THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS AND THE REGENERATION OF POLITICAL POWER

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Enter the ANC world

In the 20 years of transitional and confirmed democratic politics in South Africa I traversed two worlds, having been both direct observer and analyst-researcher, and occasional research participant in the processes. First, there is the world of the African National Congress (ANC). When one enters the marquee in Polokwane, the ‘hallowed halls’ of Gallagher Estate, Esselen Park or the Durban Convention Centre for ANC elective conferences, National General Councils (NGCs), policy conferences, or South African Communist Party (SACP) and Congress of South African Trade Union (Cosatu) gatherings, one finds the profound, emotive experience of struggle ethos, movement mobilisation against the forces that restrain and prohibit faster progress, and politico-intellectual engagement to explain and propel the present and the future. There is a sense of representation of the people and the advancement of the national democratic revolution, albeit in the contexts of elections and modern government.

A profound awareness in the movement of the responsibilities that come with being a spoke in the wheel of democratic centralism is omnipresent. Internal debates to advance the project of far-reaching transformation are embraced. The outside environment is often seen as hostile, embodying forces that continuously threaten the mission of the ANC as liberation movement-party. The ANC frequently faults that outside world for disregarding the impact of apartheid-racism and colonialism, and the profound progress that the ANC has recorded since 1994. Protection, consolidation and extension of gains made in the time since the early 1990s are as paramount as the projection of the tasks that remain. It is a central charge for the ANC not just to demonstrate connection with the masses, partly mediated by branch and regional structures, but also to persuade the people that the project of transformation is on track. In ANC parlance, this is the time of the ‘national democratic revolution’ and there is continuous progress.

At times, such as in the aftermath of local government election 2011, there is profound trepidation that this world of the gradual revolution is becoming the subject of voter apprehension and that scrutiny in the electoral inter-party battleground is gradually penetrating the inner sanctum of the ANC’s deep relationship with the people.
Role of the author-analyst and the thread of ‘political power’

The *other world* is that of critical observation and analysis. Here the observer-researcher needs to negotiate the route between counter-truths, using both confidence and rootedness to link trends and occurrences. The world of critical observation constructs the bigger picture and discerns the trends, assessing how the building blocks of the ANC’s hegemonic power project of close to a century have materialised in the period in government power. It is a shifting target that is being analysed. The ‘answers’ are often at variance with the officially-projected ANC perspectives.

The book *straddles these two worlds, but is unapologetically analytical*. It builds on the empathy of understanding the struggles and achievements, along with deferred dreams and frustrations. It moves to analyses of power, victories, strategy, engineering, manipulation, denials and corrections, obfuscation … and causes for celebration. Anchored in this world, the book focuses on discerning the bigger picture, which transcends the daily and monthly variances in who is in power and who in favour with those who are in power. It is a project on the ANC in elections and opposition, in multiple relations with the people, in government, policy and the state. The writing was finalised in the aftermath of the 2011 local government elections. There were just four months to go to the ANC’s January 2012 centenary and just over a year to its Mangaung elective conference.

Upon reflecting on ‘political power’, I realised the extent to which much of my scholarly work over the years – whether on transitional negotiations, elections and party politics, policy, the institutional configuration of government, or intra-ANC and alliance intrigues – concerned aspects of the ANC aspiring to, and its use and regeneration of, political power. My research and analytical inputs over the 20-year period that the book covers ranged from scholarly articles and book chapters, to opinion pieces and many media analyses. One thread ran through them – that of political power. It made sense to pull cohering observations, research and analyses together into the framework of ‘the ANC and political power’, the lifeblood of politics of state, party and people. Some of the chapters have their roots in previous analyses. In all instances these were extensively reworked to assess the ANC’s contemporary processes of the regeneration of political power. They were supplemented with a range of analyses to deal with additional aspects of ANC power, to arrive at a slate of chapters that deals with four faces of ANC power (organisation, people, party politics and government). The chapters are all anchored in my 20 years-plus of ongoing research and monitoring.

The book is written with the insight and hindsight that comes from living the politics of South Africa. As a political scientist and analyst one is profoundly aware of the political import of every critical statement, one is aware of how it might or might not be construed. One is acutely aware that South Africa tentatively emerged from the McCarthyist days of the Mbeki epoch in which freedom of critical analysis was circumscribed. Subsequently, there were tentative retreats, culminating for the time being in threats to constrain the mass media and projects to contain internal dissent and divergence. One is equally cognisant of the fact that new divisions and vulnerabilities, and consequently also new sensitivities for critiques, continuously evolve.
The epoch

This manuscript was prepared at the point of two decades since the political normalisation processes of the early 1990s. The ANC was moving beyond 17 years of state power. The analysis also covers the three early years before the ANC assumed government power, hence covering 'the ANC's first 21 years of political power', up to mid-2011. The change factors that are identified are highly relevant to assessments of the 'state of the ANC' in the immediate run-up to its 2012 centenary. The main interest of the book, against the historical background, is the current conjuncture moving into the future. The analysis does not deal with all phases and periods equally. The earlier periods are analysed in order to make sense of the present, and at least parts of the possible futures. The focus is on how the ANC, 17-plus years into power, acts to continuously shape, maintain and regenerate power in relation to its internal structures and processes, opposition parties, and people, government and the state. The closer to the present, the more time is expended on the significance of the events and trends. This approach reflects the fact that the present is a synthesis of much of the past.

The time of the mid-2011 finalisation of the manuscript was one where power configurations of and around the ANC were converging to deliver a present that held vexing uncertainties. The ambiguities of future paths of political power were greater than in any of the preceding periods of undisputed, uncontested hegemony of the monolith, the colossus that the ANC has been for many years. The years of 2009-11 were of particular importance to the ANC. It was a maelstrom, constructed by the events and trends of the preceding years, and in particular those of 2005-11. New forces emerged, which would propel the ANC in future decades. By dissecting the power dimensions of the time, comparing them with what had gone before, and assessing how these came together to construct this ‘complex’ of what is the political power of the ANC, the book hopes to offer insights into how South African politics, in many ways synonymous with the politics of the ANC, seems likely to unfold in years, possibly decades, to come.

The ANC had arrived at a point where its continuous projects of generating and regenerating political power had to be upped a level. The tools that the ANC took into the endeavour were the experiences, lessons and ways of strategising and operating that the organisation had acquired in the preceding decades. The experiences in its first 17 years in political power and with power, competing for non-racial voter favour, managing its intra-ANC and intra-Tripartite Alliance relations, running government and being in charge of the state, is the topic of the book.

Change and continuity – ANC strengths and weaknesses

The book portrays the contradictory reality of a historically profound organisation that is simultaneously omnipotent and racked with internal organisational and national governance weaknesses. It displays incredible flaws of internal fractioning and dissent, of a party-in-government that does not quite master the task at hand. Yet it retains both a direct and powerful interface with the people and the ability to muster spectacular election victories.
Certainty and uncertainty about future ANC directions coexist seamlessly, and the manuscript focuses on the patterns of certainty and change. There is relative certainty as to future trajectories of the ANC-in-government, in party politics and in relation to the people. Yet many change factors intervene. Uncertainties rule, for example, on the nature of future leadership, and the duration of the period for which voters (especially black-African) will refrain from substantially punishing the ANC for deficits in governance. Simultaneously, the bulk of policy directions, government programmes and the ANC’s relationship to the people of South Africa have been manifested with certainty.

The book has been finalised at a time of excitement and apprehension for South Africa and the ANC. On the eve of the ANC’s centenary, four months beyond the 2011 local government elections, and moving towards 18 years in power, things in and around the ANC are changing. The ANC is weakening, even if election results do not universally reflect this. Its eroding position has not resulted in a national threat from any opposition party. Opposition inroads, especially from the Democratic Alliance (DA) in 2011, are not immediately threatening ANC base support. Yet they are a wake-up call to the ANC to sharpen its act towards indisputable organisational integrity and dignity, government effectiveness to more tangibly implement paper transformation, and to prevent a third round of ANC slippage in the electoral stakes following the elections of 2009 and 2011.

The ANC’s continuous strength is substantially due to the part of South African political culture that witnesses phenomena like the coexistence of protest against government (often directed at local authorities, even if caused by national and provincial under-performance) and election support for the ANC. As an extension of this strength, the ANC simultaneously operates on two parallel tracks of democracy – besides working in electoral and multiparty-institutional democracy mode, it relates directly to ‘the people’, engages them through government outreach and ANC structures, resolves ideological and policy issues within the ANC’s ‘broad church’ and Tripartite Alliance formation … and then closes ranks to fight off (thus far modest) opposition party electoral challenges.

The ANC’s relative weakness comes despite the fact that it has brought much and frequently profound change to South Africa. Life for South Africans is incomparably better in 2011 than under apartheid. But, in a slowly unfolding process too little has changed. New, growing inequalities mix with pervasive poverty and relentless unemployment. It is the ‘new’ South Africa in which so much of the racial and apartheid past remains reflected. Reliance on social grants is immense. The youth are disproportionately affected. The generous definition of youth and low life expectancy of South Africans further emphasise this upshot. The ways out of the quagmire are often opaque. The people’s, citizens’ and voters’ relationship with the ANC is at a point where things cannot be taken for granted – the ANC has arrived at a juncture where it increasingly has to work for continuous allegiance. The liberation dividend is ever more diluted. The ANC is fractured and wracked by power contestation that often eclipses policy and state governance processes. The ANC centrally struggles to retain control over local power hierarchies that frequently link politics and business. Simultaneously, it is not about to lose power. The ANC still retains a reservoir of generalised trust, along with specific electoral
support. Its own world of ‘parallel (to electoral) democracy’ remains virtually impene-
trable to opposition actors. In years and elections to come, however, the ANC indis-
putably will have to work harder to maintain its prestige and popular beliefs in its integrity
and legitimacy. The ANC will need all possible lessons on the regeneration of power
that it has learnt in its first 17 years in power.

**Linking the faces of political power**

Since 1990, the ANC’s first 21 years of engagement with political power in democratic
South Africa have been in the domains of its intra-organisational power struggles, its
connections with the people of South Africa and its own members, inter-party politics
and elections, and in relation to the ANC-in-government. This book explores the
changing relations of power within the party-state-people-opposition party complex.
All chapters assess how the particular chapter theme developed in the period of study,
the roughly 17 years from 1994 to 2011. The book follows an analytical approach,
whilst each chapter deals with thematically relevant aspects of past, present and future.

*Chapter 1* positions the analysis. It takes stock of the power shifts in the course of
the ANC’s rise to power, mainly through the mechanisms of negotiations and elections.
It follows through with the mapping of crucial moments and periods in the ANC’s
more than 17 years in power. It also highlights conceptual aspects of the use of the
term power in the study. The book thus searches for the manifestations of political
power as exercised by the ANC. It explores the links and the discontinuities,
the strengths and the weaknesses.

*Chapter 2*’s consideration of the Polokwane war, moving on to Mangaung in 2012,
is central to the ANC’s power anchors with the people, intra-ANC and inter-party
domains. The ANC is a mass movement, yet its branches, conference delegates, officials
and representatives – and their internal struggles – determine how the ANC fares when
it comes to the power anchors. The seven-year period from the ANC’s NGC meeting
of 2005 to its next national conference in Mangaung in 2012 demarcates an era of crucial
battle to keep the ANC on track in terms of organisational renewal, and managing the
wars of internal factions, the leagues and the provinces.

The ANC’s power cannot be assessed without reference to ‘people’s power’. This is
done in *Chapter 3*. ‘People’s power’ denotes the ANC’s special relationship with a large
segment of the people of South Africa. It is a complex, unique and direct relationship –
one that none of the opposition parties has been able to even vaguely emulate. It is
anchored in the ANC’s role as liberator and subsequent trusted guardian, and infused
with issues such as democratic centralism and popular legitimacy. It is also linked to
electoral power and protest. Yet it simultaneously stands in its own right. Populism and
a taste for continuous resistance have been harnessed to advance the relationship.

Janus-faced protest action reflects the strong direct relationship (unmediated through
elections) that the ANC maintains with the people of South Africa. *Chapter 4* shows
how, rather than vote for opposition parties, large numbers of citizens in a particular
period would either protest (or offer support for protest) against the ANC government,
even protesting violently, and then also vote for the ANC. ‘The brick’ supplements
‘the ballot’ in a dual repertoire of dissatisfied people relating to their ANC. Protests tell government to recognise problems of governance, and to step up action on representation-accountability and performance-delivery. Protest has frequently succeeded in getting government’s attention and, if not corrective action, at least renewed undertakings. In the time of the Zuma presidency, government action promised to move into the domain most needed at the time – action against corruption and incompetence. Incapacity and dysfunctionality at the level of especially the local state have been frequent backdrops to protest action.

Participatory democracy is part of the ANC-in-government’s primary ideal to create elaborate, hegemonic interfaces between people and government. It also serves to co-opt and subdue citizens in the face of suboptimal state performance. The ANC dominance over the South African state is high, and has assumed different manifestations across the different presidencies. Chapter 5 addresses the changing forms of public engagement in matters of state governance. It assesses how the repertoires of engagement have been accumulating over time, and how the ANC-in-government works to regenerate hegemonic power and convert protest into co-optation and complicity, along with co-responsibility.

Electoral power for the ANC is about more than winning elections and enjoying either an outright majority or perhaps being the most widely supported political party. For the ANC, electoral participation is a question of pride and remaining the undisputed, predominant party that enjoys a majority of hegemonic proportions. This is not just a question of popular legitimacy, but the ANC also recognises the importance of commanding electoral presence in continuously leveraging the state-institutional dominance necessary for facilitating leadership compliance in the hope of benefitting from patronage. The ANC over time has been astute in working pre-emptively, and even defensively as seen in the 2009 national and provincial and 2011 local elections, to counter perceptions of the ANC as ‘electorally strong but slipping’. Its 3-4 percentage point decline in 2009, under adverse conditions, emerged as an achievement of sorts. Its 2011 local election slippage to 62 per cent (for comparative purposes on the proportional vote) made the ‘colossus’ look distinctly fragile. Chapter 6 offers detailed trends and assessments.

Floor-crossing was part of the ANC’s act to clean up the party political scene and hasten the emergence of a new party system. By design or default, as Chapter 7 shows, floor-crossing helped the ANC to liquidate the National Party (NP), undermine the Democratic Alliance (DA), and in particular splinter and destabilise South Africa’s plethora of opposition parties. In many instances floor-crossing created a somewhat clichéd ‘rainbow space’ in which tens of tiny parties blossomed, often having broken away from their parent parties in legislative institutions. The Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), with the aid of floor-crossing, accelerated its decline from former liberation movement into one of the smallest micro-parties in Parliament and, by 2009, without representation in the provincial legislatures. Having played its catalyst role, floor-crossing was phased out, and buried in 2009. At the time of its death it had been thoroughly maligned and delegitimised in South Africa and in the ANC as well.
Chapters 8 and 9 explore the details of the ANC’s conquest of two important opposition parties. Both the old NP and the more recent Congress of the People (Cope) posed special threats to the ANC – the first through its latent and lingering presence, and the second by virtue of having split the ANC (although as election 2009 and subsequent politics testified, in an insignificant way). By 2010-11 the skeletons of the NP (later the New NP) hardly rattled anymore. Chapter 8 comprises a case study of how a political party, once the nemesis of the ANC, died. It was more than a question of the fate of a delegitimised apartheid party. The NNP had partially redeemed itself by officiating over the unbanning of political organisations and individuals, the withdrawal of security forces from the civil struggle, and by entering into negotiations that were regarded as ‘negotiating itself out of power’. The ANC’s post-GNU demolition of the NP showed how doggedly the ANC would act, not just to deal with an old foe, but also to show the DA and other emerging opposition parties how opportunistically the ANC would use the subversion of parties to try and capture the voter constituency within.

Chapter 9 tells the more recent story of the ANC’s subversion of the threat from Cope. The rise of Cope was as close to home and as threatening an opposition party presence as the ANC had experienced in its then 15 years of political power. The threat was ruthlessly subverted. Cope achieved a 7 per cent national presence in the 2009 elections becoming the third biggest political party in South Africa judged by electoral percentages. Yet this achievement condemned Cope to the mazes of legislative institutions, with the overwhelming burdens that they place on small opposition parties. Superimposed on this burden were an incessant leadership war and the phenomenon of the ‘two Copes’. There were indications that Cope would go into terminal decline, to the point of reconfiguring itself into an alliance, or its factions spreading into different alliances. Its significance for the ANC, however, was rather in bringing the knowledge that the threat could re-emerge, perhaps in a reinvigorated Cope, more likely in another future political party. The demographics of Cope’s electoral support showed that the space existed for future ‘Copes’. The Cope experiment served as a warning to wannabe dissidents: a possibly dismal party political fate awaits them should they exit the ANC. In this way, Cope may have worked to the benefit of the ANC, containing future comparable endeavours.

Moving into the state domain, Chapter 10 relates the tale of how state institutions fall victim to ANC succession wars, renewal and maintenance of support. Institutions were politically captured and potentially undermined in terms of longer-term capacity – ironically, whilst the ANC relied on state-institutional capacity to help build a reserve of good will and support in times when its legitimacy as liberation movement-turned-party was starting to decay. The Polokwane war was debilitating. The subsequent series of fall outs over party-state relations, deployment and redeployment, and institutional design have thus far been largely unsuccessful in ensuring high-level capacity for governance. The chapter investigates the nature, scope and impact of these struggles on the ANC’s hegemonic and electoral power projects.

The Presidency of South Africa denotes the heart of state power. It is both the object of intra-ANC contest and at the centre of broader political contestation. The quests included positioning for influence as close as possible to, if not within, the Presidency.
Many debates orbit the Presidency. The centralisation of power (real, perceived or both) and that of party versus state, are powerful examples. The Presidency draws incumbents in. It contributed to the fall of Mbeki, not so much because of its powers and the policies pursued, but because Mbeki’s close, personality-driven rein on its operations could foster arguments of centralisation, control and marginalisation of the ANC. It was redesigned in the time of the Zuma administration. **Chapter 11** investigates the changing composition, across presidencies, of the primary cluster of influences on the Presidency.

Policy is central to defining the identity of a movement and government, and the governing party’s governance project. **Chapter 12** deals with both the policy contest and changing policy substance over time. It shows how the ANC alliance and ANC leagues in effect monopolise the ideology-policy debate, courtesy of direct and continuous engagement with the SACP and Cosatu, and to an extent the ANC Youth League. Whether the two Tripartite Alliance partners were ‘marginalised’ outside the formal perimeters of government (under Mbeki) or first brought into the centre of government executive power (under Zuma), followed by a critical Cosatu being punished with more distance, the contest prevails. The Zuma administration’s action to **bring in** the Alliance (both based on principle and in recognition of Polokwane and election 2009 support) was in some respects destabilising. It threatened to delay decisions and required continuous policy clarification by the ANC. It was (**if and when** it was forthcoming) only the final word as spoken by Zuma that would put daily contestation to rest (alternatively, ambiguous compromise statements suspended contests). However, on the broader front policy contestation in the Alliance also had a legitimating impact. As long as the two alliance partners stayed on board, the ‘broad-church, multi-ideology, several-policy option, governing party for all’ ethos could prevail. The almost mythical (future) ‘turn to the left’ retained its status as the alternative that still beckoned with hope in case of the failure of the present governance project.

**Chapter 13** draws together the strands of the preceding chapters to reflect on the ANC’s projects of regeneration of power across the four faces of political power around which the book is organised. The book traced the elements of power in the ANC as party-movement and the power contests in its inner chambers, in the inter-party contests, of the ANC in relation to people’s power, and the ANC in operation in the South African state. The four domains are interrelated, but analytically differentiated. In each domain the ANC has been registering strengths and weaknesses. These are summarised. The chapter specifically highlights governance – where the ANC organisationally comes to bear on the operation of policy and institutions in and of the state, directed by leadership that the ANC exercises. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the ANC power projects circa 2011, and an underscoring of its ongoing projects of power regeneration.

**Interpretative synthesis and continuous tension lines**

The book is an interpretative synthesis of power trends and events concerning the ANC in power. It would clearly be impossible, except in an encyclopaedic series, to review all happenings, or offer all of the substantiating evidence to all arguments, interpretations and syntheses. The approach is rather to keep the text largely interpretative, synthesising trends, using illustrative quotations and offering references, resources and
further illustrations in endnote form. The empirical events that posit the power trends are often summarised in tables showing the sequences of salient events. Evidence, in the form of my preceding writings, academic research and consultancy projects, in media monitoring, and in other scholarly contributions, follow in the detailed endnotes.

There is never a good time to end a book on contemporary politics, even less so a book on a political movement on the eve of a centenary. Many of the tension lines remain open-ended. At my final cut-off point the ANCYL disciplinary hearings and related fallouts were hovering, we were awaiting the terms for the arms deal judicial inquiry, waiting to see whether President Zuma would redeploy misfiring cabinet members, watching whether the ‘Secrecy Bill’ would survive on the altar of ANC factional wars, studying the smoke above the Mangaung wars, taking the temperature of the maelstrom of protest and voting, and fixing our antennae on policymakers trying to fashion the next round of solutions to unemployment and government deficits and malfunctions. The trends that this book reveals were set to become even more intriguing. The frameworks and interrelations that the analysis puts down will, I trust, help us track the unfolding production.

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Susan Booysen
10 September 2011
The ANC’s power project is anchored in the organisational strength that this movement-party carries forward into its relationship with the people, its electoral performances vis-à-vis the other political parties, and the governance project in terms of which it exercises state power.

Organisationally the ANC is a formidable force. In many respects, politically, the movement-party is also a world of its own. Internally, it is frequently wracked by power contests, dissent and policy-ideological contestation, with or without the motive to use ideas in the quest for position, succession and hence control over the levers of power. The ANC acknowledges its weaknesses of careerism and pursuit of individual power and prestige rather than unambiguously commitment to selfless service – which would be in line with the overwhelmingly noble character of the ANC as liberation force. The ANC towards 18 years in power had become a vastly changed organisation from the one that waged the anti-apartheid liberation war. Yet, despite its weaknesses, its internal wars (often substituting for inter-party challenge) and its complex policy-ideological positioning, it remained the strongly dominant (and only modestly declining) party political force in South Africa.

Section 1 takes stock of the overall paradox of ANC power and its paths into and in political power (Chapter 1) and the Polokwane-towards-Mangaung contests for internal power (Chapter 2). It explores the Tripartite Alliance and the strengths and vulnerabilities it brings to the ANC. It links the alliance contests to the ANC Youth League (ANCYL) quest for centre-of-power status. The section demonstrates how the ANC regenerates power internally. The processes sometimes happen in flawed and manipulated ways, yet combine with movement character to render a continuously legitimate and popularly endorsed organisation that remains in a league of its own. The overall thrust of this section is that the ANC’s project of sustaining and regenerating its own power has entered a phase that is different and distinctly more uncertain than it had been in previous eras. The ANC remains powerful, and projects itself as the tested liberation movement government. Yet, it is a distinctly different organisation, increasingly driven by new types of cadres that pursue scaled-down dreams.
The African National Congress (ANC), more than 17 years after political liberation, is hard at work to ensure that it rules ‘until Jesus comes again’. It is working hard to make the ‘heaven’ of persistent ANC power happen. It works to continuously regenerate its power, thereby ensuring that post-liberation South Africans continue believing that their future and fortunes lie with the liberation movement-party. Without such processes, the ANC’s still-formidable power base is likely to suffer far-reaching erosion. As this book argues, the ANC de facto or systematically by design has been working to contain its post-peak losses of power.

In the 2011-12 conjuncture the ANC has retained the bulk of its liberation movement appeal. South Africans carry deep scars inflicted by apartheid, racism and colonialism. The ANC is the symbol of their liberation. Opposition parties might have rationally-valid appeals, highlighting alternatives to ANC lapses and ANC government deficits. However, the people still retain a deeper linkage to the ANC, one that is cultivated both in the form of an electoral majority and through the ANC nurturing direct and powerful bonds with the people.

There is no guarantee that this deep and presently still pervasive ANC-people bond will persist. The ANC works to avoid a Zimbabwe-like situation at all costs, one where the popularity of the former liberation movement is eclipsed by new alternatives. In this the ANC has been acting pre-emptively to avoid a situation where there is a dangerously narrow margin between the governing liberation movement-party and any opposition party. To do so it works continuously on all fronts to regenerate political power peacefully, by all means legally and constitutionally available. Its democratic integrity is unlikely to allow it to turn to Zimbabwe style violence on its own citizens. Its insurance is precisely to work systematically to defend and nurture popular support, and the power that such support leverages.

Through this carefully steered project the ANC has largely managed to reproduce its power-status across the four domains – ‘faces’ of political power:

- of movement-organisation;
- in relation to the people;
• as competitive political party formalising power through elections; and
• as party in command of most of the state.

The result hitherto is that the ANC has been largely unchallenged by other political parties. Yet the period since 1994 bears testimony to modest threats to this position and flaws in the ANC’s armour. There is evidence of the ANC having moved beyond previous peaks in political power. Retreats in proportions of voter support across the provinces (in both 2009 and 2011 in all provinces except KwaZulu-Natal), cynicism about prospects for improvement in government performance, its ethics in government and in engagement in profit-making enterprises, and rising societal inequality in the face of enrichment of a new elite illustrate spectacular flaws. However, a critical marker of the current epoch is that the electorate has not abandoned the ANC. Rather, people have continued voting for and generally endorsing the ANC, often despite doubts and recognition of its flaws.

Most seriously, divisions and contests centring on factions mobilising for intra-ANC and intra-government power wrack the ANC internally. Intra-alliance contests contribute to what often appears as internal free-for-all combat. The ANC Youth League (ANCYL) acts as an internal guerrilla force, a de facto fourth member of the alliance, trying to hold the top leadership to ransom through the threat of its king-making power and imputed custodianship of the new generation of voters that holds the key to party political fortunes. By 2011, and operating in conditions of the ban on campaigning for ANC succession at Mangaung in 2012, the battle of the vanguards took hold. The South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) locked horns with the ANCYL over the position of vanguard of the poor and the workers. Even this debate was burdened by suspicions about motives and which business interests were being safeguarded in the name of being the torch bearer for achieving the (substantial) outstanding revolutionary transformation of South Africa. In this battle for the heart and leadership of the ANC, the SACP was backing Jacob Zuma as potential guarantor of its continuous hold on the position of ANC secretary general. Cosatu was playing a delicate balancing game, with Zwelinzima Vavi veering between taking on the role of top internal opposition to the ANC, and retaining intra-Cosatu legitimacy.

These internal processes distract the ANC from unambiguously devoting its attention to government and the project of state governance. Progress in government and policy is undisputed, but is often overshadowed by far too modest progress in the triad of issues of poverty, unemployment and inequality. More populist forces, often driven by the ANCYL and executed through demagogy and basic instinct policy options, suggest more extremist routes, perhaps to garner hope among young South Africans that new policies will achieve more definitive differences, perhaps to map their own routes into patriotic capital.

In cadre circles on the ground the ANC has battled to retain control over deployment in the face of cabals that have worked to secure political and economic power through local government and ANC branch mobilisation. The ANC-in-government engages in serial institutional redesigns and cadre redeployment to help keep hope alive. It
often reports progress in terms of anticipated and ongoing action, rather than specific results and definitive turnarounds. It adopts moral stances and takes dipstick actions against transgressors of ethical codes of government, whilst stopping short of actions that would ‘indisputably root out’ these practices. This is combined with provincial and local government institutions and governance operations that fall far below the standard set by national government, which itself is often found lacking.

The epoch from 2010 onwards has lacked the euphoria, high optimism and unadulterated faith of people in the ANC, which characterised much of the first decade after liberation. The second decade was no longer one of automatic belief by a large proportion of the population that, given time, more change would come their way. Community protests, especially from 2004 onwards, signalled that people wanted action to supplement voting and ensure that the train to a better life would indeed stop in the local station. A political culture emerged in which large proportions of South Africans seamlessly combined between-election protest with electoral endorsements of the ANC. This dual repertoire was evident in the combination of criticising the ANC and voting for the ANC, protest voting for an opposition party like the Congress of the People (Cope) and then returning to the ANC, or in support for incisive ‘oppositional’ critiques of the ANC by Cosatu followed by statements of commitment to campaign for the ANC.

These actions send signals to the ANC that at a yet-to-be-specified time in the future the ANC will be held accountable in elections and punished for non-performance, and that the alliance partners need rewards for continuous loyalty. The pointers come at a time when the ANC top national and provincial structures are battling to retain control over local power enclaves where ANC power mongers, or power mongers acting in the name of the ANC, build control over who gets to be councillors and local bureaucrats, or branch delegates to national conferences.

Despite this torrent of deficits, people remain deeply attached to the ANC and continue to revere it. They are not abandoning the ANC, their liberation movement, by any stretch of the imagination … but the relationship has changed. The first two decades of post-apartheid political life in South Africa brought gradual changes that made the period from 2010-11 onwards qualitatively different from the preceding post-liberation order.

This book dissects ANC power over time, with the emphasis on where the ANC stands in 2011. It tells the story of the paradox of ANC power, simultaneously weak and strong, working across domains to retain and rejuvenate power. It explores how the ANC exercises and regenerates power organisationally, in relation to the people, in party politics, and in the state through policy and institutions. It deals with thematic extracts from these domains, or the ‘faces’, of ANC power. The overall power project, as dissected in the book, probably suggests a more coherent approach than the ANC actually follows in backrooms and boardrooms on strategy and tactics. The picture of ANC power operations that the book assembles, however, is the cumulative state of ANC operations that continuously unfold and which need to be considered to arrive at conclusions on ‘the state of power of the ANC’.
THE ANC AND THE REGENERATION OF POWER

The ANC has weakened over time, yet retains juggernaut status and remains forcefully in charge of South African politics and society. Even as a weakened organisation there are no prospects of replacing the ANC with another political party for the foreseeable future. A cohering, broadly trusted and in-charge ANC, the popular argument seems to be, will better serve the interests of South Africa than an ANC that crumbles and has no prospect of gaining mastery of government, and specifically of policy and delivery. Opposition parties are certainly not trusted to take over.

The period of analysis covered in this book was characterised by a succession of changes, victories, achievements, setbacks and recoveries. In each domain, the ANC’s power ebbed and flowed, yet hitherto not to a point of endangering its continuous close-to-hegemonic presence in South African society. The ANC has formally ascended into power, assumed and consolidated power, and shed and regenerated power across the domains of organisation, people, parties in relation to elections, and government. Evidence abounds of growth and consolidation of movement-party power; policy compromises, disappointments and setbacks; declines and fight-backs to regain lost power in community relations; and the quest to charge some continuously impenetrable windmills, such as the mass media (and, in effect, a larger chunk of public opinion), so as to capture them for the hegemony project. Each of the book’s chapters takes aim at one of these stories – a significant contest, manoeuvre or clash, how it unfolded over time and its status come 2011.

The ANC has arrived at a point where it increasingly needs to work for continuous support. The liberation dividend is retained, but needs constant polishing. The ANC remains undeniably strong in the party political stakes. In public opinion polls South Africans express high levels of trust in government and in many core leaders. They are optimistic about the future. They continue to support the ANC electorally on levels that far surpass those afforded to any opposition party. The ANC has a standing amongst the people that no other party currently can approximate, organisational and government flaws and all. It relates to the population in ways that are often not mediated by elections and institutions. It is simultaneously the governing party and the ‘parliament of the people’.

The ANC’s retention of legitimacy and power is anchored in its concurrent operation on two parallel tiers of democracy:

- On the one hand, there is representative, multiparty democracy, where inter-party and electoral contests formalise the scope of official ANC dominance. The ANC enjoys added impetus on this level through its continuous positioning as ‘liberation movement’. Through this status it speaks to South Africa as a whole, and effectively claims sole credit for delivering the country from past evils.
- On the other hand, there exists the world of ANC internal democracy (along with intra-Tripartite Alliance democracy) where the ANC relates directly to the people (often mediated by ANC provincial, regional, branch and league structures), and where most of the profound and fierce battles of South African politics play out. This level of action ensures that many of the divisive and
intractable issues of the day unfold in a space not penetrated by opposition parties that can take electoral power from the ANC.

The ANC seamlessly straddles, combines and mutually cross-pollinates these two strands of operations. The liberation struggle ethos and the understanding that the structural problems engendered by centuries of colonialism and decades of apartheid cannot be undone in a decade or two infuses the liberal-democratic sphere. In this vein, the national democratic revolution is unfolding progressively and this belief helps voters take electoral decisions. Change will come and the ANC champions the drive. Citizens, voters and ANC members continue as believers. Besides, there is little else, and to date no opposition party is trusted to be more likely than the ANC to help bring better fortune to the country and its people. Protest voting to scare and punish the ANC exists, but for the time being it is just that. The ANC’s parallel tier of democracy ensures that intense policy and leadership debates happen within safe confines, unthreatened by displacement from electoral and state power. The ANC ensures that this layer of democratic action infuses the state and helps it to control the state.

The ANC’s ‘power holding’ thus continuously changes. It suffers threats and setbacks, but the ANC does not sit back passively. As slippages occur 17 years and longer into political and government power, the organisation works to contain losses and regenerate power. ‘Regeneration’ thus refers to a project for the continuation of power, on parallel levels of democracy and across the four faces. Regeneration denotes the ANC’s determination not to irreversibly cede power.

CONCEPTUALISATION OF POLITICAL POWER IN RELATION TO THE ANC

The ANC’s use of power in the four domains of organisation-movement, government and the state, elections and inter-party politics, and the ANC in relation to the people are the four main dimensions – faces – of operationalising power in this book.

Conceptualisation of power and realised ANC power

Political power, the essence of politics, enables leaders, parties and governments to do things in the public realm. Parties and leaders aspire to it, because it facilitates the pursuit of high ideals and real-life benefits, both for others and themselves. It puts them in positions where they can make life-altering decisions and muster public resources in pursuit of constituency goals. The term power refers minimally to the balance between control and consent that governs the relation between ruler and the ruled. It leverages the ability, for example, of the ANC to effect decisions and gain compliance. Democratic power operates in the worlds of mandates and reservoirs of support to let governments and their party political leaders ‘get on with the job’ of governance. Popular trust and loyalty are key phenomena that give the ANC and government these powers. Electoral mandates are crucial expressions of the affirmative popular orientations. Without these forms of power, governments rule by force, coercion and outright violence. The ANC has not entered this tra-
Introduction: ANC pathways to claiming, consolidating and regenerating political power

In an altruistically defined ideal world, leaders use the power that political systems put at their disposal to govern with the sole or predominant objective of advancing the interests of their constituents, or a country. Here the ANC would add the necessity of a revolutionary ethic in pursuit of the struggle for full liberation. In best-reality it is frequently about political leaders that govern from carefully crafted platforms that combine the public and private driving forces and arrive at a credible compromise. In the nemesis world, own interest often overshadows the public good in the drive to capture the position and privilege that go with publicly held political power. Political realists admit that the exercise of political power cannot be anything but the symbiotic co-existence of the personal, the organisational and the popular. No political party, movement or individual leader freely admits the predominance of individual or elite-group interest in their public power projects. In the case of the ANC the two have been converging and cohering, in many instances uncomfortably and embarrassingly. Its saviour has been the balance of the private pursuits and the public good.

The analysis touches on the dimensions of ‘who has the real power’, and what forces push the ANC to govern in particular ways, or to effect (or not to effect) certain policy decisions. Much of the analysis is located in the behavioural world, whilst interpretations also recognise the possibility that power is at its most effective when least observable.

The conceptualisations and analyses in this book are those of the author as a political scientist. Much of the economic bases of the reproduction of political power are covered, without the economic aspects being elevated to predominant themes. The analysis is unashamedly that of the superstructure – albeit recognised to be extensively impacted by economic power – of politics and how political processes have been playing out over time in the period of democracy in South Africa. The analysis also concentrates on power in the national rather than international and global domain, with recognition of essential influences.

The ANC’s 20 years of encounters with formal political power – state power – have brought changes that have transformed the movement, along with South African politics, the people and the state itself. In many respects the ANC’s decades-long challenge to apartheid power and its own ascent into power are well recorded, yet the four faces of its political power (with their economic bases) have not been assessed side-by-side, thematically and over time, as this book does. In inter-weaving the ANC’s many interfaces with political power, a multi-faceted canvas emerges. The picture sheds light on past and present, and helps define many of the future contours of political life in South Africa.

In 2011 the ANC, both as party-movement and governing party, was in an extended period of working against forces that threatened to reduce its stature as an organisation and forestall it in achieving greater realisation of its ideals in government. There were many suggestions that the ANC’s power was past its peak. There was less certainty than at any time since the ANC’s rise to power of the extent to which it would be able to regenerate and restore the power it had lost.
ANC power and legitimacy, patronage and privilege

In operational terms, power in this book is defined as the ability to influence or control decisions and directions, be it in the ANC, in the ANC-in-government, or in the Alliance via the ANC and/or government. Popular and voter support deliver the space to do these things. Power comes mostly on state, government, organisational, community and individual levels. Power brings the positioning to help realise the noble ideals of the liberation movement, as expressed in the 1955 Freedom Charter, or at least to move South Africa closer to those ideals.

The basis of contemporary ANC power remains its liberation movement status. By virtue of being elected to govern and occupy the positions of government and state power, a further layer of power follows. Institutional or organisational placement brings to the individual and collective the factor of reputation. A party gains power by being seen to be making progress in pursuit of shared ideals, or being imagined to be better able to do that than opposition parties. Power also results from being justly financially rewarded in the pursuit of these tasks. The status associated with position in the ANC, but mostly with representing the ANC-in-government, brings power, prestige and privilege. It is accepted that politics brings wealth to the political elites. If wisely or shrewdly handled, to some extent irrespective of morality, such power can be self-regenerative, and bring with it the additional power of privilege and economic beneficiation, in either ethical or criminally inappropriate ways.

It is a complex task to draw the line where legitimate personal power and prestige ends, and where the untoward begins. When does the award of tenders to acquaintances, friends and constituents cross into inappropriate (dubious, even if perhaps not outwardly corrupt) behaviour? When do constituents start objecting? When does the introduction of these people to power-holders to facilitate tendering and contracting border on (or embrace) corruption? Is it ever sufficient to declare interest and then proceed with involvement in contracts and projects? In terms of organisational power, to what extent is the status of the ANC, as the commanding party, with its liberation struggle icon status, a guarantor of access to private and corporate funding, both national and international?

Patronage is another substantial form of power. Patronage was a serious consideration for many in not mobilising against Thabo Mbeki in 2007, fearing that he would retain power and then cut their access. It was even more pertinent for those switching allegiance to Jacob Zuma. In 2006 Blade Nzimande argued that because of patronage many people had become fearful of expressing themselves … they are now ‘owned’.

Because of the dangers of this patronage, [members] become members of other members of the ANC … [they] joined certain individuals.

The quiet avalanche of internal conversion to the Zuma camp circa 2007 was frequently driven by the knowledge that this grouping at the time represented the victorious order. The conversion of elected representatives, political appointments to government, and bureaucrats helped consolidate the shift to Zuma. It helped ensure that the ANC would remain a considerable electoral force.
Milestones in ANC power

When the question is asked as to how much longer and to what extent the ANC can continue holding sway over politics in South Africa, at least at the level that prevailed in 2011, attention turns to conceptual questions of defining what is to be looked at in asserting, for example, that ‘the ANC reached a peak in power’, ‘the ANC suffered setbacks in its exercise of power’, or ‘the ANC consolidated power’. Power needs to be operationalised and concretised in terms of observable phenomena. In line with this chapter’s broad conceptualisation of power, and the tracking of the ANC over close to a century (see Annexure 1), power will be assessed in terms of phenomena such as:

- The ANC’s command of internal contestation within the movement, and the extent to which the ANC emerges as unified – noted in relation to factionalism, intra-alliance fall outs, the ANCYL taking shortcuts into power, split-offs and performance in ANC elections;
- The ANC’s electoral performance vis-à-vis opposition parties, including how the ANC counters challenges posed by specific opposition parties, and the enthusiasm with which voters endorse mandates to the ANC;
- The willingness of South Africans to work with the ANC-in-government, and to assume co-responsibility for the ANC’s (and to a lesser extent other political parties’) governance projects;
- The continued convergence of protest and voting for the ANC, a phenomenon that has been serially realised in South Africa; and
- The ANC’s command of formulating and realising policies that do justice to the aspirations and expectations of the population, along with the ANC putting the required institutional arrangements in place to govern.

These indicators of ANC power pertain to distinct dimensions, or the ‘faces’ of ANC power. Power across the faces are illustrated in Table 1 (listings are illustrative, not exhaustive).

Most of the dimensions depicted in Table 1 are still uncertain in their standings circa 2011 – or in the extent to which they bolster or undermine the ANC’s power standings. For example, a tipping point of uncertain impact is internal contestation and lingering intra-movement discontent.

On the one hand, the internal wars of 2005-09, and their continuation in new configurations thereafter, weakened the ANC. They undermined the ANC’s command over state institutions and distracted the ANC-in-government from service delivery and policy implementation in general. However, the period of internal discontent and the specific fallout in 2008, related to the formation of Cope, came at a time when the ANC’s public credibility was falling, caused by both failures in government policy (and in particular policy implementation), and a feeling that the ANC had become arrogant in power. With the transition to Zuma the ANC found the opportunity to associate the past with the now-expunged Thabo Mbeki, to selectively disinherit the past, and to project the notion of tabula rasa, or starting over.
This offered the ANC a reprieve. The movement had the opportunity to mount a huge 2009 election mobilisation campaign. People often identified with the ‘victim Zuma’ who was still in the process of surmounting the legal charges of corruption, fraud and racketeering that were seen to have been fostered by the Mbeki camp. These processes worked to the immediate advantage of the ANC, yet remained uncertain in their longer-term

**TABLE 1: Continuums of operationalised ANC power**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DOMAINS</th>
<th>Typical Indicators – manifested or potential</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>INDICATIONS OF STRONG ANC POWER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organisational</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal contestation in the ANC</td>
<td>Unity / cooperation despite contestation, smooth leadership handovers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Electoral</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral standing of the ANC</td>
<td>Retains support of above 60 per cent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handling threats posed by opposition parties</td>
<td>Subsume parties, form alliances / co-opt, above-board campaigns to defuse.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eliciting public participation and gaining co-responsibility</td>
<td>Active participation, belief that it helps governance, and inputs are taken to heart.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Governance and policy</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adopting policies that speak to community needs</td>
<td>Policies address the exact community needs directly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Putting in place and managing institutions for policy implementation</td>
<td>Weak institutions are redesigned, removed; coordination of functions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Popular and ‘the people’</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affecting the lives of people through improved conditions</td>
<td>Economic and social indicators show that policies are working.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community reaction through protest</td>
<td>Continues to be trusted to deliver, despite protest.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s conceptualisation and operationalisation.
impact on its power. For the longer term, it remained uncertain whether the Zuma victory and the 2009 election marvel would be durable. It was certain, however, that the ANC was not being given a full start-over card: it was unlikely to receive another 15 years of patience, like the ANC under Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki had received a decade and a half earlier. Against this the ANC remained hugely powerful, retaining abilities to self-correct and regenerate power. Despite vulnerabilities and dents, it had the capacity to continue on power highs for a considerable period of time. The evidence in these chapters is that the ANC would be using its full might to make this happen.

**The ANC’s modes of contestation for power**

The identification of the modes of contestation for political power that are in use by the ANC helps dig below the surface of changes in power in, through and around the ANC. The modes were operationalised in the context of the struggle, negotiation and governance eras. They concern the ANC in relation to its internal politics, other political parties, in government and the state, and in relation to the people. In variegated forms of struggle, across periods and eras, the ANC mainly used:

- resistance by delegation, appeals and peaceful mobilisation;
- armed struggle, along with international and domestic mobilisation against apartheid;
- underground projects of intelligence, sabotage and ‘terror’;
- strategic constitutional negotiations;
- party political electoral contestation;
- internal ANC processes – electoral, internal purges, deployment, promotions and cadre control;
- legally and constitutionally sanctioned processes of state power;
- policy renewal and the redesign and repopulation of state institutions, among others through cadre deployment;
- implementation of electoral mandates;
- wresting of class power through the addition of black economic empowerment (BEE) elites to the existing cross-racial middle classes; and
- the superimposition of the party on the state in the quest for hegemony.

**The state of ANC power**

There are no definitive answers as to the state of ANC power, circa 2011. It continuously evolves. Effective power changes internally in each of the four identified domains, and the relative contributions of these domains to the overall complex of ANC power changes constantly as does their relation to one another. Hence, electoral power can substitute for what the ANC may lack in direct and organic links with the people, whilst power that the ANC exercises through legitimate public policy and state institutions may override weaknesses in the ability of branch organisation to mobilise people, and so forth. The chapters explore the details of these changes and relationships.
The ANC’s rise to power, its assertion of a hold over, consolidation of, and defensive actions to guard its power assumed many faces and voices over time. Some of the shifts happened chronologically; or unfolded throughout the period, whilst the effects of others were limited to specific sub-periods. Illustrations of the state of ANC power include:

- The contemporary ANC reaps substantial benefit through association with its historically quite unambiguously virtuous role as an organisation and liberation movement (with blemishes like Quatro arguably being serious aberrations on the radar screen). This virtuous status was anchored in both the inherent values that the ANC held and the evil of the apartheid system it fought and, in some respects, continues to fight.
- In a gradual post-1990 shift in power, the ANC progressively extended pockets of new societal and state power.
- It formally ascended to power through election 1994 and consolidated power by reorganising the state, implementing new provincial structures and dissolving the bantustans.
- In introducing new policies the ANC started effecting social transformation. Deviations like its stance on HIV-AIDS in the time of Mbeki, lapses across presidencies in asserting political morality in the region, the virtual collapse of education policy and the school system (despite multiple policy initiatives), and failure to generate sufficient growth and jobs (notwithstanding a plethora of plans), were substantial. Yet, at least for the present, they have not significantly detracted from overall ANC power.
- Dealing with party political opposition, the ANC countered both significant and minor opposition onslaughts at election times. Formidable election campaigns countered losses; lesser campaigns saw the ANC suffer the consequences. It remained to be seen whether the DA would be the party to break the ANC’s definitive hold on electoral power. The mass media stepped into the gap and fulfilled the roles that many of the mostly minor opposition parties could not do – to the chagrin of the ANC.
- Dealing with new forms of contestation from within, the ANC became an arena for continuous mobilisation for deployment and access to government power. Strategies to manage government often became secondary to success in succession battles. It was necessary to mobilise the right camps to gain loyalty and active support. The most secure way to do so was to tie significant elites into positions of power and privilege, both within government and in the private sector.
- The ANC reorganised class power, benefitting the middle classes in particular, and generally improving conditions for the working and sub-working classes, yet without delivering them from poverty and inequality. Intra-race inequality became a major feature of South African society with whites, on average, remaining the best-off, best-paid and most-employed of the racial groupings. The country’s Gini coefficient surged to No. 1 in the world.
• The ANC built a financial kingdom that made it virtually untouchable among the political parties. There were direct financial holdings, often leveraged through state power. Deployed comrades and BEE beneficiaries paid their financial dues to benefit the organisation that had delivered financial prosperity to them. State contracts (both legal and in the shadow world of ‘not illegal but of dubious judgement’) contributed to positioning the ANC as, by far, the best-resourced party in South Africa.

• The ANC as regional hegemon and international interlocutor wielded widely recognised international power. Yet its self-subjugation to values of respect for elderly leaders and national sovereignty often left it hamstrung.

MAPPING THE ANC’S PATHWAYS TO POWER

The periodised mapping of the ANC in relation to political power reviews pathways that it traversed in its first 20 years of engagement with formal state power. The rest of the book cuts across periods thematically – this section provides the broad historical trajectory that is the background to the book’s chapters. The periodisation maps the ANC’s main pathways to and in political power from 1990 onwards. It outlines a series of phases, noting the continuous exchanges and interactive effects between the four domains of political power in which the ANC’s power was realised. Contemporary challenges to the ANC’s exercise of power rise against the background of the historical feats of the ANC, especially since the early 1990s. Both the present and future are better fathomed against this background.

From the early power shifts away from the ancien régime to negotiations

The ANC started assuming de facto political power when the balance of forces shifted in its favour and that of associated forces from the mid-1980s onwards. Pivotal factors were the modest armed struggle that combined with internal mobilisation, which saw civil society in revolt over a broad front. The business community increasingly ignored dictates of ‘separate development’ and the international community enforced specialised and economic sanctions. The ‘moment’ of the long-drawn interregnum between mobilisation and extensive resistance, along with internal and external peaceful but forceful protest and eventual unbanning brought the ANC to the point of being ready to assume power in the about-to-be-born democratic South Africa of 1994. Detention and exile in combination with internal resistance had created a leadership core that would in due course be further legitimised through internal-ANC and national elections.

Once the unbanning of organisations and negotiations started in 1990, there was no turning back. This was despite the hurdles that had to be overcome prior to the 1993 agreement and scheduling of the April 1994 elections. The challenges came from several sides. There were serious doubts about the suspension of the armed struggle and striking a deal with the apartheid-regime enemy. The ANC’s own Operation Vula was evidence of this. The Azanian People’s Organisation boycotted the negotiation
process and would not participate in the 1994 elections – although it later came to believe that this had been a mistake. The reactionary ‘white right’, both intra- and extra-system, posed challenges. The Afrikaner Weerstandsbebeweging (AWB) briefly laid siege to the World Trade Centre, the nerve centre of constitutional negotiations. Some white intra-system challenges were addressed through a 1992 whites only referendum, aimed at legitimising continued negotiations. Apart from the ANC those participating in the negotiations were mainly the government, the National Party (NP) (separately represented at the negotiating table), parties to its liberal left, inclusive of (legally enforced) ‘white’ parties, the so-called coloured and Indian parties that had participated in the Tricameral Parliament, and the bantustan parties. The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) was obstinate, bolstered through the civil war that raged in its provincial base of (what subsequently became) KwaZulu-Natal and townships of Gauteng. The state security and intelligence forces were divided on the process and were responsible for many instances of destabilisation.

