Speaker and quote reduced parenthetical clauses

Abstract: In this paper, I present a syntactico-pragmatic delimitation and subsequent analysis of reduced parenthetical clause constructions that is based upon Schneider’s (2007a) superordinate and binary division between reduced parenthetical clauses that modify quotes, and those that modify utterances of any other illocutionary type. I argue that the parentheticals in question can receive a unified analysis, and that, by splitting them asunder according to the type of host they modify, the vast majority of the seemingly disparate properties they display can be readily accounted for.

Keywords: parenthesis, comment clauses, report clauses, quotation

Introduction

Studies such as Reis (1997, 2000, 2002) and Schneider (2007a) have revealed the large diversity in syntactic and pragmatic properties displayed by the parentheticals exemplified by the italicised strings in (1) and (2).

(1) a. Claude is, I think, the best candidate for the job.
    b. Who has, do you reckon, won the race?
    c. I declare this store open, I am happy to say.

(2) a. “I have,” Kevin exclaims, “won the lottery!”
    b. “Do you know why,” asked Ysobell, “they are making these redundancies?”

Reis (1995), Schneider (2007a,b) and Griffiths (2014) illustrate that such clauses display dissimilar properties depending upon (i) their degree of prosodic integration into their host, (ii) their pragmatic function, and (iii) their position of interpolation within their host. That such variety exists has led scholars in re-
cent years to concentrate on well-delimited subclasses of these parentheticals (cf., for example, Steinbach 2007 and Fortmann 2007).

This paper is an exercise in generalisation. Here, I explore to what extent one can apply an encompassing analysis to parentheticals of the type exemplified by (1) and (2), using data from English, Dutch, German, and Turkish and analytical tools from generative syntax and Discourse Representation Theory (DRT, Kamp 1981). I adopt the following approach to this task: (i) outline a plausible analysis that provides broad but incomplete empirical coverage, and (ii) explore to what extent this account’s plausibility diminishes when one aims for full empirical coverage. By undertaking (i) and (ii), I aim to mark out the path that I believe one should tread towards a generalised analysis that accounts for the vast majority of the disparate properties that these parentheticals display.

My investigation is guided by two dicta from Schneider (2007a). The first is Schneider’s delimitation of the object of inquiry. He delimits the parentheticals in (1) and (2) as reduced parenthetical clauses (RPCs), and defines them as follows (ibid.:7):

(3) ‘[RPCs are] clauses with finite verbs that may be inserted everywhere in the host, that are not overtly linked to the host, whose verbs lack one of the arguments required by their valency, and whose lacking argument can be recovered semantically from the host sentence.’

The second is his superordinate and binary distinction between RPCs that modify (that is, ‘have an interpretative effect upon’) host clauses that are quotes (2), and those that modify host clauses that are of any other type of speech act (1). I call the former quote RPCs, and latter speaker RPCs.

The paper proceeds as follows. In §1, I advance a typology that delimits RPCs according to type of host they modify. In §2, I outline my analysis of how RPCs and their hosts relate to one another. In §3, I outline my analysis of the internal syntax of RPCs. In §4, I discuss utterance-initial RPCs, and explore the extent to which the analysis outlined in §2-3 can account for their distribution. §5 concludes.

1 Reduced parenthetical clauses

Throughout this paper, I maintain that RPCs can be delimited across two dimensions: (i) report versus attitude type, and (ii) quote versus speaker use. Let us examine these two divisions in turn.
1.1 Report versus attitude type

Report RPCs describe the actions of the speaker or another agent. These actions can occur either concurrently or asynchronously with speaker time (the time at which the speaker utters the host). In English, a report RPCs’ verb permits any tense, and its subject permits any person. RPCs in which passivation is displayed are also report RPCs.

(4) a. Bob’ll make chief cameraman by July, he, reckons.
   b. Clint mustn’t, I thought yesterday, blame himself.
   c. Dirk must, I’ve been told, re-mortgage his house.

Attitude RPCs express an attitude of the speaker. Adoption of this attitude runs concurrent with speaker time. Attitude RPCs display active voice and a first person subject. An attitude RPC verb is typically marked in the simple present. However, certain combinations of modality and tense are permitted provided they have no semantic import.

(5) a. It’ll be shot in analogue, I hope.
   b. All of Fassbinder’s films, I declare, are utter rubbish.
   c. Eastwood will retire at ninety, I’d have thought. (where the RPC means ‘I think’)

1.2 Quote versus speaker use

In certain situations, the speaker may take no responsibility for the content of the utterance that she voices. In these environments, the speaker is a spokesperson that relays utterances that are said or thought by others (or herself, at an epistemic distance). When the speaker functions in this manner, she employs quotation. The utterance that is relayed is a quote. If the speaker wishes to provide extraneous information about the quote’s creator or the manner in which the quote was created, she utilises a report RPC.

Quotes that the speaker voices are either originally created before, after, or concurrent with the speaker’s broadcast of the quote. Considering the variation in creator and time, (6) provides an illustrative list of quote/report RPC combinations (where \( t \) = speaker time, the time at which the speaker broadcasts the quote).
(6) a. “Orson,” I {think / say}, “must be fired.”  [speaker]  [creator, at t]
    b. “Orson,” Mank {thinks / says}, “must be fired.”    [speaker]  [creator, at t]
    c. “Orson,” I {thought / said}, “must be fired.”    [speaker]  [creator, before t]
    d. “Orson,” Mank {thought / said}, “must be fired.”  [speaker]  [creator, before t]
    e. “Orson,” I will {think / say}, “must be fired.”  [speaker]  [creator, after t]
    f. “Orson,” Mank will {think / say}, “must be fired.” [speaker]  [creator, after t]

Note that, in quotation of the type illustrated in (6), deictic expressions displayed in the quote are interpreted relative to the quote’s creator. This is *direct quotation*. When the quote’s deictic centre shifts to the speaker, *free indirect quotation* is obtained (Rooryck 2001, Sharvit 2008). *Modulo* this shift in deictic centre, both types of quotation are identical with respect to their syntax and semantics (Maier to appear).

Quotes are *demonstrations* (Clark & Gerrig 1990) of previously-performed illocutionary, locutionary, or non-linguistic acts. Quote RPCs may modify demonstrations of any type.¹

(7) a. “My husband is an awful cook,” Mary admits.  Host = quoted illocutionary act
    b. “Who is,” Adam asked, “coming to my party?”  Host = quoted illocutionary act
    c. “Doo-wop skoobie-doobie,” he scatted.  Host = quoted locutionary act
    d. “Sacrebleu!” he exclaimed.  Host = quoted locutionary act
    e. <The speaker claps>, the rhythm will go.  Host = quoted non-linguistic act

Direct and free indirect quotation comprise the *quote use* of RPCs. RPCs used to modify quotes are *quote RPCs*. RPCs are employed for their *speaker use* whenever they are not employed for their quote use. Therefore, whenever a RPC modifies a proposition that is utilised by the speaker to commit an assertive, erotetic, declarative, commissive or optative illocutionary act (*inter alia*) – i.e. any act that is not a quotation –, that RPC is a *speaker RPC*. (8) provides some exemplary cases.

