Confucianism
Its Roots and Global Significance

MING-HUEI LEE

Edited by David Jones
Confucianism
CONFUCIAN CULTURES

Roger T. Ames and Peter D. Hershock, series editors

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Confucianisms for a Changing World Cultural Order
Edited by Roger T. Ames and Peter D. Hershock
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Confucian traditions are often regarded in purely historical terms. Having been transmitted and transformed over nearly two and a half millennia, this focus on history is well-justified. But Confucian traditions are by no means solely of historical interest and significance.

In the last quarter century, amid remarkable advances in science and technology that have dramatically transformed practices in virtually every domain of human endeavor, recognition has dawned that human activity is capable of adversely affecting planetary-scale phenomena such as climate and that the greatest challenges we will face in the coming decades will not be technical but ethical. We now know that human beings and our ways of being in the world are complicit in the predicaments we are facing—among them global warming; the persistence of hunger in a world of food excesses; widening gaps of wealth, income, resource use, and risk; and the increasingly intimate interdependence of economic and political vitality and volatility. Secondly, we know that these predicaments are not constrained by national or social boundaries. Pandemics and global warming have global reach and affect everyone regardless of nationality or status. Thirdly, an organic relationship obtains among this set of pressing challenges that renders them zero-sum: We either address them all or we can resolve none of them. In short, these challenges cannot be met seriatim by individual players but must be addressed instead by a world community acting in concert. Finally, the predicaments with which we find ourselves ever more powerfully confronted can only be addressed by effecting a radical change in human intentions, values, and practices.

When we look for cultural resources that will enhance capabilities for resolving these global predicaments, primary among them are values and practices that will support replacing the familiar competitive pattern of single actors pursing their own self-interest with a collaborative pattern of players strengthening possibilities for coordination across national, ethnic, and religious boundaries. And it is in this context that Confucian traditions assume distinctive contemporary relevance. As is now widely appreciated, Confucian
cultures celebrate the relational values of deference and interdependence and understand persons as constitutively embedded in and nurtured by unique transactional patterns of relations. This series is committed to exploring how and to what extent contemporary Confucian ethics that locate moral conduct within a thick and richly textured pattern of family, community, and natural relations may be a force for challenging and changing the international order. At the same time, the series is committed to raising critical questions retrospectively about the contributions and failings of Confucianism in its long history as a pan-Asian phenomenon, as well as prospectively about the globalization of Confucian values in response to contemporary global dynamics.

A key element in our Confucian Cultures series is the translation of seminal works in Confucian cultures from Asian language sources. While Asian scholars continue to translate much of contemporary Western scholarship into Asian languages, including Western commentaries on their own cultures, the opposite has not been true. Translations of the best Asian scholarly literature into English remain rare.

But the scope of the series is not limited to promoting literacy on Confucian cultures as understood within those cultures themselves. An essential parallel element in the series will be critical research on Confucianism by scholars outside of these Asian traditions. Moreover, the series is committed to approaching Confucian traditions in a manner that respects the diversity of those traditions, and will welcome scholarship that looks at Confucian cultures through a range of disciplinary lenses, including literary, anthropological, and historical perspectives, and those that are philosophical and religious. Finally, the series is committed to publishing works that explicitly place Confucian thought and cultures in conversation with other traditions. This, we hope, will contribute to the collaborative realization of a more just, equitable, and harmonious global future.

In this inaugural volume in the series, Lee Ming-huei offers an interpretation of traditional Confucian themes from a contemporary perspective. In light of the demise of Confucianism as a state ideology in East Asia, Lee surveys the prospects Confucianism still has as a cultural resource for the modern world. With a strong sense of history and an unrelentingly rigorous philosophical methodology, he assesses the strengths, the failures, the possibilities, and the limitations that might still be relevant to the moral education and the social and political philosophies of these different yet continuous Asian Confucianisms.
The project of comparative philosophy is almost exclusively associated with Western philosophers opening their minds and hearts to non-Western ways of thinking. Even the term “comparative philosophy” was coined by a small group of Western philosophers who founded the University of Hawai‘i’s philosophy program. This new vision was borne primarily through the imagination of Charles A. Moore, who wished to create an opportunity where outsiders “could most closely approach the ideal of understanding other traditions as the people of those traditions understand themselves.”1 We may forget in the twentieth-first century how radical an idea this must have been in 1939, when the first East-West Philosophers’ Conference was held.

As Moore realized, one must understand from within before creating a new philosophical approach. And before a new approach can gain ascendancy as method—that is, before considering the way in which comparative philosophy is to be done—the way in which it is approached is fundamental and crucial. In other words, we need to have a clear direction before the process develops and a theoretical framework before techniques and practices are put into place—only after the approach to comparative philosophy is developed, is there an opening for deciding what method or methods we wish to engage.

But comparative philosophy is not exclusively a Western undertaking as some think. In fact, many non-Western philosophers have been engaging in their own approaches and development of methods. In seeking an understanding of European ways of thinking, Ming-huei Lee left his native Taipei for the University of Bonn, where he studied the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Today, he is one of New Confucianism’s most prominent thinkers. In Confucianism: Its Roots and Global Significance, English-language readers get a rare opportunity to read in a single volume the work of one of Taiwan’s most distinguished scholars. Although Ming-huei Lee has published in English before, the corpus of his non-Chinese writings is in German. Readers of this volume will soon discover the hard-mindedness and precision of thinking so associated with German philosophy as they enter into his discussions of Confucianism. As readers progress
through this book, they will be constantly reminded that all philosophy should be truly comparative.

In arranging and editing this book, I have tried as much as possible to let Lee jiashou’s philosophical insights and deep understandings of Confucianism come forth both as he intended as well as in the spirit of comparative philosophy’s originary time. At times, I have added some minimal text for clarity purposes and enhancement of his points. In no way has the meaning or style of his text been altered. All edited and content contributions have been approved by Professor Lee. The book has been divided into three sections: Classical Confucianism and Its Modern Reinterpretations, Neo-Confucianism in China and Korea, and Ethics and Politics. These sections evince just some of the range of Ming-huei Lee’s thinking as well as his inclusive reach of Confucian philosophy to the whole of East Asia, especially to Korea. In the Ethics and Politics section, readers will get a taste for the return to his own tradition through the lens of Kantian philosophy with his analysis of Confucius and the virtue ethics debate in Confucian philosophical circles. Lee’s thinking through Mou Zongsan’s interpretation of Confucianism, Zhu Xi and the Huxiang scholars’ debate on ren, and the unfolding of the debates over the “four budings” and “seven feelings” in Korea by Yi Toegye and Gi Gobong sets up the subsequent chapters of the book: a reconstruction of Wang Yangming’s philosophy and theories of democracy, and a critique of Jiang Qing’s “political Confucianism.” His work in this book adds a sizable appendage to Confucian scholarship. Moreover, the interrelated ideas and arguments presented in this book are a special contribution to the Confucian project in English-speaking countries across the world.

I am grateful for the opportunity to convert these essays into a unified book form for readers because they show in many ways how to think with, through, and beyond a tradition. Being able to assist in bringing Ming-huei Lee’s work to English readers in a more accessible fashion is indeed an honor. This project originated with and was mentored by Huang Chun-chieh, University Chair Professor and dean of the Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities and Social Sciences at National Taiwan University. Much of the fine work of the institute occurs behind the scenes with Kirill O. Thompson, the associate dean, and this project is no exception. So many extraordinary projects and undertakings that have benefited so many have found their origin with Huang Chun-chieh and the institute. My deep gratitude to Huang Chun-chieh laoshi moves unendingly throughout my life. This book is just one of the contributions originating with him and moving munificently beyond him for the benefit of others. To me, he is the embodiment of the Confucian ideal, and I dedicate my work on this project to him.

Finally, I am most grateful to Professor Ming-huei Lee for his generosity,
patience, and cooperation. As one of East-Asia’s most prominent Kant authorities and Confucian scholars, he offers both East Asia and the West something very few can provide. Through his work, we are given a space to reflect critically about what it means to be human—a being that is human—and the future of humanity.
Acknowledgments

The present volume comprises newly revised versions of my articles on Confucianism that have been published since the year 2000. In these articles I discuss some traditional themes of Confucianism from a modern and comparative perspective. Although the original articles were written on different occasions, they exhibit a common concern with the modern purports of East Asian Confucian traditions. For the publication of this volume, I have updated the articles with editorial revisions, material emendations, and supplemental content.

I owe a profound debt of gratitude to Professor David Jones. He contributed more to this volume than what an editor would normally do. He not only edited my manuscripts and polished the texts, but also inserted commentaries for readers. I would like to express my sincere gratitude also to Professor Huang Chun-chieh, dean of the Institute for Advanced Studies in Humanities and Social Sciences at the National Taiwan University. With his excellent talent for organization, he induced me to write some of the essays included in this volume to elaborate the themes I develop here. Special thanks go also to Professor Roger T. Ames and Professor Peter D. Hershock for their kindness in receiving this volume into the Confucian Cultures series.
Introduction

Destinies and Prospects of the Confucian Traditions in Modern East Asia

In the past, China, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam formed what might be called a “Confucian cultural sphere.” As a result of Chinese immigration, Confucian values became an essential part of the cultures of Singapore and Malaysia as well. Although the modern fate of Confucian traditions in these countries has varied, they have all faced common problems, such as the challenge from the West, the pursuit of modernization, the collapse of traditional systems, as well as others. Perhaps the most significant commonality was the eclipse of Confucianism as a national ideology. After East Asia’s entry into the modern world, the restoration of Confucian traditions to the status of national ideology, as Jiang Qing 蔣慶 would like to see, became impossible. However, it will be suggested throughout this book that Confucian traditions can still function as a main resource for cultural Bildung, that is, for the education, formation, and cultivation of self and society. In this light Confucianism should not retreat into the realm of “inner sagehood” (neisheng 内聖), as Yu Ying-shih 余英時 suggests, because Confucianism is characterized by the connectedness of “inner sagehood” with “outer kingliness” (waiwang 外王). In the twenty-first century Confucianism needs to develop a modern system of ethics as well as theories of cultural, political, and social criticism. In this context, the views of both Jiang Qing and Yu Ying-shih will be discussed below.

Modern Confucianism: A Wandering Soul?

In a 1988 paper titled “The Predicament of Modern Confucianism” (Xiandai Ruxue de kunjing 现代儒学的困境), the renowned scholar Yu Ying-shih used the metaphor of a “wandering soul” to describe modern Confucianism.1 Yu, who much appreciates the Confucian tradition and its values, uses “wandering soul” without any intended mockery and merely to describe the predicament of modern Confucianism. He notes that, in the past, the institutionalization
of Confucianism allowed it to considerably dominate China’s traditional culture. Since the advent of the modern era, however, in the course of the total collapse of Chinese society, China’s traditional political and social systems were rocked in succession, “the connection between Confucianism and the political and social systems was broken, and institutionalized Confucianism died.” As a result, Confucianism no longer had a system on which it could depend and became, as Yu puts it, a “wandering soul.”

Yu also points to an important reason why modern Confucianism fell into this predicament: Traditional Confucianism lacks its own system or organization and has to depend on existing political and social systems, which is a situation different from that of Western religions, especially Christianity. By basing itself on its own churches, Christianity avoided becoming a wandering soul in its own domain. In stark contrast is Confucianism. In modern society Confucianism has no churches on which to establish itself. Rather, it could be argued that modern Confucianism has only been able to attach itself to universities and scattered Confucian communities. Modern universities’ increasing emphasis on specialization, however, has come in conflict with Confucianism’s traditional emphasis on liberal arts and general education.

In view of this modern and ongoing situation, what direction should Confucianism take in the future, and how should it position itself in society? Yu provides an initial answer to these questions in his “Confucianism and Daily Life” 儒家思想與日常生活. Yu writes, “A modern way forward for Confucianism is to become part of daily life, and it seems that only by doing this can it free itself from the system and regain its influence on spiritual values.” He goes on to add that the Confucianism of the Ming (1368–1644) and Qing (1644–1911) dynasties after Wang Yangming 王陽明 (1472–1529) had already developed such an orientation. In fact, this new direction broke with traditional Confucianism’s ideal of “inner sagehood–outer kingliness” (neisheng waiwang 内聖外王) and the “sage ruler–worthy chancellor” (shengjun xianxiang 聖君賢相) arrangement. His conclusion is as follows:

Modern, daily-life oriented Confucianism can realize itself only in the private domain, separating it from the public domain, a situation that is roughly similar to the modern Western separation of church and state. In other words, Confucianism can still play an important role on the level of self-cultivation and maintaining order in the family; however, in terms of governing the country and pacifying the world, Confucianism can only project indirect influence as a “cultural backdrop.”

Although I do not disagree with Yu at a fundamental level, he does seem to overlook the possibility of a modern transformation of the traditional “inner
sagehood and outer kingliness” connection. However, before discussing this oversight any further, it is instructive to follow Yu’s “wandering soul” metaphor and then review the modern fate of Confucian traditions in East Asia.

The Development of Confucian Traditions in East Asia

One could argue that Confucianism was already a “wandering soul” from its inception during the pre-Qin era (before 221 BCE), before it became China’s national ideology. Although Confucius devoted much of his life to traveling restively to various surrounding states, he actually had little influence and was forced to give up his efforts to find a ruler whom he could serve. Instead he decided to promote his own ideas and accept disciples. The “Second Sage,” Mencius (Mengzi 372?–289? BCE), had much the same experience. It was only much later after the establishment of the Han empire that Confucianism was combined with the system of autocratic monarchy and attained the status of a national ideology. This amalgamation lasted until the Qing dynasty ended in 1911. In addition to the autocratic monarchy system, Confucianism was also dependent on the examination, education, and family clan systems. The examination system included the Han era recommendation (chaju 察舉) and employment (zhengpi 徴辟) systems, the Wei and Jin dynasties’ (220–420) Nine Ranks system (jiupin zhongzheng zhi 九品中正制), and the imperial examination system (keju zhi 科舉制) after the Tang dynasty (618–907) and until 1905, when the Qing court abolished it. The education system included each dynasty’s central and local-level schools as well as the private academies that were established after the Song dynasty (960–1279). This was essentially the scenario until the Western educational system replaced the Chinese traditional educational system during the late Qing. The traditional Chinese family clan system was then gradually replaced by the small family system with the advent of the modern age.

If we consider the spread of Confucianism beyond China, we find similar developments, especially in Korea. Among the countries of East Asia, Korea most closely mirrored the experience of China. During Korea’s period of the Three Kingdoms (from approximately the first century BCE until the seventh century), the Koguryŏ 高句麗, Silla 新羅, and Paekche 百濟 kingdoms adopted China’s systems in succession. By the time of the Koryŏ 高麗 era (917–1392), Confucianism had spread to the Korean Peninsula, and the Koryŏ dynasty actively sought to emulate China’s political, educational, and examination systems. The Chosŏn 朝鮮 dynasty (1392–1910) that followed reflected China’s various systems to an even greater extent, and Confucianism (particularly the teachings of Zhu Xi 朱熹 [1130–1200]) attained the status of national ideology. This practice was retained until Japan’s annexation of Korea in 1910.

After the Paekche scholar Wang In 王仁 took the Analects (Lunyu) to
Japan at the end of the fourth century, Confucianism gradually came to be valued by the Japanese nobility. The Seventeen-Article Constitution promulgated by Prince Shōtoku 聖德 in 604 was based essentially on Confucian ideals. In the middle of the sixth century, Emperor Kōtoku 孝德 implemented the Taika 大化 period reforms, which fully copied the systems of China’s Tang dynasty. In 702, Emperor Bunbu 文武 promulgated the Taihō code 大寶律令 that mandated the founding of universities, the teaching of Confucian classics, and the implementation of the kōkyo examination system, which was based on the Tang dynasty’s gongju 賢舉 system. In the early Nara 奈良 (710–794) and Heian 平安 (794–1185) periods, the study of Chinese culture, which especially included Confucianism, developed rapidly. During the subsequent Kamakura 鎌倉 (1185–1333) and Muromachi 室町 (1338–1573) periods, the literati lost influence with the military’s domination. Then, during the Tokugawa 徳川 period (1603–1867), there was a revival of Confucianism, and the shogun’s administration (bakufu 幕府) took the teachings of Zhu Xi as the basis for official education. This situation persisted for over two hundred years, until 1867, when the Tokugawa bakufu restored imperial rule and Emperor Meiji 明治 came to power. The most significant difference between Japan and China, however, is that the Japanese examination system existed in name only after the eleventh century.

Beyond Korea and Japan, Confucianism also became influential in Vietnam. During China’s Han dynasty, the government established the three prefectures of Jiaozhi 交趾, Jiuzhen 九真, and Rinan 日南 within the borders of Vietnam. During the Tang dynasty, the area that is now central and northern Vietnam was a Chinese prefecture that was historically called Annam 安南. Before Vietnam’s independence in the tenth century, its various systems were identical to China’s. After independence, a succession of Vietnamese dynasties continued to use China’s systems, establishing schools and an examination system covering the Confucian Four Books and Five Classics. Vietnam’s examination system was established by the Ly 李 dynasty (1010–1225), continued during the Tran 陳 dynasty (1225–1400), and reached its zenith during the Le 黎 dynasty (1428–1789) before it was abolished in 1919. Until Vietnam became a French colony in 1883, it can be claimed that it was a Confucian state, at least in terms of its political, social, and educational systems.

Possibility of Restoring Confucianism to a Form of State Religion

The brief historical overviews of China, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam above can give us some understanding of the meaning of Yu Ying-shih’s “wandering soul” metaphor as used to describe the fate of Confucian traditions in modern times. By the late Qing dynasty, faced with the decline of Confucian political and social
institutions, Kang Youwei 康有為 (1858–1927) advocated establishing Confucianism as the state religion. Confucius was venerated as its founder and, copying from Western Christianity, Kang Youwei established a Confucian Church (Kongjiaohui 孔教會). After the founding of the Republic of China in 1911, Kang, Chen Huanzhang 陳煥章 (1880–1933), Yan Fu 嚴復 (1854–1921), and other well-known scholars further promoted the Confucian Religion Movement, which gained support from Yuan Shikai 袁世凱 (1859–1916) and his Republican government. Following the dissolution of Yuan’s Hongxian Empire 洪憲帝制, however, Kang Youwei’s Confucian Religion Movement failed. The primary cause of its failure was its going against contemporary trends by attempting to restore Confucianism’s sacred traditions in a modern society that was already disenchanted with them. It is of little wonder that Liang Qichao 梁啟超 (1873–1929), Kang Youwei’s most notable student, published the article “Defending Religion Is Not the Way to Venerate Confucius,” where he openly opposed the Confucian Religion Movement.

Kang Youwei’s Confucian Religion Movement represented an effort to institutionalize Confucianism, but this effort was not the only one of its kind. A similar movement existing today in mainland China is called “political Confucianism” (zhengzhi Ruxue 政治儒學) and the “kingly way of governance” (wangdao zhengzhi 王道政治). This movement was started by Jiang Qing. Beginning in the late 1990s, Jiang began vigorously to promote a return to Confucian values, encouraging study of Confucian classics and restoring traditional rituals. He further asserted that Confucianism should replace Marxism as the official ideology and ultimate spiritual values of the Chinese people.

Jiang elucidated his concepts as follows. In his view, the thought of Confucius covered two distinct yet related dimensions that had developed into two different traditions: “mind-and-nature Confucianism” (xinxing Ruxue 心性儒學), or “life Confucianism” (shengming Ruxue 生命儒學), and “political Confucianism,” or “institutional Confucianism” (zhidu Ruxue 制度儒學). The latter was developed especially in the New Text Gongyang 公羊 School. Jiang criticized Hong Kong and Taiwanese New Confucians for being familiar only with mind-and-nature Confucianism and not with political Confucianism. In trying to develop democracy from Confucianism, they neglected its particular characteristics and positions, and simply accepted Western political values as universal. Rather than following this route, Jiang advocated making full use of the traditional resources of political Confucianism.

Jiang proposed replacing Western democratic governance with “the kingly way of governance.” From his perspective, the kingly way of governance offers advantages over democratic governance. In terms of the problem of political legitimacy, democratic governance emphasizes legitimacy only based on the will of the people, whereas the kingly way of governance derives its legitimacy from
three sources: legitimacy based on the will of the people; transcendent, divine
legitimacy; and historical and cultural legitimacy. In essence “the kingly way”
makes for balanced governance.

Although we may find Jiang Qing’s dream interesting because it incorpo-
rates essential Chinese cultural virtues, questions arise concerning its implement-
ation and operation. His criticism of the modern democratic electoral system
for the ease with which it can slide into vulgar or populist politics may be to the
point, but is it so clear that China currently possesses the necessary historical
and social conditions for the actual realization and execution of Jiang Qing’s
system? Or is his dream nothing but a utopian pipe dream? To many observers,
attending to restore Confucianism to the status of national ideology in mod-
ern China seems like attempting to restore the ideal of Caesaropapism in the
West. As readers proceed through this book, it should become clearer why such
an idea is simply impractical and dislocated in time. I will give a critical review
of Jiang Qing’s idea of “political Confucianism” in the last chapter of this book.

The Prospects of Confucianism in the Twentieth-First Century

Comparing Yu Ying-shih’s views with those of Jiang Qing, we may observe
that, although they both affirm the significance and value of the learning of
“inner sagehood” in modern society, their views on “outer kingliness” are at
two extremes of the spectrum: Jiang Qing overemphasizes “outer kingliness,”
whereas Yu Ying-shih underestimates it. In his article “Confucian Thought and
Daily Life,” Yu quotes a view expressed by the American humanist scholar Irving
Babbitt (1865–1933). In his *Democracy and Leadership* Babbitt maintains that
the teachings of Confucius can provide political leaders with qualities they
need.9 Yu takes this pronouncement as support for his own view that a “daily-
life oriented Confucianism can still continue to indirectly help in governing the
country and pacifying the world.”10 Though this is perhaps true, Confucianism
can perform even more functions in a modern, democratic society.

Although the terms “inner sagehood, outer kingliness” first appeared in
the “Tianxia” chapter of the *Zhuangzi*, they are apt expressions of the essence
of Confucianism. The Confucian ideal of inner sagehood and outer kingliness
affirms the connection between the two as well as the necessity of inner sages-
hood leading to outer kinglyness. If modern Confucianism has indeed become
the study of inner sagehood alone, as Yu holds, and its realization can be pur-
sued only in the private domain, with only an indirect role in the public realm,
then the essence of Confucianism has been lost. Here, we may borrow from
Hegel’s legal philosophical terminology to understand the relationship between
inner sagehood and outer kinglyness. If we understand these terms roughly as
a relationship between *Moralität* (individual, rational, and reflective morality)
and Sittlichkeit (ethical, social life), they shed some light on inner sagehood and outer kingliness. The learning of inner sagehood in traditional Confucianism essentially belongs to the realm of Moralität. As for Sittlichkeit in the Hegelian sense, it is not limited to the realm of politics, but covers the household, civil society, the state, and even world history. In this sense, the areas touched on by Confucianism’s “outer kingliness” are principally the same as those found in Sittlichkeit. For Hegel, Moralität cannot stop at the self, but must necessarily extend to Sittlichkeit. In response to Kant’s more abstract moral philosophy, Hegel wished to synthesize the best of Moralität with Sittlichkeit, that is, to embed Moralität into the concrete forms of what Confucians refer to as li—the rites, customs, and ritual proprieties of cultural traditions that manifest in the feelings, moods, emotions, behaviors, and mental states of individual human beings. In other words, this way of thinking resonates with Confucianism’s extension of “inner sagehood” to “outer kingliness.”

Even though traditional Confucianism did not include these last three areas (civil society, the state, and world history) in the modern sense, all of these four spheres of human life—including the household—do indeed belong to the realm of politics. The household too falls within the scope of Confucianism’s “outer kingliness,” as we see in Analects 2.21:

Someone addressed Confucius, saying, “Sir, why are you not engaged in politics?” The Master said, “What does the Book of Documents say of filial piety?—‘You are filial; you discharge your brotherly duties. These qualities are displayed in politics.’ This then also constitutes the exercise of politics. Why must there be a question about making one participate in politics?”

Because filial duties are espoused as having a political dimension (in the sense that politics functions or at least should function along the lines of family relationships and dynamics), the idea of family is a central one for the Confucian project. For this reason, despite East Asia’s traditional family clans having been transformed into the small households of the modern era, Confucian traditions can still continue to play a role in keeping order in these small households. In places in East Asia where there has been a sustained preservation of Confucian traditions (such as South Korea and Taiwan), emphasis on making offerings to ancestors is more prevalent than in China itself. In ethnic Chinese communities in Singapore and Malaysia as well, Confucian traditions are closely linked to making offerings to ancestors, resulting in a trend toward the “religionization” of Confucianism. In Indonesia this process has a century of history, and the “Confucian religion” (Kongjiao 孔教), which has been permitted to operate openly in recent years, essentially takes ancestral worship and family ethics as its
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At present, because of the long ban on Chinese-language education during the rule of Suharto, nearly all Indonesian Chinese under the age of fifty are unable to speak Chinese. Nevertheless, the “Confucian religion” has been well preserved over time through the clan structure and family ethics, and because of this preservation it represents a vital example of the role that outer kingliness has played as it is passed down through time.

On the educational front, Confucianism can also be a resource for Bildung. In the past, Taiwan’s Kuomintang government included instruction in the Four Books of Confucianism in its high schools’ “Basic Teaching Materials for Chinese Culture” course. Although this practice drew criticism from academia because of its political intent, it still had certain positive aspects. In recent years, both Taiwanese and mainland Chinese social organizations’ strong promotion of children studying Confucian classics outside of the school system has also had positive effects. In university education, Confucianism can become part of “general education” through classical readings courses.

Confucianism has already become the subject of specialized study in university departments of philosophy, Chinese literature and language, and history. Concerns have been voiced regarding whether this trend toward the disciplinization, specialization, and intellectualization of Confucianism may damage its far-reaching cultural sense and cause Confucianism to lose its vitality. In recent years questions have been raised regularly about “the legitimacy of Chinese philosophy” in discussions in mainland China. In fairness, these concerns are not without reason. Those who raise such doubts mainly focus on whether the essence of East Asian traditions (including the Confucian tradition) can be carried forward in the Western academic system. But such thinking seems to misplace the crux of the issue. The central question should be whether or not traditional thought, including East Asian thought, can preserve its essence in the modern academic system. This question has been taken up in the West by the French historian of philosophy Pierre Hadot (1922–2010). In his work *Exercices spirituels et philosophie antique*, Hadot emphasizes the original meaning of philosophy, which he wishes to restore. The practice of philosophy “as a way of life” was at the core of ancient Greek and Roman philosophy. In the modern Western academic system this original meaning of “philosophy” has been replaced with a “discourse about philosophy.” Thus, traditional Eastern and Western thought both must face the problem of the specialization and intellectualization of the modern academic system.

Although the modern academic system cannot preserve the original vitality of Confucianism, it can actually open up another aspect of Confucianism, that is, an intellectualized Confucianism. Apart from Confucianism as “wisdom of life,” it can develop a modern system of ethics as well as a theoretical basis for cultural, political, and social criticism—as the saying goes, “losing at
sunrise and gaining at sunset.” The following example demonstrates this kind of Confucian political criticism.

New Confucians in Hong Kong and Taiwan such as Mou Zongsan (1909–1995), Tang Junyi (1909–1978), Xu Fuguan (1903–1982), and Zhang Junmai (1887–1969) created a theory of “developing democracy from Confucianism.” They have advocated that China should employ a democratic system that is based on the “intrinsic requirements” of Confucianism.14 This theory does not, as Jiang Qing has maintained, draw too close to Western culture, nor does it, as Taiwanese liberals such as Yin Haiguang (1919–1969) have held, arise from a psychological need for self-protection. In brief this theory comprises two main points: First, the combination of Confucianism with monarchy arose from particular historical circumstances, and Confucianism’s essence can be more fully realized in a modern democratic system. Second, democracy cannot be directly transplanted from the West to China and can only be absorbed through the internal development and adaptation of traditional Chinese culture.

In the past, liberalism was seen as the theoretical foundation for democracy, but, if the communitarian criticism of liberalism is meaningful, we have to admit that a Confucian justification for democracy is possible. This is the theoretical core of the theory of “developing democracy from Confucianism” and can also be seen as an example of Confucian political criticism. In this sense an intellectualized “academic Confucianism,” another development of traditional Confucianism, has a major role to play because it can also be seen as a display of Confucianism’s “outer kingliness” and more keenly reveal the connection between “inner sagehood” and “outer kingliness.”
PART I

Classical Confucianism and Its Modern Reinterpretations
CHAPTER 1

Mou Zongsan’s Interpretation of Confucianism
Some Hermeneutical Reflections

MOU ZONGSAN (1909–1995) played a significant role in the development of “Contemporary New Confucianism.” This chapter narrows his role more specifically and hermeneutically reflects on his interpretation of Confucianism, which is characterized by the influence of Western philosophy, especially that of the German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). In his interpretation, Mou employs not only Kant’s philosophical terminology such as “thing-in-itself,” “intellectual intuition,” and “autonomy,” but also his philosophical framework of “appearance” and “thing-in-itself.” Mou even views this framework as the common model for all philosophical thinking. His interpretation of Confucianism, however, has encountered criticisms on two fronts. On one hand, he has been reproached for distorting Kant’s “original” philosophy, and, on the other hand, he has been criticized for reading too much Kant into Confucianism.

Mou’s Interpretation of Confucianism

As a reaction to the challenge of Western culture, “Contemporary New Confucianism” arose in China at the beginning of the twentieth century. In view of the variety of its contents and directions, it should be regarded more as an intellectual movement than as a school. The initiators of this movement primarily include Liang Shuming 梁漱溟 (1893–1988) and Xiong Shili 熊十力 (1885–1968), with Zhang Junmai, Tang Junyi, Xu Fuguang, Mou Zongsan, and perhaps Qian Mu 钱穆 (1895–1990) as their followers. Characteristic of this movement is its attempt to integrate some ingredients of Western culture
with the Confucian tradition, insofar as these ingredients can facilitate China’s modernization and promote the further development of Chinese culture. This attempt is often based on the philosophical reconstruction of the Chinese tradition in terms of Western ideas. The efforts of the New Confucians are similar in many ways to those of the Fathers of the Church in developing early Christian theology. In this respect, Mou Zongsan deserves special attention for his philosophical achievements; an analysis of Mou’s interpretation of Confucianism and the hermeneutical problems involved in his reconstruction of Confucian philosophy are of special cultural significance and philosophical purport.

Mou’s reconstruction of Confucianism is characterized by his appropriation of Kant’s philosophical framework and concepts, and is one of the earliest instances of what has come to be known in the West as comparative philosophy—however, instead of moving from the West to the East, the intellectual movement here is from China to the West. Strictly speaking, Mou may be considered unqualified to be a Kant specialist because of his lack of acquaintance with the German language. Nevertheless, as occasionally is the case, this disadvantage is offset by his genius for philosophical thinking and his diligence in researching—sometimes a “disadvantage” can be transformed into its opposite. On the basis of English versions, he translated Kant’s three Critiques and Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten into Chinese. To these Chinese versions he appended his commentaries, which are not only philological but also philosophical-interpretative. He often interprets Kant’s philosophy by contrasting it with Chinese philosophy, especially with Confucian philosophy.

Kant’s influence on Mou’s interpretation of Confucianism can best be considered from two perspectives: the framework of philosophical thinking and moral philosophy. In the first place, Mou appropriated Kant’s philosophical framework of “appearance” and “thing-in-itself.” For Mou this framework can serve as the common model for all philosophical thinking. In 1975 he published Appearance and Thing-in-Itself (Xianxiang yu wuzishen 現象與物自身), where he thoroughly discussed Kant’s distinction. In this book, he interpreted Kant’s concept of “thing-in-itself” not as a usual epistemological concept but as one with value-connotation. He did so even though he realized Kant had never clearly expressed this thought. In this regard, Mou shows his Confucian (and New Confucian) roots. In Mou’s view, an epistemological concept of “thing-in-itself” is not sufficient to support Kant’s transcendental distinction between appearance and thing-in-itself since the “thing-in-itself” in this sense lies always beyond human knowledge. In order to solve this problem, Mou appealed to the thesis that human beings are indeed finite but have access to the infinite, which is a common conviction of Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism. As revealed in his Intellectual Intuition and Chinese Philosophy (Zhide zhijue yu Zhongguo
zhexue 智的直覺與中國哲學) (1971), he found this access in the “intellectual intuition” of human beings.