Negotiation lines blurred to effectively constitute two camps – the ANC versus the NP. Internal, previously intra-system parties often sided with the ANC. There were many direct and public confrontations, whilst backroom consensus-seeking propelled the process. The ANC’s negotiation path was tainted with compromises arrived at outside the constitutional negotiations of the World Trade Centre in meetings with business forces, both national and global. Yet these different sets of negotiations offered a way into power – a platform from which further battles to convert a ‘settlement victory’ and further the ‘national democratic revolution’ would be conducted. Negotiation benchmarks along the way – such as the compromises and settlements on sunset clauses, a constitutional state, and a unitary state with certain federal characteristics – served to legitimise the process and consolidate the largely unidirectional nature of the transition. Joe Slovo observed, regarding the compromise actions:

There are, however, certain retreats from previously held positions which would create the possibility of a major positive breakthrough in the negotiating process without permanently hampering real democratic advance. Let me at once grasp the nettle and specify some areas in which compromise may be considered as part of an acceptable settlement package … [The] ‘sunset’ clause in the new constitution which would provide for compulsory power-sharing for a fixed number of years in the period immediately following the adoption of the constitution … This would be subject to proportional representation in the executive combined with decision-making procedures which would not paralyse its functioning …

The suspension of the armed struggle, and the concentration of ANC and other previously banned parties’ and organisations’ energies on negotiations propelled the process onto centre stage. Despite the presence of destabilising forces, it was clear that the ancien régime was ceding power.

The period was interspersed with several near-reversals, especially the assassination of Chris Hani, Operation Vula and threatened right-wing revolts. The Hani assassi-
nation ended up being the most tangible point in shifting the balance of power towards the ANC. The April 1993 Hani funeral was a watershed moment. The assassination\textsuperscript{24} had brought South Africa to the brink of a return to violent struggle. Events on that day could have pushed the transition over the edge, into mayhem, or the anger could be channelled into the negotiated transition process. The authority of Nelson Mandela on the day of the mass funeral in the FNB Stadium in Johannesburg, along with the endorsement of leaders such as Joe Slovo, tilted the process towards the path of negotiation.\textsuperscript{25} They harnessed popular anger into a drive to conclude the negotiations and grab power from the old regime through elections. Nelson Mandela and the ANC successfully claimed moral authority and brought a definitive shift of power to the ANC. Expectations were running high and negotiations were proceeding, albeit with further obstructions ahead.

**The pre-1994-election period, turmoil, transitional government and ‘miracle elections’**

The pre-election period was one in which the certainty of emerging as the winner in liberation elections combined with the uncertainties of the exact outcome and the precise power that the NP would retain. The ANC operated in the knowledge that the competitor liberation movement, the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), had already been definitively eclipsed. Yet an array of reactionary internal forces resorted to brinkmanship and threatened reversals.

The introduction of a few months of joint government, through the Transitional Executive Council (TEC) in the run-up to the 1994 election, was a crucial point that confirmed the shift at the Hani funeral, the conclusion of the negotiations and agreement on an election date and Interim Constitution. O’Malley describes the TEC event as ‘the first grip on state power for the extra-parliamentary liberation movements of South Africa’.\textsuperscript{26} The TEC saw ANC and NP functionaries, jointly, in the final months leading to election 1994 taking responsibility for important state departments and their administration.\textsuperscript{27}

This part of the ANC’s road to power was also demarcated by other broader events and processes. The PAC waited until January 1994 to formally suspend its armed struggle. Internal violence in the transitional years often amounted to civil war. This was endemic in the province of KwaZulu-Natal, but also in townships (especially in Gauteng) and bantustan areas in many other parts of South Africa. The wars of the late 1980s and 1990s in the KwaZulu-Natal Midlands repeatedly threatened to derail the transition. In late March 1994 De Klerk declared a state of emergency in the province. The violence combined with the IFP playing a game of brinkmanship in negotiations, of ‘now-in, now-out, another concession or a bit more publicity, please’. In another action, in a late March anti-elections march in central-Johannesburg the IFP circled the ANC’s Shell House headquarters, appeared to threaten attack, and violently clashed with ANC security staff. It was only on 19 April that the IFP was persuaded to participate in the 27 April 1994 elections. There was an immediate de-escalation of violence.
The IFP was not the only bantustan political force that threatened to derail the transition and the pending elections. In the final months of the run-up to the 1994 elections the then bantustan of Bophuthatswana remained poised on the brink of unleashing chaos and destabilisation. Its governing party was aligned with white reactionary and culturally exclusivist forces in the form of the Concerned South Africans Group (Cosag), which was also described as an informal alliance between the white right wing and the IFP. It included the white right wing in the form of the Conservative Party (CP) and the Freedom Front (FF). The final stand-off in March 1994 in Bophuthatswana saw a revolt by security forces and citizens demanding reincorporation into South Africa, followed by a Cosag invasion, and the TEC’s high-power intervention that removed Bophuthatswana leader, Lucas Mangope, from power. The right-wing onslaught was subverted and Bophuthatswana began hasty preparations for the April elections. Tensions were at breaking point.

It was an excruciating transitional period. The shift of power to the ANC was certain, but the stability that eventually followed remained one of the most uncertain factors in the transition. With the Bophuthatswana rebellion still fresh in South Africans’ minds, a right-wing car-bomb blast three days prior to the main polling day ripped through downtown Johannesburg, near the ANC regional headquarters, killing nine and injuring 92. South Africa continued to reverberate with reports of the right wing stockpiling arms. Analysts would not predict peace on voting day and in the period thereafter. The following day another car bomb was detonated at a Germiston taxi rank, killing ten and injuring 40. The explosions were supposed to be the signal for the revolt of the ‘right’. With a hovering spectre of Armageddon, the voting days of April 1994 would tangibly be in the genre of a ‘miracle’. More than 20 million voters queued and the new South Africa entered.

The ANC sealed the preceding period of liberation struggle and uncertain-outcome negotiations with a commanding electoral victory, yet with the knowledge that substantive transformation remained a longer-term quest. The most formidable immediate hurdles would be the capture of the South African state and getting the economy to support the transformation project in all its enormous challenges and complexities. The extent to which it would be a race against time, whilst the liberation movement legacy and the miracles of a negotiated outcome and elections persisted, remains one of the great uncertainties today.

**Celebration and constraints on assuming, consolidating and sustaining political power**

Election 1994 had the profound role of confirming the ANC as the popular and legitimate heir to state power in South Africa, in the spirit of reconciliation, nation building and limited co-governance with the former apartheid foe. Assuming power and taking over control of the state and government was, however, no simple matter.

The early days of the ANC in power (in government) were celebratory, ecstatic, and accompanied by the likely underestimation of the full scope of the required turnaround. The first five years were a rollercoaster of capturing and populating public institutions.
There was the gratification of policy substitution, anchored in a culture of human rights, recognition of the need for restitution and progressive politics, infused by an economy that was turning away from the severe decline of the late-apartheid years. The era brought liberal democracy with gradualist, piecemeal transformation. Processes were enhanced by both the (final) Constitution of 1996 and new supportive legislation. New government, new policies and new orientations, fundamentally to care for all people, were substantially counter-balanced by growth paths and patterns of accumulation that continued.

There was, for example, consideration given to the Slovo sunset clauses of the negotiated settlement, which were generally seen as guaranteeing civil servants continued employment. Although, Phillip Dexter argued, it was in practice the complexity of the task of rationalising and aligning the public sector that consumed time. The Interim Constitution of 1993 had guaranteed a period of Government of National Unity (GNU) with former political foes. The NP and the IFP were not just incorporated into the executive on ministerial and deputy ministerial levels, but also continued to occupy important positions of power in two of the provinces, the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal. The first sets of elections confirmed their positions. Whilst sunset clauses and the GNU indeed contributed to reconciliation, inclusivity and tolerance helped seal the transition and nation-building. The dispensation aided international confidence in South Africa, yet placed constraints on the ANC governing South Africa in the way it had idealistically envisioned.

The assumption of power combined with the effects of decades of social and economic exclusion and deprivation to bring heightened expectations of access to state means and resources. This was, in the first place, in benefitting from the liberation party’s control over the state. Despite South Africa having taken the liberal-democratic route, most people expected that democracy would bring a far more substantial change than having the right to vote for the government of their choice. Deeper social transformation was an integral part of their expectations. The legitimacy of the 1996 Constitution with its emphasis on second generation human rights illustrated this. In the second place, the expectations concerned the economic well-being and class status of the black capitalist class, bordering on a comprador bourgeoisie. As the ANC expressed it in its 2007 conference documentation:

…because [the black capitalists’ group] is dependent in part on co-operation with elements of established white capital, they are susceptible to co-option into serving its narrow interests – and thus developing into a comprador bourgeoisie. Because their advancement is dependent on a variety of interventions and, as with all private capital, on opportunities provided by the state, they are constantly tempted to use corrupt means to advance their personal interests – and thus developing into a parasitic bureaucratic bourgeoisie. The liberation movement must combat these tendencies.

It was in this class that the need for service to the community and for resolution of the social problems of inequality and lack of development became conflated with personal
advancement that was legitimised as an integral part of the social development of society. In dealing with state resources, outsourcing along with tendering processes and public sector contracting, vast new worlds of reshaping South Africa’s class structure unfolded. The policy of BEE both ensured the relatively rapid, even if still partial, correction of some of the race-class disproportionalities, and bolstered inequality and the experience of injustice in society.\textsuperscript{34} Seventeen years into democracy, a heightened awareness was evident of the difference in the extent to which elites and ‘ordinary people’ had benefitted from the democratic transition. The ethos of cadreship\textsuperscript{35} was another significant blockage here.

Constraints on the exercise of power also came from the global political and economic environment of the time. The ANC stepped into power in the short-term aftermath of the collapse of the communist-driven Eastern Bloc, the source of much of its struggle backing. With the ANC’s ascension to power came the self-recognised need to advance from liberation movement to government-in-waiting and then to government, and to act out the associated roles. These included operating within the constraints of the predominantly capitalist global order and working to present an ‘investor-friendly’ setting in order to embark on chosen growth paths. The ANC in many respects, 17 years into political power, was still working to reconcile the struggle and government ethos. This was natural, given the constraints experienced by any governing party that aspires to more than piecemeal and patch-up actions. For the ANC, however, the problem was that of the real deprivation of its followers, and the imperative to ‘make right’ on their expectations.

The constraints on the consummation and exercise of power, undergirded by ideological tensions and resentment of the Mbeki hold on power, would help precipitate the 2005-07 rebellion in the ANC. The clash was aided by the dual impact of elite power seen not to have been adequately shared with enough of the aspiring elite, and ideological-policy clashes, often also held (or alternatively opportunistically used) by those who had been (or were feeling) excluded. Differentiating opportunistic self-interest from altruistic ideological belief and democratic conviction that informed the drive for changing of the guard remain tenuous endeavours.

Stock-taking a decade on – delays and recognition of the elusive ‘better life for all’

In the first five years of post-1994 democracy the popular culture was one of patiently waiting for the realisation of the 1994 ‘promises’. When the icon of democracy and liberation, Nelson Mandela, vacated the West Wing of the Union Buildings in 1999, Thabo Mbeki consolidated his de facto rule, and moved in on the wings of expectations of getting ‘down to business’. This was accompanied by anticipation of better and faster justice especially for black-African South Africans, along with visions of elite-driven empowerment to start filling in the gaps in expectation. Mbeki heralded a new Africanism with his ‘I am an African’ speech. He was the proud national symbol of the Africanist president who had credibility, even if uneven popularity, across the continent. He was widely anticipated to be the statesman to lead South Africa to the Canaan of ‘the better life for all’.

Expectations continued at high levels, even when, a decade into democracy, stock-taking projects indicated severe deficits in socio-economic transformation and few
assurances that it would arrive any time soon. By the end of the ANC’s first decade in power there was both elite and citizen knowledge that the fulfilment of expectations would require new initiatives, continuous pressure and insistence on accountability. Representative democracy was not the silver bullet. This period was complicated by the fall out among the ANC political elite. The Polokwane succession war was fuelled not just by individual and factional ambition, but equally by the need to secure change – even if the ANC would be continuing as the electorally dominant party that continued to occupy most of the positions of state power. The same phenomenon would be reinvented in the time of the Zuma administration.

**Business of government, delivery and silences**

Delivery proceeded apace, and far-reaching albeit uneven transformation resulted. In neo-managerialist manner, the Mbeki regime recorded its delivery steps through notching up the change indicators for access to water, electricity, basic health care, education, sanitation, and in latter years social welfare, among others. The calculation of the ‘social wage’ helped show how much South Africans’ lives had improved, even if poverty and unemployment statistics threatened to torpedo the ship. There was always the delivery deficit of more required as per the objectives of the new policies than had been delivered. Mbeki moved into state of the art models of state organisation to facilitate delivery. Designs abounded, and the Presidency and state featured centrally, although controversially so for the extent of centralisation that was effected. Finely designed systems were the order of the day, from the Presidency of South Africa at the highest level down to carefully crafted models for local government organisation that were accompanied by expectations of citizen participation. Yet government structures on the levels of provinces and municipal government often faltered.

The silences in government policy and action spoke loudly. The background was that people lived in poverty in larger numbers, with a greater Gini coefficient in the country, and with higher numbers of continuous unemployment (despite occasional improvements) than were ever envisaged in 1994. The education system seemed incapable of turning the corner. Lapses in health policy and its implementation – including gross injustices on the HIV-AIDS front – meant that more people died or lacked continuous access to treatment and an acceptable quality of life than could be comfortably associated with a liberated South Africa driven by social justice. This was not for lack of initiatives announced, in ways that Mbeki and his associates proposed and the ANC endorsed. There were plans such as the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (AsgiSA), the Joint Initiative on Priority Skills Acquisition (Jipsa) and the War on Poverty. South Africa’s democracy in the time of Mbeki became the contradictory site of uncertain outcomes beyond knowing that the 1994 ideals remained out of reach. Deficits and shortcomings mixed with the celebration of achievements. Being an economic model to Africa contrasted with hushed stands on political and moral issues of the sub-continent. Liberation icon status in election time reflected South Africans continuously endorsing a party-movement that remained trusted, even if it fell short on delivery.
Window for reassessment brought by succession struggles

Intra-ANC contestation, accompanied by vigorous campaigns, to a large extent substituted for inter-party challenges to the ANC in the elections of 2009. The Mbeki-Zuma transition foregrounded the universal tension between party and state and ‘who governs’. The Mbeki period was known as the era in which government lost contact with ‘the party’. The successor Zuma administration often characterised the Mbeki era as ‘government gone wrong’, whilst at election times parading the achievements of the Mbeki administration. The counter-Mbeki moment held the advantage of renewing relations with voters and claiming new beginnings. Rather than turning stale in power, like many ruling parties (and liberation movement governing parties) do in the face of imperfect delivery, the ANC in the interregnum between Mbeki and Zuma (in the time of a then challenging opposition party) had the chance to reinvent itself and re-learn the lessons of remaining humble and connected with the people who are its source of power.

Election 2009 showed how the ANC could partially reinvent itself. The vast majority of the electorate showed that it was persuaded by the election campaign. The message that the ANC, despite problems, was trusted to deliver better and change more lives for the better than any of the other political parties carried weight. The ANC of Jacob Zuma inherited the challenge to infuse the state apparatus, and particularly the civil service, with the ethos of serving the people and servicing the ANC’s electoral mandate. This was going to be no easy task, as the ANC-in-government struggles of 2009 onwards showed.

The transition from Mbeki to Jacob Zuma brought to the fore the ‘unspoken side’ of South Africa’s democracy. It was Mbeki’s style of governance of the South African state and the ANC, accompanied by both his playing god over appointments and continued deployment, and his belief in the right to run for a third term as ANC president that unleashed the discontent. The duel became a vehicle to articulate the silences and contradictions of the preceding period of ANC governance, even if ideological divergence was not the inspiration behind the fall out. In the course of mobilisation for succession the Zuma camp became the vehicle for vaguely articulated policy and governance alternatives. Better government caring and responsiveness were envisaged. The mobilisation drew on challenges by the two Tripartite Alliance partners, Cosatu and the SACP.

The restlessness stirred up the hope for policy change and organisational renewal, yet with seeming certainty that only limited change would result. There were endeavours to extract an approximate or proxy left alternative from the policies which, hitherto, had hardly been vehemently opposed and for which the Zuma camp shared paternity. In subsequent years this duality haunted the Zuma administration. In its first year of incumbency, it increasingly admitted to ‘no substantial policy change’. In its second year it advanced a New Growth Path (NGP), which was judged as largely recycled-old upon its release in October 2010 and fine-tuning at the time of the 2011 State of the Nation address. In the third year Cosatu and the ANC-in-government continued to strike compromises to help make the NGP more palatable to organised labour.
Distinctly ‘left’ policy movement was evident in the extension of access to health and education – yet turnaround effected was partial and porous.

Given the fact that shortcomings in policy delivery converged with capacity constraints, perceived or real corruption and frequent poor motivation in the public sector, uncertainty prevailed as to the extent to which amended policies would address problems. As the bottom-line, policy delivery and thus potentially relations with citizens turned out to be a dimension of power over which the ANC had limited control, irrespective of which president was in charge. Ironically, and irrespective of how necessary the turnover-renewal was for the ANC and government, the succession struggle may have lessened ANC capacity to perform in government. First, the transition wreaked havoc in the civil service and politics due to turnover and purges of senior staff. Second, the transition amplified a relatively embryonic culture of factionalism and undermining of internal discipline in the ANC.

One of the anomalies of ANC power over the 17 years was the Tripartite Alliance. Intellectually powerful and organisationally useful in election times, alliance members, the SACP and Cosatu, had become alienated in the times of both Mandela and Mbeki. The rise of Zuma provided them with the vehicle to mobilise for influence. The two, along with the ANCYL, played a central role in achieving the Polokwane victory for Zuma. The alliance partners in the 2009-11 period were positioned inside the ANC’s National Executive Committee (NEC) and National Working Committee (NWC), and senior SACP functionaries were deployed in powerful government positions. The policy influence contest was transplanted into the heart of government. Cosatu’s position differed from that of the SACP. It refrained from taking up government positions, and again reinvented itself, circa 2010-11, as the primary intra-alliance opposition force. It was highly critical of ANC entrepreneurship and the predator state, yet ensured that popular disillusionment would find a home within the alliance and very close to the ANC. In 2011 the Alliance thus was again in a period of peak contestation as the members aligned and positioned themselves for maximum influence over succession and associated policy. A major difference, this time around, was that the contest had a dual front – the alliance partners had to position for influence over the ANC and be mindful that the ANCYL might be trying to out-maneuver them.

A period followed in which there was much reflection on addressing the party-state issues of state power impacting on the character of the ANC, how much manoeuvring for public position was affecting internal ANC struggles, and how malfunctioning public institutions were triggering poor public perceptions, protest action and lessened (even if still huge) electoral support. In some respects the ANC was taking on the challenge to get government right, ensure public ethics, address corruption and mismanagement, install a genuine service ethic in the public sector, and generally rein in extravagances. In other respects there was the substantial and ever-growing conflation of party and state in which the ANC proclaimed the right to exercise direct command over government and the public sector.
CONCLUSION

The status of the ANC as political party or movement,^40 anchored in its popularity and legitimacy, obviously directly impacted on its ability to operate in government. There was a strong ‘ethic’ running counter to the Batho pele^41 ethos. The imperative behind this ethic had been asserting a larger than life presence in both the ANC as movement-party and the ANC-in-government. This was the elite compulsion to fall victim to crony capitalism, to make a good life out of, or out of association with, the state, and to use state resources to the maximum legal and sub-legal extent for the betterment of small circles of beneficiaries, and personal lifestyles. Service to the people was often the surprising side-effect of service to the self. Political intellectuals Pallo Jordan and Raymond Suttner in effect warned about the phenomenon of enmeshing class and political interests.^42 ANC big names who were no longer dependent on the networks of ANC approval – such as Jordan, Frene Ginwala, Ben Turok, Jay Naidoo and, in a different context, Desmond Tutu – increasingly dared to break silences on misdirected ANC actions.

The question arises as to future directions of an ANC strongly entrenched in power and, simultaneously, not entirely in control of the regeneration of its power. After four years in the run-up to officially assuming power and 17 years in power, the question arises whether the ANC will be able to continuously adjust with the times, and either make the liberation movement status more real for voters and electorate alike, or compete as ‘just’ a political party, appealing simply on the basis of contemporary policy and leadership issues. An adjunct question is whether the ANC will prove to be the exception to many of its African contemporary political parties and remain committed, in touch with the grassroots, and sufficiently corruption free to retain popular allegiance and credibility in times when the liberation rhetoric will cease to speak with authority.

Once, it may have been regarded as possible for the ANC to exercise unfettered power. Presently, it is a question of how much ANC power has faded, the extent to which this might be a relentless process, and the amount of control the ANC has over its regeneration of political power. The ANC’s assumption of political control over the state left it with daunting tasks, both internal and external. Externally, it had to process policy objectives and formalise them into workable new policies, balance these with budgets, reform the state apparatus, get the civil service corps in place and motivate it to give effect to policies, overcome divisions and state paralysis that accompany leadership succession, and reorganise and operate provincial and local governments in order to give effect to old and new policies. Internally, the ANC had to balance its constituencies and bring consultation into effective practice, as was evidenced in its September 2010 National General Council (NGC) meeting. It had to balance the deployment of politically loyal cadres with expertise and authority in the top ranks of the civil service, an imperative that was well recognised yet poorly operationalised.

It is these complex and interwoven sets of factors that the rest of the book dissects, with a view to finding answers to the vexed questions on the nature and sustainability of the ANC’s project for the regeneration of political power.
Introduction: ANC pathways to claiming, consolidating and regenerating political power

NOTES

1 In April 2011 Zuma remarked: ‘When you vote for the ANC you are voting for Qamata (God), Qamata is the midst of the ANC. We are the mother of democracy, no other party deserves to be voted for other than the ANC. There’s always the presence of God where we are. When you vote for the ANC even your hand gets blessed.’ In February 2011 he told a crowd in Mthatha that a vote for the opposition is a vote for the devil. In May 2011 he told a meeting in Delareyville that those who turn their backs on the ANC will have to explain themselves to their ancestors when they die. Earlier he had said that the ‘ANC will rule until Jesus comes again’ and ‘only those with ANC membership will go to heaven’. See, for example, Sabelo Ndlangisa, 2011, ‘Vote ANC, vote for God’, City Press, 10 April 2011, p. 1; ANC, 2011, ‘President Jacob Zuma’s figurative expression amounts to no blasphemy’, media statement, Johannesburg, 6 February 2011; Mandy Wiener, 2011, ‘Politics, the 2011 polls & the afterlife’, http://www.ewn.co.za/articleprog.aspx?id=65718 (accessed 13 May 2011).


5 Ibid., p. 1.


9 For a conceptualisation of power, see Steven Lukes, op. cit.

10 These themes are explored in the rest of the book. Pallo Jordan, for example, has argued that the ANC’s contemporary problems are anchored in its past failure to sufficiently deal with issues of public morality. See Pallo Jordan, 2008, ‘A letter to Comrade Mtungwa, an old comrade and dear friend’, address to the Platform for Public Deliberation, University of Johannesburg, 14 November 2008. In the 2009-11 period the SACP and Cosatu were outspoken about the tender-rich ANC elites. See, for example, Chapter 2.


12 An illustration, which followed with the advent of Mbeki’s recall from power, includes United Democratic Movement (UDM) president, Bantu Holomisa, saying: ‘The ANC has become arrogant in power. Vital decisions — such as the removal of the head of state — are casually taken
by a few dozen people in Luthuli House. They don’t even pause to consult the nation’, at the
20081008_speech_holb_campaignlaunch.html (accessed 1 July 2009).

The full historical trajectory of the ANC’s emergence into power is mapped in Annexure 1,
which constitutes an essential accompaniment to the short-term historical positioning of the
main text in this chapter.

See for example, Martin Legassick, 2004, ‘Armed struggle and democracy: The case of South
Africa’, Discussion paper 20, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet Discussion Papers; Rocklyn Williams,
2004, The impact of “Umkhonto We Sizwe” on the creation of the South African National


Strini Moodley, Azapo, interview, Johannesburg, 18 October 2005.

See Peter Harris, 2010, Birth, The conspiracy to stop the ’94 elections, Johannesburg, Umuzi.


Richard Spitz and Matthew Chaskalson, 2000, The politics of transition: A hidden history of South
Africa's negotiated settlement, Johannesburg, Witwatersrand University Press.

68.6 per cent of the white electorate voted in favour of a negotiated settlement.

See for example, Martin Legassick, 2004, ‘Armed struggle and democracy: The case of South
Africa’, Discussion paper 20, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet Discussion Papers; Rocklyn Williams,
2004, The impact of “Umkhonto We Sizwe” on the creation of the South African National


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To illustrate, Pravin Gordhan, Minister of Finance in the Zuma administration, urged Land Bank officials to move away from activities that promoted the ‘selfish ends of individuals’ and urged officials to be intolerant of maladministration. This was after allegations of senior officials being shielded from public scrutiny after apparent large-scale abuse. See ‘Land Bank skeletons kick up debate in Parliament’, Business Report, 14 July 2009, p. 13. In 2011 the Hawks arrested a former Land Bank CEO and a former housing MEC in Gauteng, plus two others following an investigation into money that had been allocated to the Land Bank to fund struggling enterprises; see South African Police (SAPS), 2011, ‘4 arrested in connection with Land Bank corruption – Hawks’, Statement issued by the SAPS, 1 March 2011.

See Thabo Mbeki, 2000, keynote address, ANC National General Council (NGC) meeting, Port Elizabeth, 12 July 2000: “I am talking here of the need for us to implement a programme focused, among other things, on the development of cadres who are truly politically committed to the all-round success of the new democratic South Africa, and properly prepared with regard to the skills our country needs to achieve that success”, http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?doc=/ancdocs/speeches/2000/sp0712.html (accessed 4 November 2009).

These programmes are further elaborated in Chapter 12.


The author was present as an observer with media status at both the mid-2007 ANC policy conference, Midrand, and at the 52nd ANC elective conference, December 2007, in Polokwane.


William Gumede, 2009, ‘Modernising the African National Congress: The legacy of President Thabo Mbeki’, in Peter Kagwanja and Kwandiwe Kondlo (eds.), State of the nation: South Africa 2008, Pretoria, HSRC Press, argues that the ANC under Mbeki had developed into a modern political party. The author argues later in the book that the ANC retains the explicit intent to remain both movement and party.

Batho pele (People first) was a government initiative to motivate civil servants to be service oriented, to strive for excellence in service, and to commit themselves to the continuous improvement in their performance; see (then) Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG), 2007, Draft National Policy Framework for Public Participation and Empowerment, Public Participation and Empowerment Chief Directorate, Free Basic Services and Infrastructure Branch, Pretoria, p. 9. It was widely recognised that the project, by 2009, had had a limited impact.

ANNEXURE TO CHAPTER 1

MAPPING THE ANC’S POWER TRAJECTORY, 1910-2011

The ANC’s quest for political power, its retention and consolidation are best understood in the broad historical setting of the history of the movement and the brief period in power compared with the extended period of gaining power. Approximately eight decades of struggle preceded the movement’s ascension into power. The brief 17 years in power have seen the ANC fighting to extend and protect its gains, whilst straddling the divides between party and state, election campaigns and governance. In this century the ANC (at first the South African Native National Congress, SANNC) metamorphosed from resistance party, to liberation movement, to a modern political party-movement that continued to embrace a movement identity.

The following outline of events offers in broad strokes the century of South Africa’s political history up to 2011, with the ANC almost always central to developments. The outline culminates in the state of power play in South African politics, and in particular in the ANC, in mid-2011. It illuminates the ANC’s gradual rise to political power, and the range of challenges it encountered subsequently. The main emphasis is on the political dispensation, regime, national leadership, ideology, and, in recent times, intra-ANC politics. Due to its dominant position in South African politics, the ANC’s internal operations – including contestation for leadership and policy positions – often substitute for the paucity of matching inter-party operations. The outline’s primary objective is to sketch the extent of change in the environment in which the ANC operates, and the degree to which the ANC itself underwent changes.

### Historical context to and events summary of the ANC’s rise to power and first 17 years in power

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year or period</th>
<th>Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>From Union to Republic</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>Consolidation of the white South African state in the Union of South Africa, bringing to a conclusion the anti-British Boer Wars, formalising British conquest of the territory that comprises present day South Africa. Black South Africans are excluded from the franchise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>Disappointment over the outcome of the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910 leads to the gathering of prominent Africans in Bloemfontein, on 12 January 1912 (chief mover Pixley Seme). A committee is appointed to draft the Constitution for the formation of the South African Native National Congress (SANNC, forerunner of the ANC).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>Natives Land Act lays down the principle of territorial segregation and sets some of the foundations of consequent dispossession of black South Africans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914-48</td>
<td>Period of internal tumult, white governments coming to terms with ways to work with British authorities. Intensification of black subjugation, rise of white Afrikaner nationalism. Range of new institutions imposed on African people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Age of social engineering starts under premiers DF Malan, Hans Strijdom, Hendrik Verwoerd. National Party is elected through white franchise. Weight and institutional force are given to segregation, political exclusion and bantustans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Declaration of the Republic of South Africa, ending membership of the Commonwealth. Birth of the Republic became the occasion for ANC to go underground. Treason Trial concluded, with all being acquitted. Militant wing of the ANC, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), established, focusing on sabotage. The PAC’s Poqo follows somewhat more extreme tactics. ANC and PAC set up headquarters outside RSA; developments lead to the establishment of the African Liberation Committee in Addis Ababa in 1963.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Apartheid, repression and revolt**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Rivonia trial, setbacks for MK and a general escalation of apartheid oppression and repression.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Wave of strikes starts, and inspiration added by the liberation struggles in Mozambique.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>September: Black Consciousness leader Steve Biko is killed by apartheid forces. November: UN Security Council approves mandatory arms embargo against South Africa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980s</td>
<td>Large-scale internal protest and mobilisation. Formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) with wide range of associated civil society organisations. Apartheid government finds it difficult to contain the protest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Mutiny of up to an estimated 90 per cent of MK troops in Angola and Tanzania. Incarceration of leaders of the mutiny in the Quatro prison camp in Angola.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Mid- to late-1980s**

resistance under the UDF and subsequent Mass Democratic Movement (MDM). Several states of emergencies implemented, large-scale detentions, mass protests and campaigns continue into 1989. Negotiations start with Nelson Mandela whilst he is still in detention. FW de Klerk replaces PW Botha as president. ANC-in-exile in touch with the internal wings of the ANC and high degree of consensus on negotiated trajectory.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Denouement, negotiations and the 1994 liberation election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
homeland government fail, Freedom Front registers for election; TEC incorporates Ciskei and Bophuthatswana into RSA. 19 April: NP, ANC and Inkatha reach a memorandum of agreement, with Inkatha agreeing to participate in elections in exchange for more provincial powers, guarantees on position of the Zulu monarch and KwaZulu. 26-28 April: South Africa’s first democratic elections, ANC wins 62.5% of the national vote.

### The early formalisation of the transition, reconciliation and transition to Mbeki

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Adoption of the Constitution by the Constituent Assembly, comprising the two Houses of Parliament.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Thabo Mbeki elected as new president of the ANC at ANC congress.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Heydays of Mbeki governance, ANC absorption of the NP, and floor crossing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>June: ANC wins second national election, with majority of just under 66.6%, which was boosted to two-thirds when the Minority Front joined it; Thabo Mbeki takes over as president and announces new Cabinet on 17 June.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>June: NP and DP join to form the Democratic Alliance (DA); December: Local government elections, with ANC performing consistently, making progress in the Western Cape; lower percentage poll.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-03</td>
<td>October-November: ANC and NNP in partial cooperative alliance, facilitating some measure of power-sharing at all levels of government. 2002-03: Legislation and constitutional amendments to facilitate floor-crossing between political parties. ANC December 2002 Stellenbosch conference consolidates ANC hold over SACP, Cosatu.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>South Africa celebrates ten years of democracy, a process that is generally associated with stocktaking and renewed plans of action for policy implementation and transformation. The ANC secures a 69.69% majority in the national election, and wins all nine provinces. The race for ANC presidential succession starts soon after the election.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Zuma’s rise to power and the 2009 reinvention of the ANC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Jacob Zuma is ‘relieved of his duties’ as deputy president of South Africa, following corruption allegations and the conviction of his business associate, Schabir Shaik. The late June Midrand ANC NGC meeting revolts and starts ousting Mbeki loyalists.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006-07</td>
<td>South Africa and government at a virtual standstill as the ANC mobilises for its elective conference of December 2007. Court challenges and a series of charges against Zuma are thwarted and postponed through counter legal action.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The run-up to Polokwane dominates politics with branches, regions and provinces gradually coming out, seemingly in favour of installing Zuma as the next ANC president. The June 2007 ANC policy conference takes policy decisions that are often interpreted as a swing to the left, but there are only modest and incremental changes from previous policies. The focus on the ‘developmental state’, combined with an emphasis on more powerful positioning of Cosatu and the SACP, inform the argument of a left turn in ANC policy directions. The December elective conference votes in Zuma, with a margin of roughly 60-40.

An uncomfortable truce prevails between Mbeki as president of South Africa and Zuma as ANC president. Mbeki steps into line and obeys ANC directives, although with reluctance and delays. These include the inclusion and appointment of ANC deputy president Kgalema Motlanthe first as MP and later as member of cabinet. Much of the 2008 political debate concerns whether Mbeki will be allowed to serve out his term. The September 2008 ANC NEC meeting requires Mbeki to resign as president; he does so 36 hours later and in the following days South Africa is gripped by an en masse resignation of cabinet members, followed by the retraction of most resignations, and early rumours of the formation of a breakaway party. This party, eventually called the Congress of the People (Cope), holds a consultative conference in early November and launches in mid-December in Bloemfontein. Although inspired by the treatment of Mbeki, he remains a (silent) member of the ANC. By the time of Cope’s launch, the ANC had already deployed task teams around the country (especially in provinces like the Eastern Cape) to counter the Cope initiative. Cope supporters are rooted out and the ANC makes it clear in action and strategy that it remains in charge.

The ANC prepares for the 22 April 2009 election. It launches a major campaign and reasserts contact with and undertakings to the electorate. It engages in a ‘robust’ election campaign, specifically targeting Cope, but moderates the campaign and, along with the other political parties, commits itself to the Electoral Commission’s code of conduct. The ANC falls just short of repeating its previous two-thirds majority. The period of the early Zuma administration is characterised by an over-emphasis on ‘newness’. The second half of the year is characterised by contestation of the precise power that the SACP and Cosatu exercise in the ANC and the alliance.

Stabilisation of the Zuma regime – strengths and vulnerabilities

Crunch time for the ANC. The Zuma administration’s new plans face the implementation test, whilst President Zuma faces the challenge of managing government and simultaneously containing a potential fall out in the alliance. Internal contestation and preparation for the new succession war leading up to Mangaung, 2012, puts the Tripartite Alliance under pressure – whilst alliance members share deployments to crucial government positions. October: the ANC’s third NGC meeting confirms Zuma’s dominance of the ANC, and the subjugation (at least for the time being) of the ANCYL, which had started acting like a de facto fourth member of the Tripartite Alliance. November: Zuma leads with a wide-ranging Cabinet reshuffle (although not affecting under-performing key power brokers, and removing some who had rocked the boat), bringing into strategic positions emerging power brokers, SACP members, and ANCYL endorsed candidates. The reshuffle is interpreted as Zuma positioning for a second term in office.
2011

The ANC is unsettled in the course of preparations for the May local government elections. The ANC’s candidate nominations metamorphose into community protests, approximating ‘service delivery’ protests. The ANC largely retains its local government standings, albeit with significant (mostly minority group) losses to the DA and with KwaZulu-Natal boosting its national averages for the second election in a row. The prohibition on campaigning for the ANC’s 2012 Mangaung contest largely holds. In September the ANC differentiates between discussing leadership (fine) and succession (not fine). The ANCYL demonstrates its power over policy and ANC king-making. Its Johannesburg downtown protest of 31 August brings youth anger with policy and leaders to the doorstep of Chief Albert Luthuli House. The SACP and civil society actors take on the ANCYL on integrity issues in the Limpopo government.

Select sources: Spitz and Chaskalson, 2000; Davenport, 1977; contemporary events monitoring by Booysen, based on a range of mass media sources and personal observation.
CHAPTER 2

Aluta continua,
from Polokwane to Mangaung

The old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum there arises a great diversity of morbid symptoms.

Antonio Gramsci

Polokwane 2007 was the opening of the ANC’s Pandora’s box. In the run-up to Mangaung the ANC struggled to get the lid back on. Polokwane unleashed a wave of energy that regenerated organisational fervour and power. It confirmed in ANC ranks that mobilisation against incumbents and around internal issues works. The run-up to Mangaung 2012 brought replays of tried-and-tested strategies. The ANC has never been a stranger to fierce internal contests. Yet, Polokwane bestowed unequalled and enduring factionalism (although the specific factions changed), free-for-alls in mobilisation to secure enclaves of power in the party and in the state, and rejection of the idea of movement elders being supreme in wisdom and authority (yet with hierarchical ascendancy as a primary driving force). Albeit suppressed by the ANC’s leadership in the 2007-11 period, and lived out in policy codes, proxy alliances and leaked plots in the subsequent between-elective-conference-period, mobilisation for power and king-making were incessant.

This book’s full dissection of the political brutality of the ANC’s 52nd national elective conference is not just due to the drama of the time. It was a cathartic event for the ANC, changing the movement permanently. These realities were, again, lived out in the ANC preparing itself for its 53rd conference in Mangaung. The ban on public campaigning for Mangaung tempered some mobilisation. The ANC incumbents were at pains to emphasise that ‘premature’ campaigning would be as disruptive of state governance as it had been in 2007-09. For much of the preparation and mobilisation, however, Mangaung replayed Polokwane.

The ANC-Polokwane events that paralysed so much of state operations for an extended period thus help us understand both the past and the future of the ANC. Fusion between state and party meant that the state was and remained an arena for
ANC contests. The events of Polokwane frequently distracted the ANC. They diluted, although they did not negate, the focus on state governance. These effects lived on.

This chapter takes a broad view of the ‘Polokwane war’. The trends of the period from mobilisation for Polokwane to Election 2009 take centre stage, with a view to extracting understandings of how the contests of the time impacted on movement, immediately and continuously. Beyond this, the analysis explores the post-Election 2009 front of the ‘new ANC’ coming to terms with its tasks and the new lines of intra-ANC contestation opening up in the approach to Mangaung 2012. It investigates the onset of the Polokwane war, aspects of mobilisation for turnover in leadership, including the role of the African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL), the revenge of those who had experienced Mbeki’s recriminations, and Mbeki’s counter-onslaught in the form of the Zuma trials. The analysis spans the run-up to Polokwane, the nine-month interregnum from Polokwane to the recall of Mbeki, and the ‘new ANC’ in the period 2009-11. Chapters that explore the electoral battle (Chapter 6), the battles in state institutions (Chapter 10), and the contests for policy direction (Chapter 12) complement this chapter.

Ruthless competition for the top jobs and control over power resources had wracked the ANC for roughly five years in the run-up to Election 2009. As argued in Chapter 10, state institutions in the post-Polokwane period were afflicted by largely the same factors that had impeded the Mbeki administration. This time around, however, the divisions ran deeper and factionalism had an amplified impact on state apparatuses. What was once a roughly consensual bloc of ANC moving into the state and searching for ways to carry out mandates was now an organisation with multiple lines of division that continuously impacted its ability to effectively exercise state power. The Mbeki-Zuma divides were being overlain by new divisions within the once opportunistically united Zuma bloc. In the Mbeki past, the Tripartite Alliance was marginalised. In the Zuma governance period there was an ongoing contest to work out the exact centre of power. The Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) agitated against a seeming repeat marginalisation (in the form of ‘unilateralism’) under Zuma, and both Cosatu and the South African Communist Party (SACP) countered ANCYL ascendance. Further down, a multitude of ANC local, regional and provincial structures engaged in pre-emptive and proactive alignments to position themselves for leverage in changing ANC power relations.


The tormented transition from the ‘old ANC’ under Thabo Mbeki to the ‘new ANC’ of Jacob Zuma was a transition driven by aspiration to be at the helm of the ANC, rather than by ideology and policy, even if these were royally used to characterise the transition. The ‘new ANC’ was severely tested in the 2009-11 period. Policy shifts were piecemeal and in essence continuations-extensions of previous practice. A cacophony of voices suggested that the nationalisation of mines (perhaps other entities as well) could bring dramatic policy change. A ‘nationalisation alliance’ took shape
towards Mangaung. The debate stood out for divergent motivations and meanings attached to ‘nationalisation’. The ‘unmistakably left policies’\(^4\) that Polokwane was said to have delivered overwhelmingly related to sentiment and intent, rather than realised differences on-the-ground, unless the adoption of policies like national health insurance (2011), which was anticipated to be implemented incrementally over the next roughly 15 years, or the sketchy and still contested Green Paper on land reform, are taken as evidence of on-the-ground change.

In fact, the post-Polokwane ANC was intensely contradicted by the co-existence of the old and the new. Some recognised the preceding events as a ‘watershed’.\(^5\) Others thought the movement was in a condition of ‘self-destruct’.\(^6\) Irrespective, Polokwane was a pivotal moment and the ANC post-Polokwane was a vastly changed, yet also very familiar organisation. The significance of the transition to the ‘new ANC’ extended into all four power domains of ANC as party and alliance partner, ANC-in-government, and ANC in relation to opposition parties and the people (Table 1).

Without Polokwane, the ANC in the period 2011-12 might have been a far weaker organisation. Polokwane reinvigorated the organisation, revitalised its relationship with the people, and contributed to an enhanced lease on life. There were questions and concerns at the time regarding Zuma’s appropriateness to the position and nationalist populism, but these were soon largely forgiven. Polokwane created a fervour of popular affirmation and gave the victorious ANC branches the continuous sense of having reclaimed the organisation. It helped leverage a convincing 2009 election victory and contributed to the result in 2011. The war struck a chord with the political irreverence, challenge and disdain for authority that are evident at times and in part in South African political culture. South Africans relate to political struggle, and in Polokwane they saw a convenient in-house revolt that stirred things up without unseating the ANC. The ANCYL built on this phenomenon, becoming another symbol of intra-ANC rebellion, without pushing the ANC from power. Cosatu extended the trend, sharply criticising the ANC and ANC-in-government, whilst working for continuous ANC electoral support.

The Polokwane epoch showed resentment against Mbeki and his followers for their determination to cling to power and in effect deprive ANC comrades, arguably at least as qualified as the incumbents, of a turn to drink from the trough. Four frequently interrelated sets of factors drove the Polokwane war and the determination to oust Mbeki, first from the ANC presidency and nine months later from the Presidency of South Africa: the sentiment that it was time-out for Mbeki and time for internal democratic rotation; second, mobilisation for revenge against Mbeki (for Mbeki having ‘dealt with’ people); third, greed and careerism, or ‘our turn to drink at the trough’; and fourth, policy or ideological differences (largely albeit not exclusively articulated by the alliance members). Come Mangaung 2012, the focus was on a vaguely defined improvement of performance, and specifically on turnover to a diverse and impatient top-echelon of alternative leaders. For this group, another five years of waiting, to see Zuma serve a second term as ANC president, was too long … too subject to their being eclipsed by an impatient younger generation.
### TABLE 1: Contradictions of the post-Polokwane ANC and ANC-in-government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>Same as in ‘old’ ANC</th>
<th>Some difference</th>
<th>Suggestions of ‘new ANC’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ANC leadership</strong></td>
<td>A limited amount of continuity, but some effort not to alienate potential enemies.</td>
<td>Retained Mbeki leadership now converted, or silently compliant; some names are used to prove continuous plotting, now against Zuma.</td>
<td>High turnover, far-reaching renewal, new guard’s slate elected; yet soon after Polokwane, allegations of new turnover plots surface.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alliance relationship</strong></td>
<td>A reinvigorated Tripartite Alliance with serious hope of influence from inside, whilst ANC asserts itself as centre of power and consolidates this in NGC 2010 meeting.</td>
<td>Dynamics different, and ongoing contestation as to where centre of power resides; Alliance pitches for making the Alliance the centre of decisions and power – argues influence on numbers in Parliament and gradualist policy directions.</td>
<td>Different in many respects, e.g. alliance partners well positioned for influence, congenial and consultative relationship, later contested by the ANCYL; SACP feels its policies are being given effect; Cosatu notes new marginalisation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Divisions and factionalism</strong></td>
<td>New divisions and factions arrived soon after dawn of new Zuma elite and government administration.</td>
<td>New lines of division are being realised continuously.</td>
<td>Limited – recreation of many of the previous modes of mobilisation; continuous mobilisation against incumbents probably institutionalised.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Policy</strong></td>
<td>Bulk of policies entail ‘no change’ compared with the Mbeki ANC.</td>
<td>Modest change in range of important policies, new nuances (as in Polokwane resolutions), but implementation ambiguous.</td>
<td>More suggestions of change than concrete evidence; gradualism in extension of access to education, health, social grants; ANCYL uses land and mining to mobilise against incumbents.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Stepping back to Polokwane and the entry of the Zuma era, the new beginning was confirmed with the clean sweep at Polokwane, and the recall nine months later of Mbeki from national presidential office. Zuma’s national election campaign stressed the new, reinvigorated ANC that was reconnected to the people. Simultaneously, Polokwane bestowed elements of new and probably permanent instability on the ANC. The incoming Zuma ANC, and subsequently Zuma administration, used the space to buy time for government performance and delivery. It brought a renewed lease on political life. Through the disinheritance of Mbeki much of the blame for the inadequate performance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State institutions</th>
<th>Overwhelmingly retained.</th>
<th>Some exaggerated claims of re-invention, e.g. in restructuring of state departments, clusters of government departments, and arrangements in Presidency.</th>
<th>Modest evidence at best – mild reconfigurations only – with limited impact.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government leadership</td>
<td>Continuous tensions over appointment of premiers; doubts about continuity to obtain Zuma allegiance.</td>
<td>Retained but now Zuma-aligned faces bring memories of the 1996 class project.</td>
<td>New guard of loyalists deployed; first reshuffles in late 2010; 2011 instability brought by covert Mangaung mobilisation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance operations</td>
<td>Governance continues on previous paths; provinces and local government remain problematic.</td>
<td>Some new ethos, but uncertainty as to how this filters through – a few years into the Zuma period serious questions arise about ‘how different’?</td>
<td>Limited change results; in early stages the rhetoric was not yet substantiated with action – and later only limited changes are proven.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government and the people</td>
<td>Bottle-necks and government inability to make substantive differences prevail.</td>
<td>Sincere efforts to reassess problems of representation and working with the people.</td>
<td>More of a popular orientation and ANC leadership image of being in touch early on bolsters newness – this hope for the new fades at the time of local election 2011.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Author’s monitoring and interpretation.
of the ANC in its first three terms of government office was compartmentalised and con-
signed to the Mbeki corner, associated with perceived aloofness towards the people, 
bureaucratization of the state, and subjugation of the ANC to the state.

Polokwane was the time of a fleeting belief that a new ANC was also ringing in a 
new world of ANC government. The Zuma ascendance brought a sense of newness organisationally that stopped short of translating into state and government. The 
reinvigorated organisation soon ran into the concrete walls of continuous popular 
expectations being met by the same modest state capacities and limited new policy 
options, this time around also framed by ongoing cycles of civil servant and political 
executive purges and replacements. The newness was overrepresented, essentially as 
part of the ‘new way’ of doing government. The ship of state fell back on the order that 
had been established in the Mbeki state. Upon assumption of state power institutional 
and policy redesign acknowledged the continuity of the initiatives of the past Mbeki 
regime while offering institutional and procedural renewals.

Policy was modestly recast in Midrand and Polokwane in 2007. A series of vaunted 
and then moderated policy changes followed in the subsequent years. The SACP, a 
solid Zuma backer, felt that its policy prerogatives – those that are possible in the 
international ideological conjuncture – were being realised. Turnarounds were 
announced; but material changes remained slender. Eighteen months into the Zuma 
administration came a cabinet reshuffle that cut wide but not very deep, ostensibly to 
get the new project onto firmer ground. With the exception of the extreme case of 
Siphiwe Nyanda, the reshuffle turned a blind eye to the portfolios of closely-aligned 
senior Polokwane supporters of the president. The ANC was engaged in a momentous 
battle to keep the ‘balls in the air’ whilst making changes and bringing reinventions 
that would allow it to continue proclaiming that the problems were known, that 
action was being taken, but that the remainder of the country’s substantial problems 
would take time to settle.

From early 2010 through 2011, with confirmation of Cope's implosion and the re-con-
solidation of the ANC, the game was changing away from the Polokwane divisions. Many 
dissidents continued to be reintegrated into the ANC. Yet the new ANC was even more 
susceptible than the old to being unsuccessful in halting internal polarisation and faction-
alism. One of the main lessons learnt from the Cope experience was that the place to be 
was in the ANC – and that the battles for predominance had to be fought internally.

