This research unravels the economic collapse of the Datoga pastoralists of central and northern Tanzania from the 1830s to the beginning of the 21st century. The research builds from the broader literature on continental African pastoralism during the past two centuries. Overall, the literature suggests that African pastoralism is collapsing due to changing political and environmental factors. My dissertation aims to provide a case study adding to the general trends of African pastoralism, while emphasizing the topic of competition as not only physical, but as something that is ethnically negotiated through historical and collective memories.

There are two main questions that have guided this project: 1) How is ethnic space defined by the Datoga and their neighbours across different historical times? And 2) what are the origins of the conflicts and violence and how have they been narrated by the state throughout history? Examining archival sources and oral interviews it is clear that the Datoga have struggled through a competitive history of claims on territory against other neighbouring communities. The competitive encounters began with the Maasai entering the Serengeti in the 19th century, and intensified with the introduction of colonialism in Mbulu and Singida in the late 19th and 20th centuries. The fight for control of land and resources resulted in violent clashes with other groups. Often the Datoga were painted as murderers and impediments to development. Policies like the amalgamation measures of the British colonial administration in Mbulu or Ujamaa in post-colonial Tanzania aimed at confronting the “Datoga problem,” but were inadequate in neither addressing the Datoga issues of identity, nor providing a solution to their quest for land ownership and control.

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Samwel Shanga Mhajida
The Collapse of a Pastoral Economy

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Samwel Shanga Mhajida

The Collapse of a Pastoral Economy

The Datoga of Central and Northern Tanzania from the 1830s to the 2000s

Volume 15

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## Contents

**Acknowledgements** .................................................................................................................................................. 9  

1 **Introduction** .................................................................................................................................................... 13  
1.1 The Architecture of the Thesis ......................................................................................................................... 20  
1.2 Disclaimer / Clarifier ............................................................................................................................................ 23  
1.3 Literature Review .................................................................................................................................................. 24  
  Historiographical Background ................................................................................................................................. 24  
  Space as a Perspective in Research ........................................................................................................................... 26  
  African Pastoralists and Pastoralism ........................................................................................................................ 27  
  Contextualizing the Datoga ...................................................................................................................................... 32  
1.4 The Methodological Approaches .......................................................................................................................... 34  
  Archival Sources ....................................................................................................................................................... 34  
  The Oral Research Process in Tanzania ................................................................................................................... 37  
  The Challenges to the Research ............................................................................................................................... 39  

2 **The ‘Enlargement of Scale’ and the Datoga Pastoralist Identity**  
**Formation 1830s–1910s** ......................................................................................................................................... 43  
2.1 The Geography of the Datoga Settlements ........................................................................................................... 44  
2.2 Introducing the Pre-Colonial Histories of the People in Singida and Mbulu ........................................................... 48  
2.3 The Origin of Competition for Space in Central and Northern Tanzania ................................................................ 50  
  Reconstructing the Pre-Maasai Datoga Historical Encounter ................................................................................... 52  
  Datoga–Maasai Conflicts: The Creation of Competing Landscape Memories in the Plains ......................................... 55  
2.4 Shapes and Memories of Landscape:  
  Contested Datoga–Maasai Experiences ................................................................................................................... 60  
2.5 The Transnational Trade and the Formation of Complex Identities .................................................................... 64  
2.6 Transfixation of Spaces and Colonial Tribal Boundaries, 1900–1916 .................................................................... 67  
2.7 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................................ 75
3 British Colonial Policies and the Limitation of Datoga Economic Spaces, 1918–1950s ............................................. 77

3.1 Introduction .................................................................................................. 77

3.2 Negotiating Access and Resource Use:
Ethnic versus Public Definitions .......................................................... 79
The Salt ‘Fracas’ and the Datoga Resistance to Public Land Discourse .. 82
Border Hopping and the Limits of Selective Development .......... 88

3.3 Background of the Datoga–Nyaturu Ethnic Conflicts ......................... 91
The Different Interpretations of Ethnically Motivated Murders
at the Singida–Mbulu Border ................................................................. 96
Non-Human Forces Contributing to the Murders ......................... 105
The Colonial State and Strategies against Ethnic Murders .......... 110
The Making of “Aliens” in Singida and Mbulu:
The Case of the Datoga ................................................................. 116
The Datoga-Iraqw Forms of Engagement on Land Issues ............ 121

3.4 Conclusion .......................................................................................... 128

4 The State, Ujamaa and the Sedentarization of the Datoga,
1966–1984 ......................................................................................... 131

4.1 Ujamaa, Datoga “Murders” and ‘Operation Vijiji’ ...................... 132
Historical Antecedent: The Datoga “Murders” in the Era of
Independence ....................................................................................... 134
Working Solutions against Ethnic Clashes: The Temporary Measures ... 142

4.2 Ujamaa and the Sedentarization of the Datoga:
The Long Term Process ................................................................. 149
The Creation of Datoga Villages ........................................................... 154
The Impact of the Sedentarization Projects on the Datoga .......... 159

4.3 Conclusion .......................................................................................... 164

5 The Orphans of the Plains: Negotiating Livelihood amidst
Changing Ethnic Relations at the Singida–Mbulu Border,
1984–2012 ......................................................................................... 167

5.1 Understanding the People and the Landscape of the Study Area ...... 168
The Spill out of Food Shortage .......................................................... 170
The Datoga–Sukuma Conflict, 1984–1987 ......................................... 174
Working for a Solution: The Government Approach .................... 177

5.2 The Datoga Option: Coexistence by Association ......................... 179
Mzee Hodi Hodi Musoma (ca. 80 Years Old) .................................. 180
Dunga Gilaisi (ca. 43 Years Old) .......................................................... 184
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1 Introduction

This thesis is about the Datoga pastoralists of central and northern Tanzania. As discussed in the chapters, the Datoga are people who have lived in an environment with volatility, competition from other pastoralists and non-pastoralists groups, and the effects of state policies and interferences especially from the late 19th to the first decade of the 21st Century. This study presents an often over-looked aspect of pastoralism, which is competition and how it weakened the economic wellbeing of the Datoga. Throughout this thesis I purposefully avoid overemphasizing the word resilience, as the historical realities of the Datoga can be better understood as people who have constantly struggled, resisted and engaged with other communities as a way of protecting and securing resources in the plains. In using the phrase ‘the collapse of a pastoral economy,’ I attempt to capture and summarize the process into which the Datoga’s economy has been weakening over time. Among the Datoga, survival from the mid-19th to the 21st centuries not only came from resilience to hostile situations and circumstances, instead life was contested through competitive encounters, a fact which is reminiscent in Datoga folklores.¹ Being a minority pastoralist group, the Datoga have learned to define life through negotiating the boundaries of disputed

¹ Part of the folklores appears in Datoga oral traditions. See my interviews with Paul Kuga (Interview Kuga, 10.11.14), Nyina Moshi (Interview Moshi, 02.01.15), and Mzee Mabochi (Interview Mabochi,
land ownership. Frictions emerged in the second quarter of the 19th century after the historical rupture in the Serengeti and the surrounding plains. In the process of this massive scattering, the Datoga encountered other ethnic communities fleeing from the conflicts either generated by dwindling resources or the outbreak of major diseases (Börjeson, Hodgson and Yanda 2008: 537).

While the objectives mentioned above are central in the study and understanding of the Datoga, the additional motivation to undertake this research on the Datoga came from three publications by Gordon Wilson in 1952 (Gordon Wilson 1952: 11). Wilson’s report, alongside two papers for the journal *Tanganyika Notes and Records*, were the first written accounts of the Datoga for the general public and wider audiences in colonial Tanganyika. These were not new pieces of information on the colonized ethnic groups in northern and central Tanzania. Similar works had previously appeared about other neighbours of the Datoga such as the Wanyaturu, Wambulu (Iraqw), and Wambugwe (e.g. Gray 1955; Cory 1952; Winter 1955). The aim of the accounts, as the colonial district officers argued, was social control and indeed such accounts were a medium through which the British could follow activities in the colonies. Contrary to F. J. Bagshawe’s earlier portrayal of the Datoga and their neighbours as peoples of the ‘happy valley’ (Bagshawe 1925b) Wilson’s work on the Datoga aimed at riddling out the controversies surrounding the ‘murders’ in the Singida-Mbulu districts. The timing of the Wilson report was also significant because it appeared at the moment in which the tides of colonialism and the British in Tanganyika were slowly waning. The report formed a major trajectory of the Datoga as controversial pastoralists in the way they killed other ‘peace loving’ communities. This narrative was adopted by the post-colonial government and guided their understanding of the Datoga pastoralists.

One problem with Wilson’s report and his subsequent publications on the Datoga was the production and propagation of an image of the Datoga as naturally hostile and violent. These documents built and enhanced the image of a community that was ‘hunting’ other communities in ritual killings. The construction of the Datoga’s identity as ‘enemies’ that resisted development and modernization was later embraced and accepted as received wisdom by the post-colonial government in Tanzania. As if to echo Wilson’s conclusion, the government of Tanzania reported intern-ethnic clashes between the Datoga and their neighbours at the border of Mbulu (Arusha) and Iramba (Singida) between 1965 and 1968. An official statement was

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2 See a broad discussion and meaning of this term in Shetler (2007: chap. 3). In this seminal work, Shetler treats and associates the coming of the 19th century with increasing tensions to societies living in the Serengeti and the surrounding villages at the time. For her, the century brought a sudden break down of the social, economic and cultural fabric of communities sharing the Serengeti ecosystem. The forces leading to the break-down (rupture) were many, but the most pronounced were the Maasai wars, the trans-national forces as a result of the Trans-Indian Ocean trade, the human and animal diseases – rinderpest and sleeping sickness. All in total brought the ‘rupture.’
made in the parliament in September 1967 condemning the Datoga as ‘murderers,’ and labelling their culture as an obstacle to development that had to be changed.3

And change, according to the ideology of the state whether in colonial Tanganyika or in the wake of the post-independence atmosphere in Tanzania, meant socially engineering the entire Datoga way of life. The Minister of Home Affairs broadly defined the meaning of social engineering of the Datoga [Wamang’ati] in May 1968:

Because of this the government has realised that the Wamang’ati have to be transformed mentally. The government intends to: 1) show them that the government will take serious measures against their violent culture in the ways they have never experienced. 2) Change the settlement patterns of the Wamang’ati so they can live in Ujamaa villages while the government will commit to give them social services that will improve their lives and fortunes. 3) Provide security in Wamang’ati villages so that they can stop harming their neighbours. 4) Create a plan through the Ministry of Local Government and Village Development of changing their bad habits so they can follow new modern culture.4

Taken broadly, Datoga pastoralists and pastoralism in general were viewed as contradicting the developmentalist trajectory of post-independent Tanzania. The developmentalist attitude of the colonial and post-colonial governments was hostile to the Datoga’s non-agricultural economic path, which was not market oriented or driven by monetary gains. The governmental approach towards capitalism was forceful, not only in Tanzania, but for colonized peoples all over the world. However, the Datoga pastoralists’ engineered path to ‘development’ was vexed by a misrepresentation of the ‘murders.’ The origin of the Datoga’s contested history is even older than the post-colonial experience. It began in the 1830s. The Datoga, Maasai and other agro-pastoralists in central and northern Tanzania dominated the plains in these regions. They produced intensively cultivated areas and grazing landscapes, which Börjeson and others have attributed entirely to the Iraqw and Maasai (Börjeson, Hodgson and Yanda 2008: 537). This attribution is historically incorrect. Rather, the grazing landscape in northern and central Tanzania was a space disputed primarily by the Datoga and the Maasai. In naming the two landscapes, the Datoga and Maasai steppes, the German colonial administrators understood this landscape as contested (Jackson 1942: 3; Fosbrooke 1948: 2). However, despite the presence of other pastoralist communities like the Datoga, in Tanzania the Maasai have dominated scholarly and state discourse.5

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3 Majadiliano ya Bunge (Hansard), United Republic of Tanzania’s Proceedings of the Legislative Assembly (hereafter cited as Majadiliano ya Bunge (Hansard)), 1967, 1200–1201.
4 Majadiliano ya Bunge (Hansard), 9th May, 1968, 529–531; author’s translation from Swahili.
5 Ernestina Coast (2001: 1) attributes the reasons to why the Maasai are overrepresented in international research to their early entry into the public imagination. They are also more visible and their visibility attracts the attentions throughout the globe. One particular observation is from Dr. Amani
sai are relatively new to the plains of central and northern Tanzania (Galaty 1993). Their arrival disrupted order in the plains, as they imposed their own imagination of the plains by force, which greatly impacted the Datoga and their immediate neighbours. In this study, the conflict between the Maasai and the Datoga is interpreted as the beginning of encounters by which different forms of imaginations about and presence in the landscapes of central and northern Tanzania were produced. Both Datoga and Maasai created their own memories in their narratives and those of their neighbours; in addition, forms of presence were definitively marked on the land in terms of naming and producing culture, healing practices, land prophets and territorial positioning. Since the collision of the groups a profound and unrequiting enmity has emerged (Lane 1993: 3). The most destructive conflicts occurred when the Maasai sought to impose their dominance and the Datoga employed multiple forms of resistance. Primarily by attempting to extract the cattle wealth from other pastoralists and agro-pastoralists and to create what I call Maasaiphilia, the Maasai exhibited their power and dominance over the landscape. In other ways, the so-called “Maasai raids” reconstructed, cemented, and militarized ethnic coalitions among smaller and often scattered groups like the Datoga. Oral narratives from communities in Singida and Mbulu indicate that a coalition to defend against the Maasai raids was formed from the 1830s until 1894 when the last raid in Singida was recorded (Cory 1952: 3).

Studies on the Datoga in recent years have mainly come from the work of ethnologists, environmental geographers and medical scholars. These generally focus on the Barabaig subgroup, omitting three large existing Datoga groups and at least nine others who are either lost, submerged within expanding communities, or have seized to exist as a result of systematic and/or forced incorporation into other ethnic communities. Apart from continuing a debate on pastoralism in general, this study is also an effort to produce historical work on often academically overlooked subgroups of the Datoga. Until now, major historical works on the Datoga have concentrated on sub-groups around the Serengeti and villages south of the Mara Region; while the remaining Datoga sub-groups, particularly those bordering Singida and Arusha, have been largely disregard despite their rich history. Furthermore, unlike many previous studies, I have tried to move beyond a simple representation of a single group by choosing to study four of the major Datoga groups – the Barabaig

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Lusekelo, a senior Lecturer in the Department of Linguistics-DUCE and an ardent researcher on Socio-linguistics in Tanzania. In March 24th 2016 he remarked on his non-public facebook account that “once I read in every 10 Maasai, there is a researcher. I think this is correct because there is a lot of publications for Maasai, ranging from pastoralism, tourism, diversification, schooling, conservation, game, initiation rites, migration, age-set, language, worrisome/moranhood, to several other disciplines, e.g. gender, homestead, decision making…. I sometimes fail to sort out which one is a good resource for education of the Maasai.”


7 See for example major pioneering works by Jan Bender Shetler (2003, 2007) and Kjaerby (1979).
(Mang’ati), Bianjidi/Taturu, Brediga and Gisamjeng. In this way, my research aims to provide a genuine representation of what can be called a history of the Datoga communities; this study may therefore be regarded as a first. As Peter D. Little writes, researching what has been called ‘tribal’ or ethnic history is to work on both “hidden histories and identities,” (Little 1998: 444) which can be discerned through relationships of dominance. Whether in the struggle for grazing or agricultural land, hidden histories and identities are produced through struggles or multiple encounters. In this case, stretching this study over a long period of time enables us to unravel and unpack the hidden dynamics, changes, adoptions and continuities across the Datoga subgroups.

In this study I also examine the development of the Datoga identities in northern and central Tanzania. Following Jan Bender Shetler’s thesis of rupture and displacement, I argue that apart from the pessimistic interpretation of events that shaped the 19th century in the Datoga landscape, there was also a positive impact on how societies were moulded and strengthened by the hostilities, enmities and friendships. I argue that, fearful of being annihilated and dissolved by other more powerful societies, the Datoga coagulated and merged into definitive social formations (Kimambo 1989: 249–50). Communities in Singida mostly trace their origin from merging with several ‘alien’ communities who migrated into their spaces. Most of the narratives of the Nyaturu, the Nyiramba, Iambi, and Nyisanzu in Singida, and the Gogo and Sandawe in Dodoma, suggest their recent history is a result of collective identities cemented by multiple forces during the 19th century (Shorter 1972: 150–263; Mnyampala 1995: chap. 3). In contrast, the Datoga (in Mbulu and Singida), Iraqw (Wambulu), Mbugwe, Gorowa, and the Fiome seem to have built their identities and consciousness of being a cultural unit prior to the 19th century, and later transported their forms of existence into different areas of central and northern Tanzania. This suggests that the latter’s formation of group identities started much earlier in the plains than that of the former communities (Koponen 1988a: 184–85). From this, I argue that the merging of old and new social groups bred cultural and political diversities that were possibly unique to this area of Tanzania (Shorter 1972: 150–263).

Whether through the District and Provincial Commissioners, Village Chairmen or the coercive forces of the police and the political organizations, the state and its corporate machinery not only parcelled the Datoga landscape, but also systematically endorsed the liquidation process of the Datoga economy. The policies of the British and later post-colonial governments were largely driven by the imaginary narrative of the Datoga as violent murderers of any community that came into their spaces of production.8 Emerging in the 1920s, the narrative of the violent Datoga resulted from so-called ‘tribal’ protests against the institution of public or government-owned land. The creation of these spaces had entailed the subjugation of the Datoga’s own imagination of being in sovereign control over their land. The lines that were drawn

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8 Tanzania National Archive (hereafter cited as TNA), accession 69, file 8/5/A. This is part of the extensive report by Henry A. Fosbrooke (Fosbrooke 1950b: 20).
to demarcate the colonial territories into pockets of dependences did not end at the territorial level but were extended to the ethnic divide. Communities in Tanganyika were divided within their areas of domicile, as a way of insuring control and effective colonization. But, as the case of the Northern and Central Provinces exemplifies, such was the easiest way possible of the divide and rule policy.\(^9\) The case of the Datoga was perhaps unique in the way that such colonial projects to invent and erect ‘native’ borders were resisted. First, the Datoga chose chiefs for the government popularly known as *chifu ya serkali* (government chief), while simultaneously maintaining their own *chifu ya Datoga* (Datoga chief), whose power surpassed those of the government chiefs. These chiefs openly resisted the government chiefs, resisting the German and later the British colonial project of indirect rule in the Northern Province. As a result, between 1926 and 1940, the British frequently replaced the Datoga chiefs; some elected chiefs hardly completed a month. This form of resistance created great panic among British colonial officers.\(^10\)

Both in the Northern and Central Provinces the discussion within the British colonial sphere continued about how best to contain the Datoga. These discussions intensified in the late 1920s, when the Datoga became increasingly threatened by the British’s new model of landscape reconfiguration. At the time, the British administration expanded policies that were connected to the ‘grow more crops’ campaigns, which favoured the Iraqw [Wambulu] over the Datoga pastoralists. This colonial economic policy, popularly known as “amalgamation,” was aimed at increasing the Iraqwization of the political landscape in Mbulu and led to a number of more subtle measures.\(^11\) While in many districts of Tanganyika, several ethnic groups were co-opted into other identities to reduce the cost of government and to improve efficiency, the amalgamation appeared morally and politically sound. However, the British colonial administration also aimed to use amalgamation as a form of social engineering. For the British in Mbulu, the Datoga represented a community that clung to the past and the only quick and effective way to render them productive was to transform them — both politically and economically — into a group that emulated change and modernization. The British viewed the Datoga’s neighbours, the Iraqw/Mbulu people, as a ‘model’ community that was hard working and developing. As such, either through persuasion or by force and persuasion, the amalgamation included fusing the Datoga social structure into that of the Iraqw. To the Datoga, this indicated an end to their control of the land and borders, as well as their political power and identity. The Iraqwization policy was formalized in two phases: first between 1927 and 1929 and then between 1929 and 1942.\(^12\) In the Dongobesh and later Ghatesh Barazas (meetings) held in August 1927, the Datoga and Iraqw communities were brought together to discuss the formation of a paramount chief.

\(^9\) A detailed discussion on this policy appears in Stewart (1951: 49–50).
\(^10\) TNA, accession 69, file 8/5/A: Mbulu District.
\(^11\) TNA, accession 69, file 8/5/A: Mbulu District.
\(^12\) TNA, *Mbulu District Book*, vol. 3: Minutes of the Ghatesh Baraza.
More than six hundred representatives from both communities attended.\textsuperscript{13} With the British openly favouring the Iraqw and fearing marginalization by the more populous Iraqw, the Datoga alone contested the political and economic amalgamation. The Datoga were especially concerned about the increasing porosity of the once strict ethnic boundaries, which had begun allowing the Iraqw to further expand inside Datoga territory. Between 1918 and 1927, the Datoga lost more than 40 per cent of the territories bordering the Iraqw in the south of Central Mbulu.\textsuperscript{14} Although the British knew these territories belonged to the Datoga, they instituted the first Iraqw chief as a paramount chief of the Datoga and Iraqw; thus ensuing debates between the Datoga and the Iraqw, under the supervision of the British colonial officers. These debates focused on four main themes. First, the British argued that they preferred Iraqw chiefship on demographic grounds, or what they called ‘the majority must rule’ principle. In the Mbulu District, they argued that for every ten ‘native’ people, six were Iraqw. Therefore, Iraqw political dominance was legitimized on the basis that they were the primary contributors to government income through taxation. Secondly, the local Datoga leadership was characteristically regarded as rebellious and impeding British control over the District. Between 1920 and 1938 more than five Datoga chiefs were forced to relinquish their powers due to ‘political extortion.’\textsuperscript{15} Third, according to British narratives, the Iraqw in Mbulu were a hardworking and exemplary community who pursued modernity and development. As such, the British wanted to infuse the Datoga with Iraqw ‘culture.’ The fourth was centered on the conflicting ethnic boundaries as defined by the British colonial authorities. Several reports from the 1920s onwards indicate the increasing tensions over claims of border infringements either by the Iraqw south of Mbulu or by the Nyaturu north of Singida (Fosbrooke n.d.). These British narratives consequently produced different forms of Datoga resistance and counter narratives. Counter narratives highlighted the competition between British policies of social engineering and Datoga claims of territorial rights.

In post-colonial Tanzania, the terrain that the Datoga pastoralist’s had to negotiate was difficult and largely defined by how the Datoga encountered the state and their neighbours. The narrative of the violent Datoga was dominant among policy makers in the post-colonial government and constituted an important factor in deciding how the administration behaved toward and responded to the Datoga. By formally denouncing the Datoga’s ‘tribal’ leadership alongside chieftainship throughout the country in December 1962, the government also banished ‘unsuitable’ elements, which they viewed as hindering development.\textsuperscript{16} The first conflict that brought the Datoga under the government’s spotlight came between 1965 and 1968 in the

\textsuperscript{13} TNA, \textit{Mbulu District Book}, vol. 3: Minutes of the Ghatesh Baraza.

\textsuperscript{14} TNA, \textit{Mbulu District Book}, vol. 3: Minutes of the Ghatesh Baraza.

\textsuperscript{15} TNA, accession 69, file 54/MB/1: Chiefship & Land Rights in Dongobesh Mbulu (Gitagano).

\textsuperscript{16} Chiefs as leaders of ethnic communities were abolished in December 1962. In 1963 there was the African Chiefs Ordinance (Repeal) Act 1963, and as part of a law enacted by the National Parliament of Tanzania and then signed by the President of the Republic in 1969, reads: “is hereby abolished and
border regions of Singida and Arusha. Clashes between Datoga and neighbouring groups resulted in several deaths and injuries on both sides. However, the conflicts were not new. Similar clashes and killings had taken place in 1935 and remained unresolved. In 1968, following the clashes, the Tanzanian government decided to collectively punish the Datoga in the border regions and beyond. This unprecedented move ended ethnic relations based on Nyaturu-Datoga land issues and violence. Nevertheless, it completely failed to ‘modernize’ the community, as the commissions behind the move had argued it would. Over time, the government offered little or no compensation for the large tracts of Datoga land it took, leaving the pastoralists to work on diminishing parcels of poor-quality land. In the process, the Datoga’s century long efforts to claim *nchi* (territory) were halted. Though the Datoga resisted the government takeover of their lands, the government increased the pace and scale of their invasion of (exclusively) pastoralist economic space. With its socialist (*ujamaa*) ideology, the government was unable to envisage how the Datoga pastoralists could be made to fit in the new, post-colonial society. Moreover, modernization through centralized government ranches failed to produce high yields and good economic returns.

### 1.1 The Architecture of the Thesis

This thesis is organized into seven thematically and chronologically arranged and developed chapters. In each chapter, I approach the pastoralist Datoga through multiple sources in several sub-sections. In this first chapter, I begin by giving a general introduction to the rationale of this study, before introducing the study from a theoretical perspective. In the process, I also cover the research questions, the objective, the literature review, and the methodological issues. Chapter 1 therefore offers a broad introduction to the issues discussed later. In particular, I engage with the pastoralist problem at a general level, before moving onto specific and analytical questions that clarify the trajectories of this study. In the literature and methodology sub-sections, I illustrate how African pastoralism is a focal point of many recent medical scientists, ecologists and scholars. In this research, I have tried to focus on ethnic interactions, dialogue, conflicts and engagement with the state and non-state agencies.

The second chapter provides an anchor and foundation to the understanding of the Datoga as a community, their geography and their subgroups. I approach this by looking at the groupings, migrations and the understandings of the history underlying the formation of the Datoga identity. In particular, I explore the genesis of Datoga–Maasai conflicts from the late 1830s until the late 1860s. These conflicts produced the Datoga ‘refugees’ whose presence in Singida, Mbulu and neighbouring districts set into motion a chain of further conflicts, associations and migration.

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to the extent to which any customary law confers upon a chief any function, power or authority such law shall be invalid.”
into new ‘tribal’ spaces. As pastoralists, the migrating Datoga increased cultural diversity and brought ‘new’ imaginations into these places. These new imaginations included Datoga healing and rain making practices, cattle culture, and the intricacies of trans-ethnic claims to land. These experiences were also related to broader forces at work in the 19th century, including the effects of transnational developments like the Trans-Indian Ocean trade and with it the spread of animal and human disease and violence. In particular, I discuss violence in relation to the Datoga and Maasai narratives which defined an enemy precisely from the global experiences of the 19th century. Contested viewpoints on what constituted the ‘new’ cultural trends of initiation that came with the violence of the Maasai raids and the long-distance effects are discussed in this chapter. The discussion is also extended to cover the German colonial period and emphasizes the establishment and institution of tribal limits and concepts of ‘tribal’ leadership. All these are explored with an eye to how the Datoga found space within the German colonial framework.

Chapter 3 is crafted to encompass the Datoga’s experiences in Singida and Mbulu during British colonial rule. The focus here is on the British colonial understanding of the Datoga as violent and ruthless killers of other communities. Despite ample evidence collected by their own officials, British officers ignored the fact that the Datoga were victims of the British indigenous development policies. Declaring what the Datoga understood as their own land, lakes and grazing spaces to be “public land,” the British produced unbalanced and battled spheres of interests. In other words, British definitions of land management and control sought evidence of definitive occupation and continued usage of land, either by tilling or hunting and denied claims to ownership for semi-mobile pastoral land use. However, the real conflict stemmed from the selective development policy, which the British had established as a way of eradicating the Datoga economic life. With greater competition over resource usage, the size of politically contested spaces grew over time. While the British were uncomfortable with the Datoga’s reminiscences of power, they also loathed the ‘native’ power dynamics. To counter this, the British pursued a more subtle and ruthless form of suppression, creating a leadership crisis across the entire Datoga leadership. By implicitly denying the existence of the Datoga, they asserted and created ‘other’ identities that they regarded as ‘superior,’ favourable and less controversial. From a Datoga perspective, the chapter addresses four main issues. Firstly, how relations across ‘tribal’ boundaries were developing, which were healthy for survival and sustenance by helping to procure material necessities. But the imposed restrictions of ethnically defined boundaries created power imbalances, allowing some communities to contravene the lines while denying this to others. Secondly, communities’ movements across districts in Mbulu and Singida were so fluid that it was challenging to define ethnic boundaries without causing conflicts with other communities. As pastoralists, the Datoga were profoundly affected by the fluidity of the shifting boundaries of their “homelands.” Thirdly, conflict over boundaries created tensions and violence, which the British colonial officers commonly referred to as Barabaig or Mangati murders. The history of the murders, which began in 1935 created a
powerful (post) colonial narrative about the violent Datoga. Fourthly, the effects of branding the Datoga as violent did not just affect the community economically, but also accelerated its marginalization while exempting other communities from responsibility.

The fourth chapter reflects on post-colonial development paradigms in relation to the Datoga pastoralists. I argue that between 1965 and 1973, Tanzania was undergoing a shift from the capitalist economic paradigm that was inherited from the colonial era to a socialist economy. Tanzania's drive to socialism or *ujamaa* carried with it a modernization agenda, which involved the resettlement of a large number of rural communities to designated places to establish *ujamaa* villages. As promulgated by the Arusha declaration, the state and collective farming would set the development of Tanzania in motion. As argued again in this chapter, the government viewed the continued ethnic strife between the Datoga and their neighbours in Singida as impediments on the path to national development. I argue that while such conflicts were not exactly new, the state's response to them was. First, the state's understanding of violence as the work of the Datoga did not come from the realities on the ground, but rather was constructed by the competing communities and aggravated by the state intolerance to 'resistance' to the national development project. As pastoralists, the Datoga were at odds with the Arusha declaration and *ujamaa*. Based on this narrative, the state sought to initially suppress the Datoga through massive and violent arrests and later through the resettlement and sedentarization as ways of containing the Datoga.

The fifth chapter is poised within the neoliberal turn in Tanzania, from 1984 to 2012. The study places the Datoga question within the complex history of transition from *ujamaa* and state supervised economy to the increasing exposure to the forces of the transnational neoliberal economic agenda. At a local level, the collapse of *ujamaa* as an option to economic progress led to economic vacuum, which was filled by individuals and companies competing for rural land opportunities, facilitated the arrival of a *de facto* neoliberalism. The second aspect discussed in the chapter is the complex path Tanzania took to becoming a neoliberal economy. Facing economic break-down, social service cuts and security issues, I argue that the government was unable to resist broader global economic forces toward neoliberalism. Using the case of the lower Wembere plain, in the final sub-section I focus on the Datoga's survival and coping strategies in this transitional economic environment.

In the sixth chapter, I juxtapose personal and family experiences with other sources to create a vital and credible history of Datoga families. I develop the chapter by focusing on three generations, my own lifetime and that of my siblings and parents before looking at my grand and great-grand parents’ lived experiences (primarily from my paternal side). As both an author and as a subject of enquiry, I devote some space to interrogate and reflect on the general themes recurrent amongst the Bianjidi/Taturu group south of Singida including migration, disappearance and violence. In doing this, the chapter focuses on personal experiences to bring out often overlooked
aspects of family histories as a complementary way of understanding the more complex and subtle issues of a wider society.

Chapter 7 provides a brief summary of the issues discussed in all six chapters, while also reflecting on the analytical and theoretical contribution of the study. Moreover, here I reiterate the linkages across the chapters, outlining the trends and continuities reflected over the several decades which the study has examined.

1.2 Disclaimer / Clarifier

I identify myself as Datoga with an interest in the history of the Datoga. The histories I focus on in this thesis therefore partly detail my own plight and that of the wider Datoga community. However, this experience is not entirely new in scholarship. As Marie Smyth has accurately pointed out, being an insider helps the researcher in “the conduct of the research, of the culture and political sensitivities involved in the topic” (Smyth 2005: 9). I am also aware that as African and Tanzanian in particular, dedicating years of my life to this thesis has enabled me to traverse and develop a more distanced, scholarly and scientific treatment of historical realities. While it is of course possible that my interpretations of several Datoga encounters with other communities have been influenced by my insider status, at all times I have endeavoured to remain balanced by focusing on the available evidence and by critically evaluating the sources I draw on.

In this study I use the “Datoga” as a generic name to encompass the (minimum) 13 Datoga subgroups,17 which are discussed in Chapter 2. I decided to focus on four of these subgroups (Barabaig, Gisamjeng, Brediga and Bianjid/Taturu) to represent the issues that are discussed in the research. Moreover, these subgroups are still in existence carrying a common history of marginalization. I essentially devote chapter two to the collective discussion of all the Datoga. In Chapters 3 and 4, I focus mainly on the Barabaig and Gisamjeng subgroups, giving their voices a space. Though there is some mention of other Datoga groups, Chapter 5 focuses mainly on the Brediga of the lower Wembere, in the border region between Iramba, Mbulu and Igunga (Shinyanga), while Chapter 6 is mainly devoted to the Bianjid (Taturu), a Datoga community rapidly disappearing through assimilation into neighbouring groups. Though I present the chapter as my own personal reflection on family history in the

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17 The name Datoga was used in multiple variations by different authors. Oscar Baumann (1894: 69) uses both ‘Tatoga’ and ‘Taturu’ to refer to the Datoga. While in his 1942 article, H. N. Jackson maintains the use of Mangati (which for the Maasai meant an enemy). Gordon Wilson (1952) used ‘Tatoga,’ a rather preferred name by anthropologists and government sociologists in the 1930s and 1950s; a reference to how the name is used see Henry Fosbrooke (1950b: 20). Others have tended to use a rather popular name of the Datoga subgroup, like Barabaig, as a representation of the entire subgroups of the Datoga, see for example George J. Klima (1970). The speakers and subgroups of this ethnic community which are more than 90 per cent prefer to be called ‘Datoga,’ with the exception of the Datoga in Itigi, the Bianjid subgroup, who rather pronounce ‘Tatog’.
process, I also disentangle the Bianjid/ Taturu memories and narratives on interactions and change, as well as the impacts of different regimes of power. In the process, I reiterate the point that the Datoga should be seen as one people, thereby undermining the common claim/ assumption that the different Datoga subgroups constitute different ‘tribes’ (Baumann 1894: 69–74).

1.3 Literature Review

Historiographical Background

Academic studies on African people appear to have taken a sharp turn after what has been termed the “African year” in 1960.\(^{18}\) Since then, as Lentz (1995: 303) has pointed out, literature on ‘tribal’ or ethnic history in Africa has flourished. A large amount of this literature was produced out between 1960 and 1980 (Fratkin, Galvin and Roth 1994: 1). Intimate studies of African groups as historical entities followed what Kwame Nkrumah (1967) called the great African awakening of the 1960s. Researchers focused on the Igbo, Mandinka, Hausa, Ndebele, Somali, Zulu and the Yoruba among others (Heine and Nurse 2000: 4). Throughout the continent, historians, linguists, and social and cultural anthropologists took up the search for histories of ethnic groups, regions, countries and the continent itself (Fratkin, Galvin and Roth 1994: 1). In the 1960s and 1970s, the scope and depth of ethnic histories of East Africa was unparalleled. The work of both historians and anthropologists focused primarily on so-called ‘state societies’ as opposed to ‘stateless’ societies. In this regard, the work of Alison Redmayne (1968) on the Hehe, Aylward Shorter (1972: 306) on the Kimbu, Robert Abrahams (1967) on the Wanyamwezi, Hans Cory (1955) on the Wasukuma, and Feierman (1974) on the Shambaa, pushed the recognisance of African pasts to new levels. At the same time, a new generation of scholars from Africa emerged, including Isaria Kimambo, who researched the Pare (Kimambo 1969), and Israel Katoke, who worked on the Abanyambo (Katoke 1975). While such histories started to wane by the mid-1970s and early 1980s, historians like Seth Nyagava (the Bena) (Nyagava 1986) and Buluda Itandala (the Babinza) (Itandala 1983) continued the tradition. Across these academic studies of broad ethnic groups, the themes were distinctly political. As such, these texts were often understood as nationalist histories,\(^{19}\) and were marked by an agenda to reclaim the pre-colonial glory of empires, kingdoms and personalities. In these nationalist

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\(^{18}\) The year 1960 is best captured in the rhetoric of Kwame Nkrumah’s speeches. See for example Kwame Nkrumah (1967).

\(^{19}\) A fine discussion on this historiography see for example in Temu and Swai (1981) and Ranger (1968). See also Ranger (1976) and on the Dar es Salaam school Denoon and Kuper (1970) and Ranger (1971).
narratives, economic issues receded into the background or were ignored entirely (Temu and Swai 1981: 3).

Critiques of these nationalist scholars, who had extensively researched the ethnic histories in Tanzania and across Africa, began toward the end of the 1970s. Tiyambe Zeleza termed this criticism the “rise and decline of academic tourism” (Zeleza 1983: 9–17). Most problematically, these nationalist historians demonstrated little interest in pastoralists and hunters and gatherers as historical entities. In East Africa, a handful of scholars, including Christopher Ehret on the Nilotes (Ehret 1971, 1974a, 1974b, 1998), Betwel Ogot on the Luo (Ogot 1964, 1967) and Richard Waller on the Masai (Waller 1974) pioneered the historical work on pastoralists and filled some of the void left by earlier nationalist historians. In doing so, these groundbreaking authors emphasized that the Nilotic histories were mainly influenced by migrations, linguistic diversities and interactive histories (Sanders 1969: 530–31; Morton 1978). As with the nationalist historians, the Nilotic school overlooked the importance of economic factors. Ehret and Ogot for instance fail to take economic factors into account, and appear to primarily or solely attribute community migrations to intra-community pressures (Morton 1978: 78).

A more powerful history that ushered a new era into the study and understanding of African societies came from a Marxist tradition. As Temu and Swai (1981: 22–28) say, this was a radical history. Early Marxist works on Tanzania include Walter Rodney's *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (1972), and edited volumes by Kaniki (1979), Sheriff (1987) and Shivji (1970) in the late 1970s. These writings did indeed percolate the social sciences, education, humanities and natural sciences (Mbilinyi 1973: 328). However, the Marxist scholars on Tanzania seemed to have responded favourably to the political fervent of the socialist economy, and ethnic scholarship thereby suffered. By concentrating on Marxist history, class and economic issues were emphasized, consequently neglecting ethnically based scholarship. This neglect is based on Rodney’s critique of a bourgeois history of parcelling knowledge (Rodney 1972: 3). However, in my opinion this stance was influenced by the socialist state and its branding of ethnicity as politically unsuitable.

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20 This Marxian scholarship in Tanzania according to Tordoff and Mazrui (1972: 427) came first from an increasing radicalism of University students. The students’ attack on the non-state newspaper *The Standard*, which was considered an imperialist symbol in Tanzania in 1967, was one of the ‘radicalist’ tendencies. The newspaper, the then only non-governmental paper, was later disbanded. Second, the triumph of this radicalism drew inspiration from the Arusha Declaration of 1967, that produced “a high-water mark for socialist measures in the country” (Tordoff and Mazrui 1972: 427). More on student radicalism in Priya Lal and Samuel Mhajida (2012).

21 For a fully accepted materialist history in Dar es Salaam see among others Kaniki (1979). In the beginning, the book has a scattered discussion on ethnic movements in various parts of Tanzania, then in succeeding chapters authors are discreetly engaging the colonial and post-colonial periods as processes of resisting colonial oppression, themes reflecting the genres of the *ujamaa* political and economic orientations. Kaniki’s collections do indeed share a similar tone from other ‘Dar es Salaam scholars’. 
Space as a Perspective in Research

The second strand of literature examines space from the perspective of the pastoralists. I approach this from a point of view that Karen Witsenburg, Fred Zaal and Paul Spencer call angles of space (Spencer 2003: 43). This involves multiple perspectives. Firstly, there is the geographical vantage point which Witsenburg and Zaal define as “concrete area, identifiable on a map, with X and Y coordinates, where things happen between people, where the natural environment is visible, where society interacts with nature occur, where human structures are built, and where people move between concrete points” (Witsenburg and Zaal 2012: 3). The second space is abstract rather than physical; it is a state of mind. In his study of the Samburu Maasai, Spencer identifies this space as a social construct. Here the elders build relationships along age, gender and gerontocratic rule as a way of imposing their will, while mindful of the boundaries defining, and splitting their age groups over time (Spencer 2003: 15–22). The geographical rationality as understood by Witsenburg and Zaal has a human factor. It is geography that hosts ethnic interactions both abstract and historical. In other words historicizing time and space is looking into other frontiers of human interactions which Paul Tiyambe Zeleza calls “an axis to locate and make sense of the human experience, politically, socially, culturally, and economically” (Zeleza 2006: 19). In this case, I concur with Sanna Ojalammi’s definition of space as a “socio-spatial construct which has been produced through social struggle and which also has an ethnic-related significance and some territorial ideology” (Ojalammi 2006: 12). In this regard, space encompasses abstractness, geographical consciousness on which people engage (economically, socially or culturally), within a given time frame.

Building on this understanding of space, I also draw on Edward Evans-Pritchard’s and George Klima’s work on the Nuer and Barabaig (Datoga). Evans-Pritchard (1940) and Klima (1970) argue that pastoralist imagine their spaces as not entirely open to external agents. For example, Evans-Pritchard approaches the question of the Nuer space as geographical and social, evolving according to the movements of camps and people in accordance with seasons and how individual pastoralists conceive of such movements (Evans-Pritchard 1940: 94–96). Such processes are imbedded within the Nuer concepts of time, which is understood as a cycle of repetitive activities. Time is thereby structured around protecting and defending tribal spaces. Indeed, Evans-Pritchard argues that “each Nuer tribe and tribal section has its own pastures and water-supplies, and political fission is closely related to distribution of these natural resources” (Evans-Pritchard 1940: 94). As Ojalammi’s definition suggests, because time and space involve a social struggle, we may also accept the etiology of competition among the pastoralist communities as being a product of this protective instinct. As Shetler (2007: 1–5) and Simone Rettberg (2010: 252) in particular have shown, competition for the control of land, water sources and the geo-political claims related to them has intensified and over the past two centuries, pastoralist spaces’ have been moving from relatively ‘stable’ to increasingly contested.
Terminological issues are also important in this study. Indeed, terminology is a common problem in the study of African indigenous groups or communities. Firstly, it is disputable whether historians today can still use and thereby reproduce concepts like ‘tribal,’ ‘native’ or community. In employing these theoretical concepts to cluster, differentiate and understand societies in Africa, historians have triggered alarms about their ideological incorrectness (Mafeje 1971: 255–57). As early as the 1970s, Archie Mafeje’s seminal work on the “ideology of tribalism” illustrated the different levels at which African identities could be understood. According to Mafeje, such levels were closely linked not to the realities of how communities actually were, but rather to the realm of changing imaginations (Mafeje 1971: 256). Before the end of the Second World War, dominant conceptions of ‘the African’ were affected by what David Anderson (1993: 121) calls the stereotypical “otherness” that came from 19th century European philosophies of colonial empire building. As they expanded their empires in Africa, the colonial powers developed new imageries of the colonized. According to Frederick Cooper, colonial conceptions of the colonized as ‘savage,’ primitive and pagan natives emanated from the Judeo-Christian and social-Darwinist philosophies of being, and were charged with European post-enlightenment rationality. For Cooper, the knowledge colonialists produced about African societies between 1890 and 1930s was a result of this very European rationality (Cooper 2005: 20). I argue that until about 1900 European writing on Africans can be understood as ‘discovery’ texts. Classic examples of this genre that refer to the geographical areas under study include texts by Oscar Baumann (1894), Johannes Rebmann (1858), Hans Meyer (1890) and Joseph Thomson (1885). In this early ‘discovery’ scholarship, the African and his surroundings were subjects of study. The ‘discovery’ discourse was not limited to the African valleys, savannahs, rivers, lakes and people but also to what Patrick Brantlinger (1985: 166) calls “the power of culture.” As the first accounts on the African people, these early ethnographic works remain a major contribution to African scholarship. Nevertheless, their definitions of what an African was have been the source of significant academic debate. For instance, the works of S.G. and Brenda Seligman (1932: 3) and Peter Murdock (1959: 2) epitomize the problematic understanding of African pastoralists in racial terms. Seligman and Seligman, for example, claim that Nilotes were Hamitic Caucasians; they argue that the earliest pastoralists in eastern Africa like the Bari, Lotuko, Lango, and Maasai were among the Hamites. Seligman and Seligman and similar scholars have therefore long been critiqued for their racist assumptions and limited understanding of who an African was. In short, the racial terms used by such scholars were methodologically weak tools for studying variations between different social groups among the pastoralists.

African Pastoralists and Pastoralism

According to Andrew Smith (1992), the antiquity of pastoralism is no longer contested. Indeed, a significant amount of archaeological evidence indicates that the culture of nomadic pastoralism is ancient (Sadr 2008: 185–89; Lynch and Robbins
Apart from their long tradition of keeping cattle, pastoralism and pastoralists have often been misunderstood and misinterpreted. This misunderstanding is most evident in debates about the origins of African pastoralism. Karim Sadr (2008: 189) and Christopher Ehret (2002: 15) seem to agree that there are three main theories about these origins. One argument is that pastoralists are late comers to the African Savannah. As Edith Sanders (1969) shows, in the 17th century the argument on the origin of pastoralists began to be influenced by the theory of “Hamitic Myth.” During the 19th century this theory grew, and pastoralists were viewed as migrants from north of Africa. This argument became the dominant frame of thinking (Sadr 2008: 189). Seligman and Murdock reaffirmed this theory of African descent by comparing pastoralists to the agricultural communities, who they considered superior in terms of culture, organization and relationships. Though this was a profoundly flawed argument, it found reception in the work of J. Bagshawe, who regarded the arrival of the Datoga in central and northern Tanzania as the beginning of the distortion of life in the ‘happy valley’ (Bagshawe 1925e: 69). The second major argument emerged from scholarship by authors like John Berntsen, Richard Waller and Thomas Spear between 1970s and early 1980s, who viewed the problem of origin of pastoralism from a prism of changing perceptions. Berntsen (1980: 3–6) for instance, conceives the early knowledge of pastoralist communities like the Maasai as literally borrowed or imitated from the Bantu or Swahili speakers. In other words, the understanding of pastoralist communities was invented by the local people and later adopted and transformed by other political regimes. In their work Being Maasai, Spear and Waller put forward a third theory. They argue that especially after the economic crises of the 1890s, the Maasai migrated and were absorbed in other communities like the Meru, Arusha, Taveta, Kamba, Kikuyu and Chagga (Spear 1993: 122–24; Waller 1993: 227–29). In turn, the Maasai also influenced these communities both culturally and economically. However, similar work on other pastoralist groups like the Datoga is still lacking.

In addition to the question of origin, the pastoralist communities are still viewed as frustrating development efforts in Africa. For instance Katherine Homewood, Elliot Fratkin and David Anderson indicate that conflicts between the state and pastoralists in colonial and post-colonial Africa was a result of such a limited understanding. Across the continent, a number of “development projects” to enhance what Fratkin calls livestock productivity have been carried out (Fratkin 1997: 244). Multi-million dollar projects on pastoralist lands in Nigeria among the Fulani, and the Maasai and Datoga in Tanzania and Kenya have centered on land in so-called “demarcated zones” (Homewood 1995: 337). According to both Homewood and Fratkin, improvements in roads, as well as access to water and social services in pas-

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22 See a detail account on post-independence interventions in Homewood (1995: 337–38); on the impacts of sedentarization of pastoralists is discussed further in Fratkin (1997: 242–44); and for a review on how governments have been behaving and defining pastoralists developments and the dominant approaches see a review by Anderson (1993: 122–25).
toralist areas have created unexpected encroachment from agricultural communities. Typically understanding pastoralists as anti-development, successive governments have carried out “cosmetic exercise[s] of rearranging relatively mobile homesteads around existing facilities” (Homewood 1995: 337). In doing so, governments have attempted to limit pastoralists to a particular area, while largely failing to understand their perspectives or address their concerns.

Events affecting the Sahel and the Horn of Africa (the main pastoral area) from the late 1960s onward had a profound effect on pastoralist studies. Fratkin, Anderson, and Bassett attribute the change in scholarship to a wide range of environmental factors. Fratkin sees drought in the Sahel (1968–1973) and later famine in Ethiopia (1981–1984) as the primary movers of historiography of pastoralism in this part of Africa (Anderson and D. Johnson 1988: 1–5). However, these were not the only forces behind this shift in academic and political discourse, both on the continent and in the Euro-American side. Political instability in Somalia, Eritrea, Sudan, and Uganda, as well as the prolonged drought in most of the pastoral landscapes in East Africa and across the arid lands of Africa led to a paradigm shift in the studies of pastoralism (Waller and Sobania 1994; Bassett and Crummey 2003: 3). Through the power of television, the Euro-American media brought the vulnerability of the pastoralists and agricultural lifestyles to the west. Claiming that pastoralists were keeping too many cattle for the carrying capacity of the land, radical environmentalists in the Euro-American world argued that pastoralism was economically and environmentally doomed (Oba 2013: 29). Moreover, they argued that pastoralism eroded the soil and depleted water supplies (ibid: 30; Abusuwar and El Hadi O. Yahia 2010). These arguments were strongly supported by leaders in the international community like the World Bank, Non-Governmental (NGOs) and Western governments (Fratkin 1998: 5). Little sees this period as the beginning of two broad bodies of work in anthropology: the ‘rangelands at disequilibrium’ and ‘the political ecology’ approaches (Bassett and Crummey 2003: 5–7; Little 2003: 162–66). For the first time, pastoralism was not only a focus for scholars from anthropology but also from other disciplines such as history, ecology, geography and political science (Fratkin 1998: 2). Historians like Anderson and Douglas Johnson (1988: 2–3; see also Monod 1975: 5), John Sorenson (1995: 32–33), James L. Webb Jr. (1995: 28–51) and Leif Manger (1996: 5) adopted an ecological approach to respond to the supposed African drought and famine crises with a long term study of the pastoralists’ use of the land and how it has changed in the past two centuries. These historians were preoccupied with challenging the ‘Merrie Africa’ of post-colonial historians and the Africa ‘in equilibrium


24 The Ethiopian hunger crisis of 1984–85 was the most dramatized. Pictures of dying children, men and women, animals and coupled with expanse area of seemingly lifeless landscape caught the attention of media people. These pictures provided a genuine global concern that the pastoralist landscape was in a crisis.
thesis’ that was typical of the post-colonial theorization (Manger 1996: 3). The historians’ views on the relationship between ecological stresses caused by pastoralism and economic crises conformed to Helge Kjekshus’s (1977: 3) paradigm of ecological crisis. For Kjekshus, the ecological collapse in East Africa was historical, and began with the global entanglement of capitalism and population dynamics in East Africa. It was therefore a result of a failure of the colonial system to understand and address the changing African ecology (ibid: 2). Adding on the ecological approach, J. Terence McCabe (2004: 20) sees it as two competing views of pastoral rangelands. The first is an understanding of rangelands as equilibrium-based ecosystems, where nomadic pastoralism is considered an anachronistic way of life that must die out in order for development to occur. This ‘mainstream perspective’ tends to condemn all traditional land management systems as inefficient, destructive and even irrational. This view is reflected in Garret Hardin’s theory of the “tragedy of the commons.” Hardin’s theory suggests that it is in the herder’s interest to accumulate as many livestock as possible without regard for the scarcity of land and water resources because of the benefits accrued to the individual. According to the argument, this comes at the cost of reducing the productivity of the rangeland shared by the group. While this argument may be intrinsically appealing, it is historically incorrect as it fails to take into account the fact that environmental disturbances are not exclusive products of herder’s actions. Confidence in Hardin’s theory places the blame for the decimated productivity of the rangeland solely on the pastoralists.25

Some scholars saw the crisis at the Horn of Africa as a combination of ecological stress, war and political instability. Eltigani E. Eltigani (1995: 10), Katsuyoshi Fukui and John Markakis (1994: 2), Markus V. Höhne and Virginia Luling (2010: 10) essentially identify global perspectives of militarization and conflicts in the Horn of Africa as the underlying reason for the displacement and economic marginality of the pastoralists in recent years. Civil war in Sudan, Somalia, and Eritrea, as well as the fragile political situation at the Horn of Africa completely transformed the pastoralists’ livelihoods. Fukui, Markakis, and Höhne and Luling argue that war intensified the competition for resources and the displacement of pastoralists in the war zones (Höhne and Luling 2010: 8).

In the 1980s, a further theoretical shift in the study of pastoralism occurred. This new political ecology approach provided a “framework for weaving together different disciplines … toward understandings of the social and political processes underlying resources use in the savannah areas” (Little 2003: 164). Since the 1990s, scholars of this school have deployed ideas from Marxism, neo-classical economics, critical theory and feminism to address power relations, the politics of land ownership and the pastoralists’ spaces of power (ibid.). The political ecology approach was also evident in a number of other scholarly works such as those by Sharon Hutchinson (1996: 3), P.T.W. Baxter (2001), Dorothy Hodgson (2001b) and Richard Hogg (1997). These scholars highlight the problems of pastoralism by looking at the recent dynamism of

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25 For a detailed discussion and criticism on Hardin’s theory see Sharma (2001).
the economy. They view a combination of issues such as money, war, the role of the state, gender roles, and the repositioning of the pastoral youth through urbanization and urban culture as fundamental. These are relatively new and hotly debated issues for both the pastoralists themselves and those who study them (Little 2003: 164). According to Paul Goldsmith, the pastoralists’ recent struggle to carve out economic space is taking place in the context of a broader capitalist transition in the Horn of Africa which is marked by “high rates of demographic growth, technology change, accumulation of indigenous capital, contested rights and popular support for legal-constitutional reforms” (Goldsmith 2013: 131). However, in this argument, Goldsmith appears to view global capitalism as a recent phenomenon rather than a long term trend which dates back to the 19th century.

Another recent theoretical approach in the study of pastoralism is neoliberalism. As a movement, it has generated a renewed focus on ethnic histories. Leroy Vail (1989: 4) treats ‘tribalism’ as something that was greeted with mixed reactions in post-colonial Africa. While in some spheres tribalism was a force that nurtured Africa’s state-based nationalisms and in others it was a counter-force against the functioning of the one-party state. Reflecting on his own experiences, Tepilit Ole Saitoti (1989: 5) similarly sees the ‘tribal’ element as an entity strangled by the forces of post-colonial development strategies. By modernity, both Vail and Saitoti are referring to the beginning of the neo-liberal era in the late 1980s. In Being Maasai, Spear and Waller interrogate Maasai historical realities in the context of neoliberalism from the late 1990s onwards (Spear and Waller 1993: 4). Spear and Waller’s book is similar to James Giblin’s The History of the Excluded in terms of the time frame, treatment of ethnicity (individual and family) as they battle against the tentacles of the neoliberal world economic order (Giblin 2005: 12). This literature on neoliberalism shares some basic tenets, such as multiple voices from the side of the ‘victims’ of neoliberalism and from the side of the ‘aggressors’ (states, multinationals, and capitalists). These works understand the pastoralists as victims fighting a losing battle to maintain their identities, while the aggressors are accruing and solidifying their dominance. In defining the era since the 1990s as neoliberal, Dorothy Hodgson sees Maasai identities as being redefined through new confrontations and competition, alliances and regimes of connections.26 But Hodgson’s own neoliberal approach disconnects the Maasai from other pastoralists in the region, thereby reinforcing the understanding of the Maasai as the only pastoralists in the East African Rangelands.

Since the 1990s, the intensification of neoliberal policies, privatization of land and the dominance of market forces have become important factors in redefining pastoralism in Eastern Africa. As Hydén (2011) argues, the neoliberal era has seen the end of idealism and the beginning of the surrogate of the state in many African countries. Emerging with the neoliberalization of these national economies was an increasing gap between the rich and poor. According to Anderson, for governments

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and the elites, the poor were simply poor irrespective of whether they owned cattle or not. In contrast, the pastoralists conduct what Patta Scott-Villiers (2011: 771) – citing Fraser – sees as “counter-discourses to formulate oppositional interpretations” – maintaining that the ‘poor are not us’. The pastoralists’ discourse on the ‘other’ is apparent in Aud Talle and Mario I. Aguilar’s exposition of discourses based on encounters between urbanizing communities and the pastoralist ‘laggards’ from the rural peripheries. Taking place far removed from centers of economic power, these are rather encounters amongst excluded and deprived individuals and groups on the social, economic and spatial periphery. Aguilar argues that the urban center is becoming an alienating force to pastoralists. For Aguilar, modernity has shaped a new cultural space that allows pastoral women to “keep, create and re-create spaces for themselves,” as a way of enhancing continuity and persistence of pastoral societies (Aguilar 2001: 249). However, Aguilar’s argument is limited, as it strips the pastoralists of a sense of agency. While it is true that urbanization sometimes intrudes on the pastoral areas, individual pastoralists are not mere victims of forces beyond their control, they are also actors negotiating these changing realities.

Contextualizing the Datoga

The earliest historical research on the Datoga was done by linguists and historians. Amongst these works, Christopher Ehret’s history of the Datoga is particularly enlightening. Ehret argues that the Datoga were part of a huge family prior to the collapse of the Nilotes (Ehret 1969: 81–84). This work is a significant starting point for showing that the evolution of the Datoga and other Nilotes is complex like that of the Bantu. In addition, Ehret was possibly the first to show that the settlement of the Datoga into central Maasai land, Mbulu and Singida may have preceded many other communities such as the Nyaturu and Maasai (Ehret 1969: 84).

Morimi Tomikawa and Tadao Umesao both studied the Datoga from a cultural perspective (Tomikawa 1978: 15–20), focusing on settlement patterns and the meaning of the household (Umesao 1969: 56). These works are important ethnologically as they provide glimpses of how the Datoga people engaged with and defined material life. George Klima also focuses on these factors in his discussion of the Barbaig. In doing so, Klima expands the meaning of pastoralism by looking at the ways into which the Datoga herding practices are impacted by cultural practices (Klima 1970: 1).

There are also relevant studies on the Serengeti area in Tanzania that touch on the history of the Datoga. Works by Jan Bender Shetler, Kathrine M. Homewood, W. A. Rogers and Kathrine Snyder show how different pastoral, agricultural, and

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27 Most of what appears in the literature in the 1960s and 1970s is part of a huge debate on the African languages, interactions and migrations. Descriptions on how language evolved are particularly significant. There is very little discussion on the political and economic issues. See for instance Flight (1981: 49ff.).
conservational groups and the state have competed for land resources since 1950s (Shetler 2007: 7). Shetler argues that for the Datoga pastoralists, the landscape is both imagined and also a contested reality that is shaped by long-term historical phenomena (Shetler 2007: 5). Homewood argues that the Datoga's economic, political and cultural spaces began to shrink from about 1850 when the Maasai pastoralists became the dominant force in the Serengeti, a position that they retain today (Shetler 2007: 7). However, this aspect of history has been widely overlooked by historians. In contrast to Homewood's and Rogers' arguments, Snyder sees the landscape as affected by competing economic styles of tradition and modernity. Environmental forces or development do not dictate this competition per se, but rather by shifts in the post-colonial government's development focus. Nevertheless this view is not taken as something that affected all pastoralists (Snyder 2005: 87). Some other accounts of Datoga pastoralists from Charles Lane, Daniel Ndagala, Astrid Blystad and Ole Björn Rekdal provide yet a more vivid scenario of the effects of modernization. Rekdal approaches the problem of changes in the Datoga's landscape and space by focusing on encounters with the expanding Iraqw, Nyaturu and Nyiramba agro-pastoralists in the 19th century, which minimised the Datoga's economic spaces and areas of movement (Snyder 2005: 88). Lane and Ndagala view the colonial and post-colonial state as powerful, oppressive forces that use the law and unilateral decisions to rob the Datoga pastoralist's resources. Blystad, Rekdal and Malleyeck take the contribution of the state to the marginalization of the Datoga economic spaces into account, but their focus is primarily on cultural dimensions of Datoga life (Blystad, Rekdal and Malleyeck 2007: 335–47). Like most studies, these also equate the Barabaig with the Datoga. As such, other Datoga subgroups are drastically under-represented in the research. It is therefore important to reconcile the histories of the Datoga subgroups by looking at spatial migratory patterns and the way the groups maintain relations with each other.

Recent research on the Datoga has also come from researchers in public health, child care (Young 2008), and violence studies (Blystad 2005). As I have argued above, the narrative on Datoga violence dates back to the colonial officials and researchers in the 1920s (Fosbrooke n.d.). Blystad investigates how this narrative has been at the heart of many official understandings of ethnic conflicts in the areas settled by Datoga (Blystad 2000: chap.3). Even today, much research from a violence studies perspective draws upon and reasserts this simplistic, racist narrative as a way to understand the nature of and reasons for the violent course of Datoga history.

29 On the destruction of Datoga livelihood see especially Charles Lane (1990: 5–15) and also Charles Lane (1991: 55–57).
1.4 The Methodological Approaches

Archival Sources

In researching the history of a community it is also important to reflect on how we approach our sources. For Isaac Olawale Albert, the researcher studying the past in Africa must take three important factors into account (Albert 2005: 290). The first is to consider social aspects in the understanding of the African past. The second is to critically analyze the role other authors’ perspectives play in their analysis of culture and political history on the continent. Lastly, the researcher should know how to negotiate contemporary history and its role in changing the continent. Taking these different perspectives into account may seem general and possibly too optimistic. But, as Albert suggests, research involves not just playing the historian’s role, but also interrogating the relationship between the sources and the historian/researcher (Albert 2005: 291). As Koponen says, “the historian can never face the past directly, but has to be content to study surviving traces and signs of the past, from which he/she can make probabilistic inferences about the past itself” (Koponen 1988a: 24). Recorded in different sources, the past is a mediated product which needs to be read with caution.

Historians interact in different ways with the mediated past. Typically, historians have divided most of the sources into written and oral (ethnographic) sources (Špiláčková 2012: 26). In my research I draw on both primary resources including documentary, biographical and geographical reports and diaries, as well as secondary materials including recent publications on the study areas. For first-hand histories of the communities I draw on accounts by explorers, ethnographers, researchers, colonial administrators and geographers that passed through central and northern Tanzania during the 19th and 20th centuries. For central Tanzania, the works of David Livingstone (Livingstone 1875), H. M. Stanley (Stanley 1890), Richard Burton (Stisted 1897) and John H. Speke (Swayne 1868) provide first-hand information of the nature of interactions, conflicts, and migrations of the communities in central Tanzania in the late 19th century. Due to the unpopularity of the route to the Great Lakes through northern Tanzania during the 19th century, few texts are available about northern Tanzania during that time. Accounts by Oscar Baumann (Baumann 1894), G. A. Graf von Götzen (Götzen 1895) and Joseph Thomson (Thomson 1887) are particularly useful. For instance, Baumann was important in understanding the perils of the rinderpest among the Maasai and the Datoga settlements in Mbulu in the early 1890s. But, narratives from these early visitors to Singida and Mbulu need to be carefully scrutinized as they reproduce the European chauvinism and racism of the era. Many other materials also came from early colonial ethnographers. From the German colonial period, the most important sources include Eberhard von Sick’s (1915) ethnographic work on the Wanyaturu and Waldemar C. Werther’s (1898) work on the middle highland areas. Von Sick’s work has been crucial in developing
my understanding of the cultural, economic and political experiences of the Wanyaturu in relation to their neighbours in Singida. To supplement these, I also read the German archival sources located in Dar es Salaam. Though the German district reports were lost during the World War One, I was able to find territory reports which gave me a background and an understanding of the German colonial policies in north and central Tanzania. On colonial Tanganyika, I read accounts from British colonial officers like J. F. Bagshawe, Henry Fosbrooke, and Edward F. Lumney. I also had access to rich ethnographic data collected on the Datoga, Nyaturu, Iraqw and Wambugwe by Hans Cory, E. H. Winters, Robert F. Gay and Gordon Wilson. The collections made by Cory and Fosbrooke at the University of Dar es Salaam are considered to be the largest in East and Central Africa that are located in one place. Both individuals were British administrators, government sociologists and great campaigners for the protection of pastoralists’ land and environment. The depositories at the University of Dar es Salaam, in the form of research papers, reports, conferences and minutes, span the 1930s to 1980s. Spending time on these collections in Dar es Salaam was indeed rewarding, that it inspired the production of this ethnic history of central and northern Tanzania.

Additionally, I used district books from the three districts, Singida, Mbulu and Manyoni. Collected by colonial officers, the district books provide rich first-hand research materials, which were useful in understanding some of the local narratives. A good example of this is the lengthy transcribed ethnological notes collected by E. C. Willis on the migration of the Datoga from Mbulu to Singida in Manyoni District in 1921/1925. I later discovered that these narratives matched exactly with the oral accounts recounted by the Datoga elders in Itigi. Monthly and annual colonial reports were also important in understanding the conflicts for space between the Datoga and their neighbours, particularly the murder cases that received great attention in the British colonial reports. A special file carried the reports of the Datoga (TNA, accession 69) making it easier to trace the documentation on the dynamics and transformations of the contested issues. Though gaining access to the files was a great challenge at times, my experience in working with archives has taught me resilience and serenity.

I also drew sources from a number of other archival institutions. Of these, the colonial sources from the British National Archives at Kew (formerly the Public Records Office) in London were particularly useful. Apart from the main archive

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31 J. F. Bagshawe’s papers on communities in central and northern Tanzania appeared in the British Journals of the African Society (Bagshawe 1925a, 1925c, 1925d), more also came from ethnographic materials and sociological surveys by Henry Fosbrooke on the Datoga and neighbouring groups, for example Fosbrooke (1948, 1980). Some writings were mainly on North Tanzania’s pre-historic times, e.g. Fosbrooke (1950a). There is also a fine narrative of District Officers in Mbulu in E. K. Lumley (1976: 69–80).

32 I aimed to read files at the London School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), but the week that I was destined to spend at SOAS was limited and frustrated by a strike. I remember reaching at the main buildings of the SOAS and was met by shouting students and workers, and all the doors to
in Dar es Salaam, three zonal archives that were established in 2007 further enriched this research. The Central Zone Archive, a modern three storey building in Dodoma, houses regional post-colonial documents. When I visited the archive in 2014 it had recently been expanded to become the Dodoma National Records Centre (DNRC). I was lucky that the files on the Datoga and Nyaturu conflicts of the 1960s had just been opened for access. I was among the first persons to access such sources, a rare occasion for any researcher. Indeed, I had been told that I was the second person to visit the new building, after one *Mzungu* (a European researcher) who had come a few weeks before.

With the help from my acquaintances at Makumira University College in Arusha I was granted special permission to access the files there. Some missionary sources specifically the Leipzig Lutheran Missionary collections were useful. For my study I found one file useful on the founding of the mission work by the German Missionaries in Singida from Moshi. These documents were central in the understanding of societies and people of Singida in particular.

Housed for many years within the former East African Archive, the new Arusha Zonal Archive near Makumira holds files related to all the districts of Arusha and Kilimanjaro (the colonial Northern Province). Located about a kilometre away from the city Centre in the *Idara ya Maji* (City Water Department), the archive has one cramped reading room next to the secretary and administrator’s office. But the archival building is a periphery enclave, its presence somewhat hard to locate, as it is over-shadowed by the buzz of people going through the main gate to the water department. The challenge with this archive is that many of the files on the districts of Mbulu, Kiteto and Hanang were surveyed and catalogued in 1988, but were still not at the Centre at the time of my arrival. However, the availability of a guide assisted me to locate alternative sources at the DNRC.