It is generally known that Kant ascribes intellectual intuition only to God. But on a full analysis of the relevant sections of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Mou came to the conclusion that Kant's philosophical system logically implies the possibility of ascribing intellectual intuition also to humans, although it is contrary to Kant's own expressions. This is a viewpoint Johann G. Fichte (1762–1814) also advocated. It is here that Mou found a key to the comparison between Kantian and Chinese philosophy. Therefore a “transcendent” or “noumenal” metaphysics, which is impossible for Kant, is possible for Chinese philosophy. In such a metaphysical structure Mou found the proper place for Confucian metaphysics. According to Mou, Confucian metaphysics is founded on *liangzhi* 良知 (original knowing) or *benxin* 本心 (original mind), which is a type of intellectual intuition of the moral and therefore free subject. In this sense, the “thing-in-itself” has a practical connotation, because it is a horizon that discloses itself through *liangzhi*. So Mou views Confucian metaphysics as a “moral metaphysics,” which is different from Kant’s “metaphysics of morals” inasmuch as the latter means a metaphysical (a priori) explanation of morals.

This point brings us to the second perspective of moral philosophy. In the introduction to his epoch-making work *Heart-Mind as Reality and Human Nature as Reality* (*Xinti yu xingti* 心體與性體), Mou critically examined Kant’s system of moral philosophy. Mou agreed with Kant’s view that the essence of morality lies in the “autonomy” of the moral subject (will). In the concept of “autonomy,” Mou found the key not only to interpret the doctrines of Confucianism, but also to classify the systems within Confucianism. At the same time, however, he curiously pointed out that the whole meaning of Kant’s insight in this respect cannot be fully developed within the framework of his own moral philosophy. The reason for this is that Kant presupposes a dualist standpoint between the rational and the emotional deportment in the moral agent. Kant’s strict separation of the rational from the emotional means the moral subject can function only as a *principium dijudicationis* (the principle of the appraisal of the action) and not at the same time as a *principium executionis* (the principle of its performance). In other words, the moral subject in Kant lacks the power of self-realization, which means there is a narrowing of the “autonomy” of the moral subject as its moral self-legislation. For Mou, it is because of this narrowing and the deprivation of intellectual intuition in humans that Kant is not in a position to establish a moral metaphysics. In its place Mou saw the prototype of moral metaphysics in Confucianism.

Thus, in Mencius’ theory of *xin* 心 (heart-mind) as moral subject, Mou found a more suitable philosophical-anthropological framework for Kant’s concept of “autonomy” because this theory is based on an a priori universalism
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as well as a unity of the rational and the emotional. On the basis of Mencius’ philosophical anthropology, Wang Yangming advanced the thesis of the unity of moral subject and moral law (xin ji li 心即理) as well as that of the unity of moral knowledge and action (zhi xing he yi 知行合一). The first of these theses means that liangzhi as moral subject is the last resort for moral legislation, whereas the second means that liangzhi functions not only as the principium dijudicationis, but also as the principium executionis of the moral good.

In both characteristics of Mencius’ moral philosophy—that is, the ethics of autonomy and the philosophical-anthropological unity of the rational and the emotional—Mou finds the criteria for the grouping of different systems within Confucianism. In his classification, he identifies Confucius, Mencius, the author(s) of the Doctrine of the Mean (Zhongyong 中庸), and the commentators of the Book of Changes (Yijing 易經) in the mainstream of pre-Qin Confucianism. Xunzi 荀子 (ca. 298–238 BCE) is then considered as a representative of another stream of Confucianism because he established an ethics of heteronomy. For the same reason, Mou excluded the Han Confucians from the mainstream of Confucianism because they appealed to what Kant called “theological ethics,” which made their ethics heteronomous in nature.

In his Heart-Mind as Reality and Human Nature as Reality and From Lu Xiangshan to Liu Jishan (Cong Lu Xiangshan dao Liu Jishan 從陸象山到劉蕺山) (1979), Mou propounds a new classification of the Song-Ming Neo-Confucians. In his opinion, the early Northern Song dynasty Confucians, such as Zhou Dunyi 周敦頤 (1017–1073), Zhang Zai 張載 (1020–1077), and Cheng Hao 程顥 (1032–1085), belong to the aforementioned mainstream. Here we see something novel compared to the traditional view, since the thought of Cheng Hao and his brother Cheng Yi 程頤 (1033–1107) formerly were not distinguished from each other. According to Mou, Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism developed into three systems: (1) that of Lu Xiangshan 陸象山 (1139–1193) and Wang Yangming, (2) that of Hu Hong 胡宏 (1106–1161) and Liu Jishan 劉蕺山 (1578–1645), and (3) that of Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi. The first two systems lead to a moral philosophy that is founded on the autonomy of the moral subject. The difference between them consists only in their approaches. The first system starts subjectively from a philosophical-anthropological thesis on the human heart-mind, whereas the second one starts objectively from ontological assertions about Tian 天 (Heaven). In any event, Mou regards these systems together in the mainstream of Confucianism. In contrast, the third system is excluded from the mainstream, although through his comprehensive philosophical system, Zhu Xi has exerted tremendous influence on the subsequent development of Confucianism. The reason for this lies in Mou’s judgment that this system is essentially intellectualistic and therefore based on the heteronomy of the moral subject.
Mou and His Critics

In the Chinese-speaking community, Mou’s interpretation of Confucianism, as mentioned above, encounters dual criticisms for simultaneously distorting Kant’s “original” philosophy and reading too much Kant into Confucianism. An example of the former criticism is that of Kuang Zhiren 鄺芷人, who criticizes Mou for interpreting Kant’s concept of “thing-in-itself” as one with value-connotation.3 The criticism of Huang Jinxing is of the latter type; he questions whether it is appropriate to introduce the concept of “autonomy” into the interpretation of Confucianism.4 In addition, some scholars doubt the suitableness of ascribing Zhu Xi’s ethics as heteronomous.5 Mou’s interpretation of Confucianism seemingly also fails to cope with the criticism from the so-called neopragmatic or contextualistic discourse of such scholars as Herbert Fingarette, Roger T. Ames, Henry Rosemont, Jr., Randall P. Perenboom, and others, who emphasize the particularity of Chinese philosophy and avoid, as much as they can, using Western philosophical concepts or categories in their interpretations of it.6

None of the above critics has given a methodological reflection on Mou’s interpretation of Confucianism, but one can be found in Feng Yaoming’s 馮耀明 article in Chinese “Conceptual Relativism and Chinese Philosophy.” On the basis of W. V. Quine’s relevant theories, Feng advances a so-called conceptual relativism that includes the following points: 7 (1) Every conceptual scheme is a subjective device, which is able to describe and interpret the objectively real but has no necessary relation to it. This can be called “internal relativity.” (2) In every conceptual scheme, the meaning of concepts, the truth of sentences, and the affirmation of beliefs are relative to the presumption of this scheme. This can be called “external relativity.” (3) Because of the double relativity, different concepts that belong to different conceptual schemes or theoretical systems are unintertranslatable, and hence the nexuses of beliefs to which these concepts belong are incommensurable. (4) Therefore, no conceptual scheme has absolute and ultimate superiority in its function of justification, and there is no criterion that is independent of all conceptual schemes and hence theoretically neutral. (5) The objectively real that the conceptual relativism presupposes is not the given actual but a regulative concept, such as Kant’s thing-in-itself. (6) Conceptual relativism is different from irrationalism, subjectivism, skepticism, and pluralism, because it presupposes the objectively real and admits a relative superiority between different conceptual schemes in regard to their function of describing and interpreting the objectively real. (7) As a methodology, conceptual relativism rejects any direct conceptual transplantation or appropriation but admits absorption or transformation between conceptual schemes that have similar theoretical traits.

According to his “conceptual relativism,” Feng then makes a quantitative
comparison between the metaphysical frameworks of Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Buddhism, and Confucianism in terms of ten theoretical traits: immanence, participation, transcendence, subjectivity, immutability, objective reality, subject-object duality, contrast of reality, value-connotation, and metaphysical preexistence. In light of the comparison, Feng argues that it is Plato’s metaphysical system rather than Kant’s that is the closest to Confucianism.8 From this he concludes: “It is the burden for both sides either to adopt or integrate the epistemological connotations of Kant’s concept of ‘thing-in-itself’ into any system of Chinese philosophy or to adopt or integrate the philosophical-anthropological implications of the concept *wu*物 [thing] included in any system of Chinese philosophy into Kant’s critical philosophy.”9 Needless to say, this criticism is leveled at Mou’s interpretation of Chinese philosophy.

It is unnecessary to discuss the relation of Feng’s “conceptual relativism” to Quine’s, but Donald Davidson’s criticism of conceptual relativism is worth discussing in this context, for it is relevant to our concerns.10 According to Davidson, the incommensurability between different conceptual schemes implies the unintertranslatability between different languages that can transmit these schemes, granted that every conceptual scheme must be transmitted by some language. However, the unintertranslatability between different languages means either complete or partial failure of translatability. Davidson demonstrates convincingly that we cannot make sense of the claim of complete failure, so the only possibility is the case of partial failure. Here it is not necessary to go any further into the details of Davidson’s argument. For our present purpose it will suffice simply to provide a quote:

The dominant metaphor of conceptual relativism, that of differing points of view, seems to betray an underlying paradox. Different points of view make sense, but only if there is a common co-ordinate system on which to plot them; yet the existence of a common system belies the claim of dramatic incomparability. What we need, it seems to me, is some idea of the considerations that set the limits to conceptual contrast. There are extreme suppositions that founder on paradox or contradiction; there are modest examples we have no trouble understanding.11

In brief, the claim of total unintertranslatability between differing conceptual schemes must presuppose a common coordinate system independent of them; otherwise, we shall lack a common foundation for the comparison between them. But this amounts to negation of the point we want to defend.

Now, if we return to Feng’s idea of “conceptual relativism,” according to his fifth and sixth points, he seems to presuppose a common coordinate system, namely, the objectively real, even when he stresses the unintertranslatabil-
ity between different conceptual schemes. In light of Davidson’s theory, we are warranted to suppose that by “unintertranslatability” Feng means here only partial failure of translatability, as his seventh point suggests. Therefore, the distance of Feng’s standpoint from Davidson’s is not as great as one may think. When we apply Feng’s conceptual relativism to the intertranslation of differing philosophical systems such as the Confucian and the Kantian, it amounts to no more than a trivial truth that in two philosophical systems we cannot find two totally corresponding concepts, because at the very least they do not have exactly the same position and meaning within their own systems. That is to say, in employing a concept in one system to interpret a concept in another system, we are always doing it analogically, and therefore some conceptual adjustments become inevitable. Even in ordinary conversations we are used to making such adjustments either consciously or unconsciously. This is why we can communicate with each other by means of the same concepts although we have different nexuses of beliefs. So it seems that Feng’s “conceptual relativism” is more rhetorical than substantial.

In addition, Feng’s “conceptual relativism” as a methodology of philosophical interpretation cannot offer any clear criteria for determining between which concepts there are similarities in their theoretical traits that allow a meaningful conceptual absorption or transformation. With regard to the ten theoretical traits that Feng uses for comparison, we may ask, “Why just these ten?” And in reference to the comparison between Confucian and Kantian systems, we may also ask, “Why not compare their ethical frameworks instead of their metaphysical ones?” It is obvious that in the ethical sphere there are more similarities between Confucian and Kantian philosophies.12

Moreover, the least persuasive point in Feng’s “conceptual relativism” lies in the fact that it totally neglects the hermeneutical dimension of philosophical interpretation. Because of this neglect he hastily concludes that Kant’s philosophical framework of appearance and thing-in-itself has “no value-connotations” when he compares it with other philosophical frameworks.13 As we have seen, Mou interprets Kant’s concept of “thing-in-itself” not as an epistemological concept, but as one with value-connoteation. If this interpretation is correct, Feng might wish to give up or at least revise his view on Mou’s philosophical interpretation. As I have indicated elsewhere:

The concept of “thing-in-itself” in Kant’s philosophy has a double meaning. In its epistemological context, it is, as generally understood, a factual concept; in its ethical context, it reveals some kind of value-connoteation. In terms of Kant’s assertion of the primacy of practical to speculative reason, we are oriented to say that the latter, that is, the ethical interpretation, is the real implication of this very concept.14
On the face of it, Mou’s interpretation of “thing-in-itself” seems contrary to Kant’s own expositions, especially to those in the First Critique. Apparently Mou’s approach presupposes Friedrich Ernst Daniel Schleiermacher’s (1768–1834) hermeneutical motto that “we understand the writer better than he himself did.” As Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900–2002) shrewdly sees, the whole history of modern hermeneutics shows itself in the changing interpretation of this statement, which embraces the proper problem of hermeneutics. In order to do justice to Mou’s interpretation of Confucianism, it is necessary to go further into his hermeneutical views.

Mou’s Hermeneutical Views

Mou never articulated a system of philosophical hermeneutics. None of his works has devoted special attention to the problems of modern hermeneutics. Yet his prefaces to his books *Intellectual Intuition and Chinese Philosophy* and *Appearance and Thing-in-Itself* and his lectures titled “The Text-Interpretative Approach for the Study of Chinese Philosophy” and “Objective Understanding and Rebuilding of Chinese Philosophy” reveal his hermeneutical views. Mou does not draw a sharp distinction between “interpretation” and “understanding.” His hermeneutical view seems to run parallel with Gadamer’s dictum that “all understanding is interpretation.”

In his preface to *Appearance and Thing-in-Itself*, Mou attempts to justify his interpretation of Chinese philosophy. On one hand, he appeals to the Buddhist hermeneutical principle of the Four Refuges:

Rely on the spirit, not the letter.
Rely on the teaching, not the teacher.
Rely on direct knowledge, not discursive consciousness.
Rely on the definitive meaning, not the provisional meaning.

On the other hand, Mou resorts to Kant’s distinction between “rational” and “historical” knowledge in the First Critique. As Mou writes:

In interpreting texts three things should be avoided: superficiality, out-of-context interpretation, and one-sided comparison. One has to comprehend the text thoroughly, while suspending the incomprehensible. In this way the fundamental meanings of texts will reveal themselves. Then, one has to determine further the levels and scopes of the meanings. That is to say, one has to make clear the differences and similarities of the meanings. “Difference” means demarcation between meanings. “Similarity” means convergence of various meanings. Once this becomes clear,
one may comprehend the meanings of texts through one’s own reason, as if they came from one’s own mouth. It begins with comprehending the meanings on the basis of the “letter” and ends with “rely on the spirit, not the letter.” The reasons for “not relying on the letter” lie in avoiding literalism. Literalism achieves only what Kant terms as “historical,” not “rational” knowledge. The beginners and those who are confined by their own schools are inclined to fall into this trap. Only those who are skilled in the text-interpretative method become able to “rely on the spirit, not the letter.”

All grand systems of thought are objective rational systems, which are crystallizations of the wisdom of the sages. When we understand the sages’ wisdom through the texts, our lives are to be exalted to the level of reason through their words. How can one speak of “relying on the spirit, not the letter,” if one’s life is not moved by objective truths? Is he really relying on the spirit? At this moment, it is better to start from the very beginning. Such a beginning method has to be concrete, actual, and precise. It unites gradually the variety of meanings into reason as their ultimate criterion. It is through the lack of practicable methods that one falsely speaks of the differences and similarities between the meanings due to literalism or arbitrarily plays with words or unites the meanings by making their demarcations blurred. For those who are skilled in the text-interpretative method, the rational is simultaneously the historical.

The above quotation covers almost all important problems of modern hermeneutics. It contains at least three points: (1) Understanding or interpretation has its “objectivity,” and only at the level of reason can it reach “objectivity.” (2) It must be through the subjective “life” that understanding or interpretation can reach its “objectivity.” (3) Understanding or interpretation covers two levels, namely, the semantic and the philosophical, which correspond respectively to Kant’s “historical” and “rational” knowledge. But the former level is subordinate to the latter.

If we put these points into the context of modern hermeneutics, their meanings will become clearer. In the development of modern hermeneutics, there are two divergent, although not completely opposite, lines. One line was founded by F. E. D. Schleiermacher and Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911), and the other was initiated by Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), then developed into a methodology by Gadamer. The first stresses the autonomy of the object of interpretation and argues strongly for the objectivity of interpretation. The second line starts from the historicity of understanding and disputes all interpretative standpoints outside of history, and hence questions the possibility of “objectively valid interpretation.” The controversy between these two lines has culminated in the dispute between Gadamer and Emilio Betti (1890–1968), who argued for the reconstruction of authorial intention.
In light of Mou’s first point, his hermeneutical principle may belong to the line of Schleiermacher because Mou grants the possibility of “objectively valid interpretation.” For Mou the object of philosophical interpretation is not the texts as such, but their meanings, which are comprehensible only through reason. So the term “objective” for him means “conforming to reason” rather than “corresponding to the original meanings of texts”—his motto for the interpretation of philosophical texts would be that “one has to interpret the texts as reasonably as possible.” Therefore, we must suppose that reasonable interpretations correspond to the “original” meanings of texts more than unreasonable ones. An “objective” understanding or interpretation presupposes the ability to use reason for thinking. Even when we want to prove that the thoughts revealed in some texts contain logical contradictions, we can resort only to reason. This seems to be implied in Bertrand Russell’s remark about the reports of Xenophon and Plato on Socrates: “A stupid man’s report of what a clever man says is never accurate, because he unconsciously translates what he hears into something that he can understand. I would rather be reported by my bitterest enemy among philosophers than by a friend innocent of philosophy.”

Regarding the validity of philosophical interpretation, Mou rejects a relativistic standpoint insofar as he does not deny the possibility of achieving an interpretation corresponding to the original meanings of texts. Nevertheless, he does not take an objectivistic standpoint because he finds the criteria for determining the original meanings not in the texts as such, but in our own reason.

Mou’s second point also reveals his distance from objectivism, because he views the responsiveness of life as another precondition for a valid interpretation. This reminds us of Dilthey’s hermeneutics for the reason that he sees the guarantee of an objectively valid interpretation not in abstract reason, but in what he terms “objective spirit,” namely, in “the manifold forms in which the community existing between individuals has objectified itself in the sensible world.” In other words, the “objective spirit” is the embodiment of human nature in culture, which in Dilthey’s system is inseparable from the concept of “life.” Likewise, for Mou, our reason cannot embody itself without life. In this sense, human reason is “experiential.” Therefore, Mou defines Confucianism as a “learning of life” (shengming de xuewen 生命的學問). For him the concept of “life” covers both the spiritual activities of individuals and the institutional activities of communities such as politics, economy, law, and so forth. Mou also points out that objective understanding requires not only the faculty of understanding, but also a “responsive life and temperament.” Note how similar Mou’s hermeneutical view is to that of Dilthey.

Mou’s third point refers to Kant’s distinction between “rational” and “historical” knowledge. Kant defines these two kinds of knowledge in this way: “Historical knowledge is cognitio ex datis [knowledge from facts]; rational
knowledge is *cognitio ex principiis* [knowledge from principles].” Whether a kind of knowledge is historical or rational does not depend on its content but on the way in which to acquire it. In brief the knowledge that one obtains through one’s own rational thinking is “rational.” But the same knowledge would be “historical” if one were to take it only as data and did not exalt it to the level of rational thinking. Since the latter kind of knowledge is dead, Kant compares it to a “plaster cast of a living man.” For Kant, philosophical interpretation should not remain at the level of “historical knowledge” but must be exalted to the level of “rational knowledge.”

In an article published in 1790, Kant replied to criticism from Johann August Eberhard (1739–1809), who claimed that Leibniz’ philosophy had already contained a critique of reason even more comprehensive than that of Kant. At the end of this article, Kant writes:

> Thus the *Critique of Pure Reason* may well be the real apology for Leibniz, even in opposition to his followers who exalt him with words of praise that hardly do him honor. It can also be an apology for many older philosophers who speak the purest nonsense through certain historians of philosophy, for all the praises the latter bestow. They do not comprehend the intention of these philosophers when they neglect the key to all explications of the works of pure reason through concepts alone, namely, the critique of reason itself (as the common source of all concepts), and are incapable of looking beyond the literal meaning of what these philosophers have said to what they intended to say.

Evidently, “works of pure reason through concepts alone” refers to what Kant terms “rational knowledge.” And the distinction between what a philosopher has said and what he intended to say corresponds to the difference between “historical” and “rational” knowledge. Philosophical interpretation should begin with the literal meanings of texts and then be required to go further into the level of “rational knowledge.” As soon as it reaches that level, the interpreter may determine the “original” meanings of texts according to his or her own reason, even in opposition to their literal meanings. This is what modern hermeneutics terms as the “hermeneutical circle.” So it is no accident that Heidegger appeals to the quotation above when he defends his interpretation of Kant’s first *Critique*.

In his lecture “The Text-Interpretative Approach for the Study of Chinese Philosophy,” Mou stresses the necessity of the “text-interpretative approach” (*wenxian tujing* 文獻途徑). But in the study of Western philosophy, we discover this does not apply because Western philosophy is more systematic and the concepts it employs are more distinct. Because the majority of Chinese philosophi-
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cal texts were not systematically written, modern researchers have had to start from reading the texts, and the “text-interpretative approach” becomes critical. This is why, in his works such as Heart-Mind as Reality and Human Nature as Reality, From Lu Xiangshan to Liu Jishan, Talent and Xuan-Principles (Cai-xing yu xuanli 才性與玄理) (1963), Buddhata and Prajna (Foxing yu bore 佛性與般若) (1977), and On the Highest Good (Yuanshan lun 圓善論) (1985), Mou explicated a great many relevant texts. For him, the “text-interpretative approach” is not identical with a historical or philological approach. He criticizes the philologists of the Qing dynasty for adopting a lopsided hermeneutical principle where philosophical implications can be disclosed only after the clarification of philological issues (Xungu ming erhou yili ming 訓詁明而後義理明). In modern terms, the fault of the latter approach lies in the neglect of the “hermeneutical circle.” On the contrary, Mou’s “text-interpretative approach” is founded on the circular interactions between philological commentary and philosophical exposition.

Unlike the above-mentioned Western philosophers, Mou himself never built up a philosophical hermeneutics. Yet some of Mou’s hermeneutical principles can be drawn on the basis of the foregoing discussions. In brief, he distinguishes between two levels of philosophical interpretation: the philological and the philosophical. At the former level, an interpreter must “comprehend the meaning on the basis of the letter.” Mou never neglected the methodological meaning of this level, insofar as he translated Kant’s main works and explicated the basic texts of Chinese philosophy. At the second level of philosophical interpretation, Mou warns us that one must “rely on the spirit, not the letter.” Mou’s philosophical creativity can best be sensed in this regard.

In his book Intellectual Intuition and Chinese Philosophy, he defends his interpretation of Chinese philosophy:

One may say, your so doing amounts to forcing Kant into the Chinese philosophical tradition. Kant may not wish this, and he may even dislike your tradition. I say, what is rational has its necessary consequences whether you like it or not. Kant may like to know the Chinese tradition since he gave special attention to morality and also was good at discussing morality. You think that Kant may not like the Chinese tradition because you do not understand the proper, real, and profound meanings of this tradition. As long as the proper, real, and profound meanings of the Chinese tradition can be disclosed, I believe it is still Kant who really understands Chinese Confucianism.29

Just as Kant and Heidegger, Mou claims at the second level of philosophical interpretation that he understands the author better than the author did him-
self. If someone questions him at this level regarding whether his interpretation corresponds to the original meanings of texts, it reveals only the former’s ignorance of philosophical thinking as well as the principles and problems of hermeneutics. It may be argued that the criteria for distinguishing a creative interpretation from a distorted one lie in nothing else but the philosopher’s creativity. In this sense and to that extent, it seems safe to defend Mou’s philosophical interpretation of Confucianism, especially in spirit, and not by the letter.
CHAPTER 2

Modern New Confucians on the Religiousness of Confucianism

Since the seventeenth century, the question whether or not Confucianism is a religion has been a subject of much heated debate in intellectual circles. Before the regime change in mainland China in 1949, most Chinese intellectuals, including representative figures of the first generation of Modern New Confucians, did not regard Confucianism as a religion. Thereafter this tendency underwent an essential change with the emergence of the third generation of Modern New Confucians, especially Tang Junyi, Xu Fuguan, and Mou Zongsan. In their view, the Confucian tradition does not lack a religious, transcendent spirit, but, as we will see, Xu Fuguan’s view is different from that of Tang Junyi and Mou Zongsan. For both Tang and Mou Confucianism is a “humanistic religion,” which, for them, means the oneness or conflation of humanism and religion. In other words, the humanistic focus of Confucianism has a religious dimension as its essence. Although Xu Fuguan agrees on the humanistic emphasis and does not deny that Confucianism originally possessed a religious dimension, he claims that this dimension has gradually been transformed and finally replaced by a humanistic spirit in the process of historical development.

The Question of Confucianism and Religion

The question of Confucianism as a religion has been debated both inside and outside China. The emergence of this question can be traced far back to the debates among the Catholic missionaries who came to China in the late Ming and early Qing. The Jesuit Matteo Ricci (1552–1610), in accordance with the
missionary strategy at the time, attempted to harmonize Confucianism with Christian beliefs. In order to bridge the gap between the two and to rule out the possibility of direct conflict between Confucianism and Christian doctrines, Ricci explicitly emphasized that Confucianism was not a religion. However, his successor, Nicholas Longobardi (1559–1654), altered his strategies and in doing so provoked the “Rites Controversy” within the Roman Catholic Church. From the mid-Qing (early nineteenth century) on, Chinese and Western cultures began to come into contact on a much broader scale and the subsequent import of the term _zongjiao_ 宗教 (religion) once again evoked a debate over whether or not Confucianism was a religion. According to the research of Japanese scholar Suzuki Norihisa, it was the Japanese who initially adopted the Chinese characters _zongjiao_ to translate the term “religion,” which first appeared in the Japanese translation of a protest letter submitted by the American ambassador to the Japanese Meiji government in 1868. This usage gradually gained popularity in Japan and was also adopted by the Chinese intelligentsia.

Under the influence of the European Enlightenment and the underlying scientism since the early Republican period (1912 and later), Chinese intellectuals tended to parallel and even equate “religion” and “superstition.” Consequently, the majority of scholars were reluctant to view Confucianism as a religion, emphasizing only its humanistic tradition. The only exceptions were perhaps Kang Youwei, who endeavored to establish Kongjiao (Confucian religion) as a national religion, and his followers. However, taking the prevailing view of religion as a starting point, Liang Qichao, one of Kang’s senior students, published the article “Defending Religion Is Not the Way to Venerate Confucius,” in which he openly opposed the “Kongjiao movement.” His argument presupposed that so-called religion in the West is nothing more than superstition and that religion is not the proper vehicle for progress. The renowned scholar Wang Guowei 王國維 (1877–1927) also asserted that “the sayings of Confucius and Mencius are not really religious, but doctrinal.” Another famous scholar, Zhang Taiyan 章太炎 (1869–1936), opposed the Kongjiao movement as well by claiming Confucius was not the founder of any religion since he had actually rejected religion.

Yet another example is the leading liberal educator Cai Yuanpei 蔡元培 (1868–1940), who had studied in Berlin and Leipzig (1907–1911) and later held important positions in Republican China as minister of education (1912), president of Beijing University (1917–1923), and president of Academia Sinica (1928–1940). Influenced by the works of Friedrich Schiller (1759–1805), he advocated the “substitution of aesthetic education for religion.” According to Cai, human spirit has three functions: cognitive, volitional, and emotional. In the beginning of human culture, religion possessed all three of these functions, but with cultural and societal progress, the cognitive function was the first to
become separated from religion and was taken over by science. Subsequently, physiologists, psychologists, and sociologists devoted themselves to research on morality and facilitated the emancipation of the volitional function from religion, leaving only the remaining function of the emotional, which was most connected to art. Hence “aesthetic feeling,” is connected most closely with religion. But as an appendage to religion “aesthetic feeling” had always been eroded by religion, because all religions have the tendency to oppose other religions and support for their own purposes authoritarian regimes in a republican age. In order to emancipate aesthetic feeling from the negative influences of religion, Cai advocates replacing religion with aesthetic education. For him, aesthetic education and religion are completely opposite for three reasons: (1) aesthetic education is liberal, whereas religion is compulsory; (2) aesthetic education is progressive, whereas religion is conservative; and (3) aesthetic education is universal, whereas religion is specific.

The New Confucians and the Question of Religion

Even representative figures of the first generation of Modern New Confucians such as Xiong Shili and Liang Shuming did not regard Confucianism as a religion. Xiong Shili, for example, argues that “Chinese philosophy might be summarized in the phrase ‘being rooted in itself’ [ziben zigen 自本自根], which was coined in the Zhuangzi. For that reason, Chinese people simply do not need religion. In other words, religion depends on the other; it is a kind of outward pursuit.” In the chapter “The Substitution of Morality for Religion” of his book The Essentials of Chinese Culture (Zhongguo wenhua yaoyi 中国文化要义), Liang Shuming emphasizes that Chinese culture after the time of the Duke of Zhou and Confucius “basically does not have a religious life any more” because “the teachings of the Duke of Zhou and Confucius do not pertain to religion.” He argues that, even though Confucianism is not a religion, it still possesses some quasi-religious functions by “arranging ethical relationships to organize society and designing and establishing rituals, music, and civility to cultivate people’s reason.” Therefore, it can be said to “substitute morality for religion.”

The tendency to make the subject of religion taboo did not undergo any essential change until the emergence of the second generation of Modern New Confucians. In the wake of shifts in the political and social situation after the 1949 regime change in mainland China, Tang Junyi, Mou Zongsan, Zhang Junmai, and Xu Fuguan fled and took refuge in Taiwan and Hong Kong or in foreign countries. They profoundly felt the agony of “the falling and withering of the blossoms and fruits” of Chinese culture. For them, the changing of the banner in China meant not only a transition of political power, but also a
serious cultural crisis. This situation led them to reflect deeply on the underlying aspects of Chinese culture. In the course of their reflections, they inevitably encountered what they regarded to be the misunderstandings and prejudices held by Westerners. One of these prejudices is that Chinese people only attach importance to everyday-life ethics and morality and lack a religious transcendent feeling. Chinese ethical and moral ideals were considered merely to be concerned with regulating people’s external behavior while neglecting the internal dimensions of spiritual life. This misunderstanding can be traced back to Hegel’s Lectures on the History of Philosophy:

> We have conversations between Confucius and his followers in which there is nothing definite further than a commonplace moral put in the form of good, sound doctrine, which may be found as well expressed and better, in every place and amongst every people. Cicero gives us De Officiis, a book of moral teaching more comprehensive and better than all the books of Confucius. He is hence only a man who has a certain amount of practical and worldly wisdom—one with whom there is no speculative philosophy. We may conclude from his original works that for their reputation it would have been better had they never been translated.11

In January 1958, the four Confucians jointly published the “Manifesto Regarding Chinese Culture to People All over the World” 為中國文化敬告世界人士宣言.12 The “Manifesto” is composed of twelve sections, and the fifth section, “Ethics, Morality, and Religious Spirit in Chinese Culture,” especially targets this prejudice with the intention of clarifying it. The authors admit that Western-style institutionalized religion and an independent religious cultural tradition are absent in Chinese culture, but this does not mean that Chinese people only pay attention to everyday-life ethics and morals and lack a religious spirit. In their view “since the religious transcendent feelings of Chinese people and the religious spirit they value have the same cultural roots as the ethics and morality the people cherish, they integrate the religious with the ethical and moral spirit as one inseparable entity.”13 These words mainly address the Confucian tradition, emphasizing the oneness of morality and the religious spirit.

Because the “Manifesto” was drafted by Tang Junyi, it corresponds perfectly to an idea propounded in his book Mind, Matter, and Human Life (Xin wu yu rensheng 心物與人生). According to this idea, “religion is also a realm of the human world. Religion is culture, a kind of culture in which the whole of human life or the whole personality is related to the ultimate reality and truth of the cosmos, a kind of culture where heaven and humans meet and interact with each other.”14 In other words, religion and culture (humanism) are so intimately connected to each other in the Confucian tradition that they are inseparable.
To put it most directly, culture is nothing other than religion. If Confucianism is humanism, it is a sort of humanism with a profound religious dimension—that is to say, it is oriented toward religion. This characteristic is similar to what the American scholar Herbert Fingarette called “the secular as sacred.”

In light of this orientation of the Chinese tradition, Mou Zongsan views Confucianism as a “humanistic religion,” uniting humanism and religion as one. His article “Humanism and Religion” elaborates this idea and also refers to “humanistic religion” as “moral religion.” As he further explains, “A moral religion that is able to be the foundation for the establishment of a nation must have two dimensions: First, it is able to regulate and guide everyday life...; Second, it is able to lift spirits and to provoke inspiration, that is, it is able to maintain and create the life of culture.”