An important part of the ‘new’ in the Zuma ANC and government was continuous 
factionalism, albeit with new factions (SACP-ANC, and ‘socialist’-nationalist) over-
laying the old. There was a consistent struggle for deployment to top positions, access 
to those in top positions, influence over them, and access to the personal benefits that 
good placements inevitably brought. The regeneration of ANC power had become a 
complex endeavour.

Politically, internal ANC contestation and mobilisation for all forms of power, 
including shady enclaves of sub-national personalised power, became institutionalised. 
The irreverence for power figures, the evidence of the power of intra-ANC constituency 
mobilisation, and tolerance of blemished personal records in the name of expedient
mobilisation lived on. The post-Polokwane ANC struggled to contain these forces. It took Zuma time to rein in the organisation and position himself for a second term. It was only at the halfway mark of the 2010 NGC meeting that Zuma emerged with the combination of ANC organisational status, personal credibility and statesmanlike demeanour that put him in charge of the movement of which he had been the president for two-and-a-half years. Yet this emergence was the product of careful management of the constituencies that elevated him into the ANC presidency. Polokwane 2007 had delivered invaluable lessons in winning over, pacifying and controlling the king-makers of the provincial ANC chairpersons, ANCYL, the MK Veteran’s League, Cosatu, the SACP and the Women’s League. The ANC’s embargo on ‘premature’ Mangaung campaigning in very certain terms helped construct Zuma’s eminence.

A BREAK WITH POST-1990 ‘LEADERSHIP DETERMINATION’

Whilst contestation for top positions in the ANC is not new, the scope and intensity of contestation circa 2007 were remarkable. Polokwane torched a path of virulent internal contestation. Mangaung followed, at least up to 2011 sans the public acrimony. Even if it would not exactly be emulated in subsequent internal elections, Polokwane set a tone of the right of branches and leagues, led by any alliance of top leadership, to mobilise for succession. Below, the term ‘war’ is explained as it relates to internal struggles in the ANC. The generally hierarchical succession line in the ANC ensures that the deputy president more often than not ascends to the presidency – hence the deputy presidency is the site of some of the fiercest contests. The power of the secretary general over both movement character and election-succession issues puts this position in the same league.

Leadership elections have taken place at all main ANC conferences. In the period from unbanning onwards the ANC had held conferences first in three-year cycles, from 1991 to 1997 (48th National Conference, Durban, 1991; 49th National Conference, Bloemfontein, 1994; and 50th National Conference, 1997, Mafikeng). It followed with conferences in five-year cycles (51st National Conference, Stellenbosch, 2002; 52nd National Conference, Polokwane, 2007; and the forthcoming 53rd National Conference, December 2012 in Mangaung). Halfway NGC meetings have taken place between the conferences (Port Elizabeth, 2000; Midrand, 2005; and Durban, 2010). Policy conferences are held roughly six months before the elective conferences. All conferences have built on elaborate participatory ANC processes from the branches upwards.

By the time of Zuma’s 2007 election the ANC had elected five ANC presidents. Up to 2007, however, the position of ANC president had not been electorally determined by conferences. In contrast with Polokwane, contests for the top positions had largely been settled by leadership ‘determination’ and consensus-seeking prior to elective conferences. The conferences then affirmed pre-determined new presidents, albeit with internal constituency mobilisation and affirmation. Only occasionally some of the top six positions were put to the vote. In the 2002 elective conference, for example, none of the top five positions was contested.
Mbeki’s three predecessors had signalled their preferred successors, including Mandela who had anointed Mbeki in mid-1996 as his successor. By 1996, it was acknowledged that Mbeki had already taken over many of the executive functions of the president, ‘without looking like he is challenging the president’.

In December 1997, after Mbeki’s unanimous election to succeed him, Mandela nonetheless warned that leaders who are elected unopposed may be tempted to surround themselves with sycophants and settle scores with their detractors. In September 2007, the divided ANC NEC rejected the idea of nominating a list of ‘consensus candidates’. This was a rejection of Mbeki’s attempt to anoint a slate that would deliver him as the retained ANC president. The Zuma camp’s Polokwane victory, however, was itself slate-driven, establishing the slate approach as commonplace in the ANC.

The leadership determinations of the early 1990s were probably second only to the Polokwane process judged by the fierceness of the top-level contest. The 1991 ANC election incorporated the compromise position of an ANC chairperson created to accommodate the ailing Oliver Tambo and propel Mandela into the ANC presidency. Mbeki and Hani fought for the position of deputy to Mandela – and Walter Sisulu became the compromise candidate. Harry Gwala entered to oppose Sisulu, but lost. In 1994, Cyril Ramaphosa and Mbeki both wanted to be deputy president to Mandela. Mbeki outmanoeuvred Ramaphosa, and was endorsed by Mandela. Ramaphosa then did not oppose Mbeki for the deputy presidency in 1994. Once he had completed his role in finalising South Africa’s 1996 Constitution he pursued a business career.

Zuma’s rise to the top position in the ANC was through a succession of ANC election victories and his one-time appointment as deputy president in government. His path into the ANC presidency was in some respects coincidental. He was only elected deputy president of the ANC after Mathews Phosa was forced to step down in 1997, as Lodge points out, because of being disliked and distrusted by party elders. In 1999, Zuma (still close to Mbeki) rose to become deputy president of the country after the position had first been offered to, but declined by, IFP leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi, in the spirit of continuing the government of national unity. Once Zuma had reached the positions of deputy in both the ANC and the government hierarchies he became unstoppable.

The 2012 contest is still unfolding, but indications in 2011 suggested a suppressed, fierce contest. Both premature campaigning and overt ambition were likely disqualifiers. The name of the game, 2011-12, included denials of ambition, going on record to deny aspirations to top NEC positions, subterfuge, and leaks of ‘plots’ (almost inevitably by security establishment sources). The main questions were whether Zuma would formally confirm a repeat candidacy (he had done so in the form of ‘if the ANC want me …’), and whether Motlanthe would move upward (should Zuma be pushed out), sideways as a second term (effective to keep the Zuma successor issue on hold) or not be available as deputy or as president of the ANC – both options would throw the race right open. Irrespective, it was clear that the leagues (women, youth and veterans) were positioning themselves, branch, regional and provincial executives were lining up in changeable formations and political principals were building alliances.
POLOKWANE AS ANC ‘WAR’

The ANC’s Polokwane internal struggles are designated ‘war’, because the extended fallout was no-holds barred, a brutal and all-consuming disagreement between two major ANC groupings. The story of the ‘Polokwane war’ relates an enduring message of the nature of the ANC in power and in contests for organisational power. The way in which the ‘war’ played out is the story of the dominant faction revolting against one leader and his circle de facto proclaiming themselves as bigger than the movement, of the ANC’s willingness to exorcise those who grant themselves the right to occupy government positions – diminishing their deployee status, and of the movement’s ability to reinvent and resurrect itself in the wake of excruciating battles. On a lesser scale, it legitimised mobilisation for leadership change – along with overriding top leadership that wishes to suppress contest.

Historically, the ANC had never been devoid of internal contest and division. The Polokwane conflict was exceptional in that it divided the whole organisation and was deepened through its implications for deployment and power in the state. In government it distracted from government work and caused paralysis in state institutions. Public institutions became trenches in the ANC war, and it was c’est la vie for Mangaung.

Zuma Polokwane campaigner, Mo Shaik, downplayed the ‘war’ character of the Zuma-Mbeki clash, but stressed the greatness of the 2007 transition:

[ Mbeki and Zuma] are not at war with one another; the contestation is legitimate democratic practice. During glasnost and perestroika, Gorbachev introduced the concept that different tendencies could co-exist within the party and that contradiction must be resolved non-antagonistically. One hundred years from now, 2007 will emerge as a decisive moment when a new democracy started to emerge.

In contrast, ANCYL president at the time, Fikile Mbalula, boasted that ‘[t]o have Jacob Zuma elected as the president of the ANC in this conference was war. And we won’. (The six names originally suggested by the ANCYL all became ANC elected officials.) Kader Asmal conceded a ‘cold war’ and Winnie Madikizela-Mandela cut to the chase:

I have been a member of the ANC for more than 50 years and there have been many contestations in the past, but never has it been characterised by such a high level of acrimony, personal attacks, accusations and counter-accusations and a total disregard for the ANC and what it stands for by both sides.

The Mbeki side used a war of attrition in which they imagined that their opponents would fail to match their assault from the trenches of state power. The Zuma group’s mobilisation zoomed in on the constituencies with ANC voting power – youth, women, military veterans and ANC branches, regions and especially provinces. The alliance partners helped through overlapping memberships and their relative freedom to speak out.
Triggers of the Polokwane and Mangaung wars

The first signals of the succession struggle dawned in late 2004. The ANCYL paid Mbeki (what they had thought would be) a routine visit to inform him, as a matter of courtesy, that they would back ANC deputy president Zuma as Mbeki’s successor. Mbeki was taken aback. He had just delivered the ANC its biggest election majority in three elections, and wished for a generous amount of time to work on his vision and legacy. He did not aspire to a third term as president of South Africa in conflict with the Constitution – only of the ANC. Sparks’s 2004 words indicate the likely Mbeki perspective at the time:

Here is a man who has done a remarkable job, first as deputy president and then as president. As our surging growth rate shows, he is in the process of delivering an economic miracle to follow Mandela’s political miracle. He is recognised as the African continent’s pre-eminent statesman and he is respected on the world stage. He commands an unassailable majority in Parliament with not a political challenger in sight. His legacy is assured.

Mbeki precipitated Polokwane, losing sight of the competitive ANC echelons that were impatiently awaiting his exit and that would in due course also plot to unseat Mbeki’s successor. Mbeki thought his loyalists and performance record in government, rather than ANC endorsement, would carry him and his circle into another term. A series of interrelated factors precipitated the Polokwane fall out, in the form of Mbeki’s:

- Ideological-policy alienation of the left and pursuit of alliance-offensive policies, which triggered the alliance members into positioning the early phases of the assault on Mbeki – even if Mbeki’s policies had been ANC-endorsed (Chapter 12);
- Ensconcing himself in a fortified state Presidency with apparent centralisation of power (Chapter 11), engaging beyond this fortress with intellectual disdain whilst his weekly ‘Letter from the President’ achieved sniper status;
- Intention to be a three-term ANC president and ‘save South Africa from Jacob Zuma’, albeit with the support of a sizable ANC faction at the time;
- Pseudo-consultative leadership style and perceived intellectual arrogance; and
- Assaults on competitors and perceived or portrayed persecution of main opponent Jacob Zuma (this included legal charges as well as firing Zuma from the two deputy presidencies).

Mbeki used state power procedurally and in conformity with ANC prescriptions, for example in executing Polokwane resolutions and constitutional prerogatives and obligations. He thought this would secure his power. Yet he was his own president, did not ‘unnecessarily’ defer to the party and the alliance, and was reluctant to hand over his power.

His sin was not so much that he created the Presidency infrastructure with its centralising tendencies, but that he let his political personality and a tightly controlled state leadership culture protected by, among others, a narrow band of unpopular syco-
phants, occupy these institutions. It was largely personal rather than policy-ideological factors that made the Presidency and its operations so unpopular. In the process, Mbeki fired, or insisted on people being fired, across the spheres of government. Many were hurt and aggrieved. Hence, one of the favourite Polokwane songs: Isondo liya jika jika (‘The wheel will keep on turning’).

Mbeki’s style of using state power over his ANC adversaries contributed to estrangement between Mbeki’s ANC and the alliance partners. The partners were ‘out there’. Mbeki felt no compulsion to consult with them. His denialism – in a broader sense than HIV-AIDS – of the responsibility of his cabinet and administration for problems in policy and governance, and vindictiveness in dealing with those who crossed swords with him, pulled the plug on sympathy for his candidacy. In the final months of his leadership, the Mbeki ANC, trying to heave itself back to life, posted ‘A fundamental revolutionary lesson: the enemy manoeuvres but it remains the enemy’ on the web. The document stated:

… the opponents of our national democratic revolution, who lack a significant base among the masses of our people, have sought to use the domestic and international media as one of their principal offensive instruments, to turn it into an organised formation opposed to the national democratic revolution and its vanguard movement.

Over the years many had remarked on Mbeki surrounding himself with sycophants. In the final days of his ANC presidency, Mbeki conceded that he had made a mistake in not talking ‘directly and truthfully’ to the ANC membership (instead having just talked to the NEC, then loaded with Mbeki-ists), and that if he had done so they would have understood that he had not been conspiring against Zuma. Mbeki frequently let continuous and consensual contact with Luthuli House lapse. He averred that he found it ‘puzzling’ that people were said to be afraid of criticising him openly. Adding fuel to the fire, Mbeki said that it might be that people (or NEC members) feared that he might successfully contest the point at issue due to his perspicacity, resulting in the defeat of their viewpoint. This was contrasted with Zuma as in Pallo Jordan’s remark that: ‘[Zuma] has a great native intelligence, and that is shown in part by the fact that he is wise enough to be conscious of his own limitations.’

The ANC’s Jackson Mthembu remarked on Mbeki isolating himself and estranging the ANC. Rather ‘we must take decisions through proper, respectful consultation and in a way that is seen to be fair and justifiable’. Resentment of Mbeki’s appointments, non-renewals of appointments, marginalisation of many (for example in provinces, local governments and ANC leagues), and attacks on many others, ran deep. Joel Netshitenzhe contributed a positive spin on Mbeki appointments, noting that ‘the curse of incumbency is that there aren’t enough senior posts in government …’. The need for revenge followed.

In due course, a new coalition of the wounded started taking shape around Zuma. The Mangaung round, in 2011 days, was shaping up along three main lines: whether Zuma would make it into a second term as ANC president (if not, Motlanthe was likely to confirm availability); if Zuma stayed, whether Motlanthe would also stay as
deputy; and if Motlanthe moved up or out who would step into the deputy president position and become the prime candidate for ANC president in 2017. By September 2011 Zuma was shoring up support in the wake of fall out with the ANCYL. Motlanthe was a major factor – the deputy ANC and government president who knew the lessons of not showing ambition, being in ‘good behaviour’-standing in the ANC and government, and evolving in the slip-stream of the ANC’s affinity for hierarchical ascendancy. Meanwhile, others were positioning themselves in the other coveted positions of secretary general or national chairperson.

**Mbeki, from humble servant to alliance target**

Mbeki’s fall held lessons for future ANC leaders. His self-decided overstay at the ANC helm was a declaration of war, given the resistance that had been building up against his intention to cling to power. Mbeki muddled on trying to veil his ambitions, stating in 2005 and 2007, respectively:35

> If they said: ‘We … want you to continue’, then it’s half fine. It depends. Two-and-a-half years is a long way ahead: I might be too tired by then.

> I had no ambition to be president of the ANC. If the membership says ‘we want you to be president because we want you’, for whatever reason, then one must respect that opinion. You can ask anybody in the ANC whether they have ever heard me campaigning to be president. I will never do it.

Mbeki positioned himself as the humble servant of ANC members. Zuma also tried this approach. In 2010 Zuma started talking the language of ‘if the movement wants me …’. It would only be in 2010 that the ANC explicitly acknowledged the need to have open, but regulated, candidate campaigns, commencing at a point to be determined by the movement.36 The 2010 NGC reiterated that the ANC would announce such a date at a later stage. By 2011 it appeared that ‘the later stage’ would only be 2012. By April 2011 the pot had started boiling over; by September ANC structures pleaded to discuss ‘leadership performance’, if it cannot be ‘succession’.

Mbeki’s fall out with the Alliance was gradual. The SACP’s July 2002 Rustenburg congress had decided not to oust ‘government deployees’, such as Charles Nqakula,37 from the chair of the SACP and thereby exacerbate tensions between Mbeki and the Alliance. Days before, Mbeki had been advised by his NWC not to open the SACP congress, fearing that he would face public humiliation. In addressing the congress, Cosatu’s Zwelinzima Vavi said the Alliance was in tatters because of the ANC’s arrogance in dealing with its partners. This arrogance was manifested in:38

> … the insistence that the national democratic revolution should only be a bourgeois revolution, and the argument that we must strengthen capitalism as the basis for socialism. And it appears most brutally in the clamour from some quarters to smash strikes, privatise, cut taxes and weaken popular organisations.
The SACP 2005 national congress in Port Elizabeth, two weeks after Midrand, was a more demure, perhaps confused, event. As on some previous occasions, the SACP was contemplating contesting future local government elections against the ANC, whilst stressing that the developmental state model of the ANC constituted a significant move to the left, and that this had been as a result of their influence. That congress, however, ousted the Mbeki-associated leaders that had been tolerated in Rustenburg, Mbeki did a no-show, and the SACP extended implicit support to the Zuma campaign, which it constructed as pro-poor. By the time of the SACP’s 2009 conference the wheel had turned in full. The anti-Mbeki glue was stale and new divisions were opening up; the SACP was deployed in government, making minor strides at best to assert ideological influence. The ANCYL was working to counter its influence. Mbeki was gone, but influence at the helm was not guaranteed.

Cosatu in its September 2003 congress had hinted that all was not consensual in the land of succession. Zuma, a friend over time of Cosatu, appeared at the congress to thunderous applause, with delegates singing ‘What has he done, Bulelani?’ This was against the background of an accumulation of allegations and charges against Zuma. They remained untested in court, mainly courtesy of Zuma’s resilience and his legal team’s finesse. Cosatu resolved to work towards making the Alliance the political centre, yet accepting the ANC’s leadership of the Alliance if this went with equal participation by the alliance partners (not necessarily equal influence) in important matters.

It was only in 2005 with the meeting of the ANC’s NGC that the anti-Mbeki mobilisation was expressed in major movement forums. The NGC was an angry internal rebellion. Mbeki was under siege and his contingent of public servants, which had parachuted in (as was common practice under Mbeki) to facilitate yet another large ANC meeting, was ousted. The NGC confirmed Zuma as ANC deputy president and served notice that the ANC was reclaiming power from the Mbeki-era’s ‘state power over the ANC’.

The ANC’s mid-2007 policy conference deliberated the third-term issue. It could have guillotined Mbeki out of the race. Instead it stated conference support for ‘one centre of power’ and left the door open. In the one-centre model the ANC president is also the president of South Africa. This contrasted with the two centres that a Mbeki ANC presidency and another leader in the national Presidency would have created. The statement said:

Judging from the reports from the various commissions, there is general agreement that the ANC President should preferably be the candidate for the President of the Republic. There was also a strong view that this must not be made a principle.

LESSONS FROM THE PRESIDENT OF PLOTS AND CONSPIRACIES

The president who had seen so many ‘plots’ and ‘conspiracies’ to topple him, in the end was ousted through open mobilisation. Ironically, much of the resentment of Mbeki’s opponents had been inspired by Mbeki’s perceived plot to keep Zuma from power.
Mbeki saw ‘plots’ rather than political mobilisation and strategy. Such conceptual distinctions might have been harmless had Mbeki not on several occasions invoked state security using terms like ‘conspiracy to seize power’ to raise alarm and foster sympathy. State security agencies then were required to investigate the accused plotters. Rather than shield Mbeki, his accusations of plotting back-fired and aided his fall. This section explores the most prominent ‘plots’ of the time.44

With the tables turning on Mbeki, the Zuma camp identified a Mbeki plot to keep Zuma out of the ANC presidency (by discrediting him through legal charges) and from becoming the ANC’s candidate for the presidency of the country (by disgracing him and suggesting a successor). The definitive evidence of such a conspiracy or plot was never delivered, although the September 2007 obiter dictum or legal opinion by Judge Chris Nicholson (resoundingly criticised afterwards by the Supreme Court of Appeal) was used for this goal. The NGC in Midrand (2005) and at the conference in Polokwane (2007) hence took revenge for Mbeki’s systematic plotting since at least 2001 to try and eliminate competition come the 2007 ANC contest.

Mbeki usually found others to tell the world about plots against him but finally, in 2006, he meekly articulated it himself pinpointing a succession of plot-conspiracy accusations. In mid-2001 then Minister of Safety and Security, Steve Tshwete, announced that Mathews Phosa (Mpumalanga premier from 1994-99), Tokyo Sexwale (first premier of Gauteng) and Cyril Ramaphosa (chief constitutional negotiator and subsequently businessman) were being investigated regarding a plot to oust Mbeki.45 The accusations followed shortly after the seven years of democracy celebrations in which ANC members circulated pamphlets advocating ‘One president, one term’.46 Jacob Zuma entered as a late voice, stating that he was not aspiring to Mbeki’s job either.47

Tshwete claimed that the three were part of a disinformation campaign to undermine Mbeki. According to him allegations included that Mbeki had been involved in the 1993 murder of Chris Hani, who had served as ANC national secretary and leader of its military wing.48 The plot was said to have been discovered by a Luthuli House secret intelligence unit. The unit, which reported directly to Mbeki as ANC president, was said to have been created in 1998 as part of an investigation of Mathews Phosa.49 In a TV interview on the 2005 ‘plot’, Mbeki effectively equated state security with intra-party contestation. His explanation boiled down to some businessmen secretly funding challengers within the ANC.50

It’s a conspiratorial thing … The best way of dealing with the matter is to have open debate about everything, including the presidency. Because once you start a conspiratorial thing, you are implanting a destructive process.

In an extension of the ‘plot’ theme, Gevisser in Thabo Mbeki: the dream deferred, remarks that some of Mbeki’s advisers believed that his life was really at risk.51

It was not unusual, in the parallel universe that was the presidency between 2000 and 2002, to hear otherwise-reasonable people saying, in absolute seriousness,
that the Americans might engineer ‘regime change’ to get rid of a president whose actions could cause the pharmaceutical industry to lose billions in a year.

The three main 2005 accused denied the allegations. A police investigation followed. Mandela defended them, saying that ‘[u]ntil there is concrete and credible evidence to the contrary, I will continue to hold Cyril Ramaphosa, Tokyo Sexwale and Mathews Phosa in high esteem’. Mandela was positive about Mbeki, but effectively endorsed Ramaphosa as a future presidential successor. He said that Ramaphosa ‘would be one of the right people to lead South Africa’ should he someday decide to run for the presidency. The investigation exonerated the ‘plotters’. Mbeki welcomed it, saying that Tshwete had made a mistake naming the three persons.

This extreme case of plot paranoia had followed on the 2000 edition. In that instance media reports surfaced that United States and British businessmen had plotted to replace Mbeki with Ramaphosa. The weekly Rapport reported that South African intelligence agents had discovered evidence at the South African embassy in Washington of a plot to have Ramaphosa replace Mbeki. The ANC dismissed these, with then spokesperson Smuts Ngonyama saying: ‘… the ANC is as united as ever, and … such allegations are the work of sinister forces trying to destabilise the organisation’.54

On the eve of Polokwane Mbeki related to Sunday Times journalists Mondli Makhanya and Wally Mbhele that he and Zuma had privately discussed the allegations in 2005, with the blessing of the NEC, which was, in the end, not fully briefed on the discussion due to the sensitivity of the allegations:

I gave [the NEC] one example of the matters that the deputy president [Zuma] had raised with me, and they understood. In the end, what I’m saying is that the National Executive Committee came to a conclusion that there was no conspiracy … [Mbeki then proposed a commission of inquiry into the alleged conspiracy] … The matter was tabled, discussed, and later it was said there was actually no need for the commission of inquiry … My view was that it’s always better that we ensure that the truth is told because it’s very easy to spread rumours, very easy to manufacture stories ...

Mbeki reiterated these points in the context of his alleged conspiracy against Zuma in 2007. He added that he had let Zuma talk about the perceptions for eight hours and over several meetings, that the allegations went back to 1991, and that Zuma’s story cited ‘NEC members in a manner you could neither prove nor disprove’.

In his penultimate plot allegation Mbeki told an NEC meeting in May 2006 that a group of people were plotting to topple him as president of the ANC and the country. They were said to define themselves as progressive and were using Zuma’s name to launch their plot. Mbeki used pro-Zuma demonstrations and media columns to back up his claims. It was clear that all along Mbeki, at best, had not differentiated intra-party contestation from security issues, or, at worst, had conflated the two in order to discredit contestation and further his own ambition.

In 2006-07 Mbeki or his associates’ final contrived ‘plot’ surfaced in the form of a sub-
plot to the overall ‘plot to keep Zuma from rising into power’. This time around it was the ‘top secret’ *Special Browse Mole Consolidated Report* about an alleged plot by Zuma, his left allies and former Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) leaders, who allegedly conspired with President José Eduardo dos Santos of Angola and Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi to ‘overthrow’ Mbeki. The report was leaked to Cosatu. The conspiratorial deeds comprised covert funding and support to the Zuma campaign. The document provided evidence that Zuma’s ‘presidential ambitions are fuelled and sustained by a conspiracy playing out both inside South Africa and on the African continental stage’.

Security agencies, including the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) and the Scorpions via Leonard McCarthy, admitted to Parliament’s Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence (JSCI) that the Browse Mole Report was the work of senior Scorpions investigator Ivor Powell. Powell, in an interview with the *Mail & Guardian*, revealed the ‘Browse’ in the name indicated an open-source report and that he had compiled the report on instruction from Scorpions boss Leonard McCarthy. Powell was required to use certain phrases and McCarthy did the conclusions and recommendations. The NPA’s Vusi Pikoli, testifying to the Ginwala Commission, said that upon receiving the report from McCarthy in July 2006 he had reckoned it should not be taken seriously. He passed the report to the directors-general of the then South African Secret Service (SASS) and the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) and there ‘was consensus that there were huge question marks about the authenticity of some of the information … in the report.’ Pikoli denied having approved the Scorpions’ investigation. In February 2008, Parliament’s JSCI (by now, in the aftermath of Polokwane, thoroughly turned against Mbeki) concluded that the Scorpions had produced the Browse Mole Report illegally and in contravention of their mandate. The committee chairperson was the future Minister of State Security, Siyabonga Cwele. This time around, however, the parliamentary committee identified a plot behind the fabrication of the plot allegations, warning against reactionary, pre-democracy style security operations peddling information:

They use specific harmless facts out of context, adding to that, dangerous lies, in the production of their documents. By the use of selected facts, they proceed to distort the truth and so produce documents and supply information to state institutions and governments. Their products are mainly about fabricating ‘conspiracies’ and ‘plots’ as a method of getting closer to those who hold power. The negative outcome is for their clients to view the legitimate intelligence services as useless and start relying on the peddlers.

The Browse Mole Report thus outlined an alleged plot by Zuma to oust Mbeki, but may have been a plot by Mbeki and/or his associates to bolster efforts to remove Zuma from the presidential race. Zuma associate Ranjeni Munusamy raised the irony that ‘… Zuma’s path to the ANC presidency opened the moment the political crusade against him began. Had the NPA and its political masters not run their malicious two-pronged media-prosecutorial operation against Zuma, the Polokwane revolt would probably not have happened.’
In April 2011, the alleged Estcourt plot of the Mvela group (including Sexwale, several KwaZulu-Natal ANC heavyweights, and the ANCYL) was revealed through a leaked report of a covert intelligence operation by beleaguered intelligence operatives. The report concerned early 2010 alignments preceding the Durban NGC meeting, and coalitions might have changed in the interim. Sexwale denied the allegations. The ‘plot’ allegations were used to discredit those with potential leadership ambitions and the only certainty they revealed was that succession struggles were real, albeit underground.

Zuma reacted politically wisely. He dismissed the reports as invalid and the work of security services that often got these things wrong. At the May 2011 ANC NEC meeting he countered alleged ring-leader Tokyo Sexwale who wanted a full investigation due to his image having been ‘tarnished’. Unlike Mbeki Zuma held out an olive branch, and assured those who had been named in the report by the then suspended crime intelligence chief Richard Mdluli that they would not be investigated, and that there would be no retribution. He thus defused the situation, showed that he had the strategic upper hand over Sexwale, and minimised the chances of creating further second-term enemies.

ANC YOUTH LEAGUE – king-makers, foot soldiers and agent provocateur

The ANCYL over time has been at the forefront of ANC king-making. The League’s role in preceding, pre-democracy periods is well recorded. Subsequently, the League helped several ANC presidents into power. In 1993 ANCYL leader Peter Mokaba announced that the league had thrown its weight behind Mbeki for the position of ANC deputy president, ‘with the understanding that when the time comes for Comrade Mandela to rest, Comrade Thabo should become the president of the country’. The ANCYL next helped ensure Mbeki’s re-election as ANC president. It went on to precipitate the Polokwane fallout. Its king-making actions are illustrated in its campaign to save and elect ANC deputy president Zuma.

The league was vocal in the Polokwane campaign to dislodge Mbeki. The ANCYL’s Mbalula and Cosatu’s Zwelinzima Vavi pinned down Zuma’s rivals. Referring to Mbeki’s quest for a third term Mbalula, for example, told a Kimberley rally that those ‘with an uncontrollable urge for power are clearly suffering from psychological problems and have until the Limpopo conference to seek counselling’. The League confirmed its influence in the Polokwane nomination process. In the run-up to the conference it infused ANC branches with League members, bringing many more delegates to Polokwane than just the number assigned to the League. Formally, the provincial executive committees, and the women’s, youth and ANC veterans’ leagues share 10 per cent of voting delegates at ANC conferences.

The League often led the campaigns to have legal charges against Zuma dropped (and Mbeki removed from office). They worked on the ground also leading charges against the judiciary, Cope and the DA. Erstwhile ANCYL president Mbalula led the process up to Polokwane. His successor Julius Malema took over in April 2008 and was re-elected in June 2011 at the 24th National Congress of the Youth League.
The ANCYL was influential in the events of the Polokwane war. In early September 2008, shortly before Nicholson was to pronounce on the Zuma case, the ANCYL’s NEC called for Mbeki to be ousted. This contrasted with the ANC’s prior reiteration that Mbeki would be allowed to complete his term. The debate was opened – and the rest was history. In the historic 19 September 2008 ANC NEC meeting to deliberate Mbeki’s fate, Malema threatened to mobilise the youth of South Africa should the ANC fail to fire Mbeki. These sentiments resonated with the majority sentiment in the post-Polokwane ANC. By now it was hard to imagine that the ANC could perform convincingly in elections with Mbeki at the helm.

Malema’s polemical style and power to mobilise came to characterise much of the 2009-11 political landscape. He came to be king-maker with coercive power derived from organisational ability, determination by top leadership not to alienate him, and a voice that could mobilise many in the electorally powerful ‘born free’ youth generation. His style was illustrated in a June 2008 celebration of Youth Day, associated with the 1976 Soweto youth revolt. Malema told the Thaba Nchu crowd that young people were prepared to ‘take up arms and kill for Zuma’. The ensuing outcry failed to subdue Malema. He reiterated:

We are prepared to die and take up arms only if the need arises ... killing counter-revolutionary forces hell-bent to reverse the gains of our revolution ... there are people who are all out to destroy JZ. They push their agenda, they will reach a point to engage directly by fire without using the law ... The only option [we have is to] engage through fire ... What triggered my statement is that people perpetuated division, undermining the leadership of the ANC. We will not allow that, not in our lifetime ...

ANC top leadership responses varied from noting that it had accepted the League’s assurance that it had not ‘wavered from the principles enshrined in the constitution and that it will defend them through democratic and peaceful means, for the common good of the country’ (Zuma), to ‘[t]he statements were a reflection of eagerness of young people to pledge their support [for Zuma], and bordered on reckless’ (Mantashe) and ‘[i]t is intemperate and reckless for anyone to say any such thing ... especially after the recent [xenophobic] killings’ (Motlanthe).

Post-election 2009 the League turned its eyes to future power brokering and used policy as a proxy for mobilisation, in part due to the ban on campaigning. They came out in support of the nationalisation of mines (first refuted by the ANC, then redirected into future policy deliberations, then placed on the agenda for research and a response at the 2012 ANC policy conference, and positioned by the ANCYL in 2011 as the policy-in-waiting), radical land reform and anti-labour brokering. Despite continuously campaigning in this style, league spokespersons had publicly averred, until June 2011, that it was premature to start the next succession debate. By this time the ANCYL was playing cat-and-mouse with the ANC top leadership. The latter went out of their way to avoid antagonising and triggering the ire of the League ... at least
until the League publicly started endorsing Motlanthe – and Zuma, with a fair list of NEC supporters and no blocking by the top six, went along with pursuing disciplinary charges against Malema in August-September 2011.

The League was determined to occupy campaigning space and not let silence cede strategic advantage to opponents. Besides its emerging position on Zuma, it confirmed its wish to have Mbalula nominated in 2012 as the ANC’s next secretary general, to replace incumbent Gwede Mantashe. It also belied head-on campaigning against communists who had been positioning for 2012 candidacies. ANC top leadership still tried to halt campaigning, stating:

The NEC stands by its view that succession debate is very premature and could disunite the organisation. The ANCYL is categorically opposed to the commencement of the succession debate, irrespective of who raises it. The succession discussion will only happen towards the ANC National Conference in 2012, and the ANCYL has never discussed succession issues in the ANC …

The statement followed after the nationalisation debate had precipitated intra-alliance fall out, starting in 2009. Malema and the ANCYL used the debate to discredit the SACP, and prevent powerful SACP figures such as Mantashe and Blade Nzimande from becoming comfortably entrenched in their ANC positions. The ANC’s September 2010 NGC condemned the tendency ‘to open debate prematurely on the leadership line-ups for 2012 … The NEC has taken a firm decision that it should be stopped, as any lobbying for positions is by nature divisive’. By the time of the November 2010 cabinet reshuffle, the Youth League was again being drawn in closer, with Zuma working to ensure that senior executive appointments of former Youth Leaguers Mbalula and Malusi Gigaba would counter alienation resulting from Head Office having sentenced Malema to ANC school, and Zuma dressing down the Youth League on the NGC platform in Bloemfontein. The disciplinary charges signalled Zuma’s manoeuvre to limit the chances of Youth League mobilising forces being ripe for the picking by his opponents.

The ANCYL appeared set on provoking ANC top leadership into reaction, which followed in the wake of the ANCYL threatening mobilisation to bring down the Botswana government. Statements by Mantashe and Mthembu noted that the ANCYL was undermining the ANC.

THE ARMS DEAL, POLOKWANE WAR AND THE HAUNTED ANC

The 1998 arms deal haunted the ANC for much of its first 17 years in power. The allegations of kickbacks, and of buying influence and favour in the process of purchasing major military hardware from high-level international arms manufacturers for South Africa, would not die. The ANC’s brutal 2007 succession war is inseparable from the arms deal, which along with its associated transactions provided ammunition in the efforts to prevent Zuma from ascending to the two presidencies. The political ramifications rippled
out beyond Polokwane. In 2008, then acting president Motlanthe rejected a high powered call from Desmond Tutu and FW de Klerk for a judicial commission. Continuous 2010-11 pressures culminated Zuma’s September 2011 announcement of a judicial commission of inquiry.

In 1998 cabinet approved the multibillion-rand deal. Soon after Mbeki became president in 1999, Patricia de Lille (then of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC)) called for a probe and handed a dossier to Judge Willem Heath’s Special Investigating Unit (SIU). The dossier was known to have been prepared by then intelligence operative Bheki Jacobs. Giliomee and Mbenga argue about continuous ANC efforts to keep the details under wraps:

The extent of corrosion of South Africa’s constitutional checks and balances was fully exposed in early 2001 when the ANC leadership acted to control and limit the inquiry, launched earlier by parliament, into the exorbitant spending on a multibillion rand arms deal ... The various political appointees in the other investigative agencies closely watched the progress of the inquiry, and the final report of the investigators was watered down after President Mbeki met with Auditor-general Shauket Fakie, nor was the ANC caucus in parliament, firmly subordinate as it was to the leadership, effectively able to hold the executive to account ...

In 2001, Mbeki excluded Heath from the investigation and the government announced plans to scrap the SIU. ANC MP Andrew Feinstein was fired as chair of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (Scopa) for calling for an arms deal inquiry. Committee chairperson Gavin Woods resigned his position in protest. Feinstein observes on the conversion of Zuma over time from critic of the arms deal to complicit silence:

[Zuma’s] initial support for our work on parliament’s standing committee on public accounts (Scopa) – which included advising me to ignore pressure from then president Thabo Mbeki’s office to halt the inquiry – came to an abrupt end after Thomson-CSF had agreed in an ‘encrypted fax’ to pay him R500,000 a year to protect the company’s interests in South Africa. No sooner was the fax received than Zuma cut off all communication with me and signed an absurd letter to Gavin Woods vilifying the committee and defending the integrity of the international arms companies. Given all this, it is obvious why prosecutors have continued to pursue Zuma, who has publicly appeared to welcome the opportunity to answer his critics in court and protested loudly that justice delayed is justice denied. Behind the scenes, however, his lawyers used every trick in the book to delay Zuma’s appearance in court – if not prevent it from taking place altogether. They have launched countless actions attempting to ensure that a trial either never happens or occurs only after Zuma has been elected president ...

The suspicions of corrupt relationships between Zuma and his financial adviser, Schabir Shaik (subsequently jailed), provided the link to divert the arms deal suspicions into Zuma’s lap. The probe was extended to include possible corruption and fraud involving
Zuma, Shaik’s Nkobi Group and the Thint Group (Thomson/Thales). In 2003, the National Prosecutions Authority (NPA) informed Zuma that he was being investigated. NPA head Bulelani Ngcuka, however, argued that Zuma would not be prosecuted, despite a prima facie case against him. Next Zuma figured prominently in the Shaik trial and judgement. Vusi Pikoli took over as NPA boss in 2005. Upon Shaik’s conviction Mbeki fired Zuma (and Mlambo-Ngcuka took his place as the South African deputy president). Zuma appeared in the Durban magistrate’s court on charges of corruption (Tables 2 and 3). The charges were later extended to include fraud and tax offences. The mid-2005 NGC insisted that Zuma would remain ANC deputy president. ‘Innocent until proven guilty’ became a favourite ANC slogan. Rape charges against Zuma followed in late 2005, but he was acquitted. Later in 2006 Judge Herbert Msimang threw the Zuma corruption charges out of the Durban High Court due to the state’s inability to proceed at that point. The case was reinstated in late 2007, with Zuma charged with racketeering, corruption, money laundering and fraud. Mbeki next suspended Pikoli, seemingly to protect Police Commissioner Jackie Selebi from being arrested. Selebi faced allegations of taking bribes from convicted drug trafficker Glen Agliotti.85 The 2008 Ginwala Inquiry concurred that Pikoli was not fit to hold office. (He was, however, exonerated.)

Court rulings, both in Mauritius and in the Constitutional Court in South Africa, went against Zuma. In September the Nicholson obiter dictum found that the NPA should have heard representations from Zuma before reinstating charges (the state argued that it had been an ongoing investigation thus obviating the need for representations). The judgement included a range of statements on political interference. Mbeki’s opponents seized the moment and turned the tables.86 The NPA next announced that it would appeal the obiter, and both Mbeki and Ngcuka indicated they would seek legal advice. Cabinet followed suit. In early 2009 the Nicholson obiter was overturned in the Supreme Court of Appeal. By then, however, it was water under the bridge. Two weeks before Election 2009, strategically leaked taped evidence suggested direct Mbeki interference in the late-December 2007 reinstatement of charges against Zuma. The political-legal solution to make the charges against Zuma go away had been found. Yet it was a no-win situation. Both South Africa and the ANC remained haunted by the arms deal.

The names of the two main Polokwane protagonists featured centrally in the arms saga. Some suggested that Mbeki himself might not be squeaky clean; although fingers pointed to him only having taken benefits for the ANC.87 Other central figures were the ANC’s Joe Modise – Minister of Defence at the time of the deal – and arms deal middleman Fana Hlongwane.88

Legal manoeuvring comprised much of the ammunition in the multiple skirmishes in the Polokwane war. The details reveal how serious conflicts are handled in the ANC. The continuously unresolved allegations, well into 2011, showed the ANC’s ongoing reluctance to lay it all bare. 2010 and 2011 saw renewed efforts to get Zuma to reopen the arms deal investigation. In September 2010 Hawks head, Anwa Dramat, decided to close the decade-long investigation. The decision was anchored in a memorandum by the Hawks commercial crimes head. He argued, amongst others, that the passage of time would undermine a speedy trial, that witnesses had moved on and were no longer available (or
had died) and that parallel foreign investigations had been closed. In addition, Terry Crawford-Browne, a former banker known for his opposition to the deal, applied to the Constitutional Court to order Zuma to appoint an inquiry into the arms deal contracts that had led to the now abandoned allegations of corruption against him. The May 2011 application sought a review of the refusal to exercise presidential power to appoint a commission of inquiry as provided for in Section 84(2)(f) of the Constitution. In 2008 Browne had asked then acting president Motlanthe to reopen the investigation. Mbeki had turned down such a request in 2003 (and was forced to leave office amidst tensions over Zuma’s prosecution for allegedly receiving bribes from arms dealers).

TABLE 2: Shifting power in the ANC – NGC 2005 to NGC 2010 and its aftermath

Full details on the Zuma trials, interspersing with the events below, in Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Events and strategic moves</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>PHASE 1: MBeki’s ISOLATION AND POLOKWANE DEFEAT</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-02</td>
<td>In November 2000 investigators start a preparatory investigation to see if there are grounds to investigate corruption and fraud in the multibillion-rand arms (in 2009 worth R60 billion) deal; in 2001 the auditor-general presents a report on the arms deal to Parliament; the report clears government of wrongdoing and corruption, but it is then revealed that Mbeki has extensively edited the report; the investigation starts in 2001; by October 2002 the investigation included Zuma.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2005</td>
<td>The ANC NEC calls Zuma to account for damage done to the image of the ANC, and calls on him to prove his allegations of a conspiracy against him.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June and December 2005</td>
<td>Shaik convicted of fraud and corruption; a few days later (14 June 2005) Mbeki fires Zuma as deputy president of the country; late June Zuma appears in court on two charges of corruption; in December Zuma is charged with rape.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2006</td>
<td>Zuma is acquitted on charges of rape and resumes his position as deputy president of the ANC; Cosatu calls Mbeki a dictator; NUM endorses Zuma for top leadership and questions Mbeki’s motives in calling for a woman president; SACP discussion document accuses Mbeki of dominating all aspects of government and ANC operations; Mbeki claims there has been an attempt to overthrow him.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2006</td>
<td>The NEC calls Zuma to account for damage done to the image of the ANC, and calls on him to prove his allegations of a conspiracy against him; NEC document Contextual considerations in addressing challenges of leadership sets down the values that presidential candidates should hold; statement acknowledges: ‘The NEC recognises that events of the last few weeks and months have tested the unity, cohesion and standing of the ANC’; the South African National Civics Organisation (Sanco) suspends its president, Mlungisi Hlongwane, for calling for a constitutional amendment to enable Mbeki to govern South Africa for three terms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2006</td>
<td>The Durban High Court rejects charges against Zuma; resolution by Nelson Mandela region of ANC (Eastern Cape) that it will support a third ANC term for Mbeki.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October – December 2006</td>
<td>Zuma supporters hijack the launch of Gandhi’s satyagraha movement and embarrass Mbeki; KwaZulu-Natal Zuma supporters also embarrass Mbeki by staging a walkout from the reburial of struggle hero Moses Mabhida.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Range of political and legal developments, handled in the text of this chapter.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>2007</strong></td>
<td>ANC delegates gather in Polokwane for the ANC’s 52nd national conference, and on 19 December elect Zuma over Mbeki in a roughly 60:40 ratio; the Zuma camp’s slate of NEC candidates is victorious.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>December 2007</strong></td>
<td>Telephonic conversations between Bulelani Ngcuka and Leonard McCarthy on dates for the new charges against Zuma; National Intelligence Service (NIS) tapes the conversations (and these would be crucial to the eventual withdrawal of charges against Zuma in April 2009). On 28 December Zuma is charged with racketeering, corruption, fraud and money laundering.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>January 2008</strong></td>
<td>Mbeki is absent from Atteridgeville ANC anniversary celebrations, busy with the suspension of Jackie Selebi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>February 2008</strong></td>
<td>Mbeki’s State of the Nation address adopts a different style, devoid of trademark ‘victories and progress’, now focusing on outstanding tasks and ‘business unusual’; on opening of Parliament speaker Baleka Mbete hosts a rival function to the traditional SA president’s event.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>First half of 2008</strong></td>
<td>Mbeki out of step with the ANC on several issues, including electoral crisis in Zimbabwe, electricity crisis, xenophobia attacks, SABC board wars, disbanding of Scorpions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>May 2008</strong></td>
<td>Kgalema Motlanthe sworn in as MP (calls for his appointment as deputy president started in January 2008).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mid-July 2008</strong></td>
<td>ANC forces Mbeki to accept Motlanthe into his cabinet; sacking of premiers of the Western Cape and Eastern Cape – the moves compromise Mbeki’s power to ‘hire and fire’ (he is visited by an ANC delegation that informs him of decisions to be implemented); the procedure followed in the dismissal process is challenged but upheld.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>August 2008</strong></td>
<td>Pressure mounts to find a ‘political solution’ to the Zuma trials, with calls coming, for example, from the SACP; gist of the calls is that the continuous persecution is driving South Africa into anarchy; Zuma’s application for charges to be dropped served in Pietermaritzburg High Court.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Late August 2008</strong></td>
<td>Business leaders call for a solution to be found, noting that continuous uncertainty is paralysing the country; SACP’s Blade Nzimande calls for street protests if the Zuma charges are not dropped.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>12-18 September 2008</strong></td>
<td>The Nicholson obiter in the Pietermaritzburg High Court provides the sudden beginning to a legal solution to the Zuma problem; the Presidency’s notice that it will appeal the Nicholson opinion precipitates Zuma camp’s action to protect the new political opening.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>18 September 2008</strong></td>
<td>The ANC NEC meets at Esselen Park; intense deliberations with the weight of argument going to force Mbeki out of office.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>19-20 September 2008</strong></td>
<td>Unfolding Esselen Park drama; several sidebar meetings, including visit of secretary general Mantashe to Mbeki; NEC decides to recall Mbeki as president of South Africa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>21 September 2008</strong></td>
<td>Mbeki holds a cabinet meeting and announces his resignation in a televised national address on Sunday night.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>22 September 2008</td>
<td>Mbeki applies for leave to appeal the Nicholson obiter in the Constitutional Court; ANC secretary general requests cabinet members to stay on.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 September 2008</td>
<td>Release by Presidency of names of one-third of cabinet members resigning, including Trevor Manuel; confusion as to the status of the resignations; some reversals follow.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 September 2008</td>
<td>Final meeting of outgoing cabinet; it is confirmed that six of the 11 original resignations stand (Pahad, Mlambo-Ngcuka, Mufamadi, Kasrils, Fraser-Moleketi, Erwin).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 September</td>
<td>Motlanthe elected as new president of South Africa in a parliamentary vote (269 Motlanthe, 50 for DA's Joe Seremane, 41 abstentions) and announces new cabinet (mostly re-appointments); Zuma opposes Mbeki’s application to join the appeal against Nicholson’s obiter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 September</td>
<td>Confirmation of preparations for the launch of a breakaway party; three days later Mbeki loyalist Mbhazima Shilowa resigns as Gauteng premier, citing Mbeki’s ‘unfair treatment’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September – December 2008</td>
<td>Developments in formation of a new party, later named Congress of the People (Cope). Simultaneously, there is a new prominent person campaign to probe the arms deal.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Phase 3: Power Build-Up of the New ANC**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October 2008</td>
<td>Tensions between Lekota and NEC come to the surface, increasing possibility of a breakaway party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January – April 2009</td>
<td>Appeal Court finds that Zuma may be charged, but the ANC is engaged in a massive election campaign, capturing and re-consolidating its popular appeal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 April 2009</td>
<td>NPA withdraws corruption and fraud charges against Zuma after acting NPA boss Mokotedi Mpshe announced that secret connivance between former Scorpions boss, Leonard McCarthy, and former NPA boss, Bulelani Ngcuka, amounted to an ‘intolerable abuse’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 April 2009</td>
<td>The ANC wins a commanding electoral victory, although ending 4 percentage points lower than in 2004; a huge KwaZulu-Natal performance facilitates the achievement, whilst the ANC cedes the Western Cape to the DA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2009</td>
<td>Announcement of new cabinet and revised government structures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May onwards</td>
<td>The ‘new ANC’ steps in projecting a spirit of newness, coming to terms with old problems, continuously negotiating intra-alliance dynamics.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Phase 4: Emergence of New Lines of Mobilisation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>September – December 2009</td>
<td>Zuma tries to put brakes on the next succession debate, whilst turning a blind eye to ANCYL campaigns, especially directed at senior SACP members and officials.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>A year of vacillating power relations among the ANC, the two alliance members and the ANCYL, positioning in terms of support for a second Zuma term, or replacement of Gwede Mantashe as secretary general; Cosatu steps up its role as ‘internal opposition’ with attacks on ANC integrity and commitment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September – November 2010</td>
<td>ANC’s NGC meeting, Durban, sees the affirmation of the ANC as the centre of power, but with Cosatu’s conditional acceptance; Cosatu’s civil society meeting irks the ANC; Zuma’s cabinet reshuffle finds favour with the ANCYL; in October the Hawks (successor to the Scorpions) end their investigation of the arms deal, leaving questions unanswered.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Early 2011 | Evidence of mobilisation for Mangaung, showing schemes to marginalise Zuma and the SACP – but alliances continuously shift.

April 2011 | Local government elections in which the ANC loses support, yet maintains overall dominance; the losses are often due to ANC internal contests and infighting.