(8) a. Lucy, should, {I reckon / Pete tells me / she’s been told}, sell the house.  *Assertive*
    b. Who has, {do you wonder / does Fred believe}, solved the problem?  *Erotetic*
    c. I hereby name this ship the Paralus, I am happy to say.  *Declarative*
    d. I do swear that I will bear allegiance to the Queen, I declare.  *Commissive*

¹ I assume here that *mixed* quotations are not demonstrations, however, based on the fact that quote RPCs cannot modify mixed quotation (i).

(i) * Bush has an “ecelectic”, he says, reading list.
e. Live long, I \{wish / hope\}, and prosper!  \textit{Optative}

With respect to pragmatic function, speaker RPCs fall into three main classes: \textit{mitigative}, \textit{speech act} and \textit{evaluative}. These classes correspond to Cinque’s (1999) distinction between \textit{evidential/epistemic}, \textit{speech act}, and \textit{evaluative} adverbs (adverbs such as \textit{probably}, \textit{frankly}, and \textit{fortunately}, respectively). Mitigative RPCs alleviate the speaker’s responsibility for the truth of proposition denoted by the host. In English, Dutch, and German, report and attitude RPCs can be employed to serve this mitigative function.\footnote{In English, Dutch, and German, only first and second person report RPCs can be employed in speaker RPC constructions.} If an attitude RPC is employed, the speaker shifts the burden of responsibility to her own attitude. If a report RPC is employed, the speaker shifts the burden of responsibility to a third party.

(9) a. John will, I \textit{believe}, be late. attitude RPC
   b. John will, \textit{Mary heard}, be late. report RPC

In Turkish, attitude RPCs alone may serve this mitigative function. This is evidenced by (10), where the host must be interpreted as an assertion and not a quote when an RPC occupies the host’s postverbal area. In such cases, report RPCs are prohibited.

(10) a. Ali bir hırsız-dır, \{san-iyor-um/ * san-iyor-Ø\} ki. Turkish
   ‘Ali, is a thief, \{I / he\} believe(s).’
   
   b. Ali bir hırsız-dır, \{san-iyor-um/ * san-dı-m\} ki.
   ‘Ali is a thief, \{believe / believed\}.’
   \cite{Griffiths & Güneș 2013}

Speech act RPCs ‘type’ the host that they modify for a particular illocutionary force (11a). Evaluative RPCs express the speaker’s emotional stance towards a host (11b). To perform either function, only attitude RPCs can be utilised.

(11) a. I will, I \{promise / swear / declare\}, always love you.
   b. My article should, I \{hope / pray\}, be accepted.
The ‘demarcation lines’ between mitigative, speech act and evaluative RPCs are not sharp. Some RPCs, such as those in (12), inherently function as evaluative and speech act RPCs simultaneously. Others change function according to the context. In (13a) for example, when the speaker vows, a ‘speech act’ reading is obtained. However in (13b), when the newspapers vow, the RPC is understood as shifting the burden of responsibility for the truth of the host from the speaker to a third party. Hence, in (13b), the newspapers vow is interpreted as mitigative.

(12) a. John will, *I regret to say*, be late.
    b. John will, *I'm happy to concede*, be late.
    c. Who will, *I'm obliged to ask*, be late?

(13) a. He will, *I vow*, be acquitted by Friday
    b. He will, the newspapers *vow*, be acquitted by Friday.

Thus, the terms mitigative, evaluative, and speech act most likely denote positions on a cline of evidential meanings (Rooryck 2001), and are not discrete classes (Schneider 2007b:243).

Which type of speaker RPC may modify which type of host depends upon whether pragmatic congruity is obtained when hosts and RPCs of certain types are combined. Table 1 below provides an overview of permissible combinations in English (see appendix 1 for corresponding examples).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Host type</th>
<th>Mitigative RPCs</th>
<th>Speech Act RPCs</th>
<th>Evaluative RPCs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assertive</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erotetic</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Declarative</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commissive</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Optative</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Possible only with evaluative/speech act combos:
*I declare this store open, I am {happy/sad} to {say/pronounce}.*

3 This refers the illocutionary force that the host would express if the RPC were absent.
1.3 Combining report versus attitude type and quote versus speaker use

Table 2 summarises how an RPC’s type (attitude or report) and use to which it is put (speaker or quote) may interact in English, Dutch, and German.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Quote</th>
<th>Speaker (mitigative)</th>
<th>Speaker (speech act)</th>
<th>Speaker (evaluative)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>attitude RPCs</td>
<td>✕</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>report RPCs</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓4</td>
<td>✕</td>
<td>✕</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Possible ‘type’/’use’ RCP combinations

Table 2 highlights two sources of ambiguity in English, Dutch, and German. The first arises from the fact that for every attitude RPC there exists a homophonous report RPC counterpart. The second arises from the fact that report RPCs can be used in both quote and speaker – specifically, mitigative – RPC constructions. Combined, these two sources of ambiguity engender structures like (14), whose hosts can be interpreted as either quotes or assertions in neutral contexts.

(14) a. Pete should, I think, quit his job. attitude or report RPC
    b. Susie has, Pete says, finally finished her thesis. report RPC

Fortunately, there are a number of means by which examples like (14) can be disambiguated. A subset of these means are language-specific (I concentrate solely on English here).

The first concerns disambiguation of the RPC’s verb. In (14a), think is ambiguous between an attitude that is synonymous with believe (the ‘attitude RPC’ reading) and an action that is synonymous with contemplate (the ‘report RPC’ reading). This ambiguity renders the host ambiguous between a quote and an assertion, as only second and third person report RPCs can be used in speaker RPC constructions in English. Thus, the addition of disambiguators such as to himself, which disambiguates think as an action, disambiguates the host as a quote.

(15) Pete should, I think to myself, quit his job.

4 As per the examples in (10), this cell is checked in with a ✕ rather than an ✓ in Turkish.
In English, provided certain restrictions are obeyed (cf. Collins & Branigan 1997), subject-verb inversion may occur in quote RPCs but not speaker RPCs. As such, the presence of subject-verb inversion in an example such as (14b) disambiguates it as a quote RPC construction.\(^5\)

(16) Susie has, says Pete, finally finished her thesis.

In English, provided (i) the host contains sentential negation, (ii) the RPC contains a common *verbum sentiendi*, and (iii) the RPC’s subject is a first person pronoun, a semantically vacuous instantiation of *not* is optionally licensed in speaker RPCs, but not quote RPCs. Thus, if an instance of *not* in an RPC such as the one in (17) is interpreted as semantically vacuous, the host is disambiguated as an assertion.

(17) John won’t, *I shouldn’t think*, be late.

Provided the context is sufficiently rich, *point of view* may help disambiguate speaker from quote RPCs. *Point of view* describes through whose eyes the host content should be understood. Most often, speaker RPC constructions represent the speaker’s point of view (as speech acts tend to convey the opinions of their creator, which in this case is the speaker), while quote RPC constructions represent the RPC’s subject’s point of view (as quotes tend to be faithful replicas). In context A, the host in (18) is interpreted as an assertion in which the speaker’s point of view is represented. This interpretation arises because Julie is unlikely to hold the opinion that her best friend is an idiot. In context B, the host in (18) is interpreted as a free indirect quote in which the RPC’s subject’s point of view is represented. This interpretation arises because Julie is likely to use *idiotic*, while an impartial speaker is unlikely to (unless employed *expressively* (Potts 2005) or restrictively, *idiotic*’s use by the speaker violates the Maxim of Quantity in this context).