According to these two criteria, he further elucidates in what sense “humanistic religion” represented by Confucianism can be regarded as a religion:

The reason that humanistic religion is a religion lies in that, while it can be down to earth to regulate and guide everyday life, it can also be as lofty as confirming a transcendent and universal moral, spiritual entity. This entity becomes a “divine entity” and “source of values” with religious significance through the worship of Heaven, ancestors, and sages. The God in Christianity becomes an object of worship merely because of Jesus; therefore God is separate from the human world. The entity of worship in a humanistic religion, on the contrary, is not separate from the human world, because it becomes an object of worship with religious significance on the basis of the whole system composed of Heaven, ancestors, and sages. This constitutes the reason why it is a humanistic religion. How could it not be a superior and perfect religion? But what we talk about here as zongjiao is not “religion” as defined in the Western tradition.

Later, Mou Zongsan expands the connotations of “moral religion” in The Heart-Mind as Reality and Human Nature as Reality to accommodate the three main Chinese cultural traditions of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism. In the introduction to the first part of volume 1, he ascribes the Daoist “principle of mysteriousness” (xuanli 玄理), the Buddhist “principle of nothingness” (kongli 空理), and the Confucian “principle of human nature” (xingli 性理) to “moral religion.” He further explains, “What Song and Ming Confucians talked about is actually the ‘learning of moral human nature’ [xingli zhi xue 性理之學]. It is both morality and religion; that is, morality is religion. Herein morality and religion have the same nature and finally become one.”

In an August 1980 interview more than a decade after the publication
of the “Manifesto,” Xu Fuguan indicated that he by no means agreed completely with the ideas regarding the relation between Confucianism and religion as expressed in the document. At the time he suggested that Tang Junyi might modify them, but the suggestion fell on deaf ears. Contrary to Tang, Xu believed that “Chinese culture originally also possessed religiousness and did not reject religion. Since the Spring and Autumn Period, however, it had gradually separated itself from religion and become rooted in human life. There is no need for it to turn back.” This confession concerns different understandings of the Confucian Way of Heaven within Modern New Confucianism. The differences are subtle enough that they were often overlooked by past researchers. If Tang Junyi and Mou Zongsan saw the essence of Confucianism in its pattern of thinking with regard to “integrating humanism and religion,” Xu Fuguan discerned the fundamental direction of Confucianism in the transformation from religious consciousness to humanistic consciousness.

The view upheld by Xu Fuguan was naturally not formed overnight; it was the result of his long study of Chinese intellectual history. In his *History of Chinese Theories of Human Nature: The Pre-Qin Period* (Zhongguo renxing lunshi: xian Qin pian 中国人性论史：先秦篇), he construes the development of the whole of Chinese intellectual history before the Qin as a process of the gradual humanization of the primitive religious consciousness that originated in the Shang dynasty. According to his elucidation this kind of transformation to humanism is formed through the Zhou people’s “consciousness of sorrow and worry” (youhuan yishi 悼患意识) as a sense of morality. Their consciousness of sorrow and worry is expressed through the concept of “reverence” (jing 敬). Xu contrasts this consciousness of sorrow and worry with the “consciousness of horror” that constitutes the foundation of primitive religions. In these archaic religions ordinary people were driven by horror and despair and often felt themselves to be insignificant and weak. Consequently, they gave up their responsibilities and entrusted their fates to external gods or to Heaven. In contrast, the consciousness of sorrow and worry stems from human beings’ spiritual self-consciousness and is expressed as a sense of responsibility in human affairs.

For Tang Junyi and Mou Zongsan, religion and humanism as well as transcendence and immanence are two sides of the same coin in Confucian thought. On one hand, they connect with each other and are inseparable, but there is also an eternal tension between them, on the other hand. For Xu Fuguan, however, the essence of Confucianism unambiguously lies on the side of humanism and immanence. Although he does not deny that Confucianism originally possessed a religious dimension, he insists that this dimension has gradually been transformed over time and finally replaced by a humanistic spirit in the process of historical development. In short, for Tang and Mou the tension between religion and humanism as well as between transcendence and immanence consi-
tutes the essence of Confucianism. Xu Fuguan, however, limits the significance of the religiousness of Confucianism to a certain historical period rather than regarding it as an essential element of Confucianism. In other words, for Xu Fuguan, Confucianism is a consummate humanism, and its religiousness is no more than a residue of history.

The Historical Roots of the Difference in Understanding

This difference in understanding actually comes from the different understandings of the transformation of Confucianism from Confucius through the Doctrine of the Mean to Mencius. According to the records in classics such as the Book of Changes, the Book of Documents (Shangshu 尚書), and the Book of Poetry (Shijing 詩經), Chinese people before the Zhou dynasty did indeed have a strong sense of religion and performed sacrificial activities frequently. The objects of sacrifice included Heaven and Earth, ancestry, ghosts and gods, the sun, moon, stars, and natural phenomena such as the four seasons and disasters like flood and drought, the four directions, and so forth. This primitive system of beliefs even includes faith in the supreme god Tian 天 (Heaven) or Shangdi 上帝.

In the development of the religious tradition in the Zhou dynasty, Confucius occupied a crucial position. Through his doctrines, he internalized both the external order of ritual and music in Zhou culture and the transcendent god Tian or Shangdi, as recorded in the Book of Poetry and the Book of Documents, into human nature and moral practice. The contribution made by Confucius in these two aspects is similar in nature and significance to Kant’s in the development of Western ethics and the philosophy of religion. By introducing the concept of “autonomy” into his ethics, Kant ascribed the origin of moral norms to the moral subject or to practical reason and advanced a “Copernican revolution in ethics.”22 By the same token, Confucius also finds in the moral subject and the humaneness it embodies the origin of the external order of ritual and music and the criteria for judging them. This is why he said, “When one talks about ritual, does it merely mean gifts of jade and silk? When one talks about music, does it merely mean bells and drums?” (Analects 17.11) and “What has a person who is not humane got to do with observing the rituals? What has a person who is not humane got to do with the playing of music?” (Analects 3.3). Furthermore, he finds that the strength for practicing humaneness lies precisely in our own subjectivity. As he said: “Observing the rituals through self-discipline is humaneness. If for a single day one were able to accomplish this, the whole world would defer to this humane model. Becoming humane in one’s conduct is self-originating—how could it originate with others?” (Analects 12.1).23

According to the records in the Analects, Confucius’ thought has two aspects. On one hand, he still has a strong sense of Heaven or the Heavenly
Mandate—several cases even indicate that “Heaven” as construed by Confucius still carried the flavor of a personal god. On the other hand, his notion of Heaven also shows a shift toward rationalization and humanization. Whereas the former highlights the transcendence of Heaven, the latter projects its immanence. Xu Fuguan’s understanding, however, places the stress on the side of immanence:

What Confucius calls the Heavenly Mandate, Heavenly Way, or Heaven, if put in the simplest words, actually refers to the transempirical character of morality. Owing to its transempirical character, morality possesses universality and eternity. Because of its transempirical character, it could only be represented and symbolized at that time by traditional terms like “Heaven,” “Heavenly Mandate,” or “Heavenly Way.” The universality and eternity of morality are precisely the real content of what Confucius calls “Heaven,” “Heavenly Mandate,” or “Heavenly Way.”

In light of this interpretation, when Confucius uses traditional terms like “Heaven,” “Heavenly Mandate,” and “Heavenly Way,” he intends merely the transempirical character of morality rather than any substantial religious connotation. In this sense the “Heavenly Mandate” that Confucius was aware of when he was fifty years old is “a Heavenly Mandate with moral character rather than one with religious character,” and his “awe of Heavenly Mandate” is actually “reverence for the endless moral obligations and responsibilities in his internal personal world.” As Xu further elaborates:

In Confucius’ mind, Heaven is merely the consciousness of the existence of cosmic life and laws in the face of phenomena such as “the four seasons proceed, myriad things on earth grow.” He neither took a step forward to make a further metaphysical exploration of this, nor did he regard it as proof of the existence of a personal god in any way.

Regarding the concept of “Heavenly Mandate” in the *Doctrine of the Mean*, Xu Fuguan provides a similar reading:

The term “Heaven” as in “The Mandate of Heaven can be called moralized human nature” does not loosely refer to the sky over our heads. Instead it is a kind of internal moral self-guide, expressed in the process of introspection and elimination of vices, which cannot be transformed or influenced by the external world. The so-called Heavenly Mandate merely refers to the mind that, when one gets to the bottom of it, shows itself to be irresistibly driven by an unknown power while being free of
any physical bonds. The mind at this moment, because of being free of any physical, a posteriori bonds, only feels itself as a priori existence, namely, a kind of universal existence that breaks through varied a posteriori barriers. Thus in the *Doctrine of the Mean* it is named by the traditional term “Heaven.”

The same line of thought also appears in Xu Fuguan’s interpretation of Mencius’ notion of the “Heavenly Way.” Mencius made the statement: “For a man to give full realization to his heart-mind is for him to understand his own nature, and a man who knows his own nature will know Heaven. By preserving his heart-mind and nurturing his nature he is serving Heaven” (*Mencius* 7A.1). Xu Fuguan’s reading of these words is as follows:

The truth is that beyond the heart-mind there is no human nature, and beyond human nature there is no Heaven. This is why Mencius can say that “by preserving one’s heart-mind and nurturing one’s nature he is serving Heaven.” If beyond the heart-mind there was human nature and beyond the heart-mind and human nature there was Heaven, then, even if one claims full realization of his heart-mind, he would not necessarily know human nature. Consequently, preserving the heart-mind and cultivating human nature would also not be directly regarded as serving Heaven. The reason why the generally mentioned “serving Heaven” is always expressed in the form of religious rituals lies in [the belief] that Heaven is beyond and above the heart-mind of the human being…. Mencius thinks that preserving the heart-mind and cultivating human nature are the way of serving Heaven. In this way, he completely accommodates the pursuits of ancient religion and transforms them into the expansion of the morality embodied in his body and heart-mind. Beyond one’s own moral character, there is nowhere to accommodate the religious illusions.

Xu Fuguan summarizes the essential character of the *Doctrine of the Mean* in one sentence: “Confucianism takes morality as its core; the *Doctrine of the Mean*, by pointing out the immanent but also transcendent character of morality, establishes the foundation of morality.” His ensuing explanation shows that what he calls “transcendent character” actually refers to universality in a transempirical sense and has no religious connotation. On this understanding he even criticizes his teacher Xiong Shili and his good friend Tang Junyi by name, insisting that their attempts to create metaphysics from Confucianism actually run counter to Confucius’ basic thought. His criticism also covertly targets Mou Zongsan.

Although Tang Junyi and Mou Zongsan agree with Xu Fuguan’s stance...
of viewing the development of pre-Qin Confucianism as a process of humanization and affirm the intellectual turn taken by Confucius, the Confucian tradition in their view still preserves some kind of religious consciousness in the process even with the caveat that it might have undergone a certain transformation. Moreover, this religious consciousness has by no means faded with the development of Confucianism. On the contrary, it has become an essential ingredient. According to the ideas presented in the “Manifesto,” religious consciousness expresses itself in three areas. The first area is the practice of sacrificial rituals of Heaven and Earth worship and ancestor worship. Notions such as “the harmony of Heavenly virtues and human virtues” (Tian ren hede 天人合德), “harmony between Heaven and humanity” (Tian ren heyi 天人合一), “Heaven and humanity are not two separate entities” (Tian ren bu er 天人不二), “Heaven and humanity have the same substance” (Tian ren tongti 天人同體), and so forth represent the second area. And the third is the belief in the values of humaneness and righteousness and in the Way itself, and the determination to sacrifice oneself to achieve humaneness and to give up one’s life to obtain righteousness.\(^{33}\)

In his Development of the Chinese Humanistic Spirit (Zhongguo renwen jingshen zhi fazhan 中國人文精神之發展), Tang Junyi emphasizes the religious significance of the three sacrificial rituals of Heaven-Earth worship, ancestor worship, and sage worship.\(^{34}\) In addition, in his masterpiece The Existence of Life and Horizons of the Soul (Shengming cunzai yu xinling jingjie 生命存在與心靈境界), which was written in his old age, he puts forth the notion of “nine horizons of the soul,” dividing the horizons that the soul can reach through dialectical development into “objective horizons,” “subjective horizons,” and “horizons beyond both the objective and the subjective.” In the “horizons beyond both the objective and the subjective” in the final stage, Christianity, Buddhism, and Confucianism respectively represent the three horizons from bottom to top in terms of perfection. In his mind, Confucianism represents the zenith of the religious horizons.

Mou Zongsan also identifies “religiousness” as an essential ingredient of Confucianism. The collection of his lectures published in 1962 titled The Characteristics of Chinese Philosophy (Zhongguo zhexue de tezhi 中國哲學的特質) concludes with the chapter “Confucianism as a Religion,” emphasizing Confucianism’s strong religious character or spirit. Written in his later years and published in 1985, On the Highest Good reexamines the issue of “the highest good” propounded by Kant by incorporating it into the line of the Buddhist “perfect teaching” (yuanjiao 圓教). Mou Zongsan addresses the “perfect teachings” of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism, respectively, and finally identifies himself with the perfect teaching of Confucianism, making it the highest type of religion for him.
A Headless Humanism

It is clear that Xu Fuguan holds a view on the relationship of Confucianism and religion that is different from that of Tang and Mou. For Xu Fuguan, the development of pre-Qin Chinese intellectual history is a process of humanization, and the essence of Confucianism lies in its substituting humanistic spirit for religious consciousness. As for concepts of primitive religions such as “Heaven,” “Heavenly Mandate,” or “Heavenly Way,” which appeared in pre-Qin documents, especially in the Analects, Xu Fuguan either regards them as residues of history or interprets them through a rationalizing process. Regarding the development of metaphysics that appeared in Confucianism after the Qin and Han dynasties such as Zhou Dunyi’s 周敦頤 (1017–1073) Explanations of the Diagram of the Supreme Ultimate (Táijítu shuō 太極圖說) or religious thought such as the Han Confucians’ theory of “interaction between Heaven and humanity” (Tian ren ganying 天人感應), Xu regards them all as deviations from the core of Confucian doctrines. Contrary to Tang and Mou’s understanding, in Xu’s eyes, the relationship between Confucianism and religion expresses itself in a totally different image. Although the process of humanization of pre-Qin Confucianism transformed primitive religious consciousness, it only internalized the concept of a god into human nature and moral practice from the external transcendent character in the Book of Poetry and the Book of Documents. In doing so, it was turned into another type of religious consciousness. Confucius’ idea of “the Heavenly Way” retains the flavor of a personal god, with the process of internalization not being completed until the emergence of the Doctrine of the Mean. Thereafter, Confucianism still retained a transcendent religious consciousness, but no longer with a personal god as its object. In this kind of religious consciousness, religion and humanism or the transcendent and the immanent are not opposed to each other, even though there are certain tensions between them. As for the Han Confucians’ theory of the “interaction between Heaven and humanity,” Tang and Mou also regard it as a deviation from the core of Confucian doctrines, because it runs counter to the notion of moral autonomy.

The Xu Fuguan brand of humanism with any religious character excluded might conform to what Mou Zongsan has called “headless humanism.” Though Mou never mentioned Xu’s name in criticism, Mou undoubtedly opposed this sort of “headless humanism.” Mou’s Moral Idealism (Dàodé de lixiāngzhuyì 道德的理想主義) includes chapters titled “The Basic Spirit of Humanism” and “Completion of Humanism,” which analyze Western humanism. In the latter, Mou expresses himself explicitly:

The religious tradition carries the highest enlightening power for moral spirituality and cultural ideals…. The sense of divinity and sin in moral
religion, which is contained in the inward contraction and the upward transcending of the authentic religious spirit, possesses the lofty significance of humanism. At this moment humanism should absorb it [the sense of divinity and sin] and meld with it. In this way humanism will be connected to the religious tradition, and we will not be opposed to any great religious spirit. On the other hand, any great religious spirit through the elevation by and melding with humanism will also gradually shed its radical character and begin to reflect on itself step by step in order to fully adjust, broaden, and promote itself.36

Xu Fuguan’s “headless humanism” can be regarded as a rather unique theory. At its core is a set of ethics, but it cannot provide a set of explanations of the world itself. Given the history of the development of Confucianism, its explanatory power is fairly limited. Putting aside the Han Confucians’ theory of the “interaction between Heaven and humanity,” is it true that the “three sacrificial rituals,” which existed throughout the history of the development of Confucianism, and the relation between Heaven and humanity, which had become the focus of discussion in Song-Ming Confucianism for hundreds of years, are merely residues of history? In the entire history of the development of Song-Ming Confucianism, the propounding of the relation between Heaven and humanity not only concerns moral psychology, but also provides an explanation of the ultimate reality of the cosmos. This kind of explanation goes beyond the scope of any “headless humanism.” As far as this point is concerned, Tang’s and Mou’s ideas are more consistent with the historical development of Confucianism and better elucidate its constituted essence. It is little wonder that none of the third generation of New Confucians such as Liu Shu-hsien or Tu Wei-ming adopts Xu Fuguan’s interpretation. On the contrary, they repeatedly emphasize Confucianism’s religiousness. As early as 1971, Liu Shu-hsien published an article titled “The Religious Import of Confucian Philosophy: Its Traditional Outlook and Contemporary Significance” that elucidated the issue of religiousness.37 Likewise, Xu Fuguan’s student Tu Wei-ming takes the Doctrine of the Mean as being representative in showing the religiousness of Confucianism.38 Moreover, the combination of this sort of religiousness with humanism not only makes Confucian humanism different from modern Western humanism and distinguishes Confucian religiousness from the “Abrahamic religions,” but it marks Chinese religiosity as being profoundly unique.
PART II

Neo-Confucianism in China and Korea
The Debate on Ren between Zhu Xi and the Huxiang Scholars

Modern scholars of classical Chinese philosophy find the indistinctness of notions as well as the lack of a single conceptual system to be among the greatest obstacles to the interpretation of philosophical texts. These characteristics are traceable to the uniqueness of the mode of writing and even thinking that prevailed in ancient China. An example of this uniqueness is the Analects, which is the most authoritative Confucian text, composed of a series of disconnected short dialogues and events wherein we cannot discern a single overarching systematic series of representations. In part, this is because of how the text was compiled. Two generations of students collected their quotes for almost a century, and it took another hundred years before those quotes were “tied together” as a single book. As Michael Nylan writes in her edited book on the Analects, “The text is a patchwork: fragments from different hands have been stitched together, with uneven skill—there are some repetitions, interpolations, and contradictions; there are some puzzles and countless loopholes; but on the whole, there are very few stylistic anachronisms: the language and syntax of most of the fragments is coherent and pertains to the same period.”

This is in contrast to the somewhat more systematic dialogues of Plato, especially the earlier ones, where the elenchus, or method of Socrates, is revealed with discussions that often begin with a definition of terms and are then followed by a disputation by Socrates. The elenchus usually unfolds with the assertion of a thesis, which becomes the target of refutation by Socrates, followed by his introduction of further agreed upon premises that ultimately imply the falsity of the original thesis, making its negation true. Although at some level it is appropriate to call these discussions debates or arguments, they typically
unravel in good nature (similar to the “debates” in Chinese philosophy) with
the emphasis placed on dialogue, a going through (dia) language (logos) to
ascertain the truth and a better way of ultimately being human.

To be sure, in the Analects we also occasionally find argumentation, such as
that in 17.21 where Confucius discusses the significance of a three-year mour-
ing period with his pupil Zai Wo 宰我, but most dialogues in the Analects lack
argumentation. The use of the Hegelian idea of notion in the Analects is also
unfamiliar to modern readers. As is well known, the notion of ren 仁 holds a
central position in Confucius’ thought. There are forty-eight sections in the
Analects where Confucius uses the notion of ren and discusses its meaning. In
addition, there are five sections where Confucius’ pupils talk about ren. Among
these examples, however, we find no consistent formulation, except between
passages 17.17 and 1.3. In the Analects we do not find attempts by Confucius to
establish a precise Socratic-like definition of ren. Owing to these characteristics
of Confucius’ sayings, Hegel in a moment of Germanic superiority dismissed
the Analects because they lacked the kind of speculative philosophy and rigor
found in Cicero’s De officis.

Confucius’ way of “defining” key concepts not only perplexes modern
readers, but has led to over a millennium of debates by later Confucians to
ascertain what he actually meant. The Song Confucian scholar and philosopher
Cheng Hao expressed perhaps just a little exasperation when he commented on
passage 6.30 in the Analects: “It is very difficult to speak of ren.” His younger
brother Cheng Yi also wrote: “It is very difficult to describe the principle of ren.
The closest term to it is gong 公 [impartiality]; but this does not mean that gong
is identical to ren.” Zhu Xi quoted the comment by Cheng Hao about ren and
explained it in similar terms: “It is not easy to speak of ren, because it is subtle in
its entirety.” The subtlety of extremely fundamental terms was in many ways
an acceptable practice in the Chinese philosophical tradition and would have
likely been a practice rejected by the Greeks and the subsequent Western philo-
sophical tradition.

Conceivably because of the difficulty in apprehending Confucius’ notion
of ren, Zhang Shi 張栻 (1133–1180) compiled a book with the title Confucius’
Sayings about Ren (Zhu Si yan ren 洙泗言仁). This book is no longer extant,
but its preface is preserved in Zhang’s collected works. The preface lists the
text’s contents: (1) sayings about ren from the Lu edition of the Analects; (2)
the Cheng brothers’ interpretations of ren; and (3) Zhang Shi’s comments on
the Cheng brothers’ interpretations. At first Zhu Xi opposed the compilation
of this text and others like it for two fundamental reasons. First, since all sayings
of Confucius have direct or indirect references to ren, extra glosses are unneces-
sary. Second, these texts encourage pupils to take shortcuts in their moral self-
cultivation instead of following the proper and prescribed order. However, in
a letter to Zhang Shi, Zhu Xi admitted that compilations like *Confucian Sayings about Ren* would be conducive to moral self-cultivation. This book was followed by a series of similar compilations that later became popular among Confucians.

The difficulty in comprehending Confucius’ sayings about *ren* originates from the fact that these sayings give neither lexical explanations of terms found in later Han Confucian writings, nor do they offer philosophical definitions of the type Socrates attempted to create. Mou Zongsan has pointed out that Confucius’ sayings about *ren* are suggestive and heuristic in nature with a view to lead people into realizing *ren* as a morally creative reality. Confucius, therefore, varied his explanations of *ren* according to the dialogic situation, the pedagogic demand, and the rank and temperament of his speech partners. In this sense, it is an exercise in futility to attempt to find a lexical (nominal) or philosophical (real) definition that will accord with all of Confucius’ renditions of what constitutes *ren*. In what follows, I discuss the problem of the interpretation of *ren* in terms of the debate between Zhu Xi and the scholars of the Huxiang school, among which Zhang Shi ranks as one leader. Hu Hong, the founder of the Huxiang school, was Zhang Shi’s teacher. Because Hu, Zhang, and their followers carried out their cultural and intellectual activities mainly in the area of Huxiang (Hunan province), the school was given this designation.

**The Zhu Xi–Zhang Shi Debate on Zhong and He**

Just before the debate between Zhu Xi and Zhang Shi took place, Zhu Xi’s philosophical development took a crucial turn. He changed his interpretation of the notions of “equilibrium” (*zhong* 中) and “harmony” (*he* 和) as found in the *Doctrine of the Mean*. At first Zhu Xi followed his teacher Li Tong 李侗 (1093–1163) on questions of achieving the primordial tranquility of heart-mind through quiet-sitting (*jingzuo* 靜坐). In 1168, still under the influence of his teacher five years after Li’s death, he formulated his own interpretation of “equilibrium and harmony.” In formulating this interpretation, Zhu Xi exchanged ideas with Zhang Shi in person as well as through correspondence. In 1169 at the age of forty, Zhu Xi suddenly felt doubtful about this “old interpretation” as a result of conversations with his pupil Cai Yuanding 蔡元定 (1135–1198). This prompted Zhu Xi to spawn a “new interpretation” of “equilibrium and harmony,” which he formulated in his “Treatise on the Manifest State of Heart-Mind and the Indistinct State of Heart-Mind” as well as in his correspondence with Zhang Shi and his followers.

A comparison between Zhu Xi’s old and new interpretations of equilibrium and harmony is much too complex to be fully discussed in this chapter, and it is also unnecessary because Mou Zongsan studied this difference in detail.
In brief, Zhu Xi’s “old interpretation,” according to Mou’s analysis, reflected his wavering between Cheng Hao’s and Cheng Yi’s directions of thought, whereas his “new interpretation” exclusively followed Cheng Yi. An essential contribution of Mou to the study of Neo-Confucianism lies in how he differentiated Cheng Hao’s direction of thought from Cheng Yi’s, instead of following previous scholars who treated them as a pair. Generally speaking, Zhu Xi’s formulation of the new interpretation of “equilibrium and harmony” marked the fixing of his own philosophical framework. As Mou puts it, this framework includes a dual ontological structure of  

\[ \text{li} \quad \text{(principle)} \]  

and  

\[ \text{qi} \quad \text{(material force)}, \]  

as well as a threefold anthropological structure of  

\[ \text{xin} \quad \text{(heart-mind)}, \]  

\[ \text{xing} \quad \text{(nature)}, \]  

and  

\[ \text{qing} \quad \text{(emotion or feeling)}. \]  

For Zhu Xi,  

\[ \text{xin} \]  

belongs to the higher realm of  

\[ \text{li}, \]  

whereas  

\[ \text{xin} \]  

and  

\[ \text{qing} \]  

belong to the lower realm of  

\[ \text{qi}; \]  

and  

\[ \text{xin} \]  

as the subtlest of  

\[ \text{qi} \]  

integrates  

\[ \text{xin} \]  

and  

\[ \text{qing} \]  

with each other.

Within this philosophical framework, Zhu Xi drafted his “Treatise on Ren” (Ren shuo). This treatise took its final form after Zhu Xi’s repeated correspondence with Zhang Shi. Around the same time, Zhang Shi also wrote an essay with the same title. Owing to the remarkable similarity between the formulations found in both treatises, Zhang Shi’s treatise was mistakenly considered to be Zhu Xi’s, and the latter was considered to be a preface to the former. As Hitoshi Sato points out, even Zhu Xi’s pupils Chen Chun and Xiong Jie thought that Zhang’s treatise came from the hands of their teacher. On the basis of these facts, the contemporary scholar Liu Shu-hsien suggests that Zhu Xi, as editor of Zhang Shi’s collected writings, wrote another treatise on ren and added it to the collection. The key argument for this thesis rests on Zhang’s radical turn away from the views of the Huxiang school to those of Zhu Xi, as reflected in the text of this treatise. Liu writes: “I have grave suspicions about such a radical change in Zhang Shi’s thought. Frankly speaking, I suspect that this treatise on ren, in fact, did not come from the hands of Zhang Shi.” This thesis is strongly disputed by Wing-tsit Chan. Chan’s stance should likely be preferred since Liu seems to ignore the fact that the resemblance between the treatises of Zhu and Zhang is superficial rather than substantial. Even after the end of this debate, Zhu Xi acknowledged that there were differences between his views and those of Zhang. Once, Zhu’s pupil Zheng Kexue asked him: “My master, in former times you repeatedly discussed ren with Nanxuan [Zhang Shi]. Did you agree with each other in the end?” Then Zhu Xi answered: “There still were some disagreements. The views of Jingfu [Zhang Shi] come from Mr. Hu [Hong].” In order to determine where these “disagreements” lie, it is necessary to make a philosophical comparison between the texts of the two treatises.
The Treatise on Ren

In his standard work *Heart-Mind as Reality and Nature as Reality*, Mou Zongsan has a detailed philosophical analysis of Zhu Xi’s “Treatise on Ren” and his discussions about the interpretation of ren with Zhang Shi and his followers. Surprisingly, however, nowhere in this work does Mou mention Zhang Shi’s treatise on ren. According to Mou’s analysis, the debate between Zhu Xi and Zhang Shi concerned the following topics: (1) the meaning of xin and its ontological position, (2) the relation between ren and love (ai 愛), (3) the relation between ren and jue 覺 or zhijue 知覺, (4) the thesis of the unity of all things and the self, (5) the relation between ren and gong (impartiality), and (6) the interpretation of Analects 4.7. Since point 6 is secondary, the following discussions are limited to points 1 through 5.

Before proceeding to the meaning of xin and its ontological position, it is informative to repeat Zhu Xi’s well-known definition of ren as “the principle [li] of love and the character [de 德] of xin.” In the first part of this definition, ren is viewed as the metaphysical ground for love as a kind of feeling (qing). In his twofold ontological structure, ren as xing (nature) belongs to the higher abstract realm of li, and love as qing belongs to the lower concrete realm of qi. In the second half of this definition, Zhu Xi provides an ethical gloss for ren by viewing ren as the metaphysical ground for the activities of xin (heart-mind) as moral agency. In his dual framework, the relation of xin to ren is the same as that of qi to li, with the caveat that xin is “the subtlest of qi.”

Now let us consider the first section of Zhu Xi’s “Treatise on Ren”:

“Heaven and Earth have the mind to produce things.” In the production of man and things, they receive the mind of Heaven and Earth as their mind. Therefore, with reference to the character of the mind, although it embraces and penetrates all and leaves nothing to be desired, nevertheless, one word will cover all of it, namely, ren. Let me try to explain fully. The moral qualities of the mind of Heaven and Earth are four: origination (yuan 元), flourishing (heng 亨), advantages (li 利), and firmness (zhen 貞). Moreover, the principle of origination unites and controls them all. In their operation they constitute the course of the four seasons, and the material force (qi) of spring permeates all. Therefore, in the mind of man there are also four moral qualities—namely, humanity (ren), righteousness (yi 義), propriety (li 禮), and comprehension (zhi 智)—and ren embraces them all. In their emanation and function, they constitute the feeling of love, respect, being right, and discrimination between right and wrong—and the heart of commiseration pervades them all…. For
*ren* as the Way (*dao* 道) consists of the fact that the mind of Heaven and Earth that produces all things is present in everything.

The primary question in this passage concerns “the mind of Heaven and Earth.” What does this phrase specifically mean? In his discussions with Zhu Xi about the old text of this treatise, Zhang Shi expressed his dissatisfaction with the proposition “Heaven and Earth have the mind to produce things.” Surprisingly, this proposition came from Cheng Hao, whose direction of thought Zhang Shi usually followed. In reply, Zhu Xi stressed that Heaven and Earth possess the Way (*dao*) for producing things but that the process of producing is separate from the Way. In a letter to Zhu Xi, Zhang Shi suggested replacing this proposition with the following: “The mind of Heaven and Earth that produces all things is that which man receives as his mind.” From this correspondence it would appear that by “the mind of Heaven and Earth” Zhu Xi understood the principle (*li*) for the process of producing in the realm of *qi* rather than a cosmic mind with creative forces (as did Zhang Shi). So in this context Zhu Xi used the term “mind” (*xin*) only as an analogy, as Mou Zongsan has pointed out.

In the first paragraph of Zhu Xi’s treatise on *ren*, we see four different orders: ontological (origination, flourishing, advantages, firmness), cosmic (spring, summer, autumn, winter), onto-ethical (humanity, righteousness, propriety, comprehension), and ethico-psychological (love, respect, being right, and discriminating between right and wrong). In his dual ontological framework, the relation of the first to the second order is nothing more than the relation of *li* to *qi*; and the relation of the third to the fourth order is the relation of *xing* to *qing*, which specifies the relation of *li* to *qi*. For Zhu Xi, *li* as principle is abstract and static; it contains no action in itself. Although it can be a metaphysical ground for some action, this occurs only in the realm of *qi*. Consequently Zhu Xi does not conceive of principle as a metaphysical entity with creative forces, since creation means action.

In contrast, Zhang Shi’s treatise on *ren* continues to promote his notion of such a metaphysical entity: “What is called the principle of love is none other than the mind of Heaven and Earth to produce things, and it is from this that *ren* originates.” It should be noted that Zhang Shi does not use the term “mind” as an analogy in the way Zhu Xi did. This is apparent in subsequent passages: “If nothing beclouds the principle of love, it will be internally combined with Heaven and Earth and all things like arteries and veins and hence function everywhere.” Here the principle of love, which Zhang identifies with “the mind of Heaven and Earth,” is obviously not only an abstract, static principle (as in Zhu Xi), but a dynamic entity with creative force that can penetrate all things. This is just one of the core ideas of the Huxiang school, which can be
traced back to Cheng Hao. In Zhang Shi’s preface to *Confucian Sayings about Ren*, compiled around 1170 and hence before his discussion about ren with Zhu Xi, we find also “Ren is the mind of Heaven and Earth, which is present in humans. This is what ren means.” From this it would appear that, with respect to “the mind of Heaven and Earth,” Zhang Shi did not change his original position after his discussion with Zhu Xi.