June – September 2011 | Increasing pressure on the ANC top officials to declare ‘open season for Mangaung’; irrespective of the prohibition on open campaigning a range of lines of mobilisation emerge, including the ANCYL’s call for the reopening of the investigation into the arms deal. Presidency pre-empts Constitutional Court hearing scheduled for November and announces a judicial commission of inquiry.

Sources: Author’s monitoring through observation, interviews and media-tracking.

The 2011 question at first was whether the president had the discretion to exercise this power at will. He opposed the application. A few weeks later, multinational Swedish Aeroplane Company Limited (Saab) announced that multimillion Rand ‘consultancy fees’ to Hlongwane had been hidden from Saab by its partner in the deal, British Aerospace Enterprise (BAE) systems. Next, Dramat informed Scopa that the Hawks would be following up on the Saab admission. His carefully worded statement said that the Hawks would ‘determine whether there is information which points to crime/s in South Africa’. In September, on the eve of the Constitutional Court Ruling that was expected to order an investigation, Zuma announced the commission of inquiry. It was the ANC’s effort to let the ANC set the terms of reference and show that the ANC government rather than the Constitutional Court was in charge.

TIMES OF AMBUSH AND CONQUEST – case study of the construction of an ANC elective conference victory

The transition from Mbeki to Zuma was a prolonged and often tortuous process, with power shifts occurring regularly in the period from the 2005 NGC meeting onwards. The transition would extend into the NGC meeting five years on in Durban when, finally, Zuma appeared to be consolidated in his position. Within six months, however, it was confirmed that even at the time of this NGC, attempts at counter-mobilisation to replace Zuma in Mangaung might have been unfolding, from at least early 2010 onwards. Potential replays of Polokwane, a university of internal contest and mobilisation, were taking shape.

An exploration of the intra-ANC mobilisation in 2005-07 reveals a prolonged period of positioning and counter-positioning and organisational mobilisation. The struggles helped the ANC reach out to communities and mobilise for leadership transition. Through the Cope experience the ANC briefly seemed to relearn the lessons of community connection. The mobilisation and battle details of the period serve as a case study of how political organisation and internal democracy in the ANC operates, with lessons for the future of the movement.

In the 2005-07 period mobilising agents in the ANC, the ANCYL, Cosatu and the SACP were deployed in massive branch mobilisation campaigns. ANC forces were strengthened through a coalition of the wounded, aggrieved, marginalised opportunistic
and ambitious, along with others who had to suppress their political ambitions in the time of Mbeki. Table 2 relates the main events and tells the story of an exceptional period, of counter-strategies between the protagonists, and a continuously shifting balance of power. Table 3 details essential events and turning points in the story of the ‘Zuma trials’, which, in turn, were inseparable from the notorious arms deal.92

### TABLE 3: The legal side of the succession war, 2003-09

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Legal events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003 &amp; 2004</td>
<td>NPA head Bulelani Ngcuka says there is a prima facie case against Zuma, but that Mbeki would not be charged alongside Schabir Shaik for corruption and fraud.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2003</td>
<td>Shaik pleads not guilty to charges of corruption and fraud.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>National Intelligence Agency (NIA) boss Billy Masetlha hands Mbeki a report, claiming to have uncovered a Scorpions plot against Zuma.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2005</td>
<td>Judge Hilary Squires finds Shaik guilty of corruption and fraud.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 June</td>
<td>Mbeki sacks Zuma as deputy president of South Africa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 June</td>
<td>NPA boss Vusi Pikoli announces that Zuma will be charged on two counts of corruption.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 June</td>
<td>Zuma appears in the Durban magistrate’s court on two graft charges.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>Zuma is charged with rape of the HIV-positive daughter of a long-standing family friend.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2006</td>
<td>Scorpions raid the South African offices of French arms company Thint,93 the offices of Zuma’s attorney, Michael Hulley, Zuma’s home and his former offices.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Johannesburg High Court acquits Zuma on the rape charge.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>NEC calls Zuma to account for damage done to the image of the ANC, and calls on him to prove his allegations of a conspiracy against him; NEC document <em>Contextual considerations in addressing challenges of leadership</em> sets down the values that presidential candidates should hold.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>Durban High Court Judge Herbert Msimang strikes Zuma’s case from the roll, saying he had no choice after the prosecutor had said the state was not ready to proceed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>A bench of five judges in the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) reject Shaik’s bid to appeal his conviction on charges of corruption and fraud, upholding the Squires judgement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>Constitutional Court rejects Shaik’s bid to appeal his conviction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>SCA rules in favour of the NPA in the case relating to various search and seizure raids in the Zuma case, including obtaining the personal diary of a senior member of the French arms company.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
28 December
11 days after Zuma wins the ANC presidency he is served with papers to appear in court on corruption charges; telephonic conversations between Bulelani Ngcuka and Leonard McCarthy on dates for the new charges against Zuma take place; NIS tapes the conversations, which would be crucial to the eventual withdrawal of charges against Zuma (see April 2009).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2008</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>March</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Zuma and Thint appeal to the Constitutional Court against the SCA ruling in favour of the NPA (see November 2007).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>April</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Constitutional Court dismisses Shaik’s appeal against the validity of a confiscation order on Shaik’s and his companies’ assets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>31 July 2008</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Justice Pius Langa berates the pre-trial litigation efforts by the Zuma legal team, due to which there had been delays in the corruption case going to trial; the Constitutional Court rules in favour of the NPA in the Zuma-Thint appeal (see March 2008).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4 August 2008</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zuma’s application served in the Pietermaritzburg High Court for his case to be scrapped, arguing that his rights were not respected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>12 September</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judge Chris Nicholson issues his obiter in the Pietermaritzburg High Court that Zuma had been entitled to make representations before the National Directorate of Public Prosecutions (NDPP) decided to recharge him. The obiter effectively halts Zuma’s prosecution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>22 September</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mbeki applies for leave to appeal the Nicholson obiter in the Constitutional Court (the day after his resignation as president in a national televised address).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>30 September 2008</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDPP acting national director, Mokotedi Mpshe, also applies for leave to appeal the Nicholson obiter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>11 November</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitutional Court dismisses Mbeki’s application because his points would be dealt with in the course of the NDPP appeal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>28 November</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCA hears the NDPP appeal against the Nicholson ruling.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>12 January</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCA upholds the NDPP appeal and finds that Zuma may be charged, but dismisses Mbeki’s application to intervene and dismisses the application to have Nicholson’s ‘political meddling’ findings struck out.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3 February</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zuma’s lawyers file a Constitutional Court appeal application, arguing that Zuma’s prosecution was invalid because the state had failed to invite his representations upon deciding to recharge him.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4 February</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Pietermaritzburg High Court sets out a timeline for the Zuma case.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>6 April</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After receiving representations from Zuma’s lawyers, NPA head Mokotedi Mpshe announces that all charges against Zuma will be withdrawn; the documentation used in the decision is not disclosed, but behind-the-scenes intelligence trade-offs are confirmed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: ‘Events leading to the decision’, Sowetan, 7 April 2009, p. 17; ‘Six years of court cases, and in the end it was all for naught’, The Star, 7 April 2009 p. 15.
Mobilisation and the revenge of the aggrieved

South Africa’s weekend of 24-25 November 2007 was a turning point in the Polokwane war. It confirmed the power of branch, regional and especially provincial leadership. It was long in the making and revealed the revenge of provincial ANC leaders. More generally, it was a weekend of settling scores by those who felt wronged, marginalised, and publicly humiliated in the decade of the Mbeki presidency. Mbeki triggered this avalanche. A coalition of the wounded had closed ranks and was ready to pounce. As ANC spokesperson Jackson Mthembu said:\(^94\)

> For years, we have behaved in a respectful manner towards the leadership, but inside we have been bleeding. This conference in Polokwane has been our opportunity to make our feelings known.

Signs of the rise of the aggrieved had been accumulating. At the NGC meeting of June-July 2005 there was public mobilisation around the Zuma court appearances, and support for any seemingly populist figure seen to be challenging Mbeki in his exercise of state power. The June 2007 ANC policy conference fired the next warning shot.

The retribution of October and November 2007 took the shape of the provinces finalising their candidates and determining their votes for the ANC presidency in preparation for the Polokwane conference.\(^95\) Calculations of the Mbeki regime’s progress in dealing with socio-economic problems, distinctive policy options and ideological alternatives were low on the provincial structures’ agendas. It was largely Zuma’s status as the Mbeki nemesis that turned him into the ultimate warhead. Nothing would hurt Mbeki more than support for Zuma. The voices of alliance partners lent further weight to the onslaught. Zuma had been prominent in the deployment committee in the Mbeki years, but he was ‘hardly ever around when controversial deployment decisions were taken’.\(^96\)

The anti-Mbeki mobilisation was a reflection of the magnitude of personal-organisational discontent with the Mbeki years. Big provincial names, with constituencies, were ready to turn the tables on Mbeki. There was a who’s who of persons ‘dealt with’ by Mbeki and his associates. The provinces were well represented. Taking stock revealed the presence of the Western Cape, Eastern Cape, Northern Cape, Mpumalanga, Limpopo and the Free State – provinces where leaders had been demoted or sidelined in the Mbeki years. Several names of powerful ANC provincial chairpersons and secretaries were reminders of past skirmishes. They included James Ngcule (in Western Cape battles with Mcebisi Skwatsha and premier Ebrahim Rasool), John Block in the Northern Cape, and Ace Magashule in the Free State.\(^97\) The anti-Mbeki force was bolstered by former premiers. Mathews Phosa, popular premier in Mpumalanga in the Mandela years, and in 2001 accused of being party to the plot to overthrow Mbeki; Makenkesi Stofile, finally booted out and consigned to a low-key cabinet post after surviving several close governance-related challenges in the Eastern Cape government; Thandi Modise from the North West having been on the receiving end of Mbeki’s manipulation of positions in the ANC Women’s League (ANCWL);
former Limpopo premier Ngaoko Ramathlodi, once destined for high position under Mbeki but then sidelined amidst allegations of corruption; Billy Masethla, former intelligence chief and Mbeki adviser cut by Mbeki after accusations of having withheld information from inspector-general of intelligence Zolile Mgcakani in the so-called hoax email incident.

In appointing loyalists to positions as provincial premiers Mbeki had acted in terms of the powers of provincial appointments conferred by the 1997 ANC Mafikeng conference – motivated at that time by intense provincial bickering for power and positioning for patronage. Even if on occasion driven by the need to get provincial government to rise above the fracas of provincial contests, the appointments of premiers such as Thabang Makwetla, Beatrice Marshoff, Edna Molewa, Nosimo Balindlela, and Sello Moloto had trounced others. Some loyalist Mbeki premiers had managed to get elected as provincial ANC chairpersons. However, they could not deliver the provinces in support of Mbeki’s third-term quest. In addition, the Mbeki protégés’ poor performances helped fill the arsenal against Mbeki with blame for often poor provincial government performances being laid at his door.

The opposition to Mbeki from the ANCWL showed that the discontented had subverted one of his key trump cards – acting as a champion of women’s advancement into top positions in national and provincial government. This might have been expected to get Mbeki the endorsement of the Women’s League; however, the league endorsed Zuma. Even if not always united, the alliance partners were essential campaign anchors. Mandela in 1998 had introduced the era of anti-SACP finger-wagging. In many respects, however, it was Mbeki, through his engineering of Gear, who had initiated the prevailing tripartite rift. The alliance members’ feelings of marginalisation both in the ANC and in government had peaked. Cosatu felt betrayed, snubbed in favour of business.

The ranks of the wronged were further swelled by those who could assert that Mbeki had been using state powers to drive personal agendas (in more domains than just the provincial). The case of the prosecution/persecution of Zuma was the centre-piece of the anti-Mbeki campaign. The cases of Masethla and Pikoli helped build the image of Zuma as the justifiably aggrieved Mbeki victim.

The branches played a crucial role in mobilisation to turn Mbeki in. Mbeki had seen the writing on the wall and in 2006 he cautioned the ANC to turn away from internal divisions and build the party. The ANC had been running the Mvuselelo programme that aimed at reviving ANC branch structures through monthly ‘political schools’ to debate policy and ideology. Branch organisation was commonly in disarray, with ‘serious problems’ and disorder. Yet, in the mobilisation for Polokwane the branches appeared to come together again, albeit with major flaws that were open to manipulation. Motlanthe as the then ANC secretary general knew precisely the weaknesses of branches and regions and this knowledge was used to help engineer the Polokwane result. Declining branch membership had been a concern in the movement. The ‘Discussion Document: the organisational design of the ANC “a case for renewal”: an abridged version’ has as a core focus the weakness of ANC structures that were unable to ‘intervene and provide leadership to all centres of power’.

Aluta continua, from Polokwane to Mangaung
Filling the branch delegate spaces at the ANC national conference was determined in steps that the ANC outlined in April 2007. Firstly, a branch audit was conducted in August of that year to assess the state of ANC branches and membership as at 30 June 2007. It consisted of a physical audit of all membership records to establish the exact number of members per branch. Only members in good standing, up to date in their payment of R12 per year, were counted. A branch was deemed in good standing if it had at least 100 members, had held an annual meeting in the 12 months up to June 2007, and achieved a quorum at this meeting of 50 per cent of its membership. Upon completion of the branch audit, ANC provinces were allocated their number of branch delegate spaces in proportion to the total number of members per province. Each province’s allocation was divided among all its branches in good standing in proportion to each branch’s share of the total paid-up membership in good standing.

**Crumbling of the Mbeki edifice**

ANC polarisation was immense. Countless blows, retreats and counter attacks became the focus of both popular and organisational politics. State and governance operations frequently suffered paralysis. Mbeki’s roots ran deep into the public sector and representative institutions, including the national and provincial executives. His most powerful base for mobilisation was incumbency and the accompanying patronage. The Zuma camp was only going to make inroads if its powerful organisational mobilisation threatened to unseat the incumbents. This task was eased by the fact that few institutions of state and government were united in their support of Mbeki.

In the final months of mobilisation for Polokwane, Mbeki saw the erosion of his state-institutional power base. Important shifts just before Polokwane included the policy conference resolution on presidencies and two centres of power, and the NEC decision not to prescribe a list of preferred top-six candidates (whilst Cosatu announced its list of the leadership that it envisaged would best pursue a programme in the interests of the working class). The Mbeki camp became fractured. The NEC (Mbeki’s bastion of power, albeit not undivided) would not endorse him, the Women’s League defected, and some of his expected provincial support bases tumbled.

The events confirmed shifts in ANC organisational culture. A new irreverence emerged. Factions and blocs became legitimated, and new lines of division surfaced along part ideology-policy, part group/individual-beneficiation lines. It was a legitimate open season. It was precisely a replay of this phenomenon that the ANC tried to quell in the build-up to Mangaung 2012, when the ANC attempted to halt the transfer of wars in the party into the state. But this only happened after the new administration had entrenched its rule.

**Intra-ANC manoeuvre and political elimination in Polokwane**

The anti-Mbeki camp mobilised and recruited where it mattered within the ANC (in branches and amongst the likely delegates), as opposed to Mbeki who relied on the loyalty of incumbents and the threat to deprive them of future access. The alliance of the aggrieved and party supremacists (adamant that the ANC and not Mbeki had the
final say) mobilised systematically from the branches into the provincial nomination conferences. They built a warhead that was insurmountable by the time the week of the Polokwane conference dawned in December 2007.

Branches and their organisation were pivotal to the change process – as this translated into conference representation. The irregularities reported were suspected to run against the Mbeki camp. This added to a misguided pre-conference expectation in the Mbeki camp that there would be a correction and that the Polokwane verdict could reverse the provincial votes. In the Free State, for example, three of the province’s five regional structures were disbanded with immediate effect, and 29 branches (equalling 40 conference delegates) were instructed in early December 2007 to elect new delegates. Some members took the ANC to court after the provincial leadership was said to have failed to resolve complaints of vote rigging and irregular branch nominations. Out of court settlements were reached. Mbeki supporters also alleged intimidation of members, for example in Limpopo and the Eastern Cape, and trusted that these votes would turn in the conference ballot. In the North West ‘backyard branches’ sprang up in preparation for the provincial conferences. At the onset of Polokwane, Gauteng had its number of delegates slashed by 100, due to branches not having complied with ANC guidelines. In a radio interview, Motlanthe conceded that vote buying in the run-up to the national conference was ‘rampant and pronounced’.

### TABLE 4: Slate nominations for ANC top-positions in the Polokwane elections, December 2007*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Zuma camp</th>
<th>Mbeki camp</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>Jacob Zuma</td>
<td>Thabo Mbeki</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy president</td>
<td>Kgalema Motlanthe</td>
<td>Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National chairperson</td>
<td>Tokyo Sexwale/ Baleka Mbete**</td>
<td>Joel Netshitenzhe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary general</td>
<td>Gwede Mantashe</td>
<td>Mosiuoa Lekota</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy secretary general</td>
<td>Baleka Mbete / Thandi Modise</td>
<td>Thoko Didiza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasurer</td>
<td>Mathews Phosa</td>
<td>Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: * The ANC applied the 50-50 gender representation rule to the 80 NEC positions elected at the conference, but exempted the top six officials.  
** Sexwale withdrew as ANC 2007 presidential candidate on the eve of this election, Mbete moved into this slot and Modise replaced her.

The two camps in each of the nine provinces, along with the women’s and youth leagues, nominated two slates of candidates for the top-six positions (Table 4). The provincial votes represented the culmination of an elaborate nomination process that had unfolded in the provinces in the preceding months (Table 5). Life in South Africa came to a standstill as each of the 11 formations (nine provinces and two leagues – women and youth) suggested likely outcomes. Five provinces (Mpumalanga, KwaZulu-Natal, Northern...
Cape, Free State and Gauteng) and both the women’s and youth leagues favoured Zuma (Table 6). The Mbeki-ists only had a small chance of swinging the likely pro-Zuma outcome. The potential for a small swing vote was implicit in the fact that each conference delegate would have an individual and secret vote, and could thus vote on provincially agreed position, branch preference, or individual preference.\(^{111}\)

From the end of November until the conference two weeks later there was a debilitating process of canvassing support from delegates, stepping up the previous months’ preparations. The Mbeki camp had to attempt to reverse the trends that had emerged

### TABLE 5: Nomination processes for ANC top officials and NEC – 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Beginning of October 2007 onwards</th>
<th>ANC branches convene general membership meetings to take nominations for each of the six top positions and up to 60 NEC nominations.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nominations sent in sealed envelopes to ANC provincial offices, where they are opened in the presence of members of the ANC Electoral Commission.(^{112})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provincial nomination conferences (or Provincial General Councils) meet to decide on their nominations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Electoral commission and an independent electoral agency manage the voting and nominations procedures with administrative support from the province.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>For each of the top-six officials’ positions, the four who receive the most branch nominations are presented as possible provincial nominees, and the merit of each candidate is debated. A name may be added to the ballot with the support of 25 per cent of the delegates. Delegates choose the provincial nominees by secret ballot.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The 60 nominees for positions on the NEC with the most nominations are automatically nominated by the province. Proposals for changes to the list may be made if they are supported by 50 per cent of the delegates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monday 26 November 2007</td>
<td>Nominations from each of the nine provinces and the two leagues are submitted to the ANC Electoral Commission by this date. Each nominee is expected to indicate acceptance of nomination in writing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17-22 December 2007</td>
<td>Nominations are placed before national conference. Additional nominations can be added to the ballot if 25 per cent of voting delegates agree. Voting takes place by secret ballot. In the case of officials each voting delegates casts one vote for each of the positions, and up to 60 other votes for the NEC positions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

from voting at the ANC’s November provincial conferences. His strategists held meetings across the country. Mosioua Lekota, at the time ANC chairperson, said: ‘The disinformation that is being spread needs to be stopped and the correct information needs to be put out.’ The truths, argued Lekota, included that Zuma had gone to Schabir Shaik’s Nkobi Holdings in his personal capacity and in contradiction of the ANC leadership’s decision not to become organisationally involved; and that Zuma was the ‘executioner’ (as in the case of Lekota being fired as Free State premier), rather than the ‘victim’. These late attempts to stop the ‘Zunami’ were by now water under the bridge. The Zuma camp was increasingly secure in its anticipated victory. Despite Mbeki’s incumbency advantages, the Zuma campaign, said to have been masterminded by Mac Maharaj, unfolded relentlessly. By December 2007 a salvo of newspaper opinion pieces by virtually every close Mbeki associate resembled epitaphs to an epoch.

**TABLE 6: ANC provincial conference votes in the two camps, November 2007**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provinces</th>
<th>Zuma votes</th>
<th>Mbeki votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mpumalanga</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaZulu-Natal</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limpopo</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Cape</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Cape</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gauteng</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free State</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,236 (62%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,394 (38%)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: As summarised by *Mail & Guardian*, ‘TM vs JZ – how the provinces voted’, 30 November-6 December 2007, p. 2.*

### The riotous assembly

The writing was on the wall by the time the delegates, ANC elites and the media gathered in Polokwane. It was a riotous assembly. The authority of Mbeki-ite office-bearers was dismissed. In the conference marquee anything but pro-Zuma voices were drowned out, mostly with the singing of the Zuma song *Umshini Wami* (My machine gun). The tone was set by an ANCYL proposal for manual vote counting, arguing the possibility of vote-rigging with automated counting. The delegate details (Table 7) suggested the possible outcomes when read in conjunction with the provincial confer-
ence results. But nothing was taken for granted. As the details of the voting process were being mapped, rival groups of conference delegates gathered on sports fields around the central marquee and challenged each other in gesture, slogan and song. It was internal contestation in a form the ANC had not experienced before. The stand-offs were channelled into voting. From daybreak on the Tuesday morning, the delegates formed queues that snaked around the University of the North campus buildings. Change was in the air.

TABLE 7: Pre-vote branch delegate allocation at the ANC’s Polokwane conference, 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>ANC membership</th>
<th>Allocated delegates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>153,164</td>
<td>906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free State</td>
<td>61,310</td>
<td>363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gauteng</td>
<td>59,909</td>
<td>354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaZulu-Natal</td>
<td>102,742</td>
<td>608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limpopo</td>
<td>67,632</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mpumalanga</td>
<td>54,913</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West</td>
<td>47,353</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Cape</td>
<td>37,267</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Cape</td>
<td>36,947</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>621,237</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,675</strong>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Ongoing changes in branch credentials resulted in an adjusted 3,983 ballots being issued on Polokwane voting day. Source: ANC Media Briefing, Update on preparations for the ANC 52nd National Conference, 11 October 2007.

Conference talk had it that Mbeki had wanted to withdraw on the Monday, having sensed the turning of the tide. He was in angry confrontations with his chief campaigners and the coterie of close confidants who had sheltered him over many years from the realities that now stared him in the face.118

Around midnight, Tuesday 18 December 2007, the result confirmed the definitive power shift towards ‘Msholozi, the man from Nkandla’.119 The 62-38 per cent division in the provincial votes was remarkably close to the final Polokwane result (Table 8). The delegates ousted Mbeki and most of his cabinet members. Aligned with the victorious camp were rebellious youth leaders, diehard nationalists, reformed and subjugated Mbeki-ists, conventional ANC leaders of moderate nationalist and non-socialist persuasion, those who had been hurt or aggrieved in the course of Mbeki’s long tenure, irrespective of ideological inclination, and unionists and socialists who saw in the Mbeki
fallout the opportunity to enter and influence the ANC from within. It was not unusual to have turnover in the top ranks of ANC officials (Table 9), through conference elections and especially after the (by now, near conventional) two terms had been served, but the 2007 elections went further and also changed the organisation. The new alignment of forces would remain tight through the next two periods – the removal of Mbeki from his bastion of state power, and the ANC renewal of the election 2009 campaign period. Soon thereafter, however, in the period towards Mangaung 2012, new lines of division would open up, old lines of tension would reopen, Zuma’s leadership would be questioned, and frustration would rule with limited realisation of new policy directions.

TABLE 8: Polokwane election results for the top-six officials, 18 December 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Zuma slate</th>
<th>Mbeki slate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>Jacob Zuma</td>
<td>2,329 (61%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy president</td>
<td>Kgalema Motlanthe</td>
<td>2,346 (62%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National chairperson</td>
<td>Baleka Mbete</td>
<td>2,326 (61%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary general</td>
<td>Gwede Mantashe</td>
<td>2,378 (62%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy secretary general</td>
<td>Thandi Modise</td>
<td>2,304 (61%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasurer</td>
<td>Mathews Phosa</td>
<td>2,328 (63%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Number of ballots issued: 3,983; valid ballots returned: 3,974.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>Nelson Mandela</td>
<td>Nelson Mandela</td>
<td>Thabo Mbeki</td>
<td>Thabo Mbeki</td>
<td>Jacob Zuma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy president</td>
<td>Walter Sisulu</td>
<td>Thabo Mbeki</td>
<td>Jacob Zuma</td>
<td>Jacob Zuma</td>
<td>Kgalema Motlanthe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National chairperson</td>
<td>Oliver Tambo</td>
<td>Jacob Zuma</td>
<td>Mosiuoa Lekota</td>
<td>Mosiuoa Lekota</td>
<td>Baleka Mbete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary general</td>
<td>Cyril Ramaphosa</td>
<td>Cyril Ramaphosa</td>
<td>Kgalema Motlanthe</td>
<td>Kgalema Motlanthe</td>
<td>Gwede Mantashe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy secretary general</td>
<td>Jacob Zuma</td>
<td>Cheryl Carolus</td>
<td>Thenjiwe Mtintso</td>
<td>Sankie Mthembu-Mahanye</td>
<td>Thandi Modise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasurer-general</td>
<td>Thomas Nkobi</td>
<td>Makenkseti Stofile</td>
<td>Menzi Msimang</td>
<td>Menzi Msimang</td>
<td>Mathews Phosa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Recall of Mbeki and the Motlanthe moment

Mbeki’s last flashes of autonomous power were in the dying days of December 2007 and January 2008. He appointed a new SABC board, and suspended Jackie Selebi. In the January NEC Lekgotla (the first NEC meeting since Polokwane that Mbeki attended; having missed the first two) the law was laid down: regularly attend NEC meetings and account for how the government is implementing ANC policy.121 Mbeki’s February 2008 State of the Nation address signalled the lapsing of the Mbeki order, even if Mbeki remained ensconced in the Union Buildings. The speech was low on emphasising achievement and high on the extraordinary challenges that remained. Luthuli House watched over Mbeki. The dominant camp felt that Mbeki and his cabinet had to be managed into implementing ANC policies (Polokwane resolutions), such as abolishing the Scorpions and reforming the judiciary.122

The two hostile centres of power endured for nine months. Several ANC statements reiterated that Mbeki would be allowed to see out his term up to election 2009. From mid-2008 onwards, however, the alliance partners and the Youth League stepped up pressure for Mbeki to go. Mbeki’s formalistically compliant but less-than-enthusiastic cooperation with the ANC fuelled the frenzy of the final push. The SACP and Cosatu cited reasons why the Mbeki presidency was in crisis and incompetent, including the fiasco in which the SABC CEO and the head of news were suspended; bitter exchanges between government, the Presidency and prosecutions chief Vusi Pikoli at the Ginwala inquiry; investigations into the arms deal that could implicate Mbeki’s government (old news but now reinforced by the SACP); and the country’s electricity crisis.

The bell tolled at the NEC meeting at Esselen Park, east of Johannesburg, 18-20 September 2008. The meeting came hot on the heels of the Nicholson obiter of 12 September. The superficial unity of the preceding nine months could no longer hold. Mbeki was ‘asked to resign’, or ousted from the Presidency of South Africa, six months before the end of his term. The nine month-old NEC now came out in force, few daring to defend Mbeki. The NEC ended the Mbeki presidency in the early hours of Saturday 20 September 2008.123

Mbeki’s exit was fast, with roughly 19 hours from the formal NEC announcement at midday on Saturday to the national broadcast of his resignation, accompanied by a curt farewell speech on Sunday evening. Mbeki’s ambiguous parting shot was:124

I would like to say that gloom and despondency have never defeated adversity. Trying times need courage and resilience. Our strength as a people is not tested during the best of times. As we said before, we should never become despondent because the weather is bad, nor should we turn triumphalist because the sun shines.

In the immediate aftermath of the recall, there were days of vacillation and ambiguity when first 11 of Mbeki’s cabinet members and three deputy ministers resigned. The severity of the moment, however, was reflected in the ‘higher hand of the markets’, which fluctuated and threatened to slaughter the South African currency. Five cabinet
members reversed their resignations (including then finance minister Trevor Manuel). They were officially reappointed when ANC deputy president Kgalema Motlanthe was elected the caretaker president of South Africa. The cabinet members that exited with Mbeki and did not return were Essop Pahad (Minister in the Presidency), Mosiuoa Lekota (Defence), Ronnie Kasrils (Intelligence), Sydney Mufamadi (Local Government), Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi (Public Service and Administration), several deputy ministers, and deputy president Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka. Constitutionally it was not required for cabinet members to resign along with the president, because there had not been a vote of no confidence against Mbeki in terms of section 90 of the Constitution. Politically, however, the recall amounted to a motion of no confidence in the president, albeit outside Parliament, thus not invoking section 102 of the Constitution. As Manuel noted, there ‘… was no simple policy or ideological divide … there was lots of anger, and unresolved issues … the divide was about personal loyalties’. The most aggrieved, disillusioned with what they saw as the ANC’s flagrant disregard for constitutionalism, linked the Mbeki recall to what they saw as a growing lawlessness, disrespect for the rule of law, and demeaning populism in the new ANC.

Motlanthe’s election as deputy president was the outcome of another duel, between Motlanthe and ANC national chairperson Baleka Mbete. Some in the ANC alliance had preferred Mbete for the position, ironically for her lesser status in the movement and the requirement that the caretaker would not be strong enough to develop aspirations to the presidency. Motlanthe won and signalled the ANC strategy of maintaining intra-ANC and intra-alliance peace. The ANC recognised the damage that had been done through the forceful exit of Thabo Mbeki and moved in with a conciliatory cabinet and recognition of Mbeki’s achievements. It issued assurances that government ‘was not affected’ by the intra-party turbulence. In his inaugural speech Motlanthe stressed that the ANC had moved rapidly to ensure stability in Cabinet. He emphasised government’s war on poverty and government working with the people in the context of a participatory democracy, guided by the vision of the Freedom Charter. He acknowledged the transitional character of his tenure.

The Cope catharsis

In the heat and anger of the time splits followed. The Congress of the People (Cope) initiative briefly blossomed. Cope was a traumatic experience for the ANC. The momentum and popular endorsement that it gained in late 2008 was, however, not to be sustained (Chapter 9). The ANC regained composure and embarked on an election campaign through which it largely contained losses.

The Cope phenomenon was significant in that it scorned the notions of democratic centralism that promised self-correction of the ANC. Cope in fact externalised the ANC’s internal problems into the inter-party domain, and, uncomfortably for the ANC, placed them in the domain of multiparty democracy. Gone, for now, was much of the separation between the two parallel layers of democracy in South Africa – on the one hand, the world of ANC internal democratic processes and culture, and, on the other, its public contestation with other political parties. Cope, however, still
needed to prove sustainability\(^{130}\) and its prospects for continuing to take support from
the ANC. In the interim, its impact on the ANC included:

- The initial shock of the defeated and aggrieved faction within the ANC feeling
  so strongly about the perceived changed character of the movement that they
  were prepared to exit (it had been thought highly unlikely that a leadership
  group would have the fortitude to take such a step);
- The popular enthusiasm that the initiative elicited was more widespread than
  the ANC had anticipated (even if it soon became subdued);
- The popular media attention and public critiques of the ANC were far-reaching
  and its internal processes and character were subjected to intense public scrutiny;
- In the aftermath of the Cope founding initiatives the ANC was pushed to
  return to the grassroots, its roots, and work with the people – it also used the
  opening to identify and dislodge grassroots Cope support; and
- ANC post-election research showed that Cope’s supporter profile\(^{131}\) was one
  with potential for future growth – whether this would be through the vehicle
  of Cope, or another opposition party that could appeal to the same set of voters,
  remained to be seen.

From the formation of Cope onwards,\(^{132}\) the ANC thus operated with the knowledge
that its failures could convert into party political presences, with damage at the polls.
The ANC hoped that observations of the fate of Cope would help serve as a deterrent
for others who might in future harbour aspirations of abandoning the ANC ship. Many
of Cope’s post-election woes, however, were self-inflicted. Incessant top leadership
friction and multiple funding woes were serious drawbacks. In many ways Zuma’s
words of September 2008 would prevail:\(^{133}\)

\[\ldots\text{one thing that we know from decades of experience [is that] (a)n}yone \text{who has}
\text{left the ANC, for whatever reason, has failed to shine. The ANC is simply bigger than}
\text{the individuals in it.}\]

**FORWARD TO MANGAUNG**

The Polokwane war went beyond the confirmation of the new Zuma ANC in power,
prompted by the 2009. The ‘Polokwane war Mark II’, perhaps the ‘Battle of Mangaung’,
started as the pencil lead was settling on the Polokwane ballot papers. Potential aspirants
to the 2012 crowns as ANC president or deputy president, such as Kgalema Motlanthe,
Tokyo Sexwale, Lindiwe Sisulu and Mathews Phosa, were said to have started consid-
ering their options at that point. This was partly confirmed through 2011 revelations
of 2010 strategising and mid-2011 draft slates being deliberated by the ANCYL\(^{134}\).
Lines of the next succession confrontation were being drawn on multiple fronts. The
battle between the alliance partners as to who would be at the centre of power, and
who the new holders of decisive ANC policy power would be, was a significant continuation. Another was intra-ANC lines of division, on occasion striking out to form apparent alliances with the SACP and Cosatu, and the ANCYL almost invariably featuring in (if not dominating the determination of) the line-ups. This was happening in the knowledge that in the end it would be the ANC branches, regions and provinces that would have the final say. There were early initiatives to infuse and construct branches with the cadres that would take forward the task.

This was despite Zuma’s ‘ruling’ in late September 2009, reminiscent of earlier Mbeki protests of untimely campaigns, that it was premature to start the next round of succession campaigning. The 2010 NGC meeting, a year later, continued to confirm the moratorium ... although this was after Zuma had declared his if-the-people-want-me indication of availability. In this way, the ANC was attempting to limit the destructive and distracting campaigns that had preceded Polokwane. The ‘bans’ potentially served to entrench incumbent leaders, leaving them with good chances to affect the outcomes once they legitimised the commencement of the campaign. Despite these bans (still holding, under pressure, in mid-September 2011) clandestine and proxy campaigning continued. For example, a draft top-six slate compiled by the ANCYL was out in the open by August 2011.

Cacophony of emerging battle lines

The SACP and Cosatu had backed Zuma against Mbeki, driven both by intense dislike and alienation, and for the purposes of obtaining influence over issues of policy and governance within the ANC. Without their mobilisation the battle might have been substantially less conclusive than Polokwane’s 62 versus 38 per cent result. Yet there was a multiplicity of players and this continued into 2012. Lines of open division for the Mangaung contest in the Alliance and leagues that became evident early on were ‘the ANC’s nationalist voice versus the socialist voices of the alliance partners’ and ‘speaking out about corruption, mismanagement and conspicuous public consumption’ amongst ANC government leaders and ANC movement leaders, including the ANCYL. The ANCYL also invoked ‘generational mix’ as campaign speak for making space for Mbalula as secretary general.

In the first two years of Zuma governance, there was ambiguity as to the alliance partners’ real influence. They were close to Zuma and had easy access to him courtesy of friendships and public position. For several, such as ANC secretary general Gwede Mantashe, who was also national chairperson of the SACP, there were overlapping deployments. The alliance members were influential in gaining national and some provincial deployments, and advocated for good representation in the candidates lists for municipal elections. They pushed for policy positions that went beyond the Polokwane resolutions, including a ban on labour brokering (Chapter 12) and the alternative growth path of 2010. The process of counting successes was abruptly halted when a nationalist lobby, fuelled by the Youth League, blossomed from late 2009 onwards. Resistance paired with concerted efforts to confirm the ANC, instead of the Alliance, as the centre of power. Aspersions were cast on the alliance partners’, and especially the SACP’s attempted ‘take-over’ of the ANC. The ANCYL voice was prominent,
basking in its ‘king-maker’ reputation. Cosatu’s Vavi was growing closer to those mobilising against the incumbents.

Mantashe at the time had been earning scorn for his advocacy of separating business and government. Cosatu took similar, powerful stands. Vavi’s 2010 and 2011 pronouncements on the ANC as running a predatory state, in which corruption and mismanagement were rife, stood out. He warned in 2011 of the new, powerful predatory elite. Mantashe said the ANC intended to force its leaders to declare their business interests once they were elected to avoid corruption. The SACP coined the term ‘tenderpreneurship’ to characterise much of state operations under the ANC. Mantashe wanted to fight the practice of people using their influence with Zuma to introduce business people to him for a ‘facilitation fee’.

I tell people, I know you have meetings with business people and then introduce them to Zuma and take R1-million. When you raise the matter they say: ‘This will tamper with our business.’ But a facilitation fee is a bribe.

A range of alignments started surfacing within the ANC leg of the Tripartite Alliance, despite warnings that the ANC could ill afford another round of bruising battles. The basic consideration was whether Zuma should be retained for two terms as president or whether there should be a new president come Mangaung. The immediate supplementary questions were whether Motlanthe would be available, should Zuma go, and who would then slip into his shoes as deputy president.

By 2011 the ANCYL’s positioning was ambiguous. It was playing hot-and-cold in terms of endorsing Zuma for a second term. It promised to protect Zuma from potential challengers, threatened the withdrawal of such support, and subsequently started punting Motlanthe. It was also trying to ensure that Zuma would push aside the SACP and Cosatu, in exchange for ANCYL backing.

Whilst the alliance members and leagues were locking each other in battle ANC big shots were campaigning by proxy and code (given the top officials’ campaigning prohibition), in policy and in mutual critiques of one another’s failures and lapses. They trod carefully around the sensitivities of potential king-makers. Top-candidate at the time, Zuma, campaigned through ambiguity, appeasement and treading water. Possible top ANC candidacies were noted, in opposition to the lobby for two terms for Zuma. In some instances trade unions pitched against the ANCYL, especially when the league called for its ex-president Mbalula to become the next ANC secretary general. Prior to its September 2009 conference, Cosatu had anticipated endorsing the retention of the current leadership of the ANC when its term of office ended in 2012. Others at the time gave the impossibility of fulfilling mandates in one term as motivation for two-term incumbency.

The late 2010 cabinet reshuffle signalled that Zuma was covering his flanks. He tried to keep the Youth League close, not alienate the alliance-sympathetic senior executive deployees, and speak the language of turning the state around. By mid-September 2011, Zuma was still resisting calls for the replacement of controversial members of his cabinet.

The ANC provincial chairpersons remained relatively quiet on national level ANC
succession struggles. Their king-making power, however, was well recognised – and had been demonstrated in 2007. Some had known associations with Zuma and Sexwale. Several had strong links with the ANCYL, which signalled a possible 2012 convergence of two of the proven king-making forces. They would bring much mobilising power to bear in the year before Mangaung. It is also the chairpersons in the high-membership, high-branch-number provinces that will dominate. The September 2010 membership and branch statistics suggested that, in descending order, KwaZulu-Natal, the Eastern Cape, Limpopo and Gauteng will determine the next ANC president, but with cross-cutting ANCYL, Tripartite Alliance and women’s and veterans’ league mobilisation.

The post-Polokwane ANC

The tale of the Western Cape ANC in the post-Polokwane, post-election 2009 period is the story of the worst of the problems confronting the ANC in the period. Membathisi Mdladlana, then ANC envoy to the Western Cape, referred to the Western Cape ANC as being ‘torn apart by factionalism, abuse of power, patronage and greed’. Groups of ANC gatekeepers continuously worked to try and determine candidates, whether it was for regional and provincial ANC elections, local election 2011, or Mangaung 2012. Such mobilisation for power regularly eclipsed ideological and policy debates. The Western Cape problem of the ANC was magnified by the minority group status of much of the provincial population. The ANC conceded that it had been insufficiently sensitive to the issue and that racist statements by especially ANCYL leader Malema had cost the ANC. Variations on this story of constructing dominant intra-ANC alliances, whilst the ANC in the inter-party domain was suffering fallout, also prevailed in other parts of the country.

With Western Cape-specific emphasis, the ANC observed in ways that could equally have spoken to issues in other parts of the country that ‘[s]tructures are weak … and comrades fight one another for positions and personal gain.’ About the state of branches Mdladlana concluded that there were branches that ‘belong to certain individuals with money. This was not particular to the Western Cape, but it was probably more pronounced in certain areas’. He confirmed that ‘fly-by-night’ branches were formed on the eve of provincial elections. An ANC deployment committee member remarked that the ANC was struggling to assert its control through deployment. This was specifically a problem at the local level where power mongers abounded. Zuma reiterated the indictments of branches, lamenting that ANC deployees were hunting positions and privilege and in the process ceding territory to the opposition.

The interface of party and state in the ANC’s 17 years in power had turned it into a party that was divided between aspirations and realities, with enough cross-over from the liberation ideals to practical governance to let the ANC survive handsomely from election to election. On the one hand, the ANC mobilised the people in pursuit of the ideals of the Freedom Charter, which would be achieved through state social-welfare policies. South Africans would vote for the ANC as the party with the best credibility to take forward popular needs. Jeremy Cronin and Zola Skweyiya helped summarise the Polokwane-to-Mangaung challenges that the ANC faced:
The question now is whether the energy being spent on the internal ANC succession race will result in just a change of personalities, or will force a fundamental rethink on how we are approaching transformation ... (Cronin)

We are faced on a daily basis with hunger, homelessness and the abuse of women. These should be the issues ... (Skweyiya)

On the other hand, there was the ANC that uses state power, derived through popular mandates, as a stepping stone to personal fame and fortune, opportunities and launching pads for friends, family and acquaintances. The ANC increasingly required reminders and interventions by top leadership of the responsibility of elected representatives and bureaucrats alike to serve the people. Government and the state had to perform with sufficient credibility to leverage the pardoning of individual extravagances and arrogance. The delicate balance that the ANC maintained between the selfless and the selfish continued to differentiate the ANC from what had become undisputed predator states in other national settings.

In retrospect this strategic counter-positioning resembles a parable of the ‘easy’ part of South African politics. Both inter-party and intra-ANC democracy were alive and well in the country. The more difficult parts included making these struggles and renewals bear on the state, and getting incumbents to assume full responsibility.

By 2011 the Zuma administration was under intense pressure, also self-imposed, to cut public sector corruption and regain credibility in the eyes of communities. Some of the incongruities that emerged in the mobilisation for leadership transition were again evident in 2010 and 2011. The arrest and intended prosecution for corruption of Northern Cape leader, John Block, highlighted these. Block had been one of the provincial ANC stalwarts who helped execute the revolt against Mbeki. As the state apparatuses rolled into action on Block, ANC structures rose to defend him (before being briefed by ANC officials).

Several 2011 developments revealed serious fragility in the ANC and ANC-in-government when it came to action on corruption. There were, for example intelligence sources ruling over politicians due to the politicians’ transgressions and embarrassments that could be revealed. Zuma and his co-leaders were caught in the middle of this web. The threatened arrest of public protector Thuli Madonsela for alleged corruption when employed as a commissioner of the SA Law reform Commission (SALRC), on the eve of her public briefings regarding top-level corruption in the police services was a further illustration. President Zuma accepted her report, but with questions hovering as to the extent of action that was to follow.

CONCLUSION

The ANC’s 2005-09 Polokwane succession war stands in the context of a long-time tension between what the ANC had become since 1994 (amongst other things a
strong ruling party, with mixed ideological foundations, and a highly ambitious echelon of senior leadership), and the idealist liberation movement.

Polokwane saw the convergence of leadership struggles, contestation over the character of the ANC, and recognition of the limitations of policy-leadership reinvention. The post-Polokwane ANC was a party-movement that had lost the innocence of an untainted belief that it could shape the future to fit its foundational ideals. Its challenge now was how to deliver enough to demonstrate progress, whilst conditioning people on the lower steps of the delivery-transformation ladder to remain in continuous adoration of the ANC ... and, this challenge would have to be pursued amidst internecine intra-ANC distrust of motives for leadership mobilisation.

Zuma in his Polokwane route to power offered the vehicle to manoeuvre a broad alignment of anti-Mbeki forces into a space that was opening up. The resulting clash displayed the delicate balance between leadership interests of power and privilege versus ideology-policy-delivery imperatives. The follow-up battle to determine leadership at the ANC’s 2012 national elective conference in Mangaung was conducted surreptitiously from mid-2009 onwards.

Mangaung was set to be a replay of Polokwane, yet with different operational rules, the absence of the acrimony that marked Polokwane, an incumbent president that was vulnerable although strategically more in charge than his predecessor and who has the hindsight of the scorched-earth lessons of 2007. The ANC was in need of the self-healing and auto-correction that its organisational philosophy of democratic centralism held out.

NOTES

2 This was again evident in the statement by the ANC and South Africa deputy president, Kgalema Motlanthe, denying campaigning for Mangaung. His spokesperson said, amongst others: ‘Deputy President Motlanthe is more concerned with executing his current responsibilities as deputy president of the ANC and … of the republic’, as reported in Sam Mkokeli, 2011, Business Day 5 July 2011, p. 3.
4 Zwelinzima Vavi, 2011, statement on Forum at 8, SAFM-SABC, 1 July 201.
The term ‘factions’ is used in this chapter as equivalent to ‘camp’. For a long time in the course of the campaigns the existence of camps was officially denied. The camps, however, were well established, complete with marketing teams and spokespersons. Each had its own list of candidates. See Tiniyo Maluleke, 2007, ‘Some notes on leadership challenges in the run up to the ANC elections’, SABC news editors’ briefing, Johannesburg, 7 December 2007. An ANC secretary general report, September 2011, confirmed unabated divisions. See Moshoeshoe Monare, 2011, ‘Chaos and division hit ANC’, The Star, 21 September 2011, p.1.


See, for example, Patrick Laurence, 2007, ‘History revisited, and a prediction re-evaluated’, The Sunday Independent, 9 December 2007, p. 9. Mandela also assured conference delegates that Mbeki was not that kind of man.

Such a step was likely to have pushed for the re-nomination of Mbeki; see Mpumelano Mkhabela and Moipone Malefane, 2007, ‘ANC NEC votes to reject consensus candidate idea’, Sunday Times, 9 September 2007, p. 1.

See Lodge, op. cit.


Zweli Mkhize, KwaZulu-Natal premier, denied the existence of the alleged 2010 Estcourt plot by the Mvela group in an interview with Xolani Gwala, 2011, Forum at 8, SAFM-SABC, 19 April 2011, 8:00.

In an interview with (then) Mail & Guardian editor, Ferial Haffajee, ‘We won’t topple Mbeki’, 7-13 November 2007, p. 4.


Up to a late period in the race, candidates included Tokyo Sexwale. In earlier phases the camps and the provinces considered Kgalema Motlanthe, Cyril Ramaphosa, Jeff Radebe, Frank Chikane, Gwede Mantashe, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, Mbhazima Shilowa, Mosiuoa Lekota, David Makhuru and Mathews Phosa for the top six positions.

Mbeki’s mother, Epainette Mbeki, once remarked that due to his above average intelligence ‘people are unable to reach up to him, and he won’t come down to them’; see Zine George, 2007, ‘People won’t reach up to him …’, Sunday Times, 23 December 2007, p. 8.
There are numerous examples, including the ANC deputy secretary general being specifically targeted by Mbeki (interview, employee in the Presidency, granted on condition of anonymity, 10 September 2008, Johannesburg); Makanekesi Stofile was once lined up to be fired by the Mbeki government but was let off the hook at the last moment, Ncumisa Kondlo was fired by Mbeki appointee Nosimo Balindela from his position as MEC; also see Mpumelelo Mkhabela, 2008, ‘Vengeance high on the agenda’, *Sunday Times*, 13 January 2008, p. 19. Also see Susan Booyse, 2007, ‘Policy contestation in times of presidential succession in South Africa’, paper presented to the South African Association of Political Studies (SAAPS), Biennial research colloquium, University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, 28 September 2007.

See, for example, Vusumuzi ka Nzapheza, ‘President needs to double up’, *The Citizen* online, 20 September 2009, http://www.citizen.co.za/index/article.aspx?pDesc=24339,1,22 (accessed 6 October 2009), on the fact that Mbeki was attending Non-Aligment Movement and UN meetings whilst the Cosatu congress was underway. It was also stated that up to this time Mbeki had not met formally with the ANCYL leadership.

On HIV, Ronald Suresh Roberts, 2007, *Fit to govern: the native intelligence of Thabo Mbeki*, Johannesburg, STE Publishers, p. 192 argues that Mbeki, when addressing conventional international treatments for HIV/Aids, had been faulted ‘less for denying anything than for asking questions’. Roberts elaborates: ‘Mbeki’s sin was to reject a drugs-based intellectual protectionism in favour of a free exchange of ideas on the proper solution to the AIDS pandemic …’, p. 195. Nicoli Nattrass, 2007, ‘Now in fiction: the president on Aids’, *Mail & Guardian*, 20-26 July 2007, p. 28, notes the Roberts arguments as red herrings. She points out how Mbeki had given ‘unambiguous credence’ to a central tenet of Aids denialism by stating that taking an HIV test would confirm ‘a particular paradigm’. When in 2003 he stated that he did ‘not know anyone who had died of Aids’ he both rejected Aids diagnoses and isolated himself from the ‘life and death of ordinary South Africans’.

