries, and sociologists, geographers and others have turned to descriptions of these communities, and the “problems” associated with the migrants’ cultural and political assimilation.21 Interestingly, because large percentages of the labor migrants in some countries came from former colonies, many works trace the commencement of these migrations to decolonization. However, these works often neglect the parallel migrations of former colonists during roughly the same period.
Further patterns emerge in the immigration literature. Not only does much of this work highlight labor migrants, but the focus has been on the more “foreign” migrant populations, such as North Africans in France, Turks in Germany, or West Indians in Britain. From this choice of research subject, an image of the “immigrant” as a foreign racialized “other” has developed. A hidden analytical distinction informed by race emerges, and migrants are sorted, often covertly, into “outsider” versus “insider” categories, or the “visible” as opposed to the “invisible;” and scholars have tended to highlight the more visibly different in their research. In doing so, social scientists may be unwittingly reaffirming the popular racialization of the social category “immigrant.” In France, for instance, the term immigrant (immigré) is often blurred with that of foreigner (étranger). However, as Silverman notes, these are not overlapping groups. Some people who are new arrivals to France are quickly granted French nationality. As new arrivals, they are immigrants, but they are no longer “étrangers” (Silverman 1992:3). In contrast, the category “étranger” also includes the non-immigrant children, or those born in France, but of immigrant parents, who have not yet been granted French nationality. In popular usage, however, immigré refers to anyone different, outsiders, non-Europeans, and especially North Africans (Ibid; see also 1991).

A similar slippage occurs in British parlance. In contrast to France, where people are classified officially by nationality, and thus as either French nationals or “étranger,” in Britain, ethnic origin is an institutionally recognized category (Ibid:1), and the term “immigrant” is often blurred with “ethnic minority.” For instance, in The Politics of Immigration. Immigration, “Race,” and “Race” Relations in Post-War Britain (1992), Layton-Henry focuses on what are termed “ethnic minorities,” a social category not entirely synonymous with “immigrant.” This seemingly heterogeneous category includes both first-generation immigrants and those established for many generations in Britain as well as people who arrived in Britain as citizens and as foreigners (1992:8). This assortment of people has one key trait in common, however: they are all “non-white.”22 While there may be good reasons for highlighting commonalities between populations based on phenotype, the automatic exclusion of other first-generation immigrants, such as Swedes or Germans, again reinforces the popular conceptualization of the immigrant as one who is physically different.

Because more research has been conducted with “visibly” different migrants, a real bias has developed in the literature. The colonial migrants are a case in point. Hundreds of thousands of people who
shared a migration experience with a similar periodicity have been sys-
tematically excluded from studies on other migrant groups in Europe. 
Their assimilation has been considered a non-issue. As the Lucassens 
write, historians studying settlement “tend to concentrate on the nega-
tive aspect of the settlement process.” While immigration is not always 
considered intrinsically problematic, they argue, settlement is. In fact, 
they write, “settlement scholars love this process and earn a living from 
studying the subject” (1999:21). As a result, our understanding of the 
processes of integration, ethnic minority or cultural subgroup forma-
tion, upward mobility, and legal, linguistic or educational facets of or 
impediments to assimilation is based on research that has considered 
only a subset of the array of peoples involved. While it may be true that 
certain migrant groups have experienced more difficulty assimilating, 
perhaps due to the active or covert racism in the host country involved, it 
seems unwise for scholars to make such an assumption out of hand. 
The uncritical targeting of the more visibly different migrants only 
fetishizes physical appearance, and could give some people further 
reason to believe that their immigration “problem” has less to do with 
their own attitudes and more to do with the new arrivals and their differ-
ence.23

We can counter this bias in the literature by also considering popula-
tions who may have encountered fewer such difficulties. The decoloni-
zation migrations, for instance, can be viewed as a massive social exper-
iment with results that should be of considerable interest to European 
politicians and analysts today. The little research completed on this 
question so far suggests that the government programs that promoted 
the social and economic integration of colonists were unmitigated suc-
cesses (Baillet 1975; Entzinger 1995:343; Rocha-Trindade 1995:341). If 
this was indeed the case, we will want to understand why. Colonial 
migrants had some advantages such as considerable linguistic and cul-
tural capital. In addition, most “repatriates” were citizens or were quick-
ly granted this status on arrival. Along with its important symbolic 
value, to what degree does citizenship facilitate the settlement process? 
And how significant were the preferential loans and housing facilities 
many “repatriates” received? Analyses of successful assimilation expe-
riences could certainly assist in the better design of programs for all mi-
grant populations. It is only through the consideration of both positive 
and negative experiences that we can begin to truly understand the vari-
ables shaping the lives of migrants overall.
Diaspora, Displacement, and Exile

Diaspora, displacement and exile are key themes in the contemporary social sciences and literary studies, and it has become commonplace to note that we seem to be witnessing an acceleration in the movement of people around the world. Some of this literature highlights the experiences of refugees, while a growing literature explores the processes of transnationalism and the multiple border-spanning relationships held by transmigrants (see Basch et al. 1994:7), often viewed as part and parcel of processes of globalization and deterritorialized forms of nationalism. Where, if at all, do the former settlers discussed here feature in these discursive formations? In the following section, I treat the colonial migrants as a new, doubly diasporic population, and illustrate how a consideration of this population helps to revise these concepts and the theories they inform.

Diasporic communities are sometimes viewed as representatives par excellence of the postmodern condition, and a wide and sometimes disparate array of transnational communities is now described as diasporas. But what exactly typifies a diasporic community? Brown challenges the tendency to define diaspora solely through the sensibility of displacement (1998:293) and calls for more ethnographically grounded work to document the range of diaspora subjectivities. In Global Diasporas (1997), Cohen also argues for an expanded concept. The term has its origins in the Greek verb “to sow” and the preposition “over,” and was employed to describe the early Greek colonization of Asia Minor and the Mediterranean (Cohen 1997:2). Since this time, it has taken on quite different connotations through its application to the Jewish diaspora in particular or forced dispersion in general. Noting both the term’s origins and the difficulty in distinguishing forced from free migrations, Cohen suggests that we expand our view of diaspora. He proposes that alongside the “victim” model we consider “trade,” “labor” and “imperial” diasporas, all of which include some voluntary population movements. In Cohen’s model, imperial diasporas involved the settlement for colonial or military purposes by one colonial power (1997:67). He further contrasts “quasi-imperial” from true “imperial” diasporas to take into account the many regions in which settlers and locals eventually rebelled against the home country, forming new nations through what Anderson has termed Creole nationalism (1991), such as the many new nation-states of South America. In contrast, “imperial diasporas” have maintained a connection with the home country. Cases in point, in his opinion, include the British diasporas to Australia, New Zealand,
Canada and South Africa. However, Cohen neglects to consider the third possibility, those imperial diasporas that finally failed. We propose here yet another type, “diasporas of decolonization.” This case challenges scholars who have argued that the diaspora trope is intrinsically rooted in a simple relationship between culture, identity and territory (Soysal 2000), as these diasporas are hybrid almost by nature, and attempts to pin down the populations’ origins are practically futile. Firstly, such diasporas involve the merging in a colonial space of unique combinations of several of Cohen’s types, including forced and free labor, trade, and imperial diasporas. On decolonization, some large portion of this new diasporic community was again on the move, yielding yet another diaspora that often is global in scope.

Cohen’s work also outlines features common to many diasporas. These include the dispersal from an “original homeland... to two or more foreign regions,” or the expansion from a homeland in search of work, trade or to further colonial ambitions. Diasporas also include, in his view, a “collective memory and myth about the homeland,” “an idealization of the putative ancestral home and a collective commitment to its maintenance, restoration...[or]...even to its creation,” “the development of a return movement,” a “strong ethnic group consciousness sustained over a long time,” “a troubled relationship with host societies, suggesting a lack of acceptance at the least,” “a sense of empathy and solidarity with co-ethnic members in other countries of settlement,” and “the possibility of a distinctive creative, enriching life in host countries with a tolerance for pluralism” (1997:26).

To what degree do the diasporas of decolonization meet these criteria? The significance of the colony in the collective memory of former settlers is widely acknowledged, and the way this collective memory plays out in their attempts to adapt to their new host country is the subject of Cohen and Locher-Scholten’s chapters here. However, can we consider the former colonists as comprising a distinct “ethnic identity”? In some ways we can. The chapters outlined here delineate many zones of disjuncture between the migrants and their new homes, and while they are nationals, they often maintain an array of distinct organizations, social clubs, newspapers and collective activities that closely resemble the identity politics of ethnic groups elsewhere. These organizations are often transnational, as settlers emigrating to new countries, as described here by Willems, maintain contacts with their former friends and family members settled elsewhere. This has led to the development not only of a sense of empathy, but also sometimes truly global linkages with members of the same decolonization diaspora.
However, one of Cohen’s key features of diasporas does not apply to our case. While many dream of returning to the former homeland, the development of a viable return movement among former settler organizations has yet to take hold. The decolonization migrations therefore present further examples of diasporas that are not associated with a politics of return, challenging the linkages commonly made between these phenomena. As such, migrations of decolonization provide excellent sources for further exploration of the multiple impacts caused by the irrevocable loss of homeland. Is the possibility of return a necessary trope for the political mobilization of diaspora populations? These questions also lead us to the problem of the longevity of the “ethnic” group consciousness of former settlers. Among many of these populations as well as metropolitan politicians, the transmission to the next generation of common cultural beliefs and practices is a topic of real concern. Whether or not a “colonial” consciousness will be reproduced in future generations may be associated with the relationship the individuals have with their host countries. A consideration of the survival of these migrant cultures in contrast to, for instance, the African diaspora so eloquently outlined in Gilroy’s work (1987, 1993), can tell us a great deal about the degree to which the persistence across the generations of a distinct identity and identity politics reflects enduring host country antagonisms and the legacy of racist ideologies and practices.

The colonial migrants have not only permanently lost their “homeland,” in that the colonial world they grew up in has ceased, but the fact that they represent a double or even triple diaspora should tell us that their relationship with “homeland” will be complex. These people are not unlike transmigrants who maintain multiple involvements with home and host countries, only in this case, traveling back and forth physically between the two locations is often impossible. More than other migrants, they must turn to the work of the imagination. Willems’s chapter in this book suggests a model for scholars trying to conceptualize the multiple homelands migrants carry with them across the globe, and the ways they operate in their daily lives.

Nations and Narrative, History and Memory

There is yet another reason why the diasporas of decolonization have to date been unthinkable, and this is related to the collapse of history and existing national master narratives with decolonization. Colonial spaces were connected to the metropolitan nation-states in part
through ideological formations such as official national histories. The creation of imperial imagined communities were projects of no less importance than their national counterparts described by Anderson (1991). Imperial master narratives were developed, propagated, interpreted and to varying degrees believed in by those in the colony. A sea change in worldviews has led to a fatal challenge to the foundations on which these narratives were built. What happens to individuals when the wider narrative that gave meaning to their world can no longer be told? Decolonization was so rapid and so sweeping in scope that we have yet to determine the longer-term consequences for both the formerly colonized territories and peoples and as well as the colonizing nations involved. Moreover, these events occurred at a particularly fluid moment in European history, the period of reconstruction following World War II and the increasing involvement of European nations in the EU and the Cold War. Many states were so busy moving forward after the war that politicians and populaces alike were unprepared for the unprecedented shift in national identities that decolonization necessarily entailed. In many former colonial powers, an intense disdain for the colonial heritage grew with decolonization, a disdain that was easily transferred symbolically to the former colonists themselves, as Dembour reports for those returning to Belgium from the Congo in the 1960s (2000), and as Ovalle-Bahamón outlines here. As a result, many people – politicians, historians and social scientists alike – have actively avoided this population and the national failure that they represent.

The chapters in the second part of this book address the ways in which history is implicated in the difficult incorporation of the “repatriates” into national communities. The problem of social memory – and, more specifically, of conflicting memories and identities – is a central theme. The colonial heritage has and continues to hold very different meanings to those based in the metropole and those who spent this time in the colony, and both groups maintain quite different understandings of metropolitan history as well. Locher-Scholten’s chapter on the public memorialization of the Pacific war, for instance, outlines the very different ideas held by two groups of Dutch citizens of World War II. For the Indies Dutch, memories of this war, which involved a Japanese occupation and internment in POW camps at a time of accelerating nationalist attacks, blurred into those of decolonization and their mass departure from their homeland. For the metropolitan Dutch, this war was devastating and nearly fatal as well, but occurred instead in Europe, involving a German, not Japanese, occupation.
In France, a pied-noir identity began to form during the French Algerian war but crystallized in the metropole, as Jordi and Cohen both outline. This was in part due to the migrants’ confrontation with a metropole that differed from what many had imagined, or, in Willems’s terms, to the great gap they found between the “imagined homeland” and the “official fatherland.” In addition, as Jordi clearly shows, mutual misunderstandings that developed during the traumatic period of pied-noir settlement still linger. Cohen’s description in this book of pied-noir perspectives of the colonial past, perspectives that clash with those of most metropolitan French, clearly illustrates some of the fault lines between the two groups, and the role social memory can sometimes play in inhibiting their assimilation. As he writes, “having lost everything, they saw in history their final redemption.” These clashes between two memories and two identities, between two understandings of France and what its legacy should be, may go a long way towards explaining the success of right-wing politicians such as Le Pen in getting the pied-noir vote.

History and memory are implicated in the silencing of this topic in wider debates. Willems outlines the historical trajectory of Dutch interest in these migrants, an interest that emerged independently through works written by Indies Dutch, culminating in a series of conferences in the 1980s. It could be argued that Dutch scholars have made the greatest strides in grappling with these difficult questions, perhaps reflecting the fact that more time has passed since decolonization. A similar pattern appears to be underway in France. After the extensive publication of their life memoirs by pieds-noirs, discussed here by Cohen, and by some historians of historical tomes on this experience, interest in this past seems to be growing. Perhaps it will just be a matter of time (again, forty years after decolonization?) before the French public as a whole will be able to fully accept this population into the French national community. We may also see in Portugal, as we do now in the Netherlands, a similarly rich and vibrant interest in the retornados, their heritage and the contribution it has and can make to contemporary society.

Moving Beyond the Three Cases

Until further work is conducted in other European countries, it is difficult to outline in detail the potential contributions of future collaboration, but some research directions are worth enumerating here. Italy was the first of these European nations to begin repatriating its colonial
representatives, and did so even before the end of World War II. Italy’s relatively short-term holdings in East Africa may not be exactly comparable to the much older settler colonies of the Dutch East Indies or French Algeria, but parallels with Portugal’s twentieth century activities in Angola and Mozambique are worth noting. Like Portugal, Italy encouraged settlement of its citizens overseas well after World War I and after most other European powers had ceased to do so. One wonders if the motivation and rationalization for conquest employed by the two countries were similar, and how these may have differed from those employed by other powers during earlier eras. Little work has been conducted to date in Britain on returning “repatriates.” The vast British Empire included several settler colonies that have taken varying routes on the road to decolonization. Comparisons between the cases of Kenya, Zimbabwe and even South Africa to French Algeria would be interesting.

Finally, in his thorough article on postwar migration in Europe, Ceri Peach includes in his “reflux” category the mass return migrations following World War II to Germany that continue to this day (1997). Should we include these migrants, or the reflux of Greeks from Asia Minor (see Hirschon 1998), in the scope of future research? Doing so would greatly expand the scale of this phenomenon. There are many similarities between the return migrations of the Ethnic Germans and the French of Algeria. Both groups have been defined by state officials as members of the nation and as such have benefited from a range of government programs designed to facilitate their integration, and both groups are also linked to unsavory periods of the national past. Some might argue that Algeria was a true “colony” and claim that the territories annexed by Germany during the war are incommensurable. Research exploring the degree of overlap between these cases should yield exciting results with important ramifications for further work on the classic colonial return migrations.

If we move outside the time frame explored by the authors of this book, we find a wealth of cases that could yield further interdisciplinary and collaborative projects. When we include in our scope different centuries altogether, we find instances in which colonial return migrants played pivotal roles in national economies and societies: the return of Spanish from the “New” World in the eighteenth century is a noteworthy example. Finally, European countries were not the only colonial powers to undergo mass decolonization during this era. Future research should include Japan. Before World War II, approximately 1.5 million Japanese were living in Japanese colonies in Asia, especially
Korea and Taiwan, a number analogous to that of the French in North Africa (1.6 million in 1938) (Etemad 1998:458). By 1952, approximately 3.2 million Japanese had been repatriated from formal colonies or Japanese spheres of influence in Asia, of whom at least 85 percent were civilians (Ibid:168). Further collaboration will allow us to compare the experiences of these “repatriates” with those in Europe.

Conclusion

The consideration of the colonial migrants and migrations revitalizes research on European immigration by helping to further collapse unnecessary and even misleading conceptual dichotomies and to correct biases in the available literature. In addition, the inclusion of this topic in the wider canon will serve to challenge the covert racialization of the immigrant category. Research on these populations also expands our understanding of diaspora and the range of diasporic experiences faced by people worldwide and provides yet another “transnational” population for consideration, one with an exceptionally hybrid cultural background and historical trajectory.

The following chapters consider the experiences and consequences of decolonization for migrants from the former Dutch East Indies, French Algeria, and Portuguese West and East Africa and the residents of these three European nation-states. Using archival resources, interviews and ethnographic research with the former “colonists,” the authors have explored their connections with their new home and continued ties to the former colony. Strategies employed by the migrants on arrival in the metropole were often surprisingly similar given their distinct heritages. The unprecedented nature of decolonization may be partly, but never wholly, responsible for the home country’s inability to predict, prepare or plan for the mass migrations. Despite its origins, this lack of planning often led to similar difficulties in each country for both metropolitans and “repatriates,” as they tried to adapt to the increased competition for scarce housing, provisions, and jobs that accompanied the migrations. The legacy of colonial wars had left scars not only for members of the newly independent states, but also for the “repatriates” and conscripted metropolitan soldiers and their families. All of these factors have contributed to a sense of alienation on the part of the migrants towards the metropolitans as well as the reverse. Migrants often chose to rely on each other at first, forming self-help groups for assistance. This inward-turning stance has not been perma-
nent, however, and in each of the countries considered here, migrants have since sought a place for themselves in the national polity and history. The ways in which they have pursued this strategy as well as the responses by the wider national community have varied, however, as the chapters here illustrate. But in each of these three cases, it must also be underscored that adaptations to the new “home” and of the new home to the migrants have occurred during a period of rapid change in postwar Europe. As Cooper writes in Chapter 8, these migrants are the true “postcolonials” – a population that arrived in a decolonizing metropole during an era of shifting understandings of their nation’s relationship to Europe while the colony and the colonial era were quickly fading in significance.
Appendix 1: numbers of colonial migrants moving to Europe after decolonization, 1945 – early 1990s
(high and low estimates, in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FEATURED CASES</th>
<th>“Europeans”</th>
<th>“non-Europeans” total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>1,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indochina</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch Indies</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>290</td>
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<tr>
<td>Surinam</td>
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<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER CASES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruanda-Urundi</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Colonies</td>
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<tr>
<td>French Maghreb</td>
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<td>Egypt</td>
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<td>Spain</td>
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<td>200</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>500</td>
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<tr>
<td>India and Ceylon</td>
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<td>140</td>
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<td>Far East</td>
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<td>Africa</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
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</tr>
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</table>

1. This table is adapted from Etemad 1998, Table 2, page 465. The reader is asked to consult this thought-provoking work, as well as Miège and Dubois 1994, on which Etemad’s table is based.
2. For a discussion of the problematic nature of these categories, see chapter 1, page 12.
3. These figures include Eurasians.
Chapter one

No Sheltering Sky: Migrant Identities of Dutch Nationals from Indonesia

Wim Willems

Yet it is no exaggeration to say that liberation as an intellectual mission, born in the resistance and opposition to the confinements and ravages of imperialism, has now shifted from the settled, established, and domesticated dynamics of culture to its unhoused, decentered, and exilic energies, energies whose incarnation today is the immigrant, and whose consciousness is that of the intellectual and artist in exile, the political figure between domains, between forms, between homes, and between languages (Said 1993:332).

Decolonization and Migration

In the years after World War II, a process of decolonization took place that has still not been completed today. It has involved the migration of millions of people who, because of changed sociopolitical circumstances, decided to leave the country of their birth or settlement and move to the homeland of the former colonizer. This was the case with Dutch migrants from the former Dutch East Indies, now Indonesia, who came to the Netherlands from 1945 to the end of the 1960s. This group consists of at least three categories: European-born people who were in the Indies temporarily; Dutch and other European nationals who were born and settled in the colony and their descendants, often of mixed Indonesian-European descent; and indigenous people with legal status equivalent to Europeans. As a whole we are talking about
approximately 300,000 Dutch nationals or people of an equivalent legal status who came from Indonesia to the Netherlands, at least initially.

Interest in the history and the contemporary position of these colonial migrants from the former Dutch East Indies – to whom I refer here as “Indies people” (from the Dutch East Indies) – has been on the increase since the 1980s. Some research, initiated by the Dutch government, was undertaken in the 1950s during the migrants’ repatriation to their official homeland, but once it was assumed that assimilation had been achieved, this interest waned. It was only in the context of commemorations of the Pacific war, including the recognition of the suffering experienced during the Japanese occupation, that the issue returned to public attention, as we learn in Locher-Scholten’s chapter in the next section of this book. Prior to this time, Indies people encountered indifference regarding the vicissitudes they had experienced in the 1940s: the native Dutch had had their own war with the Germans and knew almost nothing about what had happened in Southeast Asia. Only in the last ten years has this attitude begun to change, and more publications about this dramatic period are beginning to appear.

For a long time the Indies people were known only as successfully assimilated migrants and as victims of the Pacific war. Only in the 1980s did some authors start to write novels and stories about the East Indies heritage of those of mixed descent, and journalists, sociologists, and historians came forward with publications about this specific group in the colonial or in contemporary Dutch society. In retrospect it can be observed that these initiatives originated largely independently. A shift occurred at the end of that decade, however, when a small group of academics at the University of Leiden started a series of conferences (the fifth was held in 1995), inviting scholars from different disciplines to reflect on the issues of the Indies people as well as the participation of the people whom this research concerned. This formula led to a stimulating exchange of academic ideas, personal knowledge, and general insight.

The results of this cooperation are threefold. Firstly, these conferences have culminated in the publication of five volumes of conference papers as well as separate articles that indicate a shift in how the sociocultural and economic position of Indies people in colonial society and the postwar period has been conceptualized. There has been a growing recognition that the Indies people are in themselves a rich source of knowledge about important chapters in Dutch history. For this reason, the Royal Institute of Language and Anthropological Studies (the KITLV) in Leiden, in collaboration with the Department of
Asian Studies at the University of Amsterdam and the State Institute for Research on World War II (the NIOD), has initiated a large oral history project involving interviews with hundreds of individuals with colonial ties. In addition, the Dutch government has become more aware of their neglect of an important group in postwar society. In 1995, in association with the commemoration of the end of World War II, funds were made available for a popularly written and richly illustrated book about the history of Indies people, based on the results of the research that had been carried out over the last twenty years. In the meantime, the communication between the Dutch government and representatives of the Indies communities had been formalized, leading the latter to present an official request for a reassessment of their history in the colonial and postcolonial periods. A group of historians has now been appointed to write a coherent story in three volumes about this part of Dutch history. As one of these historians, I will focus here on the postwar period from a migration perspective.

In every migration and settlement process it is necessary to distinguish three levels: the structure of the receiving society, including governmental responses, the institutional organization (top down as well as bottom up) regarding the reception of the migrants, and the personal experiences and perceptions of the newcomers. The events of the Dutch nationals leaving the East Indies force us to look at the governmental policies of the former colonizer, that is, the Netherlands. The first question that arises is whether or not all Dutch citizens from the former East Indies were given permission to come to their official fatherland. The answer is simple: no, they were not. Those of mixed European and Indonesian descent were invited to stay in the new republic of Indonesia and opt for Indonesian citizenship.

We have to bear in mind that the Dutch nation in the 1950s and 1960s, and still today, considered itself unfit for immigrants, and instead actively encouraged emigration. In the beginning of the 1950s the country had to contend with unemployment and feared overpopulation, so Dutch from overseas were not particularly welcome. Furthermore, an array of negative ideas about colonials with a (partly) Asian background also played a role. In the end, the Dutch were unable to justify their arguments for a restrictive policy towards their compatriots from overseas.

The evolution of this reasoning is certainly worthwhile analyzing, especially when we compare the attitude of the Dutch government towards the arrival of “Eastern oriented” Dutch with their contacts with immigration officials from other countries, such as the United States,
where approximately 20,000 “ethnic Dutch” from Indonesia emigrated, and Australia, which took in some 9,000 people. In the United States, which has always viewed itself as a nation of immigrants, ethnicity has long been used to articulate collective interests. In Australia, however, it was not until the postwar period that immigration was encouraged on a large scale and even then the government had a preference for immigrants who were native English speakers. During these years, as in the Netherlands, it was taken for granted that the new Australians would completely adopt the Anglo-Australian way of life. Assimilation was the norm.

Did these different immigration policies lead to different outcomes? Employing divergent approaches, we should analyze not only the state responses to the immigration of Indies people, but also the ways the people themselves have organized over time, and the way they have experienced their settlement in the different countries. While this research is ongoing, preliminary results indicate that in the postwar period, Dutch nationals with a mixed descent were not welcome wherever they settled. Officially or not, most countries that were in need of immigrants preferred those of “European stock,” by which was intended white people. This was true for South American countries, South Africa, Canada, the United States, and also Australia.

The Native Country

Dutch nationals from Indonesia, especially those of mixed European-Indonesian descent, are often referred to and refer to themselves as a people living between two worlds, the former Dutch East Indies and the Netherlands (or the new country of settlement). This may be a valid perspective but it can give the wrong impression of a people lost somewhere in between. It is also an oversimplification. There are many more worlds running through the minds and souls of immigrants, especially when they come from the former East Indies. Identity formation is ultimately a very complex issue.

Metaphorically speaking, identity can be viewed as a map comprising differently shaded regions. In general, at least two regions are shaded here, those of the country of birth and, as people grow older, the realm of childhood, the landscape people take for granted at the time and yearn for later. Memories of our formative years can prove very crucial in the end. Immigrants add a different country to that map when they move away to a new society where they try to settle. Colonial
migrants are even more unique, as they also had a picture in their heads of the imagined homeland they belonged to as nationals, although as a rule most of them had never actually set foot there before independence. In the case of the Indonesian-born Dutch, this was the kingdom of the Netherlands. When historical forces chased them out of their country of birth and caused them to flee to the postwar Netherlands, they went to a nation that was new to them. When some of them decided, after having moved to the Netherlands, to emigrate again, for example to the United States of America or Australia, a fifth country was highlighted on their identity map.

Remembering these five countries, the Dutch from the Indies feel that in each of them the war, the Japanese occupation and the Indonesian struggle for independence, plays a role. What further confuses matters is that the Dutch East Indies no longer exist. The former colony was transformed into a new republic where, in the long run, most but not all Europeans no longer felt safe. Their experiences during the war of independence alienated them from Indonesia so completely that they did not want to stay in the new republic, although citizenship was theirs if they had been born there. Others chose to remain. Some, after having lived in the Netherlands for several years, were subsequently expelled by Sukarno and his government when, in retaliation for Dutch refusal to recognize Indonesian claims to Dutch New Guinea, Dutch companies were nationalized and all Dutch citizens were finally made to understand that the future held no real opportunities for them in the new republic. Among those affected were men and women who had opted for Indonesian citizenship in the early 1950s, but who came to feel so strongly discriminated against because of their Dutch background that they now wanted to leave for the Netherlands. After first resisting this group’s demands, the Dutch government finally acceded. Between 1957 and 1965 approximately 25,000 “late” Dutch refugees arrived in the Netherlands from Indonesia. The situation was similar for a group of some 10,000 men and women of mainly mixed European-Indonesian descent who, instead of repatriating to the Netherlands, preferred to move to the Dutch colony of New Guinea. In 1962 when this too was annexed by Indonesia, they had to move on again, some resettling in the Netherlands, others elsewhere.

The country of birth had been transformed between 1945 and 1965 into a somewhat to sometimes very overtly hostile place in which those of (partly) Dutch descent could no longer fit in, and certainly not in the same social position as in colonial times. Many people lost their home, their job, their property and possessions, and even their loved ones.
They were forced to start a new life elsewhere in the world. Something more, however, than simply the transformation of their motherland into a new state brought about a breach with their past: the Japanese occupation. During the war, as Locher-Scholten outlines in chapter 5, the Dutch were placed in internment camps and in military camps for prisoners of war. On Java a larger number of Dutch women and children with Indonesian ancestry were, if luck was with them, left behind (although luck is only relative in this context, as outside the camps they also had a bitter struggle to survive). The stories of the male prisoners of war are by now well known. In Japan, Singapore, and Burma, they were worked to the bone. Resistance was severely punished. Nobody escaped the beating, kicking, and torture. Many of these men died from malnourishment and disease, as did women and children in the internment camps. Those who stayed outside the camps lived in constant fear and had to sell everything to stay alive. Most did indeed survive.

The country of birth is therefore also the country where almost all Indies people, including the Indonesian and Chinese victims of the Japanese, suffered from a brutal occupation. Youngsters were given responsibilities that were too great a burden for their shoulders. How many young women in their adolescence were asked by their fathers, who had been taken away from the family, to take care of their mother and other members of the family? They did it as well as they could and they continued doing so after the war, sometimes far beyond their capabilities. The stress to live up to the expectations of others was severe, and although one can only have the deepest respect for the mental strength of the survivors, there is also a dark and almost neurotic side to this, as feelings of loss, anger and acknowledgment were denied for years. The price the women paid was high; the same holds true for the boys and the young men. Many were on their own from the moment they were taken away from their mothers and disappeared into special camps for boys and elderly men. They had to fight for themselves and learned to trust nobody. At the same time they were too young to comprehend what had happened to them. They came out of the camps with emotional scars, but had learned never to show their true feelings. In Australia I spoke to so many who, even today, cannot forgive the Japanese for what they did to them, their parents, or their friends, the torturing, the beheadings, and so on. It still hurts, and it will undoubtedly linger on.
The Imagined Homeland

This brings me to the second world to which Dutch nationals from the Indies belonged to from their birth onwards, the Netherlands. There were of course individuals who had visited their official fatherland before the war, when their parents went there on vacation. The impressions of that cold country, where people went skating on frozen water in winter, and where extended families of aunts, uncles, nephews and nieces lived, could be very vivid. Nevertheless, the majority of the people who left the Indies after 1945 had never before set foot on Dutch soil. They did not “repatriate,” as was the case for many of the other migrations outlined in this book. They left for an imagined, somewhat idealized homeland, which they knew from stories and school textbooks.

There was confusion regarding this second world as well. While the Dutch East Indies colony was part of the Dutch empire, this did not mean that all former Dutch residents from the Far Eastern possessions were equally welcome on the coast of the North Sea. Even those tens of thousands admitted to the Netherlands after 1945 were assumed to be committed to going back again as soon as they had recovered, and pulled themselves together. We have no idea, however, how many actually did return and how many stayed on. After Indonesia became a sovereign republic in December 1949, the Dutch government encouraged Dutch people born in the Indies to adapt to the new state of affairs and become Indonesian citizens. Nonetheless, in the following years the urge to leave became widespread. Tension increased as the Dutch government remained reluctant to receive an influx of Dutch migrants from the Indies. There was resistance especially against admitting people who were “Eastern oriented,” i.e. those of mixed descent belonging to a lower stratum of colonial society.

Even a well-known Dutch author from the Indies, Tjalle Robinson (also known as Vincent Mahieu), who had a Dutch father but a mother of so-called “mixed” descent, had to plead four times for permission to come to the Netherlands. His argument was that as a journalist and literary author who wrote in the Dutch language, there was no future for him in Indonesia. Nevertheless, the ministries of Justice and Foreign Affairs, those responsible for decisions on requests from abroad, refused him admittance. They argued that since his work focused primarily on the situation in his country of birth, it was felt best that he base his future there. His response was to start a series of articles and short stories for Dutch journals. After these were published in one volume by a Dutch publisher, he had finally proved in the eyes of Dutch authorities...
government employees that he was a “real” Dutch author, and in 1954 he and his family were finally permitted free travel to the Netherlands. Here he became the founding father of the Indies magazine Tong Tong, later Moesson. He also developed the Pasar Malam Besar – the annual large Indies market – 40 years ago as well as many other Indies institutions still in existence in the Netherlands today.29

In 1955, the Dutch government, after strong internal political pressure, finally acknowledged that those born in the Indies and who had grown up there as Dutch nationals, belonged to the Dutch community, even if they were visibly “different,” or considered not to measure up to the standards of western culture. After 1957, the number of applications dramatically increased with the nationalization of Dutch businesses and the eviction of all Dutch citizens by the Indonesian government. Tens of thousands of Indies people then received free passage to the Netherlands. But the case of the people who had opted for Indonesian citizenship but regretted their choice in the course of the 1950s because of growing anti-Dutch sentiments caused by the political fight for New Guinea (the spijtoptanten)30 shows once again that the central unanswered question remained: who belonged to the Dutch nation and who did not? The recognition of the principle that every person of European descent in the colony was of Dutch stock and therefore entitled to resettle in the Dutch homeland implicit in the appeals of would-be emigrants from Indonesia was postponed again and again by the Dutch government.

Tjalie Robinson and others started a nationwide action to mobilize Dutch opinion in favor of the spijtoptanten with their NASSI-committee, and finally succeeded when the government was forced to admit that people of a partly Dutch descent were being discriminated against because of their mixed background. They were victims of a political game with consequences more far-reaching than the parties involved could have predicted. Robinson stressed again and again that these people were indeed of Dutch “stock” and that the Netherlands had to take full responsibility for what happened to them. The actions of the NASSI-committee, in which well-known professors and Members of Parliament participated, in the end changed Dutch government policies. The Ministry of Justice reluctantly widened the yearly quota and within a couple of years all applicants for visas had come to the Netherlands. The same process followed with people who had to leave New Guinea in 1962 and who saw themselves forced to come to the Netherlands before their plans to emigrate to a more subtropical country could be substantiated.
The Official Fatherland

What happened to the 300,000 Dutch nationals from Indonesia who came to the postwar Netherlands? Their fate depended largely on the timing of their immigration. For those who arrived during the first six years after the war, to integrate into a society trying to recover from five years of German occupation, confronting unemployment, an acute housing shortage and huge material losses, was truly difficult. The specter of poverty hovered near at hand. Some foods and other items could be acquired only with ration coupons, and the newcomers were looked on as rivals for the scarce supplies. In addition, for a short period they received extra supplies from the government, and thus were called *dubbele bonnenvreters*, people who profited from a double share of ration coupons. The Dutch thought that the Indies people spoke oddly because they pronounced the Dutch language in a somewhat different way. They also looked different, especially those of mixed descent. They cooked differently, that is if they got the chance to do so. And they had experienced a totally different war of which the Dutch knew practically nothing. Not only had they no idea of what had happened in the eastern part of the Dutch kingdom, people were completely unaware of the feelings of pain and loss experienced by the Dutch from abroad. As a response, the newcomers withdrew into themselves. They accepted material support when arrangements were offered (in the beginning and especially for war widows), but they isolated themselves mentally. Many of them never recovered from that false start and wanted to get away from “that cool and inhospitable country.” The climate was also difficult. One sometimes gets the impression that the weather and the landscape were the largest obstacles for the newcomers from the former colony. This somewhat ruined, overcrowded and frightening small country below sea-level, which lacked the space to live and breathe fully, did not particularly fit the image of a second homeland. The thwarted expectations and disappointments of the Dutch nationals from Indonesia led to an increasing urge to get away, to emigrate to a better place.

What also played a role is that many of the thousands of people who came to the Netherlands to recuperate thought, as did the Dutch government, that they would eventually return to their country of birth, which some finally did. They shared anti-Sukarno feelings with the native Dutch. For a while they tolerated their experiences of discrimination, exclusion and social bewilderment, while clinging to one idea: we will go back. The exile, so they thought, would be temporary. Guus
Cleintuar, an Indies author who has published regularly on his group over the last 40 years, told me in an interview:

Shortly after the war you almost could not feel pro-Indonesia, only pro-Indies. It looked as if everything of value was taken away from you. Not only a country, but also a way of living. Only when we realized that the republic of Indonesia would really come into being did the question become urgent: what room will there be in this new state for people with a mixed background? What ever would be the outcome of the revolutionary struggle over there, we all were convinced that the Indo-European population would stay there. Because of ordinary self-interest, I think. Indonesians and Indies people in the end would be one and the same category. Temporarily we were a community of exiles who would return to their native country, be it in a different national constellation. But slowly we evolved into a community of migrants who saw our chances vanish into thin air. At that moment the estrangement between us and the “real Dutch” started, as the interests differed too much. That specific image we had in the camps of Sukarno as the traitor, which, for long, we shared with the other Dutch, did not mean the same for them as for us. If the road to independence were tackled in a wrong way, it would have consequences for the position of Indies people in the new republic. And that is exactly what happened after a couple of years. Till then we still saw chances, but at a certain moment we saw the door being closed for people like us. That is how we perceived it, from here, in the Netherlands. A frightening experience. More and more I realized that I would never go back again to the country that had made me into what I was.

After 1950, the official reception of the “repatriates,” as they were designated, expanded into a large-scale network spread over the whole country. Until late in the 1960s this network provided the initial stages in the acclimatization and settlement of people from the Indies, many of whom arrived virtually penniless. The whole approach was, in accordance with the Dutch spirit of the age, rather patronizing. Of course, the intentions were good – as intentions so often are – but the undertaking of the “rehabilitation” of so-called pitiful and helpless Indies communities by public servants and in the media could hardly have been appreciated by the targeted beneficiaries. In his magazine Tong-Tong, Tjaltie Robinson wrote vigorously against this patronizing Dutch attitude of the 1950s and stressed that assimilation could never be a one-sided process. Newcomers also had a lot to bring, a suitcase full
of history, culture and different experiences. Society had to give them the opportunity to unpack their goods and present them to the receiving society. What politicians and policy makers forgot, as Robinson wrote and many after him elaborated, was to take seriously the cultural identity of the newly arriving guests, in this case Dutch nationals. They realized that the cultural baggage of the Dutch from the Indies differed from what was common in the Netherlands but the idea dominated that assimilation would prove to be the right medicine for solving all inter-group problems. The Dutchman and Dutchwoman from the East would readily transform into Westerners. Today we know of course that there is more to say about that.

Just as in the former colony, the Indies community in the Netherlands consists of many strata. The settlement process of the migrants who were born in the Indies and had no family ties with Holland whatsoever occurred quite differently from that of individuals who had been in Holland before and were partly rooted in that country. Before the war they had belonged to different social groups and we recognize that pattern in the changes they were able to create for themselves in the new Dutch society. And of course there were also regional differences between people, which had an effect on their life in Holland. My general impression is that the people who really repatriated (or re-emigrated), the ones who were born and raised in Holland, but had spent their working life and the war in the Indies, once back in their native country, were the most frustrated and rancorous about the way they were treated in their fatherland. They led the way when Dutch governmental policy towards Indonesia was under attack. They were the first to point to the responsibility of the Dutch for their loss of status. On the other hand, the majority of the migrants who were born in the Indies succeeded in the new, more democratic society that the Netherlands represented. They endeavored to profit from the new opportunities to advance socially, and had more to gain by orientating strongly towards their new homeland. Young families with children in particular experienced only limited difficulties in their adaptation and taught their offspring not to behave too “Indies” in the world outside. They integrated on an instrumental level, but kept some of their own cultural norms and values. In the 1980s and 1990s, this strategy of survival was attacked by some members of the second generation. With greater emphasis than ever before, they now ask for a reorientation towards the history of their forefathers and mothers who, after all, are the source of knowledge for everything we still today can call Indies.35
It goes without saying that Dutch society also can profit from a re-evaluation of its own past to learn how closely linked the Eastern and the Western parts of the Royal Kingdom once were and actually still are. I would like to illustrate this point with a personal story. In 1984 a small study about the reception of and the stereotypes about Indies people in the Netherlands in the 1950s was published. The authors were my fellow historian, Annemarie Cottaar, and myself. We then lived in a flat outside of Leiden. Four years later one of our neighbors took the initiative to hold a social meeting. It was to be the first time we had been to visit each other in the small apartment community; we knew nothing about each other. Fourteen neighbors reacted positively and the evening was a success. After an hour one neighbor wanted to tell us a funny story. A couple of months before he had bought a little brown book about Indies people for a friend, who was also from the East. The friend was really pleased with the gift and looked at the back of the book: “Nice picture of the authors,” he said. Our neighbor looked at the photograph and then exclaimed: “But those are my neighbors.” The anecdote was not only funny, it also opened a Pandora’s box, and out came the ghost of the Indies. Another neighbor started to talk about her youth in the Indies, the camps, and about her years working as a social nurse on the boat that transported the repatriates in the 1950s. She told us that she could remember that one day the Dutch Queen had come on board, because so many babies were born during that journey. There were even pictures taken of the Queen with one of the babies in her arms. What happened then can hardly be believed. One neighbor of a married couple who had recently moved into their flat shouted after this story, “But that baby was me.” An astonished audience waited as the man went home to return with an enlargement of the same photograph, his proud mother in the background and him as a newborn in the arms of the Dutch Queen. The boat was the Sibayak and the harbor was Rotterdam. It turned out that the evening had only just begun. Another woman, who had also only recently moved in, spoke about her unknown father, who had left her Javanese mother shortly before the war and had married another, I believe French, woman. She had recently tried to contact her half-sister from that marriage, a woman who of course also had a mixed background. And now they wanted to go to Java, together, to visit the places where their forefathers had lived. The woman was reading every book she could get about Indies history and was delving into the roots of her identity. Still another Indies woman, a teacher for many years, with whom we had had a chat now and then, started to talk about her past. She was not particularly interested in her
years in the Indies, she said. What had happened, had happened. She preferred to concentrate on her life in the Netherlands. But at the end of the evening, when we were leaving, she took me aside and said: “Do you still have copies of that booklet, for I would love to read it.” Just an ordinary row of flats, in an ordinary suburb that could be anywhere in the Netherlands. And at the end of a social gathering more than 70 percent of the visitors turned out to be involved with the former East Indies in one way or another.