To be sure, Zhang Shi said in his treatise on ren that “to designate love as ren is to be blind to its substance, for ren is the principle of love.” To this sentence he himself added a comment: “This is what Master Cheng [Yi] meant by the saying that ‘love is qing [feeling] and ren is xing [nature].’” Both Zhu Xi and Zhang Shi considered the distinction between ren and love to be a distinction between substance and function, but there is an essential difference between their views. The substance-function relation is vertical for Zhu Xi, whereas it is horizontal for Zhang Shi. In other words, for Zhang Shi, love as a function of ren pertains to the same ontological level as ren. Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi, however, would not agree with this view.

Ren and the Principle of Love

In light of what has been discussed, we can now consider the second point, namely, the relation between ren and love (ai). In his “Treatise on Ren,” Zhu Xi continued from where we left off above:

*Someone said:* According to our explanation, is it not wrong for Master Cheng to say that love is feeling (qing) while ren is nature (xing) and that love should not be regarded as ren?

*Answer:* Not so. What Master Cheng criticized was the application of the term to the expression of love. What I maintain is that the term should be applied to the principle of love. For although the spheres of man’s nature and feelings are different, their mutual penetration is like the blood system in which each part has its own relationship. When have they become sharply separated and been made to have nothing to do with each other? I was just now worrying about students’ reciting Master Cheng’s words without inquiry into their meanings, and thereby coming to talk about ren as clearly apart from love. I have therefore purposely talked about this to reveal the hidden meaning of Master Cheng’s words, and you regard my ideas as different from his. Are you not mistaken?
Here “Master Cheng” refers to Cheng Yi, whose direction of thought Zhu Xi steadily followed.

The passage from Cheng Yi that Zhu Xi discusses here appears in Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi’s *Henan Chengshi yishu* 河南程氏遺書:

Because Mencius said that “the heart of commiseration pertains to ren,” later scholars have regarded love as ren. Commiseration is certainly love; but love is just feeling (qing), whereas ren is just nature (xing). How can one confine ren to love? Mencius said that “[the heart of] commiseration pertains to ren”; for in the preceding text he had said that “the heart of commiseration is the budding of ren.” Since it is called “the budding of ren,” it should not be regarded as ren. Tuizhi 退之 [Han Yu 韓愈] erred in saying “universal love is ren.” To be sure, the person who has ren loves universally; but one may not therefore confuse ren with universal love.44

For Confucians it is not groundless to regard ren as love or even as universal love, since Confucius defined ren as “loving men” (ai ren 愛人) in reply to a question from his pupil Fan Chi 樊遲 (*Analects* 12.22). Likewise, Mencius adds to this sentiment by saying that “the person who has ren loves men” (*Mencius* 4B.28), and “the person of ren loves everyone” (*Mencius* 7A.46). Moreover, Mencius asserts that “the heart of commiseration is the budding of ren” (*Mencius* 2A.6) and that “the heart of commiseration pertains to ren” (*Mencius* 6A.6). Following Cheng Yi, Zhu Xi interpreted the latter in light of the former, because the former corresponded with his more dualistic anthropological framework of xin and qing. So the relation of commiseration (or love) and ren was viewed as that between xin and qing, or between li and qi.

In his treatise on ren, Zhang Shi agreed with Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi that love is not ren. But this concession is merely rhetorical rather than substantial because both sides presented divergent formulations. In accordance with their dual framework of xin and qing, Zhu Xi and Cheng Yi viewed ren as “the principle of love,” which, as abstract principle, contains no creative force in itself. Zhang Shi viewed ren likewise as the “principle of love,” but for him the term “principle of love” would mean something quite different. As mentioned above, “the principle of love” here does not mean something abstract and static, but rather a dynamic “mind” with creative forces that penetrate all things.

Generally speaking, although both Zhu Xi and Zhang Shi defined ren as the “principle of love,” the term did not mean the same thing to them. For Zhu Xi, the principle of love meant a static metaphysical principle for the feeling of love, and hence “principle” and “love” belonged to different realms. However, for Zhang Shi it meant a dynamic metaphysical principle that manifested itself as love, and hence “principle” and “love” belonged to the same realm.
The Relation between \textit{Ren} and \textit{Jue}

In considering the third point, namely, the relation between \textit{ren} and \textit{jue} (or \textit{zhijue}), it should be first noted that the Chinese term \textit{jue} is itself ambiguous. Among others, its multiple meanings include “sensation,” “perception,” “feeling,” “consciousness,” and “realization.” Let us consider a relevant passage from Zhu Xi’s “Treatise on \textit{Ren}”:45

\textit{Someone said:}  The followers of Master Cheng have given many explanations of \textit{ren}. Some say that love is not \textit{ren}, and regard the unity of all things and the self as the substance of \textit{ren}. Others maintain that love is not \textit{ren} but explain \textit{ren} in terms of the possession of \textit{zhijue} by the mind. If what you say is correct, are they all wrong?

\textit{Answer:}  From what they call the unity of all things and the self, it can be seen that \textit{ren} involves love for all, but unity is not the reality which makes \textit{ren} a substance. From what they call the mind’s possession of \textit{zhijue}, it can be seen that \textit{ren} includes the \textit{zhi} (comprehension), but that is not the real reason why \textit{ren} is so called. If you look up Confucius’ answer to Zigong’s question concerning the conferral of extensive benefit on the people and bringing salvation to all, and also Master Cheng’s statement that \textit{ren} is not to be explained in terms of \textit{jue}, you will see my point. How can you still explain \textit{ren} in these terms?

Furthermore, to talk about \textit{ren} in general terms as the unity of things and the self, this will lead people to be vague, confused, neglectful, and make no effort to be alert. The bad effect—and there has been—may be to consider other things as oneself. To talk about \textit{ren} in terms of \textit{zhijue} will lead people to be nervous, irascible, and devoid of any quality of depth. The bad effect—and there has been—may be to consider desire as principle.

In this passage, Zhu Xi disputed two theses about \textit{ren}: first, that \textit{ren} consists in the unity of all things and the self, and, second, that \textit{ren} consists in the possession of \textit{zhijue} by the mind. The first thesis was brought forward by Yang Shi 楊時 (1053–1135) and the second by Xie Liangzuo 謝良佐 (1050–ca. 1120).46 Both of these theses are logically connected and are further traceable to Cheng Hao’s saying “Medical books used to describe the paralysis of the hands and feet
as a lack of ren. This is a very good description. The person who possesses ren identifies himself with Heaven and Earth and all things.”

The first thesis will be considered in the next section. For now, we turn to the second thesis that ren consists in the possession of zhijue by the mind. In the above cited passage, “lack of ren” (bu ren 不仁) refers explicitly to a lack of perception (jue or zhijue), a euphemism for a lack of moral consciousness. In Analects 17.21, we witness a discussion between Confucius and Zai Wo concerning the significance of a three-year mourning period. When Zai Wo claimed that while in mourning he would feel at ease in eating good rice and wearing silk brocades, Confucius criticized him for being bu ren, that is to say, lacking moral consciousness. Thus, when Xie Liangzuo defined ren as the “possession of zhijue by the mind,” he also meant moral consciousness.

For Zhu Xi, however, jue or zhijue holds a different set of connotations, as we see in the following passage from the Zhusi yulei 朱子語類 (Classified dialogues of Master Zhu): "According to the meaning of these terms, ren is just the substance of love, and jue is just the function of zhi (comprehension). Both are properly different. But ren embraces four moral qualities [namely humanity, righteousness, propriety, and comprehension]. If one has ren, how could he have no jue? We see that Zhu Xi understood the relation of zhi to jue to be equivalent to that of ren to love, or as the relationship of ti 體 (substance) to yong 用 (function). In this context, it is necessary to distinguish ren as “character of mind” from ren as “the complete character of original mind.” The former is one of the “four moral qualities,” whereas the latter embraces them all. Only in the latter sense of ren did Zhu Xi find the connectedness between ren and jue. Hence, for Zhu Xi, it is a misappropriation of categories to interpret ren in terms of jue.

Furthermore, when Zhu Xi delimited the definition of jue as the moral quality of zhi, he understood the term zhi in an exclusively cognitive sense. In a letter to Zhang Shi, Zhu Xi wrote:

What Shangcai 上蔡 [Xie Liangzuo] called zhijue is just the feeling of coldness, warmth, satiety, hunger and the like. Even [the capacities for] dealing with the changing situation and serving as an assistant to the spiritual pertain to nothing but this zhijue. But they have a wider or narrower scope of application. Nevertheless, their applications have reference only to the emanations and functions of zhi, and the person of ren alone can embrace them. Therefore, one can say that the person of ren possesses zhijue in his mind; but one cannot say that the possession of zhijue by the mind is ren.

Clearly, Zhu Xi understood jue (or zhijue) as a cognitive capacity that includes sensations caused by physiological reactions as well as the capacity to respond to
more complex situations. For him both are homogeneous, and they are different only in the scope of their applications.

But in regard to the thesis that ren consists of the possession of zhijue by the mind, Zhu Xi’s criticism was likely based on a misreading of both Mencius’ text and what Cheng Hao and his followers meant. In Mencius’ assertion that “the heart of right and wrong pertains to zhi” (Mencius 6A.6), the “right and wrong” (shifei 非非) undoubtedly refers exclusively to moral judgment but not to the judgment of knowledge as Zhu Xi assumed. Therefore, even if we, following Zhu Xi, understand jue in terms of zhi, it should be noted that zhi as the capacity for moral judgment pervades all moral activities. In this sense, zhi constitutes an essential aspect of jue, since we cannot conceive of moral consciousness without moral judgment.

At this juncture it is necessary to distinguish between two kinds of jue, namely, between jue as sensation or perception, and jue as moral consciousness. They are heterogeneous in regard to either their origins or their functions. Hu Dayuan胡大原, Hu Hong’s nephew, seemed to realize this distinction when he wrote:50

“Ren consists in the possession of zhijue by the mind.” This is the core thesis that Shangcai [Xie Liangzuo] brought up for his teaching of Dao. Therefore, it seems impossible for this thesis to be problematic. Furthermore, zhijue has different degrees of depth. All ordinary people can feel coldness, warmth, satiety, and hunger. If one considers such feelings to be the culmination of zhijue, it would be more than problematic! This is also the reason why Yichuan伊川 [Cheng Yi] said that “ren is not to be interpreted in terms of jue.” Because he worried that one may merely adhere to the word jue.

In this context, Max Scheler’s distinction between Gefühl (feeling) and Fühlen (to feel) is illuminating. For Scheler, Gefühl in a general sense refers to the sensible state that has a determinate location in the body, whereas Fühlen refers to intentional comprehension a priori.51 In this sense, he speaks of Werwfühlen (feeling of value). According to this distinction, we can say that what Cheng Hao, Xie Liangzuo, and the Huxiang scholars meant by jue or zhijue pertains to Fühlen but not to Gefühl. Here it should be noted that Hu Dayuan seems to misunderstand Cheng Yi’s comments about jue, because Cheng Yi did not presuppose the heterogeneity of jue. In Zhang Shi’s treatise on ren, he wrote simply that “only the person of ren possesses clear zhijue. This is what constitutes zhi [comprehension].”52 Only in this statement do we find some trace of Zhang Shi’s concession to Zhu Xi’s point, since Zhang Shi here understood zhijue in terms of zhi as did Zhu Xi.
The Unity of All Things and the Self

As mentioned above, there is a logical connection between the two theses that ren consists in the possession of zhijue by the mind and that ren consists in the unity of all things and the self. For Cheng Hao, Xie Liangzuo, and the Huxiang scholars, jue or zhijue as moral consciousness also possesses an ontological meaning. This is the case because ren is at the same time a creative force, which belongs to the same level as its substance, namely, the “mind of Heaven and Earth.” For this reason, Mou Zongsan called it “ontological feeling.” Through such “feeling,” humans gain access to the “mind of Heaven and Earth” and hence enter into the macrocosm. Only based on such “feeling” can Cheng Hao and others speak of the “unity of all things and the self.” This idea can be traced back to Mencius’ following statements: “He who gives full realization to his heart-mind will understand his own nature, and he who understands his own nature will understand Heaven” (Mencius 7A.1) and “All things are there in me” (Mencius 7A.4). For Mencius, the “original mind” (benxin 本心) of humans has an ontological dimension. As a moral agent the original mind possesses the capacity for self-realization and thereby for creating a world of values wherein the essential meaning of “Heaven” resides.

For Zhu Xi, however, jue has no ontological connotation in itself; just like love, it belongs to the realm of qi (material force) and thus to a lower level than li (principle). In other words, for Zhu Xi, all kinds of jue are homogeneous. For this reason he criticized Cheng Hao, Xie Liangzuo, and others for “considering desire as principle.” Furthermore, in Zhu Xi’s dual ontological framework, such an “ontological feeling” that opens up a world of values common to humans and other things is not conceivable. Consequently, he criticized them for “considering other things as oneself.”

In light of the above discussion, we can come to consider the fifth point, the debate between the two sides about the relation between ren and gong (impartiality). In the first section of this chapter, Cheng Yi’s statement was cited: “It is very difficult to describe the principle of ren. The closest term to it is gong [impartiality]; but this does not mean that gong is identical to ren.” Zhu Xi agreed with this statement because he, like Cheng Yi, viewed “impartiality” as a formal characteristic of the notion of ren. In other words, through the notion of “impartiality,” the connotations of ren are easily understood. In this sense, gong is not conceptually identical with ren. In contrast, Zhang Shi contended that gong was the substance of ren. In a letter to Zhu Xi, Zhang Shi wrote: If one overcomes his selfishness, he will become totally impartial and internally combined with Heaven and Earth and all things like arteries and veins. Thereby, he possesses the principle of love in himself and can
apply it to external things so that all things between Heaven and Earth are embraced in his ren.

Undoubtedly, Zhang Shi’s thesis that gong is the substance of ren logically implies the thesis of the “unity of all things and the self.” In reply, Zhu Xi stressed:56

What I call the “principle of love” is originally possessed by my nature. It comes to existence through total impartiality, but its being is not the result of total impartiality. It extends through my inner combination with Heaven and Earth and all things like arteries and veins, but its existence is not the result of such a combination.

Here Zhu Xi insisted on the ontological priority of ren as an abstract “principle of love” because, for him, the combination of ren with Heaven and Earth and all things could be only secondary in the ontological order. This is the main reason why Zhu Xi objected to Zhang Shi’s interpretation of ren in terms of gong.

Owing to Zhu Xi’s criticism, Zhang Shi added the following sentence to his treatise on ren: “To designate ‘impartiality’ as ren is to lose its reality, for impartiality is what enables man to be ren.”57 Even to this sentence he added a comment: “This is what Master Cheng [Yi] meant by saying, ‘It is very difficult to describe the principle of ren. The closest term to it is gong [impartiality]; but this does not mean that gong is identical to ren.’”58 Still, Zhang Shi did not concede Zhu Xi’s point, because in the same treatise he wrote:59 “The first thing for the realization of ren is self-mastery. If one overcomes his selfishness, he will become totally impartial, and the principle of love, which was originally possessed by his nature, will not be clouded.” This suffices in showing that Zhang Shi had not abandoned his original position.

In comparing these two treatises on ren, it becomes clear that, despite superficial resemblances, they still represent two divergent directions of thought, which are, moreover, traceable to the Cheng brothers. Zhu Xi, following Cheng Yi’s direction of thought, constructed his own philosophical framework, whereas Zhang Shi and his followers adhered to Cheng Hao’s direction of thought. Both sides tried to interpret the notion of ren from their own perspectives, although they seem to ignore the differences between the Cheng brothers. Nevertheless, this comparison serves to strengthen Wing-tsit Chan’s conviction that the treatise on ren included in Zhang Shi’s collected works came from his own hand.
The Four-Seven Debate between Yi Toegye and Gi Gobong and Its Philosophical Purport

The reach of Chinese Confucianism extended to Korea and Japan, and followed the Chinese diaspora wherever the Chinese went, whether it was by choice or by force. The first and second sages, Confucius and Mencius, would always accompany the transmigration or emigration of Confucian thought, as would other great Confucian thinkers such as Zhu Xi, the voice that gave Neo-Confucianism its timbre. This chapter takes the historical context to Korea and explores the significance the Four-Seven Debates had in the unfolding of Confucianism beyond its homeland in Yi Toegye’s 李退溪 (Hwang滉, 1501–1571) and Gi Gobong’s 奇高峰 (Daeseung 大升, Myeong-eon 明彦, 1527–1572) encounters with Zhu Xi.

The Two Four-Seven Debates and Their Historical Background

The debate over the “four buddings” and the “seven feelings” (or the Four-Seven Debate) was the most important intellectual dispute in the history of Korean Confucianism. From its initial stirrings in the writings of Gwon Geun 權近 (1352–1409) until its denouement at the end of the Chosŏn era (1392–1910), the controversy surrounding the proper interpretation of these concepts lasted for over five hundred years. Whereas there were many who contributed indirectly to this debate during its long history, its most important phase occurred in the sixteenth century, when Yi Toegye and Gi Gobong, as well as Yi Yulgok 李栗谷 (I珥, 1536–1584) and Seong Ugye 成牛溪 (Hon渾, 1535–1598), deliberated and discussed with one another the proper relationship between the four buddings and the seven feelings. Yi Yulgok’s and Seong Ugye’s main points
of difference involved in the Four-Seven Debate were without exception contained in the arguments previously advanced by Yi Toegye and Gi Gobong. The exchange between them was basically a continuation, but it was an even more profound treatment of the issues than what was discussed in the first debate. Their discussion focused on problems involving the interpretation of Zhu Xi’s philosophical system and was less directly concerned with philosophical issues. It is necessary to explicate and clarify some of the problems of textual interpretation that are implicated in the positions of Yi Toegye and Gi Gobong in their debate to uncover the philosophical significance of their respective views. This is necessary also to understand the subsequent exchange between Yi Yulgok and Seong Ugye, which will be discussed only when necessary.

The term “four buddings” (siduan 四端) comes from the Mencius 2A.6: “The disposition of commiseration is the budding of humanity; the disposition of shame and dislike is the budding of righteousness; the disposition of yielding and deference is the budding of propriety; the disposition of discriminating between right and wrong is the budding of comprehension. Human beings have these four buddings, just like they have four limbs.” The term “seven feelings” (qiqing 七情) comes from the “Liyun” 礼運 chapter of the Book of Rites (Li ji 礼記): “What are the feelings of human beings? They are joy, anger, grief, fear, love, hate, and desire. These seven feelings are what human beings are capable of without learning.” Within Chinese Confucianism a number of thinkers had discussed the “four buddings” and the “seven feelings” separately, but the relationship between them did not develop into a topic of debate. However, in the unfolding of Korean Confucianism, the relationship between the “four buddings” and the “seven feelings” became an enduring focus of intellectual discussion.

The terminology of Immanuel Kant can be useful in understanding the relation between the “four buddings” and the “seven feelings.” The “four buddings” can be seen as types of moral feelings and the “seven feelings” as types of physical feelings.1 For Kant, “moral feeling does not pertain to the giving of laws, but is the basis of their execution.”2 Such feelings as loving one’s neighbor, self-respect, moral feelings, and conscience constitute the requisite subjective conditions for what it means to become a moral person. In contrast, physical feelings have no relation to morality. Korean Confucianism would anticipate this division of feelings in the discussion of what constitutes a virtuous person and how to achieve this status. Korean Confucianists attempted to address a number of significant philosophical questions in the Four-Seven Debate that were similar to Kant’s questions: What exactly is the relationship between moral and physical types of feeling? Are they homogeneous or heterogeneous? What is the criterion for judging their similarity or difference? Stemming from these questions, their positions advanced against a unique background in the history of thought.
Cheng-Zhu learning of the nature and principle (or Neo-Confucianism) began to make its way into Korea toward the end of the Koryŏ era (around the end of the thirteenth century). By the Chosŏn era, it had already attained an unparalleled position of authority among Confucian intellectuals. For this reason, Korean Confucians who engaged in the Four-Seven Debate were forced to deal with two layers of textual authority. In addition to the early Confucian texts such as the Book of Rites and the Mencius and the textual authority they represented, they had to confront the authority of the texts from the Cheng-Zhu tradition. If we grant Mou Zongsan’s argument, which views Cheng Yi’s and Zhu Xi’s learning of the nature and principle as “lineages founded on separate stems” (biezi wei zong 別子為宗) of the Confucian and Mencian traditions, then the intellectual historical background formed by these two layers of texts and textual authority in and of itself served as the root cause initiating the Four-Seven Debate. If it is the case, as Mou Zongsan and other modern scholars have argued, that Zhu Xi premised his explanation of Mencius’ “heart of the four budplings” on his framework of the learning of the nature and principle, which consists of the twofold division between principle (li 理) and material force (qi 氣) and the threefold division between the mind-heart (xin 心), the nature (xing 性), and the feelings (qing 情), then Zhu’s ideas do not necessarily conform to those found in the text of the Mencius. Given this situation, respecting Zhu Xi’s authority meant that one has to deviate from the authority of Mencius and vice versa.

If we look at the arguments advanced by Yi Toegye and Gi Gobong, we find that Gi Gobong’s explanations more consistently adhere to Zhu Xi’s point of view, and thus he unavoidably departed from the views of Mencius. As for Yi Toegye, he could not make up his mind between Zhu Xi and Mencius, and he was unable to discern the incompatibilities in their basic points of view. In the debate between Yi Yulgok and Seong Ugye, Seong Ugye defended Yi Toegye’s viewpoint, whereas Yi Yulgok quoted Zhu Xi’s views to criticize Yi Toegye’s arguments, citing Gi Gobong in support of his position.

As Mou Zongsan’s research on this matter shows, in the area of ontology, Zhu Xi presupposed a twofold framework of principle and material force, whereas, in the area of philosophical anthropology, he presupposed a threefold framework of heart-mind, nature (xing), and feelings. Moreover, he maintained that there is a relationship of correspondence between these two frameworks. Zhu Xi explained the relationship between principle and material force on two distinct levels. On the concrete level, all things existing in reality are necessarily composed of a combination of principle and material force. It is not possible for one to exist without the other: without principle, material force will lack any ontological foundation; without material force, principle will simply be an abstract form of being that lacks any real existence. However, on the abstract
level, these two entities are decidedly different, and it is impossible for them to reduce to one another.

In this context, Zhu Xi advanced the theory that “principle is prior to material force” (li xian qi hou 理先氣後). The meaning of “prior to” in this sentence does not refer to a temporal sequence, but rather to their ontological arrangement. In other words, principle has ontological priority over material force and serves as its foundation. However, the type of principle that could be distinguished from material force is only abstract and does not exist in reality. It therefore lacks the capacity to be active; for Zhu Xi held that the only thing that can be active is material force. According to Mou Zongsan’s explanation, Zhu Xi construed principle as something that “just has being but does not have activity.”

This point is extremely pertinent to what follows, for one of the most significant questions in the Four-Seven Debate is whether principle is able to give rise to the four buddings, a question that involves the problem of whether principle is itself able to be active. On the level of philosophical anthropology, Zhu Xi understood the relationship between nature and the feelings as one involving principle and material force, which are combined together in the mind-heart. Although in his ontological system he bestowed the mind-heart with a mediating and combining function, it ultimately pertains to the side of material force even if it is “the subtlest of material force” (qi zhi ling 氣之靈) and “the numinous of material force” (qi zhi jingshuang 氣之精爽).

Moreover, Zhu Xi based his interpretation of Mencius’ “heart of the four buddings” on this philosophical framework. In his Collected Commentaries on the Mencius (Mengzi jizhu 孟子集注), Zhu Xi explained the passage concerning the four buddings in Mencius 2A.6 in the following manner: “commiseration, shame and dislike, yielding and deference, and [discriminating between] right and wrong are feelings. Humanity, righteousness, propriety, and comprehension are the nature. The mind-heart is that which unites the nature and the feelings. The buddings are clues [xu 緒]. As one’s feelings issue forth, the foundation of the nature can be obtained and seen, just as the clues of something within can be perceived externally.” Zhu Xi took each of the four sentences from Mencius 2A.6, starting with “the disposition of commiseration is the budding of humanity,” and analyzed them according to the threefold conceptual framework of the feelings, the mind-heart, and the nature. The boundaries between these three concepts are clearly defined and absolutely do not allow for commingling. Let us take Zhu Xi’s analysis of the sentence “the disposition of commiseration is the budding of humanity” as an example. According to his interpretation, commiseration belongs to the feelings, and humanity belongs to the nature. The heart of commiseration is not equated with humanity but rather with the budding of humanity, which is the clue to the humanity of the nature, an internal principle becoming manifest externally. In other words, humanity
and commiseration do not exist on the same ontological level but are divided between principle and material force. This understanding clearly presupposes his threefold philosophical-anthropological framework of mind-heart, feelings, and the nature.

Here we can see that Zhu Xi strictly distinguished “humanity” from the feeling of “commiseration”—as well as righteousness from the feeling of shame and dislike, propriety from the feeling of yielding and deference, and comprehension from the feeling of right and wrong—and attributed this distinction to the two different ontological levels of principle and material force. But, as noted above, his selective commentary on the above passage was premised upon his own philosophical framework, for, in *Mencius* 6A.6, Mencius unequivocally stated that “the heart of commiseration is humanity; the heart of shame and dislike is righteousness; the heart of reverence and respect is propriety; and the heart of [discriminating between] right and wrong is comprehension.” In this passage there is absolutely no indication, implicit or otherwise, that humanity, righteousness, propriety, and comprehension belong to a different ontological level than the feelings of the four buddings. It is clear that Zhu Xi based his interpretation of 6A.6 on his understanding of 2A.6 in order to establish a connection to his own philosophical framework, and thus his views do not necessarily conform to the purport of Mencius’ thought.

In addition, within Zhu Xi’s philosophical framework, the distinction between the original nature (*benran zhi xing* 本然之性)—which is also called *yili zhi xing* 義理之性, *tiandi zhi xing* 天地之性, and *tianming zhi xing* 天命之性—and the physical nature (*qizhi zhi xing* 氣質之性) served as an important philosophical foundation in the Four-Seven Debate for Korean Confucians. Zhang Zai first proposed the concept of the physical nature in the “Illumined Sincerity” chapter (*Chengming pian* 誠明篇) of *Correcting Youthful Ignorance* (*Zhengmeng* 正蒙), and it was later inherited by Cheng Yi. For both Zhang Zai and Cheng Yi, the physical nature referred to the nature that was formed by natural endowment. The original nature denotes moral endowment: on one hand, its manifestation has to proceed through one’s corporeal form; on the other hand, it is limited by the corporeal form that gives rise to various discrepancies in the expressions of one’s life or in one’s life circumstances. When contrasted with the physical nature, the original nature was considered to be an independent concept.

Although Zhu Xi also adopted the phrase “physical nature,” he endowed it with a wholly different meaning. From his perspective, physical nature was original nature, but it was the original nature as it was embodied within physical matter (*qizhi* 氣質) and thus was termed physical nature. Physical nature was not an independent concept as contrasted with original nature. Even today, the majority of scholars studying Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism misapprehend the relationship between original nature and physical nature in Zhu Xi’s thought as
one of principle and material force. In fact, according to Zhu Xi, both original nature and physical nature are principle; it is just that one is tainted by physical matter and the other is not. In Zhu Xi’s philosophical system, it is the original nature and physical matter (not the physical nature) that constitute the relationship between principle and material force. In the Four-Seven Debate between Yi Toegye and Gi Gobong, the different interpretations of the physical nature held by Zhang Zai, Cheng Yi, and Zhu Xi did not receive sufficient attention, which needlessly contributed to Yi Toegye’s and Gi Gobong’s entanglement over theoretical issues.10

The Four-Seven Debate between Yi Toegye and Gi Gobong can be traced directly to an explanatory note written by Jeong Jiun (鄭之雲, 1509–1561) in his diagram of the Heavenly Mandate (cheonmyeong do 天命圖),11 in which he stated that “the four buddings issue from principle [li]; the seven feelings issue from material force [qi].” After Yi Toegye saw this schema in 1553, he discussed it with Jeong Jiun, and they together decided on an emendation on the basis of Zhu Xi’s interpretation. They changed the above sentence to read: “The four buddings are the issuance of principle; the seven feelings are the issuance of material force.”12 Despite their rewording, the essential implication of these two sentences is actually the same.

In a letter to Gi Gobong written in 1559, Yi Toegye mentioned that, because of the criticism he received from other scholars, he decided to change the emended phrase to “the issuance of the four buddings is purely a matter of principle and therefore involves nothing but good; the issuance of the seven feelings includes material force and therefore involves both good and evil.”13 Consequently, Gi Gobong expressed doubts about Yi Toegye’s new thesis in his “Letter to Yi Toegye [to discourse on] the Four Buddings and Seven Feelings.”14 Over the next three years, they exchanged three letters in which they debated the problem of the “four buddings and seven feelings” in detail. Four years later, in 1566, Gi Gobong out of the blue composed the “Latter Discourse on the Four Buddings and Seven Feelings” and the “Comprehensive Discourse on the Four Buddings and Seven Feelings” and presented them to Yi Toegye.15 Yi Toegye only briefly mentioned these essays in his two letters to Gi Gobong that year and neither approved nor disapproved of their content.16 Whereas the debate extended over a period of seven years, the most important intellectual exchanges occurred during the initial three years.

Yi Yulgok and Seong Ugye belonged to the generation immediately following that of Yi Toegye and Gi Gobong. In 1572 Yi Yulgok reinitiated the Four-Seven Debate in a letter to Seong Ugye. At the time, Seong Ugye was thirty-eight years old and Yi Yulgok was thirty-seven, Yi Toegye had already been dead for over a year, and Gi Gobong would die before the year was over. Seong Ugye and Yi Yulgok exchanged nine letters during 1572, continuing the debate held by
their forebears. Generally speaking, Seong Ugye defended Yi Toegye’s point of view, and Yi Yulgok criticized it by quoting Gi Gobong in support of his position. The extant source material concerning their debate is not complete. The third, seventh, eighth, and ninth letters composed by Seong Ugye are no longer extant, and only the replies of Yi Yulgok have been completely preserved.17

The Four-Seven Debate between Yi Toegye and Gi Gobong

Although the writings exchanged between Yi Toegye and Gi Gobong appear to be extremely complicated, they actually convey the positions of their authors quite clearly. Over the course of the debate, both sides maintained an open mind and even amended their own positions based on doubts expressed by the opponent. However, these emendations primarily involved the written expression of their ideas rather than the substance of their positions. The reason for the complexity of the written debate was that it involved the direct interpretation of Confucian writings.18

Generally speaking, the main point of divergence between their views was that Yi Toegye emphasized the heterogeneity of the four buddings and the seven feelings, whereas Gi Gobong insisted on the homogeneity of both. This difference gave rise to two more complicated and related questions: Do the seven feelings contain the four buddings within them? And is it possible for the four buddings to lose their proper measure? Given that Gi Gobong insisted that the four buddings and the seven feelings were homogeneous, his answer to both of these questions was affirmative. On the contrary, Yi Toegye persistently answered these questions in the negative.

The divergence in their points of view involves a more fundamental question—whether principle (li), in and of itself, possesses the ability to be active? In other words, does the word “issue” (fa) in the statement “the four buddings issue from principle” imply that principle in and of itself possesses the ability to be active? Or does it mean only that principle is the ratio essendi of the four buddings and thus lacks the inherent capacity to be active? Even if this question had not appeared in their writings and constituted a focus of direct debate, it was implicit in their theoretical presuppositions and fundamentally involved in their disagreements over other matters. Concerning this question, however, Gi Gobong upheld Zhu Xi’s position, which viewed principle as “just having being but not the capacity for activity,” whereas Yi Toegye moved back and forth between Mencius and Zhu Xi and did not clearly recognize the contradiction between their positions. Working from these basic assumptions, Yi Toegye and Gi Gobong invoked passages from classical texts to support their own points of view.