Sections of the media were accused of colluding with ‘opponents of the national democratic revolution’ when they revealed unsavoury details about then health minister Manto Tshabalala-Msimang; then Deputy Minister of Health, Nozizwe Madlala-Routledge, was isolated for speaking out about hospital deaths of babies; see S’Tshembiso Msomi and Caiphus Kgosana, 2007, ‘ANC blames “enemies” in Manto saga’, *City Press*, 26 August 2007, p. 4.


Jackson Mthembu, as reported in Carlin, op. cit. Mthembu related Mbeki’s high-handed style was reflected in the capricious manner with which he fired and hired senior personnel in the Mpumalanga government.


The *Star*, 4 July 2005; *City Press* (Mbeki interview with, Mathatha Tsedu et al.), op. cit. Journalist Patrick Laurence points to Mandela’s 2003 denial that Mbeki would want to change the Constitution to allow for three national presidential terms as tentative evidence of Mbeki even then having contemplated longer term tenure. See ‘History revisited, and a prediction re-evaluated’, *The Sunday Independent*, 9 December 2007, p. 9.

See Political Bureau, 2010, ‘ANC wants drastic changes in the way party candidates are selected’, *Saturday Star*, 23 January 2010, p. 2; statement at media briefing, ANC NGC, Durban 21 September 2010.

Nqakula states in his congress address that communists who serve in cabinet must implement government and ANC policies, even if they have reservations about them; see Mpumelelo Mkhabela, 2002, ‘Govt duty before SACP – Nqakula’, *City Press*, 28 July 2002, p. 1.
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42 Interview on condition of anonymity with public servant who was ousted from NGC meeting functions by the Alliance, 12 January 2010, Cape Town.
43 ANC media statement, 29 June 2007, Midrand.
45 Also see R.W. Johnson, op. cit. p. 253. Ramaphosa was once considered Mbeki’s top rival for the ANC presidency. He retired as secretary general of the ANC to go into business.
47 Ibid. Zuma denied ‘unverified, so-called intelligence reports’ that he might stand for the deputy president position.
48 At the time of his death in April 1993 Hani was Mbeki’s chief rival to become deputy president under Nelson Mandela following the 1994 elections.
51 Mark Gevisser, 2007, Thabo Mbeki: The dream deferred, Cape Town and Johannesburg, Jonathan Ball, p. 753 refers to Mbeki’s saying to the parliamentary caucus in October 2000 that he was a target of a ‘massive counter-intelligence campaign’ by the big pharmaceutical companies, given that he was threatening their profits. Also see pp. 736, 739, 755 and 758.
56 See Tsedu et al., 2007, ‘Having the last word’, op. cit.
60 Advocate Vusi Pikoli was suspended from office as the National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP) by former President Thabo Mbeki on 23 September 2007. On 28 September 2007, an enquiry, chaired by Dr Frene Ginwala was established in terms of section 12(6)(a) of the National Prosecuting Authority Act No. 32 of 1998 (the Act), with terms of reference (dated 3 October 2007) to determine … The fitness of Advocate V Pikoli, to hold the office of National Director. See the report of the commission, on www.parliament.gov.za/content/Pikoli%20report%20ver%2005.doc (accessed 4 October 2009).


The ANC Youth League’s important role in ANC politics was evident, for example in the days when it was led by Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu.


Zuma had also specifically invited them to contest and help make policy; see Amy Musgrave, 2007, ‘Give direction to ANC, Zuma tells youth’, Business Day, 23 April 2007, p. 3, with Zuma saying to the League: ‘As long as we have not called you to order as the NEC, you have not done anything wrong’, and ‘You have to give the real direction where [the ANC] must go’.


Ibid.

ANC Youth League National Executive Committee, 2009, Statement, Riverside Hotel, Vaal, Gauteng, 10 September.


See Anna Majavu, 2011, ‘Bid to reopen arms probe’, Sowetan, 29 March 2011, p. 5, in relation to the Hawks having cancelled the Scorpions’ long-standing investigation into arms deal bribes in 2010 and the Constitutional Court’s 2011 ruling that the law setting up the Hawks was inconsistent with the Constitution.


87 See, for example, the details offered by Johnson, op. cit., pp. 251-2.


92 The overwhelming likelihood that there was a ‘plot’ against Zuma, does not mean that Zuma was not guilty of the offences of corruption, money-laundering and racketeering as claimed. It does help explain, however, why he was charged while many around him were not.

93 ‘Thint’ refers to Thint Holdings (Southern Africa) (Pty.) Ltd., formerly Thomson-CSF Holdings (Southern Africa).

94 Jackson Mthembu, ANC national spokesperson under Mandela and Zuma, former chief whip in the Mpumalanga legislature, as quoted by Carlin, op. cit.

95 Provincial chairpersons and secretaries from the provinces engaged with one another to try and horse-trade their preferred nominations in order to ensure election at national conference. In the case of the Mafikeng conference, consensus was reached on all but the position of national chairperson, and in the case of Stellenbosch the platform of chairpersons and secretaries’ consensus position ensured that the six top positions were not contested. See S’Thembiso Msomi, 2007, ‘Powers behind the ANC throne’, City Press, 26 August 2007, p. 23.

96 Interview with an ANC provincial leader in the North West, Johannesburg, 20 November 2007.


98 Ramathlodi was earmarked to become justice minister (upon finishing his spell as premier), and once also expected to succeed Bulelani Ngcuka as NPA head, but was then investigated by the Scorpions. In 2006, in the process of switching to Zuma, he said, at an ANC meeting in the Free State: ‘What s**t is this? People are being charged for nothing, look at Tony Yengeni, Zuma and Pat Matosa’ (ANC deputy chairperson in the Free State); see Moipone Malefane, 2006, ‘Shock attack’, Sunday Times, 24 September 2006, p. 1.

99 Mbeki denied such motives, stressing that he had simply raised a commonly held ANC position when he suggested South Africa should next have a woman president. See, for example, Ido Lekota, ‘Truth shall out’, Sowetan, 6 December 2007, p. 9.

100 There were instances, for example, of the investigation of Vavi by Madisha, Cosatu president at the time, for alleged credit card misuse, and indiscretions with women, and Blade Nzimande for ‘black bag cash’; see Christelle Terreblanche and Xolani Mbanjwa, 2006, ‘Cosatu president
denies probe into Vavi as affiliates simmer ahead of elections’, The Sunday Independent, 20 August, p. 3. Zwelinzima Vavi, 2006, ‘Debate not a sign of crisis’, The Star, 18 September 2006, p. 18 denied that Cosatu suffered from divisions. He also said that it is ‘not true that Cosatu has endorsed any personality for the leadership of the ANC’. Philip Dexter, then SACP treasurer general, wrote in a mid-2007 report that the SACP is riven with a culture of ‘revisionism, opportunism, ideological incoherence and factionalism’; see Vicki Robinson, 2007, ‘Dexter: SACP is quasi-Stalinist’, Mail & Guardian, 15 June 2007, p. 7. (Amidst reports on shady deals that involved the hijacking of companies, Sandile Majali was found dead in a Johannesburg hotel room in late 2010.)

103 Anonymous interview, 2009, Cape Town, 15 September. Other reasons for the declined relationship between Motlanthe and Mbeki include the Oligate scandal where Mbeki was absent when public explanations of the actions of Sandile Majali (brought into ANC operations by Mbeki) were required; and Motlanthe’s resistance to the inspector-general’s inquiry into the hoax e-mail document. See Mondli Makhanya, 2007, ‘Forget Zuma – here’s a power struggle that’s far more intriguing’, Sunday Times, 18 February 2007, p. 18.
106 This was denied by Mbeki; see Angela Quintal, 2006, ‘Mbeki denies that succession battle is affecting governance’, The Star, 13 October 2006, p. 3. Confirmation came from several other sources, cited in several chapters of this book.
108 Term used by André Duvenhage in his analyses of the province’s conference events, SAFM-SABC After 8 debate, 20 July 2007.
109 Thoko Didiza, head of the ANC’s credentials committee, cited in Karima Brown and Amy Musgrave, 2007, ‘Zuma loses as Gauteng is cut to size,’ Business Day, 18 December 2007, p. 4. Of the Gauteng branches, 109 had been allowed to vote in the provincial general council without having held branch general meetings at which they would have received mandates. See Caiphus Kgosana, City Press, 2 December 2007, p. 10.
112 The electoral commission consists of at least three persons, appointed by the ANC; once conference starts, the commission is strengthened by a representative from each of the provinces and the leagues (Rule 14 of the ANC Constitution). Bertha Gxowa chaired the 2007 commission.
113 There were many allegations of, for example, Mbeki campaigners using state resources or simply financial incentives to sway delegates. These were denied by the Mbeki camp. See Pearlie Joubert, Matuma Letsoalo and Mandy Rossouw, 2007, ‘Hints, allegations and hefty hotel bills’, Mail & Guardian, 7-13 December 2007, p. 2.
116 The author attended the conference as researcher-analyst, observed proceedings and attended briefings.
118 Personal communication by adviser to a minister who served in both the Mbeki and Zuma cabinets, 21 January 2008, Cape Town. In July 2011, when Zuma was bolstering his base with a view to a repeat candidacy in Mangaung, he brought Maharaj in as his spokesperson in the Presidency of South Africa. Maharaj remarked: ‘We have shared trenches in the liberation struggle. Now we share the trenches in the reconstruction of our country.’ See interview with Sabelo Ndlangisa, 2011, ‘Return of the Mac’, City Press, 10 July 2011, p. 2.

119 Zuma’s home village in KwaZulu-Natal.

120 There were reports that Mbeki and some associates had considered resigning from their state positions, upon defeat in Polokwane, but this never materialised; see Angela Quintal, Moshoeshoe Monare and Jabulani Sikhakhane, 2007, ‘Mbeki “considers quitting”’, The Star, 20 December 2007, p. 1.


122 The opposing point of debate about the immediate future of Mbeki was that his term of office would be cut through a motion of no confidence in parliament. Discussion with delegates to Polokwane conference, 22 December 2007.


124 Direct broadcast on SABC-TV, Sunday 21 September 2008.


127 Interview granted on condition of anonymity, ANC NEC member, Cape Town, 16 September 2009.

128 Blade Nzimande envisaged this moment when he observed in December 2007: ‘The SACP believes that the electoral renewal of the ANC leadership provides a platform on which to rebuild our Alliance around a shared platform of action’; see Ido Lekota, ‘New leadership will unite alliance’, Sowetan, 20 December 2007, p. 9.

129 Kgalema Motlanthe, September 2008, Inaugural speech, Parliament, Cape Town, as broadcast by SABC-TV.


132 Although Cope came into being in the November-December 2008 period, the possibility of a new party had been mooted since Polokwane; see Gwede Mantashe, 2008, as cited in Maureen Isaacson, I'm not an ANC whipcracker, The Sunday Independent, 28 September 2008, p. 7.


134 On some of these persons’ ambitions, see Moshoeshoe Monare, 2007, ‘If you thought Polokwane was brutal, the leadership war of 2012 will knock your socks off’, The Sunday Independent, 23 December 2007, p. 5; Moffet Mofokeng and George Matlala, 2011, ‘Tokyo’s bid for ANC flops’, The Sunday Independent, 7 August 2011, p. 1.


141 On theANCYL relationship with the ANC main body at this time, see for example, Nkululeko Ncana, 2011, ‘I was abandoned to assassins: Malema’, The Times, 20 June 2011, p. 1; Matuma Letsoalo, Rapule Tabane and Mmanaledi Mataboge, 2011, ‘Fall in line, Zuma tells youth league’, Mail & Guardian, 17-23 June 2011, p. 4.

142 A top-level illustration was Tokyo Sexwale’s mid-2011 veiled criticism of Lindiwe Sisulu in her term as housing minister. Both were known to be ambitious and watching the Zuma-Motlanthe space to spot emerging vacancies. See for example Adriaan Basson, 2011, ‘Sexwale vs Sisulu’, City Press, 10 July 2011, p. 1.


147 Anonymous interview, member ANC deployment committee, 28 October 2010, Johannesburg.

148 Jacob Zuma, 2009, address to PEC of the ANC in the Western Cape, Mitchell’s Plain, 18 October 2009.


150 It was increasingly acknowledged from 2009 onwards that the ANC’s deployment policy had run into problems, with ANC-elected officials who were deployed in the public sector prescribing to, for example, senior provincial bureaucrats. See George Matlala, Albert Pule and Loyiso Sidimba, 2009, ‘ANC blames deployment’, City Press, 18 October 2009, p. 1.

151 See James K. Galbraith, 2008, The predator state: How conservatives abandoned the free market and why liberals should too, New York, Free Press. The predator state is conceptualised as a coalition of relentless opponents of the very idea of a ‘public interest’. Its purpose is to master the state structure in order to empower a high plutocracy.


The ANC takes pride in being the party of the people. It revels in the repeated popular endorsements that carry it forward. Its relationship with ‘the people’ directly informs the other three faces of ANC power, in party organisation, state and elections. Vulnerabilities here ripple through the other ‘faces’.

The ANC’s relationship with ‘the people’ is complex. It effectively constitutes an alternative and non-electoral sphere of democracy in South Africa – a ‘parallel democracy’. In the ANC this is denoted the heart of democracy. ‘People’s power’ speaks to a direct relationship between the ANC and people. The relationship is continuously expressed – whether through consent and expressions of popular support or in adversarial protest and challenge in the between-election periods. It is an honest form of engagement, at times when the people do not feel obligated to protect ‘their ANC’ (and especially their ANC-in-government) against opposition party and media attacks and revelations. Goodwill and trust are the foundations of this relationship. These two ANC resources are not bottomless, yet they do not reveal signs of fatal decline. A pivotal question in contemporary politics concerns how long popular trust will prevail in conditions of deficits in ANC commitment and the ANC government’s realised capacity to address popular needs more consistently and equitably. This, in turn, depends on ANC dexterity in selecting manageable but meaningful government priorities and persuading the people that it governs as well as organisationally and governmentally possible.

Section 2 explores the organic relationship between the ANC and the people, and adds empirical trends data to help fathom the connection (Chapter 3). The vexing duality of voters doubling up on repertoires of ballots and bricks in order to get the ANC to serve them better, illuminates the ANC-people’s between-election relationship, with particular reference to the politics of the local (Chapter 4). The analysis shows how the motivations for and demands in protest have been changing, pointing to the distinct likelihood of ‘problems ahead’. The ANC in state and government power has simultaneously grappled with people’s participation in the processes and institutions of democracy (Chapter 5). Chapter 5 shows the multitude of participatory options, along with the shortfalls. The overall argument of the section is that the incidence of protest is rising and becoming more adversarial, whilst government processes of participatory democracy often fulfil formalistic requirements without meeting expectations. Yet thus far the people remain bonded to the ANC.
Chapter 3

The ANC and its pillars of people’s power

For even the most powerful cannot rule without the cooperation of the ruled.
Mohandas Gandhi

‘The people’ of South Africa afford the ANC immense leeway for underperformance and deficits. They have a deep and forgiving bond with their ANC. They treasure the assurances of ‘power to the people’ and largely continue to see the ANC as the torch-bearer for their aspirations. The bond captures both evidence of caring and delivery, and a sense of belonging and identification. It bestows immense power on the ANC. It exists on a level that opposition parties fail to penetrate and constitutes a protective cordon for the ANC. Roughly 17 years into democracy, however, the bond has started to require careful nurturing to ensure its regeneration.

The ANC successfully emerged from the people’s war of the decades before the 1990s (both internal and from exile) to take control of government and state in South Africa – and to govern legitimately in the name of the people. The statement ‘the people shall govern’ in the Freedom Charter is the origin of the notion of people’s power in this context. ‘The people’ denotes the totality of those who are democracy oriented and, overwhelmingly, the formerly oppressed and by now at least politically-liberated, citizens of South Africa. ‘People’s power’ indicates an organic link between the ANC and its followers – a relationship that could help the ANC outlast much evidence of imperfection, leadership insincerity and failures in government. There is space for neglect, failure and slippage. The ANC is thus afforded the space to thrive in the midst of deficits.

‘Power to the people’ has nevertheless increasingly been recognised to be a relative and, except in the case of the entrepreneurial and state tender-driven middle classes, a gradual process. Throughout the process, the people have retained immense patience and trust that the ANC will indeed deliver. In cases of failure thus far, and judged by electoral outcomes, the people have generally retained the belief that the ANC is more likely than other political parties to edge them closer to the better life.

The ANC sees itself as the legitimate representative of the aspirations of the people; the truthful and rightful custodian. This ANC-people relationship prevails on two tiers –
on the level of liberation struggle and liberation legacy, and in the world of electoral support and experiences of government.

- The first tier derives a sense of piety courtesy of the sanctification of much of the liberation struggle. In this domain a large amount of trust and acceptance of the authority of the ANC as the legitimate representative of the people stands out – to the extent that democratic centralism of internal decision-making processes and the projection of the ANC as ‘disciplined force (of the left)’ generally prevails, along with top-down ANC initiatives in government, in exercising state authority. The relationship is also distinct from the profane world of the measurables of electoral and opinion survey politics. In this parallel tier of democracy the ANC relates directly to the people. It casts a relationship of unity that has hitherto superseded much of the specificities of government and elections.

- The parallel tier on which the ANC-people bond is realised is the mundane world of specific mandates, delivery and governance. In post-1994 South Africa, people’s power was neither an instrument to unlock revolution, nor a mechanism to ensure the unambiguous representation of people through the institutions of hard-won representative democracy. Evidence of an epoch of growing resentment by the people came in the form of community protests (which combined with electoral endorsements), voters deviating from the ANC in some by-elections, lowered local election support, and mild but increasing opposition voting in national, provincial and local elections. Nevertheless, surveys showed that South Africans stuck to the belief that their country and government were doing well. The one alignment of factors that could undo this nirvana of patience with the ANC in the face of delayed performance was the combination of corruption and a belief that the ANC had stopped caring about the people that elected it.

The two tiers of the ANC-people relationship are interconnected. In the period 15-20 years into South Africa’s democratic era, the balance between the two was becoming increasingly uncertain. Liberation status and deep trust continued to prevail, but were countered by the specifics of performance and ‘modern-day’ delivery related proof of furthering the interests of the people. ANC leadership lamented ‘the general collapse of discipline’ in the movement as a key factor that undermined the people’s trust.2

The ANC recognises that the right to represent and govern the people is earned by way of the democratic and multiparty vote in legitimate elections, even if it frequently invokes liberation status to bolster the contemporary project of liberal representative democracy. It nurtures the liberation bond, while recognising that its electoral endorsements have moved beyond ordained status and increasingly have to be earned through truthful and effective representation.

This dual bond of the ANC with a large majority of the people of South Africa is integral to the regeneration of political power. This chapter explores how the ANC
has nurtured and maintained its relationship with the people, subject to many pressures and tensions. It first identifies the main contours of the relationship and then maps the particular phenomenon of trust in the ANC and the institutions of state and how this has changed over time. It also links trust to electoral relationships. The chapter moves to the ANC as organisation and explores how the ANC as party-movement has projected and lived its ‘relationship with the people’. The ANC and governing party’s use, non-use and misuse of state power to build popular relationships is considered. The chapter uses both interpretative and empirical analyses to explore these relationships.

PEOPLE’S POWER IN SOUTH AFRICA

People’s power is usually positioned as the alternative to elective power. Activist literature comes with reassurances that electoral participation can be made compatible with the promotion of peoples’ power. Similarly, people’s power is commonly projected as the antithesis to elected government power. People’s power is associated with resistance, movement and mobilisation, such as was manifested in South Africa’s United Democratic Front (UDF) of the 1980s. It can also be used to challenge incumbent power. It is similar to power through mobilisation. In socialist systems, and in particular in Cuba, people’s power shows how local communities through the mandat impératif, hold extensive power over their local representatives, with high levels of accountability and biannual meeting-based powers of recall.

The ANC’s intimate association with ‘people’s power’ and the movement’s status of custodianship of the power of the people brings home a hybrid understanding – one of both a layer of direct links with the people and the legitimacy of the representational and electoral spheres. The ANC’s model, however, has refrained from exposing its representatives (beyond the protective boundaries of elections) to direct popular scrutiny. Powers of recall are mostly only realised in the construction of new candidate lists for elections. People’s discontent with local representation has become manifest in multiple community protests in which they have insisted (overwhelmingly without direct impact) on the immediate recall of faltering municipal representatives (Chapter 4). The results of local election 2011 testified to (moderate) punishment of the ANC in the form of, for example, more DA support, predominantly but not only in minority communities, and a comparatively low turnout amongst its core supporters (lower for the ANC than for the DA). The ANC’s 2011 local government candidate screenings, and implicit powers of recall through ANC community participation, faltered in many instances due to candidate rivalry, intersection with ‘service delivery protests’ (community protests), application of gender, youth and race quotas, and the imposition by ANC structures of candidates that would aid their preferred positioning for Mangaung 2012.

The ANC has worked hard to retain support roughly at the level of its founding electoral support. Much of the challenge in this achievement was in the fact that ‘delivery’ – or policy implementation and socio-economic transformation – reflected impressively positive and turnaround trends, yet was patchy and failed to address the ‘big
three’ issues of poverty, unemployment and inequality. The ANC’s early-democracy promises of ‘a better life for all’ (Chapter 6) were increasingly being confronted with angry citizens protesting in fear (or just doubting, and often triggered into protest by scheming local ANC leaders, pursuing their own political-financial gains) that the chance to escape their dismal life might be passing them by. The ANC’s retention of power in this broad period remained remarkably high, given citizen disillusionment with aspects of the ability of representative institutions to make a real difference to their lives. Retention of interest in electoral participation was also remarkable. This was largely courtesy of the ANC operating on the parallel level of democracy – direct engagement between citizen-supporters and the party – besides the democracy of governing parties relating to citizens through state institutions and processes.

The ANC, people’s power, populism and paradoxes of channelling people’s power

Populism is no newcomer to South African politics. It was prevalent in pre-democratic days, on both sides of the oppressor-oppressed divide. There was Afrikaner mobilisation for a racially exclusive nationalist order, achieved in 1948, and consolidated in the face of resistance.8 There were the peasant uprisings, between 1946 and 1962, in Witzieshoek (border of Lesotho); in Marico (south of Botswana, now in the North West province); in Sekhukhuneland (Limpopo); in Zululand (South Coast of KwaZulu-Natal); and throughout the Transkei, especially in Pondoland (Eastern Cape).9

These risings were concurrent with pass protests such as those culminating in the Sharpeville massacre, and were linked to the people’s resistance on issues such as ‘bantu administration’ and racially exclusive access to land. Apartheid forces brutally suppressed the uprisings. A people’s war10 of widespread and increasing resistance followed in the 1980s. It was expressed mainly through the umbrella organisations the UDF and, subsequent to its banning the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM), and through progressive trade union organisations, especially the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu). On a lesser scale, the 2004-11 civil society upheavals were seen as ‘the same form of civil society activism that mounted heroic protests against the apartheid regime’, with the difference that ‘our country today is governed by revolutionary agents for social change that understand the importance of a historical context …’11 In addition, many of the contemporary protests amounted to intra-ANC ructions that spilled over into the public domain.

These experiences of populist mobilisation in South Africa demonstrate that politicians from any party or ideological direction, noble or ignoble, may mobilise populist sentiment. Mangcu notes that populism can indeed be progressive, as opposed to the fascist versions that have affected world history.12 Populism generally denotes a political movement that mobilises the population against an institution or government, usually in defence of people that have been wronged. It often concerns the rights and power of people in their struggle against privileged elites, where mainstream political institutions fail to deliver. A sense of anger about exclusion or oppression prevails.13

The rise of populism in South Africa at the time of Jacob Zuma’s rape (acquitted) and corruption (charges dropped) trials, his successful contest for leadership of the
ANC against Thabo Mbeki, the 2009 election campaign, and ANC Youth League rallies, helped to re-establish it, this time in the political mainstream. It gave rise to questions as to the exact nature and implications of this phase of populism in South Africa. While some revelled in it; many others feared the new populism. Vincent argues that ‘equating … democracy with “the will of the people” … sounds reasonable enough but represents a very fundamental challenge to the founding precepts of constitutional democracy’.

She places populism in South Africa in the context of the energy of mass popular protest having been contained, demobilised and in some instances criminalised in the time of Mbeki. This was linked to the failure of South Africa’s history of mobilisation to enrich procedural democracy in the country. Popular democracy is differentiated from populism, with the former realising that ‘there remains a role for leadership, for organisation, for education, but at the same time making a genuine attempt to remain alive to popular energies …’

Mangcu argues that the important point is not whether Zuma was a populist or not, but to assess what kind of populist he was. There is little evidence in Zuma’s politics that he is truly a populist in the finest sense of that term: ‘My concern is that there is nothing about his public actions that suggest he is a populist – that he would return power to the people.’ Mangcu hence predicted that once Zuma was in power the populist frontier that had been established to challenge Mbeki’s centralisation of power would begin to disintegrate. These observations articulate with the evidence that is considered in this chapter.

South Africa’s Zuma style populism was linked to election campaigns, and constituted direct action to channel populist actions into state institutions under a different custodian. It was mainly populism to dislodge the incumbent Mbeki who was entrenched in the state institutions. The Zuma contrast to Mbeki was strong enough, and the lines of division cut deeply enough, to make this a tangible ‘defeat of the system’. The ‘new ANC’ reinvigorated itself by gaining control over the state. The ANC’s Gwede Mantashe argued: ‘The Polokwane conference marked the beginning of renewal and rectification in the party. It was about rescuing the ANC.’

Mathekga puts forward that the charismatic Zuma represented ‘the other’ to Mbeki. It was therefore a compromised, or controllable and soft version of populism that swept the Zuma administration into power. There was no rejection of the system – neither of elections nor institutions. Rather, the 2006-09 populist moment concerned the people’s symbolic recapture of these institutions – in an elitist manner … It was conducted by 60 per cent of the Polokwane conference delegates and was carried through to state institutions by a broad church of those who wanted to see changes in policy, along with those who wanted to move closer to power and privilege through deployment. It continued in the months and years after Polokwane. From late 2009 onwards communist and nationalist polarisation cut across these divisions, frequently in support of leadership contests.

Nevertheless, the populism that was expressed through community protests from 2004 onwards was also populism to capture state institutions and get quality representation from ANC representatives (albeit subject to provincial and national government structures). The ANCYL leadership put down anchors in this populist
base. It was received with much popular reverence in community and ANC rally appearances. Its irreverence and disdain for some mother body dictates made it a people’s candidate for leveraging better representation.

**Populist democracy and putting the genie of protest back in the bottle**

The convergence and coexistence across the boundaries of ANC and state, of democratic centralism, parliamentary democracy and grassroots populist democracy were evident. By 2011 the question was whether the Prague Spring of populist mobilisation, along with angry grassroots rebellion against continuous disempowerment, could be re-channelled continuously into the institutional and procedural liberal-democratic state design. The 2011 local government elections would be a test not just of the political survival skills of the ANC, but also of whether institutional democracy remained a sufficient platform for the expression of populist demands.

At the time of the first Zuma era lekgotla of the ANC parliamentary caucus, ANC caucus chairperson Mathole Motshekga announced the hopeful plan to amalgamate all ANC constituency offices into one-stop outlets where community members would be able to locate their member of Parliament (MP), member of the provincial legislature (MPL), and councillor in recess periods, hence minimising the need for protest. The question was whether populism and people’s power would remain under the guiding and controlling hand of the ANC, and would remain channelled into state institutions, or whether the ANC had let the genie of people’s power (this time around in the form of protest) out of the bottle and would no longer be able to switch it on and off, depending on the movement’s need at the time. Makhanya noted:

> … Zuma … has to manage this anger and make sure it does not become a permanent feature of our national psyche … The anger is the result of poor people feeling they were left behind as one section of society benefited from the prolonged period of economic growth. It is a by-product of poor people saying that the rapid roll-out of RDP houses and services in the past fifteen years was nice but not adequate.

Into 2011 there were few answers as to the prospects for the ANC as movement and as government managing popular anger, or sufficiently neutralising it by addressing delivery deficits. The ANC faced a dual challenge. One was to manage populist anger procedurally and along liberal-democratic institutional lines that would protect the democratic institutional base and its legitimacy as government. The danger was that such channelling could result in more support for opposition parties. The second challenge was to ensure that liberal-democratic processes and institutions worked, not in ritualistic affirmations of the once-liberation-movement, but that the ANC-in-government would deliver more substantively on the socio-economic transformation of people’s lives. The in-between position of the present, of the dual repertoire of voting amplified through protest, could also continue as a safe compromise. The 2009-11 indications from the cabinet were that the Zuma administration was following the route of condoning a right to peaceful and lawful protest and acknowledging the deficits. At the same time a relative
clampdown and an attempt to shove the genie back into the bottle were evident both in cabinet briefings and in forceful responses of the police to protests.24 These trends of successively outing populism and people’s power in association with electoral democracy in South Africa, and pushing it back into the institutional process bottle, were aligned with the ANC’s simultaneous, and often seemingly paradoxical, worlds of using revolution-speak in the contexts of non-violent politics and liberal democracy.25 This was illustrated when Joel Netshitenzhe cautioned Cosatu that union militancy could undermine the national democratic revolution (NDR) and the socialist revolution itself.26 Johnson also remarked on the ANC’s use of a mixture of revolutionary and counter-revolutionary discourse, plus a blend of insurrectionism, militarism and reform:27

Ironically, one still finds the use of Marxist methodology or terminology in ANC circles or as the predominant mode of expression in ANC pronouncements. Indeed the ANC leadership still uses the language of insurrectionism and militarism while pursuing an agenda of reform. It still has militaristic, top-down concepts of organization, even though the terrain is no longer that of warfare.

From a different ideological position, Suttner remarked that ‘the ANC abandoned Marxism but retained Stalinism’, whilst the ‘SACP abandoned Stalinism but retained Marxism’.28 The ANC commonly operates in two concurrent and occasionally intersecting democratic frameworks – in the inter-party liberal democratic domain, and in the internal democracy democratic centralism mode. One such point of intersection is in multiparty elections, when the ANC’s substantial internal energy infuses national electoral politics. An ostensibly vanguardist leadership takes over and roughly gives effect to the mandate delivered by the voters and majority ANC supporters. A more amorphous point of connection concerns the interfaces between party (movement) and state. Several of these were instituted in the Mbeki era – and the Zuma administration continued using them in adapted and elaborated styles, ranging from ANC executive rule in the provinces to ward committee operations in the local domain.

**PEOPLE PARDONING THE ANC, REPEATEDLY**

The ANC’s between-election relationship with the people is a complex story that goes beyond voting. There is a layer of discourse and engagement that has little bearing on electoral politics and the formal rules of the game. It is part of the powerful parallel level of ANC democracy and direct engagement that runs alongside electoral politics. This is the world of the ANC engaged with the people – its people. Politically, the ANC uses between-election periods to ensure that come election time it will not be in electoral trouble. The ANC, however, has also had the continuous and daunting task of overcoming the twin challenges of fallout from intra-party politicking and government delivery deficits.

Given the commanding position of the ANC in the state, government activities that facilitate public participation (Chapter 5) have often been favourably cast as the
ANC in government in relation to the people. Yet the ANC has been unable to galvanise the full power of the state to boost its own popular standing. Notably, it has failed to fully conquer the public sector, even if it has been politically and demographically-racially transformed. The public sector often falls short on the ethos of ‘serving the people’. Batho pele\(^2\) and similar ANC public sector battle cries did not fly with many elements of the new petty bourgeoisie that now constitute the public sector. In addition, institutions and processes have often been insufficiently organised to achieve the government’s performance and delivery targets. Extravagances and legal but dubious actions of the ANC political class, have also not helped to inspire bureaucrats to improve their act. The ANC has had to rely on between-election political organisation and election mobilisation to compensate for these deficits.

The ANC’s liberation movement legacy and valiant (if limited and ‘incomplete’ through interruption by negotiations and compromised settlement) armed struggle against apartheid are only some of the reasons for its commanding electoral strength and evident legitimacy with both the poverty stricken masses and the rising ‘black diamond’ middle classes. There are many theories as to why South Africans vote the way they do and support the ANC in elections to the extent that they do. These often relate to identity, party image, and racial census voting.

One of the most remarkable characteristics of the ANC erring and faulting in power has been that the people have virtually unerringly, rightly or wrongly, supported leadership claims that displace the blame. For example, to abridge popular arguments: it is not the ANC nationally that is failing, it is the ANC on local level; it is not the ANC locally that is at fault, it is the mayor (or town or city manager); or, it takes time to change things. The ANC has often argued the bigger picture, namely that of residuals and legacies. The damage wreaked by colonialism and apartheid left real legacies, and the centuries and decades of their prevalence have helped the ANC assert the argument that ‘Rome was not built in a day’. The problem, however, is that whilst the people have been generous in giving it time, they are increasingly intolerant of visible corruption and mismanagement as the reasons for poor delivery.

The Zuma administration has displayed a tentative trend towards accepting at least partial responsibility for contemporary failures. The responsible parties were increasingly called to task, although talk remained far more frequent than walk. Civil servants, local bureaucrats and councillors in fair numbers were not only pinpointed as falling short on honesty, commitment and service, but were increasingly warned that the buck would stop with them. In the early stages, the Zuma administration’s political task was eased by the fact that many of the councillors and local bureaucrats that stood to lose out had Mbeki-era origins. Later on, Mangaung lines of mobilisation and community involvement complicated this situation. In other respects prominent figures in the Zuma administration with tainted records were overlooked for punishment, or were appointed to and retained in pivotal government positions.\(^3\) The Zuma administration’s ability to convert stated intentions into actions faced a growing challenge.

The ANC relationship with the people greatly benefitted from the Mbeki-Zuma transition. ‘Continuity and change’\(^4\) was the theme. At first, the ANC readily apportioned
blame for things gone wrong to the ‘previous ANC regime’. The Zuma administration benefitted from the idea that it was a new and more caring ANC, swept into power on the basis of a populist inspired campaign that raised hopes of renewal and change – albeit scaled down in comparison with pre-Polokwane allusions.

The ANC-people relationship simultaneously remained fragile. The reconstructed relationship spoke of great skill, both by design and default. Yet there was the great uncertainty of how an ANC that was likely to operate in shorter ‘people patience cycles’ would be affected. The 17-plus years of patience with the ANC to deliver definitively and more equitably remained, but not unconditionally. With each new election came the threat that ‘this time around’ the people would start punishing their ANC at the ballot box. The result of local election 2011, however, once again showed that voters would go to great lengths not to punish the ANC through voting for the opposition (Chapter 6). The displacement of the ‘demon’ of responsibility for delivery deficits remained.

THE PARADOX OF POVERTY, UNEMPLOYMENT AND ANC POWER

One of the paradoxes of South African politics is that poor people continue voting for a party under whose rule the pace of change away from vast poverty has been disappointing, with daunting levels of poverty continuing and inequality increasing. Furthermore, they remain optimistic – albeit markedly less so than a decade before – that things will be better, or that ‘the country is moving in the right direction’ (Figure 1). This is in conditions where inequality has risen to such an extent that by 2008-09 South Africa’s Gini coefficient of 0.8 was the highest in the world. Unemployment

FIGURE 1: Belief that South Africa is moving in the right direction

Question posed: Is the country headed in the right or wrong direction?

was continuously high and rising, even before the 2009 recession set in and claimed more than 900,000 jobs. By 2011, the total number of jobs lost since 2009 in South Africa was estimated at well over a million, with the balance of jobs down 800,000 from 2009 to the first quarter of 2011 reflecting a 6.1 per cent decrease in total employment. The economy needed to grow by about 7 per cent a year (double the 3.5 per cent that had been realised to mid-2011) to reduce unemployment significantly.

Jordan remarked that the wealthy had benefited disproportionately since 1994, and the poor had ‘benefited somewhat because, for the first time in the history of this country, the ANC government has put in place a social safety net for the poor of all races’. Whilst the security net barely kept heads above water, the income and social security it offered was better than anything the poor had before 1994.

Voters believe that the ANC-in-government, despite shortcomings, has done better than any of the other political parties might have done should they have been in power. The poor have benefitted in many respects, despite still being captives of the living conditions of the underclass. These realities are important in situations where the former liberation movement increasingly parts with liberation movement esteem and is increasingly judged simply as a political party (although the ANC resists this, knowing the mobilising value of its liberation movement esteem). The ANC also believes that the people appreciate its honesty in recognising failures. Zuma expressed this sentiment:

We have done well … The record speaks for itself and our people know that too, as shown by the manner in which they keep returning the ANC to power every five years. We however remain honest to our people, and tell them that while we have achieved a lot, much more still needs to be done, and that working together we can achieve more.

For close to a decade, and in some respects contradictory to poverty and inequality trends, living condition surveys had been showing that the poor in South Africa, despite remaining poor, have been experiencing improvements in quality of life since the mid-1990s. The ANC, and in particular the Presidency, began calculating the so-called ‘social wage’, based on benefits derived from social policy, in about 2006. This instrument shows nuanced changes in quality of life not captured by indices that concentrate on employment and income. These calculations stand beside the direct expenditures on social grants. In late 2008 the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA) had spent approximately R71 billion in the preceding year on social grants to alleviate poverty. Thirteen million people were benefitting, including 9 million children receiving the child support grant (this was prior to the gradual extension of the child support from 9 to 14 and in future to 18 years). By 2009, the figures had risen to 13.7 million recipients (and 13.8 million by January 2010). Total expenditure in 2009/10 on child support grants amounted to R80 billion. By 2011, close to 15 million social grants were being issued annually to about one-quarter of the South African population, at a cost of R97 billion. In April 2011 the social development minister said that there were 15.3 million recipients of social assistance including 10.3 million children, 2.7 million pensioners,
and 1.2 million people with disabilities. In the 2011/12 financial year the total will be R104 billion embracing over 16 million South Africans.\(^{42}\)

The ANC's relationship of trust with 'ordinary', often continuously poor South Africans has helped it to 'take advantage' of them in several elections. ANC policy and electoral platforms have included an abundance of plans and undertakings to address the continuing plight of the poor, but it has persistently failed to fully realise these undertakings.\(^{43}\) In contrast, some other political parties' race and class identities have largely disqualified them from earning the trust and vote of the poor, while others were simply too small and ineffectual to be taken seriously.

Despite the shortfalls in realisation, overwhelming electoral support still went to the ANC. High and rising unemployment did not deter unemployed voters from largely affirming their support for the ANC. The comparative credibility of the ANC and its legitimacy as a pro-poor, pro-unemployed, and (selectively) anti-capitalist and anti-business movement continued to extend this seeming paradoxical legitimacy. In each of the ANC's election campaigns jobs have featured foremost.\(^{44}\) The ANC has mostly been modest in the promises it made after 1994 when 'jobs for all' was a major rallying cry. In the 2009 elections the ANC took care to be circumspect in its undertakings. Opposition party alternatives, including the DA's well articulated campaign, failed to substantially sway the voters. In its early heyday period Cope briefly attracted a substantial number of unemployed, poor voters, but this window largely closed with Cope's (between-election) decline. This again suggested the prevalence of identity-image\(^{45}\) voting for a trustworthy party, with voters not necessarily expecting that campaign promises will carry much weight after elections.

**Popular trust in the ANC – in government and in elections**

The ANC's seemingly paradoxical relationship with the people can be concretely interrogated through credible opinion polls and voting data. Such data shed light on both the relationship between the ANC and its support base, and the ANC in relation to South African citizens in general.

Beyond its own membership, the ANC has long maintained varied but strong relationships with supporters, voters and South African citizens. These relationships are sustained on the basis of party identification (based on, but also extending beyond, organisational membership; Table 1), electoral support (irrespective of strong or weak identification), and trust and feelings of legitimacy (despite perhaps not having voted for the ANC).\(^{46}\) Trust can thus be operationalised as the broad base of the affirmative 'ANC-the people' support that has been sustaining the ANC in government (Figure 2).\(^{47}\) The ANC has been fully cognisant of voters who continue voting ANC because of an aversion to endorsing an opposition party alternative, rather than signalling profound endorsement of the ANC. To this end, the ANC throughout electoral and between-election times, works to ensure that opposition parties remain pinned down in their corners, especially when it comes to operations in the black-African community.

The formulation of theory about the specifics of the voter orientation and motivations of South Africans is still taking shape. It is commonly assumed, and sometimes statistically demonstrated, that the South African voter does not altogether eschew rational choice
voting. However, government performance has been shown not to correlate (directly) with voter choice (see below). Schulz Herzenberg, in findings that support the argument in this book, points out that ‘if voters become dissatisfied with the performance of the ANC, they will not necessarily vote for another party’. Before switching their vote they will consider the image of alternative parties. Party image depends on a range of composite factors.

### TABLE 1: ANC membership per province, 1997-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>ANC event where membership details were released</th>
<th>Mafikeng Conference 1997</th>
<th>Stellenbosch Conference 2002</th>
<th>Tshwane NGC 2005</th>
<th>Polokwane Conference 2007</th>
<th>Durban NGC 2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td></td>
<td>44,684</td>
<td>89,167</td>
<td>70,651</td>
<td>153,164</td>
<td>161,161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free State</td>
<td></td>
<td>40,184</td>
<td>33,115</td>
<td>38,331</td>
<td>61,310</td>
<td>41,627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gauteng</td>
<td></td>
<td>42,824</td>
<td>52,764</td>
<td>58,223</td>
<td>59,909</td>
<td>70,305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaZulu-Natal</td>
<td></td>
<td>64,998</td>
<td>53,531</td>
<td>75,035</td>
<td>102,742</td>
<td>192,618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limpopo</td>
<td></td>
<td>68,560</td>
<td>44,107</td>
<td>56,474</td>
<td>67,632</td>
<td>101,971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mpumalanga</td>
<td></td>
<td>38,044</td>
<td>48,588</td>
<td>48,239</td>
<td>54,913</td>
<td>46,405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West</td>
<td></td>
<td>35,800</td>
<td>41,388</td>
<td>39,006</td>
<td>47,353</td>
<td>57,911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Cape</td>
<td></td>
<td>19,894</td>
<td>24,390</td>
<td>21,608</td>
<td>37,267</td>
<td>37,122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Cape</td>
<td></td>
<td>30,790</td>
<td>29,796</td>
<td>33,141</td>
<td>36,947</td>
<td>40,427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>385,778</td>
<td>416,846</td>
<td>440,708</td>
<td>621,237</td>
<td>749,547</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**FIGURE 2: Layers of ANC endorsement**
factors. This is in line with qualitative analyses of voters in South Africa, which show that party and government performance evaluations impact on all three layers of popular support for the ANC (Figure 2). The chapter argues that the assessment of ANC performance in government offers one, but by far not the only, measure of electoral support for the ANC.

In turn, the proportion of votes won in elections is arguably one of the best measures of trust that the likely winner is fit to govern. The detailed electoral trends that are dissected in Chapter 6, when read in conjunction with the current chapter, suggest that voter trust in the ANC remained at a remarkably high level after it had been in power for 17 years. There were dents in the performance, especially in the form of a broad overall decline, which was veiled by the rallying of ANC supporters in KwaZulu-Natal in 2009, especially in the metropolitan areas of the province. It also suggested the ‘normalisation’ (to match ANC support in other provinces) of the ANC in a province where it had previously underperformed.

The ANC’s membership base is dwarfed by the electoral support that it harnesses. Details released by the ANC in its organisational report in Polokwane (Table 2) show the ANC’s 621,237 members in 2007 constituting 5.7 per cent of those who voted for the party in the 2004 election, dropping to 5.3 per cent of the 2009 vote. The ANC’s Imvuselelo campaign for one million members by 2012, its centenary year, was reported to be on track at the 2010 NGC, despite simultaneous reports on multiple dysfunctionalities in branch organisation.

The 2010 NGC captured this vulnerability through its statement that branches need to be ‘much stronger and rooted in … communities if our movement is to survive as the progressive force for change and servant to the people.’ Zuma stressed – in effect repeating a refrain since the ANC’s Port Elizabeth NGC of 2000 – that the membership campaign

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>ANC members 2007</th>
<th>Votes cast for ANC 2004</th>
<th>Votes cast for ANC 2009</th>
<th>Voting age population 2007</th>
<th>ANC voters per ANC member</th>
<th>Total voters per ANC member</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>153,164</td>
<td>1,806,221</td>
<td>1,552,676</td>
<td>3,702,903</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free State</td>
<td>61,310</td>
<td>838,583</td>
<td>734,688</td>
<td>1,788,057</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gauteng</td>
<td>59,909</td>
<td>2,408,821</td>
<td>2,662,013</td>
<td>7,326,536</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaZulu-Natal</td>
<td>102,742</td>
<td>1,312,767</td>
<td>2,192,516</td>
<td>6,100,233</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limpopo</td>
<td>67,632</td>
<td>1,487,168</td>
<td>1,265,631</td>
<td>2,871,829</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mpumalanga</td>
<td>54,913</td>
<td>979,155</td>
<td>1,110,190</td>
<td>2,165,572</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West</td>
<td>47,353</td>
<td>1,083,254</td>
<td>783,784</td>
<td>2,080,658</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Cape</td>
<td>37,267</td>
<td>222,205</td>
<td>245,699</td>
<td>684,535</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Cape</td>
<td>36,947</td>
<td>740,077</td>
<td>1,012,568</td>
<td>3,606,208</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>621,237</td>
<td>10,878,251</td>
<td>11,559,765</td>
<td>30,326,531</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

was about ‘building an ANC cadre who is loyal to the organisation and who understands the mission, principles, character and traditions of the movement …’ The ANC relies on the goodwill and trust of a much-expanded group of South Africans to support its pre-eminence in government. Yet, its branch structures were often elitist, driven by individualist and financial interests, and were seen by the ANC itself as insufficiently rooted.

Public opinion survey results profile the citizen trust that the ANC has been enjoying over time, particularly since coming to power in 1994. Survey findings illuminate the question of legitimacy and satisfaction with the way in which democracy works in South Africa. The Markinor and AfroBarometer data (Figure 3; Tables 3 and 4) offer a series of snapshots of beliefs in the democratic system, and of South African democracy representing the will of the people. The data illuminate the fact that many more South Africans than those who vote for the ANC believe that South African democracy is working well. These trends need to be considered alongside the statistics on the modest number of votes that the ANC gains in national elections in relation to the overall number of voting-age South Africans (although vastly more than the support of any of the opposition parties nationally). The 2005 details in Figure 3, for example, provide a useful counter-perspective to the assertions that the vote for the ANC in Elections 2004 and 2009 represented less than 40 per cent of the voting-age South African population. Along with the tables it shows that there is far more support for South Africa’s governing party, sustained across elections, than is suggested merely by focusing on voting trends.

**FIGURE 3: Government as representative of the will of the people, 2005**

The AfroBarometer findings (Table 4) indicate that in 2004 a total of 67 per cent of South Africans were either fairly or very happy with how democracy works in the country. A Markinor survey indicated that 85 per cent of respondents thought democracy was the best system of governance, and 72 per cent were happy with democracy as the system of governance in South Africa. This taps into a slightly different dimension of democracy support,
but suggests that South Africans were quite content with the way in which the ANC steered democracy in the country. The 2002 snapshot (Table 3) indicates the nuances that exist within the overall view of the legitimacy of state power. Procedural legitimacy is very high (over 70 per cent), whereas decisional legitimacy drops to just over 40 per cent. The responses in Table 4 to the questions posed in 2000-08 sustain the argument that substantial majorities of South Africans continuously accept the prevailing political system as democratic. From the mid-first decade of the new millennium onwards there were, however, significant dips in the South African system being judged as democratic and seen to be performing in sufficiently democratic ways. Given the turmoil in ANC politics, and hence in South African politics in general, these trends could have been period effects. The declines may thus have been temporary rather than indications of consistent decline.

### TABLE 3: Dimensions of state legitimacy, 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statements</th>
<th>Agreement with statement Cumulative %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘Our government was elected to power by accepted procedures’</td>
<td>73.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Our government exercises power in an acceptable way’</td>
<td>52.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Our constitution expresses the values and aspirations of the people’</td>
<td>59.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Our government has the right to make decisions that all people have to abide by whether or not they agree with them’</td>
<td>42.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Methodology notes:** Based on a sample size of 2,400 South African respondents between 13 September and 13 October 2002, e=+2. The cumulative percentage statements refer to responses on ‘agree’ combined with ‘strongly agree’.

**Source:** Mattes et al., 2000, p. 3154 (time series data not available).

The governing party’s relations with ‘the people’ to some extent depend on government performance, buffered by trust and legitimacy, as well as party identification and opinions of opposition parties. There is the likelihood, argued more extensively in other chapters, that elections and electoral support largely exist in a world of their own, and that support levels are not directly mediated by the level of satisfaction with government performance. Hence, with great election effort the ANC has been able to overcome, thus far and to a large extent, the scourges of partial, under- and non-performance in government. The ANC’s credibility and legitimacy, the perception that it is the party that is closest to the people, the most trustworthy and the most likely to perform to voters’ expectations, weighs more than the absolutes of performance. Voters, the people, have not yet given notice as to when they may sever this magical, paradoxical cord.