Furthermore, my work draws on a number of oral sources. As defined by Richard Johnson and Graham Dawson (1998: 76–77) oral sources are the past recalled orally in public and collective memories. I particularly focused on events which affected individual Datoga communities as a whole and were passed on as a collective memory from one generation to another. In my study, I found such collective memories mostly in oral expositions from a cross section of Datoga people who typically produced narratives on the Maasai wars and migrations. As G.N. Usoigwe has advised, collecting and making use of oral sources is like learning to drive a car, “no amount of lectures and films can make a non-driver into a driver. He must attempt to drive it himself and learn from his mistakes” (Usoigwe 1973: 183). My own initial struggles in collecting oral narratives in Lower Wembere (Singida) between August
and October and between December and January (2014/2015) support Usoigwe’s claim. The first important force compounding historical research on societies which are constantly besieged harassed and highly mobile like the Datoga is that informants are generally difficult to find and speak to on several occasions. Pastoralists are very mobile, and for the Datoga these movements have been unusually shifting to the extent that people who were usually in a specific location in certain period are no longer there. Consequently, relying on spatial specificity was quite challenging. My familiarity with the history, places and people proved useful in accessing individuals despite their migratory nature.

Being a historian, I was sometimes “forced” to adopt participatory methods of research such as attending meetings convened by the Datoga on the plains of Wembere. I was circumstantially “forced” to adopt these methods in order to engage with my informants directly in an activity. I invoke Jarg Bergold and Stefan Thomas’ definition of participatory research, which consider it a processor engaging with informants whose life-experience and actions are congruent with the focus of the research (Bergold and S. Thomas 2012: 1). I used this method as process and not an end to understanding issues and discussions that transcended the rain rituals or meetings. In short, I was especially interested in how individuals connected their narratives or actions to historical realities. I participated in several rain making rituals in the Wembere plains, where meetings and ritualized discussions on the conflicts in Wembere were also undertaken. Such processes helped me understand first-hand, how the plains were defined and imagined by communities in Singida. I later compared these definitions and narratives with other historical reports, memoirs, letters and other sources in untangling processes of interaction and conflicts in the history of the Datoga.

The Oral Research Process in Tanzania

In addition to consulting written primary and secondary sources, as well as participatory activities, I conducted oral interviews. As I had eight months in total allocated for research, both the collection of archival materials and organization for interviews had to go hand in hand. In some instances I worked in the archive throughout the week and conducted interviews in the neighbouring villages during the weekends. For instance, when I was reading and collecting archival information in Dodoma, I spent the weekends conducting interviews in villages between there and Manyoni. Due to the spread of Datoga around the country, such interviews were organised in two ways. I did not conduct interviews on the Barabaig areas (in Mbulu and Hanang Districts), because colonial, post-colonial and ethnologic archival sources on the subgroup are already rich in comparison with other Datoga subgroups. To supplement the lack of archival resources on other subgroups like Taturu, and Brediga, I therefore devoted most of my time for interviews in the Manyoni and Wembere areas. In these semi-structured interviews I sought to address a range of themes important for my research including accounts of 19th century history, migration stories, biographies of
prominent Datoga medicine men, the Maasai wars, and colonial and post-colonial experiences. Of the interviews conducted in the Lower Wembere, most were in villages from Shelui town at the foot of the Iramba Plateau and at the beginning of the Wembere Plains, along the Singida-Mwanza road to the borders between Iramba (Singida region) and Igunga District (Tabora). Because the Datoga are spread out in camps and sometimes unregistered villages in the plains, I used the weekly *mnada* (market/auction)\(^{33}\) in Mgongolwa village, where Datoga converged every Thursday to conduct some interviews. Not only did this reduce travelling times and costs, but it also enabled me to interview individuals from villages difficult to access. Moreover, this strategy allowed me to select interview partners from a range of individuals. My technique was simple. I had a guide into the hierarchy of the Datoga who assisted me to meet people from different clans. Throughout the day I would go through the market meeting people from a wide range of Datoga groups. However, there were two important disadvantages with this technique. The first was the question of continuity. If I wanted to probe more deeply on a certain subject with the same or similar people, this proved to be difficult because the same/similar people did not attend the *mnada* every week or did not attend again within the three weeks that I stayed in Mgongolwa. Secondly, due to individual personalities and the location of the market, some interviews were prompt and not pre-arranged; two of the 15 in depth interviews I conducted were organized hurriedly. Besides the markets, I also found respondents in shopping centers in Mgongolwa. Owned by Datoga shopkeepers, these centers were an excellent place to make new contacts. At such centers I learned a lot about the history of the Wembere, its people, conflicts and the present ethnic alignments. The Datoga shop owners became my first respondents, and through their *dukas* (shops) I was able to conduct interviews with some Datoga, particularly women, which would have been difficult or impossible in normal circumstances to speak as a stranger. The opening of shops by the Datoga can be seen as the first signs of transformation in their ways of life and the ways social interaction is taking place in the plains.

I also met another group of Datoga interview partners through the individual men and women that I spoke to at the *mnada*. These interviewees were often sources of authority of the history of the Datoga in Wembere. They lived mainly in two villages, Nkongilangi and Shibishibi (Luono). In Nkongilangi, I spoke to some individuals who were victims of the 1984–1987 ethnic clashes (or war as they called it), and/or were engaged in ‘battle’ with the government at the time of the interviews.

\(^{33}\) The Mnada, apart from its economic incentives, was also a significant source for social and cultural interactions in the plains. The event seemed to be an important one where the youth from different ethnic backgrounds met and established friendship: engaged in romance (those with boy or girl friends), met their relatives from other villages and received and sent greetings to other members. The avenue asserted by the Mnada, was a proper excuse for the unmarried girls and boys to enjoy the privacy that the activity offered. While old men and women could be seen enjoying the alcohol (bottled and home brewed), and within such complexity of individuals, conversations steamed up in every corner of the few buildings and the surroundings.
(September 2014), having received a notice requiring to leave the villages by October 20 that year. In Shibishibi I was referred to Mzee Hodi Hodi, an elderly man who is respected as the custodian of the knowledge on the 1984–1987 conflicts. Indeed, he proved to be a very valuable source of information on the history and narratives of how social relations were defined and contested in the plains. In short, the mnada conversations (Mazungumzo) were important in accumulating my knowledge about and experience of the history of the people in Wembere. Given the complexity and expansive nature of this area, without these conversations I would have not been able to accomplish my objectives. At the mnada, I heard recordings of Datoga songs and speeches by elders who are revered in the plains due to their economic standing or wisdom. Such speeches and music attracted the Datoga to the dukas making interviews for this research possible. I also found these recordings, which were typically mp3 or flash files, useful in my understanding of how messages were shared and how such Datoga were changing the ways the youths saw themselves in Wembere.

Another important group of interview partners, often also referred to in the oral traditions, were descendants of Datoga rainmakers and chiefs. The Ghawogh and Bajuta clans were important in my interviews in Itigi and Wembere villages respectively. Both clans were the basis of chiefship in the two areas and beyond. The history of Itigi (Chapter 6) partly benefits from these interviews. As I was raised in the Itigi area, it was relatively easy to navigate the surroundings and the existing relations of people and their clans.

The Challenges to the Research

The biggest challenge in conducting this research was the organization and management of the archives in Tanzania, especially in the main archive in Dar es Salaam. The Staff appears to lack the skills and experience needed to organize an archive effectively. Requesting and receiving files is a gamble for any researcher in Dar es Salaam. It appears that the catalogues have not been updated since the 1980s, and since then very little improvement has been made. Old and disordered catalogues with faded titles and names obviously inhibit effective and efficient research. Arriving at the archive for the first time is like going into an unfamiliar jungle, where even the people around are not sure what to expect. Despite having used the archive in Dar es Salaam for almost seven years, such difficulties continue to impede research. No doubt someone going for the first time will have to endure more. A second hurdle to research in the archives is that while there are no limits to the number of files one can take, regulations in Dar es Salaam stipulate that you cannot take photographs of more than ten percent of a file. To enforce this regulation, each time I wanted to photograph a file, an attendant would come and oversee the process to ensure that I did not exceed the allowed percentage. As such, taking notes was often the only option. This is a particularly daunting job in a room above 30 degrees Celsius and with limited air conditioning.
Another bureaucratic challenge was the need for permission to conduct research in specific regions, districts and wards. Aside from the huge task of applying at each level of state, some villages and communities did not fit into my planned areas of research. Whilst ‘hunting’ for villages in Singida, on a number of occasions I found myself in a different ward or district jurisdiction than I had permission to work in. For instance, I applied for a permit to research in Iramba district, meaning I could cover all of the Datoga villages that appeared in archival records, but when I arrived many of the Datoga villages had been moved to Mkalam, a district jurisdiction which had been established recently and for which I lacked the appropriate permission. This happened in a number of wards and villages. As a result, in some cases I had to run a risk of trespassing into villages beyond my limits, otherwise it would have been nearly impossible to conduct research in some communities; for example, when I travelled with some Datoga deep into the Tabora Region to attend several meetings.

The final challenge was the persistent tension in Wembere in the encounter with unfamiliar faces. Especially in Wembere, the history of the Datoga is marked by traumatic past experiences of violence, war and more recently, forced eviction. As a result, local Datoga tend to fear and distrust the government and those that they consider government representatives or employees. On arriving in many villages, I first had to prove that the government did not send me. If they believed me to be a government employee, then they were cautious about what they said. This was challenging, as the goal of a successful interview is trust and openness. In this atmosphere it is not surprising that many interviews expected a proof that I was not a government representative. Although my letters from the University of Göttingen were in both English and Swahili, letters from the regional and District Administrators were only in English. In such cases, when it came to situations of proving my non-government status, letters were useless as few (particularly in the villages) could read and understand English. The following extract from one of the interviews with a respondent in Kizonzo on 10th November 2014 provides a sense of what this meant in practice:

Kabati: *Sasa, sawa umetuuliza mengi na sisi tumekujibu. Tutajua je kuwa wewe ni mtu mzuri, na si wa serikali? Habari za barua zako viongozi wetu wanajua?* (Now, ok. You have asked us so many questions and we have answered you. How do we know you are a good person/honest? And on the issue of your letters, are our officials informed?)

Mhajida: *Kama nilivyosoma, mimi ni mwananchi wa kawaida wa nchi hii, na-fanya utafiti juu ya historia ya Wadatoga, na vibali ni kama nilivyosoma kwenu. Au Hammiamini?* (As I said to you before, I am a common citizen of this country. I am doing research on the Datoga and the documents I read to you are a confirmation of that. Or don’t you trust me?)
Kabati: (speaking this time low with a neighbour who is urging him to probe more), *wewe unafanya utafiti huu kama mtu wa serikali au?* (Are you doing this research as a government person?)

Mhajida: *Hapana. Mimi ni mwanafunzi katika chuo kikuu, na utafiti wangu ni wakimasomo tu. Japo serikali inajua nipo hapa, lakini mimi sijatumwa na serikali, wala hamna haja ya woga wowote.* (I am a university student, and my research is completely academic. Though the government knows about my presence here, I have not been sent by them, so no need to be worried.)

Kabati: *Mimi nasema hivi kwani najua, serikali ina mkono mrefu unaweza kukuta kuna kitu wanafuatilia tukakuta wote baadaye tunakamatwa na polisi. Sisi hatuiamini serikali.* (I am saying this because I know that the government has a long arm, you may find there is something that is being scrutinized here, which may eventually lead to arrests by the police. We don't trust the government.)

Mhajida: *Usiogope. Japo nimeomba vibali serikalini, utafiti wangu hautamdhuru mtu yeyote. Ukipenda pia naweza nisitumie jina lako halisi kama unaogopa.* (Don't worry. Though I have documents from the government, my research will not affect anybody. If you like I may even not use your real name, in case you feel intimidated.)

Kabati: *Haya, huo ulikuwa wasiwasi wangu tu na pia wazee hapa, wameniambia tukuulize vizuri* (Ok, those were my own feelings, and also the elders here asked me to ask you more for clarifications.) (Interview Kabati, 10.11.14).

Although such cases were limited, they revealed to me the truth of Usoigwe’s statement that researching is like learning to drive. The lesson and practice of researching, shows the challenges of moving from theory to practice. In my own experience, this fieldwork was also a testimony that the Datoga were not passive recipients of events, but critical people who are aware of the political domains that govern their life. In short, this thesis is grounded in a rich and broad array of historical literature, archival sources and oral interviews, as well as my own personal recollections. In the next chapter, I engage the sources to understand the early history of the Datoga, the pre-colonial and the beginning of the colonial historical developments that had impacts on the Datoga pastoralists.
2 The ‘Enlargement of Scale’ and the Datoga Pastoralist Identity Formation 1830s–1910s

*Then God saw that this Masujaa was giving him too much trouble, so he said to him: “I will make other people so they can challenge you”... So God created other ethnic groups that we know today and flooded the plains.*

Understanding a history of the Datoga in Singida and Mbulu districts in the 19th and early 20th centuries entails grasping the complex regional and global processes that shaped many African societies in East Africa. Regional migration and encounters between many African societies and their responses to external dynamics resulted in new configurations of cultures and living spaces. These changes were produced from new migrations and weaved together by instincts for survival, security, ethnic cohesion and ruptures in their places of origin. For the Datoga in Tanzania, the mid-19th century saw the establishment of an ethnic consciousness and new understandings of cultural divergence. The enlargement of scale involved disentanglement, subjugation and assimilation, peripheralization of minority cultural entities and the formation of cultures of ‘big men.’ These internal dynamics were coupled with the

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34 Oral narratives by the Datoga on the beginning of conflicts and emergence of other ethnic groups manifested especially in many interviews in the Wembere plains.

35 The term ‘enlargement of scale’ was first used by Godfrey and Monica Wilson in the 1940s. They characterized what was happening in East African communities as enlargement of scales of contacts (Godfrey Wilson and M. Wilson 1945: 40–45). As used in this chapter, the term means an increasing complexity in the Datoga encounter with different forces first from within the community and second how they interpreted their encounter with other communities in the Serengeti and beyond.
politicization of global ruptures that had resulted from the development of an Indian Ocean transnational culture and economy. In all these processes, central and northern Tanzania, and regions became the convergent zones. While not all Datoga were fully integrated in the circulation of the Indian trade, the culture, activities and political movement resulting from it and other internal dynamics made them part of the process. In pushing their own experiences into Singida and bordering districts, Nyamwezi and Kimbu politics were essential in establishing Nyamwezi-Kimbu led chiefdoms and clan organization. In re-organizing and defining local spaces, the German colonial administration in the region struggled with ethnic divides. Although the colonialists reinforced local spaces and their arrangement, the colonialists also moulded local ethnic power and influence and fundamentally initiated territority defined by physical borders.

In this chapter I try to contextualize the enlargement of land and power in the context of Maasai and German colonial power in the making of the Datoga as an ethnic community. I discuss the beginning of a history of ethnic diversity and migrations in the plains of then central and north Tanzania. I argue that for the Datoga the 19th century was a turning point, which opened up both peaceful means of interactions and struggles in the form of violence and wars. I show how a romanticized understanding of the pastoralists as simple, non-territorialist and non-expansionists is ahistorical. Indeed, the ways they encountered other communities, advanced their culture and developed their economic spheres show that the Datoga and their Maasai neighbours were complex people. The process of building independent identities and a land that they called their own is discussed as part of this instinct of building relations and enlargement of scale. The aim of this chapter is to contribute to an understanding of the pre-colonial and colonial framework into which ethnicity took shape in central and northern Tanzania.

2.1 The Geography of the Datoga Settlements

This chapter focuses on the districts of Singida and Mbulu (pre-1958 boundaries) in central and northern Tanzania (Figure 1). Invented by the German and British colonial administrators, the two districts incorporated many Datoga settlements. In this study, the discussion on the Datoga is also extended to Manyoni and districts like Iramba, Hanang, Kiteto and Babati. In the course of the near two centuries this study spans, the two districts political boundaries have changed dramatically. For instance, in German colonial period, Singida was part of Kilimatinde sub-district until 1908 when its administrative duties were moved to Kondoa-Irangi. The same year, another new district headquarter (boma) close to Singida was completed in Mkalama.

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56 TNA, Singida District Book (1921).
Figure 1: The location of the study areas. Source: Geographic Information System (GIS), Institute of Resource Assessment (IRA), University of Dar es Salaam.
making Mkalam and Singida two sub-districts in close proximity to each other. In 1916, Singida became a full district under the Central Province and its center of power extended to the borders of Mbulu. Between 1904 (when it was founded) and 1911, Mbulu served as an outpost of the Kilimatinde sub-district, before the district was split between the Dodoma and Arusha districts. Under the British, Singida became a full district encompassing half of Mkalam in the east, while its extension to the railway in Itigi changed from time to time, either becoming part of Dodoma at one time and at another moving to Singida. Recently, parts of the two districts have been broken up into several districts which today form a region.

The then Singida and Mbulu districts covered varied climatic and ecological landscapes which produced significant variations in social and economic organization. For example, Singida region is known for its undulating landscapes, long stretches of plains (Mbuga) and characteristically short grasses and bushes. In the north of Singida, the plateaus are as high as 5,600 feet, and extend down into the escarpments on the Sibiti Valley, Lake Kitangiri and Lake Eyasi (Balangida Lal) (Jellicoe 1978: 4). With its valleys and plateaus (collectively known as Iramba Plateaus – Figure 2), the northern part of Singida has exerted significant cultural and economic influence. The most populated area of Singida District, Nyiramba and Nyisanzu subgroups make up the bulk of the population, followed by the Sukuma, Datoga, Hadzabe and others (Lindström 1986: 225). In the west of Singida, the Iramba Plateau borders the Wembere flood plains, which has “a great expanse of grassy steppe, flooded in the wet season, where the scattered groups of pastoral Tatog … mingle with the Nyamwezi and Sukuma” (Jellicoe 1978: 4). Each of these communities has powerfully influenced one another. In the south, the plateau extends gently towards the Manyoni District and Itigi on the central railway line, where the population was until 1920 thinly spread for a long time. In the 19th century, this area was thought of as a place of refuge where displaced communities met. This created a mosaic of different ethnic groups including members of the Gogo, Nyamwezi, Kimbu, Datoga and Nyaturu peoples. The area was known for its dry patches of land, with much of it covered by impenetrable ‘Itigi thickets.’ The thickets extended between Tura in the west and Ugogo in the south and lie within what 19th century European travellers referred to as the ‘Mgunda Mkali’ (which Morton Stanley (1872: 257) interpreted as “hot field”). The area south of Ugogo, from Mudaburo to Mpwapwa, was known as ‘Marenga Mkali’ (or what Stanley sometimes called ‘Uyanzi’) (Speke 1890: 56–57), and was sometimes regarded as a desert or a stretch of bush and a few thickets where lack of water was the main challenge (Stanley 1872: 257). The terms ‘Mgunda Mkali’ and

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38 The first District in this regard was Iramba that was pronounced in 1958 (TNA, location 5/5/04, box 101, file s.4: Boundaries; Iramba-Iambi Boundary). Hanang became another district from Mbulu in 1969 (see G. L. Thomas (1978)), Babati (from Hanang administrative area) in 1985, later in 2002, part of Arusha Region was split to form Manyara Region with Hanang, Simanjiro, Babati & Kiteto as its administrative Districts, see http://tazamaramanitanzania.com/Manyara.html.
‘Marenga Mkali’ were used to geographically differentiate much of what was called Ugogo from the area north of it. To a large extent, they also explain why pastoralism and hunting activities were predominant in this part of Singida.

Mbulu is geographically close to Singida and shares one important characteristic with it: the absence of water outlets from and towards the districts (Lindström 1986: 225). However, Mbulu is different in many other aspects. In comparison to Singida, it is mountainous with fertile valleys, and numerous permanent rivers, streams, and lakes. For instance, in the East African Rift Valley lie two large lakes, the Balangida Gidahan and Balangida Lalu. These lakes provide many people with water and salt in the dry season, which are vital resources in developing trading partnerships between the Datoga and other communities (Koponen 1988a: 256). However, one of the most important geographical features in the region is Mount Hannang (Mangwatai in Datoga) (Jackson 1942: 2). Apart from its towering presence and imposing grandeur, it was a spiritual sanctuary of the Datoga.
2.2 Introducing the Pre-Colonial Histories of the People in Singida and Mbulu

When I interviewed Mzee39 Hodi Hodi (Musoma) in Iramba District in 2014, he told me that “the Maasai have a country of their own, I hear also the Sukuma, Nyiramba and Mbulu have theirs, but where is the country of the Datoga?” (Interview Hodi-Hodi, 20.09.14). While this question sounds rhetoric, it neatly summarizes the complex history underlying the Datoga’s contested claim to a homeland on the plains of Tanzania. Today, the geographical spaces of the Datoga are intertwined with the lack of a single place identified as a Datoga homeland. Instead, Datoga settlements are scattered with a great number living in the south of Mbulu, and smaller communities scattered in areas of the Singida, Tabora, and Mara districts. Owing to constant migrations (mostly as a result of forced eviction), Datoga groups have moved in search of pasture and security. Since 1850, there have been dramatic shifts in the spread and pattern of Datoga settlements. For example by the 1850s the Datoga had already become scattered through large parts of central and north Tanzania. In this chapter, I focus on the geography of the Datoga between the 1830s and 1910s, before looking at the complex patterns of resettlement after 1910 in the following chapters. For the Datoga, the period between the 1830s and 1910s brought momentous change. In this period, they reinvented their own identity amidst a series of crises and ethnic wars.

There are about twelve Datoga subgroups (emoojiga Datoga) spread throughout different districts in central and north Tanzania (Blystad 2000: 48). In 1858 Richard Burton wrote about a Taturu subgroup of the Datoga and said that “the Wataturu extend from the Mangewa district, two marches northward of Tura in a north-north-westerly diagonal, to Usmao, a district of Usukuma, at the south east angle of the Nyanza Lake. On the north and east they are limited by the Wahumba [Maasai], on the south by the people of Iramba” (Burton 1860: 220–21). The Taturu/Waturu is the first subgroup that is mentioned in this time and the location noted by Burton is part of a wider expanse of the Mbuga plain that suited pastoral production, because the forest miombo (the Julbernadia Brachystegia plant community) were avoided due to tsetse fly infestation. In the western part of the area lay the great Nyahua plains that extended from Itigi in the south to Tabora in the west (Jackson 1942: 2). It is important to note that the existence of the Taturu as noted by Oscar Bauman in 1894 was not only in Tura and areas around Itigi, as some Taturu also settled in Mbulu (Baumann 1894: 69). G. A Graf von Götzen was possibly the first to address the Taturu as a subgroup of the Datoga. Today most of the Taturu still maintain their

39 Mzee is a Swahili word used for an elderly person. Also it is used as a way of reverence or respect to people occupying high offices in the society, for instance directors of companies, councilors and or parents. In the context of this part, it is limited to the meaning of an elderly person.
old settlements, though they are becoming absorbed by the Nyaturu, Sukuma and Gogo ethnic communities.

In the north east of Tura village there is a long strip of the mbuga plains that has been a home for another Datoga subgroup, the Brediga/Bradg (Bihariova 2016: 94–95). The Brediga of the Wembere plains have settled along the Wembere River, which has, to a large extent, provided food for their cattle throughout the dry season. The river also served as a crucial water source in the dry season, because water could be reached by digging the dried-out riverbed. Today, the Brediga are still scattered in the Wembere plains, though developments in the 1980s significantly affected them. I aim to offer a historical account on these Datoga in Chapter 5.

To the north of the Brediga lives the Rotigeng subgroup. Before the government ‘operation vijiji’ in 1974, the Rotigeng lived in the west of the Great Serengeti National Park. They are considered a remnant of the first Datoga migration of 1836 and 1860, during the Maasai wars that drove the rest of the Datoga to different parts of Tanzania. The Rotigeng still have a strong connection with the history of the Serengeti plains (Borgerhoff Mulder, Sieff and Merus 1989). The Brediga and Rotigeng communities are geographically close and individual Datoga histories (Hodi Hodi Musoma – in Chapter 5) attest to this. Before 1855 the two Datoga subgroups were united culturally and geographically within the huge savannah plain (Blystad 2000: chap. 2). It is during the Maasai-Datoga conflicts that some of the Datoga migrated to the districts of Mbulu and Hanang in today’s Manyara region. Early German records also mention the presence of Datoga groups in the Kilimanjaro areas in the northeast of Tanzania. However, this mention is difficult to substantiate because during this time other branches of Maasai were also reported in large areas of Kilimanjaro (Thomson 1887: ch.4). There is a possibility that such people were not Datoga, because no traces of such migrants were ever mentioned again.

The Barbaig subgroup of the Datoga is the best studied. In the 1948 population census they numbered 23,382, or 5 per cent of Mbulu population. It co-existed with other smaller groups of the Datoga, namely the Gismajeg and the Dororajeg in the south of the district of Mbulu. The area these groups lived in is the most varied geographically, with features like mountains, lakes and shrubs of different sizes. Some of the common tree species in the area include miombo and acacia trees, as well as a diversity of grass species. The most important of which were the Themetatriandra and Pennisetum massaicum, which provide excellent grazing (Jackson 1942). In the Southern Mbulu, where the district spread gently into nearby areas of Singida in the west and Kondoa in the east, the Mount Hanang volcano rises abruptly out of the Rift Valley walls. Throughout the German colonial period, this landscape was known as the Mangati Steppe in recognition of the Datoga pastoral communities living in

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40 Fosbrooke Collection, East Africana Section, Library of the University of Dar es Salaam, FOSF23: Papers on Protohistory, by Henry A. Fosbrooke.
the area (Jackson 1942: 6). The Hanang (or Nguruwe) Mountain and the steppes around it was where the first Datoga settlement (Maangwatai) was established after their flight from the Serengeti. Maangwatai was a collection of Datoga villages that spread from the foot of the Hanang mountain and extended to the Basotu plains in the north and south and the border between the Hanang and Arusha Districts. Another important land feature in the area is the East African Rift Valley escarpment, a continuous strip of mountains dividing the highlands and the plains and the Hanang area into “north-highland Basotu and south-lowland Barabaig plains” (Lane 1994: 82–83).

The Gisamajeng are another major group in the area today. They are a small group and rapidly fading away amid assimilation and incorporation into the neighbouring Iraqw. Aside from the Gisamajeng, other Datoga subgroups in the area included the Dororajeg, Isemjang, Nyanyewda, Bisiyeda, Daragwajega and Gidang’odiga (Blystad 2000: 47; Interview Mabochi, 08.01.15), most of which have dissolved into the communities surrounding them. This was not unintentional, as part of the British colonial government policy was to erase the existence of Datoga subgroups. I discuss this later in Chapter 3. Some other Datoga subgroups like the Barakushega and Sisiga in Dodoma, have completely vanished while only a few Gogo people in the villages around Kintinku in the north of Dodoma still trace their origin to the Datoga migrants of the 19th century; though most of them have not retained traces of Datoga culture (Interview Mabochi, 08.01.15).

### 2.3 The Origin of Competition for Space in Central and Northern Tanzania

The pre-history of the Mbulu and Singida districts survives in rock shelters and engravings scattered throughout the plains of these areas. The 1934 Ludwig Kohl-Larsen expedition to areas around Mbulu and Singida unearthed several artefacts indicating that human settlement dated back to the Late Stone Age. In the 1950s, British anthropologist James Woodburn’s found a similar pattern of ancient human artefacts, art shelters and pottery remains that closely related to the modern day living habits of Hadzabe, Sandawe or Yanzi. These artefacts included engravings buried in numerous rock shelters within the Eyasi Basin and in many parts of Kondoa, Singida and adjoining districts. These simple artefacts offer a glimpse of the history of human activity and the development of societies in the regions before the 1800s and indicate that interaction and forms of economy were simple and dominated by cultures of the these communities (Masao 1976: 15). The authors argue that competition for political and economic resources was minimal because the pictures do not show any form of political engagement or violence/war. Some authors have argued that the rock paintings, which depict animals and a culture of hunting and gather-

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ing, may be from a human culture other than the Hadzabe or Sandawe (Marlowe 2002: 252; Jackson 1942). Typical of this argument is the work of G. Blausen, a field officer in Mbulu in the 1950s, who critiqued the Hadzabe thesis claiming that “they [the Hadzabe] certainly have no traditions of painting and as remarked above hardly seem to be aware of, and attach no importance to these paintings.” However, Blausen’s work has been strongly criticized because of the number of similarities between the artworks and the modern lives of the Hadzabe or Sandawe. Indeed, these hunters and gatherer groups today represent one of the oldest surviving social systems in this part of Tanzania. With their economic activity revolving around hunting and the collection of wild fruits and honey, the Hadzabe and Sandawe appear to have enjoyed dominance of the plains for centuries and lead a simple, less competitive and less stratified existence (Marlowe 2002: 250). The social formation appears to have been matriarchal with hunting bands only meeting for group hunts.

The history of migrations of other communities into Hadzabe and Sandawe territories is scattered and remains one of the most contested issues about the history of the peopling of the central and northern Tanzania plains (Cohen and Odhiambo 1989: 15–17; Ehret 1974b: 85–88). Many oral accounts indicate that until the beginning of the 19th century the population of Singida and Mbulu was sparse, consisting of only a few ethnic communities. The commonly known groups were: the Yanzi (mainly from the south of Singida District), the Datoga (from the Serengeti plains and Mbulu), the Hadzabe (from Yaeda Chini through the corridors of Eyasi Lake to Kondoa), the Iraqw in Mama Isara (in Mbulu) and the Mbugwe (Fosbrooke n.d.). These communities had different economic activities. While the Iraqw and Mbugwe in the north and southeast were agro-pastoralist communities, the Datoga used the plains lying along the Rift Valley wall through Singida as pasture. The Yanzi remained in isolated enclaves in the Jiwe la Singa and neighbouring areas (modern Mgandu in the southwest) to the extent that early European travellers called the place Uyanzi in recognition to their dominance of the area. They mainly hunted game and collected honey. Until the beginning of the 1850s the economic activities of all of these groups seemed to have remained separated and different from one another, meaning there was comparatively little competition for land or resources (Cohen and Odhiambo 1989: 85).

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44 Eric Ten Raa (1970: 142) considers most of the paintings as mainly from the Sandawe who he recognises as the Aboriginals of the plains and therefore gives little consideration as being a shared landscape between the two and possibly the Yanzi in the south western Singida.
45 The place names throughout the 19th century were accorded with regards to the dominant ethnic community in the vicinity.
Reconstructing the Pre-Maasai Datoga Historical Encounter

Two points are crucial in understanding how the Datoga conceive of territory. The first point is the Datoga cosmological understanding of living space. Based on his work among the Giriama in Kenya, David Parkin has classified ethnically based landscapes into three categories: “as a fixed centre amenable to being regarded as absolutely sacred; as a relational pattern of ecological zones and human movements; and as indeterminately regarded amorphism, without centre, boundary or even content” (Parkin 1991: 7). Borrowing part of Parkin’s classification, it is reasonable to argue that the Datoga understands of themselves and cosmology prior to their encounter with the Maasai was mainly centrist and relational. The centric category is poised in the historical evolution of their thinking as a community in terms of how they came to exist from a religio-mystic perspective. Conversations with the Datoga indicate a single, consistent evolutionary narrative on how life on the plains originated. Second, the mythical explanation of Masujaa (quoted at the beginning of this chapter), shows the modest beginning of how ‘the Datoga walked the plains. Masujaa is a semi-deity and a symbolic centre of origin of the Datoga genealogical history. In him, the Datoga relate themselves as people and their history to this dominant figure who theoretically divides the Datoga historical time between the ‘ancient’ or pre-Maasai and the post-Masujaa (Maasai time) eras.46 The Maasai have similar mythological figures that structure their past and like the Datoga recreate the history of their landscape. However, the Maasai creation imagination significantly differs from the Datoga myth. Unlike Masujaa, the great Maasai ancestor Maasinda was born of a woman who “came down from heaven and bore two sons, Maasinda (the Maasai ancestor) and ol – meek (the ancestor of Bantu people), this being the origin of the Masai and the Bantu” (Fosbrooke 1948: 3). While there are dualities in the Maasai story of creation, like recognizing the ‘other’ – ol meek from the origin narrative, the Datoga begin with a singularity and proceed later to duality. The differences can be interpreted as the first points of divergence in their imagination of spaces of existence. Looking more at the singularity of Datoga narrative, it is asserted that Masujaa was a chief with many cattle, and an ancestor of the Ghawough clan, important in medicine, prophecy and foresight. Since Masujaa possessed a semi-god stature, the Datoga present him as a master of the sky (rain) and for this was arrogant and easily angered, resulting in quarrels with Asseeta (God) about life on the plains. For instance, one particular area of contestation is detailed as:

You see: usually, Masujaa’s cattle used to feed far away from the kraal. Around four in the evening at the time when his cattle needed to be home, normally they were still far away. So, Masujaa used to restrain the sun to the same posi-

46 The oral account as expressed by Mzee Mabochi and Mzee Mlewa tarcitly divides the pre-colonial history of the Datoga in two: the Masujaa and Maasai times. Each of these periods provided understandings about antagonism and a self portrayal of a community in the making.
tion until his cattle were back at home. This limitation of the natural course of the terrestrial body angered God very much. Then God saw that this Masujaa was giving him too much trouble, so he said to him: “I will make other people so they can challenge you”... So God created other ethnic groups that we know today and flooded the plains. (Interview Kuga, 18.09.14)

The mythical renderings above and the conflict they present challenge historical conventions of how people interact in the natural world. Yet they should not be ignored as explanation.47 The mythical explanation of the first creation and conception of other people as a punishment of disobeying Asseeta is not something new or unique in African pre-dynastic history. V.Y. Mudimbe develops this argument in his work on the paradoxes of Central African myths. Mudimbe (1991: 76) argues that myths (to qualify his point) are purely not only meant to “constitute a discourse on and an interpretation of the past,” but also as ways to show that a culture is old enough to be survived by its own myths and fables (ibid: 75). Y.Q. Lawi argues the importance of myths as discourses and interpretations of the past in another context:

An old Iraqw myth has it that a long time ago someone overheard a conversation between the sun-deity looa and the Land-based spirit neetlang’w, in which the two agreed on the manner in which the life of a just-born child would end. This baby boy would grow into adulthood, but his life would eventually be terminated “by the horn of a rhino.” And this is what came to be despite the community’s effort to shield the boy from any encounters with rhinos. At an advanced youthful age, he fell and died on the horn of a rhino when excitedly inspecting the animal, after his peers had killed it! (Lawi 2004: 26; emphasis in original)

In addition to the Masujaa-Asseeta contestations, oral narratives also regard the emergence of ethnic differentiations due to linguistic reasons. Before his powers were stripped, Masujaa and Asseeta shared a similar view that the Datoga should only speak to one another in Datoga language, especially after night falls. Therefore it became a taboo for the Datoga to speak a different language, even if they knew it well. The penalty for those who defied the canon, as my informant Nyina Moshi told me, was that “the people whose language you speak shall come and dominate you” (Interview Moshi, 07.01.15). Domination in this sense did not imply replacement by another clan, but the loss of a pure ethnic identity and the beginning of a savanna-babel within their community. That is emergence of different linguistic groups was also interpreted as beginning of chaos and competition for the control

47 Robert F. Gray’s definition as “the origin stories, which are but dimly understood at present, are mythological in character and have little or no historical value,” for him such oral presentations are not concrete. This is an ahistorical assessment, because histories everywhere oscillate sometimes between the so-called concrete and mysticism. See more in Gray (1955).
of the savanna. The immediate consequences of the battle and competition between Asseeta and Masujaa and partly the disregard of the language cannon led to the birth of Kumbageng, who is said to have mysteriously appeared from a sort of shrine or Durukwajeg (Interview Kuga, 19.10.14; Interview Mabochi, 08.01.15). Born full of hatred, Kumbageng took the chiefhood from Masujaa and from then on the Bajuta clan emerged and became more powerful than the Ghawough. The relational aspects in the Parkin’s categories seem to fit well with the Datoga myths about the original sphere of power and how it was contested. Both the Datoga and Maasai myths of origin consequently can be interpreted as spiritual and political. Competition for power was fought not only physically but also through language. The religio-mythical representation of the imagined sacred is a way in which two communities can properly be understood from a background of how they mythologise and “colonize the past and organise the geography of current customs and traditions” (Mudimbe 1991: 76). As will be discussed later, both the Datoga and Maasai myths work as tools to monopolise and personalise memory and group identity for political and economic reasons. For instance, the sacred aspect of how Kumbageng emerges (from under the earth) as opposed to Masujaa, split the centre of the Datoga pre-Masujaa past between lords of the rainmaking Ghawough (who dealt with ailments and misfortunes of the land, spirits and departed souls) and the post-Masujaa era, the Bajuta as the rain makers. Even today, the two Datoga clans are considered leaders in the rituals and rites that define the Datoga. This creation story is the first level towards a history of how the other in the plains of the Serengeti was conceived. In the story, the Ghawough and Bajuta first battled for a monopoly of power within the Datoga community. Two of my interview partners, Mabochi and Gurekshi, seem to agree that an uneasy relationship between the two clans continues today, at least discursively (Interview Mabochi, 08.01.15; Interview Munega, 20.09.14). In other words, the first level of the enlargement of scale developed from this stage of Datoga history and indicated complexity in its own right. It is also indicative of how the differentiation between the subgroups began to take shape. The emergence of rainmaking was the first stage of social and cultural differentiation. Over time, such rituals became institutionalised. The Datoga started to split and distinguish by moving from a simple and less competitive life led by Masujaa (who nevertheless occasionally wrestled with Asseeta) to the emergence of Kumbageng and his clan. Unlike the Iraqw, the emergence of two different groups was not predestined. The continuity of the story of Masujaa after the split of the Datoga has been lost in the Datoga narratives, but his clan survived and continued to appear in different forms in later narratives. It is difficult to accurately trace the origin of the myths, but their existence frame a broad time period where history is constructed and contested from intra- and inter-ethnic levels.
Datoga–Maasai Conflicts:  
The Creation of Competing Landscape Memories in the Plains

The second level of the enlargement of scale appears with the beginning of several conflicts between the Maasai and Datoga in the process of controlling the Serengeti and the landscape beyond it. The coming of the Maasai in the 1830s is an epical shift in time and a crucial period where the identities of the two communities were redefined by and through each other. With the Maasai came a break with the vague and largely unknown past, when ‘ecological thought expressed in articulated beliefs and ritual practices’ dominated the landscape experiences (Lawi 1999: 287). However, in 1836 the two communities began to fight for the control of the Serengeti (Blystad 2000: 52). In the oral narratives of the Datoga the causes of the conflict is expressed symbolically. The Maasai and Datoga were friendly with one another until one day their sons playfully “threw sticks at each other in a joking mood, but with time the joke changed into a serious battle and when the elders also joined from both sides it led into a full-scale war that spread throughout Fueda (Ngorongoro) and shealeangeati [Serengeti]” (Interview Makaranga, 20.09.14). Other narratives of how conflicts in Mbulu evolved also begin trivially; however, events that later unfolded were grave, complex and intriguing. For example, a story that attempts to explain how the Datoga got into battles with the Gorowa begins with an unusual demand. The flourishing Gorowans, whose richness encouraged in them a sense of pride and greatness, one day pressed their chief Haymu to find a serious community to challenge and fight. Aware of the dangers, the chief adamantly refused to avail to their demands. To pressure him more, the people kidnapped the chief’s only son:

In order for his son to be released, Haymu went to meet the Datoga leader and gave the request of his people (to fight). As each party agreed to the deal, the Gorowa gathered a huge army of youths and the Datoga did the same. The excited Gorowans hastily released the chief’s son, but after getting back his son back, Haymu gave up his leadership to Nalaa, who was from the Datoga clan Barbojik. And Haymu gave Nalaa this plea “if you see your own shadow has stood at the middle of your head, stop the war with this mighty stick that I give you. You shall shout the word ‘Hoyot’ – which means enough.” He was instructed to stand from north–south, while pointing Haymu’s stick and repeating the same word until the war came to a close.48

In interviews carried out among the Datoga in the northern Serengeti, Mulder, Sief and Merus heard that the Datoga-Maasai 19th century wars began as a “play-fighting among the young herds boys which began to get out of control and eventually developed into a tribal war over the Ngorongoro Highlands that lasted for four years

or more” (Borgerhoff Mulder, Sieff and Merus 1989: 33). The consistent motif of simple-playful matters mounting into serious battles that involved the entire community is historically telling. Mulder and her colleagues have shown that Gitangda and his five sons led the Datoga into battle. Followed by his sons, he was speared by the Maasai. The Datoga assertion to have the first martyrs in the Maasai wars seems to suggest the beginning of other forms of contestation, particularly a battle to control narratives (memories) of the land. After Gitangda fell, Saijilo Magena took over the leadership of the Datoga. The history of the Datoga was slowly evolving from the mystic foundations of Masujaa to more recent and detailed memories of individuals, places and battles. Magena is another such figure recorded in many oral and written documents.

After losing the first wars, the Datoga were essentially pushed out of the Serengeti. Today, the Datoga elders recount the exodus led by Magena. According to the narratives, the first group of Datoga migrants headed west and settled around Nzega, southwest of the Serengeti. From there they divided into groups with one moving east and settling south of Mbulu in Maangwatai, while other groups either remained in Tabora and the surrounding areas or moved to Singida. Many of these migrations were the result of the Maasai wars and were later recounted among the Nyiramba and Gorowa around the 1880s, the Nyaturu earlier (possibly before 1850) and the Sarwat in Mbulu in the 1860s. The scattered narratives of the time of eviction from the Serengeti illustrate how the arrival of the Datoga in many ethnic communities created alarm and disturbance in many areas of Singida and Mbulu. A letter written in 1942 by the Datoga regarding how they recreated their own sphere through force illustrates that:

The explanation of Gisamjeng’s elders is that it is true that the Gisamjeng came from Harar. They were fighting a tribe called the Davovajek (Sarwat). The war broke out because the Davovajek would not allow the Wagisamjeng water for their cattle. Some were driven up to Endesh. Others went to Mbugwe, Quvus and Sonjo.

The violence connected with the Datoga and Maasai is an essential element of their histories, which has largely been misinterpreted by scholars (Gordon Wilson 1952: 43–53). These misrepresentations are typically unfavourable to the Datoga. What is often forgotten or overlooked is the transformative role of the Datoga’s presence in the configuration of new identities and connections. After being forced out of the

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49 First Magena appears in Burton (1860: 220–22). See also TNA, accession 69, file 54/MB/1/1: A letter to the District Commissioner Mbulu.
50 This was a healer and rain maker; he is still popular throughout the plains. He is believed to have led the Datoga out of the Serengeti, before he died around 1880 (Fosbrooke 1950a; Interview Kuga, 19.10.14).
51 On the Nyiramba see Kidamala and Danielson (1961: 73–74).
52 TNA, accession 69, file 51/1: Mbulu chiefs. A letter from Gitagano, 7.7.1941.
Serengeti the Datoga created new experiences of the landscape as they sought to find a niche for themselves by pushing other communities out. On the Tabora route a segment of the Datoga ‘refugees’ appears to have converged in villages north of Itigi (Burton 1860: 220–22). Possibly led by Magena/Magina, the Datoga who took the central route through the Wembere climbed up through the Iramba Plateaus. As such, the Datoga in Iramba sometimes refer to Magina in their oral narratives. In a collected history of Iramba, it states that:

The Magina descended and went west, defeating the people of Iambi. They pierced the country as far as Kinisungu and built a fort in the midst of the Anisungu. The Anisungu called them Nkambi, and to this day they are called thus. They encamped between two rivers of Uwanza. The Anisungu were defeated and retreated north to the Chief of Kisilili. The Magina conquered all the people in the centre of Iramba, and went about the land as they pleased. (Kidamala and Danielson 1961: 73–74)

Not only did the coming of the Datoga create chaos, but it also cemented the groups’ presence beyond the Serengeti. Perhaps embittered by the Maasai, the Datoga expanded and claimed land through the use of force. However, the scale and intensity of the violence in the competition for land in Iramba appears unique. The Datoga’s oral narratives in Kidamala agree that they were responsible for the political organization of the Nyiramba; however, it is difficult to verify these narratives since no traces of such an establishment remain. The Datoga’s ingenuity in inventing political cohesion in Iramba is worth noting. While Datoga oral narratives in Kidamala are typical, there are some gaps in these oral accounts. The limitations are threefold. First, in these narratives there is a lack of additional information about the communities found and the areas of their final settlements. Secondly, there is very little agreement on why the Datoga, apart from the fact that their migrations are comparatively recent, have scattered into so many fragmentary groups. To explain the emergence of so many subgroups, some Datoga use an etymological approach to the group names. My respondents in Wembere in the border between Singida and Tabora consistently explained their origin as:

You know we are all Datoga. These other names came as our ancestors were moving from Serengeti to either Tabora or Mbulu. Before they were just one group, but the migrations became too difficult, and some became too slow. And when were pushed to continue with the journey, they just refused because they were exhausted. So became the name Bredga, those who were tired.

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53 It seems that before the coming of the Datoga, Iramba was politically fragmented. It was after the arrival of Magena/Magina, the Nyiramba’s political awareness grew (East Africana Section, Library of the University of Dar es Salaam: Annual Reports of the Provincial Commissioners for the year 1941, 29.).
Then with more travels, another group also started cutting pieces of sticks as a way saying they were no longer interested in the journey. And when they were told to move on, they just kept on doing what they were doing, and their name became Barbaig (meaning sticks). One group of Datoga just refused to travel further because they wanted to search for a lost donkey, and therefore their name became Rotigeng. (Interview Makaranga, 20.09.14)

The third argument supplements and qualifies this narrative. While in most Datoga narratives there was a single major migration discourse, it appears more likely that there were in fact a series of Datoga migrations to Mbulu and other places prior to the Maasai War in the mid-19th century (Blystad 2000: 57; Baumann 1894: 169). Rather, the Datoga most likely started moving to Mbulu and Singida before 1836. The presence of Gismajeng and Dororajeg around Mbulu, arguably older identities than the Barabaig, suggests that the two subgroups could have migrated earlier but remained in contact with the other Datoga (Interview Muna, 12.11.14). This would also explain why the Barabaig and other Datoga groups, who were victims of the Maasai, chose Mbulu and Singida and not somewhere else. This theory has been supported by Hans Cory who argues that the Rimi (Nyaturu) migrated into Singida around the 1750s (or earlier) and found the Taturu (Datoga) already established in the plains of Singida. In 1951 Cory estimated that the Taturu had arrived in the plains about 200 years earlier than the Nyaturu (Cory 1952: 9), meaning that they must have arrived as early as 1550.

Two additional ethnic communities played a major role in the expansion of the Datoga’s territory and power. The Nyaturu (also called Arimi) and Nyiramba are probably more contemporary to the plains. According to oral narratives recorded in the 1930s (Cory 1952: 9), the two communities came to the Singida plains around 1850s (or possibly earlier) and settled in different parts of the Singida District. While the Nyaturu settled around water holes in the middle of the district, the Nyiramba settled in the north of the district. There are further tales of these two Bantu communities and how they entered the area and interacted with the Datoga. On the foundation of the Arimi/Nyaturu in Singida one oral narrative states that:

Soon the Arimi families became friendly with the Watatuu, and some of the latter settled down with them. They intermarried and lived amicably together, until the two groups fell out over the accidental death of a child, the father of which was a Mtatuu and the mother a Mrimi. Friendly relations broke off for a time, and some fighting took place. The Watatuu moved off and shortly after four families of the Ajairi clan left and entered the Singida area. This as far as can be calculated, was about 250–300 years.54

54 TNA, Singida District Book (1930).
These time frames may be mere estimates, but narratives collected by Cory in the 1950s and recent testimonies still acknowledge the early settlement of the Datoga in Singida. It is highly likely that Nyaturu families arrived in Singida before the 1850s and began spreading into the plains while interacting and intermarrying with the Datoga. There is evidence that the first Nyaturu (Arimi) settlement in Singida was established by the Ajairi clan, a fragment of the Ajairi community which had drifted from a settlement in Handai (Kondoa), while a larger group continued on to Tabora. The Ajairi found the Datoga in Singida roaming the plains at will (Gordon Wilson 1952: 3–4). The two ethnic groups began to interact with the Ajairi and continued to populate the area. The oral account adds that sometime in the 1870s a lone Mfipa man (from the Fipa communities in the west of Tabora region) named Mkahiu came into the area from the southwest (mweri ni ataghama). He married and settled in the southwest of the today’s Singida Division, with his later kinsmen retaining his name. Having settled in Singida, the Akahiu had a considerable influence on the making of Nyaturu ethnic group and Saki, the grandson of Mkahiu, was still mentioned in every popular war song and remembered by many Nyaturus in the 1950s:

We come from the borders and we revel in war, the lion disports and the wanderer plunders, Munda, your child is an imbecile. Saki moves further afield to Gitunda and we go to help him to build. Youths, cease your games and come test your strength against us. (Cory 1952: 3)

As mentioned earlier, the Kimbu and Nyamwezi had a significant influence in the making of ethnic affiliations in Singida and in the entire central Tanzanian region. Two competing theories attempt to explain the influence of Kimbu and Nyamwezi in the region. According to Aylward Shorter’s settler theory, the Nyiramba and Nyisanzu (both residents in the district) were descendants of Nyitumba and Igwilibi migrants.55 Such individuals were either lone travellers or drifters from the epicenter of conflicts either in Unyamwezi or in the south of Dodoma. They later moved south or north and founded more clans and ethnic groups. Around the 1860s, a number of these Wakimbu and Sagara had migrated from Ukimbu and Usagara and passed through the Singida area before arriving in Mkalama (in the north of Singida) where they founded the Aniramba and Aniambi ethnic groups. Evidences for this theory are the names of the clans recorded in the Singida Provincial and District Books.56 Some of the common clan names widely represented among the Aniramba and Aniambi include the Anambwa (with dog totems), the Anikumi, the Anangiri and the Anampanda. More complex aspects of the Kimbu-Aniramba interactions show that there was always back and forth migration between the two communities (Cory 1952: 4). The second theory is advanced by Daud Kidamala and Jan Lindström (Kidamala and Danielson 1961: 67–68; Lindström n.d. 21–22). They argue that

56 TNA, Dodoma Provincial and Singida District Books: Tribal History and Legends.
the communities made their way to Singida through a series of frustrated, snake-like migrations, coming from the east and settling in Ukimbu in 1850 before the wars in the Nyamwezi which drove them to Singida. Their stay in Ukimbu may explain why some local narratives attribute their names to these Kimbu visitors. Linking these theories and circumstances from the neighbouring Dodoma region, Cory and Mathias Mnyampala have provided yet another interesting hypothesis about the Gogo social formation around this time; that the Kimbu and Nyamwezi were in a large part responsible for the formation of a “solid block of tribes at the centre of Dodoma.”

To a large extent, Central Tanzania was a sanctuary for refugees from different ethnic communities fleeing turmoil in neighbouring regions. Dodoma and its immediate areas were safe enclaves for the Hehe, Nyitumba, Sagaras and Kagurus, each emigrating for political or economic reasons. Cory and Mnyampala’s hypothesis (which I also share) asserts that the 19th century was a period of identity formation, with each of these communities in Singida interacting with different communities and creating mixed identities of Nyamwezi, Kimbu, Datoga, Nyiramba and Nyisanzu. During these periods of identity formation, both ethnic consciousness and survival were important in Singida. I believe that several forces triggered the later development of ethnic consciousness and creation of space and what I refer to as ‘nchi’ (a Swahili word meaning one’s country, but in a manner very different to the modern understanding). Nchi is presented in oral and colonial discourses as a cultural, economic and political attachment towards land. As a concept nchi is a local understanding of land not just as a resource, but also the ethnic memory of the landscape in terms of its history, its connection to ancestral grave yards (hence significant ritual sites) and grazing (Klima 1970: 2–4). As a claim and attraction to the land, nchi is also promoted by ancestral origins and first settlement of the land. Understanding land as nchi brought with it other claims to the land including political power and ethnic expansion (Iliffe 1979: 29).

2.4 Shapes and Memories of Landscape: Contested Datoga–Maasai Experiences

Datoga and Maasai communities’ representations of their history and memories of the landscape in north and central Tanzania is another important aspect. The conflicts, mobilities, encounters and relationships in the area have produced names and remembrances whose claims are contested among the Datoga and Maasai. To understand the Datoga and Maasai in the region today, we need to grasp their histories and memories of the landscape. Firstly, whenever the two communities are called to question their attachment to the land, the communities refer to the names of and memories of the landscape. This is particularly so in the Serengeti. Though the Maasai also believe that the Serengeti was originally Datoga territory, they dispute the
naming of it. The Datoga call it the Ngorongoro Fuedi and the Serengeti Moheeda Shealeangeati. This naming on the Datoga side dates before the evictions from the Serengeti in 1836 (Blystad 2000: 58; Borgerhoff Mulder, Sieff and Merus 1989: 33; Interview Mabochi, 08.01.15). Moreover, the Datoga associate the area with memories presented in forms of shrines and graveyards (bung’eda). Over the last two centuries, the Datoga have venerated their fallen in Ngorongoro. On the part of the Maasai, the Ngorongoro and Serengeti are the very embodiment of ‘Maasainess’ in the plains of Tanzania. Siringet, which to the Maasai means a wide open or endless plain, cannot be understood outside of the Maasai etymologies (Borgerhoff Mulder, Sieff and Merus 1989: 33). Why is the naming of the Serengeti a source of so much controversy? As argued in the story on Masujaa and the savanna-babel, it seems that whoever named the landscape rightly claimed it. So while the Datoga persist with their claims to the Serengeti, the Maasai today retain control over the naming and but also ownership as nchi.

Another equally important aspect in the early history of the Datoga and Maasai is the ethnic coalition in Singida, Mbulu and surrounding Districts. The first round of Maasai raids of the Datoga and other communities started in 1836 and ended in 1855. These raids were mainly limited to the Serengeti and Ngorongoro plains. Following these raids, which resulted in the wide dispersion of the Datoga, a second wave of Maasai raids extended beyond these areas. Beginning in 1860, this new wave of Maasai raids appears to have pushed the conflict further into the districts of Mbulu, Singida and throughout the plains of central and northern Tanzania (Thomson 1887: 78). The expanding Maasai were characterised by more aggression and violence in the encounters. These raids were likely both motivated by the pursuit of archenemies, the Datoga, and by an impulse to dominate the plains. The most common explanation was the Maasai’s desire for more cattle, as their cultural and livelihood became increasingly built around livestock ownership (Cory 1952: 4). Many narratives and written accounts date the second Maasai raids to between 1860 and 1880. The raids had serious repercussions in the development of ethnic territoriality (nchi), with the Nyaturu, Nyiramba and the Datoga. The final and most remembered Maasai onslaught in Singida was in 1880:

On the last occasion on which the Maasai visited the country a body of men from wilwana, confident in Manaheri’s medicine, offered resistance but they were swept away and Maasai penetrated to a place called Matuiku, about 19 miles south of the present Singida station, and captured a quantity of cattle and killed many men, women and children. (Cory 1952: 4)

It is important to note that the Maasai were pastoralists and therefore most of their invasions were aimed at increasing their herds rather than their territory of occupation. Though the Maasai raids led to expansion of territories directly under their influence, the victims of such raids tended to band together and built more social cohesive units against common enemies. My interviews with Datoga elders highlight
the Maasai’s impact on the migration and establishment of wide areas of Datoga settlement from 1870s.

One of the most referred to migrations was that of the Datoga subgroup Ghumbiek. Under the leadership of Singu and constant intimidation by Maasai raids for cattle, the group left Mangwatai, their place of origin near the Nguruwe (Hanang) Mountain, and travelled into Ugogo and then Singida, where they found new grazing spaces and water. Singu the leader of the Ghumbiek sought peace with the Gogo by marrying a woman in Unyangwira, a village below the Rift Valley escarpment. The woman belonged to the Wakimbu, who had also migrated from Kipembawe. It seems that Singu’s attempts to gain peace and stability was successful for a period. When Singu died at Mkwese (a village east of the present town of Manyoni), he was succeeded by his son Irangu, who led the community until he died. Irangu was buried in the same village. This settlement was later abandoned and the Ghumbiek headed north and built another village at Chaya. After Irangu’s death, his successor Ghambonei moved the subgroup to Ibonwa near Sanjaranda (Interview Moshi, 21.11.14). From Singu to Ghambonei, the Ghumbiek traditional leadership was able to maintain relative peace. The tradition of changing settlements was inherited by another generation of leadership. After Ghambonei’s death, Gamasa moved the Ghumbiek to Dururto (the today’s Doroto village, west of Itigi town). He then built his chiefly court in Msisi, where he died. When Mwayora succeeded Gamasa, the Maasai raids began again: “Mayoda (Mwayora) was greatly troubled by the cattle-raiding Masai, due to this he was driven out to Mtiwe (in Unyangwira) where he fell ill and died.”

His son Aghondi was too young to rule so his brother Mwaja became chief. Mwaja’s encounter with the German colonial power in 1895 ended his rule. The Datoga’s migration to Ugogo is significant because they aimed to seek “shelter and aid from the Wagogo neighbours” (Interview Moshi, 21.11.14). In comparison to the Datoga, the Gogo were large in number and well-organised; enabling them to resist the Maasai. Specifically after adopting Maasai military tactics like the creation of *moran* fighting men, the Gogo attained comparatively equal strength with the Maasai. In exchange for protection from the Maasai, the Datoga offered the Gogo much needed rain making services (Iliffe 1979: 28–29).

Tracing the political genealogy of the Ghumbiek shows that migrations occurred and that Singu must have left the Datoga country in Hanang around 1870s and seemed to have wandered until the coming of German colonialism in 1895. When Andu Aghondi became a chief of the Taturu at Itigi in 1927, Maasai raids had completely ended.

The continual fighting between the Ghumbiek and Maasai had far reaching consequences. As both were pastoralists seeking a monopoly over cattle and grazing

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59 Iliffe’s argument that rain making was separate from political office may not be true to the Datoga. In many narratives, it appears that rain making was a prerequisite for someone’s occupation of political power. All those who were empowered to lead the Datoga were healers and rain makers. Devoid of these abilities no political office was given. The trend continued with Datoga watemi in Itigi, who most of them continued with their rain making rites.
areas, the animosity between the groups became intense until 1890. And because of this, expressions of animosity developed between the two. The Maasai called the Datoga *Ol Mang'ati l toroto* (true enemy) (Fosbrooke 1948: 10). In labelling the Datoga their enemy, the Maasai re-invented the identity and the imagination of the other. Through this common hostility towards the Maasai, the Datoga became determined to overpower the Maasai either through expulsion (using ritual medicine) or by killing them in rituals like the *lilicht/lilikta*. Among the Datoga, the violence against the Maasai led to the transformation of the *lilikta* tradition. *Lilikta* among the Datoga youth seemed to have been a common practice of killing the enemies of cattle – that is lions, elephants and buffaloes. While Blystad (2005: 113) views the *lilikta* as strictly a reproductive ritual, this ritual had other cultural significance. After the Maasai wars, the enemies of the cattle seemed to have also included the Maasai and those who opposed the Datoga. According to oral narratives, *lilikta* was an embodiment of female power controlled by young Datoga girls who expressed their femininity through demand for favours. When the Datoga were in the Serengeti prior to the conflicts with the Maasai, young Datoga girls seemed to have demanded trophies from young men (therefore engaging) “in hunting expeditions after the five dangerous mammals: lions, leopards, elephants, buffalo and rhinoceros” (Blystad 2005: 113). *Lilikta* was therefore a way of soliciting energy and maturity from the men that they fancied. But with the Maasai encounters and violence against the Datoga, *lilikta* appears to have started to also include hunting the enemy ‘tribes’ in the plains. My interview partners claimed that this was a Datoga response to the Maasai declaring them the enemy *Ol Mangati l toroto*.

In the 1890s, the Maasai raids decreased due to the outbreak of diseases, specifically the rinderpest that wiped out their entire cattle population in the Serengeti and Ngorongoro. At the same time, “smallpox had a similar impact on the human population” (Kjekshus 1977: 131). In Ngorongoro in 1894 Baumann witnessed the mass migration of starving Maasai fleeing the human and bovine diseases to various places in Tanzania. Baumann in particular noted in 1894 the Maasai corpses who littered the paths that led to Mwanza in most shocking ways. The psychological stress of family breakdown and loss of children caused some Maasai women to experience mental breakdowns (Baumann 1894: 169). Remembered by the Datoga as *sotoka*, they estimate that rinderpest killed most of the cattle (Interview Mabochi, 08.01.15). Among the Datoga, one oral narrative indicates that a small village called Mbowe in the northern Manyoni escaped the horrors of the *sotoka* because its Datoga chief protected his village through traditional healers from Wembere. Because the village remained unaffected by rinderpest, it was important in restarting cattle raising. With

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60 Blystad (2000: 57) defines *lilicht* as a complex cultural institution of the Datoga that involved hunting and spearing a fierce animal or any enemy of the cattle. The evolution and dynamics of this culture have been changing over time among the Datoga. This culture was also discussed with Kuga in an interview (Interview Kuga, 19.10.14).
their herds decimated by the rinderpest, the Datoga-Maasai conflict shifted from conflict over land and pasture to solely cattle ownership.

2.5 The Transnational Trade and the Formation of Complex Identities

In Central Tanzania in the late 19th century, the exigencies of expansion and development of political spaces in many of the communities was a direct consequence of the transnational Indian trade relationships. Like many other communities, the Datoga were also affected by the arrival of the caravan men. The transnational trading routes came from the coast and Ugogo, before truncating through various Datoga and neighbouring areas. In the 1850s the most important caravan routes went from the East African Coasts to the Great Lakes and Central Africa and after Ugogo went into Muhalala before branching into the north and north east of Manyoni. The routes were used by Richard Burton in 1857 and John Hanning Speke in 1858. Both passed through Muhalala, Tura, Chaya and Kazeh before reaching Unyanyembe (Tabora). Along the route, Burton encountered the Datoga around Tura who he described as “small, dark, and ugly savages, almost beardless and not unlike the ‘Thakur’ people in Maharatta-Land” (Burton 1860: 221). In 1873 Verney Lovett Cameron travelled around Muhalala before heading west into the then Jiwe la Singa and on to Uyanzi. Cameron and others make no mention of the Datoga along this route, which seems to have been popular prior to the attacks from Waruga-ruga (singular Ruga-ruga) (Shorter 1968: 240; V. Lovett Cameron 1877: 140–41). The third northern route began in Bagamoyo or Pangani on the coast and continued through the Pangani valley to Kilimanjaro before bending west to Mbulu and crossing the Great Serengeti Plain to the Great Lakes. The route was taken by many travellers, but the most celebrated are Oscar Baumann and Gustav Adolf von Götzen, who both passed through in 1894. Baumann and von Götzen spoke of the landscape and people of the Umbugwe (who von Götzen names the Umburre), Wataturu and Maasai (Götzen 1895: 47). The culture and lifestyles of these three groups must have inspired the two explorers. They stated that while these ethnic communities lived in similar ecological environments and showed many resemblances, the cultures and economic lifestyles were unique. Observing the Datoga, von Götzen had an opinion that the two groups, the Mangati (Barabaig) and the Wataturu, were from the same ‘tribe.’ of these communities he further states that:

61 There are many accounts regarding the impacts of the long distance trade on local communities in central Tanzania. Some of these included the escalation of warfare and ethnic tensions; see for example (Stanley 1876: 138–40). Stanley tells of the annihilations which his expedition committed to the Wanyaturu in Singida. Such stories resonated almost in many European and Arab expeditions in the 19th century.
The ‘Enlargement of Scale’ and the Datoga Pastoralist Identity Formation

Die Leute von Mangati gehören zum Stamm der Wataturu, sind den Massai vermutlich verwandt, leben aber seit langer Zeit vom Ackerbau. Ihre erschreckend mageren Glieder verhüllen sie durch ein Stück fettigen Leders, dass auf der rechten zusammengeknüpf t wird. Als Gastgeschenke brachten sie mir Mehl in Körben, einige Ziegen und Honig. (Götzen 1895: 47)

Baumann and Von Götzen’s observations that the Mangati (Barabaig) were a branch of the Wataturu whose language and physical appearances were similar contributes to the knowledge of the diverse nature of the expansion of the Datoga by the turn of the 19th century. Their settlements had not only spread over a large geographical area, but they had also managed to command authority over these spaces. According to Baumann, the Datoga in Mbulu had settled separately from the Mbugwe (Um- burre) and Maasai. Baumann and von Götzen indicate that the people were tall and slender, almost like the Maasai. Therefore, Burton may have been mistaken in calling the group of ‘small, dark and ugly’ people, because they could have not been at the same time tall and short.

Importantly, these accounts and others show that by the late 19th century the Datoga had become a widely complex group concentrated mainly in central Tanzania and spreading into the Mbulu district in the north. Apart from Mbulu and central Tanzania, there was also a Datoga presence in parts of the Lake Province (particularly in the Musoma and Shinyanga and Tabora areas), where the community is rarely mentioned as it had been largely absorbed into groups like the Nyamwezi and Sukuma. It is also striking that the Datoga had settled along strategic trading routes. It is likely that they took part in trade, with both selling commodities and provisions to traders, as well as buying from them. Burton tells of the enterprising Wataturu around Tura, whom he saw with asses with “neat saddle-bags of zebra skin.” Burton adds that this party “brought calabash or monkey-bread flour in this country, as in Ugogo, a favourite article of consumption and a little coarse salt” (Burton 1860: 220). For the Datoga, the trade in salt (processed either by drying mud from a mbuga or by extracting it from Lake Eyasi) in exchange for holcus grass and beads was not new (Burton 1860: 221). It is important to note that the participation of the Datoga in the trade, whether local or the trans-Indian Ocean trade, was primarily scant. Datoga groups remained on the periphery of trade, where the center was controlled by the Nyamwezi and their Arab allies, whose control of trade in Tabora had made the town a metropole of west and central Tanzania.

The Nyamwezi’s active involvement into the trans-Indian Ocean trade sprang from their early recognition of its benefits (Rockel 2000). Due to their entrepreneurial abilities, the Nyamwezi made the neighbouring communities function as their own satellites. As the local Nyamwezi leaders’ political influence grew with his attachments to the Indian trade, Mirambo carved out an empire that covered much of Tabora and the neighbouring areas like Singida. Mirambo maintained and expanded his control through his militia (Ruga-ruga), which was recruited from Nyaturu, Datoga and Nyiramba communities.
A well-recorded incident documents the Datoga recruits in the group. In 1857 Burton observed that:

This wild pastoral people were formerly rich in flocks and herds… about five years ago, however, they were persuaded by Msimbira, a chief of Usukuma to aid him against his rival Mpagamo, who had called in the Arabs, as has been related, were worsened in the field, and the Wataturu suffered severe losses in cattle. (Burton 1860: 220)

The Datoga and Iraqw elders retold the same story differently, referring to those recruits of Msimbira as people who were involved in “the Datoga Rascal Domain.” According to the narrative, by 1852, the Arab traders had established formidable trading and political power in the region, particularly in Tabora. Nervous about Mirambo’s growing power and the threat to Arab trading interests, the Arabs entered a coalition with a local Sukuma leader Mpagamo. Subsequently, Mirambo formed similar alliances with other ethnic groups in an attempt to bolster his competitive advantage against the Arabs. This alliance seeking behavior among leading enterprising communities forced immediate communities and those that were at the periphery like the Gisamjeng to be drawn into the politics of ‘big men’. The recruitment of the Gisamjeng by Msimbira in the war against Mirambo led to a loss of cattle by the Gisamjeng. This event is also presented by the Gisamjeng as a lie that lured them into a complex war that impacted their population. According to the Gisamjeng, the “rascal domain that misled the tribe and lured them with lies to trek to Tabora, there most of them died” can be historically verified. While the “rascal domains” motivations and the trick remains unexplored in its details, the conflict was disastrous for the Datoga groups involved. Not only were they decimated, but “the remnants of this unhappy race drifted once more to Mbulu, hungry and poor,” they also became an increasingly marginalised group fighting to cement their own identity against other larger and more powerful ethnic establishments.