The Immigration Nations

It is time to leave the windy country behind the dunes to follow the people who decided to take their destiny in their own hands and move away to settle elsewhere. This was not an easy task for the “colored” Dutch from the Indies, as I have stated above. The postwar western world tried to become whiter than white, out of fear of ghettos full of deprived colored people, as in America, or racial segregation, as in South Africa, or out of fear of the “Asiatic,” that is, the communist danger, as in Australia, America, and everywhere else in the western world. Notwithstanding this reluctant attitude, approximately 30,000 Dutch from Indonesia did in the end succeed in gaining access to North America, comprising the largest Indies group outside of the Netherlands. Emigration was part of the spirit of the age and millions of postwar Europeans moved to Australia, New Zealand, Canada or the Americas.

General public opinion holds that the United States took special measures to make their arrival possible. A closer look at US immigration policies reveals that coincidence played an important role, and in fact that Dutch policy-makers had to struggle for years to get the Dutch with a mixed background to be accepted as immigrants in America. Over the years Dutch officials maintained two main arguments. Firstly, the bursting of the dikes in the southern Netherlands in February 1953 led the US to add 17,000 visas in addition to the annual quota for Dutch immigrants at the disposal of people who had been displaced from their place of general abode or actual dwelling. This Refugee Relief Act was meant for people with an ethnic Dutch origin. But behind the political scenes, Dutch diplomats tried to convince their American counterparts that the notion of “refugee” or “displaced person” had to be broadened so that the repatriates from Indonesia would also be eligible. It took some time, but in the end the State Department was willing to accept
people who could prove that they had been forced to flee from Indonesia, and finally even the category of people of mixed descent was accepted as being “ethnic Dutch.” The US Immigration and Naturalization Service, however, was less flexible. Because of their paranoid fear for communist agitators, they required severe security directives, and as such it was almost impossible for the Dutch from Indonesia to be accepted as refugees. The situation changed when Sukarno forced the remaining Dutch to leave the Republic of Indonesia in 1957. After that this entire category of people was acknowledged as victims of political persecution and became subject to bills for displaced persons. This is not to say that people of mixed descent were easily accepted. The Americans permitted only 10 percent of the whole group to be “half-caste.” In the end, however, only the ability to assimilate was used as a criterion, which was, as one can imagine, a very difficult one to handle; probably skin color and “European outlook” were the main criteria used. What we do know is that until 1962 about 30,000 Dutch nationals from Indonesia and their families received visas to emigrate under the three Refugee Relief Acts. Others undoubtedly tried to go to America on a visa apart from the normal annual quota, but we do not have these figures.

From the publications now available we know that the emigration to the United States overall was quite successful. Most had to work hard, but they shared that reality with other immigrant groups. The first five years were the hardest, but during that time most people succeeded in creating new opportunities rather quickly and escaped unemployment. One in every three Indies migrants could already afford to buy a house and did not end up in an ethnic ghetto, as the American authorities had feared. Almost half of them concentrated completely on the English language and American culture. Everything Dutch receded into the background. Everyone agreed that life in America was more agreeable and less patronizing than in the Netherlands. Particularly in California, where most Indies people settled, the climate was mild, there was abundant space, dress was less formal and there was ample housing and diversity in foods. But people especially experienced the freedom of movement as a source of joy and satisfaction. The ease with which it was possible to build up a business, the relatively low tax burden, the feeling that there was still a place for the self-made man and woman: all of these aspects of their new life satisfied these Indies migrants very much.

Of course they also met with the pitfalls that all immigrants confront on their way towards feeling at home in the host country. Every new environment requires adaptation and a flexible and simultaneously tenacious attitude. Diplomas and certificates suddenly lost their value.
The immigrants had to prove themselves in practice. They had to accept that they could be fired on the spot. A day off meant no payment. The language, the accent, the feeling of being an outsider – these too were part of the settlement process. Most Indies migrants wanted to become an American citizen within a couple of years, an important indicator of the feeling of belonging to the new country. When asked about their Indies background, most people in the 1980s said, half joking, half seriously, that they were “The Last of the Mohicans.” After them, the Indies culture would be lost. Their children had learned to be courteous, polite and hospitable, and to behave like everyone else. The second generation have American partners, they only speak English, are well off in their job, home, and education, and seem to be completely integrated into the American way of life. They also know almost nothing about the Indies heritage of their parents, who at the same time maintain all kinds of social contacts with other Indies organizations, as in barbecues, kumpulans (social meetings), reunions, memorials and the like. Indies magazines are in existence, and some have taken the initiative to record life histories and to set up a center for documentation, although funds are still needed. They believe their mutual ties are closer than those of their Indies family members in the Netherlands, and they definitely do not feel alienated from their Dutch and Indonesian backgrounds. Nevertheless, they have never succeeded in carrying over this culture on to their children. With them, the memories of the country of birth will fade away.

This brings us to the vicissitudes of the approximately 9,000 Indies migrants of the first generation who came to Australia. Did their experiences differ very much from those in the US? I do not think so as the parallels are manifold. In the 35 interviews I had with Indies people in the first half of 1998, it struck me that most of them, just as their counterparts in America, were very proud of their new country of settlement. For them Australia really is the country, a part of the world to be proud of, one they have helped build over the last fifty years. They have become an integral part of an expansive continent, an important component of a booming culture on its way to becoming multicultural. Unlike the migrants to America, with their golden images of the Land of Hope and Glory, the Australian migrants did not know a thing about this red desert on the other side of western civilization. Obscurity dominated and the information services did not make it any better. They stressed the chances for real colonists, who were prepared to use their hands to build up a country with space you had to fill yourself with the products
of your imagination. A world of wonder, that was what the brochures, the posters, and the documentaries were all about.39

And what did they find, these migrants with fifty pounds in their pockets and, if they were lucky, a box full of furniture and the like, following later by boat or airplane? A country in which the inhabitants spoke a language in which one could vaguely recognize the sounds of what once had been English. A country without toilets, only wooden dungboxes in the back. A country in which men and women lived in separate worlds, never touching each other in public, where men went drinking in the pubs on Friday nights with their friends. A country in which you had to be tough and willing to endure setbacks, otherwise you need not unpack your suitcases.40 Not only people with two green thumbs but also those with a good education had to go into the countryside and try their luck. People who had never seen a dairy farm before found themselves milking cows or burning horns with the help of their wives to earn a living. Many noticed, to their surprise, that they were more enterprising than they had thought. They started their own business, tried a job as a manager or supervisor, took on a trade, and explored a continent in which, in the long run, they found themselves at home.

How and why did these Dutch migrants from the Indies succeed in Australia, and did this have anything to do with the country itself? This is difficult to say. In retrospect these migrants emphasize how on arrival “down under” they felt they were entering an unimaginably vast world ripe for exploration, where the government treated them the same way as everybody else. After an initial reception period they had to rely on themselves and they are proud to have become part of a booming continent. It struck me how proud most of these Indonesian-born Dutch settlers are of their new country (although we know nothing of those who gave up and went back). As successful immigrants, they certainly do not have a complex about being second-rate Australians.

They also found that the locals led a more relaxed way of life than they were used to in the Indies or back in the Netherlands. “A job is done when a job is done” seemed to be the Australian standard back in the 1950s and the 1960s, at least according to the perception of the Indies migrants I spoke to. No reason to work yourself into the ground, that is only embarrassing for the others. For many migrants it was as if work was not a dominant part of life for Australians. Everybody only did his prescribed part of the job; what the others did was not their responsibility. The Dutch, in the end, took advantage of this different attitude towards work and succeeded in distinguishing themselves from the
other laborers. In their own words, their way of tackling things attracted attention. And in the end it almost always improved their position. They profited from a difference in mentality; this was another attendant benefit of the new country.

One drawback of this migration was the situation of being cut off from family members. In the new country their children grew up largely without the support and care of their grandparents, aunts, uncles, and other relatives. They missed not only the shelter and the self-evidence of being part of a social network wider than their own household, they also grew up without the supplementary attention of caretakers other than their own parents. There are several consequences of this. First of all, many children may have received too little guidance in their lives. The first generation of immigrants had to work hard to give their children opportunities, especially in the field of education, that they themselves had never dreamed of. Many stories I heard spoke of double jobs, for both man and wife; one wonders where people could find the time to be there when the children needed them. At the same time, there were no other relatives who could replace the parents. It is currently a matter of debate in this community if it was this situation that stimulated the independence of the second generation such that they have in turn become exclusively oriented towards the Australian society and estranged from the background of their parents.

A second circumstance that possibly influenced this development is the lack of grandparents and family members in general, the bearers of family traditions as well as those of the culture in which they are rooted. Most Indies people have never had the opportunity to acquire the necessary knowledge of the historical heritage of their ancestors. Because of the war and the traumatic period that followed, they did not have the time or the opportunity to absorb the characteristics of their Indies and Dutch culture. Many pieces of the puzzle were missing when they went to the Netherlands and again when they decided to emigrate to Australia. They were not fully able to pass on this double legacy to their children and there were no older people to do so in their place. This may also explain the one-sided orientation of the second generation living in Australian society. There was no alternative, as they inherited too little of the original background of their parents. At the same time they are very strongly attached to their nuclear family, particularly in an emotional sense. This is not surprising, as they are the only relatives available and young people tend to search for role models first of all in their own family. This must be the explanation for the strong sense of close-
ness in Indies immigrant families in Australia, about which even the people I spoke to were surprised.

The Country of Lost Youth

Finally, people also live in the country of their lost youth, the unproblematic period during which they were sheltered by the sky of the Indies and the protection of their loved ones in a setting where no responsibilities existed. These are the formative years for their character and personality, and a longing for that paradise will never completely fade. The memories become even stronger as people grow older. During adult life, youth seems to vanish, but this is only temporary. Of course, people have to put all of their energy into their family, jobs and getting settled in a place where they feel comfortable. They have to create a new home in the immigration country, to adapt to a way of life in which they feel at ease. Once they are really settled, and once the children have left home, they sink back into themselves and their thoughts and feelings begin to dwell on pivotal moments in their past.

For most Dutch from the Indies between the ages of 60 and 75, the principal category I spoke to in Australia, looking back, especially at their youth, awakens mixed feelings. They experience a sense of loss and a longing for the innocent happiness of their early years, the continuity of which was disrupted all too soon and dramatically at that. The Japanese occupation and the Indonesian war of independence not only deprived them of a normal puberty, but also swept away the light-heartedness of their youth. These upheavals marked the beginning of the end of the Indies people, driving them from the country where they had been socialized and where they had developed their own particular outlook on life. Two wars and two migrations later, they had to focus completely on creating a new existence, one in which memories of the past were an irrelevant distraction. There was no way to deal with the troubling feelings that arose.

However, the strategies survivors develop can also serve those who migrate. Whoever has experienced and survived a war, even detainment in a prison camp, is in a way well equipped to cope with the hardships of pioneering in a new country. The problem is that one cannot go on living indefinitely with an unresolved past. Minds full of stories and hearts rich in feelings that they have constantly put aside to get on with the demanding task of living will sooner or later have to deal with the rupture in their lives. The need to retrace the course of their lives, to
retrieve a sense of continuity with their origins, often grows strong on retiring. It may even stir them on a journey back to their native homeland. Although several people I spoke to felt at ease in Indonesia, a prevalent theme in their commentary was, nevertheless, that one cannot go home again. Still, in their consciousness, people retain and cling to an image of the way things were before. They may have adapted in attitude and behavior to a world where progress rules the roost, yet something deep inside them wants to turn the clock back to the idyllic, static world of their youth.

Who do they blame for what they experience as an irreparable loss? This is where immigrants differ from others. People who leave their native country have to come to terms with the feeling that they may have left something behind to which they were more attached than they had realized at the time. Had they made the right decision? Dutch immigrants in Australia are now apt to feel rather guilty towards the people and way of life that they abandoned. In a sense, they chose to isolate themselves, socially and emotionally. To realize one is in such a position can be painful. Not that they will return to the Netherlands again when they grow older, but many of these immigrants would like to be in closer contact with the landscapes of their youth.42 They are longing for that self-evident world.

The situation is somewhat different for Dutch migrants from the Indies. They too turned their backs on their youth. But they do not feel responsible for the course their lives took. Instead, for instance, they blame the Japanese who threw their formative years into chaos. Maybe this can account partly for the hatred many of them still feel towards Japan. First and foremost, of course, this hatred was prompted by their experiences during the war years, but the Japanese have also come to represent the forces behind the break with prewar society. If it were not for them, the colony may not have changed so radically and their chances to adapt to the new reality would have been far more favorable. This is how people looking back see things now. The Japanese denied them any further access to the traditions, norms, and values of the society in which they grew up. In addition to other material losses, the pain arising from this discontinuity of their lives is what makes it so difficult for them to forgive. People sometimes cherish fantasies which, even after half a century, make it still difficult to accept the realities of change.

Similarly entrenched negative attitudes towards the Indonesians also developed among these migrants. In 1945 these people, with whom they had passed the halcyon years of their youth, suddenly, in the
perception of adolescents, turned into enemies, terrifyingly hostile towards the Europeans whose long-standing authority was no longer accepted. For the second time within five years the world turned upside down. This led to an even more total and final disconnection from the past. This gap in their lives lasted for about seven to eight years, with no longer the chance to renew contact with the previous colonial period, which was gone for good. Political, social and emotional distance separated people from the lives they had known. They went into exile for the rest of their lives, with no possibility of return. Indonesian-born Dutch blame the Dutch government, Sukarno and the Japanese for this turn of events. They never had a chance to adapt to the new situation, that is, the Dutch Indies’ changing into the Republic of Indonesia.

The older they get, the more they look back. They want to become reconciled with their past, sometimes feeling the need to tell their life stories to their children and grandchildren, to render an account of what they have done. This retracing of one’s steps also uncovers the mouths of dark alleyways where the light of memory fails to penetrate. For many it is almost impossible to comprehend what happened to them during some of the more dramatic episodes in their lives. They can merely try to accept what faith made possible for them to endure, and concentrate on all they have accomplished in the country where they chose to resettle. Perhaps this explains why most of the people I spoke to were so outspoken in their enthusiasm about what Australia had given them. During their individual search for stability or inner peace, as many women expressed it, they found a haven in Australia. They have not been able to resolve problems connected with their past, but what they can do is revive something of the ambiance of their lost youth by sharing the company of people who have undergone similar experiences. We can recognize this longing for lost yesterdays in initiatives undertaken over the last ten years in several Australian cities, such as the organization of Indies magazines, social meetings, picnics like they had “before,” and the holding in 1997 of a “world reunion” of people from the Indies on Bali. Apparently people want to come together on a regular basis, in a relaxed setting, with others who also grew up in the former colony, who share the same morals and customs, even using the same expressions and referring to familiar far-away places and habits in just the same way as they do themselves. It is not with the Dutch from the Netherlands, but with the Dutch from Indonesia that they can return to the country of their youth and give free rein to their memories without running any risk of failing to be appreciated and without any necessity to explain over and over again what happened to them in the dramatic 1940s.
The War Lingers On

When I interviewed Indonesian-born Dutch immigrants residing in Melbourne, Sydney, and Brisbane about their postwar lives, it proved impossible without first affording them an opportunity to speak at length about what had happened to them during the war. This was not undertaken to familiarize me with their history. Tales of the Japanese occupation and the Indonesian revolution represent in the eyes of many the most dramatic and influential chapters in their life history, the hinge on which all the rest hangs.

By now a wide range of work about the Indonesian-born Dutch during the war and in the camps has appeared. Here I am going to restrict myself to three themes that recurred most often in the interviews. Not unlike members of the Indies community in the Netherlands, many Indies Australians contend with nightmares that they can never entirely shake off. During dozens of interviews, only a few were willing to reveal anything concrete about that sensitive subject covered in shame, and these were almost exclusively men. The solitary woman who related a dream that had dogged her for years and from which she had only lately been freed after two sessions with a hypnotist, first asked me to turn off my tape recorder before she related the gist of her nightmare in a few hastily spoken sentences. Then she asked herself out loud whether the dream could have anything to do with her time in a Japanese camp. In her dream she kept finding herself in a zoo where all the animals walking about had been skinned alive. She saw their bloody hides, their open veins which throbbed heavily and their quivering, unprotected flesh. Yet they all walked about as if nothing was wrong, which scared her senseless. End of dream.

As a rule, all of the Indies men with whom I spoke and who wanted to talk without inhibition about the rough aspects of the war also always alluded to the nightmares of varying intensity and frequency that troubled their sleep. Most of them knew for certain that they would spend a practically sleepless night after our conversation. Talking about the war summoned it up. One man I have called “Jack” said:

We've consulted psychologists, a psychiatrist, a hypnotherapist. Nothing helped at all. I was prescribed sleeping pills but in the morning I was shot so my work suffered. One of the psychologists helped me by letting me go back through my memories. He assumed the role of Camp Commander. It doesn’t bother me anymore now. I’ve been pensioned off and need less shut-eye. But when I still worked and got up at five and han-
dled dangerous machinery, I had to be fit. It’s something you have to
learn to live with. You want to forget, but your spirit doesn’t. I really also
shouldn’t watch any more war films, because they upset me. I have a
cousin in Sydney who’s doing a lot better. She seems able to deal with
her camp history. She says she’s forgotten it. Some can take it, some can’t.

Nevertheless, people who have suffered injury often want to file a claim.
The efforts of one of them to found JAPRAG, an Australian branch of
the Stichting Japanse Ereschulden (Foundation for Japanese Debts of
Honor), dates from 1988. At that time the Dutch government had made
it clear that the Indies war victims who had not settled permanently in
the Netherlands were not entitled to a one-time compensatory payment
of 7,500 guilders under the Uitkeringswet Indische Geinterneerden (Indies
Camp Detainees Welfare Act), a law which had been enacted after much
difficulty. The Indies migrants also proved ineligible for benefits that
Australia finally adopted for prisoners of war (POWs), because they
were predominantly civil internees. In one homeland, the Netherlands,
they were not acknowledged as civil internees because they no (longer)
lived there; in another, Australia, which paid out damages only to pris-
oners of war, they were not regarded as war casualties. The group
threatened to fall into none of the categories qualifying for claims,
motivating the chairman and his adherents to set up their own organi-
zation to promote their cause. By word of mouth he succeeded relatively
quickly in amassing a thousand testimonials in support of his action.
Members had to pay ten dollars a year to keep things rolling. In 1998,
after ten years of campaigning, membership had slid to 350, consisting
of some English and Dutch well-wishers, in addition to the Indies
migrants. A first step was taken toward the long and little satisfying
road leading to obtaining financial compensation – a restoration pay-
ment of twenty thousand guilders per claimant forthcoming from the
Japanese authorities.

Somewhat battle-weary after ten years, the chairman is considering
handing over the Indies-Australian torch and, based on a number of
interviews I had with JAPRAG members, with the passing years, belief
in a successful outcome has been critically undermined. For the present
JAPRAG appears more closely to resemble a ritual prolongation of what
once began as a quest for recognition and satisfaction, and as a ques-
tion of honor stemming from a wounded sense of justice. What compli-
cates things is that everything revolves around acknowledgment of suf-
fering incurred during war but doubt remains whether solely Japan or
the Netherlands should be held accountable. Between rational argu-
ments, which point in the direction of Tokyo, and emotional loyalties, which are oriented towards The Hague, a field of considerable tension persists. Migrants’ attitudes towards their own plight as victims also lead to ambivalent feelings. The image of the proud survivor, the prospering immigrant and the unrecognized (civil) war victim may be incompatible, although they still coexist. In addition, the understanding that historical claims have their shadow side has gained conviction among Indies-Australians over the years. Above all this consciousness has been heightened by confrontation with the demands for compensation being brought forward by the “original” inhabitants of Australia, the Aborigines.

How far back will we go together to attribute guilt? Before you know it situations arise like the mess in the Balkans where families have been acting out feuds for centuries. If we aspire to a tolerant, modern state, we cannot go on blaming the current generation in Japan. They don’t want to know about it, just as we Australians don’t want to know what our fathers and forefathers were up to. Nobody is blameless. I don’t feel called upon to dole out billions to the Aborigines now for what Australians did before the great postwar migrations. As newcomers, that’s not our responsibility, is it? Should the taxpayers of 1998 pay off the debts of the English? That’s crazy. When you come right down to it, that money from the Japanese can be stolen from me, I don’t care. Meanwhile I keep up my usual membership in Debt of Honor.

Where the war is at issue, “recognition” appears to be the key term. Not only the bad dreams and the damage claims but also commemoration plays a role in that process. People want a monument to preserve the memory of what overcame them. The wish to be heard is no easy matter in a country that may have experienced the same war but not as an occupied nation. Here again it is above all the Indies migrants who were civil internees or who spent time in a republican camp who are at risk of falling between pillar and post. With its tradition of paying military honors, Australia has always taken notice of war prisoners, and until recently only European cases were commemorated at Dutch embassies. With these prevailing points of view, Indies war victims are part of neither the Australian nor the Dutch collective memory. With their accounts and experiences, there was nowhere for them to turn for a long time and as a result they were overlooked. A breakthrough occurred in the late 1980s through the writing of Australian author Shirley Fenton Huie who had lived on Java between 1972 and 1981, where a
visit to a camp for female political prisoners made a deep impression on her. Once living again in Queensland she came into contact with an Indonesian-born Dutch woman, an immigrant who had been held in a Japanese camp for several years. These two encounters led her to discover 120 women survivors of the occupation whose experiences she worked into her book *The Forgotten Ones: Women and Children under Nippon* (1992) with the revealing subtitle: Internment was as harrowing an experience for every woman as captivity was for any man. For practically every Indies-Australian woman she met, it was the first time in their lives they had confided their story to an outsider. Before they were prepared to do so, she first had to dismantle a wall of distrust.

Publication of *The Forgotten Ones* spurred a number of people, with the commemorative year of 1995 in mind, to approach the Dutch Consulate for financial assistance to do something for women and for those who as children had spent time in Japanese camps. The Consul, however, refused his support because they opposed a separate commemorative church service. Next they turned to the Rotary Club for help, proposing a church service on August 18 at which Jan Ruff-O’Herne, known for her book about “comfort women,” would be asked to speak. Funds were forthcoming for a memorial service, and a plaque in the Presbyterian Church in Sydney. Consequently, Fenton’s book ultimately resulted in an official form of recognition, even if still only within the sphere of World War II.

In conclusion, everyone’s recollections are determined by self-justification. It is no coincidence that so many hilarious anecdotes about how the Japanese were made fools of during the camp period circulate among the survivors. The macho laughter must conceal the underlying pain and humiliation. At the same time years ago a drift towards self-presentation as victims set in. An emphasis on suffering culminated in recognition and compensation (or, extremely frustrating, not). Stereotypes began to overpopulate memory, as the authorities who sit in judgment are only at ease with standard interpretations. It demands ever more subtle analysis when reconstructing postwar developments to set personal accounts in a fitting contemporary context. Making things even more complex is in fact that the transition from resistance and heroism to the role of victim did not correspond to how people saw themselves, as no one is solely either an exile or a victim (nor would they want to be). Moreover, passivity and endurance are attitudes that clash with the resiliency many attribute to the character of the Indonesian-born Dutch. Not only because of their status as refugee or immi-
grant, but also as a people who lived through the war and the years of Indonesian struggle for freedom.

The concept of the survivor kept popping up in conversation, especially on the lips of women. They are proud to have come through wars, emigrations and, in no small numbers, even divorce unbowed. They have often traveled down a long road towards “inner healing.” Many have even derived a certain degree of moral strength from their trials. The war is endlessly invoked – even in unlikely circumstances – as a standard for later behavior. As one couple remarked, “At times we feel an inclination to say: I wish the Japanese camps would come again, for our grandchildren. It would do them good. We’re not allowed to say that, but if you see how much they waste! How this generation lives, often it’s beyond us. And then sometimes we say to each other: a small Jap camp, for two weeks, that would be enough.”

Although many may have handed down their war experiences to their children, with differing degrees of directness, the new generation ultimately decides its own lot. Another couple I spoke to lived to see the day their daughter came home from the university to announce to them, “I’ve booked a vacation to Japan.” They had the shock of their lives. Their daughter offered no explanation. Back from three weeks of traveling, she informed them she was bent on studying Japanese. She had always learned that the Japanese were a cruel race. In high school she had even given a talk about the barbarity with which the Japanese had treated her parents during internment. The whole class had made fun of her. “You and your Japanese prison camps!” That was why she wanted to go there now. She wanted to get to know the people themselves. And she found those she met wonderful. At present she is working in Japan as an interpreter. So, while memories may be absolute, you cannot impose them on people who have not lived through the original experience. That realization is also a plea in favor of recording disparate memories.

A Plea for an Interdisciplinary Approach

Where do all these contemplations ultimately bring us? Let me start with some general statements. The historiography of the Dutch in the former colony between the seventeenth century and the official date of independence (December 1949) is very ethnocentric, directed at the expansion of Dutch influence overseas. In studies of former colonies the focus always is on the people who ruled it, that is, the governmental,
economic and military strata. The social history of the people who settled and their descendants – the mixed European – Asian category – for a large part still has to be written. This has led to a distorted picture of the interaction between the colonizers and the colonized and the way in which they have influenced each other. As a result preconceived ideas still exist about the marginality of people with a so-called “mixed identity” in the colonial as well as in the postcolonial world, as in the idea that a mixed identity is in fact a kind of half identity or that the “mixed Dutch” lived between the white colonizers and the suppressed indigenous population.

Research about the fate of the people in the Dutch East Indies who suffered from the Japanese occupation, within or outside of the internment and prison of war camps, and what happened to them during the revolutionary war of the Indonesians after 1945, has only recently been taken into account seriously. No attention has been paid until now in Indonesian historiography to the role Dutch Eurasian leaders and other influential journalists played in the political process of Indonesian emancipation.

Almost no research has been done on the international migration aspects of the hundreds of thousands who were forced to leave Indonesia between 1945 and 1968. The same holds true for the settlement process in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s, a period in which a worldwide “white immigration policy” existed, at least in principle. The predominant idea is that integration went smoothly, so the group did not need any special attention after a few years. Because of that idea most Indies people were looked upon as the most invisible migrants in the postwar Netherlands. We still know little about whether there is such a thing as a Dutch Indies identity today and if such an identity is in itself advantageous.

To tackle these complicated issues we have to combine the tools of four academic disciplines. In colonial history, attention has to be extended towards categories other than the elite, Dutch as well as Indonesian. The social history of the Dutch and in fact the Europeans in general as well as the Chinese and other groups in the area that is now called Indonesia needs to be explored. Sources other than official ones, with their restricted perspective, and literary works, another favorite playing field, have to be analyzed, such as church archives and newspapers.

We also need to try to reconstruct the lives and social evolution of families with Dutch or European ancestors across the centuries. The interest for genealogical research is progressing, but much of this material is very basic, just the bare skeleton of family trees, and has to be
supplied with information from other sources, to get a better picture of the intertwining of family clans, their influence in the colonial society, their way of incorporating indigenous norms and values, with a resulting mixed culture or, in opposition to that, their trying to keep or make the colony as westernized as possible. How did people live, what were their expectations, how was their mentality shaped, and what were the boundaries of their daily social life? These are the questions about which there is still a great deal to be said.

Specialists in the field of migration studies should be involved in such a project. Their way of looking at settlement processes can help to get a clearer picture of the way people have behaved in the very extraordinary migration situation that existed in the colony. Many of the colonizers came and went, and were therefore only temporary immigrants. Nevertheless, many of them also stayed, married or lived with a concubine or had children who became part of colonial society. What were the determinants of their success or failure? How did they integrate and how did they function as a mixed category in this continuously changing colonial society? We can ask similar questions about the people who left after the Dutch East Indies became the Republic of Indonesia, officially at the end of 1949. Which choices were they confronted with? Where did they go, where did they want to go, and where and how did they settle in the end?

Finally, social scientists in ethnic studies are needed for such a project, as we are dealing with migrants who are historically determined by a mixed European-Indonesian identity, who went through a twofold war, and after that through a process of emigration. How did all these factors influence their day-to-day life and identity? What effects did this multiple background have on the second and third generation of migrants? Does the colonial heritage of their parents and grandparents still constitute part of the way they construct their identity, or has the structure of the receiving countries wiped away these group-specific features? A program-based and long-term research project in which these four academic branches are combined will ultimately lead to a more complete picture of the social evolution of colonial societies and their effects on the migration and settlement of people in the course of decolonization.
Chapter two

The Creation of the Pieds-Noirs: Arrival and Settlement in Marseilles, 1962

Jean-Jacques Jordi

Introduction

Many factors have contributed to the creation in France of a distinct "pied-noir" culture and identity. In contrast with the other migrations of decolonization explored here, the “return” of the French from Algeria occurred remarkably quickly, resulting in the transplantation of over a million people over the course of a few years, with a half a million crossing the Mediterranean in only a few months in the summer of 1962. Mass migration from Algeria, moreover, was only one of a series of migrations that followed the decolonization of the French empire in the two decades following World War II. Overall, an estimated two to two and a half million French, comprising at least 4.5 percent of the metropolitan population, ‘returned’ to France in the 1950s and 1960s alone.

These migratory movements represented a tangible reminder for metropolitan French of the end of the French Empire, a dramatic historical shift whose consequences are only now being fully appreciated, as Cohen and Cooper’s chapters outline in this volume. The unique vantage point on this historical break that was shared by those living overseas contributed to the formation and maintenance of a distinct pied-noir perspective. An additional constellation of factors must be considered as well. In this chapter I consider the more practical difficulties for one French city associated with the phenomenal mass migration from Algeria over the summer of 1962, the immediate and longer term consequences that these difficulties generated for both the migrants
and the metropolitan population, and the resulting long-lasting rift that has endured between the two populations as a result. I argue here that this rift has slowed the migrants’ complete incorporation into wider French society. Because of its special role as the initial destination of more French from Algeria than any other metropolitan city, I focus here on the experiences of the arrival, reception, and settlement of French to Marseilles, France’s major port city along its Mediterranean shores.

Marseilles and Decolonization

The history of the city of Marseilles is integrally linked with that of French imperialism. It is therefore not surprising that decolonization would affect Marseilles more than any other city of the metropole. If the first incidents of Indochina and the dramatic events of Algeria in May 1945 compelled the French to consider engaging in war with the colonized populations who had helped liberate France only a few years earlier, it was with what has been called, modestly, the Algerian “events” (les événements) that this history accelerated. Independence movements developed in quick succession in Morocco and Tunisia, followed by Guinea, the Suez affair in 1956, Bizarte in 1961, and the Bandung Conference. In Marseilles, these colonial conflicts were not isolated to the level of politics and political discourse, but were of wide concern. Divisions in public opinion were reflected by the local press, which was characterized by entrenched views regarding the collapsing colonial empire. Popular opinion in Marseilles as in the rest of the metropole paid increasing attention to the events of the other side of the Mediterranean, and evolved as France became further engulfed in the conflict.

The French government’s policy shift in 1960 toward supporting Algerian independence, which was accompanied by rioting by a segment of the French population living in Algeria, and the “Algerian” emissaries’ determination to encourage the French government to take care of the Algerian “situation,” reached a critical point with the Evian Accords and the end of hostilities in March 1962. Unfortunately, the scorched earth policy carried out by both the OAS (Secret Army Organization) in the countryside and the FLN (National Liberation Front) in the heart of many European quarters plunged Algeria into a period of terrorism leading to further widespread panic. Fearing the consequences of the FLN’s rise to power, the Europeans of Algeria left the land where they were born suddenly and en masse.
The repatriation of the French from Algeria was not an unprecedented phenomenon, however. French authorities had already welcomed nearly 500,000 repatriates from Indochina, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia who returned during the preceding decade. While the first departures from Algeria to France began as early as 1956, it is undeniable that the vast majority of the repatriates left their Algerian homeland in 1962. This chaotic departure quickly turned into a veritable exodus beginning in May 1962. Unfathomable just a few months earlier, and denied or minimized even at its peak by the French government, the massive departure took place under painful if not tragic circumstances. The overwhelming majority of these so-called “repatriates” arrived by boat or plane in Marseilles, a city that was ill prepared for their arrival. French government officials hoped that Marseilles would serve as a temporary transit point through which the recent arrivals would pass on their way to other destinations throughout France. As Robert Boulin, Secretary to the Repatriates, summarized in December 1961: “It is essential for the repatriate to be directed to those regions in France which, in accordance with state planning (“le Plan”), need industry, factories and housing for their economic recovery.”

During this major historical turning point, tensions and misunderstandings developed and were exacerbated during the summer of 1962. These tensions would structure a memory and forge a collective mentality that persists to this day.

The Ambiguous Lesson of Statistics

When we analyze the figures of the “Reception office” (Bureau d’accueil) below, one is first struck by the fact that 1,064,000 people arrived in France in 1962 (and this is only taking into account the European population). Over the same period, 412,000 returned to Algeria; these figures include those people who made round trips. From these figures, we can calculate that in total over 650,000 people settled in France in 1962.

Migration did not occur as a regular and continuous stream of arrivals in France throughout the year. Instead, we can identify three radically distinct periods, as outlined on the following page.

1. January to April 1962

The balance of these four months (or the positive difference between the arrivals, 174,000, and the departures, 106,000) was only 68,000.
These repatriates, even if they did not remain unnoticed in Marseilles, did not create significant problems. Marseilles (including both the port and the airport) was the final destination for approximately one-quarter of these arrivals, and for most, the city was merely a transit point before other destinations in France. In addition, interestingly, very few of these arrivals claimed the status of “repatriate.” As the Prefect of Marseille, Haas-Picard, stated in his meeting with the Home Secretary in May of 1962: “Most of the people arriving from Algeria had a place to stay in France and the only need was to promote their reception. So far, there have been no problems at the sites of disembarkation.”

There was one troubling note, however: with the exception of some “reception committees” (comités d’accueil) organized by professional organizations, such as the Electric and Gas Companies of Algeria (EDF-EGA d’Algérie), and others based on identity, such as the Corsicans of Algeria, there was no official reception of any kind. Those arriving simply registered, if they so desired, at 26-28 Pierre Puget Court, in an office located in a building rented to the Repatriate Delegation of the French Company of West Africa. The main reception and orientation center on Breteuil Street was not yet open.

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<td>September</td>
<td>71,020</td>
<td>52,233</td>
<td>18,787</td>
<td>599,035</td>
</tr>
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<td>54,162</td>
<td>43,975</td>
<td>10,187</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>35,540</td>
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<td>9,735</td>
<td>618,957</td>
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<td>December</td>
<td>56,717</td>
<td>24,409</td>
<td>32,308</td>
<td>651,265</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. May to August 1962

This second period is of the most interest to us here. This involved the massive and unexpected arrival of hundreds of thousands of people, leaving the city of Marseilles in total disarray. From May (more precisely, May 16, 1962\(^{11}\)) until August, the positive balance of arrivals over departures exceeded 512,000. Marseilles found itself completely overwhelmed by a steady stream of refugees. Over 100,000 people arrived in May, 355,000 in June, 120,000 in July, and 95,000 in August. Marseilles’ share of the refugees increased throughout this period from more than one-third of the total migrants in May to more than half in June and, ultimately, three-quarters in July and August. Of course these figures need to be critically analyzed. June is an emblematic example: out of 355,000 arrivals, more than 200,000 disembarked in Marseilles, and nearly all of these applied for repatriate status there. The French government, unprepared, tried to devise practical solutions for immediate needs, and private associations also participated in the assistance of the new migrants. Nevertheless, Marseilles quickly found itself on the verge of collapse. We return to this point below.

3. September to December 1962

This period was very much like the first. The positive balance of arrivals over departures was approximately 71,000. The major difference at this time, however, was in the composition of the migration flow: still comprised of some families, there was a greater percentage of single men and male heads of households, most of whom had attempted to return to the newly independent Algeria, hoping to find an improvement in the political situation or planning to sell whatever possessions they had left behind that could still be sold, such as shops, furniture, and apartments, and returning back to France afterwards.

It should be emphasized that these figures represent the most conservative estimates according to my calculations. I did not take into account here repatriates who used other means to get to Marseilles (small fishing boats, for example), or those who arrived through Spain and Italy. Furthermore, the Central File figures never took into account the “French Muslims,” an improper (and even illegal\(^{12}\)) category that has nevertheless been used throughout this period, who represented an additional 26,000 arrivals between May and August alone.\(^{13}\) Finally, while their numbers are dwarfed by the scale of the Algerian exodus, there were approximately 15,000 French citizens from Morocco and
Tunisia who also arrived in Marseilles during this same period. Consequently, we can conclude that even the numbers presented above underestimate the true scale of this migratory phenomenon.

The French government has systematically underestimated the number of repatriates, even though this was not a new phenomenon, as we have already pointed out in the cases of Indochina, the Suez, Morocco, and Tunisia. When estimating the potential number of migrants from Algeria, the French government relied for the most part on the conclusion of experts consulted when legislation was developed regulating repatriation in 1961.14 These experts had predicted that the Algerian repatriation would occur on a larger scale than the preceding repatriations, but that it would probably take a similar shape. As a result, they predicted that a maximum of 400,000 people would arrive in France, spread over four years. Once the migrations began to increase, French officials continued to ignore the phenomenon. It was not until April 25, 1962 that the Conseil des ministres first acknowledged that any mass repatriation had in fact occurred, when it reported, “Three hundred French from Algeria arrive in Marseilles every week. If they are going to remain in France, we must make sure that everything, from the moral to the financial, goes smoothly.”15 After this point, the number of official missives regarding the repatriates quickly increased. On May 24, Minister Joxe admitted to the Conseil that the departures toward France were indeed occurring on an alarming scale, and on May 30, the official governmental predictions were adjusted upwards to 300,000 arrivals for 1962 alone. Robert Boulin, the cabinet minister in charge of repatriates, noted at the end of June that approximately 160,000 arrivals in France had been registered.

Although the government admitted to an increase in the overall figures, it still underestimated them. In June alone, 355,000 repatriates arrived in France, twice the number estimated by the Secretary of State. The accuracy of the reports of Prefects that were submitted to the Home Secretary and ultimately to the State Secretary in charge of the repatriates should be questioned. Why would the government underestimate these figures? Was this a way of avoiding official censure from the Head of State for not having been able to predict such an exodus and consequently adequately respond to the crisis? More historical research into this issue is needed and will undoubtedly yield interesting results.

The government’s subsequent official declarations to the French in general and the population of Marseilles in particular downplayed the mass migration and attempted to argue that there was nothing exceptional about these circumstances. Louis Joxe went so far as to character-
ize the arriving repatriates as “seasonal workers looking forward to their holidays.” Promises were made to the people of Marseilles via the local press: the repatriates would only be “passing through” and would not add to the city’s existing problems. “The newspapers,” wrote Robert Boulin, “speak of a flood of miserable refugees, miserable and homeless people. Nothing of the sort is true.”16 This would continue, culminating in de Gaulle’s behest to Alain Peyrefitte, the government’s spokesperson, after a cabinet meeting on May 30: “Keep in mind what Boulin said ... There is no considerable change if we compare 1962 to the two previous years. There is no exodus, contrary to what your press, your radio, your television claim to be true.”

On June 27, during the peak of this repatriation movement, and two days after what would be called “the saddest and most important day in Marseilles’ harbor, the importance of which has never been surpassed,”17 Boulin still contended that the migrants were indeed “people on vacation until there was proof to the contrary.” Just two days earlier, on June 25, the port at La Joliette had received seven boats with 10,437 repatriates who had made the journey under conditions of unbelievable overcrowding. The Ville-de-Bordeaux disembarked 1,503 passengers, whereas its official loading capacity was only 1,000; the Ville de Tunis had 2,037 passengers aboard instead of the 1,400 officially allowed; the el-Djezaïr had 1,627 instead of 984; and the most egregious example was the Kairouan, which disembarked 2,630 passengers, well beyond its official limit of 1,172. The official denial of this migratory phenomenon would continue until November 23, 1962, when, according to Peyrefitte, de Gaulle finally acknowledged what had occurred, that a page had been turned between France and Algeria. The government only then finally began to face the definitive presence in France of at least 800,000 repatriates from Algeria.18

**Inadequate Reception**

Given these circumstances, it is not surprising that the reception centers (Centres d’Accueil) were totally overwhelmed by the flood of arrivals and their myriad problems. Marseilles was facing the consequences of a failed domestic policy. As indicated, the first repatriates to arrive at the Joliette port or Marseilles’ airport in the beginning of May 1962 realized that they were not expected. There was no official reception upon arrival, and no one even available to answer basic questions or offer advice (for instance, on finding temporary housing). It was not until
mid-May that the state established a reception center to carry out these tasks. In the meantime, private organizations contributed what assistance they could. The Red Cross, the Catholic Aid Society, the Social Unified Jewish Fund, the Protestant Assistance Society, the Salvation Army, and local mutual aid societies, among many others, united to form “contact committees.” These organizations provided free transportation, food and drink, luggage transport, financial aid, and temporary housing, even if only little more than a bed in one of over eighty hastily created dormitories.