A dichotomy exists between protest (and in particular community protests linked to living and delivery conditions as a result of action and inaction by government) and public debates on delivery deficits, on the one hand, and opinion poll trends on levels of satisfaction with government performance, on the other. Opinion polls project a
The ANC and the multiple faces of people’s power

more favourable overall situation than is suggested by reasonably widespread protest. The discrepancy is fuelled by the fact that protests get amplified through media coverage (and ‘non-protests’ obviously are not reported). The qualitative and quantitative trends, however, are compatible and illuminate the ANC-people interface (Table 5). There is substantial citizen cynicism about election promises and post-election commitment to perform. Voters make electoral choices that do not necessarily twin with endorsement of the post-election actions of the party they supported. They furthermore get mobilised by factions of local (mostly) ANC leaders using community delivery deficits to rightly or wrongly reflect on ANC incumbents. The differences between voter support and cynicism about the representatives’ likely subsequent performance help constitute the phenomena of ‘elections as a different world’ and ‘between-election advocacy and agitation so that the ANC will work harder to try and get my vote’.56

### TABLE 4: Satisfaction with democracy in South Africa, 2004 – compared with assessments of state of democracy over time, 2000-08 (all figures in percentages)

#### Specific 2004 question: Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in South Africa?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statements</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Coloured</th>
<th>Indian</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Africa is not a democracy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all / not very satisfied</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very / fairly satisfied</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Question posed in 2000-08: In your opinion, how much of a democracy is South Africa today?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A full democracy / a democracy with minor problems</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A democracy with major problems / not a democracy</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know / don’t understand</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Question posed in 2000-08: How satisfied are you with the way democracy works in South Africa?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very satisfied / fairly satisfied</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very satisfied / not at all satisfied</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Methodology notes:** Sample size of 2,200 in 2000 and 2,400 thereafter. E=+2 at a confidence level of 95%; the next survey in this AfroBarometer series was only scheduled for late 2011. Due to rounding not all sets of figures add up to 100.

**Sources:** AfroBarometer 2004, 2009.55 Last updated December 2009.
The complex governing party-people interface is further illustrated by tracking details of evaluations of the president of South Africa, the deputy president and national government for the years 2000 to 2009 (Table 6). Trends across survey companies are comparable, although the first part of Table 6 builds on Ipsos-Markinor data for the broad tracking span. Although variably so, Table 7 depicts assessments of the president and national government of South Africa. The TNS-Research Surveys metropolitan data for 2008-11 offers unfolding trends on job performance by President Zuma in particular. The details show the large extent to which assessments vary according to political circumstance and events. Zuma’s percentage performance ratings, for example, started off in the 30s in 2008, rose at the time of election 2009 into the 50s, and from early 2010 onwards remained in the 40-50 per cent range but showed gradual decline. This placed Zuma roughly on par with Mbeki in the early 2000s. Zuma’s ratings were highly ‘race’-dependent. When his general ratings were in the 50s, his approval among black-African South Africans in 2009 were mostly into the 70s (Table 7). Subsequently they dipped and ranged between the mid-50s and early-60s – support levels below the ANC’s prevailing national electoral standing.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question posed: <em>In your opinion, how often do politicians keep their campaign promises after elections?</em></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rarely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Often</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Always</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question posed: <em>In your opinion, how often do politicians do their best to deliver development after elections?</em></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rarely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Often</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Always</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: AfroBarometer 2006 (time series data not available; the table reflects a once-off questionnaire item).
TABLE 6: Job performance of President and National Government, 2000-2008 (all figures represent percentages)

Question posed: ‘Is ... doing his / her / their / its jobs well? Responses in cumulative percentages of ‘very well’ and ‘well’ (Markinor; Ipsos-Markinor)

| Person / institution | Apr ’00 | July ’00 | Nov ’00 | May ’01 | Nov ’01 | May ’02 | Nov ’02 | May ’03 | Nov ’03 | May ’04 | Nov ’04 | May ’05 | Nov ’05 | May ’06 | Nov ’06 | May ’07 | Nov ’07 | May ’08 | Nov ’08 | Apr ’09 | Nov ’09 | Apr ’10 | Nov ’10 |
|----------------------|---------|----------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| President            | 71      | 66       | 53      | 56      | 56      | 55      | 55      | 62      | 62      | 80      | 80      | 82      | 78      | 79      | 73      | 63      | 27      | 50      | 77      | 68      | 59      |
| National Government  | 57      | 56       | 45      | 49      | 49      | 50      | 51      | 57      | 58      | 75      | 72      | 72      | 71      | 70      | 64      | 57      | 58      | 52      | 56      | 70      | 65      | 59      |

Methodology note: Politics in the 2007-09 period was in flux, with different persons acting in top government positions, and figures not directly comparable. The Markinor survey is based on a sample of 3,500 respondents, and is representative of all South Africans.


TABLE 7: Assessments of job performance by President Zuma, 2009-2011 (all figures represent percentages)

Question posed: Is President Jacob Zuma doing a good job? ‘not doing a good job; ‘don’t know’
The percentage before the ‘/’ is the figure for all South Africans; after the ‘/’ is the percentage for black-African South Africans specifically

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Approve</td>
<td>36 / 51</td>
<td>40 / 58</td>
<td>52 / 73</td>
<td>57 / 75</td>
<td>53 / 67</td>
<td>58 / 75</td>
<td>43 / 58</td>
<td>51 / 67</td>
<td>42 / 54</td>
<td>49 / 62</td>
<td>49 / 63</td>
<td>48 / 62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disapprove</td>
<td>40 / 24</td>
<td>40 / 20</td>
<td>29 / 9</td>
<td>13 / 4</td>
<td>19 / 9</td>
<td>23 / 11</td>
<td>41 / 27</td>
<td>33 / 18</td>
<td>44 / 33</td>
<td>34 / 22</td>
<td>35 / 22</td>
<td>38 / 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>24 / –</td>
<td>20 / –</td>
<td>19 / 17</td>
<td>31 / 21</td>
<td>28 / 24</td>
<td>19 / 14</td>
<td>17 / 15</td>
<td>16 / 15</td>
<td>15 / 13</td>
<td>17 / 16</td>
<td>16 / 15</td>
<td>14 / 13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Note – Sept 2011 update: The trends for September 2011 were Approve: 45 / 62 per cent; Disapprove: 41 / 26 per cent; Don’t know: 14 / 12 per cent.

Methodology notes: The 2,000-responder sample of TNS-Research Surveys reflects opinions in South Africa’s seven major metropolitan areas; e=2.5%. Table last updated September 2011.

Sources: TNS-Research Surveys, media releases up to 27 September 2011.
These trends show, first, a positive assessment of high level office holders in state power, and second, that there is a gap between respondents’ (and probably voters’) assessments of people in high office, especially at national level, and reported beliefs in the likelihood of these people fulfilling campaign promises. This could also further corroborate the ‘separate world of elections’ thesis, in that people actually understand ‘campaign promises to be just campaign promises’, without actually expecting elected representatives to be able to deliver on their undertakings! Other survey data clearly shows the far less positive assessments of elected representatives on provincial and local levels of government. This, in turn, supports the argument of displacement of blame, with South Africans preferring to hold national government in high esteem and to blame lower echelons for things gone wrong or not happening.

The quartet of Tables 8, 9, 10 and 11 illuminate the displacement of blame for government performance to the lower levels of government. There is less of an ‘elections as a different world’ phenomenon the closer to the ground the assessment reaches. The information in the tables on ‘trust in provincial government’, ‘assessment of provincial government performance’, ‘assessment of local government performance’ and ‘assessment of local government councillor performance’ shows the details. Some of the data

**TABLE 8: Trust in provincial government by province, 1995-2008**

**Question posed: ‘How much do you trust your provincial government?’**
1997-2000 questions and responses are based on the categories of ‘most of the time / almost all of the time’, 2002 data is based on ‘a lot’ / ‘a very great deal’ and in 2008 ‘a lot / somewhat’ (all figures in percentages)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gauteng</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mpumalanga</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limpopo</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaZulu-Natal</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free State</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Cape</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Cape</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>32</strong></td>
<td><strong>37</strong></td>
<td><strong>49</strong></td>
<td><strong>28</strong></td>
<td><strong>28</strong></td>
<td><strong>46</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Methodology note:** Based on samples of 2,200 and 2,400 South African respondents, e=±2 at a confidence level of 95%; the survey did not track the provincial government question in 2006.

**Source:** AfroBarometer, 2009; Mattes et al., 2000, p.34; Mattes et al., 2003, p. 5. Post-2008 data will only become available in late 2011.
variances, especially in Table 9, are in all likelihood due to sampling factors. Irrespective of variation, trends indicate that national government is largely exempt from the harsh assessments made of local government.

**TABLE 9: Provincial government job approval, 1995-2008** (all figures in percentages)

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Limpopo</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>36 (55, 73, 67, 61, 38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free State</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>71 (54, 51, 56, 61, 58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Cape</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>64 (48, 75, 78, 44, 52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaZulu-Natal</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>68 (57, 53, 58, 60, 59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>30 (62, 53, 46, 47, 53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>55 (60, 70, 55, 51, 54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gauteng</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>49 (58, 57, 49, 49, 60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mpumalanga</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>38 (45, 33, 34, 33, 50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Cape</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>61 (54, 45, 38, 48, 38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>76</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Methodology notes:** Based on a sample size of 2,400 South African respondents, e=+2 at a confidence level of 95%; the intermittent survey did not ask comparable questions; Ipsos-Markinor sample of 3,340. The details show fairly wide variations in results; further variations occur when Markinor asked a similar question, but used the premier’s name.

**Source:** Mattes et al., 2003: 20; AfroBarometer, 2009, Summary of results …; Ipsos-Markinor, 2009; 2010.

The details on popular trust in politicians and institutions, perceptions of government performance, and beliefs in the likelihood of elected representatives keeping their election promises thus demonstrate the separation between election and non-election orientations. National government commonly scores higher than provincial and much higher than local in terms of general assessments and job performance (Table 12), yet
still gets lower levels of trust than the electoral support expressed through national elections for the ANC. The survey findings illuminate the ANC’s relationship with the people in pointing to the phenomenon of different types of displacement of blame for things that have not gone very well in the governance and delivery stakes. People regularly look for reasons to continue supporting the ANC – in general, but also particularly through elections.

**TABLE 10: Approval of local government and councillor performance by province, 2004-2008**

*All figures represent percentages and express the cumulative figure for (A) ‘fairly well’ and ‘very well’ and (B) ‘approve’ and ‘strongly approve’ (all figures in percentages)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>(A) Rating of ‘local government’</th>
<th>(B) Rating of ‘local government councillors’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North West</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Cape</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaZulu-Natal</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free State</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gauteng</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limpopo</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Cape</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mpumalanga</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Methodology note:** Based on samples of 2,400 respondents, e=+2 at a 95% level of confidence. **Sources:** Bratton and Sibanyoni 2006:11; AfroBarometer 2004, 2006, 2009.62 Last available data are for 2008: next round of the survey series only likely in late 2011.

**TABLE 11: Trust in local government, 1995-2008**

*All figures represent percentages; 1997-2000 – percentage expresses the cumulative total for ‘most of the time’ and ‘almost all of the time’; 2002 – cumulative percentage refers to ‘a lot’ and ‘a very great deal’; 2006 and 2009 – cumulative percentage refers to ‘somewhat’ and ‘a lot’*

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** Mattes et al., 2003; AfroBarometer 2006, 2008, each based on a sample of 2,400 South Africans63; e=+2; AfroBarometer 2006 and 2008, also based on a sample of 2,400 South African respondents, e=+2 at confidence level of 95%.
The ANC, against some expectation given poor local government performances, sustained high levels of electoral support in both the 2006 and 2011 local government elections. The 2011 results, however, showed declines and certain evidence of disgruntlement. The 2011 election in many respects had become a national poll, rather than one that was specifically directed at local representation and improvements in direct living conditions in the community. Given the (still modest) electoral decline of the ANC in the national and most provincial elections of 2009, and the emergence of heightened waves of protest action that started just over one week after the inauguration of the Zuma government and continued through the local elections of 2011, the ANC circa 2009 appeared determined to turn around local government – out of what seemed to be a morass of inefficiency, disdain for the people, abuse of local government positions for self-enrichment, and corruption. With known high levels of discontent on the local level (although often aimed at functions that mainly belong in the other spheres of government) it had been a real possibility that the ANC could be punished in the 2011 local elections. It was important for the ANC to take action. The 2009 minister of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (Cogta) in the Zuma administration promptly launched an investigation into the causes of dissa...
faction in each of South Africa’s municipalities and presented a report in late October 2009. The report built on the review of local and provincial government that had commenced in mid-2007. A national level turnaround strategy followed two months later and individual council strategies in 2010. The years 2010-11, however, showed a slowing down in the initiatives, as individual municipalities tried to give effect to them. Much of the focus was on incumbent councillors and officials. The ANC assured South Africans that the ANC’s policy sub-committee was assessing an evaluation of public representatives. This project had originally been planned for completion in February 2010. Findings were eventually reported in September 2010. The NGC followed with an effort to separate local government executive positions and ANC local office-bearers:

Other proposals put forward by this NGC include separating the executive functions from the administrative ones in municipalities. Unlike in other spheres where there is a separation, in municipalities a council is both an executive body as well as a legislative one.

In April 2011 Parliament formalised the changes through amendments in the Municipal Systems Amendment Act which prohibited municipalities from employing party officials. The ANC had acknowledged that one of the reasons for the lapses in local government was the blurring of the lines between party and state on local level but it did not extend the argument to the provincial and national levels.

In the local sphere there was the possibility of party support directly suffering due to non-performance. Seventeen years into democracy in local election 2011 the ANC found that it needed to campaign at national level using the racism-liberation ethos to shelter it from community dissatisfaction. There was little else to buffer it against community wrath. One of the ways in which the ANC tried to address the problem was to consider holding synchronised ‘super’ elections that would combine national, provincial and local elections from 2014 onwards. The ANC hoped this would make voters more inclined to transfer broader ANC loyalty into local election contests. In a project to boost a nationalistic and identity-driven vote by reminding South Africans of the struggle and liberation, Zuma, on behalf of government, announced in late 2009 that national orders from 2010 onwards would be awarded on Freedom Day, 27 April, to give meaning to celebrating national heroes, and the founding fathers and mothers of the freedom and democracy attained in 1994. Government changes such as the 2010 cabinet reshuffle would also be used to support the contention by the ANC in government that it recognised problems and was taking steps to correct them.

ANC IN ELECTION MODE RELATING TO THE PEOPLE

On occasion, an election manifesto yields spectacular insights into a party’s DNA, including how it relates to citizens and supporters. The ANC’s election manifestos
reveal much when comparatively assessed (Tables 13 and 14). It is sometimes argued that political parties' election manifestos do not matter – especially in the light of inter-party policy convergence and the large role of voter trust in determining the vote. However, in all instances the ANC’s election manifestos are carefully crafted. They are based on survey results that reveal voter needs and expectations and relate to specific issues and to identities, history and images. They reflect how the ANC wants the people to see the movement. ANC policy is signified by the combination of national conference resolutions and election manifestos. The documents set out to maintain core support, consolidate weak support, and win over voters that only weakly identify with opposition parties that are threats to the ANC.

In comparing the ANC’s 1999 and 2009 manifestos, 1999 breathed RDP but with both feet in GEAR, whilst 2009 revealed a renewed sense of urgency, with government intentions spelt out in action driven language at a time when greater persuasion of voters was needed. Roughly 18 months after the manifesto, however, the ANC government’s ‘New Growth Path’ (NGP) would confirm the essentials of the preceding order,72 requiring voters to keep the faith.

Slogans, outreach and records of progress in ANC election campaigns

The ANC works to ensure that its campaign slogans and messages also articulate the sentiments that its supporters and potential additional supporters are looking out for. In the 1994, 1999, 2004 and 2009 national-provincial elections its main slogans were:

- A better life for all / Now is the time / Ready to govern (1994);
- Together, fighting for change / A better life for all (1999);
- Contract with the people / Together we can and we will do more, better / A better life for all (2004); and
- Working together we can do more (2009).

The ANC puts much effort into reaching out to the people. The ANC president, and the ANC candidate for the South African presidency, took centre stage in all campaigns. In 1999, Thabo Mbeki’s campaign had a ‘speaking and listening’ format. Supporters revelled in the fact that their aloof president was descending from Meintjeskop73 into the homes of the people. Across the country the ANC reportedly fielded74 100,000 trained volunteers as well as 30,000 paid organisers and trainers to connect to communities, many of which were rural and not accessible through print advertising. Lodge points to the conversational tone that these meetings took and that they ‘echoed the behaviour of pre-industrial village leadership in which one major function of authority was to maintain social consensus’.75 This meeting format would later be echoed in the presidential imbizo programme (Chapter 5). ANC election strategists thought Mbeki was brilliant in this role.

Outreach in election 2009 mirrored the populist mobilisation that had taken root in rallying support for then presidential aspirant Jacob Zuma, when he was facing rape
ANC POWER AND THE POWER OF THE PEOPLE

and corruption charges. The ANC leadership worked to counter negative publicity, the launch of and campaigning by Cope, and possible fallout through abstention. A sense of rebellion and pseudo-regime transition reinvigorated the campaign. The leadership often descended into communities in grand style in motorcades and helicopters. The party shone in mass rallies that hero worshipped the vibrant ANC that had effectively resisted the forces of Mbeki’s ancien régime and resurrected the populist orientation and connection with the people. However, as voters also clearly articulated, they rallied with the expectation that at least, this time around, the ANC in government would live up to expectations. Launching the ANC election campaign, Zuma pledged:

South Africa will need a government with the experience and political will, a government that fully understands what needs to be done to address our apartheid past, and a government that puts people first and which works with the people. The ANC continues to be such a government. A vote for the ANC is a vote for a better life for all (Ukuvotela uKhongolose ukuvotela impilo engcono kubantu bonke).

It was in the aftermath of election 1994 that the ANC learnt the lesson that campaign undertakings would be interpreted as promises, and failure to realise these as broken promises. Each of the 1999, 2004 and 2009 ANC campaigns took care to moderate claims as to forthcoming achievements of the ANC in government. Voters would gradually learn that campaign promises were not to be taken literally (Table 5), and they often deliberately used them to try and extract more action from their representatives. Recurrent campaign themes were that ‘more needs to be done’ and that the remaining tasks would only be accomplished in cooperation between the ANC and the people of South Africa. The post-1994 campaigns all emphasised that the corruption and careerism that had taken hold in many quarters of the ANC (including in the ANC-in-government) needed to be countered.

ANC manifestos related its performance record in a fair amount of detail (Table 13) whilst often dwelling on the outstanding tasks. The campaigns acknowledged the remaining tasks and always declared a commitment to attend to them, albeit mostly in terms that would afford flexibility in delivery dates. This was especially true for the 2009 and 2011 campaigns, in which the ANC frankly acknowledged the extent to which ‘the good life for all had not been achieved’. This resonated with a strong popular sentiment. It was important for the ANC to own its management. This time around, new initiatives were highlighted to give effect to Polokwane resolutions. Simultaneously, existing policy emphases were enhanced, rather than displaced or replaced. The populism, plus the amplified appeal of ‘working together with the people’ afforded the ANC the space to recognise the elusive chunks of the dream of 1994 more openly. By 2011, however, the tone had changed to accusing the ANC of erroneously believing that an attitude of ‘business as usual’ would be sufficient to address deficits, especially in economic liberation.
### TABLE 13: Progress since 1994 – ANC achievements and plans through the lens of election manifestos

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Areas for ANC performance</th>
<th>Manifestos 1999</th>
<th>Manifestos 2004</th>
<th>Manifestos 2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic growth and investment</td>
<td>The ANC has removed apartheid barriers hampering economic growth and development, and introduced better conditions for investment.</td>
<td>Before 1994 economic growth had come to a halt. Since then, the economy has grown by 2.8% p.a.; it has become more competitive, with increasing volume, diversity and export destinations.</td>
<td>Longest period of economic growth and expansion recorded in South African history – from 1994 to 2003 economy grew at average of 3-5% p.a.; investment as share of GDP rose from 15% in 2002 to 22% plus by 2008.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>New programmes have been put in place to urgently reduce unemployment and retrenchments; economy cannot create enough jobs for the 350,000 new work seekers annually.</td>
<td>Economy has created 2 million net new jobs between 1996 and 2003.</td>
<td>Unemployment decreased from 31% in 2003 to 23% in 2007, using the official narrow definition – 500,000 new jobs have been created annually since 2004, but unemployment remains unacceptably high.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social grants</td>
<td>In the next five years the ANC will continue to improve the management of social grants.</td>
<td>Equitable distribution of R34 billion in social grants to 7 million plus beneficiaries; up from R10 billion in grants distributed to 2.6 million in 1994.</td>
<td>Access to social grants up from 3 million people in 1997 to 12.5 m in 2008 – 8 million of whom are children under 14 years, with plans to extend grants to children aged 15-18.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>Nearly 3 million people have been housed – with 750,000 houses built or under construction.</td>
<td>Since 1994, R50 billion transferred to the poor through subsidised new houses accommodating 6 million people, and through transfer of deeds to houses in townships.</td>
<td>3.1 million subsidised houses were built, giving shelter to 14 m people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clean water</td>
<td>Water supplied to 3 million people since 1994.</td>
<td>More than 80% of households have access to clean running water.</td>
<td>18.7 million people have access to clean water.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanitation</td>
<td>No specific mention besides provision in school.</td>
<td>ANC will speed up programmes to provide water and sanitation.</td>
<td>10.9 m people provided with sanitation; households with bucket system reduced from 605,675 in 1994 to 113,085 in 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>2 million households connected to electricity.</td>
<td>More than 70% of households have access to electricity, compared to 30% in 1996.</td>
<td>Expansion of access to electricity has reached 80% of population.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Indications of the crunch times ahead for the Zuma administration had started arriving in its first months in office. Job creation illustrates how the ANC administration scrambled to make good on pledges to the people. It had to face the concurrent realities

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Land</strong></td>
<td>Transferred 220,000 ha of land to 68,000 households.</td>
<td>The R50 billion transferred to the poor, includes housing, transfer of deeds and land reform and restitution.</td>
<td>Land and agrarian reforms have not produced the desired results.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Heath care</strong></td>
<td>Improved healthcare for the poor – over 500 new clinics built or upgraded, free medical care for children under 6 and pregnant women.</td>
<td>Hundreds of clinics for primary care have been built closer to where people live.</td>
<td>Expanded infrastructure, including building and upgrading 1,600 clinics and 18 new hospitals; many public hospitals revitalised, refurbished.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Anti-retroviral treatment rollout</strong></td>
<td>ANC has the vision and determination to attack the root causes of problems such as HIV/AIDS.</td>
<td>Together we are fighting TB, HIV and AIDS, malaria and other chronic illnesses; expenditure on HIV and AIDS programmes has increased a hundred-fold from R34 m to over R3,6 billion.</td>
<td>Anti-retroviral treatment rollout programme increased, with more than 480,000 people enrolled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Basic Education</strong></td>
<td>1.5 m more children have been brought into education system; 10,000 new classrooms built or upgraded.</td>
<td>More than 95% of children enrolled in primary schools, with school feeding schemes in poor areas, thousands of new classrooms built and new syllabus content introduced.</td>
<td>Near universal enrolment in primary and secondary schooling, girls’ participation among highest in the world; total of 98% of children aged from 7-15 enrolled in schools; 88% for 6 year-olds; mass literacy campaign covers 500,000 plus.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Higher education</strong></td>
<td>Improved access to universities and technikons; new qualifications framework introduced.</td>
<td>Financial assistance to those in need in universities and technikons.</td>
<td>Since 1994, 140,000 students benefited from National Student Financial Aid Scheme (NSFAS).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
<td>Gender Commission established to continue fight for emancipation of women; programmes led to increase in numbers of women in decision-making positions throughout society.</td>
<td>Women have attained right to equality, more and more women found in leadership structures; land, health and housing programmes have favoured female-headed households.</td>
<td>30% of parliamentarians, members of provincial legislatures and councillors are women; 43% of cabinet members, with ANC aiming at 50% in 2009.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** Election manifestos of the African National Congress (ANC) of 1999, 2004 and 2009.
of economic recession, shrinking state income, and job losses in the face of the need for accelerated job creation. It pledged 500,000 ‘job opportunities’ for the first six months of the administration up to December 2009. According to an August 2009 government implementation report these were to be provided in the form of 45,000 opportunities in public works 240,000 in 1,214 public sector projects, 80,000 in the social sector, 6,800 in the youth service, and 60,000 across 46 community development worker (CDW) work sites. Cosatu expressed disappointment, pointing to the discrepancy between the election promise of ‘decent work’ and the temporary jobs that were offered. By late 2009 an abundance of reports confirmed that fewer than the expected opportunities had been realised, and that other plans to protect existing jobs had yielded limited results. It was only in the last quarter of that year that tentative evidence of a possible end to that recession emerged.81 Zuma was reported to have told the ANC’s November 2009 NEC meeting that ‘even 100,000 job opportunities can be considered a success’. This contrasted with the Public Works minister stating at the same time that 224,000 job opportunities had been created since April 2009. In December 2009, the minister lamented that 202 of South Africa’s municipalities had not come forward to participate in the public works programme for the creation of the job opportunities and that R200 million of available funds had remained unspent.82 In his 2010 State of the Nation address, Zuma, however, announced that more than 480,000 such opportunities had been created.83 Debate immediately ensued as to how the calculations had been derived. Next, it was on to the ANC government’s ‘New Growth Path’, approved by cabinet in October 2010, which envisaged the creation of 5 million jobs in, and in partnership with, the private sector over the following decade.84 The 2011 State of the Nation address fine-tuned the details. And the targets remained elusive.

ANC, people and power in four campaigns – the crux of inequality, poverty and unemployment

The ANC’s use of ‘the people’ in its election campaigns and manifestos, along with the use of ‘people’s power’, changes significantly over time. People’s power was widely associated with the fall of the apartheid government.85 The 1994 campaign took place in the time of the ‘victory of the people’ over the oppressor apartheid regime. However, the centrality of people’s power gradually diminished over time in ANC election messages.

The subsequent three manifestos were tame in comparison with the celebratory 1994 formulations on the ANC-people bond, in the context of the crux issues of inequality, poverty and unemployment (Table 14). The 1994 manifesto had referred to the new government as ‘a government of the people’. It declared that the government would exist ‘to serve the people. It must be answerable to them’. It elaborated on people-ANC structures that went beyond the usual representative institutions (also see Chapter 5):

Forums representing government and workers, business, education and other groups will be strengthened to help in policy formulation. In government, the ANC will continue the tradition of People’s Forums – meetings in which ordinary people can voice their opinions.
### TABLE 14: The ANC election manifestos addressing the three core issues over four national-provincial elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elections</th>
<th>Inequality</th>
<th>Poverty</th>
<th>Unemployment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>It is not enough to talk of equality. Especially when the vast majority of our people have been left behind by a system that excluded them by law and deprived the country of the contribution they could have made.</td>
<td>Most people in the rural areas – the majority of whom are women – live in poverty. Central in the development programme will be job-creation through industrial development and opportunities for small business, alongside land reform.</td>
<td>The millions of people without jobs will be at the top of the ANC government's agenda; A new trade and industry policy will focus mainly on job creation ...; an ANC government will immediately start a national public works programme which will address community needs and create jobs. Through this programme alone we will aim to provide employment and training for about 2.5 million people over the next ten years ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>There are huge difficulties that we must address: inequality, lack of jobs, crime and corruption, poverty and the HIV/AIDS problem.</td>
<td>The apartheid system left us with a legacy of massive poverty and underdevelopment for the majority of our people which will take time to overcome; the fight against poverty requires a coordinated strategy that cuts across all sectors and pays particular attention to rural and disadvantaged areas.</td>
<td>The ANC will continue to expand economic opportunities by speeding up job creation, increasing possibilities for self-employment, entrenching worker rights, advancing work-place equity programmes, and developing skills training; our economy cannot create enough jobs for the 350,000 new work-seekers each year, let alone absorbing the current unemployed ... But there are grounds for hope.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>We must ensure that the country's wealth, business opportunities, skills training and other opportunities are more equitably shared by all our people, irrespective of race, gender, disability and age differences.</td>
<td>Poverty is still a reality for millions as many do not have appropriate skills, while many cannot get credit to start or improve their own businesses. We must create work and roll back poverty. These two core objectives are the major focus of our programmes for the Second Decade of Freedom.</td>
<td>The economy has created 2 million net new jobs since 1995. But the number of people seeking work has sharply increased; many workers have lost their jobs; and many have been negatively affected by casualisation and outsourcing.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The ANC and the multiple faces of people’s power

The 1994 manifesto equally enthused that ‘the ANC has led the struggle to bring about a South Africa that belongs to all the people … Our programme reflects years of people’s struggles and is informed by their aspirations … Government administration exists to serve the people. It must be answerable to them …’ By 2009, there was a more sober, programmatic focus on mobilisation, as in: ‘All our activities should aim to mobilise people to participate in programmes aimed at creating a better life for all.’

The campaigns in the Mbeki epoch moderated the excitement and promise that were usually associated with notions of power to and of the people. The use of ‘the people’ in these manifestos could very well have been substituted with a more neutral use of ‘South Africans’. The most enthusiastic of the 2004 ‘people formulations’ was: ‘South Africa is a democratic country with a government based on the will of all the people’. Similarly, the 1999 manifesto in one of its rare explicit linkages to the people, talked about ‘the people’s housing’. In 2009, the presence of notions of the ANC working with the people of South Africa was more tangible, such as in ‘South Africa will need a government that fully understands what needs to be done to address our apartheid past, and a government that puts people first and which works with the people’. More enthusiastic articulations thus re-entered the manifesto in 2009, even if only indirectly connected to ‘people’s power’. The manifesto’s emphasis was on enhanced (and re-instated) direct relations between government and the people.86

Democracy is more than electing representatives to power once every five years. It means empowering people, especially women, workers, youth and rural people, to participate in decision-making processes that affect their lives.

THE SEEMING PARADOX OF DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM AND PEOPLE’S PARTICIPATION

The ANC’s turn to the armed struggle helped steer the movement towards democratic centralism. Its reorganisation as an exiled liberation movement aimed at seizing state power, and its links with the South African Communist Party (SACP) influenced the ANC to adopt communist style bureaucratic methods of work and a vanguard Leninist strategy, with democratic centralism as its organising principle. The ANC positions itself as a ‘disciplined force of the left’, a movement in which internal deliberation is a core operational mode. Democratic centralism emerges by virtue of such deliberation.

Democratic centralism entails that the decision of the majority prevails – and it is the responsibility of leadership and cadres to effect decisions. Higher structures bind lower ones. Gumede quotes the ANC’s Jabu Moleketi in asserting that democratic centralism, and in particular the principle that everybody needs to support decisions that have been taken, ensured ANC cohesion in the days of exile. The ANC embraces democratic centralism as not simply the rule of the organisational elite over the masses – it places a premium on open and democratic internal debate, and emphasises that the organisation corrects itself from within. But there is tight control and strong central coordination. Lodge points out that democratic centralism in combination with ‘a constitutionally prescribed prohibition on factionalism, made it very difficult for any organised mobilisation to assert itself against leadership policy.’ Democratic internal debate hopefully resolves differences. If not, however, the organisational ruling will be accepted and publicly defended. Zuma explained that democratic centralism means that:

… once the organisation has taken decisions they are binding even to those who did not advocate them. In the ANC we put the organisation above the individual, the unity of the organisation is central and must be protected at all times.

Internally, debate may continue after decisions have been taken. It is recognised that alliance members may have clashing loyalties in that the ANC may hold an opinion that differs from the position of either or both of the alliance members. The notion of direct (intra-party) democracy is evident in ANC leaders’ reference to the ANC as ‘the parliament of the people’. In the aftermath of Polokwane 2007 intense factionalism, sensitivity to and suspicion of dissent and criticism prevailed. Kader Asmal noted that:

Throughout its history, the ANC has had a remarkable capacity to heal itself and move on … What is happening now is the regrettable ‘normalisation’ of party politics, where personalities and personal ambitions and thwarted desires have taken over from policy debate …

It was against this background that the ANC’s venomous response to the disaffiliation of Cope supporters should be seen. As the ANC’s Kaizer Mohau noted, ‘… this is ill discipline and worse (sic) of all counter revolutionary’. This sentiment articulated
with a general intolerance of opposition to the ANC and coexisted with a tradition of
direct democracy. There were intense efforts to silence outspoken comments about
leadership qualities in the Zuma administration, the practice of separation of party and
state or the perceived designs, especially by leaders who had once been associated with
Mbeki, to position themselves for public influence. The Polokwane dividing line ran
strong, albeit cutting across, for example, communist versus non-communist or nationalist,
even combining seemingly socialist sentiments under the mantle of nationalist
economic empowerment.

It was a sign of the new ANC, however, that the ‘theory’ of democratic centralism
had started declining. The ANC was no longer as tightly united as in the past. Demo-
cratic centralism no longer held its core value to members, and especially so among
the leadership corps of the ANC. This new reality was spelt out by Gwede Mantashe
in his secretary general’s state of the organisation report to the Durban NGC:

Infighting and destructive contestation in the structures of the ANC remain one
of the many challenges facing the movement. The influence of money in our
processes has the biggest potential to change the character of the movement from
being people-centred and people-driven in all the processes, to one where power
is wielded by a narrow circle of those who own and/or control resources. This is
at the centre of the resurgence of factionalism in the movement where contestation
is neither political nor ideological but driven by narrow interests.

On the face of it, democratic centralism and deliberation by an anchor group in the
ANC posited a contained form of people’s participation. Debate that was effectively
restricted, along with a premium on internally resolving problems, appeared to contradict
the notion of the ANC-in-government encouraging and facilitating participation in
the policy processes of South Africa. Given the realised practices in the Mbeki and
eyear-Zuma periods, however, it was not necessarily contradictory, from the ANC’s van-
tage point at least. First, it was in effect argued that the broad policy decisions had
already been taken at an earlier stage – anchored in voter support and electoral man-
dates. This would have been in the mass participation in policymaking processes of the
mid-1990s and subsequently, through the ANC, in inputs into the Polokwane policy
resolutions and subsequent endorsement in Election 2009. Second, participation
through the range of mechanisms (Chapter 5) in government processes, is overwhelmingly
solicited with a view to either co-opting citizens into complex transformation and delivery
processes (in which cooperation and popular assistance would ease the implementation
trajectory), or feeding into monitoring and obtaining feedback on the state of policy
implementation. Public consultations are also given a party political cast, with consult-
tative meetings held in geographical areas where it is known that opposition parties
will not arrive in large numbers to hijack policy content.

The co-optation, ‘no criticism please’ rationale was particularly evident in the Mbeki
period, but has been sustained in the Zuma administration. As the ANC’s Mohau noted
in 2008, ‘For the past 14 or so years the ANC was led by a faction – led by Thabo
Mbeki, state institutions were used to silence those who do not subscribe to his views and ideas – this is in the true sense a systematic purging of different views. The Zuma administration did not necessarily have a more open approach, but the style was different. With the advent of the ‘days into the new administration’ protests that welcomed the Zuma administration into power, Mavimbela argued:

The spirit and culture of activism can be redirected by democratising the very conversation of the struggle of the poor in their quest for access to available and scarce resources. The catchwords here are conversation, inclusivity, engagement and openness, even about the very political, social and economic constraints we face, like the need to balance race and gender, the shortage of skills in the public sector and the limitations of our economy.

This has been the hallmark of President Jacob Zuma’s leadership since assuming office. He has clearly understood that antagonism between the state and society arises when institutions of economic and political power insulate themselves from conversation and engagement with civil society.

Recognition of the need for public participation has been consistent across presidencies of the ANC and South Africa. Under Mbeki’s ANC and government there was a proliferation of systems, institutions and processes (Chapter 5). Mbeki as president threw his weight into the initiatives to engage citizens and to open channels of communication, albeit often unsuccessfully. In many of his crusades, and those of the ANC in Mbeki’s time, they specifically worked to get councillors and MPLs to directly engage with their communities, and to respond to community grievances and general needs. The ANC, in the time of Mbeki and for example in the run-up to the 2006 local government elections, replaced non-performing incumbent councillors and attempted to extract commitment from incoming councillors through a pledge of service to the communities they represented. Local election 2011 exercised a troublesome variation on this theme – a process of consultation with the people which the ANC could no longer control. The earlier statement by Mavimbela on democratising the conversation was accurate in as far as the desired outcomes of the processes of community engagement were concerned. It suggests that the ANC had found the answer to the vexing issue posed in Umrebulo in 2000:

... successes attained thus far are a result of profound synergy between policies and actions of the ANC on the one hand, and, on the other, the aspirations of the mass of the people who have been active participants at least during decisive moments; however we have not as yet mastered the art of mass involvement in the process of governance and social transformation ...

This was a necessary conversation at a time when the government and the ANC depended on soothing continuous hitches and deficits in delivery by reassuring the people...
that their needs were being attended to. The Zuma administration often used the same co-optation and patience buying strategies that the Mbeki administration had employed. Two important differences, however, were the greater time lapse since 1994, and the opportunity for ‘new approach, new sincerity’ that the Mbeki-Zuma transition delivered. The verdict remains to be delivered, especially in the context of evident impatience and frustrations with the ANC’s performance in government, and unsuccessful ANC-as-movement processes to continue binding the people together in pursuit of virtuous ANC ideals.

In several instances in the time of Zuma the ANC used metaphors of God and religion – such as ‘God is on the side of the ANC’, and ‘ANC members will go to heaven’ – to substitute for the confidence that the ANC in South Africa in 2010 and 2011 would deliver what the people hoped to get.

Democratic centralism and the internal deliberations of the ANC as party-movement thus stood side-by-side with electoral mandates and the state’s public participation programmes. The closer connection between party and state in the Zuma administration infused the democratic centralist operations of the ANC into the state. There were few clear lines to differentiate critiques of leadership and governance in the government domain from internal ANC dissent. Deliberations on policy were more open than leadership contestation through critiques of style and content – although by the time of the September 2010 NGC meeting and beyond policy codes were increasingly being used as proxy-speak for leadership mobilisation. Policy deliberation and inputs via public participation processes were certainly open. Yet, they were far more open when they involved ordinary voices that did not come with public impact; the higher the level of deliberation, the less the freedom to openly debate.

**CONCLUSION**

‘People’s power’ in the ANC’s first 17 years in power in South Africa transformed from an insurrectionary movement, with some revolutionary thrust, into a procedural form of support for the liberation movement-party. In this mode, people’s power was largely used to support the ANC whilst soliciting trust that the movement-party through its government offices would gradually ring in the changes that would further transform peoples’ lives.

More activist notions of people’s power prevailed both in the early post-1994 days and during campaigning for the Zuma transition and election 2009. This reconnected people with the ‘new’ Zuma ANC and brought renewed hopes that lives would be more definitively transformed and the economic base of people’s power become more evident. Both election and survey results demonstrated the substantial extent to which ‘the popular’ remained the preserve of the ANC and ANC government. This was despite the contradictions of poverty, inequality and unemployment as persistent political ogres and the conspicuous evidence of elites benefitting far more from the new democracy than ordinary citizens. The predominant redeeming factor for the black-African ‘BEE classes’ was that white South Africans in apartheid and beyond had frequently benefitted even more.
This chapter showed the large extent to which the ANC draws its popular support across a far wider spectrum than merely its members. Despite setbacks in election 2009 and local election 2011, the ANC generally retained its ‘colossus’ or dominant status. This was regardless of severe shortcomings in its performance, both organisationally and in government. The ANC in its parallel domain of democracy could still reach out to the people directly and persuade them of its good intentions and good progress – because the people continued to want to trust the party that was seen to be most likely to help realise what were, by 2011, thoroughly scaled down expectations.

A media briefing at the ANC’s 2010 NGC in Durban,\textsuperscript{104} taking stock of the state of the organisation in relation to changes in the terrain of struggle, referred to the need for the ANC always to put the people first, the need to promote ‘revolutionary values and ethics’, to entrench internal democracy and debate, and to deepen the role of membership and grassroots in the ANC. These points were reminders of ANC failures at the time, posing threats to the ANC’s continuous direct lines of access to and sympathetic reception from the people.

\begin{notes}
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The ANC and the multiple faces of people’s power


20 The ANC in effect has made the transition to being a social democratic party or movement, having departed from socialism, and acknowledged operating within liberal democracy, but has never accepted that its liberal-democratic state shell will prevent it from achieving social justice. As Raymond Suttner observes with regard to Saul Dubow, 2000, The African National Congress, Johannesburg, Jonathan Ball Publishers: ‘It may be possible to sustain an argument that the ANC has been transformed into a social democratic party. But if that is the case, it has not been as a result of rigorous debate within the organisation. Rather it would have been the result of some imperceptible process of the absorption of ideas that were previously not assimilable’, see Suttner, January 2003, http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showpdf.php?id=7123 (accessed 30 August 2008).


22 Mondli Makhanya, 2009, ‘Gestures are good and the best one now is a firm hand, Mr President’, Sunday Times, 30 August 2009, p. 11; police violence that killed an activist of the Meqheleng Concerned Citizens of Ficksburg in the Free State, April 2011 was a likely turning point which would signify decreased legitimacy of police action. As background, see The Star, ‘Face to face in Ficksburg’, 18 April 2011, p. 1.

23 Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSV) and Society, Work and Development Institute (SWOP), July 2011, The smoke that calls: Insurgent citizenship, collective violence and the struggle for a place in the new South Africa. Eight case studies of community protest and xenophobic violence does an in-depth study into the protest phenomenon in the context of citizenship and the realisation of rights. Their data and arguments articulate with the analyses in this book.


power of the racist ruling class, and the establishment of one united state of people’s power in which the working class will be the dominant force and which will move uninterruptedly towards social emancipation and the total abolition of exploitation of man by man’.

27 Krista Johnson, 2002, ‘Liberal framework or liberation framework? Comparing liberal and van-


29 Batho pele (People first) was an initiative to get civil servants to be service oriented, strive for excel-
lence in service delivery, and to commit to continuous improvement; see Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG), 2007, Draft national policy framework for public participation and empowerment, Chief Directorate: Free Basic Services and Infrastructure Branch, Pretoria, p. 9.


31 In November 2008, in response to business and other concerns that Cosatu and the SACP were making ANC policy, Zuma said the ANC was striving for ‘continuity in change’ – continuing with practices that had been a success, but changing those that had not worked well. See Gaye Davis, 2009, ‘SACP, Cosatu cannot dictate to ANC – Zuma’, Cape Argus, 27 November 2008, http://www.capeargus.co.za/general/print_article.php?fArticleId=4734480 (accessed 17 January 2009). This became a popular explanation in the ANC’s world of policy in 2009.


33 The StatsSA 2011, labour market dynamics report for 2010 note South Africa had lost 395,000 jobs in that year. Furthermore, Jeremy Seekings, 2005, ‘Socio-economic changes since 1994’, in Jessica Piombo and Lia Nijzink (eds.), Electoral politics in South Africa: Assessing the first democratic decade, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 35-37 also addresses the reasons why social and economic changes had not had ‘visible electoral implications’.


36 Jacob Zuma, 2009, address to the SACP congress by the president of the ANC comrade Jacob Zuma, University of Limpopo, Polokwane, 12 December 2009.


38 Joel Netshitenzhe (head of the policy unit in the Presidency), 2003, ‘Government spending has reduced inequality sharply’, This Day, 12 November 2003, http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0000589/index.php#social_wage1 (accessed 10 December 2009). The concept became widely used in South Africa from 2003 onwards. Netshitenzhe argues that ‘(t)he point in identifying these dimensions [increasing social spending, including social grants , and access to social services, like education, healthcare, water, sanitation, housing and others] is that a narrow focus on income can ignore critical redistributive aspects of a government budget, normally referred to as the “social wage”; see also ANC, 2003, ‘Government has improved the lives of the poor’, ANC Today,3:43, 31 October – 6 November 2003, http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0000589/index.php#social_wage1 (accessed 10 December 2009). Seven social grants were at stake (plus their monthly amounts, effective November 2009): child support grant (R240), Foster care grant (R680), care-
dependency grant (R1,010), disability grant (R1,010), old age grant (R1,010), grant-in-aid (R240) and the war veteran’s grant (R1,030).

39 South African Social Security Agency (SASSA), 2008/09 (for the year up to March 2009),


Jacob Zuma, 2011, State of the Nation address, 10 February 2011, Cape Town.


Seekings and Nattrass for example argue that pro-poor social expenditure in post-1994 South Africa has in several instances been extracted from government by non-poor social groups. This would include unions and teacher organisations. See Jeremy Seekings and Nicoli Nattrass, 2005, From race to class: The changing nature of inequality in South Africa, New Haven, CT., Yale University Press.


It is also possible that there could be voting for the ANC without the trust that the ANC as government can actually get things right, but this would be a numerically small component.

For a detailed exposition of the relationship between party identification and other orientations, see Susan Booyzen, A theoretical and empirical study of the socialisation of Afrikaans students, PhD thesis, Rand Afrikaans University, Johannesburg, 1988 (in Afrikaans).


Jacob Zuma, 2010, Political report of the president of the ANC to the NGC, Durban, 20 September 2010.

See Schulz Herzenberg, op. cit. She argues that ‘The elements of party image refer to the intrinsic values or attributes associated with a party …’ (p. 35). Inclusivity-exclusivity is one of the constituent elements of image that she specifies.


Markinor, 2005, op. cit.


Surveys steer clear of ‘ANC’ in their questions, and rather just focus on ‘government’.


64 Bratton and Sibanyoni, 2006, op. cit., p. 3.


66 Also see, Public Service Commission, 2011, ‘Profiling and analysis of the most common manifestations of corruption and its related risks in the public service’, Report, April, Pretoria.


69 The Act still awaited the president’s signature at the time of local election 2011. He signed it soon thereafter. One of the South African Municipal Workers Union (SAMWU) demands in exchange for suspension of an eve-of-election strike had been that the president does not sign it into law.


73 The site of the Union Buildings seat of government and office of the president of South Africa.


75 Lodge, 1999, op. cit., p. 119.

76 In 2006 Zuma was acquitted on rape charges (see Jeremy Gordin, 2008, *Zuma – A biography*, Johannesburg and Cape Town, Jonathan Ball Publishers, pp. 144-168), and on the eve of the April 2009 election, the corruption-money-laundering, etc. charges ‘went away’ – having been dropped by the National Prosecuting Authority.

77 Jacob Zuma, 10 January 2009, Address on the occasion of the celebration of the 97th anniversary of the African National Congress and launch of the 2009 election manifesto, East London.

78 Interview with senior official in the presidency of South Africa (anonymous), 10 March 1995, Cape Town.

79 See Lodge, op. cit. 1999, p. 120 on these themes in the ANC’s 1999 campaign. The alarming ‘scale of corruption’ was even noted by Mbeki in a 1996 interview. He said that it was felt at every level, from those who are at ease buying stolen goods to police officers helping car thieves and bureaucrats taking pay-offs; as cited in Suzanne Daley, 1996, ‘Mandela’s successor skilful but lacks a common touch’, *The New York Times*, 23 July.

80 Author’s phrase.


83 Jacob Zuma, 2010, State of the Nation address by the President of the Republic of South Africa, at the joint sitting of Parliament, Cape Town, 11 February 2010.
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Cabinet media briefing, 26 October 2010, Pretoria.


ANC election manifesto, 2009.

A useful overview is offered by Johnson, 2002, op.cit.


Tom Lodge, 1999, South African politics since 1994, Cape Town and Johannesburg, David Philip Publishers observes that both Mandela and Mbeki at the ANC’s 50th national conference in 1997 referred to the organisation as the ‘parliament of the people’.

Makhudu Sefara, editor, ‘Sauer Street: No real space for open debate’, The Sunday Independent, 13 December 2009, p. 14 argued that the ‘space for debate is indeed open for those who agree on a path forward’. He singled out the Tripartite Alliance’s treatment of the voices of dissent of Joel Netshitenzhe, Trevor Manuel, Frene Ginwala and Kader Asmal to illustrate how intimidation into silence in the Zuma ANC had replaced Mbeki’s ANC Today column as the instrument to get compliance and consensus. Also see ANC, 2009, ‘Ginwala’s statement on remuneration of public office bearers’, Media statement, 6 December 2009.


Mohau, 2008, op. cit.

Mavimbela, 2009, op.cit.


Community protest in South Africa is Janus-faced. It is the relatively benevolent partner to electoral behaviour and a valve to vent frustration whilst continuously supporting and voting for the ANC. It is also the dark side behaviour that couples with anarchy, criminal lawlessness, contests between rival ANC associated leaders, and the nurturing of alternative formations of political authority in the absence of tangible, effective local government.

Protest in South Africa has overwhelmingly not been used in rejection of (mostly ANC) elected government. Rather, protest has frequently been used to pressurise the elected ANC government to do more, to deliver on election promises, to replace local leaders or as a minimum, it has been used to extract promises and reassurances from ANC government. South Africans have crafted protest to supplement the vote, not to substitute for voting. Protest has been occurring overwhelmingly in metropolitan, urban and medium-size municipalities, in township and informal settlement areas where a large proportion of South Africa’s black-African population – anchor of the ANC support base – lives.

Protest signified both continuously poor local government and debilitating ANC internal battles. The post-Polokwane ANC and the Zuma administration had reeled with shock in mid-2009 when a range of community protests greeted the ANC following its convincing re-election. Much of the 2009 campaign success was, after all, because of the distance it had put between itself and the preceding Mbeki order. It had, for the brief interregnum from December 2007 until April 2009, imagined that it was truly new, and that past imperfections would be buried with the exorcised Mbeki regime.
The ANC’s 2009 campaign had promised urgent attention to delivery problems. The new administration struggled to fathom *how it* could be held accountable for the dragging deficits of local government delivery … and the devastating effects this had had on South Africa’s communities. But it soon came to realise that its April 2009 mandate was only one spoke in the repertoire that citizens were using to get government to deliver. In addition, and as repeated in 2011, the subsequent protests confirmed that South Africans were not ready to switch votes en masse to opposition parties.