(18) Mary’s idiotic brother, *Julie tells me*, has eloped with a schoolgirl.

*Global context:* Mary only has one brother.

*Context A:* The speaker dislikes Mary’s brother. Mary’s brother and Julie are best friends.

*Context B:* The speaker is impartial to all parties. Julie dislikes Mary’s brother.

---

\(^5\) As Collins & Branigan (1997) note, subject-verb inversion is impossible with pronouns in English. Consequently, subject-verb inversion cannot be employed as a disambiguator in the case of (14a).
Adult speakers tend to avoid *illeism*, and quotes tend to be faithful replicas. These two tendencies provide another means of disambiguation that involves pronominal elements. If (19a) were a quote RPC, John would have committed illeism when he originally uttered the assertion depicted by the quote. As this is unlikely, (19a) is most naturally interpreted as a speaker RPC construction. Conversely, if (19b) were a speaker RPC construction, the speaker would violate constraints on specificity that demand that co-referent entities follow an *R-expression > pronoun* linear order across utterances. As this is unlikely, (19b) is most naturally interpreted as a quote RPC, where the desire to avoid illeism overrides constraints on discourse specificity (where (19b) is interpreted as free indirect quotation).

(19) a. John, will, *he, said*, be late.
   b. He, will, *John, said*, be late.

Ambiguous constructions like (14) can also be delimited by their prosody. While the majority of speaker RPCs may be optionally integrated into the prosodic domain of a host constituent (Dehé 2007), there exist a subset of speaker RPCs in English that must be integrated. These are *constituent-modifying* RPCs (Griffiths 2014).

(20) John and *I think* Bill[^F], are coming to the party.                  (where _F_ = focus marking)

Quote RPCs are obligatorily isolated from the prosodic domain of the host in English (Reinhart 1983). Consequently, if *I think* in (20) is pronounced as prosodically isolated, as in (21), only a quote interpretation is obtainable (if at all).

(21) ?John and, *I think (to myself)*, Bill[^F] is coming to the party.

Finally, context may distinguish between the ambiguous constructions in (14). In neutral contexts, the hosts in (14a-b) are interpreted as assertions. This is because, as a default, speakers assert propositions rather than quote them. However, if (14a-b) are embedded within a chunk of narrative, a quote interpretation is more readily obtained.

---

6 That I appeal to constraints of discourse specificity to explain the distribution of pronominal elements in (19b) implies that RPCs and their hosts constitute separate utterances related only across the discourse. This is precisely the view for which I argue in §2.
From a novel yet to be written by this paper’s author:

I suddenly awake from my period of narcissistic self-analysis, and consider the plight of my friends. I begin to run through my opinions about the people I love. Firstly, **Pete should, I think, quit his job.** As I think this, the man himself bursts through the door. He looks excited. **Susie has, Pete says, finally finished her thesis.** I tell that I am relieved at this news, and suggest we celebrate.

### 1.4 An aside: point of view and Reinhart (1983)

Following Schneider (2007a), I adopted in §1.2 the idea that dissimilar host types (quotes versus non-quotes) is the marker by which RPCs should be split asunder. As §1.3 illustrated, certain epiphenomena follow from this distinction, such as (i) attitude versus action RPC verb, (ii) speaker versus subject oriented point of view, and (iii) pronominal distribution.

That RPCs should be delimited according to the type of host they modify does not enjoy unanimous support. Reinhart (1983) adopts point of view – an epiphenomenon according to the current approach – as the marker by which RPCs are split asunder. Unlike the current approach however, Reinhart’s distinction is not jointly exclusive, and is hence a false dichotomy. Joint exclusivity is not achieved because there exist RPC constructions that are neither speaker nor subject oriented, as (23) and (24) illustrate.

First, consider the exchange in (23). As (23A’-B’) make clear, (23B) employs a portion of (23A) as an echo, in order to question the presupposition implied by (23A). In (23B), the opinion that the thesis is stupid is held by neither the speaker nor the subject of the RPC (who, in this case, co-refer).

(23) A: Is your stupid thesis due in today?  
   B: No – my STUPID thesis is, *or so I think*, due tomorrow.  
   A’: No need get defensive! It *is* stupid! Why would anyone write a book on soil?  
   B’: Evidently you are not an Ecologist!

Second, consider (24). The context for this exchange is the following: B’s supervisor Henry is a well-spoken British professor unlikely to employ American English slang. (24B) makes a joke of this fact, utilising A’s opinion of B’s paper as *kick-ass* (a slang term) in the quote B attributes to Henry. In (24B) *kick-ass* is neither the opinion of the speaker nor the RPC’s subject; it is A’s opinion.
(24) A: What did Henry say when he read your kick-ass paper?
B: “Your kick-ass paper,” said Henry when I saw him today, “is super-awesome.”
A’: Very funny... what did he actually say?

The existence of ‘unoriented’ RPCs like (23B) and (24B) undermines Reinhart’s attribution of mutually exclusive properties to speaker and subject oriented RPCs. (23B) displays ‘or so’, while (24B) displays subject-verb inversion: properties her approach attributes solely to speaker and subject oriented RPCs respectively.

The current approach makes a weaker claim than Reinhart’s, asserting merely that speaker RPC constructions tend to be speaker oriented, while quote RPC constructions tend to be subject oriented. If complicated contexts like those in (23) and (24) override these tendencies, then point of view cannot be employed as a reliable disambiguator of speaker and quote RPCs. However, other cues remain. For instance, that the RPC in (23B) is an attitude RPC suggests that its host is an assertion, while that the RPC in (24B) displays subject-verb inversion suggests that its host is a quote.

This type of reasoning is unavailable on Reinhart’s approach, where the existence of ‘unoriented’ RPCs necessitates a tripartite division of RPCs. Thus, to utilise point of view as the marker of superordinate delimitation is to unnecessarily conflate Schneider’s (2007a) dichotomy between quote and non-quote RPC constructions. On the current approach, this conflation is avoided. Thus, the current approach should supplant Reinhart’s.

1.5 Summary: descriptions versus demonstrations

RPCs form natural classes according to (i) their attitude versus action specification, and (ii) the type of host they modify. In the remainder of the paper, I aim to demonstrate that one can appeal to (ii) in order to account for the vast majority of dissimilarities observed across RPC constructions.

Ultimately, the dissimilarities listed below in §2-3 arise from that fact that quotes constitute distinct communicative acts to all other types of speech acts. Clark & Gerrig (1990) maintain that communicative acts are conveyed by three methods: indication, description, and demonstration. Suppose Lucy wishes John to know how actor x walks. She can point to footage of actor x’s gait (indication), predicate relevant properties of actor x in an assertion (description), or alter her gait to exemplify actor x’s (demonstration).

As mentioned in §1.2, quotes are demonstrations. They are vocal exemplifications that depict linguistic objects (LOs). All other speech acts under discus-
sion here are descriptions. To describe, one utilises the content (i.e. the propositionality) of a linguistic object like *John is tall.* To demonstrate, the content of *John is tall* is irrelevant. Demonstrations utilise *John is tall* solely as an entity in the world that consists of a string of sounds whose likeness can be depicted. In this respect, descriptions and demonstrations must differ with respect to their mereology. Assertions and questions, for example, can be composed of assertions and questions (Krifka 2014). Demonstrations, on other hand, are indivisible (i.e. demonstrations are not composed of ‘sub-demonstrations’).