The Nyamwezi traders and their growing political influence in the 1850s impacted neighbouring districts in a number of other ways. Some of the Nyamwezi and Kimbu also influenced political administrations in the Iramba area. Ushora, for example, became chiefdom and reputedly a melting pot of ethnic groups. The Kimbu and Nyamwezi contributed to this ethnic conglomeration with individuals and groups of Nyamwezi moving from Tabora and settling in Singida, Dodoma and

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63 See for a detailed discussion of what is also referred by Felicitas Becker as ‘self-made traders’ or power brokers Becker (2004: 4–6).
64 TNA, *Mbulu District Book*, vol. 3 (1930).
neighbouring districts. While Mnyampala has written about the contribution of the Kimbu in Ugogo, he argues that this movement began much earlier.\textsuperscript{67}

2.6 Transfixation of Spaces and Colonial Tribal Boundaries, 1900–1916

After a punitive expedition by Captain Von Prince in Ufiome, Turu – Singida, and Kilimatinde a \textit{boma} (administrative center) was established in Kilimatinde in September 1896 (Verhandlungen 1898: 5–7). The German colonial administration found the local ethnic communities either in the rinderpest crises or recovering from decades of Maasai wars. Establishing further centers in Singida in 1904 and Mbulu in 1906, the Germans began restructuring the local administrative system to suit the colonial situation. In the context of Datoga and the history of ethnic claims to \textit{nchi}, the German colonial establishment engaged into what I call transfixation of spaces. Transfixation as a process meant a reorganization and arrangement of ethnic territories into fundamentally European constructs (Mudimbe 1988: 1–2). The process of domesticating the natives and ‘managing’ ethnic organizations had an impact on the prior local organization.

The first manifestation of the transfixation of space of the Datoga appears in the encounters between the Germans and the Datoga. German colonial power in the Itigi plains and in many other Datoga \textit{nchi} is still remembered by Datoga as tragic (Interview Mgokoo, Mawope and Mabochi, 08.01.15). In combating forms of local resistance, it appears from sources that the German political authority had a difficult encounter with the Datoga. Specifically, oral narratives point out that the Datoga’s ritualistic control over all the communities in the plains was the first to be attacked by the German authorities (Interview Mgokoo, Mawope and Mabochi, 08.01.15). The first to succumb to this colonial machinery was a Datoga \textit{Mganga} (healer and rain maker) named Mwaja Mangwela. From his young age, Mwaja is said to have exhibited great powers as a rain maker, rising to fame throughout the Ugogo plains (Interview Mgokoo, Mawope and Mabochi, 08.01.15). Even during the dry season, Mwaja is said to have brought rain. On arrival, the Germans found Mwaja at the height of his powers. As such, he represented a challenge to the new colonial power which sought the total submission of all local authorities. He was arrested on a number of occasions, and legend has it that he frequently vanished from the prison cell and reappeared unharmed. On other occasions, he was found to have grown so much that he filled his entire prison cell (Interview Moshi, 21.11.14). Mwaja was allegedly betrayed by his sister, whom he ordered to bring milk from a young heifer that had never been milked. This milk would give him strength to fight his tormentors. But his sister brought milk from an old cow and the moment she approached the prison cell Mwaja exclaimed: “Sister, you have killed me!” (Interview Moshi, 02.01.15). Mwaja

\textsuperscript{67} TNA, accession 108, file 2/A: Gogo Customary Law and Customs.
drank the milk as a final farewell and immediately called in the German *askari* to cut off his last finger as a sign of defeat and submission. From then on, his magic failed him, and he was publicly hanged in 1895. He was buried just a few kilometres from the German *boma*, and the site remains revered by the Datoga as holy.68

Another Datoga healer and rain maker in Mbulu was Gidamausa Saijilo. He had a similar story. Gidamausa commanded much respect among ethnic groups from the north to the south of Singida. He fought with the German authority over the limits of his power and was hanged in Singida in 1908. Eduard Ittameier argues that before Gidamausa was hanged two incidences between the Datoga and the colonial power had contributed to the unease. (Ittameier 1906: 6–7). According to Ittameier, the first incident was in Wembere (Datoga territory) in 1906, “when there was trouble in the district of Iramba to the west of the Rift Valley, as a result of the behaviour of white traders who had purchased cattle ‘by force’ (*kwa nguvu*) and had been massacred by irate Africans” (Ittameier 1906: 7). The second occurrence was the capture of the Datoga chief Gidamausa who had led an uprising north of Lake Manyara in 1907 (Ittameier 1906: 7). Other oral narratives approach the Saijilo case from a political point of view. They first relate the conflict (*fitna*) between Saijilo and the Isara, a subgroup of the Iraqw. According to this thesis, Saijilo was a sub-chief within the Iraqw administrative authority. But when the Germans arrived Saijilo began a process of secession from the Iraqw. This was reported to the provincial governor in Moshi who arrested Saijilo and imprisoned him at Moshi for months and confiscated all his cattle.69 Upon his release, instead of going back to Dongobesh, Saijilo went to Singida where he led the 1907 uprising; this led to his demise. It is not clear why the Germans decided to confiscate his entire cattle or he might have also lost it to white traders. Saijilo may also have been targeted by the Germans due to his power as a chief and because of his wealth which came from ritual practices of *uganga* (healing). The German apprehension of the presence of the traditional healers seemed to have been aggravated by roles of healers in the wars of resistance. In Singida, the resistance by the Nyaturu was allegedly connected to medicines which came from Saijilo (Jellicoe 1978: 97). Broadly, the Maji-Maji uprising which had ended in 1907, could have brought such ramifications in the way the German colonial institutions viewed the Datoga ritualists (Becker 2004: 6; M. Wright 1995). Stemming from healing and rain making clans of Ghawogh and Bajuta, Mwaja’s and Saijilo’s tragic history is connected to their inherited powers. The Germans saw the Datoga as a threat to their control over the region, and thus decided to eliminate them.

The story of the two Datoga *waganga* is an example of another history of political encounter. The Ghawough and Bajuta subgroups mastery of rainmaking, the wealth

68 Mwaja is possibly among the few names that are most remembered among the Datoga, particularly those of the Ghumbiek sub-group.
69 TNA, accession 69, file 54/MB/1: Chiefship & Land Rights in Dongobesh Mbulu (Gitagano). This file contains the best counter narratives between Iraqw and Datoga and in the process it carries magnificent written information on the history of encounters which otherwise are rare to find in other orally generally details on the Datoga migration history.
that they received and political power they garnered from other Datoga and communities greatly suffered. While rainmaking was possessed by ritual specialists, it evolved to become the main form of generating extra-income for these groups. Iliffe claims that:

Over a large area of the western plateau a single rainmaking tradition appears to have existed...originated with the Ghawogmang clan of the Tatog, who provided Tanganyika's most famous rainmakers. The Alagwa rainmakers of the Sandawe were of Tatog origin. So probably, were Isanzu, Iraqw, Turu, and Mbugwe ritual experts and also the Masai ritual terms were of Tatoga origin. Several Sukuma chiefs consulted Tatoga experts, while the Nyitumba who created several chiefdoms in Ukimbu introduced rainmaking techniques probably derived ultimately from the Tatoga. They attracted clients far beyond Ukimbu. (Iliffe 1979: 28–29)

A similar narrative also appears in other accounts among the Nyaturu in Singida, according to which the medicinal and ritual power of the Datoga influenced and contributed immensely to the social standing of other people who were able to acquire it. A Nyaturu named Kisuda was believed to be the richest person in Singida until the beginning of Catholic missions in 1908 (Idara ya Habari 2008: 19). In the account it is indicated that:

Wamisionari wa kwanza walifika katika kijiji cha Kimbwi katika eneo liitwalo Wijoe. Katika Kijiji biki, palikuwa na tajiri mkubwa wa ng’ombe aliyeitwa Kisuda. Aliupata utajiri huo kutokana na kupewa dawa za kienyeji na mganga maarufu aliyejulikana kwa jina la Suku, wa kabila la Wataturu wa Wembere maarufu kama “Abulai.” Kabila hili ni matajiri wa ng’ombe hata leo hii. Kila mwaka Kisuda alikwenda kwa mganga Suku kumwagua kama ilivyokuwa ada kwa watu ambao wakilikuwa wakipatia hudo na mganga huyo. (My translation: The first missionaries came to Kimbwi to an area called Wijoe. In this village lived Kisuda, who was the richest in cattle. He acquired his fortunes through the dawa (medicines) that he obtained from Suku, a popular Datoga (Taturu) medicine man from Wembere also known as Abulai [bredga?]. This ethnic group has remained rich in cattle until today [2008]. Every year Kisuda went to Suku to see him about several issues, as was always the case with the rest of other herders who relied on him). (Idara ya Habari 2008: 18)

Both these narratives make clear that the Datoga ritualists had independently grown into a significant force in the plains. They were not simply rain makers as Iliffe argues, but also treated diseases that were threatening the people and their cattle. The case of Kisuda, who became rich by relying on these ritual specialists from another group, does not tell us how his cattle herd was increasing. Was it by mystic powers or because Suku had the medicine to cure his cattle (from rinderpest or other diseases)?
Before Mwaja and Saijilo were executed by the German administration, the two seemed to have acquired far more influence throughout the region. And for this reason, the oral and written reports on their activities and origin can be deciphered. In moving from one place to another to carry out rituals, the grand father of Gidamausa referred in the Maasai wars was unique amongst the healers. Magena reputedly visited all Datoga villages from Tabora to Mbulu and Singida. On one of these journeys Magena was anxious about the threat of attack from Maasai and caravan traders, and so asked his fellow Datoga to escort him:

There was a man named Magena Saijilo who was traveling from Tabora through Sonjo and proceeded to Qurus. But when he reached the country of the Gisamjeng he was restrained for a while. He then continued to Ufiome, Mbugwe and Basuto to the Barabaig. In leaving these countries, he requested young people from the Datoga to give him a company to Tabora as he feared the conflicts in Unyaturu. The company of the Datoga youths took him to his home country in Tabora, where, after a few years, Magena died. After 9 years, the youths came back with Magena’s son, Gidamausa Saijilo, who was made a chief due to his prophetic and healing powers.

With paranormal abilities, these ritual specialists appear to have served the leadership gap that existed in pastoralist communities like the Datoga. They used their healing powers to offer leadership and command a following among different communities. A foreigner who appears to have gained acceptance due to the ritual influence of his father, Saijilo became such a leader. Though his chiefship may have been contested by other communities, his ritual powers were not. As Richard Waller argued about the Maasai, there were also different forms of divination, prophecy, sorcerers and foresight tellers in many other communities in central and northern Tanzania (Waller and Sobania 1994: 45–53). Among the Datoga, there were different types of practitioners, some diviners were local and served several households, others were popular but stationary practitioners like the Wembere Mganga who people visited in times of crises, and some like Mwaja and Gidamausa Saijilo were mobile prophets and fortune tellers. Saijilo did his prophetic work between Mbulu and Singida and his fame is still recounted today. Although the Nyaturu had similar ritualists as Saijilo, their powers of foresight were reputedly no match for those of Saijilo.

The Germans sent their expeditions into the country from their fort at Kilimatinde. So demoralized were the people by internal strife and possibly by Saigilo’s prophecies that they met with little if any resistance. The boots worn by the Germans seem to have fastened in their imaginations, because these

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70 TNA, accession 69, file 54/MB/1: Chiefship & Land Rights in Dongobesh Mbulu (Gitagano). A letter from the Gitagano Falla to the District Commissioner, Mbulu, Nov. 1942.
71 Saijilo is still revered in oral expositions from a wide area between Singida and Mbulu.
were seen as fulfilling the prophecy that red men would be “without toes”.
(Jellicoe 1978: 96)

These last mobile prophets and doctors found it difficult to coexist with the new colonial power, who did not tolerate their popularity and knowledge of the genres of power. In eliminating them, the Germans sought to eradicate the Datoga centers of power and sources of negotiation that were accepted by other communities in the plains. One immediate consequence of the disappearance of Datoga ritualists as presented in Mbulu and Singida was the German invention of leadership in Datoga territories. There are two particular cases that address this issue. One is connected to the foundation of the process of replacement of Mausa Saijilo in Mbulu. It is argued that after the execution of Saijilo in 1908, the Germans needed a local colonial representative in Mbulu. Because the previous leadership mostly consisted of rain makers, the Germans chose a Datoga who was a non-hereditary and who could speak Swahili to be the *akida* (Fosbrooke n.d.). A Swahili speaking trader who lived on the footpath up from Mbugwe contacted the patrols of German askaris who at the time came as far as Mbugwe. By virtue of his linguistic accomplishments he was designated ‘chief,’ but was thoroughly unpopular and his house was burnt down by the locals (Fosbrooke n.d.). In 1913 in Singida Conrad Schliemann, a Leipzig Missionary pastor, said that “as there has been no tribal chief, the Germans named 26 *jumbe* who supervised the people, translated and forwarded orders and decisions from the central administration” (Schliemann 1913: 1–6, translated by S.M.). *Jumbe* or *liwali* are common Swahili names of local officials who worked in the beginning of the German colonial period. Most of these came from the coast. These were literate individuals from Qur’anic schools. So the *jumbes* or *liwalis* performed both functions: as local secretaries and government tax collectors. With the British, some of these continued, or the names came to apply to all local individuals who worked below the chief of the area. In Ugogo and parts of Central Tanzania, apart from the *jumbes* or *liwalis*, the local names like *manangwa*, *wazengaitumbi* (*builders at the hill side*) *mpembamoto* or *wapembamoto* (one who lights on the fires for the chief) were used interchangeably.

Most of these *jumbes* were forced upon local administration. As was the case with Saijilo who had refused to accept the new rulers, the Swahili *jumbe* were imposed into their territories. In trying to settle the uneasiness among the Datoga, the Germans chose Malomba, a non-hereditary chief who was consistently unpopular among the Datoga in Mbulu throughout the German period. The problem of leadership is highly priced in the Datoga definition of land ownership and leadership is evident in the ways that the Datoga in Mbulu chose Gishingadeda as a rival of government chief. The two came to be known as *chief ya serkali* (chief of the government) and *chief ya Datoga* (chief of the Datoga) (Fosbrooke 1950b). The full impact of this conflict will be discussed in Chapter 3.

After 1905, the trans-fixation of ethnic spaces took another shape when the German colonial authority in Central Tanzania was facing the expanding menace
of rinderpest epidemics. Rinderpest began much earlier in Northern Tanzania and devastated the Maasai’s cattle population, their economy and in turn, threatened their very survival. Rinderpest arrived later in Central Tanzania through the Central Caravan trade. German reports of the disease spell out that the epidemic began in the north of the Dodoma district, and then spread to the villages along the old caravan routes. Other accounts say that the epidemic came from the lake region through Mwanza and was brought by the caravan traders to the Datoga and their neighbours to the south. A different account largely places the blame for the spread of the epidemic on the Maasai’s ‘reckless’ marauding and roaming into the plains. The Maasai were well connected with fellow Maasai in British East Africa (Kenya), and many German Veterinary Officers accused them of the spreading of rinderpest through these trade channels. However, this argument is simplistic. The Maasai were also victims and therefore could not alone be blamed as the sole carriers of the epidemic to the plains of Central and North Tanzania. But, it appears that the Maasai in Ugogo brought the rinderpest to Central Tanzania around 1900 via cattle exchange, marriage, cattle curling and trade. According to the German administrators’ account, the epidemic came through the Maasai-Mara then “spread from the Maasai through the Serengeti plains, then Shirati where cattle died massively.” By 1914 the epidemic had spread throughout most of the plains and had claimed more than 90 percent of the cattle and wildlife populations (Kjekshus 1977: 131; Koponen 1994: 353). The report submitted in Dar es Salaam by the head of the veterinary department for German East Africa, Dr. Lichtenheld, mentioned that Singida, Mkalama and Mbulu were the most severely affected by the outbreak. Other districts badly affected by the rinderpest were those which bordered the caravan route such as Arusha, Dodoma and Kondo.

The rinderpest outbreak put pastoral production in central and northern German East Africa into uncertainty. Throughout this region, the livestock population was decimated with about 10,000 cattle dying south of Bahi in 1914 and about 1400 local cattle in Turu in the district of Kilimatinde had died in April 1913. Missionaries reported that animal carcasses were scattered throughout Kilimatinde, Singida and Mkalama. Approximately 90 percent of the cattle died in the central and northern part of the colony. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the outbreak became a serious cause for panic among the German colonial authorities. To combat the disease, they devised several short and long term mechanisms. The short term approach included what was called an education program with teachers (veterinarians) travelling throughout the area and advising locals to take a series of measures to contain the disease. These measures included the separation of sick animals from the healthy ones, the burning of dead animals and burying them far from local kraals and the feeding of calves by

72 TNA, G5/34: Rinderpest in D.O.A.
73 TNA, G5/34: Rinderpest in D.O.A.
74 TNA, G5/34: Rinderpest in D.O.A.
cows for as long as possible. In the longer term, the Germans adopted a biomedical approach to the treatment of diseases. In the veterinary colleges (tierarztliche Hochschulen) in Berlin and Hannover, the German colonial government trained teams of veterinarians to be dispatched to the affected areas. Regional and district veterinary officers were assigned to each affected district. These teams were also crucial in educating local groups about the eradication of the disease. Some of the most remembered experts include the Government Veterinary Officer Muenchgesang and the regional epidemic officer Trautmann, who served under the district officer Sperling. However, it was the development and distribution of trenches throughout the affected regions in central and north Germany East Africa that appears to have been most effective in combating the disease.76

In order to combat rinderpest, the German colonial government exchanged information on the spread of the disease with the administration in British East Africa (Kenya). This letter from a British administrator says that:

To enable me to follow more closely the spread of rinderpest and the location of outbreaks of other diseases, I have the honour to ask you to be so good to furnish me with a map of the territory... Your request for regular reports from us on outbreaks of animal diseases will be complied with.77

In response, the German colonial government produced a comprehensive report on the geography of the spread and impact of rinderpest and other animal diseases in the colony in 1914. The Stand der Tierseuchen in Deutsch-Ostafrika (The status of animal disease outbreaks in German East Africa) report mentioned coastal fever and rinderpest as the leading diseases in the colony. East coast fever was endemic in districts like Bagamoyo, Dar es Salaam, Morogoro, Kondoa and Wilhemstal (Lushoto), and was also impacting on other districts like Mwanza, Bukoba, Bukoba, Pangani and Langenburg (Lumbira, in Mbeya). Meanwhile, rinderpest was considered rampant in Kondoa and its outlying districts Mkalama, Mbulu, Singida, and some pockets of southwest Dodoma (close to Ruaha), while only one cattle beast had died of rinderpest in Mwanza and Tabora. In general, the Germans reported that there had been few encouraging developments in the fight against animal diseases, with only Mwanza, Tabora, Arusha and large parts of Dodoma Areas declared free of disease.78

Though the cooperation between the British and German colonial powers was too limited to effectively counter rinderpest, the Germans enforced quarantines and transfixied tribal boundaries that limited the movement of pastoralist groups like the Datoga and Maasai.79 It is evident that quarantines were more strictly observed in all areas feared stricken by rinderpest. To make the quarantine zones in these areas

76 TNA, G5/32, folio 1–3.
77 TNA, G5/32, folio 1–3.
78 TNA, G5/32, folio 1–3.
work, the Germans demarcated tribal areas and mapped ethnic settlements. Having experience with these tasks through the inter-territorial treaties, the German colonial government had difficulties in deciding where tribal spheres and economic spaces began and ended. The most challenging issue for the colonialists was how to recognize pastoralists and agriculturalists as economically separate entities within the same ecological spaces. Some sedentary communities recognized that the mapping of areas was an opportunity to expand and soon there were complaints that some (sub) groups were claiming villages for themselves to gain larger populations and greater tax revenues. The first of such ethnic clashes over spaces for pasture and agricultural production was reported in Ugogo in 1913. Similar cases were reported in the regions bordering Datoga pastoralists in Kondoa, Mkalama, Mbulu and Singida. The limitation of pastoralists’ movement to fight rinderpest complicated the border and mapping issues for the colonial administration. These colonial maps, which were the first to clearly mark tribal borders and thereby identify the limits of ethnic expansion, would have a serious impact on later interethnic relations. To create these maps, the colonial administrators used natural features like rivers, remarkable trees, beacons, and hills, as well as ethnic distribution. But these landmarks were temporal and could easily be tampered with. Moreover, they did little to manage the spread of rinderpest.

Initially the Germans focused on limiting the ‘reckless’ movement of cattle communities who they believed were responsible for spreading the rinderpest. Unintendedly, restricting the pastoralists’ movements to areas beyond their own ‘homelands’ while relatively soft in restricting agricultural communities to migrate onto Datoga pastoral lands created first elements of border contestations. The most noted case is that of the Iraqw communities. For centuries their movement had been limited by the Maasai raids in the north of their district, and they had subsequently learnt to survive in the densely populated area of Mama Isara. With the peace achieved under German rule, the Iraqw began migrating to the south. To counter Iraqw migration and expansion, the Germans posted guards on the paths down the mountains and eventually placed a company of troops at Dareda (the company was removed at the outbreak of World War One). Efforts to induce these Iraqw to return to Mama Isara would prove fruitless and become one of the key issues that defined the scale of competition for spaces between the Datoga and Iraqw over the plains for decades to come. However, apart from the underlying problem of competition of space as the case of the Iraqw above, the power of the colonial machinery in organizing and transforming ethnic areas started to take shape. The organization of ethnic administration and areas under their authority followed a European construct of space that domesticated the ‘native,’ but also created conflicts and debates.

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80 TNA, G5/32, folio 1–3.
81 TNA, G7/264.
82 TNA, G5/34: Rinderpest in D.O.A.
2.7 Conclusion

In this chapter I have looked at the social and political history of the Datoga from the early 19th century into the 1910s to show that social differentiation and identity formation of the Datoga were not only the work of external forces. I argue that a major force in the forging of a Datoga consciousness of the landscape came through their interactions with and influences from other communities in the plains of central and northern Tanzania. The complexity of the pastoralist Datoga’s (sub) group formations, consciousness and economic strategies shows that development was not forced by external political processes which were so important in community changes in Western Tanzania. Rather, the pastoralists’ imagination of their landscape and a “homeland” (nchi) began with conflicts in the Serengeti and were enhanced by external forces thereafter. It was the emergence of the Maasai as an irrepressible military force that potentially affected the Datoga the most in the 19th century. Upon losing to the Maasai in a series of wars, the Datoga split into several subgroups which spread over a large area of central and northern Tanzania. In doing so, Datoga groups expanded their pastoralist economic, social and cultural practices to places where social formations were developing. The Datoga groups’ mastery of rainmaking loomed large in the ethnic narratives and was widely considered their biggest contribution in terms of culture. The genesis of this ritual mastery seems to have come from the Bajuta and Ghawough subgroups’ ability to recreate and interpret landscape challenges. Datoga groups also made a telling contribution to ethnic diversity in the areas they moved into. This was not a unidirectional matter as Datoga subgroups were also strongly influenced through cultural and political interactions with other groups. As the Datoga subgroups suffered further violence, they learned how to respond, resist and flee. On establishing themselves in central and northern Tanzania in 1895, the German colonial administration found a highly fluid social makeup in Singida and Mbulu. Pastoralist groups were both expanding and facing disastrous outbreaks of diseases and the ensuing economic crises, while agricultural and agro-pastoralist communities were strengthening their political and social organizations through permanent settlements and greater economic power. Despite suffering from decades of violence, dispersal and disease, the Datoga were still a power to be reckoned with. The arrival of the German colonial power initiated a process of land demarcation that resulted in contestations and the promotion of agro-pastoralist communities as agents and leaders in the new colonial infrastructure. In short, the arrival of the Germans set into motion a challenging relationship between the Datoga and the state, one which would expand in complexity later with the British colonial rule.
3 British Colonial Policies and the Limitation of Datoga Economic Spaces, 1918–1950s

I respectfully submit that it is a sorry reflection on over twenty years of British rule that no alien native can pass through Barabaig Territory without the constant fear, and actual danger, of losing his life; that old men, old women, and infants of the neighbouring tribes are murdered with impunity. I maintain, however, that the present position cannot be blamed on the administration. It is proof positive of the complete failure of our judicial system as applied to primitive Africans.  

3.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the dynamics and constructions of conflicts in the Datoga landscape between 1918 and 1950s in north and central Tanzania. I explore the evolution of disagreements on land and its borders between the British and the Datoga and the role of the colonial state in the production of various forms of violence in the border districts of Mbulu and Singida. From the archival sources I draw on, it is clear that the debate and later the conflict between the Datoga and the British centered on how the two parties defined land, its natural resources, as well as the ownership and the markings of territorial boundaries. This divergence is the foundation for various forms of protest and sometimes violent encounters. Such protests

83 TNA, accession 69, file 84/10: Murders by the Barabaig.
have been grossly misinterpreted by the British colonial administrators in Mbulu and Singida and later by colonial anthropologists and sociologists who linked the Datoga murders with rituals and the general culture of the people. The policies of the British colonial government in Mbulu and Singida were defined in relation to the Datoga “murders.” The loss of Datoga land enhanced the narrative of the Datoga ‘killers.’ Essentially, the community was transformed from trying to recreate its own presence in the plains of northern and central Tanzania to one existing in a state of intense conflict with its neighbours and the colonial government. Some of the main features associated with this process were a paradigm of the “stiff-necked” Datoga resisting development. As a consequence of this perception, British policies aimed at merging the Datoga with “progressive species” (ethnic communities) “with more peaceful and agricultural mind set[s].”

This social engineering basically advocated by the District Commissioners entailed a careful replacement of all influential chiefs of the Datoga with foreign leaders (mainly chosen from their Iraqw neighbours).

In this chapter, I try to understand the British colonial system after 1926 and particularly the introduction of indirect rule and how it affected ethnic relations in Mbulu. Additionally, this chapter discusses different conceptions of space. Firstly, I examine ethnically-embedded concepts of space, which are based on claims of indenity to the land (as discussed in the previous chapter). Secondly, I explore space as a colonially mediated idea within the politics of chieftainship (indirect rule) and new definitions of borders. Negotiations and complaints surrounding claims of legality or illegality of one ethnic community in a claimed territory and how it was contested in the district borders of Singida, Mbulu, Mkalama (later Iramba) and Kondoa – are reconstructed in the last section of this chapter. The chapter delves into different forms of evidence (circumstantial evidence, oral testimonies and archival material including official reports and criminal records). I also explore the nature of negotiations and contestations that involved the Datoga and Iraqw 1950 and 1960, which informed a number of British colonial policies that had a significant bearing on the Datoga rights to the land (and its resources) and other social, cultural and economic frontiers. The limited efforts or abilities of British colonial officers to properly understand and address the situation in which Datoga pastoralists and their neighbouring communities were engaged, helps account for the negative formulation of policies targeting the Datoga (like incorporation strategies, massive land alienation and disregarding Datoga customs and norms).

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84 TNA, accession 69, file 84/10: Murders by the Barabaig.
3.2 Negotiating Access and Resource Use:  
Ethnic versus Public Definitions

The history of African communities since the late 19th century is characterised by high fluidity in terms of the formation of ethnic affiliations and settlements (Bakewell and Haas 2007). The global process of expansion of scale in forms of long-distance trade and later colonialism had a decisive impact on the ways in which communities were altered, limited to expand due to slave trade, ethnic war and along these historical processes across the continent diversity in terms of ethnic association grew (Afigbo 1985: 500–503). Despite limitations, many communities experienced some internal expansion which successfully created definitive ethnic settlements and boundaries. The initiative aimed at expanding spaces for production, a search for new sources of pastures and/or running away from violence or diseases. In other cases, colonial policies encouraged or even created other forms of movement, particularly through colonial labour processes (labour migrations by specific “tribal” groups), but also by propelling “tribal” movement as a result of land scarcity or infringements of political, social and cultural rights.85 The British colonial policies in Mbulu and the entire Tanganyika Territory between 1918 and 1950s provide an exemplary case in this regard. Datoga rights to economic space in relation to other ethnic communities become clearer when we examine the role of British colonial policies in north and central Tanzania. German colonial rule in Africa ended with the end of the First World War in 1918. The British captured Mbulu in the north of Tanzania in 1916 and Henry Fosbrooke tells this incidence in the following dramatic way:

It appears that the German force withdrew, and allowed the British to enter, but instead of retreating they remained in hiding in the vicinity. When the major British force had proceeded to Dongobesh, the hidden Germans attacked on 31.5.1916 leading to severe British casualties (witnessed by 9 war graves outside the Boma) and cooped up the British in the boma. (Fosbrooke n.d.)

The narrative goes on to state that Gichiro, an African informant who had resigned as a head boma messenger in early 1916, was let down the boma wall on a rope and recalled from Dongobesh the main British force who returned and dispersed the Germans. Singida, a region west of Mbulu, was captured from the German forces in the same year through the actions of jumbe Hema, who after realising that the “position of the Germans in Singida was becoming untenable, left the district for Kondoa-Irangi where he joined up with the British forces” (Cory 1952: 6). These two cases illustrate the connection between the two regions in Tanganyika’s history and the indigenous population’s role in the collapse of the German and establish--

85 See a detailed case as discussed by Harrison Esam Awuh (2015: 136–44).
ment of the British colonial machinery. The participation of indigenous leaders provided legitimacy for the British takeover, since it seemed to indicate the approval of the colonized population. Six years after the capture of the territory from the Germans, the British named it Tanganyika Territory (Fosbrooke 1950b). In terms of administration of the Mandate Territory, the system changed very little until 1925, when indirect rule was introduced.

For Mbulu, Singida and the surrounding districts, indirect rule began functioning officially in 1926 (Fosbrooke 1950b). Alongside the policy, the British established “tribal” authorities, mainly known as Local Native Authorities (LNA). These LNAs included the local chiefs (“tribal” chiefs or sometimes sultans), jumbes, manangwa or liwalis. The local chiefs were supposed to carry out both “tribal” and colonial responsibilities. In most cases, the local leadership was forced to become collaborators with the colonial power. Throughout the German colonial period, as a way of resisting colonial control, the Datoga had both a chifu ya serkal (government chief) and a chifu ya Datoga (chief of the Datoga). The roles of the chifu ya serkal were serving the European rulers in the administration of taxes, maintaining “peace” and order (pacifying the “natives”), and carrying out commands from the colonial administration at the district level. In carrying out these duties, the chief was required to diverge from the old roles of a medicine man and traditional duties in an open contradiction with established traditions. By contrast, the chifu ya Datoga was made sufficiently independent of European rule and his everyday duties were mainly those of interest to the Datoga, such as organizing and conducting rituals, rain making (most were medicine men), and protecting his people against government intrusion into their “tribal” space. However, this differentiation of local authority was influenced by how the Germans entered and recognized the first Datoga chief. The different categories of the Datoga chiefs, when first revealed by the Datoga elders in 1926, created an alarm among the British District Commissioners. Cherry Leonardi has recently identified similar differentiation in chieftaincy among the Baris and Dinka in South Sudan: “the vernacular nomenclature was clear: these were government chiefs, distinct from other kinds of authority and power” (Leonardi 2015: 4).

In each of the districts, indirect rule enabled the elevation of one local chief as president of the council who chaired council meetings of the chiefs under the District Administrative Officer and District Commissioner. In line with this, the British in Mbulu, Singida and Kondoa formed the Barabaig, Mbulu/Iraqw, Nyaturu, Nyiramba, Fiome/Gorowa, Mbugwe, and Rangi Native Authorities. The politics concerning these institutions will be discussed in the later stages of this chapter, but it is important to note that the evolution of these “tribal” chiefs as colonial instruments has an especially complex history among the Datoga. Administratively, Mbulu was in the Northern Province where its administrative headquarters was in

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86 TNA, accession 69, file 8/20: The Provincial Commissioner Northern Province, Arusha.
87 TNA, accession 69, file 54/vol.2.
88 TNA, Mbulu District Book, vol. 3 (1930).
Arusha (North Tanzania), whereas Singida and Kondoa were in the Central Province administrated from Dodoma (Central Tanzania).

Among ethnic communities in the Northern and Central Provinces, the Datoga – both in Mbulu and neighbouring districts – occupied a controversial and central role. It was controversial not only in terms of how they split their chieftainship, but also how the British colonial authorities came to associate them with violence and conflict over time. The District Officer compared this attitude to the situation of black Americans in the 1940s. Fosbrooke says, “many other points also suggested themselves to me; for instance, the tribal composition of the area. In the United States, there is only about 10% of the population of African extraction, but this is sufficient to cause an acute problem” (Fosbrooke n.d.). The District Officer was drawing parallels between the Datoga and black people in America, focusing on the minority status of the Datoga and the tensions created by the civil rights movement. However, the parallels had another meaning, particularly with regard to the colonial understanding of order and maintenance of the status quo. Why precisely the minority argument was so important to the British can only be explained in connection with the belligerent ethnic relations in Singida and Mbulu that were quickly associated with the beginning of the British colonialism in Mbulu. Fosbrooke strongly believed that:

The two groups of Iraqw and Tatog [Datoga] do not always appear to have been in enmity in pre-European days, is witness to the fact that numerous Iraqw round Mbulu trace their land rights to purchase from the Tatog whilst numerous elders including Nade Bea, Amna, Inge were born of Tatog women. (Fosbrooke n.d.)

Why would the Datoga and other ethnic communities develop such a fractious relationship if they were connected as the above quote tries to make us believe? To understand the complexity behind this question, let us again quote from him the reason why we should reinterpret the histories that we have sometimes taken for granted:

It is my earnest hope that pondering on the past may give guidance in days to come, enable a new generation to repair some of the errors of former years and thus govern, in accordance with needs and glory of man, the awful unfolding scene of the past. (Fosbrooke n.d.)

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89 Also as quoted by Henry Fosbrooke from an extract of Winston Churchill’s Preface to the ‘Gathering Storm.’
The past of Singida and Mbulu is coupled with memories of ethnic tensions and confrontations that reinforce the sense of misery. However, as Fosbrooke says, the interpretations of these sour relations will always differ from one generation to another. In examining archival sources one can see that the ethnic tensions in the border region of Singida and Mbulu districts preceded the British rule; yet, with the British, ethnic tensions became more frequent and had farther-reaching consequences. As a result, the Datoga in British times came to occupy a central role especially in the way that they influenced policies and ethnic relations in the two Provinces. The Datoga and neighbouring communities clashed over resources and claims of nchi. The first ethnic tension that the British extensively wrestled with emerged in 1923. The first spark was ignited by Sultan (Chief) Gidahoda Malomba of the Barabaig in his complaints against the Rangi people from the neighbouring District of Kondoa. He claimed that they were spreading tsetse fly when entering his nchi for honey expeditions. The chief also accused the Rangi of burning grass, which was precious for the survival of their cattle. The following letter from Chief Gidahoda summarizes the alleged sources of conflict:

I am informing you through this letter or letting you know. Now, I tell you this, the day 19.9.23, I have seen something bad in my country which was brought from the direction of your country. This thing is fire. Your people have burnt down grass in the direction of Akida Binde Changaha, and the fire went uncontrollably to BalagdaDalala [sic.], and many bomas have been burnt out. So our cattle do not have something to eat, all the grass is gone. You know our power we Mangati dwells in cattle, our food come from them, and our water is cattle. My people are in trouble; their bomas have been burnt down. Our cattle are also in trouble. I am in the process of migrating from here, but I know if I dare move to your country you will arrest me and all of my property will be confiscated. And if I migrate to Singida, they will imprison me as well and my property will be taken. Now, tell me if I must come to you or what? Because in my country there is no more fodder left for my cattle. Now look for the man who set these fires, because he has brought war of fire and is expelling me from my own country. Now my decision is this, tell your people that they are not allowed to come for salt nor come for honey expeditions in my forest. If I see your people in my country, I will arrest them and please don’t be annoyed.90

The chief of the Datoga wrote through a secretary and directly sent it to the leader of the “aggressor” community. In doing this, Gidahoda asserted his power as both

90 TNA, accession 69, file P.51: Jumbe Gidahoda’s letter to Jumbe Salimu Kimolo of Sikole (Kondoa) (translated from its original Swahili version; emphasis added).
chifu ya Datoga and chief ya serkali, but he did so without realising that his letter upset the British position. This letter also shows the development of the opposition and anxiety of the Datoga concerning the infiltration of other communities into their country. The consistent usage of the word nchi yangu (my country) from the local chiefs’ point of view completely opposed the order of the colonial authorities claim. Gidahoda’s letter shows the predicament of the Datoga as a result of the colonial “tribal” border regulations. The border regulations created uneasy relations with neighbouring communities in the three Districts of Mbulu, Singida and Kondoa. As both a chief and spokesperson of his people, Gidahoda defined the economy of his people (their power) as resting on cattle. Therefore, whoever attacked the survival of the cattle also attacked the entire Datoga community. The last observation from the letter concerned the tribal space and limitations that each “tribal” chief was bound to protect or expand.

The letter was sent to Sultan Salimu Kimolo of Sikole in Kondoa without going through the District Administrative Officers of the two Districts. The Acting Chief Secretary of the colony confirmed that, “I am directed to inform you that your recommendation that the Warangi should be ordered not to go into the Tatoga country for honey is approved. You should issue instructions accordingly.” 91 The Warangi were therefore prohibited from honey expeditions in the Datoga country. Although the communication through the letter was rebuked and punished by the District Officer in Mbulu, the assertion of the Datoga’s rights to their own country started to unfold.

A salt dispute expanded the magnitude of the conflict between the Datoga and the neighbouring communities. 92 While the honey expedition issue was quickly resolved, the salt issue took a different turn. The difficulties that surfaced concerned how ethnic territories were superficially defined in British colonial eyes, which created tensions between the ethnic collective/common property as opposed to the public (government) sphere.

For centuries, salt from Lake Balangda Lalu (Lake Eyasi) located within the Datoga country was a source of trade to Nyiramba, Nyaturu and other neighbouring communities. Juhani Koponen suggests that the salt in the Eyasi Lake was a huge source of a pre-colonial trade network that attracted not only the surrounding communities but people as far as eastern Nyanza. The argument that these communities paid a certain fee to the Datoga to access the salt and then used it as a trading commodity is not farfetched. 93 (Koponen 1988: 234). In 1938 a revealing article by H.S. Senior on the salt issue in Lake Eyasi apart from indicating the true scale of the demand for salt, does not mention the involvement of the Datoga. Senior shows that the salt acquired from Eyasi was a huge asset to the communities involved:

91 TNA, accession 69, file P51: Tatoga Affray.
92 TNA, accession 69, file P51: Tatoga Affray.
93 The Nyaturu were apparently mentioned as key salt traders in pre-colonial central Tanzania, taking possibly their sources of salt from the Datoga country. See for instance Koponen (1988a: 234).
To give some idea of the numbers who make the journey: fourteen hundred people were seen, some going to, and some coming from the lake, in two days. It is estimated that at least thirty thousand people make the journey to Nyaranja (Eyasi) annually from the various areas of the [sic.] Shinyanga, Kwimba, Mwanza and Maswa Districts. (Senior 1938: 87)

Senior’s observation summarises the Chief Gidahoda’s argument of the true influence of salt in the economy of the Datoga and the rest of the communities. As the Sukuma popular adage said “he who has salt never starves” (Senior 1938: 90). Since this resource was within Datoga country, the Datoga believed it to be a gift from God enabling them to buy *matama* (cereals), axes, cooking pots and other needs. The number of people who converged around Eyasi had established very elaborate exchange relations powered by the salt from Datoga land. This fact shows that since the pre-colonial period salt was a key resource. The Datoga maintained “that no one ever obtained salt free until the establishment of European administration.”

It appears that the salt problem was also a contentious issue in the German colonial period, although the tensions are not brought to attention in many of the sources that I encountered.

Examining the protests expressed in a letter by Sultan Gidahoda, we can see that the underlying problem for the Datoga-Rangi conflict was not about who owned the salt deposits. Rather, why should they give up a commodity that had been a precious source of income? The Datoga refused to agree that the salt from the lake that had been within their surroundings for centuries was now public property (as defined by the Datoga, “free for everybody”)

under this ordinance the whole of the lands in the Territory are declared to be public lands under the control and subject to the disposition of the Governor to be held and administered for the use of the common benefit, direct or indirect, of the natives of the Territory, but the validity of any title to land or interest therein lawfully acquired before the date of the Ordinance is not affected

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94 TNA, accession 69, file P.51: Tatoga Affray.
95 TNA, accession 69, file P.51: Tatoga Affray.
96 TNA, G 55/ 64: Schriftverkehr in Landangelegenheiten, provisorischer Militärbezirk Kilimatinde. Part of the Ordinance reads: “In respect to property claims or otherwise material claims are private or juristically persons, chiefs or other native communities could legally claim... all land within German East Africa is to be ownerless Crown land” (Translated from German by Lars Kreye).
thereby. On the enactment of this Ordinance the German law and practice as to the granting of public land cease to be in force in the Territory.\textsuperscript{97}

It is not a coincidence that the Ordinance appeared in 1923 and the Datoga were among the first to resist its definition of public sphere. This refusal was witnessed two months after Chief Gidahoda’s angry letter: that the Datoga began to arrest several Rangi and Nyiramba going for salt as they had warned in the letter. Some of these salt harvesters were allegedly molested while others became victims of a Datoga culture of “\textit{kufaa Umardadi}.”\textsuperscript{98} Nine days after the letter was issued, the Datoga found the Wanyiramba at the salt site and restrained them from taking the salt. In addition to this, they reportedly “t[ook] from one to three men or women where they were well fed and kept the night.”\textsuperscript{99} This was the beginning of accomplishing the \textit{kufaa Umardadi}. The kidnapped Wanyiramba were told to pass over a beam placed across the doorway of their host homes, and then water was sprinkled over their chests. The crossing of the beam symbolized that they were going backwards from adulthood into a childhood state.\textsuperscript{100} The British administrators added that after this symbolic act, these motivated Datoga youths took about 23 Wanyiramba to their Chief, possibly thinking they would be cheered for what they had done. Instead, the Chief gave them lashes. It seems that chief Gidahoda was not impressed by the public spectacle that the Datoga youths were making of the whole issue. A few days later on November 6\textsuperscript{th} 1923, a group of more than 100 Wanyiramba men and women going for salt in the Datoga country were caught by surprise by a similar number of Datoga men who inquired why were they there. Part of this story was told by the administrative officer for Mkalama, Kondoa-Irangi A. R. Perham as follows:

[They] approached them and asked them by whose order they were coming to dig salt. They replied that they were come [sic.] at their own bidding and asked “have we not permission to dig salt?” The Tatoga replied ‘it is our order that you may not dig salt’. The Tatoga were armed with spears and sticks and were seem [sic.] to strike several women with the latter. No one was, apparently seriously hurt. The Tatoga also threw salt in the eyes of the Aniramba.

\textsuperscript{98} \textit{Kufaa umardadi} (or in the today standard Swahili \textit{kuvaa umaridadi} – wearing smart). This culture was embedded in the capture of a supposedly enemy neighbour is very obscure in the way the British administrators defined it in their 1923 report. According to the British officers, the tradition then was taking the latter to one’s \textit{boma}, and “on arrival to their houses they made the Wanyiramba pass over a beam placed across the door way and water was sprinkled over their chests, this I understand to be the old native custom when they kidnapped people.” Then the captured were fed and after few days of traditional performances the victims were let free and accompanied back to their homes. The culture therefore gave those captors something to celebrate, wear ornaments such as bracelets, beads and others as a realization for having an adult ‘child’. More in TNA, accession 69, file P51: Salt Dispute.
\textsuperscript{99} TNA, accession 69, file P51: Tatoga Affray.
\textsuperscript{100} TNA, accession 69, file P51: Tatoga Affray.
The aniramba had not yet obtained their salt and were prevented from getting any. They were split into separate small groups and led away captive by the Tatoga.\textsuperscript{101}

The assault made some Nyiramba and Rangi avoid the salt expeditions in the Datoga nehi. When they went on salt expeditions they had to be covered by a government escort. At this juncture, the Datoga relations with their neighbours slowly became difficult. Oral accounts collected around this time did not reveal an outright state of violence but rather showed the beginning of fearful co-existence among the ethnic groups. What changed the situation was the reaction by the District colonial administration. The British colonial officers, who represented the public space as enshrined in the 1923 Land Ordinance, clashed with the Datoga who were ingrained within “tribal” institutions and authority. From the Datoga point of view, colonial maps, which were handed down from the German period, represented real borders that delineated the public and their own spaces. The Datoga understood public to mean territories that were outside ethnic spheres. It was therefore inconceivable for the Datoga that such maps, which defined what was theirs, were openly defied by the same people who introduced them as guides to the boundaries of economic space. It was a fallacy to them that salt within their borders was public but the land was Datoga. The multiple meanings of nehi, its borders and power over its resources were at the heart of the controversies. As a way of enforcing the British understanding of public space, they made sure that the salt matter was dealt with strictly. Following the Datoga actions, it was estimated that between 70 and 80 Datoga pastoralists were arrested and later fined 3 heifers each (a total of 210 or 240 collected cattle). Some were confined in garrisons in Mbulu and a threat of a more severe punishment if such “offences” “were repeated was communicated to the Datoga.”\textsuperscript{102}

Apart from the punishments described above, the British colonial officers wanted to find a lasting solution to the salt matter. Colonial administrators argued that “large parties of natives from Kondoa-Irangi and Mkalama come yearly to the lake; recently the Stock Inspector in Mbulu reported that on 2 days while he was at the lake some 500 Wanyaramba per day were taking salt.”\textsuperscript{103} After issuing a verdict that punished the Barbaig in the salt ‘fracas,’ the District Administrative Officers for Mbulu and Mkalama visited the conflict area. The first person to do so was the District Administrator Officer for Mbulu from November 21–29 1923. Another officer from Mkalama visited Datoga country from the 24\textsuperscript{th} to 26\textsuperscript{th} of the same month. The Mka-

\textsuperscript{101} TNA, accession 69, file P51: Report on the trouble with the Tatoga: A letter to the Chief Secretary to the Government, Dar es Salaam.

\textsuperscript{102} TNA, accession 69, file P51: Report on the trouble with the Tatoga: A letter to the Chief Secretary to the Government, Dar es Salaam: correspondences Re: Salt disputes or troubles between Tatoga and Mkalama natives etc.

\textsuperscript{103} TNA, accession 69, file P51: Report on the trouble with the Tatoga: A letter to the Chief Secretary to the Government, Dar es Salaam: correspondences Re: Salt disputes or troubles between Tatoga and Mkalama natives etc.
lama officer was accompanied by 29 Nyiramba people as victims and witnesses of the previous Datoga salt assaults. These two visits, which were supposed to be part of a fact finding mission, were nothing but a strategy of crushing the Datoga’s confidence and particularly Sultan Gidahoda’s claims to salt. In addition, the two expeditions of British Administrative Officers which converged later at Ntimitiki, the eastern shore of the Lake Balangda, used the occasion to reinforce the colonial government’s position that the lake was part of the public sphere. Similar government impositions on the public discourse appeared in prior meetings between the ‘native’ barazas and the British colonial administrators. As the following indicates:

At the senior Commissioner’s Baraza [public meeting] at Dareda that day (12th October) all present were informed that the salt was public property and they were not to stop people taking it, also the quarantine regulations i.e crossing the Mkalama or Singida border without a veterinary pass were impressed on them, these regulations were also impressed on them at a Baraza at a Mumurang on 29th August.104

After the administrative Officers’ visits and barazas there were several scattered episodes of resistance of the Datoga against the British public space discourse. After the Dareda Baraza, the Datoga youths’ actions against the Nyiramba and Rangi salt diggers were secretive and spontaneous. The chief’s letter that created the first spark of resistance was no longer important, though it was constantly referred to by the British administrators as the first symbol of defiance. The chief’s fear of imprisonment made him resolve to adhere strictly the duties of chifu ya serkal. For instance, he started to collaborate to pass verdicts and punishments upon the Datoga youths who resisted. The sultan’s aversion to government support would later haunt him in his position as a colonial chief. The Datoga interpreted the “conversion” of their chief to duties of chifu ya Serkali instead of those of chifu ya Datoga as an open betrayal. Therefore, Datoga youths were increasingly taking matters into their own hands and continued to arrest “alien” salt diggers through the guise of kufaa umardadi; as this example shows:

About 7th November a similar occurrence took place but the captors took their captives to their houses, and not to their sultan, making them go through the same ceremony as described above, feeding them well and in some cases giving them presents such as hides and beams, and food for the road and in nearly every case the captors claimed having accompanied their captives to the salt place the following morning and seeing that they get their salt and they

104 TNA, accession 69, file P.51: Report on the trouble with the Tatoga: A letter to the Chief Secretary to the Government, Dar es Salaam: correspondences Re: Salt disputes or troubles between Tatoga and Mkalama natives etc.
were not arrested again. They were obviously not carrying out sultan Gidahoda’s threat at stopping people getting salt.105

The changing of the resistance from physical encounter to a cultural manifestation was a result of British arrests and punishment. To avoid confrontation with the British while also continuing the resistance, the Datoga initiated the kufaa umaridadi, so that people entering Datoga land for salt expeditions underwent and experienced “mockery arrests” to hide the true intention, which was still a resistance to what was regarded as their tribal sphere. With these changing tactics, the British also tightened their grip in dealing with these forms of resistance. It is difficult to understand the roots of kufaa umaridadi as an invented cultural tool, because as far as the Datoga were concerned, the cultural practice seemed to have acquired prominence in the salt conflict. Years later, this invention translated into other forms of resistance including violence in the Singida–Mbulu border, popularly known as the Datoga “murders,” and mass migration of Datoga youth from Mbulu onto other districts.

Border Hopping and the Limits of Selective Development

The British had many laws that limited the free movement of the colonized into other so-called native authorities.106 What possibly altered the resistance and violations of these laws by the Datoga was the consequence of the salt dispute. The British enforcement of the controversial public space discourse eroded the Datoga perception of segregated “tribal” space and the myth surrounding tribal boundaries as represented by cartographic markings and other visual representations referred to in the previous chapter. Conflict over resources on both sides of the border of Mbulu and Singida did not stop over salt disputes. In fact, the first sign of declining ethnic relations was brought by the violation of border marks. Each community accused the other of entering their nchi without due respect of the border marks. The first reported case was of Iraqw people crossing the Kondoa border in 1918, which caused complaints from the Kondoa that their land was being invaded. In response, the British officers tried to persuade the Iraqw to return but with little success. By the end of 1918, the British colonial officers became more strict, so they burnt down all

105 TNA, accession 69, file P.51: Arusha District, Report on the trouble with the Tatoga, December 30th, 1923, 3.

106 These included among others, pass ya njia (way pass), quarantine and labour laws. In the pass ya njia it was deemed necessary by the British laws that any ‘native’ traveling from one chiefdom to the next to get a written letter allowing him/her to cross another chiefdom. Failure to produce such papers was punishable by law. The quarantine laws targeted mainly pastoralists, or cattle traders who wished to take their animals across a region or district. While labour laws were meant to deter desertion from individuals working in settler or public works (roads, rail building and the like). These three laws were frequently mentioned in British officers’ reports, and newspapers, like The East African Standard of the 11th February 1938: “Rinderpest in Nairobi,” also in TNA, accession 69, file 263/1: Rinderpest Policy.
Iraqw homes in “Kondoa-Irangi, but within six months all were back again and their numbers had increased. It has now been decided to leave them and to allow them becoming permanent residents of Kondoa” (Fosbrooke 1950b). The expansion of the Iraqw people into Kondoa and Datoga pastoral lands increased rapidly. By 1929 almost half of the Datoga areas were encroached (the British coded it as amalgamation) by the Iraqw/Mbulu Native Authority. After 1948 there was no subsequent territorial change in the Iraqw area, “but in the south the Iraqw have continued to penetrate into neighbouring tribal areas so that by 1948 (census) over 2,000 adult males in Barabaig were Iraqw i.e about 40% of the total, whilst in Gorowa the tax registers reveal (census results not available) that 25% of the taxpaying are Iraqw.”

Given the positioning of tribal areas, the only open areas for Datoga expansion were south of the Mbulu District. The North West areas were the Maasai territory, which proved difficult to penetrate. The British were pressured by the Iraqw agricultural communities so that they gave in to their demands for more land. By the mid-1930s, they sought for a chunk of Maasai land to the Southern rim of Ngorongoro Crater and the escarpment to the south of the Ghurus to be taken as provincial boundary. But, in 1931, the Land Development Commission (LDC) proposed that the whole area excluding the alienated areas be given to the Iraqw as an alternative area for Iraqw settlement. Even these options seemed futile to address the ever-increasing demand for land among the Iraqw people. With the introduction of wheat farming in Mbulu District in 1934, the District faced an increasing demand for land among European settlers and the populous Iraqw people. While the European settlers did not constitute a big problem in Mbulu, the Iraqw did. By the late 1930s, the quest for more land for Iraqw people became more pressing than ever before. Apart from the LDC efforts, the British still worried about the problem of overpopulation of the Iraqw in Mbulu. They wrote that “we are faced with a problem that will become more serious the longer we postpone tackling it in the right way.”

To tackle the Iraqw problem, it was proposed in 1938 to alienate a piece of land in what was called the Mbulmbul settlement scheme. The area was allocated under this scheme and was projected within the following perimeters:

For the purpose of this report the whole of the country, some 150 sq. miles in extent, lying between Murera River and the Mbulu District boundary to the east is called the mbulmbul area. The area has been divided into two sections. The eastern section being that beyond the Mbulmbul River and the western section that between the Murera River and the Mbulumbulu River.
The Mbumbulp scheme came into being due to the British fear that food shortages were severely affecting the Iraqw. For instance, in 1932, the Provincial Commissioner for the Northern Province argued in defence of the allocation of the land to the Iraqw that “Mbulu suffered a severe drought during the past year.”\textsuperscript{112} So the government’s decision was “to reserve all the unoccupied land to the East of Oldean for the use of the Iraqw tribe – a decision that has given great satisfaction to the local natives.”\textsuperscript{113} Apart from the Provincial Commissioner’s concern on the Iraqw’s lack of land, there was also special favour that was being extended to this ethnic group. For the Provincial Commissioners, the Iraqw woman occupied an honoured position, as she could own property; her husband worked alongside her in the field and listened to her advice in all matters affecting the family welfare. The commissioners argued that, “family affection is a real thing. The result of these conditions of life the effect of which is enhanced by an equable climate and a diet consisting largely of milk is that many children are born and reared.”\textsuperscript{114}

The British fully supported a policy of selective development targeting the Iraqw people. In this regard, a sanction was obtained for the Secondment of Mr. C.E. Gordon Russell in 1941 to carry out six months of opening up the Mbumbulp area. Mr. Russell was assigned to erect a temporary camp for the resident Administrative Officer and supervise communal labourers for an extensive clearing against the tsetse fly. All of this was done through finances from the Native Treasury Funds. Apart from the creation of this huge settlement area for the Iraqw, the scheme also paid attention to other issues like anti-soil erosion campaigns and “the transfer of population to the Mbumbulp area as … an essential preliminary to any large scale operations to repair the ravages of soil erosion.”\textsuperscript{115} Before the project could take definite shape, the demands for food for the Second World War efforts led to its postponement until 1947.\textsuperscript{116} The postponement was an agreement reached between the British Administrators for Mbulu and the elders of the Iraqw people. According to the agreement, the British would take the allocated farms and use them for “food for war efforts.”\textsuperscript{117} The food for war efforts represented another beginning of selective development. In this particular period the British amended the land policy so that settlers could get large tracks of land for wheat production.\textsuperscript{118} The land policy in this regard allowed

\textsuperscript{112} TNA, Tanganyika Territory – Annual Reports of the Provincial Commissioners on Native administration – Mbulu District Annual Report (1932), 58.

\textsuperscript{113} TNA, Tanganyika Territory – Annual Reports of the Provincial Commissioners on Native administration – Mbulu District Annual Report (1932), 58.

\textsuperscript{114} TNA, Tanganyika Territory – Annual Reports of the Provincial Commissioners on Native administration – Mbulu District Annual Report (1932), 59.

\textsuperscript{115} TNA, Tanganyika Territory – Annual Reports of the Provincial Commissioners on Native administration – Mbulu District Annual Report (1941), 33–34.

\textsuperscript{116} TNA, Tanganyika Territory – Annual Reports of the Provincial Commissioners on Native administration – Mbulu District Annual Report (1941), 34.

\textsuperscript{117} TNA, accession 69, file 205/MB: Land application & matters (General).

\textsuperscript{118} TNA, accession 69, file 205/MB: Land application & matters (General).
settlers to acquire land for three years or more in the Oldean area of the modern Karatu District. So the two communities – the European settlers and Iraqw – defined land policies and priorities of the British economic policy.

### 3.3 Background of the Datoga–Nyaturu Ethnic Conflicts

Between 1938 and 1947, the Iraqw land problem and the need for settlers for wheat production as part of the war efforts were a priority. Thus, the Datoga problem was transformed into a provincial problem. Between 1923 and 1934 the Datoga problem, as argued by the British colonial administrators, largely focused on disputes over resources. Salt collection in particular was a key problem. Unfortunately, the British resolved it violently because their view of public property was contested by the Datoga. The result was a complete transformation of ethnic relations between the Datoga and other communities. Apart from violent measures, the British came to promote the Iraqw as a lasting solution against the “stiff-necked and obstinate Datoga.” After 1934, apart from the salt dispute, the Datoga were facing tremendous pressure on their resources from their old Iraqw neighbours. From the statistics and observations of different colonial administrators in the area, it is clear that the “tribal” interference in the Datoga area was becoming unbearable. For instance, after the First World War, it was observed by the British officers that:

- The Madumga area which is spread along the border is a very popular one and migrants from Mbulu proper are always moving into it.
- The Massobeda, Narr and Bashinet localities are almost entirely Iraqw/Mbulu in population and very popular area for migrants.
- The Bassodesh and the Bassoto areas are relatively at a great distance from Mbulu. Immense numbers of Mbulu [Iraqw] cattle are grazed here, but the population is almost entirely Barabaig.

One immediate impact of such migration was the development of another dimension of inter-ethnic conflict. This was political friction between the Iraqw and the Datoga regarding who should politically dominate. The problem was first especially noticeable between the Gisamajenga and the Iraqw. The two were historically well connected and heavily influenced by each other (both intermarried often), but be-

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119 TNA, accession 69, file 3/28/3: Application for Land at Oldean in Babati for increased Wheat, Beans, and Maize Production for Purposes.
120 TNA, accession 54, file MB/1: Chiefship, taxes in Dongobesh, Mbulu District.
121 All these are cited from Fosbrooke (n.d.).
122 TNA, Tanganyika Territory – Annual Reports of the Provincial Commissioners on Native administration – Mbulu District Annual Report (1944), 55.
fore the Iraqw migrations in 1918, each community settled relatively apart from each other. As more Iraqw settled in the Gisamjenga areas, their numerical advantage allowed them to push for more influence in the settled areas. The first advantage the Iraqw enjoyed was a relatively stable leadership, which contrasted that of the Datoga. For quite some time, the British had generally discredited the Datoga Native Authorities. For instance, the first person to enjoy the status of a Sultan of the Datoga was Malomba. He was neither a healer nor a spiritual leader “but living on the main road, he knew Swahili, and no doubt, caught the eyes more readily.” When the German colonial authority saw him, he was quickly promoted to a headship. His position was, however, very controversial among the Datoga, so he ruled with difficulty until he was succeeded by his son Gidahoda, who was considered manlier and managed to win the minds and hearts of the Datoga elders. He became more popular with the salt dispute in 1923–26, but when he began punishing Datoga youths for allegedly molesting their neighbours, he lost his fame and the British forced him to resign in 1927 on charges of extortion. Such charges against Gidahoda were possibly concocted by the British to check his authority following his breach of trust in the salt affray. It seems that he was disappointed by a systematic attack from the British on his leadership as well as on his personal fortunes. Following his resignation, the British had no one to vest the powers left by Gidahoda. The leadership vacuum was not filled until much later. In the meantime there were attempts to induce Gidahoda to continue with his position, but he refused through “a dignified speech” in the course of which he said, “I got into trouble, who among you helped me? Where are my cattle today? You all know I did not take the cattle. Yet who helped me to clear myself? Not one of you. The hyena, the leopard and the goats cannot live in one kraal.”

After this saga, the British thought that the choice of a Sultan of the Datoga had previously fallen to wrong and less privileged individuals, explaining why they never won a total trust from the rest of the people. The Datoga knew perfectly well who the real chief was, hence the categories of chief ya serkali and chief ya Datoga. This late realization on the part of the British made them look for the trusted chief among heads of various clans and doctors of particular skills, enterprises and learning, who had held positions of considerable standing in the past. The British complained, “but I can find no trace of any person supreme in the tribe possibly in time, some person would have gained that position, but when the Germans arrived, I am satisfied, he had not materialized.” However, the British saw Gishingaded and Kamierisi as

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123  TNA, accession 54, file 8/20: The Northern Province.
124  TNA, accession 54, file 8/20: The Northern Province.
125  The ability to win the support of the Datoga depended on his ability to negotiate his acquired power from the coloniser against the existing local authority of the Datoga, which was equally powerful.
126  TNA, accession 54, file 8/20: The Northern Province.
127  TNA, accession 54, file MB/1: Chiefship, taxes in Dongobesh, Mbulu District.
128  TNA, accession 54, file 8/20: The Northern Province.
the most distinguished individuals with the capacity for being sultans. While Gishingaded was locally known for being a leading doctor and spiritual adviser, his contemporary, Kamierisi, was a leading warrior and legal expert. The British therefore chose Gishingaded as a sultan, but six months later he was dismissed as well. After this new experience, the British seemed to have run out of options, because at some point they tried to use a ‘foreign’ headman but, as they argued Gau a headman of Massagaloda; although an Mrangi, was next appointed regent, to fill the gap left by Gishingaded, while also the British hoped that by educating Gidahoda’s children, they would take over as responsible Datoga chiefs. Gidahoda however refused to allow his children to go to school or be viewed as chief’s designate; and he himself retired into obscurity.

On the 4th of May 1928, the British chose Saraja, son of Kamierisi, as a new sultan (he was then only 26 years old). Saraja came at a time when the British were slowly becoming disillusioned with the Datoga leadership. Their preference was clearly for more stable leadership by the Iraqw whose population in the Datoga settlements after 1928 called on the British for a new policy of amalgamation. The amalgamation was a policy which the District Commissioner for Mbulu in collaboration with the Provincial Commissioner conjured up as an evolution of leadership made up of Iraqw headships. The amalgamation as a policy was, however, not new in the general British administration of local people in Tanganyika. In times of war or economic crises: districts, provinces and many LNAs were merged together to minimize the human and financial costs of running them. For example, Nzega area had previously been established as a separate District in 1926; previously it had formed part of Tabora District, but in 1935 it was amalgamated with Kahama. The reason that prompted for this was stated first as:

Primarily the need for economy. It was emphasized that Nzega was naturally a compact area with a population of 76,000 people, while the population of 116,000 inhabiting Kahama had been concentrated as a measure against sleeping sickness, and then each area comprised but a single federation of native authorities with a joint native treasury, consequently he estimated that the total staff of four officers administering the two areas could be reduced to two for the combined district.

Similar cases of amalgamation of this nature took place in all districts, such as south and north Pare in the Northern Province in 1935 to unite the Pare people for the smooth running of the two areas. References to districts that were amalgamated

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129 TNA, accession 54, file 8/20: The Northern Province.
130 TNA, accession 54, file 8/20: The Northern Province.
131 The National Archives London, United Kingdom, file CO 691/193: Tanganyika, Development of Maasai Country, A letter from the Secretary of the State (Dar es Salaam) to the secretary of the Colony, 23rd April, 1947.
132 The National Archives London, United Kingdom, file CO691/193: Land Alienation.
are numerous and even though all had similar reasons behind them, the amalgamation in Mbulu was specifically unique. It was designed to socially, culturally and politically liquidate the existence of Datoga traditional institutions. By traditional institutions, I mean both institutions that were created by the British, like the system of indirect rule as well as the chifu ya Datoga. The first reason that played a great role in the amalgamation was what was considered by the British as disappointment with the Datoga administration. The first serious attempt towards amalgamation of the Datoga was suggested by the District Administrative Commissioner and submitted to the Provincial Commissioner in 1929, and his suggestion was openly stated as:

I have the honour to address you on the subject of the Barabaig. When posted to Mbulu in December 1929, you informed that perhaps my most difficult duty would be to study and if possible evolve a satisfactory method of administering this tribe; and your instructions were: that this important phase of work in Mbulu was to receive particular attention. I received that although the Barabaig were a very small tribal unit, and gathered notoriety and prominence by their periodical murders rather than any likeable attributes, nevertheless you wished ‘something to be done’.133

The amalgamation as proposed by the District Administrative Commissioner was to ‘free’ the Datoga leadership from the yoke of the Datoga elders who were considered “stiff necked and obstinate” and whose defiance was obstructing the functioning of the British indirect rule through resistance:

I have never in my sixteen months at Mbulu heard a Barabaig headman express any opinion, any wish, or any order on his own initiative. A more ineffective and frightened group I have never seen. Their names are Gejar of Bassotu, Tlagasi of Massagaloda and Gwadai of Balangda-lalu. They are in their present positions for the reasons outlined at the commencement of this paragraph; and chosen merely as tools, and because, should anything happen to them it is of little consequence.134

Taken together, the above statements suggest that the British were looking for a non-Datoga chief who could be used according to the principle of indirect rule. The British had somehow tested the loyalty of the non-Datoga, a Mrangi (pl. Warangi) headman of Massagaloda: “Gau the late Head of the council was in a different category, he being a Mrangi, was not in the pockets of the elders and not particularly frightened of their witch doctors; and consequently through doing his work was extremely unpopular, and has been asked to resign.”135 The question that worried

133 TNA, Mbulu District Book, vol. 3 (1930).
134 TNA, Mbulu District Book, vol. 3 (1930).
135 TNA, Mbulu District Book, vol. 3 (1930).
the British officers was how to induce the Datoga elders into complete submission
and manipulate them. Under the impression of the Mrangi’s success – meaning that
the outsider was willing to take measures and advice against the elders – the Brit-
ish saw that a clear way to change the Datoga was through absorption by stronger,
more organized and politically “lenient” group of Iraqw neighbours. This idea was
articulated very clearly by the District Commissioner for Mbulu in 1929: “I sug-
gested that their only hope was an amalgamation with the Mbulu [Iraqw people]
and he agreed that this was the correct line to take; he subsequently confirmed that
opinion in writing. By advice and propaganda I have been endeavouring to pave the
way for such union.”\textsuperscript{136} In pursuit of this goal, on May 4\textsuperscript{th} 1929, the District Com-
missioner arranged a Baraza in Bassuto, where for the first time he wanted to present
the proposal to test the reaction of the general Datoga population to such an idea.
The District Commissioner was convinced that the Datoga were generally divided
and that the youth seemed softer and easier to deal with. Because they seemed to be
the majority, they could be induced to rebel and side with the British and therefore
facilitate the process of amalgamation. This was an underestimation on the British
side since the project backfired and failed miserably. As a consequence, the British
became convinced that if indirect rule was to be successful, the destruction of the
traditional Datoga leadership based on hierarchy was the only hope. The Basuto
Baraza and the incidents that followed thereafter were well captured by the District
Commissioner in the following way:

As it was, the elders knew my reasons for coming and everything had been ar-
ranged to their entire satisfaction, not a person in favour of amalgamation was
allowed to be present, and in fact, as a free and open discussion the thing was a
farce. One senile old man followed another and after reciting his set peace “we
will not agree” collapsed into the usual state of coma. I inquired after many of
the more intelligent Elders and people whom I knew were in favour of amal-
gamation and was told “they are ill and unable to be present.”\textsuperscript{137}

The failure of this first method led to another more subtle and cunning strategy. The
method was fighting the Datoga elders by rhetorically twisting historical realities. At
the centre of the entire method was the strategy of playing with issues of identity, in-
digeneity and the politics of “who was the first to the land.” This was definitely a very
controversial and difficult subject that would put to test and eventually humiliate
Datoga elders in front of their neighbours and the most preferred Iraqw communi-
ties who were represented by people from a mixed parentage – chiefs of renowned

\textsuperscript{136} TNA, \textit{Mbulu District Book}, vol. 2 (1927): Minutes of Baraza held in Dongobesh on the 2nd
August 1927, by the district Officer Mbulu to elect a paramount chief of the Gisamjeng in the Don-
gobesh area.