Local election 2011 thus confirmed that protests continued to coexist with electoral support for the ANC. This time around, however, in contrast to the local elections of 2006, the result indicated vulnerability, with the ANC achieving victory by a smaller margin against opponents that ranged from the Democratic Alliance (DA) to a community socialist party. It showed that to secure the sustainability of the ANC power project substantive local government turnarounds had now become non-negotiable, in conjunction with the ANC transcending its multi-sided factional warfare of the preceding years. The ANC now had to act decisively, in unity, and with speed, or face election 2014 as a *badly frayed* 100-year old former liberation movement.

The voting-protest dual repertoire displayed the simultaneous operation of the two parallel layers of democracy in and around the ANC, and how they intersect. The essential repertoire is: first vote ANC, and then in between-election periods protest against the ANC in government to get more attention and better action, perhaps even via substituted local leaders.

The rest of this chapter explores the interface between community protest and voting, and the impact of protest on the political power of the ANC. It briefly previews the chain of causation and the triggers that lead to protest, and then considers the dual repertoires of protest and voting, in which protest is used as the bargaining chip for better performance by the ANC government, with demands largely targeting local government. The chapter conducts a comparative analysis of five peak periods of protest, starting in late 2004, and going up to the candidate selection and service delivery revolts at the time of local election 2011. The African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL) Luthuli House protests of August/September 2011 were a variation on preceding themes and form the cut-off point for the chapter’s analysis. The analysis concerns the changes in protest motivation across the peaks, and shows how complex, hybrid forms of protest have evolved.

**THE CHAIN OF PROTEST TRIGGERS**

Community protest in South Africa is intricately linked to the many faces of poverty and dispossession, inequality and unemployment, frustration with a government that is still trusted to perform better and deliver more and internal rivalries within the governing party. Protest meshes with hope for the promised land of 'the better life for all' in which constitutionally endorsed socio-economic rights are realised. Frustrations, disappointments and the inequality between the formerly disadvantaged and the continuously disadvantaged mix with knowledge that life for South Africans has vastly (albeit
imperfectly and differentially) improved in post-1994 South Africa. The substantial
impatience with the backlogs of ‘service delivery’ in the form of electricity, water, san-
itation, refuse removal and housing extend well beyond local-sphere government pow-
ers. Yet community protests frequently hold the local sphere responsible – acts that are
facilitated by visible lapses in leadership integrity.

Failures of local government operations are highly visible in communities from which
South Africans find limited opportunity for social and economic escape. The short-
comings of provincial and national government are channelled through expressions of
discontent with the local. Local government has become the scapegoat for failures
higher up in the provincial and national government spheres. Even where delivery has
happened, there is often desperation due to inability to pay for any services beyond the
free basic amounts of water and electricity. Local protest is equally about the bigger
issues of township and informal settlement dwellers, close to 20 years into democracy,
seeing signs that the good life is passing them by. Young people, frequently unemployed,
swell the ranks of the party faithful in the protests. Rather than express discontent
through support for other political parties, large numbers of South Africans choose to
combine protest with electoral support for the ANC.

It has been equally true that deprivation and desperation have not triggered protest
directly. Many of the most deprived communities have never turned to protest. Protests
in South Africa in 2004-11 occurred mostly in the metropolitan municipalities, or in
the townships attached to towns. Municipalities with better delivery records than many
others were often the sites of protests. This suggests that certain trigger conditions needed
to be present before deprivation and unhappiness with services would lead to protest.
Active civil society organisations, the presence of individuals with political aspirations
and political rivalries (frequently intra-ANC), criminal and local warlord elements that
stir frustrations up into protest, unemployed organised and unorganised youth that have
time on hand and anger in heart, copycat communities that want to ensure that they do
not slip down government’s attention list all help explain why poverty, inequality and
desperation on occasion, but not always, have been transformed into local level protest.

Protest differs from ‘direct action’, but can also encapsulate it. Direct action entails an
immediate confrontation with a specific individual or organisation with a set of specific
demands, and is often central to building a programme of social change. Social move-
ments, which are often associated with protest, are relatively informal interactive networks
that engage in collective action about social change at either the systemic or non-systemic
level. They are generally linked to the advancement of a broad programme of social
change, such as a vision of an alternative order.

Protest in South Africa offers pertinent illustrations of the general definition of protest
as a statement or an action that expresses dissatisfaction with actions or failures to act,
including policies, government administration, and government’s ways of addressing the
grievances of communities, individual citizens, social movements or community-based
organisations. The actions may be unprompted, roughly spontaneous or well orchestrated.
Non-violent protest may take the form of marches, rallies, and blockades, all intended to
send a political message. In violent manifestations on local level, protest could damage
or destroy municipal infrastructure or the property of councillors, officials or politicians associated with the municipality or political parties present, claim lives and destroy personal property. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) draws attention to the substantial role that socio-economic factors play in mediating the use of protest. It indicates that it is in conditions of high Gini coefficients and low growth rates that the use of protest is most likely. In such conditions, a particular spark or political opportunity can create situations for the use of protest.

**PROTEST AS ‘BARGAINING’ WITH THE ANC FOR BETTER GOVERNANCE**

Throughout the 2004-11 period and in the context of three sets of election results – local election 2006, election 2009 and local election 2011 – it emerged that the protesting communities were not in an electoral war with the ANC. They used a dual repertoire of protesting against (overwhelmingly) ANC local governments and then returning the ANC in that ward and council to power. More generally, those areas also continued voting for the ANC in national and provincial elections. (Western Cape protests against DA metropolitan and provincial government were frequent, yet had a different dynamic. It is a side-issue in this chapter.)

**The dual repertoire of protest and voting**

Protest had come to uniquely complement electoral action in South Africa. In being courted by political parties in elections, and in this instance especially by the ANC, citizens extract undertakings. They also vent their anger in ‘one-sided transactions’ and post this act find it acceptable again to endorse the ANC electorally. Between elections, the accepted mode for many (Table 1) is objection through protest, and, if opportune, also in violent form. The Community Law Centre (CLC) estimates that in the years 2007-10 totals of 42, 38, 44 and 54 per cent respectively of each year’s protests, incorporated violence.

Communities optimise their chances for delivery, whether it is for local government services in particular, or government action in general. Many variations on this theme demarcate South Africa’s electoral and protest landscapes. Even when explicit party political motivations enter the protest fray, voting and protest in the period of study continued to be used in complementary ways.

The impact of protest on government extends beyond just those communities that protest. Protest inevitably occurs in communities with issues of ‘service delivery’ – yet, not necessarily in the communities with the worst states of service. Government thus confronts the possibility of protest action in many more communities than those with really bad service delivery. In the specific South African conditions of underperforming local governments, however, the threat of protest has not visibly helped improve local government performance. One of the reasons might have been precisely that the ANC government knows (and had this confirmed in local election 2011) that South Africans will continue to vote for it for the time being irrespective of local government performance. Government’s endemic failure to attend to biting problems definitively, however, held...
ANC political power is both positively and negatively impacted by protest. Negatively, protests obviously indicate that citizens are not extending unconditional support to their elected government. It confirms that the channels and processes of representative democracy function deficiently. Positively, protest constitutes a valve to release popular frustrations about government’s performance deficits. South African citizens express discontent with services and government, but reserve their vote to endorse the ANC for further terms in office, especially when there is an opposition party looming. Protest in the current conjuncture has been thus an alternative to vote switching.

In most instances community protest in democratic South Africa has been aimed at getting government to address problems such as service delivery, housing and infrastructure. In addition, frustration and anger with deficient representation and local maladministration and corruption were virtually omnipresent as twin causes. These specific triggers were often linked to deeper frustrations and disappointments. Exclusion from local opportunities to become socially mobile, and even pursue the better life somewhere else, was notable in interviews with protesters. Such cases included the expression of desperation at diminishing chances to catch up with the Wabenizis. The run-up to local election 2011 saw an extension of the repertoire when ANC candidate revolts (against not being selected as ANC candidates, in most cases despite community support) seamlessly escalated into ‘service delivery protests’. In many instances rival factions linked to rival candidates and their followers flourished in conditions of inadequate social and economic transformation. In the aftermath of the 2011 election, protests immediately focused on issues with candidates, but also explicitly targeted provincial and national players, whether it was ritual killings where the North West premier had to intervene, or the national police commissioner having to negotiate with taxi associations over community protests against fare hikes.

ANC party identity and protest

The turn to protest by many South Africans to supplement local government representative democracy (and its associated delivery patterns) needs to be considered in the context of the particular forms that party identity and party loyalty in South Africa assumed at the time. Discontented voters in free, multiparty democracies generally turn to opposition parties to improve the representation of their needs. Yet in the post-1994 elections from 1999 to 2011 large majorities of South African voters repeatedly demonstrated their continuing support for the governing ANC. They believed that, despite shortcomings, the ANC was the party that remained most likely to realise delivery. Voters often practised the displacement of blame – holding the ANC minimally responsible for failures, and often taking on board ANC explanations of apartheid and colonialism as the ongoing causes of contemporary problems, at least in the period of analysis. A July 2011 Enzenzeleni (Warden, Free State) protester summarised this orientation: Protest is not about party politics, about dropping the ANC … Protest is part of the struggle to realise people’s rights.
These trends are demonstrated across the periods of protest identified in the studies that inform this chapter. Voters protest between elections, rather than choose an opposition vote come election time. The xenophobia protests of mid-2008 onwards saw the displacement of blame for delivery frustrations onto foreigners, who were exposed and vulnerable. The Cope split from the ANC of October 2008 somewhat altered the pattern. In this instance protest against the ANC was transformed into support for an opposition party with ANC origins. The community protests of July 2009 onwards confirmed that the ballot-brick pattern continued, with slight repertoire modifications. The ANC had conducted a populist-driven 2009 election campaign. The post-election protests showed that the voters and citizens were responding with an intensity of protest that matched the campaign. ‘Service delivery’ and ‘xenophobic’ protests increasingly became integrated as citizens widened their search for non-ANC targets to blame. General ‘economic transformation protests’, such as those from the ANCYL, blamed the ANC (mother body) directly yet kept the fight strictly intra-ANC.

FREQUENCY, SPREAD AND PERIODS OF PROTEST

Although there were many service delivery campaigns and sporadic outbursts in the democratic period and before 2004, such as the one in Eldorado Park in Johannesburg in 1997 and housing protests from at least 1998 onwards, Intabazwe in Harrismith in the Free State in August 2004 marked the start of a rise in concerted and antagonistic action to convey messages of discontent with matters of government action and inaction. Therefore this chapter starts with Intabazwe. It first assesses the 2004-05 protests that were largely driven by local issues, albeit in the context of national poverty and unemployment. Subsequent protests increasingly incorporated protest on local level against predominantly provincial and national issues, such as housing and jobs. The mid-2008 xenophobia-linked poverty and service protests followed. They first engulfed Gauteng and subsequently spread to other provinces. They incorporated preceding service delivery issues, whilst centring on the differential realisation of rights – in competition with ‘insurgent citizens’. The post-election protests of 2009 and 2010 concluded the initial quartet of protest types. In the run-up to the 2011 local government elections a fifth mutation was spawned – essentially internal, candidate-driven ANC revolts that transformed into community-wide protests against aspects of government or ANC action and inaction.

The crossprovincial border protests in Khutsong in the Merafong (Gauteng) municipality about its incorporation into the North West, in Matatiele about its incorporation into the Eastern Cape, and in Moutse over its transfer from Mpumalanga to Limpopo province had many atypical characteristics, but also converged with the rest of the protests in their emphasis on service delivery and quality of life (with communities believing that government service delivery and development prospects in Gauteng, Mpumalanga and KwaZulu-Natal were better than in the new provincial locations).

The waves of community protest in 2004-11 (with the exception of the ‘xenophobia protests’ of 2008) mostly took the relatively mild or mildly violent form of street protests.
and blockades, tyre burnings, marches, stone throwing and, from time to time, the burning of buildings, including municipal property such as libraries, or councillors’ houses, or damage to other forms of infrastructure. Many of these protests incorporated violent clashes with police. The police commonly used tear gas and rubber bullets. In a small number of cases, protesters shot at the police and police vehicles. Some lives were lost due to police fires, for example in Intabazwe in 2004, and in Mqheleleng and Khayelitsha in 2011. The xenophobia-attack protests of 2008 onwards targeted foreigners, with gruesome killings and inhuman displacements.

Community protests that focused on or incorporated anger about service delivery were widespread, yet official statistics about their frequency and geographical spread were hard to come by. When available, they were mostly subject to poorly defined (or unspecified) criteria. Municipal IQ conducted surveys of protest hotspots (and government also depended on this data). In its 2009 report on the state of local government, the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (Cogta) used these statistics, noting that it did not have its own protest database. Parliamentary question time provided a channel to obtain clarifications, and the Freedom of Expression Institute (FXI) solicited answers with the help of then Independent Democrats (ID) member of parliament, Patricia de Lille. It is thus known, as reported to parliament, that 881 ‘illegal protests’ occurred in the country from March 2004 to the end of February 2005. There were also 5,085 ‘legal’ protests in this 12-month period – protests for which official permission was sought and obtained. The annual total was thus close to 6,000. For the subsequent year, March 2005 to February 2006, the total came to 9,809 ‘peaceful’ and 954 ‘unrest related gatherings’. The figures for the year March 2006 to February 2007 were 8,703 ‘peaceful’ and 743 ‘unrest related gatherings’. All indications are that these figures embraced many more ‘gatherings’ than those that have become known as community or ‘service delivery’ protests that this chapter is concerned with.

The statistics generally indicate continuously high rates of protest, with a modest cyclical decline in the period after the 2006 local government elections. The sweeping wave of xenophobic attacks of mid-2008 reinstated high counts. The 2009-10 wave of protests occurred mostly in the months immediately following the April 2009 election, and then flared up again in February 2010. Alexander, working with Municipal IQ data, notes the figures for 2009 as astounding, with 63 of the 83 (as measured by Municipal IQ) 2009 incidents occurring between July and November. The first seven months of the Zuma administration had more protests than the last three years of the Mbeki administration. ‘Unlike the lull that followed the 2006 elections, the 2009 election was followed by a storm.’

Despite variations in the monitoring findings of community protests in South Africa (Table 1; compare with the above statistics), a rising trend was evident from 2004 to 2010. There were variations and cyclical effects, with trends up to 2009 showing a greater likelihood of an increase in periods before and after elections. This would be to state and then reinforce community demands, linking the demands to voting and electoral support for the ANC. In some instances it also related to candidate controversies. The post-election protests of 2009-10 followed earlier patterns, but were also exceptional in their linkages to the new administration wanting to be seen to be new and attending to community
TABLE 1: Protest in South Africa, 2004–11 (July) – Illustrative trends across provinces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011*</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gauteng</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Cape</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mpumalanga</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free State</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaZulu-Natal</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limpopo</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Cape</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>499</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Table contents are based on monitoring of media coverage by the author and by Ronesh Dhawraj of the SABC research department. The monitoring excluded the so-called xenophobia attacks of mid-2008, and the ANC candidate revolts of 2011. It is probable that additional incidents occurred, but never received national-level media coverage. Municipal IQ notes their recording of ‘main’ incidents. Their count was also used in the Cogra, 2009 State of Local Government report. For the period 2004 to 2009, their annual figures were 10, 35, 2, 31, 27 and 51. In a subsequent document Municipal IQ noted that in the January 2004 to August 2011 protests, 30 per cent were in Gauteng, 15 per cent in the Western Cape, 12 per cent in the North West, 10 per cent in Mpumalanga, 9 per cent in the Eastern Cape, 8 per cent in KwaZulu-Natal and 3 and 2 per cent in Limpopo and the Northern Cape, respectively.24

* Measured up to 21 July 2011, excluding ANC candidate protests.

Sources: Range of South African print and electronic media; SABC research department 2011, based on media monitoring; Cogta, 2009, State of Local Government report.

needs, a trend that faded in the course of 2010. 2011 introduced a fifth protest variant in the form of the bottom-up fusion of party and state. Essentially ANC protests transitioned into local government protests when mobilised and anomic community members joined to protest against both the ANC and their local governments in general.

The first wave of protests (first peak period) mostly spanned metropolitan areas such as Tshwane, Cape Town, eThekwini and the Nelson Mandela Metropole. Protest also surfaced in many urban and semi-urban areas. A high proportion – 90 per cent25 – of the municipalities under Project Consolidate26 were among those targeted through protest, confirming the need for high-level government intervention. The protest series of 2007 (second peak period) was largely concentrated in the northern provinces (such as the North West and Gauteng) and in the Western Cape. A substantial proportion emanated from informal settlements. The 2008 xenophobic protests (third period) and attacks unfolded across the country, but mostly in Gauteng. They originated in Alexandra in
Johannesburg and had their epicentre in the Ekurhuleni municipality east of Johannesburg. The protests in the aftermath of the national and provincial elections of April 2009, extending into 2010 (fourth peak period) were most prevalent in Mpumalanga and Gauteng, with notable instances in provinces such as the Western Cape. The 2011 ANC candidate-revolt protests and ANCYL protests (sharing direct targeting of the ANC; fifth peak period) occurred across the provinces (but with a high concentration in KwaZulu-Natal) and at the ANC headquarters in downtown Johannesburg, respectively.

The chapter now explores the five peak periods of protests, with reference to the three main axes of reasons for protest – service delivery and transformation in relation to issues of representation and governance (Table 2).

**FIVE PEAK PERIODS OF PROTEST AND EVOLVING COMPLEXITY OF PROTEST, 2004–2011**

From August 2004 to 2011 South Africa experienced continuous protest, demarcated into five periods. The periods came with high frequencies of protests and variations in scope, intensity, motivation and targets. There was never just one set of motivations for the protests, but rather complex sets of reasons, mostly with common denominators between periods (Table 2). As the protests progressed across the periods they accumulated characteristics. The five periods each displayed a predominant character (Table 3), supplemented with some of the other qualities. Table 3 illustrates how the character of protest in South Africa evolved over time, each instance building a complex of protest causes and triggers, and each tending to incorporate core aspects of the preceding dominant types. For example, once xenophobia was introduced, many subsequent protests incorporated xenophobic elements. Or, once the protests incorporated national or provincial issues in the demands being made, these did not lapse.

Protests were anchored in aspects of the developmental model that had been pursued in post-apartheid South Africa.\(^{27}\) Protests were almost inevitably in communities that lived in poverty, and were deeply affected by unemployment and inequality.\(^{28}\) Whereas generalised government inaction and delivery deficits contributed, the direct triggers were mostly specific community issues – in contexts such as community experiences of insufficient government responsiveness to needs (and demands), or responses moderated by leadership corruption. The delivery of housing was central, and government indeed also pursued targets for housing delivery. Whilst falling short on these, the quality and location of housing delivery also failed to uphold good standards. In response to a parliamentary question in late 2010, the human settlements minister noted that 131,380 houses built by government needed significant repairs; and that 368 had to be demolished.\(^{29}\) Issues around the services of water, electricity, sanitation, refuse removal, and roads also featured centrally. Other issues included medical and policing facilities and services, high mast lights, a particularly poor road, skills training and policies about local job recruitment.\(^{30}\) ‘Service delivery protests’ thus pertained to government delivery in a broad sense, or, in the words of Pithouse, ‘material benefits of full social inclusion’.\(^{31}\)
Communities protest about lack of, and unequal access to, services (locally) and insufficient delivery on provincial and national policy issues, all with a bearing on the realisation of socio-economic rights.

Is local government effectively acting on the service delivery issues and developmental needs in the local community? Are the services available, accessible, sustained, maintained, and affordable? Is socioeconomic transformation being realised?

How do the councillors and bureaucrats take forward the issues requiring action that communities convey to them? Are they accountable, reporting back and updating the community?

Are the responsible government agencies seen to be diligently and honestly working to realise service delivery, without corruption, nepotism, tender rigging, etc.? Is state capacity sufficient to deliver?

It was frequently young people, often in ANC structures, the unemployed, those with limited prospects for advancement and, in local contests, for control over and access to resources that took the lead. Youth overwhelmingly led the protests. Cosatu’s Vavi warned
that the protests were a ‘ticking time bomb’ and the onset of an uprising. Protests predominated in urban and metropolitan communities that experienced infrastructural stresses. They often occurred in informal settlements, or in established township areas with adjunct informal settlements. One of the contributing causes was migration into urbanised areas, both by South Africans from rural areas and Africans from other African countries.

The factors combined with the observation of inadequate or non-existent local government impact on the communities that were supposed to be served. It often boiled down to the way in which communities were represented in government. In many instances the protests would not have materialised had it not been for community exasperation with non-responsive and/or absentee local government ‘representation’, broken promises by local governments, along with community observation of mismanagement, cronyism, patronage and corruption in local councils. In multiple instances, inter- and intra-political party rivalry and mobilisation contributed to the protest, or offered the final trigger. In many of the 2011 protests intra-ANC contests became the primary protest triggers. The creation of an expectation of pending government action, such as that generated in the 2009 election campaign, further helped motivate protests. By 2009-11 communities and some intra-ANC constituencies had become cynical as to prospects for definitive government action – and thus again had good reason to double up on the repertoire of protest and voting.

The perception that protest was effective was already firmly established by 2009, and experiences further confirmed that ‘protest works’. Tarrow argues that this knowledge contributes to a political opportunity structure (POS) being established. Many communities observed the effectiveness of protest in attracting government attention, and possibly eliciting action. The South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR) noted that ‘(c)ommunities learnt to express their dissatisfaction violently and this is set to continue as long as local authorities remain corrupt and incompetent’. In the wake of the community protests, the residents of South Africa’s township areas – those who were most affected by poor socio-economic conditions, government inaction or corruption, and service roll-out and affordability issues – witnessed (or learnt about) surges of community visits by municipal officials, councillors, members of provincial executives, even members of the national cabinet, and by 2009 the president himself, negotiating and promising improvements.

Hitherto invisible councillors from several political parties, mayors and municipal managers emerged to address meetings – even if (as happened on many occasions) these representatives could or would only enter communities under police escort and address them under police watch, or from the back of police vehicles. Nyala’s (armoured personnel carriers) were a favourite. In the final run-up to the 2006 local government elections, many of the protest areas received izimbizo visits (Chapter 5). The 2009 protests confirmed the trend of protest bringing improved prospects for attention. The Zuma administration engaged on a high level and wide scale with communities. Early indications were that communities were satisfied, for the time being, with the reassurances issued by high-level delegations. By 2011, however, several 2009 protests re-erupted, this time specifically against non-delivery on the 2009 government undertakings. Once
high-level visits had been paid, and delivery remained insufficient, communities increasingly rejected lower level substitute visits.

Protesting communities and social or political groupings had their belief reaffirmed that 'protest works' – at least in drawing the attention of authorities, including in many cases the ANC itself, and extracting additional undertakings. Securing follow-through action was more difficult. In post-protest situations, as reflected in the Centre for Development and Enterprise's (CDE's) 2007 research, communities that had protested reported that nothing much had changed for them. However, attracting government attention to the specific problems in particular communities – something that was achieved by protest – was far better than being unsure whether government had noticed particular plights at all.

PERIOD ONE – 2004-05: Protest as local election bargaining tool

The 2004-05 period of community protest delivered certain evidence of voting and protest as complementary mechanisms to achieve service delivery. This evidence was first detected in the ACNielsen urban-metropolitan survey results of 2005, conducted by the author in collaboration with the survey company. When the protests were superimposed on the election results of 2006 it revealed the relationships between protest and voter turnout in elections, as well as the effect of protest on support for the ruling ANC. The basic finding was that the same communities protested and voted in elections, and the same communities protested and voted for the ANC. The data showed that protest did not dilute grassroots interest in elections. Instead of a falling voter turnout and a diminishing vote for the ruling ANC party in the light of community protests, both turnout and ANC support levels were sustained.

Against the backdrop of widespread discontent with the state of service delivery, it had been expected, for example, that voters might record votes of revolt, turning away from the ANC and towards opposition parties – or in social movement style, revolt against the system. Up to 2006, the ANC was the governing party not only in approximately 70 per cent of all of the country’s municipalities, but almost without exception also in the municipalities where protests had occurred. Alternatively, it was suggested that come the local government election of March 2006 voters would choose to boycott the polls. The benchmark was local election turnout rates of 49 and 48 per cent in 1995 and 2000, respectively. A different trajectory unfolded.

The 2005–06 base case study generates ‘the ballot-and-brick’ thesis

To shed light on the dynamics of grassroots action for service delivery, the author in conjunction with ACNielsen included a series of questions on service delivery and voting in the company’s omnibus surveys. In November 2005, the survey requested respondents to indicate their levels of agreement or disagreement with the two core statements: ‘Voting in a local government election will help make a difference to the quality of services that we get from the municipality’ and ‘Protesting against the local municipality is an effective way to get the municipality to deliver better services’.
Contrary to suspicions that protest indicated alienation from the political system, the survey results showed that protest and voting comfortably coexist. There was equal support for the twin statements. A total of 52 per cent reckoned that protest helped them to get better services, and 54 per cent thought that elections would achieve this. The 1.3 per cent margin of error cancelled out the difference. Only 29 per cent believed that protest could not help get better service delivery, and 19 per cent were not sure whether it could help or not. The headline trend from the survey results was therefore that South Africans believe that ‘protest works’. Protest and voting were seen as complementary methods to achieve objectives of service delivery. Voters were literally doubling up on repertoires of action to use in their efforts to attain higher levels of ‘service delivery’ or government responsiveness.

Post-election Booysen superimposed the 2006 local election outcomes on a selection of communities (and the specific wards) that had experienced high-profile protests in the 2004 to 2005 period. The specific wards that had high-levels of protests in the run-up to the 2006 local government elections had also realised high levels of participation – turnout was at least on par with the average for South Africa, and was in line with turnout in the preceding local elections. In addition, these case studies of protest communities and wards showed that the communities had also returned repeated pro-ANC votes in the 2006 local elections. In most of the case studies, the percentage of support for the ANC was slightly higher than in preceding elections.

The 2006 AfroBarometer quantitative survey data produced by the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (Idasa) sheds further light on the inclination to use protest, or not, in this particular period in South African politics. It confirmed that South Africans have either a strong inclination to use, or a direct and positive experience of, protest action. A total of 53 per cent across response options had attended a demonstration or a protest, or would do so if the opportunity arose. In comparison, 44 per cent rejected protest or demonstrations as acceptable actions.

The coexistence of support for community protest and voting in local elections was further confirmed through the Booysen-ACNielsen survey finding that the strongest support for elections (percentages were in the mid-60s) came from two of the provinces – the Eastern Cape and the Free State – where support for protest against municipalities was also strongest. The lowest provincial support for local elections as a means to ensure delivery (with percentages in the low 50s) came from the Western Cape (50 per cent), KwaZulu-Natal (52 per cent), the North West / Northern Cape (combined for purposes of this survey, 51 per cent) and Gauteng (51 per cent). The provinces that least supported participation through voting were also the least supportive of protest, with the Western Cape and the Northern Cape / North West at 39 and 40 per cent, respectively.

In as far as ascribed racial identity in South African politics signals differences in political culture, the Western Cape result was affected by members of the so-called coloured community – across a range of income and language categories – who were more disapproving of protest than their black-African Western Cape counterparts. Among black-African Western Cape citizens the support for protest as a means to enhance delivery rose to 61 per cent. Only 21 per cent of the black-African respondents
felt that protest does not work, compared with 24 per cent coloured, 35 per cent Indian and 52 per cent white respondents.

Based on media monitoring of service protests in 2004-10, we also know that many non-protesting communities were worse off in the service delivery stakes than those that turned to protest. The research showed that there was no fixed, externally defined level of service delivery beyond which protests would be a certainty.

Simultaneously, the findings indicated that the politics of getting service delivery was changing gears – away from a sole reliance on voting, representation, conventional advocacy-style participation and even participation in the new community-oriented

### TABLE 4: Turnout and party support, March 2006, in wards affected by protest in 2004-05

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wards affected by protest</th>
<th>Turnout (%)</th>
<th>Party support (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KwaZulu-Natal: eThekwini 1 ward (Clare Estate)</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free State: Intabazwe 2 wards</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free State: Embalenhle, 3 wards</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape: KwaZakhele 3 wards</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gauteng: Soshangue, 3 wards</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Abbreviations:** ANC (African National Congress), DA (Democratic Alliance), IFP (Inkatha Freedom Party), DP (Dikwankwetla Party), IND (Independent candidate/s), UDM (United Democratic Movement), SCA (Soshangue Civic Association).

**Selection of wards:** eThekwini (ward 25), Intabazwe (wards 5, 6), Embalenhle (wards 4, 8, 12), KwaZakhele (wards 20, 21, 22) and Soshangue (wards 12, 13, 25). Several of these areas had many more wards affected by protest than those listed.

**Source:** Booysen, 2007. Based on information obtained from the IEC in 2006. The help of Liezel van Niekerk (Media24) and Elsabé Düring (IEC) in extracting the data is hereby acknowledged.
government initiatives, towards the grassroots application of a permutation of mechanisms, using the combination of voting and protest as a means to obtain more effective service delivery. The politics of service delivery thus contributed to communities having moved from a blind loyalty to the governing ANC to a critical, even confrontational mode, whilst electoral loyalty at the time of the 2006 elections remained largely unaffected.

The relations had been true for the local elections of 2006, but it could not yet be ascertained whether it was merely a shifting period effect or if it would carry over into different political conditions. Subsequent trends, as outlined in the later periods, would confirm the persistence, albeit probably not permanence, of the phenomenon.

PERIOD TWO – 2007: National and provincial delivery grievances

From early 2007 onwards there was another surge of community protests across several provinces. The qualitative analysis of these protests indicated that this ‘second wave’ was focused, even more than the first, on dismal experiences of representation and the dysfunctionality of local government in South Africa. Evidence was accumulating that protests were often about issues on which national and provincial, rather than local government bore primary responsibility.

The 2005 protests had demonstrated that citizens used the pending vote in the 2006 local government elections, partially or solely, as a bargaining tool to help get attention to their grievances. Politicians stood to be both generally embarrassed and potentially threatened with vote losses. Hence it might have been expected that, in the post-election period, protest would be less attractive to communities. However, protests continued and demonstrated ongoing utility. Communities believed that ‘protest works’ in drawing authorities’ attention to anger about conditions on the ground. It also drew the attention of national and provincial government to insufficient state capacity in the local sphere.

Three interrelated sets of motivations were evident in the second period: protest specifically against poor local-level service delivery, against deficient local representation and access to the municipalities, and local protests against provincial-national delivery issues. The motivations tended to be elaborations of those of the first wave. It was already evident that broader national and provincial service issues, such as housing, were used in protest against local government. The 2007 protest foci increasingly transcended the local domain and concerned the issues of provincial and national government. The phenomenon of grievance displacement could therefore be identified. Issues that were essentially national and provincial (housing, in the form of concrete delivery, but also poverty and unemployment, and provincial government responsibility to ensure functional local government) were regularly the reasons for the 2007 protests (Table 5).

Several of the protests featured in Table 6 were in informal settlements, where conventional service delivery levels were by definition on a lower level than in established township areas. However, it was frequently a sense of desperation for contact with councillors and hearings with municipal officials regarding service delivery that finally triggered the protests.
TABLE 5: Case study of the reasons for the February – July 2007 community protests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case study community, locality, month of the protest</th>
<th>Service delivery related grievances in protests</th>
<th>Conventional municipal service protests</th>
<th>Deficiency of representation and communication</th>
<th>Protests about bigger national issues</th>
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<tr>
<td>Boikhutso, outside Lichtenburg, February</td>
<td>Service delivery to be fast-tracked, bucket system, recreation centre, parks, clinic, street lights, reduction licensed taverns.</td>
<td>Mayor had fled home; municipal officials take shelter at police station.</td>
<td>Job creation; ‘politicians ridicule us with political mumbo-jumbo’.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ikageleng, Zeerust, February</td>
<td>Poor road conditions.</td>
<td>Funds promised by mayor to attend to roads unavailable.</td>
<td>Lack of capacity and financial viability of local government blamed for much of the service backlogs.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Boitumelong, near Bloemhof, March</td>
<td>Better service delivery demanded.</td>
<td>Demands for municipality to listen to grievances.</td>
<td>Substantial local government capacity issues.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Lonely Park Village, Mafikeng, March</td>
<td>‘Village is amongst the least developed in the country’.</td>
<td>Want local councillor removed.</td>
<td>Housing problems in community.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Luate &amp; Dube in Winterveld, Block NN Soshanguve, April</td>
<td>Water and electricity: ‘No power in the houses’.</td>
<td>‘When we speak to our local councillor it is just promises’; councillors retreat to suburbs.</td>
<td>‘How can national government say we are free if the local is like this?’</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hammanskraal and Eersterus, Tshwane Municipality, April</td>
<td>Poor service delivery such as water shortages.</td>
<td>Ward councillor fled for safety.</td>
<td>‘Freedom has not brought us much improvement in the communities.’</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lebaleng, Wolmaransstad; Tswelelelang and Maqhwasu, near Wolmaransstad, May</td>
<td>Collapse of service delivery, poor delivery.</td>
<td>‘Municipality ignored an earlier memo’ on poor service delivery; police guarding councillors’ homes.</td>
<td>None mentioned.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital Hill, Slovo Park, Lenasia South informal settlement, May</td>
<td>Need speedy service delivery – sanitation and water supply deficient, need roads, flooding, electricity; water and electricity failures.</td>
<td>Ward councillor addresses protestors from back of police vehicle, would not disembark; ultimatums put for responses – earlier ones had lapsed.</td>
<td>‘Poverty is rife in our area.’ Unemployment is out of control; we require proper housing – ‘We want RDP houses’.</td>
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The protests happened in the context of national government arguing at the time that it had done what it could to enhance representation. On the party political side, the ANC attempted to exercise improved control over who would serve as local government councillors. The government and the ANC adopted the position that much of the discontent was anchored in anger with councillors not fulfilling their roles as representatives. It proposed action in the form of ANC leaders calling for communities to identify councillors who were not genuinely concerned with the communities they were supposed to serve.\textsuperscript{56} Engaging with Soweto residents in an imbizo meeting former South African president Mbeki stated:\textsuperscript{57}

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Note</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freedom Park, near Eldorado Park, April and July</td>
<td>Poor municipal service delivery.</td>
<td>Lack of response from municipality.</td>
<td>None mentioned.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enkanini, informal settlement near Khayelitsha, Cape Town, May</td>
<td>‘It is about basic service delivery’ – electricity, water and sanitation.</td>
<td>None mentioned.</td>
<td>‘Land needs to be distributed to the people of Enkanini.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petsana, Reitz, Free State, May</td>
<td>‘The demands did not have to do with service delivery’; Municipality: ‘No real service delivery issues were raised’.</td>
<td>Accountability, incompetence; municipality not reacting to earlier memorandum.</td>
<td>‘Development is not taking place – whose responsibility is this?’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mamelodi, Tshwane, May</td>
<td>Lack of service delivery.</td>
<td>None mentioned.</td>
<td>Shortage of housing; ‘Government promised but nothing has happened.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vlakfontein informal settlement, Gauteng, July</td>
<td>Lack of services.</td>
<td>Councillors invisible and municipality ‘does not hear’.</td>
<td>Lack of proper housing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refenkgotso, Deneysville, Free State, July</td>
<td>Site allocation.</td>
<td>Municipality unresponsive, protestors locked out and protest turns violent; ANC councillor killed and counter-violence claimed.</td>
<td>Land and allocation of stands.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The listing in this table is a selection of the protests in the first half of 2007. Table 1 notes a total of 69 protests in 2007. Quotations are from the contents of media reports on the protests. Sources: Author’s research through media monitoring, interviews and observation.
ANC councillors took an oath to represent you at all times. If you come across such people who no longer come to your meetings and hear your concerns, then write to me and deliver your concerns to the ANC headquarters. We will replace them with those who are willing to serve you.

The ANC’s June 2007 policy conference in Midrand agreed to give ANC regions more power to elect councillors to the ANC lists, instead of councillors being selected at national level.\textsuperscript{58}

The detailed empirical research into period two bears out general observations about the causes of protests. The research confirmed that the second period was simultaneously due to anger with poor government delivery (across spheres of government), the deficits in contact with and representation by elected representatives (political) and municipal functionaries (bureaucratic), and the widespread evidence of corruption, maladministration and self-enrichment in local government. Poor service delivery by the municipal authorities in combination with failures of the representational mechanisms and bureaucratic access, along with non-functional communication and doubts whether the communities in question would ever advance out of the trap of poverty in a meaningful way triggered the protests.

Two variants of national issues surfaced in these 2007 case studies. First, there were pervasive issues of housing or land and, second, responsibility for instituting and maintaining functional, effective local government. In two of the cases – Lonely Park Village (Mafikeng) and Refenkgotso (Denesysville, Metsimaholo municipality) – communities were being cold-shouldered by the municipality in its implementation of housing policies, in combination with the specifics of land allocation. These became the immediate protest triggers. Both communities were known to be high in municipal performance rankings.\textsuperscript{59}

PERIOD THREE – 2008: Xenophobia and the dark side of lapses in local authority

The xenophobia (de facto, ‘Afro-xenophobia’) attacks of especially May – June 2008 reverberated through South Africa. The mid-2008 period of protest across several parts of South Africa was exceptional in its projection of anger onto a range of foreigners in township and informal settlement areas. To some extent it deflected anger away from authorities and institutions and onto weaker targets, a trend that would continue through 2011.\textsuperscript{60} The ‘standard’ service delivery protests also continued and 40 were recorded for the year (Table 1, which excludes xenophobic protest-attacks). Many analyses excluded the xenophobic events from ‘protest’, differentiating the ‘hate of foreigners’ character from the domain of services and change for the better in the lives of South Africans. In some respects this set of protests had a different genealogy from South Africa’s usual (even if diverse) service delivery or governance protests (for example, in their upfront use of violence). In other respects, they were the picture of what could emerge unless the continuous dysfunctionality of local government and associated absence of functional and authoritative institutions and leadership were arrested.\textsuperscript{61} The chapter \textit{includes}
the xenophobic protest-attacks, due to the roots of socio-economic deprivation, and the links to competition for scarce resources amidst poverty, that the Afro-xenophobia attacks shared with the ‘service delivery’ protests.

Statistics recorded by NGOs and research organisations indicate that in the peak month of May 2008 there were more than 90 ‘major’ recorded xenophobic protests. The scope of these attacks is evident from statistics about casualties and numbers of displaced foreigners; also those that were housed in special shelters:

- 62 people died (21 of them South Africans), 670 were wounded, and about 100,000 displaced;
- 19,652 people were housed in ad hoc shelters in the Western Cape, 17,548 in Gauteng, and 1,560 in KwaZulu-Natal;
- 40,528 (estimate) Mozambicans fled home, as did 1,260 (estimate) Malawians;
- 11,384 suspects were arrested;
- 342 shops were looted and 213 burnt down, along with countless shacks burnt and/or looted; and
- several rapes were recorded.

The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) report identified factors that contributed to the protest-attacks. There was no singular cause or reason. Rather, layers of factors accumulated and built up to the attacks. The main layers were:

- A series of basic socio-economic conditions underpinned the xenophobia attacks. These included widespread and intense societal unemployment (of up to 70 per cent in affected communities) and poverty, and conditions of poor service delivery that impact on the quality of life in communities, which is often already dismal because unemployment interacts with poverty. The months preceding the attacks saw steep rises in the price of food. The IOM report noted that ‘[u]ndoubtedly, poor service delivery has played a role in heightening tensions and delegitimisation of political leadership in many of the affected communities. However, it was not necessarily the most objectively poor or deprived who turned on foreign nationals’.
- Certain cultural orientations and values, directly linked to the condition of life in lower socio-economic areas, had an impact. Foremost was impunity from the law. Affected communities took the ‘law’ into their own hands. There was little fear of legal and judicial penalties. Perpetrators were arrested, but mostly released on bail, often upon community insistence. In many cases the charges were dropped; in other cases organisations like the Anti-privatisation Forum (APF) arranged for pro bono legal representation, which resulted in some acquittals. Political leaders also helped facilitate this. Furthermore, ethnic and national divisions and tensions prevailed, both between South Africans and foreigners and among, for example, Xhosa and Zulu inhabitants of particular areas. Histories of organisational violence in the affected com-
munities (taxis, gangs, and politics) and low levels of trust that public institutions and leaders could resolve problems heightened the chances of community violence.

- Foreigners were seen to be depriving South Africans of jobs (for example, taking lower pay than South African counterparts), houses (getting access to sought-after RDP houses, sometimes being sold the houses but on other occasions marrying South Africans or bribing officials responsible for allocation, whose services in manipulating lists are well-known in the communities), running lucrative business practices (that were seen to be undercutting prices and selling goods cheaper than the South African competition), and being resented for courting South African women.

- These problems were manifested in political, administrative and specifically law enforcement vacuums strung together in a deadly web. Municipal councillors were seen to be absent, not giving leadership and not guiding communities. Business leaders were known to have paid youths to torch shops belonging to foreigners. Many different types of alternative leadership structures emerged, but elected leaders were also reported to have been behind the attacks. Instigators ranged from thugs to ward and street committee members:

In the absence of institutionalised, legitimate elected leadership, other groups fill gaps in the affected areas. Examples of these include the ‘comrades’ in Itireleng (Laudium), ‘izinduna’ in Sector II, Alexandra, the Masiphumelele Development Forum (MDF) in Masiphumelele, and the ‘Advisory Centre’ in Du Noon. Even for those commonly known community structures such as street committees, block committees, community policing forums (CPF), Sanco, and so on, the local government … has no say in their membership, the nature of their mandate, or the character of their operational and disciplinary procedures. In affected areas, these structures completely appropriate the authority that should belong to local government, or alternatively operate as ‘untouchable’ parallel leadership structures.

- Several triggers permeated these layers to spark the attacks. Mostly self-appointed leaders went about, often in groups or small committee contexts, leading followers into attacks, and building their own community power by gaining esteem through the attacks. This happened while police were reluctant to act, also afraid that their own standing in the communities could be damaged through interventions to stop the attacks. This stands in the context of the same issues about representation and councillors that were at the heart of community protest in general. A quotation from an IOM interviewee reflects this:

The government has a big role to play, but they are not doing it. They must encourage people, there is no leadership, and the councillor is voiceless. There
is lack of leadership, councillors have lost, they have a higher voice but they are silent. They are hardly known by the community, they don’t interact with the community. Then, when there is trouble, it is difficult to address the community because they are not known by the community. They can’t offer anything to the community, they are supposed to be more powerful … but they are not informed, they don’t know what migrants are, they don’t know about Human Rights, … therefore what can the community learn from them?

In many respects, this extraordinary set of events was the dark side of what ‘service delivery’ protests in South Africa could be. The Afro-xenophobia attacks suggested that it was, comparatively, still good news when communities were protesting to get their councillors to represent them and to work for them. In contrast, this side of the protests gave a glimpse of the anarchy and anomie that could prevail once alternative bands of leaders take control and ‘find solutions’. Post-2008, xenophobic attacks persisted, albeit on a smaller scale and were accompanied by government efforts to subdue xenophobic sentiments and defuse threatened attacks. In 2011 there were repeated flare-ups, which also linked to instances of ‘necklace’ style executions through ‘mob justice’ – in the absence of trust in policing and judicial services by the state.

PERIOD FOUR – 2009-10: ‘Rights activism’ protests

The same ANC remained in power across the periods of protest. Yet, as was seen in terms of institutional capture and policy expectations, there was a sense that the entrance of Jacob Zuma and the ‘new ANC’ would bring renewed sincerity and urgency in dealing with problems. In the communities’ view, however, inter-administration continuity was a given and they were not taking improvements for granted. Just as the ANC was getting on stream with its post-election Siyabonga! rallies to thank voters for their election support, post-election protests erupted. Communities stressed that they expected action on the mandate they had just afforded the Zuma administration. The ‘new ANC’ had to account for both past deficits and new expectations. The protests often integrated ‘standard service delivery’ protests with limited xenophobic protest-attacks. A strident insistence that the better realisation of citizens’ socio-economic rights was a right differentiated this period.

The Zuma team appealed to communities for respite, given that ‘we have only been in power for two months’. Communities seemed to heed the call, to some extent and at least for some (as evident in a reduced incidence rate that followed). They found some reassurance in the fact that after their protests the new administration was displaying urgency, including on the longer-term issue of building the capacity of local government (or reduction of functions in line with constrained municipal capacities). The attention was evident in high-level delegations being dispatched to hotspots, and Zuma issuing appeals via the media and making occasional personal appearances in troubled areas.

The details of the Zuma administration’s head-on engagement with community protest
revealed that they had neither new policies to address the Mbeki era deficits, nor an immediate plan of action. The new policy ideas, including the much vaunted ‘Polokwane left shift’, would take time to advance to a point of implementation. The situation foregrounded how the Polokwane policy mantra fell short of covering many of the policy and governance problems that the ANC was encountering (Chapter 12). Notwithstanding the ANC’s continuously commanding electoral power, it was increasingly facing a governance crisis.

Protest levels in 2009 stood at a high of 85 publicly reported incidents for the year. Municipal IQ reported 51 incidents (Table 1). Irrespective of which figure is adopted, the counts show an upward trend from 2004 to 2009, albeit with the provincial peaks occurring in different years. Gauteng and Mpumalanga jointly had over 50 per cent of the 2009 protests. In 2010 Gauteng had the bulk of the protests.

**Government ‘trying to understand’ the protests, circa 2009-10**

The Zuma government was initially paralysed with disbelief that it could have become targeted with community delivery protests, given its recent and imposing electoral victory. Government’s understanding of the 2009 protests evolved. Many of the reasons it identified were reminiscent of Mbeki era offerings. It suspected political motives, instigated by opposition parties. Later, the reason changed to trouble stirred by rival ANC local leaders and aspiring councillors – a theme that directly linked into the fifth, 2011, peak period of protest. Concurrent with the emergence of suspected political reasons, however, the ANC also recognised the serious community issues that demanded attention. Policy implementation and delivery were insufficiently pursued by local municipalities, allocated functions often did not match municipal capacities, and the provincial and national spheres were ineffectively intervening to turn things around.

Zuma was frank in acknowledging the problems. Government sent out task teams to investigate the specific protest communities and identify the causes, survey all municipalities in South Africa before the end of 2009 and come up with a strategic plan. In the short time of barely a week, the ANC had moved from Zuma’s innocence of ‘have patience with this administration, we have only been in power for two months, and the new administration is still finding its feet’ to recognising the depth of the problem and instituting multifocal action. Speaking in the KwaZulu-Natal township called Mpumalanga, Zuma urged communities to recognise that government was serious about service delivery. The *State of local government* report followed in October 2009. Government supplemented the report with a survey of problems facing each of the then 283 municipalities in South Africa. The auditor-general felt emboldened to release his report on the state of local government, and the ANC conducted a national investigation of its own. A national local government indaba followed in late October 2009. In December 2009 cabinet adopted a national turnaround strategy. It was to be diffused into communities from early 2010 onwards. Each local government had to have a strategic turnaround project ready by early 2010.

The reasons that the ANC government acknowledged for the 2009 protests both illustrate the evolution of its understanding, and serve as a benchmark for assessing its 2009-11 response:
• Disbelief and initial non-recognition of the legitimacy of protest action prevailed at first as the post-election protests unfolded. Anti-ANC or anti-government political motivations were claimed to have inspired the protests, as seen in the surprise with which Zuma’s ANC spokesperson claimed: 81

How can people who voted for the ANC a mere three months ago all of a sudden, and out of the blue, embark on a Damascan conversion and ‘revolt’ against a movement they returned to power with an almost two thirds majority?

Cabinet’s Nathi Mthwetwa elaborated on the ANC’s stance, including on intra-ANC rivalry: 82

… in some instances you have genuine protests about certain issues. In others it tends to be politicised and made into a political football … using this for their own political gain. Why would it be, three months after the election and having a party voted into office overwhelmingly, that people would come and say, here and now, that they’re not happy with the government to an extent that property is damaged and people are killed?

• In a continuation of the first theme, communities were seen to be angry with Mbeki camp local government incumbents, as cabinet member Tokyo Sexwale insisted: 83

The people are not demonstrating against the month-old government … They are simply saying leaders in the past have done things wrong and they want to tell us … (T)his is a new administration, although we are a continuing government of the ANC. That is why Polokwane happened. We needed change.

• Opposition parties were reasoned to be behind the protests. The ANC alliance fingered Cope. SACP secretary general Blade Nzimande said some opposition parties took advantage of the protests to score political points: 84

There are those who lost the April (election) and they think what they lost they can reclaim by exploiting our people’s grievances by fighting the ANC government. We say to them we will defeat you again, just as we defeated you in the April election.

• The spillover effect of general economic conditions, including poverty, unemployment and urbanisation was recognised. Sexwale argued: 85

It is a fact that (the) housing department has built 2.8 million houses, whether
good or bad. Housing is not a problem, but poverty is … The crisis now is about urbanisation … The global downturn has put more pressure on us.

• Government recognised that corruption and nepotism were underlying causes of many of the grievances. ANC secretary general Gwede Mantashe observed: 86

Perceptions of corruption, favouritism regarding tenders and employment frequently underlie the grievances and are often seen as corruption, even when practices have not infringed any laws.