## 2 The external syntax of RPC constructions

In this section, I advance my analysis of how RPCs and their hosts are related to one another. I argue that RPCs are simultaneously clausal adjuncts and independent speech acts, and demonstrate that certain differences in distribution displayed by speaker and quote RPCs can be explained by appealing to the constraints that determine how speech acts are organised at the level of the discourse.

### 2.1 The proposal

I propose that RPCs are clausal adjuncts that do not influence the semantic composition of their host. On such an approach, concatenation of an RPC and a maximal projection $\gamma$ returns $\gamma$ unaltered.\(^7\)

(25) a. John$_1$ didn’t [VP [VP t$_1$ help], [RPC Bill says]].

---

\(^7\) To ensure that the concatenation of the RPC and $\gamma$ returns $\gamma$ unaltered, one may either posit a compositional rule that achieves this (as in Potts’ 2005:66 *isolated CI application*), or posit that the RPC is dominated by a semantically vacuous functional projection that *pair*-Merges with $\gamma$ (as in De Vries’ 2007, 2008, 2012 *par*-Merge approach).
Because RPCs are not involved in the semantic composition of their host, (25) predicts that RPCs are unaffected by c-commanding operators, and are unsuitable targets for Internal Merge (Chomsky 2004). This prediction is borne out. RPCs escape the scope of sentential negation (26), models (27), and cannot host reflexives (38). Moreover, RPCs are \textit{locked islands} (to use Postal’s 1998 terminology) (29).

\begin{itemize}
\item (26) John won’t be late, \textit{I reckon}.
\end{itemize}  
Interpretation:
\begin{itemize}
\item a. \textit{reckon}(p, I) \land \neg[\textit{will-be-late}(John)]  
\item b. \* \neg[\textit{reckon}(p, I) \land \textit{will-be-late}(John)]
\end{itemize}

\begin{itemize}
\item (27) John might, \textit{I fear}, be late.
\end{itemize}  
Interpretation:
\begin{itemize}
\item a. \textit{fear}(p, I) \land \Box[\textit{be-late}(John)]  
\item b. \* \Box[\textit{fear}(p, I) \land \textit{be-late}(John)]
\end{itemize}

\begin{itemize}
\item (28) John will, \{\textit{he/ *himself}\} \textit{thinks}, be late.
\end{itemize}

\begin{itemize}
\item (29)* Who, will John, \textit{t}, \textit{thinks}, be late?
\end{itemize}

(25) also engenders a description of how RPCs ‘modify’ their hosts. If RPCs and their hosts are semantically unrelated (as (25) suggests), then they constitute independent speech acts (Potts 2005:68). Thus, (30aA) is the 2-tuple of speech
acts in (30b). The order of the speech acts in (30b) is dictated by derivational timing. Interpretation is bottom-up compositional and therefore dominated XPs (i.e. RPCs) suitable for Transfer (Chomsky 2004) will be Transferred before undominated XPs (i.e. root clauses). If XP α is Transferred before XP β, α precedes β in the discourse structure.

(30)  a. A: Marx, Engels told the press, wrote most of their manifesto.
    B: No, he didn’t.

b. ([α Engels told the press β.], [β Marx wrote most of their manifesto])

(30b) is a monologue, albeit a short one. In monologues, utterances are interpreted relative to the context created by the utterances that precede them. In (31) for example, δ’s felicity is contingent upon the truth of γ; γ’s felicity is contingent upon the truth of β; and so on. Moreover, as the monologue continues, the alleged veracity of assertions made ‘early on’ becomes harder to question unless such assertions are targeted specifically (as illustrated by speaker B’s and B’s responses in (31)).

(31)  A: ([α The football season began yesterday.], [β Man United played Chelsea.], [γ The score was 1-0.], [δ Man United’s new striker scored the game’s only goal.])
    B: # That’s not true! (referring to β)
    B’: While it’s true that Man United won 1-0 and that their new striker scored, it’s NOT true that Man United played Chelsea. They played Arsenal!

In (31), α, β and γ are context restrictors. If quick enough to interrupt A, B may reject A’s proposal to update the context at any juncture: after α is uttered, after β is uttered or after γ is uttered. If no rejection is forthcoming at any of these points, the common ground is updated. But there is no time for B to voice her dissent in (30aA). By virtue of the fact that α and β in (30aA) are voiced synchronously, B can never question the veracity of α before β is uttered (as illustrated by (30aB)). In this respect, the truth of α is imposed on the common ground. In sum: RPCs ‘modify’ their hosts by altering the context in which their host is interpreted.8

8 This formulation of RPCs as context restrictors requires abandonment of Potts’ (2005:32) claim that one requires a four-valued system of truth evaluation to interpret utterances that contain parentheticals. According to Potts, parentheticals can be false whilst their host is true. He says that one can still ‘recover’ from (i) that Lance Armstrong has won the 2003 Tour de France, even though the appositional material – i.e. Lance is an Arkansan – is false (he is a Texan). Thus one requires that a system in which the truth values 0 (for the apposition) and 1
(25) treats the RPC verb as selecting for a propositional object variable $p$ (in the case of speaker RPCs) or the entity-denoting variable $x$ (in the case of quote RPCs). If RPCs and their hosts are separate utterances, $p/x$ is an anaphor. As an anaphor, $p/x$’s resolution is subject to the same accessibility restrictions that govern pronouns. According to DRT, the referents of a discourse representation structure (DRS) $K_1$ are accessible from $K_2$ only if $K_1 = K_2$ or $K_1$ subordinates $K_2$. To provide an example, she cannot corefer with woman in (32) because the referent $s$ cannot find a suitable antecedent within $K_1$. The referent $w$ in $K_2$ is inaccessible to $s$ because the DRS that contains $s$ subordinates $K_2$.

(32) John kissed every woman. # She’s happily married.

While the $p/x$ of RPCs refers to either propositions or quotes – i.e. DRSs themselves – the constraints on accessibility remain the same. In (33) for example, only $K_2$ provides an accessible antecedent for $p$. $K_3$, on the other hand, is subordinate to the DRS containing $p$, and thus an inaccessible antecedent for anaphor resolution.

(33) [John regrets that [Sam, Mary reckons $p_{i/*k}$, will be late]$k$]$_i$

(for the host) provided by (i) can still be defined. I disagree, and argue that the host is ‘recoverable’ in (i) only if the apposition’s content is ignored for the truth evaluation of the host.

(i) Lance Armstrong, an Arkansan, has won the 2003 Tour de France! (Potts 2005:32)

9 For formal definition of subordination in DRT, cf. Asher (1993). Here, the idea that $K_2$ is subordinate to $K_1$ if $K_2$ appears inside $K_1$ will suffice.

10 The DRS is hugely simplified, and employs non-standard orthography for exposition. Cf. Asher (1993) for a detailed exposition of precisely how anaphors that denote abstract objects and their antecedents interact.
Anaphora, whether they denote a proposition or an entity, resolve to their most local suitable accessible antecedent. This fact explains certain scope dissimilarities that pertain between speaker and quote RPCs. As mentioned in §1.5, speech acts that are not quotes such as assertions can themselves be composed of assertions. Examples are conjoined assertions (Krifka 2014) (34) and constructions containing asserted adverbial clauses (Reis 2000, Haegeman 2006) (35).