By June, however, the flood of repatriates had overwhelmed both official and private reception structures, as well as local good will. Local and state authorities had made a modest effort to deal with the problems by opening boarding schools and requisitioning a few furnished apartments as dwelling spaces, but these efforts were absurdly inadequate. On June 26th, the regional Prefect Haas-Picard warned Parisians about the problems in Marseilles, emphasizing that from March 18 through June 22, 194,117 out of the total population of repatriates had been registered as having remained in Marseilles. This was a considerable number for a city of 770,000, and the Prefect considered completely barring repatriates from filing for repatriate status in Marseilles altogether.

The existing infrastructure was overwhelmed. The transit center in Rougières, for instance, was a low-income high rise apartment that was requisitioned by the government before its completion at the end of May. This center was developed to handle the continuous and regular processing of a maximum of 2,000 repatriates over a 48-hour period. But during the first weeks of June to the end of August, the center was already housing 3,000 people for an average stay of four to five days! It was becoming clear to local authorities and residents alike that the successful integration of the repatriates would require their relocation throughout France, although such a tack would have necessitated prior planning on a national level. This of course had not happened, as the government would not officially acknowledge the migrants’ presence until June. Consequently, the government shifted from a policy allowing the repatriates relative freedom in their choice of where to settle to one of “useful intervention” which determined their location, a policy that clashed with the intentions of the first repatriates, who in turn refused to leave Marseilles for what they perceived to be a hostile if not foreign country beyond. “The natural trend for many recent arrivals is to settle down immediately on the spot, and to try by all means to remain in Marseilles,” concluded the Prefect.
The Long Term Legacy of this Historical Juncture

Not only were public and private reception centers soon overwhelmed, but by the beginning of July, all available housing in Marseilles had been exhausted, a situation that would necessarily lead to conflict in this tumultuous atmosphere. There was increasing tension and misunderstanding between repatriates and metropolitans in Marseilles, and this period has left a lasting impression. Repatriates who arrived with strong feelings of having been “abandoned” by France, held a particularly negative impression of Marseilles and expected to be poorly received. These first hours of resignation gave way to anger, irritation and increasing bitterness. The repatriates complained about having to stay in Marseilles, even for a few days, due to what they perceived as a disinterested if not rude welcome on the part of the French. Others evoked the everyday climate of hostility in which they felt entangled. Their complaints included concern with the sudden rise in prices, the impossibility of finding housing and the extensive vandalism of their cars, which were easily recognized by their license plates.

The general impression of being exploited or even robbed was worsened by the petty annoyances visited upon the repatriates by civil service bureaucrats as well as frequent police controls. The French government, on the other hand, feared an infiltration of the metropole by members of the OAS. This fear motivated several citywide police operations, ultimately unsuccessful, but which reinforced the repatriates’ feeling that France had not only betrayed them, but also considered them criminally suspect. Many repatriates began to feel like scapegoats. The perception of being persecuted by Marseilles was widespread and deeply rooted: “We are accused of everything. If there is a robbery, it’s us. If there’s a traffic jam, it’s our fault. If rents go up, if the price of groceries shoots up, it’s our fault again. At the same time, none of us has a business or a flat to sell. It’s the people of Marseilles who are profiting from us” reported one repatriate.

In order to cope with this array of difficulties, repatriates began to turn to each other for moral support and practical assistance. They began to congregate at sites throughout the city center, such as the Place de la Bourse and the Place Félix Baret, which increasingly began to resemble a bazaar. They met to exchange news and information, find repatriates with whom they had lost contact or, as one witness stated, simply “to see the only smile of the day.”

The population of Marseilles, on the other hand, feared that the pieds-noirs would carry with them to France the turmoil of Algeria.
true that Marseilles was becoming increasingly agitated in the summer of 1962. The “Canebière,” Marseilles’ most famous avenue leading from the Vieux Port, became the site of a non-stop “French-Algerian” concert (Al-gé-rie-fran-çaise), as repatriate motorists honked their horn five times to identify themselves (particularly after they had to change their special license plates), a practice that lasted long after legislation was established June 29th against the honking of horns. Unemployed youths wandered around the city wearing a distinctive “Bigeard” cap. There were occasional reports of noisy demonstrations by young people around the Bompard Hotel, another repatriate boarding and processing center, or in apartment buildings in the Sainte-Marguerite neighborhood, where fireworks were still going off fifteen days after the national holiday on July 14.26 The Prefect attempted to limit these disturbances by assigning physical education programs for unoccupied young repatriates in the Rougière and Bompard neighborhoods, and by multiplying the number of police controls. However, these measures were insufficient to quell the growing tensions. “The population of Marseilles which has up to now warmly welcomed the repatriates has started showing frustration, following a series of strikes due to overcrowding and especially the offensive attitude of a minority of the repatriates,” underlined a municipal report at the end of June 1962.27 Fighting between repatriates and Marseilles natives regularly occurred near the Place de la Bourse in Marseilles’ old quarter, or near the central police station.

This everyday tension was compounded by the spectacular rise in crime during the summer of 1962. Holdups, shootings between the police and well-organized gangs, and bank robberies multiplied in Marseilles during this time. From mid-June, the police reported between five and eight holdups a week, instead of the usual two or three. On June 28 alone there were eight robberies, all of which were credited to the OAS. “Between June 27 and the last week in July,” added the Prefect in a note to the Home Secretary, “out of 19 aggressions in Marseilles, 17 concerned Europeans recently repatriated from Algeria.”28

By the end of July, positions were hardening and becoming increasingly polarized. In this city, as in France in general, ideological orientation was an important influence, particularly given the lack of accurate, detailed information concerning the repatriates’ situation. To the slogan “No, Marseilles will not become another Chicago,”29 repatriates replied “There are too many memories floating along the Canebière to view gangsterism as a recent import.”30 Police reinforcements at the
end of July along with various measures to “knock some sense” into Marseilles did not appease anyone’s fears nor their resentments.31

The Role of the Press

The regional press played an important role in this situation of increasing polarization between the metropolitan Marseilles residents and the repatriate communities. From May through September 1962, the period of the largest waves of arrivals, the positions taken by daily papers in reference to the repatriates radicalized. The daily Meridional had supported the effort to preserve the French presence in Algeria. While this position became impossible to maintain after July 3rd, 1962, Algeria’s date of independence, the newspaper continued in this vein through its unflagging support of the repatriates. The paper employed repatriate journalists and almost all its headlines during this period covered Algeria and/or the repatriation (with the notable exception of Marilyn Monroe’s death!). More significantly, the newspaper devoted two to three complete pages each day to the repatriates, which ultimately served to foster links between the repatriates and the people of Marseilles.

In contrast, the Marseillaise, a Communist daily, carried relatively few articles on the repatriation over this period and showed little if any sympathy for the repatriates’ plight. On the contrary, the paper presented itself as the “protector of the people of Marseilles against the ‘Algerian invaders’” such as in their articles in favor of “native” taxi drivers in their fight against repatriate competition. This tone went well beyond normal protectionism or corporatism. It contributed to a strong wave of antirepatriate sentiment, reinforced by the comparison it made between the “new Algeria and the expired imperialist enterprise”32 (articles dating around Algerian independence) and the coverage it gave to the spectacular increase of crime in Marseilles and its purported ties to the OAS.

The third paper, Le Provençal, gave considerable coverage to the repatriates’ problems, as well as the issues their presence in Marseilles raised for the local population. If, for the Meridional, the defense of the repatriates was more a national than a regional priority, and one that the government was inadequately addressing, the Marseillaise held that the government had already done too much in favor of the repatriates who, to put it simply, “only got what they deserved,” and who were taking resources from Marseilles’ local population. In fact, when Prefect Haas-Picard invited all local Marseilles personalities to come together
and form a reception committee for the repatriates on May 28, only the Communist Party and the CGT (Communist union) declined. Two reasons were cited for the refusal: the first declared that “the Communist Party and the CGT feared that a decision ultimately taken by the reception committee might be contrary to the well understood interests of Marseilles’ population.” Secondly, the CGT and the Communist Party stated that they “wanted to take care of the rights and defend the interests of workers coming from Algeria, and to inform the Prefect that, on this particular point, they were making a distinction between “workers” and “capitalists,” “colonialists” and “Harkis,” none of whom could be considered workers.” In this way, the Marseillaise as well as the Le Provençal did not reflect kindly on the repatriates’ situation.

Misunderstandings between the repatriates and a segment of Marseilles’ population intensified, and here the government can be held partly responsible, for there was a veritable silence around the migrations. Even when the events were obvious to everyone, they were denied. De Gaulle waited until the end of October 1962 to even acknowledge that a massive repatriation had taken place. This silencing, designed to quell widespread fears that could be aroused by the efforts undertaken on the repatriates’ behalf, left the repatriate communities feeling isolated and inward looking, particularly those based in Marseilles. In 1962, the Club Jean Moulin, a group of intellectuals, sent the government a warning about the attitudes they perceived among the wider metropolitan population: “Concerning metropolitan opinion, it would be much easier to win over public opinion if people were calmly presented with the facts, rather than placing them abruptly in front of an alarming situation, which they will only accept with difficulty.”

Their report was sent in vain. Public opinion in Marseilles as well as throughout France was uninformed, and continued to believe that the repatriates “only got what they deserved.” Many believed that the repatriates were rich enough to manage on their own, whereas in reality, the average repatriate standard of living had been much lower than in France. The press and government officials provided only a partial image of the situation faced by both repatriates and Marseillais, leaving an enduring mark on the memories of this period.

**Aftermath: The Birth of the “Pied-Noir”**

We cannot deny that the population of Marseilles was tremendously affected by the 1962 “shockwave” of repatriations from Algeria. This
summer remains “the summer of confrontations,” of “misunderstandings.” The traumatic events created tensions that grew daily, widening the gap between those who were forced to “return” and those obligated to receive them. To those who were deemed responsible for the loss of the colonial empire, for whom “we had already done too much,” the response was a cold and unwelcoming reception. In many ways, both the repatriates and the people of Marseilles were the scapegoats of a hesitant and flawed public policy.

One unexpected outcome of the massive repatriation from Algeria to Marseilles was the forging of a distinct collective memory and new group identity. On closer examination, it was not in Algeria but in France, and not until May 1962, that the “pied-noir” was born. The 1962 repatriation would become the foundational event for a community in exile, a community that had not existed as such in Algeria.

What is the legacy of this momentous mass migration for the country as a whole? Once immediate needs such as housing were met, the government faced many associated problems, such as the employment of over 300,000 people who had been actively employed in Algeria. This process was difficult, and would create further confrontations and tensions between pieds-noirs and metropolitans throughout the country. Integrating the repatriates economically was complicated by the fact that pieds-noirs were choosing to settle in southern France, a region at the time already plagued by job shortages. In response, the government began initiatives to encourage settlement in 1963 and even created employment opportunities in northern cities for the repatriates (Baillet 1975:304-5). Not only was this program only minimally successful, but soon after, even those settled in northern regions began to move southwards to the eight départements of the Midi along the Mediterranean. By the 1970s, the city of Marseilles was again receiving pieds-noirs, some 3,000 per year, but this time from the central, eastern, or northern parts of France (Baillet 1975:309). The pied-noir population today is still concentrated in the cities of the south.

Have the pieds-noirs become completely integrated in wider French society? This question is difficult to answer. Despite their establishment in France for over three decades, surprisingly little research has been conducted into this question. Even the numbers of pieds-noirs are largely unknown. Because they “melt” into French society statistically, in that censuses and other reports in France do not distinguish individuals by national, ethnic, or religious origins, it is difficult to conduct large-scale survey-based research on their social or economic integration. Anecdotal evidence suggests significant difficulty in adapting to
their new home, at least for some. For instance, high rates of suicides have been reported by psychiatrists, as have psychological problems linked to war-related traumas (Jordi 1993:186-7). However, systematic studies of these and other aspects of their integration have yet to be realized.

Following their uprooting and scattering throughout France, Marseilles has continued to play a central role in the constitution of a new collective conscience. The inadequacy of the reception, the appearance of an ungenerous France and the hostile reactions of the hosts gave way to a feeling or even a conviction of systematic ill will on the part of the metropolitans. Memories converged that associated Marseilles with shame, even for those repatriates who did not pass through the city. This memory would be constructed in and around Marseilles.

At the end of the summer of 1962, Marseilles had rid itself of four-fifths of these repatriates. However, nearly 100,000 would choose the city as a home for their new life, despite their difficult memories of this summer. Some repatriates would use this sentiment of rejection to “rebuild everything,” less in reaction to their fate than in revenge against those who had offered such a lukewarm reception. Such a formidable weight of resentment is not erased in one generation. Even if integration into French society has been successful, strong feelings of not being totally “at home” in France and in Marseilles persist. This has led to the recent “quest for identity” among many pieds-noirs, which can be summed up in the following question: who was I before becoming a French repatriate from Algeria? A new site has emerged to compete with the Algerian and French contexts, that of the prior ancestral home such as Spain, Italy, Malta, Germany and so forth, and little by little a third “memory” has started to take shape, that of the former homeland and the period before 1830. We can conclude by stating that the pied-noir is searching for his or her place in a history that has yet to be written.36
Chapter Three

Race, Class, and Kin in the Negotiation of “Internal Strangerhood” among Portuguese Retornados, 1975-2000

Stephen C. Lubkemann

Introduction

In the immediate aftermath of Portugal’s revolution of April 25, 1974, the rush to decolonization ushered a wave of humanity onto Portuguese shores. Within the short period of little over a year, over half a million residents of the former African colonies, termed “retornados” (literally translated as “returnees”) arrived in Portugal. Despite the inevitable social, demographic, political, and economic impact of an influx of this size on a country of just under 10 million inhabitants at the time (Baganha 1998), with a long history of exporting rather than receiving immigrants (Baganha 1998; Brettell 1986; Rocha-Trindade 1981, 1990; Higgs 1990), and in the throes of postrevolutionary political uncertainty and economic crisis, this process of “decolonization migration” (Smith, this book) and its impact on Portuguese society has attracted only the slightest attention from social scientists who focus on Portugal and even from the Portuguese academy itself (Pires et al. 1984; Ovalle-Bahamón, this volume; Baganha 1998; Boura et al. 1984; Lubkemann 1994, forthcoming). This almost glaring omission in social scientific literature is echoed by the invisibility of any distinct retornado population or sociopolitical consciousness within Portugal twenty-five years after decolonization and by the virtual demise of the term as a sign or marker of identity in Portuguese public discourse. A term that briefly pervaded popular newspapers and political debates, that stirred contro-
versy and divisively mobilized opinions during the first two or three postrevolutionary years, the label retornado has faded from popular parlance and the political stage alike.

Without addressing this remarkable analytical omission (a topic worthy of analysis in its own right), this study traces in broad lines the various social trajectories experienced over two decades by those who arrived in Portugal during the “decolonization migration” wave of 1975-76. It examines how the retornado population was internally differentiated in terms of at least three key factors: race, class, and strength of family ties in Portugal, and how these factors affected the ability of retornados to negotiate their social position and identity in Portuguese society. Drawing on Richard Werbner’s framework for analyzing “strangerhood” (1989) I suggest that immediately upon their arrival in Portugal in 1975-76, the retornados were treated as what Werbner terms “internal strangers” inasmuch as their inclusion as part of the Portuguese civitas – their legal status and consequently rights as citizens – was broadly acknowledged, while at the same time their membership in Portuguese societas – as members of the community, of Benedict Anderson’s “deep horizontal comradeship” (1991:7) – was placed in question in everyday forms of social interaction.

This study traces several reasons for why the retornados were framed as “internal strangers” within Portuguese society. These include the specific sociopolitical and economic conjuncture in post-revolutionary Portugal and the effects of decolonization migration on the related concerns of resident Portuguese, the very specific significance of colonial migration vis-à-vis other migratory options, and finally racialized Portuguese ideologies of nationhood. This study examines how family and class played a critical role in mitigating “internal stranger” status. It also proposes the salience of race as a pivotal factor in determining whether mitigation of “internal stranger” status was possible, or alternatively whether further deterioration and re-categorization as “external strangers,” as essentialized others, has occurred. Juxtaposing original life-history interview data with existent demographic analysis (Pires et al. 1984) this study perhaps above all suggests the need for far more detailed and in-depth analysis of the Portuguese decolonization migration process and its impact on postcolonial Portuguese social, political, economic and cultural development.

Two periods of fieldwork between 1990 and 1993, together totaling approximately twelve months, allowed me to conduct over forty in-depth interviews with retornados who had settled in three distinct
areas, namely those dispersed in the urban setting of the greater Lisbon area, those settled in one of the bairros sociais (social housing projects) of concentrated retornado settlement in the Setubal district, and those living in a small rural town that I have assigned the pseudonym of “Olival” in the central district of Aveiro. In many of these instances I was also able to interview extended family members, neighbors, and other members of the local community who had witnessed the arrival of the retornados. This research also allowed for a thorough review of the fortuitously assembled archive of several hundred press articles spanning the period from 1975 to 1983 on the retornados housed at the University of Coimbra’s Instituto 25 de Abril. However, this study also draws heavily on my own life experience as a resident in Portugal for over seventeen years during the period from 1972 to 1992. As a young witness to the revolution of April 25, 1974, my formative years were generated within the social milieu of postrevolutionary Portugal – the precise time-space setting for the social processes addressed here. During these years I came to know many retornados as friends. My connections to the three specific settings examined and a number of those interviewed in this study predate my period of “formal fieldwork” by over a decade. Similarly, as a member of a local community that received retornados and visibly interacted with one of the more noticeable concentrations of this population in the Lisbon area, I can reflect on my own first hand witnessing of the development of the narratives about the retornados deployed in receiving communities.

The Impact of Decolonization Migration on Postrevolutionary Portugal

Portugal’s April 25 revolution brought about the last major African decolonization by a European colonial power. One of the outcomes of the politically turbulent months following the revolution was the decision to pursue the fastest possible route to decolonization. By the end of 1974 independence for the colonies had already been announced in Lisbon and shortly thereafter transitional governments had been put in place with a view to imminently ceding power directly to the respective anticolonial movements in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau. The ascension to power of these movements, their implementation of policies that nationalized private property, and in the case of Angola the rapid degeneration of the situation into civil strife among competing movements all converged to produce massive exodus, particularly from
the large “white settler” colonies of Angola and Mozambique (Hall and Young 1997). While significant numbers of former colonists also moved to the neighboring countries of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, at least 505,000 (as verified officially by the 1981 Portuguese census) chose to migrate to Portugal itself. Of this official number, the overwhelming majority arrived from Angola (61 percent, or over 300,000) and Mozambique (33 percent, or over 165,000) (Pires et al. 1984).

This influx represented an increase in Portugal’s population of over 5 percent within one year.1 As a proportion of the total receiving population this represented a larger increase than that experienced by any other European country as a result of “decolonization migrations.” Moreover this demographic wave arrived on Portuguese shores at the height of postrevolutionary political uncertainty and factored significantly into the related social turmoil and economic crisis. Postrevolutionary political uncertainty wracked Portugal in 1975-76 as the government continued to be hotly contested by a plethora of political parties and coalitions, by various factions within the military, and by informal popular movements organized from the “bottom” and formal labor unions and vanguard movements organized “from the top.”

In the immediate aftermath of decolonization, Portugal was suffering economically from the disruption of business and industry as owners and technicians fled in the wake of early nationalization policies, from economic policies levied by the West as it aimed to counter the country’s political drift to the “left,” and from the loss of the colonies themselves as a privileged source of raw materials and a semi-protected market. The national economic crisis coincided with and was accentuated by the worldwide economic depression precipitated by the oil crisis of the mid-1970s.

Many retornados arrived destitute and came seeking housing and jobs in a country with an acute housing shortage that was already at a historical peak in the rapidly developing urban areas. The retorno population quickly became negatively stereotyped in the popular Portuguese discourse of the time, and the label of retorno became an ascription of identity pregnant with social stigma. Negative stereotypes were strongly reinforced in the news and in particular the press as a wave of stories of retornados unlawfully seizing housing in their owners’ absence were reported. These sentiments grew as press reports of the minimal government assistance provided to retornados sparked rising accusations that retornados were “stealing housing and jobs” from Portuguese residents. In this challenging political and economic
environment the retornado population received far less financial and social support from the Portuguese government than did comparable returnees in France or the Netherlands (Pires et al. 1984).

Sociohistorical and Demographic Characteristics of the Retornado Population

Although all decolonization migrants arriving in Portugal from the former African colonies in the immediate aftermath of decolonization were called retornados (“returnees”), a significant minority had actually been born in Africa and many of these had never set foot in Portugal, while yet others claimed only tenuous, if any, European ancestry. Nevertheless, it is important to realize that in contrast to the decolonization migrants in France and the Netherlands, of whom the majority had been born in the colonies, in the Portuguese case the majority (over 60 percent) had actually been born in Portugal. In fact, the bulk of Portuguese colonial emigration to its “settler colonies” occurred during the two decades after 1950, precisely when other European powers were contemplating or actually implementing decolonization. Consequently, the white population in Angola that in 1940 had numbered just 44,083 had leaped to an estimated 335,000 by 1974 (Bender 1978:228), and in Mozambique the number increased from just over 30,000 whites in 1945 to over 155,000 in the 1970 census (Newitt 1995:475; Hall and Young 1997:4).

Belying the Salazarian regime’s official rhetoric of five centuries of pervasive and large-scale colonial settler presence in Africa (see also Pennvenne 1995; and Bender 1978), these figures affirm that large-scale European settlement in Africa was concentrated in the twilight quarter century of Portuguese colonialism. Bender estimates that the “roots” of over 70 percent of the European population in Angola did not extend back even one generation (Bender 1978:26). Flowing against the broader anticolonial trend that pressured other European colonial powers into decolonization after World War II, the rapid growth of Portugal’s “white settlement” in Africa was in part itself a reaction to those same pressures. Rather than succumb to international pressure to decolonize, the Salazarian government reacted by increasingly affirming Portugal’s claims on Africa, eventually by reclassifying the colonies as “overseas Portuguese provinces” in 1951 and a decade later, in 1961, by legally dissolving what were ultimately racially determined distinctions between citizens and indigenous subjects through the extension
of citizenship to all subjects of the Portuguese state. The government’s widespread promotion of Portuguese settlement in Africa in the decades following World War II served on the one hand as part of its strategy for substantiating its claims that the colonies were really “overseas provinces” while also serving a variety of other social and economic interests of the Estado Novo, including diverting illegal labor emigrants away from European and North American to internal destinations, developing the colonial economies in service of the metropolitan one, and coping with rising socioeconomic and demographic pressures within Portugal itself.

Thus among the 580,000 Portuguese enumerated in the 1981 census who had lived in the African colonies prior to 1975, 60 percent had been born in Portugal. This number reflects an even stronger level of “original connection” to Portugal when broken down by age, given that a larger proportion of those actually born in the colonies themselves were in the under-15 age group (85 percent of this age group had been born in the colonies), and therefore dependents, whereas among older age groups the proportion of those Portuguese-born was considerably higher (15-39 age group: 60 percent born in Portugal; 40+ years age group, 85 percent born in Portugal) (Pires et al. 1984:38-39). In contrast with other European decolonization migrants, it has been estimated that only 20 percent of the pieds-noirs who migrated to France had originally been born there (Baillet 1975:64), and only 30-40 percent of those who arrived in the Netherlands in the wake of Indonesian decolonization were believed to have been born in Europe (Kraak 1969 as quoted in Pires et al. 1984:30).

The fact that the retornados were both more likely to have been born and raised in Portugal (or to be the dependents of parents who had this experience) and therefore still have family networks has been highlighted by several analysts as a factor that played a critical role in facilitating their reintegration into Portuguese society. This factor has been given added weight in light of the fact that this integration has apparently occurred much less problematically than in the case of comparable processes such as that of the pieds-noirs in France, despite the fact that the demographic impact of the retornados was considerably greater, occurred under much less favorable economic and political circumstances, and involved considerably less direct government assistance to arriving decolonization migrants. Unlike the pieds-noirs in France, the retornados have not coalesced into a socioeconomic minority, nor have political interests been organized around this identity,
which arguably has virtually disappeared from public and political discourse alike.

The Problem of Activating Family Ties

The importance of active family ties to successful reintegration should not be neglected since in fact of those retornados born in Portugal, 53 percent (or approximately 31 percent of all retornados) did return to the districts where they had been born (Pires et al. 1984:45). Nevertheless, while closer family networks may have existed in the Portuguese case, this does not necessarily mean that these ties were activated or self-evidently facilitating of reintegration without problems. As examined at greater length elsewhere (Lubkemann, forthcoming), “decolonization migrants” from the African colonies were often received very differently to returning immigrants from other labor migration destinations, particularly in rural Portuguese communities. This reception was partially derived from local interpretations of the ways in which different initial emigration destinations reflected different levels of commitment to and participation in the social life of communities of origin. Whereas outmigration had long been a fact of rural Portuguese life, not all emigration destinations were evaluated in the same way, in particular by those who stayed behind.

Emigration has been a historically significant factor shaping Portuguese society and identity for at least four centuries (Brettell 1986; Ferreira 1976, 1977, 1981; Serrao 1972, 1976; Rocha-Trindade 1978, 1981, 1990; Higgs 1990). Brettell has described emigration as a strategy focused on improving and reproducing peasant life in rural Portugal, rather than as a way of leaving Portuguese society altogether. Portuguese emigration has therefore long been dominated by a strong ideology of return, regardless of the fact that actual rates of return have often fallen short of this ideology’s prescription (Brettell 1990). In places such as Olival, remittances from those working abroad in France or Germany historically played an extremely important role in the local rural economy. Annual visits back to Portugal brought a further influx of money and gifts for relatives, often marked by a rotating series of “Festivals of the Emigrant,” as was (and still is) the case in the various towns near Olival. During these visits many emigrants worked on the construction and furnishing of their houses – one of the principle investments of earnings from abroad and a major reason to go work abroad in the first place. Remittances, visits, and the construction of
houses all figured as visible signs of commitment and primary orientation to home communities and the eventual establishment of a permanent presence “back home.”

To those who remained in rural Portuguese communities such as Olival, emigration to Africa contrasted starkly and very visibly with the emigration to other destinations. In contrast to labor migration to European destinations, emigration to colonial destinations was intended from the outset as a permanent relocation. In line with its colonial policies, the Salazarian government promoted permanent re-settlement and provided financial subsidies only for those who at least expressed this intent. As a result, emigration to Africa signaled a definitive break with home communities that contrasted sharply with the way emigration to France or Germany was understood. In fact, choices to leave for Africa were often seen by those left behind as a decision by the migrant not to follow another proven and available emigration stream that remained oriented to Portugal and in which the purpose of emigration was to enable and maintain rural Portuguese communities back home. In contrast to migrants to France or Germany, those who emigrated to Africa were sometimes seen by those left behind in rural areas such as Olival as placing themselves above family and community – as having pursued prosperity that was unshared and unresponsive to family and community obligations. In fact, those who left for Africa were far less likely to maintain regular ties or visit extended family back in Portugal. Unlike Germany, France, Switzerland, Venezuela, and the USA, Mozambique and Angola were never sources of major remittance back to Portugal despite their large immigrant populations from rural Portugal. In one regional survey conducted in 1982 in an area not far from Olival, only 17.2 percent of retornados reported ever having sent remittances back to Portugal, in contrast to 91.7 percent of returned migrants from other emigration destinations (Boura et al. 1984:67). Despite the fact that emigration to Africa during the 1950s and 1960s was technically a matter of “internal migration,” the lack of an ideology of return or “home orientation” was often a serious cause for contention between those who set out for Africa and their extended family members, especially parents.

This understanding of the meaning of emigration to Africa affected the way retornados were received when they arrived in their communities of origin after 1975 – communities and family that often perceived the retornados very much as having largely forsaken their roots in the first place. Mr. Maia, a retornado who left to Angola and later returned to Olival, described his own experience as follows:
[When we returned in 1976] even our family members did not want to know us. I was told: ‘You left because it was not good enough for you here with us and did not come back – now you should make it on your own like you wanted before.’ They said that we had exploited the blacks to have an easy life and now we wanted to exploit our families too, even though before we had forgotten who they were... I went to Africa because agriculture here was difficult – my family wanted me to go to France but I said no, and went to Africa... but for April 25 I would never have come back to this.

In Portuguese rural communities that historically relied on emigration, the retornado ascription clearly devalued the claims of decolonization migrants from Africa on the resources of community and family on their return. Family and neighbors challenged the right of retornados to forms of assistance enshrined in the local understanding of community and family by strongly suggesting that their original migratory choices – of going to Africa – had constituted a voluntary (and morally reprehensible) abdication from community in the first place.

Heightened popular resentment against the colonial war merged with the portrayal of colonial exploitation in the postrevolutionary Portuguese press to reinforce doubts about the moral character of those who had opted to emigrate to Africa. Mr. Simoes, a retired ceramic worker in Olival, expressed sentiments about retornados not uncommonly felt and expressed by those who witnessed the arrival of the decolonization migrants:

The retornados did not want to work in Portugal with their families after a life of ease (“vida a larga”) in Africa where the blacks did everything for them... They went to where others would do the work for them because they did not want real work like my own in the factory for thirty years or in the field where life is hard... even in France they have to work long hours, but in Africa they could all have shops and sit and drink coffee. They would say to the blacks ‘do this, do that’ and then they would say ‘we are working’... they were successful because they exploited the government and forgot about their families so they would not have to work... this is why so many have now become successful in commerce in the district, with grocery stores (mercearias) and clothing stores and in trade... but even now you do not see them lift a hand to work the land and they always have clean hands without any calluses.
Accepted as fellow citizens and consequently as fellow Portuguese in one sense, even those retornados who returned to places of origin and extended family networks were likely to be treated as “internal strangers” whose own choice to forsake the community by leaving for Africa was taken as evidence that their membership in that community was not self-evident. However, the fact that for retornados the grounds for exclusion as “internal strangers” were “performative” rather than “essentialized” – seen as the product of voluntary choices rather than inherent essences – opened up the possibility of challenging this status over time through counter-performances that could reestablish their public commitment to community and family.

Over the quarter of a century since their arrival in Portugal, the retornados have proven capable of reactivating atrophied social networks and successfully challenging marginalizing narratives through their public performance of community and family commitments. One of the major reasons for this success has been the ability of the retornados to translate advantages in human capital into material success. As a population the retornados had considerably more education and professional experience than the rest of the Portuguese population as a whole. Whereas 51 percent of the total Portuguese population in 1981 had not yet completed at least a primary school diploma (through 4th grade), only 17 percent of the retornados suffered from this disadvantage. Despite their comprising less than 6 percent of the total population, retornados represented 16 percent of all Portuguese with a “professional qualification” and 11 percent of those with higher education (university level) degrees (Pires et al. 1984:114-115). These educational credentials proved valuable in particular during the postrevolutionary expansion of the Portuguese public sector.

In 1981 when over 20 percent of the total Portuguese population was involved in mostly small-scale peasant agriculture, less than 6 percent of the retornados followed this occupation, whereas 65 percent worked in the tertiary sector and 29 percent in the secondary sector (versus 52 percent and 27 percent respectively for the Portuguese population as a whole) (Pires et al. 1984:131). In light of two decades of reduced returns on small-scale agriculture, arriving in Portugal without access to agricultural lands did not turn out to be an economic disadvantage in the long run, even in rural areas of resettlement such as Olival. At a national level the preponderance of retornados in certain higher status professional areas is particularly noticeable. The retornados arrived in Portugal at a time when many professionals were leaving the country because of the political uncertainty and economic policies of the period after
April 25. They were accordingly well placed to fill needed vacancies and get in on the ground floor of Portugal’s economic expansion in the 1980s. By 1981, retornados represented over 14 percent of all professionals in the banking, financial service, and insurance industries and occupied just under 11 percent of all civil service positions in the country (Pires et al. 1984:114).

By 1981 they already represented just under 10 percent of all small business activity. Drawing on their professional experience in Africa that had required a form of business entrepreneurship stifled under the corporatist models of the Salazarian state back in Portugal (see Riegelhaupt 1979), the retornados opened numerous small businesses not only in the urban areas, but more importantly throughout the small towns and villages and medium-sized cities of rural Portugal. Frequently named after places in Africa such as “Café Luanda” and “Mercearia Lourenço Marques,” restaurants, small grocery shops, and numerous other small businesses throughout Olival and other towns like it throughout rural Portugal are public signs of retorno enterprise and success. By 1981 just over 50 percent of retornados were employed in what were ranked as “skilled professions” as opposed to under 29 percent of the rest of the total Portuguese population (Pires et al. 1984:129-131).

The entrepreneurial achievements of those who arrived from Africa and their material success in the wake of having “lost it all” allowed them to successfully challenge marginalization and treatment as “internal strangers” within local communities on “moral grounds.” Their material success and the passage of time not only allowed them to reinsert themselves into patterned systems of local reciprocity, but also strengthened the interest of local populations in including them in these systems – in funerals, baptisms, weddings, and so forth. Moreover the success of many retornados, particularly in the small rural communities throughout Portugal, has involved a very public performance of virtue as evidenced above all in an ethic of hard work and investment in the local community. In Olival, Mrs. Letra stated:

... the women from here always used to say ‘retornoas don’t work, retornadas don’t work’... but then they watched me open up the foundation of this house alone with a hoe while my husband worked ... and later on they saw me help the mason laying bricks because my husband could not. And he kept working even in his condition to keep bread on the table. Even after his surgery he drove a truck, delivered bread, and collected scrap metal. Now we have better houses and cars than these
people who always lived here do and they have to be quiet because they saw the work we did and that when we came we had nothing and that now we have more than they do.

Retornados Without Family: The Urban Phenomenon of the Bairros Sociais

While family and community ties had to be problematically negotiated (rather than simply self-evidently exploited) by the majority of retornados in their integration into Portuguese society, some retornados had weak or no links at all to family networks and local communities in Portugal. A substantial minority had been rooted in Africa for a longer time, sometimes over several generations, during which time social connections to extended family in Portugal had become negligible or non-existent. Although considerably more research is needed to establish how many retornados faced this type of situation and the variety of ways in which they coped with it, there is strongly suggestive demographic evidence that a large portion of those retornados without family ties in Portugal settled in urban areas upon their arrival in Portugal.

Of immediate interest is the fact that just under half of all those retornados born in the colonies were settled in Lisbon alone in 1981 (Pires et al. 1984). As a whole the retornado population in 1981 was considerably more urban than the rest of the Portuguese population, with over 62 percent living in populations centers of 2000+ inhabitants and over 42 percent in areas of 10,000+ inhabitants (in contrast to 42 percent and 29 percent for the remaining Portuguese population, respectively; Pires et al. 1984:56). Thus while major urban areas such as Lisbon and Setubal attracted a high percentage of retornados who had been born in these districts in the first place (71 and 66 percent, respectively), they also attracted even larger numbers of retornados who had been born elsewhere, so that in Lisbon and Setubal, “native-born” retornados were outnumbered 1.27:1 and 2.61:1, respectively, by “non-native” retornados (Pires et al. 1984, 60). Lisbon, Setubal, and Porto districts alone accounted for the settlement of 54 percent of all retornados enumerated in the 1981 census (Pires et al. 1984:56) despite counting for only 26 percent of all retornados born in Portugal and only 15 percent of all retornados resident in Portugal (Ibid: 40, 60).

Urban areas in Portugal were likely to attract retornado resettlement in light of the fact that as a whole the settler populations in Angola and
Mozambique had been far more urbanized than the Portuguese population prior to decolonization. By 1970 over 75 percent of the European population in Mozambique were settled in urban areas of 2000+ inhabitants (almost half of these in the two major cities of Lourenco Marques and Beira) (Hall and Young 1997:4), while in Angola over 50 percent of the European population lived in its five largest cities (Bender 1978:27). In contrast, in as late as 1980, under 43 percent of the Portuguese population lived in population settlements of over 2000 residents, while fewer than 30 percent lived in urban areas with over 10,000 residents (Pires et al. 1984). As a result, while prior urban experience was likely to influence the resettlement patterns in Portugal of all retornados, its effect could be expected to be stronger on those who had no family networks in rural areas. Moreover, employment and housing opportunities in general, and the limited government assistance provided to the retornados, tended to be concentrated in the urban areas, especially in the greater Lisbon area (Pires et. al 1984).

Housing in particular presented a challenge to those decolonization migrants who arrived in Portugal without family networks to draw upon. The country was already facing an urban housing crisis, making this one of the hottest grassroots political issues in the immediate post-revolutionary era (see Downs 1989). Much of the press coverage of the retornados focused on stories about unlawful seizure of housing by retornados during the owner’s absence. Within some areas in the peri-urban Lisbon area locals expressed a concern that their homes might be occupied by retornados during the month-long vacations traditionally taken in July or August, leading some to postpone or cancel such plans. Many of the media reports erroneously exaggerated situations in which the government itself commandeered hotels and housing for the retornados with the few actual such seizures that did occur, although these were not only perpetrated by retornados but also by migrants from rural areas of Portugal (Downs 1989). Nevertheless, the media focus on this issue resonated powerfully with contemporary popular Portuguese concerns and strongly shaped a broadly negative image of those arriving from the African colonies. The limited housing assistance that the minority of retornados did qualify for and the preference they received in assignment to government-subsidized housing in the peri-urban areas (such as in Amadora and Almada in the greater Lisbon metropolitan areas) engendered considerable resentment among many local residents and sparked rising accusations that retornados were “stealing housing and jobs” from Portuguese residents.
Many of the retornado shantytowns that grew up on the outskirts of Lisbon, Cascais, and Leiria, or the government sponsored encampments, such as the large tent settlement in the Vale do Jamor area outside Lisbon, were often discussed in the press and regarded by the residents of the surrounding local communities as dangerous loci of criminality, often conflated with gypsy settlements – another historically marginalized and strongly stigmatized population in Portugal.

The conflation of retornados living in the bairros sociais and peri-urban shantytowns with populations such as the gypsies reveals how a more essentialized and less performative form of “internal strangerhood” was often ascribed to decolonization migrants whose lack of family networks and poverty forced them into these residential options. Unlike those retornados whose membership in the community was questioned as the result of a perceived voluntary act – of leaving to Africa in the first place – those settled in peri-urban shantytowns were often conflated with groups regarded as “ethnic others,” suggesting involuntary and essentialized forms of differentiation. Mrs. Joana, a “white” retornada who had been born Angola and in 1991 lived in a bairro social on the outskirts of Lisbon with two young children described her treatment as follows:

When we arrived here in 1975 we did not know where to go... yes, there is some extended family in a small town in Trás-os-Montes which is where my parents came from – my father – but I did not even know which town for sure... I entered the (government) lottery and was able to get this house... this was all that was done for us and the government owed us more than this because they caused the events of April 25 here, not there, but we who were there (in Africa) had to pay for it by losing everything we had worked for... The people around here treated us like we were another race (outra raça) ... but I am Portuguese and because my neighbor is another race does not change that... I only worked sometimes when I could because when they found out that you live here in the bairros they treat you like a ‘black’– they are afraid that you will steal from the house and they say that those in Africa don’t know the difference between telling the truth and telling a lie.
Social Race and the Essentialization of Retornados of African Descent

The fact that many of these peri-urban retornado shantytowns and the bairros sociais were racially mixed in composition reinforced the tendency for all residents to be differentiated as ethnic others by those in the surrounding communities. Although there are no direct figures available, the best indirect estimates indicate that at least 25,000-35,000 (Baganha 1998:229-277) of the retornados were of African as opposed to European descent—a figure possibly amplified if we consider the fact that many of those of mixed racial descent would be likely to be classified as “black” at least in terms of the way they would be treated in everyday interaction within Portuguese society.

Those retornados of African descent were less likely to have extended family networks in Portugal and more likely to have fewer financial resources. They were therefore likely to be concentrated in the aforementioned peri-urban shantytowns. Ethnic or racially differentiated demographic figures are not available from existing data sources, making it impossible to reliably generalize the extent to which racial discrimination affected the social trajectory of the retornados, although the qualitative indications from this study certainly point towards the overwhelming significance of racism in limiting the opportunities and possibilities for those whose phenotype cast them as “Africans” and therefore as “non-Portuguese” within popular, everyday practices of Portuguese social constructions of race. Mrs. Laura, a part-time seamstress whose phenotype strongly suggests her African heritage was working for several private individuals when I interviewed her in the Lisbon area in 1993. She had arrived in Lisbon in 1976 with her former boss for whom she had worked as a domestic in Angola for over a decade:

After we arrived here I responded to an ad in the newspaper for work as a seamstress. When I went to the indicated address the woman who opened the door looked surprised and put on airs (meteu ares)... she said they didn’t want retornadas because they needed people who had a will to work... The thing is that a week later a woman who came from Angola and lived down the street got that same job... but she was white.