As noted above, since Yi Toegye maintained that the four buddings and
the seven feelings were heterogeneous, he invoked Zhu Xi’s “the four buddings issue from principle; the seven feelings issue from material force” in support of his position. Although he later revised this statement to read “the four buddings issue from pure principle and thus are completely good; the seven feelings issue together with material force and thus contain both good and evil,” he did not abandon the point of view that the four buddings and the seven feelings were heterogeneous. Yi Toegye further invoked the Song Confucian distinction between the “original nature” and the “physical nature” to support his doctrine. In this vein he wrote:

It was only in later times, after the appearance of the Cheng brothers, Zhang Zai, and other thinkers that a thesis regarding the physical nature finally became unavoidable. That likewise was not just a case of creating differences out of a fondness for complexity. Since what they were referring to had to do with the condition after having been endowed and being born, then it was also not practicable to refer to it without distinguishing it from the original nature. Therefore I recklessly venture that the distinction between the four buddings and the seven feelings in the case of feelings (qing) is similar to the distinction between the original nature and the physical nature in the case of the nature (xing). If this is so, since it is considered permissible to distinguish between principle (li) and material force (qi) in speaking of the nature, why should it solely become impermissible to distinguish between principle and material force when speaking of the feelings?19

Yi Toegye continued to describe the characteristics of the four buddings and the seven feelings:

Whence do the feelings of commiseration, shame and dislike, yielding and deference, and discriminating between right and wrong issue? They issue from the nature that is composed of humanity, righteousness, propriety, and comprehension. And whence do the feelings of joy, anger, sorrow, fear, love, hatred, and desire issue? They are occasioned by circumstantial conditions when external things contact one’s body and excite one internally.20

On the basis of these two passages, it is evident that, according to Yi Toegye, the essential difference between the four buddings and the seven feelings is that the four buddings derive from the “original nature” and so inherently possess spontaneity, whereas the seven feelings issue from the mind when the body is stimulated by external things and so inherently possess passivity.
Furthermore the distinction between the four buddings and the seven feelings is parallel to the distinction between the “original nature” and the “physical nature.” Yi Toegye’s interpretation of the four buddings and the seven feelings thus involves three questions: (1) How should we understand Zhu Xi’s statement that “the four buddings issue from principle; the seven feelings issue from material force”? (2) How should we understand the distinction between the “original nature” and the “physical nature”? (3) Is the distinction between spontaneity and passivity sufficient to explain the difference between the four buddings and the seven feelings?

Within Zhu Xi’s philosophical system “the four buddings issue from principle; the seven feelings issue from material force” has a clear and definite meaning. But the implicit meaning of the word “issue” (fa) is not the same. The word “issue” in the phrase “issue from principle” means that principle is the ontological foundation for the four buddings, whereas “issue” in “issue from material force” connotes something closer to the term “initiate” in a psychological sense and means that the seven feelings are produced from the activity of material force. However, in Zhu Xi’s system, given that principle cannot of itself be active, one cannot go on to say that the four buddings are initiated by the activity of principle. Thus, Zhu Xi spoke of the “issuing” of principle metaphorically, whereas he spoke of the “issuing” of material force literally. And the “issuing” in the two cases does not mean the same thing. Yet Yi Toegye failed to recognize the different meanings of “issue” in Zhu Xi’s usage and uniformly attributed a type of activity to the term.

From a different perspective, Gi Gobong expressed reservations about Zhu Xi’s statement and viewed it as “words spoken by chance on some occasion that refer to only one side of the matter.” He explained his argument in the following manner:

Master Zhu [Xi] has a saying: “When one speaks of the nature of heaven and earth, it refers solely to principle (li). When one speaks of the physical nature, it refers to the principle mixed together with material force (qi).” In light of this, the statement that “the four buddings are the issuance of principle” refers exclusively to principle, and the statement that “the seven feelings are the issuance of material force” refers to principle mixed together with material force. And this means that the statement “[these] are the issuance of principle” certainly cannot be altered, whereas the statement “[these] are the issuance of material force” does not refer exclusively to material force.

Gi Gobong invoked Zhu Xi’s distinction between the “original nature” and the “physical nature” to serve as the foundation of his argument. As noted
previously, in Zhu Xi’s usage, the physical nature is identical to the original nature; it is termed “the physical nature” because it refers to the original nature that has been immersed in and mixed together with physical matter (qizhi). In other words, the original nature is pure principle (chunli 純理), whereas the physical nature is a mixture of both principle and material force. Given this definition, the relationship between the original nature and the physical nature is not identical to the relationship between principle and material force. Thus, for Gi Gobong, if one desires to use Zhu Xi’s understanding of the relationship between the original nature and the physical nature in order to explain the relationship between the four buddings and the seven feelings, one can say that “the four buddings are the issuance of principle” but not that “the seven feelings are the issuance of material force.” This is because Gi Gobong clearly saw that the physical nature is a mixture of principle and material force and so cannot be correlated with “the issuance of material force.”

However, in contrast to Gi Gobong, Yi Toegye based his explanation of the relationship between the four buddings and the seven feelings on the understanding of original nature and physical nature advanced by Zhang Zai and Cheng Yi. As noted earlier, in Zhang Zai’s and Cheng Yi’s usage, the original nature and physical nature were mutually independent concepts, and the relationship between them could be viewed as that between principle and material force. As their assumptions differed, Gi Gobong and Yi Toegye arrived at very different conclusions in the debate.

Moreover, the different interpretations of the “physical nature” and the “original nature” held by these two men naturally led to different views on the relationship between the four buddings and the seven feelings. According to Yi Toegye the four buddings and the seven feelings are mutually independent and heterogeneous; however, according to Gi Gobong, the four buddings are homogeneous with the seven feelings and are, moreover, included within them. Yi Toegye’s point of view on this subject is evident in his explanation of the four buddings and the seven feelings as being heterogeneous (the contrast between spontaneity and passivity). Gi Gobong’s viewpoint on this matter is clearly expressed in his “Letter to Yi Toegye [to Discourse on] the Four Buddings and Seven Feelings.” In this letter, Gi Gobong used statements in the Doctrine of the Mean about the feelings of joy, anger, grief, and pleasure to encompass the seven feelings from the Book of Rites, emphasizing the following:

Zisi 子思 was speaking of them in a way described as “speaking of them in their entirety,” whereas Mencius’ discussion is described as “singling out [the good side].” . . . It is just that, in the case of Zisi and Mencius, that with respect to which they were speaking was not the same, and so there
is the distinction between the four buddings and the seven feelings. It is not that apart from the seven feelings there are also the four buddings. Now, if one regards the four buddings as being issued by principle and [hence] as nothing but good and the seven feelings as issued by material force and so involving both good and evil, then this splits up principle and material force and makes them two distinct things. It would mean that the seven feelings do not emerge from the nature and that the four buddings do not direct material force [to issue]. What such wording conveys cannot but be considered problematic, and later students of the matter will certainly have doubts about it.23

In this passage, Gi Gobong argued that the four buddings represent the proper measure of the seven feelings (what Mencius “singled out” from them). He therefore rejected the claim that the four buddings are heterogeneous with the seven feelings, contending instead that they are encompassed by the seven feelings. In his “Later Discourse on the Four Buddings and Seven Feelings,” he stated this clearly: “Those of the seven feelings whose issuance is perfectly measured are from the start not different from the four buddings.”24 Yet, since Yi Toegye distinguished the four buddings from the seven feelings according to the contrast between spontaneity and passivity, he clearly could not agree with the contention that “the seven feelings encompass the four buddings.”

However, because Gi Gobong insisted that “the seven feelings encompass the four buddings,” he naturally rejected the attempt to distinguish between the four buddings and the seven feelings according to the contrast between spontaneity and passivity. Instead, he advanced the hypothesis that “the four buddings are stimulated by things and act.” In one of his letters replying to Yi Toegye, Gi Gobong wrote:

That of feelings being aroused by things and moving is a natural principle. For it is because there really is a given principle within that there is a match with the stimulus given externally; it is not that there is originally no such principle within, but upon the approach of an external thing, there is a fortuitous match and [the mind-heart] is aroused and acts.…If we are to discuss the matter in terms of being aroused by things and then moving, the four buddings are exactly the same. When the stimulus is a child about to fall into a well, then the principle of humanity automatically responds, and the disposition of commiseration is thereby formed. When the stimulus is passing by a shrine or the court, the principle of propriety automatically responds, and the disposition of reverence is thereby formed. In being aroused by things, these are not different from the seven feelings.25
In this passage, the statement “when the stimulus is a child about to fall in a well...and the disposition of reverence is thereby formed” comes from Zhu Xi's “Reply to Chen Qizhi 陳器之.” The statement “when the stimulus is passing by a shrine or the court” refers to Analects 10.1: “Confucius, in his village, looked simple and sincere, and as if he were not able to speak. When he was in the prince’s ancestral temple, or in the court, he spoke minutely on every point, but cautiously.” In order to demonstrate theoretically that the four buddings and the seven feelings are homogeneous, Gi Gobong emphasized that both the four buddings and the seven feelings are based in internal principle and respond to external objects and situations. He appropriated the passage from Zhu Xi to explain how the arousal of the disposition of commiseration is solely attributable to the circumstance of the child about to fall into the well and, likewise, that the arousal of the disposition of reverence is only attributable to the circumstance of passing by a shrine or the court. In other words, the arousal of the dispositions of the four buddings is linked to external circumstances, and in this regard there was no difference between the four buddings and the seven feelings.

Whereas Gi Gobong held that the four buddings and the seven feelings are homogeneous, he also conceded that the seven feelings sometimes failed to attain their proper measure. He further accepted, as an unavoidable logical consequence of his position, that the four buddings are not always good:

Indeed, the view that the four buddings are the issuance of principle (li) and are nothing but good is originally based on the point of view from which Mencius was speaking of them. But if one exactly discusses them in terms of feelings in general, then the issuance of the four buddings likewise involves cases that are not perfectly measured; one certainly cannot say that in all cases they are good. Take an ordinary, common person as an example: sometimes he will feel shame and dislike for what he should not feel shame and dislike, and sometimes he will have a sense of right and wrong about what should not be judged right or wrong. For principle is in the midst of material force and directs it in order to become actively manifest. When principle is weak and material force is strong, and so the control of the former over the latter does not succeed, it is certainly easy for such cases to occur when [material force] flows into activity. How then can it be that feelings have no evil? ... Moreover, how can one regard the four buddings as having no evil?

The theses that “the four buddings sometimes fail to attain their proper measure” and that “principle is weak, material force is strong” both come from Zhu Xi. In his philosophical system the four buddings and the seven feelings
both belong to the level of material force and are thus homogeneous. From this we can see that Gi Gobong’s understanding of the four buddings and the seven feelings faithfully represents Zhu Xi’s point of view.

In fact the argument advanced by Gi Gobong above seriously misconstrues Mencius’ “heart of the four buddings.” In *Mencius* 6A.15, Mencius explained the distinction between “the greater part of self” (dati 大體) and “the minor part of self” (xiaoti 小體): “The organs of hearing and seeing are unable to reflect [on themselves], and can be obscured by things. When one thing comes into contact with other things, it will be led away. The organ of the mind-heart can reflect [on itself]. It will find the way only if it reflects [on itself]; otherwise it will not find the way.”31 The seven feelings belong to the sphere of the minor part of self, that is, the physical life.

What Mencius called “the organs of seeing and hearing” actually denote the senses of vision and hearing. He used them to represent the complete natural life, which encompasses both the physiological and the psychological aspects of one’s life. The natural life of human beings is, in essence, situated in a particular condition that involves contact with external objects and the reception of their stimuli. The eyes and ears of human beings are the organs that are the most sensitive to external stimuli, and so Mencius used them to represent the whole of natural life. The first instance of the word “thing” (wu 物) in the statement “when one thing comes into contact with other things” refers to the organs of the ears and eyes. The second instance denotes the external objects. Since the eyes and ears are attracted by external objects, they are essentially passive and “unable to reflect [on themselves].” Mencius’ description of the “organs of the eyes and ears” is identical to Yi Toegye’s statement that the seven feelings “are occasioned by circumstantial conditions when external things contact one’s body and excite one internally.”

Mencius’ doctrine of the four buddings properly belongs to the sphere of the greater part of self, that is, the spiritual life. The term “mind-heart” (xin 心) in “the organ of the mind-heart can reflect [on itself]” refers to the “original mind” (benxin 本心), which is the moral subject. It possesses, in its essence, spontaneity as indicated in the sentence “it will find the way only if it reflects [on itself]; otherwise it will not find the way.” With regard to this, the heart of the four buddings is not like the organs of the eyes and ears that passively arise in response to external objects. Rather, the heart of the four buddings inherently possesses spontaneity, which is invested with the power of self-actualization without being stimulated by external objects. As for the heart of commiseration, its issuance is not dependent on the condition of the child about to fall in the well; this circumstance is the occasion for its issuance, not its actual condition. This is similar to Mencius’ description of Shun 舜 in 7A.16:
When Shun lived in the depth of the mountains, he lived amongst trees and stones, and had as friends deer and pigs. The difference between him and the uncultivated man of the mountains then was slight. But when he heard a single good word, witnessed a single good deed, it was like water causing a breach in the dykes of the Yangtse or the Yellow River. Nothing could withstand it.\(^\text{32}\)

This passage immediately follows the passage in which Mencius discourses on “original knowing” (\textit{liangzhi} 良知) and “original ability” (\textit{liangneng} 良能). Thus, what Mencius intended to explain is the power of the original knowing and original ability to issue from themselves. The sentence “when he heard a single good word, witnessed a single good deed” simply denotes the occasion of Shun issuing forth his original knowing and ability, not the condition of their formation. In the passage, Mencius clearly stated that “what a man is able to do without having to learn is his original ability; what he knows without having to deliberate is his original knowing.” For this reason, it is clear that Gi Gobong misconstrued Mencius’ doctrine of “the heart of the four buddings” when he grouped the four buddings, which inherently possess spontaneity, together with the seven feelings that arise in response to external things.

In addition, the thesis that the four buddings are sometimes not good not only lacks the slightest textual corroboration in the \textit{Mencius}, it also directly contradicts Mencius’ doctrine that human nature is good. This is because Mencius explained the goodness of the original nature precisely through reference to the goodness of the four buddings; if the four buddings had that which was not good, he would then have had to discard the doctrine of the good human nature and merely propound the doctrine that “the nature possesses both good and evil.” But Mencius manifestly rejected this position in his critique of three erroneous views of the human nature in \textit{Mencius} 6A.6—the other two positions are that “the nature lacks both good and evil” and that “it is possible for the nature to be either good or evil.” Strictly speaking, the circumstances of “feeling commiseration when it is inappropriate to do so; feeling shame and dislike when it is inappropriate to do so” do not actually arise from the original mind. “Feeling commiseration when it is inappropriate” is not the true disposition of commiseration, but only has the appearance of commiseration. From Mencius’ point of view, saying that the four buddings have that which is not good is akin to saying that the original mind has that which is not good. How could Mencius concur with this statement? For this reason, Yi Toegye criticized Gi Gobong in the following way:

As for the thesis that the four buddings also involve cases that are not in perfect measure, although it is very novel, nevertheless this is not
what Mencius was originally getting at. Mencius’ intention was just to indicate that [the feelings] are pure emanations of humanity, righteousness, propriety, and comprehension, with the view of manifesting that the nature is originally good and therefore the feelings are likewise good; that is all. But now you feel the need to put aside this correct and proper original intention, and pull it down to the level of the common, ordinary man, confusedly appealing to those of his feelings whose issuance is not perfectly measured. Indeed, a man’s feeling shame and dislike for what he should not feel shame and dislike, or feeling something is right and wrong when it should not be felt right and wrong—all this is the effect of the turbidity of material force. How could you refer to this kind of vulgar thesis as grounds for confusing the status of the four buddings as the pure issuance of heavenly principle?33

Yi Toegye appeared not to notice that Zhu Xi made similar statements. In fact, Gi Gobong himself also felt that his thesis was problematic. He thus frankly stated:

What I presented earlier all took the four buddings as a matter of principle (li) and as good; and now here I am speaking of the issuance of the four buddings as also involving cases that may not be perfectly measured. These words seem to contradict each other, and I imagine you might think it strange. Nevertheless, if such a way of expressing it is carefully thought through, there is not necessarily any problem with its rationale and it can be fit into a single consistent explanation.34

Gi Gobong’s former and latter statements are clearly self-contradictory. As long as he accorded with Zhu Xi’s point of view and insisted that the four buddings and the seven feelings were homogeneous, then logically it was impossible not to come to the conclusion that “the four buddings have that which is not good,” which contradicts Mencius’ point of view. This type of predicament, in which all choices present difficulties, underscores the position presented at the beginning of the chapter: respecting Zhu Xi’s authority means deviating from Mencius’ authority and vice versa.

Yi Toegye’s Theory of “The Mutual Issuance of Principle and Material Force” and Its Criticisms

Faced with Gi Gobong’s objections, Yi Toegye did not back down. Instead he proposed the following theoretical argument in response:
Considering the case of heaven and earth and man and other things likewise is not a matter of principle being outside material force. If one can make the distinction in that case, then in the case of the nature (xing) or of the feelings, although one may say that principle is in material force or the nature is in the physical matter (qizhi), why is it impermissible to distinguish them? For in man’s single body, principle and material force combine, and so it is born. Therefore, the two have a mutually issuing function, and, moreover, they are interdependent in their issuing. Since it is a mutual issuance, one can see that each has its own predominant factor; since they are interdependent, so one can see that both are included in each other. Since both are included in each other, there is certainly an undifferentiated way of speaking of them; since each has its own basis, therefore there is nothing impermissible to speak of them in a differentiated way. In discussing the nature, we grant that principle is in the midst of material force. Nevertheless, Zisi and Mencius could point out the original nature, and the Cheng brothers and Zhang Zai could emphasize the physical nature. Then, in discussing the feelings, we grant that the nature is in the midst of the physically endowed life. Why in that case alone should it be impermissible to consider in each case whence it issues and so distinguish the four buddings and the seven feelings in terms of their point of origin? The matter of combining principle and material force and having both good and evil does not pertain only to the feelings; the nature also is like that. How can you take this as evidence that it is impermissible to distinguish them?35

In this passage, Yi Toegye posited the relationship between principle and material force as “mutually interdependent in their issuing” in order to explain the relationship between the “original nature” and the “physical nature.” In so doing, he invoked Zhang Zai’s and Cheng Yi’s explanation of the physical nature and implicitly rejected Zhu Xi’s interpretation as a standard, since, as explicated above, in Zhu Xi’s system the relationship between the original nature and the physical nature is not one of principle and material force; rather, Zhu Xi defined the relationship between the original nature and physical matter (qizhi) as one of principle and material force. Only by basing his position on the interpretation of Zhang Zai and Cheng Yi is it possible for Yi Toegye to conceive of the relationship between the original nature and the physical nature as one involving the “mutual dependence and issuing together” of principle and material force. Also, it is only on the basis of this type of relationship between principle and material force as being “mutually interdependent in their issuing” that Yi Toegye is able to account fully for the heterogeneity of the four
buddings and the seven feelings. Some years later, Seong Ugye cited the above passage, which he termed “Toegye’s Original Position,” in his debate with Yi Yulgok, which became the primary textual basis for Yi Toegye’s theory of “the mutual issuance of principle and material force.”

Yi Toegye further responded to Gi Gobong’s thesis that “the four buddings are also stimulated by things and act” by stating:

This thesis is, of course, correct.… From the perspective of the undifferentiated manner of discourse, the seven feelings combine both principle and material force. This is clear enough without wasting too many words. But if we contrast the seven feelings with the four buddings and discuss each in terms of its distinct characteristics, the seven feelings are related to material force in the way the four buddings are related to principle. Their issuances each have their own systematic ramifications, and their designations each have their particular point of reference. Therefore, we can follow their predominant factor and categorize them separately. I have never said the seven feelings have nothing to do with principle or that they are aroused by a fortuitous encounter with external things. And the four buddings are certainly not different from the seven feelings with regards to being stimulated by things and then moving. It is only that, in the case of the four buddings, principle issues them and material force follows it, whereas, in the case of the seven feelings, material force issues them and principle directs it.

In the last part of the passage, Yi Toegye has proposed a new explanation of the different functions of principle and material force in the issuance of the four buddings and the seven feelings.

In a different section of this same letter, Yi Toegye explained this thesis more clearly:

Generally speaking, there are cases where principle issues and material force follows, so one can speak of these in a way that takes principle as the predominant factor; but that does not mean principle is external to material force. The four buddings are such a case. There are cases in which material force issues and principle directs it, so one may speak of these in a way that takes material force as the predominant factor; but that does not mean that material force is external to principle. The seven feelings are this kind of case.

In Yi Toegye’s view, this thesis provided a response to Gi Gobong’s critique that “the seven feelings do not emerge from the nature and the four buddings
do not direct material force [to issue].” Moreover, by espousing this thesis, Yi Toegye was able to preserve the heterogeneity of the four buddings and the seven feelings. However, the ineffective nature of this kind of response makes it lack persuasive power, because Yi Toegye remained unable to account directly for the essential distinction between “being stimulated by things and moving” in the cases of the four buddings and the seven feelings. Instead of addressing this problem directly, he simply reiterated Gi Gobong’s thesis that “the four buddings are certainly not different from the seven feelings with regard to their being stimulated by things and then moving.” Thus, in his “Reply to Yi Toegye to Discourse Once Again on the Four Buddings and Seven Feelings,” Gi Gobong still could not agree with this phrasing and, not surprisingly, recommended changing it to “As for the issuance of the feelings, in some cases principle acts and material force are together with it; in other cases material force is stimulated and principle directs it.”39 This statement and Yi Toegye’s statement “principle issues and material force follows it; material force issues and principle directs it” seem not to be different in their wording. However, Gi Gobong added “as for the issuance of the feelings” to the beginning of the sentence, which encased the four buddings and seven feelings within the concept of “feeling.” In so doing, he thereby rejected Yi Toegye’s point of view that regarded the four buddings and the seven feelings as pertaining to different levels.

Fundamentally, the real key to this problem does not lie in the written expression of their ideas, but in how to interpret the meaning of Yi Toegye’s “issuance of principle” (lifa 理發) and Gi Gobong’s “activity of principle” (lidong 理動). It is in fact possible to unite the literal meaning of these two phrases. Gi Gobong offers the following interpretation of this problem: “When material force is compliant with principle and issues without a single bit of obstruction, then it is the issuance of principle. If you wish to find some issuance of principle outside this, I fear that the further you go with such conjecture and groping, the more fruitless it will be.”40 Here Gi Gobong strictly adheres to Zhu Xi’s position. Within this line of thought, the issuance of principle is actually the issuance of material force, and the activity of principle is in reality the activity of material force. For, as repeatedly emphasized above, principle is incapable of activity in Zhu Xi’s philosophical system.

Some years later, Yi Yulgok wrote the following in a letter replying to Seong Ugye: “Generally speaking, that which gives issuance is material force; that whereby there is issuance is principle. Without material force, there would not be the power of issuing; without principle, there would not be that whereby it issues.”41 If Yi Toegye could have accepted this kind of explanation, which conforms to Zhu Xi’s viewpoint, he would not have had any reason to continue his debate with Gi Gobong. But his persistent unwillingness to concede to Gi
Gobong’s arguments indicates that he must have had an alternative explanation for the issuance of principle.

In Yi Yulgok’s letter quoted above, he expressed reservations about Yi Toegye’s notion that “principle issues the four buddings and material force follows it.” As he argued, “The state with regard to being issued by principle is like [Hu Yunfeng’s] saying that the nature issues forth as the feelings. But, if one says principle gives issuance and material force follows it, this means that at the very first moment of issuance, material force is not involved, but rather after that issuance it follows and gives issuance. Is this reasonable?” The thesis that “the nature issues forth as the feelings” comes from Hu Yunfeng 胡雲峰 (Bingwen 炳文, 1250–1333), the Yuan dynasty follower of Zhu Xi’s learning.

From the standpoint of Zhu Xi’s learning, the reservation expressed by Yi Yulgok is reasonable. Yi Yulgok later proposed the notion “principle pervades and material force delimits; material force issues and principle directs it” (itong i giguk 理通而氣局; gibar i riseung 氣發而理乘) to replace Yi Toegye’s notion of “principle issues [the four buddings] and material force follows it; material force issues [the seven feelings] and principle directs it.” This notion first appeared in Yi Yulgok’s sixth reply to Seong Ugye: “Principle is formless and material force has form; therefore, principle pervades and material force delimits. Principle is nonactive and material force is active; therefore, material force issues and principle directs it.” Comparing this notion with Yi Toegye’s, the use of “material force issues and principle directs it” is consistent in the two formulations. Yi Yulgok only rejected the thesis that “principle issues and material force follows it.” Thus, his theory is also called “the proposition that the material force issuing and principle directing it is the sole way.”

It is clear that Yi Yulgok’s substitution of “principle pervades and material force delimits” for Yi Toegye’s “principle issues and material force follows it” was premised on Zhu Xi’s notion that “principle cannot be active.” This is because, from Yi Yulgok’s perspective, Yi Toegye’s theory of “the mutual issuance of principle and material force” is not different from admitting that principle could in fact be active, which violates the fundamental viewpoint of Zhu Xi’s learning. But how could this not have clearly demonstrated that Yi Toegye’s insights could not fit within the parameters of Zhu Xi’s learning? Yi Toegye seems to have become mired in the idea of viewing the four buddings as the activity of principle itself in order to conform to Mencius’ view. Yet, due to Zhu Xi’s authority, Yi Toegye also quite naturally invoked Zhu Xi’s “the four buddings are the issuance of principle” in support of his views. However, when he was forced to confront Gi Gobong’s questions, which are formulated from the standpoint of Zhu Xi’s learning, he could not escape the delimitations inherent in Zhu Xi’s philosophical system, putting him in an awkward position.
The Philosophical Purport of the Four-Seven Debate

Franz Brentano (1838–1917), a philosopher of German phenomenology, proposed a fundamental question in his *Foundation and Construction of Ethics*: Is the principle of ethics knowledge or feeling? This question serves as the starting point for phenomenological ethics and pervades its entire subsequent development. The Korean Confucian Four-Seven Debate is, at its root, concerned with the same fundamental question.

At the beginning of this chapter, Immanuel Kant’s terminology was borrowed in order to identify the four buddings with moral feeling and the seven emotions with physical feeling. As is generally known, during the critical period, Kantian philosophy presupposes a two-level framework consisting of “appearance” and “the thing-in-itself.” Within Kant’s ethics, this framework becomes the dual framework of feeling and reason. Within this latter framework, the moral subject is the will as practical reason and is completely unrelated to all feelings (including moral feelings). Thus, on one hand, Kant indicated that moral feelings and physical feelings are both sensible. On the other hand, however, he emphasized the fundamental distinction between these two types of feeling: moral feelings represent the effect of moral law on the feelings, and physical feelings are initiated by the inclination of our will toward its objects.

When Kant decided to view the will as moral subject merely as practical reason and attributed moral feeling to the sensible level, this was not different from stripping the moral subject of the ability to implement the commands of moral law. In other words, the moral subject only possesses *principium dijudications* (the principle of the appraisal of the action); its *principium executionis* (the principle of its performance) is relegated to moral feelings. The separation of *principium dijudications* and *principium executionis* leads to the difficulty of how to account for moral responsibility. On one hand, if moral feelings belong to sensibility, then they lack autonomy and naturally have no means of bearing moral responsibility. On the other hand, the moral subject is definitely able to give moral law and only lacks the ability to actualize the commands of moral law and thus too is unable to bear moral responsibility. The inevitable result is that moral responsibility falls into a vacuum at either end.

One of Kant’s successors, Friedrich Schiller (1759–1805), discovered this difficulty in Kant’s ethics. In order to solve it, he did away with Kant’s twofold ethical framework consisting of feeling and reason, and proposed the concept of *Neigung zur Pflicht* (inclination to duty). This intellectual trend was continued by the German philosophers of phenomenological ethics Dietrich von Hildebrand (1889–1977), Max Scheler (1874–1928), and Nicolai Hartmann (1882–1950). Scheler, for instance, summarized Kant’s dual framework as follows:
However, Scheler indicated that this dichotomy does not actually exhaust all realms of possibility and that a third realm, the a priori and material, should be added. He placed our Wertfühlen (feeling of value) into this third realm of the a priori and material. He intentionally used the term Fühlen (to feel) to highlight the spontaneity of Wertfühlen and thereby distinguished it from common Gefühl (feeling). In this way Wertfühlen was raised to the level of the a priori.

When looking back at the above analyses of the Korean Four-Seven Debate, we can say that the four buddings are a type of moral feelings in the Kantian sense and that the seven feelings are a type of physical feelings. Zhu Xi and Gi Gobong attributed both the four buddings and the seven feelings to the level of material force, just as Kant had attributed both moral feeling and physical feeling to the sensible level. With regard to this matter, the viewpoints of both sides have areas of similarity. The greatest point of divergence between the ethics of Kant and that of Zhu Xi is that, in Kant’s ethical system, the will as moral subject is the giver of moral law, whereas, in Zhu Xi’s philosophical anthropology, the nature is mere principle; though the mind-heart is able to recognize principle, it is not the giver of principle. For this reason Kant’s ethics belongs to the “ethics of autonomy,” whereas Zhu Xi’s ethics belongs to the “ethics of heteronomy.”

In Kant’s ethics of autonomy, a moral feeling represents the effect of moral law on sensibility, and so it can be viewed as “a feeling self-wrought by a rational concept” (durch einen Vernunftbegriff selbstgewirktes Gefühl), which is distinguishable in essence from a passive physical feeling initiated by contact with external objects. On the surface, this appears to be consistent with Yi Toegye’s usage of “the issuance of principle” and “the issuance of material force” to distinguish between the four buddings and the seven feelings. However, on a deeper level, there is a fundamental difference between the two systems.

For Kant, moral feelings do not belong to the activities of the moral subject, but represent only the effects of moral law on the feelings. The activity of the moral subject is just the giving of moral law, and moral law is only a formal principle that in and of itself does not possess the power of self-actualization. In contrast, when Yi Toegye bestowed principle with the capacity of activity, it was not different from acknowledging that principle issues from the original mind and that the four buddings are the activity of the original mind. In this way, the four buddings are elevated to the level of the original mind, which is quite different from Kant’s later understanding of moral feelings as belonging to the sensible level even if they have their grounds in reason. In sum, in Kant’s later
ethics, moral feelings and physical feelings share the same level but are heterogeneous, whereas, in Yi Toegye’s thought, the four buddings and the seven feelings are located on different levels and hence heterogeneous. On this point, Yi Toegye’s position is closer to phenomenological ethics than it is to Kant’s ethics.

In Mencius’ philosophical anthropology the four buddings are the activity of the original mind; they issue directly from the original mind, and the original mind is the origin of the principles of humanity, righteousness, propriety, and comprehension. Thus, Mencius’ philosophical anthropology can be seen as including Kant’s concept of autonomy but takes it a step further by elevating the four buddings as well as the principles of humanity, righteousness, propriety, and comprehension to the level of the original mind. As a result, in Mencius’ ethics, the four buddings are nothing but what Mou Zongsan called “ontological feeling.” In terms of the self-legislation of the moral subject, the ethical viewpoints of Mencius and Kant coincide; however, with regard to the a priori nature of moral feelings, Mencius’ philosophical anthropology is fundamentally consistent with phenomenological ethics.

Taking the above discussion into consideration, even if Yi Toegye respected Zhu Xi, his position in the Four-Seven Debate contravened Zhu Xi’s thought and corresponded to Mencius’ philosophy. Faced with the dual-layered texts and authority of Zhu Xi and Mencius, it was difficult for Yi Toegye to strike a balance between their different points of view, whereas, in the case of Gi Gobong, there was no such difficulty since he adhered to Zhu Xi’s standpoint throughout. Yet, rather than viewing this as a shortcoming in Yi Toegye’s position, it reveals the richness and creativity of Yi Toegye’s thought and his refusal to be constrained by the limits inherent in Zhu Xi’s philosophical system.
PART III

Ethics and Politics
CHAPTER 5

Wang Yangming’s Philosophy and Modern Theories of Democracy
A Reconstructive Interpretation

This chapter examines another central Neo-Confucian philosopher, who intently studied Zhu Xi’s writings and later became one of his most serious critics. Wang Yangming challenged many aspects of Zhu Xi’s interpretations, and the nature of his criticism has contributed much to the modern discussion over the relationship between Confucianism and democracy among Taiwanese liberals and the New Confucians. Wang Yangming’s brand of Neo-Confucianism plays a key role in modern Chinese philosophy, considerations of the compatibility of the theories of democracy, and the general Confucian project.