\textsuperscript{137} TNA, \textit{Mbulu District Book}, vol. 2 (1927): Minutes of Baraza held in Dongobesh on the 2nd
August 1927, by the district Officer Mbulu to elect a paramount chief of the Gisamjeng in the Don-
gobesh area.
stature across the two communities and who were well advanced in age and wisdom. They could compete with the Datoga through open debates, essays/letters with collected evidence, myths, and histories of the land and the people. As a start to this “new” approach, another special *baraza* was convened in Dongobesh in September of 1929. Apart from bringing all of the high ranking British staff into the baraza (the District Commissioner for Mbulu, and the Provincial Commissioner for the Northern Province), the Baraza also brought on board the chief of the Iraqw-chief Qwassal, the Sagochan Gitaongo of the Gisamjenga and all respected elders from both sides. Some of the elders who appeared included Nade Bea, Amnai Ingi and some 90 members from both sides and several hundred Iraqw. In this Baraza, the Provincial Commissioner brought back an old debate that began in 1927, where an “agreement” was made between the chief of the Iraqw (Mikael) and Sagochan Gitaongo of the Gisamjenga, of course under the supervision of the British. Though it was clear that in 1927, the Gisamjenga were partly forced into a meddled alliance with the Iraqw, it later became apparent that such an alliance was simply a way of enhancing the dominance of the Iraqw over the Datoga. This section of the Datoga fell prey to the British’s treacherous manoeuvre, which consequently ended the political existence of the Gisamjenga. What was not completed in the 1927 “agreement” was the extension of that success to all the Datoga sub-groups. This matter is connected to yet another issue that I have called the making of the alienation of the Datoga and will be discussed in the course of the chapter.

The Different Interpretations of Ethnically Motivated Murders at the Singida–Mbulu Border

Either as a result of loss of land, the salt affray or the leadership crisis, a number of strange ‘murder’ cases emerged. They were consistently attributed to Datoga youths who were allegedly targeting and killing their neighbours – especially the Nyaturu. Likewise, Nyaturu killed Datoga in reprisals, though the cases mentioning murdered Datoga are scarce in British resources. The first case of this nature was reported in 1920 and with time such incidents of people being killed in this way formed a major trajectory of the dealing of the British with the Datoga.

The ‘murders’ along the Singida–Mbulu border began as soon as the migration of the Datoga into Singida increased. To understand the gravity of the problem, a few cases have to be shown here. Between 1935 and 1942, more than 30 cases of people murdered on the Singida side of the district border were reported. For instance, a report by the temporary Inspector of Police in Katesh on the June 19th, 1942 showed that in the Month of May alone, the following individuals were found dead:

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138 TNA, accession 54, file MB/1/49: Mbulu District.
139 TNA, accession 54, file MB/1/49: Mbulu District.
Siru d/o Muja 4/5/42 village Mugumo Jumbe Kilongo, chief Hema
Amasi s/o Manja 4/5/42 village Pahama, jumbe Mkonongo, chief Hema
Kanka s/o Mumaa 4/5/42 village Pahama, jumbe Mkonongo, chief Hema
Awati d/o Matatuo 7/5/42 village Barangida, chief, Gejar of Mbulu district
Kingu s/o Dafi 25/5/42 village Kihunaji, jumbe Kilongo, chief Hema
Ikaku s/o Dafi 25/5/42 village Kihunaji, jumbe Kilongo, chief Hema
Muna s/o Kundu 25/5/42 village Mamungu, jumbe Kilongo, chief Hema
Amaida s/o Mande 30/5/42 village Unyanghya, jumbe Mkonongo, chief Hema

District Commissioner Singida on 2/3/42 reports 5 more Wanyaturu in last week of May including woman and 2 children whose heads were cut off.

Isima d/o Majengo 14/6/42 village Sairu, jumbe Mkonongo, killed missing

Sanga d/o? 140

The ‘murder’ cases increased and by June of 1942 there were more than 16 reported ‘murders, a number that then increased to 18 by September. The ‘murders’ that happened in these serial patterns had a huge bearing on the border relations between the Datoga and the Nyaturu. After the above reported ‘murders’ a state of panic spread, especially in the border areas of Singida, where it was rumoured that the Wanyaturu were amassing about 500 youths as a retaliatory move. This pressed the British to act. The state of panic appeared mainly in forms of increased activities in the two districts:

Mr. Fosbrooke and myself discussed plans for dealing with murders with a view of settling the high ill feeling which existed between the border tribes. While this discussion was going on a report was received that two Wanyaturu had been murdered by the Barabaig at the east end of the border. I at once left on investigation. On my way I received another report that three Wanyaturu had been murdered at the west end of the border the previous day. I immediately went to the scene of this latter murder. I made a thorough investigation of the spot but was unable to find any clues as the bodies had been sent into

140 TNA, accession 69, file 84/10: Murders by the Barabaig.
### Table 1: Contribution to the Murders by sub-groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>Name of the Datoga subgroup</th>
<th>Frequency of the murders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Gisamajenk</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Buradik</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Bajut</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Rutageink</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Iseimajek</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Barabaig</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: G. McL. Wilson (1953: 53)

### Table 2: Estimated murder cases reported of the Barbaig clans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of clans</th>
<th>Frequency of reported murders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Daremajek</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basangek</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barabojek</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghowok</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hilbanyangura</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hilbamolamu</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aseichek</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hilbamusha</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daredajek</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hilbanagowa</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dudiek</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hilbagwaloing</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halamk</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arajik</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modomojek</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hilbasalap</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: G. McL. Wilson (1953: 53)
Singida for medical examination and all traces of blood strains and footprints etc removed.¹⁴¹

Why were all of these cases dubbed Barabaig murders? Were these incidents from one Datoga sub-group or from all the Datoga groups in Singida and Mbulu? These were some of the challenging questions that led to a public clamour demanding immediate attention from the British colonial system. They made the discussion of the murders a colonial problem. But most of the British colonial officials in Singida, Mbulu and other neighbouring districts and provinces apportioned all of the murders to the Barabaig. The 1952 Wilson report gave the summary of the frequency of murders according to the sub-groups (Wilson calls them “sub-tribes”) of the Datoga, as it appears in Tables 1 and 2.

The conclusion given by Wilson and the general British Colonial officers when addressing the murders as largely Barabaig was extremely misleading. One of the flaws evident in the two statistics given above, is that it largely ignores one important aspect of the Datoga; that they were/are in the first instance so closely related among themselves that it is difficult to differentiate whether one was a Buradik/Bredga, Bajut/Bajuta or Gisamjenga. Secondly, the clans of all of the Datoga have close ties with similar kinship and clan names. For instance, Ghawogh, Daremjek and Hibanya-ngura are very common clan names in almost all the Datoga sub-groups. This fluidity of Datoga ethnicity was witnessed in 1942, when a runaway Datoga was said to have migrated to another subgroup in the Wembere, to the Bredga subgroup. The following telegraph tells of this event:

In connection with recent Barabaig murders investigation in Kitangiri [sic.] (late Kenworthy) areas aaa grateful you cause investigation areas concerned aaa in particular arrest three wounded Mangati first arrow wound back of left thigh second wound between shoulders, third knife wound splitting left side nose and upper lip and knife wound left ribs aa shs. 500/- reward for information leading arrest aa further any recent arrivals ex Mbulu or Singida border areas should be returned under escort aaa addressed Mwanza repeated Tabora.¹⁴²

The second flaw is the general attitude of the colonial officials of over-generalising the murders as if the “aggressor” communities were only from the Barabaig. Until the 1930s the Datoga were a community emerging from several decades of disintegration following the Maasai dispersal of the late 19th century. Even those Datoga who had moved to Wembere or those who remained in the Serengeti still had strong connections with the other members of their families. Therefore, it was incorrect to consider any of the sub-groups, whether in Mbulu or other settlements, as completely

¹⁴¹ TNA, accession 69, file 84/10: Murders by the Barabaig.
¹⁴² TNA, Mbulu District Book, vol 2 (1927).
Barabaig or Buradik by looking into the ways that they dressed. There were always oscillation of cultures and identity when one moved from one district to another. So when a Datoga travelled to Mbulu, he dressed and acted like a Barabaig, and likewise those who went to the Lake Zone acted similarly. Rather it was the colonial mentality that built rigid spatial distinctions.

Many reports and studies on this particular issue point to several causes of the Datoga murders (which are sometimes called Barabaig or Mangati). Fosbrooke in the 1940s and Wilson in 1952 argued that there were two sets of factors behind the murders, one centered around Datoga rituals and another on extraneous reasons (G. McL. Wilson 1953: 54–56). According to Wilson, the rituals that guided the Datoga youths to kill other members of ethnic communities were very complex. Part of the complexity arose from the secrecy, with only people within the inner circle of the ethnic groups knowing the precise meaning of the rituals involved. Examining the rituals that were referred to by the British, one can see that there are two lines of rituals that are either completely different or converge at some points to produce a single cultural manifestation. One factor that my informants also agreed on is the culture of building sexual relationships. My informants in lower Wembere told me that a ritual of killing a Maasai or fierce animals like lions, elephants or rhinos has its origin in a girl-boy relationship. According to Kuga:

To know exactly where this culture begins and where it ends is somehow difficult. We may begin from a Datoga girl, being matured, and interested boys will always compete to entice her, you may find a case where you love a girl but she does not like you, so you get into expenses. In the past, to cultivate her interests in you, you could not go into the current ease measures of pampering her with money and other presents until she starts reciprocating the love to you. In the past, enticing a girl involved going to the forest with a gang of boyfriends after telling your intentions that you want to entice one girl to love you, because loving a girl empty-handed was shameful; for the girl will always ask, you want me? Well, how can I know that you are a man? The girl will say, I don’t know you, I can see you are just like a woman, but if you are not, prove to me by killing for me a lion or Maasai, and there is when I will understand. Otherwise, I don’t know you and I will not entertain your seductions. From there, a young man goes for a hunt after a consultation with Saguchenda gwaren a senior member of the youth group. (Interview Kuga, 12.11.14)

This boy-girl relation which eventually leads to the killing parties is again explained in connection with a beautiful girl who wears very romantic clothes that entice a man for sexual intercourse. If a man conceded to this “treacherous” pursuit then the same process as appears in Kuga’s analysis begins. One of the most quoted explanations among the British colonial authorities in the 1930s and 1940s was given by Chief Gishingadedi. This popularised the explanation that building a sexual rela-
British Colonial Policies and the Limitation of Datoga Economic Spaces

tionship was a contributing force to the alleged murders. The idea was that “a young man must kill to obtain a wife and that the young girls dance naked, but for the siminyek\textsuperscript{143}, before their swain in summer grazing areas.”\textsuperscript{144} The explanation goes on to suggest that “these young women would entice the young men in this way finally when their sweetheart was aroused, they promised him in satisfaction if or when he could produce an appendage of someone he had murdered” (G. McL. Wilson 1953: 44). The arguments along this line seemed to have become popular among British officials in the two districts in the 1930s and 1940s. The reason why this explanation was highly valued was that it was produced by a former chief and a renowned medicine man.

When the District Officers in Mbulu pursued this same problem, they believed that the murders were a key ingredient in the initiation process of the Barabaig. This conviction never went unopposed by conflicting arguments. Of particular interest was an argument that was made in 1942 by chief Gejar, who seemed to refute the sexual relationship as mostly false and misrepresenting the general truth among the Datoga. The issue that was widely contested between Gejar and the British officers concerned the argument that if the sexual attraction or intercourse was the main driving force, why was this phenomenon mainly visible in a selective District of Singida? The British Colonial Officers reiterated similar questions in 1943: “Barabaig youths, knowing of trouble between the two tribes probably think their elders will be less disapproving and less likely to report if they kill Nyaturu, otherwise, why are no other tribes killed?”\textsuperscript{145} Another question that was posed was: “prestige aside, it is obvious that economically the boundary claims of the Nyaturu are preposterous, if they had real need of the Ngamu wells, or the grazing area disputed in 1941, how is it that they can afford to encourage Barabaig to migrate into their country?”\textsuperscript{146}

Such questions drive this discussion to a well-articulated argument about the alleged Datoga murders in the border region. As part of Wilson’s extraneous reasons, the economic motive was postulated and publicized in his 1952 report on the Datoga. He argued that “the basic cause of the Barabaig murders is economic gain, \textit{duk a geimart}.” The rationalization of this motive is further quoted here:

If a man kills a lion or cattle thief he has protected my cattle. All lions are potential cattle thieves as are all members of other tribes. Women of other tribes are killed because they are breeders of cattle thieves and therefore enemies. In the past we did not kill women or children; we captured them and held them for ransom, or took them into the tribe as our own. Therefore if a near relative kills an enemy, lion or human I am in duty bound to repay him in cattle or other livestock for the service he has rendered me. (G. McL. Wilson 1953: 44)

\textsuperscript{143} Siminyek is an adornment.
\textsuperscript{144} TNA, accession 69, file 84/10: Murders by the Barabaig.
\textsuperscript{145} TNA, accession 69, file 84/10: Murders by the Barabaig.
\textsuperscript{146} TNA, accession 69, file 84/10: Murders by the Barabaig.
The *duk a geimart* explanation as maintained by informants of Mr. Wilson was partly supplemented by a statement that appeared in the 1923 letter by Chief Gidahoda that “you know our power, we Mangati dwells in cattle, our food come from them, and our water is cattle.”¹⁴⁷ Wilson linked the killing rituals of the Barabaig with what was officially known as spear blooding, a calling to maturity. In this act a Barabaig youth would kill any enemy of the cattle, representing the economic power of the Datoga. This ritual was asserted by Datoga elders, including chief Gejar from time to time as potentially beneficial to the Datoga as a community. Hunting for a lion or any fierce animal as part of a ritual aimed at elevating the youths to a heroic status and at the same time prepared them for the pivotal duty of protecting their community. This effort was duly rewarded with cattle after producing a trophy. There was a variation in rewards from the kill of a lion in the 1940s and 1950s “between twenty and fifty head depending on the density of the vicinity of the kill, the size and influence of the clan of the killer, and finally the circumstance of the kill” (G. McL. Wilson 1953: 54). The killer of a lion in this circumstance went from *boma* to *boma* among his clan members collecting cattle, and his movement was echoed in a song that accompanied him.

In 1942, Gejar agreed in his conversations with the District Commissioner regarding the cultural side of the killings. Gejar insisted to the District Commissioner that for the Datoga youth the killing ritual reached beyond the actual murders that were being reported in Singida. Apart from the economic gains that the youths accrued, the culture was well embedded in the dances, songs and rituals that defined the being of the Datoga youth. Dances like *gesibeti-bwahewi* and *Geron* were common singing songs and dances that celebrated bravery of the youths. In the two dances, a Datoga warrior – particularly in *gesibeti-bwahewi* singing and dances – competes with other warriors over how brave they were by singing praise songs mentioning what they had achieved, either by killing a fierce animal or member of an enemy “tribe.” Such praise songs honoured the heroes, who had indicated the tallying of their kills by placing sticks into the ring one with more sticks gained more respects and reverence from peers. They also won admiration from other Datoga, particularly women. Part of the outward signs of admiration was the award of *sabojek*, which was:

Adornment by the men and consists of many strands of fine fibre worn around the waist, the strands are given to the men by female admirers. The recipient is enticed to sexual intercourse with the donor when and where he likes. Naturally the collection of these souvenirs of past favours and future promises are greatly valued and also naturally, only a warrior gets them and the more he has the more proud he is. (G. McL. Wilson 1953: 46)

Both *sabojek* and *siminyek* were special adornments that made men or women appear unique, with a posture that made them attractive to each other. The problem with

¹⁴⁷ TNA, accession 69, file P.51: Tatoga Affray.
Wilson’s analysis of the *geimark* and the symbolism that came with them is his conclusion that poses the killing ritual as the end result. Many of killings were not simply motivated by a single objective as suggested by Wilson. Instead, they were driven by multiple other causes, sometimes completely personal. Examining many of the murders in Singida, one sees that there were other forces besides the ritualized reasons. Until recently, the Datoga have considered the Nyaturu and other non-Maasai as nothing (*bure*), not worthy of reward for the heroic killing (*hawafai*) (Interview Mama Dunga, 11.10.14). Examining the Datoga’s statement above may partly or completely miss the whole picture of what happened in the 1930s and 1940s. Some victims of the Singida murders were found with severed or mutilated body parts, agreeing with Wilson’s argument. It might have been possible that the definition of the enemy among the Datoga (particularly the youths) who had migrated to Singida had shifted from the Maasai to the Nyaturu.

From the 1930s, economic competition between the Nyaturu from Singida and the Datoga from Mbulu led to the remarked violence or killings along the Singida-Mbulu border. The most referred to is the one that happened in Gihanu, a village off the border of the two Districts. With increasing numbers of the Datoga migrants into Singida, more similar cases of conflicts were reported. The real expansion of the Datoga into Singida began with the enforcement of the public sphere discourse by the British in 1923. By 1942 it was observed by the District Officers that “there are at present over 350 families or 10 per cent of the Mangati tribe, living in the Singida District over whom chief Gejar has no control and from amongst whom it is conceivable that some at any rate of the murderers may emanate.”148 This number, though small, must have been big enough to cause strenuous relations between the two ethnic communities. But of more interest regarding these migrations is the fact that most of these Datoga were youths whose stay in Singida gave them a relative freedom from the restrictions of both the British at Katesh (Mbulu) and their own elders. Above all, the common factor that attracted the youths to this side of their district was the relative availability of grazing space and water. What aggravated the tensions were related issues connected to the arrival of this group that had different culture and economic practices. While the Nyaturu ownership of cattle was between five and six on average in every household in 1940, the Datoga had more than 231.149 As shown in a memorandum by De Beer, such richness on the part of the Datoga became a source of envy by their neighbours, especially the Nyaturu. Some Nyaturu men and women wanted to benefit from the ‘rich’ Datoga through stealing or treacherous ways. De Beers indicates numerous cases of Barabaig buying *mtama* [cereals] from Nyaturu and being swindled and later chased off, leaving both cash and flour in Nyaturu hands. Sometimes it was argued that the Barabaig cattle that crossed the border from Mbulu were impounded, with calves at home dying before they were returned to the owners. Some Nyaturu, seeing the Barabaig, began taking

148 TNA, accession 69, file 84/10: Murders by the Barabaig.
advantage of their wealth and started selling grazing places. De Beers observed that a “list of 19 Barabaig who state they have paid a total of 22 heifers and Shs. 110- for grazing concessions in Singida District. Recipient was alleged to be Mwanangwa Shumbe, son of sub-chief Kilongo.”

All of the cases discussed above indicate that what was happening in the form of violence and which unfortunately affected the Nyaturu had such varied backgrounds. De Beers maintained that under ordinary circumstances, the Nyaturu considered the Datoga as strangers who were infringing on their land rights. In most cases the results of these clashes and murders were misrepresented to the administration by the Nyaturu chiefs. In line with this thinking, de Beers observed that:

On the other hand, the Wanyaturu are loyal to their chief and anything the latter do or order to be done is considered law. The chiefs taking advantage of this loyalty help to feather their own nets. They also take care to carry out orders given by the administration. When a Nyaturu kills a member of the Barabaig tribe false information is spread so that the former is not suspected. If a member of the Wanyaturu is killed the news is spread throughout the tribe and cases are often misrepresented and exaggerated. The Barabaig do not give publicity to their casualties as they consider the murder of one of their tribesmen as his having been in heroic action; hence there are very few complaints received from the Barabaig but many from the Wanyaturu.

Related to the Nyaturu-Datoga border conflicts, there were other developments that tightened the engagement between the two communities. For instance, it was believed that some poor members of the Wanyaturu communities from the borders of the two districts were colluding with the medicine men from the Datoga side and that the Nyaturu poor families secretly offered some of their relatives for this purpose. It was observed that:

No. 6070 1/G/ Constable Ali (T. Mnyiramba) stationed at Singida, said that it was common gossip in his tribe that poor members of the tribes bordering the Mangati country would connive with the Mangati (M’mganga) to inveige victims into going to convenient places in the bush near, or over, the Mangati border there to meet their deaths at the hands of the Mangati and thus provide the necessary piece of ingredient. In return, these Judases received four or five head of cattle. He also said that the mwinyaturu purchased “dawa” from the mangati the use of which increased the fertility of their women. (Witnessing the droves of children at every village near the border might incline one to believe in its efficacy). This constable asserts that the Mwinyaturu argue that

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150 TNA, accession 69, file 84/10: Murders by the Barabaig.
151 TNA, accession 69, file 84/10: Murders by the Barabaig.
152 TNA, accession 69, file 84/10: Murders by the Barabaig.
The above claims are not easy to verify with certainty, but there were several elements that helped to drive such allegations home. First, it was accepted throughout Mbulu and the districts around including Singida that the Datoga were popular in traditional healing and curing. Their possession of this ability dates back much earlier in pre-colonial times where it was claimed by the British officers that “the tribe possesses very clever Wa-ganga- who concoct dawa [medicine] for every contingency.” In the past it was believed by the Datoga that the dawa, when sprinkled in the path of incoming Maasai, caused them to become so weak that the Datoga were able to fall on them and kill them to a man. The formula for this very patent dawa was believed even by the British officers as still known to this day by some of the chiefs:

Some of the Chiefs among the Datoga were popular medicine men, including Chief Gidamausa Sajilo, Gidahoda Malomba, Gishingideda Gizar, Gejar and many others. Among the Datoga they proved pivotal because they provided medicines for the youth effecting the hunting ritual. The dawa carried by the hunters was not always efficacious.

On the British side, the fear was that the medicine had effects on many ethnic communities’ belief that it provided protection for the youths from the claws of colonial government. These cases of the Waganga later began to come under attack from the British colonial state. There were two cases apart from those mentioned above connected with the double dealing of the Wanyaturu, who in many circumstances regarded the Datoga as enemies worth expelling from their border. However, there were reports that “the matter of the Singida native who paid two Barabaig to murder the two children of the woman who he had quarreled.” The second case concerned claims by British officials that some Nyaturu men secretly killed their wives who could not give them children and then publicised this to their headmen as being the work of the Datoga. In general, the claims surrounding the murder incidents had many forms and appearances.

Non-Human Forces Contributing to the Murders

The conflicts in Mbulu and Singida as discussed above had different dimensions and appearances. No one can deny their historical existence in Singida, but the motives and interpretations presented by many of the colonial reports were possibly ahistorical. They did not consider other social and economic circumstances in Singida and

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153 TNA, accession 69, file 84/10: Murders by the Barabaig.
154 TNA, accession 69, file 83/1: The Barabaig.
155 TNA, accession 69, file 83/1: The Barabaig.
Mbulu district. One of the failures of interpretation had to do with the reasons used to explain why murders took place in Singida and not in the adjacent districts of Mkalama and Kondoa. Examining the historical antecedents more closely examining, one sees that there were two related non-human forces that contributed to the stiffening competition between the Datoga and the Nyaturu. The tsetse fly and rinderpest menaces both contributed to deteriorating relations between the two communities. I will discuss these two questions separately and show how they contributed to conflicts in spaces of production: first in Mbulu, and then in the neighbouring districts, including Singida.

Tsetse fly became an East African disaster from the early 20th century (Willett 1963). The reason behind the increasing encroachment of the tsetse fly is believed to be both landscape changes (especially the growth of bushes in a once open grassland) and the transnational linkages that created paths for the spread of Grossina Trypanosomiasis. The point of origin of the Grossina Trypanosomiasis in Sub-Saharan Africa was West Africa, then the fly went southwards following caravan routes into the Belgian Congo and Angola, and by 1901 it had spread to Uganda (Willett 1963: 197); making the arrival of the fly a more recent phenomenon in this part of Africa. In Singida and Mbulu the problem became especially acute from the 1920s, and it became a limiting factor for both human and animal populations in the 1930s (Willett 1963: 198). Recent oral expositions also reiterate the fact of the expansion of tsetse fly as a product of the proliferation of bushes in once open grassland in Central and Northern Tanzania. Mzee Mabochi, Tuwowu Mawope and Elieza Mgokoo for instance, state that when their own parents were growing up, the plains were exceedingly open that the Datoga used to climb some hills around Sanjaranda village to view the incoming Maasai invaders from as far as the eyes could see. The bush and thickets popularly known as Itigi thickets encroached this savanna steppe decades after the decimation of many mammals as a result of the rinderpest menace (Interview Mgokoo, Mawope and Mabochi, 08.01.15).

As discussed in the previous chapter, rinderpest was a problem of the late 19th century. Throughout the British period, it continued to pose a serious limitation to both human and livestock populations. When discussing the problem of rinderpest with the Legislative Council on 19th April 1937 the Chief Secretary of Tanganyika Territory indicated that the rinderpest scourge that hit the colony from 1896 destroyed both game and livestock in a violent way. So the period between 1896 and 1912 was a phase when the destruction was the highest (Mutwo 2001: 8). Afterwards, many surviving livestock and game developed a mild form of resistance. After 1912, rinderpest became recurrent in most of Tanganyika. In the 1930s, the British established a rinderpest policy that divided the Tanganyika Territory into three zones depending on effects and proximity to rinderpest outbreaks. The first zone was the Northern Zone which the secretary of the colony called the “dirty” zone. In this zone, rinderpest was rampant and the region contained the most affected cattle, especially in local communities. The second was the so-called “buffer” zone, in which rinderpest was vigorously fought. That is the zone “lying to the south of the
The final zone was in the southern region and was thought to be clean and safe of any rinderpest menace. The three zones were conceptually established not for the interests of Tanganyika but to deter any likelihood of rinderpest expanding to southern states, particularly the Union of South Africa and the Rhodesian states. In 1938 a Conference of Experts in Veterinary Sciences from nearly all the territories in Africa south of the Equator met in Nairobi to further discuss the problem of rinderpest. In this meeting the above division was cemented, but they added other ways to technically make sure the problem did not go beyond Tanganyika. The East African Standard heralded this story:

Rinderpest is marching southwards and southerners are alarmed. That is why they are in Nairobi today. Their great livestock and beef export industries will be threatened unless something is done...at the date, rinderpest had crossed the Central Railway of Tanganyika and was south of Dodoma. Two alternatives were suggested in the conference, 1. Concentration on an attempt to push rinderpest north and the establishing of a line of defence along the Kenya-Tanganyika border. 2. The deliberate spread of rinderpest throughout the whole of the Tanganyika by double inoculation, giving local protection at a reasonable cost and transferring the whole burden of defense to the Rhodesians, Nyasaland, Portuguese East Africa and the Union.

The British believed that the fear about rinderpest as seen by the settler states (whether Kenya or South Africa) was not merely conceptual, rather it was an everyday reality that the Datoga and other communities encountered. The tsetse fly had the biggest impact on the local people, in the ways that it changed life in the plains. However, there is still little-known on how the two diseases affected inter-ethnic engagement in the districts of Singida and Mbulu. As stated by the British secretary of the colony in the 1930s, the Northern Province had a bigger share of the impact of the rinderpest menace than all the regions in East Africa. The colonial governments’ panic was justified not only because the cattle industry in a wide sense was in jeopardy of being swept away by rinderpest, but because the interests of the settler community in Kenya and Southern Africa could be annihilated by the encroachment of the diseases. The measures taken by the colonial government aimed at addressing this problem and as a result the strategies put forward were deemed to be more menacing to pastoralism rather than to rinderpest itself.

Limitation of the movement of pastoralist groups in Tanganyika first came in the form of quarantines. Quarantines were imposed all over cattle districts in Tanganyi-
Some quarantines and checkpoints were imposed on cattle auction markets, like the one in Ngiri Village (12 kilometres from Manyoni) where cattle from Singida were quarantined for 14 days before railed to Dar es Salaam. During the Great Depression in the 1930s, the veterinary officers were very few in number so the colonial state had to rely on veterinary guards. In 1927 there were only three in the entire Manyoni area. As a consequence, treatment of affected cattle was rare. More significant was the law that prevented the movement of pastoralists, because that was regarded as economical and easier to implement. Then there were ordinances that prohibited or restricted the movement of native cattle. Item 4 of the Rinderpest Ordinance of 1939 states that “all restrictions considered necessary for the movement of stock whether native or European owned are imposed by this department [Veterinary],” however the Ordinance was mainly tougher when it dealt with Africans’ cattle owners.

In general, both rinderpest and the tsetse fly had significant consequences throughout the Northern and Central Provinces. For instance, in the country of the Wambugwe British officers who visited the villages overlying the southern end of Lake Manyara near the bottom of the east rift wall in 1922 observed that the population had significantly shrunk due to the tsetse fly which invaded most of the grazing land. The second area reported on concerned the Datoga. Faced with expanding Iraqw from the north of the Mbulu District, the Datoga also had to battle the expanding fly encroachment. As observed in 1936 by the visiting British officers, there was an alarming decrease of the population of the Datoga in Bassuto, “we first visited Basuto 61 miles from Mbulu which at one time was fairly thickly populated by the Barabaig but now or less deserted owing to the encroachment of tsetse fly.” The population decline was not because the people were running from rumours, but because the situation was truly dire. For instance, it was reported in 1944 that up to 239 cases of sleeping sickness were diagnosed, of which 25 proved fatal. In such cases, some local populations either migrated themselves or had to be evacuated. The 1944 report for the Northern Province indicated that “apart from the evacuation from Kiru and re-settlement of natives in the Magugu area, the Wambungwe who have been steadily retreating from bush and fly encroachments have been given

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160 TNA, Dodoma District’s Report, 8th January 1925, 8.
161 TNA, Manyoni District Annual Report, 12th January 1927.
162 A statement in the Legislative Council (LEGCO) by Colonel Lle Wellyn in 1932, possibly says it all: “The position as I see it in this country is that the cattle represent values but they are mostly cattle of the scrub type and the moment very largely unsalable – there are too many and they ruin the country in which they are kept, such as Singida. The idea that we should leave the cattle to die off and not protect them from diseases is easier, but at the same time I do not think we are justified in carrying a department costing so much at this time for their protection if we are able to do it by a cheaper method.” See this in Tanganyika Standard, 13.2.1932, p.19.
164 TNA, Mbulu District Book, vol. 3 (1930).
165 TNA, accession 69, file 83/1: Establishment of a Police Post in Barabaig Area, Mbulu District.
166 TNA, accession 69, file 263/1: Rinderpest Policy.
room for expansion” (Lumley 1976: 62). In September 1944 the then Acting District Commissioner, Edward Kenneth Lumley, evacuated about 500 families of the Mbugwe and resettled them in Babati (Lumley 1976: 87).

In Mbulu and Singida in the 1930s rinderpest and the tsetse fly continued to exert significant pressure on pastoralists and agro-pastoralist groups whose survival depended on the water reservoir and grazing spaces, which had been encroached upon by the expanding fly population. Room for expansion was given to the Mbugwe but not to the Datoga. For instance, apart from especially alarming cases, the British officers restricted the Datoga from moving away from the tsetse fly. The migration of the Datoga in Singida from the 1930 increased immediate tensions with the Nyaturu. Soon there were reported killings, but the British were quick to twist the causes to merely cultural orientations of the Datoga. Even after this, the Datoga migrations persisted and the conflicts over limited grazing and water resources continued. After the first reported murders in Singida in 1935, in 1936 about 40 Datoga pastoralists’ families under the quarantine laws were told to leave Singida.167

In some cases the British understood the risks of dwindling water and grazing resources and thus tried to assist the local population through clearings. First, in 1936 the Tsetse Reclamation Department sent Mr. Russel to assist the local population in tsetse clearing.168 His first duty started with the Mbulmbul Project, which aimed at establishing extra Iraqw living space and thus relieving Central Mbulu from population pressure and soil erosion. Apart from this project, which commanded a lot of resources, there were still limited clearings in different parts of the district, through communal or sometimes (forced) labour.169 The cleared areas ultimately turned into valuable resources for both agriculturalists and pastoralists. Competition was quickly noticeable throughout the cleared places as each group clamoured for a share of the cleared spots, which contained grazing and watering spots for their animals. In 1935 Lumley complained that the Datoga’s presence was creating difficulties in Singida (Lumley 1976: 89); however, this tendency intensified between 1935 and 1942. Though he does not immediately mention what types of difficulties, his comment was surely connected with continued violence which was popularly known as the Barabaig murders. To the District Officers, such violence remained a cultural manifestation, even when the evidence to the contrary was clearly observable. For example, most of the violence reported in the Singida–Mbulu border took place between May and June. The question is, what was so special among the Datoga in these months? Why would these rituals happen so consistently mainly in every beginning of the dry season? I think we should agree that increased competition for a few rain ponds which were quickly drying between May and June created such a tense strug-

gle between the Nyaturu Datoga. By contrast, in 1942, a police investigation headed by superintendent G. de Beers in 1942 showed that in places where water was plentiful, ethnic relations were cordial and no violence was reported. A good example that de Beers provided was that of the Datoga migrants in Kondoa. The Datoga started moving part of their cattle to Kondoa during the dry season in the 1920s. Apart from the fear of arrests from the British officers for contravening the quarantine regulations, the Datoga had no conflict with their Rangi hosts. The only remembered conflict in the history of the two groups was over the salt of Balangida Lalu. But with the unseating of Gidahoda in 1926 and later the coming of Gejar in 1938, relations were improved. During de Beers’ visits Sultan Salim stated that he had nothing against the Datoga. Sultan Salim talked about friendly relations with the Datoga:

At Kolo, on the 31st of August, I spoke with the paramount chief of the Warangi, SULTAN SALM [sic.]. Who confirmed that the tribes under him lived in closest friendship with the Mangati and that he, himself, was on the friendliest terms with their paramount chief, Geja (or KIJA) who lives at KATESA [sic.], and that they were in the habit of visiting each other, though infrequently.170

In the eyes of the British, the above observation was sincere because it came from someone they were sure could have carried the grudges of the salt fracas. This might have strengthened their conviction that the Datoga were a conflict-seeking community and therefore hated by every other communities. Salim’s response was quite unexpected. Apart from the Rangi, the local chiefs of the Fiome, Mbungwe, and Sandawe had similar responses, agreeing that nothing violent existed between them and the Datoga.

The Colonial State and Strategies against Ethnic Murders

The murders at the border between Singida and Mbulu were officially known as the work of the Barabaig. Part of the British colonial strategy against such claimed atrocities largely targeted this sub-group of the Datoga. There were several decisions reached by both the District and Provincial Commissioners in Singida and Mbulu to halt the tensions and animosity that resulted from the killings. The first recorded decision that targeted the Barabaig was made on May 20th1931in a Baraza in a village between Dongobesh and Endamasak held to discuss ways and means of stopping what the British called a “stupid custom.”171 In this meeting, many songs and dances of the Barabaig were abolished. In a statement by the Mbulu District Commissioner, it was asserted that:

170 TNA, accession 69, file 84/10: Tour by the Acting District Commissioner, Mbulu, 26.6.1942.
171 TNA, accession 69, file 8/20: The Provincial Commissioner Northern Province, Arusha.
The chief and all elders agreed without dispute that the cause of these murders was the usual craving by the youth of the tribe to be known as warriors as one better than their fellows. The lack of war and the decrease of lions make it extremely difficult for them to show their bravery. The girls of the tribe are of course at the bottom of the affair demanding some proof of bravery before favours are granted.\textsuperscript{172}

In this regard, six dances and songs, including their rituals and cultural manifestations, were forbidden from May 31\textsuperscript{st} 1931, and they were declared as illegal in the entire area of the Barabaig and in the bordering districts. The list of these dances and songs and their allied cultures included the following.

The first was the Mulbadaw or Mlilyoni (among the Wataturu sub-group) dance. This was a dance that was common among the Datoga in which the youths stood in a line and the girls opposite jumped very high in the air, the girls jumping opposite the men they fancied. According to the British administrators, if a girl was seen dancing with a man who had not earned the right to call himself a warrior (i.e. not having killed a lion or a man), the other warriors interfered and challenged him to name his victims (how many lions etc.) If he was unable to do this he was chased out of the ngoma (dance), the girl who chose him was laughed at, and both he and she felt extreme shame. Naturally, the man who could name the largest number of victims was always the hero at this type of dance, and “the other law abiding members of the tribe get little chance, and often through shame commit murder, failing to find a lion.” Therefore, it was stated by the District Administrative Officer that “the Mulbadaw dance is now forbidden as being the chief cause of these senseless murder [sic.]”\textsuperscript{173}

The second aspect of Datoga culture that suffered the same fate of banishment was gesibet-bahewi. This was the song sung at wedding ceremonies or any important cultural event; the song is called babewi. Likewise, this song became a target by the British officers because it was argued that singers of this genre, which were mostly performed in night hours after the mulbadawi/Mlilyoni dances, were also part of the problem. Colonial officers argued that after hours of jumping and dancing, the youths had a moment of relaxation in which the singing became a major undertaking. Male leaders in these songs pushed on the chorus by improvising the rhymes and verses alongside their female counterparts. The verses sung in gesibet-bwahewi came from everyday experiences of the youths: their sorrowful life, happiness, cows, pasture or women they fancied. The British interpreted such messages and assumed that they all inculcated violence. According to the British understanding, the exploits of the singers must be sung in detail, with numbers of the victims given and great self-praise necessary. They further stated that “here also the unfortunate and law abiding member of the tribe is made to feel very small and often after being ashamed sets off off
hunting for lion, and failure to find one may lead to murder. The *bahewi* as a single song was to be modified.”

The third aspect of cultural tradition to follow was *lilikta/lilichta* or *halooda*. This was included in the 1931 *Baraza* in Dongobesh as one of the most dangerous norms that was to be abolished. The British defined *lilikta* as an organized hunt by a gang of young men for lion or rhinoceros to show their mettle and to earn the title of warrior. For the British officers, *lilikta* often led to murder and therefore was also forbidden. However, the institution of *lilikta* or *halooda* is more complex than this limited definition, which was given in 1931 (Blystad 2000: 76; Nyoni 2006: 10).

The colonial state did not stop at songs and dances. Their decisions were extended to the dressing styles of both sexes. The British specifically admonished the wearing of *siminyek* by girls or *sabojek* by young males. *Siminyek* was an adornment worn by unmarried girls. It consisted of pieces of ostrich egg, threaded on fibre or string and worn around the waist. The report of the District Administration Officer said that “the girls are entirely naked before the young men either at dances or when alone in the bush, the only thing they wear is this *simwegwek* [sic.] which is as far as I can understand is viewed as a bait (*kama sukari*) or standing invitation for intercourse” (Interview Kuga, 12.11.14). As postulated by the officer, the young men, being invited (by the *siminyek*) and the naked posturing by the girl, enticed them to accept the invitation. When the girls attracted a man, he was teased somewhat and if he was unable to prove that he was a warrior, he was spurned. As also pointed out by Kuga, the girl would goad the man by saying that “two girls cannot lie together I want a man” (Interview Kuga, 12.11.14). Naturally the man was very angry, and if the girl was “worth the trouble,” he went to prove his mettle; murder might follow. Hence “the wearing of the *simwegwek* is now forbidden as the elders say it has no other significance except the one outlined above and is an immoral practice which had better go.”

*Sabojek* was an adornment by the men and consisted of many strands of fine fibre worn around the waist. The strands were given to the men by female admirers. The recipient was entitled to sexual intercourse with the donor whenever. Naturally the collection of these souvenirs of past favours and future promises were greatly valued. Only a warrior got them and the more that he had the prouder he was. The officers thought that men who did not receive *sabojek* became morose over the subject and were forced to go out to kill. Just as killing by organized hunting or murder was outlawed, the wearing of the *sabojek* was also forbidden. As a starting point, all men present at the *baraza* were made to cut theirs off. It was said that they did so quite cheerfully. One observed that “I formed the impression that even the wearers thought the idea rather silly and we are not sorry to do away with it.”

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174  TNA, accession 69, file 8/20: The Provincial Commissioner Northern Province, Arusha.
175  TNA, accession 69, file 8/20: The Provincial Commissioner Northern Province, Arusha.
176  TNA, accession 69, file 8/20: The Provincial Commissioner Northern Province, Arusha.
The details about *geron* do not appear in many Datoga narratives. Possibly this was a sort of *buahewi*, sometimes called *girenawe* in Ki-taturu. According to the list that was provided in 1931, *geron* is equated to *Mulbadaw* or *Mlilyoni*, which was also forbidden. This suppression of Barabaig cultural practices gave two kinds of general impressions. The first was that the attack on their cultural values in connection with the murders in Singida was either pushed single-handedly by the British officials in Mbulu in the name of Local Native Authorities or some of the Barabaig were used against the rest as part of the *fitna* [sedition], something that polarised the Datoga. The second impression, which pointed to the practicality of the Dongobesh decisions, was that the killings were not ebbing but instead increased. The highest number of recorded border killings happened in 1942, in which more than 20 victims of such atrocities died, an indication that the British were targeting manifestations other than the core of the problem. Since the murders were regarded as Barabaig doings, there was nothing specially done that focused on the Nyaturu who seemed to be the victims although there were many clues that pointed to the contribution of the latter. Datoga were bordering the Fiome, Nyiramba and Sandawe, but why were the Nyaturu the main targets? The cultural suppression was definitely inaccurate.

The second strategy against the murders was “tribal” disengagement or coordinated interaction; that is, setting apart all ethnically related activities that involved the Datoga and Nyaturu. In anything related to daily issues like settlements, grazing areas and cattle watering spots, the two communities in the districts of Singida and Mbulu had to be separated. The British colonial officers made a log of complaints to L.N.As for not limiting and setting apart activities involving the two communities with distinct economic practices. In pursuit of this, it was argued that:

> It is inescapable that divided control is the cause of the trouble, and that the Nyaturu Native Authorities are entirely to blame for this state of affairs. Wherever one has nomadic pastoralists and sedentary agriculturalists side by side, the latter will try and profit from the former, e.g. Gogo, Irangi, Sonjo or European settlers around Meru and Kilimanjaro, but they expect the government to step in when the pastoralists, encouraged by them for their own profit, start to give trouble.177

As a way of correcting the above mistakes, both districts brought in the following key proposals. The first was to adjust the border that separated the two districts, especially as far as water was concerned. It was suggested for example that border villages which were sources of water to be divided between the Datoga and Nyaturu. Ngamu was to be totally Barabaig to serve the plains to the east; the Nyaturu used the sources in the west. Second was the prohibition of the Barabaig from using part of the Balangida Lalu Lake deposits, thus giving the Nyaturu more power over the contested salt deposits. Third, they also envisioned establishing a neutral strip along

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177 TNA, accession 69, file 84/10: Murders by the Barabaig.
the whole boundary half a mile in widths neither side to enter. The fourth action was
the complete abolition of any idea of shared water between the two communities.
Fifth was the removal of the Barabaig from the country of the Nyaturu. Sixth, was
a proposition to establish a common but coordinated market at the border between
the districts. Last was the imposition of a levy, a replica of a levy in Kenya, to fund
the "policing, if such proved necessary after all the Barabaig returned to their own
country." In addition to the above mechanisms, the British devised what they
called a tripartite process of engaging individuals involved in the murder through
detection, trial and punishment. These three processes needed time, manpower and
legal institutions, which also helped to indicate the downside of the British legal
systems. In the first instance, the British colonial officers often complained that iden-
tifying the culprits of the Nyaturu murders on the borders of Singida and Mbulu was
a daunting task, because the accomplices escaped from the scenes of the murders to
Mbulu, where their fellow Datoga united to hide them so as not to be implicated.
In the detection process, a permanent police post in the Barabaig country under a
picked inspector was made available from 1942. The challenge in this effort was
the establishment of police posts in all conflict zones and the strengthening of police
patrols. In the context of trial, the tendency for "a mass of minor clues and signifi-
cant features of tribal life must be presented in such a way as to build up a case for
the prosecution strong enough to remove any doubt from the judge's mind." Detect-
ing perpetrators of the murders also led to the establishment of different police
posts. Regarding a post erected at Mbulu, officials wrote that “this post will consider
play a most important part in the investigation of murders and the disappearance of
Wanyaturu natives especially being situated as it is on the Mbulu–Singida border in
a quickly populated area. Reports from these areas that take so long to reach Mbulu
will be made direct via this post.” In connection with this on February 19th 1944
“the colonial government employed two trackers for 20/- per month (who are con-
versant in Nyaturu and Kibarabaig).”

The last aspect of this process was the punishment process. At first it was consid-
ered necessary to impose a collective punishment on the entire Datoga population
whenever the convicts of a murder were not identified, but this idea was discarded
for stern measures on individuals like public hanging, imprisonment, fines and abo-
lition of some cultural aspects as it was the case with the Dongobesh and Endamasak
decisions. This view was strongly supported by the District Commissioner of Mbulu,
[who] in a memorandum accompanying his 1942 letter under reference put forward
a strong plea for public hanging. This memorandum was written on the understand-
ing that the law specifically provided for such a course. The District Commissioner

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178 TNA, accession 69, file 84/10: Murders by the Barabaig.
179 TNA, accession 69, file 84/10: Murders by the Barabaig.
180 TNA, accession 69, file 84/10: Murders by the Barabaig.
181 TNA, accession 69, file 84/10: Murders by the Barabaig.
182 TNA, accession 69, file 83/1: Establishment of a Police Post in Barabaig Area, Mbulu District.
183 TNA, accession 69, file 83/1: Establishment of a Police Post in Barabaig Area, Mbulu District.
for Mbulu wanted even minor clues to be used as sufficient evidence to publicly condemn the convicts. The result of this was the capture and prosecution of several Barabaigs in the District and High courts in Moshi, Dodoma and Dar es Salaam. For instance, in November 1942 the District Commissioner in Mbulu reported that:

Several weeks of very creditable and patient work by temporary inspector of police Mr. G. de Beer, assisted in the field and unofficial prosecutor in the preliminary inquiries by Mr. Fosbrooke, Assistant District Officer, and long hours of laborious work on the bench by Mr. Tomlison, Assistant District Officer have resulted in 4 cases being committed (or likely to be committed in the next few days) for trial at the high court sessions due to open at Moshi on 24th September, involving 10 accused.184

The cases referred to in the above statement by the District Commissioner resulted in several hangings. Though the hangings took place miles from Mbulu, the District Commissioner publicised them to exert terror on potential convicts; “the recent hanging of six Barabaig murderers has been given a great publicity amongst tribesmen by those who witnessed the hangings and the general opinion is that the death at the hands of the government is the only fear the young tribesmen have.”185 In this way, the Barabaig youths experienced some long sentences in jails despite limited and shaky evidences which were presented. Releasing the Barabaig, even if the evidence for such charges was still unconfirmed, found unfavourable reception by the District Commissioner in Mbulu. For example, there was a murder case against two young Barabaig men, Gisurumbuda bin Gadamishi and Gopa Munyumba, who allegedly killed a person by the name of Kiru (a Mnyaturu from Singida). According to Chief Gejar, after their act, the suspected men were summoned to the local native Baraza and under oath agreed that they killed Kiru. Afterwards, the two were convicted to hanging in the Dodoma Provincial Court. Not satisfied with the verdict, the two appealed to the East African Court of Appeal in Nairobi and were acquitted. They returned to the Barabaig country. This infuriated Mr. Lumley and in some ways forced chief Gejar to write a letter complaining against the verdict. In the letter, Gejar demanded from the British judicial system a change of process regarding punishment to convicts of the murders. Chief Gejar and Mr. Lumley wanted justice for the victims to be obtained in Mbulu through hanging by coram populo [Lat. translated as ‘in public’]. The logic of prolongation of cases involving Barabaig convicts by granting the right to appeal the verdict and later acquitting them was regarded by the District and Provincial Commissioners as unnecessary. These complaints, although they found supporters, had to pass the test of the legal frameworks. On the one hand, the District and Provincial Commissioners in Mbulu and Arusha were demanding that if the culprits were found guilty through local legal frameworks, the British courts

184 TNA, accession 69, file 84/10: Murders by the Barabaig.
185 TNA, accession 69, file 84/10: Murders by the Barabaig.
had only one function: to confirm such decisions, even when the freedom of the local courts from the colonial officers’ meddling was questionable. Under British law, evidence beyond doubt was heralded as the key to any conclusion of a case. Convicting any person needed the court to establish evidence beyond doubt. Condemning someone because of an oath or any other insufficient grounds were loopholes that the compelled the court to free the suspected.

Another similar case of a murder happened in July 1935. Lumley relates that “nine Wanyaturu tribesmen on their way home to Singida were attacked as they lay asleep in their camp near Lake Bassotu. Eight were bludgeoned or speared to death” (Lumley 1976: 89). According to the Commissioner, the eleven suspects were quickly interned and under oath they agreed to having committed the murders. What angered the District Commissioner and the chief was that the High Court in Arusha acquitted them all due to insufficient evidence. Like the last case of the two suspects, this decision disturbed the confidence of the Commissioners in the British law system seemingly incompetent in addressing the murders.

Apart from the letter from Gejar, the District Commissioners in Singida and Mbulu and later the two Provincial Commissioners in Arusha and Dodoma jointly persuaded the Secretary of the Colony in Dar es Salaam to bring back all Barabaig convicted of the murders to Katesh (Mbulu district) where a hanging by *coram populo* would be held for everyone to see. The idea was formulated to make the punishment of the accused a function of the District Commissioners. As indicated in the quotation at the beginning of this chapter, the District Commissioner had serious contempt for the British law system, because it looked blunt and weak as far as the dealing with the colonised in Africa was concerned. This is why the attitude of the British against the Datoga turned to be harsh and uncompromising.

The Making of “Aliens” in Singida and Mbulu: The Case of the Datoga

In this final sub-section, I want to bring into perspective the way the alleged “Datoga murders” created a sense of alienation among the Datoga. The alienation was driven by the denial of occupancy of some pockets of land in Singida or of the right to expand into new spaces of potential use for their cattle. The “murder cases” were continuously brought forward as a pretext to indiscriminately push the Datoga out of many villages in Mbulu and Singida. The identification of the Datoga as murderers resulted in negative publicity throughout the Northern and Central Provinces. This publicity reflected on two areas: on the land, which perfectly suited the broad British agenda of reserving a big share of the land in the Northern Province for agriculture; and the creation of tribal boundaries. The tribal boundaries in many districts of Tanzania were sometimes marred with a fluidity of interest among communities adjacent to each other, but when it came to the Datoga, there was a unity of many agricultural producers against them. Aylward Shorter and R. G. Abrahams noted similar cases among the Kimbu and Nyamwezi (Shorter 1972: 358; Abrahams 1967: 15), in whose territories there were frequent adjustments of the chief boundaries. But the
boundaries in Singida-Mbulu were mainly a result of what the British claimed to be increasing inter-ethnic tensions for land resources. In most cases the lines that were drawn between communities changed and were mainly engineered by the state.

A few cases may illustrate the process of alienation of the Datoga by the British politics of the invention of ethnic boundaries that eventually ostracized them through expulsions in many of their newly acquired settlements. One of the examples of the Datoga encounters with the government and claims of their illegality took place in Iambi, a village on the Singida/Iramba side of the border. In a letter written on June 5th 1957, the administration claimed that the boundary separating the two communities (Nyiramba and Datoga) was made by the German colonial state in 1916 and the Land Development Commissioner regarded the document legal because it was accepted “by the tribes concerned.” The villages contested by the Nyiramba and Datoga were Diagwa, Kidou, and Basudishi. According to the reports, all of these were Datoga and even had Datoga headmen. The problem that brought the two groups to loggerheads was the justification that made such villages Datoga or otherwise. Complaints ensued from the Nyiramba on the other side of the border, who claimed that the Datoga were creeping into their territories, hence creating competition for the few available water sources. Chief William Jima of Nduguti, Iambi articulated the problem as follows:

Complaints are sourced from the quarrels which have recently emerged on the border between Wamang’ati of Mbulu District and a subdivision in Iambi, Singida District. In following laws of Tanganyika on District and Provincial borders as quoted in the Penal Code Section No. 329 and Section No. 330 of 1945, all these laws say that borders which remain legal are those laid down by the German administration, but now it seems that the Wamang’ati of Mbulu District are pushing the frontiers of the border further into the land of Iambi, in Singida, it is not lawful according to the laws of the land.

Chief Jima of Nduguti-Iambi was an educated and highly influential local and “tribal” leader of the Nyiramba, who had been a chief for more than twenty years. By the same token, he had won formidable admiration from the British District officers from both provinces and districts of Singida and from across the border in Mbulu. Before this case, he had also created a controversial border case regarding Gimbu, a small village that bordered Mbulu and Singida. Chief Jima’s claims over Gimbu came after similar claims were made by his contemporary chief K.M Kingo of Kisoriri-Iramba. Their basic claim was over the adjustments of their “tribal” borders that

188 Jima became a chief in 1925, and for years was influential in Singida district and the districts around.
the District Commissioners of Singida made in 1921, 1944, 1950 and 1952. According to the two conflicting parties, before the colonial arrangement of borders, Gimbu had no proper ruler and the local chiefs closer to it were warring from time to time. The Germans fixed the borders, allying Gimbu to the Chief of Nduguti, which continued until 1921 when many sub-chiefdoms were amalgamated with that of the Nduguti under chief Jima. During this time, the situation in two chiefdoms was peaceful and stable. According to chief Jima, tension began with his sub-chief Abdalla Mandolya, who was “a sub-chief in a certain part of Gimbu [who] was removed from his work by chief Jima because of corruption.” The reaction of Mandolya after this was that he merged with the neighbouring chief Kingo of Iramba where he was:

Instructed to come and incite people to rise against the established authority and write down the names of people. He wrote down the names of the people without them themselves knowing it, and took them to chief Kingo. Chief Kingo took the names to the D.C. Mr. Russel. The D.C gave the names to chief Jima. Chief Jima imprisoned Abdalla Mandolwa for six months for the offence of agitation. This then is the origin of the disputes in Gimbu.

Chief Jima and Kingo’s competition over Gimbu expanded in 1952, when the Gimbu case was finally closed by the decision of the district council to award the village to Chief Kingo. In the same year, the Gimbu villagers began paying their taxes in Kingo’s court in Kisiriri. Jima fought back and used all efforts, particularly his literary abilities, to even forge evidence, influence witnesses and quote laws in the aim of wresting the decision to defeat Kingo. The use of written materials as evidence to arbitrate ethnic cases was quite an invention. Between 1945 and 1952, dozens of letters and appeals poured in from both sides, all showing historical evidence going back decades or even centuries before colonialism. Jima’s supporters even collected evidence from the old German district and local boundary maps, which the British once said was like unearthing the graves and bringing out old and forgotten problems once again. Despite this, Jima lost Gimbu to Kingo.

When it came to the Iambi-Barabaig boundary conflict, Jima was once again the key figure. Jima was by this time one of the oldest serving chiefs, so for him the new matter involving the Datoga was simple. While the Gimbu case was an intra-tribal conflict, the case of the Datoga was not. The response of the District Officer in Singida to Jima’s complaints about the alleged border of the Iambi-Mbulu was immediate because according to the District Commissioner Iramba was going to be announced

190 DNRC, location 5/5/04, box 101, file S.4/12: Maps & Boundaries Iramba, Iambi Boundary, 1944–57
a separate district.\textsuperscript{192} The District Commissioner in Singida wanted to find a solution to the problem so that the new Commissioner would not inherit unresolved conflicts. Therefore, in June 1957, District Officers from Singida and Mbulu converged at Ginyawiri, a village at the border in Mbulu, to once again discuss the Datoga problem. In their statement they indicated that “the old beacons shew [sic.] that a considerable stretch of Mbulu territory was ceded to Singida. Nevertheless, you will doubtless let me know whether there are any good reasons, in your opinion why deeper inquiry should be made.”\textsuperscript{193} Jima’s claims, if observed from another angle, had a certain hidden agenda. It was later observed by the District Officer that between May 14\textsuperscript{th} and June 10\textsuperscript{th} 1957, a group of Iambi people who were sent to clear a section of the Iambi tsetse fly-stricken area went further than envisaged. As a result, they entered “a large Nzasaaula continuation of the Giyauri Mbuga (plain) which they had previously regarded as their territory. In fact, one of the elders of the Tribal Council lived there until recently.”\textsuperscript{194} This same issue was heard one more time during the meeting of the “Barabaig Tribal Council” in February of 1958. The Datoga elders seemed to have been angry, because the Singida people were occupying their grazing land to a depth of about 8 miles in the Ginyauri Mbuga. What was most irritating for the Datoga was that their neighbours made their presence even more permanent by planting banana trees around the water supplies; thus impeding them from accessing such a resource with their cattle.\textsuperscript{195}

Evidence presented from each side indicates that each community was equally contravening or pushing its frontiers into the other’s territory, either knowingly or not. However, there was more to it than such externalities of the claims. The elements that defined ownership of a given space on the Datoga seemed obscure from the perspective of the British definition of occupancy and ownership. The Datoga had a practice of establishing sets of houses that were described as “simple hedge which is built by stacking up tree branches with sharp thorns; it is called \textit{boma} in Swahili and \textit{hiliguandra} in Datoga” (Umesao 1969: 55–57). These were not temporary houses, as the British and Swahili or other ethnic communities regarded them, but they were permanent in their own right. I am arguing this because apart from the supposedly genuine complaints from the Datoga concerning the fact that their land was being impounded on by other communities, both district commissioners in Mbulu and Singida ignored them for the simple reason that they saw the Datoga as alien to such lands. In other words, there were no symbols or marks that indicated

\textsuperscript{192} DNRC, location 5/5/04, box 101, file S.4/12: Maps & Boundaries Iramba, Iambi Boundary, 1944–57.


\textsuperscript{194} DNRC, location 5/5/04, box 101, file S.4/12: Maps & Boundaries Iramba, Iambi Boundary, 1944–57.

that their occupancy was permanent apart from the houses, which were mostly bomas with no other signs of occupation and utility.

In a report produced in July 1958 by the Land Development Commissioner in Arusha and circulated to all Provincial Commissioners in Dodoma and Arusha, the Commissioner argued that the ‘tribal boundaries’ that communities contested were sometimes exaggerated. Therefore, his ruling was that all border problems were already taken care of by several visits and mappings by the Survey Department. In the report he argued, “I defined the boundaries between Mbulu District and Mkakulama, Singida and Kondoa myself on the ground at various times... all the boundaries were fixed with consultation with the tribes concerned.”\textsuperscript{196} Based on this, the District Commissioners began evicting all the Datoga pastoralists from Singida, burning their camps and settlements. The decision grounded in the findings of the Land Commissioner, popularly known as the Wilson Commission, which had promulgated land policies, arrangements and settlements of land disputes across the Provinces. According to this Commission, better land usage and land buying were instituted and rights of occupancy for settlers and agriculturalists were established. One problem with the Commission was its short sightedness when it came to the land rights of pastoralists, whose occupation and modes of usage were entirely different. Hence, all individuals with semi-permanent housing along the borders were considered alien. With this ruling at hand, Fosbrooke and the Assistant District Commissioner in Mbulu started to clear 10 bomas of Datoga who were considered recent immigrants. Fosbrooke’s report tells that “we visited about 8 bomas and left Mtemi Gejar’s Messenger to tour the remaining areas with the Mwanangwa, the situation was fully explained to Mtemi Jima and his Wanangwa.”\textsuperscript{197} At the time the clearings of the Datoga along these borders continued into Iambi, where local chiefs were also encouraged to expel all the Datoga from the Singida-Mbulu border region. In Chief Kilongo’s areas around Iambi and Kisiriri, “it is estimated that there still remain 150 men, women and children out of a total of 550. In Mkonongo’s area a 100% move had taken place – approx. a total of 292 persons. It is anticipated that the removal of those remaining in Kilongo’s area will be quickly completed without any difficult.”\textsuperscript{198} Further inland, in the regions of the Wanyaturu, particularly at Mrumba, chief Hema also arrested 11 Datoga, one who was the unnamed ex-chief of the Barabaig who wore the abolished sabojek. The continued arrests and expulsions continued throughout the borders of the Singida-Mbulu region, and most of the victims of these evictions were Datoga pastoralists. But when such evictions were questioned by some Datoga elders, the British officers’ responses were less convincing to the Datoga. For instance, during the evictions, one Datoga, jumbe Gidaganyeres, being unhappy with the one-sided-

\textsuperscript{196} DNRC, location 5/5/04, box 101, file S.4/12: Maps & Boundaries Iramba, Iambi Boundary, 1944–57.
\textsuperscript{197} DNRC, location 5/5/04, box 101, file S.4/12: Maps & Boundaries Iramba, Iambi Boundary, 1944–57.
\textsuperscript{198} DNRC, location 5/5/04, box 101, file S.4/12: Maps & Boundaries Iramba, Iambi Boundary, 1944–57.
ness of the decisions, posed the following question to both district commissioners in Mbulu and Singida in 1958: “under whose jurisdiction should be the 6 or 7 Nyaturu houses at the bottom of Balangida? As it has been decided that the portion of Lake should be given as concession and not as permanent boundary change, they should theoretically be under Mbulu [Datoga].” The response from the British officers was that Nyaturu people were not conflicting with any border mark. For the Datoga, this kind of imbalance in judgment, must have served as a proof for the biased nature of British policies.

The Datoga-Iraqw Forms of Engagement on Land Issues

The expulsions endured by the Datoga had three major repercussions in the district of Mbulu. First, they solidified a particular sentiment among the Datoga themselves. Despite the fact that the evictions were affecting them economically, the Datoga felt that they had existed in a permanent state of “alienation” since 1923. The Datoga were not the first to experience the atrocities of having their homes burned down and forcibly removed from their home or territory. Before the Datoga incidences, the Iraqw faced the similar evictions, particularly in the Kondoa–Mkalama border region. After that the British conceded to their pursuit of land, the Iraqw became free to take as much of the Datoga land in the north without repercussions. At times they were even encouraged because they were considered a “progressive, fine breed.” At some points, individual administrative officers thought it necessary to allow them into Datoga territories, because they would induce hard work and progress among the “grasping enemies, the Masai [sic.] and Barabaig.” Since 1933 the Maasai were reportedly moving part of their herds to adjoining districts of northern Tanzania; particularly Moshi, Arusha and the Lake Zone in the districts of Maswa and Musoma. At first this was quickly dismissed as a mere tactic of the Maasai averting taxes. With time the claims reached the Provincial Commissioners in the respective areas and later the secretary of the state. In a statement given by the Acting Provincial Commissioner of the Northern Province, C. McMahon, on July 18th 1934, the Maasai movement (also referred to as exodus), was prohibited and threats of prosecution were delivered. Additionally, steps toward the creation of “a Maasai reserve” were taken. But the laws that prosecuted the Datoga and Maasai were weakened when applied to other “alien” people entering into the Datoga and the Maasai’s “native” lands. It was only suggested to such “aliens” to pay a tax of sh. 15/- as compensation for using native land in the case of encroachments.

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201 TNA, Mbulu District Book, vol. 3 (1930).
The second impact of the “alienation” of the Datoga was seen in the representation of the Datoga as fugitives and criminals. This image of the Datoga was particularly created by the colonial officers and a system of indirect rule in Mbulu and Singida. The criminal imagination of the Datoga also made the colonial state exert several measures of terror on the Datoga in Mbulu. In 1935 Lumley, the acting district commissioner in Mbulu says that: “B., the outgoing DC, was extremely nervous about visiting the tribe, and only did so with a strong armed police guard. One occasion he brought a company of the King’s African Rifles and made them give a display of rapid rifle fire to impress the tribesmen” (Lumley 1976: 80). C. H. Jackson also indicated the same display of violence on the Datoga by the King’s African Rifles, involving attempts to showcase “by bombarding tins with automatic weapons, but I do not know whether this display of force has reduced the murder rate in recent years” (Jackson 1942: 2).

The third aspect that is closely linked with the above point is an argument that the Datoga were not resilient enough and less competitive compared to other ethnic communities. One particular case that Ole B. Redkal takes as a truth is the way the Datoga were easily giving away their land by being scared through charms, or any bizarre things left close to the Datoga homesteads (Rekdal and Blystad 1999). Redkal, in particular, gives a case of how the Datoga in Mbulu were being replaced by the Iraqw communities through simple fetishism (use of magic) and through powers other than coercion and state machinations. While along the border of Singida the Datoga were compelled to retreat, the northern front was battled by local intellectuals and historians. It was a fight of memory and evidence as opposed to agitation as a way of soliciting ethnic space. The Iraqw’s and Datoga’s commitment to history came especially after the British declaration of Iraqwization of Datoga land in 1929. The British thought that this would be a simple replacement of Datoga institutions as begun with the cases of chiefship among the Gisamjeng in 1927 and later the Barabaig in 1929. The land issues were more complex than the chiefship problem. The leadership crisis was an outward manifestation that the Datoga understood as encompassing identity, land issues and histories of belonging. In 1943 the Provincial Commissioner, F.C Hallier and the District Commissioner R.G Rowe in quoting the ex-chief of the Datoga, Gidahoda, wrote:

_The serkali [Officer] has listened to the Wambulu. Bwana [master] we proved it was the Wambulu who did the murders in our country. They have got my country. Tell the Barotzl [British?] to give me back my country and I can and I shall rule my people. If there were no serkali there would not be an Mbulu in my country._

Gidahoda was quite an experienced Datoga elder and an ex-chief. Although the British had dismissed him as leader, in the eyes of the ordinary Datoga he was still rec-

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203 TNA, accession 69, file 51/4: Native Chiefs in Mbulu District (emphasis added).
ognised as a protagonist of securing Datoga land. It was this tacit leadership that Gidahoda continued to hold a special place in the Datoga struggle for land rights. For him, the British were a staunch obstacle that displaced the Datoga from their land through the Iraqw (Wambulu). Although Gidahoda understood the issue of murder, he was convinced that it was a simple pretext to victimise his people so that their land could be given to their neighbours. The demand for his country was a strong statement against the British. Since the salt conflicts, his cries for “my land and my people” continued though with some ups and downs. The concept that the “industrious Wambulu will absorb the Wabarbaig,”204 was being challenged by the Datoga, with Gidahoda once again becoming a leader in that struggle. The problem arose with regard to the increasing replacement of Datoga by the Wairaqw in the villages of Dongobesh, Tumati, Endesh and many others around their vicinities. In 1939, the Provincial Commissioner, F.C. Hallier responded to Gidahoda’s complaints with a rhetoric question: “Who were the first owners of the land?”205 By this question, he was carefully trying to not to appear pro-Iraqw. By asking the question he also wanted to initiate a debate across the two ethnic communities. Apart from Gidahoda’s repeated claims, could he or any other Datoga prove or give evidence of what they argued for? Or was there just a negative mindset of the Datoga directed against the prospering Iraqw? Could the Datoga leadership prove their claims that through the Iraqw, the British were ousting them from their hereditary rights to the land? In December 15th 1939, Hallier called a meeting of the Datoga and Iraqw elders. Apart from the leadership problem, the meeting met with a complaint similar to the one that was from time to time repeated by Gidahoda. The Provincial Commissioner was told of the underlying problem by the Datoga: “Iraqw settlers in this area settle and demarcate land at will and without consulting him or his elders. Further that when there are any ‘plums’ going as well watered land like Dongobesh Swamp or Yaida River Valley, Iraqw tribesmen get most of it.”206 The narrative on the part of the Datoga said that before the arrival of the Germans to Mbulu, their land stretched from Tlawi to Central Mbulu. The claims by the Datoga that they were landowners in many of the areas settled by the Iraqw were not well received by the Iraqw. The Provincial Commissioner said, “I feel it would be very difficult to establish (with justice) who were original owners of the land.”207 In an attempt to respond to the Datoga, the Iraqw elders dismissed the Datoga claiming that they were misrepresenting the facts or misunderstanding the history and the proper borders.