(34) a. \([\alpha \beta \text{Harry kissed Chloe}] \text{ and } [\gamma \text{Sue, I hope, kissed Nathan}]\].

_interpretation:_

b. Harry kissed Chloe and I hope that Sue kissed Nathan.
c. *I hope that Harry kissed Chloe and Sue kissed Nathan.

(35) a. \([\alpha \beta \text{Zoë has eaten all the cream cakes}], \text{ while } [\gamma \text{Tom, I fear, hasn’t eaten any}]\].

_interpretation:_

b. Zoë has eaten all the cream cakes, while I fear that Tom hasn’t eaten any.
c. *I fear that Zoë has eaten all the cream cakes, while Tom hasn’t eaten any.

If propositional anaphora resolve to their most local suitable antecedent, one expects that the RPCs in (34) and (35) can be interpreted as modifying \(\gamma\), but not \(\alpha\) or \(\beta\). This expectation is borne out, as (34b-c) and (35b-c) illustrate.

As demonstrations, quotes cannot be composed of quotes (see §1.5). This predicts that quote RPCs are always interpreted as modifying the entirety of their host. This prediction is borne out, as (36) and (37) show.\(^{11}\)

\(^{11}\) Many native speakers of English judge (36c) and (37c) to be entirely acceptable, contrary to my prediction. (36c) and (37c)’s acceptability arise due to the confounding effect of mixed quotation. To illustrate that a quote RPC does indeed modify the entirety of its host – regardless
(36) a. \[ (\alpha [\beta \text{Harry kissed Chloe}] \text{and} [\gamma \text{Sue, says Pete, kissed Nathan}]).] 

*Interpretation:*
  b. Pete says “Harry kissed Chloe and Sue kissed Nathan.”
  c. * Harry kissed Chloe and “Sue,” says Pete, “kissed Nathan.”

(37) a. \[ (\alpha [\beta \text{Zoë has eaten all the cream cakes}], \text{while} [\gamma \text{Tom, says Frank, hasn’t eaten any}]).] 

*Interpretation:*
  b. Frank says “Zoë has eaten all the cream cakes, while Tom hasn’t eaten any.”
  c. * Zoë has eaten all the cream cakes, while “Tom,” says Frank, “hasn’t eaten any.”

From (25) arise predictions about what types of verbs RPCs may exhibit. For instance, (25) predicts that factive verbs (Hooper & Thompson’s 1973 class $C$ & $D$ verbs) like *regret* and *deny* are prohibited as speaker RPC verbs (38a). To see why, consider (39) below.

(38) a. # John will, I \{deny/regret\}, be late.
   
   b. \( \langle [\alpha I \{deny/regret\} \beta], [\gamma \text{John will be late}]. \rangle \)

(39) a. \( \langle [\alpha \text{John kissed his cousin}.], \beta \text{He regrets that he kissed his cousin terribly}. \rangle \)
   
   b. # \( \langle [\alpha \text{John regrets that he kissed his cousin}.], \beta \text{He kissed his cousin}. \rangle \)

(39a-b) are monologues, like (31A). In (39a), $\beta$ is felicitously asserted because the verb *regret* selects for presupposed clauses and the content of *regret’s* complement – i.e. $\alpha$ – is rendered presupposed by virtue of $\beta$ being uttered in context in which $\alpha$’s truth is guaranteed. In (39b) however, $\beta$ is infelicitously asserted because its content is understood as presupposed in $\alpha$. By asserting $\beta$ after $\alpha$ in (39b), the speaker attempts to offer for truth evaluation a proposition whose truth is already taken for granted.

(38a) creates the 2-tuple in (38b). In terms of discourse structure, (38b) mirrors (39b): the content of propositional variable in (38b) must be presupposed, and yet the variable’s content (i.e. $\beta$) follows $\alpha$ as an assertion. This results in an incoherent discourse.

of what the orthographic quotation marks suggest – consider (i) and (ii). Here it is clear that the quote RPC is permitted only if the entirety of the host is quoted.

(i) “That I am well-liked at school,” says Mary, “comforts me.”
(ii) * “That I am well-liked at school,” says Mary, comforts her.
Note that the same reasoning applies to semifactive RPCs verbs (Hooper & Thompson’s class E verbs). Semifactive verbs are permitted in speaker RPCs only if their complement is not presupposed (compare (40) to (41)).

(40) a. I understand that John will be late.
   (interpretation = John will be late; at least according to my understanding of the situation)
   b. John will, I understand, be late.

(41) a. I understand that two plus two equals four.
   (interpretation = I have come to sufficiently grasp the undisputed fact that 2+2 =4)
   b. #Two plus two, I understand, equals four.

Because quotes are demonstrations (and not assertions), the restrictions observed in (38) to (41) do not apply to quote RPCs. Consequently, factive, semifactive and nonfactive verbs are all permitted in quote RPCs (42). If the action denoted by a verb can be interpreted as an action that creates something demonstrable, that verb is permitted in quote RPCs. Thus, intransitive bodily-movement verbs are permitted, yet transitive verbs like forget are not (43).

(42) a. “I am not alone in this house,” John, instinctively knew.
   b. “I wish I could have saved her,” John, regrets.
   c. “I am not the killer,” John, denies.
   d. There are 11 planets, Max realizes. (Ross 1973:138)

(43) a. “I have,” grins Terry, “found a great new job”.
   b. The pope dies, flashes the neon sign. (Schneider 2007a:54)
   c. *“I am,” forgot Mary, “due in court today.”

The choice of quote RPC verb is not entirely unrestricted, however. It appears that quote RPCs containing verbs like ask and wonder may modify questions alone (44a-b), while quote RPCs containing verbs like declare and assert may not modify questions (44c). One might suggest that (44a-c) show that the variable for which the quote RPC verb selects is sensitive to the [+Q]-status of the host. This suggestion is untenable. (44d) illustrates that verbs like said or whispered – which select only for [–Q] complements in subordination environments (45) – may select for [+Q] hosts. Thus, one cannot appeal to syntactic clause-
typing to explain this restriction. Future investigation is required to discover precisely why this restriction holds.

    b. * “Mary will come,” \[wonders/asks\] John.
    c. * “Who will come?” \[declares/asserts\] John.
    d. “Who will come?” \[said/whispered\] John.

(45) * John \[said/whispered\] \[\[+Q\] whether Mary will come\].

(25) also predicts that quote RPCs cannot interpolate into demonstrations with no internal linguistic structure, as in such hosts no points for adjunction are available. This prediction is borne out, as (46a) illustrates. If used as LOs, such demonstrations’ opacity demands that adjunction is available only at their edge (46b).

(46) a. * <speaker claps>, goes the rhythm, <speaker claps>.
    b. [LO [LO <speaker claps>] [RPC goes the rhythm]].

2.2 Summary

In §2.1, I outlined my proposal for the external syntax of RPC constructions. This proposal confers a number of benefits. From a conceptual perspective, it maintains Chomsky’s (1995 et seq.) views that (i) the post-syntactic components of the grammar are interpretative alone (i.e. no reorder or insertion operations occur there), and that (ii) a tight correspondence pertains between the syntax and linear order.\(^\text{12}\) Also, my proposal describes how RPCs ‘modify’ their host in a manner that does not appeal to the apparent exceptional informational status of an RPC as a conventional implicature (Potts 2005) or as information that updates the common ground in a manner distinct to how assertions do (AnderBois et al. 2011). RPCs, like many assertions, are difficult to question solely because of their place in a structured discourse.