“Original Knowing”: Liu Shipei’s Reconstructive Interpretation of Wang Yangming’s Theory

Since the end of the Qing dynasty, the relationship between Confucianism and democracy has been a great concern of Chinese intellectuals. Even today, after a century of discussion, this problem is still being raised in connection with the debate over “Asian values.” In previous scholarship, a number of scholars claimed that the Confucian tradition encompasses the concept of democracy. This topic, however, has not received much contemporary scholarly attention. Recent discussions focus on the following questions: Is the Confucian tradition compatible with the requirements of modern democracy? If so, can we find intellectual resources in Confucian tradition that will facilitate the implementation of modern democracy?
One topic that has received attention in connection with this ongoing discussion is the relevance of Wang Yangming’s learning to the implementation of democracy. The 1904 book *The Essential Meaning of the Chinese Social Contract* (*Zhongguo minyue jingyi* 中国民約精義) was the earliest Chinese publication on the relationship between Wang Yangming’s thought and democracy. Written by Liu Shipei 劉師培 (Shenshu 申叔, 1884–1919), who relied on Yang Tingdong’s 楊廷棟 (1878–1950) translation of Rousseau’s *Social Contract*, the book compares some of Rousseau’s ideas with those of the Confucian tradition, claiming that the Confucian tradition already embodies the same democratic concepts.¹ At that time, Rousseau’s book was accepted by Chinese intellectuals as one of the standard works for the theory of democracy. In his preface to *The Essential Meaning of the Chinese Social Contract*, Liu wrote that “in obtaining this [Rousseau’s *Social Contract*], our country has merely acquired a new scholarly locution and nothing more. And yet certain reactionary individuals regard it as a heterodox doctrine, as if the sages and worthies of our country had never advocated such an idea.”² Liu continued: “Searching through our country’s works, I have obtained several texts that contain the former sages’ ideas about social contracts. I have appended my commentaries to these texts, corroborated them according to Rousseau’s theory, and reflected upon their strengths and weaknesses.”³

The range of Liu Shipei’s compilation extends from the *Book of Changes* to the works of the Qing scholar Dai Wang 戴望 (1837–1873). In the section of the text devoted to Wang Yangming, he included the following three passages:

1. The man of humaneness [ren 仁] takes heaven, earth, and the myriad things as one body; there is nothing that is not the self. Thus [Confucius] said: “[The man of humaneness] in wishing to establish himself, seeks also to establish others; in wishing to be accomplished, he seeks also to accomplish others” (Letter to Wang Jiaxiu 王嘉秀 Requesting Instruction).⁴

2. The mind of judging right and wrong knows without deliberation and is capable without study; this is the meaning of the “original knowing” [liangzhi 良知]. The original knowing is in the human mind; it does not vary between the wise and the foolish, and throughout the world it remains the same today as it was in the past. The cultivated individuals of our times should devote themselves to extending their original knowing. Then they of themselves naturally will be able to impartially judge right and wrong, unite likes and dislikes, view others as themselves, view the country as their families, and take heaven, earth, and the myriad things as one body. When
this is accomplished, it would be impossible for the world to be in a state of disorder (Letter in Response to Nie Wenwei 聶文蔚).\(^5\)

3. Only [those who] illuminate their bright virtue in order to love the people can take one body as the world; only those who love the people in order to illuminate their bright virtue are able to take the world as one body (Script written for Zhao Limeng 趙立孟).\(^6\)

After quoting the above three passages, Liu added the following commentary:

[Wang Yangming's] theory of the original knowing derives from Mencius' thesis that human nature is originally good. Wang Yangming spoke of the original knowing, whereas Rousseau spoke of the goodness of human nature. The Social Contract states: “People’s predilection toward goodness derives from their innate nature. It is so even if they have yet to enter into the social contract” (book 2, chapter 6).\(^7\) These words firmly grasp the purport of Mencius’ [thesis about] the goodness of human nature, from which [Wang Yangming's] theory of the original knowing derives. The original knowing is that which originates only in heaven. Since people's original knowing is the same, what they obtain from heaven is also the same. Since what they obtain from heaven is the same, as demonstrated by the statement that “Yao 堯 and Shun 舜 are the same as ordinary people” (Mencius 4B.32), how is it possible to establish a division according to different grades? The Social Contract also states: “Everyone is born to have the right or capacity to liberty as the master of his body. He manages his right or capacity to liberty with a view to control the affairs of the world, making them conform to his own will and not allowing it to bow even slightly to others. This is what rationality affirms” (book 4, chapter 2). Indeed, although there exist natural distinctions at birth between the strong and the weak, the intelligent and the ignorant, once the social contract is established, in the eyes of the law, such distinctions no longer exist. [These words] are similar to those expressed by Wang Yangming. (Yangming said: “Only the most refined sages in the world are able to be intelligent and wise. Formerly, [the sage’s ability] was looked at as being very miraculous, but now [we] see it as something that all people originally had.” He also said: “Only those who illuminate their bright virtue in order to love the people are able to take one body as the world.” He likewise said: “The bright virtue refers to the heavenly endowed nature, which is miraculously radiant and not darkened; it is the place from which the myriad principles originate.” This is exactly the purport of both the statement in Doctrine of the Mean: “What heaven imparts to man is the nature” and Mencius’ [thesis about] the goodness of human nature. Now
Wang Yangming regarded goodness as coming from the original nature, and thus he wanted all people truly to attain impartiality in their will. In this, his ideas were similar to the Song Confucian Lu Jiuyuan 魯九淵.

Liu continued:

Moreover, Rousseau regarded renouncing the right or capacity to liberty to be equivalent to renouncing what makes one human. Thus preserving the right or capacity to liberty is one of the most important responsibilities of our life. [Book 1, chapter 4, of the Social Contract states: “Those who discard the right or capacity to liberty discard their bright virtue bestowed by heaven and [maintain that] it comes from the outside. This is the meaning of self-abnegation.”] This [statement] also takes liberty to be innately endowed at birth. Now, the right or capacity to liberty is endowed by heaven, just as the original knowing is endowed by heaven. Liberty has nothing on which it depends, just as the original knowing has nothing on which it depends. Thus it is permissible to say that the original knowing is just the right or capacity to liberty. Although Wang Yangming did not elaborate upon the principles of civil rights in his writings, the essential principles of equality and liberty can be inferred from his theory of the original knowing. Today, if we intend to shake up Chinese scholarly trends, need we only elaborate upon the theory of the original knowing?

In the above commentary, Liu Shipei included three different passages from The Social Contract. By contemporary standards, Yang Tingdong’s Chinese translation suffers from a lack of precision, and his sometimes mechanical use of traditional Chinese terminology reveals a tendency toward overinterpretation. For example, Liu Shipei’s quotation from book 2, chapter 6, reads that “people’s predilection toward goodness derives from their innate nature. It is so even if they have yet to enter into the social contract.” This deviates widely from the original text that reads: “That which is good and conformable to order is such by the nature of things, independent of human conventions.” Since this passage does not directly address human nature, Liu Shipei’s use of it to prove that Rousseau advanced a thesis about the goodness of human nature is problematic. Yet, in some of his other works, in particular, Émile and Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, Rousseau clearly confirmed the goodness of human nature. Therefore, even if the texts Liu Shipei quoted from have problems, his conclusions can still be regarded as fundamentally correct.

If we leave aside the particulars of these passages and look at Liu Shipei’s comments on the thought of Wang Yangming as a whole, we can discern Liu’s two key points: First, Wang Yangming’s theory of the original knowing encom-
passes the essentials of liberty, equality, and civil rights; and, second, the meaning of the phrases “taking heaven, earth, and the myriad things as one body” and “taking the world as one body” in Wang Yangming’s theory of the original knowing is especially consonant with the principles of civil rights.

Debate between Taiwanese Liberals and the New Confucians: The Relationship between Confucianism and Democracy

Although the above two points are relatively simple, they were often repeated and critiqued in the ensuing debate over the relevance of Confucianism to democracy. The significance of Liu’s conclusions for this debate can be seen in the papers presented at the “Conference on the Thought of Wang Yangming” hosted by the Center for Humanities Research at Taiwan Normal University in 1988. At the conference, three papers discussed the relationship between Wang Yangming’s philosophy and modern democracy: Wang Bangxiong’s 王邦雄 “On the Theoretical Foundations of Democracy and Rule of Law from the Perspective of Zhu Xi’s and Wang Yangming’s Views on the Mind and the Nature,” Zeng Chunhai’s 曾春海 “Possible Problems in the Practical Implementation of Wang Yangming’s ‘Extending the Original Knowing’ in Democratic Order,” and Chen Yufu’s 陳郁夫 “On the Possibility of Using ‘Extending the Original Knowing’ as the Philosophical Foundation for Democracy.” In their papers, both Wang and Chen affirmed the relationship between democracy and Wang Yangming’s thought. What is noteworthy is that the basic points of their arguments do not go beyond those advanced by Liu Shipei.

In opposition to their views, Zeng Chunhai discussed four potential problems in the practical implementation of Wang Yangming’s “extending the original knowing” in a democratic order:

1. Wang Yangming’s theory of the original knowing affirms a high level of spiritual value. It transcends the pursuit and allocation of common value, resulting in the absence of the capability to develop individualism and a consciousness of rights, both of which are essential elements of democracy.

2. The everyday norms of democracy must be established on the conceptualization of objective knowledge. The original knowing is not able to provide this because the knowledge acquired by the original knowing is a kind of “moral knowledge.”

3. The standards of democracy are institutional, experiential, external, objective, and require dealing with the structure, the operation, and the relationships of power. However, the standards of the original knowing are a priori, internal, and subjective. They merely involve the moral impli-
cations that political activities may have and do not directly consider the problems surrounding institutions and power.

4. Wang Yangming’s theory of the original knowing takes the pursuit of a perfectly moral personality as its end. However, the demands made by democracy on its leaders are not moral ones.

Just as the papers presented by Chen and Wang, Zeng’s arguments do not break any new ground, because ideas similar to Zeng’s were already being advanced by Taiwanese liberals in the 1950s in their debate with the New Confucians over the relationship between Confucianism and democracy.

In this debate, the main representatives of liberalism are Yin Haiguang 殷海光 (1919–1969) and Zhang Foquan 張佛泉 (1908–1994), whereas the main representatives of New Confucianism are Xu Fuguan, Mou Zongsan, Tang Junyi, and Zhang Junmai. In their joint declaration “Manifesto Regarding Chinese Culture to People All over the World” dating from 1958, the New Confucians acknowledged that the “practical moral subject” in Confucian ethics (or the learning of the mind and nature) was not directly equivalent to the “political subject” sought by democracy. This acknowledgment demonstrates that they in no way dismissed the distance and even inconsistency between Confucian ethics—which includes Wang Yangming’s theory of the original knowing—and democracy. On this point, there is no obvious difference between the position of the New Confucians and that of the liberals. What causes the sides to part company are their attitudes toward the Confucian tradition. From the liberals’ point of view, the Confucian tradition not only failed to develop democratic institutions, but it also worked to obstruct the emergence of the idea of democracy throughout Chinese history. For this reason, if the Chinese people intend to establish a democratic order, the liberals argue, they have to model it on the West.

From the perspective of the New Confucians, however, the fact that Chinese culture, which throughout history had been dominated by the Confucian tradition, failed to establish democratic institutions did not prove that the essence of the Confucian tradition is incompatible with democracy. In their opinion, the establishment of democratic institutions is an aim internal to Confucianism; it is a cultural ideal that is pursued in the process of the spiritual development of Confucianism. In their attempts to demonstrate this, they responded to the challenge posed by the liberal scholars from two different angles. First, on the basis of his extensive research on the history of Chinese thought, especially in his book *Intellectual History of the Han* (Liang Han sixiang shi 兩漢思想史), Xu Fuguan demonstrated that the fundamental Confucian spirit was corrupted to a substantial degree by the establishment of the imperial monarchy after the Qin and Han. Thus, he argued, it is not
“true” that Confucianism adapted successfully in the historical development of the imperial monarchy. Second, Mou Zongsan formulated his doctrine of “the self-negation of the original knowing” to explain the internal connection between Confucianism and democracy.

Mou Zongsan first advanced the above notion in his book titled *Wang Yangming’s Teaching of Extending the Original Knowing* (*Wang Yangming zhi liangzhi jiao* 王陽明致良知教). He originally wrote the book to explain the relationship between original knowing and knowledge. Later, in his books *Philosophy of History* (*Lishi zhexue* 歷史哲學) and *The Principle of Legitimation and the Principle of Governance* (*Zhengdao yu zhidao* 政道與治道), he again invoked this theory to explain the relationship of moral knowledge to science and democracy. In these works he divided the expressions of reason into two types: “functional expression” and “structural expression,” or “intentional expression” and “extensional expression.” Simply put, the functional expression of reason is for Mou a type of intellectual intuition, where the relationship between the subject and the object is expressed as one of subordination. The structural expression of reason then is a conceptual form of thought, where the relationship between subject and object is expressed as one of coordination.

Mou Zongsan identified the moral knowledge emphasized by traditional Confucians as the functional expression of reason. He further contended that the knowledge of democratic systems and science belong to the structural expression of reason. He defined the functional expression of reason as the direct expression of the moral subject and argued that, at the moment of its transformation into structural expression, the moral subject necessarily undergoes a dialectical turning of self-negation. This theory amounted to a modern transformation of the conceptual framework of traditional Confucianism—“inner sagehood, outer kingliness”—where the direct connection between “inner sagehood” and “outer kingliness” was transformed into an indirect one.

Mou Zongsan used this theory as a clever response to the doubts raised by the liberal scholars concerning the relevance of Confucianism to democracy. On one hand, he admitted that moral knowledge and democracy are essentially different, thereby providing a reason for the failure of the Confucian tradition to develop democratic institutions in the past; on the other hand, he affirmed the internal connection between moral knowledge and democracy, and provided a philosophical explanation for correlation of the two. As a result the main point of dispute between the liberal scholars and the New Confucians shifted from the former to the latter, because the liberal scholars opposed taking moral knowledge as the foundation for democracy.

The main reason Taiwanese liberal scholars opposed making moral knowledge the foundation for democracy is that they were influenced by the English and American liberal tradition. Passages from both Yin Haiguang and Zhang
Foquan demonstrate this point. In his essay “Keystone of Democracy,” Yin Hai-
guang wrote:

If you take morality as the foundation for democracy, then this is con-
sonant with Hegel’s panlogicism. Panlogicism is one of the theoretical
foundations of panpoliticism, and panpoliticism serves as the framework
for totalitarian government. Under the influence and even the domi-
nation of modern technology, the process is more important than the
objective. This is because what people personally have contact with is
the actual process but never the ideal objective. It has been like this since
antiquity, and it has become more intense in the present. If the process
of implementing the objective of morality is not done morally, then the
ideal morality has the potential to create actual harm. The religious per-
secutions of the past, the tragedy engendered by the way of thinking of
the “Record of Realization and Confusion Regarding Great Righteous-
ness” (Dayi jue mi lu 大義覺迷錄) in the East, and the formation of mod-
ern totalitarian government are all rooted in this. Morality itself actu-
ally does not have the capability of preventing immoral behavior from
appearing. Therefore, morality is not even remotely able to serve as the
foundation for democracy. Taking a step back, even if we say that there
are no such harms, morality after all belongs to the ethical realm. It is
external to institutions, and, because of this, morality and political insti-
tutions are still two different entities.15

Likewise, Zhang Foquan, in his book Liberty and Human Rights (Ziyu yu
renquan 自由與人權), wrote:

“Formal” and “negative” liberty serves as the point of distinction between
democracy and totalitarianism. In the world today, the theory of positive
liberty can be called the fashionable theory of the moment. It is a slogan
of the totalitarian world; it is also a slogan of the socialists. These peo-
ple harbor doubts about “negative liberty,” or the principle of removing
“obstacles,” [saying that] it just treats the head when you have a headache
or treats the feet when they hurt [i.e., it treats the symptoms and not the
disease]. [They say that] what we are in urgent need of today is a com-
plete plan and a thorough method. Let me indicate that the above words
can only be spoken after one has been hypnotized by totalitarianism.
When people speak such words, the complete plan in their minds is to
have a “superman” design the lives and thoughts of the masses. The thor-
ough method they envision in their minds involves opening up all bar-
riers and letting the great dictator unrestrainedly trample [the lives and
rights of the masses. In fact, these advocates of positive liberty are not actually criticizing the inability to implement existing means of liberty or the fact that existing components of liberty are currently awaiting modification. The material liberty they advocate, rather, involves only those rights that have been determined by the rulers. Over the past decades the bitter taste of this type of material liberty is something that people have actually experienced under totalitarian institutions.\textsuperscript{16}

Zhang completed this book in May of 1953, before Isaiah Berlin (1909–1997) advanced the distinction between positive liberty and negative liberty.\textsuperscript{17} In addition to following the English and American liberal traditions, Berlin’s use of the concept of negative liberty to combat positive liberty was also formulated against the historical background of the Cold War. From the time Jacob Leib Talmon (1916–1980) put forward the distinction between “totalitarian democracy” and “liberal democracy,” the majority of Anglo-American political scientists and intellectual historians recognized that the modern West had two traditions of democracy.\textsuperscript{18} The first began with J.-J. Rousseau and was continued through the advocacy of French intellectuals and led to the French Revolution. Later, this tradition was picked up by the German idealists, especially Hegel, and, after being reinterpreted by Marx and Engels, the tradition led to the communist revolutions. The second tradition began with John Locke and was continued through the advocacy of English liberal thinkers and America’s founding fathers. It served as the foundation for the constitutional democracies of both Great Britain and the United States.

F. A. von Hayek (1899–1992) called these two traditions the “French tradition” and the “British tradition,”\textsuperscript{19} but it is actually more appropriate to call them the “European continental tradition” and the “Anglo-American tradition.” One of the points of divergence between these two traditions is precisely their different views of “positive liberty” and “negative liberty.” As the two passages quoted above demonstrate, the problem of “negative liberty” and “positive liberty” also entered into the debate between the scholars of liberalism and the New Confucians.

Simply put, the concept of “negative liberty” emphasizes the scope of action that remains exempt from external obstacles and constraints, whereas “positive liberty” refers to the freedom of self-realization that is not dependent on any external condition. As a result the advocates of the former stress external freedom, whereas the proponents of the latter tend to be more concerned with spiritual and moral freedom. The main reason liberals advocate negative liberty and oppose positive liberty is that negative liberty only involves itself with the scope of external behavior and preserves a neutral position with regard to value choices. The implications of negative liberty are clear, making it possible to cre-
are lists of “basic freedoms” or “bills of rights” that are not easily susceptible to distortion. In opposition to this, positive liberty concerns itself with the contents of values, resulting in its engagement with metaphysical problems. This concern with metaphysics provides totalitarian regimes with an opportunity to invoke ideology as a pretext for interfering with people’s external freedom, as commonly seen in communist countries.

However, it is important to note that, although Taiwanese liberal scholars resembled their Western counterparts in using negative liberty to oppose positive liberty, the New Confucians not only did not reject negative liberty, they recognized that it is absent from the Chinese cultural tradition and that it is something that should be adopted. What the New Confucians disagreed with is the liberal scholars’ use of arguments based on logic and practical results to contrast positive liberty with negative liberty, employing the latter to reject the former. From the viewpoint of the New Confucians, negative liberty logically presupposes positive liberty; otherwise it has no means of being established.20 Moreover, in terms of practical results, the New Confucians believed that the moral implications inherent in positive liberty could serve as an effective instrument for dealing with totalitarianism. No wonder Xu Fuguan indicated that he “was not willing to be merely a liberalist.”21

Reappraising Wang Yangming’s Theory of “Original Knowing” from the Communitarian Perspective

From the 1980s there emerged in the American intellectual community the trend of “communitarianism,” whose main representatives were Alasdair MacIntyre (1929–), Michael Sandel (1953–), and Charles Taylor (1931–). This intellectual trend arose as a critical response to John Rawls’ (1921–2002) seminal work A Theory of Justice and later developed into a critical examination of the basic presuppositions of liberalism. The communitarian critique of liberalism involves a number of points, which cannot be examined in detail here. For the present purpose, the problem of positive liberty and negative liberty, and concerns for the relationship between the individual and the community will be addressed.

In his essay “What’s Wrong with Negative Liberty?” Charles Taylor provided a critical examination of the theory of negative liberty.22 In Taylor’s opinion, limiting negative liberty to “the exemption from external obstacles” makes it impossible for it to encompass one of the core objectives of liberalism—the self-realization of an individual. Taylor contended that, once we adopt the standpoint of self-realization, we are unable to avoid distinguishing between true and false or between important and unimportant in all of our motives (or ends). In other words, the adoption of this standpoint requires us to recognize
that value choices are not purely subjective. This in turn compels us to adopt the concept of “positive liberty” and further to define it as “the ability to realize one’s ends.”

From the liberal perspective, once we acknowledge that motives (or ends) possess distinctions between true and false, and between important and unimportant, this will inevitably lead to the recognition that value choices have objective standards. Such objective standards can provide a country or society with the opportunity to use the pursuit of true ends as a pretext for interfering with people’s actions, giving rise to the collective suppression of the individual. Because of this, liberalism needs to preserve the “Maginot Line” of negative liberty to protect against the possibility of the collective suppressing the individual. But, according to Taylor, this line is impossible to hold, and, moreover, recognizing objective standards in value choices does not inevitably lead to totalitarianism. In other words, Taylor believed that there is no necessary logical connection between positive liberty and totalitarianism.

Moreover, when liberals insist on the position of negative liberty, they actually presuppose a type of individualist viewpoint, looking upon the individual as an independent subject with no relation to the community. This is precisely what Sandel called the “unencumbered self.” According to communitarians, an individual’s choices about ends and values are formed within society. For this reason society is not merely an instrumental existence, but rather has an indivisible internal connection with the formation of an individual’s self. Taylor elucidates this position in this way: “One is a self only among other selves. A self can never be described without reference to those who surround it.”

Not all of the disputes between the communitarians and the liberals are diametrically opposed, nor are all of the criticisms that the communitarians directed against the liberals evenhanded. It seems that the liberals’ affirmation of the basic rights and values of humanity is beyond doubt, and in this respect the communitarians’ rebukes cannot avoid a sense of impropriety. Thus, rather than viewing communitarianism and liberalism as two mutually opposed positions, perhaps it is better to regard communitarianism as a supplement to and revision of liberalism. However, communitarianism’s critique of liberalism definitely exposes several theoretical dimensions that the latter overlooks, as the two points discussed above show.

If we use these two dimensions as a template for interpreting the language used by Liu Shipei at the beginning of this chapter, it is not difficult to discern some points of agreement between Wang Yangming’s philosophy and Western communitarianism. Liu Shipei stated that Wang Yangming’s theory of original knowing could serve as the foundation for civil rights. This is simply an acknowledgment that positive liberty can serve as the foundation for negative liberty, since original knowing pertains to the realm of positive liberty. More-
Wang Yangming emphasized that “heaven, earth, and the myriad things are one body,” “regarding one body as the world” and “regarding the world as one body.” The meaning of these statements is that the original knowing necessarily connects with other people and society at large when it issues forth.

However, according to Wang Yangming, individuals can rely on their original knowing to uphold their autonomy in making moral judgments and decisions. For this reason, it is not difficult to discern an intense spirit of liberty in the thought of both Wang Yangming and his later followers, especially the Taizhou school. However, this spirit of liberty is not established on a concept of the self completely divorced from the community, or “the unencumbered self,” if put in Sandel’s words. Quite the opposite, in Wang Yangming’s view, an individual’s moral autonomy and the universal connectivity of the original knowing represent two sides of the same coin. Thus, following Wang Yangming with regard to the problem of the relationship between the individual and community, it has been argued, traditional Confucians would neither adopt the modern Western viewpoint of “individualism” nor discard individual autonomy and follow collective values as maintained by the recent advocates of “Asian values.”

Xu Fuguan, in his highly influential article explaining liberalism, “Why Oppose Liberalism?” wrote the following:

When liberalists were emancipated from tradition and society, they did not fundamentally deny tradition and society, but made a new evaluation of tradition and society in which they clarified and refined the given ideas and events and moreover imbued them with new content. In this way, they created a more reasonable and enriched tradition and society. Liberalists still had to live within the mainstream of tradition and society. However, they would not live passively or negatively. Rather they were active and positive in their unrelenting efforts to create and improve tradition and society. They caused both to no longer be a blind impulse but instead, illumined under humankind’s conscience and reason, to gradually become the product of humankind’s conscience and reason. For this reason, liberalism not only actualized individuals from the emancipation of their own spirit, it also actualized the community at the moment it actualized individuals.

Xu Fuguan wrote this essay in 1956, at a time when communitarianism had not yet become part of the Western intellectual landscape. From the above passage it is not difficult to see that Xu’s explanation of liberalism or his revision of it is consonant with the viewpoint of Western communitarianism.

In sum, the appearance of communitarianism in the West has provided us
with an advantageous position from which to once again evaluate the relationship between Confucian tradition (including Wang Yangming’s thought) and democracy, and to revise the one-dimensional viewpoint of Taiwanese liberalism on this issue. With this intent in mind, it is appropriate to conclude this chapter with an especially thought-provoking passage from Yin Haiguang’s disciple Zhang Hao 張灝:

“Inner sagehood, outer kingliness,” this concept contains a type of “personality.” On one hand, this kind of “personality” emphasizes a person’s sociality and considers a person’s sociality as indivisible from what makes a person human. Because of this, people must participate in society and politics. These “externally oriented” duties are a part of personality. This is essentially different in spirit from the recent Western individualism that takes the individual as the standard in contemplating political and social problems. On the other hand, the Confucians’ idea of the “inner sagehood” possesses a transcendent consciousness. Confucians believe that people’s nature is endowed by heaven, and, upon this base, individuality can forever preserve its independence and autonomy and will not be swallowed by sociality. This type of “individualism” combines sociality and individuality and yet transcends both, eliminating the opposition between individualism and collectivism in modern Western culture. It can cure the defect of partiality found in both positions and provide a new perspective for modern social thought.  

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In recent years, a trend of adopting the Western concept of “virtue ethics” to interpret Confucian ethics has emerged and gained popularity in the English-speaking world. Bryan W. Van Norden’s *Virtue Ethics and Consequentialism in Early Chinese Philosophy*, Jiyuan Yu’s *The Ethics of Confucius and Aristotle*, and May Sim’s *Remastering Morals with Aristotle and Confucius* are representative examples of this popular trend. Recently, Michael Slote, an advocate of virtue ethics, has also begun to concern himself with this theme. His 2008 “Humanistic Value Lectures” delivered at National Chengchi University in Taiwan as well as his 2013 edited volume with Stephen C. Angle, *Virtue Ethics and Confucianism*, represent his efforts. Following the lead of David Hume, he promotes not Aristotelian “virtue ethics” but what is called “sentimentalist virtue ethics.” Taking this as a reference point, he also made some comments on Van Norden’s aforementioned book.

There is no doubt that behind the emergence of this trend is the revival of contemporary Western virtue ethics. As is generally known in philosophical circles, it was G. E. M. Anscombe’s 1958 essay “Modern Moral Philosophy” that triggered the resurrection of the intellectual trend of virtue ethics. In this essay, Anscombe makes a sharp contrast between “ancient moral philosophy” as represented by Aristotelian ethics and “modern moral philosophy” as represented by Kantian ethics and consequentialist theories (mainly utilitarianism). This theme has been more fully developed in Alasdair MacIntyre’s influential *After Virtue*. Since its publication, “virtue ethics” has taken a place as the third type of ethics besides “deontological ethics” and “teleological ethics.”
The Exclusion of German Philosophy

Before engaging in further discussion of the concept of virtue ethics, let us turn first to two overlooked aspects of its intellectual background—ones that have been neglected in the discussion of virtue ethics and Confucianism in the English-speaking world. The first aspect is an intellectual trend in modern German philosophy known as the “rehabilitation of practical philosophy” (Rehabilitierung der praktischen Philosophie). This trend obtains its dynamic directly from studies of Hegel after World War II. Hegel distinguishes between Moralität (the individual, rational, and reflective morality) and Sittlichkeit (the ethical, social life), as we saw in the Introduction. Based on this distinction, he criticizes Kantian ethics because he considers Kantian ethics to remain moored in the stage of Moralität, yet to enter into the stage of Sittlichkeit. In this sense, some German scholars trace “practical philosophy”—or “the second philosophy,” as it is called by Manfred Riedel—back to Aristotle, regarding Hegel as the modern inheritor of “practical philosophy.” In 1960, Joachim Ritter published the essay “On the Foundation of Practical Philosophy in Aristotle,” which triggered discussion of the “rehabilitation of practical philosophy.” Afterwards Manfred Riedel collected essays contributing different views on the subject and compiled a two-volume book titled The Rehabilitation of Practical Philosophy. Among the authors of the essays were such well-known scholars as Leo Strauss, Hermann Lübbe, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Karl-Otto Apel, Karl-Heinz Ilting, Otto Pöggeler, and Hans Lenk. Although this intellectual trend in the German-speaking world and the intellectual trend of virtue ethics in the English-speaking world emerged along different intellectual lines, they both confront the same question of “Kant or Aristotle?” In this sense, they can be said to reach the same goal but through different approaches. For some reason this German intellectual trend has seldom been included in the discussion of virtue ethics in the English-speaking world, and its exclusion is most unfortunate.

Another neglected aspect is the approach taken by contemporary New Confucians—those who interpret Confucianism by means of Kantian philosophy and its contrast with virtue ethics. Even those with basic knowledge about contemporary New Confucianism cannot fail to realize that Mou Zongsan borrows concepts and frameworks from Kantian philosophy to classify and evaluate Confucianism from the pre-Qin period to the Song and Ming dynasties. With respect to pre-Qin Confucianism, Mou adopts Kant’s concepts of “autonomy versus heteronomy” as his major criterion for classifying Confucian ethics. The ethics of Confucius, Mencius, the Doctrine of the Mean, and the commentaries to the Book of Changes are organized under the pattern of autonomy, and Xunzi is placed under the pattern of heteronomy. In his three-volume masterpiece Xinti yu xingtī (The mind-heart as reality and
human nature as reality), Mou continued to employ this criterion to classify
and evaluate the philosophical systems within Song-Ming Confucianism.
Representing the ethics of autonomy was the line from the three Confucian
masters Zhou Dunyi, Zhang Zai, and Cheng Hao in the Northern Song to
Lu Xiangshan and Wang Yangming in later times. The line from Hu Hong to
Liu Zongzhou 劉宗周 (1578–1645) inherits the philosophical orientation of
Confucius, Mencius, the Doctrine of the Mean, and the commentaries to the
Book of Changes, which were classified as representing the ethics of autonomy.
The line from Cheng Yi to Zhu Xi is a deviation from it and represents the eth-
ics of heteronomy. Therefore, Mou defines Zhu Xi as the establisher of another
philosophical line of ethics. In the first half of his book Yuanshan lun 圓善論
(On the highest good), Mou adopts Kant’s principle of autonomy to interpret
most chapters of the first half of book 6 of Mencius and several chapters of
book 7. In the second half, he follows Kant’s question of the “highest good”
to explain the patterns of “perfect teaching” (yuanjiao 圓教) found in Con-
fucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism in order to answer the question of “how to
unify virtue and happiness” that was raised by Kant in his Critique of Practical
Reason.