The overwhelming significance of social race in determining the challenges faced by retornados is suggested in particular by the ways in which race tended to factor as more important than family ties and even
served to nullify the possibility of drawing on family networks in the four cases of mixed racial marriages among retornados as well as all the cases of phenotypically visible mixed racial heritage examined in the course of this study’s research. In all four cases examined in this study retornados in mixed race marriages were less likely to be acknowledged or assisted by Portuguese family upon arriving in Portugal. Sr. Joao, a white retorno who had been born near Aveiro and settled for several years first in Leiria and then Lisbon with his African wife discussed their own rejection by extended family members during an interview in 1990:

I am revolted above all by those who will not speak to my children even though they are of the same blood, or even to me, their son – I only went there once and we came to blows. To be treated by your own blood as a stranger is too much... They say we live in misery because we don’t know how to work. Look at these hands... they worked harder in Africa than all of these miserable people put together and they are working now at 67. I arrived yesterday from three weeks at sea. My wife works like a slave... who are they to tell us about work?... How can they say that my oldest son is not Portuguese when he was born in Luanda and Luanda was then in Portugal?... Just because they are darker (morenos) they say these beautiful children of mine are “unintelligent” and treat them like animals at school.

Similarly, those retornados of mixed racial heritage whose phenotype led to their being regarded as “black” all reported being unable to avail themselves of extended family networks with Portuguese family even when these existed and were known of.

The Racially Differentiated Trajectories of Decolonization Migrants in Portugal

A quarter of a century after the massive influx from Africa and in stark contrast to the immediate years that followed decolonization, the term retorno has lost its salience and visibility in Portuguese public discourse and interaction. Unlike the pieds-noirs in France there is no publicly recognized retorno ethnic minority in Portugal. It is not an identity that engenders either political opinion or daily social interaction in the same way that it once did. Those who arrived from Africa and have reestablished themselves in Olival and elsewhere throughout the country are not thought of or approached by neighbors, strangers, and
family as retornados but simply in terms of the roles that characterize the broader Portuguese community— as “sisters”, “clients”, “retirees”, “cousins” and “neighbors”. The term is rarely seen in newspapers—in short this “identity label” has suffered radical atrophy in the public sphere.

From the very outset the retornado label and all the forms of stigmatized differentiation it implied were rejected and hotly contested by all decolonization migrants from Africa. Arrivals from Africa pressed their claims through counter-narrative strategies of their own. These strategies sought to suppress and subvert the different types of disconnections with the Portuguese imagined community suggested by the retornado label by emphasizing the importance of other forms of connections to Portugal and by offering alternative interpretations of the meaning of emigration experiences to Africa.

Organized around an emphasis on their legal status (citizenship) and cultural—in particular linguistic—commonality, such narratives sought to collapse societas into civitas, turning the latter into criterion for the former. Consistently throughout my own interviews retornados referred to the Salazarian regime’s legal redefinition of the African colonies as “overseas provinces of Portugal and an integral part of Portuguese territory.” Variations on the following narrative by one woman were typical of those offered by many retornados during my interviews:

We were always Portuguese and even had a better Portuguese education than many of those who lived here on the continent. In school we learned all about the kings and history of Portugal. The geography they taught us was the rivers and mountains of Portugal and not of Africa… this is the geography I know, not that of Angola.

In part such claims were advanced by inverting the meanings attributed by local communities to African emigration, reinscribing them not as the abandonment of local family and community obligations but as acts of “moral virtue” in service of the greater Portuguese community.

We were all Portuguese there and Portugal was only something when it had the overseas provinces… we were the real Portuguese who did something for Portugal… Portugal was made by discovery and by those who went…. They cut off the right hand that did all the country’s work with Abril. (Mr. Ail, a retired railroad worker and retornado from Mozambique.)
In this way, retornados cast themselves as the ones whose rights had been betrayed by a government that was supposed to protect its own, as the ones “abandoned” by Portugal and the Portuguese. This emphasis on the rights enshrined in citizenship also represented an inversion of the moral characterizations by the mainland Portuguese who portrayed emigration to Africa as a choice to abandon community and family in the interest of exploitative self-gain.

The socioeconomic success of many retornados who were able to draw on their own human capital advantages as well as on family networks in Portugal and the passage of time have allowed enough retornados to challenge their status as “internal strangers” (inasmuch as this status was based on “performative claims”⁴) so that the term itself has been suppressed from public discourse. However, social race has determined the effect of the demise of this category of “internal strangerhood” in critical ways.

Unlike white retornados who have enjoyed greater acceptance with time and are generally undifferentiated in either social practice or legal terms from other Portuguese, black or mixed-race decolonization migrants have suffered deterioration in the way they are treated in everyday social interactions. The atrophy of the label of retornado in public discourse has not translated into the treatment of this minority as “Portuguese,” but paradoxically has resulted in their increasing conflation with other populations of African origin who never had claims to Portuguese citizenship. The 1980s witnessed an influx of often illegal Cape Verdean workers responding to the construction boom in the metropolitan areas surrounding Lisbon in particular (Muir 1989). As “Cape Verdean” has become virtually synonymous with “black” in popular Portuguese parlance, non-white retornados have increasingly found themselves framed as “external strangers” (Werbner 1989), without civil rights as citizens, much less regarded as members of common social body, and discriminated against in everyday interaction not merely as a minority but as foreigners.

Conclusion

The analytical silence that marks the absence of investigation into the impact of the retornados on postcolonial Portuguese social, political, economic, and cultural processes is almost deafening in light of simply the sheer demographic significance of the decolonization migration wave of 1975-1976. The agenda for future research on this process and
the implications for other lines of research are rather vaster than can be
delineated here. Basic demographic analysis that can establish more
clearly the regional impact of the retornados throughout Portugal, and
which do so at the household (rather than simply individual) level
would provide a crucial start. The impact of the retornados as a popula-
tion with a very different human skills profile from that of the rest of the
Portuguese population on the country’s economic development in the
last two decades is another clear area for research. The connections
between decolonization migration to Portugal and the changing labor
emigration regime over the last two decades has yet to be investigated in
depth. The political impact of the arrival of a highly politicized, essen-
tially “forced migrant” population of huge proportions on Portugal’s
immediate postrevolutionary political process and on developments
since demands analysis. The fact that this decolonization migration
wave literally brought Portuguese society its first modern encounter “at
home” with ethnic and cultural diversity requires that this process serve
as the critical starting point for investigations into contemporary race
relations, and the ways in which social and national identity is perceived
in postcolonial Portugal.
In an insightful and thorough review article dealing with various theories of international migration, Douglas Massey and several coauthors (Massey et al. 1993) address the aspect of World Systems Theory that argues that the process of economic globalization has created cultural links between core capitalist countries and their hinterlands. In many cases, these links are long-standing, and are rooted in the bureaucratic structures built by core colonial powers in peripheral colonies. One consequence of these deep-rooted links is the movements of natives of the periphery to the capitalist core that occurred in the post-World War II, postcolonial period. These “natives” included not only those formerly colonized (for example, South Asian Indians who went to Britain or Moluccans who went to the Netherlands), but also the descendants of natives of the core born and residing in the periphery who were supposedly “repatriated.” To this one might add, as Willems suggests in his chapter, a third group—the colonists who, although born and raised in the core, spent their working adulthood in the colonial periphery.

One of the central problems of this book is whether and to what extent these populations have anything in common. Are they immigrant populations? Do they share the same sense of home? Do they identify themselves in similar ways, and are they identified by members of the host society (the core) in similar ways? Is insertion the same as reinsertion, if reinsertion is even the correct term to use to describe what happened to those removed two or more generations from the homeland of their ancestors? What is the significance of citizenship in each case—what rights are extended to each population and do these differ from the rights extended to immigrant populations? These are some of the questions I address in this brief commentary.
Let me first deal with the question of whether or not these are immigrant populations. This question encompasses most directly Andrea Smith’s call for an integrated analytical model that includes repatriates in our studies of immigration in Europe. There are a few observations to be made here. First, if one goal of this book is to establish a research agenda for a comparative study (something that would be of significant intellectual value) then we must be more precise with regard to the terms and the populations being discussed. Willems applies the term repatriates to the third group mentioned – the former colonists born in the core. Smith and others consider the repatriated to belong to the second group. Then there are the individuals who almost everyone would consider to be immigrants (those formerly colonized). An additional group, and one that needs somewhat different treatment in my view because it raises different issues about home (which I discuss below), comprises the migrants (Willems uses this term) who go to places other than the colonial core – for example, the Dutch from the Indies who went to Australia and the United States after decolonization. Within this integrated model one might also want to introduce a fourth group – people such as the ethnic Germans who have returned to Germany since the collapse of communist Eastern Europe and who been given a particular status different from Auslanders (Turks and other immigrants who have been migrating to the former West Germany since the late 1950s).

It is also important to consider the debates in the literature that pertain to differences between refugees and economic migrants. Although some scholars, Liisa Malkki (1995) for example, want to underplay the differences (especially after the initial period of settlement), there is certainly a distinction to be drawn between those who leave their homeland voluntarily and those who leave involuntarily. Many of the populations discussed by contributors to this book fall more easily into the latter category – indeed Willems uses “exiles” to refer to those who left the Dutch Indies during the early phase of decolonization. Like the Cubans who left their island homeland between 1960 and 1962 under somewhat different but equally nationalistic circumstances, this first group of Dutch East Indians hoped to return to Indonesia soon. For both populations, “soon” became “later” and “later” extended into decades. However, putting aside the reasons for departure, we must ask if this extension of time is any different from that experienced by Portuguese immigrants who considered their migration to France to be temporary but who were still there twenty years later?
Duration can be approached from a different perspective. Although Willems describes a more extended process of “repatriation” in the Dutch/Indonesian case, often repatriation occurs suddenly and over a short period of time in the immediate aftermath of decolonization. Jordi’s chapter captures the urgency of this process with dramatic figures for monthly net inflows of pieds-noirs to the city of Marseilles during the single year of 1962. Marseilles was as ill-prepared for these arrivals in the early 1960s as Albania and Macedonia were for the massive and sudden arrival of Kosovar refugees that occurred thirty-seven years later during the spring of 1999. Even in September of 1962 President de Gaulle accused his Minister of Repatriates, Alain Peyrefitte, of “exaggerating a bit” about the numbers of French Algerians who were in France to stay. Although neither Lubkemann nor Ovalle-Bahamón (in the next section of this book) offer comparable monthly figures for the Portuguese retornados, arrivals in Portugal were largely concentrated in a single year (1975). In both cases, early sentiments on the part of members of the “host” (formerly colonial) society were negative, although officials in Portugal never denied the reality of what was occurring as apparently de Gaulle did during the Algerian exodus. What is the meaning of this denial? Was it merely to save political face? Why was this not an issue for the Portuguese? Was it because in the latter case, the collapse of the colonial empire was linked to revolutionary change at home (i.e. the final demise of Salazarism)? Have these differences affected long-term integration, including the emergence of a pied-noir literature and the absence of a comparable literary movement in Portugal?

If most repatriations are of short duration yet sudden and dramatic in their demographic impact, economic migration streams generally begin more slowly and grow over time based on a process of chain migration. Massey and his colleagues (1993) distinguish between those theories that explain the origins of a particular population movement, and those that explain its perpetuation. This is an extremely important distinction. The consideration of perpetuation leads directly to an exploration of the kinds of communities (including ethnic enclaves) established by immigrant populations. What is missing in the chapters in this book is a rigorous discussion of the kinds of communities forged by repatriates, if indeed any were formed. Lubkemann tells us that the retornados settled in both rural and urban Portugal, but primarily in Lisbon. Did they have a similar impact on Lisbon as the pieds-noirs had on Marseilles? Have they built their own institutions? Certainly questions about absorption and/or institution-building are ones that schol-
ars of immigrant populations routinely ask and they should also be asked about repatriates.

I want to make one final and more minor point about the similarities and differences between repatriates and immigrants. Several authors in this book allude to the special services (housing, employment opportunities, etc.) provided to the repatriated populations who came from former colonies—the case for the Portuguese retornados, for those who left the Dutch Indies during the second phase, and for some of the pieds-noirs once that movement was actually recognized. Such special services are rarely provided to economic migrants until their numbers are so great that they become defined as a “social problem.” It is this special treatment that sometimes generates hostility among natives of the core society. When I was in Portugal in the late 1970s, working in a village in the north, I would hear comments about the problems the retornados had brought to Portugal—particularly drugs—but also about the advantages they were given in finding jobs. Whether or not this was true, this was the perception. As a result, although repatriates have often been given a status that helped to avoid conflict with metropolitans—that is, they were defined as citizens with rights—distrust existed, at least in the initial years of resettlement.

The second question I raised at the outset of these comments is related to the sense of home. In both anthropology and literary studies, the concept of “home” has become of increasing interest (Constable 1999; Klimt 2000; Rapport and Dawson 1998; Robertson et. al 1994; Stack 1996; Western 1992) and it is of central importance here. The retornados were supposedly returning home and yet the majority had never lived in Portugal. Retorno was a term applied to these people from the outside. How did they conceptualize what it was they were doing and what was happening to them? Similarly, a segment of the Dutch Indies population had never lived in the Netherlands and hence found the geography (below sea level), the climate (cold), and the food hard to cope with. This was an unfamiliar, imagined, and idealized homeland, Willems argues, and for this reason those who left the Indies after 1945 did not really “repatriate.” But, curiously, he also writes of the Dutch from the Indies who went to Australia, and who, on retirement, are stirred to make a journey back to their native homeland—that is, Indonesia—even though they know deep inside that they cannot go home again.

The Algerian repatriates, according to Jordi, even if integrated into French society, still do not feel fully “at home” in France and Marseilles. Although the colonists who returned from European overseas empires
also had problems with resettlement (having to do more with matters of class – that is, a loss of social status – than with cultural differences), home for them was less problematic just as it was undoubtedly less problematic for all the British military and government officials who were forced to return to England in 1947 when India gained independence. But what really happened to these people, these repatriated former colonists? As Andrea Smith suggests, the absence of information on these groups represents an enormous gap in the literature and perhaps tells us more about the “others” considered appropriate for study than anything else. I am equally intrigued by Cohen’s analysis (in the next section of this book) of the disjunction between memory and history and of the recent attempts from within the pied-noir population in France to debunk certain myths so as to come to terms with the “truth” of the colonial and nationalist periods. Coming to terms with this “truth” is a way to also come to terms with the meaning of home and with pied-noir identity.

It would also behoove us, as we examine these repatriated populations, to bear in mind the literature on return migration produced by migration scholars (and what they say about a sense of home) as well as more recent studies which invoke the concept of transnationalism (Basch et al. 1994; Georges 1990; Glick-Schiller et al. 1995; Gmelch 1980; Guarnizo 1997; Kearney 1995). Transnationalism implies not only a mental capacity to live in two worlds (or two territories) but also the physical capacity to move back and forth. Clearly it is not easy for the retornados to physically return to Angola and Mozambique (although a few have) and it is impossible for the pieds-noirs and the Dutch East Indians to return to Algeria and Indonesia, respectively. But for how long do they return in their mind; how long is their identity defined by what they were prior to forced repatriation?

As must already be evident, the issue of how home is defined relates very closely to matters of identity and citizenship. Citizenship has to do with rights, a topic with which sociologists and political scientists studying migration are intensely concerned (Brubaker 1992; Jacobson 1996; Soysal 1994). Andrea Smith emphasizes the distinction between defining someone as a national and defining someone as a citizen, a distinction that, in the French case, is part and parcel of colonialism. She also suggests that the use of the term “repatriates” by governments was itself an indication of an effort to recognize these populations as members of the nation to which they were returning and hence individuals with the legal status of citizen and the right to belong. Ovalle-Bahamón (in the next section of this book) mentions the Portu-
guese concept of Lusotropicalism whereby the colonies were encompassed in the territory of Portugal and a fundamental part of what it meant to be Portuguese. Portugal in some sense became European when it decolonized.

Matters of racism and discrimination are clearly relevant to the discussion of repatriates. Smith emphasizes the image of the “immigrant” in Europe as a foreign racialized other who is both visible and distinct, and suggests that repatriates are therefore invisible to scholarly inquiry because they are white and perceived to be culturally similar. And yet some pieds-noirs report that when they first arrived in France they were not considered to be truly French — or white — due to their “African” background. Jordi’s description of the scapegoating of the “Algerian invaders” in Marseilles reminds us of how other immigrants in other places have been become scapegoats for the ills of society. In fact one could easily replace the word repatriates with immigrants in Jordi’s narrative and it would still make sense. These matters of racialization and the othering of both immigrants and repatriates (some of whom, it should be remembered, are of mixed heritage) are extremely complex, but I find an observation made by Kenneth Lunn (1999[1997]) in an article on immigration and reaction in Britain between 1880 and 1950 to be instructive in its emphasis on the fluidity of perceptions of immigrant populations. He writes about Europeans and West Indians:

At a superficial level we might expect the reception of these two groups — Europeans and West Indians — to be very different, based on assumptions about cultural attitudes to skin color. Although East Europeans, including the Polish Resettlement Corps and European Volunteer Workers may have been perceived as closer culturally and “ethnically” to Britons, and West Indians regarded as “others,” perceptions and attitudes were also determined by other factors. Certainly, for the British government distinctions were complicated by the different legal status of the groups. The Europeans were brought to Britain on very strict terms, were a far more controlled workforce and were not, at least until naturalized, British citizens with all the ensuing rights. West Indians were citizens, came as free labor and were thus, at least officially, beyond control by state agencies. Thus, although for most Britons, the Europeans, by sheer weight of numbers, appeared to pose a threat to jobs and lifestyles, for the government, it was the West Indians who, in the long term, raised more difficult questions (Lunn 1999:339).
Instructive to our efforts to develop a more refined analysis would be consideration of the debates that have ensued, particularly in Germany, about extending citizenship to immigrants and their children. What, we can now ask, will be the impact of the shift from the deep-rooted concept of citizenship based on *jus sanguine* (citizenship based on who one’s parents are) to one based on *jus soli* (citizenship based on place of birth)?

Let me conclude with a few specific issues that are, in my view, important as guides for future research. First we need to pay more attention to class and social status, comparing, for example, the class position of the repatriates in the former colonies with their position after repatriation. Several authors in this book allude to the assumptions made by citizens in the country of repatriation about the previous high status and exploitative behavior of repatriates – of rich pieds-noirs when in fact many were of modest means, of retornados who treated blacks in Africa as slaves. This needs to be more carefully analyzed before we attempt further comparison with the economic migrants who would be included in an integrated comparative model. Secondly, the comparative efforts of this volume are laudable and it would be extremely useful to come up with a set of questions that could guide future comparative research: questions about reception, about citizenship and other rights, about reinsertion, about definitions of home. Finally, although Willems includes the Dutch East Indians who went to the United States and Australia in his discussion (and calls them migrants), I think those who “returned” to the homeland faced a different receiving population and hence a different set of issues to those who went to another place of immigration. This too needs to be considered in any broad comparative analysis.
PART TWO:

THE MIGRANTS, HISTORY AND MEMORY:

RECONFIGURING COLONIALISM AFTER THE FACT
Chapter Five

From Urn to Monument: Dutch Memories of World War II in the Pacific, 1945 – 1995

Elsbeth Locher-Scholten

Introduction

In 1946, an eleven-year-old girl was given a small homemade apron by her mother for the liberation festivities of May that year. The wearing of “national celebration skirts” had been promoted in the Netherlands by one of the survivors of the Nazi camp Ravensbrück as a female way to remember the traumatic past of World War II. These skirts were composed of old pieces of cloth from beloved family members and friends and decorated with embroidered memories. This girl had her own war memories, however. She had lived through the hardships of the Japanese internment camp in the Indies and the chaotic period of the Indonesian Revolution. Early in 1946 she returned to the Netherlands. Wearing her apron, she participated that year in the first national May 5 commemoration in a very Dutch way. Nothing on her apron reminded her of the Indies. “At that time we really wanted to belong here... we saw Holland as our home country.” Now, more than fifty years later, instead of attending the national May ritual, she attends the August 15 commemoration at the Indies Monument in The Hague, inaugurated in 1988.

The journey of commemorating the Pacific War in the Netherlands has been a special one: from aprons to bronzes, from May to August, from assimilation to claiming a group identity of its own. These changes are not restricted to this girl. Memorizing is never solely an individual process. Notions and ideas circulating in society about the
past inspire personal memories and organize them into social events and rituals, into memorials and monuments.\textsuperscript{4}

In considering some of these monuments, I intend to explore the public memory of World War II in the former Dutch East Indies within the postcolonial Netherlands.\textsuperscript{5} Whereas memories are always social and political constructions, monuments are memories in material form, loaded with interpretations of that past that provide coherence, “soul” and meaning. Their “genesis” expresses the contestation and/or consensus regarding these interpretations between different interest groups with their own local or “vernacular” memories, to use John Bodnar’s term.\textsuperscript{6} Implying patterns of inclusion and exclusion – who remembers whom and what, who and what is left out? – Pacific war monuments in the Netherlands are illustrative examples of the ongoing social construction and contestation of the Pacific war. Moreover, in commemorations monuments serve as rallying points and centers of visibility for interest groups, thereby strengthening group identity. Or, as Pierre Nora has maintained, monuments may function as lieux de mémoire and define national identity at a time when public memory has lost contact with history itself. As we will see, Pacific war monuments have met this need for a visible identity of “vernacular” groups.

By 1980 some 1,500 monuments commemorating World War II had been constructed in the Netherlands, and a considerable number has been added since then. Until the end of the 1980s, however, memorials for the war in the Pacific could be counted on the fingers of one hand. A selection of three of these illustrate the commemoration process of the Pacific war in the Netherlands:

1. The National Monument on Dam Square in Amsterdam, containing the Twelfth or Indonesian urn (1949-1950).

These have been selected not only because they are of national interest, but also because they each represent a specific moment in the evolution of war memories in the Netherlands. Pacific war memories follow – with a slight delay – the three general trends recognized in Dutch war memorizing in general: a great deal of attention immediately after the war, decreasing at the end of the 1940s and in the 1950s, and a revival in the 1960s that reached unexpected heights in the 1980s and 1990s. But these Pacific memories also show a pattern of their own, as they have
been deeply influenced by the process of decolonization of 1945-1949, a period that was initially considered inseparable from the Pacific war itself.7

I argue here that the initial problems associated with these Indies war memories were a direct consequence of the distance of the Pacific war, fought on the other side of the globe, and of the contemporary process of decolonization of Indonesia. This painful process complicated the memories and split the national consensus. That Pacific war memories could find a place in the wider national setting was made possible by three social and cultural processes: a “depoliticization,” i.e., a separation of the memories of 1941-1945 from those of the 1945-1949 period; a growing recognition of shared suffering or a “psychologization” of the war; and the emancipation of the Indies groups.

The distinction between memories of the Pacific war and decolonization may need some explanation. To most inhabitants of the Indies, these were closely related, overlapping or even completely inseparable events. The Japanese occupation authorities had interned white civilians of Dutch nationality as well as their allied prisoners of war. Life outside the camps had not been without poverty and hunger either. The capitulation of Japan on August 15, 1945 did not imply a general liberation. The proclamation of the independence of the Indonesian Republic on August 17, 1945 heralded a dramatic period of chaos, protracted war and diplomatic maneuvering. The Dutch government reluctantly ceded sovereignty to Indonesia only at the end of 1949.8 The exodus of Europeans returning to the metropole, which had started after the war, continued throughout the 1950s and 1960s. In these years, around 300,000 persons of Dutch and Indo-European descent would come to the Netherlands, bringing with them memories of their 1940s experiences of both war and decolonization.9 They would not find an eager audience.

The Pacific War in the Netherlands

To most Dutch in the metropole the Pacific war of 1941-1945 had been a distant war. During the German occupation of the Netherlands, the Indies had not been of national concern. Although in the early years of the war national pride may still have found an outlet in the last independent part of the Dutch empire, a complete lack of information and the ever pressing daily needs removed the archipelago from Dutch view after the capitulation of the Indies government to Japan in March 1942. The Indies became completely isolated. Only incidentally news about

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the internment of prisoners-of-war and civilians (the majority of whom were European women and children), the forced labor of internees and Indonesians alike, or the hardships of the Indonesian, Chinese and Indo-European population groups outside the camps reached the Indies government in its Australian exile or the Dutch government in exile in London. Information of this kind hardly circulated in the Netherlands. As a result, the war against Japan remained placeless and faceless for most Dutch.

Nor were stories easily heard and integrated when after the war the first Dutch people were repatriated from the Indies. Dutch society, comprising 10 million inhabitants living on food coupons and distribution, had given the cold shoulder to all who had returned from the war, whether they were war veterans, forced laborers or Jewish compatriots. Memories of “their” war were silenced. The experiences of the first wave of nearly 100,000 Indies repatriates, who returned between 1946 and 1949, were no exception to that rule.

This lack of knowledge and interest by the mother country contrasted strongly with the nationalist sentiments of the Dutch population in the Indies. Their identification with the Netherlands had been growing in the 1930s. Between May 1940 and 1942, the war in Europe had even been front-page news in the dailies. While the European population in the Indies was generally well informed about the Netherlands, the Dutch population in the metropole knew little or nothing at all about the Indies – a painful contrast for those returning to the Netherlands after the Japanese capitulation.

The Japanese capitulation and the Indonesian proclamation of independence had not stimulated a lively interest in the fate of these repatriates either. On the contrary. The departure of Dutch conscripts for Indonesia – 95,000 would be sent over – divided public opinion: according to an opinion poll of 1946, 40% of the Dutch population were in favor of sending troops, 40% against. The first official Dutch attack, the so-called Police Action of summer 1947, divided the political left, since the Socialist Party (Partij van de Arbeid) shared responsibility for the action as a government partner. After the Police Action, the Dutch public considered the solution of the “Indonesian Problem” to be the first task of the government. Both the Dutch lack of interest in Pacific war experiences and the painful experience of decolonization limited the space reserved for Pacific war memories in the Netherlands. Of the three monuments under consideration, the genesis of the Indonesian urn in the National Monument illustrates this in the most direct way.
I. The National Monument on Dam Square and the Indonesian Urn

Monuments in the postwar Netherlands

The memorization of war seems to be characterized by a high degree of ego-referentiality: every group remembers its own fate first. Most monuments are created by those directly involved. Consequently, as a long-standing neutral country, the Netherlands lacked any tradition in this domain, even as late as World War II. It had no monuments for the unknown soldier, no eternal flame, and no local memorials in the central marketplace or the village church as in France or England.

When after the liberation in May 1945 private groups or local communities energetically started to make up for this lack of memorial sites, the Dutch government quickly interfered. As of October 1945 it required official approval for the construction of local monuments. A year later, a National Monuments Commission was founded to advise on the establishment of national war monuments. It was a venerable committee composed of ministers, chiefs of staff, provincial commissars of the Queen, mayors, representatives of churches, universities, student organizations, resistance and illegality, women’s organizations, artists and media, labor organizations, industry, agriculture, etc. As all levels and denominations of Dutch society were included, the National Monuments Commission represented the urge of the government and other groups in Dutch society for national consensus and unity, one of the results of the war.

This urge for unity, however, was expressed in the limited sense of the word: it remained restricted to the European part of the Kingdom, the eleven provinces of the Netherlands. The idea of empire was absent as no official representation of East or West had been included. When the Commission presented its plans for nine national monuments in November 1947, none was devoted to the war in the Pacific.

The most important monument would be the National Monument in Amsterdam. Plans for such a monument had won the approval of the authorities in the summer of 1947. Because the design and construction of a definitive monument would take time, a temporary monument was unveiled in December 1947. It consisted of a half circle of brick colonnades with eleven urns, filled with earth from sites of execution in the eleven Dutch provinces. These urns symbolized national unity and consensus, but in a restricted sense. At the monument’s inauguration, the struggle against Japan was not even mentioned. In 1947, memories of
the Pacific war were screened from national consciousness. The commission, the plans, and the temporary monument were Dutch and Eurocentric. The Dutch repatriates felt greatly neglected and concluded that they had to draw attention to their fate themselves.

The Dispute about the “Twelfth” or Indonesian Urn

At the end of 1947, high-ranking military officers as well as organizations of former internees and members of the Indies resistance came forward with the idea of adding an urn from the Indies to the Dam Square monument. These organizations were staffed by and represented the Dutch-born colonial elite, well able to voice its interests.18 They wanted recognition of their efforts for the national cause and wished to commemorate their victims properly. However, the newly founded Working Committee of the National Monuments Commission, responsible for the Dam Square monument and consisting largely of members of the Dutch resistance, did not react enthusiastically. After a few discussions on the subject, the commission was happy to refer this delicate matter to the Ministry of Overseas Territories (MINOG). Monuments, including urns, should come from the local initiative of the territories themselves.19

In view of the chosen symbolism of national unity and with the Police Action of the summer of 1947 still in mind, the urn presented a thorny political problem. What unity between the mother country and colony should be symbolized at that moment of diplomatic and military struggle? An urn with earth from Indies cemeteries raised questions about the ties between the Netherlands and the Indies, about the use of Indies/Indonesian earth, about the inclusion or exclusion of the Indonesian population who had fought against Japan but had also “collaborated” with the Japanese; about inclusion or exclusion of the soldiers who were falling at that very moment. There was more at stake here than the simple commemoration of Pacific war victims.

In November 1947 the Working Committee decided in principle on the inclusion of “all persons and groups from all phases in the struggle in the period of 1940-1945 […] also those fallen in the Indies,” but the exclusion of “those Dutch victims who now fall daily in the Indies.”20 In the beginning of 1948, just after the so-called Renville Agreement between the Indies government and the Indonesian Republic had been signed and which formulated a new agreement about the interim government until formal independence, the Working Committee suggested to the Minister that the Dutch in the Indies could not dispose
solely of the earth of the Indies. “In spite of the 300-year history of the Netherlands overseas it was not their “monopoly. ... The present events in the Indies prove the opposite.” It was therefore necessary to obtain the cooperation of the indigenous population, as otherwise a Dutch initiative to transport earth from the Indies to Amsterdam could be interpreted as a symbol of colonialism and as a “political demonstration.”

The Working Committee wanted a local initiative by all population groups of the Indies, especially the Indonesians. The role of colonial Dutchmen in the process should be limited. The committee expressed its criticism of die-hard Dutch colonialism, and cautiously suggested images of federalism and cooperation. Politics was directly reflected in the symbolism of commemoration.

In February 1948, the Ministry of Overseas Territories had already propagated the idea of memorial urns to the governments of the Indies, Surinam and the Antilles. While the West Indian governors reacted positively and waited, representatives from the East Indies suggested that their urn should be filled with earth from the 22 cemeteries of honor in the archipelago. In addition, they identified some Indonesian organizations that might represent the Indonesian population and that might propagate the plan among their members.

It took the responsible military authorities in the Indies a little longer than expected to realize these plans. Only in April 1949, long after the Second Police Action of December 1948/January 1949, could they provide an urn, made specially for this purpose. And only then did they consult the regional Dutch and the Indonesian federal authorities about the project. The few critical remarks of these Indonesians, especially from the most organized federal part of the Indies, East-Indonesia, caused a name change: the urn was renamed from the “Twelfth” to the “Indonesian” or “Indonesia” urn. It was a political gesture designed to prevent too easy an association with the conservative pro-Dutch movement in favor of a Twelfth (Dutch) province, the Minahasa (Sulawesi).

Meanwhile, in the Netherlands a newly founded “Temporary Urn Commission” comprised of government officials and private organizations had reported favorably on the project to the Council of Ministers. The political connotations of the plan were now explicitly recognized, however, since it had come “at cross-purposes with government policy on the reconstruction of the empire.”

The Socialist Prime Minister Willem Drees could not agree more: he refused his cooperation in May 1949. It was the first time that he had expressed his opinion on the subject. He had postponed his reactions
until the “Indonesian Problem” had reached a near-solution: in the beginning of May, the Van Roijen-Roem agreement had been signed which proposed a Round Table Conference and the transfer of sovereignty. Drees now wanted to postpone the urn project or, better yet, bring it to a halt. In his opinion, it would be difficult to install an urn commission representing all population groups of Indonesia, Europeans and Indonesians, as the Temporary Urn Commission had required. Moreover, an urn would create further problems since it would be filled with Indonesian earth and would also include memories of the fighting after the Japanese capitulation.26 However, Drees could not stop what was already in motion: the pressure of the Minister of Overseas Territories and the Indies government was too strong. He nevertheless managed to moderate its speed. In the beginning of July 1949, the Dutch government decided on a transfer of the urn, but only after the Round Table Conference had been finished. When that moment had been reached in the fall of 1949, it postponed the ceremony again until after the transfer of sovereignty, because it feared political demonstrations of Dutch right-wing groups around the ceremony. Press commentaries on “the funeral of the Kingdom” were not considered unlikely.27

Transfer of the Indonesian Urn and Inclusion in Dam Square Monument

After having been informed belatedly by the Indies government of the final preparations in the Indies and of the accompanying charter, the responsible Ministry of Overseas Territories decided at the last minute for a transfer. The text of the charter stated that the urn was offered by the High Representative of the Crown to Queen Juliana, a formula that would be worthless after the transfer of sovereignty on December 27, 1949.28 An official ceremony was held in Batavia on December 21, 1949, eight days before the departure of the Dutch authorities from Indonesia. It was attended by Dutch officials, representatives of Indies organizations, and by one Chinese and one Indonesian – hardly a proportional representation of all population groups. The urn was American-made but, as one source mentions, originated from the Japanese city of Yokohama.29 In line with earlier plans, it contained soil from 22 cemeteries of honor, including victims of the 1945-1949 period. However, the latter was clear only to those who knew. Following ministerial admonitions, it was not mentioned explicitly. The charter for Queen Juliana mentioned that in this way all were honored, “military and civilians, irrespective of race or nationality, who fell in the struggle against Japan and
for peace and justice.” “Peace and justice” were the words used during the 1945-1949 period to legitimize Dutch military actions: according to official views these were meant to restore peace and order.30 For political reasons and the sake of clarity, the dates 1941-1945 were inscribed in the lid of the urn; that was, after all, what the urn was meant to commemorate.

The urn arrived at Schiphol airport on Christmas Eve 1949 and was officially placed at the center of the Dam Square monument in April 1950.31 The original and problematic symbolism of unity had been left behind. The transfer of sovereignty in 1949 had changed the symbolism of the Indonesian urn into an honoring of war victims, as the repatriates had wished it to be. A bronze plaque bore the inscription “In memory of all fallen in the struggle in Southeast Asia/The spirit conquers.”32 Explicit references to the 1945-1949 period were absent from the April ceremony.33

Although the Royal Dutch East Indian Army (Koninklijk Nederlands-Indische Leger, KNIL) had included Indonesian soldiers, and in spite of the fact that the charter accompanying the urn had mentioned all war victims “irrespective of race and nationality,” Indonesians were only implicitly present.34 They were not mentioned by name in the speeches. No representatives of the Indonesian population had been included in the ceremony either. It is symbolic that among the many wreaths laid after the placement of the urn, a wreath from the Indonesian government was missing. Owing to a misunderstanding, the Indonesian High Commissioner had not been invited, for which the Dutch Minister of Overseas Territories offered his apologies personally.35

Through the unveiling of the official monument in May 1956, the inclusion of Pacific war memories in the Dutch memory culture of the war was officially completed. Relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands were at a low ebb; in January of that year the Indonesian government had denounced the union between both countries in the context of its New Guinea policy.36 At the inauguration, Prime Minister Drees mentioned the lost hopes of a commonwealth in which the Netherlands and Indonesia could have collaborated voluntarily. It was the only allusion to the painful past of decolonization.37

Like the provincial Dutch urns, the Indonesian urn was installed in the rear wall of the monument in which 14 niches had been created. Those of Surinam and the Antilles would remain empty as the West Indies initiatives had not gotten off the ground.38 The urns were closed off by special stones bearing the provincial escutcheons. Since the Indies as part of the Dutch kingdom did not carry a specific escutcheon,
the Indonesian urn, placed in the tenth niche, was covered by the national heraldic symbol: the Dutch lion with sword and arrows. It was the ultimate sign of integration, carved out to such an extent that the specificity of the Indies war memories was lost. To a general public, it would not be easy to recognize the contents behind the stones. On the wall, the original poem of the temporary monument of 1947 stressing a restricted national unity was repeated as if no Indonesian urn had enlarged its original meaning: “Soil dedicated by sacrifice, collected from the entire country, symbol for ages to come of remembrance and close ties.” The escutcheon and the poem do not seem to have been the subject of discussion either within the now active Committee for the Construction of a National Monument on Dam Square or among repatriate circles.

In the 1950s, the separation of the memories of 1941-1945 from those of 1945-1949 continued. In 1955 and 1956, two attempts were made to use the empty niches for urns from Korea and from the grave of General S.H. Spoor, the Indies army commander. However, these attempts of the Dutch Veterans Legion (Veteraan Legioen Nederland) and the War Department failed. Both received neutral responses to their efforts from the committee responsible: the Dam Square monument was meant exclusively for the commemoration of Dutch victims of the period 1940-1945. The committee had not been convinced by the Legion’s argument “that the voluntary soldiers for the Indies had continued the resistance against fascist nations and that constitutionally and factually separation was inaccurate.” It has only been since 1961 that the national May commemoration on Dam Square has been held in honor of “all who have fallen since May 10, 1940,” indirectly implying the inclusion of the Indies veterans.

To conclude, the problematic history of the Indonesian urn in the Dam Square monument illustrates the friction between memories of the war in Europe and in the Pacific as well as the conflict between the desired consensus and the reality of political differences. The politics of decolonization determined the politics of memory. Inclusion of Pacific war memories could only take place at a “safe” moment, just before and right after the transfer of sovereignty. Only then would the earth representing war victims find a place at Dam Square officially. Simultaneously, the 1945-1949 memories concerning “the trauma of decolonization” were muted. They found an outlet in a temporary colonial activism along “ethical” lines in New Guinea, which would remain under Dutch control until 1962, and in Dutch indignation of Sukarno’s “untrustworthy” behavior. Like other wars of decolonization, such as
the Algerian war in France, this painful process of national “letting-go” was passed over in silence, split off from public memory and forgotten, until its return at the end of the 1960s. In Dutch culture, in literature and scholarship, an almost twenty-year period of silence about twentieth-century Dutch colonialism began.

In spite of a verbally expressed wish to include all population groups, particularly the Indonesians, the Indonesian urn action remained the activity of former POWs, resistance fighters and female civilian internees. They acted primarily as pressure groups and reminders of their own suffering and were prominently present at the official ceremonies in 1949 and 1950. In the absence of Indonesians, prewar colonial patterns of Eurocentrism were repeated, which had been reinforced by the isolation of Europeans in the Japanese camps and opposition during the revolutionary period. This colonial Eurocentrism strikingly reflected the Eurocentrism in the Netherlands with its focus on Dutch suffering in Europe, the subject of complaint by colonial repatriates. Within different geographical contexts, various segments of the Dutch population each stuck to their own stories of suffering.

In 1956, a ritual integration of war memories had been achieved. Vernacular memory had been incorporated into the ultimate symbol of national unity, the Dam Square monument. It illustrated the reintegration of the colonial elite into Dutch society. While relations with Indonesia deteriorated, new groups of Europeans from Indonesia, the majority of Eurasian background and lower social class, came to the Netherlands. The Indonesian urn now represented the silent and inconspicuous assimilation of the nearly 225,000 who had repatriated until that moment. Like the provincial urns, this urn had been hidden from sight, the symbol of a declining interest in the war period in the 1950s, a decade of hard work, thrifty morals and economic reconstruction.

II. The Women’s Monument in Apeldoorn/Bronbeek

War and Indonesia at the end of the 1960s

In the 1960s, when memories of World War II in Europe returned to the public sphere, memories of the struggle in Southeast Asia followed in their wake. Stabilized European relations, the beginning of a thaw in the Cold War and the luxury of the welfare state created space for looking back. In a complicated, fast changing and secularizing world, the
war seemed to offer clear moral lessons. The notorious Eichmann trial of 1961, presented on the new medium of television, marked the beginning of this war revival in Dutch public culture, and television became an important vehicle in the popularization of World War II. Dr. Louis de Jong, official historian and “public schoolmaster” of World War II in the Netherlands, popularized the Dutch war experience “in manageable chunks at home” in the years 1960-1965. In the second half of the 1960s the younger generation started to question its parents about the myth of the Dutch resistance, about their personal war behavior and – as a result of the detested Vietnam war – about their belief in the American allies. By the end of the sixties, the war had become a contested moral example; unified images revealed the first cracks.

This criticism offered space for protest by different groups against unified memories and the general neglect of their stories, for instance those of the Pacific war. A few additional factors stimulated memories of the war in the former Dutch East Indies, such as the improvement in relations with Indonesia and the greater visibility of an economically expanding Japan. After the transfer of New Guinea/Irian Jaya in 1962 – a second “failure” of Dutch decolonization – Indonesia returned happily to the Dutch imagination. This tendency was reinforced after 1965, when Suharto succeeded Sukarno, the magnet of all Dutch national frustration of the 1940s and 1950s. Dutch tourism to Indonesia got off the ground, while governmental agreements concerning finance and technical, economic and cultural cooperation were reached between 1967 and 1970. In 1970 and 1971, mutual visits by the heads of State confirmed the improved relations ritually. In 1971, Dutch television presented Queen Juliana and Prince Bernhard sight-seeing on the Borobudur. Indonesia was “in.” Nostalgia for a lost homeland began to gain more publicity.