In 1938, Chief Mikael, the Iraqw leader, who was believed to be the architect of the insubordination to Datoga leadership died. And Qwassal Nade Bea succeeded him. Qwassal was considered not to have the wit and diplomacy of his predecessor.

204 TNA, accession 69, file 51/4: Native Chiefs in Mbulu District.
205 TNA, accession 69, file 54/MB/1/1: A letter to the District Commissioner Mbulu.
206 TNA, accession 69, file 54/MB/1/1: A memorandum of the Provincial Commissioner for Northern Province, December, 15th 1939.
207 TNA, accession 69, file 54/MB/1/1: A memorandum of the Provincial Commissioner for Northern Province, December, 15th 1939.
So the claims by the Datoga that were quoted by Hallier started to be dealt with by Qwassal squarely. In a one page Swahili letter written in November 27th 1939, Nade Bea and Ingi through Qwassal initiated a very controversial debate. The letter was titled, ‘Asili ya Wagismajeng kuingia katika nchi ya Wairaqw na kukaa inchi ya Dongobesh’ [which can be translated as: the origin of the Wagismajeng in entering the land of the Wairaqw and their settlement in the country of Dongobesh]. But when this same letter was interpreted for the Provincial Commissioner and for the general British government use, the title was “Claims by Gitagano Alla to chiefship at Dongobesh.”

My point here is not focused on semantics and meanings but the general British support for the Iraqw’s course that was clear by the ways land politics was played. The Iraqw letter was a single sheet of paper but addressed three issues important to the Iraqw regarding their indignity to Dongobesh and the surrounding villages. The first point that the Iraqw tried to make was that the Datoga were alien to Mbulu and Dongobesh in particular. Second, which was also related to the leadership controversy, was the argument that the Datoga also did not evolve a sophisticated leadership, so to speak, because they were alien. And the last point portrayed the Iraqw as the most benevolent people who received the Datoga when they did not have a country, thus becoming hosts to the Datoga. The benevolent image had been depicted before in the meeting about the leadership controversy, and the point was always the same: “it was we Iraqw people who had made you Datoga into the way you are today.”

A translation of Qwassal’s letter contained more interesting issues. The British presented the Datoga as people who never evolved a leadership and were intolerant to authority:

Today it is difficult to trace a true Gismajeng. At most some 300 Kismajeng (self-styled) live in the district – mainly in the Dongobesh area and at Endabash under sub-chief Hau. They have never been ruled by a chief nor had a ruling family. Before their flight to Iraqw they were in the grip of one ‘mganga’ Giligendo Gidamausa. They are work-shy people, intolerant of all forms of authority, now exceedingly rich, and essentially pastoral.

The inclusion of a four-page-long translation of Nade’s letter from the District Officer aimed at strengthening the Iraqw point of view on the contested issue of who owned Dongobesh. So the British as judges on the Datoga–Iraqw claims were not bias free. As noted in the Mbulmbul Scheme, the British Officers had since taken side when it came to promotion of Iraqw interests in the district. Siding with the Iraqw elders in the claims laid in their letter seemed to enhance the land hungry Iraqw as they suited the British policy of increasing agricultural output (Swai 1980: 36–44). The argument was “the Kismajeng did not have claims to the Dongobesh

208 TNA, accession 69, file 51/4: Native Chiefs in Mbulu District.
209 TNA, accession 69, file 51/4: Native Chiefs in Mbulu District.
210 TNA, accession 69, file 51/4: Native Chiefs in Mbulu District.
area. It is not right that a representative of such a mere handful of people should rule the Iraqw, who are in the vast majority throughout the area.”

Even before responding to the allegation by the Iraqw elders, the British seemed to have concluded the debate. For the Datoga, it was clear that they were fighting a losing battle. In fact, the Datoga agreed that they came from Harar, a country close to Mkalam, but then the move was not as recent as their neighbours tried to establish. Instead, several things regarding the Datoga were purposefully mixed up. For instance, Gidamausa Magena or Saijilo [Gilgendo as the British called him], who we have discussed in Chapter 2 was considered a refugee by the British who came in the early beginning of German colonial period and did not originate from the Gismajeng. Instead, he was from the Bajuta subgroup of the Datoga originally came from Wembere. He was a son of Magena Saijilo, a popular healer who moved from one village to another for such a work, before he decided to settle in Mbulu. After completing his duties among the Gismajeng, he appealed to his brothers to escort him through the country of the Nyaturu and so took with him a couple of young Datoga/ Gisamjeng men and travelled to Tabora. His son, Mausa/Gilgendo through invitation from the Gisamjeng, became a chief and remained so until he was hanged in Singida in 1908. The Magena, who is rather referred by the British, appears also in a report by Richard Burton in 1858, long before the German rule by any rate (Burton 1860: 220–21). The confusion of the story again appears regarding the movement of the Datoga from Harar to Mbulu. While the Iraqw claimed that Mbulu was their country, the Datoga strongly protested the allegations of their alienism:

We reply to this letter because we regret the untruth which the Mbulu spoke on the subject of our origin. We are also sorry to hear the Iraqw saying that the Gisamjeng have no country. Loo! We earnestly beg you to ask the following: 1. Nade s/o Bea 2. G. Amnaay s/o Ingi 3. Meryengda s/o Qafol, if it is true that the Gisamjeng have no country?

The matter was not about truth or fiction, but about a fight for existence in the competitive economic environment. First, the Iraqw and Datoga were facing pressure from tsetse flies that had a devastating effect on their grazing and water spaces. For instance, John Iliffe indicates that for the Iraqw between 1930 and 1948 more than “three-fifths of Mbulu district had been infested by tsetse and hundreds of square miles of grazing – including south-eastern Kainam – had been lost” (Iliffe 1979: 351). The most important change that accompanied this crisis for the Iraqw was the decimation of their herd to only 20 per cent of its previous size (Iliffe 1979: 351). This explains why agriculture became so significant to them. The years between 1939 and 1945 constituted the war periods and what David Anderson has

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211 TNA, accession 69, file 51/4: Native Chiefs in Mbulu District.
212 TNA, accession 69, file 51/4: Native Chiefs in Mbulu District. A letter by S. Gitagno Falla, dated December, 1939.
called the beginning of a new colonialism (Anderson 2002: 2–3). The reconfigura-
tion of land and ecology into more productive ventures in the changing capitalist
economy were key to the survival of British colonial capitalism. All that taken to-
gether demanded dynamic societies that could contribute labour and produce for the
market. Communities in central and north Tanzania were responding differently to
such a demanding capitalist pressure. The Nyaturu, Gogo, and their neighbouring
agro-pastoralists were becoming the core of labour supplied in settler plantations in
Mbulu and Moshi from 1938 onward.213 Pastoralists, particularly the Datoga, were
almost absent in such colonial labour processes.214 But their land became increasingly
targeted by the Iraqw and the expanding communities of European settlers.

The above constituted the context in which the problem of the Datoga should
be situated and understood. In this same vein, it is also safe to argue that the debates
that the Datoga began about the perceived injustice done to their land rights were
not a matter of factual evidence. As stated before, the Iraqw had three elders and
wrote a one page defence, while the Datoga came with a list of 11 witnesses to their
case, some even from the Iraqw. The Datoga claimed that “all they say is nothing
but lies, because they are anxious to get the country.”215 As Gidahoda had pointed
out, the British were at the centre of this subversion and the Iraqw were just instru-
ments used to crush the proud Datoga. After these two letters, the Datoga, through
Gitagano, wrote another letter to the Provincial Commissioner. This time he tried
to appeal to higher offices, believing that their call for justice would be listened to.
Fearing the misinterpretation of his message, Gitagano, through his own son wrote
in English and part of the letter reads:

My father chief Gitagno has sent me to you, to approach you on explanation
of the such treatment, and disobedient to his people, who are the Gisamjeng,
that since he approached you last year on the same till now he is in trouble.
I should be grateful if you could be so kind enough to allow me to interview
you on the matter, as I have so many words to tell you, your honour.216

The Gisamjeng wanted more discussion with the Provincial Commissioner but for
many months they were told that the Commissioner did not have enough time for
the requests. As this slow response unfolded, Gitagano started to show a feeling of
defeat. Though at some points the Provincial Commissioner agreed to meet with
the Datoga chief in 1942, it was clear that the British were tired of the Datoga com-
plaints, and preferred the alternative, namely to erase the Datoga leadership. The
Provincial Commissioner saw the problem of the Datoga as general and specific. The

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213 TNA, accession 69, file 8/5/A: Sociological Report on the Iraqw of Mbulu with Particular Refer-
ence to Destocking.
214 TNA, accession 69, file 8/5/A: Sociological Report on the Iraqw of Mbulu with Particular Refer-
ence to Destocking.
215 TNA, accession 69, file 51/4: Native Chiefs in Mbulu District.
216 TNA, accession 69, file 51/1: Mbulu chiefs. A letter from Gitagano, 7.7.1941.
general aspect according to the Provincial Commissioner came from a long-standing grievance that the Datoga were being continuously portrayed by their Iraqw neighbours as people and rulers who ignored their vested economic interests. The situation as described by the Provincial Commissioner was aggravated by the new chief, Qwassal, who represented a hard-line position when dealing with the Datoga. There was “no lost love between them.” The specific reason was a dispute mentioned in 1939 over what the Datoga called *hindawi* (closed grazing areas). Two of these *hindawis* were critical to the survival of many Datoga pastoralists in Dongobesh, but since 1938, “two *hindawis* claimed by Gitagano to be his own were continuously and deliberately trespassed by the cattle of certain Iraqw elders.”

This letter writing went on from 1941 to the end of the British colonialism in 1961, in which the Datoga accused the British of masterminding and orchestrating their ousting from the land by the Iraqw. During this period, the issues remained similar. While the Datoga pressed for more voice, presence and autonomy as a distinct culture and economy, the British mostly opposed it. The British believed that the Datoga as a social and economic entity could not lead a separate Native authority. For instance, they argued, “the proportion of Iraqw to Gisamjing tax payers was 5 to 1. They have intermarried and completely intermixed as regards land holdings and the Gisamjing in the whole area numbered 550.” On the part of the Datoga, land issues and fear of being trumped by the majority Iraqw were key to their demands. The negotiating power fell largely on the Datoga elders and their “chiefs.” Throughout this period, the chiefs of the Datoga seemed to encounter rough and rugged terrain, because on the one hand they did not want to get into trouble with the British authorities who always seemed intolerant of what they regarded Datoga secession (and of course the British were the employers), and on the other hand, the need for loyalty and communal solidarity with the elders and the rest of the Datoga made the choice a daunting task. A good example of such a case appeared in 1940 in a meeting between the Datoga and the Iraqw, which was mediated by the District Commissioner after the Provincial Commissioner had announced that the merging of the two ethnic groups was inevitable. In this meeting, after hours of arguments and pressure from the government and threats of stripping away his authority and his monthly salary, Sagochan Gitagano gave in to the demands but was immediately confronted by more than 20 elders who protested and said they would never accept the ruling. The 20 elders went ahead and punished their chief for being too soft. This protest was manifested by an appeal of more than 105 Datoga elders to the

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217 TNA, accession 69, file 51/4: Native Chiefs in Mbulu District. A letter by the P.C. Northern Province, 1942.
218 TNA, accession 69, file 51/4: Native Chiefs in Mbulu District. A letter by the P.C. Northern Province, 1942.
219 TNA, accession 69, file 51/4: Native Chiefs in Mbulu District. A letter by District Commissioner, Mbulu 1942.
220 TNA, accession 69, file 51/4: Native Chiefs in Mbulu District. A letter by District Commissioner, Mbulu 1942.
chief secretary and governor of the colony in 1943. To their disappointment, their requests were denied and consequently the Sagochan as a leader of the Gisamjenga was disbanded. The 1944 report celebrates the decision:

It has been evident for some time that as long as Gitagano remained in office, the administration of this area (where famine had persisted for several years) would make no progress and that it must be brought more fully within the framework of the Iraqw administration.\footnote{TNA, Tanganyika Territory – Annual Reports of the Provincial Commissioners on Native administration – Mbulu District Annual Report (1943), 46.}

Apart from other protests, the subjugation of Gitagano and stripping of his chieftainship removed this subgroup of the Datoga from the politics of the District. As the elders said, “we will lose our identity and our tribe will be nothing.”\footnote{TNA, Tanganyika Territory – Annual Reports of the Provincial Commissioners on Native administration – Mbulu District Annual Report (1943), 46.}

### 3.4 Conclusion

This chapter discussed three major issues. The first was the controversy surrounding how a livelihood space was contested between the British colonial officers and the Datoga. The limits of collective-ethnic and public productive space appeared to create a tense encounter after 1923. Through examining the letter from the Datoga chief, one sees that the Chief was underestimating or misjudging the power constellation in the political framework of the colony. This is evident in the way that he took salt and other resources as merely his own and respectively the Datoga’s. This conflict created different forms of protests by those who wanted to maintain the pre-colonial status quo. In the wider perspective, the salt affrays, as the British called it, was an indication that the colonial presence was becoming a significant force in redrawing their borders. The conflict between the Datoga and the British produced different results. It is clear that the Datoga chiefship as a product and creation of indirect rule policy came under attack. The attack took the forms of relieving the Datoga chiefs from their duties or replacing them by neighbouring chiefs. Another issue which was discussed in the chapter is violence. From the sources, it is clear that the way the British interpreted the Datoga murders was largely incorrect. The motive was not cultural. The violence had a specific beginning and was situated in Singida. It did not constitute a traditional cultural trait, nor was it common in other areas of Datoga settlements. The central reason that also was referred to by the British officers was competition for land and livelihood. The Datoga were certainly violent due to the pressure they experienced both from the British policies and their neighbouring communities. Such expressions of violence could be explained by examining the nar-
narratives that both the Nyaturu and Datoga gave from 1935 on. Many of the killings were coming from conflicts as these communities struggled to secure the few water sources in the border region. Other conflicts stemmed from common injustices arising at local markets. The examination of the British responses to the murders suggests that an understanding was somehow pushed further outside the context of the two communities. For instance, the targeting of Datoga cultural practices in 1931 and the evictions from 1936 were testimonies of such limited understanding. The problem of the Datoga was economic. Grazing areas were shrinking due to rinderpest encroachment, expansion of population, the tsetse fly and the effects of the British policy of amalgamation that allowed many Iraqw agro-pastoralists into the Datoga grazing lands. These reasons were also reminiscent in many of the narratives of the Datoga elders. The question of why the British were not listening to alternative voices that gave a different story is very difficult to answer. The situation of the Datoga in the British colonial period was also contested by the Iraqw, whose indignity was questioned through letters. These neighbours were redefining their presence not from their own perspective, but in the mould of the colonial framework. The third aspect was a highly competitive life which as a phenomenon was manifested in the ways the Datoga in both Singida and Mbulu negotiated their life in the daily discourses of the British colonial framework. Being a pastoralist community, the Datoga responded to crises by enlarging their areas of settlement. The migrations into Singida and other districts were attempts of survival and expanding their nchi. However, from 1923 the British colonial authority created a consistent image of the violent Datoga in response to a Datoga leadership seen as rebellious. Connected to this development was a policy of amalgamation that promoted the Iraqw ethnic community in terms of leadership and land provision as way of inducing modernity and hard work (defined from the perspective of a sedentary agricultural life style). The impact of this policy, as shown in the discussion, was that the Iraqw were encouraged to expand into the Datoga land while also promoting an extension of Iraqw leadership into the Datoga territories. The discussion on the alienation of Datoga land and the campaigns to uproot them in the district of Singida were some of the issues that were contentious. Unfortunately they remained unresolved and were later inherited by the post-colonial society in Tanzania.
Between 1965 and 1967 the border districts of Singida and Mbulu witnessed ethnic violence that was thought to be instigated by the Datoga nomadic pastoralists. Although the manifestations of violence resembled that of 1935 and the following years, the locality and government’s response was significantly different. The conflict between the Datoga and the Nyaturu, which had loomed large in colonial British narratives, appeared to have become increasingly complex. While most of the colonial-era ethnic violence was defined by isolated incidences – disappearances, kidnappings and the killing of lone travellers in villages – violence in the post-colonial era appeared more organised, and were executed by groups of either Datoga or Nyaturu and Nyisanzu people. As this violence became more organised and increased in scale, the authorities became increasingly anxious. Police and other government reports indicated that the killings peaked in December 1966, when more than a dozen individuals were murdered in villages in Iramba and Mkalama.

This chapter cross-examines the history of the violence between 1965 and 1967, the politics of interpretation, the post-colonial understanding of the Datoga as murderers, within the realm of the politics of *Ujamaa*. Firstly, I will argue that the interpretation of the Datoga as murderers is ahistorical and lacks a proper representation of the events that transpired among the communities. The narrative of who was violent in Mbulu and Singida was not invented by the post-colonial government; rather
it was transported and endorsed from the colonial narrative. The government used the so-called ritual murders or blood-bathing to illustrate the ‘backwardness’ of the Datoga, emphasising that this ‘backwardness’ was the result of their status as outsiders to village life. This interpretation was poised within the modernization rhetorics carried out in the settlement campaigns or ujamaa vijijini policy. This chapter highlights the process of government’s redefinition and the solutions to the violence from the point of view of ujamaa. Secondly, I will argue that the Tanzanian government’s definition of Datoga as Mang’ati portrays them not only as epitomised backwardness, but also the extent to which violence was engrained in their culture and norms of such people. Though the difference between the Mang’ati—as represented in police reports, government minutes and annual reports—and the general understanding of the Nyaturu, Nyiramba and Nyisanzu (Ihanzu) did not differ, the genre of what constituted the ‘violent Datoga’ was radically different from the colonial construct. While the colonial construction of violence in the two districts was derived from ethnic constructs, the post-colonial interpretation saw it as a product of cultural backwardness of the Datoga. As part of reformulating the national agenda of resettlement and development in the post-colonial period, the state reinvented the Datogas ‘the enemy.’ This portrayal would later become naturalised into the national sphere of development and change.

4.1 Ujamaa, Datoga “Murders” and ‘Operation Vijiji’

Tanzania gained independence in 1961 and in 1964 merged with Zanzibar to form the United Republic of Tanzania. The first three years after independence were characterised by general optimism that independence and African leadership would quickly improve the overall livelihood of the population. For Tanzania, the excitement was short lived. In 1964 the government was faced with a military mutiny that fundamentally changed the course of the country’s history. This mutiny brought into questions not only the state’s commitment to defining the meanings of uhuru (freedom) and its pledge of development for the majority of the citizens, but also the need to formulate a new national ideology (Nyerere 1969: 5). Though the process of building ujamaa and the socialist development policy in Tanzania was not an outcome of the 1964 mutiny, the mutiny promoted radical changes and pushed for further reforms in the national development project (C. Girard Thomas 2012: 148–50).

The year 1967 marked a shift in the national development focus, from a capitalist to a socialist orientation. The ruling party, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), launched ujamaa vijijini as an official policy and created what Ludwig Watzal calls the Tanzanian model (Watzal 1982: 202–4). As government and party manifesto, the 1967 Arusha Declaration called for socialism and self-reliance, “a determined struggle against economic inequality and exploitation as the basis of the country’s future development” (Boesen, Madsen and Moody 1977: 14). The declara-
tion enabled the government to establish the Five Year Development Plan (1969–1974) and the “Presidential Circular no.1 of 1969” (Boesen, Madsen and Moody 1977: 15). The conception of the *ujamaa* village as a developmental focal point and space was a hallmark of President Nyerere’s philosophy. The village was conceived of as a space for rural transformation through collective efforts for the country’s modernization. Between 1969 and 1974, the *ujamaa* movement in Tanzania was established in more than 4125 villages with a total of about 7.6 million inhabitants (Samuel Mhajida 2009: 146). The discussion of the Tanzanian development model as connected to the sedentarization of the Datoga will be further explored in the later stages of this chapter.

In the districts of Singida and Mbulu the years between 1965 and 1967 represented a historical antithesis of what has been outlined above. While the rest of the country was in the midst of overwhelming pressure to respond to the villagization programme, the two districts receded into the backlash of cross-border killings. The violence was particularly rampant among the three ethnic groups of the Nyisanzu, Nyiramba, and Datoga. The Datoga who were incorrectly listed in government reports as Mangati/Mang’ati seemed to have carried the biggest burden of murders/killings. While murders were committed by members of all three groups, the crimes were attributed to the Datoga and became known in government, press and police

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Ethnicity of the deceased</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Village</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23.3.1965</td>
<td>Wamang’ati</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Kinyangiri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.12.1966</td>
<td>Wanyisanzu</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Nkinto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.12.1966</td>
<td>Wamang’ati</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Nkinto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.12.1966</td>
<td>Wanyisanzu</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Nkinto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.5.1967</td>
<td>Wanyirambo</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>lambi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1967</td>
<td>Mnyiramba</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>lambi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1967</td>
<td>Mnyirambo</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>lambi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1967</td>
<td>Mnyiramba</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>lambi&amp;Mtinko</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.1.1968</td>
<td>Mnyisanzu</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Mwangeza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.1.1968</td>
<td>Mnyisanzu</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Mwangeza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>31</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: TNA/DNRC Location 5/4/05 Box No. 67 File SR/L.30/1 Matata ya Mang’ati, 1968–68.
reports as the “Datoga Killings” or the “Datoga murders.” To better understand the problem of the killings/murders, we need to discuss how such murders were represented in many police reports, oral narratives, annual regional and district reports, as well as meetings of the Singida and Mbulu.

Historical Antecedent: The Datoga “Murders” in the Era of Independence

The Datoga “murders” in the post-colonial era represent a failure of the British and post-colonial regimes to understand the nature of ethnic relations along the Singida-Mbulu border. As discussed in the previous chapters, the first ethnic killings associated with the Datoga began in the late 1920s and continued despite efforts to suppress and/or engage with the Datoga. To understand this historical problem, we need to ask who was killing who, and why? For the British and the post-colonial governments, Datoga killings of members of other ethnic communities were interpreted in relation to Datoga cultural rites of “spear blooding or bathing,” both of which were considered necessary rites in the Datoga initiation process. The notion of killings as associated with Datoga rites of passage formed the official British narrative. The British fought this cultural rite by advocating the incorporation of the Datoga under another ethnic administration in the hope that such a tradition would subside and be absorbed by “superior” cultures. This social engineering or what Arturo Escobar calls the “European construct of modernity” (Escobar 1995: 5), was not limited to the Datoga. Amongst others, a similar process of a European construction of modernity has been observed by Jan-Bart Gewald after the Second World War in Eritrea, when the British encountered ethnic strife in the west of the country. In efforts to neutralize the violence, the British reinvented the Tigre ethnic group as a model group, while disempowering small “tribal” communities (Gewald 2000: 4–5). In the context of the Datoga, incorporation into the Iraqw (Mbulu) ethnic community was considered necessary to eliminate the customs which the British considered repugnant and anachronistic (Fosbrooke n.d.). This strategy was unsuccessful, as it did not address the core causes of the conflict, which were the existing power struggle and economic competition between agriculturalist and pastoralist groups. The post-independence government deemed “tribal” elements potential dangers to the flourishing of the nation state, with the Nyerere government abolishing the administration of the chiefs on the 31st of December 1962 on the basis that they were potentially divisive and a colonial brainchild (Nyerere 1969: 4). This declaration ended the chiefs’ involvement in the arbitration of local conflicts, thus forcing the national government to intervene at the community level.

The post-colonial government’s first encounter with cases of the Datoga-agricultural community appeared in reports several years after formal independence.224 In terms of the government discourses that informed the official narrative, such long-standing rifts were either ignored or overshadowed by more pressing and immediate

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national issues of the time. For instance, until 1964 the official reporting, mainly conducted by the police and other agencies of social and ethnic relations in Singida and Mbulu, revolved around everyday crimes such as incest, corruption, and cattle thefts.\(^{225}\) From the same sources, it is apparent that not a single one of the cases, which were a nuisance to the regional government, were linked to a specific ethnic group. For example, in October 1964 the Regional Commissioner in Singida wrote a letter to the Area Commissioners in response to the alarming rate of crimes:

> I am deeply saddened to observe from the recent report from my C.I.D. of the incidences of criminal cases mentioned above. Such cases are now on increase in your districts, especially in the district of Singida: as you know, we cannot move forward in fulfilling our planning in executing the Five Years Development Plans if we continue to allow a bunch of criminals to assume full control by killing the innocent and contravening their rights to property, to say the truth this is a setback to our development projection.\(^{226}\)

It is still a speculation, whether the Regional Commissioner did fully understand the gravity of social conflict and antagonisms, which defined ethnic relations in the borders of Mbulu and Singida. But what is clear is that the abolition and the relinquishing of the power of the chiefs made security issues at the district level a function of the Area Commissioners and the police force.\(^{227}\) That is why the letter did not mention the chiefs although their influence was known.\(^{228}\) The chiefs were no longer politically active, thereby hindering an appreciation of the social background of competitions that defined social and ethnic relations since colonial times. One year later, the documentation of the criminal cases that the Regional Commissioner vowed to contest took a completely different turn. The ethnic border killings, popularly known as Mang’ati murders, were defined as violent Datoga (mainly Barabaig actions). A limitation of government sources is that they neglect to examine the causes and background of the conflict, thus misrepresenting the conflicts and adding to the further deterioration of the Datoga’s relations with other communities.

My examination of the police reports indicates that the killings peaked between 1965 and 1968. From March 1965 to January 1968 there were approximately 31 reported deaths in five villages on the borders between Iramba in Singida and Mbulu in Arusha.\(^{229}\) Table 3 highlights the number and ethnicity of the deceased, and the date and location of the killing as recorded in police reports.

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\(^{225}\) DNRC, location 5/5/02, box 89, file P.1/5: Police Reports of Apprehensions, 1966.

\(^{226}\) DNRC, location 5/5/02, box 89, file P.1/5: Police Reports of Apprehensions, 1966.

\(^{227}\) DNRC, location 5/5/02, box 89, file P.1/5: Police Reports of Apprehensions, 1966.

\(^{228}\) This is more vivid in the narrative of the encounter that George J. Klima discusses when, for the first time in 1962, he visited the country of the Datoga. Klima talks of his introduction to the Chief of the Datoga, not the village or government official. See more in Klima (1970: 1–5).

\(^{229}\) According to the 1967 census, the total population of Iramba was 182,198, while the Isanzu or Ihanzu was about 15,000 people. These statistics do not take into account the villages in the borders
From the police reports it appears that the Datoga were the first ethnic community to succumb to violent killings. On the 5th of May 1965 a police report noted that, “two African males and one child were murdered by unknown Mang’ati.”230 Targeted killings of either the Datoga (Mang’ati) or the Nyisanzu followed this report. For the government, dichotomising the agricultural community as African and the Datoga pastoralists as Mang’ati was aimed at representing the Datoga as “barbaric “and the agriculturalist as modern. These reprisals took place in December 1966 when more than 19 killings were reported. The Police Progress Report of 1966 described these incidents as:

During the week of December, 1966 there were clashes between Wamang’ati and Wanyisanzu tribesmen in Kiomboi District [sic.] which resulted in the loss of life of twelve Wanyisanzu and five Wamang’ati tribesmen. Police went to the area from Singida and Kiomboi to deal with them and to keep law and order. About 40 Wamang’ati have been arrested for question. Field Force from Moshi was called to carry out operation.231

While the killings caused a general panic among both the government and the communities involved, external manifestations connected with the year 1966 heightened the tension and creation of a narrative victim. The events preceding the killings of December 1966 gave impetus to the belief that the year was possibly the darkest for the villages surrounding the borders between Singida and Mbulu Districts. First, in March 1966, intense torrential rains destroyed crops on many family farms. It was reported that the rain was abnormal for the semi-arid district of Iramba; the rain coming down in successive torrents which were frequently followed by tornadoes. According to reports, eight people were killed, as were a number of domestic animals. Many people also lost their homes.232 The effects of the rain were followed by another gruesome tragedy. On the 15th of October 1966 about 60 villagers boarded a bus from Mwalalo to the Ilongero Trading Centre after a happy Maulidi233 celebration. A few yards after beginning the journey the bus caught fire, killing five on site, and leaving eleven more to die while receiving medical care.234 While the accident,
unlike the rain, was not a natural phenomenon, the two produced similar outcomes. First, they both brought tragedy to the neighbourhoods and villages, and secondly, while the two events happened seven months apart, they marked 1966 as a *mwaka mbaya* (unfortunate year). The violence that occurred subsequently in December 1966 enhanced the impact generated by the torrential rains. One of the impacts, particularly on the agricultural communities who were mostly affected, was a sense of victimhood.

Tensions in the Datoga-agricultural communities took a different turn in 1967. From the police narratives of the murder, the spaces in which the murders were occurring widened both in geography and in scale. By February 1967 the killings spread from five villages to all the villages bordering Mbulu and Singida districts. For instance, between May 1967 and February 1968, around eight people were killed. The police reported that “one woman was killed by a sword and her tongue removed. Her death was the work of the Mang’atti.” 235 Similarly, there was an incidence of a man who “was found dead and his body eaten by hyenas. It is thought to be a work of the Mang’atti.” Even when it was difficult to ascertain who the culprits were likely to be, the Datoga were blamed. For example, “in Ikolo Village, Isanzu, bones of a person identified by his clothes were found on the 3rd of September 1967, and it was assumed he was also murdered by the Mang’atti.” 236

From the reporting it is difficult to tell why the Datoga would kill so many people for ritual reasons within this short time. The reporting did not mention the deaths of any Datoga, which leads to questions concerning motives and intent of this omission. From the government sources, it appears that the murder with the greatest social impact was that of the teacher Mussa Tonga. On the 15th of February 1968, Mussa Tonga was murdered on his way to a school in Mwangeza owned by the Tanganyika Parents Association (TAPA). 237 The sense of victimhood on the part of non-Datoga communities was solidified by his killing, whose fellow teachers helped organise villages against the Datoga. One such move from the teachers was that of using their education, representing the victim and perpetrator to the government through letters. Such letters had a significant impact on the government’s image of the Datoga as aggressors. For example, a Head Teacher of the Kinampundu Village School spoke to the Regional Commissioner and the delegates overseeing the problem of ethnic clashes in the district:

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237 TAPA was generally a group of schools which were established through self-help by members of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU). The schools began in the 1950s, and by the late 1960s had branches throughout the country. These schools were non-governmental, therefore operated as party properties under the auspices of the Parents Organization, a wing of the TANU and later from 1977, Chama cha Mapinduzi (Revolutionary Party-CCM).
The Mang’ati has made this place a slaughtering area for people, just like pigs without owners. The terror and the animalistic minded brutality of this nature are increasingly making us more than slaves of the colonial period and tyranny of the Maasai who slaughtered our fore fathers cold bloodedly. I am wondering, while we all joined together to fight the colonialists so as to be truly free, why now are we allowing ourselves sacrificial lamb to the Mang’ati? If killing someone for a wife is their culture, I would not be in remorse if they had killed one of their kinds. I don’t take such a culture because God did not give them a letter allowing them to kill other human beings.238

The teacher made a powerful plea to the government and the ruling party:

Delegates, I being truly free from colonialism, I abhor any other forms of colonialism, of being butchered like goats. So, today I would not implore TANU and our esteemed government to engage the Mang’ati in action so that we can do away with all these treasonous actions brought by the Mang’ati and their cattle. Exploitation, abuse and treason are never friends to TANU. Please TANU clean even here, we are tired of seeing illicit meats that cannot be eaten.239

This letter spurred other teachers from Kinampundu and neighbouring primary schools to push for more action. In another letter written on the 10th of November 1967 the schoolteachers made a direct connection between the violence that was happening and the school’s performance. The letter argued that among its 132 registered school children, 17 were reported to have left the school due to fear. Insecurity was stated as a leading problem, thus the letter begged for “special security for kids going to school.”240 Additionally, the letter discussed more cases of murders to strengthen the notion that the problem was truly affecting all aspects of their lives. In response to such calls for security, the Regional Police Commissioner reported the developments to higher bodies. In one of the letters the Datoga were represented as “bugs” that should be exterminated. One of the letters stated:

I also patrolled another Mang’ati infested area called KINAMPUNDU where recently a married woman was brutally murdered by a Mang’ati. I saw the head teacher of the primary school who informed me that people were leaving the area because of the fear of the Wamang’ati. People have stopped sending their children to school at least they might be ambushed and killed by Wamang’ati. The head teacher asked for a police protection. I promised him that I would send armed police men to patrol the area and if a house would

be available I would post some officers temporary until such a time when the fears are gone.241

These representations solidified the dichotomy of the Datoga as aggressors and the neighbouring agricultural and agro-pastoralist communities as victims. The aggressor-victim narrative appeared to be unchallenged by the Datoga, whose opinions on the conflict were rarely sought. For example, in an effort to examine the depths of the conflict, police officers visited the homes of some Datoga in November 1967. One of the police officers in Singida noted, “I visited several families of the Wamang’ati right in the bush and through an interpreter I had talks with them. General [sic.] they were pleased to see me and did not seem hostile at that time, but a little barbaric.”242 It is noteworthy that little effort was made to solicit more information on an alternative narrative among the Datoga. Rather, it was a matter of who had the power over the media of information. The control of the media gave agricultural communities the power to articulate the problem and seek support from politicians, the police, and the government. As such, the agricultural communities who controlled the schools (the power-house in the negotiation and articulation of information) were highly influential in shaping opinion on the murders. The government’s conclusion then, that the Datoga were murdering other ‘peace loving people,’243 was a socially constructed reality from a compromised terrain.

According to the government, there were four main contributing factors to the escalation of ethnic violence along the borders of Singida and Mbulu. The first was the issue of cattle theft. The Datoga were cattle headers, so it was argued by government officials that they killed other communities that competed with them in the control and ownership of cattle. This reasoning was drawn from several reports of cattle thefts throughout the district of Singida. For example, on the 13th of January 1966 a police report stated that, “26 heads valued at sh 2,600 were stolen by unknown person(s), nothing recovered.”244 Similar cases appeared in successive monthly police reports, where in December of 1967, it was stated that: “There has been another increase of cattle theft during this month, for there were 185 head stolen compared with 178 head stolen during the last month, of the 185 head, about 48% per cent

243 More in Majadiliano ya Bunge (Hansard), 1968, 529 (question no. 217). Here the questions that were raised in the National Assembly by Mr. Kingu on May 9th 1968 to the Minister for Home Affairs suggested that the Datoga were a threat to peace-loving neighbours. According to Mr. Kingu, why had the Datoga been allowed to kill other communities for so long without effective measures taken against them? In this regard, he requested a change of law to allow the permanent incarceration of the Datoga.
was recovered. A report issued by the Minister for Home Affairs in response to a question from Member of Parliament for Iramba East Mr. Kingu seemed to reach the same conclusion. The report listed the following facts concerning the damaging impact of cattle thefts between the Datoga and their neighbours:

1965: all 176 cattle from the Wanyaturu were stolen and nothing was recovered.
1965: 224 cattle were stolen from the Datoga, only 14 were recovered.
1966: 160 cattle of the Datoga were stolen and all were recovered.
1967: no recorded theft.
1968: nine cattle of the Datoga were stolen and later four were recovered.

Police and government reports show that cattle theft peaked in 1965. All of the communities, especially the Wanyaturu and Datoga, were stealing cattle from each other, resulting in counter-reprisals and war which came about were arguably a product of these inter-ethnic tensions. The number of arrests reflected the trend of cattle thefts, with more than 119 people from all communities arrested between 1965 and 1968; among them 76 were imprisoned. The increase in cattle theft was regarded as a motivation for the murder cases, especially in the border areas between Mbulu and Iramba districts.

Although the argument was part of the official narrative, it was difficult to directly link the cattle thefts to the killings. Indeed, cattle theft as a factor and also the statistics given if taken together then all communities were contributing to the violence. In fact, individuals caught from such cases came from a wide range of ethnic backgrounds. Linked to this was the fact that cattle theft among different ethnic groups was not limited to these two districts, but was also common in other pastoral and agro-pastoralist districts like Arusha, Mbulu, Monduli, Maswa, Musoma, and Tarime. Interpreting the cattle thefts as cause for the murders, the government invested its energy into recruiting police officers, Field Forces Unit (F.F.U), and a Stock Protection Unit (S.T.P.U.) to investigate, deter and capture the thieves. In 1965 the S.T.P.U. started working in what were called “contiguous” districts to increase the security and recovery of cattle. The Singida cases remained the most unique and troublesome. In March 1966 a conference that involved all Regional Police Commissioners (R.P.C) from all “contiguous” districts was held in Moshi town a few days

246 Majadiliano ya Bunge (Hansard), 1968, 529–530.
247 Majadiliano ya Bunge (Hansard), 1968, 530.
after a clash between the Nyisanzu and Datoga in Kiomboi.250 Cattle theft however was a huge problem that was not only affecting the Datoga and other agro-pastoralist groups.

The second cause was dubbed by the government officials “Mila na desturi mbaya za Wamang’ati” (the bad culture and customs of the Wamang’ati).251 The theory was that the Wamang’ati (Datoga) were inherently backward people, whose culture was considered violent and that ‘killing other people (w)as something cultural’.252 According to this narrative, the Mang’ati killed as a call to fulfil cultural obligations. The belief was that killing a fierce animal or human from another tribe was a way of increasing the number of one’s cattle, enticing a woman to have sex or to find a wife, or showing heroism to the members of their community.253 It was argued that these rewards led young Datoga men to employ all means to attain them. Related to this was the Datoga culture in which “women dressed on special clothes that signified violence, or enticed their men to kill.”254 Other narratives focused on the culture of spear bathing, where Datoga youths sought to prove to the community that they were mature and able to protect the community. The concept of the enemy in the Datoga narratives is very complex. For the Datoga, ritual killing has a long history. Many of the interviewees willing to talk to me about this ritual agreed there was such a thing as “ritual killing.”255 The ritual evolved from the 19th century killing of elephants, buffalo, and lions – and later turned to the killing of Maasai. Youth killings of the Maasai, traditional enemies of the Datoga, were supported by the entire community. The practice and the culture was articulated in the traditional dances, many of which I have already discussed in the previous chapter. The British tried to eliminate dances which celebrated heroism in 1931, but murder-related cases continued to rise. Among the cases discussed earlier, killings resulted from the counter-reprisals from each side of the communities. Indeed, there is limited evidence that points to the murders being a product of this aspect of Datoga culture.

252 This was later held as the main rallying point in the government efforts to sedentarise the Datoga. Desturi mbaya was not a post-colonial invention, but rather a British anthropological and sociological understanding of the Datoga. The post-colonial government advanced desturi mbaya as it resonated with the ujamaa philosophy that inspired people to modernise through agriculture and moving to sedentary villages. The Datoga were neither in the villages nor working in agriculture, so by not cultivating they continued the desturi mbaya. This cultural difference is what was considered dangerous by the government. See a detailed discussion of the quest for modernization in the ujamaa time in Scott (1998: chap. 7).
253 DNRC, location 5/5/02, box 90, file SR/P10: Matata ya Mang’ati.
255 The matter is still very sensitive to many Datoga, so that they would not agree to discuss it. I encountered this hesitation throughout my research. The experiences of 1984–1987 had taught them not to trust government officials, and as in many cases I was understood as a government agent, when it came to questions of that nature. My informants would just keep quite or ignore the question.
The last reason, while it is not directly mentioned in the sources but rather inferred by the government officials, is the matter of Datoga occupying different living and cultural spaces. This issue particularly concerns the identity of the Datoga as pastoralists against other agricultural communities. Reading the police reports, one must keep in mind that the conception of the Mang’ati as killers of “African” people was formed as a construction of the other. I have to insist again on one important change in the representational discourse in reporting on the ethnic clashes in Singida and Mbulu. Throughout the British period, the murders were reported in colonial narratives as “Barabaig murders” or “Barabaig killings.” The British understood the “murders” as essentially a function of one Datoga sub-group, the Barbaig. The post-colonial discourse dropped the Barbaig name and adopted the anecdotal and metaphorical name used by the Maasai, who referred to the Datoga as *il Mang’ati* (the true enemy), “rather than the contemptuous *il meek* which was reserved for the general run of non-Hamitic stock, Chagga, Rangi, Sandawi, etc.” (Moffett 1958: 209). This discourse offered a distinctive and categorical classification of the “murderers” that appealed to the Maasai in apportioning the blame to the Datoga, the Mang’ati.

The three reasons highlighted above were not responsible for intensification of clashes between the pastoralist Datoga and agricultural communities in Singida and Mbulu. Yet, they formed a precedence of future decisions regarding the Datoga. Rather, the conflict originated from what Daniel Ndagala calls “incompatible economic and land use practices between the two forms of land utilization” (Interview Ndagala, 20.01.15). The origin of border conflicts between the Datoga and their neighbours dated back to the 1920s, when the Iraqw were allowed by the British government to expand southwards into the Datoga territories. The movement was discussed extensively in the previous chapter, but it is important to note here that, with the euphoria of independence, the scale of violence shifted from a problem with “alien” Datoga youth migrants in Singida District in the colonial period to border claims between the two—the Datoga pastoralist and Nyaturu agro-pastoralists. The colonial “border hopping” pushed the two different forms of economy into loggerheads with one another. Although land was not a problem at this point, conflicts arose regarding the control and management of the few water boreholes available in the borderlands. I argue that the shifting control and management of these spaces, including the means of production, along with changing concepts of the idea of *nchi* were among the key factors underlying the conflicts.

Working Solutions against Ethnic Clashes: The Temporary Measures

In the Mbulu and Singida Districts, the reported murders were a great challenge for the government. They were also considered a major setback in the implementation of *ujamaa vijijini* throughout the country. Some government workers referred to

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the “Mangati problem as a disgrace and disappointment to the country.” In some cases, such ethnic clashes were viewed apprehensively as a potential cause for large-scale ethnic wars between the pastoralists and agricultural communities. There were also frequent complaints from the Second Vice President Rashid Mfaume Kawawa that the ethnic violence in the region slowed the fulfilment of the Arusha Declaration and the building of socialist villages in the districts. The rest of the political leadership that eventually positioned Singida and Mbulu in the national spotlight also shared Kawawa’s concerns. As a result, between January and October 1966 more than eight top political and government administrators visited Singida and Mbulu. When President Nyerere toured the region for three days in March 1966 he spoke at political rallies about *ujamaa*. Although the issue of ethnic clashes does not appear in the official records of the visit, the latter represented a very important point of departure in the ways his government dealt with the conflict. After this visit more state tours followed. In July 1966, in the midst of these political visits, a team of police officers from the headquarters in Dar es Salaam arrived. The government was alarmed by the rumours of murders, so in August Junior Minister for Home Affairs A.M. Maalim and the General of Police Mr. Shaidi visited the region. They visited Singida, where they held a meeting with members of rank and file, and Kiomboi, a border town with Mbulu. During these tours attention was on short-term solutions to the tensions, but no program was publicly laid out on how to address or understand the problem.

My analysis of the sources indicates that state interventions into the ethnic conflicts in Singida and Mbulu took two forms. The first was a sporadic use of military and police force. The second took a form of trial and error and it embedded within the politics and economy of *ujamaa vijijini*. The two approaches developed by the government effectively ignored the fact that the conflicts were long running and complex, rather the government’s short-term focus was simply to stop the killings without necessarily understanding the causes or motivations behind them. The government’s second priority was to deal with the accused Datoga through collective arrests and punishments. The government appeared to believe that the Datoga were the source of the conflict, as outlined in the police reports that claimed arresting Datoga would stop the killings and stabilize ethnic relations. Although five Datoga were killed in 1966, the government did not look for the culprits among other ethnic communities. From February to April 1968, the government sent convoys of Field Force Units, armed with machine guns and pistols, into Datoga homes. In addition to the police forces in the regions of Arusha and Singida, the government sent supplemental forces from the neighbouring regions of Tabora and Kilimanjaro/

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257 DNRC, location 5/5/05, box 67, file SR/L.30/1: *Barua ya Mwalimu, Kinampundu Shule ya Msingi*.
259 TNA, accession 69, file 8/20: The Provincial Commissioner Northern Province, Arusha.
Following the death of Mussa Tonga on the 15th of February 1968, the government sent the following telegraph to the Singida Regional Administration:

After the Mang’ati had murdered teacher Mussa Tonga, a tense situation has developed to all the teachers in the area, and it is possible that the teaching process will be halted due to such a fear. I have already talked with the Inspector General of Police to bring F.F Unit as the only way left is to arrest all the Mang’ati especially the youths in the area that are not beyond 40.

At around noon on the 22nd of February 1968, the police began massive arrests of Datoga youths under the age of 40 on the border between Singida and Mbulu. Operation Mang’ati, often referred to in Swahili as *msako* (rounding up), initially targeted all Datoga youths irrespective of gender. It was a house-to-house roundup implemented by three Field Force Units from Tabora and Singida with the intention of disarming what the government called the “Datoga Morans- (circumcised youths),” and it was demanded by the police officers: “then arrest and after their arrests inform me [the Security Officer] how many are they.” The details of the process of the arrests are not documented in the police reports. However, interviews with Datoga elders in Singida showed that the process involved torture and revenge killings by neighbours of the Datoga, many of whom acted as guides during the government operation. In some instances, “the soldiers brutally entered houses, raped, stole house belongings” (Blystad 2005: 116). Other accounts speak about informants volunteering for *msako*. In one letter for example, a Nyisanzu villager named Nassoro Seif led the *msako* into Datoga homes and that he claimed to possess “the knowledge of the entire forests of Iramba and in Mang’ati area,” and all these in total lead to the conclusion that the arrests were a targeted activity. The use of guides like Nassoro from the Nyissanzu and Nyiramba who went from house-to-house with the police to arrest Datogayouths solidified how the enemy was ethnicized. According to my Datoga informants, if members of the household showed any form of resistance, the house was set on fire. In November 1967, TANU Youth Leaguers from the Nyisanzu and neighbouring agricultural communities were among the first to join the rounding up. Although they were not part of the military wing the government recruited them as “special constables grade B.” The police and regional TANU office ap-
proved the recruitment of the Youth Leaguers, and in the same month, eight youths were recruited from the Nyisanzu, Pogoro, Nyiramba and Nyaturu for the msako. The size of the shoes and uniforms that were distributed to such Youth Leaguers, which ranged from medium to large sizes and boot numbers between 7 and 9, indicated that the choices were meticulous and purposeful.

When the rounding up of the Datoga began in February 1968, the short term objectives were limited to achieving “discipline” and preventing future murders. Therefore, it was expected that the number of those arrested would not exceed 50 men from the Datoga homes. But on the first 24 hours of the roundup, there were about 80 Datoga arrests (including 31 women of differing ages and 49 young men). During the following days the treatment of the Datoga lapsed into dehumanizing hunting parties in which harassment and degradation were indiscriminately inflicted (Blystad 2005: 116–17). The detained were hauled on trucks every morning from different police posts, and reports of how many were captured formed the main engagement of military police. By April 1968 more than 208 Datoga were in Singida, Arusha and Dodoma prisons. As the arrests increased, some Datoga migrated north away from the Singida–Mbulu border; yet, the government still pursued them. One report noted that, “three sections of F.F.U. from Tabora are in Endesh while the Singida Police section is still in Singida.” An important element to emphasize is the general displacement that occurred during the transfer of Datoga “convicts” from Singida to Dodoma main prison. The massive arrests led to overcrowded prisons in Mbulu, Arusha, and Singida. The General Prison Director advised that all “convicts” should be detained in nearby prisons. But when these prisons became overloaded with inmates, it was decided that some Datoga should be transferred to neighbouring regions. Thus, the first group of 100 “convicts” were “transferred under watchful eyes of Nos. 3559 Prison Officer Juma, 4518 Prison Officer Ally, 5255 Prison Officer Samwel and 5761 Prison officer Hassan.” It is striking how the police officer’s command to arrest the Datoga was implemented in spatial terms. While it is clear from the reports that ethnic conflicts occurred in the Singida–Mbulu border, when it came to the arrests, this fact was not observed. With the intensification of the arrests Datoga, even those from villages deep inside Mbulu and far away from the centre of conflict were arrested. It was claimed by the police that the reasons for the geographical extensions

Regional Police Commissioner, Singida to the Inspector General, Dar es Salaam.

266 DNRC, location 5/5/02, box 90, file SR/P10: Matata ya Man’g’ati, Saving Telegram.
267 DNRC, location 5/5/02, box 90, file SR/P10: Matata ya Man’g’ati, Police Monthly Report, 18.2.1968.
268 The Minister for Home Affairs on May 9th 1968 when responding to questions from Mr. Kingu reported that “about 250 people [Datoga] were caught and until now they are still in remand” (Majadiliano ya Bunge (Hansard), 1968, 529).
269 DNRC, location 5/5/02, box 90, file SR/P10: Matata ya Man’g’ati, Police Monthly Report, 18.2.1968.
270 DNRC, location 5/5/02, box 90, file SR/P10: Matata ya Man’g’ati, A Telegram from Gereza (Prison) Singida to the Main Maximum Prison in Dodoma.
during arrests to Mbulu was that all Datoga homes were the same and because there were complaints of Datoga fleeing to the north across the Singida border, the wave of arrests eventually extended into villages like Basuto, Katesh, Gehandu, Gendabi, and Balangida-Lalu. As a result the number of arrested Datoga came to exceed the capacity of the existing prison’s infrastructure.

Among government officials the primary aim was to create a camp, either in the border between Singida and Mbulu where the arrested would be collected as part of disciplining the Datoga youths. The second proposition though was also contested, required the Datoga youths collected in different prisons to be sent later to the military. Sending the Datoga to the military was also referred to as *kuwapeleka Wadatoga kambini* – sending the Datoga to military camp. It is possible that the mechanisms of the camp divided the government between those who wanted the discipline to be taken beyond the norms of law enforcement bodies and those who wanted the exercise to be limited within the sphere of the disarmament of the Datoga. The Singida Regional Government advocated stern measures against the Datoga and allowed “unlawful” arrests, whereas Arusha local government, which included the district of Mbulu, was resistant to the use of excessive force in the arrests. The different approaches to the arrests created a sense of confusion in the regional administrations. The period of arrests lasted from February to April of 1968 and from February to July the captured Datoga languished in Mbulu, Arusha, Singida, and Dodoma prisons without bail and awaited ‘proper’ decisions. The purpose of keeping the Datoga in prisons for that long was allegedly to “avoid escalation of ethnic wars,” while awaiting confirmation that they would be sent to a compulsory military training popularly known as Jeshi la Kujenga Taifa (J.K.T.), nation-building army, or National Service. Military training had begun in 1963 and in 1966 became national policy, with compulsory two-year attendance for all school-leavers and elites working in the government. It was a mechanism for political and economic organization that aimed at mobilising the nation to strengthen unity, the spirit of nationhood, and the fight against elitism. Many of its recruits were school leavers from primary schools, secondary schools, and colleges. For political cadres, the J.K.T. was the perfect meth-

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275 Jeshi la Kujenga Taifa was born out of a vision by Mwalimu Nyerere, the former President of Tanzania. It was a necessary political decision as a way of responding to the cold war politics of defending ‘*uhuru*’ as well as a platform where national spirit and cohesion was to be built for a secure nation. Being one of the frontline states and the seat of the Southern African liberation struggles from the 1960s to 1980s; security was taken very seriously in Tanzania. See more detailed in (Kimambo and Temu 1969: 247).
od for the creation of national unity and fighting colonial mentalities and ethnic-mindedness. In 1966 Kawawa decided to send the Datoga-Mang’ati convicts to J.K.T. as a mode of disciplining them and correcting their “bad cultures of killing other communities.” R. M. Semvua, the Regional Commissioner for Singida, was particularly interested in the idea, which also justified the arrests to temporarily hold Datoga until negotiations about sending them to J.K.T. were concluded. Although it was politically acceptable to send the Datoga youths to J.K.T., there were still obstacles on their recruitment. Officials were especially concerned that the Datoga could tarnish the J.K.T.’s image. Firstly, the Datoga youths were not members of the elite and had not attained any form of western education, going against the general tradition of the J.K.T. recruiting school and college leavers, and making their recruitment somewhat odd. Moreover, the Datoga youths had a poor reputation—as convicts, “murderers” and people who deserved to be in prison.

The decision to send the Datoga to the J.K.T. stalled for more than three months. Upon arrests the prison officers were told that holding the Datoga would be temporary before they could be moved en masse to the designated military camps. However, the General Director for the J.K.T. refused to allow the Datoga into the camps, as bringing “convicts” to a peace-loving people was contrary to the aims of the military guidelines. After apparently long negotiations, Vice President Kawawa gave up this stance. A telegraph from the General Director of the J.K.T. to the Commissioner of Police of Singida on the 29th of March 1968 ended the long anticipated project before it had begun:

Jeshi la Kujenga Taifa has adamantly refused admission of the youths caught in crimes. The project of recruiting Mang’ati youths in the Jeshi la Kujenga Taifa is denied because such youths lack required trainings. They need prior training before they can be accepted into the military courses. So you need to develop their skills in different trades before they qualify into the military. You must train them not holding them as prisoners. If we follow what you are suggesting, the image of our institution as a place for voluntary training will be horribly tarnished. Please leave them free if they are not guilt.

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277 DNRC, location 5/4/05, box 67, file SR/L.30/1: Mkatano wa Kuzungumzia Matatizo ya Mang’ati.
278 National service was instituted in 1963 and began as voluntary for secondary school graduates. It became compulsory after 1972 under the auspices of the Ministry of Defense. Until then, JKT recruits were secondary and post-secondary graduates.
Although measures taken by Kawawa, like that of disarming the Datoga, led to massive collections of small arms they were soon criticised as the policy disarmed the Datoga and encouraged their neighbours to arm themselves against future attacks. In a meeting convened in June 1968 in Mbulu to discuss the “Mang’ati” problem, msako was abandoned. Instead, on the 6th of June 1968, Kawawa toured Singida and Mbulu, in a mission of campaigning for settlement in ujamaa villages. Kawawa was given the assignment because he was considered a man of stern character and unwavering conviction on matters regarding security and the promotion of ujamaa.

In political circles, Kawawa was popularly known as Simba wa Vita (the Lion of War) (Bjerk 2012). In one of the rhymes sung in circumcision songs in Singida in 1980 the character of Kawawa as a person was characterised as bold and bad tempered:

\[\text{Nimesema, mjini Iringa, mpaka Songea... Aboud Jumbe alikasirika sana alikata mkataba, na Rashidi Kawawa alishika na bunduki, Nyerere kasema tulia kidogo, Tanzania yetu mama haiwezi kupigana, maswali na kalamu vitaungana, tulime ae Tanzania.} \]

(Literally translated as: I have said, from Iringa to Songea... Aboud Jumbe was so furious and drew a line of no go, and Rashid Kawawa took a gun, but Nyerere said, please hold on for a while, our Tanzania mama shall never fight, questions and pens shall unite, let’s farm, ae Tanzania.)

From the quotation we can see that the establishment of ujamaa was never a smooth process. Rather, it was marked by ideological and political disagreements. Questions about moving rural populations to “planned” villages or the response of the government to groups of people who were frustrated by the process were among the main issues that threatened the political regime. The case of the Datoga arrests was presented as an exemplary act against ujamaa, which gave the political regime a real test. That is why such tests needed also tough characters to deal with such difficulties. Kawawa is revealed as a militant individual and his resolute to embrace violence was interpreted as an indication of his strength and firm standing, yet his decisions created no easy or peaceful solutions. Thus, amidst this, the need to retreat to “questions” and “pens,” as the song suggests, also required certain forms of agreements so as to begin the most pressing issue of including the Datoga into villagization, which had just started, with the announcement of the Arusha Declaration in February 1967. Part of Kawawa’s long-term project to implement ujamaa in Singida and Mbulu Districts was to resolve the Datoga problem. In June and July 1968 he toured

\[\text{281 DNRC, location 5/4/05, box 67, SR/L.30/1: Kikao cha kuzungumzia Matata ya Mang’ati, 6th June 1968.}\]
\[\text{282 Majadiliano ya Bunge (Hansard), 7th November 1975, 19–20.}\]
\[\text{283 Azimio la Iringa (The Declaration of Iringa) was one of many pronouncements that came with the Arusha Declaration of 1967. The Azimio la Iringa was declared in 1972, with its motto, Siasa ni Kilimo (Politics is Agriculture). The emphasis was on the modernisation of agriculture through collective cultivation in the villages.}\]
Dodoma and Singida prisons. In these visits, Kawawa talked with the incarcerated Datoga youths, and possibly saw the precarious conditions in which they were made to live. On the 9th of June, A. Laurian, the then Commissioner of the Prison in Singida, wrote the following to his superiors in Dar es Salaam:

I have the honour to inform you that, Mr. Rashid Mfaume Kawawa- the Second Vice President arrived in this prison at 4:30 p.m. in the evening of the 8th June, 1968, to see and talk to the 39 Mang’ati whom he eventually decreed that they should be released this morning of 9th of June, 1968. Their names are attached with this letter.284

The decree meant possibly the biggest ethnically-based release in Tanzanian history.285 Apart from the 39 youths in Singida, 140 Datoga youths in Dodoma were released on the 15th of June 1968, and many more around the same time from the Mbulu and Arusha prisons. In total, more than 300 Datoga youths were released. This ended the government disciplinary approach, the results of which had been significant disturbance of the Datoga family life and economy. The removal of the youths, the defenders of the family had created difficult adjustment for the already shattered Datoga communities. The consequences of more than three months incarceration, where Datoga mingled with “real” prisoners, may have had long-term effects that will be preserved in the memory of all those were caught up in the web of state-coordinated violence.

4.2 Ujamaa and the Sedentarization of the Datoga: The Long Term Process

Kawawa convened another meeting in Singida on the 6th of June 1968 to introduce a new strategy, this time to settle the Datoga as a means of ending the ethnic killings. In the meeting the government sought to address four issues. The first was a review of the Datoga pastoralists’ arrest. Second was complying with the villagization process in the context of reforming the rural land policy of the Datoga. Third was the establishment of state-funded dairy farms in conflict villages. And fourth was the settlement and creation of Datoga pastoralist villages.286 Each of these issues will be addressed below.

The meeting in Singida brought together nine members of parliament from the districts of Singida, Iramba, and Mbulu, the Minister for Internal Affairs, the inspec-

tor General of Police for Tanzania, Regional and Area Commissioners (later District Commissioners), and Regional and District Police Commissioners (RPCs & OCDs). Additionally, some representative members of the ruling party (TANU), Regional and District Rural Development Officers, Prison Officers, and District Magistrates also attended. The total number of those attending the Singida meeting was 31 people; all of them political elites.

With regard to the Datoga arrests, the government tried to review the disciplinary camp approach in a bid to change tactics. There were complaints that although regions like Arusha were addressing the Datoga problem, the operation destroyed their plans, arguing that “though the problem of the Mang’ati is familiar among us, the arrests were haphazard and destructive. The arrests were carried into our administrative areas without information and all our plans on the Datoga that were in process were spoiled.”287 There were also complaints that the plans to arm the agricultural communities bordering the Datoga were contradictory to the philosophy of peaceful co-existence, which made the government not just a mediator of the conflicting communities, but part of the problem. The administrators from Arusha were especially critical and opposed the way the government had carried out the operation. Furthermore, addressing the issue solely as ‘Mang’ati’ was criticized as simplistic and misleading because members from Arusha Region complained that “though it is clear that the Mang’ati are criminals, there are many times where the source of conflict is both ways; the people from Singida have a share on the problem. Therefore it was not proper to brand all these as Mang’ati.”288

The review of the Datoga arrests was limited, as members could not ask detailed questions about the arrests. This was partly because the arrests were supported by an arsenal of laws, which ranged from the Preventive Detention Act of 1962 and the Regions and District Commissioners’ Act to the Magistrate Court Act (1963) (Peter 1997: 119). These laws empowered the Regional and District Commissioners to detain suspects, even on petty thefts, without trial. The Datoga were also victims of these unjust laws. The conclusion of Kawawa’s speech, that the Datoga were criminal, continued to be the guiding message, ironically, the government replicated the ethnic approach that it so deplored.289 Reviews also took little account of the property that the “convicts” had with them when they were arrested. Most had had money, ornaments and/or arms in their possession on arrest, and these items were listed against their names on the arrest records. However, in June 1968, when the names of the released were made public, no money or property of any form was

mentioned in the official government report. This was considered by the Datoga a deliberate government attempt to dispossess them. There were also other accounts asserting that the government arrested the Datoga youths so that “they could take all the cattle from Datoga bomas and send them to other regions” (Interview Mgokoo, 08.01.15).

The second aim of the June 1968 meeting was to discuss and plan the villagization (sedentarization) process of the Datoga within the context of reforming the rural land policy. While the government was wrestling with the problem of the Datoga, nationwide it was also trying to implement the socialist policy it had started experimenting a decade earlier. Ujamaa did not develop in Tanzania as an isolated political and economic event; rather it was the product of more than a decade of an experimental economic policy promoted within the improvement approach (Hydén 1980: 76–80). The age of improvement began in many districts in 1964 with the development of settlement schemes, which were early prototypes of Nyerere’s development initiative based on the village. They aimed at the modernization of agriculture, housing, social services, and collective production by the rural majority. Government Circular Vol. 1 of 1965 issued a Village Settlement Agency which gave power to the Commissioner for Village Settlement in Dar es Salaam to oversee the execution, capital disbursal, and coordination of the scheme. Field Assistants throughout Tanzania assisted the Commissioner, but the program did not match the expectations of the government, and with the Arusha Declaration, the conception of the village as a theatre for transformation would change significantly. The new beginning of the ujamaa policy was manifested in the second Five Year Development Plan for Tanzania. I will discuss this when addressing the settlement plans of the Datoga within ujamaa villages.

The arrests were not a total failure on the part of the government, as they instilled fear amongst Datoga communities. The government was convinced that with the arrests “the Wamang’ati have shown signs of fearing the government and laws, something which was not the case in the past.” Months following the mass arrests, there were no police reports that mentioned any murders related to ethnic tensions. However, after the camp strategy to incorporate the Datoga into the surrounding communities by force had failed, a new project was still needed. According to Ka-

290 Most of the letters which were dispatched to different Police Regional Commissioners never included a list of possessions which the convicted Datoga were required to be returned on release. Another example is a letter that declared the release of 208 prisoners: “I have the honour to bring before you the names of 208 former convicts who have been declared free today 11.6.68 by the decree/command of Mr. R.M Kawawa, the Second Vice President.” DNRC, location 5/4/05, box 67, file DO/1/182: Police Reports.


293 Majadiliano ya Bunge (Hansard), 1968, 530.

294 DNRC, location 5/4/05, box 67, file DO/1/182: Police Reports.
wawa, the new strategy would be one that overhauled the entire Datoga culture, their economy, and their landscape. The government, its agencies, the party, and the Village Committees would organize the process of the overhaul. These were organized under the blanket philosophy of *ujamaa* and self-reliance. The Ministry of Regional Administration and Rural Development pronounced the grand project in July 1968 when discussion over how to suppress “the bad culture” of the Datoga/Mang’ati was at its strongest. The government’s standpoint is worth quoting:

The government is trying hard to suppress this behaviour directly or indirectly, it urges the neighbourliness to live in Ujamaa villages where the Mang’ati will fear to attack them and raid their cattle. Since, the Mang’ati, unlike the Tindiga- know what it means to possess private wealth, they are likely to resist communalism. It means then- that slow and steady approaches are called for. The best way to settle them willingly is through supplying them with enough water for their cattle. First find suitable pastures: then provide them with cattle troughs and dips, improve their pastures.295

The plans show the government’s realization that “changing” the Datoga was to be a gradual coordinated process, unlike the *ad hoc* measures of the camp strategy. It also entailed government supervision and avoided complete alienation of the Datoga from other ethnic communities. As the only agent of that change, the government faced a serious challenge, with the Datoga issue as it also began to view it as an economic burden. On Datoga related problems, the government claimed to have spent 12,000 Tanzanian shillings in 1965, 16,000 shillings in 1966, 20,000/85 shillings in 1967, and 42,412/10 shillings in 1968.296 The 1968 plan included a process of settling the Datoga and their neighbours into villages and transforming their cattle economy by establishing and setting up a steady water supply, improving their pasture, and finally inculcating the ‘*ujamaa*’ ideology into their ways of life: first by practicing grazing together with other neighbouring communities, then setting aside a few head of cattle as communal possessions, and eventually assisted the de-stocking and introduction of agriculture among the Datoga pastoralists.297 These pronouncements were not simple tasks of commands and responses, rather they represented the beginning of a process of negotiation, compulsion, dispossession, and the marginalization of Datoga through state-led land grabbing on a massive scale.

Prior to the June 1968 meeting, the Regional Commissioners for Singida and Arusha assembled a joint commission of seven people to set the agenda for the problem of the Datoga. Reverend T. Mussa headed the Commission and its members included Chief A.B. Dodo (Member of parliament (M.P.), Mbulu South), A.M. Nalingigwa (M.P., Iramba East), S. Sabida (District Chairperson Mbulu), and S.K.

296  *Majadiliiano ya Bunge* (Hansard), 1968, 530.
Mtinda (M.P., Singida East). Others included J.T. Tayari (Executive Officer, Mbulu), and F.W. Mtibili (Area Secretary, Singida, secretary of the meeting).