From an empirical perspective, my proposal correctly accounts for a number of properties (many hitherto undocumented) displayed by speaker and

\(^\text{12}\) Note that analyses of how RPCs and their host are externally related such as Espinal (1991) and Haegeman (2009) violate condition (i) in the main text, as they each require that the post-syntactic components of the grammar may order or reorder linear strings of lexical items.
quote RPC constructions by utilising general constraints on anaphor resolution and discourse structure. For ease of reference, these properties are recapitulated in table 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>speaker RPCs</th>
<th>quote RPCs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>c-command</strong></td>
<td>no c-command relations with host</td>
<td>no c-command relations with host</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>modification</strong></td>
<td>unable to modify non-root clauses</td>
<td>able to modify all demonstrations (discourse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>congruity permitting)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Scope</strong></td>
<td>local scope</td>
<td>widest scope</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RPC verb</strong></td>
<td>only nonfactive</td>
<td>(almost) no restriction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prosody</strong></td>
<td>integrated or isolated</td>
<td>isolated</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Properties of speaker and quote RPCs

3 The internal syntax of RPCs

In this section, I advance my analysis of the internal syntax of speaker and quote RPCs. First, let us consider the relevant data. In both speaker and quote RPCs in Dutch and German, the subject and the finite verb must invert.

(47) a. Hans hat, {(so) glaube ich (*so) / * ich glaube}, das Auto repariert. German
       Hans has so believe I so I believe the car repaired
       ‘Hans has, I believe, repaired the car.’

       Hans has the car repaired so says Rudi so Rudi says
       “‘Hans has repaired the car,’ says Rudi.’

b. Joop heeft, {(zo) denkt Jan (*zo) / * Jan denkt}, zijn brood gegeten. Dutch
       Joop has so thinks Jan so Jan thinks his bread eaten

       “Joop heeft zijn brood gegeten,” {(zo) denkt Jan (*zo) / * Jan denkt).
       Joop has his bread eaten so thinks Jan so Jan thinks
       ‘Joop’s eaten his bread, Jan thinks.’

In mitigative and quote RPCs, so can be optionally realised, but in the first position alone (47 – 48).
(48) a. John will be late, (so) Pete says (*so).
    b. “John will be late,” (so) says Pete (*so).

In both speaker and quote RPCs, unacceptability ensues if the RPC verb is contained within a strong syntactic island.\(^\text{13}\)

(49) a. John will, Mary reckons that Pete said, be late.
    b. *John will, Mary heard [ISLAND the rumour that Pete says], be late.

(50) a. “I will,” Mary was told that Pete whispered, “be late.”
    b. **”I will,” Mary was told [ISLAND the claim that Pete whispered], “be late.”

In both speaker and quote RPCs, parasitic gaps are licensable.

(51) a. John will be late, Mary instinctively knows _ without articulating _.
    b. “I will be late,” John instinctively knew _ without articulating _.
    c. She instinctively knew it without articulating *(it).

Based on the observations listed in (47) to (51), my analysis of the internal syntax of speaker and quote RPCs is provided in (52). Here, Ø represents the phonologically null counterpart of so, which A’-moves to a topic position within the RPC’s C-domain (cf. Suñer 2000:543).

\(^{13}\) One may argue that the cause of unacceptability in (49b) and (50b) is simply an increase in syntactic complexity (i.e. subordination), rather than an island violation. Examples like (i), where clausal complements are subordinated under bridge verbs, may be utilised to support this view.

(i) ? John will, Mary heard that Pete said that many think likely, be late.

While syntactic complexity no doubt degrades the acceptability of an RPC, the examples in (49b) and (50b) demonstrate that when only one level of subordination is observed, acceptability judgements differ sharply according to whether an island-boundary is displayed in the RPC or not. If one considers (ii) – (iv), where no A’-movement occurs, one observes no degradation in acceptability between (ii) and (iii) (even though there is an island boundary in (iii)), while one observes degradation in acceptability in (iv), where complexity is increased. These observations, taken together, suggest quite convincingly that island-violations occur in (49b) and (50b).

(ii) John will – and Mary heard [ISLAND the rumour that Pete denies it] – be late.
(iii) John will – and Mary reckons that Pete denies it – be late.
(iv) ? John will – and Mary heard that Pete says that many think it likely – be late.
(52) a. \([\{\emptyset/\text{so}\}_1 [\text{Mary} (\text{says} e_{\text{pro}} t_1)]]\)  
   \(\text{English, Turkish}^{14}\)  
   b. \([\{\emptyset/\text{so}\}_1 [\text{says}_2 [\text{Mary} ([t_2 e_{\text{pro}}] t_1)]]]\)  
   \(\text{Dutch, German, English quote RPCs (optionally)}\)

Assuming that subject-verb inversion in Dutch and German is triggered by A´-movement to the C-domain (Zwart 1997), (52) explains the obligatory subject-verb inversion in (47). That so is optionally displayed in mitigative and quote RPCs but must appear in the first position rather than after the verb (as in (53)) is accounted for by (52), where so or its phonologically null instantiation \(\emptyset\) is treated as a VP-adjunct of *say.*^{15}

(53) Pete thinks that Nixon was a crook. (*so) Mary thinks *(so), too.

According to (52), the A´-movement of \(\{\text{so}/\emptyset\}\) the C-domain causes the unacceptability observed in (49b) and (50b). Similarly, parasitic gaps are licensed in (51a-b) because of A´-movement.

The proposal that A´-movement to the C-domain occurs in speaker and quote RPCs is well-supported by the evidence in (47) to (51). This proposal is further strengthened by the fact that in Irish RPCs COMP must be realised as *aL* – the realisation that encodes the fact that an A´-moved element (or its trace) occupies the C-domain.^{16}

(54) Bhí an traen mall, a mheas Klaus.  
   *The train was late, Klaus thought.‘

In (52), \(\{\text{so}/\emptyset\}\) is an adjunct of VP, not the direct object of the RPC verb (*contra* Suñer 2000, Corver & Thiersch 2001, Van Maastricht 2011). A number of observations support this conclusion. Firstly, so does not receive an objective case in a language that always assigns them, such as Turkish. This suggests that so is not an argument of the RPC verb.

---

14 In Turkish, a wh-in-situ language, A´-movement to the C-domain is covert. Thus, *öyle* ‘so’ is phonologically realised in its base position.

15 It should be noted that so cannot be realised in evaluative or speaker RPCs (i), and yet these RPCs still exhibit the properties listed in (47) to (51). From this observation one must conclude that the phonological realisation of \(\emptyset\) as so is dependent upon some unknown but extraneous factors that are sensitive to the pragmatic function of the RPC’s verb.

(i) John will, (*so) I (hope/assert), be late.

16 Thanks to Jim McCloskey (p.c.) for the Irish data.
Secondly, unlike it, so cannot be the subject of passive RPCs. Moreover, it and so may co-exist in passive RPCs.

(56) a. John, \{it/ *so\} has been said (by Pete), will be late.
    b. John, (so) it has been said (by Pete), will be late.