However, not only nostalgia marked Dutch memories of a colonial past. Memories of the war in general and Indonesia in particular went hand-in-hand with memories of decolonization in 1945-1949. The latter attracted considerably more public debate and political contestation. In January 1969 the psychologist Dr. Joop Hueting, a former soldier in the Indies, drew attention on television to war crimes committed during the 1945-1949 period in the Indies, which were reminiscent of American war crimes in Vietnam. The “big silence” on the period had been broken; it trailed strong military protests, a government report, a parliamentary debate, and a scholarly publication in its wake. Then silence concerning this problematic subject returned, proof of the selective character of collective memory.
In this cultural climate of recurring war and colonial memories, echoes resonated among those who had been involved in the Pacific war. In 1967, the first large-scale reunions of camp inmates were organized, such as the annual “Burma reunion.” These were private events for those directly involved without an outward radiation towards a larger public. A year later, women who had lived in the Indies during the war began to organize a monument. This monument is relevant here because it represented a new trend of vernacular memorizing by an Indies (female) subgroup that claimed its own suffering and which did so in a traditional way of heroic endurance.

**Women in Camps: A “Silent” Emancipation**

In the Indies, the internment of European women and children separately from their husbands had attracted attention immediately after the war. A “silent emancipation” had taken place in these camps. Strong women, some already leading personalities in prewar women’s organizations, had occupied positions of authority in camps with thousands of inmates. In 1945, British and Dutch officers had been (un)favourably impressed by their resoluteness. Their moral and physical strength was attributed, even by these women, to the mother role: “for upon her the appeal of family bonds, awareness of community and responsibility was strongest,” as a representative of this group claimed in 1949. This image was repeated in scholarly and popular literature. These women were even identified with the Western world itself. Japan had tried to belittle the West “by the humiliation of the Dutch woman [...] a humiliation in which it had not succeeded,” was the proud claim in the introduction to a war diary. Their strength may have caused such amazement because it conflicted strongly with traditional ideas about female weakness and with the daily practice of Dutch women in the prewar Indies, where the majority had lived a life of social contacts, servants, tennis and charity work.

Moreover, these female experiences caught a public imagination that abhorred the idea of the internment of innocent members of society. When the first ideas for the Indonesian urn had been developed, former male internees in the Indies had even suggested filling the Indonesian urn with earth from women’s camps, “symbolizing the struggle of the woman in the Indies.” Their internment soon served as material for films and books and has been recognized in a commemorative coin (1947) and in a monument in Indonesia (1954). Beginning with the dissertation of a former camp inmate, scholarly interest for the Pacific war...
addressed this female experience before that of the male prisoners of war.55

Although many of these women returned to their home life after the war, some continued to be active outside the household. Women from the camp Tjideng (Batavia/Jakarta) founded the government-financed center for social welfare among Indies war victims in the East Indies and the Netherlands, the Pelita Foundation (1947), which is still in existence.56 The Women’s Union in the Indies was one of the pressure groups in favor of the Indonesian urn in 1948. In commemoration rituals such as a mourning service in December 1949, the installation of the Indonesian urn in the temporary Dam Square monument in 1950, and the unveiling of the definitive monument on Dam Square in 1956, women occupied a visible and equal place.

The Foundation for Dutch Victims of Japanese Female Internment Camps

In 1968 women from the internment camp Tjideng, wives or daughters of military (KNIL) officers, took up this tradition of female activity when they organized the Foundation for Dutch Victims of Japanese Female Internment Camps (Stichting Nederlandse Slachtoffers Japanse Vrouwenkampen). It seems more than accidental that they did so at the time of the start of the second feminist wave.57 Their direct inspiration, however, was the general lack of attention for the Pacific war at official commemorations. In order to gain recognition for women’s war history, the foundation drew up a four-point program: a reunion, an organization, a book, and a monument. Within a year, the foundation succeeded in attaining its first and second goals: the first large-scale reunion of 6,000 to 7,000 former victims of war was held in April 1969 in The Hague, organized by the foundation and the new Alliance of Former Overseas Prisoners (BEGO). The book, The Laugh Born of Sorrow, was published in 1971, while the monument was unveiled later in that same year.58 As the book illustrates and reinforces the messages of the monument, both deserve attention.

The monument was a memorial for and by war-stricken women; the necessary sum of money had been raised entirely from private sources. Early ideas about its placement in The Hague failed because the city administration wanted to have its say in the choice of designer. The foundation stuck with its favorite candidate. At the suggestion of Queen Juliana, who showed a warm interest in the design at the August 1970 commemoration (see below), the municipality of Apeldoorn was
approached. Queen Juliana unveiled the memorial there in December 1971. Demolished by vandalism in 1984, it was restored in Arnhem a year later, where it still functions as a site for commemoration.\(^{59}\)

The sculpture characterized strength and protest more than suffering. A woman with a child in the corner of a stone wall represented the protesting and protecting mother, imprisoned with her child. She hid a solitary woman, who looked desperately to the sky, a symbolic shadow figure of the strong mother. The text “Unflinching and unbroken” formulated a similar message of inner strength, overcoming weakness and despair.\(^{60}\) In this way, the monument combined ideas of female resistance to (male) power with the traditional emblem of femininity and motherhood. It therefore rendered female strength functional and appealing rather than challenging traditional ideas of proper womanhood. Moreover, this representation inscribed the vernacular memory of women from the Indies into the national language of memory. Civic motherhood, the extension of the female role outside the boundaries of the private home, had been a twentieth century concept of Dutch feminism which had been broadened to other female groups during the war. The image of the strong mother implicitly underlined the unity between the Netherlands and the Indies.\(^{61}\)

The Foundation was a new initiative and as such a break with the past: no large-scale reunions of female internees had been held before, nor was there any other Indies monument for a subgroup in the Netherlands at this time. However, both monument and book conveyed a leaning towards tradition: in their representation of strong women and mothers, in the heroic way of remembering, and in their focus on Dutch royalty. The sacrosanctness of Dutch (female) royalty, cherished in the Indies, had also characterized the Netherlands in the 1950s, but had come to an end in the 1960s. Within the Foundation, however, it still prevailed: for instance, the book opened with a letter from the former Queen Wilhelmina to formerly interned women of November 1945; the commemoration day of the Foundation was fixed on her birthday, August 31; her daughter Queen Juliana inaugurated the monument and would regularly attend the commemorations.\(^{62}\) In this respect, war memories of this subgroup (vernacular memories of interned women) were also expressed in a national – although by now rather obsolete – idiom.

Like the monument, the book underlined female strength. Anecdotes and small stories about greater and lesser heroes, selected from the memoirs of female survivors’ deeds, filled its pages, in which humor seemed to have served as a strategy of survival. “And laugh is
what we did” characterized the general tone of the text; it left no room for complaints and offered indirect emotions at most. The book consequently represented the climate of the first wave of memories, characterized in 1949 as “experienced sorrow is remembered only incidentally with a few words or in silence.”63 At this time, the wave of autobiographical impressions full of pain and sorrow of the following decades had yet to begin.64

Moreover, just like the monument, the text combined ideas of female resistance and motherhood, a combination that would lose popularity in the following decade as a result of the second feminist wave. In The Laugh this idea of strong mothers found its clearest expression in the denial of forced prostitution. Although the problem of forced prostitution in Central Java had been raised at different times in the 1960s, it was flatly denied here that Japanese officers had ever been able to treat girls from the camps in this way. Female solidarity had prevented this. While this held true for Sumatra, the painful differing experiences of girls in Central Java were hidden behind this myth of maternal strength. It would take the coming forward of the former forced prostitutes from Korea, the female war experiences in former Yugoslavia as well as further development of the sexual politics of feminism before this aspect would be more fully uncovered.65

In its book and its commemorations the foundation focused exclusively on the experiences in the women’s camps while other population groups remained out of sight.66 As is not unusual in commemorations, the reunion, book and monument testified to the depoliticization of memories. In restricting the focus to the 1941-1945 period and personalizing the remembrance through autobiographical stories, memorizing steered clear of public political debates. Decolonization with its problematic aspect of war crimes, which called for further exploration in 1969 and 1970, was passed over.67 Even continuity with the bloody and chaotic postwar months of 1945 to early 1946, known as the Bersiap period, was not mentioned.68

To sum up, the women’s monument had a limited goal: to commemorate the victims of the women’s and children’s camps in the period 1941-1945. Vernacular memory made use of nationally accepted symbols of strong motherhood and female royalty. Their monument illustrated the end of an old period of silence as well as the start of a new phase, one in which the Indies victims, in line with the general development of psychological care for victims of war, claimed their victimization more than their heroism and in which new groups came to the fore.
III. The Indies Monument in The Hague

The “Commemorative” 1980s

The 1980s showed an intensification of interest in World War II in the Netherlands and elsewhere. In this decade, a search for meaning and identity manifested itself in a new hunger for history, reflected in the growing popularity of historical books, television programs and museums. The growing popularity of new items on the political agenda such as human rights reinforced the urge to learn about racism and discrimination in the past and the present. “The War,” i.e., World War II, had now become an integral part of Dutch culture. Younger generations gained general knowledge from early on through children’s fiction, television or education. At a time of ego-literature, personal documents, diaries and memoirs concerning the war found eager readers. Personal memories of those years provided the war with a human face. Debates shifted from the good-bad dichotomy of occupation and resistance to questions about the attitudes of the great gray mass during the war as well as to local and individual experiences.  

In the 1980s, the tendency to “psychologize” the war, the growing attention paid to the psychological effects of war and internment, and the representation of the war in psychological terms were further developed. The cultural revolution, with its “emancipation of emotions,” had brought personal pain into the news. In the 1970s, “immaterial” psychological support for war victims had gotten off the ground. This “psychologization” of the war included people with painful Pacific war memories, quite a number of whom were traumatized. A shared “victimship” opened up new possibilities for public recognition.

Memories of the Pacific War in the 1980s

Memories of the Pacific war followed in the wake of this wave of war publicity. Indonesia had become more and more popular in the Netherlands. Vying with India for the number one position as a recipient of Dutch aid and featuring as a tourist destination, for many Dutch it was the (unilateral) symbol of historical ties between both countries. The Indonesian attitude towards human rights cast only a superficial shadow on this popularity.

This growing popularity had repercussions in scholarly literature and fiction. Stimulated by the general growth of autobiographical literature, new genres evolved, including “return literature” by former resi-
dents who intertwined travelogue with reminiscences of tempo doeloe (former times) and memoirs of the Pacific war. Between 1945 and 1950 only eighteen memoirs and diaries on the war had been published, followed by fifteen in the twenty-year period of growing silence (1950-1970), but the genre picked up in the 1970s (nineteen publications), followed by a rapid growth in the 1980s (sixty). These publications, however, catered to the demand of an in-group reading public. They did not popularize the Pacific war among the younger generation in the same way as books on the German occupation in the Netherlands.

Historical publications on the Indies/Indonesia in the 1980s experienced the same fate. They paid attention to war and revolution but remained isolated knowledge. Only volume XIa of the monumental series The Kingdom of the Netherlands in World War Two by De Jong on the history of the Indies before 1942, published in 1984, attracted wide public attention. His criticism of “the myth of good rule” earned him a lawsuit by combined Indies organizations that took it as an insult. Their anger was also aroused by a preliminary draft of De Jong’s volume on the decolonization period that mentioned war crimes. It raised a second public debate on this subject. His volume on the Indies war experiences was received with far more enthusiasm: it became the “Bible” of those who had suffered under Japanese rule.

The 1980s also witnessed a new “invented” tradition of the commemoration of the Pacific war on August 15. Remembered in the 1940s, the date had been forgotten in the 1950s and 1960s. It took a lustrum year, always a strong incentive for the commemoration industry, to bring it back to memory. In the wake of the May commemorations of 1970, an extensive commemoration was organized on August 15, 1970 in The Hague. It clearly met a need as it was attended by 10,000 people.

These participants had to wait another decade for a “reprise.” In the commemorative 1980s remembering was institutionalized through the “August 15, 1945 Foundation,” consisting of twenty-four (later forty-eight) Indies organizations. It organized the 1980 commemoration in Utrecht, attended by 11,000 people, including the royal couple, members of the government, and the Indonesian ambassador. Although Indonesians were also honored, the focus was on European war experiences in the Pacific. The speeches contained a program for the 1980s. They acknowledged psychological damage caused by the war and championed a search for “self-respect and identity,” an identity that was based on war experiences and loss of country, including the
process of “sequential traumatizing.” In this way, the 1945-1949 period was indirectly present as a period of loss, without the political context of decolonization. The somewhat overblown heroism of The Laugh had gone.

It was the start of a new tradition of annual commemoration of the Pacific war. In addition to the old totok generation, two distinct groups participated more visibly in these commemorations: Indo-Europeans, and those who had been children during the war, both inside and outside the camps. As their material well being had been assured, they acknowledged their cultural inheritance in a modern society. The organizations of people from the Indies had evolved as interest groups for social welfare, as cultural associations of Indo-Europeans, as reunion clubs, and as organizations of shared victimship and partnership in suffering. While their number increased in the 1980s, a generational turnover as well as emancipation of the hitherto silently integrated group of Indo-Europeans brought new actors to the fore.

The Indies Monument: Symbol of Shared Victimship

The genesis of the Indies Monument is representative of this 1980s commemoration activity. Contrary to what might be expected, it was not an initiative of the Indies organizations, but the result of cooperation between the Ministry of Welfare, Health and Culture and a former (Communist) member of the Dutch resistance, Harry Verheij. It therefore came from the level of governance. Because of the forty-year commemoration, the Ministry had set up an Advisory Commission on War Memorials in 1985 to get advice on the spending of available funds. Members of this commission were selected because of their active involvement with the war and war memories in the Netherlands: the Resistance, the Auschwitz Committee, and Foundation 1940-1945. Verheij was one of them. He can be characterized as a full-fledged administrator with great social capabilities. As a former member of the Communist resistance in the Netherlands, he had had a career in the Communist Party, becoming alderman of Amsterdam for this party (1966-1978), then chairman of the board of Amsterdam University Hospital. Since no Indies monument existed, both Verheij and the responsible section of the department had an Indies monument in mind. Verheij had no Indies experience, but through personal contacts and – from the late 1970s – as a member of the Allowance Council that decided on recognition of war victims in the frame of the recent social laws, he was well informed about camp syndromes and the influence of
the Pacific war on life histories. He illustrated in person the direct link between the “psychologization” of the war, mentioned before, and Dutch memories of the Pacific war, as expressed in the Indies monument. For him, moreover, solidarity between the Dutch resistance and the Pacific war victims was a strong motive. He wanted an antiwar monument for a group who had been left out and whose history he had come to know. “A national commemoration can only do full justice if all diversity of suffering is commemorated,” he stated in 1986.82

Verheij became the driving force behind the Indies monument. A committee under his chairmanship consulted the Indies organizations. Their positive reactions as well as a similar reply from the Minister of Welfare, Health and Culture certainly stimulated the plans. In August 1986 an Indies Monument Foundation launched its activities officially. It aimed at a monument “of national style” in The Hague – a subtle formulation since the National Monument stood on Dam Square. Its funds came from different sources, private as well as official. The Indies community was addressed successfully through one of the Dutch broadcast corporations, which collected 125,000 guilders in a few months. The Resistance reacted favorably to the claim of solidarity. Industry and lottery funds were a third donor, while the Ministry of Welfare, Health and Culture contributed approximately one third of the required half a million guilders.

The broad social and political acknowledgement of the Indies war monument found its clearest expression in the membership of the committee of recommendation, which included, among others, the Prime Minister, the two chairmen of the parliament, and representatives of resistance organizations. National consensus was beyond doubt. Only a few critics – notably from the Indies community itself – raised their voices. In the Indies journal Moesson, for instance, a member of the post-war Indies generation claimed a “Dutch East Indies monument” in honor of the colonial period as a whole. For “the Indies” was more than the war and recognition of the past of the Indies group should mean more than a recognition of war suffering.83 His criticism was ignored.

Since the monument itself had to be recognizable for the different groups of war victims both inside and outside the camps, the selected design showed seventeen bronze figures around a bier in front of a woven fence. They represented the many faces of suffering, the pain and protest of different generations.84 With death at the center, the figures at both ends displayed liberation, while the number of figures left enough space for personal interpretations by visitors. A few Indies touches were added to the original design, such as the map of Indone-
sia, an inscription “The spirit overcomes,” and a small triangular pillar, on which the victim groups were mentioned as well as the symbolic value of the monument: a sign of sorrow and struggle against terror. The monument was unveiled by Queen Beatrix at the commemoration on August 15, 1988. It was no longer exclusively Dutch or Indies. The most heavily afflicted groups of Indonesian victims, Indonesian forced laborers or *romushas*, would be remembered at annual commemorations.85

That memories of the 1941-1945 period and the 1945-1949 period had been separated successfully was clear from the start. At approximately the same time as plans for the Indies monument were being formulated, former Dutch conscripts in Roermond (Limburg) who were now retired or about to retire started a campaign for a military monument for the Indies for the period 1945-1949. Their activities coincided with renewed organizational activities by veterans in this decade, claiming recognition for their forgotten role in Dutch history. Contact between both initiatives in the spring of 1986 resulted in agreement on distinct time periods for each monument.86 After forty years, memories of both periods were now also separated in form and representation.

National consensus regarding the Pacific war was clearly demonstrated in the story of the construction of the impressive Indies monument in The Hague. It was also proven in rituals accompanying Dutch foreign policy towards Japan in the same period. In 1986 and 1989 plans for royal visits to Emperor Hirohito and to his funeral had to be halted as a result of fiercely debates on Emperor Hirohito’s past during the war. The political parties were in unison in their reactions and their sympathy for Indies war victims, who claimed their suffering in voicing their well-organized “no.” In both cases the government complied “in view of the existing sensibilities” (1986)87 and “the memories that live in our society” (1989).88 The Netherlands found itself in an exceptional position. In 1986, the Japanese emperor had already visited or been visited by all heads of state who had been Japan’s enemy during the war, such as Queen Elizabeth II, President Ronald Reagan, and even the highest authorities from China and Korea. In no other country was official representation at the imperial funeral the subject of more intense debate than in the Netherlands in 1989.89 While most countries which had been at war with Japan sent a, if not the, leading representative, the Dutch government sent a low-level delegate, the Minister of Foreign Affairs.90 The exceptional position of the Netherlands in both cases can be attributed to the relatively large number of Dutch people who had been interned in the Indies (100,000, i.e. four fifths of all civilians.
interned in the Pacific war, plus around 40,000 interned prisoners of war), as well as to a growing organization and emancipation of the relatively large group of those who had emigrated from the Indies (the approximately 300,000 previously mentioned, out of a total population of 15 million).

This national agitation about royal visits to Japan was not only a sign of national consensus; it also popularized Pacific war memories among a larger public. Even if not part and parcel of Dutch public culture like World War II, memories of the Pacific war gained ground. In 1991, 37 percent of the Dutch population knew about it, while 70 percent of the Dutch population had memories of or knew about the days of May 1940.91

In conclusion, the 1980s witnessed a growing awareness of war experiences in the Pacific among the Dutch population. The Indies community made itself heard in national and international politics and gained visibility through its own monument. The Indies monument did not stand alone, but was accompanied by a wave of other monuments of Indies subgroups.92 These monuments, all of which found a place in an Indies setting, the former KNIL center Bronbeek in Arnhem, were the initiative of the Indies subgroups themselves. Another subgroup that remembered the colonial past, the Moluccan community of former colonial soldiers, preferred a historical museum to a monument as a site of commemoration. It was opened in Utrecht in 1990. However, recognition and commemoration remained by and large an in-group activity for those directly concerned. Their many organizations and monuments reflected the institutionalization of vernacular memories and tallied with the increasing individualism of a society in which national commemoration held a restricted sway. The Indies past had become personalized.

Since then, the process of remembering World War II has not come to an end. In the “calculating nineties,” the Indies community focused on Japan and the payment of compensation. As elsewhere, the fate of forced prostitutes has gained public attention, here in an official report. However, memories of this period have been largely overshadowed by emotional public debates on the 1945-1949 period. The admission to the Netherlands of the former Dutch deserter Jan ‘Poncke’ Princen, who had joined the Indonesian army in 1948, and the angry reactions of well-structured organizations of veterans, which had developed in the 1980s, attracted public attention to this forgotten part of Dutch national history. This third debate on Dutch war crimes resulted in a wider distribution of knowledge: while in 1991 only 31 percent of the population...
knew about the Dutch Police Actions of the period 1945-1949, in 1995 this was 81 percent. To analyze this memory process would require another article.93

Conclusion

In addition to the small apron of a girl from the East Indies, a symbol of a desired assimilation, three artifacts illustrate Pacific war memories in the Netherlands. A hidden and forgotten urn on Dam Square in Amsterdam—how many people in the Netherlands know of its existence?—represents the complete integration of the first wave of Pacific memories of the 1940s and 1950s. The sculpture of a protesting and protecting mother in Arnhem expresses the fierce spirit of Indies memories of a specific vernacular group, formerly interned women, of the late 1960s and 1970s. The well-situated and visible monument in The Hague, fruit of a political consensus, draws attention to the growing acknowledgement in the Netherlands in the 1980s and 1990s of Dutch Pacific war experiences. The history of these monuments illustrates a clear trajectory in the collective memory: from assimilation of Indies memories (the Dam Square monument), to inscription of separate memories into the national memory, making use of a Dutch idiom (the Women’s monument), ending in national acknowledgement of differing Indies memories (the Indies monument).

While for Dutch contemporaries the two periods of war and decolonization were closely interrelated, memories of decolonization only influenced war memories during the 1945-1949 period itself. Besides a general Eurocentrism of Dutch war memories and the distance of the Pacific, this was the main reason that these memories were excluded from the symbol of national unity, the National Monument on Dam Square. Separation of the two sets of memories favored integration. While this was achieved by inclusion of the Indonesian urn in the Dam Square monument in 1950, memories of the 1945-1949 period were silenced. From the end of the 1960s onwards, the fragmentation of national consensus on World War II provided space for explicit memories of new vernacular groups. Female internees were an early example of such a group that protested against the uniformity of the collective memory and the neglect of their forgotten stories.

In the following decades, the general “psychologization” of World War II, the formulation of war experiences in psychological terms of trauma and loss, provided Pacific war participants with the recogniz-
able face of victims. Among the Indies part of the population, emancipated new groups, Eurasian and former camp children came to share the side of the white “reminders” who had fought for recognition in earlier decades. The Indies monument, the result of the commemoration boom of the 1980s, expressed and fostered a strengthened Indies identity that could make itself heard at the level of government and international relations. The Indies monument was a lieu de mémoire in the literal, not in the national, sense of Pierre Nora. It defined an Indies identity, not a national one, the identity of a subgroup, not of a nation. Paradoxically enough, however, the integration of memories has been stimulated by organizing diversity. The process of local/vernacular remembrance has continued since then in Bronbeek and elsewhere. Memories of both periods (1941-1945 and 1945-1949) remained apart until this separation found form in two different monuments in 1988 (The Hague and Roermond). For the general public, Pacific war memories were easier to accept than those of the unpopular period of decolonization, which had first been forgotten and then called into question.

After this historical tour along some monuments we may pose a few final questions: what do we see of public memory by focusing on the subject of monuments? What is forgotten or left out? Literally situated in the public sphere, monuments are easily identified with public memory itself. However, they offer only a view of the broad outlines of that memory, of the central political debates and general cultural changes (here decolonization and “psychologization”), as the given examples show. This is due to the fact that, in view of governmental approval and financial backing, their construction requires a minimum of consensus. This minimum is also needed for their future commemorative function, which has to appeal to many and provide scope for several interpretations. Because of this required consensus, more detailed contested matters in the analysis of the past are passed over. “At a memorial, ceremony and analysis cannot be combined,” Ian Buruma has stated. In this sense, monuments themselves tend to make the past innocuous by diverting attention from historical and intellectual debates. For instance, those on the war record of Emperor Hirohito, on the character of the Japanese internment camps, on military and colonial myths such as the reasons of the Dutch defeat in 1942, have remained out of focus.

Monuments and memorials therefore offer only one point of entry, valuable though it is, to public memory, whether of World War II in Europe or in the Pacific.
Chapter Six

Pied-Noir Memory, History, and the Algerian War

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In 1958, the newly minted agrégé in history, Pierre Nora, was assigned his first teaching post, the Lycée Lamorcière in Oran, Algeria. In addition to teaching his classes in the midst of war, he worked on a book on the European population in Algeria, *Les Français d’Algérie*. The theme of the work was the gap between the reality of the Algerian situation and the myths and illusions the Europeans, or pieds-noirs, maintained. Twenty-five years later Pierre Nora edited his famous *Les Lieux de mémoire* and strangely none of the seven volumes addressed the issues connected with the Algerian war. Yet the methodological essays contributed by Nora to these volumes connect with a theme developed in his first book; that of the difference as he now expressed it, between “history” and “memory.” It is this distinction he cites that this article explores in regards to the pieds-noirs.

The outbreak of war in 1954 was a transforming event in pied-noir history. While the term pied-noir postdated the conflict, it came into common usage after that time (Nora does not use it, choosing instead the more cumbersome term, “Français d’Algérie”), and it was accepted, albeit reluctantly, by the European population only after their arrival in France in 1962.

The trauma of the Algerian war and then exile led to a new self-consciousness by the pieds-noirs. Since 1962 there has been a far larger literary output by Europeans from Algeria than in the entire preceding 132 years spanning the era from French conquest to Algerian independence. And while the writings do not all address the war, they reflect the desire to create and hold on to a memory, to recapture the world that was lost, existing prior to the fall of “Algérie française,” French Algeria.
Already prior to 1962 the Europeans in Algeria had felt deeply misunderstood and unappreciated by metropolitan France. The war only widened the gap. While the Europeans in Algeria were almost universal supporters of Algérie française, the metropole supported de Gaulle’s attempt to disengage. Forced to leave their homes, most of their possessions, and the soil on which they and their ancestors had been born, the pieds-noirs received a cool, if not hostile, reception in the metropole. In the summer of 1962 the metropolitans seemed more concerned with ensuring the success of their summer vacation plans than the lot of their cousins across the Mediterranean.

Many metropolitans were convinced that pied-noir selfishness and shortsightedness had led to the outbreak of the Algerian revolt, imposing on the metropole the sacrifice of resources and lives. Furthermore, the pieds-noirs in their desire to keep Algeria French at all costs had been willing to endanger democracy, first in the successful uprising against the Fourth Republic in May 1958 that brought de Gaulle into power, then the failed ones against de Gaulle in 1960 and 1961. Many pieds-noirs had rallied to the terrorist OAS (Organisation armée secrète), seen widely as a Fascist organization. Then when they arrived in the metropole, the pieds-noirs’ presence appeared to represent an economic burden, as they put an added strain on public services such as schooling and housing. They also appeared as economic competitors, although with a booming economy this was more of an apparent than a real threat.

Most French felt uncomfortable about the pied-noir presence. For the political classes, acknowledging their plight would have been tantamount to admitting a monumental political failure – both for the political left and the Gaullist right. Both in the end supported Algerian independence while minimizing the likelihood that it would lead to a total European exodus. It is true that no one could have predicted the paroxysms of OAS violence in the last months of Algérie française, which made coexistence between the European and non-European populations practically impossible. Yet even without the OAS terror, it is unlikely that the Europeans would have stayed. Both the political left and the Gaullists had underestimated the extent to which the leadership of the FLN, the dominant Algerian nationalist group, wanted to create a community of the faithful based on Islam and the extent to which the Europeans would not feel secure in Algeria once they lost political dominance.3

It was claimed that the Evian agreement of March 1962, signed between de Gaulle’s representatives and the FLN had ample guarantees...
in it, including ensuring the continuity of a pied-noir presence in Algeria and if they left, their right to get a fair compensation for their property. Instead, within weeks of independence, three-quarters of the pieds-noirs were in France, and by the following year it became clear that the Algerian government would not honor its promise to pay compensation for property confiscated from European owners.

Immediately upon arriving in France, the pieds-noirs demanded that the French government provide indemnification for the property left behind in Algeria. The Gaullist government steadfastly refused, urging the pieds-noirs to contact the Algerian authorities. To admit the pied-noir claims would have constituted an admission of political error that de Gaulle could not acknowledge. Only in 1970 after the French signatory of the Evian agreement was out of office did the government start addressing the issue of indemnification. The presence of the pieds-noirs was an annoying reminder of a less than perfect process of decolonization: they were a reminder of the loss of Algeria and of grandeur, spelling the end of French great power status.

If the political left had been unsympathetic to the Europeans in Algeria during the war, once they arrived in France their demands for indemnification won a sympathetic ear from the Socialists and even the Communists (as long as there was a ceiling for the amount of indemnification provided to each individual.) The pieds-noirs, bitterly hostile to Gaullism, were fertile electoral ground for the parties of the left. Until the issue of Algérie française had polarized pieds-noirs, opening them to OAS propaganda, they had been the natural constituency of the parties of the left in Algeria. Publicizing their plight was also a way for the left to embarrass Gaullism.

Four separate indemnifications were voted in and were conveniently timed to coincide with national elections. The amounts were too small and for many too late to be of help. But after the final indemnification of 1987 that issue is now viewed as essentially resolved.4

History has been the locus of pied-noir concern. Having lost everything, they saw their final redemption in history. Jean Brune, the writer and champion of Algérie française, shortly after the French loss of the North African territory, declared the necessity to “begin a case for revision before the High Court of the Future... the case for an appeal before History.” Maurice Calmein, a leader of the Cercle Algérieniste, an important pied-noir cultural organization, comforted his members a quarter century later with the notion that History would vindicate them: “We know we are right and history one day will justify us.”5
The pieds-noirs have a vision of history they wish to see adopted by the metropole. The most important “truth” the pieds-noirs wanted to establish was that they lived in harmony with the other ethnic groups in Algeria. What is striking about the many novels and memoirs on French Algeria is the absence in them of any account of strife between Europeans and Muslims. It is as if memories of such incidents had been repressed. The writer Georges Kopp observed in one of his writings: “Never ever did I sense before 1950 that there could be two antagonistic groups in Algeria.”

Instead, the picture was one of harmony. A pied-noir exiled to Spain wrote in his memoirs, “Algeria lived calmly and in peace. One hundred and twenty years of French presence had left the country with a deep imprint. Muslims, Christians, and Jews practised their religion in perfect harmony, in mutual respect of each others’ beliefs, their mores and ancestral customs.” In oral interviews pieds-noirs complained about the Algerians, “Why did they want independence? They were happy with us.” In oral interviews I conducted in May 1998 pieds-noirs unanimously told me that they lived in harmony and with a deep understanding of Algerians (although with rare exception none of my interviewees spoke Arabic).

The goal of writing about French Algeria, suggested Maurice Calmein in his advice to fellow pieds-noirs who might want to pick up a pen, was to “reveal that we were a unique community in which the races, religions, peoples of multiple origins lived side by side... respecting each other...” A recent Christmas cover of a pied-noir publication wanted to celebrate the cheerful harmony between the religious communities. But in so doing it betrayed the lack of Christians’ understanding for the “other” and the continued desire to exercise hegemonic influence over the other two population groups. It shows three inhabitants of French Algeria, one wearing a beret, another a fez, a third a yamulka, each holding a candle, the first under a cross, the second under a crescent, and the third under a star of David, all wishing the reader a “Merry Christmas.”

While the uprising of 1954 seems to give rise to this myth of harmony between Europeans and Muslims, pieds-noirs often insist that the war was not between the French and the Muslims, but rather a civil war between Muslims who were loyal and those disloyal to France. If there had been hostility between Muslims and Europeans, born of misunderstandings and the failure to implement reforms, the fault lay not with the European community, but with the metropole, claimed the pieds-noirs. The writer Marie Cardinal accused the mother country of
having fomented division between pieds-noirs and Muslims, exaggerating the differences between them. Jean Brune has one of his protagonists say in a novel: “If abuses occurred, one must not accuse those who might have committed them. But instead the State which did not carry out its responsibilities.” A professor of pied-noir origin insisted that the French of Algeria did not legislate for the colony. That was the responsibility of the French parliament. “If there was a mistake made, it was not just that of the pieds-noirs, but of all French.” Jacques Roseau, president of one of the major pied-noir groups, the RECOURS, in his historical novel, Le 113e été has a pied-noir explain the lack of reforms after World War I: “From time immemorial the policies of this country have been decided in Paris.”

Pieds-noirs have tried to fix an image of harmonious relations between them and the Muslim population in the last few years by expressing concern for the harkis, Muslims who fought on the French side during the war. Under the generic term harki some 60,000 Algerians sided with France; other military formations also provided pro-French troops, who also were often called harkis. The total number of Muslims fighting for the French in 1961 numbered 180,000 men. Many of them and their dependents fled to France; by 1968 they and their families numbered 140,000 and now they number around 400,000. Ill-treated by the French government, discriminated by the host people who often treated them with the same disdain they reserved for North African migrant workers, the harkis now serve a pied-noir cause. In the early years of their exile in France, the pieds-noirs ignored the harkis, showing no particular concern for the unequal treatment accorded them in regards to lodging, indemnification, and even access to French citizenship. But that has changed. By championing the case of harkis as “good Arabs” – those loyal to France – the pieds-noirs are proving to themselves and the nation that they are capable of Arabophilia. Protesting against the tendency to label pieds-noirs as French and the Algerian loyalists as “French Muslims,” a pied-noir publication asked that they all be called French, since “we form a single community.” Solidarity now suggests the solidarity of population groups in the days of Algérie française.

Beginning in the mid-1970s harkis started agitating, demanding that their sacrifices on behalf of France be recognized in tangible as well as symbolic ways. In the 1960s the political left was unsympathetic to the harkis, who were seen as brutal mercenaries and tools of French imperialism. But by the following decade the harkis had come to be seen as victims. The pied-noir expression of concern for the harkis can
tap into leftist sympathy for these other Algerians, who although not migrant workers, were equally impoverished and victims of French discrimination. By viewing the loss of Algeria through the prism of the fate of the harkis, the left might, pieds-noirs probably hope, better understand the harm done by granting Algerian independence.

The fate of the harkis, not just in France, but even more so in independent Algeria, has been a **cause célèbre** for the pieds-noirs. Harkis and other French collaborators were dealt with harshly in independent Algeria; thousands were imprisoned, tortured, and lynched. While not as quick to come to the aid of harkis who had arrived in France, the pieds-noirs early on publicized the fate of the harkis in Algeria. While the number of harki victims is not known for certain, it is widely believed that the minimum killed was 10,000, and a figure of 30,000-50,000 is quite possible. The pieds-noirs have put forward higher figures: 100,000, 150,000, 100,000 harkis and their families, even 300,000. A former putschist officer, devoted to the pied-noir cause of *Algérie française*, claimed in a burst of verbal excess that “nearly a few million” had been killed.\(^\text{14}\) Such high figures are intended to reveal the callousness and ineptitude of the de Gaulle regime, willing to sacrifice not just pieds-noirs, but also Algerians, to carry out the chimera of decolonization.

In fighting for their rights the harkis argue that, just like the pieds-noirs, they are French from across the Mediterranean who fought for France. As one harki put it: “At all times we served France with loyalty, love and patriotism.” And in fact, they were Frenchmen not just as a result of military service, but also by birth. The son of a harki declared, “I have been French for 130 years.” Abd-el-Aziz Méliani, an Algerian graduate of St. Cyr (the military academy) argues that the harkis were French before “our compatriots in Nice and Savoie had decided to remain French after the independence of Algeria.”\(^\text{15}\) Even if in Algeria there were few interests they had in common with the pieds-noirs, once in France the Muslims insist that they were repatriates just like the pieds-noirs.

The situation of the Jews is different. While in Algeria they tried to link their fate with the Europeans, once the 120,000 Jews had arrived in France they kept their distance from the other pieds-noirs. As a result of the Crémieux decree of 1870 Algerian Jews became French citizens. Unlike the other non-Muslims whose ancestors immigrated to Algeria after 1830, the Jews in many cases had been in Algeria for 2000 years. Although native to the area, the Jews threw in their lot with the “Europeans,” insisting on their Frenchness. Jean Daniel, the editor of *Nouvel*
Observateur, remembers that the main sentiment he and the people in his acquaintance had was that they were French: “During my childhood we wanted to be the same as the French, not different. It was not the fashion to uphold one’s Judaism at every opportunity.” During the Algerian war, with rare exception, Algerian Jews supported the cause of Algérie française. When the FLN asked for Jewish support, one of the main Jewish organizations declared, “We are French and want to remain so; our fate is tied to that of the French population of Algeria.” In their support of Algérie française some Jews even joined the OAS.16

Deprived of their French citizenship in 1940 by the Vichy regime that had annulled the Crémieux decree, the Jews regained their citizenship in 1943. This experience made them anxious that they might lose their citizenship again. After de Gaulle broached the possibility of Algerian independence beginning in 1960, Algerian Jews asked and received repeated reassurances from Paris that even after independence they would be recognized as French.17

Arriving in France, Jews emphasized their Frenchness and their Jewishness. One Algerian Jewish leader declared, “We consider ourselves wholly as French citizens, not as natives or settlers in a foreign country.” This Frenchness, some asserted, was one of lineage. A myth serving this purpose was that Algerian Jews were the descendants of the Provençal Jews who, driven out in 1487, had sought refuge in Spain, from where five years later they had again been forced into exile, this time going to Algeria. In 1962 the Algerian Jews were but returning “to this France which they had never forgotten.”18 If few Jews could trace their ancestry back to France, emotionally they felt closely connected to the mother country. “Always, I have felt myself to be French” declared Enrico Macias, the famous pied-noir Jewish crooner, in 1967. When asked twenty years after Algerian independence whether he wanted to return to Algeria for a visit, a Jew from Algeria declared, “For what purpose? My past is France. The Gauls are my ancestors.”19

The second point of reference is Jewishness. Speaking about their exile from Algeria, many Jews said that for them it meant regaining “a sense of the diaspora,” an opportunity to join European Jewry, to “rejoin the history and future of Jews.” The writer Bensoussan, a Jew from the Mozabite community in the Sahara that was two thousand years old, on leaving Algeria with his family in 1962, sensed that now he had joined his ancestors in the larger Jewish experience of exile. The philosopher Shmuel Trigano described expatriation as allowing Algerian Jews to make a contribution to European Judaism by providing it
with a new dynamism, which “marks an historic turning point in Jewish history.”

Since independence Algerian Jews have moved away from identifying with the pied-noir community. A Jewish member of the OAS, who presumably was well instructed on the anti-Semitism of the pied-noir community when he joined the terrorist organization during the Algerian war a generation later, regrets his youthful indiscretion. He asks himself how he could have joined an organization whose members were the children and grandchildren of those who had voted for anti-Semites, such as Édouard Drumont and Max Régis, and had supported the anti-Jewish Vichy laws. “I am not and do not feel as if I am a pied-noir,” one Algerian Jew announced. Algerian Jews have abandoned a pied-noir identity and are not interested in contributing to the myth of a harmonious Algérie française where all three religious communities lived in perfect harmony with each other.

The pied-noir paradigm of an Algeria in which all the ethnic groups lived in harmony with each other has also been questioned by the younger generation of pieds-noirs. Benjamin Stora (born in 1950) has made the discord between the various communities in Algeria clear in his many publications and numerous TV programs. The movie-maker Alexandre Arcady, best known for his movies “Le coup de Sirocco” and “Le grand pardon,” remembers Algeria as a segregated society, divided between Muslims and Europeans. Daniel Mesguish, a theatre director, who left Algeria at the age of 10, says of the Europeans in Algeria, “we lived turned so inwards, in a kind of blindness... I remember discovering that Algeria was part of the African continent only quite late. The day I discovered we were not, as I then thought, a country like Italy or Germany, but that we lived, walked on African soil... I received a shock.” Morgan Sportes, author of the novel Outremer, (the basis of a movie by the same name) who left Algeria at the age of fifteen, remembers sharing with other pieds-noirs a racist view of Arabs: “Leaving Algeria was for me as if I had escaped a cocoon of lies.”

Not all the doubts about a harmonious French Algeria came from younger people; some older ones also questioned this myth. During the Algerian war liberal pieds-noirs such as Jean Daniel and Jules Roy had questioned the viability of Algérie française, based as it was on the dominance of a European minority over a large Muslim majority. Their writings after the war have continued to question how idyllic relations were between the two communities.

In history the pieds-noirs have wanted to see vindication of their past. Somehow they have felt that their history has not been recorded
adequately. The Cercle Algérieniste, in a leaflet distributed in 1993, complained of having to do battle with “thirty years of misinformation.” “What we read in the metropole almost never corresponds to what we consider as ‘truth,’ ‘our truth.’ We have the impression, especially since 1962, that our history is being stolen from us...,” complained a pied-noir writer. Yet there certainly is no lack of information. A list of books published on Algeria between 1950 and 1992 contains several hundred titles; a survey of literature on the Algerian war alone has 2,000 titles. When I was in Nîmes on Ascension Day 1998, I repeatedly heard people talking about the need for history books about Algeria. They claimed nothing had been written about the country; people needed to be informed. A pied-noir author was trying to sell her novels; people around her table became interested when her enterprising son told the crowds that his mother’s novels would inform them about “the real history of Algeria.” And that history was viewed as being the history of the pieds-noirs.