If we acknowledge that Kant’s ethics is a system of deontological ethics,
then, in light of Mou Zongsan’s interpretation, Confucian ethics is basically
also a system of “deontological ethics,” even though he never used this term.7
To counterbalance the interpretive approach of the New Confucians, especially
Mou Zongsan, and because of the traditional affinity between scholasticism
and Aristotelian philosophy, some Taiwanese scholars with Catholic back-
grounds have attempted to interpret Confucian ethics as being essentially virtue
ethics. Some examples are Shen Qingsong 沈清松 (Vincent Shen), Huang Huo
黃藿, and Pan Xiaohui 潘小慧, and there are other representatives of this type
of scholarship as well.8

All three of the authors of the books mentioned at the beginning of this
chapter completely ignore this intellectual background. This omission not
only cost them an opportunity to dialogue with the Chinese academic com-
munity, but also led them to some misunderstandings. Jiyuan Yu, for instance,
at the beginning of his book The Ethics of Confucius and Aristotle mentions
the Contemporary New Confucians’ “Manifesto Regarding Chinese Culture
to People All over the World,” which was published in the same year as Ans-
combe’s “Modern Moral Philosophy.” Yu used the two documents as signals
marking the “revival of Confucianism” and the “revival of Aristotelian ethics.”
Moreover, he emphasized that, “indeed, the philosophical orientation of these
two rivals [sic] is the same, that is, a virtue approach to ethics,”9 even though
the respective philosophical directions represented are actually diametrically
opposite.
Confucianism, Kant, & Virtue Ethics

Western and Confucian Ethics

Having explained the two neglected areas of philosophical background, let us return to the question of the relationship between Western ethics and Confucian ethics. In Western ethics, the distinction between “deontological ethics” and “teleological ethics” is a typological distinction based on dichotomy, which is to a large extent equivalent to the distinction in the German-speaking world between Gesinnungsethik (ethics of conviction) and Erfolgsethik (ethics of consequences). In brief, teleological ethics insists that the ultimate criterion for moral duty or moral value is the nonmoral values it brings about—the good in a nonmoral sense—such as joy, happiness, utility, and so on. In other words, this type of ethics reduces the good in a moral sense to the good in a nonmoral sense. Or, in Kant’s words, it reduces the “moral good” (das moralische Gut) to the “physical good” (das physische Gut). On the contrary, deontological ethics is opposed to reducing the good in a moral sense to the good in a nonmoral sense, insisting that the ultimate criterion for evaluating the moral significance of an act or a rule of action is not the nonmoral value it brings about, but its own character or the motive of the agent. In John R. Silber’s terminology, whereas deontological ethics affirms the heterogeneity of the good, teleological ethics regards all the good as homogeneous. Furthermore, for deontological ethics, since the moral value of an act does not depend on the nonmoral value it produces or may produce, moral value lies in its “moral character or morality” (Moralität), not in its “legality” (Legalität). In other words, it must be done “out of duty” (aus Pflicht) rather than merely “conforming to duty” (pflichtmäßig).

It is broadly acknowledged that the first chapter of the Mencius already raises the issue of the distinction between righteousness and utility. As a matter of fact, this distinction is by nature one between the “moral good” and the “natural good” and implies the heterogeneity of the good. Confucius had already understood this distinction when he said, “Superior persons understand what is righteous whereas mean persons understand wherein their own utility lies” (Analects 4.16). Moreover, Confucius explicitly expresses his deontological viewpoint in his discussion with Zai Wo about the preservation or possible curtailment of the three-year mourning period for parents (Analects 17.21). Zai Wo has two reasons for his suggestion to curtail the three-year mourning period for parents. His first reason is, “if a superior person abstains for three years from performing the rituals, then the rituals will definitely be lost. If for three years he abstains from playing the music, then the music will definitely be ruined.” The second is, “when old grain is exhausted, the new grain will be on the ground; in making fire by friction, we must choose the proper wood for every season within one year; therefore, after one year, the mourning should stop.” Whereas the former is a viewpoint of consequentialism or a teleological...
stance, the latter proves the “ought to be” (moral laws) by the “is” (natural laws) and also presupposes a teleological standpoint. Confucius, on the contrary, asks Zai Wo whether or not he feels at ease in his heart, which means that Confucius establishes the meaning of “three-year mourning period” on the basis of the agent’s motivation. This is a viewpoint of Gesinnungsethik, that is, an ethics of conviction, and therefore it implies a deontological viewpoint.

Since the distinction between deontological ethics and teleological ethics is a dichotomous one, the result is that the relationship between the two is both exhaustive and exclusive. It should be emphasized here that there is an asymmetric relationship between these two ethical viewpoints. If the moral value of an act is evaluated from the viewpoint of teleological ethics, the motivation of the agent does not matter at all unless it can give rise to the expected result. In contrast, deontological ethics is opposed to weighing the moral value of an act by the results or the possible results it may bring about; it does, however, still admit that these kinds of results have nonmoral value. Let us take the principle of utility as an example. Though deontological ethics is opposed to using the principle to evaluate moral value, it probably still would accept it as a derivative moral principle. For example, even though Kant insists that the moral value of an act has nothing to do with the possible happiness it may bring to either oneself or others, he still regards “to improve other people’s happiness,” along with “to perfect oneself” as a “duty of virtue” (Tugendpflicht). He takes a decisive step toward deriving an indirect duty of improving one’s own happiness from the duty of “increasing one’s own perfection.” No matter whether it is one’s own happiness or others’ happiness, it can be ascribed to the principle of utility. Therefore, the principle of utility can be accepted as a derivative moral principle.

It is quite the opposite for the teleological ethicists. In this camp, if the ethicist more or less accepts the fundamental principles of deontological ethics, it actually means a retreat from the standpoint of teleological ethics. For example, suppose someone faces a moral choice and must choose between two different actions. He follows the principle of utility to assess both actions only to discover that the possible consequences these actions may bring about are either too complicated to weigh or, even if measurable, too close to distinguish. Under such circumstances, if he takes the purity of his motivation (duty for the sake of duty) into consideration when making the choice, this means that he retreats from the utilitarian standpoint and abandons the unity of his viewpoint. He may defend himself by saying that the reason he takes the purity of his motivation into consideration is precisely because this motivation could bring about positive results, and this is why he still maintains a utilitarian stance. But such a response is just playing with words and concepts, because so-called purity of motivation precisely means “completely ignoring the result of an act.” There-
fore, as long as the distinction between teleological ethics and deontological ethics theoretically remains strict, there is an asymmetric relationship between the two. In this sense, it could be argued that William K. Frankena’s “mixed deontological theory” is a misleading concept.15

Returning to the Question of Virtue Ethics

With this background in place, we can begin discussing virtue ethics more meaningfully. Since the distinction between teleological ethics and deontological ethics is exhaustive and mutually exclusive, it is not logically possible that there exists a third type of ethics. The only possibility is that there are what might be called “subtypes” that are subject to these two main types of ethics. Virtue ethics, for example, can be viewed as a subtype of teleological ethics. When advocates of virtue ethics regard it as a third type of ethics besides teleological ethics and deontological ethics, they need to explain what the criterion for this trichotomous typology is. Although many ethicists try to define the concept of “virtue ethics,” the explanations remain rather confusing throughout. If such different ethical views as Aristotle’s and Hume’s can be put into this one single concept, then how could it not be confusing?

Let us put aside Slote’s “sentimentalist virtue ethics” for the time being and take Aristotle’s ethics as the major representative of virtue ethics and Kant’s ethics as the major representative of deontological ethics to see the fundamental distinction between the two. We can summarize the popular views of the distinction in three points: (1) deontological ethics emphasizes “duty,” whereas virtue ethics accentuates “virtue”; (2) the former stresses “principle” or “rule,” whereas the latter underscores “character”; and (3) the former attaches importance to “action,” whereas the latter highlights the “agent.”

Regarding the first point, “duty” is undoubtedly an important concept in Kant’s ethics, but is not the concept of “virtue” as well? In recent years a significant number of scholars have explored Kant’s concept of “virtue” to illustrate the important position of this concept in his ethical system. Robert R. Louden,16 Onora S. O’Neill,17 Robert N. Johnson,18 Nancy Sherman,19 and Andrea Marlen Esser20 are among these scholars. In 2008, Monika Betzler edited a book titled *Kant’s Ethics of Virtue*, 21 which includes a group of essays that are related to and explore this topic. In this important volume, the editor conveys special implications in using the term “ethics of virtue” rather than “virtue ethics.” She states in her introduction that “the essays here suggest that Kant’s ethics, to be sure, are not to be assimilated into virtue ethics…. But Kant’s later writings help us to see that virtue is a core element in his ethics, precisely because it helps us to do our duty.”22

Kant published his book *Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine of*
Virtue (Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre) in 1797. In this book, he not only provides a detailed explanation of the concept of “virtue,” but also regards “increasing one’s own perfection” as a “duty of virtue.” According to his explanation, this duty includes the cultivation of our natural perfection, that is, to cultivate our ability for cultural creation, and the cultivation of our inner morality, that is, to cultivate our moral feelings. Betzler’s view that Kant’s ethics does not pertain to “virtue ethics” as represented by Aristotle but contains an “ethics of virtue” is accurate. In this sense, it is meaningless to distinguish between deontological ethics and virtue ethics by means of the contrast between duty and virtue.

The cultivation of our inner morality in Kant’s ethics to which the moral principle refers is a categorical imperative, and moral rules are concrete norms derived from it. The categorical imperative is undoubtedly the core concept of Kant’s ethics, but it should not be forgotten that, in Kant’s ethics of autonomy, the categorical imperative comes from the self-legislation of the moral subject. In this sense, the moral subject is a more fundamental factor. In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant discusses the dual “character” of human beings, that is, the “intelligible character” and the “empirical character.” Whereas the “intelligible character” is the moral subject, the “empirical character” is composed of qualities that are to be cultivated, including our natural instincts, social habits, and moral feelings. Therefore, it is problematic to claim that Kant’s ethics only emphasizes principles and rules but disregards “character.” Having clarified the first two points of distinction, it is not difficult to explain the third point made above, that is, deontological ethics attaches importance to “action” whereas virtue ethics highlights the “agent.” Since a moral act is the act of the moral subject (agent), it is not possible that it only emphasizes “acts” but disregards “agents.”

In terms of interpretive strategies, the purpose of interpretation is to make the object of analysis emerge from ambiguity to clarity. Given that “virtue ethics” is such an ambiguous term, the strategy to interpret Confucianism under its aegis can only make things go from bad to worse. For example, some years ago the Taiwanese scholar Cai Xin’an 蔡信安 published an essay titled “On Mencius’ Moral Choice,” asserting that Mencius’ theory of act-choice is a sort of “act-utilitarianism” but appears in the guise of “rule-deontological ethics.” Later he published another essay titled “Mencius: Virtue and Principle” assuming that Mencius is a “virtue ethicist.” Such loose characterizations of Mencius render his philosophical worth most ambiguous and uncertain. Pan Xiaohui is another example. She acknowledges Confucian ethics as represented by Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi pertains to the “deontological type rather than the teleological type,” but she also stresses that it is not a “pure deontological type.” She concludes:
Looking at Confucian moral philosophy represented by Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi from this perspective, we find that it is basically a synthesized type attaching importance to both virtue and principle. If we must distinguish the relative superiority or inferiority of each one, I would argue that it should be construed as a synthesized type giving top priority to virtue while simultaneously borrowing from deontological ethics.28

If it is the case, as advocates of virtue ethics point out, that Kantian “deontological ethics” and Aristotelian “virtue ethics” are so diametrically opposed to one another, then how is it possible to find a synthesized type of these two ethics in Confucianism?

Western scholars encounter a similar problem when they borrow the term “virtue ethics” to interpret Confucianism. Van Norden, for example, in his book *Virtue Ethics and Consequentialism in Early Chinese Philosophy*, attempts to define “virtue ethics.” According to him a virtue ethics has at least four components: (1) an account of what a “flourishing human life” is like, (2) an account of what virtues contribute to leading such a life, (3) an account of how one acquires those virtues, and (4) a philosophical anthropology that explains what humans are like.29 He then mentions different forms of virtue ethics:

In its most moderate form, virtue ethics can be seen as a complement to consequentialist or rule-deontological versions of ethics, filling out one of the latter by adding on to it accounts of human virtues, flourishing, cultivation, and philosophical anthropology that are consistent with it. However, in the more moderate versions of virtue ethics, the four components above are logically dependent on consequentialist or deontological aspects of the ethical view. Kant, for example, has a conception of the four items above, but they appear primarily in his seldom-read *The Doctrine of Virtue*, and he thinks of virtues as helping one to follow the deontological strictures of the categorical imperative. In its most radical formulations, virtue ethics attempts to serve as a foundation for all of ethics and to completely supplant consequentialist and rule-deontological foundations.30

With these various forms of virtue ethics, the term is so broadly defined that it almost loses its function as a marker. In its most extreme form, virtue ethics is in diametrical opposition to deontological ethics as represented in Kant’s ethics; in its moderate form, however, even Kant’s ethics can be viewed as a form of “virtue ethics.” Since the connotations of “virtue ethics” are so divergent, no wonder Guido Rappe calls “the mainstream of ancient ethics,” including Confucian and Aristotle’s ethics, “deontological virtue ethics.”31
Though Kant in his formal publications never tries to define the position of Aristotle’s ethics directly, he levels harsh criticism at the “eudaemonist” in the preface to “Metaphysical First Foundations of the Doctrine of Virtue”: “if eudaemonism (the principle of happiness) is set up as the basic principle instead of eleutheronomy (the principle of the freedom of internal lawgiving), the result of this is the euthanasia (easy death) of all morals.” The passage seems to indicate that Aristotle is an unlikely candidate for Kant’s ethical exemplar. In recent years, however, Kant studies fully displays, contrary to the understanding of many advocates of virtue ethics, that Kant’s ethics is not in diametrical opposition to Aristotle’s ethics or without any overlap with the latter, because it contains an “ethics of virtue” in itself. Nevertheless, Kant’s ethical system can by no means be equated to “virtue ethics” as represented by Aristotle. Scholars who attempt to interpret Confucian ethics by means of “virtue ethics” in recent years at best reveal that we can find the concept of “virtue” and other relevant traits in Confucian ethics, but this in no way proves that Confucian ethics is in the same family as Aristotelian “virtue ethics.”

Sentimentalist Virtue Ethics and Confucian Ethics

What remains to be discussed is the relationship between what Slote calls “sentimentalist virtue ethics” and Confucian ethics. It is true that what Mencius calls “the four buddings” readily remind us of the Scottish ethics of “moral sense” in the eighteenth century. The Taiwanese scholar Huang Jinxing, for instance, once construed Mencius’ “four buddings” as a kind of “‘moral sense’ with empirical meaning,” and he consequently asserted, “Instead of saying that Confucian moral philosophy has something in common with Kant’s philosophy, it is better to say that Confucian moral philosophy has more similarities with Hutcheson’s and Hume’s theories to which Kant is opposed. Both insist that human beings have an innate ‘moral sense’ as the criterion for moral judgment.” Because Kant in his late works classifies what Hutcheson called “moral sense” as the “principle of heteronomy,” Huang Jinxing relies on this to question Mou Zongsan’s interpretive strategy of using Kantian philosophy to interpret Confucianism.

The reason Kant in his late works is opposed to regarding “moral sense” as the basis for moral judgment, as the Scottish ethics of “moral sense” does, is that he views all feelings (including moral feelings) as sensible and thus excludes them from the structure of the moral subject as a rational agent. Nevertheless, in the latter stage of Kant’s ethics, moral feelings still have two important functions—that is, both as a moral incentive (the driving force for moral conduct) and as an anthropological basis for moral cultivation. These two functions are directly related to his concept of “virtue.” “The four buddings” mentioned by
Mencius, however, are not (contrary to what Huang Jinxing asserted) a kind of “moral sense’ with empirical meaning”; rather, they are a kind of a priori feeling, belonging to what some phenomenological ethicists such as Max Scheler and Nicolai Hartmann call a priori Wertfühlen (value-feeling). Therefore, the moral subject (the original heart-mind) for Mencius is not merely a rational subject as construed by Kant; rather, it possesses explicit emotionality, expressing itself as “the four buddings”: the dispositions of commiseration, of shame and dislike, of yielding and deference, and of discriminating between right and wrong. Here reason and emotion are unified.

Confucius also affirms the moral subject that unifies reason and emotion. As alluded to above, Confucius and Zai Wo once discussed the issue of preservation and possible curtailment of the three-year mourning period for one’s parent. In the dialogue, Confucius, on the one hand, bases the meaning of the three-year mourning on whether one’s conscience feels at ease or not (“If your heart-mind feels at ease, then do it”); on the other hand, he adopts the “principle of gratitude” to refute Zai Wo’s reason for shortening the three-year mourning period: “It is not until three years old that one is able to leave one’s parents’ arms. This is why the three-year mourning is a universally observed rite under Heaven. Did not Zai Wo also receive three years of love of this sort from his parents?” (Analects 17.21). It is clear here that Confucius, unlike Kant, does not regard the moral subject merely as the rational subject, nor consequently does he deprive it of all its emotionality. Therefore, the assertion by David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames that pre-Qin Confucians built moral judgment on aesthetic intuition rather than on the reflection and application of moral principles is certainly not true.36

Although Confucius and Mencius have a different understanding of the structure of the moral subject from Kant’s, this does not prevent both ethics from belonging to deontological ethics. It is true that pre-Qin Confucian ethics contains plenty of discussions of virtue and abundant relevant intellectual resources, but at most this can only show that pre-Qin Confucianism also has an ethics of virtue. This, however, cannot prove itself to be a “virtue ethics,” because it cannot belong to both Kantian deontological ethics and Aristotelian virtue ethics at the same time.
CHAPTER 7

A Critique of Jiang Qing’s “Political Confucianism”

In the course of this book, we have moved from the beginnings of Confucianism in a variety of historical contexts toward its modern and contemporary significance in current thinking in both East Asia and the West. This chapter places the work of Jiang Qing, often considered China’s most controversial Confucian thinker, alongside the contemporary conversation on virtue ethics, where we left off in the previous chapter. In the spirit of philosophical exchange, this chapter too will be critical in nature in an attempt to bring the hope for clarity into the dialogue of contemporary Confucianism. It is only through such exchanges that Confucianism can profess to be a globally relevant philosophy.

The Inseparability of Confucian Ethics and Politics

Jiang Qing has made significant contributions to modern Confucian thought by drawing attention to its political tradition and by applying Weber’s concept of “ethics of responsibility” to analyze Confucian political ethics. His construction of political Confucianism, however, appears to be mired in theoretical and practical difficulties. By trying to make an “ethics of responsibility” out of political Confucianism that is entirely independent from the “ethics of conviction” of mind-and-nature (xinxing 心性) Confucianism, it lends itself to a misconstruction of both Weber and the Confucian tradition. In both the ethics of responsibility relies on and presupposes the ethics of conviction, for in Confucianism ethics is always the foundation for politics. As a proposal for a future Chinese government, Jiang has provided a very complex institutional structure that stands little likelihood of ever being implemented—and if it were ever to find itself enacted, it could turn China back to the Middle Ages. Democracy
Critique of Jiang Qing’s “Political Confucianism”

certainly has its problems; even though we can witness these almost daily, the elucidations Jiang offers provide no other realistic solutions. By casting democracy as a solely Western phenomenon, he neglects to recognize that Chinese people have been laboring for democracy on their own terms and in their own ways through their own free choices.

In 1989, Jiang Qing published an article in Taiwan’s Ehu Monthly by the title “The Practical Significance of and Problems Facing the Revival of Confucianism in Mainland China.” In this article, Jiang boldly stated that “the greatest problem in mainland China at present is the problem of reviving Confucianism” and that “Confucianism should replace Marxism, be restored to its lofty historical status, and become the orthodox thought representing the life and spirit of the Chinese nation in mainland China today.”¹ This article was severely criticized on several occasions by Fang Keli 方克立, director of the Studies on Modern New Confucian Thought research project in mainland China.² Jiang’s ideas clearly touch on a sensitive issue, but it is one that is exceedingly important to contemporary mainland China—that is, with mainland China’s reopening to the world, how are intellectuals and ordinary citizens to reassess the Confucian tradition? In this context Jiang Qing’s ideas have both theoretical and practical significance.

Since the 1989 article, Jiang has published a number of books: Introduction to Gongyang Thought (Gongyangxue yinlun 公羊學引論),³ Political Confucianism: The Reorientation, Characteristics, and Development of Contemporary Confucianism (Zhengzhi Ruxue: dangdai Ruxue de zhuanxiang, tezhi yu fazhan 政治儒學：當代儒學的轉向、特質與發展),⁴ and Life Faith and the Kingly Way of Politics: The Modern Value of Confucian Culture (Shengming xinyang yu wangdao zhengzhi: Rujia wenhua de xiandai jiazhi 生命信仰與王道政治：儒家文化的現代價值).⁵ In these books he develops his theories of “political Confucianism.” Reading these works might have an unsettling effect on some.⁶ Recently Jiang has published Further Thoughts on Political Confucianism (Zailun zhengzhi Ruxue 再論政治儒學),⁷ which expands but does not significantly alter his primary arguments.

Some Critiques of Jiang’s “Political Confucianism”

The critiques of Jiang’s political Confucianism center on two points: The first focuses on the theoretical problems in Jiang’s political Confucianism and the second on the structure and feasibility of Jiang’s “Kingly Way of Politics” (or “Confucian constitutionalism”).

Let us discuss the theoretical problems with his political Confucianism first. In his Introduction to Gongyang Thought, Jiang distinguishes two branches of the Confucian tradition. The first is mind-and-nature Confucianism (also
called “life Confucianism” or “inner sagehood Confucianism”), and the second is political Confucianism (also called “critical Confucianism” or “outer kingliness Confucianism”).

Broadly speaking, Confucianism can be divided into political Confucianism and life Confucianism. The former is exemplified by the Han dynasty New Text Confucian tradition and the latter by Song and Ming dynasty study of heart-mind and human nature (心性之學 xinxing zhi xue). Both originate in Confucius, and both reflect one aspect of the master’s teachings; yet, because they focus on different problems and pose different solutions, they are by nature very different and constitute two unique traditions within the history of Chinese Confucianism.

As described by Jiang Qing in his *Introduction to Gongyang Thought*, political Confucianism originates in Confucius, is carried on by Mencius and Xunzi, and is later transmitted by Gongyang scholars in the Han dynasty including Sima Qian 司馬遷 (145–86 BCE), Dong Zhongshu 董仲舒 (179?–104? BCE), and He Xiu 何休 (129–182). Nevertheless, Jiang insists that political Confucianism is not equivalent to a “politicized Confucianism” in which the monarchy is considered absolute, eternal, and holy. In Jiang’s view, it is rather the Han dynasty Zuo zhuan 左傳 and Old Text school that exemplify this kind of politicized Confucianism, which is an alienated, that is to say, an ideological form of Confucianism. Simply put, the difference between political and politicized Confucianism is that the former takes a critical stance toward practical politics, whereas the latter is what Max Weber would describe as *Machtpolitik*. Thus, says Jiang, “political Confucianism is neither a type of political pragmatism nor a type of political romanticism. Rather, it seeks a middle path that both embraces lofty ideals and respects concrete realities.”

Jiang Qing also makes use of Weber’s distinction between an “ethics of conviction” (*Gesinnungsethik*) and an “ethics of responsibility” (*Verantwortungsethik*) to explain political Confucianism. In response to Lin Yusheng 林毓生, who believes that Chinese culture favors an ethics of conviction, Jiang stresses that life Confucianism is a study of mind and human nature, and of inner sagehood, and offers little use to an ethics of responsibility. Lin Yusheng thinks that life Confucianism represents the entirety of Chinese Confucianism and encompasses the entire Confucian tradition. This would naturally lead to the conclusion that Chinese culture has a highly developed ethics of conviction but lacks an ethics of responsibility. However, if, along with life Confucianism, we acknowledge political Confucianism
as part of the tradition—the part concerned with politics and including abundant resources of an ethics of responsibility—we can avoid mistak-
ing the part for the whole and the misunderstanding of Chinese culture to which this gives rise.\textsuperscript{14}

In support of this view, Jiang enumerates nine basic concepts of an ethics of responsibility:

1. An ethics of responsibility holds that the world is essentially irration-
   al, refuses to acknowledge the universe as a rational moral organ-
   ism, and objects to the imposition of reason, morality, or purpose on
   history or the world.
2. An ethics of responsibility holds that, in practical politics, the
   relationship between intentions and results is paradoxical: Good
   intentions do not necessarily bring good results and can bring bad
   results. Therefore, the behavior of those in power should be judged
   based on this complex relationship between results and aspirations
   (intentions).
3. An ethics of responsibility holds that political agents must take
   responsibility for the foreseeable consequences of their actions and
   must not shift this responsibility to God, the will of heaven, other
   people, or society: Good intentions and proper action do not absolve
   one from responsibility for said consequences.
4. An ethics of responsibility holds that in practical politics there is a
   tension between ends and means, arising from the frequent need to
   use morally questionable means to achieve benevolent ends. Con-
   summate political skill is needed to dispel this tension and find a
   “middle path.”
5. An ethics of responsibility holds that political problems are different
   from the problems in life, in that government possesses the power
   of external compulsion (military power), which makes government
   a unique and independent category, and political ethics is different
   from personal ethics.
6. An ethics of responsibility holds that military power is the founda-
   tion, that compulsion is the primary tool of practical politics, and
   that a dialectical relationship exists between the two—that is, mili-
   tary might and compulsion are demonic powers that are “necessary
   evils” but also “proper and legitimate” means of bringing about the
   good. The use of military power and compulsion in practical politics
   should be understood dialectically.
7. An ethics of responsibility holds that the world is not perfect, and
neither is politics. The people whom one encounters in politics are normal, flawed people, and this is reflected in government. Political goals are constrained by reality, and there is a gap between the real and the ideal; thus, when making political decisions, real situations must be taken into account, and politicians must be willing to compromise on their ideals, beliefs, and ultimate goals, and to use gradual, practical, effective, and moderate means to achieve their aims.

8. An ethics of responsibility holds that practical politics is extraordinarily complex and in constant flux, and it is difficult to create static norms for political behavior. Therefore, politicians must bring complex ways of thinking and deep wisdom to bear on their political duties and seek to resolve unforeseen problems creatively and flexibly while remaining true to fundamental principles and beliefs. Inflexible, unconditional, and “all or nothing” approaches based on simplistic thinking must be avoided when dealing with political problems.

9. An ethics of responsibility holds that only those people who possess an enthusiasm for their work and a selfless sense of responsibility, and are capable of maintaining an impartial faculty of judgment are qualified to dedicate themselves to government.15

Next, Jiang demonstrates that political Confucianism as embodied in Han dynasty Gongyang thought fulfills each of these nine criteria and is in fact an ethics of responsibility.16

Jiang emphasizes the place of political Confucianism in the Confucian tradition and its role in political criticism, but this area has been overlooked in previous research. As a result, Confucianism is often understood simplistically as supporting monarchic or autocratic ideologies, and Jiang’s work has helped clear up this misconception. However, Jiang’s understanding of the relationship between mind-and-nature Confucianism and political Confucianism is problematic. Within traditional Confucianism, distinctions do exist between inner sagehood and outer kingliness, between the study of ren 仁 (humaneness) and the study of li 礼 (rites), and each has a place in Confucius’ teachings. But the relationship that holds within each pair is one of inequality and subordination. In the Analects, Confucius asks, “When we say, ‘the rites, the rites,’ are we speaking merely of jade and silk? When we say, ‘music, music,’ are we speaking merely of bells and drums?” (Analects 17.11). In Analects 3.3, he poses the question “A man who is not humane—what has he to do with ritual? A man who is not humane—what has he to do with music?” He also agrees with Zixia 子夏 that “it is the rites that come after” (Analects 3.8). Confucius also acknowledges that “the Yin followed the rituals of the Xia, altering them only in ways that we know. The Zhou followed the rituals of the Yin, altering them only in ways that
we know. If some dynasty succeeds the Zhou, we can know what it will be like even a hundred generations from now” (Analects 2.23). From these quotes we can see that for Confucius ren had a higher status than li, since ren is what gives meaning to li. Or, to put it another way, li is the objective instantiation of ren in a specific time and place. As such it thus changes and evolves. In sum, ren and li are brought together in a hierarchical and unequal relationship.

Apparently, for Jiang, mind-and-nature Confucianism is to political Confucianism as ren is to li. If this is the case, he is obliged to acknowledge the hierarchical relationship between mind-and-nature Confucianism and political Confucianism, with the former subsuming the latter. Yet, when Jiang emphasizes their “equal standing”17 and “complementary relationship,”18 he does not feel the need to explain their “integration,” because, in his view, these two Confucian traditions are fundamentally dissimilar “in origin, in methods, in their view of human nature, in their concern for society and social reality, in their attitudes toward rites and music, in their understanding of history, and in their ideals.”19 Since Jiang believes that both traditions originate in the teachings of Confucius, he must also believe that these two aspects of Confucius’ thought are inconsistent with each other. One wonders if he would be willing to accept this conclusion. In his book titled The Historical World of Zhu Xi (Zhu Xi de lishi shijie 朱熹的歷史世界), published in 2003, Yu Ying-shih shows conclusively that Confucians of the Song and Ming dynasties never gave up on the idea of “outer kinglyness,” and so Song and Ming Confucianism cannot be dismissed as being simply “mind-and-nature Confucianism.”

Jiang’s claim that Han dynasty Gongyang thought includes an ethics of responsibility is well-founded and can serve as a corrective to Lin Yusheng.20 I have argued previously that the Gongyang texts reveal that Han dynasty Gongyang thought also contained an ethics of conviction.21 We also find evidence of both an ethics of conviction and an ethics of responsibility in Confucius and Mencius.22 As mentioned above, Jiang Qing believes that political Confucianism and life Confucianism both originate in Confucius and both reflect one aspect of his teachings. Unless Jiang is willing to maintain that Confucius’ thought lacks consistency, it must be shown somehow that an ethics of conviction and an ethics of responsibility can in theory be united; further explanation would be needed to show how it could happen in practical terms. This is a theoretical question that Jiang’s exegesis must address.

Resolving the Issue

In order to resolve this theoretical problem, we should turn to Weber’s discussion of ethics of conviction and ethics of responsibility.23 To put it succinctly, Weber mentions this pair of concepts a number of times, but his treatment of
them is inconsistent. Sometimes he says that there is “an irreconcilable opposition” between the ethics of conviction and the ethics of responsibility, whereas other times he says that “there is no absolute opposition” between the two and that “they are mutually complementary.” These contradictory statements lead to two completely divergent readings. Underneath the contradiction and confusion, Weber’s intention is to show that, on the level of political ethics, the ethics of conviction and the ethics of responsibility are incompatible. In other words, people involved in politics must choose one or the other.

Yet people who read Weber often overlook the fact that the ethics of conviction can be understood on two different levels. Like Weber, we could understand the ethics of conviction on the level of “special ethics” (here political ethics) to be a political principle that ignores the foreseeable consequences of actions and focuses solely on the purity of conviction. Or, on the level of “general ethics,” we could understand ethics of conviction as the opposite of an “ethics of consequences” (Erfolgsethik). On this level, an ethics of consequences would claim that the ethical value of an act depends on its potential consequences or desired aims. An ethics of conviction, however, holds that the ethical value of an act depends primarily on the agent’s intentions and not on the potential consequences or desired aims. They represent two fundamentally different approaches to ethics and are logically incompatible. Kant’s ethics is commonly seen as the canonical ethics of conviction. But it is important to note that an ethics of conviction so understood need not necessarily reject all consideration of an action’s consequences. Thus, from a logical standpoint, an ethics of conviction is capable of coexisting with an ethics of responsibility. This is clearly demonstrated in Kant’s ethics. It should also be pointed out that, on the level of general ethics, Weber’s ethics of responsibility presupposes the Kantian ethics of conviction, without which it would be indistinguishable from the “power politics” that Weber himself despises. Only in this sense can the ethics of conviction and the ethics of responsibility be reconciled and these theoretical problems put to rest.

Jiang follows Weber in explaining the relationship between these two types of ethics as a “dialectical relationship,” and he even stresses their connection; yet his treatment of this issue creates the distinct impression that the two are clearly distinct and incompatible. It is for this reason that he completely rejects the possibility of deriving political Confucianism from life Confucianism, thereby depriving Confucius’ thought of its consistency. This represents the biggest theoretical shortcoming in Jiang’s political Confucianism.

The Structure and Feasibility of Political Confucianism

Next we turn to the structure and feasibility of this political Confucianism. On the basis of the claims discussed above, Jiang criticizes the Hong Kong and
Taiwan New Confucians for only being familiar with the traditions of mind-and-nature Confucianism and not with those of political Confucianism. He further charges that their wish to develop democratic systems from Confucianism is equivalent to doing away with the particular characteristics and positions of Confucianism and drawing China ever closer to Western culture. In other words, New Confucianism is in fact “Westernization” in another guise. Instead, he advocates making full use of the traditional resources of political Confucianism and “establishing a political system with Chinese characteristics,… in concrete terms, a political system that realizes aspects of Confucian thought such as the spirit of ‘rites and music’ [li yue 礼乐], the ideal of ‘the kingly way,’ the wisdom of ‘the great unity’ [dayitong 大一统], the doctrines of the ‘three eras’ [sanshi 三世], and the ‘emperor as the highest rank’ [tianzi yijue 天子一爵].”