Thirdly, so is optionally displayed in quote RPCs that contain bodily-movement verbs such as grin (57a). In utterance-initial RPCs, grin cannot select for a demonstrative object (unlike say) (57b-c). This suggests that in RPCs grin is intransitive. If true, so cannot be the realisation of grin’s direct object, because grin does not select for a direct object.

(57) a. “I will,” so grins John, “start my new job tomorrow.”
    b. Paul says this: “I am glad to be home.”
    c. Paul grins (*this): “I am glad to be home.”

Fourthly, unintegrated German speaker RPCs (unlike their integrated counterparts) license the correlative pronoun es (which moves to the left periphery of Mittelfeld).\(^\text{17}\) If so and es were both direct objects, one would expect them to display a complementary distribution. This expectation is not borne out. In such RPCs, so is licensable. If present, so occurs in the first position and triggers subject-verb inversion.

    ‘Theo brought – so says Paul – his dog.’

\(^\text{17}\) Cf. Reis (1995, 2000) for the distinction between integrated and unintegrated RPC constructions.
\(^\text{18}\) Note that this generalised description of the internal syntax of RPCs also applies to [+Q]-RPCs like do you reckon in (i). Two potential dissimilarities do pertain between the RPC in (i)
in Dutch and German, (ii) island effects, (iii) parasitic gaps, and (iv) the presence of the aL complementiser in Irish.

4 Extending the analysis in §2-3: utterance-initial clauses

In §2-3, I outlined a generalised analysis of RPCs that treats them as clausal adjuncts that display internal A’-movement of a host-denoting anaphor to a topic position within the RPC’s C-domain. While this approach accounts for many of the properties RPCs display, it cannot be understood as an exhaustive analysis. This is because my analysis so far makes no mention of utterance-initial clauses such those in (59). In this section, I explore the extent to which utterance-initial clauses can be accommodated into the analysis from §2-3, and whether this particular level of inclusion is predicted by it.

(59)  

a.  [INITIAL_CLAUSE I think] [CONSEQUENT_CLAUSE John will be late]  
b.  [INITIAL_CLAUSE John, thinks] [CONSEQUENT_CLAUSE “I, will be late”]

The first point to make with regards to the constructions in (59) concerns the diagnostics for parataxis (i.e. ‘RPC-hood’). One must distinguish between diagnostics for parataxis and diagnostics for parataxis in a particular linear position.

It was shown in §3 that utterance-medial/final RPCs (i) optionally display so, (ii) obligatorily display subject-verb inversion in Dutch and German, (ii) display island effects, and (iv) license parasitic gaps.

Utterance-initial clauses like those in (59) display none of these properties. They cannot display so (in either the first position or VP-internally) (60); subject-verb inversion is prohibited in Dutch and German and in English constructions containing quoted consequent clauses (60); no island effects are observed (61); and parasitic gaps cannot be licensed (62).

and its [-Q]-counterparts, however. The first is that wh-movement is focus rather than topic movement (Breu 2004), and the second is that the moved element Ø might be base-generated in the direct object position.

(i) Who has, do you reckon, won the prize?
(60) a. \{(*So) ich glaube(*so) / * glaube ich\} es wird regnen.\hfill \text{German}  
so I believe so believe I it will rain  
‘I believe it will rain.’

b. \{(*Zo) Jan zegt(*zo) / * zegt Jan\} “het boek ligt op tafel”.\hfill \text{Dutch}  
so Jan says so says Jan the book lies on table  
‘Jan says “the book is on the table”.

c. * (So) said John (so): “I will be late.”\hfill \text{20}

(61) a. Mary heard \([\text{ISLAND the rumour that Pete said}]\) John will be late.

b. Mary was told \([\text{ISLAND the claim that Pete whispered}]\): “I, will be late.”

(62) a. Mary instinctively knows __ without articulating (*it) that John will be late.

b. John, instinctively knew __ without articulating (*it): “I, will be late.”

If so is an adjunct in utterance-medial/final RPCs that A´-moves to a topic position within the RPC’s C-domain (see §3), then so’s absence in utterance-initial clauses like those in (60) – and consequently the absence of A´-movement, island effects and parasitic gap licensing – can be easily explained: so cannot be licensed in utterance-initial clauses because (i) so (or its null counterpart Ø) is not a cataphor, and (ii) even if so were a cataphorically licensed, the consequent clause is not a topic, and thus A´-movement of so to a topic-position within the utterance-initial clause would be unnecessary.

Resultantly, the dissimilarities between utterance-initial clauses and medial/final RPCs listed in (60) to (62) arise because of the dissimilarity in linear position: utterance-initial clauses precede their ‘host’, while utterance-

---

19 In Dutch, zo is permitted VP-internally on its ‘thus’ interpretation (De Vries 2006:222), as illustrated in (i) below.

(i) Joop verdedigde zich aldus/zo/ (met deze woorden): “Ik heb het niet met opzet gedaan.”  
Joop defended himself thus /so/ with these words I have it not with intent done  
‘Joop defended himself with the words, “I did not do it on purpose.”’

20 The use of subject-verb inversion in utterance clauses like (60c) is not unacceptable in English, but rather archaic. An illustration of this comes from Hesse’s Siddhartha, translated into English in 1951, where subject-verb inversion is observed with the archaic-sounding quoth (i).

(i) ‘Quoth Siddhartha: “What should I possibly have to tell you, oh venerable one? Perhaps that you’re searching far too much? That in all that searching, you don’t find the time for finding?”’
medial/final RPCs do not. Thus, the presence of *so*, obligatorily subject-verb inversion in Dutch and German, and so on are diagnostics of *parataxis in a particular position*. The absence of these properties in utterance-initial clauses like (60) bears no relevance to the question of whether the clauses in (60) subordinate or are paratactically related to the clause that they precede (*contra* Griffiths 2014).

If the observations from §3 provide unsuitable diagnostics of parataxis (as has just been shown), we must look to the predictions from §2. The analysis from §2 predicts that, if utterance-initial clauses are RPCs, c-command dependencies cannot be established across the initial/consequent clause boundary.

This diagnostic applies straightforwardly to the Turkish data, and illustrates that utterance-initial clauses are indeed RPCs in Turkish. Regular subordination constructions in Turkish display quantifier-binding (63a), wide wh-scope (64a) and exceptional case marking (65a): all dependencies that require c-command (cf. Şener 2010 for arguments that Turkish ECM requires c-command). That ‘enclitic-ki’ constructions do not license any of these dependencies (63b – 65b) illustrates that the enclitic-ki clause does not c-command its consequent clause and is thus an RPC.21

(63) a. Herkesi [proₜ₁/₂ geç gel-*e*ceğ-in]-i söyle-di.²² Turkish
   Everyone pro late come-FUT.NOM-POSS-ACC say-PST
   ‘Everyone, said that (hek/₁) will be late.’

   b. [Herkes i dedi *ki* o/proₜ₁/₂ geç gel-ecek
everyone, said ki he/pro late come-FUT
   ‘Everyone said (hek/*₁) will be late.’