Through pied-noir activism there have been a number of attempts to fix pied-noir memory. Monuments have been erected in different parts of France to celebrate the European presence in Algeria. Some are intended as pure memorials of another era and land; in Théoule-sur-mer a 16-meter-high enlarged version of the statue of Notre Dame d’Afrique of St. Eugène, a suburb of Algiers, was raised in 1990. Others have a message: a statue called “Mémorial des rapatriés” erected in Nice in 1973 consists of a huge hand carrying an urn that contains Algerian soil. On one side is inscribed “To the French of North Africa and distant lands who created France overseas while shedding their blood...,” while the other side reads “Passerby, remember there once was a prosperous French Algeria, happy and harmonious and never forget those who worked and died for it.” In 1930 on the occasion of the centennial of the conquest of Algeria, the French had raised a monument at Sidi-Ferruch, where the first French soldiers had landed in the military expedition. It read: “Here on June 14, 1830 by order of King Charles X, the French army ... came to provide freedom of the seas and give Algeria to France. A hundred years later the French Republic, having given prosperity to this country, civilization, and justice, grateful Algeria pledges to its Mother Country its eternal allegiance.” The bas-relief, saved by the French army in 1962, was raised in Port Vendres in 1988. By including on the restored monument the words engraved in 1930, the pieds-noirs wished to project the same view of the beneficence of the French presence in Algeria as had been the case when the monument was first raised.
If French Algeria existed for 132 years, the memory that often is foremost is that of the last eight years, the years of the Algerian war—and some of the more extremist events or personalities connected to the war are included in this memory. A monument raised in Toulon “To the Martyrs of French Algeria,” is a large marble slab; on one side is engraved “French Algeria to all, Europeans and Muslims, who often at the price of their lives, pacified, fertilized and defended its soil, 1830-1962.” On the other side, the slate shows a dying soldier with a quote from the OAS military officer, Roger Degueldre, “for an oath given.” In this way, Degueldre, military deserter, putschist, and terrorist was associated to the cause of Algérie française.29 In Dunkerque pieds-noirs inaugurated a sundial entitled “1830-1962 – The memory of a people.” Each hour was marked with a different personality. They included Albert Camus; Dr. Laveran, the pioneer of research into malaria; Bachaga Boualem, a leading pro-French Muslim during the Algerian war; Eugène Etienne, a major pied-noir politician at the end of the nineteenth century; Marcel Cerdan, world middle weight boxing champion in 1948; Alphonse Juin, Marshal of France, of pied-noir origin; and General Edmond Jouhaud, a pied-noir participant in the generals’ revolt in April 1961. Added to these Algerian-born personalities were Jouhaud’s fellow plotters, not born in Algeria: Generals Challe, Zeller and Salan.30 These men, who by force had tried to overthrow the French state, who had justified and encouraged open warfare against the French army in Algeria and had later been tried and convicted of treason, were included in this “memory of a people.”

Whatever their message, the different memorials tended to be local and lacked a national resonance. There was a strong desire to have a national memorial that would be recognized as such. In the 1981 presidential elections François Mitterrand openly appealed to pied-noir voters and seems to have received a good deal of support from them. After Mitterrand’s victory a number of policies were adopted to please them, including a complete amnesty for OAS plotters and terrorists, a revision of the indemnity payments, and the promise of a national shrine. However, this last project was ambiguous and lacked clarity from the beginning. In September 1983 Raymond Courrière, the Sérétaire d’état aux rapatriés (Secretary of State for Repatriates) in the Socialist government, announced that he would study the possibility of erecting a center that at the same time would be “a museum, a site for conviviality, a study center, a center for exhibition and entertainment which would pose the question: how is one to preserve, but also bring to life, relive the past, and experience in the present the saga, made of
shadow and light, of the peoples who lived overseas, whose contribution to the national community is incontestable.” If the cabinet minister’s aim was to establish a site devoted to the French empire – as suggested by its name, the Mémorial de la France d’outre-mer – the pieds-noirs saw it mainly as one that was to be devoted to their story. The following year the Association pour la conservation et le développement du patrimoine culturel des français originaires de l’Afrique du nord (Association for the Preservation and Development of the Cultural Heritage of French from North Africa) indicated support for the creation of a center dedicated to “remember the history of this minority of 2 million people” [1 million pieds-noirs and an inflated estimate of the Europeans from Morocco (400,000) and Tunisia (200,000)].

Pied-noir groups gave varied readings as to the purpose of the Mémorial. Among its stated purposes they saw it as intended to recognize “the civilizing accomplishments over the centuries of our fathers across the seas in the name of France and its greatness.” It was therefore aimed at celebrating the whole empire, while for another pied-noir organ it was intended to be a cultural center “to promote a living culture as much as that of the Corsicans, the Bretons or the Provençals....” For yet others it represented “the rehabilitation of the history of hundreds of thousands of French citizens.” It also was seen as some sort of compensation for “the suffering we have endured.” All these latter statements suggested a pied-noir focus. When discussing the imperial objectives of the Mémorial, pied-noir leaders would quickly slide into references that were specifically Algerian, hence the leader of the Confédération des associations de rapatriés pour le Mémorial de Marseille (note the organization had dropped the reference to overseas France) called for a Mémorial “that will establish for us and future generations the glorious truth of our French presence in Algeria, our Protectorates, our colonies and give a strong message from 1830 until the imprisonment or the death of our defenders, Roger Degueldre foremost amongst them.” This last phrase was a specifically Algérie française message and as such irrelevant to the rest of the empire.

Many regions and cities competed for the site, but Marseilles was chosen – the capital of the département with the largest number of pieds-noirs, the Bouches-du-Rhône, with over 200,000 pieds-noirs inhabitants. The museum was to be housed in the restored Saint-Jean Fort in the Old Port. Repeatedly politicians as varied as the Gaullist Jacques Chirac and the socialist Lionel Jospin in addressing pied-noir audiences promised support for the Mémorial de la France d’outre-mer. Consequently the project appeared to be mainly aimed at pieds-noirs,
but no government official openly sanctioned a site solely celebrating Algérie française. There was therefore ambiguity – would it be devoted to the whole empire, as the name suggested, or just to the pieds-noirs as they seemed to believe? (although they sometimes referred to it as both an imperial and a specifically French Algerian shrine). Furthermore, there was ambiguity as to its functions – how could it be celebratory and yet provide an accurate historical picture? The pieds-noirs believed the two were compatible, but already at its inception Secretary of State Courrière had spoken of the imperial record as being one of “shadow and light.” When Lionel Jospin, the Socialist candidate for president in 1995, told the pieds-noirs he supported the Mémorial as “it is time to teach the young generation about this era with objectivity and calm...,” they may have been satisfied that the “truth” was going to be told, but the former professor may have carefully crafted a statement that would not contradict stricter requirements of historical objectivity than the pieds-noirs had in mind.35

Funds had been voted by both the national and local governmental units; an architect had been picked. But dissension within the planning committee as to the purposes of the Mémorial prevented its realization. The commission to establish the Mémorial consisted of pieds-noirs, local politicians, and academics. Their interaction was rocky. The academics warned the other members that if the museum was to represent a historically accurate picture of the colonial past, they might be disappointed. Some academics resigned in protest against a project that seemed less interested in providing historical accuracy than being celebratory. The future of the Mémorial was delivered a fatal blow by the national elections in 1997. The elections brought a strong leftist majority into parliament. With close elections seeming to be a matter of the past, the Socialists no longer had to curry favor with the pieds-noirs (and the latter appeared in any case to be a less homogeneous electorate than they had previously been). While the Mémorial had been initiated in 1983 under a Socialist government, it had in the late 1980s and early 1990s been warmly supported by the Gaullists – in their quest for pied-noir votes. No longer needing to compete for this electorate, the new Socialist government shelved the plans for the Mémorial. One might argue that the defeat of the project ratified a decision the French State had taken already in 1960: when caught between the dilemma of accommodating pieds-noirs’ wishes and adjusting to a world in which colonialism had to be recognized as outdated, the latter prevailed. The slowness in realizing a project, promised in 1983, suggests that the political class had probably had second thoughts all along and had let
the matter drag out as long as possible. While politicians as different as Chirac and Jospin had come out in favor of the Mémorial, France’s relations with its former empire could not have benefited from a museum that glorified French imperialism, or even the more restricted goal of celebrating French Algeria.

Since coming to France some pieds-noirs have by their shrill voices confirmed metropolitan stereotypes of them. Lacking a sense of proportion, pieds-noirs described the repression of the OAS by the French army or of pied-noir confrontations engineered by the OAS such as the “massacre of March 26, 1962” of pieds-noirs in their Algiers stronghold Bab-el-Oued, as Nazi-like, as “crimes against humanity,” as an act of “genocide,” and even as a “holocaust.” They have even described the failure of the French army to intervene and prevent massacres of Europeans that occurred on the eve of independence in similar language. De Gaulle has been labeled a “war criminal” merely for deciding to grant Algeria independence.36

Bitter at what they saw as betrayal by de Gaulle of his promises to preserve French Algeria, pied-noir organizations called on their followers to vote in the presidential campaign of 1965 for extremist, anti-Gaullist candidates such as Tixier-Vignancour, Pétain’s defense lawyer after World War II and thereafter an ardent partisan in the effort to rehabilitate the Maréchal’s reputation. Later, in 1988 and 1995, they supported Jean-Marie Le Pen, the neo-Fascist leader, in his campaigns for president. Pied-noir organizations were in the lead demanding amnesties for OAS terrorists and military officers guilty of mutiny and rebellion. They have participated in commemorations honoring the memory of Jean-Marie Bastien-Thiry, a military officer executed for his attempt to assassinate de Gaulle at Petit Clamart in August 1962. Positive references in monuments to the OAS leader Degueldre and putschist generals have already been mentioned. When General Salan, one of the leaders of the generals’ uprising in 1961 who was tried and condemned for treason, died, his picture appeared on the front page of a pied-noir publication.37 On the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of their exile, pieds-noirs covered the portraits of Degueldre and Bastien-Thiry, framed by black mourning crepe, with flags.38 On a similar occasion ten years later, pieds-noirs held a national meeting in Marseilles, choosing as honorary president Colonel Antoine Argoud, who had been responsible for summary executions of suspected FLN members during the Algerian war and who had also participated in several armed uprisings against the French state. While such actions undoubtedly reflect the activist minority in the choice of leadership and do not
mirror the opinions of the rank and file, it has filled the public space devoted to pied-noir discourse.

Pieds-noirs want their memory of Algérie française to be inscribed in the nation’s textbooks. But history has its own rules, independent of memory. One of the most outspoken supporters of Algérie française was the pied-noir historian Xavier Yacono. Among his many works is a study entitled De Gaulle et le FLN. While his fellow pieds-noirs denounced de Gaulle as an evil man who from the beginning had intended to abandon Algeria, Yacono, constrained by historical evidence, reveals that de Gaulle only gradually and reluctantly came to the conclusion that there was no other way out but to agree to Algerian independence.39 Published by one of its most distinguished pied-noir historians, Yacono’s book found no reception in the pied-noir community as it competed with the community’s memory.

In 1998 a remarkable event occurred. The Cercle Algérieniste, a repository of pied-noir memory, confronted history. It invited several academic historians (including fellow contributor Jean-Jacques Jordi) to address it. Rather than playing to an audience immersed in memory, the historians gave strictly academic papers. The poor reception accorded the pieds-noirs, Jordi had argued in his previous publications and in his paper to the Cercle, was not due to studied metropolitan hostility towards the pieds-noirs so much as a lack of anticipation and planning. In a more general talk directly confronting the pied-noir penchant for mythmaking, Guy Pervillé warned the Cercle Algérieniste against “historical fiction.” “True history does not allow us to claim that de Gaulle is responsible for all the misfortunes of Algeria and France,” he told the pieds-noirs. Pervillé attacked “some ideas considered as true by individuals suffering of nostalgia for Algérie française. Why repeat that Algeria was a French province ... and as French as Alsace-Lorraine when the vast majority were deprived of French citizenship until 1944, even 1958...” The failure of the metropole to support the French presence after 1960 was not due to some nefarious plot by de Gaulle and the left, but rather “the loss of credibility of colonial propaganda which had grossly simplified and distorted colonial problems....” The duty of historians, Pervillé told his audience, is “to re-establish the historic truth... The repatriated and their children do not need to impose political directives onto historians: it is sufficient for them to carry out the task of historians.”41 While it is unclear how much of an impact Pervillé’s message had on pied-noir memory, the fact that the talk had been given in a pied-noir meeting was significant. It will be interesting to see if Pervillé is invited back.
Many of the extremist pied-noir messages have been addressed to fellow pieds-noirs and ignored by the rest of the population. Pied-noir themes that appear to have won a wider reception and are usually gentler are provided in the cinema. Perhaps the explanation for the difference in the message of different media is that since movies are so expensive to make and need to be supported by a larger market than angry pieds-noirs, the message in celluloid has to be less strident than the specialized journals or manifestoes of pied-noir congresses. The most popular pied-noir movie is Arcady’s “Le coup de Sirocco,” seen by 350,000 people in the first six weeks of its opening in Paris. Instead of presenting wealthy land owners who fitted the metropole’s image of the pieds-noirs, the movie instead came closer to reality in depicting poor whites who were endowed with neither wealth nor even the capacity to speak good French. They represent all elements that make up the pieds-noirs – the descendants of immigrants from Spain, Italy, Malta, Alsace, and the Communards. They are caught in a large drama, swept away by the “winds of history.” Bereft of all means, they have to find a way to establish themselves in their new homes. This gentle film makes a far better case for the pieds-noirs than their leaders’ agitated charges.

In another movie Arcady zeroes in on a small coastal Algerian town occupied by the Americans in November 1942. The central character of the movie is the town’s richest landowner and mayor, Etienne Labrouche, played by Philippe Noiret. Labrouche is never directly responsible for the exploitation and terror directed against the Arabs: these acts are carried out on his behalf by his son or employees, although he benefits from them. Philippe Noiret is perfectly cast, playing a highly sympathetic character, who like so many pieds-noirs stands to benefit from a violent and exploitive system without necessarily being directly responsible himself. He never quite understands how or why pied-noir conduct leads to the son of the local Arab dignitary becoming a nationalist. As the movie ends, we are told off camera that several of the characters died in Algeria, “the country they believed to be theirs,” while others left for France in 1962. We are not told about the Algerian war, but we know. Comic at times, the movie is a tragedy, revealing characters caught up in forces larger than themselves, unable to understand them.

A third pied-noir movie that also communicates the pied-noir experience as a tragedy is “Outre-mer” by Brigitte Rouan (1990). It is the story of three sisters living in Algeria between 1946 and 1962. In 1954 the war intrudes on their careless lives. The pieds-noirs are revealed as vacuous, occupied in small talk, reassuring themselves that the Arabs
are cowards, incapable of fighting. One of the sisters, Malène, enraged by her husband’s inability to deal with the farm they are running, sets the barn, containing the year’s harvest, on fire. The Arab laborers are blamed, rounded up, brutalized, and led away by the army. The movie seems to suggest that pied-noir thoughtlessness and lack of self-control brought the firestorm to Algeria. While many pieds-noirs have idolized the OAS, “Outre-Mer” provides a different glimpse of the organization. Trying to prevent the pieds-noirs from leaving Algeria, the OAS in late spring 1962 tried to terrorize pieds-noirs into staying. Struggling to leave, the youngest of the sisters, Gritte, while lugging a battered suitcase, is attacked by OAS members. They are nothing but thugs, adding to the misery of the pieds-noirs. Overall the movie depicts the outbreak of the war as a great tragedy – a tragedy for both pieds-noirs and the Muslim population.

A number of forces have transformed the pieds-noirs over the last few years. Many have made their peace with France. The older generation is slowly disappearing and the younger one is not as committed to the memory of Algérie française. These trends can be discerned in many different ways. For instance, the Centre de documentation historique sur l’Algérie in Aix-en-Provence, a center founded in 1974 to study French Algeria, had 275 readers in 1996 of whom 200 were more than 50 years old; only 24 were born after the end of the Algerian war. Similarly, most of the pieds-noirs attending the procession at Nîmes in May 1998 were over the age of 60. When I asked one person attending where his children were, he answered they were at home, minding their children. Yet a generation earlier the person I chatted with would have been there, children in tow.

The new generation has naturally looser bonds to the memory of Algeria. Interviewed by Le Monde on the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of their arrival in the metropole, a pied-noir mother complained about her son’s lack of interest in the family’s past in Algeria: “All our children are the same; it does not interest them.” One of the young men interviewed said, “My life is in France, in Montpellier.” Young people ignore the history of French Algeria. In one oral history project six children of pieds-noirs were interviewed. While they knew the dates of the Algerian war, they did not know when Algeria was conquered nor other details about French Algeria. If Camus was the bête noire of the pieds-noirs in the heyday of Algérie française, now he is often the only pied-noir author they can name. Le Monde’s interview was intended to suggest the confusion that thirty years had brought to memory. A young pied-noir boy explained his parents’ need to leave Algeria: “They no
longer could manage after the Arabs arrived,” he said.44 Such a memory, faulty as it may be, still suggests the transmission of some of the cornerstones of pied-noir memory – a sense of having been wronged, of having been robbed of one’s birthright. If the details of a story are lost with time, the meaning of the historical event can still be maintained.45 How long such memory will persist and how sharp that feeling of being wronged by history will remain only time will tell.
Chapter Seven

The Wrinkles of Decolonization and Nationness: White Angolans as Retornados in Portugal

Ricardo E. Ovalle-Bahamón

Mr. Graça sat across the small table in the café we had frequented for about two months and which had been his place for over two decades, and solemnly stated, “I was born in Angola, lived there all my life except for a few years that I spent in the liceu in Lisbon, and know no other home. I didn’t leave Angola; I was expelled. With independence people would yell at me in the streets [of Luanda] to go back to the land of my father (vai p’ra terra do teu pai!). And when I arrived in Portugal, people would say that we had gone to Africa to exploit “blacks” and now we were in Portugal to exploit them [the Portuguese].” Mr. Graça’s “race,” biography, and cultural identity, and their interaction with larger historical processes (colonialism and its demise), produced an ambiguous situation where Mr. Graça’s nationality or “nationness,” like that of many other retornados, highlights its interstitial character that can be so easily overlooked. Unlike texts that homogenize and flatten out the terrain of nationness in their attempts to describe it or explain it, the stories of nationness among retornados point to its limits, to its constraints, and to its unevenness in the distribution of subjects across social space.

This moving account of displacement and liminality illustrates the social workings and contradictions of popular conceptions of “race,” culture, and nation and their complex relationship with national identity. It underscores the dissonance between legal and social/cultural definitions of nationness, emphasizing the potential distance between
nationality (citizenship) and nationness (imagined community). The events described also point to the historically contingent connections across “race,” culture, civilization, and nation as cultural concepts that delimit the imaginable boundaries of community and belonging, even when these boundaries are widely denied, as in the case of Portuguese colonialism. These systems of categorization have enjoyed a long and varied history of signification that was informed by colonial processes to a great extent. It serves us well, then, to look closely at the ambiguities in nationness that surface in specific contexts of postcolonialism. The ambiguities of identity addressed in this chapter are part and parcel of the struggles of power, where hybridity “makes possible the emergence of an ‘interstitial’ agency that refuses the binary representation of social antagonisms” (Bhabha 1996:58).

One of the tasks, then, is to understand the location of individual narratives within the contexts that serve as bases for histories and that inform individual identities as well as the writing of those histories, which are far from neutral records of events. In part, they encode the power to name “things,” to make them meaningful, to engage the world in a process that delivers the social disarray of multivalent terminology into a cosmology of categorical order. As Nietzsche wrote, “the lordly right of giving names extends so far that one should allow oneself to conceive the origin of language itself as an expression of power on the part of the rulers: they say ‘this is this and this,’ they seal every thing and event with a sound and, as it were, take possession of it” (1969:26). The very process of colonialism was imbedded in a web of discourse whose focus contributed to the construction of systems of signification and order. When colonialism was declared over in “Portuguese Africa,” or at least when the formal end of the last “great” European empire in Africa was in sight, the struggle focused on the power to name and delineate the spaces that would ensue. I would like to focus on these processes, particularly when they are manifested in the lived experiences of people who become increasingly conscious of colonialism through its novel absence. The core of what lies at the closing moments of colonialism is not in what it is, nor in what it brings, but in the absence of an order that helped inform life for people inserted in specific colonial structures. The old systems of colonial categories became increasingly ambiguous and difficult to replicate or replace in the context of the radical political and social changes that define decolonization, resulting in a struggle to redefine the parameters of the social order. In the context of Portugal and Angola, we have to ask how individuals are located in the schemas of national identity.
Under the leadership of Salazar and Caetano (1932-1974), the Portuguese government actively advertised to the world, and to itself, a vision of Portugal without colonies (Salazar 1953:10-11). After World War II, the Portuguese presence in Africa and Asia was openly criticized in the new United Nations, in particular by the independence movements in Asia, with increasing sentiments against the legitimacy of colonialism. In response, the Salazar-Caetano regime firmly defended the position that Portugal no longer possessed colonies; instead, it was said to have “overseas provinces,” a characteristic, it was claimed, that resulted from one of the particularities of Portuguese colonialism, namely, its ability to civilize and assimilate indigenous populations. The official rhetoric stated that Portugal was one “undivided nation” and that all residents of all territories under the control of the Portuguese State fell within the space of this “one great multicontinental and multiracial nation.” In this vision, the Portuguese role in the colonies was that of the paternal elder engaged in the selfless endeavor of spreading “civilization” (Bender 1978). O Estado Novo devoted a great deal of effort and resources to promote the idea that Portugal was one across the continents; a vision that often claimed all the residents of the Overseas Provinces as Portuguese, albeit with varying political rights. O Estado Novo attempted through constitutional amendment to reshape the relation between metropole and colonies and evade the issue of decolonization by reaffirming, if only legalistically, that Portugal was one and undivided.

In effect, Portuguese political and cultural imagery after 1951 exhibited contradictions and ambiguities of identity that stemmed from official attempts to consolidate political support within Portugal and to resist growing international pressure to end colonialism. Two coexisting and contradictory realities dominated Portuguese imagery of itself and the colonies after 1951. On the one hand, Portuguese policy since 1930 attempted to use the image of empire to promote national pride and support for the Portuguese regime among the Portuguese people. At the same time, the growing attacks from Asia and the UN against colonialism moved the Portuguese regime to attempt to reshape its projection of the Portuguese nation. In response to India’s demands for the reintegration of Goa in the Indian Union, Salazar stated:

No Portuguese Government can... negotiate cession or transfer of a single part of the national territory or its population, first because of the
Constitution then by virtue of men’s very conscience, if not for what we owe the people of that State who have in so many ways and with such insistence tried to demonstrate their ties with Portugal (July 10, 1953).

The Portuguese regime found itself managing two irreconcilable visions of itself and the colonies, of the Portuguese and the colonized. In many ways, the government had already addressed the problem of the colonies in various ways, if only within its boundaries. Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, the regime organized public celebrations of the “Discoveries” and the “Empire.” *A Grande Exposição Colonial* (The Great Colonial Exhibition) in 1934 and the *Exposição do Mundo Português* (the Exhibition of the Portuguese World) in 1940 mark two major attempts by the Portuguese government to delineate the Portuguese nation and to exalt its colonial history as a holy mission.

For the Estado Novo, the Exhibition constitutes a spectacular affirmation of the regime, whose brilliance would gain even more projection from the difficult conjuncture of the war. José Hermano Saraiva, stating that “nothing similar had been done until then or since in Portugal,” concludes that “the small Portuguese fatherland proudly and ostentatiously exhibited its eight centuries of history like a testament to a mission to accomplish in the world, a mission that was its reason for being and that justified its independence” (Serrão 1987:372; translation by author).

Internally, this self-reification contributed to the imagining of a European nation whose importance in the world exceeded the logical implications of its geographic diminutiveness. Portugal was, in fact, a colonial power with a rightful place among the European powers.

In contrast, the increasing pressure from the international arena pushed the Portuguese regime to adopt a new self-image that avoided the pitfalls of empire in the postwar period. The answer to this was the reaffirmation of the concept of lusotropicalism as explanation of the Portuguese role in the world. The adoption of Gilberto Freyre’s concept of lusotropicalism to describe and deny Portuguese colonialism served the regime well. But as has been amply demonstrated, lusotropicalism in practice never became more than an empty justification and ideology for the rhetorical defense of Portuguese colonialism in Africa and Asia (Bender 1978; de Andrade 1958). The lack of substance and depth of lusotropicalism were clearly exposed, not only as expressed by critics of
colonialism but, more importantly, by the demands imposed on the Portuguese regime in the period that followed colonialism.

The anticolonial movements, particularly in Africa, challenged these assumptions and highlighted the need to re-imagine history and Portugal’s place in it. And, with the independence of the African colonies in the 1970s, around which time about 800,000 people relocated from the former colonies to Portugal, colonial national identity was challenged from various perspectives (Pires et al. 1984). This repatriation underlined the contradictions that were already visible during the colonial period and exacerbated the ambiguities of identity that plagued colonial Portugal.

The Indigenato and Nationness

Prior to 1961, official colonial policy operated within a structure that excluded over 99 percent of Africans from full political and economic participation in colonial Angolan society, the Indigenato. Vehemently and officially, colonial leaders refuted the racial basis of this policy by emphasizing “culture” and “civilization” as the determining factors of belonging. Consequently, citizenship for “blacks” and “mestiços” was firmly linked to their tested mastery of an idealized Portuguese “culture” and “habits;” forms of cultural capital that Angolan and Portuguese “whites” possessed by fiat. The 1961 statute ending official and legal colonial discrimination rejected previous categories of status and belonging. Ironically, the 1961 laws reaffirmed the existence of the very categories they were meant to disassemble, the categories “indigenous,” “assimilated,” “mestiços,” “second-class whites,” and “whites.” In effect, the 1961 attempt at broadening the “imagined community” aimed to include those in the colony that the anticolonial armed struggles might mobilize against the Portuguese regime in Angola. In its very conception, the statute highlighted the contradictions that juxtaposed European/colonizer/civilized and African/colonized/savage. The points addressed by the statute of 1961, the salience of categories of race, class, and language in colonial relations in Portugal and Angola, were highlighted by the attempt to undermine their role in organizing colonial society.

The success of the Revolution in Portugal and the eventual independence of Angola did not resolve the contradictions of the colonial system. Independence and citizenship were both a strain on these categories and simultaneously constrained by them. If during the decades
in which the Indigenato was in effect, the Portuguese colonial regime had distinguished between nationals and indigenous people using categories of race and culture, events that followed the 1974 Revolution and 1975 independence reproduced the classificatory schema without overt and specific reference to either race or culture. In effect, race and culture continued to play an important role in defining belonging in Portugal and Angola, and continue to this date. These processes help explain the massive dislocation of whites from Angola and their experiences as retornados in Portugal.

The Indigenato was but one of the foci of the various independence movements in Angola. Its demise in 1961 had little significance given that the three main movements in Angola (FNLA, MPLA, and UPA) had turned to armed struggle, precluding any diplomatic solutions. At this point in history, the end of the Indigenato represented reform at a point where “revolution” and “independence” were the buzzwords of the day. In many ways, the contradictions across nation, via race and culture, survived the Indigenato and independence, highlighting the wrinkles in Portuguese national identity. Race and culture continued to mark status and belonging and define alliances even as their importance in organizing society were openly denied.

Revolution and Decolonization

The Revolution of 1974 brought an end to the Salazar-Caetano dictatorship in Portugal and the promise of a new Portugal. However, history and culture weighed heavily on the processes that followed. Among the promises of coup and opposition party leaders were the end of the colonial wars in Africa and the return home of the young Portuguese men who were fighting there. These points played an important role in the policies that followed the Revolution and helped define Portuguese policies in what were to become the “former colonies.” The end of the war, decolonization, and repatriation quickly dominated the political imagination both in the metropole and in the colonies. The situation between April 1974 and November 1975 was beyond the control of the formal legislation which offered cosmetic solutions to the structural conflicts erected on a foundation of colonial policies, not to mention the growing effects of anticolonial sentiments inside and outside Angola and Portugal. The Revolutionary regime that ensued was forced to define the terms of decolonization and address the limits of Portugueseness in the context of national enclosure. Ancient visions of political boundaries
reappeared and the need to associate people as “nation” with nation as “space” returned in the context of decolonization, repatriation, and the dramatic emergency airlift that took place with independence.\textsuperscript{13}

Within the postrevolutionary regime in Portugal there was no unanimity on the topic of decolonization and the course it should take. Although the officers who led the Revolution had made a point of their plans to end the wars in Africa and to bring home the young Portuguese soldiers, there was ambivalence regarding the end of colonialism. The military, led by General Spinola, did not completely agree with the position proposed and promoted by the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP), wide sections of the Portuguese people, and other political leaders of the left, such as Mário Soares.\textsuperscript{14} It was as if the Estado Novo’s ideology of the multicontinental nation had survived the Revolution intact. In fact, within ten years there would be a whole body of literature criticizing the decolonization of Angola, on the grounds that the war had been won militarily and that what was lacking was the political resolve on the part of the postrevolutionary Portuguese regime (see Instituto Amaro da Costa 1982). Nevertheless, the Revolution spelled the end of formal colonialism and introduced the challenge of decolonization.

The defacto political and economic systems in Portugal and Angola collapsed under the weight of internal problems, forcing the colonial structures that defined the Portuguese empire in the twentieth century to tear apart at the seams. In 1975, after decades of international protest by Portuguese officials in defense of their possessions in Africa and Asia, the Portuguese world, official and private alike, was forced to deal with the end of empire. But, beyond the military and political imperatives that preoccupied leaders in Portugal and Angola after the April 25, 1974 Revolution, society as a whole, institutionally and in practice, had to define and redefine nationness across the ethnoscape\textsuperscript{15} of Portugal-Angola.\textsuperscript{16} The logic that had informed political and economic arrangements in Portugal fell into disorder, bringing into question fundamental assumptions of being for the individual and the state. As one informant put it, “for Portugal and the Portuguese [the end of colonialism in Africa] was like a person losing his limbs.” Politically and socially the need to redefine the role and place of Portugal and Angola in history, and to find the meaning of nationness with the end of empire, gained a sense of urgency.

April 25, 1974 marked the beginning of the official transformation of the Portuguese multicontinental, multiracial nation of lusotropicalism into the Europeanized Portugal of postempire boundedness. After A Revolução dos Cravos, the post-Caetano regime, hemmed in by the polit-
ical imperatives of the colonial war in Africa and its effects at home, concluded the dismantling of empire and pronounced the answer to the national question of colonial vintage, namely, what is the relation between race, culture and nation in the Portuguese territories?

In effect, the political boundaries of the multicontinental Portugal were redrawn in 1975 to include Iberian Portugal and the two archipelagos of The Azores and Madeira, while Angola, defined within the colonial boundaries of Angola plus Cabinda, was inserted into the order of nation-states as an “African nation.” At the social level, Portugueseness and Angolanness were defined both de jure and in practice. On the one hand, people’s locations in the new space of Portugal-Angola depended on legislated definitions of nationness. On the other, social recognition of identity and belonging was constructed in practice using long-established popular conceptions of community that at once coincided with and contradicted official edicts. The two imagined communities, Portuguese and Angolan, would rise out of the tangled relationships of colonialism, reflecting, distorting, and reshaping categories of identity and nationness and differentially locating persons across the ethnoscape of Portugal-Angola, albeit ambiguously. In modern and anticolonial fashion, nationness was boldly delineated to extricate Portugal and Angola from their colonial unity as a transcontinental social space, marking and separating exclusive national spaces of belonging and defining unambiguous categories of peoples and nations.

This process brought about the reaffirmation of certain historical and political discourses, but also the rejection or historical amnesia of others. Human social relations were both recognized and denied in the process of defining individuals’ locations in the new Portugal-Angola. Nationness and nationals suffered the blanket application of legalistic rules in a moment of practical ambiguity. Race, culture, class, and formal policy dichotomized Portuguese-Angolan identity. Simultaneously, these discursive transformations contributed to the writing of nationness in ways that reaffirmed both lusotropicalism and its negation – its negation being the separation into sovereign nation-states, a European Portugal and an African Angola.

During these years, common sense or popular conceptions of Portugueseness and Angolanness worked alongside legal processes to reproduce ambiguities in nationness that challenged many in Portugal and Angola. With independence, people in Angola were forced to choose a nationality, to opt to possess a Portuguese or Angolan legal identity. People who may have lived most or all of their lives in Angola, but who identified as Portuguese had to decide on their future residence
and legal status. People whose lives had been connected both to Portugal and Angola and whose families, property, and memories were linked across the Portugal-Angola ethnoscape had to grasp one national identity and claim it as “the one true identity.” Others had their subjective decision on belonging precluded as legal processes and biographical accident coincided to define their place in the new order. Through unevenly distributed rights and obligations, some Portuguese-Angolans could opt for either citizenship, while others did not have such option. This process unevenly fixed Portuguese and/or Angolans with different social, political, and economic rights and obligations. At the same time, the process of “cleaning up” categories of national belonging also served to consolidate historical relations of social inequality. In the midst of these broad social processes, individuals found themselves struggling to anchor their sense of being in a changing context that belied the “natural” character of nationness.

Decolonization and Repatriation

The Portuguese government faced the imperative of decolonization and the urgency to reorganize social arrangements so as to meet the demands of anticolonialism in Portugal and in Angola, demands that challenged the very essence of lusotropicalism. In this context, the regime focused on the end of the colonial war and the consequent repatriation of the Portuguese people from the former colonies. Beyond the pragmatic and strategic concerns of the dislocation of hundreds of thousands of people from the former colonies, a central question the governments in Portugal and Angola had to answer was: who would be Portuguese and who would be Angolan?

Officially, the response to this question rested on the Portuguese and Angolan governments’ mutual definitions which combined biographical specificity (for example, place of birth and ancestry) with individual choice, producing an ambiguous situation where people could, at least in theory, opt either for Angolan or Portuguese citizenship within specified parameters. In practice, choice was limited by the rights and obligations of citizenship as defined by law, by the advantages and dangers of social context, and by widely accepted popular beliefs on the relation between race and nation. Although legally race was not made an issue on independence, the overwhelming majority of those who left Angola for Portugal where white (over 95 percent), and of the white population who lived in Angola before independence, over 95
percent left for Portugal. Most were escaping the insecurity and dangers that the ensuing civil war represented for those in Angola, a danger that was in fact shared by all people in Angola regardless of race, culture, class, or gender. But, as it was, these labels contributed to the social organization and interpretation of nationness in the new context.

In Angola, independence saw the onset of civil war between the three parties that dominated the political-military scene at the time. With the intensification of internal conflict in Angola and the spread of the battle to densely populated areas, more and more people in Angola began to look for a way out of the immediate zones of war. For most people, “black,” “white,” and “mestiços” alike, this meant leaving their rural homes and traveling to urban centers where they could find some protection, however nominal, provided by the Portuguese forces in Angola. For some, the privileged, predominantly “whites” and “mestiços,” it meant leaving the urban areas they occupied by leaving the country. Eventually, most “whites” accepted or came to believe that their only viable alternative was to leave Angola, and most opted to settle in Portugal. Well over half a million people arrived in Portugal from the former colonies at or around formal independence. For the majority of people in Angola, namely “blacks,” the exit to Europe option was nonexistent. In the rural areas of the North, South and East of the country, hundreds of thousands fled to the bordering countries (Zaire, Namibia, and Zambia, respectively) where many still remain as refugees. For most “blacks” in the urban centers and on the coast, those who had closer ties with Portuguese colonial structures and cultural styles, their only alternative was to remain in Angola.

Decolonization in Angola, then, resulted in the definition of Portuguese and Angolan identities along lines that reaffirmed the historical importance assigned to categories of race, culture, and class in defining status and nationness. The independence of, the civil war in, and the exodus from Angola combine to highlight the contradictory positions that Portuguese colonialism had maintained from 1930 on. With this history as background, independence and decolonization, realized in the name of the Human Rights of Man and the self-determination of nations, reformulated nationness in Portugal-Angola in a form that coincided with the colonial principles defined in the Acto Colonial and the ideology of lusotropicalism. Race and culture remained central in informing the construction of nationness.
De Jury Nationness and Decolonization

In the context of the widespread conflict and growing confrontations among opposing parties in Angola, the postrevolutionary government in Portugal addressed the question of belonging and Portugueseness with Decree-Law No. 308-A/75 of June 24, 1975. Five months before formal independence, the Portuguese Ministry of Interterritorial Coordination decreed the official position on Portuguese citizenship and its corresponding rights and claims. The legal act addressed the question of citizenship by linking, to paraphrase Anderson (1991:19), the specificity of biographical accident with the eternal character of nation. The end of colonialism was met with the formal or official recognition that Portugueseness was ultimately neither multicontinental, nor multiracial.

In this light, the 1975 decree defined Portuguese “nationality” as follows:

Article 1.
1. The following Portuguese residing in overseas territories that have become independent will maintain their nationality:
   (a) Those born in continental Portugal and its adjacent islands.
   (b) Until independence of the respective territory, those born in overseas territories still under Portuguese administration.
2. The remaining descendants up to the third generation of the groups referred to in (a).

At first glance, and in light of the September 1961 decree revoking the Indigenato, virtually all residents in Angola would have qualified for Portuguese citizenship and a “return” to Portugal after the independence of Angola. However, the June 1975 decree relies on Law No. 2098 of July 29, 1959, which regulates the attribution, acquisition, loss and reacquisition of Portuguese nationality. Law No. 2098 links the identity of Portuguese nationality with the pre-1961 era, which still linked citizenship with culture, civilization, and race. Postrevolutionary Portugal reaches back to the pre-1961 period to locate Portugueseness and, in the process, excludes over 95 percent of the people in Angola from Portuguese citizenship. Without ever making specific reference to it, the 1975 decree reaffirms the link between national identity and race. By decree, Portugueseness is self-evident and tautological: only the Portuguese are Portuguese.
In 1974, an estimated 335,000 “whites” were living in Angola. In 1981, there were over 300,000 retornados from Angola in Portugal. These latter were people who had left the African colony at or around independence and had established themselves in Portugal as “returnees,” Portuguese who had returned from the former colonies. What these figures reveal is striking, especially if one considers that everyone in Angola was in danger regardless of color or cultural style. Everyone was in the midst of the bloody internal war that has now ravaged Angola for over twenty-five years—everyone had well-founded fears of violence and harm.

We can therefore conclude that the overwhelming majority of those who left Angola to become retornados in Portugal were “whites,” about half of the adult “white” Angolans (“naturals” of Angola). The moment of decolonization forced the authorities in Portugal to deal with the question of peoplehood, and the path taken was to encapsulate Portugueseness within the European boundaries of traditional Portugal; Portugal was bounded by the peninsular limits of historical tradition. Nationness stood aside from the active promotion of lusotropicalism that had been consistently used to claim the existence of a multiracial, multicontinental nation; nationness was tantamount to historicized continuity, lineage, and a reaffirmation of national purity. The three-and-a-half decades of lusotropicalism were nullified in the Decree of 1975, and the link between ideas of race and nation were encapsulated in the practical affirmation of repatriation and “return.”

“White” Angolans in Portugal: Returnados or Exiles?

Much has been written on the African diasporas, but I want to emphasize that in the twentieth century historical processes manifest efforts to hem in and deter the movement of people. The end of colonialism for Portugal-Angola marks more than the end of a certain pattern of political-economic relations. It also marks the affirmation of the categorization of people into discrete nation-states—people whose national identities and political belonging are nevertheless complicated by historical lineages that emphasize and intertwine pigmentation, cultural pedigree, class histories, and a variety of social privileges. Many Portuguese citizens are culturally and biographically Portuguese and Angolan, and many Angolan citizens are also similarly Angolan and Portuguese. Although the common sense and expedient definition of citizenship
and nationness contributed to the reproduction of national forms that were homogeneous and discrete, the social reality of Portugal-Angola did not permit post-independence nationness to take shape without the effects of the significant wrinkles of conceptualizations of race and culture, or by the multifaceted life experiences and memories of those involved in the process of decolonization. To glimpse the ways in which these wrinkles challenge the imagining of nations, I turn to the experience of white Angolans in Portugal after independence.

In the midst of political and economic crisis, retornados were inserted into a social order that lacked the institutional, financial, and structural means to absorb them. The result was a growing conflict between local, long-time and regular residents of continental Portugal and the new arrivals. At the same time, Portuguese society was rebuilding itself after the fall of the fascist regime in April 1974, and there arose an imperative to redefine Portugal as a democratic “postcolonial” society growing out of the remains of the society organized by the previous government. During this period, segments of the Portuguese population reacted against the retornados’ presence in Portugal and against official policy by reconstructing colonialism in the process of imagining the end of colonialism. While the Portuguese postrevolutionary government recognized the process of colonialism and the Portuguese-ness of retornados, significant sectors of the Portuguese population opposed these conceptions.

The Revolution in Portugal reflected, among other things, the promise to end the colonial wars, and also a significant political shift to the left. However, the domestic economic disarray and the political and economic costs of decolonization highlighted social tensions arising from this same process of decolonization. High unemployment, housing shortages, and the relocation of former “colonos” (colonials) to Portugal inspired in daily life attitudes and interpretations of sociohistorical events that did not support official positions. Against history and policy assumptions, colonialism was transformed from structural process or political-economic system, to a process that elevated individual actions to the level of totality. In effect, retornados became the signifiers of colonialism in Portugal, and their presence in Portugal inspired a transformation of the imagined Portuguese nation. The retornados’ presence permitted the reinvention of Portugal and the Portuguese as part of the European nation-state system, distancing the nation from colonialism and locating retornados at the margins of Portuguese-ness. I address this complex and multifaceted process by focusing on the experience of some retornados, “whites” who had been residents of
Angola for most of their lives. These retornados arrived in Portugal at or around independence from the former colony and their reception in continental Portugal, at a time when “postcolonialism” was being defined and debated, highlighted the ambiguity of their location in Portuguese nationness.