This small committee revisited the British colonial ban on perceived provocative ethnic elements and recommended to the government that by the end of 1968 the following cultural aspects of the Datoga should be banned permanently: (a) the dressing styles [of the Datoga women] which enticed men, (b) a culture of awarding cows to men who have killed a fierce animal or human being from another “tribe,” (c) walking with a spear, (d) a culture of detesting farming, and (e) a culture that demands a man should kill a fierce animal to get a bride.

Apart from these targets, the government also outlined a five-point roadmap in the settlement process of the Datoga. First, the government promised a radical measure to deal with the Datoga as an ethnic community. Second, it outlined how to change the pattern of Datoga settlements to *ujamaa* coordinated villages that had better social services. Third, it sought to increase security in all the Datoga villages to ensure that there was no ethnic violence. Fourth, it aimed to initiate development projects in conflict villages. Lastly, the government aimed to build a new culture of neighbourliness across communities in Mbulu and Singida.

The British had already attempted most of these settlement plans by 1931, in addition to ideas of banning the so-called bad cultures. Some of the Datoga cultures that both the British and the post-colonial government were not happy with were key to the community itself. For example, the demand that the community should stop walking with a spear was equivalent to demonizing an emblem of the society. Why, for instance, was the carrying of a spear and other arms by Maasai not considered a threat, but it was when carried by a Datoga? On the 9th of May 1968 a question was raised in the Tanzania National Parliament that queried the government’s silence on Maasai resistance to adopting “modern” clothing.

For the Maasai, having political representation in the house of parliament proved beneficial. Apart from endorsing the old British ban of some Datoga cultural traits, the 1968 Committee took what it regarded as a wider approach, completely departing from the British policies toward the Datoga, from 1968 onward the government sought to devise a policy which would transform the economy of the Datoga through modern agriculture and animal husbandry.

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301 The discussion hinged on what was reported along the border between Kenya and Tanzania, where the Maasai from Kenya amassed to protest against what was called the forced ‘modernisation’ of the Tanzanian Maasai. What the Kenyan Maasai were unhappy with were rumours that the Tanzanian government was announcing a complete abolition of the traditional Maasai ways of dressing. In a response, however the government stressed it would continue with the process but the issue of arms was completely off the agenda.
Among the recommendations were instructions for a direct change of the use of land settled by the Datoga along the borders of Singida and Mbulu. The committee argued that the Datoga land could be put to better use, including farming, modern animal husbandry, and the creation of Datoga villages. The committee proposed a number of plans in the Mang’ati Village program that embraced an uncompromising strategy of partitioning the Datoga landscape to allow other communities and the government a share of the land. The committee claimed that, “in the entire Mang’ati area agriculture and animal husbandry can better flourish. The soil is fertile and productive. In order to change the culture and customs of the Mang’ati, the government should from 1968 put development plans that will push for modernisation of the Mang’ati.” These “modernisation” projects hinged on the complete partition of the Datoga land and living spaces: by proposing the Datoga to become farmers, the committee was actually proposing the alienation of large tracts of their land. For example, the committee suggested that Basuto in Mbulu “should be cleared and distributed to both agricultural and pastoral communities. While areas like Gehandu, Gendabi and Balangida Lal in Mbulu district should clear between 10,000 acres each for farming and 20,000 acres for pastoralists.” The same division of land was proposed on the Singida side, and included the Datoga villages of Mudida, Makuro, Kidarafa, and Ngimu. Here it was advised that a total of 150,000 acres were to be given as government state farms. For the committee, the allocation of big government farms on the borders between Singida and Mbulu could create a buffer zone between the two districts and therefore deter any likelihood of future conflicts.

The Creation of Datoga Villages

On the 2nd and 6th of June 1968, Kawawa in his several meetings about the Datoga embraced the recommendations of the Small Committee. Until then the villagization programme, meaning the movement of people into state planned villages had been a gradual and voluntary process. However, Kawawa’s statement made the settlement of the Dataga into villages was to be “immediate and compulsory.” Kawawa clearly asserted that the government strategy to establish Datoga settlements was to be administered under the Ministry of Land, Housing and Water because they had a long history of engaging with people in collective settlement. Kawawa further ar-
argued that a settlement of this nature should be simple and inexpensive and that the government should refrain from promising to assist with the construction of Datoga houses and providing food supplies. Instead, under the command of the regional commissioners, the Datoga should take full responsibility of the movement to the villages. The government pledged to contribute to the building of health centres and schools. Kawawa and the members of the meeting rejected the recommendation that insisted on arming neighbouring communities and creating a Datoga youth camp, which they argued would be counterproductive to the settlement programme.

From April and July 1968 the government brought discussions of the villagization programme of the Datoga to the implementation stage.\(^{307}\) However, the Datoga were completely disregarded in the process of planning their spaces of production. In addition, discussions from the Datoga side on the viability of the settlements seemed not to have been taken seriously by the government. On the 17\(^{th}\) of June 1968, when a team of planners met to assess the viability of the project, more villages were added to the future settlement of the Datoga. For instance it was argued that “besides those areas mentioned in the outline to the minutes of the meeting held by the 2\(^{nd}\) Vice President at Katesh recently, the chairman knew of other villages which might prove suitable for settling the Wamang’ati or for Ujamaa villages. Those villages are Singa, Kinampundu, Ikolo, Mpambaa and Kidarafa.”\(^{308}\) Agricultural communities, many of which were frequently engaged in conflicts, had already settled in these villages. Even though the government recognized the impossibility of bringing the Datoga into these villages, the formalization of the process went ahead. Indeed, effectively adding more Datoga with their estimated 28,000 cattle in areas with few bore holes and wells was one of the biggest miscalculations by the government.\(^{309}\)

By analysing the processes of government involvement in the creation of the Datoga villages, several weaknesses can be delineated that ultimately impacted on the entire effort. First, though the settlement of the Datoga was occurring within the sentiments and enthusiasms of Ujamaa, the government saw the settlement of the Datoga as a means to ending the “Mang’ati Murders.” Structurally, the government programmes were driven by the conviction that they were settling convicts into villages, rather than pastoralists with their own set of grievances. Second, Datoga involvement in the process of planning their future settlement was entirely absent. For instance, the alienation of their pastoral lands as government farms was barely agreed on by the Datoga. As a result, the Datoga village projects were resisted because of this lack of involvement. Third, the allocation of Datoga villages barely considered existing social and economic realities. As discussed in Chapter 3, Singida and Mbulu were historically hot beds of ethnic conflict motivated by territorial claims. As discussed, such claims were sources of tensions which throughout the British pe-


\(^{308}\) DNRC, location 5/4/05, box 67, file SR/L.30/1: Mkutano na Makamu wa Pili wa Rais.

\(^{309}\) DNRC, location 5/4/05, box 67, file SR/L.30/1: Mkutano na Makamu wa Pili wa Rais.
period remained unresolved. Consideration of such historical realities in the allocation and resettlement of the Datoga could have been a huge milestone in resolving such rifts between the communities. Fourth, the government settlement plan happened to the traumatized communities of the Datoga. The massive arrests executed by the government between February and April 1968 and the resultant imprisonment of Datoga youths left a negative feeling about the government. As such, the process of settlement was taking place among people who were suspicious, contemptuous, and apprehensive of the government actions.

Despite the pitfalls in planning, in 1970 the government did form some Datoga villages. This came at a major cost to Datoga land ownership. The settling of the Datoga was pushed by the desire to end the “Mang’ati murders,” resulting in little concern for the rights of the Datoga to their ancestral land for pastoral activities. 310 There are three cases that demonstrate why the villagization of the Datoga differed significantly from what was happening in the entire country as a result of the Arusha Declaration. In 1970, with the registration of *ujamaa* villages in Singida and Mbulu as cooperative societies, these sites officially became both centres for big enterprises and political powerhouses. In 1974 the forced villagization of the Datoga became official. The villages were empowered as local government, inhabitants were required to produce for them and work in *ujamaa* cooperative farms. In Singida and Arusha Regions, the exercise of forcing the Datoga into these villages was aimed at removing them from their ancestral land so that the government could confiscate the land. Two cases in particular highlight the extremity of government land grabbing: these were the Diagwa Cattle Ranch Project (D.C.P) and the National Food Corporation (N.A.F.C.O)/Canadian Wheat Production Programmes (C.W.P). Together they seized more than 50 per cent of the fertile and rich pastoral land of the Datoga with little compensation. 311 Each of these projects will be discussed separately.

The D.C.P. was the idea of the small committee members who proposed that a sizable amount of land should be distributed to small agricultural producers and state farms. Amidst the heated discussions about economic development in post-1967, each district and region formed cooperative societies. The government also allowed private enterprises to co-exist with those of the government. Using the early planning of the committees, the government seized about 10,000 hectares (23,400 acres) of Datoga land in areas bordering Singida and Mbulu. 312 The preparation for seizing the land began in 1970 when a Greek-born investor C. Kikkides and his company Sagara Cattle Ranch initiated the D.C.P with the full support of the government through the N.A.F.C.O.; a government agency which would become the major force in the early years of running the project. NAFCO assisted in the initial

312 DNRC, location 5/4/05, box 67, file SR/L.30/1: *Mikutano na Makamu wa Pili wa Rais*. 
clearing of the forests and demarcating and erecting poles for fencing. In the budding stages of the project, the government tried to run the scheme as a joint cooperative firm where each neighbouring community was required to contribute about 1000 *mitamba* (heifer cattle). For the first four years of the project, local pastoralists within the ranch-designated areas were tolerated, as long as the land was not in use by D.C.P. Indeed, until 1974 the ranch used between 400 and 500 acres around the camps, and the rest were utilised for grazing by pastoralists.\(^\text{313}\)

The irony that the Datoga were trespassers in their own ancestral land led to complaints by the Datoga, hence a conflict with the state. Until 1974 the D.C.P. was struggling: apart from the infrastructure that was in place, the project was not fully operational. Therefore, through NAFCO the government temporarily leased the responsibilities of running the ranch to the Sagara Ranch project.\(^\text{314}\) The Sagara Ranch refused co-existence and demanded the government evict the Datoga and the agricultural communities that were still in the project area. Mr. Kikkides complained to the government that:

> Diagwa is an ideal place for cattle ranching, but is full up with Wamang’aties [sic.] (approximately 200 bomas\(^\text{315}\)) are in the ranch mostly Wamang’ati also Wanyaturu and Wambulu. Apparently as I found have never gone out of the ranch…insisting that they will stay besides the 4 Ujamaa villages created around the ranch.\(^\text{316}\)

The Datoga resisted the eviction by refusing to be settled into the *ujamaa* villages and started fighting back against the land grabbing “by strongly opposing the idea of vacating the area and say[ing] that they have never promised anything in the past for vacating the areas”\(^\text{317}\). The Datoga defied the government and fought the injustices by obstructing the progress of the project. One report added: “Since the time NAFCO left the ranch, a lot of damages were caused by the Mangaties [sic.] and others to the buildings, dips and other properties by breaking doors and windows, removing and tearing corrugated iron, tearing ceiling boards, breaking timber of buildings


\(^{315}\) *A boma* is an enclosure made of thorns or poles which encircle a Datoga homestead. One *boma* is normally composed of different yards for the grown up cattle and another smaller yard for calves. Within the *boma* are houses; depending on the wealth of the homestead, it may include the house for the father and his wives, children, grandchildren and other relatives from the extended family. On average, a *boma* can have between five (less wealthy families) to 20 members (in a relatively wealthier family).

\(^{316}\) DNRC, location 5/3/04, box 30, file C.17/313: A letter from Sagara ranch to the General Manager, SIRECU, 2nd April, 1974.

and uprooting border marks.”\textsuperscript{318} All these were indications that the Datoga were completely unwilling to accept any company occupying their land.\textsuperscript{319} This resistance jeopardized the functioning of the ranch and resulted in the Sagara Company complaining that the investment was a complete disaster which as a result of sabotage by the Datoga. In March 1974 the Sagara Company relinquished the running of the program. Still determined, the government gave the ranch to Singida Regional Cooperative (S.I.R.E.C.O.), which invested 2 million Tanzanian shillings of borrowed money from the Tanzania Rural Development Bank (TRDB).\textsuperscript{320} Before the money was given, the bank required S.I.R.E.C.U. to declare its assets and also demanded that the Datoga vacate the land so that the borders could be discernible. After handing over of the ranch the conflict resurfaced for a few days. Under the command of Didi Magayuka, 40 Datoga pastoralists invaded the ranch demanding to know “how was it their land was being taken up without their own wishes and threaten[ing] to fight for it.”\textsuperscript{321} The SIRECU called for TANU involvement, which led to the police driving the Datoga out of the farm.

The T.C.W.P. is another example of a project that destroyed the economic spaces of the Datoga in the plains of Manyara. In partnership with N.A.F.C.O., the project was conceived in 1968 with the intention of resolving ethnic tensions and putting Datoga land into the hands of “better” users.\textsuperscript{322} Another reason connected to this project was an effort to make Tanzania self-sufficient in wheat production. To pursue both goals, the government isolated 70,000 hectares for seven wheat farms along Lake Basuto and Balangida Lalu. This was one of its biggest multi-national economic projects in terms of capital investment, manpower, and spatial scope. In total, the project area took 12 per cent of the districts land and affected more than 50 per cent of the Datoga grazing land (Lane 1993: 5). The N.A.F.C.O. wheat farms took the Datoga land with little or no compensation, resulting in a battle between the Datoga and the T.C.W.P. over control of the plains of the Basuto (Lane 1993: 5–7). The commission had concluded that the best way to settle the Datoga was to bring them into \textit{ujamaa} villages and alienate the entire land by sub-dividing the Basuto and part of the land in Gehandu, Gendabi, Balangida Lalu, and Dirimu.\textsuperscript{323}

\textsuperscript{322} DNRC, location 5/5/02, box 90, file SR/P10: \textit{Matata ya Mang’ati}.
\textsuperscript{323} DNRC, location 5/5/02, box 90, file SR/P10: \textit{Matata ya Mang’ati}.
The Impact of the Sedentarization Projects on the Datoga

The misfortune of being a Datoga in the era of *ujamaa* is apparent when taking into account the consequences of the government initiatives in their settlement. One of the most significant impacts of the projects was the decrease in grazing spaces for the Datoga. In an effort to abolish ethnic tensions in the border region between Singida and Arusha, the government created another perpetual economic disruption, which escalated the mobility of the Datoga even more. The villagization programme of the Datoga did not address the pressing issue of the need for grazing land. Apart from the large-scale confiscation of Datoga lands, the government encouraged other institutions like villages, prison headquarters, and regional cooperative unions to develop similar ranches. By 1977, there were more than 33 government-funded ranches covering the once open grasslands in the Singida Region alone.324 These ranches imposed a great deal of pressure on the existing pastures, boreholes, and seasonal pasture regimes (Lane 1991: 42–44). The presence of the ranches heightened the tensions, as pastoralists were increasingly viewed as potential competitors for the land resources. There were significant discrepancies between the rhetoric of government modernization of animal husbandry and the actual management of the government ranches.

The sedentarization of the Datoga pastoralists was a failure. Placing the Datoga in *ujamaa* villages without coherent policy on pastoralists was mere rhetoric (see also in Mattee and Shem: 5). The definition of a socialist village as appears in government reports is agriculturally oriented, so cattle are only mentioned as long as they supplemented the ideal *ujamaa* village (Mattee and Shem: 6). Nyerere considered the village cooperative union the main source of the socialist reform and therefore the most important and at one point was quoted saying, “the urban areas can go to hell” (Ibhawoh and Dibua 2003: 67). To better understand this argument, I will analyse the case of the Hadzabe, who are similar to the Datoga and were also considered anti-modern. In fact, the government utilised the experiences of the settlement of the Hadzabe to inform the sedentarization of the Datoga. Between 1945 and 1959, in several villages surrounding Eyasi Basin in Yaeda-Chini, the British first settled the Hadzabe. The Tindiga Scheme, as it was popularly known, aimed at settling the Hadzabe and initiating the cultivation of different food crops to ensure self-sustainability in food production.325 It is said that the scheme, which was initially a success story, was destroyed in 1959 because an elderly Mnyisanzu man poisoned a local beer and killed seven Hadzabes, including a pregnant woman.326 Following this incident, the Hadzabe deserted the villages and retreated to their pre-1945 settlements. In 1964 the government revived the resettlement of the Hadzabe into two villages in Yaeda-Chini and Endamaghan. By 1967 the population of these villages had

increased and the Hadzabe had started intermarrying with neighbouring societies. Soon the Hadzabe were divided between those who had assimilated into the village and those who had not. One of the early impacts of the villagization of the Hadzabe was the encroachment on their land by other communities.

Following the government’s first forced sedentarization of the Datoga, in 1968, the government formed five villages close to the D.C.P. ranch, somehow a replica to the Tindiga scheme. The aim of settling the Datoga in villages was taken as a process of putting the Datoga close to carriers of modernization – the agricultural communities. However, the problem with these villages was that the land was supposed to be shared between the Datoga and agricultural communities, who had increasingly populated the areas after the 1968 Datoga round up. Since competition between grazing and agricultural activities remained high, the Datoga were detested in such villages. Indeed, there were many incidents of farming communities forcing the Datoga out of these villages due to past mistrust. Apart from such attempts to establish mixed villages (villages where Datoga and other agricultural communities living together) which were mostly rejected because of these tensions, the government established two exclusively Datoga villages, namely Endash and Dominik. The two villages on the border of Mbulu, Iramba, and Dirima were the government’s first experiments with Datoga-only villages. In these villages the government set the following priorities:

In these Mang’ati should be forced to do farming in their gardens. It is not going to be voluntary in migrating to these government villages, it is a government decree and all should (Datoga) adhere to. It is a must that all these villages should be under twenty four hours police surveillance so that the Wamang’ati cannot leave the villages as they wish.

In these villages the government aimed to bring modern development facilities, provide education, and “teach” the Datoga better methods of animal husbandry and agriculture. The government budget was a total of Tsh 106,979.45 for such projects. These vijiji vipya (new villages) had veterinary service buildings that had been constructed in Mudida and Sambaru for a cost of 89,243.15. The Singida Regional report of December 1977 entitled “Miradi ya Wabarbaig (projects for the Barabaig)” emphasized some of the developments of the project. In an effort to show that sedentarization was a success story, the district attempted to report the number

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The State, *Ujamaa* and the Sedentarization of the Datoga

of Datoga residing in the villages. In 1978 the report indicated that there were five Datogahomes in Mudida, 45 in Diagwa, and 20 in Gairu and Misuna/ Ngimu. However, a much larger Datoga population refused to stay in such villages. The patronage system of the government and its officials was an additional reason for the Datoga’s unwillingness to stay in the villages. Another important influence of the sedentarization was the intensification of animal husbandry, with the government arguing that traditional pastoralism was incapable of meeting the demands of a new nation. The 1968 Government Commission demanded changes to Datoga practices of animal husbandry. For the government, the line in the development of livestock improvement program began in the early years after independence with the establishment of so-called “improved Bull centres.” A report produced by the Regional Livestock Development for Singida between 1972 and 1981 reflected the government thinking:

> It was known since independence that the type of local breed (short Horned zebu) which are kept by the local people, though seem to be good when we take into account that they are more tolerant to various conditions, but their growth and weight by nature is very limited and that even if you put a lot of efforts in raising them in modern way, they will almost remain the same, that is why we in the Department of Livestock were forced to change the situation.

The change that the officer envisioned included, but was not limited to, *ufugaji wa kisasa* (modern animal husbandry). As suggested by the government, this meant “trying to engage with the vital needs of life like the needs for enough animal fodder (pasture and grazing spaces), water, and collective health and transforming our traditional cattle into better animals.” Singida received 78 Bulls for all of its villages and the villagers were required to hire the bulls whenever the need arose.

Two cases that exemplify the government’s efforts to modernise animal husbandry were the Doroto and Mwanga village animal schemes, which were formulated through the World Bank in 1978. The World Bank required each respective village to contribute 20 per cent of the total project costs, in an attempt to engage the com-

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munities. The 20 per cent contribution aimed at giving villagers a sense of ownership and thus creating a willingness to become responsible caretakers of the project. Moreover, as the villages were registered as cooperative societies they were given a full mandate to run the projects. There were significant similarities between the projects. Both represented a substantial commitment of resources as they included more than 50,000 acres in total land allocated. These schemes were a product of the 1968 committees, which sought to modernise animal husbandry and spaces in which traditional pastoralism was organized. A common feature of the two projects was that both were executed in Datoga “frontier” villages with a sizeable number of Datoga pastoralists. An indication that both villages were becoming centres of the modernization process is that the two village animal farms had established offices, housing for the managers, cattle fences, and dips: all of which were necessary attributes of the modernization package. These contrasted with the traditional boma of the pastoralists where such inputs were largely non-existent. In a report submitted to the Prime Minister’s office in May 1979, the purpose of the two projects was outlined as follows:

Singida region has two livestock projects financed by the World Bank, namely Mwanga village ranch and Doroto village ranch. The purpose of the two is to establish a breeding and fattening project in order to raise and improve the standard and economy of the villages. Further the ranches are strategically situated to demonstrate ranching skills to prospective enterprising villages.

Breeding responded to a call made in the 1970s, and it was in line with a general contemptuous attitude towards local cattle. While crossbreeding between the local and modern bulls was very limited, the focus was on fattening the local breeds. This was accomplished by borrowing the approach of the old Tanganyika Packer’s (TP), which bought cattle from the locals and stored them in selected centres before transporting them to consumers in different towns of Tanzania and abroad. From 1947 the TP established fattening centres at Kitaraka village, 20 kilometres from Doroto. By 1980 the Doroto village ranch project had 962 cattle worth more than Tsh 811,320. Meanwhile, the Mwanga village had 528 head of cattle bought with the

The State, *Ujamaa* and the Sedentarization of the Datoga

aid of the Tanzania Rural Development Bank (TRDB). The Mwanga village had additional technological support like a tractor, trailer, and a motorcycle to facilitate communication and work efficiency. Of the two projects, Doroto was considered more successful because it was erected in an area where conflicts were minimal.\(^{346}\)

The sedentarization of the Datoga had further implications for wider national policy on the execution and modality of moving people to planned villages, especially with regard to the use of persuasion or force when implementing the Arusha Declaration and *ujamaa vijjini* policy.

In 1964 the establishment of *ujamaa* in the form of settlement schemes was strangled by Nyerere’s liberal attitude— that is *ujamaa* should be a slow, steady process of education, persuasion, and diplomacy. Apart from being too expensive (in terms of technical, financial aspects and grants committed to villagers in these schemes), since the establishment of such schemes throughout the country, the project remained unpopular and people showed indifference toward joining them. For instance, in 1966, the Regional Commissioner for Singida and his lower officials complained from time to time about the low turnout of villagers in government-assisted settlement schemes. In one instance he was quoted as urging administrators that “people should be sought who are willing to go and settle there.”\(^{347}\) At the time, some of those who had been moved there began abandoning the settlements. Regarding persuading settlers to the schemes, G. O. Mhagama, the then Area Commissioner for Manyoni, witnessed the difficulties of keeping people in such planned settlements. In one letter he offered a gloomy picture of the project:

> When I visited there on August last year, all of them showed unwillingly. I believe that assisting them again this year, might result to the same thing. I therefore asked those who are determined to stay there could give me their names and I would consider their request. Since then I have never seen any and all have left, each one to his own direction.\(^{348}\)

Before the formal collapse of the schemes in 1966, the Commissioner for Village Settlement in Dar es Salaam issued a letter demanding formal knowledge on the number of people living in the settlement schemes. Apart from a few successful schemes in other regions especially the coastal regions surveys in Singida, Tabora, and neighbouring regions showed that an increasing number of people did not support the

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\(^{346}\) A testimony of this is revealed in a letter by the office of the Regional Commission Singida on 17\(^{th}\) May 1980 which stated that “the village had more than 800, with 600 oxen which they expect to sell next year for 2,000 Tsh. So by this they will get more than 1,200,000 Tsh. That means the village will be the next millionaires!” (DNRC, location 5/5/04, box 100, file SR/R 30/29: Singida: Monthly and Annual Progress Report – *Vijiji vyaa Ujamaa: Taarifa ya safari. Kurembelea miradi ya mifugo Manyoni*)


\(^{348}\) Ibid.
government’s modernization agenda. What was the implication of this lack of support on the wider national development initiative? Firstly, scholars who have studied the development paradigms for Tanzania frequently fail to appreciate the pre-Arusha Declaration efforts in building rural socialism.\textsuperscript{349} Tanzania’s socialist beginnings were different from what came to characterise \textit{ujamaa} after 1967. The shift from settlement schemes to \textit{ujamaa vijijini} was a result of resistance from the local population rather than the ingenuity of politicians. Secondly, it was a lesson that the government drew out of the failure of the Settlement Schemes and how then the \textit{msako} gave the government a new strategy – especially the use of force. During his engagement with the Datoga problem, for the first time Kawawa changed tactics – from persuasion and diplomacy to coercion and compulsion – as the best method to push people into \textit{ujamaa} villages.\textsuperscript{350} The government, through the TANU Youth League, the Police Force, Regional Commissioners and Ministries of Interior and Regional Development, entertained and tolerated the use of excessive violence to enforce settlement. Indeed, the government adopted the use of force nationwide, culminating in forced evictions across the country from traditional villages into “planned” \textit{ujamaa} villages in 1974.

The sedentarization programme was responsible for the scattering of the Datoga all over the country. Until 1968, the Datoga were still living in the villages and regions they had settled in after the first migrations of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century. The failure of the government programme saw an increasing spread of the Datoga first all over Singida, followed by a massive migration to Mbeya after 1977. Thus, through this scheme, instead of sedentarizing the Datoga, the government through land grabbing forced them to migrate into different regions.

\section*{4.3 Conclusion}

This chapter addressed the Datoga history along the Singida–Mbulu border in post-colonial Tanzania, while particularly emphasizing three issues of concern to the Datoga in regards to ethnic tensions. The first matter was the return of the problem of “murders” in the border region of Singida and Arusha between 1965 and 1968. The government interpretation of these murders as entirely Datoga/Mang’ati produced would ultimately affect the Datoga’s settlements, economy, and identity. After 1968, the conflict became highly politicised and drastically changed the identity of the Datoga, as it resulted in an unprecedented government decision to apply collective punishment to the entire Datoga population. The imprisonment of all Datoga youths as perpetrators of the ethnic violence had far-reaching consequences. Although the


impact of the imprisonment on individual Datoga and their families was not discussed in depth, this chapter indicated that collective punishment was ineffective in the settling social discords that existed, especially ethnic tensions of historical nature as that of the Datoga and their neighbours. Irrespective of whether the Datoga were sources of conflict or not, the wholesale punishment created resentment. This chapter also addressed the large-scale post-colonial development dilemmas, particularly the hastened nature of post-colonial theoretical approaches to issues of nationalism, modernization, and rural economy. On the one hand, the post-colonial development paradigm projected the building of a Tanzanian path where rural socialism was embedded within a larger project of making the village the main theatre of development. Behind such efforts were the political elites who constantly bolstered the notion of top-down development engineering. The sedentarization of the Datoga between 1965 and 1968, just four years after formal independence, largely came as a surprise and as a test to newly independent Tanzania regarding how it would develop. This coincided with the announcement of the Arusha Declaration, which advocated for a significant departure from the colonial model of development. When it came to addressing the Datoga, negotiating between the ideals of the Arusha Declaration and pitfalls resulting from ethnic conflict did not lead to the destruction of “tribal” sentiment.

The last theme that this chapter dealt with was the limits of the sedentarization of the pastoral landscape. A limitation of the program is that it hinged on the nature of thinking about the village and its meaning, structure, and economy. The key economic activity the 1967 Arusha Declaration assigned to the villages was farming and this attitude embedded an agricultural bias in subsequent state projects. Pastoralism was definitely anathema, which to state policies, as was the so-called “bad culture” that the Datoga were pressured to abandon by the government. The creation of Datoga settled villages with production modelled along agricultural lines fundamentally undermined the entire Datoga spaces of production because the means and the ends of settling the Datoga were marked by a lot of contradictory decisions. For example, forced settlement began with violence, misappropriation of cattle, and massive land grabbing. Given these decisions, the resulting settlements were a failure – imposed on a hostile people in a hostile setting.
By 1984 Nyerere’s presidency was coming to an end. This end was however characterized by significant economic decline and falling agricultural production. This resulted in a decrease in government expenditures on social services and a decline in the functioning of government service delivery, decreasing investments in rural agriculture, and a lack of consumer goods. In 1984 Tanzania also witnessed a gradual acceptance of neoliberal economic policies, which created pressure on the existing *ujamaa* economic framework. In late 1985, under the new leadership of President Ally Hassan Mwinyi, the government began negotiations with the World Bank and established an economic recovery programme under the supervision of the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP),\(^{351}\) indicating that the country was moving towards a capitalist economic system and away from the *ujamaa* policy. *Ujamaa* was officially denounced in 1992\(^{352}\) (Msuya 2013, Bashiru, Yahya-Othman & Shivji

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\(^{351}\) The recovery and reform took place in two phases. The first was between 1986 and 1995, when the economy was gradually liberalized, prices were adjusted to market levels, and exchange levels and restrictions on economic activities were lifted. The second phase continued from 1995 onwards, when the economy began growing again, with the stabilization of the private sector and a rise in investment in mining, industry, and service delivery. See more in Nord et al. (2009: 2–10).

\(^{352}\) Scholars of the political history of Tanzania, particularly the rise and fall of the socialist economic path, will agree that the peak of *ujamaa* came with the Arusha Declaration, which was announced in
Tanzania embraced a capitalist economic model (Harrison 2010: 125–42). The impacts of neoliberalism were immediate, and particularly noticeable in the liberalization of land ownership. After 1992 the successive governments, while fighting to restore the economy, actively encouraged the private sector, internal and external investors to invest into different sectors of the economy. The government focused its attention on the urban areas, effectively promoting urban-rural rifts and further marginalizing and economically excluding the poor.353

This chapter explores the dynamics of the Datoga pastoral economy in the face of the economic turbulence and changing government policy in relation to land privatization and infrastructure development. Particular attention is given to the changing ethnic relations in the Singida and Mbulu plains between 1984 and 2012. This chapter will examine the 1984–1987 conflicts between the Datoga of the Wembere plains and the Sukuma agro-pastoralists, emphasizing the origins of the conflicts, the outbreaks of killings, government intervention mechanisms, and Datoga initiatives in negotiating the end to the violence. Additionally, this chapter will address the significant differences between the 1965–1968 conflicts and those that developed in 1984.

5.1 Understanding the People and the Landscape of the Study Area

The complex ethnic relations discussed in this chapter are located in the multifaceted setting of the Wembere valley in Iramba and Singida districts. The difficulty in discussing ethnic relations in the Serengeti ecosystem is the result of the rapidly evolving landscape due to population pressure, conservation and ethnic tensions. A key physical feature of this area is the expansive flood plain resulting from the East African rift system (Mpemba 1993: 64). The depression begins at the foot of the Iramba Plateau in the south and extends north to Lake Eyasi (Balangida Lalu), while the southern end travels up to the Nyahua steppe along the central railway line (Vesey-Fitzgerald 1970: 64–66). The southwest part of the low-lying plain, with

1967. By embracing neoliberal policies in 1986, the country began changing course from the ujamaa ideology. However, this change of course was not made official until February 25th 1991, after a meeting in Zanzibar of the ruling party Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM). Through its chairman President Ally Hassani Mwinyi, some changes in the former doctrine of the Arusha Declaration were announced. Many Tanzanians consider this meeting in Zanzibar as another Azimio (Declaration), which officially buried socialism in Tanzania. The chairman Mwinyi called this new phase Likullin ajallin kitäb (Arabic for “every generation has its book”). See for instance Elias Msuya (2013) in Mwananchi (a Swahili newspaper). See also Bashiru, Yahya-Othman and Shivji (2013: Chapter 4).

353 One of the key characteristics of increasing poverty was low productivity in agriculture. For instance, the share of agriculture to the GDP fell from 29 per cent in 2001 to 24 per cent in 2010. The reason is that while industries were revived and mining boomed, rural agriculture was almost neglected. See this in Economic and Social Research Foundation (ESRF), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and United Republic of Tanzania (2015: 3–4).
its extensive lowland grassland and belts of wooded grassland, connects with more wetlands of Ugalla in the western region of Kigoma. Being lowland plain and close to the rift wall, the plain is characterized by extremes – by drought and by flood (Vesey-Fitzgerald 1970: 66). During the rainy season the plain floods, which makes it a favourable space for rice farming and fishing. In contrast, in the dry season the temperatures soar and the valley are scorched with its grass heavily grazed (Figure 3). The migration of pastoralists following the seasonal water sources and grazing spots is therefore a distinguishing feature of Wembere plain (Mpemba 1993: 65).

Given the expansive nature of the valley, this chapter concentrates on the Singida and Iramba Districts and some bordering villages in Mbulu in the north. To avoid the recent political development of subdivisions of villages, wards, and new districts, this chapter follows the old administrative system that existed prior to 1996, so that the diversity and complexity of the people is contextualized in accordance with local narratives and spaces of the time. In both oral and written sources referring to the plains before 1984, their portrayals of the Wembere plains as exotic and filled with beautiful valleys are prevalent. Such images are particularly strong among the people of Datoga origin, like Giring’oru Mgokoo, who agrees that while growing up in the 1950s, Wembere was revered in Datoga songs as a place of peace, with evergreen valleys and milk that had no people to consume (Interview Mgokoo, 07.01.15). Other Datoga present the valley as solely a Datoga paradise which other communities occasionally visited. This view resonates with narratives by Daudi Kidamala, Aylward Shorter, and Jan Lindström, who offer historical reasons to explain why
other communities avoided the Wembere plains until much later. Kidamala and Shorter consider the plain to be a more recent site in the process of population expansion in the area: an expansion which had been begun in the mid-19th century by the Nyamwezi, Nyiramba, Datoga and Nyaturu, and was marked by a population decline between the 1920s and 1950s as a result of tsetse fly infestation (Kidamala and Danielson 1961: 67–78; Shorter 1972: 210–13). Research conducted by M. N. Mann in 1964 (Mann 1965: 43) indicates that population growth was steady in the lower Wembere and that fishing in Lake Kitangiri, particularly from the late 1950s, brought new communities of fishermen to the plains. In terms of the origins of the “new” immigrants, Mann says that:

The present commercial fishery concerns some 500 fishermen of whom immigrants Wageita (Geita), Jaluo (Lake Victoria), Wagoni [sic.] (Songea), and Wanyasa (Lake Nyasa), comprise a large part; only a few local Wanyiramba take part in the industry. (Mann 1965: 43).

The 500 fishermen who Mann mentions were seasonal migrants, who mostly came during the peak fishing months (May and August), leaving as the intensity of the dry season increased (Mann 1965: 43). Discussions with local people confirm that a large number of people along the Kitangiri Lake are a product of transient migrant populations (Interview Kiula, 18.09.14). Over the years some have found homes along the lake and settled. A recent survey of the villages along the lake shows an increasing number of people in the thread-like villages and fishing camps along the entire 12 kilometre strip bordering Kitangiri Lake (Vesey-Fitzgerald 1970: 64–66). This development shows how the lake contributes to the ethnic configuration of the area. More people are settling in Wembere partly due to the influence of fishing activities. However, the lake is only one factor amongst other developments, many of which came later. As an alkaline lake, Kitangiri had little influence on the pastoralists around it. Although the lake’s physical presence seems domineering, it was rather forces beyond it that would change the configuration of ethnic relations. The increase of other communities in the Wembere valley was also influenced by food shortages in Singida and surrounding districts, the 1984–1987 Datoga–Sukuma conflicts, and changes that resulted from economic changes after 1984. These factors in general created a complex community whose sheer size in numbers changed the ways in which the people of the plain behaved and related to each other.

The Spill out of Food Shortage

It is estimated that between the late 19th century and the end of the British colonial rule in 1961 more than seven severe food shortages occurred across the Singida region (Brooke 1967: 337). Henry Morton Stanley passed through Singida in 1873 and gave the following description:
The Orphans of the Plains

Around the milk-weed hedges that surrounded Ikungu [sic.], the chief’s village, were over a hundred human skulls, while innumerable fragments strewed the vicinity. Inquiring what calamity had occurred, I was told they were the remains of a tribe of Wanyaturu, over 400 strong, who had fled to Ikungu [sic.] from Ituru, in the hope of saving themselves from famine. What articles they had brought with them were soon sold for food, which they consumed, and then they sold their children and their wives, and they had nothing left and died. (Stanley 1890: 445–46)

The famines and food shortages that followed in subsequent years also naturally impacted on the population, the magnitude differed from different sections of the communities to the other. For example, the greatest famines recorded in the history of the area happened from 1919–1920, 1943–1944, and in 1960; each resulting in massive displacement of ethnic communities to neighbouring districts. The analysis presented in this chapter focuses on the famine in 1982–1983. The 1982–1983 famine and food shortage provides insight into how relations of violence, associations, and negotiations between the Datoga and new arrivals to the plains developed until 2012.

The causes of the 1982–1983 famine were both socio-political and climactic (Andersson and Hannan-Andersson 1984: 18). While *ujamaa* in many accounts contributed to improvements on villager’s wellbeing, particularly smallholder farmers, it also brought challenges through villagization (Phillips and Roberts 2011: 77). Noticeable positive results of *ujamaa* were related to education and health. For example, in many villages in Singida, after the 1978 Declaration of Universal Primary Education (UPE), the enrolment of school-age children increased among the Nyaturu communities from less than 39 per cent in 1978 to more than 70 per cent by 1980 (I. D. Thomas 1985: 145). Similar improvements were registered in health, which possibly contributed to the population growth in Singida (I. D. Thomas 1968: 20). The ten years of the *ujamaa* era led to an increase of population of more than 200,000 people, unlike the previous two decades in which indicated that there was an increase of only 20,000 as indicated by the 1948 and 1957 censuses (I. D. Thomas 1968: 20). However, the increase in population was not solely a result of *ujamaa*. The previous censuses were conducted under the British colonial rule, when much of the region was losing its population due to labour migration (Iliffe 1979: 305). With independence, the tribal limitation that was consistent with the British indirect rule was eliminated; thus removing the ‘tribal’ boundaries that limited the expansion into other tribal areas for cultivatable land. This change possibly explains why the years following *ujamaa* were marked by an increased population in the region (I. D. Thomas 1968: 21). However, research by Ingvar Anderson and

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354 UPE was an Education Act passed by the government of Tanzania in 1978. It made education for children aged between seven and 13 compulsory. This act led to the increase of enrolment of school-going children throughout the country (Dennis and Stahley 2012: 47).
Carolyn Hannan in 1985 found that villagization led to a serious food crisis among the Nyaturu communities in Singida:

The last season 82/83 was particularly bad one, but households reported that their food production had been generally reduced after villagisation. As a result of the current low production and the resulting food shortages, many households have already moved out from the centre of the village, and more are planning to do so after the next harvest. (Andersson and Hannan-Andersson 1984: 18)

The observation above shows the relationship between the 1982–1983 food shortages and the *ujamaa* program, which disturbed farmland as a result of resettlement (Andersson and Hannan-Andersson 1984: 18). The situation was especially difficult in the south and east of Singida, where an increase in population and improved living conditions had created greater demand for land. Before 1974–1976, many families had supplemented their income by cultivating the more distant fields called *makungu*. However in 1976, their access to these distant fields was cut off, as many families were moved to *ujamaa* villages. Faced with this challenge, the Nyaturu communities turned to the use of systematic maturing of the arable land each year (Schneider 1966: 261). This technology was dependent on whether the family had cows or goats to fertilize their fields with manure. For the Nyaturu people the distinction between those who manured their farms and those who did not distinctly defined each family as “poor” (without a secure food supply) and relatively “rich” (with a secure food supply). Such differences were discernible in many villages such as Nkoi-ree, Unyianga, and Unyangwe (Andersson and Hannan-Andersson 1984: 19). By 1980 families with more secure food supplies often had more family stability, as they were able feed and send their children to school and marry off their sons. By contrast, poorer families typically had one or two of their family members working as contract labourers in neighbouring regions (Interview Mgandu Mlewa, 15.06.14).

Given the above situation and vulnerable status of some families in southern and eastern Singida, the relatively low rainfall during 1982–1983 resulted in dramatic food shortages. The shortage spread through many parts of Ugogo and neighbouring districts like Kondo and rural Dodoma. The government and international organizations quickly intervened by supplying food to the affected communities, with the most prominent being American corn, which the local people referred to as *mahindi ya yanga*. Apart from the supply of *mahindi ya yanga*, local initiatives were perhaps most vital in ensuring survival. The first reaction to the famine among the Nyaturu was to seek other avenues through which one could survive (Interview

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*Yanga* is a shortened name of a popular football club in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Actually the team is called the Young Africans Sports Club, but because this name is too long and anglicized, fans use the shortened form. The American maize was associated with the club because it was the same colour as their uniforms – yellow.
Mgandu Mlewa, 15.06.14), which initiated a series of inter-ethnic relationships with other communities like the Datoga. Narratives of the food shortage reveal that one of the short-term survival strategies was to migrate to places where there was food. In this respect, considerable migration to the north and south of the Singida region occurred. Similar migrations were also noted among the Sandawe in Kondoa district (Andersson and Hannan-Andersson 1984: 19). Nyaturu male labour migration was a notable outcome of the famine. With tobacco production in Mgandu and neighbouring villages in southwestern Singida District, the local Nyamwezi and Kimbu smallholder tobacco producers became increasingly dependent on labourers from the Nyaturu, which they contracted on an annual basis (Interview Mgandu Mlewa, 15.06.14). Within this verbal contract a male Nyaturu was obliged to prepare the farm and attend to a few house chores. In return the labourer was fed, given some amenities like soap, some money for alcohol, and food to send back home (Interview Mzee Mlewa, 16.06.14). After the harvest and selling of the tobacco, the labourer was paid his balance. With this money some Nyaturu families bought cattle and expanded their production capacity.

The movements of the Nyaturu, particularly to the north and south of Singida, began in the late 1970s and increased in frequency after 1983 (Interview Mgandu Mlewa, 15.06.14). The expansion of these small farmers brought with it a lot of disturbances, especially given the land conflicts in the borders between Singida and Mbulu (which I discussed earlier). It is important to note that before the 1982–1983 food shortage, the expansion of the Nyaturu into other ethnic spaces had been limited and insignificant. One of my interviewees summarizes one of the reasons for this:

Ethnic borders between the Datoga in Itigi were strictly drawn in previous agreements. Such borders were recognized by the British government, and later strongly enforced by the local tribal communities in post-independence. In many cases, the Nyaturu and Datoga or some other communities stayed in their ‘countries’ – that’s how we lived. (Interview Mabochi, 08.01.15) (Author’s translation from Nyaturu)

The question of separate settlements as noted in the statement relates to the southern Datoga, commonly known as Wataturu by their neighbours. The borders between the Datoga groups in this part of Singida were contested but settled amicably through mkutano wa hadhara (public meetings). In one public meeting Mabochi recounts how the two communities encountered each other to discuss ethnic boundaries without the presence of the government. His memories focus on meetings prior to 1980 when representatives from the Nyaturu and Datoga met in the Gurungu village, eight kilometres north of Itigi town. Upon reaching the meeting point, the two ethnic groups “each sat on the grass, separated from each other by the Singida-Mbeya road. The discussion raged all day long, until it was decided” (Interview Mabochi, 08.01.15). The conflict concerned the extension of Nyaturu power and their pres-
ence in what was considered “Datoga country.” Although the government always claimed that people were free to migrate anywhere in the republic, informal agreements kept each community apart (The Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania 1977, art. 1a). However, things began to change as a result of the 1982–1983 famine. For example, the role of the government cassava farm in Bangayega village west of Singida in Manyoni District is one among the forces which stirred change in ethnic interactions in Singida. As one of *mjamaa’s* cooperative works, opened so that all people could come and dig cassava (Interview Mnyakongo, 04.01.15). This farm as argued by Mabochi (Interview Mabochi, 08.01.15), Elieza Mgokoo (Interview Mgokoo, 07.01.15) and Mlewa “brought all people from all over central Tanzania and some even decided to stay so as to continue benefiting from the access to free food – and eventually started small gardens for maize production” (Interview Mgangdu Mlewa, 15.06.14). As the food shortage continued, migration increased and the ethnic “boundary” issue began to be forgotten.

The Datoga–Sukuma Conflict, 1984–1987

A profound moment in the recent history of ethnic relations of the Datoga and other communities in central Tanzania is the ethnic clash with the Sukuma from the regions of Shinyanga and Tabora in the Wembere plains in the Iramba District in the Singida Region from 1984 to 1987. The Datoga describe this as having been “like ethnic cleansing, (with the) total annihilation of the Datoga in the plains by other big ethnic communities, particularly the Wasukuma” (Interview Hodi-Hodi, 20.09.14). The catalyst of what would later become the largest Datoga hunt in the plains began on May 23rd 1984 in Mwamalole village in the west of the Wembere plains in the Shinyanga Region. The incident, in Daniel Ndagala’s words, “let loose the ‘unmaking’” (Ndagala 1991: 78) of the Datoga by the Sukuma.

Ndagala further details what happened in May 1984:

The Sukuma side of the story has it that on the 19/5/1984, 680 cattle, 4 donkeys, 30 goats and 20 sheep were stolen and one herdsman killed in Mwamalole village. Following that incident the village defense group collected near Mwamalole village. They waited there from the 20th to the 22nd of 1984 while preparing themselves to enter the Datoga area as the latter were believed to have stolen the livestock. On the evening of 22/5/1984 the Sukuma who had added up to several hundred were advised to disperse and leave the matter to the police. As it was getting dark most people decided to spend the night there. The following morning a group of Datoga ambushed them and killed 48 people. (Ndagala 1991: 79)

The narrative asserts that the Datoga invaded their agro-pastoralist neighbours to seek revenge on the Sukuma for the loss of their cattle and other small livestock like goats and sheep. Initially, the Datoga were triumphant in the battles against their
neighbours. The Datoga were better organized and thus the Sukuma, though larger in number, found it difficult to defeat them (Ndagala 1991: 79; Interview Kiula, 18.09.14). However, the Datoga victory was temporary. Afterwards, a single incident in Mwamalole galvanized and joined together the Sukuma and other agro-pastoralists against what they considered the common enemy, the Datoga. As Ndagala notes “the response was tremendous. Datoga stock were stolen or killed whenever and wherever possible by Sukuma, and Iramba armed groups formed specifically to kill Datoga; Datoga houses were looted, people beaten-up or killed.” (Ndagala 1991: 79). Apart from the Mwamalole incident, there is no official record of the number of people that died between 1984 and 1987. Local narratives estimate the number to be more than 150 people (Interview Ndagala, 20.01.15). Understanding this conflict requires a genuine interrogation of the circumstances that shaped Datoga relations with other agro-pastoralists up to 1984. A dominant narrative in the plains is that competition for ownership of resources, particularly cattle, was critical to the beginning of the struggle. Speaking with individuals like Joseph Kiula, Hodi Hodi, and Ndagala, I gathered that they typically viewed the entire ethnic tensions as having been promulgated by cattle rustling. Ndagala says that the ethnic tensions in the plains potentially resulted from the rise of cattle prices between 1981 and 1986. For instance, he shows that in many regions, especially those bordering Kenya, cattle prices rose from Tsh. 1,500 (approximately one Tsh. to 19 US Dollar by 1986 exchange rates) to more than Tsh. 8,900 in 1986 (Ndagala 1991: 79; Talle 1999: 107). The price rise made the demand for cattle incredibly high, and thus, cattle rustling became linked to cross-border trading between Tanzania and Kenya. Rising cattle prices also led to an increase in cattle rustling, following exactly the rising prices (Ndagala 1991: 79; Interview Ndagala, 20.01.15). The dire situation was compounded by the economic crisis, with a lack of basic consumer goods like soap and cooking oil pushed a whole set of individuals into the cattle trade and rustling (Interview Hodi-Hodi, 20.09.14).

Ndagala has recently added that “the entire thing connected to cattle theft was infused with very complex identity related issues” (Interview Ndagala, 20.01.15). The identity of who was a thief was socially constructed in the plain. In many cases ethnicity was used by agro-pastoralists to target and kill the Datoga, with cattle raiders also using the prevalent stereotype to benefit from the conflict. For example, the identification of individuals by the colour of their dress was a technique of isolating who was a thief and who was not. The Sukuma preferred “green cloth, on top of another piece of clothing, while Barabaig wore pink or violet cloth, other Datoga groups preferred black cloth with copper ornaments, the Iramba people wore trousers, shirts and other dresses, and finally the Maasai were identified with red or blue cloth” (Ndagala 1991: 78). As the conflict continued some other raiders who did not belong to one of these ethnic groups used the existing stereotypes concerning clothing to raid all the communities using guns. Exploiting the economic crisis such raiders sometimes contracted the police to assist them in the raids. Following the expansion of the conflict into many Datoga homes, Mzee Hodi Hodi has added
that there was a time that the Datoga were invaded by a group of organized fighters with guns. The few available police that were dispatched to protect the Datoga cried “mbaya! mbaya!” (Horrible! horrible!) After hearing the guns shot the police then fled and left the Datoga defenceless. Most of the raiding occurred in daylight. Datoga informants said that when the cattle raiders raided the Sukuma, these individuals dressed like the Datoga, and like the Sukuma when they raided the Datoga. As a result of this playing with the identity, the government in 1987 concluded that the ethnic violence was externally generated (Interview Ndagala, 20.01.15). However, this view provides a narrow assessment of the conflict.

Apart from the conflict that resulted in the killings at Mwamalole, the conflict between the Datoga and other agro-pastoralists in the plains involved intense competition over the control of grazing and watering spots. Due to decreasing water and grazing sources during the dry season, the Wembere plain became a region of competition between the Datoga pastoralists and the neighbouring Sukuma. Another possible source of growing tensions in several districts of Shinyanga and Tabora Regions were the settlement of the Datoga during the sedentarization process in the 1970s and the impact of cotton production in the Sukuma villages. To the Wasukuma cotton was a cultural and economic transformer. It released the Sukuma from migrant labour work during the British colonial period. With *ujamaa* and the activity of cooperative unions like the Shinyanga Cooperative Union (SHIRECU), acreage in cotton production rose and thus led to an increase in demand for more land for cultivation (Meertens, Ndege and Enserink 1995: 14). As land was becoming scarce, the competition between grazing and agricultural spaces in Sukuma pushed those with numerous cattle to move to other regions. The expansion of the Sukuma to the south was limited by the Datoga settlements. In the 1970s the government settled the Datoga in surrounding villages overlooking the Wembere plain, areas which had been the envy of both Sukuma and Datoga. It is believed by many Datoga that attempts to access their sources of grazing were the root causes of the conflicts (Interview Gilaisi, 10.11.14; Interview Girabarenda, 14.09.14; Interview Kiula, 18.11.14). As the conflict expanded, the Datoga were displaced from their *bomas* in the plains and their homes were burnt and quickly rebuilt by the Sukuma. These acts were so immediate that the Datoga later believed that the conflict was not directly related to the cattle, but to their land. The Datoga villages that suffered the largest impact of the war were Luono and the surrounding villages west of Sibiti.

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356 The expansion of the Sukuma southward began between 1924 and 1947. This was a result of the recovery of cattle by the Wasukuma from several long lasting problems of rinderpest. Then the loss of land to tsetse fly and later the expansion of the cotton production pushed more Sukuma to Datoga lands. See more in Iliffe (1979: 286–289, 298–299 and 316–317).

357 Some technological innovations in agriculture such as ox-drawn ploughs increased after 1939 in Sukuma. Fertilizer imports and later the use of tractors from the 1940s brought with them huge social and economic changes. See more in Iliffe (1979: 454–56) and G. O. Lang and M. B. Lang (1962: 89–90).

358 On the migrations of the Wasukuma to the southern highlands, see Charnley (1997: 606–8).
River along the Mbulu border (Interview Gilaisi, 10.11.14; Interview Girabarendra, 14.09.14; Interview Kiula, 18.11.14).

Working for a Solution: The Government Approach

A critical feature of the 1984–1987 Datoga–Sukuma conflict was the government’s slow response to stop the killings. In interviews, both the Datoga and the Nyiramba told me that it took a significant amount of time for the government to respond to the conflict in a decisive way. There are accounts that point to this: “even when we reported to district offices in Iramba, we were told that there were not enough policemen for the job” (Interview Hodi-Hodi, 20.09.14). When some police officers were made available, the government claimed that it did not have the finances to pay them, so the Datoga, as the victims of the violence, were required to pay the night allowances for the officers. After several weeks of delays and expansions of violence into villages closer to the district headquarters, some officers were dispatched, but the Datoga had to pay for them (Interview Hodi-Hodi, 20.09.14). The presence of police was a temporary measure. When the violence escalated with the infiltration of commercial raiders, the police were not prepared to fight the more organized raiders. A few “well-to-do Datoga could manage to pay the police, but as the intensity of the battle increased the police abandoned our homes and we were left on our own” reported Mzee Hodi Hodi in one of our conversations in Wembere (Interview Hodi-Hodi, 20.09.14). The slow official response did not come from the central government, but from village and ward governments. The Datoga interpreted the government response as a conspiracy that benefitted some groups and commercial cattle raiders. As the conflict expanded, the Nyiramba also began the “hunting of the Datoga, killing them and taking their cattle” (Interview Kiula, 18.09.14). For two years, the hunting went on unabated (Interview Hodi-Hodi, 20.09.14).

As the intensity of the conflict continued, the Datoga attempted to initiate a solution. In June 1986 one of the Datoga elders – Mzee Hodi Hodi – was sent to Dodoma by the other elders to talk to the Prime Minister. According to Hodi Hodi, “when I reached Dodoma the Prime Minister was not there, but his assistant received complaints and promised to respond in a few days” (Interview Hodi-Hodi, 20.09.14). It is possible that the slow reaction of the government was the result of the stereotypes and misunderstandings assumed by many government officials, that is, the Datoga were difficult and often the source of all ethnic problems. When similar problems occurred in 1966 in the borders between Singida and Mbulu, the government reaction was swift and aggressive. As shown in police reports and other government sources, the police, Field Forces and Special Forces from neighbouring regions were called in to assist in dealing with what was called ‘Mang’ati murders.’

359 Other conflicts associated with the Datoga included the 1965–1968, and the 1976 killings at Kihonda and Iramba. All these possibly strengthened the notion of the Datoga as violent people. See more in Blystad (2005: 116).
Why then the same energy which was exerted in the 1968 *msako* was almost non-existent twenty years later? This question can be answered in two ways. One was how ethnic conflicts were articulated closely linked to ideas of power. Both the Sukuma and Nyiramba were well represented in the political sphere and were able to define kinds of response (Interview Kiula, 18.09.14). Second, as claimed by Hodi-Hodi, the government did not have enough resources to mobilize the same forces as applied in previous conflicts, due to the economic crisis that was affecting the nation.

After some delays the government established the Prime Minister’s Commission, which was led by the Regional Commissioner for Singida, Moses Mnawie, as well as Daniel Ndagala, and a further unnamed person (Interview Ndagala, 20.01.15). The commission was given three weeks to understand the circumstances of the conflict and ultimately bring the culprits to justice. The commission travelled through the key areas of the conflict and spoke to the villagers. They realized that the conflict was narrated differently on each site. The Datoga accused the other agro-pastoralists of perpetrating the raids and killings, arguing that their cattle were stolen by their neighbours. Whereas the Sukuma and Nyiramba jointly blamed the violence on the Datoga, claiming that the constant cattle raids made life in the plains difficult. The violence continued while the commission was gathering information. According to the commissioners, one afternoon there was a report that some Sukuma had invaded a Datoga village and had taken several cattle: as an indication of complexity of the conflict “when they were pursued, to the surprise of all they were neither the Sukuma nor any of the ethnic communities living in the plains, these were raiders from Kenya who were clothed like Sukuma but heavily armed” (Interview Kiula, 18.09.14). This discovery assisted the commission in ending the conflict as the narrative of the enemy changed. The capture of the raiders with a large herd of cattle in some ways eased local ethnic relations since it was clear that their enemy was an outsider.

The commission ended the conflict in 1987 and tried to popularize a limited notion of the conflict: that the Datoga and Sukuma were fighting a ghost war. According to the commissioners, commercial cattle traders exploited the communities by using the cultural schisms and ethnic identity politics. To address the problem and work towards a solution, the commission made two recommendations. First, it was recommended that the pastoralists should be assigned to specific administrative districts that would take care of their land resources and socio-economic issues in a more attentive way. Second, pastoralists should be involved in political decisions, with the commission recommending the inclusion of the Datoga and other pastoralists in village and ward leadership. Those appointed in the administration of the

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560 Focussing in this single act that has been falsely extended to claim that most of the raiders committing the violence and killing in both the Datoga and Sukuma households were using a false identity is basically not satisfactory. This single act meant all the evidence to show that the Datoga were targets of much of the violence was ignored. This evidence would have compelled the government to conduct a police inquiry so that the law could take its course. The expansion of the investigation could have restored the land that was allegedly taken from the Datoga by other ethnic communities during the conflict. However, as no enquiry was ever conducted, this land was never returned.
district councils should be from pastoralist communities or have had a background in working with pastoralist communities. Daniel Ndagala, one of the members of the Prime Minister’s Commission, recalled that: “these were among the recommendations. I am happy that the first recommendation was adhered to, because the government established Hannang and Meatu as fundamentally pastoralist districts” (Interview Ndagala, 20.01.15). The commission was applauded for its ability to listen and talk to the victims of the violence. This is the first account that government officials penetrated into remote villages and collected opinions from both pastoralists and agro-pastoralists in the midst of such violence.

Previous commissions, particularly the Vice President’s Commission and a minor commission formed by both regional commissioners for Arusha and Singida in 1968 were formed by government officials. Most of their recommendations were made from their offices in Singida and Mbulu.361 Despite their differences, the commissions did very little to resettle the dispersed Datoga pastoralists and to help the communities resolve their differences and live amicably.

As discussed in the last chapter, the commissions formed after the 1966 murders resulted in the criminalization and collective punishment of the Datoga that led to the dispersion and destruction of the Datoga pastoral economy. The so-called sedentarization campaign impoverished the Datoga as their land was taken and encroached on by agricultural communities. The Prime Minister’s Commission of 1987 provided a solution that required pastoralists and agriculturalists to maintain separate economic activities. However, this recommendation has not been executed; and today the Datoga and other pastoralist continue to lose their land (Interview Ndagala, 20.01.15).

5.2 The Datoga Option: Coexistence by Association

The Datoga’s strategy for surviving the conflict of 1984–1987 and its aftermath as viewed by Hodi-Hodi, Gulekshi Munega and Ndege Makaranga represents a moment of courage, refusal to be annihilated, and a consistent claim of a place in the plains of Wembere. Individual narratives suggest that the violence continued because some officials wanted the permanent erasure of the troublesome ‘bugs’—the Datoga (Interview Kiula, 18.09.14). In many respects, the consequences of the conflict are still fresh, but the Datoga’s persistence is apparent in the way that they were able to revive their cattle culture and economy.

What differentiated the 1984–1987 conflicts from other cattle raids mentioned in 1965, 1966 and 1967 is the number of individuals and the nature of violence involved. In the aftermath of the conflicts, the raiders collected the entire herd and killed the herdsmen. Gulekshi Munega as one of the victim of the 1984–1987 vio-

quence recalls that “they never killed the children and women, no, but they hated the herders of the cattle, the men were killed. Many families lost their dear youths, husbands and their cattle” (Interview Munega, 20.09.14). In addition to the killings, the conflict led to a massive loss of land and wells. Mzee Hodi Hodi also remembers how their bomas and water sources were permanently taken after 1987.362

Stories of loss echoed in many homes of the Datoga. Another survivor of the conflicts, Ndege Makaranga, tells a story evoking themes of deprivation and loss. For him, the loss was bitter. Makaranga was a boy of about ten years old when the Sukuma invaded his household in 1985. He witnessed his father being killed and the destruction of his entire homestead (Interview Munega, 20.09.14). Makaranga was spared because of his age, but the horror he witnessed led to difficult life experiences that followed thereafter. Makaranga’s experiences and his ingenuity will be discussed further later.

One of the most challenging consequences of the conflicts was the fragmentation of the Datoga family. The raiders killed the men of the households, abducted and later abandoned the women, and destroyed homes. Those who survived were left without property or food (Interview Munega, 20.09.14). Stories of lost families are a common narrative among the Datoga. From 1988 to 1990, some surviving Datoga men wandered about in the plains looking for their beloved ones. Uniting with their families proved difficult as the Sukuma and Nyiramba communities took the women and children and their whereabouts were unknown. In showing this difficulty, Hodi Hodi said that “after two years, I found my children in Tabora; two of my wives joined me two months later. I was left with one wife, and so we moved without children, and that was so devastating indeed” (Interview Hodi-Hodi, 20.09.14).

After the 1987 clash in the lower Wembere, the Datoga there spoke of the impact of disturbed communities as a result of the conflict. However, the Datoga have been quite competitive with whoever intruded their spaces of production, and in facing the challenges of their lost homes and property. Many of the people I spoke to showed a thorough commitment to rebuilding lost homes and their livelihoods. I will discuss a few cases of Datoga men and women who tried to give narratives of post-conflict recovery.

Mzee Hodi Hodi Musoma (ca. 80 Years Old)

Hodi Hodi Musoma embodies a sense of authority in the history of ethnicity and serves as a symbol of change and progress in Wembere. Hodi Hodi, a Swahili name that can be translated as “may I come in,” was born in Shibishibi (Luono) around 1935. His family originated from the Serengeti, but had been evicted as a result of

362 This history is told by Hodi-Hodi as “tuliingia hapa hakuna mtu, maji yalikuwa ya shida, tukachimba visima hapa lakini siku hizi maeneo tumenyang’anywa na hata visima hivyo si vyetu” (“We came here and there was nobody, water was scarce. We dug wells here, but recently our land has been taken and even the wells no longer belong to us”) (Interview Hodi-Hodi, 20.09.14).
the 19th century Maasai wars. According to his account, one of the impacts of these wars is that it split his family into two. One group was left in the west of Serengeti and formed a Datoga subgroup, which is now known as Rotigeng/ Rutiginga in Musoma (Mara) and Tabora/Singida. The Rotigeng are subgroups and remnants of the Datoga, who continued to stay in the Serengeti until they were evicted by the government in 1974 (Borgerhoff Mulder, Sieff and Merus 1989: 35). The second part of his family, originating from his grandfather, was a more widespread Datoga subgroup in the plains of Singida and Tabora, known as Brediga. After several decades of separation, around the year 1900, part of his family moved and joined other family members in the district of Musoma. And the name Musoma originated from the temporary visitation to Musoma. Musoma was not impressed with his new life and in 1905 he left his family and returned to Shinyanga where he married and started a family and a herd of cattle. Hodi Hodi remembers how his grandfather worked hard to establish a formidable homestead with herd of cattle, goats, sheep, and donkeys. Two years later his grandfather moved from Shinyanga to join the other Brediga in Shibishibi, where Hodi Hodi was born, and he and the rest of the family resided until the wars and disturbances of 1984.

It was here that his family settled and created their own space in cooperation with other Datoga families. Hodi Hodi recalls how his forefathers used their ingenuity to locate water sources and thus successfully dug wells that satisfied their family and neighbours.

At the same time as Musoma’s family came to Shibishibi, other ethnic communities went to the west of Lake Kitangiri. This is where miners from different parts of German East Africa were brought together in 1909 (Magai and Márquez-Velázquez 2011: 1). In addition to the small enclave of miners, there was a centre for Arab settlers in a small caravan town west of Sekenke named Shelui. The Arabs had remained in 1938 after the British removed a group of Somali traders, the Ishakia Brothers, who had been successful cattle traders since 1915. In 1938 in Wembere

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363 My informants translated the name Rotigeng as those who were left searching for a lost donkey. This translation has more profound connotations. The 19th century events were among such defining moments which resonated with these naming. It is likely that the Rotigeng were also a creation of the 19th century Datoga-Maasai wars, which accounted for the first and largest ethnic dispersal in the plains of Tanzania.

364 Claims made by missionary Conrad Schliemann (1913: 5) about the Nyiramba state that their young men often travelled in groups abroad in order to earn money, and one of their destinations were in Wembere (Sekenke) where goldmining had started as early as 1909. Such people contributed to ethnic diversity in the area.

365 Oral narratives from this small town of Shelui tell of the coming of Arab traders in the late 19th century as a result of the Trans-Indian Ocean Trade. The Arabs were especially interested in the gum trade, so they first formed temporary settlements in Shelui. These settlements operated as a collection centre for gum trade. With the opening of the mines in Sekenke in 1909, a village about 12 kilometres north, the Arabs opened retail shops, supplying sugar and other necessary goods to miners (Interview Kiula, 18.09.14).
due to what was considered to be their contravention of government land laws. By 1940 the Datoga were the exceeding majority in the plains. Inter-ethnic interaction existed with less antagonism than was witnessed in the borders between Mbulu and Singida. Hodi Hodi remembers the relative isolation of the Datoga in the Wembere plains, which continued until 1945 when some fishing villages around Kitangiri Dam began expanding and attracting the Nyiramba people from the upper plateau to the lower lands of Wembere. Most of these villages were formed during *ujamaa* in 1974–1976, which created the first motivation to settle on the plains (Interview Kiula, 18.09.14). With increasing population growth in the upper plateaus of Iramba led to the slow descent of more people onto the plains. While other communities were created in *ujamaa* villages, most of Hodi Hodi’s family continued to live in their old villages.

Such was the state of affairs of Hodi Hodi’s family until the Sukuma invaded his village in January 1985. The conflict changed his life profoundly. After losing everything, he and his first wife moved to from village-to-village to avoid the conflicts. This migration was also a way to take advantage of the politics of negotiation and communicate with the government. The chance for communication changed the mainstream view of the Datoga as shy and *watu wa pori* (forest people) (Interview Kiula, 18.09.14). Hodi Hodi’s confidence largely contributed to the government’s

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change of attitude toward the Datoga. Immediately after their arrival in the villages, the Datoga organized the first meeting of the remaining elders. In the meeting, Hodi Hodi was voted as the one who should be sent to the government in Dodoma. In my opinion, Dodoma was perceived as important because of the steadily growing sense that the District Officers were part of the reason that the conflict had continued so long. Hodi Hodi remembers: “When I went to Dodoma, I was determined to see the Prime Minister, to tell him why our people were being killed and to ask why the government was silent?” Though the Prime Minister never met Hodi Hodi, his case and that of the Datoga eventually reached the government. Two days later the government sent the first people to assess the situation. Hodi Hodi was able to lead the government commission into the conflict zone and was instrumental in assisting the development and facilitation of peace in the area. For him, the war impoverished his household and degraded his family, as for the first time they became dependent on the government for food supplies and security. Hodi Hodi proved to be a progressive person through his methods in changing his family’s status, with the aftermath of the conflict bringing complete change in the way of life: “Before, many of us had rarely ever used the hoe to cultivate; most of our food had come from our neighbours through exchange with cattle” (Interview Hodi-Hodi, 20.09.14).