In his book Life Faith and the Kingly Way of Politics, Jiang proposes replacing Western democratic government with “the Kingly Way of Politics.” In his view, the advantage that the kingly way offers over democracy is that democracy, in terms of the problem of political legitimacy, emphasizes only legitimacy based on the will of the people, whereas the kingly way of governance derives its legitimacy from three sources: legitimacy based on the will of the people; transcendent, sacred legitimacy; and historical and cultural legitimacy. These three sources make for balanced governance. Working from these sources of legitimacy, Jiang lays out a tricameral legislature with the “House of Profound Confucians” (tongru yuan 通儒院) representing transcendent, sacred legitimacy; the “House of the People” (shumin yuan 庶民院) representing legitimacy based on the will of the people; and the “House of the Nation” (guoti yuan 国体院), which represents historical and cultural legitimacy. The legislature would select members of the executive system, who would be responsible to the legislature. Among these three bodies, only members of the House of the People would be elected, whereas members of the House of Profound Confucians would be nominated and appointed internally, and members of the House of the Nation would be appointed by a hereditary Duke Yansheng 衍聖, Confucius’ lineal descendant.

In his book Further Thoughts on Political Confucianism, Jiang proposes the notion of “constitutional Confucianism,” which, in addition to the tricameral legislature, also proposes the establishment of a “Grand Academy Directorate” and a “republic under a symbolic monarch.” For Jiang, the Grand Academy Directorate is the “form of oversight and control,” and the republic under a symbolic monarch is the “form of government” appropriate to constitutional Confucianism. He opposes the Western idea of “popular sovereignty” and maintains that “the fundamental principle of constitutional Confucianism can be summed up in the single notion of ‘heavenly sovereignty.’” The Grand Academy is a traditional Chinese institution, and it is on the foundation of this “tradition of scho-
lastic governance” that he proposes the Grand Academy Directorate. According to Jiang’s plan, the modern Grand Academy will have supreme authority in six different areas: political oversight, education and testing, protocol and rituals, dismissal of government officials, arbitration, and cultural preservation. Jiang stresses that, because the Grand Academy has these six powers “with respect to legitimate ‘sovereignty,’ that is, with respect to constitutional governance, it is the nation’s highest authority.” The Grand Academy consists of a libationer and grand academicians, the latter being selected and appointed by the former. Thirty Confucians nominated by the House of Profound Confucians and by the Confucian community at large will come together to form the Confucian Committee, which will in turn select the Grand Academy Libationer by anonymous ballot. The Grand Academy academicians can be appointed by the government, by popular nomination, by the modern civil service exam, or by the Grand Academy Libationer. The republic is presided over by a “symbolic monarch,” Duke Yansheng, representing the “national essence” and acting to protect and promote China’s spiritual welfare, historical continuity, sanctity, dignity, values, and loyalty.

Before ending the discussion of Jiang Qing’s constitutional Confucianism, it should be pointed out that Jiang’s ideas are similar to those already put into practice in Iran’s Islamic Republic, with Confucianism replacing Islam as the founding principle. As briefly outlined above, the power relations among the tricameral legislature, the Grand Academy Directorate, and the republic under a symbolic monarch are so complex as to make Jiang’s plan seem infeasible. It is true that the modern democratic electoral system easily slides into vulgar or populist politics, but can we believe that the appointment methods of the House of Profound Confucians, the House of the Nation, and the Grand Academy really avoid the exchange of favors and arbitrary decisions by individuals? More important, it must be asked whether China currently possesses the necessary historical and social conditions for the implementation of this kind of system. On one level, it seems to be nothing more than a utopian fantasy. Attempting to restore Confucianism to the status of national ideology in modern China would be very much like attempting to restore the ideal of Caesaropapism in the West, which renders the scheme an impractical and temporally dislocated exercise.

Jiang Qing appears to be dissatisfied with Western democracy, but would he really prefer a return to monarchic or aristocratic rule? Jiang describes his ideal “Chinese-style political system” as the “Kingly Way of Politics,” “ritual government,” “nonaction government,” or “great unity government,” and it appears that he has no intention of returning China to an absolute monarchy. He admits that “from a historical perspective, ever since the Han dynasty, political thought has been dominated by classical texts, and to a large extent Confucianism has been transformed into a political ideology solely in the service of
the monarch—that is to say, politicized Confucianism has become dominant, and the tradition of political Confucianism has nearly disappeared. In other words, Jiang’s model of a “Chinese form of government” is a utopian ideal that has never been put into practice in the entire history of China. It consists of abstract principles with no specific content. Jiang repeatedly insists that the political rationality on which political Confucianism is based, as opposed to the moral rationality that underlies mind-and-nature Confucianism, has a real, objective existence, yet all he seems to offer as a solution is a utopian vision. Can we not hope for more?

The utopian nature of Jiang’s political Confucianism can also be seen in his criticism of Mou Zongsan, who appealed to “the self-negation of liangzhi [original knowing]” to explain the practical necessity of “developing democracy out of Confucianism.” In his critique of this New Confucian project, Jiang also criticizes Mou Zongsan’s “self-negation of liangzhi,” asserting that liangzhi can only be “presence” but cannot “negate itself” and that Mou’s ideas violate Wang Yangming’s “theory of liangzhi.” Jiang’s suggestion is to apply Yangming’s “direct outer kingliness” to modern situations and create an age of charismatic Confucian “sage kings” to reenchant what Weber has called a “disenchanted” age devoid of prophets. In that way the possibility of achieving inner sagehood and outer kingliness would be opened up today, attaining virtue and becoming a sage—the traditional ideals of Confucian ethical philosophy. That is to say, to turn Wang Yangming’s efforts to extend liangzhi and recover one’s original mind, and thereby to attain sagehood, into more than just conceptual exercises and empty talk.

Could this be the “political rationality” that Jiang is so insistent upon? In this passage, he admits that Wang Yangming’s ethical philosophy can be put to use in the present day; but isn’t this at odds with the sharp distinction he previously made between mind-and-nature Confucianism and political Confucianism?

By comparison, the democratic way supported by the New Confucians is more indicative of a “political rationality.” The modern Western democratic system may be a historical contingency, but it is continually being refined in the crucible of history. Over the past several hundred years, Chinese intellectuals and the Chinese people have struggled for democracy not solely because of pressure from powerful Western cultures but by their own rational choice. Recognizing democracy as a common ideal for all people is not inimical to developing democratic practice in harmony with the Chinese tradition, nor is it equivalent to abandoning what is essentially Chinese and surrendering to Western culture. In many ways, it is to bring Confucianism to the contemporary world.
Notes

Editor's Foreword


Introduction


2. Yu Ying-shih, _Zhongguo wenhua yu xian-dai bianqian_, 99; idem, _Xiandai Ruxue lun_, 162.


4. It could be said that Yu’s work _Zhu Xi de lishi shijie—Songdai shidafu zhengzhi wen-hua de yanjiu_ 朱熹的歷史世界—宋代士大夫政治文化的研究 (Zhu Xi’s historical world: Research into the political culture of the scholar-officials of the Song dynasty) (Taipei: Yunchen wenhua shiye gongsi, 2003) mainly focuses on using historical materials to support this viewpoint.


6. For a more detailed analysis on Kang Youwei’s Confucian Religion Movement, see Gan Chunsong 干春松, “Rujia de zhiduhua chongjian: Kang Youwei he Kongjiaohui” 儒家的制度化重建:康有為和孔教會 (The institutional rebuilding of Confucianism: Kang
Youwei and the Confucian church), in his *Zhidu Ruxue* (Institutional Confucianism) (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 2006), 105–186.

7. Liang’s article “Baojiao fei suoyi zun Kong lun” (保教非所以尊孔論) was first published in *Xinmin congbao* (New citizen journal) 2 (1902): 59–72; then included in, *Liang Qichao xuanji* (Selected works of Liang Qichao), ed. Li Huaxing and Wu Jiaxun (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1984), 304–314.


11. See Huang Chun-chi, “Zhanhou Taiwan wenhua zhong de Ruijia sixiang: cunzai xinshi, neihan yu gongneng” (Confucianism in the culture of postwar Taiwan: Forms of existence, contents, and functions), in his *Taiwan yishi yu Taiwan wenhua* 臺灣意識與台灣文化 (Taiwanese consciousness and Taiwanese culture) (Taipei: National Taiwan University Press, 2006), 201–233.

12. I personally developed a strong interest in Chinese culture through this course and could be called a beneficiary of the policy.


14. For a more detailed discussion of the topic, see Lee Ming-huei, “Ruxue ruhe kai chu minzhu yu kexue?—yu Lin Yusheng shangque” 儒學如何開出民主與科學？—與林毓生先生商榷 (How can Confucianism develop democracy and science?—Discussion with Mr. Lin Yusheng), in his *Ruxue yu xiandai yishi* 儒學與現代意識 (Confucianism and modern consciousness), 2nd revised and expanded edition (Taipei: National Taiwan University Press, 2016), 1–21.

Chapter 1: Mou Zongsan’s Interpretation of Confucianism


1. Yu Ying-shih has maintained that Qian Mu should not be classified in this “school.” See his “Qian Mu yu Xinrujia” 錢穆與新儒家 (Qian Mu and New Confucianism), in his *You ji feng chu sui shang lin* 猶記風吹水上市 (I still recollect the wind blowing waves on water) (Taipei: Sanmin shuju, 1991), 31–98.

2. Born in Shandong province, China, and a graduate of Peking University, Mou
moved to Taiwan in 1949 and then later lived in Hong Kong. In many ways Mou represents
the spirit and the reach of the contemporary global Chinese character.


5. For detailed analyses of this point, see Liu Shu-hsien [Liu Shuxian] 劉述先, “Youguan lixue de jige zhongyao wenti de zaifanshi” 有關理學的幾個重要問題的再反思 (Renewed reflections on some important problems regarding lixue, in his Xianshi yu lixiang de jiujie 現實與理想的糾結 (Entanglement of realities with ideals) (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1993), 250; see also Li Ruiquan [Lee Shui Chuen] 李瑞全, “Zhuzi daodexue xingtai zhi chongjian” 朱子道德學形態之重檢 (The mode of Zhu Xi's ethics reconsidered), in his Dangdai Xinruxue zhi zhexue kaituo 當代新儒學之哲學開拓 (Philosophical development of Contemporary New Confucianism) (Taipei: Wenjin chubanshe, 1993), 206–225; see also Chen Lai 陳來, You wu zhi jing 有無之境 (The horizons of being and nothing) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1991), 39.

6. For the implications of this discourse, see Heiner Roetz, Confucian Ethics of the Axial Age (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 1–6.


8. Ibid., 303–306.

9. Ibid., 307–308.


11. Ibid., 184.

12. Even Feng himself admits that, with regard to the theory of free will, Kant's philosophy is similar to Eastern philosophy. See Feng Yaoming, “Gainian xiangduilun yu Zhongguo zhexue,” 306.

13. Ibid., 304.


15. See F. E. D. Schleiermacher, Hermeneutik, ed. Heinz Kimmerle (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1974), 87; cf. 83.

17. Ibid., 392.


25. Ibid., A836/B864.


Chapter 2: Modern New Confucians on the Religiousness of Confucianism


1. The first generation includes Xiong Shili, Liang Shuming, and Zhang Junmai. The second generation is Feng Youlan 馮友蘭 (1895–1990) and Qian Mu 錢穆 (1894–1990).

2. Lin Jinshui 林金水, “Rujiao bushi zongjiao—shi lun Limadou dui Rujiao de kanfa” 儒教不是宗教—試論利瑪竇對儒教的看法 (Confucianism is not a religion—A preliminary discussion of Matteo Ricci’s view on Confucianism), in Ren Jiyu 任繼愈, ed., *Rujiao...


7. Cai Yuanpei 蔡元培 wrote several essays and lectures discussing the idea of substituting aesthetic education for religion. All of them are included in *Cai Yuanpei wenji* 蔡元培文集 (Collected works of Cai Yuanpei) (Taipei: Jinxiu chubangongsi, 1995).


12. This manifesto was first published in *Minzhu pinglun* 民主評論 (Democratic review) 9/1 on January 5, 1958, and in *Zaisheng* 再生 (Rebirth) 1/1 in January 1958. Later it was published in Zhang Junmai 張君勱, *Zhong Xi Yin zhexue wenji* 中西印哲學文集 (Essays on Chinese, Western, and Indian philosophy), ed. Cheng Wuxi 程文熙 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1981), in Zhang Junmai, *Xinxia juanxiang sibi* 新儒家思想史 (The history of Neo-Confucianism) (Taipei: Zhang Junmai xiansheng jiangxuejin jijinhui, 1980), and also in *Tang Junyi quanji* (Collected works of Tang Junyi), vol. 4, under the title “Zhongguo wenhua yu shijie” 中國文化與世界 (Chinese culture and the world).


18. Ibid., 76–77.
25. Ibid., 88.
26. Ibid., 89.
27. Ibid., 88–89.
35. I have personally heard Mou use this term in his lectures.

**Chapter 3: The Debate on Ren between Zhu Xi and the Huxiang Scholars**


2. Although it is not untrue to consider Plato a systematic philosopher, he pales in comparison to others in the West because of his mode of expression. His dialogue form allows him to be more playful, imaginative, creative, mythic, argumentative, and logical than most others. As George Kimball Plochmann has written about Plato’s writing: “The dialogue form allows Plato the free ranging between fact and imagination, and between the abstract thought and the concrete embodiment, that would have been denied him had he employed pure history or conventional theater or philosophical treatise or psychological case-study as his mode of expression.” See George Kimball Plochmann, *Plato* (New York: Dell Publishing, 1973), 18.


5. Hegel used the term “notion” (*Begriff*) to refer to the essence or nature of the object of thought and the true thought of that nature or essence. His “Doctrine of Notion” is most germane and useful for social or political discourses and for the Confucian context here. Hegel states in his *Logic* that “the notion, in short, is what contains all the earlier categories of thought merged in it. It certainly is a form, but an infinite and creative form that includes, but at the same time releases from itself, the fullness of all content. And so too the notion may, if it be wished, be styled abstract, if the name concrete is restricted to the concrete facts of sense or of immediate perception. For the notion is not palpable to the touch, and when we are engaged with it, hearing and seeing must quite fail us. And yet, as it was before remarked, the notion is a true concrete; for the reason that it involves Being and Essence, and the total wealth of these two spheres with them, merged in the unity of thought.” See part 3, section 160, of Hegel’s *Logic: Hegel’s Logic: Being Part One of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, trans. William Wallace (Digitreads.com., 2013), 121.

6. This term has been variously translated into English as humaneness, benevolence, or humanity. See *Analects*, trans. Roger T. Ames and Henry Rosemont, Jr., 48–51.


12. For the genesis of Zhu Si yan ren and its related problems, see Cheng Yuanmin 程元敏, “Zhang Shi ‘Zhu Si yan ren’ bian de yuanwei” 張栻‘洙泗言仁’編的源委 (The beginning and development of Zhang Shi’s ‘Confucius’ sayings about ren”), Kong Meng xue-bao 孔孟學報 11 (September 1966): 61–68.

13. Ibid., 64–65.


17. With regard to the date of Zhu Xi’s formulation of his own interpretation of “equilibrium and harmony,” there are different theses. What is followed generally here is Qian Mu’s and Liu Shu-hsien’s interpretations. However, Chen Lai and Shu Jingnan, following Wang Maohong 王懋弘, the author of Zhuzi nianpu 朱子年譜 (A chronological biography of Master Zhu), date it to 1166. The plausibility of this date cannot be totally excluded. For more discussion of this issue, see (1) Qian Mu 錢穆, Zhuzi xin xue'an 朱子新學案 (New compendium to Master Zhu) (Taipei: Sanmin shuju, 1971), vol. 2, 123–182; (2) Liu Shu-hsien 劉述先, Zhuzi zhexue sixiang de fazhan yu wancheng 朱子哲學思想的發展與完成 (The development and completion of Zhu Xi’s philosophical thought) (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1984), 79–96; (3) Wing-tsit Chan, “Chu Hsi and Chang Shih,” in his Chu Hsi: New Studies (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1989), 411–412; (4) Chen Lai 陳來, Zhu Xi zhexue yanjiu 朱熹哲學研究 (Inquiries into Zhu Xi’s philosophy) (Shanghai: Huadong Normal University Press, 2000), 166–170; (5) Shu Jingnan 束景南, Zhu Xi nianpu changbian 朱熹年譜長編 (A detailed chronological biography of Zhu Xi) (Shanghai: Huadong Normal University Press, 2001), vol. 1, 358–359.


19. Although Feng Youlan highlighted the difference between the directions of thought each Cheng brother represented, Mou was the first to make a thoroughgoing philosophical analysis of their differences. See Mou Zongsan, Xinti yu xingti, vol. 2, 1–13; Feng Youlan, Zhongguo zhexue shi 中國哲學史 (History of Chinese philosophy), in Sansongtang
20. The text of this treatise is included in Zhu Xi, *Hui'an xiansheng Zhuwengong wenji*, juan 67, 20a–21b, in *Zhuzi daquan*, vol. 8.

21. Since Wang Maohong did not make reference to this treatise in his *Zhuzi nianpu*, we do not know when the text was written. According to Wing-tsit Chan's analysis, the treatise was probably written in its final form in 1171, when Zhu Xi was forty-two; see "Chu Hsi's 'Jen-shuo' (Treatise on ren)," in his *Chu Hsi: New Studies*, 155–157. Liu Shu-hsien, however, dates it to 1173. See his *Zhuzi zhexue sixiang de fazhan yu wancheng*, 139–146. Liu's suggestion seems to be more convincing. The discussions between Zhu Xi and Zhang Shi about the text of this treatise are reflected partially in Zhu's letters to Zhang (included in *Hui'an xiansheng Zhuwengong wenji*, juan 32, in *Zhuzi daquan*, vol. 4).


31. This paragraph reads: "The Master said, 'Every man's faults may be ascribed to his respective kind. If one looks out for faults it is only as a means of recognizing ren.'" For the debate about the interpretation of this paragraph between Zhu Xi and the Huxiang scholars, see Mou Zongsan, *Xinti yu xingti*, vol. 3, 229–354; Lin Yuehui 林月惠, "Songru duiyu 'ren' de quanshi—yi Lunyu 'guan guo si zhi ren yi' wei li" 宋儒對於「仁」的詮釋—以《論語》「觀過，斯知仁矣」為例 (The Song Neo-Confucians’ interpretations of ren: From the case of Analects 4.7), *Ehu xuezhi* 26 (June 2001): 36–66.


33. See Zhu Xi’s “Reply to Zhang Jingfu,” in his *Hui’an xiansheng Zhuwengong wenji*, juan 32, 16b, in *Zhuzi daquan*, vol. 4.


35. See Zhu Xi’s “Reply to Zhang Jingfu,” in his *Hui’an xiansheng Zhuwengong wenji*, juan 32, 17a, in *Zhuzi daquan*, vol. 4.


38. The character of *li* in Zhu’s philosophy is a controversial issue. Here I follow Mou Zongsan’s interpretation.
40. Ibid.
49. Zhu Xi’s “Reply to Zhang Qinfu (Further Discussion on the ‘Treatise on ren’),” in his *Hui’an xiansheng Zhuwengong wenji, juan* 32, 20a–b, in *Zhu zhi daquan*, vol. 4.
58. Ibid., vol. 2, 803.
59. Ibid.

Chapter 4: The Four-Seven Debate between Yi Toegye and Gi Gobong and Its Philosophical Purport


1. See Kant, *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, 442.
3. In addition to the relevant passages found in Mou Zongsan’s *Xinti yu xingtixi*, also see...

4. Readers should keep in mind that *xing* always means the particular nature of a thing, not “nature” in general as in Mother Nature.


11. For a detailed background and the theoretical points involved in the two Four-Seven Debates, see Lee Ming-huei, *Siduan yu qiqing—guanyu daode qinggan de bijiao zhexue tantao* 四端與七情—關於道德情感的比較哲學探討 (The four buddings and the seven feelings: A comparative philosophical investigation of moral feelings) (Taipei: National Taiwan University Press, 2005). The texts pertaining to the debates are included in an appendix at the end of the book. In what follows below, there is no intention of repeating this work. Only a brief recounting of the background of the debate and the important points held by each side is presented in order to reveal their philosophical significance. Michael C. Kalton has also translated these same texts into English. See his *The Four-Seven Debate: An Annotated Translation of the Most Famous Controversy in Korean Neo-Confucian Thought* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994). In this chapter, Kalton’s English translations of the texts pertinent to the Four-Seven Debate have been adopted with modest modifications.


14. Gi Gobong 奇高峰 and Yi Toegye 李退溪, “Yang seonsaeng sachil rigi wangbok seo”兩先生四七理氣往復書 (Letters exchanged between the two masters on the four bud-
ddings, seven feelings, principle, and material force), in Gi Gobong, Gobong jip, vol. 3, 103; Yi Toegye, “Gi Myeong-eon bi sadan chiljong bun ligi byeon”奇明彥非四端七情分理氣辯 (The argument of Gi Myeong-eon against distinguishing the four buddings and seven
feelings according to principle and material force), in Toegye seonsaeng munjip, gwon 16, 12b–14b.

15. These two works are found in “Yang seonsaeng sachil rigi wangbok seo,” in Gobong jip, vol. 3, 139–141. They are also contained in Toegye seonsaeng munjip, gwon 17, 25b–30a.

16. “Reply to Gi Myeong-eon” (答奇明彥) and “Second reply to Gi Myeong-eon” (重答奇明徠), in Toegye seonsaeng munjip, gwon 17, 21b–25b; also in “Yang seonsaeng sachil rigi wangbok seo,” in Gobong jip, vol. 3, 47–49.

17. The five extant letters can be found in Seong Ugye 成牛溪, Ugye jip 牛溪集 (The collected writings of Seong Ugye), in Hanguk munjip chonggan, vol. 43, gwon 4; and also in Yi Yulgok 李栗谷, Yulgok jeonseo 栗谷全書 (The complete works of Yi Yulgok) (Seoul: Seonggyungwan daehakgyo daedong munhwa yeonguwon, 1986), gwon 9–10.

18. The analysis that follows is not concerned with minor matters of literary expres-
sion. However, in the process of comparing the main points of their philosophical positions, it is impossible to avoid dealing with the exposition of their different interpretations of Confucian texts, especially the Mencius and the writings of Zhu Xi.


20. Toegye seonsaeng munjip, gwon 16, 10. See also “Yang seonsaeng sachil rigi wangbok seo,” in Gobong jip, vol. 3, 103; and Kalton, The Four-Seven Debate, 10.


30. Ibid., juan 4, vol. 1, 71.
31. This is my own translation.
33. Toegye seonsaeng munjip, gwon 16, 41; see also “Yang seonsaeng sachil rigi wangbok seo,” in Gobong jip, vol. 3, 125–126; Kalton, The Four-Seven Debate, 77.
35. Toegye seonsaeng munjip, gwon 16, 30b–31a; see also “Yang seonsaeng sachil rigi wangbok seo,” in Gobong jip, vol. 3, 121; Kalton, The Four-Seven Debate, 63–64.
36. Ugye jip, gwon 4, 17.
38. Toegye seonsaeng munjip, gwon 16, 36; see also “Yang seonsaeng sachil rigi wangbok seo,” in Gobong jip, vol. 3, 123; Kalton, The Four-Seven Debate, 72.
40. Ibid.
42. Yulgok jeonseo, vol. 1, gwon 10, 6a; Kalton, The Four-Seven Debate, 133.
43. See Hu Guang 胡濙, ed., Sishu daquan 四書大全 (Complete compendium of the four books), in Wenyuange siku quanshu 文淵閣四庫全書 (Erudite literature pavilion edition of the collected works of the four treasuries) (Taipei: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1986), vol. 205, Daxue zhang ju daquan 大學章句大全, 8b.
44. Yulgok jeonseo, vol. 1, gwon 10, 25b–26a; Kalton, The Four-Seven Debate, 175. See also Yulgok jeonseo, vol. 1, gwon 10, 33, 40a; vol. 1, gwon 19, 59b–60a.
47. See Scheler, Der Formalismus, 72–73 and 81–82.
48. Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, 401, footnote.
49. See Mou Zongsan, Xinti yu xingti, vol. 3, 308.

Chapter 5: Wang Yangming's Philosophy and Modern Theories of Democracy


2. Ibid., 675.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., 701.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. The original text was printed with different type sizes. Sentences and phrases containing smaller characters are enclosed in braces {}.
8. Ibid., 701–702.
10. These three essays were all collected in the conference volume published by the conference organizers in 1989.
11. For further information regarding the main points and vicissitudes of this debate, see Lee Ming-huei, “Xu Fuguan yu Yin Haiguang” 徐復觀與殷海光 (Xu Fuguan and Yin Haiguang), in his *Dangdai Ruxue zhi ziwo zhuanhua* 當代儒學之自我轉化 (The self-transformation of contemporary Confucianism) (Taipei: Institute of Chinese Literature and Philosophy, Academia Sinica, 1994), 89–127; see also the simplified character edition (Beijing: Zhongguo shenhui kexue chubanshe, 2001), 81–117. For a comparison of the two thinkers and the points of their arguments, see Ren Jiatao 任劍濤, “Ziyouzhi de liang-zhong lilu: Rujia ziyouzhi yu xihua ziyouzhi—Xu Fuguan, Yin Haiguang zhengzheng zhexue zhi bijiao” 自由主義的兩種理路：儒家自由主義與西化自由主義—徐復觀、殷海光政治哲學之比較 (Two rationales for liberalism: Confucian liberalism and Westernized liberalism—A comparison of the political philosophies of Xu Fuguan and Yin Haiguang), in Li Weiwu 李維武, ed., *Xu Fuguan yu Zhongguo wenhua* 徐復觀與中國文化 (Xu Fuguan and Chinese culture) (Wuhan: Hubei renmin chubanshe, 1997), 337–363.
12. This manifesto was originally published in *Minzhu pinglun* 民主評論 (Democratic review) 9/1 on January 5, 1958, and in *Zaisheng* 再生 (Rebirth) 1/1 in January 1958 (see also note 12 in chapter 2). The relevant points are found in chapters 8 and 9 of the manifesto.
13. See chapter 3 of this book, “Zhizhi yinan 致知疑難” (Difficulties in [the theory of] extending the [original] knowing). The book was published first in two separate periodicals: *Lishi yu wenhua* 歷史與文化 (History and culture), no. 3 (August 1947), and *Lixiang lishi wenhua* 理想歷史文化 (Ideal, history, and culture), no. 1 (March 1947). It was later published as a book by Zhongyang wenwu gongyingshe, Taipei, in 1953. It is now included in *Mou Zongsan xiansheng quanjji* 牟宗三先生全集 (Complete works of Mou Zongsan) (Taipei: Linking Publishing Co., 2003), vol. 8.


20. This position is close to Immanuel Kant’s position. For this reason, whether Kant’s political philosophy should be included in the “British tradition” or the “French tradition” is not easy to determine. This example can perhaps demonstrate that there is no simple distinction between the “British tradition” and the “French tradition.”


25. Yu Ying-shih thinks that Confucianism contains a type of “individualism,” but his definition of “individualism” more closely resembles “personalism.” See his *Cong jiazi xitong kan Zhongguo wenhua de xiandai yiyi* 從價值系統看中國文化的現代意義 (On the modern significance of Chinese culture from the perspective of value systems) (Taipei: Linking Publishing Co., 1987), 27–36. In addition, although Wm. Theodore de Bary speaks of the “Confucian individualism” in late Ming thought, he understands that this type of individualism is not completely identical with recent Western conceptions, leading him to consider replacing it with the term “personalism.” See his “Individualism and Humanitarianism in Late Ming Thought,” in Wm. Theodore de Bary, ed., *Self and Society in Ming Thought* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), 147 and 225.

26. De Bary’s “Confucianism and Communitarianism” provides an excellent analysis of this point. This article is included in Chen Rongzhao 陳榮照, ed., *Ruxue yu shijie wenming* 儒學與世界文明 (Confucianism and world civilization) (Singapore: Chinese Department of National University of Singapore/Bafeng wenhua qiye gongsi, 2003), 919–932.


Chapter 6: Confucius, Kant, and Virtue Ethics


12. For a detailed discussion of the respective ethical viewpoints that Confucius and Zai Wo held in their discussion and the philosophical issues it concerned, see Ming-huei Lee, “Lunyu ‘Zai Wo wen sannian zhi sang’ zhang zhong de lunlixue wenti.”
14. Ibid., vol. 6, 388; see also Lee Ming-huei, “Cong Kangde de xingfu gainian lun Rujia de yi li zhi bian” 從康德的「幸福」概念論儒家的義利之辨 (On the Confucian distinction between righteousness and utility according to Kant’s concept of “happiness”), in his *Rujia yu Kangde*, 147–194.
22. Ibid., 27.
23. This book and *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre* (Metaphysical first principles of the Doctrine of Right) were later combined into one book, *Die Metaphysik der Sitten* (The metaphysics of morals).
30. Ibid., 34.
32. Kant, *Kants Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 6, 378
Chapter 7: A Critique of Jiang Qing’s “Political Confucianism”


2. See Fang Keli, *Xiandai Xinruxue yu Zhongguo xiandaibua* 現代新儒學與中國現代化 (Modern New Confucianism and China’s modernization) (Tianjin: Tianjin renmin chubanshe, 1997), 204. For a response and a defense of Jiang’s freedom of speech, see Lee Ming-huei, “Xueshu pinglun yu yishixingtai douzheng—jingda Fang Keli jiaoshou” 學術評論與意識形態鬥爭—敬答方克立教授 (Academic critique and ideological battle—A reply to Professor Fang Keli), *Dangdai*當代 (Contemporary) 90 (October 1993): 145–147.
4. Jiang Qing, *Zhengzhi Ruxue: dangdai Ruxue de zhuanxiang, tezhi yu fazhan* (Taipei xian: Yangzhengtang wenhua shiyi gongsi, 2003). Also available in simplified Chinese (Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 2003); however, the latter is abridged and is not used here.
6. For two articles expressing doubts about and criticisms of Jiang Qing’s political Confucianism, see Lee Ming-huei, “Ruijia zhengzhi zhexue yu zeren lunlixue”儒家政治哲學與責任倫理學 (Confucian political philosophy and the ethics of responsibility), and “You ‘neisheng’ xiang ‘waiwang’ de zhuanzhe—xiandai Xinruijia de zhengzhi zhexue” 由「內聖」向「外王」的轉折—現代新儒家的政治哲學 (The transition from “inner sagehood” to “outer kingliness”: The political philosophy of modern New Confucianism), both in his book *Ruijia shiye xia de zhengzhi sixiang*儒家視野下的政治思想 (Political thought from a Confucian perspective) (Taipei: National Taiwan University Press, 2005). Also available in a simplified Chinese version (Beijing: Beijing University Press, 2005).
8. See Jiang Qing, “Cong xinxing Ruxue zouxiang zhengzhi Ruxue”從心性儒學走向政治儒學 (From mind-and-nature Confucianism to political Confucianism), in *Dangdai*當代.
Xinruxue lunwen ji—waiwang pian 當代新儒學論文集·外王篇 (A collection of essays on contemporary New Confucianism—Outer kingliness) (Taipei: Wenjin chubanshe, 1991), 153–178; also see Jiang Qing, Gongyangxue yinlun, 1–43.

10. Ibid., 61–90.
11. Ibid., 9–16.

15. Ibid., 181–183.
16. His argument is extremely detailed and cannot be covered here in full. For more information see ibid., 183–204.
17. Ibid., 88.
18. Ibid., 165.
19. Ibid., 71.
20. For more detailed comments on this aspect of Jiang’s thought, see Lee Ming-huei, “Rujia zhengzhi zhexue yu zeren lunlixue,” 163–179.
21. Ibid., 171–175.
23. For a more detailed account, see Lee Ming-huei, “Cunxin lunlixue, zeren lunlixue yu Rujia sixiang.” The potential significance of these concepts in Weber’s theories is discussed in this essay.
27. See Jiang Qing, “Cong xinxing Ruxue zouxiang zhengzhi Ruxue,” in his Zhengzhi Ruxue, 176.

28. Jiang’s strictly differentiated assessments of the concerns, moral basis, methods of argument, standards of judgment, and goals of life Confucianism and political Confucianism make it hard to believe that the two might actually be reconcilable. See his Zhengzhi Ruxue, 179–181. Also see “Cong xinxing Ruxue zouxiang zhengzhi Ruxue,” 165–175.
31. Ibid., 174.
32. Jiang Qing, Shengming xinyang yu wangdao zhengzhi, 299–312. Also see his Zailun zhengzhi Ruxue, 102–120.
34. Jiang Qing, Zailun zhengzhi Ruxue, 128.
35. Ibid., 140–151.
36. Ibid., 151.
37. Ibid., 152.
40. Ibid., 159.
41. Ibid., 144.
42. Ibid., 135.
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