Among the contradictions I identify, two are central to the construction and the demarcation of place and belonging in the new context of Portugal-Angola. Firstly, colonialism itself needed to be reconceptualized, or better said, named and then ejected as part of an unjust past. Secondly, the Portuguese and their place in colonial relations of power had to be defined and denounced for the sake of the moral-historical “purification” of Portugal as a modern nation-state. These imperatives initiated a process that implied a voluntary self-deprecation that would challenge much of what we understand of national identity and the positive affects it implies. In this section, I put forward an account of these processes and propose that the presence of retornados in Portugal facilitated the reconstruction of Portugal by serving as the “depositories of colonial structures,” those responsible for colonialism, while simultaneously alienating the retornados from Portuguese nationness. Decolonization for Portugal produced a “present moment,” a conjuncture that recast colonialism, not as a system of political and economic structures, but as the “sum total of the individual actions of individual subjects in faraway lands.”

Both in Portugal and in the colonies, the independence of the African colonies forced a reckoning with what had been taken for granted for so long: the conceptualization of Portugal and Portugueseness. Colonizadores and colonizados surfaced in Portugal as central concepts useful in understanding history and locating subjects. The repatriation of about 800,000 people from the colonies to Portugal (around 15 percent of the population of Portugal at the time) over the course of approximately two years between 1974 and 1976, made this process particularly salient and significant. Government institutions tried to organize the repatriation and minimize the strain it put on a Portugal in crisis, economic as well as political. Various programs were created to assist retornados, such as the IARN,25 or to facilitate their integration. Yet the economic crisis was so great and the retornado population so sizeable that the strain could not be eased. The resulting situation pitted local Portuguese against retornados, forcing them to compete for housing, employment, and social services, and distancing “white” Angolans from Portugueseness.
Central to this analysis is the retornado experience on their arrival to Portugal. The term retornado was in common use in major newspapers and official documents, and also in everyday conversation. All major daily newspapers had articles on retornados between 1975 and 1978. The topic was still of interest as late as 1986. In fact, the archives of *O Expresso* and *O Diario*, two major newspapers in Portugal, today have an archive category for retornados. It is striking that this “inclusive” label was used to characterize over a half a million people who were neither homogeneous nor intrinsically part of “Portuguese society.” Other terms used in analogous historical settings, terms such as refugees, exiles, and pieds-noirs, imply a distance between the host country and the arriving guests (Guillon 1974; Baillet 1975; Malkki 1995). In the Portuguese case, retornados implies a home-coming after a temporary absence. This was the case for most of the people assigned the label retornado, but for over 40 percent of those who arrived mainly from Africa, Africa was their place of birth and upbringing (Pires et al. 1984:196), and Portugal existed only as a far away location most had never visited before.

The dominant image of retornados in Portugal after 1975 is one of poverty, homelessness, depression and confusion. Newspapers relate accounts of dispossessed families and individuals, who having “returned” from the African ex-colonies, are living in a state of great emotional and material deprivation, even though, of course, it was clear that not all retornados were living under these conditions. An article in *O Expresso* (Sept 17, 1976) offers a good journalistic account of the situation:

> Among the half a million displaced from the ex-colonies, the conditions of life are far from being common in the face of individuals, victims of the same circumstances. With authority, it is they, the retornados, who claim the existence of various classes. There are the privileged retornados and the *(bastardos)* illegitimate retornados, as they affirm. There are those who search for work without finding anything, there are those who want to build a house to live in and are denied the subsidy and, in contrast, there are those who benefit from enlarged sums when they least need it.

It is evident that the experience of the retornados was as varied as the retornados themselves, but in the midst of this diversity, there stands a commonality that is accessible through their personal narrations.
Legally, the retornados were Portuguese, for the most part, but in the eyes of the rest of the population of the country their legality did not grant them legitimacy. Their presence in the metropole was interpreted by many locals as a form of invasion, and this was made clear to the retornados, as is expressed in their own accounts. The following statement by a woman is typical of descriptions narrated by retornados when speaking of their early experience in Portugal:

The shock that I suffered when I arrived here I don’t wish on anybody... It was a terrible shock. There was a different political attitude. They all thought that we were reactionaries. You were there [in Africa] to exploit the “blacks” and now look. Most of them thought that way.

Another woman in describing this time states, “the first reaction was terrible. They believed that we came to take away their jobs. The majority [of us] did not have work or money.” A man states the following:

There was an atmosphere of hostility, due... to various factors. Well, some were just and others unjust, as often happens in these cases. Some with reason, and others without reason. One, because there were so many people. I don’t know, about a half a million. Then, people, desperate people, disturbed, some disturbed, others ready go insane. Well, I had to do something; we had to work. Jobs, the jobs, there weren’t any. They came here, some brought money, others didn’t have anything. There were many conflicts. Here, people believed us to be of selfish mentality; and also the fruit of the propaganda to justify certain things. Why was I there [Angola]? Only to exploit the blacks, only to give orders. Fine, and the consequences. So there!

The place of retornados in Portugal was the effect of a vision that represented them as a “foreign” element, an element embodying a past age of colonial exploitation that had been denounced in global and local discourse. Simultaneously, it was possible to imagine retornados as the material exploiters because their presence in the former colonies had been delegitimized. White retornados were made interstitial, temporally and politically foreign to Portugal, and foreign to the colonies because of their status (race). In the former, they were invaders representative of a colonial past, and in the latter the foreign agents of colonialism in Lusophone Africa.

The previous accounts offer views of the “return” experience that are general and removed, but the experience was by no means impersonal
to those involved. One woman, describing her encounters with her family after her arrival to Portugal, highlights the distance that separated retornados from other Portuguese:

When I arrived here, I went with my parents to Trás-os-Montes [province in northeastern Portugal, the least developed region of the country]. In those days ... there was a great employment crisis ... I was there for a year without a cent ... We went to my father’s brother’s house ... In the same village ... the other people accused, I mean, they talked, it was all talk because we had arrived from Africa. We heard a lot. There were jokes, their jokes. I mean, they said that we went there to rob the blacks and now we have come here. Your own family, even your own family would say this. Even your own family, that is hard.

The migration experience was emotionally painful and materially costly and served to distance retornados from the rest of the Portuguese population. The reaction of locals in Portugal was negative and produced a nativist reaction similar to that found in other parts of the world, as with the pied-noirs in France. Images of retornados included negative stereotypes and accusations blaming them for social problems in Portugal. Another woman relates that they were blamed for the presence of leprosy in Portugal:

I’m going to tell you a story ... At a fundraiser, there was a person with a box asking for money. It happened. I saw it. She was going around collecting for leprosy, and the Portuguese woman that was talking with me asked, “Leprosy, is there still leprosy in Portugal?” And another woman responded, “Oh yes, the retornados brought it!” Everything was our fault, everything.

If national identity means a sense of community (Anderson 1991), and the implied access to a place in society and its resources, then the retornados’ sense of belonging in Portugal was placed under great strain, if not denied outright.

As previously discussed, the Portuguese government defined the colonies in Africa as Overseas Provinces of Portugal (Bender 1978). This meant that all those born in any of the Portuguese territories were considered to be Portuguese citizens, but this proved to be a frustrating oversimplification. Under the Salazar-Caetano regime, there were various categories of citizens, including the category “second-class whites,” which referred to “whites” born in the colonies. The hostile
reaction of the Portuguese, then, can be understood in part by the colonial history of Portugal and the relationship it had defined with the people living in the colonies (Bender 1978). On independence, retornados received legal citizenship, but their social acceptance was hindered by an interpretation of Portuguese history that grew dominant with their arrival (Ovalle-Bahamón 1997). The return resulted in a process that at once questioned the Portugueseness of retornados and at the same time placed all colonial responsibility at their feet. Colonialism became the presence and actions of those living in the colonies, putting aside any ideas that located colonialism within the realm of political and economic structures. As one woman puts it:

> Once, I had an argument with a white colleague, a colleague from here, white, Portuguese. She had never been [to Angola]. She had never been outside Portugal. I had an argument with her. I got very angry. And, when I turned my back, I heard her say, ‘What does she think she is, a retornada from an Overseas Province where criminals used to be sent.’ And she knew that I was born in Angola; Angola was a penal colony in 1800 or so... But that shows the resentment they have towards us.

Events contributing to the denial of the retornados’ place in Portuguese society were not strictly limited to the “civil” sphere of personal encounters. Their legal citizenship also often created problems for them. Although official policy granted Portuguese citizenship to anyone who had at least one grandparent who was Portuguese (O Expresso Nov 12, 1976), retornados’ personal experiences often belied the simplicity of official policy. Many retornados had negative experiences resulting from the significance assigned to their place of birth, Africa. Events undermine the argument that retornados were unquestionably part of the Portuguese nation. The legal transition to Portuguese citizenship was a problem for many, even though, according to Portuguese policy, it was supposed to be a relatively simple matter. One woman describes the situation as follows:

> I only brought the documents that I used from day to day, but since I had family there, I asked my family, and my family managed to find some documents. But for me to be able to become Portuguese, to have Portuguese documents, what I had as a Portuguese citizen resident in the ex-colonies, was not accepted here. They granted a short time so the retornados could rectify the situation. Since I had been born there, I turned in my documents, and they said, we can’t give you new ones
because you were born there. You have to prove that you have Portuguese family to be able to be Portuguese. And I wrote to the village where my father was born, and the priest of the church where my father was baptized sent me a certificate. It said that in 1908 ... was baptized an individual, and so on. And with that paper I went to prove that my father was Portuguese, and that I could be Portuguese, but with a lot of fear because my father had asked for Angolan nationality. I was afraid that the Angolan authorities would say that he is an Angolan citizen. Then I would have to follow up on my grandfather ... Many people did not have documentation. I know white Angolans of five generations ... It was not true that a Portuguese is someone who is born on Portuguese soil ... There were many things that were done badly ... Many of us were treated like second-class citizens.

These narratives highlight the liminality of retornados in Portugal. They were recognized as citizens of Portugal for legal purposes, but their property in the colonies was assessed as belonging to residents of the former colonies. Although the Portuguese government claimed to recognize their place in society, it was unable to represent their claims in the colonies; a situation stemming from the political and economic crisis that the new government of Portugal faced.

Two interconnected themes consistently surface in the accounts. Firstly, there is the unwelcome reception of the retornados in Portugal. In spite of the fact that the Portuguese government had officially recognized them as Portuguese, for the most part they were not treated as such by the local population of Portugal. Secondly, their place in society, their status, increasingly rested on the popular understanding of retornados as colonialists and exploiters. The experience of many retornados in Portugal supported the argument that they were not truly Portuguese or that they belonged to a different Portugal. They were confronted by disclaimers of their “Portugueseness” on a daily basis and were reminded by everyday encounters that they were seen as invaders, exploiters, and even foreigners. This was particularly true for “whites” born in the colonies. Yet the whole retornado population shared in the burden of carrying the weight of colonialism on their shoulders.

Postcolonial Construction of “Agency Colonialism”

The narratives I obtained from retornados in Portugal highlight the discursive social processes that distanced Portugal and the Portuguese
from the colonial past. While many of us envision or conceptualize colonialism as a system or structure of political and economic relations, Portugal reconstructed colonialism as the actions and lives of individuals in the former colonies. In the context of decolonization and “repatriation” of residents from the former colonies in Africa, Portugal imagined colonialism as the sum total of individual actions in the colonies, distanced from continental Portugal: a discursive strategy of temporal and spatial containment. During the years following the April 1974 Revolution, Portugal continued to be the cultural metropole of the empire, but it was transformed into the political and economic space whose relationship with colonialism was incidental. If blame for colonialism was to fall on anyone, it would be the retornados. Even though debate and politics continued to show signs of confusion regarding colonialism and its discontents, at the level of lived experience retornados tended to shoulder the burden of colonialism.

While I emphasize the historical aspects of identity making, of belonging, I do not want to imply that the retornados are a new ethnic group or nation. I have discussed national identity elsewhere (Ovalle-Bahamón 1991 and 1993), and argued that one subset of the retornados, “white Angolans,” occupied an interstitial space in the universe of nationness. As Kellogg (1991:417) has argued, diachronicity is today central to anthropology, but we must remember that it is possible to write multiple micro-histories that address events from alternate perspectives. The location of retornados in postcolonial Portugal does not alter the fact of colonialism in Africa, but it does enable the popular postcolonial reinvention or reframing of colonialism as a product of the agency of stigmatized individuals or groups, the social elites and retornados.

Anthropology, like other disciplines, continues to debate the place of agency and structures in history (Crapanzano 1990; D’Andrade 1995; Moore 1986; Ortner 1984; Sahlins 1981; Wolf 1982). I do not propose here that agency is the central and most important factor in social processes, rather, I want to demonstrate that structural processes are sometimes envisioned as the product of agency by people in their daily lives. Postcolonial Portugal is marked by its efforts to reconstruct colonialism and this is possible because of the role assigned to retornados, both as agents of colonialism and bearers of postcolonialism. Their experience in Portugal realized the possibility of reconciling the political amputation of decolonization with Salazar’s vision of Portugal as free of colonies. Popular attribution of structural processes to the agency of some of those who resided in the colonies meant that
postcolonialism could arrive with the new regime without anyone taking responsibility for colonialism. Among the retornados, those who had strong claims to Portugal, who owned homes there, who had been raised in Portugal, who visited frequently, and who had close family in the metropole, were able to quickly integrate and blend into the general population. White Angolans, despite having links to Portugal, did not have the ability to quickly blend in. Many white Angolans brought with them different styles of speech and dress. As such, their Portugueseness, like their Angolanness, was questioned. Race, culture and class wrinkles added to the social reality of post-independence Angola to exclude them from their place in Angola. Culture, class, and history contributed to exclude white Angolans from complete participation in Portuguese society.

Conclusion: Culture, Race, and Nationness

Resting at the dock in Luanda, leaning against the crates of furniture and “stuff” that was to be repatriated to Portugal, a “white” Benguela (an Angola-born man from Benguela), prepares for the “return” to a Portugal he has never set eyes on. Across the Marginal,27 the “black” Luanda-born calcinhas28 negotiates the delivery of more crates to a family in need. Who is Portuguese? Who has the right to claim protection and assistance from the Portuguese government in Luanda? The rigid and self-evident character of the legal definition confounds the colonial categorizations that linked race, culture and civilization across the naturalized ideals of kinship and belonging.

The colonial period in Angola was marked by negotiation and contestation, as in other parts of Africa (see Cooper and Stoler 1997). And in spite of Portuguese efforts to diminish the rifts that threatened the lusotropicalist vision of empire, categories and identities were often shifting and highlighting the wrinkles of the imagined community. On this foundation, efforts to rework identities, to cleanup categories of nation, and to iron out the wrinkles of lusotropicalism proved very difficult. The lack of coincidence between legal and lived experiences, and the social inability to forget, reconfigured nationness in a form that again emphasized the messy categories of people whose place in the “order of nations” is, at best, ambiguous.

At first glance, legal definitions of nationness used on independence in Portugal-Angola appear to make sense given the cultural terrain that supported them.29 The legality of national identity at independence was
marred by the social significance of extra-legal markers that identified persons with communities, relying on categories drawn along lines of race, culture, and class. In effect, official Portugueseness and Angolanness were hemmed in by old social categories that interfered with the “postcolonial” national imagination and that reproduced colonial processes of identification and place. Color, language, and style wrinkled the ethnoscape and highlighted the ambiguity of nationness in Portugal-Angola. It is in this context that categories of white Angolans, mestiços (Portuguese and Angolan alike), and black Portuguese embody the ambiguities of nationness and the limits of the social imagination in constructing sovereign and discrete national categories. The meaningful memory of social categories produces nationness marked by ambiguity. Beyond the numerous potential forms that nationness could have adopted, rigid conceptualizations dominated even as lived experience challenged the validity of common sense. The experiences of “white Angolans” in Portugal exposes the ways in which nationness is rendered problematic. Across the experiences of these displaced people and across their memories of dislocation and “repatriation” we are allowed a glimpse at the limits of the national imagination.
Postcolonial Peoples: A Commentary

Frederick Cooper

The men and women discussed in this book, in a fuller sense than practically anybody else, are postcolonial people. If the large majority of the populations of the Netherlands, France, and Portugal sought to distance themselves from the sordid past of colonization and the embarrassing history of the loss of their colonies, citizens of new nations born of decolonization were caught up in efforts to become something other than what they had been. Not everyone who fled from newly independent Indonesia, Angola, or Algeria sought refuge in the collective identification of colonial repatriate – some wanted simply to get on with their lives. But the chapters of this book make clear the importance not only of the social phenomenon – the rapid and massive movement of a certain category of people – but also of claims based on that status: the quest to preserve memories of a place and of a certain kind of past, to obtain recognition for alleged accomplishments and suffering.

These were hard claims to make, for repatriates (to use a term which as Andrea L. Smith observes is necessarily problematic) were at the heart of a fundamental and surprisingly rapid transformation in world history. The decolonizations of the 1960s did not just end particular empires, they extinguished the category of colonial empire from the realm of the politically possible. The very distinctiveness that the Indonesian Dutch, Angolan Portuguese, or Algerian French had asserted no longer had legitimacy in a decolonizing world: they were people who had no right to exist. To the extent that their identification with a place – with the sights, sounds, and smells of a tropical or Mediterranean land – had political significance, that identification would have to be shared with the majority of the inhabitants of those places, whose majoritarian claims to political power were precisely what the repatriates were flee-
ing. And to the extent to which they could claim someplace to flee to, it was not on the basis of the profound sentiments associated with life in the shared space of France, Portugal, or the Netherlands, but of the more abstract affinities of citizenship and race.

It is not surprising that these were the people that no-one except themselves wanted to remember – not the nationals of Portugal, France, or the Netherlands, not the citizens of the former colonies, and not scholars and other intellectuals trying to rethink how the world was going to look without the empires that had once covered half the globe. And they themselves had a great deal of forgetting to do. Any claim they might make to a collective affinity was now an historical claim, based on their role in colonization. But they did not necessarily want to remember the humiliation and violence, the forced labor, the racial discrimination that was intrinsic to colonization, or the collective punishments and torture that were part of the wars of decolonization in Indonesia, Angola, and Algeria. The Frenchman of Algiers did not necessarily have a heavier moral burden to shoulder than the Frenchman of Lyon for the destructiveness of nineteenth century colonization or the tortures of the 1954-62 period – the ultimate responsibility lay with the French government and the people who voted for its leaders. But it is not clear that returnees wished for a fair and honest accounting of whatever degree of complicity they had had in a system of which they had been privileged members. Whatever claims for recognition that could be made for them collectively depended on a history which both they and their fellow citizens and new neighbors could not acknowledge.

The disappearance of the category of colonial empire is fundamental to the erasure of the people who had once received much attention and who once saw themselves as representing the fusion of metropole and colony, the human dynamic of an imperial process. It was this past which represented the basis for recognition, and it was this past that had been cut off sharply from the future of France, Portugal, the Netherlands, and the world in general.

Benjamin Stora writes that the Algerian “events” were: “For the French, a ‘war without a name,’ for the Algerians, a ‘revolution without a face....’” Two processes of effacement occurred both during and after the war itself. France could not accept the reality of the war, for if the myth that Algeria was an integral part of France were true, then France could only be at war with itself – hence the euphemisms by which the events of 1954-62 were called. On the other side of the struggle was the myth of a united people fighting for its liberation. In fact, Algerian nationalism emerged from a long process of engagement with French
power by educated elites who tried to turn the French citizenship construction into something meaningful and became radicalized as they failed, by Algerians who worked for wages in France or in Algeria and who entered the struggle via the communist party, by Islamic leaders who rejected the laicity inherent in France’s notion of citizenship in favor of another sort of polity, and by people who came to struggle via yet further routes. Its diverse and often hostile tendencies turned into factional rivalries in the 1950s, and successive leaders were purged during the war: hence the revolution with no faces and the bold but untenable claim that the Algerian people were themselves the hero of the revolution.

These willful occlusions have had long-term consequences, most tragically in Algeria itself, where within weeks of the victory, leaders were trying to purge other leaders for not being the true revolutionaries, beginning a long process in which leaders denied all legitimacy to opponents without having a clear idea of themselves of what the new society would be. In France, the deep wounds of the conflict have yet to heal. When the President of Algeria, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, visited Paris in June 2000, the government – its conservative President and its socialist Prime Minister – used the occasion to inscribe the normality and closeness of French-Algerian relations on a recent history that did not quite fit. But half the deputies on the right boycotted Bouteflika’s appearance at the Assemblée Nationale, invoking his alleged terrorist past and the memories of pieds-noirs and harkis, for whom reconciliation was still not possible. Among organized groups of pieds-noirs, the visit brought out nostalgia for Algérie française, mythopoeic assertions that relations between communities in Algeria had been good until “the events,” a longing that the world recognize the “civilizing work” of the white former Algerians, and continued bitterness that pieds-noirs were seen in negative terms within French society. However, not only these assertions but also the very claim of spokesmen and organizations to speak for the “pieds-noirs” was challenged in the press by a self-identified pied-noir who insisted that the organizations represented only 5 per cent of the 2 million pieds-noirs in France, whose diverse origins, varied situations, and conflicting political viewpoints while in Algeria, and diverse fates after 1962 were covered over by the assertion of a singular pied-noir point of view.

The controversies of 2000 soon focused on the role of the French state itself: Louisette Ighilahriz, an Algerian woman who had been in the FLN and who had been captured and tortured by the French military, wrote in the leading newspaper about a French doctor, whose name she
did not know, who had rescued her from her torturers. The general directly implicated in her accusation, Marcel Bigeard, replied that torture had never been practiced in his command, but that if it had, it would have been justified. But his commander, General Jacques Massu, wrote in the same issue of Le Monde in an entirely different tone: he admitted that torture had been practiced, that it could not be justified, and he recognized the identity of the doctor in question. A debate began over renaming a street in a small French town that had been named after General Bigeard, while the identification of the doctor who had saved Ighilahriz from her torturers was a vivid reminder that people made different moral choices in the most compromising of situations.4

The polemics of June 2000 – 38 years after the chaotic disembarkation described in these pages by Jean-Jacques Jordi – underscore the fact that this was not just a migration among many others and that the self-assertion of the pieds-noirs or retornados was not just “identity politics” like any other. At the most literal level, it is clearly true that the movement of people from Indonesia to the Netherlands, Portuguese Africa to Portugal, and Algeria to France was a migratory process outstanding for the rapidity with which this many people changed continents. But the historical significance of the migration was quite specific: a sudden, mass movement caused by a political crisis in a place, but profoundly affected by the demise of the category of empire. The migrants were the living embodiments of a history repudiated around the world.

Each chapter in this book describes organizations, literary productions, and campaigns that appear like classics of identity politics within nation-states: the assertion by people that they constitute a bounded collectivity, claiming recognition and resources from the nation-state on the basis of a commonality that distinguishes them from and connects them to fellow citizens. The retornado was in a sense claiming to be ultra-Portuguese, representing and defending Portuguese society and culture in a dangerous situation and paying a price for it – hence the validity of the demand for support and validation from the Portuguese state during the period of repatriation and reintegration or, more precisely in many cases, patriation and integration.

In reality, the migration and the identity politics models are not merely the abstractions of scholars, but real choices that returnees could make – to be a collectivity or to be ordinary immigrants. As immigrants, they might face varying degrees of prejudice, but they had the special advantage of entering with citizenship rights and the same racial and linguistic (if not cultural) markings as other French, Dutch,
or Portuguese citizens. Returnees could cease, or try to cease, to be a “they” marked by an embarrassing history. In spite of the ill-planned repatriations (by regimes that were in denial about the significance of decolonization), the established institutions for dealing with “social problems” in France and the Netherlands — and to a much lesser extent in Portugal — eventually kicked in and provided some help to returnees by treating them as immigrants, as Andrea Smith brings out in her chapter. Alternatively, if returnees saw themselves and insisted on being seen as a collectivity, they ran head on into the winds of change. Wim Willems’s chapter reveals the importance of both poles in this spectrum, some playing identity politics to the hilt, others entering migrant streams, sometimes trying to make their way in a European/North American/Australian world.

The attitudes of government officials and much of the metropolitan population in each instance has something to do with the flip side of the repatriates’ assertion of their own particularity. Returnees appeared all too alien, and something of this reaction was typical of general responses to immigration in uncertain times: xenophobia, stereotypes about criminality, fears of competition in the job market. But the reaction in France, the Netherlands, and Portugal was also much more historically based than that. I have emphasized so far the specificity of the period of decolonization. The other side of that coin (barely examined in the preceding chapters) was the changing significance of Europe from the 1950s onwards, as the European Economic Community was first talked about and then acted on. The politics of particularity of the returnees was played out not just against a national citizenship, but against a population increasingly seeing itself as “European,” and for whom the discarding of colonies was part of looking toward greater interaction within the European continent, both economically and socially. If France, from de Gaulle on, saw itself as the root of European civilization and aspired to European leadership, Portugal after 1974 was knocking at the door, its status insecure precisely because Portugal was a little too close to Africa.

Thus to the extent that the assertions of particularity and claims to recognition detailed in this book are patterns of identity politics, it was a politics that resonated badly with its time and social context. These were not recognition claims like any other: they were assertions of a past that risked getting in the way of a future.

It would be too simple to contrast the racism returnees brought from the colonies with the repudiation of racism on the part of European political elites. Ricardo Ovalle-Bahamón notes the new “wrinkles” of
race after decolonization. Returnees – and all three cases reveal this in one way or another – could still trade on their whiteness, a visible marker of belonging to a European world and one that could be translated into an entry visa into the United States or a better chance for one’s children to advance in the educational and job systems. To the extent that immigrants, notably in Portugal, were made to feel that their new neighbors looked down on them for having “exploited blacks,” such marking posited as its alternative not a benign, nonracial Europe but a tendency within Europe to dissociate itself from any sign of intimacy with its former colonies.

Whereas the expanded meaning of Europe complicates one side of the nationality story, the history of former colonies also fits poorly into a narrative that moves from empire to nation. Indeed the myth of a united struggle could stand in the way of coming to grips with the very real differences between factions and accepting the legitimacy of disagreement; Algeria’s purges in its early years of independence of its revolutionary leadership stands as a terrible illustration of this. Indonesia, as Willems notes, was first caught up in an official story of heroic liberation, under Sukarno, then in a denial of that story under Suharto, for fear that the former narrative legitimated the overthrown regime. Angola’s dilemma was a stark reminder that people do not get to build nations in a national space: when the victorious anticolonialist factions of 1974 promptly plunged into a seemingly endless civil war, they had plenty of help from outside. The apartheid government in South Africa and Reagan’s administration in the United States backed a rebel faction, UNITA, while Cuba and the Soviet Union gave aid to the MPLA government. This was very much a South African and Cold War quagmire, not a distinctly national one. The dilemmas of all such countries came not from the mere fact of being “postcolonial” but from specific histories of decolonization that risk being melded into a singular narrative, as well as from regional and international power struggles in a highly unequal world.

Ann Stoler and Karen Strassler reveal another side to the extinction of empire. Focusing on narratives of domesticity in Indonesia, they sought to find an alternative to the “flavored image of servants which is recurrent in colonial memoirs laced with the touch and smell of the servants in whose company childhoods were spent.” But instead of finding in their interviews with former servants that “subaltern narratives contain trenchant political critiques,” they found a series of stories at an oblique angle to the colonial one: some emphasized a family odyssey, some the mundane details of work, while many revealed “hesitancy,
thinness and discomfort when it came to remembering Dutch colonialism.”

The geopolitical conflicts of the years after decolonization, the conflict attending official and other attempts to construct a “national” memory of anticolonial struggle, and the obliqueness of the memories of the intimacies of colonial power all point to the difficulty of locating memories of decolonization in any one narrative framework. To say this is not to pass over the rich evidence of oral and documentary research that does emphasize national mobilization or other forms of struggle (of workers seeking equality within the boundaries of imperial polities, of peasants seeking to alter their relationship with a regional environment, of merchants, religious leaders, and intellectuals trying to navigate different border-crossing circuits). Instead, it emphasizes the volatility of the decades after World War II, when different forms of political imagination were opened up – and which elites of different types tried to restrict. Some of the more sweeping efforts of recent scholarship to capture contemporary social tensions in Europe and its former colonies under the rubric of “postcoloniality” fail to examine the range of histories. But emphasizing the inadequacy of national narratives or evocations of the postcolonial predicament reminds us of the peculiarity of the identity claims of returnees from Angola, Indonesia, and Algeria, as these were assertions of postcolonial identification that stand in contrast to the complexities of politics and the denials of memory in both Europe and its former colonies.

My emphasis is therefore on the significance of a historical process. To appreciate the context of decolonization, let me turn backward for a moment, to bring out, if only schematically, the tensions of colonial situations and how they played out as colonialism unravelled.

Colonial societies did not spring from the mere fact of colonization. They had to be constructed and reproduced. Empires are an old fact of history, but at first they were not clearly differentiated from other forms of rule, where superior people claimed the right to dominate their inferiors, whether culturally distinct or not. From the late eighteenth century in Europe, the possibility of an inclusive polity and of generalized citizenship required thinking specifically about whom to exclude. Nineteenth century colonization required ideological labor if the colonizing elite was to treat colonies in distinct ways from other kinds of polities. In such a situation, interstitial categories were given a valence that they did not necessarily have before. The man who thought he could have sex with anybody and recognize his children if he so chose was at one level the quintessential colonizer. By the late nine-
teenth century, such claims were harder to sustain. The embourgeoisement of colonialism meant sexual policing, of colonizers and not just the colonized, as Ann Stoler’s extensive research has made clear. It meant the policing of people who might go “native” and it entailed the policing of colonized people who became educated or served in the army, or did something to reveal that the distinction between colonizer and colonized was not so clear or immutable.

Colonial settlers got a lot of attention – more than a strict economic logic would suggest they deserved – they represented the fact that a colony was not simply a structure but a society, that it contained different parties, whose actions served larger purposes. In settler colonies, private citizens were part of the “team”; they represented claims for authority on the basis of race and culture; they represented progress. It is also not surprising that settler populations took themselves seriously. They often saw their role as at the center of colonizing effort, even if they were, in the final analysis, interstitial or even marginal within colonial states.

Some settler groups proved adept at using colonial rhetorics to entrench themselves as the system evolved. Algerian colon – whatever part of Europe they came from – kept focusing on the distinction between practitioners of Islamic civil law and themselves, and during the Third Republic they appropriated the rhetoric of citizenship and civilization for themselves as well, legitimating their growing voice in Algerian institutions and working to erect a wall against the application of citizenship logic to other Algerians. In 1940s Kenya, white settlers appropriated the language of development – even at a time when the British government was looking to the putatively moderate African as the future of the commonwealth, even when racial distinction was being formally repudiated – and they kept their place in a colonial order as the model modernizers. Settlers were a costly element of colonial society, demanding a level of services not provided for indigenous people. Settler populations were far from homogeneous, and many of them were poorly educated and poor in resources. Their contribution to imperial economies was not always strong, compared to corporate-controlled plantations and mines (whose European personnel came and went) or peasant producers whose cheap production of export crops earned foreign exchange, and they had the annoying habit of sticking around whether or not their economic contributions were expanding or shrinking. Most seriously, settlers demanded that the state help them discipline indigenous laborers and contain or repress disorders that arose in situations of exploitation and dislocation. The
most severe wars of decolonization occurred in settler colonies, Algeria, Angola, and Indonesia among them.

This argument emphasizes the incongruity between a structural situation and a human one: settlers were markers of the logic of enduring colonialism, of the gap that the “natives” had to cover to be truly civilized. But they were only one element of a political and economic structure, and not necessarily a vital one. They were, in the end, dispensable.

Let me turn to an equally schematic look at the process of decolonization. The cases described in this book are spread out over three decades, and I need to add an example not covered here to make sense of the chronology:

1940s: failure of Dutch to reimpose authority after World War II and withdrawal (1949)
1950s: French decisions to devolve power in sub-Saharan Africa (1956-60)
1960s: end of Algerian war (1962)

The nature of the problem changed fundamentally over these years. In the first instance, in the 1940s, no one knew that the era of colonial empires was ending. In the last instance, in the 1970s, everyone had reason to believe that colonial rule was no longer sustainable, and Portuguese colonies were besieged from independent African territories surrounding them and unable to command legitimacy and support from abroad.

The ultimate crisis of colonial rule began in the shadow of World War II, which exposed the weakness of European states and gave a bad name to ideologies based on racial domination. At the end of the war, France, Britain, the Netherlands, Portugal, and other powers needed both the resources of their colonies more than ever and to find new bases to legitimize empire. These were contradictory imperatives that colonial powers never resolved.

The Dutch exodus from Indonesia was traumatic – shocking because no pattern had yet been set, because of the length of time in which a Dutch presence in the Indies had seemed “normal,” because it came hard on the heels of a Japanese occupation that had deeply affected Dutch in Indonesia, and because of the violence of the process. Elsbeth Locher-Scholten describes a long dialogue of the deaf in which repatriates emphasized the continuity of the wars of 1941-45 and
1945-49 whereas the metropolitan Dutch tended to distinguish the victimization of Dutch in the Indies by Japanese imperialism from the losses that accompanied the defense of Dutch imperialism. Even as younger generations in the Netherlands became increasingly interested in marking memories of World War II, the version of the repatriates was hard to push beyond a subgroup; it could either be smuggled in under the generalized rubric of Pacific war memories or set aside as an embarrassing reminder of a colonial war, unsuccessful and unrighteous, that hardly fitted the Dutch narrative of building a prosperous and democratic nation from the ashes of World War II.

At the other end of the spectrum is the late decolonizer, Portugal. Portuguese Africa’s version of the development-oriented strategies of the postwar era was to bring many working class migrants from Portugal to the colonies, to fill roles for which Africans were being trained in French and British Africa in the 1950s. The contradictions of colonial rule in an era of self-determination were less strong in Portugal, which itself was under a dictatorship. Portugal maintained the myth of the unity of its empire for over a decade longer than the other European powers, and the collapse of its empire, following over a decade of war, brought with it the collapse of the dictatorship. And with it a new myth: that Portugal was leaving behind its antidemocratic and imperial past to become a modern European nation. Portugal washed its hands of its African subjects, who were left with little with which to begin forging new nations and, as Ovalle-Bahamón shows, only reluctantly accepted back retornados, many of whom had lost what little they had. Previously, settlers could manipulate the peculiar constellation of lusotropicalism – assertions of a Portuguese talent for managing a multiracial empire – with thoroughly racialized prejudices and practices to claim resources from the colonial state, but the new construction of Portugal implied a division between a white, European Portugal and a discarded black Africa. Whites abandoning Africa had a poor claim to a place of honor in the new Portugal.

In between the decolonizations of the 1940s and those of the 1970s come the crucial processes which extinguished the category of colonial empire from the world’s repertoire of legitimate political structures. In the case of France, the postwar need to assert the unity of Greater France – to set forth an assimilationist logic – had consequences that were not fully realized at the time. In 1946, France abolished the distinction between citizen and subject; all people in all territories were now citizens. White settlers had for years been able to use their status as citizens to insert themselves into councils at the territorial level and to insure
representation in the metropole. But after the war, the French government faced the task of coopting indigenous elites into French institutions and of deflecting or managing an avalanche of claims to equality based on the logic of citizenship. As a Republic, France had to take these claim-posing issues much more seriously than did Portugal, and trade unions as well as political parties were quick to demand social as well as political equality. In Algeria, the colons had for decades used their own citizenship status to forestall Muslim Algerians from asserting theirs, but that was becoming hard to do in all colonies. The once influential colon community in the Côte d’Ivoire was quickly marginalized after 1946.

The escalating claims made colonial rulers realize that the new version of empire was going to be expensive, and by the mid-1950s they were wondering if empire was worth much if the principle of clear distinction had been repudiated. In French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa, the timing of the renunciation of an empire in which all people would be assimilated into the social as well as political status of French citizen was crucial: 1956. The “loi cadre” of that year devolved most budget-making authority to elected, African-majority legislatures in each territory, and French officials hoped that if those politicians had to pay the bills, they would also assume the responsibility of keeping demands for equivalence in check. A territorial citizenship would replace an imperial one. In the delicate politics of the late 1950s, white, French Africans became an irrelevance; the stakes of managing the devolution of power to cooperative African elites were too high.

The politics of citizenship in Algeria was also a failure, but a different failure: republican institutions were not up for grabs in postwar Algeria, but were already dominated by colons. This abusive notion of citizenship which excluded Muslims was so deeply entrenched that even governments hoping to bring about in Algeria a “colonialisme du progrès” could not do so. However inadequate the postwar French government’s attempts to make the citizenship reform meaningful in Algeria, the influence of settlers there made it much harder than in sub-Saharan Africa both to implement the reform and to get out when it proved unmanageable. The postwar era for settlers witnessed a double struggle – against Algerian Muslims and against the new postwar understanding of citizenship in France. In the end, they were losers twice over, watching Muslims take over a land they regarded as theirs and finding themselves on their “return” to France in the humiliating position of having to accept from France exactly what they had been
trying to deny the majority of Algerians, the right to claim equal services and resources from the state.

The place of colonies – and even more so of colonists – in the French political imagination was always ambiguous. Charles-Robert Ageron has argued that France was never truly a colonialist nation; rather there was a “parti colonial” – settlers and some, but by no means all, business interests – which had a lot at stake in colonies versus a larger public that cared little one way or the other. But until the 1940s, colonies were taken for granted; no one had to think about them very much. Much of the left, until the start of the Algerian war itself, was able to convince itself that colonies could be reformed rather than abandoned, that the French revolutionary tradition could bring colonies out of their backwardness and onto the path toward socialism. The French left learned about colonial liberation from African and Asian political movements, not the reverse. By the mid-1950s, faced with wars in Indochina and Algeria and escalating costs in sub-Saharan Africa, French leaders were calculating the costs and benefits of empire in a cold manner not previously practiced. The sums did not add up. The businesses associated with the parti colonial were becoming less and less important as Europe was becoming more and more the field of reference for the rapidly growing domestic economy of 1950s France.

Intellectuals were briefly engaged by the dramatic changes in the colonies in the late 1940s and early 1950s – Georges Balandier wrote a brilliant article about the “colonial situation” in 1951 – but within a few years most were treating colonialism as a dying system and turning their attention to urbanization, economic growth, and “modernization.” These areas were then seen as the most profound issues of the international arena and the focus of aspirations for progress for the downtrodden and the oppressed. The Algerian war, and particularly the scandals over torture and brutality in the name of France, opened up the colonial question again; Fanon’s *Les damnés de la terre*, can best be read as a plea to French intellectuals to shed their illusions about modernizing colonial societies and recognize that only the reversal of the colonial order could unshackle colonized people.

Settlers were getting in the way of calculation and analysis, thanks to their sentimental imperialism, their insistence that Algeria was a terroir, a land of emotion as well as profit. Certain people in France as well as in Algeria cared deeply about the idea of Algérie française, and that made it difficult for the political and economic elite to wheel and deal, to get what they could out of changing political relationships and cut their losses where need be. The convulsions in French politics over Algeria
contrast with the calculation in regard to the non-settler colonies south of the Sahara.

But the result, after much pain, was the same. France not only devolved power but also abdicated responsibility. France sometimes provided aid to its former colonies, but this was foreign aid, a mark of generosity and not of obligation. Where necessary – as in Algeria – she washed her hands of the immense damage her presence had caused. France betrayed people – such as the harkis who had been its closest indigenous allies – and treated white settlers as people who should oblige the mother country by quietly disappearing, if not into the Algerian citizenry then into the French.

The colons’ problem was not simply that their claim to be central to France’s overseas projects rang false, but that they were not nearly as well rooted in French society as they thought they were. Many were not of French origin, while others had lived so long in Algeria that they understood little of the metropole; they were socially and politically diverse enough that even the views they shared could not be spoken with one voice. When some of them tried to mobilize against de Gaulle, they found parts of the military willing to conspire with them, but others were not. When the waves of “French” refugees from Algeria came ashore in Marseilles in the summer of 1962, many did not realize that their connections to the French far right marginalized them rather than integrated them into the changing society of the metropole.

William Cohen describes an effort, spanning decades, on the part of some pieds-noirs and their descendants to keep alive, through associations, books and articles, and other sorts of cultural productions, a sense of bounded collective identification and an effort toward “vindication of their past.” What he demonstrates however, is just one side of the story: such efforts were part of a range of strategies that pieds-noirs could take. As he notes, much of the next generation looked more toward assimilation into the world of neighborhood, school, and work in France. I am not convinced that asking – as Wim Willems does near the end of his rich and illuminating chapter – whether “there is such a thing as a Dutch Indies identity today” (p. 58) is posing the question as precisely as possible. To treat returnee “identity” as a central issue is to take what some activists were trying to establish as a social reality or to privilege one among other political strategies. To the extent that returnees “had” a collective identity, it stemmed from the exclusive focus on the moment of expulsion, exile, and repatriation and occluded the diverse trajectories that had brought settlers to Algeria, Angola, or Indonesia, the distinctions and conflicts that had been so important to
their lives there, and the different parts people had played in the politics of failed repression in the final years of colonial rule.