Looking into his granaries in 2014, Hodi Hodi showed that agriculture had not only become a way of surviving, but was also becoming a strategy to return to the Datoga’s pastoralist way of life. Agricultural production was labour intensive and completely different from pastoralism, where a single boy could lead a herd as large
as 200. Hodi Hodi reinvented his family to suit such the demands of intensive labour production. He had three wives when the war broke out, one did not have children, and two had a total of seventeen children. After two years of cultivation, he managed to buy a couple of oxen and heifer; he then married a fourth and fifth wife. In doing this he said “I had enough labour for my farms and a secured homestead” (Interview Hodi-Hodi, 20.09.14). Recently, at almost 80 years of age, Hodi Hodi married Urabunda Kichim. In comparison with his neighbours, pastoralists and agriculturalists, Hodi Hodi’s family is regarded as relatively rich. Most of his houses are built with mud or cement blocks and thatched with iron sheets; additionally, the family proudly possesses three motorcycles (Figures 4 and 5). In recent years his herd has increased to more than 400 cattle and other small livestock, and it continues to increase: “Every year with this sorghum, I buy more cattle and goats; I encourage my sons to do the same with their mothers and family” (Interview Hodi-Hodi, 20.09.14). Such achievements have restored the confidence of his family. Hodi Hodi refers to his older wives as mothers and their existence is recognized through mutual respect. He entrusts most of his power to them, so that each of the women is a leader of their family. He only visits each family occasionally from his new home with his new wife.

Dunga Gilaisi (ca. 43 Years Old)

Dunga Gilaisi is the product of a new generation of impoverished Datoga struggling to make ends meet as a result of loss of cattle and land. According to Dunga, he chose to adopt a life of agriculture as circumstances of violence, cattle thefts, and competition for grazing spaces have made pastoralism more difficult in recent years (Interview Gilaisi, 10.11.14). Dunga is a family man that lives with his mother, wife and four children. He is part of a much larger family of Datoga who form a cluster of houses in the neighbourhood of Kizonzo Village, five kilometres from Shelui town. Dunga, like Hodî Hodî, is a model in terms of hard work, passion for progress, and fighting what he calls the “acute poverty of my family” (Interview Hodi-Hodi, 20.09.14). Like many other “poor” Datoga men and women in the plains, he is somewhat apprehensive when he tries to articulate his own position in relation to Datoga who still have cattle. For example, when talking about his inclusion in the Datoga inner circle, he says that the Datoga with cattle do not count him and others like him as part of the Datoga, but rather sees them as Swahilized people of the town. Therefore, Dunga hardly attends the initiations, rain making meetings, and other ceremonies. His associations with other agricultural communities like Sukuma

367 In many conversations with Datoga informants, a Swahili person was defined first as one who lives in towns and speaks the Swahili language. Swahili was also an attribute of economic difference, for engaging in commerce and other none pastoral activities seemed to invoke a Swahili culture and differentiation from the mainstream Datoga life in the plains.
The Orphans of the Plains

and Nyiramba also keeps him from attending mainstream Datoga events. But what is the foundation of Dunga’s feeling of marginalization and exclusion?

Much of the contemporary life of the Datoga is clearly differentiated with regard to how many cattle one has. Dunga and his family are from a long generation of semi-agricultural Datoga and have a tradition of mixing with other ethnic communities. According to Dunga’s mother, the beginning of the interaction between the Datoga and their Wanyaturu neighbours dates back many generations. The mother of Dunga’s mother was from the Wanyaturu and married a Datoga man in Makhomeo, a village close to Shelui town (Interview Mama Dunga, 11.11.14). Makhomeo village was a transitory space that separated the Datoga of the Wembere plains and the Wanyiramba and Wanyaturu of the upper plateau. Dunga’s mother was born in Makhomeo village around 1931 when the ethnic relations between the Datoga and the rest of the communities in the village were not difficult. Apart from the close relations between the Datoga and Wanyaturu, the Dungas remained pastoralists, their livelihood depending solely on cattle (Interview Mama Dunga, 11.11.14). In 1974 the family was instructed to move to an ujamaa village, but they chose to remain in their traditional villages.

When the violence erupted in 1984, the family moved to a nearby village called Msansao. The violence, as well as the passing of Gilaisi, the father of Dunga, transformed Dunga’s homestead. The conflict created a sense of panic in the Datoga community, with Datoga outside the perimeter of the conflict beginning to feel unsafe in the plains. The problem centered on the shifts in the ways the enemy was defined in Wembere. Dunga’s mother recalls how relations between the Datoga and other agro-pastoralist groups changed – from seemingly cordial to resentful and cold. As a result of this change in relationship, the Dungas could not move their cattle up and down the valleys throughout the year; thus, their cattle were restrained in a village around Msansao. The cattle herd was eventually lost with the death of Gilaisi. It is this life that also changed the family, particularly the future of the sons and daughters of Dunga’s mother. With the loss of cattle, the Dungas lost their source of food security. Dunga and his brothers split up, and migrated to other villages. According to Dunga, the loss of cattle led to the loss of the family unit.

When I first met Dunga in November 2014 at Mwanzugi village, he was suspicious about meeting a strange man. In search of a better way of life while facing declining economic resources, Dunga moved to Mwanzugi every year during the dry season, where he grew vegetables, tomatoes and onions. Part of the harvest was for home consumption and the remainder was sold back in the village. Dunga and other non-Datoga benefit from the Mwanzugi Dam, which was constructed for pastoral-

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368 This is a fast growing urbanite setting from a previously small village enclave in the late 1990s to a semi-urban settlement in recent years. The reason behind its growth was the expansion of rice production after the 1998–99 El Niño that flooded the plains and opened the grassland to small and medium-sized farmers. Currently Mwanzugi has electricity and the neighbourhood is always busy with bars and shops. It is a growing centre for the agricultural businesses which are slowly replacing the pastoralist economy.
The dam was transformed from solely pastoral to agricultural uses due to the increasing demands for land and expansion for rice irrigation (Rural Development Livelihood Company 2009: 11). Datoga pastoralists who were expelled in the 1984–1987 conflict no longer had access to it. The dam has become the biggest source of agricultural development in the town of Mwanzugi (Interview Gilaisi, 10.11.14).

My conversation with Dunga also revealed other multifaceted issues related to the economic relations and conflicts emerging from the booming rice trade and agriculture. One of the fastest growing challenges in Mwanzugi is the rising land cost and variations in land ownership. Prior to 1999 land ownership was unclear because of the different ways pastoral and agro-pastoralist groups roamed the area. The rising investment in land surrounding the Wembere valley, particularly among rice producers after 1999, has created a new set of land users. In particular, Dunga told me that in 2008, in an effort to encourage agriculture, the government brought about 40 graduates from Sokoine University of Agriculture (SUA) to the plains and gave them land in the plains to grow rice. In addition to this group, a lack of rain in neighbouring regions of Tabora, Shinyanga and Singida have attracted small farmers, especially during the dry season. The problem of unemployment is also attracting youths to cultivating vegetables and rice. Over the years this has also created conflicts with other users of land – particularly pastoralists. Assessing this conglomeration of land users, the position of individuals like Dunga is marked by many uncertainties. Dunga told me that security of land tenure is becoming obscure as more people with huge capital move in and buy land and lease to small farmers. As a result, the possibility of a breakthrough in agriculture of such small agricultural producers with less capital is becoming uncertain with time. Nevertheless, Dunga’s hard work has enabled his family to achieve food security and allowed his children to go to school.

5.3 The Orphans of the Plains: Land Grabbing and New Sources of Competition, 1996–2012

Before 1996 the history of the Datoga along the Singida–Mbulu border and on the plains below the Iramba plateau was influenced by several key factors. Firstly, the combined impacts of the 1968 and 1987 decisions over the borders and settlement patterns of the Datoga. These had long lasting effects on Datoga relations with other ethnic communities, especially how their pastoral economy was mediated through different forms of encounters. The second factor discussed in this section is the social and political milieu that emerged in the 1990s, which emanated from global and local systems of governance, and later produced new dynamics of competition, particularly for land resources. The 1992 Zanzibar Declaration officially ended socialism and the ujamaa policies, plunging the country into the chaos of neoliberal policies.

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369 Dunga does not know when the Dam was dug and my attempt to solicit the date was fruitless.
and sending shock waves through the political economy. Similarly, the country’s adoption of multiparty democracy and the freeing of government and political officials to own property drastically changed the landscape of competition for power. The final factor is the local response to the pressure from the central government and the way that pressure in forms of policies changed the dynamics of ethnic conflict and negotiations for land resources.

The first indications of the reverse of the *ujamaa* policy and the government’s attempt to embrace neoliberal economic policy appeared on land issues. The Loliondo Land Case, sometimes referred to as Loliondogate, is an early example of the penetration of foreign capital into the grazing land of the Maasai. This case brought condemnation from non-governmental Organizations (NGOs), and pastoralists (Hodgson 2011: 75–104). The case showed the changing nature of competition in the plains of Singida and highlighted the different ways pastoralists in the same environment negotiated problems of land. The Loliondo case became a public issue when the government of Tanzania proposed more than 4,000 square kilometres of the Loliondo Game Controlled Area as a hunting block to the Ortello Business Corporation (O.B.C). O.B.C is a Dubai-based company with close links to the royal family in the UAE (Ndaskoi 2003). The source of discontent came from the way the acquisition of such land for private use by O.B.C at the expense of pastoralist users, and also the way the company was supported by “a Presidential Hunting License, which enabled the investor to have exclusive rights in the block. And the process by which the Dubai-based company was given such a precious Maasai grazing area” (Interview Ndaskoi, 12.08.14). In a proposal prepared by the owner of O.B.C to the government, his Excellence Brigadier Mohammed Abdul Rahim Al-Ali stated:

*The initial period of the private concession requested for is a period of 20 years. During this period the area will be used exclusively as a private area for use by His Excellence Brigadier Mohammed Al-Ali and his guests and not as a commercial venture. His excellence has outlined in this report the benefits of such a concession to the local people, the wildlife and the Tanzanian government. (Al-Ali 1994: 1); emphasis added*  

What infuriated pastoralists and other stakeholders was the denial of any local pastoralists’ access to resources like grazing areas, water, and firewood. The benefits to local people that the O.B.C mentioned in the proposal were fabricated, meaning that

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370 Neoliberalism is a term that has found home in many political, sociological and legal arguments. The term can be defined as a theory of political and economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade. See more in Harvey (2005). There is a plethora of publications around this theme, for example, Ferguson (2006) and Shivji (2006).

371 The case was mostly popular during the political rallies in the first multiparty election in 1995. Newspapers dubbed it Loliondogate; the cases are also referred to in Abbink et al. (2014: 9).
the government was a collaborator in land grabbing (Interview Ndaskoi, 12.08.14). As a consequence, this single ‘investment’ as it was called by the government has generated a sense that pastoralist land tenure is under siege and that they need to mobilize themselves against large-scale land theft. The Loliondo case brought the Maasai to the centre of discussions regarding indigenous rights, a sense of brotherhood amongst pastoralists, and activism (Hodgson 2011: 5–9). An expression of the Maasai’s reactions can be seen in the formation of NGOs “that [are] run by Maasai to serve Maasai people and interests” (Hodgson 2011: 77). The establishment of pastoralist NGOs began in 1994, and by 2000 the number of such organizations increased to over 50 (Hodgson 2011: 22). Organizations such as MAA (Maasai Advancement Association), MINGO (Maasai Indigenous Non-governmental Organization), MWEDO (Maasai Women Development Organization), and Inyuate Moipo (Moipo Integrated People’s Organization) are examples of Maasai initiatives (Hodgson 2011: 74). Some Maasai NGOs identified themselves with a locality, like NGOPADEO (Ngorongoro Pastoralist Development Organization), NHPO (Ngorongoro Highlands Pastoralist Organization), NGOEPO (Ngorongoro Environmental people’s Organization), and NIA (Ngorongoro Indigenous Association) (Hodgson 2011: 74).

In founding NGOs, the Datoga lagged behind the Maasai for two main reasons. First, as a result of the Loliondo case, the Maasai’s plight received global coverage and sympathy. Second, from the colonial era pastoralism seemed synonymous with the Maasai and whoever discussed the pastoralist problem was more or less connected to the Maasai. The Datoga joined the movement despite their long-standing hostility with the Maasai. Charles Lane, who was for several decades a champion of Datoga land rights, saw this as a historical parallel of past enemies being future allies as a result of historical coincidences rather than as a true coalition of the willing (Lane 1993: 3). While the NGOs were a modern means of pastoralist political resistance to land grabbing and the forces behind it, the representation of different pastoralist land users came to be dictated by the Maasai, who became the powerhouses of the pastoralist NGOs (G. Cameron 2001: 57–58). As a result, the power of negotiation and bargaining through the political or legal process has remained largely in the hands of the Maasai while the Datoga, particularly along the Singida–Mbulu border, depended entirely on their “traditional” forms of negotiation to survive on the plain. I observed some meetings of the Datoga in the Wembere plains and saw this dependence. “We are like orphans in these plains; we fight for our land rights as did our forefathers,” retorted Girabarenda in one of the meetings (Interview Girabarenda, 14.09.14). Due to increasing pressure on Datoga land from expansion of farming and increased population, a sense of exclusion and marginalization of Datoga pastoralists becomes understandable.

Unlike the Loliondo case, for the Datoga along the Singida–Mbulu border, neoliberal policies surfaced not in large-scale land grabbing, but rather through changing economic policies in the 1990s. These policies were inspired by the global economic situation, as well as local economic incentives, which merged to create new tensions
and competition for land between the Datoga and other land users. One of the first
decisive changes in the plains was the opening of agricultural markets that led to
expansion of production even in lands that were deemed remote and inaccessible
(G. Cameron 2001: 58). In Tanzania, following the election of President Benjamin
Mkapa in 1995, the country regulated fiscal policies, in a process popularly known
as the Economic Reform Program (ERP). This program aimed to eventually lead to
the repayment of debts to different financial institutions (Muganda 2004: 2). Such
policies also led to a relative improvement of the country’s economy. One of the first
signs of this improved economy was the expansion of infrastructural networks, par-
ticularly roads connecting villages with the urban spaces. This brought more people
into the villages for trading activities and it also provided the villagers with greater
economic incentives to produce more. These developments also led to the expansion
of other non-agricultural activities like mining in many parts of Singida and other
regions. The Sekenke gold mine epitomized the rise of this economy in Singida,
which had dwindled with decades of gold slumps in the world market (Magai and
Márquez-Velázquez 2011: 3). To individual pastoralists like Makaranga, the above
changes in the political economy were vivid experiences because of the ways his fam-
ily was able to use such opportunities to their advantage. At the same time, however,
such developments produced a sense of bewilderment. Makaranga’s account of these
economic shifts resonates with popular understanding of the neoliberal alliances as
a rough terrain which the Datoga had to master or be sidelined from (G. Cameron
2001: 58). After 1987, some Datoga had recovered from the 1984–1987 conflict,
as seen in the case of Hodi Hodi. But for others, as evidenced by the case of Dunga,
recovery was a difficult process. Another example of this is the story of Makaranga.
In the process of recovering from the conflict, Makaranga and his family returned
to the plains in 1996 to try to regain their pastoralist pride in a space that they were
more familiar with. However, two years later, the effects of the 1997–1998 El Niño
floods hit the plains and other parts of the country (Interview Munega, 20.09.14).
The flooding not only uprooted all forms of pastoralist habitation in the plains, but
it also physically altered landforms and claims to space in the Wembere plains (Inter-

The flooding created new land features like new species of trees, different soil
composition, and completely changed river courses. Of most interest was the change
direction of the River Mwajuma, a seasonal river that wound its way from the
highlands of Iramba plateau to the lowlands in the plains. Before El Niño, the river
was a stream that cut through the plains and found its way out of the plain. Most
of its waters were emptied further out of the Wembere plains. With El Niño, this
river lost its normal course and was redirected aimlessly into the plains, thus pour-
ing its water entirely onto the plains (Interview Makaranga, 20.09.14; Interview
Munega, 20.09.14). Makaranga and his family were attracted to the unusually long
green grasses, which offered ample fodder to cattle and those who began farming the
area. In 2000, Makaranga and more than 20 Datoga families began growing rice in
muddy ponds generated by the Mwajuma River and other streams, first, as a way
of deterring land grabbers, but then as a source of income. El Niño quickly transformed the barren Wembere plain into a basket of Iramba District with bounteous harvests of rice, sunflower, and maize (Interview A. Paulo, 09.11.14). This improved the lives of the Datoga pastoralists but also brought in more ethnic groups, as the plains became “hot cakes which everyone wanted a share of” (Interview Makaranga, 20.09.14; Interview Munega, 20.09.14). Claims for a share intensified from 2002, as the marketing of rice and sunflower became easier with the construction of Singida-Mwanza highway, thus making access to markets quicker and more feasible (African Development Bank 2013: 10). Makaranga explains the antagonisms that surrounded land access as a result of this development:

When we moved at first in Nkongilangi in 1996, the plains were not significant. We had access to land almost unlimitedly. But with increased rice production, all people saw the benefits that we were accruing. Soon, everybody was pushing for a piece of land, and some agricultural communities negotiated with the Nkongilangi village government and those from the district to remove us as trespassers. (Interview Makaranga, 20.09.14)

Unlike previous forms of conflicts, land had been important but did not have monetary value, the value of land changed after 1996. Neoliberal free market policies and reckless land policies that gave politicians and the wealthy almost unlimited access to the land promoted land conflicts. The engagement of the Datoga in agricultural production created tension among multiple users of land in the plains. The Datoga decision to openly embrace agriculture challenged the Sukuma and Nyiramba, who regarded cultivation as their heritage. The tension mounted when the government decided to privatize the Sekenke Gold Mine, which had more than 1,000 gold miners in 2012 (Interview Ward Executive Officer (WEWO), 11.09.14). The eviction “pushed the small miners to poor mining fields along the roads and those who were disillusioned with mining left the area and went fishing and the rest began farming” (Interview Kiula, 18.09.14). Following President Mkapa’s road improvement schemes, which eased the transportation of commodities between villages and consuming cities in the Great Lakes and the coastal towns, it is likely that many pursued farming option after sunflower and rice became lucrative crops. This made participating in the scramble for land ownership in the plains a necessity for survival. The plains, which had initially belonged to everyone, were now attracting multiple new land users.

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372 As confirmed also by Kiula (Interview, 18.09.14).
Surviving on the Plains: Forms of Negotiations and Livelihood

In September 2014 I was fortunate enough to attend a rainmaking ritual of the Datoga of the Wembere plain. Though I grew up with other Datoga, I had never experienced such an intense commitment of people to their history and their landscape. My experience began on the morning of November 12th 2014 when I was travelling to an interview scheduled for later in the day. When I arrived in the village a young man whom an elder had sent to pick me up met me. I was prepared for a standard interview and had a list of questions ready. But after exchanging greetings the young man asked if I was ready to walk further and if I was that he would take me to where the elder man and other Datoga were gathering for a secluded meeting and rain ritual. In this meeting, I remained an observer and at some point a passive actor. My arrival was a bit of a surprise, as many did not expect “a foreigner” in their secluded meeting. After a short introduction and exchange of information I began to prove that I was not a “government agent” by responding to a thoughtful set of questions surrounding why I was there, who I was, and what my expectations were. While responding to such questions, I took the liberty to scan through the audience and observe the crowd. This was a diverse group in both age and gender, with babies as young as one month old. The people sat in a shade of a tree and were separated by gender. They engaged in small conversations as a way of passing time before the beginning of the ritual in the evening. My unpreparedness for this encounter, as well as the general apprehension concerning the outcome of the meeting, was making me feel exhausted. But looking at the women and other female ritualists, I saw that they were beginning to start ignoring my presence. Some of the questions that were running at the back of my mind were: where was the history that I came to search for and who should I interview?

Such questions became irrelevant as I began to realize that the elders did not just want conversation, they wanted me to experience their history first-hand. The landscape on which we sat represented a history in itself. The plains that seemed empty and dry contained shrines of the Bajuta rain makers who I was told “lived in this place, and this place is one of the shrines where Magena died – possibly in 1904” (Interview Gilaisi, 10.11.14). It was overwhelming to try to comprehend the connectedness and the embeddedness of these plains in terms of the collective memory and ritualized history. Observing such a commitment to remembering the land owners was engaging in an interrogation of the influence of these plains on the Datoga im-

373 Being a government agent to the Datoga means either one is a member of the police force, a Ward Executive Officer or any of the other government officials. For many Datoga, a government official’s presence meant that they should be careful and cautious on whatever information one communicates. Personally, I encountered several such scenarios, so that I had to explain to them who I was, why I was there, and what I was doing.

374 For the Datoga-Brediga, rituals for rain making are destined to succeed if they are performed after three in the afternoon; so that by the time the activity is done it will resonate with the coming back of cattle from the grazing.
agination of their past and the future. Rainmaking is still the most powerful way of claiming indigeneity to the land and spiritual force that other communities lacked. That is why ritualization as observed among the Brediga was regarded as a safe way of organizing and encountering their plight through seeking collective support from the owners of the land. By owners of land, the Brediga meant their ancestors, and those who are buried in the land. So seeking their support through rainmaking also legitimized claims of presence and unity of the Brediga and Datoga as a whole (Interview Gilaisi, 10.11.14).

Coming back to the rainmaking ritual, apart from the few conversations of women who prepared the carcass of the goat, the intensity of the silence marked the scene as time went by. The mood was spiritual, as the leading men started pouring oil and the kidney and heart of the goat into a small hole, while invoking the spirit of the Bajuta elder to release the rain. Before the end of the procession the rain came and relieved us from the scorching sun. This I saw as one of the uncontested territories of which the Datoga are still in command.

The second part of the meeting began to address different pressing issues. I learned that the Datoga are underrepresented on the political front at the village level and that when regular village meetings were convened the Datoga were not involved. When they were able to participate, their opinion was contested by the louder voices of the Sukuma agro-pastoralists. Rain making rituals were therefore one of the few avenues for the Datoga to assemble and mobilize without attracting publicity. Indeed, rain making serves as a rallying point and a significant mediating source. As Girabarendra noted in the meeting:

Do you think the government can listen to a person like me? No. The Wasukuma are the owners of the village government, they are the majority. We as people have only one hope. The spirits of our ancestors: Those of Bajuta and of our fathers still listen and bless our land. (Interview Girabarendra, 14.09.14)

A crucial strategy for surviving the challenges of land shortages and conflicts that emanated from unresolved land conflicts was what I call strategic association. Through observations and information that I was able to obtain during interviews, I was made aware of the variety of Datoga communities. The first group of Datoga are the wealthy pastoralists who live as pure pastoralist herders, have cattle, and stay in the plains with their cattle. Their approach to inter-ethnic relations is often antagonistic and violent. The second group is the rising entrepreneurs and agro-pastoralists. When I visited the Mgongolwa, Vakule, Makomelo, and Msonga villages in 2014, I saw such individuals like Kisnei and Muja Mwana Masunga with shops along the Singida-Mwanza highway. Muja, a particularly interesting character, opened his first shop along the Singida-Mwanza road in 2005. Initially he began with a local tembe (grass and earth thatched house) where he sold sugar, kerosene, flour, diesel and petrol, and soft and hard drinks. Most of his customers were fellow Datoga who frequented the village for basic necessities. Due to the ease of transport, he was able to
commute to Igunga town to refurnish the shop. In 2010 his business expanded and he completely refurbished the buildings by adding more space for a small *mgahawa* (restaurant) and several other shops that some Nyaturu, Datoga, and Nyiramba have rented for similar businesses. His business has created spaces for inter-cultural encounters. Masunga: “I came here very poor and without a wife, but the business has given me a family and I farm more successfully” (Interview Masunga, 12.09.14). Apart from obtaining material possessions like a motorbike, Muja has created a successful recreational and shopping centre in Mgongolwa where his fellow Datoga and Sukuma converge. The third group is that of the destitute and poor, who struggle to survive. As Susanne Ådahl clearly states, when Tanzanians talk of poverty they generally use the Swahili term *umaskini*. The term pertains to the broader meaning of poverty as social deprivation. It implies a lack of ability to utilise resources or a lack of social capability (Ådahl 2007: 9). In Wembere the poor are largely individuals and families with limited access to means of livelihood (land, cattle, and social network) (Ådahl 2007: 9). Additionally, land is becoming increasingly scarce, which is increasing people’s vulnerability. During a conversation with Kabati at Kizonzo village, he disclosed that land is becoming more privately owned than before and that those who do not own land have to “rent it for 10,000 Tanzanian Shillings per acre and you have to manure it as well. For the poor like me, this limits our progress indeed” (Interview Kabati, 10.11.14).

Being without cattle has created classes of individuals like Kabati who feel socially and economically alienated. Maintaining his attachment with the well-to-do Datoga is becoming difficult, as they cannot afford to marry other Datoga or Sukuma, “because it is unaffordable to get a wife from such people as they demand a lot of cattle and most of us do not have any” (Interview Kabati, 10.11.14). Lack of or possession of cattle in the plains is a deciding factor on how social cohesion is built and maintained. Kabati told me that his family lost cattle due to lack of grazing spaces twelve years ago. Since then, he has clustered with other poor Datoga at Kizonzo and has worked in private houses and *mgahawa* (restaurants) in order to survive.

Another critical challenge for the Datoga poor is the increase of child labour recruited mainly from amongst them. According to Happy Paulo, a secondary school teacher in Iramba District, the Brediga of the plains have recently been viewed as “the poorest souls on the plains; they are losing cattle more than other social groups. Because of this they have devised a method of sending their children as contracted herders to Nyiramba ‘rich’ families to tend for their livestock” (Interview H. Paulo, 20.11.14). The children are often between the ages of 10 and 16, when they are forced to leave school and to stay with their host families and tend to the cattle. In return, their families are sent 120 kilos of maize annually. As a result, both individuals and organizations have made substantial efforts to prevent children from being forced into child labour. The Archdiocese of Tabora (Roman Catholic) in Igunga has made commendable efforts to offer free education to Datoga pastoralists and other disadvantaged groups (Bihariova 2016: 97–98). This initiative has succeeded in enrolling some children from poor Datoga families as boarders at Saint Margareth Girls
Primary and Saint Leo the Great Secondary School at Igunga District in Tabora. However, a challenge to attending these schools is the urban location. Some Datoga non-integrationists view this mixing as dangerous to their heritage, especially when a child boards at school for the whole term. In one case a Datoga mother complained about the effects of school on their children saying that “I know some of the children from my fellow Datoga family who went to Fr. Bole’s school, when they came back, they pretended not to greet in Ki-datoga. Personally, I have resisted my children being sent there, I don’t want my children to be spoilt by the Swahili” (Interview Gichim, 14.11.14). Although the schools provide free education to the Datoga, they have failed to inspire parents to send their children. As a result, the majority of pupils come from parents of other ethnic communities, especially urbanite communities of Igunga (Interview Gilaisi, 10.11.14).

5.4 Conclusion

The livelihood of the Datoga pastoralist groups over the last four decades has been largely influenced by the change in the national economy as well as the dynamics of ethnic interactions in Singida and Mbulu Districts. The violence that manifested itself in the Wembere plains from 1984–1987 established a general attitude of despair among the Datoga. Violence began with economic hardships in central Singida in the early 1980s that resulted in famine and food shortages. Communities seeking to survive the famine or food shortage moved beyond their ethnic borderlands, to both the south and north of Singida. Such massive migrations were not unique to this area. The process of ethnic expansion was coupled with the general economic crisis that manifested in shortage of basic supplies like soap and sugar. At the same time, the growing national debt led the government to reduce social services and financing for agricultural production. As a result, the ujamaa policy, a main economic framework for more than two decades, was under threat. Apart from the fact that ujamaa was also a contributing factor to the economic crisis in the ways it altered the use of the land, the economic crisis led to ethnic violence in Wembere. As discussed in this chapter, ethnic violence between the Datoga and other agro-pastoralist communities was propelled by scarcity of land, pasture and water. Though communities addressed scarcity as functions of cattle theft and coordinated attacks from foreign cattle traders, the underlying causes of this scarcity were related to a string of historical problems, the most recent of which were the failures of the government settlement schemes for the Datoga and other communities during the ujamaa period. Unlike previous forms of ethnic violence targeting the Datoga or their neighbours, the 1984–1987 conflict was also exacerbated by neoliberal economic policies that led to land scarcity in Wembere. The Datoga, as a minority pastoralist community, engaged other communities as a way of protecting their land resources and cattle. Consequently, narratives of the plains depicting the Datoga as aggressive and violent emerged. However, it is clear that as an aftermath of the conflicts in the plains the Datoga pursue dif-
different approaches in interpreting ethnic relations. Some are characteristically hostile and confrontational, seeking to separate themselves from other groups in the plains. Such groups of Datoga tend to be separatist and resistant to ‘foreign’ cultures. Another group appears to emerging though: their approach is integrationist, taking interethnic relationships as a way of enhancing their economic situation, such as those building an entrepreneurial class of Datoga along the Singida-Mwanza road. This group is adopting ‘new’ ways of economic thinking. While accepting other ethnic identities not only as customers in a changing economy, they are also serving as a site for interethnic dialogue. In doing so, they are positively changing the ways cultural exchanges are happening in Singida and Mbulu on the Wembere plains.
6 Growing up in a Community in Transition to Oblivion: Memories of My Pastoral Boyhood in Central Tanzania, 1979 – 1993

6.1 Introduction

Visiting Itigi town, particularly its train station, in the late 1980s gave one the impression of being in a bustling urban town. Itigi became a centre for business and culture at that time, and was revitalized by the trains coming in from the coast or the Great Lakes. For a wide range of people, the midday wait for the train was a time of anticipation: small food vendors who were trying to move their wares to the stations, for occasional or regular travellers struggling to secure tickets at the last minute, and for the shouting youths (vijana wa mjini) carrying heavy loaded goods on their backs or pushing two-tiered wheelbarrows to and from the train station. The station represented a real convergence of activities associated with modernity, which was popularly known as kwenda na wakati (moving with the times). Time for the vendors and Itigi dwellers was defined and punctuated by the arrivals and departures of the two trains, one from mashariki-east (from the coast) and one from magharibi-west (from the Great Lakes). Because the trains arrived almost exactly at midday or an hour later, all activities before and after were mediated by how people prepared themselves for such arrivals. In the background of the activities were other urbanite engagements that complemented the regular movements of the trains. The shops and markets positioned close to the station were fed by the arrivals and departures. They loaded
Figure 6: Itigi town and surrounding villages, Manyoni district. Source: Geographic Information Systems – GIS, Institute of Resource Assessment, University of Dar es Salaam
cargo onto or received cargo from the trains moving to and from Dar es Salaam, including clothes (mainly second-hand clothes commonly known as *mitumba*375), fruit, sugar, drinks, fish, and agricultural products. Those who approached the station hours before the arrivals of the two trains witnessed the steaming up of kitchens with different dishes all arranged in a long row on the floor, depending on the direction of the incoming trains. The trains barely spent thirty minutes at the station between their arrivals and departures, vendors in the area adjusted their actions to the tight timetable. The movement of individuals resonated with the speed of the trains. They hurried to deliver services to anxious customers who used the limited time to get some food. In addition to the people directly engaged with the trains, there were often others who went to the station to watch, fascinated by the town people. For many, Itigi and the bustling sounds of the train, markets, and people represented a meeting-point of cultures and exciting urban routines. Such people came from the “villages”376 in the area and either sat in the shade of big trees surrounding the station or gathered in the one-roomed venue of the Itigi Railway Canteen that was close to the office of the Station Master and popular for its spiced rice and *nyama choma* (grilled steak). Some went there to see trains for the first time. Their roaring noise when announcing their arrival or departure attracted people’s attention from as far as two kilometres away. Many watching saw the train as a celebration of the power of modernity or exonerating its more negative impacts – mostly the urban thugs who pick pocketed visitors and the violence and alcohol consumption that ensued after the President declared *ruksa*377 in 1985. The town witnessed a surge of people as they moved to the station from early in the morning, a movement that reached its peak with the arrival of the last train. Afterwards, the workers and the bystanders slowly retreated into the streets and villages, carrying with them narratives, stories and spec-

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375 *Mitumba* or second-hand clothes were donated or shipped to Tanzania (and Africa more broadly) during the beginning of the liberalised era. To Tanzanians, the era also known as *soko huria* began from 1985 and such clothes provided a new venture for the urban youths, often taking them from big cities across villages through retail ways. Because in the 1980s roads were practically impassable, the central and Tazara (Tanzania-Zambia) railways were used to transport the goods. In this context, Itigi was not exceptional. See also a similar story of the second-hand clothes in Hansen (2000).

376 For a detailed discussion of the post-colonial conception of the village in Tanzania see Lal (2015: 45–55). However, in the context of the 1980s in Itigi, the village and its people were mostly referred to those who were either within or outside Ukisasa-modernity. Being within ukisasa meant people who produced and sold for the market and therefore accessed and used money. While those outside the money economy were people of porini (forest/jungle).

377 This term entered popular usage after the Second President of Tanzania Ali Hassan Mwinyi declared the entry of neoliberal period in 1985 as *ruksa* – free. By free, he meant that individuals, public employees, and politicians were allowed to start any form of business they wished, provided it was considered legal and ethical. In some circumstances, Mwinyi appears to have regretted allowing this liberalisation of the economy, as he usually teased his listeners that when the doors were opened everything entered, including products and tendencies associated with them, like alcoholism, drugs, money laundery that were lethal to the people and the state. For more details see Mbunda (2013: 10) and Heilman and Ndumbaro (2002).
tacles of the colours and tastes of their town experiences. While some people became dependent on the coming and going of trains for their livelihoods and their leisure, for others visiting the station was a rare occasion with equally transformative effects. Beyond the activities of this noisy town existed a completely contrasting economic activity. The Datoga – or Taturu as they are known in Itigi – existed outside the town circle. Although Itigi is considered their original home, these Datoga were obscure, they only came to the town to sell kibuyu/vibuyu (gourds) of milk or to draw water from the old town wells for their thirst-ridden cattle.

As a Datoga growing up outside the town, the above description informs the situation within which my boyhood was framed and contextualized. Indeed, although Itigi was only 12 kilometres away (Figure 6), to pastoralists living nearby its existence was intriguing and hostile. I will juxtapose the history of the Datoga and other narratives, like that of Itigi town, as a way of discussing two contrasting dynamics in this part of Central Tanzania; one based on cattle rearing and battling to survive within the “new” emerging competitive environment, and another represented by changing political and economic policies. Through a historical framework, this chapter will provide an exploration into how Datoga families and individuals negotiated their livelihoods in post-independence Tanzania by exploring the histories of two families and their stories of conflicts, murders, and competition. This chapter will engage with the process of ‘remembering’ as a way of renewing the broad historical agenda – of giving voice to the Datoga people. The conversations in this chapter express histories of contested memories and competitive encounters between families of Datoga pastoralists and agriculturalists. I try to show that the change in pastoralist communities, as in many others, is both celebrated and mourned: as something that pushes some communities to extinction and elevates others to success. The process of change between 1979 and 1993 has been something that the Datoga, the families discussed in this chapter, and other postcolonial Tanzanian communities have been trying to master. The processes of transformation as a result of political and economic forces brought new forms of identity, pushing the communities into encounters with “others” that came to their vicinities as allies of modernity and urbanization. Throughout this chapter, I recount the histories of individuals trying to fit into a rapidly transforming landscape, culture, and state as seen through their eyes and through mine.

Conversations between the Mnyakongo and Mhajida families are the foundation of this chapter. The discussions with the two families about their discontented pasts make visible their economic situations, migrations and the forces that they had to embrace as they moved from one scene of history to another. This chapter shows the evolution of the two families as they reconnected their life experiences with the definition of the plains, the expansion of Itigi town and its surrounds. Memory as a personal force is contrasted with forgetting as a temporal process or life experience which communities sought to engage or disengage with. There are two phases of history that I present in this chapter. The first period, between 1906 and 1952, I have called ‘the memory of loss and disappearance.’ This particular period is reflected in the memories of my family (the Mhajida’s) and the Mnyakongo, primarily in the
form of oral narratives, alongside some archival sources. This phase is a reflection on decisive periods coinciding with narratives of disasters or encounters that defined the direction of the two families. As I examine these memories, I pay close attention to events that occurred beyond the family and the connections that they had on the transformation of the Taturu in Central Tanzania. This period was followed by a short transitional phase between 1952 and 1974, which I consider a time of healing and forgetting. The eras of my great-grandfather and my grandfather covers the colonial period, but more specifically the period in which oral narratives recount very ambivalent histories of the Taturu as an ethnic community. Through the prism of my own family history, I approach the complex issues of the colonial experience and the convergences and divergences produced in the identities of the Taturu. The second period is my own era, which I consciously divide between my parents’ era and my childhood (1974–1986). I conclude the discussion by looking at events that happened between 1986 and 1993.

Family or Community? Exploring Identities and Processes of Encounter

An African Family, clan, and community are concepts that both historians and anthropologists have grappled with for many years. Family has been understood as “a social group characterized by common residence, economic cooperation, and reproduction. It includes adults of both sexes, at least two of whom maintain a socially approved sexual relationship, and one or more children, own or adopted, of the sexually cohabiting adults” (Murdock 1949: 1). Evans-Pritchard defines a clan as “the largest group of agnates who trace their descent from a common ancestor and between whom marriage is forbidden and sexual relations are considered incestuous” (Evans-Pritchard 1940: 192). While a family is an existing union of two people who originate from two different clans, the clan can be a huge and diverse group sharing similar ancestry. The two definitions are reflected in observations made by Morimichi Tomikawa about the Datoga. Tomikawa sees the family and the clan as products of the dynamics of change and certain forms of generational continuity (Tomikawa 1978: 6). Using similar conceptual understandings of ‘clan’ and ‘family’ as above, I discuss two Datoga families—the Mhajida and Mnyakongo families, who both belong to the Beresta, a sub-clan of the Bianjid-Taturu.

I was born either in 1973 or 1974; I do not know my exact birthdate. But what is clear is that I was born in a small, remote village called Damweru in Itigi in the Singida region of Central Tanzania. I was baptized in the Roman Catholic Church on the 2nd of December 1974 (Roman Catholic baptismal record, Itigi parish, 1973). A faded pencil mark on my baptismal card says that I was born on the 16th of June 1973, but no one knows if that is correct. My siblings and other boys and girls of my age who were born around the time also do not know their dates of birth. Our birth-

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378 Some scholars have viewed the family as the unit in which human political evolution began. This is discussed in Friedrich Engels (1902: 13ff.).
days are obscure not because of anything connected with our pastoralist heritage, but because we belonged to a pre-literate tradition. I was the second child of Shanga Mhajida and Detena Mapiji. I was born at the height of *ujamaa* and ‘operation *vijiji*’ (villages) (Swahili: sing. *kijiji* and pl. *vijiji*) – the forced eviction from traditional to state supervised village sat the beginning of a great wave of state sponsored socialist villages in the early 1970s in Tanzania. This was a period when the Datoga in Itigi and neighbouring regions tried to come to terms with the sedentarization of their nomadic pastoralist life through the state’s forced settlement programs. I remember the hectic activities related to this period, though these memories come from its waning stages. Both of my parents and the Mnyakongo family are Datoga, coming from a subgroup called Bianjid, popularly known as the Taturu community. These are Nilotic pastoralists, just like the Maasai and the Kalenjin (Tanui 2015: 217; Ehret 1974b: 92–94). Due to centuries of migration, the Taturu, like many other subgroups of the Datoga, are scattered throughout different regions of Tanzania. As outlined in Chapter 2, historians are divided on the exact dates the Nilotes moved to East Africa: some insisting the Nilotes arrival dates back several centuries (Ehret 1974b: 92), whereas others suggest more recent settlement. Available records both oral and written suggest that the Datoga settled in the Serengeti plains and became a dominant group by 1500 A.D. They were pushed south in the mid-19th century by expanding Maasai pastoralists. It is possible that until this time the Datoga were not as fragmented as they are today. From oral narratives, one can assume that the Datoga left the Serengeti in successive waves of migration from the mid-19th century onwards. These narratives suggest that the first group from the Serengeti passed Itigi and went south (most oral discourses mention Zambia and South Africa as the destination). The second and later groups seem to have left the plains, while the last decided to stay in Itigi and parts of Singida (Interview Moshi, 08.01.15).

There are various explanations of how this group of the Datoga acquired the name “Taturu.” The common nomenclature by which most of the people belonging to this subgroup were known after the 19th century split was Bianjid. But it is not known when people began to call them Taturu. Reference to the Bianjid as Taturu appears in pre-colonial records, particularly those made by Oscar Baumann as early as 1894 (Baumann 1894: 69ff.). However, Baumann seems to confuse terms in his analyses: registering for example the Wataturu as a separate group from, rather than a subgroup of the Datoga. Some oral expositions relate the name to a corruption of the word Datoga/Tatoga by the Bantu neighbours, particularly the Nyaturu, Sukuma, and Nyiramba communities (Interview Ndojoo, 09.01.15). However, the Manyoni district book suggests that people who did the corruption were Gogo:

The origin of the word Taturu is difficult to fathom but it may have arisen through the name given by the wagogo to the small skin-made huts or tents used by the wataturu in former years. The Wagogo referred to these as Chi-tunguri which can easily be corrupted to Taturu. It is said that the guttural
language of the Wataturu is very similar to that of the Wamang’ati, which is what one would expect. Other traditions relate this to what they consider the “other” – a foreign or different culture. This last term has a derogatory connotation and is used by the Nyaturu people of Singida [Tur] in expressions like “ataturuomba,“ meaning the Taturu of the plains; pastoralist people who are far from modernization (Cory 1952: 2; Samuel Mhajida 2009: 45).

The word Taturu has become common and acceptable in most of Manyoni District and beyond. In his 1959 publication A Tribal Map of Tanganyika, Gulliver mentions the Taturu as one of the “tribes” in Tanganyika and describes them as a “small tribe scattered in Manyoni, Musoma, Nzega and Shinyanga Districts” (Gulliver 1959: 74). In all of these districts, the communities were linguistically, socially, and economically tied to surrounding ethnic communities, to the extent that some subgroups started losing their identities and languages. This may have prompted Gulliver to wrongly classify the Taturu as a “tribe” rather than just a subgroup of more expansive Datoga communities.

Oral accounts suggest that it is surprising how the Itigi plains became a choice for the settlement of Taturu pastoralists. One theory advanced by many Datoga elders in Itigi is that in the late 19th century the Itigi Plains were not the targeted destination for many migrating Datoga pastoralists. According to this narrative, many other groups of Datoga had passed through Itigi on their way to Zambia. Several groups had already passed Itigi during the mid-19th century when a calf broke its leg and stalled the last group. This led to the labelling of such people as fudakshi ghairimash Bianjera, meaning those who were tied by a broken calf and refused to continue with the journey (Interview Mabochi, 08.01.15; Interview Mgokoo, 08.01.15). A different theory was advanced by E. C. Willis in 1921 who showed that there is a significant evidence that by the 1920s the Datoga were scattered all over the plains of Central Tanzania. Willis claimed that the identity of the Bianjid subgroup was created by the frequency of Maasai invasion. In the early 19th century it was possible to settle in Itigi because the plains were scarcely settled, as the only groups roaming the area were Yanzi hunter-gatherers. The Yanzi are considered the earliest group in Central Tanzania. They lived west of Itigi, in and close to the miombo forests, thus leaving the plains in the east and south of Itigi open for the Taturu to claim and make their own. There are narratives among the elders that claim the Yanzi had a ruler called Nyamusi who welcomed the Taturu peacefully and gave them nchi (a territory), but this story is not popular among the Taturu in the area. While Itigi is open grassland, it was not an easy place to settle. During the dry season it is dry and hostile, with cracking black soils and scorching sun. The climate required that the Taturu learnt to drill wells to reach water tables as deep as thirty metres or more below (Fosbrooke

379 TNA, Manyoni District Book; “Wataturu” No.1, 25.1.1930.
1957). Additionally, a subsection of the Taturu called Wagumbu learned the art and ceremony of rainmaking. It is possible that their exposure to this dry land taught them skills of making rain and the intricacies around it.

My ancestors possibly came with the last Taturu migration, but all I know of my grandparents from my paternal side are two names: Chitili and Mhajida. The reason is that the nature of the Taturu, especially from the late 19th century onwards, was characterized by frequent migration. The people were frequently moving to different places, either to keep a significant distance from the Maasai or to escape major disasters. The late 19th century experiences of rinderpest are one such example.\(^{381}\) Survival made permanent settlement difficult and therefore families split into smaller, more manageable units as a survival strategy. Lines of ancestors were easily lost with the fading memories of elders. I think the same applies to other families of the Taturu. The lack of the written word may be the main reason for this. Further, the Taturu were unlike other African groups who had special “tribal” historians to memorize the entire lineage and line of descent by chanting it over and over again in songs, stories and epics until it became part of them. Boubou Hama and J. Ki-Zerbo have dealt with this kind of ancient African history and the way it was passed on to subsequent generations (Hama and Ki-Zerbo 1981: 50). In more centralized societies like the Mosi, Mali, Zimbabwe, and the Zulus, historians in the royal courts memorized the history of the kings and other royal dignitaries and passed it from one generation to another. Hama and Ki-Zerbo summarize this kind of passing on of the history as:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{It is not from my mouth} \\
\text{It is from the mouth of A} \\
\text{Who gave it to B} \\
\text{Who gave it to C} \\
\text{Who gave it to D} \\
\text{Who gave it to E} \\
\text{Who gave it to F} \\
\text{Who gave it to me} \\
\text{May mine be better in my mouth than in the mouth of the ancestors}
\end{align*}
\]

(Hama and Ki-Zerbo 1981: 50).

To these groups, the history of the kings and princes/princesses was also a history of the entire people, both inside and outside of the court. To the Taturu, such a repertoire of history remained in the songs and scattered narratives of elders. As I was seeking authoritative narratives for this chapter, few individuals regarded as books of stored memory and history could be pointed to. What we know from such traditions is that until the second half of the 19th century, the Taturu were already spread across the entire savannah in Central and North Tanzania. There are many reports indicat-
ing that the Taturu were closely integrated with the other groups that I discussed in Chapter 2. One of the few clearly detailed expositions on the Taturu appears in the Manyoni District Book, which was written by C. Willis in 1921. The account is based on the memories of elders, who had either migrated themselves and could therefore provide relatively fresh and accurate descriptions, or their children. It seems also that by the 1880s, apart from the constant migrations as a result of the Maasai wars, the Taturu were also imposing their own meaning of the landscape and memory on the plains of Central Tanzania. Early travellers with the countless other caravan traders also mention a few scattered Taturu settlements in Tura (north of Itigi town), Wembere (north of Singida) and Kitaraka. By 1858, expansion to the east had not reached beyond the villages of Kitaraka, Sanjaranda and later Itigi. The indication of such early settlement is clearly exemplified by the presence of deep wells in Kitaraka, Itigi and Sanjaranda. Such wells supported the culture and livelihood of the Taturu. Later, the German railway builders followed this line of water accessibility when laying a railway to Kigoma in Western Tanzania.

The Family Background: The First Phase

One of the obscurities surrounding the early Mhajida and Mnyakongo family history has to do with generational loss. There is a significant lack of information and, I believe, a number of suppressed memories are connected to how the two families struggled to survive through the past. The reason for this is not the common loss of memory related to pre-literate societies, but is rather due to the physical disappearance and disconnected narratives of origin that are contested by the Mnyakongo and Mhajida families. Moreover, my own family members from my paternal and maternal line have been affected by the way other people’s reconstructions have been imposed on their histories. My own conversations with family members on the origins of the Mhajida’s reveal contrasting narratives of early forefathers and their descendants. One of the dominant narratives regarding my great-grandfather, which for years has become an accepted version of the family history, is the mystery of the life of Chitili. According to this narrative, Chitili was the first known in the line of the genealogy of the family (Interview M. Kusenta, 02.01.15; Interview Shanga Mhajida, 02.01.15). Chitili was possibly an outsider, a non-Mtaturu who came from the east (possibly from among the Gogo). Having heard the noises of cattle in one of the Mnyakongo boma, my great-grandfather went and settled there (akaletwanang’ombe – was brought by noises of the bulls and cows). Chitili was received and adopted by Msambili into the Mnyakongo clan. As a boy Chitili was quickly accepted and integrated by members of the Mnyakongo family; and he was initiated within the Taturu culture and married off. As far as the Mhajida family is concerned, the narrative of

382 TNA, Manyoni District Book, vol.1 (1921).
Chitili is not an old one. It is possible that it was made up by some members of the Mnyakongo family after 1951.\textsuperscript{383}

The later years of Chitili are associated with histories of disappearance. It seems possible from historical evidence that both of my great-grandfathers (from my paternal and maternal sides), physically disappeared, and that their disappearances remained a mystery for many years. To begin with, Chitili was probably with the Mnyakongo clan for most of his youth. He then definitely fathered more than three children; those known were Mhajida, Msiwa, and Kusenta (there are still controversies regarding whether Kusenta was actually Chitili’s child or not). When Chitili “mysteriously” disappeared, the Mnyakongo clan expelled Kusenta and his mother. While Mhajida and his sister Msiwa were adopted by the Mnyakongo clan, their apparent (half) brother Kusenta moved with his mother to her brother’s home in Mhalala, where his mother had two other children, Uneya and Nyambwa (Interview M. Kusenta, 02.01.15). According to the Mnyakongo account, the disappearance of Chitili was a mystery, and it is possible that he disappeared from the Mnyakongo family the same way as he came to them. Muyenje Kusenta Chitili, also known as Javan Kusenta Chitili, recently told me another version of the story.\textsuperscript{384} That is, that Chitili never disappeared mysteriously, as was advocated by the Mnyakongo clan, but rather that he was a victim of the German war recruiters, and in 1916 was kidnapped together with his uncle while drawing water for his cattle at Mchindoo village. According to this story, which Muyenje heard from his father and other elders, that “while drawing water for the cattle, one African man called them, and when they went there they were compelled to assist Europeans as porters. So Chitili and his uncle never bade anybody goodbye. They disappeared with other porters to Mahenge.”\textsuperscript{385} Muyenje also adds that it is possible that those who were around the wells where he was working knew exactly what had happened. After three years, Chitili’s uncle returned alone with a few possessions of Chitili’s including fumbe (beads), shoes, and a piece of cloth. The articles were evidence that Chitili had died from natural causes – possibly of malaria in Mahenge, where he was later buried. The bringing of his few possessions seems to discount the Mnyakongo narrative. The strange thing about this history is that only the Kusenta and not the entire Mhajida and Mnyakongo families hold this version of Chitili’s disappearance to be true. The rest of the family interprets Chitili’s disappearance as a mystical act. These competing versions of Chitili’s history represent how memory was contested even within fami-

\textsuperscript{383} This is the year in which Mhajida was arrested for murder. His case brought a change of many events regarding his family history. 1951 was also a turning point in the way narratives about the case and his pre-1951 experiences were remembered and communicated.

\textsuperscript{384} This is one of the sons of Kusenta. His version of the family story provides a plausible alternative narrative. Personally, I hold his version of events dearly.

\textsuperscript{385} Mahenge was one of the German Garrisons which was well fortified following the Maji-Maji war in 1905–1907. It is possible that the recruits formed an army of porters during the World War One in Tanganyika to assist the retreating German army in carrying ammunitions and supplies. The fate of these porters after the end of the war in 1918 has not been explored by historians.
lies according to themes of forgetting, disappearance, and entangled memories of the dead. The fact that no one can point out the final resting place of Chitili makes the above narratives completely disconnected and hypothetical.

There is a similarly disconnected kinship history on my maternal side. The reason is the same as above: there is only scant information available. My mother, who was an excellent storyteller, said very little about the background of her paternal grandparents. One of the reasons for this unwillingness to explain the background of her family history is the mysterious disappearance of her father Mapiji when she was a baby. From the narratives it is certain that Mapiji was married to Mderu. The marriage possibly happened in 1952 and my mother was probably born one year later.\footnote{No one knows her exact year or date of birth. I recently learnt from an old friend of my mother that both were born in 1953. Another way that I came to believe that my mother was born in 1953 was that she told me, from time to time, that she was married when she was quite young. She estimated she had only been 14 years old. From the estimated birthdays of her children, 1953 seems close. She must have married between 1969 and 1970, aged between 15 and 17, as my sister was born in 1971.} Mapiji abandoned his wife and baby in 1954 and left to an unknown place. He returned in 1998. The first time I met my grandfather we did not talk at all about his life. Everyone had a story that they wanted to share, but resistance always came regarding how and who should first bring up the story. I am sure that my mother felt the same way. After the death of her mother in 1978, it is likely that she had accepted the fact that she was without parents, and this fact remained strong thereafter. When I came back from school one day in 1999, I heard the news of the passing of Mapiji. With him went the mysteries of his “lost” four decades in a self-imposed exile. His story, like Chitili’s, is lost to oblivion.

The final issue is an aspect of male children. Being a patriarchal community, the Taturu inherit family fortunes through the paternal line, as with the Maasai, Gogo, Nyaturu, and many other communities throughout Tanzania and Africa.\footnote{For a detailed analysis of the patriarchal societies among the pastoralist communities see Michael E. Meeker (1989).} In these communities, a male child holds a symbolic role, not only as a defender of the community, but also as a carrier of the progeny of a clan. In the four generations following Chitili, only four known male children are known to have survived to adulthood. That is to say, every generation had one surviving male child, making it one of the smallest families among the Taturu. This single fact explains another dimension of family history, which is a consistent lack of helping hands, especially when the family was crippled by a disaster or when a legitimate heir lost his ability to keep the cattle for the use of the entire family.
Mhajida: Another Lost History

My grandfather Mhajida was executed in 1952 after allegedly committing homicide.\(^{388}\) Despite the fact that he lived in the same villages that some members of my family live in today, there is a lot of silence about his life. That is, until recently, when I single-handedly started an initiative to discover more about his life even if it ended in tragedy. To better understand the spaces in which Mhajida lived, I also try to highlight background histories of the villages and landscapes in which the history of Mhajida and the rest of the family occurred. According to prison officers in 1952, Mhajida was executed when he was approximately 38 years old.\(^{389}\) However, oral testimonies from his family indicate that he was around 46 at the time of his death. Accepting the oral testimonies brings us to 1906 as the year in which Mhajida was possibly born. At the time of Chitili’s disappearance in 1916, Mhajida was around ten years old, and his sister Msiwa around thirteen (Interview M. Kusenta, 08.12.14).

Tracing this history from 1906 means going back to the time when Chitili and other family members lived in Muhalala, an old caravan village south of the present town of Manyoni. It seems that the family and members of other Datoga subgroups moved to this and other adjacent villages in Ugogo after they were driven out of Durto, Tura and other surrounding villages west of Itigi by the Maasai in the 1890s (G. McL. Wilson 1953: 35–47). The move coincided with the establishment of German colonialism in the area. The best-known clans of the Datoga in Muhalala after this migration were the Ghumbiek (sometimes known as Wagumbu), Reimojik, Bianjid, and Daragwajek.\(^{390}\) Chitili and the entire Mnyakongo clan came from the Beresta, a sub-clan of the Bianjid. It is conceivable that they moved further south to Kilimatinde for security reasons and to keep a good distance from their Maasai enemies.

From a political point of view, the German colonial experience in Manyoni and Singida revolved around the German military post at Kilimatinde. It was from this post that the entire area of central and northern Tanzania was first ruled. Kilimatinde was first erected as a Deutsch-Ostafrika Gesellschaft (DOAG) colonial outpost in 1889 and in 1895 became a permanent military station (Shorter 1972: 230). From this time onward, Kilimatinde became more significant than the old caravan town of Muhalala, 15 kilometres to the north. By 1900, all administrative duties of the German colonial regime north of Dodoma were conducted in Kilimatinde. One instance that illustrated this centralization of power was the suppression of the Nyaturu and Nyiramba revolts in the 1900s using troops from Kilimatinde (Koponen 1994: 184). Further, in 1908 and onward, when tax collections began to be demanded from all conquered villages, individual ethnic groups travelled to Kilimatinde to pay their taxes. For this reason, a market for selling local commodities began to flourish in the

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\(^{388}\) TNA, accession 238, file 5/3, vol.2: Condemned prisoners.

\(^{389}\) TNA, accession 238, file 5/3, vol.2: Condemned prisoners.

\(^{390}\) These groups of the Datoga remained distinct until the 1950s. The 1948 census indicated that there were around 1,912 in both Itigi and Muhalala. See this also in (G. McL. Wilson 1953: 42).
Growing up in a Community in Transition to Oblivion 209
town. The further development of Kilimatinde and nearby villages was enhanced by
the construction of the central railway line, which reached Kilimatinde District in
1909.

Other social groups that had a strong influence in Kilimatinde and surrounding
villages were Asian communities (mainly Arabs and Indians) and Somalis. Most of
the Arabs lived in Kilimatinde, where they had established themselves in the mid-
19\textsuperscript{th} century through caravan trading activities. But the Somalis and Indians were
newcomers who mostly flocked in as a result of the completion of the central railway
line (Iliffe 1979: 139–41). These new groups likely built and sustained the market
in the form of \textit{duka} (shops), which by 1912 had made Itigi and Saranda the new
commercial centres of all of Singida and Mbulu. Some of the names most men-
tioned include Hemed Nassoro and Bwana (Mister) Robbie.\textsuperscript{391} Apart from these
social groups, German settlers were well established in a few enclaves, owning a few
houses and properties in the vicinity, especially in Muhalala.\textsuperscript{392}

The above situation largely informed the life and times of Chitili until he disap-
peared into porterage in 1916. Throughout the German colonial period, the Taturu
were more or less considered a part of the Gogo ethnic group. Despite their numbers
and their geographic spread over large areas north of Kilimatinde, they were ruled by
a Gogo chief named Messopia Mulewa who served as their \textit{jumbe} (local leader). Mes-
sopia Mulewa remained as \textit{jumbe} until 1928, when for the first time a Datoga chief,
Andu (Said) Mangwela assumed the title, ruling the Taturu and a few other ethnic
communities from Itigi.\textsuperscript{393} The chiefs played different roles as far as colonial rule was
concerned. This was an important achievement as a Taturu chief could influence the
Taturu to assume a semi-permanent lifestyle. For the first time, the chief and his as-
sistants lived permanently in one place. As a result, the chief began accepting differ-
ent ethnic groups including Somalis and Arabs, who by 1920 had become the most
economically powerful groups. They also brought Islam with them to the chief’s
court. Because the chief was also a significant medicine man, his keen interest in new
developments had many consequences for the rest of the Datoga in Itigi. However,
the outbreak and spread of tsetse fly along the length of the old caravan routes south
of the central railway had the largest influence on the lives of many Datoga. By the
early 1930s, the British authorities in Manyoni started considering evacuating the
entire infested region, which meant clearing all of the Datoga and Yanzi settlements
in Jeje, Mgunduko, Nkonko, and Mudaburo. Among these villages, Jeje was the only
Datoga settlement southwest of Manyoni District. The justification for evacuating

\textsuperscript{391} TNA, accession 108, file 2/21, a 1952–1953: Gogo Development; also Hans Cory Collection.
\textsuperscript{392} See this in Ralph and Dora Banks, “The life and times of Ralph and Dora Banks” (unpublished
memoir). In this memoir, Dora Banks recounts the following regarding other influential communities
in Kilimatinde and villages around: “our cases from England followed later on an ox cart belonging
to an Arab, Hemed Nassor. He became a good friend all the years we were at Kilimatinde. Muhala was
an ex-German property of 3,000 hectares, developed as a Rubber Plantation in the midst of dense
bush,” 36–38.

\textsuperscript{393} TNA, Manyoni District Annual Report, 1929, 3.
the villages were some reported deaths from sleeping sickness in 1930. The British evacuated most of these villages from the 10th of September to the 30th of October in 1930.394 From conversations that I had with some members of my family, I concluded that many Datoga families also left Jeje and went to Itigi and surrounding villages. But Mhajida and other Mnyakongo family members did not leave at once. Instead, they remained until 1940 when most of the close family of Mhajida left Jeje following the death of Mnyakongo.395 It seems some of Mhajida’s brothers proceeded to Itigi while he prepared also himself to join them.

The Storm and the End of Mhajida

In 1947 Mhajida followed his relatives and migrated to Muhanga, about 14 kilometres from Itigi town. With his wives Sieba and Mchimbu, he built a home where they raised their four children (Nchenjele, Merisiana, Bibi, and Shanga). In contrast to Jeje, Muhanga was relatively closer to Itigi, “the Mecca of Singida region,” and was a bustling Taturu village with a school and dispensary.396 Competing traditions from different cultural backgrounds made Muhanga exceptionally challenging. While in Jeje, Mhajida and the Mnyakongo had been revered as successful cattle herders, whereas in Muhanga they were not. There were many wealthy Taturu pastoralists in Muhanga; their wealth resonated with their influence socially and politically. Some of these included individuals like Nanana, Kaguluu, and Rupia Kitunuwasi, whose cattle possession gave them chief-like status. Muhanga was a typical pastoralist village that had vast plains in the north with a bountiful supply of fodder. However, in the dry season water was always a source of tension and sometimes caused inter-family conflicts. Many people knew Mhajida because he immediately made a name for himself by sinking his own well and strongly defended his right to it against his neighbours. This strengthened his position among his fellow Taturu, gave him the image of a strong, uncompromising, self-imposing, and upright young man (Interview Kamaka, 22.12.14; Interview M. Kusenta, 08.12.14). Particularly important was the way he managed to keep together his adopted clan after the death of Mnyakongo in 1940, which led to unreserved reverence for Mhajida. For example, Mnyakongo’s sons moved from Jeje after the great tsetse fly movement in 1930 because of Mhajida’s encouragement. However, in oral testimonies he is also portrayed as a violent man, a trait that seemed to override all other aspects of his personality. Mhajida’s violent nature is dramatized by one case in which Rabeca Kamaka (about

394  TNA, Manyoni District Commissioners’ Report, 1930, 11.
395  Mnyakongo became the adopted father of Mhajida in around 1916. After that, Mhajida and his sister Msiwa belonged to the family. With the death of Mnyakongo in Jeje in 1940, Mhajida gained some power to oversee the welfare of Mnyakongo’s sons and daughters, as well as his boma. By this time, Mhajida appears to have considered himself a son of Mnyakongo, and all his official identification appeared as so, though there is no explanation of why Mhajida decided to drop the name of Chitili in his official identification.
396  TNA, Manyoni District Commissioners’ Report, 1923, 2.
GROWING UP IN A COMMUNITY IN TRANSITION TO OBLIVION

87 years old when I talked to her in 2014) tells of an argument between her family and Mhajida in 1947 or 1948. Having heard about Mhajida’s character, her family members refused his proposal to make Rabeca his third wife. Instead, Rabeca’s family accepted another proposal, and the day for this man to bring his bride price was arranged. The morning that they brought their cattle, they met Mhajida with a similar number of cattle on the same course, but he was marrying off his “brother” Nzalla Mnyakongo. Rabeca recounts:

That day we saw two families with cattle for the bride price all struggling to push them into the boma of my father. My family was astounded by such a move: so we kept quiet and left the two families to agree with each other. What Mhajida did is that he came forward and threatened the others with his two sticks that if any one obstructed his cattle’s way into the boma they would know what will happen. Actually, he won; the Gogo were swayed away because of Mhajida’s threats. And that is how I ended being married to Mhajida’s younger brother. (Interview Kamaka, 22.12.14)

Unfortunately for Mhajida, his family’s side of his story remains scant and mostly a whisper and largely undocumented. Only neighbours and hearsay offer a portrayal of the event. It is possible that Mhajida’s later fading away grieved the family and the best approach to handling that was to bury his memories with him. What led to my grandfather’s transformation from a revered man to one of obscurity and silence was an ‘incident’ that happened one evening in 1951 while he was returning from a local beer party in Muhanga with his ‘friend’ Rupia Kitunuwasi. The two differed on an undisclosed matter and the disagreement ended in a fight in which a single blow from Mhajida tragically killed Rupia. As killing a person in a time of peace is an abomination, this unfortunate incident changed Mhajida’s and his family’s life forever. Mhajida fled the village the night of the tragedy, ran more than 14 kilometres to Itigi town to escape the rage of the deceased’s family. From there, he was stuck and overwhelmed by what had happened. Many people who knew him also added that the incident crippled his decision-making senses. When day broke, it is said that the Chief’s assistants saw a depressed man walking around the wells. His behaviour roused their suspicions, and they eventually arrested him. For my grandfather, this was the beginning of the end of his freedom, and his life. Personally, I believe that he may have wanted to commit suicide by drowning himself in one of the six deep wells of Utemini.

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397 Some people I spoke to believe they knew each other and possibly had a cordial relationship.
398 The wells are about 30 metres deep, and they were just a short walking distance from the former chief Andu Mangwela’s residence.
The “Murder” Case and the Fate of the Hidden Will

Nothing has ever haunted me, and perhaps my entire family, more than the legacy of the 1951 incident. When I was growing up in the 1980s, before attending school, I hardly heard my family speak of Mhajida. It was surprising that when I was born I was not given his name in the Taturu tradition, as I was the ideal child to inherit his name as a way of immortalizing his spirit and that of his generation. Instead, I was named Gijemboo, the name of my great-grandfather on my maternal side. I acquired the name Mhajida much later, when I was registered for school in 1986. As I grew up, I began to hear whispers and stories of my grandfather and the “murder” case. What I was not told was when and how his life ended. Neither my other grandfathers (one of the custodians) nor my aunts ever spoke about the case and the tragedy behind it. So as a schoolboy, I wanted to know about this man, his life and how he had eventually faded into oblivion. Acquiring his name in 1986 was a very important symbolic step in moving towards this end. In 1994, I coincidentally met a person who told me a very revealing story about Mhajida. For the first time, I was told that Mhajida’s “murder” case was likely decided in 1954.399 My interest in this case lingered on until December 2007, when I was doing research on the dynamics of poverty among the Taturu from the late 19th century to the end of the 20th century. Having completed my M.A. courses at the University of Dar es Salaam, I was fulfilling the requirement of a research component when the question of my own identity grew into a serious research interest. One afternoon in Kilimatinde I was dumb founded by the reaction of my informants when I introduced myself to them as Mhajida. The old people told me they knew the owner of the name and that he was popular in the entire area of Kilimatinde and its surrounding villages. Apart from mentioning the details of the case, the conversations revealed nothing more about the person and the history of my grandfather. In an effort to locate his resting place in 2007, I went to Dodoma to visit old graveyards and see if any names or marks on the condemned prisoners’ graves could shed some light on the ongoing mystery. However, the grounds of the graveyards contained few clues. The same year, I visited the archive of the High Court of Tanzania for a similar purpose, but nothing meaningful came out of my effort. The launching of the National Records Centre in Dodoma in 2013 enhanced my pursuit. When I was doing my archival research in August 2014 I was able to see for the first time a few court cases of condemned prisoners, specifically from 1953 to 1963. Yet none mentioned my grandfather.