(64) a. Ahmet-*in* [kim-i öp-tüg-ü-n]-ü san-iyor-sun?
   Ahmet-GEN who-ACC kiss-NOM-POSS-ACC believe-PROG-2S
   ‘Whom, do you believe Ahmet kissed t₁?’

   b. *[San-iyor-sun *ki*] Ahmet kim-i öp-tü?
   believe-PROG-2S ki Ahmet who-ACC kiss-PST
   ‘Whom, do you believe *ki* Ahmet kissed t₁?’ (intended)

²¹ For evidence that (A) enclitic-ki clauses adjoin to their consequent clauses, rather than are coordinated with them (as Kesici 2013 maintains), and (B) the tests in (63) to (65) apply equally to constructions containing quoted consequent clauses, cf. Griffiths & Güneş (2014).
²² Only pro or the reflexive kendî can be bound by universal quantifiers in Turkish.
   Merve-NOM I-NOM/ACC plaj-DAT go-PST-1S believe-PROG
   ‘Merve believes that I went to the beach.’

   b. *[Merve san-iyor ki] ben-Ø/*i plaj-a git-ti-m.
   Merve believe-PROG ki I-NOM/ACC plaj-DAT go-PST-1S
   ‘Merve believes I went to the beach.’

Of course, the application of these and similar c-command tests to English, Dutch, and German and analyses that arise from the results obtained therefrom pervade the generative literature. While there is general accord that utterance-initial clauses like (59b) are quote RPCs (cf. Banfield 1982 and De Vries 2006, among others) – as evidenced in part by the fact that quotes are locked islands (66) and arise ‘complete’ (67) – the conclusion that utterance-initial clauses like (59a) are speaker RPCs enjoys little support (but cf. Schneider 2007a:177–184).

(66) *Who did John say “I have met t”?*

(67) a. John read the recipe to Mary: “flour, sugar, butter and eggs, all in equal measure. Stir.”
   b. Arnie, said (this): “I'll be back.”
   c. Terry grinned (*this): “I've finally finished my thesis!”

As is well-known, the class of verbs that purportedly c-select for embedded root clauses in German equate roughly to those permitted in utterance-medial/final RPCs (i.e. nonfactuals and certain semifactuals) (cf., for example, Reis 1997 and Scheffler 2009). This observation and others lead Reis (1997) to the conclusion that so-called ‘embedded root clause’ constructions in German (68a) are actually paratactically related to an utterance-initial speaker RPC (68b).

(68) a. [CP Ich glaube, [CP2 Maria hat Fieber]].
   German

   b. [[[CP Ich glaube,] [CP Maria hat Fieber]].
      I believe Maria has fever
      ‘I think Mary has a fever.’

To what extent the same analysis can be extended to English and Dutch is uncertain. For instance, standard Dutch does not permit embedded root clauses whatsoever. If parenthetical (i.e. evidential) function and paratactic syntax are in any sense related, one expects the absence of semantic bleaching of bang
‘afraid’ in a construction like (69). The expectation is not borne out, however – bang can indeed be understood as bleached. Such an observation might make one wonder whether V2/V-final word order is a reliable indicator of hypotaxis/parataxis, or whether some extraneous factor (perhaps the presence or absence of the complementiser) is the true trigger for V-finality.

(69) *Ik ben bang dat je kat dood is.*

I am afraid that your cat dead is

‘I’m afraid that your cat is dead.’

Such issues and speculations thereon will continue to arise if one adopts the analysis in §2, as, according to this approach, the existence of utterance-initial RPCs is expected. Nothing rules them out. While Turkish displays both utterance-initial speaker and quote RPCs, only quote RPCs are evidenced in English, Dutch, and German (from a consensus viewpoint, at least). Thus, the current approach to RPCs is incomplete in one of two ways. Either (i) additional mechanisms must be sought to adequately explain why utterance-initial speaker RPCs are unevidenced in English, Dutch, and German, or (ii) additional evidence must be sought to show that a subclass of what look like subordination constructions in English, Dutch, and German are actually root clauses with utterance-initial speaker RPCs attached to them. Whether (i) or (ii) is correct must remain an issue for future investigation.

To summarise: the analysis outlined in §2-3 predicts the existence of utterance-initial RPCs. In this section, I demonstrated how the analysis of the internal syntax of utterance-medial/final RPCs from §3 impedes one’s discovery of utterance-initial RPCs, as the analysis in §3 renders many of the internal dissimilarities displayed by utterance-initial clauses and utterance-medial/final RPCs irrelevant to the evaluation of the ‘RPC-hood’ of utterance-initial clauses. Without having these tools available, diagnosing parataxis in utterances like those in (59) is challenging. Thus, future investigation must decide whether the current analysis is correct or incorrect to predict the presence of RPCs in all linear positions.

5 Conclusion

I have endeavoured in this paper to generalise over RPC constructions from English, Dutch, German and Turkish. I argued that RPCs are clausal adjuncts whose adjunction has no semantic import on the truth conditions of their host.
RPCs ‘modify’ their host solely by restricting the context in which their host is interpreted to that context in which the proposition denoted by the RPC is true. That speaker RPCs are utterance-bound while quote RPCs modify the entirety of their host was explained by appealing to general mechanisms on anaphor resolution across the discourse and by appealing to the fact that speech acts like assertions can be composed of assertions, while quotes – as demonstrations – cannot be composed of quotes. I also argued that RPCs are independent clauses which either (i) display A´-movement of a host-denoting anaphor to a topic position (if the RPC interpolates into or follows its host), or (ii) displays no A´-movement or host-denoting anaphor (if the RPC linearly precedes its host).

The upshot of my analysis of the internal syntax of RPCs is that their internal properties have no bearing upon their external relation to their host – i.e. one cannot appeal to the idiosyncrasies of their internal syntax to support a paratactic analysis of RPCs. The major consequence of this is that the current approach requires that both utterance-initial speaker and quote RPCs should be observed in each of the languages under investigation. While this requirement can be readily demonstrated to be fulfilled in Turkish, it is difficult to judge whether it is met in English, Dutch, or German. Further research is required to discover whether this requirement is met in these languages, or whether the current requires amendment (or abandonment) if it is shown that this requirement can never be met.
References


Schneider, Stefan. 2007a. Reduced parenthetical clauses as mitigators. A corpus study of spoken French, Italian and Spanish. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.


Appendix

(A1) a. John, I think, will be late. [Assertive host, mitigative RPC]
    b. John, I swear, will be late. [Assertive host, speech act RPC]
    c. John, I hope, will be late. [Assertive host, evaluative RPC]

(A2) a. Will John be late, do you think? [Erotetic host, mitigative RPC]
    b. #Will John be late, do you assert? [Erotetic host, speech act RPC]
    c. #Will John be late, do you hope? [Erotetic host, evaluative RPC]

(A3) a. #I hereby dub this store open, I reckon. [Declarative host, mitigative RPC]
    b. I hereby dub this store open, I declare. [Declarative host, speech act RPC]
    c. #I hereby dub this store open, I fear. [Declarative host, evaluative RPC]

(A4) a. #I do swear that I will uphold the law, I believe. [Commissive host, mitigative RPC]
    b. I do swear that I will uphold the law, I declare. [Commissive host, speech act RPC]
    c. #I do swear that I will uphold the law, I prey. [Commissive host, evaluative RPC]

(A5) a. #Live long, I’m told, and prosper! [Optative host, mitigative RPC]
    b. #Live long, I assert, and prosper! [Optative host, speech act RPC]
    c. Live long, I wish, and prosper! [Optative host, evaluative RPC]