The chapters of this book reveal the importance of establishing connections in old and new ways, of making claims on the basis of criteria that are not necessarily an affect-laden form of “belonging.” As Stephen C. Lubkemann argues for Portugal, the collective identification of retornados “suffered radical atrophy” in relation to “the roles that characterize the broader Portuguese community – as ‘sisters,’ ‘clients,’ ‘retirees,’ ‘cousins’ and ‘neighbors’.”[p. 91] To focus on returnee “identity” is to project a multidimensional history onto a flat surface, and indeed to miss the poignancy of questions of belonging when they were in fact posed.

The efforts of some, but not all, returnees in the years after repatriation to dramatize collective identification and remember shared experiences is the flip side of the efforts of decolonizing powers and much of the metropolitan populations to obliterate the traces of their awkward histories. To examine the process of national forgetting is at least as important as recovering what has been forgotten.

But it is probably easier to observe the efforts of those who sought to emphasize their distinctiveness than those who quietly sought to enter into other streams of French, Dutch, or Portuguese society: perhaps seeking to distance themselves from their histories, perhaps accepting their origins as a fact without making it into a statement. More decisive than the proverbial “search for identity” is the question of what sort of social and cultural capital repatriates brought with them and how they used it. Social cohesion is an asset in some circumstances, but at the time of decolonization it was very risky to use, as to emphasize the particularity of the pied-noir, the retornado, or the repatriate was to accentuate marginality rather than integration. It might well serve, as it did for many pieds-noirs, to integrate them into a strand of right-wing politics, what became the Front National, but that was a compromised asset. The most useful capital of all, especially in the early years after return, was the fact of citizenship, especially citizenship in a social democratic polity such as France and the Netherlands. In these countries, the mere fact of citizenship, let alone the cultural and racial markers associated with it, conveyed with it specified entitlements.

Returnees were white (and those who were not faced distinct barriers in social interaction, a point Lubkemann emphasizes (p. 89)); they spoke the language of the metropole; they had familiar educational credentials. Even as Western European powers formally repudiated the racist doctrines that had been refined and naturalized in colonial set-
tings – a repudiation whose significance many returnees did not appreciate – metropolitan societies did not suddenly cease to care about issues of distinctiveness among people disembarking on their shores. Some returnees had family and business connections, although in many cases these were shallow or focused on groups that were of diminishing influence in the metropole itself. But these were resources that other immigrants often did not have. And there were political resources as well: being a victim of Sukarno, when the American State Department perceived him as an enemy of the western world, could be converted into a visa for the United States.

Willems’s discussion of Dutch returnees who moved to the United States or Australia is particularly revealing, and comparative analysis of other migration processes in such terms would be useful. These double migrants were playing a certain kind of card: their knowledge of how to manage displacement, their ability to make use of whatever would gain them entry to a place where they might find work. They traded not on their distinctiveness, but on their assimilability.

Memory – as all the chapters make clear – is a cultural and social resource that migrants could use. But memory work does not simply forge bounded collectivities that celebrate their identity and complain about how little recognition they get. It is part of relational strategies, of forging diverse connections, of finding new forms of affinity. And memory work for many returnees as well as their European neighbors entailed forgetting or compartmentalizing the connections of the past.

The strongest interest of these chapters, to my mind, does not lie in their rescuing yet another category of people from the dustbin of history, but in their using the problematic definition of this category as a means to focus on an untidy historical process. Just as colonial regimes’ inordinate attention to defining and regulating interstitial groups revealed much about the power and vulnerability of colonial regimes, the way in which pieds-noirs, repatriates, and retornados were marked and unmarked in the midst of decolonization reveals a great deal about the place of that process in European history. Power in colonial societies did not rest on an abstracted nexus of domination and difference – which some scholars misleadingly label as “coloniality” – but on concrete structures manned by actual people. Settler colonialism brought to the fore people who did not disappear when they no longer served a purpose. They turned up in awkward places, living reminders that the consequences of colonization have lasted longer than colonies.
Notes to Introduction


2. *L’Europe retrouvée. Les migrations de la décolonisation* (1994, edited by Colette Dubois and Jean-Louis Miège) presents the important first work of its kind to explore the migrations of decolonization. See also Etemad (1998).

3. If we include in our calculations the returnees and expellees to Germany following World War II, this number would increase by 9 to 12 million (Peach 1997:271).

4. Etemad suggests that we consider as a third type those settler colonies where the European populations surpassed those of the native population, such as in North America or Oceania. While the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand have gained their independence, they have done so through the work of the white settlers, and therefore it could be argued that the colonial political and economic apparatuses are still in place (Etemad 1998:460). These “decolonizations” did not result in mass white flight. Consequently, the postwar cases of decolonization considered here generally involve the emancipation of settler and tropical colonies where Europeans did not outnumber the local population.

5. Colonial auxiliaries included the Amboinese or South Moluccans, who had served in the Dutch colonial army and who arrived in Holland in the early 1950s, and approximately 100,000 to 200,000 French Muslims who served with the French army during the French-Algerian war or who were members of the colonial administration (Dubois 1994a:96).
6. South Asians, for instance, worked in British and French colonies as middlemen merchants trading between local producers and Europeans. Large numbers of the South Asian population of Uganda, as British citizens by the 1960s, migrated to the UK from 1969 to 1972 (Robinson 1995:332).

7. See Wesseling (1980:132-4) for a summary of migratory phases to Holland from Indonesia; see Robinson (1995:332) on the phases of migrations from Uganda.

8. French Equatorial Africa in 1945 consisted of Chad, Gabon, Central Congo, and Ubanghi-Shari (in postcolonial terminology, Chad, Gabon, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Central African Republic); French West Africa in 1925 included Senegal, French Guinea, the Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Upper Volta, Niger territory, French Sudan and Mauritania. For a summary of the main events in the decolonization of the French Empire, see Chamberlain (1998:150-182) and Betts 1991.

9. Over 200,000 Jews from North Africa settled in France after decolonization, and their integration and impact on existing religious institutions and practices there is the subject of considerable research (Bahloul 1996; Benayoun 1996; Bensimon-Donath 1971).

10. The term harki is often used globally to refer to Muslims who fought alongside the French forces during the French-Algerian war, although there were in fact three groups involved: harkis, mokhaznis, who were attached to special sections of the civil administration, and mobile security forces (Dubois 1994a:95-6).

11. Approximately 275,000 French were repatriated from these former colonies between 1952 and 1961 (Dubois 1994a:91). Overall, France would receive over 1.5 million French from 1952 to 1967, representing approximately 3.6 percent of the population (Ibid:107).

12. The logistical nightmare involved in the transportation, reception and re-settlement of the “pieds-noirs” has been described in depth by Jordi (1993, 1995, 1996).

13. IARN officials transported retornados on arrival to family members they might have in Portugal, along with financial support for basic subsistence needs (Dubois 1994b:231).

14. These include Peach (1997), who considers “reflux,” or the postcolonial and postwar returns as one of three principle categories of European migration; Castles and Miller, who do not highlight colonial repatriates, but at least mention this as an additional possible category (1993:66); and Robin Cohen (1995), who devotes a chapter of The Cambridge Survey of World Migration to “repatriates and colonial auxiliaries.”

15. In France, “rapatrié” government agencies responsible for the migrants included the “Centre d’orientation pour les Français rapatriés” (1957) and the
“Commissariat à l’aide et à l’orientation des Français rapatriés” (1959) (Dubois 1994a:99-100). In Holland, they are “repatriëring.” In Portugal, the principal government organization is the Instituto de Apoio ao Retorno de Nacionais, or IARN (Institute for the Support of the Repatriation of Nationals) (Rocha-Trindade 1995:338).

16. When the first groups of migrants began to arrive in France from Algeria, Algeria was still legally a part of France. The same was true for those returning to Portugal before the July 19, 1974 annulment of the Constitution of 1933 which declared its African possessions part of Portugal.

17. During the last months of Algérie française, the French government purposefully reduced the frequency of trans-Mediterranean ferry trips in an effort to prevent a mass exodus of settlers from Algeria (Jordi 1995:19). The Dutch government tried to convince especially the Indonesian Dutch to remain in Indonesia after independence. Approximately 14,000 finally chose Indonesian passports, only to regret their decision. Thousands of these spijtoptanten returned to Holland in the late 1950s (Obdeijn 1984:54).

18. William Cohen writes that de Gaulle found the presence in France of the pieds-noirs an irritating reminder of the failure of his policies to maintain a French Algeria (1980:103).

19. As part of the Geneva Convention of 1951.

20. British subjects from the colonies were already arriving in Great Britain from the Caribbean and East Asia during the war, and more followed after the war in response to acute labor shortages (Layton-Henry 1992:10-12).

21. This literature source is extensive; key works include Brubaker 1989; Buechler and Buechler 1987; Castles et al. 1984; Edye 1987; Hammar 1985; Herfurth and Hogeweg-de Haart 1982; Martin 1993; King 1993.

22. For another example of this pattern, see Modood et al. 1997.

23. As Lunn succinctly notes, in Britain, this leads to a paradigm that links racism and racialism in Britain to a significant “black presence” (1999:335).


26. For a review, see Malkki 1995.

27. An exhaustive review of this literature is impossible here. Participants are many, as are those who warn us against claiming the end of the nation-state too early (Brennan 1990:45), being overly celebratory of the liberating possibilities of globalization (Barber 1997:40), and the possibility for the over-romanticization of exile and displacement (Malkki 1995:514).

28. For a salutary critique of the diaspora trope, see Soysal (2000).

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29. Examples of trading diasporas include merchant groups such as Chinese or Lebanese traders who migrated to a variety of colonial settings (Cohen 1997:84). Labor diasporas are exemplified in Cohen’s work by indentured Indian labor brought by planters to an array of sites across the globe (Ibid:59-60).
30. This is a cultural feature of globalization underscored by Appadurai (1996).
31. I would like to thank Thomas Abercrombie for bringing this comparison to my attention.

Notes to Chapter 1

1. This article is a revised version of a lecture I gave at the workshop “Mixed Identities in the (post)colonial world,” May 1-2, 1998, organized by Deakin University, Melbourne. Since then, my insights have been developed by empirical research, resulting more recently in Willems 2001. For more information on the postcolonial history of the Dutch from the former East Indies, please refer to that work.
2. Including 12,000 Moluccans, military men in the service of the Royal Dutch East Indies Army, and their families; approximately 7,000 Peranakan Chinese; and 3,000 Minahassers and other small groups.
3. There is of course a vast amount of academic literature on colonial history, but a sociohistorical analysis of the Dutch settlers and their descendants is almost absent. A representative example of the approach in this field of study is the recent overview by van den Doel 1996. Studies on the early stages of decolonization are almost exclusively focused on the political and military struggles. See for example Drooglever and Schouten 1997.
4. The largest social scientific research project focused on the integration of the Dutch from Indonesia in the period to 1955 was Kraak 1957. See also van der Veur 1955.
5. The hypothesis of the successful assimilation of the Dutch migrants from Indonesia has been postulated in several books and studies. See Ex 1966; Wassenaar-Jellesma 1966; Surie1971; van Amersfoort 1974.
6. An important exception is an academic volume by authors who had been eyewitnesses of the events in the prewar, war, and postwar years in the former Dutch East Indies (Baudet and Brugmans 1961). The interpretation of the cultural history of the Indies group was enriched by the handbook on Dutch literature about the East Indies, Nieuwenhuys 1972.
7. See Brugmans 1960; van Velden 1963; Beets 1981.
8. For an overview of the recent findings on these topics, see Willems and de Moor 1995.
9. The most well-known authors are Gomes, whose novels were collected in the volume *Tropenkind* (1992); Bloem 1983; van Dis 1983 and 1994; Stolk 1983.

10. We should mention in particular Pollmann and Harms 1987.

11. Initiated by the Indies organization Pelita, the social scientists J.E. Ellemers and R.E.F. Vaillant wrote a general overview (1985) of contemporary knowledge of the Indies category in the Netherlands.

12. Pioneering work, focused on the eighteenth century, was done by the Australian historian Jean Gelman Taylor (1983) followed by Cottaar and Willems (1984) who discussed the postwar period.


15. Approximately 1,000 Dutch individuals with different backgrounds who lived and worked in the former Dutch East Indies or in Indonesia between 1940 and 1965 are being interviewed, and the tapes will be made available as a collection of life histories for future research projects. The coordinator of this oral history project is Fridus Steijlen, working at the KITLV in Leiden.


17. A plea for a synthesis of the macro-, mezzo- and micro-level of analysis in migration studies – and also a valuable introduction into the contemporary debates in this field of study, is Lucassen and Lucassen (1999).

18. On this topic, see Cottaar and Willems 1984.

19. The advantages of the divergent approach in migrant-studies are addressed in Green 1999.

20. On inter-governmental negotiations between the United States and the Netherlands regarding the migration of “Eurasians” from the Netherlands to the United States, see Willems 1997. On the same topic, but between Australia and the Netherlands, see Willems (to be published). On Canada, see Nagtegaal and Hellwig 1992.

21. See for example the personal accounts of Nieuwenhuys 1982; Timmerije (1993) who interviewed people with parents who have a different national or cultural background; and Visser and Malko (1988), a volume with interviews.


26. There is a growing literature about the traumatic experiences of Indies people who experienced the Pacific-War and/or the Indonesian revolutionary war. The largest, however controversial, study is van der Velden 1994.

27. In Melbourne, Sydney and Brisbane I interviewed thirty-five people whose ages ranged from 60 to 80.


31. For a summary of our knowledge about this topic, see Willems et al. (1997:167-180) and the above publications.

32. An extensive account on the history of these arrangements is to be found in Tinnemans and von Winckelmann 1997.


34. Willems 1994; Seriese 1997. A biographical sketch of this writer is included in Anthonio 1990.


36. See Willems 1997 and Willems 2001. The information in this paragraph is largely based on my chapter about America.


38. My colleagues Joost Coté and Loes Westerbeek, Deakin University, Melbourne, have taken the initiative for a large interview project focusing on people with a Dutch-Indonesian background in Australia. Their first findings were published in Coté and Westerbeek 1997.

39. An analysis of this “policy” is to be found in White 1981.

40. In his study on the postwar migration of the Dutch of all categories to Australia, Elich mentions a number of returning migrants of between 25 and 35 percent (1987:105). It is not possible to differentiate to country of birth, so we cannot conclude anything for the Indies category.

41. In different studies the importance of ties with the wider family is stressed. For the Netherlands, see Brinkgreve and van Stolk 1997:179.

42. See the section articles about “Older Dutch Australians” in Gruter and Stracke 1995.

43. The latest book in this field and the first in which an international comparative perspective is explored is Raben 1999.
Notes to Chapter 2

1. I have explored this idea in greater depth in Jordi 1993.
2. This is calculated using a low estimate of two million “repatriates,” and the metropolitan population as estimated at 44.3 million in 1960.
4. Public opinion shifted dramatically as the French-Algerian war proceeded. In 1955, three out of four French citizens were convinced that Algeria should remain French and that there were no compelling reasons to compromise with the “terrorists” (the National Liberation Front, or FLN). Six years later, in 1961, a public opinion poll showed that 69% of the French were opposed to making any further sacrifices on behalf of the French in Algeria.
5. For a summary of the principle events in Algerian decolonization, see Stora (1995).
8. Departmental Archives, Bouches-du-Rhône, M6 30874
10. Departmental Archives Bouches-du-Rhône, M6 30874
11. It was from May 16 onwards that ferry companies, in defiance of the limits imposed by the French government, instead decided to intensify their service between France and Algeria.
12. The French government is prohibited by law from distinguishing or identifying one subset of the population by ethnic origins, race or religion. However, the government did so when it established a series of rights and measures for a population defined as “French Muslims,” effectively isolating them from wider French society.
13. On this subject see Jordi and Hamoumou 1999; also Departmental Archives, Bouches-du-Rhône, M 625112 and M6 30874.
14. Article 1 of the law of December 26, 1961 generally concerns “those French having had to flee as a result of the political events territories which had been under French control when they had settled.” This law would become known as the “Repatriates’ Charter.”
18. Alain Peyrefitte, who was named Minister of Repatriates on September 1962, tried to draw de Gaulle’s and Pompidou’s cabinet’s attention to the

20. This was the official time allotted for the “dégagement” of the repatriates.
22. The government did not put in place any sort of “national organization” on behalf of the repatriates until March 1963, when it launched the “Priority for Repatriates’ Employment” campaign under the direction of the new Minister Misoffe who had replaced Peyrefitte.
24. The number of complaints registered by the repatriates in the departmental archives is innumerable.
25. Interview with “Madame M.L.”
27. Departmental Archives, Bouches-du-Rhône M6 30864.
29. The title of a Bouches-du-Rhône Communist Federation’s poster plastered on walls all over Marseilles.
31. These measures included getting an official count of the repatriate population and promoting their insertion in regions outside of Paris and Marseilles, making the repatriates turn in their weapons, but also reserving 30% of public housing units for them, constructing new housing, and reintegrating police officers from Algeria into the French police force.
32. Many articles from the *Marseillaise* published during Algeria’s independence use these terms.
33. Departmental Archives, Bouches-du-Rhône M6 30862.
36. This opinion is shared by many other researchers, including Benjamin Stora and Guy Pervillé, who have argued that the history of Algeria under French domination and its independence should break with the “colonialism versus anticolonialism” binary, and go beyond current “official” historical accounts.

Notes to Chapter 3

1. For the purposes of understanding the magnitude of this impact it is useful to imagine what an influx of approximately 15-18 million immigrants within a year might represent for the United States in 2001 (i.e. a 5-7 percent
population increase), bearing in mind that the USA (unlike Portugal) has a long history of net immigration rather than emigration.

2. While calculations of the dimensions of these migrations are still underway, as Smith points out here, some scholars even argue that the percentage increase to the Portuguese population is double that found in other European countries. See Pires et al. 1984.

3. The significance of this number is considerably amplified when we consider two additional demographic characteristics of the retornado population: (1) younger retornados born abroad who would be the accompanying dependents of parents returning to districts of origin would be counted as new immigrants to these districts; and (2) retornados were much more likely to have emigrated to Africa before marriage and have gotten married in Africa. Consequently, married retornados who migrated to their spouse's district of origin would also be counted as new immigrants to these districts. In both of these cases however, family ties via a parent or spouse who was returning to an area of origin would be established despite the fact of migration to a district where they had not been born. It is therefore highly likely that the majority of retornados settled areas in which they were likely to have some form of family ties. More demographic analysis and region-specific study is needed to determine this issue.

4. Elsewhere (Lubkemann, forthcoming) I have distinguished “performative” from “essentialist” criteria, the former referring to criteria that evaluate and can be met through chosen behavior, and the latter to criteria that are ascribed on the basis of what are presumably inherent traits.

Notes to Chapter 5

1. For my research I profited from the knowledge of the following participants of commemoration procedures: A.A. (Harry) Verheij (interview February 7, 1995); Mrs. J. van Kempen (February 8, 1995), D. van Loghem (February 22, 1995), and P.S.J. van de Ven (March 21, 1995). Dr. Jolande Withuis, Dr. Petra Groen and Dr. Penny Summerfield commented on an earlier draft of the text. I am grateful to all concerned.


5. The term “Indies” will be used for the Dutch East Indies in this chapter.


8. For a more detailed elaborated history of these years from an Indonesian perspective see Ricklefs 1993:199-237. The impressive bibliography of Klooster (1997) offers a valuable introduction to the abundant literature on the subject.

9. See Wim Willems’s chapter in this book.


17. Carasso 1995:133-147

18. Among these organizations, the NIBEG (the Alliance of Former Prisoners of War and Internees, Nederlands-Indische Bond van Ex-Krijgsgevangenen en Geïnterneerden) was the most prominent. Others include the Federation of Illegal Workers in the Indies (FIWI) and the Women’s Union. Military representatives were Chief of Staff in the Indies, General S.H. Spoor and Lieutenant-Admiral C.E.L. Helfrich, responsible for the Navy in the Indies.


22. See verbaal 20-2-1928, no. 23 and no. 24, MINOG 323, ARA. For the East Indies, the Minister J.A. Jonkman mentioned earth “representative of those parts of the population who cooperated voluntarily.” The Dutch participation should not be in the foreground. For the West, where no battles had been fought, he suggested a “representative urn,” containing remnants of those inhabitants who had fought and died elsewhere or only a list of their names.

23. Spoor to Lt.- Governor-General, 18-5-1948, MINOG doss. 323.

24. See Letter of Government Secretary to Adjudant-General War Grave Service 22-8-1949 and appendices, in archive General Secretary Batavia/Algemene Secretarie Batavia, file 2273, ARA.


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26. Prime Minister Drees to Minister Overseas Territories 24-5-1949, no. 23952; notes Council of Ministers 30-5-1949; MINOG 323.
27. Minute verbaal 24-11-1949 Q 72, MINOG Kabt. doss. G323.
28. Minute verbaal 13-12-1949 Z 76 MINOG Kabt. doss. G323. For a summary of the discussion on the text of the charter, which was stripped of all its original, politically sensitive rhetoric, see appendices 1st Government Secretary 27-10-1949, Algemene secretarie 2273.
29. This origin is not repeated elsewhere, probably due to the sensitive character of the subject. See A. Doup, War Grave Service II F, to Army Commander in Indonesia, 11-2-1949, Algemene Secretarie 2273.
30. This was similar in other wars of decolonization, such as the actions of the French in Algeria.
31. Nibeg-orgaan 5, no. 1 of January 13, 1950, 4-5. For a description of the urn, container and charter see also MINOG doss. 323 and Algemene Secretarie 2273. The Dam Monument had been designed by sculptor John Raedecker and architect J.J.P. Oud.
32. See text in MINOG doss. 323.
33. See texts of speeches in MINOG doss. 323.
34. For the text of the charter see note 27.
41. He had died a natural death in 1949 and had been buried at the cemetery of honor at Menteng Pulo, Jakarta.
42. Chairman of the Working Committee to the Minister of War July 29, 1955 and draft reply February 1956, GAA 396, file 16. The requests were repeated and rejected in the 1980s. Both urns are now part of the collection of the Bronbeek museum in Arnhem.
43. De Nieuwe Dag December 27, 1955, GAA 396, file 19; Vermolen 1995:96, 105
44. Lijphart 1966
45. Repression of memories stimulated the growth of myths about Dutch military successes and political failures, see Groen 1991. For comparable repression of lost (colonial) wars, see Stora 1992.
46. See Kousbroek 1992. In the East Indies, in contrast the European community turned a deaf ear to members of the Dutch resistance (personal communication of a former resistance member).
47. The integration of this first large group of immigrants in the Netherlands after 1945 is considered to be a success story: the expatriates from Indonesia assimilated silently and without apparent problems. See Willems and Lucassen 1994. In the 1960s, integration was so successful that the NIBEG lost its function in 1963 and was dissolved (Nibeg-orgaan 18, no. 15 of December 13, 1963, 145).

48. This number can be derived from Cottaar and Willems 1984:24-27; Ellemers and Vaillant 1987. Another 75,000 would follow after 1957.

49. Von der Dunk 1986:13


52. Text memorial service December 10, 1949, MINOG 323.


55. Nibeg-orgaan 6, no. 3 (February 9, 1951), 21. The monument was erected on the field of honor Kalibanteng (Semarang). Nibeg-orgaan 6, no. 6 (March 23, 1951), 46.; idem 6, no. 9 (May 11, 1951), 69. For the dissertation see van Velden 1963. Although five times reprinted since then, this standard work did not attract any specific attention in 1963, which illustrates the lack of interest in the Pacific war at that time. For more on POW camps, see van Witsen 1971.


57. Although the direct link is denied by one of those involved. Interview J. van Kempen, February 8, 1995.

58. The foundation was started by the author Jo van Dijk-Manders. For the reunion, see “Twintig jaar later,” The book is Manders 1971.

59. The design was by Frans Nix, a former camp child and a sculptor of some renown. He would later be involved with another war monument, the camp Ravensbrück monument in Amsterdam. Ramaker and van Bohemen 1980:118-119. Interview J. van Kempen, February 8, 1995, Vrijburg et al. 1972.

60. In Dutch, “Onversaagd en ongebroken.”


63. Memorial service December 10, 1949, speech by Major General D. de Waal, in MINOG, dossier 323.
64. Captain 1993.
66. At the 1969 reunion of the Foundation, only KNIL troops were praised as protectors. This tallied with the reminding group itself: Dutch women from KNIL families.
67. The year 1949 was only implicitly present in the title of the record of the 1969 reunion, “Twintig jaar later.” It implied that 1949 had been the final painful experience: “After twenty years, we have overcome” was the answer to the question of why this reunion was only organized then. Record of the 1969 reunion “Twintig jaar later,” private.
68. “Bersiap,” or “be prepared,” was the cry of young Indonesian revolutionaries in 1945.
70. Bramsen 1995; Haan 1997. “Center 45” for the psychiatric treatment of those traumatized by their war experiences, the law on state support for those persecuted in war were the first steps in 1973, followed by a state-sponsored Centre for Information and Coordination of Services to Victims of War in 1980 and the extension of state support to civil war victims (1984). See figures on Indies clients of the Center for Information and the Coordination of Services to Victims of War (Informatie- en Coördinatieorgaan Dienstverlening Oorlogsgetroffenen, ICODO) in ICODO annual reports 1978-1990, Utrecht.
71. In October 1971, Dutch public memory of the Pacific war had been only temporarily been revived by a protest action by the famous cabaret artist Wim Kan at the unofficial visit of Emperor Hirohito in October 1971 (Van Poelgeest 1987). The memory function of hijacking actions by Moluccans in 1975 and 1977 that brought Dutch colonialism back to public attention, was also temporary. See Barker 1988.
73. Contrary to the long list of books on the war in Europe, secondary school pupils have only a few concerning the Pacific war on their reading list, including Brouwers 1981; van Dis 1994; Springer 1993.
74. Boekholt 1992. This was the only serious criticism of this fourteen-volume series. See Romijn 1993.
76. Participants included the royal family and members of the government. The report of this day, published in 1972, was exceptional, as this book reported on the entire decade of 1940-1950. All participating groups were remembered, military as well as civilian, Indonesian as well as Chinese, men as well as women, Dutch military victims of the 1945-1949 period as well as their Indonesian opponents (except for the extremists). Both periods were treated as one and indivisible, as a continuum, including even Dutch colonialism in general, since “the Builders of the Great-Netherlands” were incorporated in the remembrance as well. Vrijburg 1972:31.
78. In 1982, the Japanese capitulation was also included in the annual commemoration of the capitulation in Wageningen. In 1985 an Indies Memorial Stone was inaugurated in the Dutch parliament.
79. Instances of the different sectors Stichting Pelita, Indische Pensioenbond, Stichting Belangengroep Dragers Verzetstter Oost-Azië; Moesson, Indisch Wetenschappelijk Instituut; the Burma Railway Reunions, the Flores Moluccas Reunion, the Pakan Baru Railway Committee, KNIL Reunion Committee; the organization Children from the Japanese Occupation and Bersiap (Kinderen uit de Japanse kampen en de Bersiap, KJBB).
80. Concept verslag Adviescomité Oorlogsherdenkingstekens (Concept report Advisory Committee on War Memorials). November 1986. Archive Ministry of VWS, Directie Verzetsteelnemers en Vervolgden (DVV), file AO vergaderingen, AO-EB-140 The responsible department management had four projects in mind: one in the Netherlands, two in Europe (from a national and an international perspective), and one concerning the Japanese occupation of the former Dutch East Indies. All were realized. (AO-EB 140, Ministry VWS, DVV; unpublished report “Jeugdvoorlichtingsbeleid Tweede Wereldoorlog-Heden. Verantwoording en voornemens,” Ministry VWS, April 1991, 2.2.1)
84. After announcements in art journals and various selection rounds, the design by the Dutch sculptor Jaroslawa Dankowa (of Bulgarian origin) was chosen.

85. According to the Japanese army officer Miyamoto Shizui, a million male Indonesians and half a million female Indonesians worked during the war on a fixed or temporary basis (Shizui 1986:247). Numbers are a point of debate among historians. However, agreement exists on the death rate of the romushas working outside Java: around 75% (Zwitser 1995:52-53).


87. Answer Prime Minister, Handelingen der Staten Generaal. Tweede Kamer, 1986-1987, Appendix no. 227, p. 453. See the analysis of public opinion in Algemeen Dagblad, December 6, 1986. The three main political parties PvdA, CDA and VVD opposed the visit. Of those interviewed in the age group of 50 and older, 70% was of that opinion. See also Trouw, December 5, 1986. This public debate followed closely upon another “war debate,” concerning the state pension of the widow of a former Dutch National-Socialist leader, Rost van Tonningen. Reactions in Japan were cool. The Asahi Shimbun of December 13 reported that while Japan tended to forget the war, other countries remembered the atrocities of the Japanese troops: “the Netherlands stands out as a country where this is never forgotten.”


89. Report “Met het oog op morgen” NOS September 27, 1989. The subject was debated in Australia, the United Kingdom, Korea, Canada, Israel (ANP and diplomatic reports in Foreign Affairs/,DOA 1988-1994, no.181 and 182; 911.21, part IV. Internal memorandum, March 28, 1989, no. 51-89, Ibid.)

Like the 1986 debate on the royal visit, this coincided with a revival of European war memories through the release of two German war criminals in January 1989.

90. Trouw, February 1, 1989.

91. Commissie Maatschappelijke Erkenning Veteranen/Lagendijk, in Veteranen, Appendix 3, 35. In 1991, two incidents had the same informative function: after a visit of the Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu to the Indies monument, a former internee threw the Japanese wreath in the water; at the August 15 commemoration, the Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers was hit by an egg.

92. The Sumatra/Pakan Baroe monument (1988), the Boy’s camps Bangkong-Gedungjati monument (1988), the Burma monument (1989) and the
monument of the former KNIL, the Royal Dutch East Indies Army (1990)


Notes to Chapter 6

3. On the struggle within the FLN to create a secular or Islamic state, see Nouschi (1993: 111-128).
11. France Horizon, no. 343 (June-Jl 1993); Roseau 1991:70.
14. Pieds noirs magazine, no. 64 (January 1996), no. 79 (May 1997); L’echo d’Oranie, no. 228 (September-October 1993); L’echo d’Oranie, no. 135 (February-March 1978); no. 221 (July-August 1992); Hélée de Saint-Marc in L’évènement de jeudi, September 19-25, 1991.


28. Pieds noirs magazine, no. 54 (February 1995); l’Echo de l’Oranie, no. 86 (February-March 1973).

29. That quote refers to Degueldre’s justification of his OAS activities—he had sworn to retain Algeria as French. Degueldre was known for the many murders committed—not only of Muslims, but also of fellow OAS members whom he suspected of being lukewarm in their support for the cause. The French state executed him in 1963 for treason.

30. France Horizon, no. 295 (September-October 1988).


34. France Horizon, nos. 359-60 (February-March 1995).

35. Ibid.


37. France Horizon, no. 25 (July-August 1984).


Notes to Chapter 7

1. The term “retornado” came into popular use in Portugal around 1975 when
the bulk of those arriving from the former colonies in Africa were relocated.
It is important to note that the term means “those having returned,” and
that it is an inclusive label implying belonging in Portugal and returning
from a temporary stay away. Although the experience of retornados in Por-
tugal challenges the transparency of these implications, the label does
differ from those used in analogous processes, for example, pieds-noirs,
referring to those arriving in France from Algeria. Whilst the term had
become a pejorative label it has lost its stigma among retornados in recent
years.

2. Mr. Graça, who was 64-years old in 1993, is one of the many people who
were very generous with their time and stories. His statements are repre-
sentative of those made by others who arrived from the colonies between

3. I use “race” to refer to the system of categorization that is widely used and
accepted in the context of Portugal and Angola. I do not mean a biological
categorization, but a cultural system of categorization closely linked to
status.

4. I use national identity and nationness interchangeably. The reference is
Anderson’s Imagined Communities (1991[1983]) and the emphasis continues
to be modern nationness. This should be distinguished from the aristo-
cratic model that is represented in such works as The Lusiads, as discussed in

5. It is very difficult to speak of postcolonialism and not imply that colonial-
ism is a thing of the past. I use this term merely to reference the chronologi-
cal marker of the timeline of historical narrative and to the processes of
reinvention of spaces, people, and the relationship between the two that
followed the formal demise of colonialism. It is a process of contests and
negotiation, not unlike colonialism itself (see Cooper and Stoler 1997).

6. The Salazar-Caetano regime was in place from 1932 to 1974, beginning
with the rise of Salazar to the position of Prime Minister in 1932 and the
introduction of the Constitution founding O Estado Novo (The New State).
Salazar established a dictatorship that survived his death in 1968 and, under
the guidance of Caetano, lasted until the Revolution of 1974.
7. I would like to point out that the antipathy towards colonialism in the post-WWII period is not as transparent as one might think. Though criticisms of colonialism were increasingly audible and virulent, there was hardly unanimity within the UN or outside it to end colonialism. While colonialism began its transformation into an ugly concept in the postwar period, histories taught across the world continued to celebrate the Age of Empire.

8. **Estado Novo** refers to the Portuguese regime after the military coup in 1926 brought the Republic to an end. Soon after the coup, the regime returned to the ideology of empire and used it to promote pride and nationalism in Portugal and among the Portuguese (Serrão 1987).

9. Under the direction of Armando Monteiro, *O Acto Colonial* (The Colonial Act) was written in 1930 and made part of the Portuguese Constitution in 1932. The Act directly shaped Portuguese colonial policies until 1951 and contributed to the rise of expression of the “exaltation of the genius of the Lusitanian race” and its achievements as civilizing agent around the globe (Serrão 1987:70). In 1934 Portugal organized *A Grande Exposição Colonial* (The Great Colonial Exhibition) and promoted the empire as a badge of honor for the Lusitanian nation. In 1951 the Constitution of Portugal was amended to revoke the Colonial Act of 1930. Under the 1951 revision of the Constitution, the colonies were considered to be Overseas Provinces and the Ministry of the Colonies become the Overseas Ministry.

10. Lusotropicalism originates in the work of Gilberto Freyre *Casa grande e senzala* (1934; see 1946). In this work, Freyre coins the term to describe the putative particularity of Portuguese colonialism in Brazil and its non-racist inclusiveness that produced a *mestiço* society to be proud of. For a critique of Freyre’s thinking, see Mário de Andrade’s preface to *Antologia da Poesia Negra de Expressão Portuguesa* (1958).

11. The *Indígenato* refers to the Native Laws Acts that defined social position, political rights, and economic responsibilities according to criteria that combined ideas of race and culture. The laws of 1946 and 1954 defined over 99 percent of the population in Angola as “uncivilized,” “noncitizens.” This legislation remained in effect until September 6, 1961, when a new statute, written in response to the outbreak of the armed struggle, repealed the formal distinction between “civilized” and “uncivilized,” “citizen” and “noncitizen.” Intended to address some of the most obvious distinctions between “whites” and “blacks” in Africa, the repeal of the *Indígenato* confirmed the contradiction that plagued Portuguese colonialism in Africa for most of the twentieth century.

12. A *Revolução dos Cravos* (April 25, 1974) consisted of a military coup led by a group of mid-level officers who openly supported parties of the left in Por-
Portugal, particularly the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) which enjoyed widespread support among the Portuguese people. The goals of the coup included both economic and political changes associated with democratization.

13. The majority of people relocated from Angola to Portugal were airlifted between early 1974 and November 1975. Most left due to the fear of what could happen with independence; this fear was exacerbated as the civil war between competing parties in Angola took shape in 1975 (see Antunes 1979).

14. Mário Soares, in prison at the time of the Revolution in Portugal, had been an active leader of the Socialist left with strong connections with the PCP. As President of Portugal, he helped shape the transformation of the Portuguese system. Soares declares that General Spinola did not trust the PCP, but the popularity of the PCP led him to accept an alliance between the military and the PCP. See his memoirs (Soares 1976, my translation).

15. I have adopted Arjun Appadurai’s term *ethnoscape* (1996) to emphasize the trans-spatial features that characterize identity in contemporary Portugal-Angola, where lived experience connects the oceanic divide, and political boundaries are blurred by multifaceted commitments. Although there are similarities with events and processes in Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, there are enough differences to make these cases separate studies.

16. The hyphenated term “Portugal-Angola” is used to emphasize the unity of social space that serves as arena in which to define the categories that inform life in Portugal and Angola. In colonial times, in Portugal and Angola, people’s social positions reflected arrangements that worked across the colony-metropole ethnoscape. Many people’s lives, particularly among the privileged, were spread across the “Portuguese territories.” Large numbers of people would spend extended periods of time in both Portugal and Angola. Families were divided between the metropole and the colonies; students from the colonies would finish their studies in Portugal. With the end of the empire, these connections and transoceanic life experiences and styles did not come to an abrupt end. In many ways they were transformed and in others strengthened, but the result was the continuance of lives across the ethnoscape.

17. From the sixteenth century, terminology has shifted between overseas territories, overseas possessions, colonies, and states. Between 1822 and 1926, colonies and overseas provinces were used interchangeably. At the end of the Republic in 1926, the favored term was colonies, that is, until 1951, when in response to international pressure, specifically from the United Nations, Salazar insisted that the overseas territories under Portugu-
guese control were not colonies but overseas provinces and part of the Por-

18. Decree-Law No. 308-A/75 of June 24, 1975 provided the formal definition
used to identify individuals as Portuguese for the purposes of repatriation.

19. The option to have both Portuguese and Angolan citizenship was precluded
by legislation in Angola and Portugal. Those who could claim Portuguese
citizenship, did so and then remained in Angola after independence, were
often chastised at work and even encouraged or pressured to leave their
employment. Others were motivated to forfeit Angolan citizenship since it
imposed travel restriction to and from Angola, and since Portuguese citi-
zenship could translate into higher paying salaries in hard currency.

20. Retornados from Angola comprised 95 percent of the white population
found in the former colony before independence. Of these, about 50 per-
cent were adults, “naturals” of (born in) Angola (Pires 1984:186, 196).

21. These parties were the Frente de Libertação Nacional de Angola (FNLA), the
União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA), and the Movi-
mento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA).

22. Although some left Angola to resettle in South Africa, Angola’s “white”
population was primarily destined for Portugal. This is one important dif-
ference with Mozambique and its “white” population. Because of the
strong links that connected Mozambique and South Africa during the colo-
nial period, and because of the connections with South Africa that had been
established by many “whites” in Mozambique, a large number opted to
relocate to that country. To this day there is a considerable Portuguese pop-
ulation in South Africa.

23. Under the direction of the Colonial Minister, Armindo Monteiro, O Acto
Colonial (Decree no. 18 570 of July 18, 1930) was decreed defining the politi-
cal, civil, and criminal status of indigenous people in the colonies. In 1933,
the Act was integrated into the Constitution defining the status of Africans
as uncivilized and indigenous, with no political claims on European insti-
tutions, and possessing only certain paternalistic protections defined by
the colonial regime. The last official vestiges of this Act and those of 1946
and 1954 remained in place until 1961. In response to the loss of Goa to
India and the beginning of the armed struggle in Angola (February 1961),
the Portuguese colonial regime conceded to ending all legal distinctions
between Europeans and indigenous peoples.

24. In Portuguese lexicon, natural of Angola means a person born in Angola. In
fact, until 1961 these were considered “second-class whites” by the Portu-
guese government, an expression still heard today.

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25. Created in Law (Dec.-Lei 494/75 de 10 de Setembro), the IARN was intended to provide assistance to the displaced from the colonies in Portugal.

26. In this section I try to demonstrate that colonialism itself suffered a radical transformation in the minds of people in Portugal. Colonialism was reinvented as the product of the actions of those who lived in the colonies instead of a system or structure. The use of the term “agency colonialism” is intended to highlight this point.

27. In Luanda, the main road that runs along the margin of the Bay is called a Marginal. The same name is given to the road that runs along the River Tejo in Lisbon.

28. This is a term used in colonial Angola to refer to young black men who wore “fancy” clothing and attempted to move in circles beyond their cultural means. It is a derogatory label that mocks the inappropriate use of pants (calças) by African men.

29. Without rejecting Anderson’s contribution (1991) to our study of nationness, nor his conceptualization of nationness as “imagined community,” it should be noted that the imagined communities have enjoyed historically specific forms. Even in Anderson’s nation of immigrants par excellence, in the United States of America, nationness continues to be bound to specific historically defined parameters of form.

30. It may well be that Renan’s attention to the social amnesia in the construction of nationness is central to understanding why it is “that the style in which they are imagined” (Anderson 1991:15) makes nations in postcoloniality unable to “forget” race and culture in “imagining the community.” In all fairness, Anderson does not use style to mean form. However, it is the form in which nations are imagined that highlights some of the limits of the imagined community.

Notes to Chapter 8

5. Stoler and Strassler 2000:5, 8, 12.
6. What follows is largely drawn from Stoler and Cooper 1997.
7. Among Ann Stoler’s many publications, one can begin with “Rethinking Colonial Categories” (1989).
8. There is a growing amount of literature on settler societies. See for example Kennedy 1987.
13. Balandier (1951). Balandier himself did not pursue his astute analysis of colonialism, but turned his focus to urbanization.
14. Fanon (1961). Fanon’s understanding of Algerian society and the Algerian revolution was reductive, but it was a reduction that served a purpose: to define a true anticolonial revolution, unsullied by the ambiguities of Algerian history, rid of the compromises through which people forged their lives and the different ways in which they sought to transform their political possibilities.
15. The concept of identity has become so overused in the social sciences and humanities that its meanings have become diffuse and contradictory. For a critique, see Brubaker and Cooper (2000).
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