It was only in January 2015 that I first saw the file with the case of Mhajida. I became the first family member to unearth what had remained hidden for more than 60 years. From the records and oral accounts, the arrest of Mhajida seemed simple. He had presented himself to the chief the day after the homicide. That same day he was ferried to the district boma. In two months, the District Commissioner

399 Conversation with Gabriel (the details of his name and place is not clear) as I recollect this conversations which happened in 1994 at Itigi town.
began his investigation into the case. It was clear from the beginning that the case looked like manslaughter, resulting in an investigation into the character of Mhajida. Apart from witnesses, many of whom appear in the reports, the people called to the District Commissioner were elders who knew the accused. It was thinkable that if testimonies of elders and local leaders represented his character in a positive way, that he would have been released or imprisoned. The first people offering “facts” about Mhajida’s character wrote a letter dated November 15th 1951. The letter states:

*Salaam, nakutaarifu ya kwamba ukipata barua hii ufanye haraka kuwaleta wazee wa kitaturu ilikuonana na mimi juu ya shauri ya Mhajida s/o Mnyakongo, aliye-muwa Rupia s/o Kitunuwas huko Muhanga. Wawe wazee kiasi cha wanane, au zaidi. Mmojawapo awe Mzengatumbi Mwinyikondo, na Mpembamoto Nanana, HARAKA WAFIKE HAPA. (Greetings! I am informing you that when you receive this letter, you should quickly bring to me Taturu elders for consultation with me regarding the case of Mhajida s/o Mnyakongo, who murdered Rupia s/o Kitunuwas in Muhanga. They should be at least eight old people or more. Among them should be Mzengatumbi (local leader) Mwinyikondo and Mpembamoto Nanana (councillor). THEY SHOULD ARRIVE HERE QUICKLY).*400

Another letter with similar intentions followed, but it was sent to Jeje, Mhajida’s birthplace. The letter explained the kind of old people that the District Commissioner was soliciting: “people who knew his character while living there.” There is no evidence of what exactly was said by these elders, but a speedy conclusion of the case ensued. Mhajida was sentenced to death. Around December 1951, Mhajida was briefly sent back to his family to see them and possibly prepared him for execution. Those who saw Mhajida for the last time said that he looked heavy-hearted. It is said that one evening he looked at the gate of the boma while the cattle were pushing into it, and silently bit his lower lip until it bled (Interview Kamaka, 22.12.14; Interview Shanga Mhajida, 02.01.15). He was certainly overwhelmed by emotions and worries about who should take the responsibility of tending the cattle and his family that he had laboured to build for decades.

There was nothing especially dramatic about the case. After all normal processes were completed, several letters were sent that detailed the day of the execution, the people who should identify him, and how much property was with him. The day before the execution, which was scheduled for the 22nd of February 1952, Mhajida was baptized as Yohana Mnyakongo. After the baptism, the prison officer arranged for someone to write his will. The writing of wills seems to have been a compulsory exercise in British colonial time for all individuals facing execution in Tanganyika. I saw many such cases in the archives where people awaiting execution had to adhere to this formality. The will was written on the 21st of February 1952; the same day he

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400 TNA, accession 238, file 5/3, vol.2: Condemned prisoners.
received baptism from the Roman Catholic Prison Chaplain. This will, written with
the clerk, stands as the only valid first-hand information of Mhajida’s thinking and
vision. The will began with a greeting statement: “I am Mhajida son of Mnyakongo,
I bid farewell.” After the opening words it addressed the following issues: first, “my
property shall be inherited by Nyambwa, my little sister, who should also take care of
my entire family.” Secondly, Mhajida specified that the elder sister, Msiwa, should be
given ten cattle by her sister Nyambwa. Thirdly, he wrote that his third sister, Uneya,
should get one cow with a calf from Nyambwa. Fourthly, a relative named Nzala
Mnyakongo should get one cow, kanzu (robe) and a pair of shoes. The above were
prompt directives of the will that defined how his possessions should be divided.

In addition to addressing the matter of property, a large section of the two-page
handwritten text defined the future of those he was leaving behind, but did little to
explain the fate of his wives. In the section on property distribution, only the elder
wife Sieba was mentioned and the only property reserved for her was the five cents
left after his death. Apart from that, the will was future-oriented when it came to ad-
dressing the family and children. It stated: “I would like all my wives and children to
embrace Christianity.” For him, Christianity forbade even his wives from giving sac-
rifice to his ancestors. He wrote: “My wives should not offer sacrifice because I have
become a Christian.” The only freedom available to his wives was that they could
return to their families if they wanted to, but without their children. In retrospect,
it is clear that Mhajida’s will failed to settle the future of his wives. In this respect, he
was likely influenced by his new religion.

The will was controversial for the family. First, Mhajida’s sisters were given full
charge of all the property, which goes against the Taturu tradition of favouring the
male relatives. As stated in the will, their position broke preconceived forms of au-
thority. A person like Nzala Mnyakongo, mentioned so often in the will, had his
responsibility limited to that of an overseer who “should not let a long time pass
without paying a visit to my sister and the family.” However, the will was not
registered by any legal bodies apart from a letter from Isanga Prison that stated “I
attach the deceased’s will addressed to his sister Nyambwa.” As such, the exercise of
establishing and implementing the will was left to the family. As a result, the women
addressed in the will were left out of the proceedings of the case, and when the will
came out it was handed to or handled by the same people who Mhajida attempted to
sideline. The loss of Mhajida’s story and memory hinged on this very matter regard-
ing Mhajida’s last will. The male family members saw the will as an announcement
of their complete insignificance. While Mhajida’s case was raging they had formed a
committee of “tribal leaders” to secretly set an alternative way of inheritance to en-
sure they had control over the inheritance. Ultimately, all of my aunts were pushed
out of the roles granted to them by the will, including that of the custodianship of
my grandfather’s family and property.

Beyond the Will: My Life as a Pastoralist Boy

The will is a significant document, which partly explains the identity and a sort of life my father and his entire family came to embrace. The will provided a roadmap for who should take what and who should assume the custodianship of my father and his siblings. But what I came to see while I was growing up was completely the opposite of this roadmap. From conversations I have learned that the people who were not mentioned in the will took on the role of pushing out the entrusted people and overturning the will’s instructions. Eventually, my father and his entire family fell under the custodianship of Nzala and his brother Isume. While Mhajida entrusted his entire wealth and family to his sister, his brothers refused his ruling, which resulted in familial discord. The matter centred on the much-desired cattle and whoever wished to exert control was first required to snatch the will. My father, who was the only surviving male child, became the centre of attention in the new arrangement. After 1952, Nzala hastily took him together with all the cattle, while my aunts and other members moved on to live with Mhajida’s eldest sister. My father became the heir and his aunts slowly vanished from family accounts. When looking from another angle, the silences and absences generally suggest that the “proper” handling of the will was done from a patriarchal point of view, propelling the contested histories of disappearances of both Chitili and Mhajida.

Family histories bring forward not only such entangled issues of individual identity and personal conflicts, but also the ethnic histories of a particular community. Both Chitili and Mhajida wrestled with their own family embroilments as well the cobweb of forces outside their own family compounds. The period between 1906 and 1952 included experiences of colonialism and increasing ethnic interactions as a result of the improvement of means of mobility. I understand this as a period of crisis and decay, in the sense that it represented the rise of new cultures, economies, and power relations. The imposition of colonialism meant the disappearances of traditional forms of authority, including forms of settling disputes and punishment. All of these forces had a collective impact on individual families as well as ethnic relations more broadly. Oral narratives recount very ambivalent histories of the Taturu as an ethnic community. Through the prism of my own family history, it appears that the colonial period brought about relatively rapid decay of the Taturu’s pastoralist culture, a decay that manifested itself in the dilution and loss of identity, and forced incorporation into legal frameworks of colonial establishment. The execution of Mhajida was a product of this new establishment.

Moving away from the story of the disappearance of Chitili, we find similarly pessimistic accounts of the influence of the railway that came to Itigi, bringing other entanglements that represented a clash of Taturu pastoralist space with an emerging class of traders and the general colonial economy. The year that my grandfather was executed also coincided with the official inauguration of the Itigi cattle auction, end-

402 For the changing modes of colonial punishment see Frank Dikötter (2004).
ing the decades of dominance of the Somali and Indian itinerant cattle traders.\textsuperscript{403} The railway was commonly known as “the intestine siphoning of the wealth of the Taturu,” but it also created differing opinions about modernity and traditionalism. Modernity was clearly defined by the British colonial authorities in Manyoni as a way of life driven by capitalist relations of exchange. These ideas were spread through persuasion, force (taxation), and indoctrination into the value of the market economy for industrial commodities. The District Commissioner in Manyoni in 1921 argued:

> The whole secret as regards the successful nursing of a market simply lies in the assurance of native sales. Once he has received the price for his produce in the market-place, whether he goes home with the money or spends it in the nearest shop does not matter a jot. But that he gets money in the first place for his produce at an organized auction and then at liberty to buy where he wills is a very good thing.\textsuperscript{404}

This stream of thought bred the notion of the Taturu’s backwardness in relation to the “modern Swahilis,” a notion which has extended beyond this period and into my lifetime. Modernization, as heralded by the British colonial administrators, was in sharp contrast with traditionalism, which was mainly embraced by the Taturu. Apart from epitomizing conservatism through their inclination to pastoralism as a unifying identity, the Taturu were viewed as a stumbling block to the success of the market economy in Itigi. For the British, the railway occupied a central position as a carrier of culture and civilization, but the people close to it were considered a repelling force.

The building of another railway, popularly known as the Manyoni–Kinyangiri railway, a few kilometres from Itigi, not only endorsed the British colonial conviction of the civilizing role of the railway, but also extended the reach of the market to a wider area. The new railway was conceptualized in 1926 through the East African Loan Committee by a proposed fund of about 500,000 pounds.\textsuperscript{405} The purpose of the railway was threefold. First, it was to open Singida to the export economy through Itigi. At that time Singida was considered an isolated outpost but with a population close to 300,000. Second, it was intended that the railway would serve the well-populated and fertile Mbulu country in the Northern Province. Thirdly, it aimed to exploit the Mkalama with its estimated one million livestock, hides, groundnuts and ghee.\textsuperscript{406} The last aim was emphasized in 1926:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{403} TNA, accession 18, file 2/4.
  \item \textsuperscript{404} TNA, Manyoni District Commissioners’ Report, 1923, 4.
  \item \textsuperscript{405} Tanganyika Standard, 2.7.1932, p.12.
  \item \textsuperscript{406} Tanganyika Standard, 2.7.1932, p.12.
\end{itemize}
The proposed new railway to Mkalam and survey part is now pegging out on the line. It will pay from the day it is completed and it should be built at a ridiculously low cost. Our aim should be to get to Kinyangiro [sic.] the terminus and collecting centre in Mkalam by the cheapest and the easiest route. Once we are there we shall tap the produce of both Mkalam and Mbulu fortunately we pass through magnificent groundnut country in getting there.  

The two railways (the central and Manyoni-Kinyangiri lines) elevated the status of Itigi in relation to many other towns in Central Tanzania. The reference to Itigi as a “Mecca of Singida” came out of its strategic position at the centre of the region’s market economy. Somalis, Asians, and a few Swahilis set up shops in Itigi, helping to bring caravan towns like Singida in the north, Kilimatinde (after 1921), and Nkonko to an end. According to the British, living on or near the railway differentiated towns and villages between what they called the large capital of the merchants along the railway, and the ‘shenzi or Pori’ culture represented by a waning culture or economy of old towns/villages built around traditions of long-distance trade and pastoralism. In a report written in 1921, the District Commissioner in Manyoni applauded the strategic position that Itigi (as a railway town) occupied in contrast to that of Singida, a remote old caravan town in the north:

Singida town as a prosperous trade community has gone forever except in so far as cattle trade is concerned. Itigi however has never seen such prosperity and I venture to say it will not only continue but will increase, if only the cattle trade would start via Itigi then this sub-district’s prosperity is absolutely assured. It is in one way regrettable that the few Singida traders, who have for ages past done what they listed [sic.] with the Turu and his produce, will have to go out of business here but with the opening up of a new market on the line they must realise that the old “method of the porini” won’t wash with the “shenzi” any more and that a couple of hundred rupees as a working capital cannot compete with the large capital of the merchants along the railway.

While the old and “new” market strategies were not fundamentally different in the imagery of the modern, both approaches stood in contrast to traditionalism and thus pastoralism. That is why long-distance trade operated physically outside the Taturu realm, while they indirectly opposed its centeredness on their region. The opposition continued during the infrastructure booms in 1910, 1926, and 1935. The railway

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407 TNA, Manyoni District Commissioners’ Report, 1926, 11.
408 TNA, Manyoni District Commissioners’ Report, 1923, 2.
409 The boom came as a result of the developments in the transport sector within the German and British colonial periods. Within three decades of the colonial enterprise, Itigi witnessed the construction of the railways. First came the Central Railway line that reached Itigi in 1910 from Dar es Salaam. Ten years later came the road connecting Itigi and the Southern Highlands’ gold mining (1928–1935). Lastly, another railway was constructed from Manyoni to Singida between 1926 and
and roads brought economic competition among traders, as land and spaces of production became strongly influenced by a new and emerging economic class. Among the Taturu, the railway brought a new way of delineating what was Taturu and what was Swahili, and therefore foreign.

By 1952 the railway had brought with it the growth of Itigi from a small Taturu village to an ethnically diverse town, creating an informal distinction between what the British called the “sophisticated” and “non-sophisticated natives.” The sophisticated lived in the inner town and were mostly Asian traders and Swahilis, while the non-sophisticated were mainly Taturu, who were being pushed out of the town walls. Although the Taturu remained close to Itigi, their presence on the town’s periphery represented the persistence of their *porini* culture. This contrast was effectively captured by the metaphor of leaping to an uplifted area. According to the Taturu, crossing from the sophisticated Swahili and other non-Taturu cultural zones to the Taturu zone required one to physically cross the railway lines. The railway served as a border between these cultures. For the Taturu, this movement also meant undergoing a cultural leap (*gelgau*). *Gelgau*, later swahilized as *tambuka reli* / *Vuka reli* (crossing the railway), denoted a process of leaping to a space without the railway culture, leaving behind the vagaries and cultures of the market economy and more explicitly entering a space where the methods of the “*porini*” were still dominant.

Returning to the Mhajida narrative, we can see that the second period from 1952 to 1974 formed a time of acceptance and rehabilitation. It was a time in which my family came to terms with the loss of a father, defender, and husband. In fact, after February 1952, the lives of the wives of Mhajida and the rest of the family were never the same. Soon, the new heads and of the family Nzala Mnyakongo and Isume Mnyakongo (not mentioned in the will) obtained control and the women were told to go to their fathers. In normal cases, such women would not have been allowed to go (because they had children), even if there was nobody to inherit them as wives. Alternatively, their *boma* could be left intact with the women in charge until their sons were old enough to replace them. Mhajida’s will does not go into details of his wife’s future, possibly due to the Christian values he had taken on, but it does suggest that the sisters continued to raise the family until the children matured enough to take over. In addition to the issues of responsibility, in my family there was a process of burying and forgetting the memories of both Chitili and Mhajida as historical people. The activity of forgetting also encompassed the creation of a myth (at least from my family’s point of view) that the entire family of Mhajida was alien. Kusenta has agreed that the myth of the alien nature of Mhajida and Chitili resulted from “how the Mnyakongos wanted to share the exploits of their decision and permanent-

1932, which made Central Tanzania the most connected area of the country and its people more mobile than before.


411 According to Elieza Mgokoo, it was common among the Datoga for the wives of a deceased man to be inherited if there were surviving brothers (Interview Mgokoo, 08.01.15).
ly distance the members of Mhajida from their own cattle” (Interview J. Kusenta, 26.12.14). As part of the rehabilitation process, the family distanced itself from what happened to Mhajida because remembering invoked images of sadness, despair, and the betrayal of the requirements of the will.

As part of the process of forgetting, the alliance with the Mnyakongo clan that was created by Chitili and later strengthened by Mhajida slowly weakened. While Mhajida officially wanted to be called Mnyakongo and rejected the name Chitili as a second name in many of his official dealings (including what appears in court proceedings), the Mnyakongo family denounced him as their own brother after 1952. They openly distanced themselves from him by clearly asserting that his father was an alien and that my father was only in the Mnyakongo family as a result of their good will. As I grew up, I came to accept their benefactor role and the silences on the will.

The third period, which falls within my own time, is between 1974 and 1986. For me this marked a transition from the unconscious mind of a child to that of a grown pastoralist man. I began to consciously understand what was happening in the spaces around me in my own family and that of the larger Taturu community. After 1977 my family and the other Datoga had moved to Mbeya (more than 350 kilometres west of Itigi). I clearly remember being in Mbeya when my father began losing his cattle. I also began to understand the social conflicts and dilemmas of my own family as we negotiated life in a “foreign” environment with complex encounters with different cultures and landscapes. Some of my most vivid memories are of events in 1979, events still discussed by members of my family. For instance, one evening while my mother was preparing supper in darkness, a group of thugs invaded our homestead. The men never said a word when my mother greeted them with “usiku” (night), a common way of addressing someone, who in turn should respond “mchana” (daylight), even if it was actually night, as a way to ward off the darkness and the evil associated with it. In this case, the call of usiku was met by total silence. My mother intuitively felt danger and in horror she dragged three of her children (including me) and fled the house. Around this time, Mbeya and its villages were clouded with increased lawlessness; the country was going into the second year of war with Uganda (Barolsky 2007). As if to signify the general crisis within my family, within two years of my parents moving to Mbeya, our cattle started diminishing at a great speed. I came to learn that part of the reason for this was that the migrations of the Taturu and other Datoga subgroups were often led by very inexperienced young herdsmen (including my father who was then no more than 27 years old). In this case “very inexperienced” refers to two things. First, according to the social hierarchy of the Taturu, 27 was still considered an age of learning and maturing. Looking at the social functioning of individuals within the segmented society of the Taturu, one sees that each gender had specific roles that were clearly defined by age. As he or she aged, a man or woman acquired more respect and responsibility. Although in places close to towns such social organization was less rigidly defined, among males
in many Datoga areas, we could identify five distinct age grades (Interview Mgokoo, 08.01.15):

**Jeftunwasi**
This was regarded as an age during the early years of a male child. Babies were cherished, but a male baby was more revered due to the patriarchal nature of the society and its means of prolonging in a kinship group.

**Blandnuasi**
This was also a young male between five and 10 years of age. He had little responsibility in the society. Normally he tended calves close to the boma and still lived with his mother(s) in the main female house. There were norituals performed for him. He was not allowed to attend funerals, any initiation ceremonies, or matrimonial functions.

**Balanda**
The dropping of the suffix – *nuasi* signifies a slightly more advanced age on the part of the boy. Usually he had already been circumcised and was between 10 and 20 years of age. He could attend to more grown-up calves and sometimes if there were two or more boys of this age, they could look after the main herds with the supervision of the elders. Still, this boy was not allowed to attend matrimonial or burial rites, because he still needed more years before he could be initiated through *ting’ora* (initiation into the cultures and norms of the ancestors of the Taturu).

**Gharemineda**
Usually this was a young married man between the ages of 20 and 40 years. He was regarded as a mature person who had married and had attained *ting’ora* initiation passage. He could attend a council of elders, meetings, and initiation rites. The person with this title was clearly identified among other male members by elongated earrings in his ear lobes and other adornments like silver bangles on both arms. He was the anchor of the community in terms of security and the search for pasture and water. However, he was still a dependent person, because he was still regarded as being in an age of learning and solidifying his skills and meeting the expectations of his family. In some circumstances, the person in this age grade was independent; he had a family and a boma of his own. This happened on rare occasions, but was especially common if the person had lost a father (as in the case of my father). Yet, even in this situation, decisions invoking the spirits of his ancestors had to be guided or undertaken in consultation with people more senior to him.

**Gulanyanda**
This was an age of 42 years and above. It was within the age of elders. Persons of this grade formed an enclave of councilors in the community. By the standard of the Datoga and Taturu in particular, this person was matured and the most senior member in the family and the surrounding Taturu community. He was also regarded as
Growing up in a Community in Transition to Oblivion

an old man and a member of the councilor of elders. He was a repository of societal knowledge, norms, and traditions.

For females, there were three distinct phases, each with different roles and functions:

*Jefunuasi*
The baby girl or toddler was understood similarly to her male counterpart above.

*Ghonyarashanda*
This was an age between 14 and 18. Normally the girl had reached marriageable age and had reached puberty. By this age, she was already circumcised (female circumcision was a dominant part of the culture until recently). At this age, she was allowed to attend traditional dances, even in faraway places. She was also allowed to put on a single cloth—*kaniki* (black cotton cloth) and a few adornments. She could not attend social functions like marriage and funeral rites. At this particular age, she was not allowed to eat in public: this was not a law, but a norm that prepared girls for maturity. Eating in public for a girl was regarded as poor manners and a display of a lack of respect, as taking food and rolling it in her mouth was not supposed to be a public thing.

*Gituwori*
This was a married woman. She was not just a woman, but was also someone’s wife. In terms of clothing she was allowed to adorn herself with more than two clothes, bangles, and earrings. Socially, she had functions parallel to those of her male counterparts (*gharemineda*) in that she was allowed to sit on a council of women elders and actively engaged in internal matters regarding the initiation of other girls in the lower echelon of her society. A woman attained this status after meeting all rites of passage (like circumcision, *ting’ora*, and lessons before marriage) to qualify for the title. Being married was not the only condition for achieving the grade. The *gituwori* underwent a social training on the fundamental values and norms defining the Taturu woman. Individual women who knew the rituals and customs of the ancestors, particularly the *gwergwagera* (women elders), were the most learned women in social values and were pivotal as far as the attainment of the status of a *gituwori* was concerned. In such meetings, older women usually sat apart from those taking the apprenticeship. On such occasions, selected women known for their accumulated knowledge of the ways of the elders, laws, and traditions were always summoned to provide teachings through speeches or songs. Such women educators were known as *shiororiga* (sing., or *shinyochanda* pl.).

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412 Until very recently, it was a common practice to see children play without wearing any clothing, though some children may have worn a piece of dried goat skin as a skirt. For a female teenager over 14 years, it was demanded by the community that she wear a piece of kaniki (cotton cloth). This piece of cloth would be her only clothing until she was married.
So the coherence among youth and senior members of community meant more responsibility, knowledge of the values and respects to existing social and cultural interdependence. In the mid-1970s, both my father and mother were in the fourth and third grades of social development. In many ways they were just at the beginning of their apprenticeship of the cultural norms and the Taturu rites of passage. However, their educational periods were cut short due to two main developments. First, against Taturu traditions, my father separated from his custodian family three years after marriage. In his early twenties he was completely in charge of his family and extended family. When the opportunity to move to Mbeya was presented, he was the one that decided to go. Second, in many other families, while the elders organized the move to Mbeya, it was actually the young men (the *balanda* and *gharemineda*) who typically moved with the cattle to Mbeya. What is important in this case is that the migration to Mbeya in the mid-1970s split the Taturu between experienced elders, who in most families remained behind in Singida, and the youths who began a new life, enjoying complete freedom from the *gulanyanda* and *gwergwagera*.

The impact of disconnecting the two age grades produced serious consequences. The first impact affected the families of the less experienced youths, who soon took up a more leisurely and consumerist lifestyle, which had a direct impact on their resources. I remember one time my father came with cattle buyers to the feeding places and sold two of the milk-producing cows, thus beginning the weakening of our economic independence. An immediate result of my father’s actions was a general crisis within our family. Though we were not old enough to understand the deep-seated problem within the homestead, we could still see some indicators. First, in late 1970s my stepmother disappeared and for several months the family could not trace her whereabouts. While my father went to look for her, my mother briefly became a single mother responsible for taking care of all the children, including the other siblings from my lost stepmother.

Second, three months after my father had found my stepmother and sent her back to her family, one of my step-mother’s child died of malaria. The death of this child deeply affected my father and further intensified the family crisis. With all the cattle gone and the family in economic crisis, as if to declare the end of the family’s independent life, a few months later my father took me to my aunt in the distant west, while the rest of the family went back to the Mnyakongo clan in another village. The cattle had died from disease, or been sold for food or to avoid financial ruin. The other siblings from my stepmother were sent to their uncles in Singida, where they remained until I saw them again in the 1990s. I still have fresh memories of the first day I travelled on foot with my father crossing rivers and villages to the west. Eventually we arrived and I was introduced to my aunt and her

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413 Some years ago, my mother grieved as she recounted this tragic story to me. This was my stepmother’s child named Kalua, and she passed away while her mother was in a schizophrenic state, and surely my mother was still a very inexperienced *gituwori* combi with the shattering cattle economy, she had to depend on traditional medicine, which did not help and led to the loss of the child.
children. Most of her children were senior to me, but not married. For the first time I experienced isolation and understood the meaning of having a family and being without a home. For my father, this situation was meant to be a temporary; however, he would not come back for me for another two years. Instead of going to our own home, I rejoined other siblings in the Mnyakongo family, who partly lived in Mbeya. By then, my first sister and I were school-age children, but neither my father nor the custodian family saw the necessity of sending us to school until much later. The Mnyakongo family, as I came to know, was relatively large, and they had many cattle, goats, sheep, and donkeys. The family was spread over several living quarters that surrounded the boma. There were also non-Taturu people who were part of the family, making it more complex than my aunt’s. As a child, I had to orient myself to this new life. Though we still had quarters of our own, my father was no longer the decision-maker, but was driven by the decisions of other people.

The third aspect that I saw, and which is still remembered by the Taturu, who migrated to Mbeya in the 1970s, was the cultural polarity between the Taturu and other groups’ pastoralist economy and the Bungu people, who were the owners of the country. The first two years after my arrival in the Mnyakongo family from my aunt, the ethnic relation in Mbeya was not diverse and complex. Although we lived in two separate places, until 1980 there was social harmony between the Bungu living in the village and the Taturu a few kilometres outside the villages. Within a short period, villages close to the pastoralist areas like Muheza, Ihofyo, Igalula, Mpako, and Kanga witnessed an increase in economic prosperity. The villages enjoyed good weather and plentiful water sources ranging from rivers, lakes, and springs. Although these were enough to change the Bungu, the narratives of members of my family reveal a different aspect. According to family members, the pre-Taturu period of Bungu economic life was sleepy and their economic cycle was often divided between agricultural activities in the rainy season and long periods of inactivity and unemployment in the dry season. However, with the arrival of the Taturu, the Maasai, and later the Sukuma, the Bungu people became motivated by these wealthier cattle herders. One of their immediate contributions was through local brews (pombe), which made villages like Kanga and Igalula quickly transform into urban spaces with booming bars, hotels, and local clubs. Some of the songs that were sung by the Bungu that captured the rhythm of the time celebrated how money was abundant in these towns:

 Nilikwenda Ilembule jamaa, nikarudi na hela mkononi, katika we, nikarudi na hela mkononi. Nilikwenda nako Kanga mama nikarudi na hela mkononi, katika we, nikarudi na hela mkononi (I went to Ilembule and returned with money in my hand, please dance, then I went to Kanga and from there also I returned with money).414

414 I don’t remember the band that composed this song. However, the song was very popular among the town and village people and as children we also sang without knowing the actual implication.
Alcohol consumption became anew norm for the pastoralist youths living far from their elders. The pastoralist youth were spending money in the neighbouring towns as the song mentions. Such youths soon had Bungu maids in town and their visits and connections to the towns synthesized their dependence on each other. Two of my uncles acquired several local maids, one of whom an uncle eventually married. Later, one of my nieces was married to a Bungu man. The Bungu language became a lingua franca. We could speak it when visiting the towns or sometimes when Bungu people visited our homes. By mid-1982, the friendly relationships with local Bungu and Nyiha that were booming in the Usangu plains and other villages slowly started to fade. In our own villages, we saw an increased number of other pastoralist groups like the Maasai, Sukuma, and as well other subgroups of the Datoga. The valleys that had always been green with grass and water became competing zones for pastoralists. It was not difficult to discern the levels of conflict through our own herding experiences. Even as boys we saw increased surveillance by the elders whenever we went to tend the calves. Apart from the dwindling grazing spaces, the Taturu were no longer the only customers in the bars and hotels. The lack of grazing space pushed some other pastoralists into more densely populated spaces where the conflicts with the locals increased. For my family, such limitations were resolved by a seasonal migration to other places where grazing was plentiful. I was the only child of less than ten when I accompanied the gharemineda and balanda on my first such journey to the Mpako village, several kilometres away. This was the beginning of many similar camp experiences that characterized my pastoralist boyhood. In all these cases, the Mhajida family was slowly slipping into oblivion amidst the complexity of the Mnyakongo family, the migrations, and the changing ethnic relationships in Mbeya.

6.2 Between Camp and Sedentary life: The Paradox of the Modernization of Pastoralists in Central Tanzania

One of the paradoxes surrounding pastoralist lives in Singida and many other parts of Tanzania is an increasing pressure from the government to “modernize.” My accounts of this issue revolve around the conception of change and modernity. With ujamaa, the push for villagization conflicted with the Taturu pastoralist life. By the 1980s, many ujamaa villages had schools and a few had dispensaries and cooperative shops. Before the economic crisis in 1983 and the years that followed, such phenomena were indeed producing a sense of change. For many villagers, these represented products of uhuru (freedom). One of the biggest changes witnessed was a widespread literacy campaign. Under adult education campaigns, even older people were required to attend classes in what the villagers called kisomo cha manufaa (meaning-

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415 This means being able to settle permanently in the villages, for the children to attend schools and adhere to village programmes. In the ujamaa era, that also included participation in the cooperative initiatives with other villagers.
ful education). Many of these classes were organized outside the regular education system and were compulsory for all adult villagers living in the villages. The curriculum involved reading, arithmetic, and writing. Apart from these fundamentals, villagers were required to attend health and agricultural programs. The government launched nation-wide campaigns like *Mtu ni Afya* (Man is health), *Kilimo cha Kufa na Kupona* (Agriculture for Survival), *Mtu na Mazingira* (Man and Environment), and many others to keep such projects running. Schoolteachers, prison officers, pupils and nurses organized most of the adult education campaigns. Because were none of the activities near the Taturu living spaces, such activities made the village classes an alienating space. Taking care of the cattle was a full time job that did not allow the chance for active participation in the village activities.

When my family returned to Singida from Mbeya in 1983, the villages were emphasizing change and modernization. What struck me about these government programs was the complicity required to merge the agriculturalists and pastoralists in village settlements and programs. As a boy in Doroto, I, like many other Taturu pastoralist boys, I grew up in a highly divided village. The division was between the Nyamwezi and Kimbu people, who were members of agricultural communities and lived in *Kijijini* (inner village) and the pastoralists who lived outside it (*Utaturuni*). The divide between the two modes of economic activity was clear, the people living in the inner village considering the pastoralists to be “backward” people, while the Taturu generalized the village people as Swahili. These differences within the village created contradictory ways in which the villagers conceived of and embraced modernity. Because of the pastoralists’ movements between camps (in the case of Mbeya and many others), life in the village for the Taturu boys was a sort of temporary visit. During the dry season a young Taturu boy was required to stay with the cattle in the camps and return to the village during the rainy season. Compromising the camp cycle was not easy for the young Taturu people as it also meant compromising the lifeline of the cattle economy. Many of these young people including myself were therefore unable to participate in these government “development” programs, and thus could articulate and identify themselves with modernity. In short, they looked “backward.”

My family seems to have acquired knowledge on how to avoid participation in many of the *ujamaa* programs. After 1983 for boys like me, the Taturu way of life became a routine. My role in cattle rearing was slowly maturing. By this time, I knew the feeding places, the names of the cows and bulls, and the ways of mastering the ways of life of a Taturu herder. Together with other boys and *gharemineda*, I actively engaged in regulating the movement of cattle between our village and camps in other villages, particularly those with access to water during the long and unforgiving dry season (from May to November). The pursuit of water was a major engagement for the pastoralist youths. After June, all of the seasonal water catchments were normally dry. Despite the rhetoric of *ujamaa*, the villages lacked sufficient water to meet the needs of the villagers and the pastoralists who had more than 2000 cattle. To avoid conflict, we first pursued all available sources of water in the government forest re-
serves west of Doroto village. The gharemineda knew exactly where these ponds were. Before committing to the journey, a survey was normally done and in the following days we drove the cattle about 15 kilometres to the water sources. I remember two of the seasonal water catchment places to which we usually commuted. The first was Itwaga, which was south west of the village and the second was Darabeta in the west. The day normally began with women (mostly ghonyarashanda and gituwori) milking cows and preparing food for the herders. We usually had one meal with the rest of the family. Thereafter we had to endure the heat and thirst for the entire day, as humans could not drink the water that the cattle drank in forests. Because the journey to these ponds was exhausting, we could not make the journey every day. This system of skipping every particular day was popularly known as mgwawo. On the days that the cattle went without water, they normally grazed close to the village. Skipping was also meant to minimize the frequency of contact with tsetse flies. By early July the nearby ponds were always dry, resulting in the need to move the cattle from the village to other places where water and fodder was plenty. July was an ideal time for movement as the villagers had already harvested their crops, making it easier to camp and graze across the maize and tobacco fields without causing conflict with the owners.

My second experience with camp life was in July 1984, when together with other young men I went to Mgandu. The camp was enclosed with thorns in a round shape with a main entrance/exit. Within the main enclosure was another small enclosure for the calves. As herders, we had our own small entrance to a living space with cooking-stones and a fireplace. In camps the main activities were grazing in the afternoon and milking the cows in evening. Since it was an all-male space, we had to learn basic skills, like cooking, washing dishes, and milking. Apart from these duties, we dug wells both for our cattle and our own use. As the name suggests, camp life was always temporary. Nothing was built to last beyond one season. In the beginning of the camps in Mgandu, we were the only herders in the vicinity, and easily coexisted with the landowners and people surrounding the camp. When we returned to the same camp in 1985, significant changes were happening. First, there were new herdsmen from other pastoralist communities, particularly the Sukuma, who also had large herds of cattle. The camp began to turn from a perfect refuge for the dry season into a site of competition for the pasture, water, and alliances with the locals. With increased competition, my family lost confidence in the Mgandu camp. As a result, from 1986 onward we travelled to the Itagata village, 35 kilometres from my village. In this camp, gaining acceptance and recognition of our presence from the villages was a daily engagement.

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416 Literally means a thick forest, or a place away from the villages.
417 It was common to deny cattle water for a day, either because the journey to the sources of water was too far or the sources were depleting due to increasing demand. It was also a way of relieving the herdsmen from this demanding job. Mgwawo was not only for cattle, but also to herdsmen. When the cattle were not drinking water, we also went without water for the entire day.
I am detailing all of these experiences to illustrate the complexities of the environment into which a Taturu pastoral boy lives. Compared to other Datoga communities, we were considered far more sedentarized, but in reality we were not. I grew up in a community that partially engaged in agricultural production, although the cattle economy remained our main activity and source of income. More importantly, as I have shown above, our economy was not integrated into the cooperative initiatives of the *ujamaa* village project, except on a rhetorical level. Rather, the government favoured and nurtured agricultural cooperatives, alienating and leaving pastoralist producers to organize their economy in a more traditional way, a fact which explains the frequent mobility of my family. By 1988 we had already set off for camping in Mbeya, Mgandu, Itagata, and Msisi. Continual mobility served as a method of survival. For a Taturu boy, growing up in this mobile community meant learning the traditions of cattle keeping while keeping an eye on the changing world through the prism of the villages.

As a boy, I remember the feelings that came with such camping migrations. Before the migrations, the *gulanyanda* and *gharemineda* worked tirelessly to complete the necessary rituals to prepare for the journey. Usually the first ritual was preparing the *nkome* (stick), which came from the local Taturu medicine men. This *nkome* was a double-pointed stick, which was cleaned and softened by animal fat. This was the most “sacred” article that I knew. On the days that the herds left the house for the trip, the head of the family stood at the main entrance/exit and gently hit all of the cattle with the stick until the last one had left. The meaning of this, as far as I know, was to heal the cattle and protect them from whatever may come on the journey. The *nkome* was later taken along to the camp and the same ritual of touching all of the animals as they entered the new home was repeated. Then there was the buying of the bio-medical packages for treating animal diseases, especially those related to tsetse fly. As far as I can recall, there were no similar packages for the treatment of human diseases (like malaria, dysentery, and typhoid). The sick in the camps were treated in normal village dispensaries near where the camp was located. The last preparation was food. Depending on the location of the camp, donkeys, bicycles or cars were used to carry these supplies, and normally those with food went ahead of the herders to prepare the *boma* and spaces for sleeping and preparing rituals.

The increase in human population and number of cattle in the villages where my clan camped resulted in a decrease in the number of available campsites. This challenge altered the dynamics of camps. In some cases, like that of Mbeya, the camp was a semi-permanent settlement. Although some clan members were still in Central Tanzania (Singida), those who were in Mbeya acquired a home status, creating their own campsites. Related to this was the fact that with increased tensions over reduced pasture and water sources came a reduction in the distances to the camps. By 1990, the camps were not more than 20 kilometres away from the main home. One of the
reasons for this reduced distance was the expansion of the Muhesi Game reserve,\textsuperscript{418} which consumed most of the sources of pasture and water, especially those used by many village cattle between May and July.

The government announcement of the expansion of the Muhesi Game Reserve in 1990 created increasing shortages of seasonal water sources. With this, the family had to reinvent its annual camp cycle. One of the changes that I witnessed was the digging of wells. The Mnyakongo family made the first large-scale attempt in 1989 when Isume Mnyakongo subcontracted a well company to drill deep wells close to the homestead. For two and half months the company camped close to our cassava farm and drilled for water without success. After spending thousands of shillings from my grandfather’s coffers, they eventually abandoned the work. This attempt revealed the limits of modern equipment in drawing water to the surface. As a boy, I remember spending hours and hours observing how the machines battled the ground beneath it over days and nights with booming noises. We were particularly baffled by the manoeuvres of the cranes and the smells of the oils. Indeed, it was unimaginable that after all this effort, there was still no water.

In 1986 I had begun my school life, and by 1991 I was almost finished primary education. I was beginning to see the contradictions surrounding my family and the family economy. By family, I mean the entire homestead, which comprised uncles, relatives, and sons and daughters of the other members of the family. As school children, we were also becoming a problem to our community. For example, in the homestead, the tension between the demands for school and herding cattle was interpreted as a problem since each part needed our presence. Though school was not completely taking us away from our duties, it was becoming an effective competitor with family demands. By 1991 more than ten boys in our own homestead, who should have been devoting their entire time to herding cattle, were going to school. The same was true for the girls, although unlike the boys, their work was limited to the kitchen chores. Although I enjoyed school activities, I was reminded daily about my role as a herder for my family.

The contradictions emanating from these tensions hindered the labour necessary for the construction of wells. I have a vivid memory of an experience in 1992 when the problem of water shortages hit all of the villages surrounding Itigi. It was common then to see a gathering of hundreds of cattle at the wells of Itigi, 12 kilometres from my village, where the youth took turns drawing water from the wells as deep as 40 metres. The bucket (\textit{nkosi}) that we made was specifically designed for this. Two angles of a bucket were attached with an iron rod and then tightly tied with a rope in the middle, making it swing easily when it reached the water table. Drawing water involved lowering the bucket into the well while holding one end of the rope until the bucket reached the water table. The process of drawing water from below

\textsuperscript{418} Muhesi Game Reserve was expanded in 1994 to include more pristine pastoralist grazing and water catchment areas. Over the years, the government has expanded the reserve to more than 2000 square kilometres.
was called *kuesela*. For those with a bigger herd, the process of *kuesela* required more people and time. As the *mgwawo* (dry season) intensified between August and November it was not just the cattle that felt its strenuous effects, it also took its toll on the herders who suffered due to the amount of work, the heat, and the 24-kilometre walk four times a week. Although I was going every weekend, the intensity of the routine was clear to all of us. As the year was coming to a close, some cattle became like walking skeletons. It was not only the walking, but also the hunger that affected them. The lack of grass growth along the way from the grinding hooves of the cattle and the competing herds from different *bomas* was evident. When it was a drinking day, the cattle hardly fed, they simply walked to Itigi to drink water and then came back in the evening. The next day was when the cattle could feed properly. During this time, the bulls were also weak and therefore selling them would not have been financially prudent. An indication that we were perhaps witnessing the fading of our livelihood came throughout the harshest rains in January, during which time the cows, bulls, and calves fought to survive. We call the first three weeks of the rain season *songola*, when the rain drops on a barren landscape (*mabalangu*). Immediately after the first rain, termites engulfed the dry grass to build anthills. The natural process of landscape renewal was a wonderful experience to observe, however, the termites also presented a challenge as they cleared the remaining feeding sources of the cattle. *Songola* was the hardest time for the herders. Cows suffered a particularly difficult challenge in the transition between the long dry season and the beginning of the rainy season. Because the long dry season and the agonizing effects of the *mgwawo* weakened the cattle, *songola* found them physically weak. The first rain brought water, but grass was almost non-existent. We had to try and feed the cattle from the sprouting new green leaves of different species of trees – and there was not enough to meet the needs of the over 500 hungry cattle. During the *songola*, we aimed to keep the cattle standing up. If they were not strong enough to lift themselves then they often could not manage to stand up again. I remember the task of lifting weaker cows when the rain was pouring. It was such a daunting task for which we as boys had to be woken up many times during the night. Older people took on more demanding tasks and became doctors for the cattle. I know one example of how fatal rains can begin 1978 a village cooperative project executed by the World Bank brought more than 900 cows and bulls to Doroto Village in an effort to modernize the animal husbandry industry. The ‘experts’ lack of knowledge resulted in the death of the entire herd and the collapse of the project during the 1988–1992 seasons of *songola*: as they lacked the resilience and know-how of many of the Taturu on surviving drought and other natural calamities. Still, there were also many Taturu who had lost their herds and their stories resonated in many of the narratives that the elders would tell around the fireplace. They recounted how the Taturu were left with increasingly empty cat-

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419 The word comes from Ki-Gogo (Gogo language) which means an extensive land surface deplete of trees or grass. This can be a result of excess grazing or human activity like clearing for cultivation or construction.
tle bomas. With time their stories became ominous, as they pointed toward the end of this lifestyle for the family. As 1992 was coming to a close, I began to see a huge difference in the size of once big cattle kraals, where anybody could walk in and start living with the Mnyakongo. 1992 was the year that I freed myself from the Mnyakongo connection. During the years that followed, I found myself in search of the “future” in urban spaces and chasing the dream of an urban life that had captivated many of us since our early experiences with the trains in Itigi town.

### 6.3 Conclusion

My interests throughout this chapter have been to search for interpretations of the Datoga history. I have tried to reflect on the general discussion about the Datoga (Taturu) and their troubled histories of the late 19th century. While historically there is significant information on the early migrations of the Datoga, linking this history to the lived experiences of individual families is still a challenging endeavour. For example, there are still some limitations in trying to connect histories of how individual families, including my own family members, interacted and established themselves in different parts of Central Tanzania. Oral narratives produce disconnected stories: crucial figures disappear or are forgotten, ignored, spoken of only in hushed tones. The story of Chitili is an example of a disconnected narrative in which memory is shown as a contested terrain with competing interpretations. It begs the question, how do we reconstruct a history that is lost and suppressed? Connected to this challenge was my quest for the history of Mhajida. My interest pertained to whether his history was connected to the well-known oral accounts of his murder case. Beyond the murder case were other ambivalent issues connected to the silence and the rejection of Mhajida’s will. I have interpreted such silences as forms of the disappearing history of my family, which has bearings on my own life and negotiations with family alliances over time. In the middle of these alliances, experiences of the pastoralist economy have been accounted for to illustrate the challenges, levels of competing traditions, and the forces that transformed the two families.

Boyhood is also approached as a process of searching for connections between the past, which is contested, and the future, which is clouded by the uncertainties of modernization. The influence of urban activities as well as the expansion of schooling is among the few forces of modernization that are producing alternative paths for Datoga youth, while they simultaneously remained trapped within the expectations of pastoralist activities. Memory therefore does not simply retrieve the past into the present, it also recovers the relevance and challenges of histories otherwise relegated to obscurity.
7 Conclusion

7.1 General Summary

Since 2014, the media have reported on several incidences of conflict between Datoga and Maasai, claiming that the incidences were the ‘result of common mistrusts.’ According to reports, the first incident happened in February 2014. A man, whom I will call Mzee Mkali, woke up to find his entire boma completely surrounded by furious Maasai youth, yelling and singing war songs. According to reports, they threatened to ‘burn down’ his entire family and his cattle herd if he did not leave the Maasai territory of Simanjiro. Over the coming hours, a number of Maasai surrounded the homestead, blocking all paths out. Even Mkali’s cattle were unable to go out to feed for a full day. Police and government officials were made aware of this event and after much tension, Mkali eventually agreed to move out of his boma and retreated outside of the Maasai sphere; thus ending the two-day ordeal. The second incidence happened on the 17th of February 2016 in Kutishi Village near the border between Simanjiro (northern Tanzania) and Kondoa (central Tanzania). It appears that the two communities were prepared for war, with each mobilizing about 50 to 100 well-armed young morans. The Datoga youths were pictured surrounding 112 Maasai cattle that they had captured, demanding a ransom of their 25 stolen
cattle and an explanation of the attack in which a pregnant, young Datoga woman had been killed. The confrontation lasted for two days, attracting more Maasai and Datoga, police, members of parliament, and Regional and District Commissioners from both regions. While it was reported that the Maasai tried to reclaim their cattle through dialogue, news sources said that it proved to be fruitless. As a result of the stalemate, Maasai youths could be seen pursuing their neighbours in an open field with weapons raised while police stood in between. Although a settlement was eventually reached and most of the Maasai cattle were returned, 25 cattle were withheld by the government until the conclusion of the Datoga appeals.

The two cases presented above highlight one underlying issue that captures the Datoga history; that is, competitive encounters with neighbouring communities or with the state. The Datoga continue to face challenges to their identity, particularly around local pastoralist conceptions of their own space in the face of shifting local borders, changes in national land policies, and conservation policies that have altered the pastoralist landscape.

It is against such a background that this thesis attempts to challenge the flawed conception of the Datoga pastoralists as inherently or culturally ‘violent.’ The murder narratives consistent throughout the 20th century have continued to define and provide an imbalanced narrative of the Datoga and of pastoralists more generally.

This section attempts to provide a summary and conclusion of main issues important to this thesis. I have argued that from the 19th century onward, discussions of the history of the Datoga have hinged on a process of complex ethnic encounters and identity creation. The first significant event that strongly influenced the formation of the Datoga was the conflicts in the Serengeti ecosystem. From the oral narratives it is evident that the turbulent relationship between the Datoga and Maasai came from a loss of mutual respect and friendship between the groups, particularly due to their competing claims to the plains. The Datoga strongly attribute the Maasai invasion to religious reasons. As punishment for disobedience, the God – Asseeta announced the coming of another equally powerful competitor to end the Datoga monopoly of the plains. This narrative shows how the Datoga conceptualized the landscape history by connecting their existence with supreme powers. It can also be interpreted as a process of imagining the landscape as an endless space which together with deities the Datoga where in total control of (Shetler 2007: chap.3). The narrative of a rebelling Masujaa is pervasive in individual stories across the subgroups of the Datoga. One of the uniting themes embedded in such stories is the unbroken culture and tradition of the omnipresent. This is an indication that there are still some unifying elements among the Datoga, even after centuries of fragmentation.420

The break down of the relationship between the Datoga and Maasai was enhanced by some additional factors outside the Serengeti. Several accounts suggest that the 19th century was particularly turbulent, not only in the Serengeti, but across

420 See more discussion on this subject in S.A. Shokpeka (2005).
Conclusion

Africa (J. Wright 2009). Adu Boahen summarizes one of the changes associated with the 19th century:

Growth was not the only change affecting the population. What was even more dramatic was its redistribution, which took the form of internal migrations and movements. Typical examples of these dramatic internal migrations of the period were those of the Nguni in Southern and Central Africa, the Chokwe in Central Africa, the Azande in East Africa, the Fang in Equatorial Africa and the Yoruba in West Africa. (Adu Boahen 1985: 40)

In his celebrated work on the Wakimbu of Tanzania, Aylward Shorter suggests four sources of change in pre-colonial Tanzania. The first indicator in Shorter and Boahen’s characterization is the argument that in many communities in central and northern Tanzania the 19th century brought significant changes to the nature of settlement and ethnic interaction. The agents of change as shown in the thesis were mainly “foreigners” who penetrated different communities in Tanzania. Such “foreigners” were often regarded as refugees or fugitives from other cultures. In this regard Shorter, as well as Stephen Rockel, consider the Nyitumba, Iguwlibi, Nyisamba, and Sangu (Walori) ‘travellers’ as the first people to bring change to different parts of central Tanzania (Shorter 1972: 150–263; Rockel 1997: 28–29). Some of the earliest structures related to political organization in areas as far as Iramba in Singida were associated with these ‘outsiders,’ who were sometimes seen as wanderers equipped with special skills (Shorter 1972: 258). In other areas of Tanzania social and political change was associated with the Ngoni after 1839 (Shorter 1972: 195).

The second indicator of change was associated with long distance trade and the tearing apart of communities due to conflicts. This was namely the result of enslavement, outbreak of diseases and ethnic turmoil which contributed to the internal and external migration of communities. Several reports in Singida recount violence between the caravan traders and the ‘native’ population that resulted in the destruction of settlements and increased migrations of the Nyaturu. The third indicator was the political turbulence in Unyamwezi that began with the conflict in 1872 and set in motion the coming of marauding warriors of the Waruga ruga (Shorter 1968). Apart from the terror that the Waruga ruga spread in western and central Tanzania, they were also responsible for the establishment of limited political centralization in Iramba, Ugogo, and Turu. The fourth indicator was connected with famines, diseases, and plagues. As discussed in Chapter 2, disease, famine and plague were common factors stimulating migration in many parts of central and northern Tanzania (Koponen 1988b; Kjekshus 1977). The discussion of the rinderpest outbreak and tsetse fly epidemic in Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrate the impact infectious diseases had on the Maasai and Datoga livestock.

Ethnic migrations in the Serengeti were discussed in relation to the role of the Maasai. As argued in Chapter 2, the Nilotic expansion, especially the Maasai movement to Tanzania, began before the 18th century. Oral testimonies cited in the thesis
provide an insight into the internal dynamics in the Serengeti. I have argued that the coming of the Maasai to the Serengeti plains brought radically new imaginations of the plains, imaginations that significantly differed from those of the Datoga. Sources on the transformation of the two communities, who moved from being peaceful to suspicious neighbours after over a century of coexistence, are limited. The Maasai obtained power and asserted their presence by defeating the Datoga and forcing them out of the plains. A direct impact of the wars between the Maasai and Datoga was a significant shift in the ways that the communities in the plains interacted.

A dominant narrative of the Datoga-Maasai encounter is based on how the two communities transported the pastoralist experiences to different parts of Tanzania. Collected accounts by Cory and Willis say that the Nyaturu, Sandawe, Nyiramba, and neighbouring groups can trace their origin as pastoralists to the coming of the Datoga. Indeed, the Datoga are credited with bringing cattle culture to several communities, spreading it as far as islands in Lake Victoria and villages in Usukuma (Koponen 1988a: 244–45; Itandala 1983: 172; Hartwig 1976: 47). The discussion on the wars between the Maasai and Datoga is further characterized by competing traditions of the ‘enemy’ that strongly developed alongside the plain culture. The ‘enemy’ factor is recounted first in the naming not only each community reinvented the otherness of the once neighbouring community, but also developed this enmity within their cultures and traditions. For example, male youths wishing to court a potential wife had ritually killed animals like buffaloes, lions, and elephants, but over time this ritual transformed to also include the murdering of the Maasai ‘enemy’. As I indicated in the second chapter, around the late 19th century, the emergence and solidification of a number of songs celebrating heroes who had killed the enemy were also associated with this transformation within the Datoga. The traditions came to be intertwined with the killing rituals known as *lilichta*.

The Maasai were not enemies of the Datoga, but were enemies of their cattle. The naming of the Datoga as Mang’ati (enemy) seems to come out of this competitive experience. The naming of the Datoga as Mang’ati (enemy) seems to come out of this competitive experience. The naming of the Datoga as Mang’ati (enemy) seems to come out of this competitive experience.

By 1870 central Tanzania was openly divided between the Hehe south of Dodoma, and the Maasai north of Usagara (Rockel 1997: 175–76). Frequent raids from the Maasai strengthened the social organization of the Hehe and the Maasai communities. The Maasai made smaller ethnic communities like the Gogo, Nyaturu, Nyiramba, and Daogaa strengthen their social organization against the Hehe and Maasai communities. The Gogo, Nyaturu, Chagga, and Meru alarmed the Maasai for their fearlessness, and their military organization. (Morton 1978: 88–90). By 1870 central Tanzania was openly divided between the Hehe south of Dodoma, and the Maasai north of Usagara (Rockel 1997: 175–76). Frequent raids from the Maasai strengthened the social organization of the Hehe and the Maasai communities. The Maasai made smaller ethnic communities like the Gogo, Nyaturu, Nyiramba, and Daogaa strengthen their social organization against the Hehe and Maasai communities. The Gogo, Nyaturu, Chagga, and Meru alarmed the Maasai for their fearlessness, and their military organization. (Morton 1978: 88–90).

The Maasai were not enemies of the Datoga, but were enemies of their cattle. The naming of the Datoga as Mang’ati (enemy) seems to come out of this competitive experience. Therefore, the Datoga are credited with bringing cattle culture to several communities, spreading it as far as islands in Lake Victoria and villages in Usukuma (Koponen 1988a: 244–45; Itandala 1983: 172; Hartwig 1976: 47). The discussion on the wars between the Maasai and Datoga is further characterized by competing traditions of the ‘enemy’ that strongly developed alongside the plain culture. The ‘enemy’ factor is recounted first in the naming not only each community reinvented the otherness of the once neighbouring community, but also developed this enmity within their cultures and traditions. For example, male youths wishing to court a potential wife had ritually killed animals like buffaloes, lions, and elephants, but over time this ritual transformed to also include the murdering of the Maasai ‘enemy’.

As I indicated in the second chapter, around the late 19th century, the emergence and solidification of a number of songs celebrating heroes who had killed the enemy were also associated with this transformation within the Datoga. The traditions came to be intertwined with the killing rituals known as *lilichta*. A dominant narrative of the Datoga-Maasai encounter is based on how the two communities transported the pastoralist experiences to different parts of Tanzania.
that accrued wealth in terms of cattle across the entire savannah of central Tanzania. Although this may appear to overemphasize the significance of the Datoga in the area, they did frequently transform the spaces they settled in, at least until the arrival of the rinderpest, which greatly limited their expansion (Iliffe 1979: 39).

A concept of ‘tribal’ boundary was not a colonial invention per se. Its institution and meaning in Singida and Mbulu came from the impact of the Maasai dispersal. By the late 19th century the ethnicity of spaces was complete, as each community in central Tanzania had secured its own ‘tribal’ country. These deeply entrenched boundaries explain the formation of identity in the German and British colonial periods. I argue that the Maasai and Datoga greatly contributed to the making of ethnicity and boundary in central and northern Tanzania. However, with the arrival of the German colonial power, the Maasai and Datoga gradually lost their leading positions in the plains. Boundary allocation based on the colonial model replaced the local definition of the landscape. The area was redrawn from the colonial perception of borders, with the intention of servicing the colonial economy. While the pre-colonial boundaries of the Datoga and other ethnic communities were drawn through watering areas and grazing spots, the Germans drew boundaries by looking at populations and the needs of the colonial state. The re-defined boundaries often remained obscure and led to several conflicts. The first known case of Datoga resistance to the colonial defined boundaries occurred under British rule in 1923. As discussed in Chapter 3, the conflict centered on ideas of border, ownership, and the divergent ideas of private and public ownership of resources. While the Datoga defined the plains as their own homeland, the British colonial authorities considered the Datoga pastoralists irresponsible and a potentially subversive factor to colonial rule, and as a result they imposed their perceptions of the border on the Datoga. The Datoga resisted physically and later expressed their protest through the kufaa umardadi, a ritualistic and playful form of temporarily detaining trespassers. Further attempts at resistance were made by restraining other ethnic communities from entering their territories to access resources like salt. Although the brutal response from the British halted the violence, it did not stop the Datoga from expressing their discontent by arresting Rangi and others who tried to gather salt on Datoga nchi. A possible explanation for the extreme level of violence was a form of protest against a form of amalgamation policy, which imposed the Iraqw presence on the Datoga landscape. The shift from physical confrontation practices targeting the Maasai along the Singida–Mbulu border was a response to British policies.

I argue that the British increased tensions subtly by creating a debate about the identity of the first ‘natives’ to the Mbulu plains. The motivation was both political and economic. The debate was supervised by the British administrators and aimed at discrediting the Datoga through a counter-narrative that projected the plains as an Iraqw sphere, with the British claiming that the Datoga were visitors who were benefitting from the benevolence of the Iraqw. Furthermore, the debate attempted to arbitrarily shift the focus from the ongoing land marginalization to discussions of indigeneity. As a result, while the Datoga existence in Mbulu was being affected by
the British policy of amalgamation, in Singida District the Datoga were forcing their right to settlements in a confrontational manner, which included several murders.

During the British colonial period, there were three acts of protest that characterized the Datoga in Singida. The first act came in the form of massive migration to Singida. It is estimated that between 1931 and 1935 about 10 per cent of the Datoga fled from the British policies, particularly the *Iraqwization* of their productive area. Initially the massive migration consisted mainly of youths who tried to preserve their basic cultural practices. Similar movements also occurred along many frontiers between groups, including the Chagga in the lower plateaus in Moshi, the Maasai in Same, Moshi, or Tanga, and Iraqw in most of the Datoga areas. While in many cases the British ignored local migrations, the experience was vastly different for the Datoga. Due to the fear of spreading animal diseases, the British restricted pastoralist migrations, either for fear that they would spread diseases or because they were considered careless land users. The massive migration began a series of inter-ethnic conflicts that the British referred to as ‘Datoga murders.’ These killings, which started in 1935 and reached a peak in 1942, were the second act of protest. What is unique about the killings is that they largely targeted the Wanyaturu and took place between May and June each year. As argued in Chapter 3, the timing of the murders shows that they were not connected with Datoga rituals. Between 1936 and 1958, the British began massive and brutal expulsions of the Datoga from Singida as a means of halting the violence, even removing those who had founded villages before the arrival of the Nyaturu. The British encouraged the Nyaturu to stay which created intense protests and led to further violence between the two ethnic communities. The identification of the Datoga as violent people, as shown by different oral and archival sources, ignored the context of this violence, and failed to offer a balanced picture. Indeed, this narrative was a British construction used as a way of limiting the Datoga expansion into areas where more ‘desirable’ agricultural producers were the majority. In British accounts, violence was expressed not as a result of confrontation between two communities competing for economic space, but rather as a tradition and a natural niche of the Datoga.

### 7.2 Competition as a Failed Strategy? A Critical Afterthought on the Way Forward for the Datoga Pastoralists

Given the situation and continuous threats to the livelihoods of the Datoga, is there a future for the Datoga pastoralists? And if so, how does it look like? These are critical questions which arise out of the complex history of the Datoga pastoralists. To some, the account presented in this thesis may be perceived as bleak, rendering the above questions unnecessary. While there are no definitive answers to the questions above, there are many sources, including my own observations as a former pastoralist herder that can be cited for clues. As Staley has correctly observed: “historians have avoided writing serious inquiries about the future because we have generally been
skeptical about our ability to make predictions,” I am also cautious about judging the future for its own sake (Staley 2002: 73). While inquiring about the future of the Datoga is not a task that this thesis aims to undertake, an examination of the past, particularly departing from the question as to how the state has interacted with the Datoga, may offer a glimpse into how we can map the future of the Datoga. Examples in Chapter 3 show the impact of British state sponsored initiatives during the colonial period. While the British merged communities in an effort to lessen the spending costs of running colonies, the policy socially and economically transformed the Datoga. Through forced integration into ‘superior’ ‘other’ cultures, even in territories they had controlled, the Datoga were forced to become subordinate to the Iraqw. This not only increased the economic and lifestyle pressure on the pastoralists, it also led to further conflicts.

Again, in 1935 and 1968 the colonial and post-colonial governments respectively prepared two important state funded schemes. These schemes envisioned a radical transformation of the Datoga ways of life. Datoga pastoralism was considered to be especially detrimental to progress, as it was allegedly connected to a culture of killing neighbouring communities that sought peaceful co-existence with them. Both schemes were based on the idea that the Datoga pastoralists needed external force to embrace modernization. The schemes framed the Datoga, particularly the Barabaig, as a backward community that only the state was capable of modernizing. In the British colonial framework, in 1935, Superintendent of Police De Beers presented the first proposition on how to change the Datoga. It appears that De Beers borrowed much of his material from the earlier works of Fosbrooke, whose sociological report on the Barabaig characterized them as a naturally difficult people (Staley 2002: 73). While De Beers’ memorandum exposed the complexities surrounding the conflicts and the ‘Datoga murders’ in Singida, Fosbrooke’s report was effectively responsible for the narrative of the violent Datoga in the British colonial context.

Respected District Administrator for Mbulu Gordon Wilson began studying the Datoga in 1951 (Fosbrooke 1950b). When Wilson was assigned to work on the Datoga, he had several sources at his disposal, including Fosbrooke and De Beer’s work as well as district reports that had been collected over the years. It became apparent to Wilson that an ethnological investigation of the political and socio-economic aspects of the Datoga was greatly needed. After about one year of ethnological work, in 1952 Secretary Mr. E. C. Willis circulated the Wilson report on behalf of the Committee on Colonial Anthropology and Sociology. In my conclusive remarks, I believe it is important to critically examine Wilson’s key findings and highlight the general impact that the report had on the wider colonial policies regarding the Datoga. The Wilson report laid out three fundamental facets of Datoga life. First was an overview of the Datoga, their identity, characteristics, demographic issues, and economy. Second was their political organization. According to Wilson, all forms of social and political organization were divided among families in the Datoga community. These

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423 TNA, Manyoni District Book (1930).
relations allowed the ‘primitive’ community to maintain cohesion, collaboration, and brotherhood/sisterhood. To explain how different segments of the Datoga people are related to one another, Wilson uses Datoga terminologies, which sometimes results in the report losing its intended meaning. The third aspect was the issue of violence (G. McL. Wilson 1953: 45–56). Wilson avoided some of the evidence that his contemporaries noted as contributing to the violence. Instead, he argued that the so-called blood bathing or ritual causes were the reasons for the Datoga violence. The role of the British in upturning established social and ethnic orders, and the impact of these changes on Datoga pastoral life is completely ignored in the report. In examining Wilson’s report one is left asking, why were most of the Datoga encounters with their neighbouring communities in Singida characterized by violence?

In 1968, Rashid Mfaume Kawawa, the Second Vice President of Tanganyika, produced the second government scheme to ‘reform’ the Datoga. This was in the aftermath of the violence along the regional borders of Singida and Arusha in 1965 and 1966. Though such ethnically based violence was not new, the process of addressing the Datoga as ‘Mang’ati’ (“enemy”), the term conferred on them by the Maasai was radical. Some terms like ‘primitive,’ ‘barbaric,’ Datoga, and ‘backwardness,’ as appeared in colonial narratives, remained prevalent in the government reports. While the colonial approach to the Datoga was marginalization by subordination to the Iraqw people, the post-colonial government utilized collective punishment and massive expulsion from the border region of Singida and Mbulu. The historical connection between the two reports is striking. Although Wilson’s report is more theoretical and labelled the Datoga culturally violent, Kawawa’s Commission featured clear recommendations on ending Datoga land ownership in the Singida-Mbulu border through a state supervised process. The commission created a framework for the partition of the Datoga landscape and provided an open mandate for the removal of the Datoga from their land to create space for government farms. The commission connected their recommendations to *ujamaa* and modernization, and in doing so, legitimized the force and violence used in carrying out these government projects. The Datoga did not have a place to appeal. In 1988 when the Datoga tried to resist the massive loss of their land, they could not amass enough resources to defeat the government, which was at the centre of the land confiscations. These dispossessions which the two governments initiated are yet to be reversed. Successive colonial and post-colonial governments’ belief that the socialization of the Datoga could facilitate their entry into modernity trumped the development of rational policy toward the Datoga. The different constructions about the Datoga were not only a result of their interactions with their neighbours, but also a result of how these governments col-

424  More than half of Wilson’s report is devoted to the details of cultural aspects of the Datoga. Towards the end of the report, Wilson takes on some of these ‘cultural traits’ and places them into an analysis of the murders. The report portrayed the Barabaig as lacking intelligence, and suggested a few segments of the Datoga clan as leaders of the killings.

cluded to proclaim the Datoga convicts and ‘murderers.’ Therefore, while the future of the Datoga seems to be haunted by tensions, the cases of the Datoga in Wembere offer a glimpse of hope – of a future towards greater inter-ethnic interaction, if only land can be negotiated as a shared resource between agricultural producers and the Datoga pastoralists.
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9 Appendix
9.1 Interviews

———, 02.01.15. Doroto, Itigi District.
Mabochi, Mzee Girabarenda, 08.01.15. Sanjaranda Village.
Mgokoo, Elieza, 07.01.15. Sanjaranda.
———, 08.01.15. Sanjaranda.
Mgokoo, Elieza, Tuwowu Mawope and Mzee Girabarenda Mabochi, 08.01.15. Sanjaranda.
Mhajida, Shanga, 02.01.15. Doroto, Itigi District.
Mlewa, Mzee, 15.06.14. Doroto, Itigi District.
Mnyakongo, Peter, 04.01.15. Itigi town.
———, 02.01.15. Utemini, Itigi.
———, 07.01.15. Utemini, Itigi.
———, 08.01.15. Utemini, Itigi.
Ndagala, Daniel, 20.01.15. Dar es Salaam.
Ndojoo, Duma, 09.01.15. Kitopeni village.
Paulo, Agnes, 09.11.14. Shelui, Iramba District.
9.2 Tables

Table 1: Contribution to the Murders by sub-groups ......................................... 98
Table 2: Estimated murder cases reported of the Barbaig clans ....................... 98
Table 3: Murders with ethnicity and corresponding villages ......................... 133

9.3 Figures

Figure 1: The location of the study areas .......................................................... 45
Figure 2: Iramba Plateaus as observed from the Wembere plains ................... 47
Figure 3: The Wembere plains during dry season ........................................... 169
Figure 4: One of the first houses of Mzee Hodi Hodi built in 1988 after the 1984–1987 ....................................................................... 182
Figure 5: The second and third houses of Mzee Hodi Hodi Musoma, newly built and showing the contrast between the old and the ‘modern’ homes .............................................................................. 183
Figure 6: Itigi town and surrounding villages, Manyoni district ................. 198
9.4 Zusammenfassung


This research unravels the economic collapse of the Datoga pastoralists of central and northern Tanzania from the 1830s to the beginning of the 21st century. The research builds from the broader literature on continental African pastoralism during the past two centuries. Overall, the literature suggests that African pastoralism is collapsing due to changing political and environmental factors. My dissertation aims to provide a case study adding to the general trends of African pastoralism, while emphasizing the topic of competition as not only physical, but as something that is ethnically negotiated through historical and collective memories.

There are two main questions that have guided this project: 1) How is ethnic space defined by the Datoga and their neighbours across different historical times? And 2) what are the origins of the conflicts and violence and how have they been narrated by the state throughout history? Examining archival sources and oral interviews it is clear that the Datoga have struggled through a competitive history of claims on territory against other neighbouring communities. The competitive encounters began with the Maasai entering the Serengeti in the 19th century, and intensified with the introduction of colonialism in Mbulu and Singida in the late 19th and 20th centuries. The fight for control of land and resources resulted in violent clashes with other groups. Often the Datoga were painted as murderers and impediments to development. Policies like the amalgamation measures of the British colonial administration in Mbulu or Ujamaa in post-colonial Tanzania aimed at confronting the “Datoga problem,” but were inadequate in neither addressing the Datoga issues of identity, nor providing a solution to their quest for land ownership and control.

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