These problems were also highlighted in the preliminary 23 July 2009 report on the Mpumalanga provincial protests. It noted the ‘existence of financial mismanagement and allegations of fraud and corruption’. 87 Rapule Tabane’s analysis referred directly to ‘the rot at local government level’, noting that the ‘cavalier attitude displayed by these [local government] officials is in total contrast with what the party preaches after its national conferences, national executive committee meetings and special conferences’.

• Weaknesses in local government structures were acknowledged throughout the period, in the Mpumalanga report and in Cogta’s State of local government report. 88 The ‘lack of responsiveness to issues raised by communities’ was noted, and the tensions between political and administrative sections of various municipalities recognised: 89

… these protests expose a weak link in our local government structures and functions. Councillors are supposed to be an area of dynamic contact between ward-based ANC branches and our people. The ward committees are expected to play their active role in terms of community involvement and participation.

• The ANC increasingly became aware that the protestors, more often than not, were linked to the ANC itself. In some instances (reminiscent of the Afro-xenophobia revolts) branch members were taking the lead; in other cases it was Sanco. 90 When the high-level ANC and government delegation came to investigate it found, in the words of ANC secretary general Mantashe, reporting to the 2010 NGC meeting:

In more recent incidents [after May 2009], ANC members led mass protests, playing a negative role in the majority of cases. These members seemed to be leading mass protests against the ANC itself, with the aim to position themselves for candidature in the 2011 local government elections. The positive work done by both the branches and the majority of councillors continues to go unnoticed … This negative characterisation of mass work has a demoralising effect on the hard-working cadres …
The ANC government’s recognition of the validity of reasons for protest was matched with firm warnings that protests had to be legal. Law enforcement through arrests and the use of tear gas and rubber bullets was the order of the day. Cogta minister at the time, Sicelo Shiceka, warned that the law had to take its course and added: ‘We’ll deal ruthlessly with [violent outbreaks] because we can’t allow that. We’re not going to allow anyone attaining their goals by illegal means.’ Zuma endorsed people’s right to protest, but also sanctioned the warnings to abide by the law:

Our constitution allows our people the right of freedom of assembly and expression, and to protest where they feel they need to, but this must be done within the ambit of the law. There can be no justification for violence, looting and destruction of property or attacks on foreign nationals …

It is worth noting that it can be excessively difficult to obtain permission for protest action in South Africa. The two main actors in the Regulation of Gatherings Act, No. 205 of 1993 are local authorities and civil society. Apart from bureaucratic obstacles, it is in the hands of the local authorities to grant permission – for gatherings or protests that often have the local authority as their target! In most cases, protesters simply do not bother to seek permission.

The fourth peak period of protest confirmed the dual repertoire of elections-plus-protest (the ballot along with the brick) in order to get government to work for citizens … or at least convincingly promise to work for them, and express personal commitment to do so. The people were acutely aware that the ANC would want to maintain its dominant local government position, and that the prevailing between-election inter-regnum was the optimal one for pressure by protest.

**PERIOD FIVE — 2011: ANC candidate-revolt and ANCYL protests**

The protests in period five were characterised by their direct targeting of the ANC itself – rather than government structures controlled by the ANC-as-government. Two variants were manifested. They were the candidate revolts around the local election of May 2011 and the August/September 2011 protests around the ANCYL that accompanied the mother body’s disciplinary hearings against ANCYL president, Julius Malema, and the rest of the League’s top leadership.

The ANC’s candidate revolts of 2011 directly linked to ANC ward candidacies for local government election 2011. This period was essentially an internal ANC development, yet the protests effortlessly fused party and state, from the bottom-up. The significance of this round of protests was that it foregrounded intra-ANC competition for positions, or that communities raised candidate issues in the course of their ‘service delivery protests’. Intra-ANC rivalry had already been present in earlier protests. It was noted, for example, as a contributing trigger factor in the 2005-06 period. In 2011 ANC internal processes burst to the surface and became primary triggers. Only some of the 2011 protests, both
before and after local election 2011, were of the candidate-revolt type. The standard socio-economic rights, living conditions and service delivery protests, not paired (or not predominantly paired) with candidate issues, continued throughout. Candidate-revolt protests also took place within the ANC election campaign when top leaders, especially Zuma, did grassroots electioneering in places like Veeplaas and Kwadwezi in Nelson Mandela Bay. These protests had two main electoral effects – the snubbed candidates stood as independents, or accepted ANC undertakings that after election 2011 the ANC would launch a task team to investigate the unhappiness and remove councillors that did not have community backing. The ANC announced the task team within a week of the 18 May election. The team started its work in KwaZulu-Natal Natal and moved on to Gauteng. It had to investigate ‘instances where the guidelines were undermined’ and would focus on ‘the manipulation of the list processes, which undermined the list guidelines’.

The Youth League’s Luthuli House protests were a variation on the theme of community protest as expression of anger against the ANC. The outbreaks and their sister community protests shared roots of aggrievement with the ANC, and feelings of having been left behind in the times of ANC government. The outward reasons were Julius Malema’s disciplinary hearing and the crowd’s fervour to protect the adulated leader. The community protests were, conveniently for the ANC, mostly in secluded townships or on arterial roads bordering informal settlements. The new protest repertoire targeted symbolically important ANC offices or headquarters, and the prevailing top ANC leadership, instead of municipal offices, councillors and their houses. The candidate revolts had included the occupation of ANC offices, but these isolated instances were mostly disciplined.

**Direct causes and prevalence of the candidate revolt-protests**

In the run-up to the 2011 election the ANC, guided by Polokwane undertakings, undertook elaborated community consultations to find the best, or most appropriate by ANC standards, candidates. First, branch general meetings nominated four candidates, community participation brought the number down to two, and regional and provincial conferences then determined the final candidate. The process went out of kilter when the regional and provincial ANC structures did these finalisations. They eliminated some candidates with community credibility. Communities alleged that factional power interests in the ANC’s regional and provincial executives informed the final and manipulated selections. In some (but far from all) cases community-preferred candidates were rivals and losers refused to accept the outcome.

Protests surged in support of community-legitimated candidates. The protests transformed into service delivery protests … service delivery deficits were the fertile soil beneath the anger; many were also steered by aggrieved rival candidates. Candidates rejected in the ANC selection processes were sometimes those that angry communities had reckoned would help bring accountability and improved representation … or would have supported their interests in regional and provincial power battles. Community anger against the ANC was equated with anger and frustration with the local municipalities. As ANC power battles played out, municipal or other public institutions and infrastructure became targets.

Many of the angered aspiring candidates were nominated as independent candidates.
The independents phenomenon was thus in part evidence of rejection of the organisational authority that follows from the ANC’s democratic centralism. The ‘ANC independents’ were a mixed bag of authentic community-preferred representatives, careerists, small-brother tenderpreneurs, and renegades that fell on the wrong side of regional and provincial party principals’ strategising for Mangauing 2012. Cosatu’s Vavi noted:

Some comrades have reason to be aggrieved. It is true that in some cases popular candidates have fallen victim to people who have appointed themselves gatekeepers, it is true that in some cases guidelines have been sidestepped.

A total of 842 independents were nominated, and 748 ran for local election 2011, compared with the 659 of 2006. The Eastern Cape and Limpopo provinces (165 and 172, respectively), followed by KwaZulu-Natal (107) and Gauteng (80), had the bulk of the independent nominations. Only 45 were successfully elected. The independents secured 2.3 per cent of the ward votes (independents do not accumulate PR votes), which translated into 0.9 per cent of the overall vote. This indicated that the dissatisfaction with ANC candidate lists only minimally metamorphosed into independents effectively opposing the ANC in local election 2011.

The ANC candidate-revolt protests demonstrated the destructive spillover of ANC internal turmoil – inclusive of deployment wars and economic adversity – into the public domain. These protests happened across the provinces. They occurred in a relatively small number of the 4,277 municipal wards, yet constituted an unprecedented phenomenon. ANC members in six provinces, and in 60 out of 1,807 ANC branches (2011), lodged complaints with Luthuli House or with provincial party offices.

Select details from eight of the provinces illustrate the range of the pre-election candidate protests – from violent community protests with human casualties, to disciplined and orderly delegations to and protests at ANC national and provincial offices, to ‘simply’ standing as independents:

**Gauteng:** A man dies in Atteridgeville, Tshwane in a list dispute; a Tembisa ANC branch chairperson is put forward as independent candidate; in Mamelodi’s ward 16 an ANC member excluded from the ANC list stands as independent; in Zandspruit, Johannesburg, protesters demand the removal of an ANC re-nominated candidate who ‘lives in the suburbs and cannot understand our issues’; hundreds from four branches in Pretoria go to ANC offices to complain.

**Mpumalanga:** Wesselton and Ermelo communities protest over the ANC’s candidates’ list (one man is found dead – apparently from police fire); unhappy ANC members protest outside the ANC’s regional office in Nelspruit.

**North West:** 100 people from the Bonjanala area complain about the candidates’ selection process; there are candidate protests in Taung and Mafikeng.

**Eastern Cape:** Four out of 31 Bizana wards go to court; ANC branch members take the ANC to the Mthatha High Court over list disputes; an angry mob assaults an ANC provincial office bearer in King William’s Town; 279 appeals are lodged by disgruntled ANC members; a 120-strong delegation from the Alfred Nzo and...
Amathole regions go to Luthuli House in Johannesburg to register their protest; in Bizana immediately after the election 5,000 people blocked government buildings in protest against newly elected but imposed (by provincial leadership) councillors. **Western Cape:** 150 members from 16 branches object to the list process by going to the ANC provincial headquarters, trashing the offices, and effectively holding those in the offices hostage.

**Northern Cape:** Party list protests in Kimberley (in Galeshewe car tyres are burnt), De Aar and Postmasburg.

**Free State:** Protests in Botshabelo; not clear whether the killing of Andries Tatane of the Meqheleng Concerned Citizens in Ficksburg was a police hit aimed at a known local opponent of the ANC and thus not linked to ANC candidate revolts, but the incident was right in the middle of this set of protests.

**KwaZulu-Natal:** ANC dissidents field at least 15 independent candidates in the eThekwini municipality and eight in the Umsunduzi municipality; in Lamontville an ANC candidate goes independent; in Richmond, ANC members stand as independents in four of the seven wards; immediately post-election Waterloo residents protest to stop the elected councillor from being sworn in.

The pre-election candidate protests continued post-election 2011. They entailed protests demanding that some councillors not be sworn in, that elected candidates (legitimately but dubiously nominated) be removed, and protesting that ward results had been rigged. The sites of these protests ranged from the streets to council chambers.

A case study comparison of two of the candidate-revolt protests – Wesselton and Zandspruit – illustrates the ‘candidate-revolt-service delivery’ interfaces of the protests in the fifth peak period (Table 6). The details also illustrate the diverse and intricate links between this set of protests and community issues concerning government delivery.

**Power implications of the candidate revolt-protests**

Key aspects of the candidate revolt-service delivery form of protest, in as far as it was important to the ANC’s power project, were:

- Not all of the rivals (or rivals-turned-independents) were bona fide candidates and credible ANC members. Some, as the ANC leadership often alleged, were opportunists and imposters. This opened the space for the ANC to discredit them.
- The ANC does not take kindly to those who do not accept democratic centralist decision making. This meant that the full ANC propaganda machine and electoral apparatus could be turned on dissident-independent candidates in local election 2011.
- The ANC, however, through the linkages between the dissident-independents and community representation and demands for better service delivery, had lost some of its previous credibility. Even if it won a particular ward election, there were going to be questions about whether the winning candidates deserved to be on the councils, or whether they had made the grade as candidates because of patronage and favouritism, rather than ability to serve the community.
• It was evident that ANC succession politics was paramount (once more) – in many instances rivals put forward by the community (only some of whom became independent candidates) were excluded and others included because of their potential in constructing power blocs for pending regional, provincial and Mangaung internal elective power battles.
• The revolt of the independents was a potential distraction from securing optimal public governance. Fallout could continue and disrupt efforts to get local governance on a higher plane.

TABLE 6: Comparative case study of two candidate-revolt protests, 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward and location</th>
<th>Wesselton, Mpumalanga</th>
<th>Zandspruit, Gauteng</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>When and where</td>
<td>Week of 13 February 2011, starts in this ward, and branches out to eight other wards in this established township area, starts 2 am.</td>
<td>30 March – 1 April 2011 on the verge of the informal settlement, bordering Beyers Naudé Drive, a primary arterial road, starts 4 am; repeat protests in May, June and July 2011.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC chosen candidate and alliances</td>
<td>Mfanimpela ‘Mpe’ Nkosi (Ermelo provincial hospital fleet manager), directly aligned to the faction around Mpumalanga premier, David Mabuza; regional executive committee (REC) tries to force Nkosi on community as only candidate.</td>
<td>Maureen Schneemann, seemingly not attached to a major ANC faction; she was re-nominated by the ANC in the absence of the specific community forwarding names at the time of the list process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community preferred candidate and alliances</td>
<td>Bongani Phakathi, associated with the REC’s Lassy Chiwayo, and Fish Mahlalela, both rivals to premier Mabuza; ‘We were shocked when we heard another candidate had been chosen, because we had already chosen our candidate’.</td>
<td>Steven Ntlapo, ‘Maureen lives in the suburbs and does not understand our issues’; this statement becomes a refrain in the June and July 2011 repeat protests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of service delivery in the protest</td>
<td>Primary trigger is the alleged manipulation of ward councillor lists; community members complain that ‘nothing works here’, of nepotism, bribery and/or sex for jobs.</td>
<td>The demands primarily concern service issues in an informal area which ambulances cannot access, where toilets do not flush (‘are always full’), the clinic is poor, poor housing; supplemented with ‘Down with Maureen’ and tearing down her posters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process of the protest</td>
<td>Community meeting called in Thembisa on Sunday 13 February; preceded by a Msukaligwa Community Committee (MCC) meeting, there are complaints about candidates; violent protests from 14 February onwards; youth rampage for three days; small shopping centre looted; one man found dead, seemingly from rubber bullet wounds.</td>
<td>Five organised groups spread out with tires, ready to start protest through stone-throwing at motorists and especially police, burning tire blockades of the road, tires of police Nyala vehicle shot; ‘hooligans’ on the road continue to start new fires; in late June protesters burn down a school classroom.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police action</td>
<td>129 arrested by the third day, 51 appeared in court within the protest week (25 of them minors), some injuries (and one dead), police use armoured vehicles, police accused of being on the side of premier Mabuza, and of using intimidation, random arrests, interrogation and torture on the other camp.</td>
<td>90 arrested; police do not seem to play a political role; they do not hesitate to use stun grenades and rubber bullets (there were rumours that some of the protesters were armed).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter claims and official versions</td>
<td>Responses from the ANC Gert Sibanda Region: ‘The protests are political’, ‘We have never received a complaint about candidates as the ANC’, ‘It is the losers that start the protests’, ‘Old councillors want to hang on to power in the name of service delivery’, ‘We don’t know of the existence of an MCC’.</td>
<td>Responses from ANC Gauteng provincial chairperson: ‘The ANC scheduled a meeting with the community but no-one came forward to put candidates up for election’; Gauteng MEC for local government: ‘The community must use ward committees to address their issues’; Gauteng ANC gives Schneemann its support; many residents talk of realised delivery against the odds of massive backlogs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election day threats</td>
<td>‘We shall not vote and will influence our parents to do the same’.</td>
<td>‘We shall block access to the voting stations come Election Day’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election day protest</td>
<td>Youth protests through peaceful ‘games protests’ on Election Day in Wesselton streets; the older generation turns out; no obstruction of electoral process.</td>
<td>No protest action on Election Day; some report that they are choosing to abstain due to dissatisfaction with the ANC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election result</td>
<td>An ANC councillor is elected in the ward election. 89 per cent ANC support and 47 per cent turnout in the ward (58 per cent turnout average for town; 56 per cent for Mpumalanga).</td>
<td>The ANC ward councillor is re-elected. 77 per cent ANC support and 53 per cent turnout in the ward (55 per cent turnout average for city; 56 per cent for Gauteng).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** Author’s monitoring, inclusive of a range of media reports; [www.iec.org.za](http://www.iec.org.za) (various windows).
Causes, execution and power implications of the ANCYL protest

The community protests’ bottom line was modest alienation from the ANC, with acceptance of leaders’ authority and reassurances, despite a few cases where angered communities demanded Julius Malema and no-one else as ANC negotiator. The ANCYL protests were more ambiguous. Despite declared love for the ANC, the protests were executed by the ‘Malema Youth League’ that was shooting from the hip and hurting the mother body with its reminders of ANC policies and projects (especially on economic transformation) tangibly falling short. The protests simultaneously articulated with the Zuma-Malema fallout at the time. Malema had started pronouncing on ANCYL support for Zuma’s replacement in the Mangaung leadership elections, and the August 2011 disciplinary charges against Malema came with Zuma’s backing.

The epicentre of the protest was on Tuesday 30 August 2011, when ANCYL leaders (national and provincial, especially from Limpopo), other supporters (from most of the provinces) and Gauteng school learners were bussed in to Beyers Naudé Square adjacent to the ANC’s Chief Albert Luthuli House. Roughly six thousand participated and caused havoc by throwing stones at police and the media, burning Zuma T-shirts and an ANC flag, and causing downtown businesses to close shop. The protest was significant in the context of this chapter in that Malema succeeded in associating his name with a revolt against the ANC’s governance project, especially amongst the young underclasses, and against the lack of sufficient economic transformation. The harnessing of revolt against the mother body was, however, not just about benevolence and caring, but also ambition and self-glorification as the ‘voice of the voiceless’.

This Malemaism can be compared with Cosatu’s public criticisms of the ANC. Cosatu follows through with pledges of mobilising voters in elections to vote ANC. Voters then find an avenue for the safe expression – within the ambit of ANC electoral support – of their criticisms of the ANC. The ANCYL under Malema, however, was not steering anger into the ANC mother body in the way that Cosatu did. It wanted to capture the ANC from within and turn it into a different body, which in theory would be more radically positioned. Thus, while the ANCYL protest shared causes and some expressions with the community protests, it was executed on a cross-community ‘demographic category’ and populist base, and in relation to particular ANC leaders.

Hierarchies of reasons for protest – configuration of unfolding waves

The precise configurations of reasons for protest in South Africa in the analysis varied across community and period. All related to service delivery and policy implementation in the broad sense of the word, or to government’s engagement with communities and citizens in the process of working towards (or claiming to be working towards) representation, delivery and development. There were three anchor causes of community protest, which inevitably featured in the stated reasons for the protests (Table 2, 3): representation, governance and service delivery. These anchors found substance in the main practical expressions in particular periods.
By far not all communities suffering from dismal service delivery embarked on protest. **Trigger** conditions had to be manifested. Triggers included political factors such as inter-councillor, intra-ANC or party political conflicts, social movement or activist organisations operating in the community, and citizen groupings banding together and snowballing a protest. The frequent absence of effective or legitimate official local government authority structures also contributed. Sometimes, local power warlords stirred up protest in pursuit of their own authority and leadership. Community specific triggers emanating from observations of municipal government conduct, or long-standing issues that took particular turns were part of the cumulative set of causes. Protest was also overwhelmingly located in communities that were adversely affected by the deep structural fault-lines of poverty, unemployment and inequality, which often combined with the youth’s frustration with lack of opportunities. The rest of this section assesses the relationship between the anchor, trigger and substructural factors that combine to determine protest in South Africa (Table 7).

**Anchor Causes**

**Ineffective citizen representation**

South African local government from the mid-1990s on, and especially in the period 2000 to 2011, fell far short of the ideal model of adequately representing the interests of constituents. As Atkinson\textsuperscript{101} confirms, ‘the protests have not only been about houses, water, taps and toilets, but also about political process’. This is substantiated through complaints about the unresponsiveness of officials and councillors, blocked channels of communication with municipal mayors and councillors, national level deployment of mayors negating responsiveness to local communities, national government’s dismissiveness of, and lack of responsiveness to, local preferences (including in the cross-border disputes of Khutsong, Matatiele and Moutse). Booysen\textsuperscript{102} documents cases of councillors effectively abandoning their communities. Negligible or, at best, unsatisfactory levels of contact with communities prevailed in many parts of the country.\textsuperscript{103} ‘Absentee representation’ frequently ruled – councillors were often neither resident in their communities or wards nor were they available for consultation with, or feedback to, their constituents. From the councillors’ side, there was the mitigating factor that they often had little progress from the side of the local bureaucrats to report on. The waves of protest revealed the regular helplessness of councillors in the face of underperforming local bureaucrats.

Absentee representation initiated a vicious circle, resulting in anything from avoidance of constituency contact to the risk of violence from the community should councillors re-enter the area. Communities complained about the lack of communication and feedback from their elected representatives. Protest would thus help penetrate councillors’ and ward committees’ cordon of aloofness and apparent recalcitrance in representing constituents’ service needs. Shiceka reported that the government task team investigating the causes found repeated complaints about government not engaging with the communities, not listening, and not doing things with communities.\textsuperscript{104} In addition, a report by an ANC NEC task team, sent to investigate political and administrative
chaos in the North West, found that the ‘total disregard for the law’ that was shown by councillors had been ‘aggravated by the fact that no action is taken by the ANC to discipline [them]’. The report referred to a deliberate blurring of roles and responsibilities of politicians and officials that had led to many instances of mayors irregularly appointing staff, overseeing procurement committees, and contracting their preferred service providers in contravention of legal requirements. The insistence, however, was not for ‘communication for the sake of communication’ – the demand came with the expectation that good news had to be reported.

In another variant of the problem, party politics, and in particular ANC politics, often predominated in municipalities’ work. Politicians were interfering in the work of municipal managers and their staff to an extent that would fuse political and bureaucratic work. It gave effect to the ANC’s ‘one centre of power – the ANC – ruling. Yet, it caused widespread paralysis. Councillor and aspirant councillor rivalry was important, but was only a partial explanation.

**Getting service delivery**

In many of the instances of protest, the direct objective was simply to get ‘service delivery’, or the correction by the local government of a substantive or municipal-managerial problem. Most of the protests did not concern any grand scheme of achieving an alternative social order, seizing power, or even changing a policy - they were overwhelmingly about the improvement of immediate conditions. This is in line with what Pithouse notes regarding Desai’s work on ‘The poors of Chatsworth’: ‘... the aspirations of these movements are not to seize political power but rather to diffuse it with the aim of creating viable neighbourhoods in which individuals and communities can flourish.’ The pertinent services included housing and roads, water, running water, electricity supply and financial access, waste management, sanitation, and the availability and operation of health clinics.

Service delivery issues were among the reasons, and almost always featured, but were not the sole motivation. The service issues in point ranged from sanitation to housing or roads. Sometimes ‘service delivery protests’ were substitutes for dissatisfaction with lapses in other government services. Roads and housing were two examples. Problems ranged from the poor quality of the houses delivered to backyard dwellers protesting because their landlords were being relocated to improved housing and they were being left in the lurch.

**Community reaction to the governance issues of corruption, nepotism and maladministration**

Corruption affecting the quality and allocation of services, contributed to the emergence of protest. Skills and capacity shortages in local government also contributed to local government weaknesses in addressing development backlogs. Reports of corruption in municipal politics and management were rife. This trend continued into the 2009-11 period. Definitive evidence of the far-reaching impact of corruption, maladministration and individual enrichment through the use of public funds had already featured in the Mbeki days. There were several instances of top government leaders campaigning to correct these governance issues. This mostly had limited effects. Renewed undertakings were made amidst both 2009 and 2011 protests. In 2009 the
Zuma administration was prepared to recognise the far-reaching impact of community observations of corruption, nepotism and incompetence precisely by those who were supposed to serve local communities. The timing of the release of the local and provincial government review that stemmed from mid-2007 was fortuitous for the Zuma administration. It could be collapsed into the crisis survey of local government commissioned by the new administration. The government would benefit from this timing, yet there was no escape from the fallout due to continuous non-performance.

**Local protest against other spheres of government**

Whereas housing, in terms of the 1996 Constitution of South Africa, is a competency of provincial government, housing protests were directed at the municipalities that acted as the facilitating agents in the provision and allocation of houses. In many instances this was due to municipalities de facto having been the main implementers of housing schemes. The housing function has not been formally assigned to municipalities, with the result that a great deal of ambiguity remains regarding who is actually in charge of housing. It was only after the 2005 protests that the then national Department of Housing focussed on accrediting municipalities on the housing function, with a view to equipping them with the skills and resources to perform their role adequately. In some instances, for example in 2007, protests were directed at municipalities against the condition of roads that were under provincial competencies. Protests were also aimed at the provision of health services and unemployment.

**Trigger causes and facilitating factors**

**Rival councillor or political mobilisation**

It was sometimes disputed, especially in the run-up to local government elections, whether there was a causal link between service deficits and protests, or whether rival politicians (either within the community or within ANC branches) had used delivery shortcomings to mobilise against local opponents. Over time observers such as Bam and Mantashe drew attention to the role of infighting within the structures of the ANC as a reason for mobilisation against incumbent councillors. The 2011 protest trends directly focused on rivalry – often in the context of ANC national, provincial and regional factionalism.

The same phenomenon was evident in the protests of 2009 onwards. There were instances of the ANC accusing Cope of being behind the Du Noon protests, and it was pointed out that mobilisation in the North West province was between the well known Black Book and opposing factions in the province, battling for local control. In addition, in 2009 with the change of provincial government in the Western Cape from the ANC to the DA, communities from areas that were known to have voted ANC promptly went out in protest, explicitly demanding that the DA provincial government should attend to their housing and other developmental needs. The ANC also averred that the Diepsloot, Gauteng protests were led by ANC members who had lost leadership elections in their branches and had instead formed SACP branches.
**Activists in social movement mobilisation, explicitly linking services and socio-economic rights**

In other instances, community activists organised protests, for example the Coalition Against Water Privatisation. The Phiri community in Soweto, Johannesburg, mobilised through the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee (SECC) and Operation Khanyisa and protested both conventionally and in the form of resistance action by making illegal reconnections. The actions were equally anchored in dissatisfaction with social conditions, the government’s failure to fulfil citizens’ rights, and in alienation from the institutions of local democracy.¹²⁰

**Opening of opportunity structures**

The turn to protest was facilitated through snowballing. Communities often followed the examples that were offered in mass media protest coverage.¹²¹ They protested to try and ensure they would not lose their place in the delivery queue to communities that did take up protest. In the early phases of protest waves, television and radio offered extensive coverage, thus facilitating snowballing.¹²² Coverage tended to decline subsequently – in 2009 specifically with coverage of protests switching to extensive coverage of government responses and initiatives. Specific types of opportunity structures also unfolded in the 2008 xenophobic protest attacks. Here the threshold was significantly lowered for copycat attacks and parallel governance practices around the country, but the openings were also contained through public opinion outcries diffused through extensive media coverage. A 2005 case study of protest in the Nelson Mandela Metropole showed that individuals at the time often come together with minimal leadership and preparatory organisation, starting to gather by word-of-mouth and giving life to more unstructured and anomic protests.¹²³

**Substructure and substructure related causes**

**Socio-economic inequality and widening gaps**

Protest arose in the context of a series of severe social problems for which municipalities bear little direct responsibility – unemployment, poverty, inequality and insufficient levels of development (although their actions often exacerbated the local conditions).¹²⁴ The protesting communities were frequently home to substantial proportions of the most disadvantaged of South African citizens. In conditions of abundance, or even just satisfactory provision and development, there would have been less frustration and anger. In addition, unemployed youth were frequently at the forefront of protest.¹²⁵ Young people without prospects were trapped in local communities. In those communities observers found a form of localised ‘cadre deployment’, which had ‘degenerated into a vehicle for waging factional battles within the party and for allocating patronage”.¹²⁶ Fear of becoming further disadvantaged due to relocation across provincial boundaries was a core reason for dissatisfaction in the cross-border communities.¹²⁷

There was an obvious class disposition for protest. It is the ‘working class’ and, effectively, ‘sub-working classes’ that are most likely to protest (on occasion along with NGO elites that facilitate protest action). In South Africa protest was linked to the
social categories of the unemployed, unemployed youth in particular, and especially those with no or limited access to alternative incomes or chances to find employment.

*Foreigner and other migratory presences that ‘aggravate deprivation’*

Xenophobic attacks and protests came to constitute an important part of the protest repertoire in South Africa. Observations that ‘foreigners’ – citizens from mostly other African countries, resident in township or other urban high-density areas – were disproportionately benefiting from social services whilst South Africans seemingly were left behind, were a trigger for the xenophobic protests. In some instances attacks were also directed at minority groups (relative to the region) from within South Africa. Crucially, xenophobic protest-attacks occurred in communities that already suffered the substructural problems of poverty, inequality and high levels of unemployment. Scapegoats are easily identified in such circumstances, and the protest potential was heightened by self-styled grassroots leaders.
Crime, lawlessness and alternative structures of authority

Protest and xenophobic attacks in South Africa became linked to crime and lawlessness. Criminal elements were often present in protests, and took advantage to instigate looting. Foreign owned shops, generally in evidence in residential areas, were easy targets. These components also linked to subaltern, alternative structures of political authority, stepping into voids left through the absence of local political representatives and effective governance processes.

GOVERNMENT’S EFFORTS AT CORRECTIVE ACTION

By the time of the emergence of systematic protest in 2004, government had already begun taking a series of steps to strengthen or compensate for the weakness of local sphere representation. In response to much of the 2009-11 protests, the Zuma administration conducted a balancing act of proclaiming the continuation of some preceding actions, working from a tabula rasa by means of a task team to visit all municipalities and determine the reasons for the protests, blaming opposition parties and councillor rivalry for many of the protests, and getting municipalities to embark on turnarounds. A stocktaking and summary of the actions taken shed light on the extent to which the South African government was in control of protest, or not.

Law enforcement and suppression

Corrective action is determined by government perspectives on the reasons for protest. Under Mbeki, there was first the perception that the protests constituted an attack on the ANC as government, and possibly also against the state. In this manner, leaders in government in late 2003 characterised protesters as enemies of the state. By 2005, the grievances were acknowledged as senior government members rushed into affected areas to respond and reassure. The Zuma administration combined corrective and restrictive steps, placing high emphasis on law enforcement and suppression of violence and destruction. Many of the government reactions were equivalent to ANC reactions. In 2009-11 it also became increasingly clear that the protest was often (albeit by far not always) de facto in-house ANC business. It was made an issue for disciplinary action in the ANC secretary general’s state of the organisation report to the 2010 NGC.

Investigations, audits and fact-finding

Cogta’s minister set up a task team to address the service protests. At the height of the 2009 protests a summit was suggested to gain an understanding of the protests. The summit took place in October 2009, mainly involving mayors and municipal managers. Mathews Phosa, ANC treasurer general, had earlier also proposed tribunals to hold officials to account and allow citizens to voice complaints over the lack of services. He suggested that these forums be used as places ‘where the public can voice their dissatisfaction with bad service, and where they can get an answer within days.” In December 2009 Cabinet’s low-key turnaround strategy set the stage for the subsequent individual municipal counterpart strategies.
The ANC in July 2009 announced a performance audit of all councillors and municipalities in order to gauge ‘whether people are happy or indeed municipalities are carrying out their mandates – delivering services to the people’. In 2010 it was reported that the audit was in place.\textsuperscript{133} The government response in the midst of the 2009 protests was that it would require all municipalities to have clean audits by 2014. Nombembe stated:\textsuperscript{134}

There is a direct relationship between financial statements and good governance. If you look at all the municipalities where there have been service delivery protests and you look at their audit reports you will find that there is that link.

The auditor-general’s 2011 report (for the 2009-10 financial year) noted that of the 237, or 85 per cent, of municipalities audited seven received financially unqualified audits (up from four in the 2008-09 financial year).\textsuperscript{135} Financially unqualified reports with findings were slightly improved (122 received clean audits but with notices of ‘improvements required’), the number of qualified opinions remained the same, adverse opinions declined modestly, and those with disclaimers of opinion declined substantially – albeit excluding the 15 per cent that remained unavailable.\textsuperscript{136}

**Admonition of councillors and getting better candidates**

In the interim, councillors were warned not to be lazy and to be accountable to their communities. The 2009 admonitions, however, stood in the light of the 2006 local government elections and the ANC’s efforts at the time to address the problem of ineffective representation, which had resulted in it retiring many of its incumbent councillors. One of the mechanisms to achieve effective representation was bringing in 50 per cent women candidates. The ANC also required candidates to sign a pledge of representation\textsuperscript{137} and to live in the communities that they would represent.\textsuperscript{138} 2007-08 showed that the problems of representation were not dissipating. In many of the 2006-08 protests it was precisely the lack of contact with local elected representatives that again came to the fore as a crucial grievance, besides disappointment with the level of transformative delivery.\textsuperscript{139}

In the 2009 edition, Zuma said that underperforming councillors would not be returned after the 2011 local government elections: ‘I therefore appeal to them to start mending their ways. They still have a chance before the 2011 elections.’\textsuperscript{140} The ANC’s Mantashe, without referring to the earlier commitment to improve representation by replacing councillors, acknowledged that ‘67 per cent of the ANC’s councillors were first-time councillors, 28 per cent second-term councillors and only 5 per cent are third-term councillors’.\textsuperscript{141} In late 2009 Mantashe called for the tightening of appointments, based on a ‘proper selection process’. In 2010 Mantashe recommended to the ANC’s NEC that the popularity of candidates be tested with communities prior to nomination as local election candidates.\textsuperscript{142}

Community engagement in the 2011 ANC local government selection processes was only partially successful. Many were satisfied with the outcomes, but manipulation to suit the construction of factional power-blocs was counter-productive. Both community protests and the phenomenon of independents revealed these vulnerabilities.
Strengthening local government

From the early 2000s on, government had taken measures to strengthen the local interface between government and citizens. Measures included the ward committee system, community development workers (CDWs), the presidential izimbizo programme, and the Thusong service centres (Chapter 5). The measures were retained and elaborated under the Zuma administration. Shiceka suggested that the effective power of local government deliberations needed to be moved into the ward committees. From the ANC side, Mantashe reiterated this and projected it as a corrective to ineffective local level representation. Ward committees had been designed to enhance the interface between councillors and their constituencies. The system aimed to ‘provide community members the opportunity to express their needs, their opinions on issues that affect their lives and to have them heard at municipal level via the ward councillor’. Ward committees were also to ensure that communities were familiar with government projects.

However, ward committees were largely ineffective in preventing community protest. The exact level of success and acceptance of the committees remained contested, with evidence of dysfunctionality abounding. The Zuma administration thus emphasised the revitalisation of the ward committees to ensure that they would function and enjoy sufficient power and also work with the street committees, ANC structures which were to be instituted. The street committee theme had resurfaced in Zuma’s closing speech at the Polokwane 2007 conference. He also urged the ANCYL to be active in establishing street committees in their areas:

In Polokwane we spoke of reviving street committees. No structure of the ANC can effectively drive that campaign better than the ANC Youth League, working with the Community Policing Forums and our hardworking and dedicated police officials. You will need to engage in practical and visible actions that should be geared to finding solutions to crime and its violent nature.

Other cabinet members and ANC leaders adopted the street committee idea, along with promoting the reinvention of ward committees. In addition, the CDW programme was expected to render multilevel assistance in policy implementation. It would also help provide strategic information to government about delivery deficits that could metamorphose into community protest. The workers would constitute multi-skilled ‘participatory change agents’ who would help government maintain direct community contact. However, ‘confusion existed as to their precise role and relationship to local role-players’. By 2008, the intention that the CDW initiative would bridge communication gaps was falling short on expectations. By 2009 government stressed their revitalisation as well, seeing a role in facilitating policy implementation and bringing services to the people. In 2011 Powell concludes:

By couching local government reform in the language of a systemic crisis requiring national intervention, the Zuma government repeated the Mbeki government’s mistake: It is hard to demonstrate progress when you cast reform in crisis mode. Replacing the Mbeki government’s programmes with a new strategy and at the
same time embarking on a major reorganization of the department has meant that Cogta is in a weak position to drive long term reform in government.

The mapping of government actions articulates the extent to which the protests of the 2000s in many ways differ from those of the 1980s and early 1990s. The pre-democracy protests had a mobilising and social movement character. They were an integral part of a project of both far-reaching social change and the overthrow of the apartheid state. The protest target was unambiguously politically bad, and the system was as bad as its products. System incumbents lacked legitimacy, irrespective of the level of government. The protests of the 2000s were instead targeted at the specific and deficient products that were being delivered and services that were being rendered, and often at the developmental model that the ANC-controlled government was pursuing. The system of government – even local government – was not seen as illegitimate, although the incumbents or councillors often personified illegitimacy.

CONCLUSION

South Africa’s protest landscape was not just a benevolent alternative track for political expression that articulated with ongoing electoral support for the ANC. Continuous and intense inequalities caused by poverty, unemployment and differential access to development made the local sphere of government particularly vulnerable. It remained a trajectory that could metamorphose and implode on a far wider scale, especially if protest should snowball to a greater extent than evidenced up to 2011 and become provincial or national in character, rather than limited to community protests. High levels of youth unemployment, with localised evidence of corruption and nepotism, could provide the connecting spark to plunge townships across South Africa into collective chaos.

From 2008 onwards, protest in South Africa incorporated variable xenophobic faces. It ranged from originally being overwhelmingly xenophobic to later on also incorporating xenophobic-Afrophobic features, with opportunistic looting, criminality and violence increasingly entering the repertoire. The ANC seemed to have a chance, circa 2010-11, to simultaneously ensure that protest would remain relatively benevolent, stay twinned with pro-ANC voting, and that local government was stabilised and capacitated to ensure the curtailment of corruption and maladministration. Instead, the ANC’s 2011 local government election campaign became intertwined with community-level candidate contestation that seamlessly blended with or evolved into community-wide service delivery protests that expressed anger with government services and corruption.

In the time of the Zuma administration there was a renewed emphasis on local government turnaround, task teams to map the grievances and deficits, specialist teams to parachute into understaffed councils, and local interventions to circumvent protests repeating and escalating. The ANC also launched investigations and dispensed task teams to investigate community grievances. These were pivotal projects for the ANC – to contain protest and ensure that local, ‘community’ protests would not transform
into networks of national protest. Should they fail, the twinning of the ballot and the brick could very well prove to have been a period effect.

NOTES

1 Frantz Fanon, 1961 (translated 1963), Wretched of the earth, New York, Grove Press, p. 36.
3 The ANC was the governing party in the vast majority of municipalities where protests occurred. Several instances of protest against DA-controlled municipalities in the Western Cape were also experienced.
4 Further illustrating the point, in a survey of 21 municipalities outside cities the Institute for Democracy (Idasa) found that nine in ten residents are unhappy with delivery. As reported in Gaye Davis, 2011, ‘Nine in 10 outside cities unhappy with delivery’, Weekend Argus, 2 April 2011, p. 6.
5 The classic works, such as those of Tarrow and McAdam still set out many of the theoretical parameters on protest. Sidney Tarrow, 1994, Power in movement: Social movements, collective action and politics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press; Doug McAdam, 1996, Political process and the development of black insurgency, 1930-1970, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
7 Protest differs from ‘direct action’, but can also encapsulate it. Direct action entails an immediate confrontation with a specific individual or organisation with a set of specific demands, and is often central to building a programme of social change. Social movements, which are often associated with protest, are relatively informal interaction networks that engage in collective action about social change at either the systemic or non-systemic level. They are generally linked to the advancement of a broad programme of social change, such as a vision of an alternative order. See Tarrow, op. cit.; McAdam, op. cit.; Shaw, op. cit., p. 212. Social movement research on South Africa (often associated with protest action) - both in terms of case studies and theorisation - has benefited from the case study-driven work by, for example, Bucus et al., Ballard et al., Mayekiso and Desai. See Imraan Bucus, David Hemson, Janine Hicks and Laurence Piper, 2007, Public Participation and Local Governance, Durban, Centre for Public Participation, p. 17; Richard Ballard, Adam Habib and Imraan Valodia (eds.), 2006, Voices of protest: Social movements in post-apartheid South Africa, Pietermaritzburg, University of KwaZulu-Natal Press; Mzwanele Mayekiso, 1996, Township politics: Civic struggles for a new South Africa, New York, Monthly Review Press; Ashwin Desai, 2002, The poors of Chatsworth, Durban, Madiba Publishers.
9 Derek Powell (Community Law Centre, CLC), 2011, The state of our local democracy, presentation, IEC working session, Gauteng, 24 February 2011.
11 The analysis does not deal with the series of varied community protests that followed after local election 2011.


Dale McKinley and Ahmed Veriava, 2005, Arresting dissent: state repression and post-apartheid social movements, Cape Town, Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation; Greg Ruiters, 2003, ‘Local government confronts the new ungovernability’, Debate, 9. The Eldorado Park protest is reckoned to have been the first major ‘service delivery protest’ in South Africa. Four protestors were shot dead.

Protests against housing issues in democratic South Africa have been evident since 1998. The youth had consistently been present in the waves of protest. Unemployment fuelled their ‘availability’. StatsSA calculated that 41 per cent of the unemployed of 2010 were in the narrow age band of 25-34 years; and 50 per cent in the wider 15–34 band.

The Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR) and Society, Work and Development Institute (SWOP), July 2011, The smoke that calls: Insurgent citizenship, collective violence and the struggle for a place in the new South Africa. Eight case studies of community protest and xenophobic violence coin this phrase.

Khutsong’s protest was against provincial re-demarcation, which moved Khutsong from Gauteng to the North West province. The resistance, however, concerned the fact that Gauteng province was seen as more likely to render local and general government services, and improve access to ‘the better life’. In August 2011 the Constitutional Court upheld Moutse’s demarcation into Limpopo. The Moutse Demarcation Forum and its associated Mpumalanga Party vowed to mobilise nationally against the ANC in the 2014 elections. The Forum would, however, consult with the ANC to try to get the type of reversal of a Constitutional Court ruling that Merafong had gained. See Omphitlhetse Mooki, 2011, ‘Moutse to stay in Limpopo as demarcated, Concourt rules’, The Star, 24 August 2011, p. 5.

This was one of the topics of discussion in the Duncan and Vally, 2009, seminar, Jane Duncan and Natasha Vally, 2009, ‘Social unrest in South Africa 2004-7: New data and new interpretations,’ seminar paper presented to the Centre for Sociological Research and Development Studies, University of Johannesburg, 13 March 2009.


The data that was obtained in the Duncan and Vally (2009) study came from the database called the SAPS ‘Incident Registration Information System, Business Intelligence System (IRIS/BIS)’. It records data nationally and provincially. The exact definitions for the categorisations in the IRIS system are not stated. The researchers identified a divergence between the IRIS data and the Department of Safety and Security’s response (dated 22 November 2007) to a parliamentary question (43/2007, question 1834) that was posed by Patricia de Lille; see Duncan and Vally, op. cit., pp. 3-19.


Project Consolidate is the national government rescue plan for failing municipalities. It was
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28 Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR), 2008, *Adding injury to insult – how exclusion and inequality drive South Africa’s problem of violence*, Report on Component 4 of study conducted by the CSVR for the Justice, Crime Prevention and Security (JCPS) cluster, 31 October 2008. Exceptions were communities, for example in the North West, where more privileged, largely white communities of ratepayers withheld rates from municipalities and purchased private service maintenance.


30 To illustrate, see the case study by Peter Pfaffe, 2009/10, ‘Inside Balfour’s protests, some reflections’, *South African Labour Bulletin*, 33:5, pp. 41-43.


32 Zwelinzima Vavi, 2011, seminar input, University of Johannesburg, 6 June 2011.

33 To illustrate, executive director of the Democracy Development Programme, Rama Naidu, said at the Birchwood local government indaba that the needs of communities were often ‘relegated to the backburner’ due to inter- and intra-party political struggles at municipal level.


35 Tarrow, op. cit., see Section 2.


37 Susan Booysen and Linda Stofile, 2005, ‘Changing the face of local politics’, *Weekend Post*, 5 June 2005. High-level government visits were the order of the day in 2009-10, and included the president of the country, several cabinet members, and the ANCYL president.

38 Booysen, 2009, op. cit.


40 See CDE, op. cit., 2007, *Voices of anger …*, p. 54.

41 The section is anchored in Booysen, 2007, op. cit. pp. 21-32. Subsequent sections rely on subsequent research.


45 ACNielsen, 2005; 2006, op. cit.

46 Khutsong, along with the other cross-border and protest-ridden municipalities, where some of the most violent protests occurred, did not form part of this particular study. Khutsong
community organisations specifically organised an election boycott (local elections of 2006), and it was successful.

49 AfroBarometer 2006 Presidency report; Institute for Democracy in South Africa (Idasa), AfroBarometer, 2006, Public Opinion in South Africa, Tshwane, Idasa. The 2008 repeat survey showed less support for protest, but confirmed that South Africans find both protest and voting very acceptable.


Orange Farm (Johannesburg) had repeat protests in 2010. Mike Muller, former director general in the then Department of Water Affairs and Forestry reported that a survey of Orange Farm services had indicated that the area was doing relatively well in the service delivery stakes. Input into P&DM seminar, 24 February 2010.

51 Booysen, 2007, op. cit.
52 Booysen, 2007, op. cit.
53 This section draws on the work that was done for Susan Booysen, 2009, ‘Beyond the “Ballot and the Brick”: Continuous dual repertoires in the politics of attaining service delivery in South Africa?” In Anne McLennan and Barry Munslow (eds.), The Politics of Service Delivery in South Africa, Johannesburg, Witwatersrand University Press.

54 See Empowerdex (Economic empowerment rating agency), 2009, Service delivery index (Munidex) for ratings over time of functionality and improvements in functionality of municipal government in South Africa; also see Geoff Doidge (Minister of Public Works), ‘Progress of municipalities’, EPWP Phase 2, PowerPoint presentation to the Birchwood municipal conference, 22 October 2009.


58 ANC, Media statement issued by then secretary general Kgalema Motlanthe, 29 June 2007, Midrand.
59 Metsimaholo, for example, was the top performing council in the Free State and was ranked 21 out of 231 local councils nationally, as pointed out by Vicky Robinson, 2007, ‘Mufamadi blames unrealistic expectations’, Mail & Guardian, 6 July 2007, citing the work of Municipal IQ, a web-based research and information service that specialises in monitoring municipalities in South Africa.

60 See Tara Polzin Ngwato, 2011, of the African Centre for Migration and Society, as reported in Erna van Wyk, 2011, ‘Communities not blindly xenophobic’, City Press, 26 June 2011, p. 4.

61 The section further dissects and interprets the research findings that were presented by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), Regional Office for Southern Africa, 2009, ‘Towards tolerance, law and dignity: addressing violence against foreign nationals in South Africa’, by Jean Pierre Misago with Loren B. Landau and Tamlyn Monso for the Forced Migration Studies Programme, University of the Witwatersrand, on behalf of the UK Department for International Development (DIFID). The current analysis further analyses and categorises the factors.

63 IOM, op. cit.
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64 IOM, op. cit., p. 44.
66 IOM, op. cit., p. 43.
67 IOM, op. cit., p. 38.
68 Brendan Boyle, 2009, ‘The editors’, SABC-SAFM, 26 July 2009, observed that the Zuma team did not create the impression of ‘hitting the ground running’ and that the president should have started with the ‘low hanging fruits’, showing that the team was trying to help, rather than doing the ‘Thank you’ rallies. Boyle also observed that it was the same people leading the 2009 protests and the xenophobia riots of 2008 – and that it was happening amidst evidence of corruption, and people seeing a ‘take, take, take’ attitude on the side of the rulers.
70 See, for example, the call by Nathi Mthwetwa, ‘Interface’, SABC-TV3, 26 July 2009.
71 Incidence rate is judged by a combination of author and SABC monitoring data bases, the latter from Ronesh Dhawraj from the SABC research department.
72 Zuma, for example, pitched in in the troubled Mkondo municipality, in Piet Retief in Mpumalanga (protests were triggered by the mayor failing to account for alleged municipal corruption and the Mpumalanga premier subsequently failing to arrive for an agreed meeting with residents), and in the Madela Kufa Section 2 township in Tembisa, Ekurhuleni, an area that remained intensely service-deprived 20 years after its establishment; see Chantelle Benjamin, 2009, ‘Zuma warns councillors on Tembisa look-in’, Business Day, 20 November 2009, p. 3; also see CSVR and SWOP, 2011, op. cit.
73 The notion that all relevant policy for the Zuma administration is contained in the Polokwane conference resolutions of December 2009, and the belief (further advanced in the 2009 ANC election manifesto) that the answers are in this bible-like document.
74 The grassroots perspectives on these causes were captured in Centre for Sociological Research (CSR), ‘Service delivery protests – Findings from quick response research on four ‘hot-spots’ – Piet Retief, Balfour, Thokoza, Diepsloot’, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, 1 September 2009.
76 Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (Cogta), 2009, State of Local Government in South Africa, Overview report national state of local government assessments, working documents, Pretoria, Cogta, October 2009; Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (Cogta), 2009, Basic services publication, Comparative information on basic services, Pretoria, Cogta.
77 See Joint Committee of Chairpersons: Workshop with the Auditor-General, 2009, Parliament of South Africa, Cape Town, 14 August 2009.
79 Powell, op. cit., captures government responses to the protests.
82 Gwede Mantashe, 2009, ‘So many questions – with Chris Barron’, Sunday Times, 15 November 2009, p. 13, called for the ANC councillors who mobilise against fellow councillors to be censured. Opposition leader Helen Zille also insisted that not all protests were equally valid. See Christelle Terreblanche, 2009, ‘Summit planned to tackle protests’, The Argus, 27 July, p. 5.
84 Carien du Plessis, 2009, ‘Nzimande warns of health war’, Cape Times, 3 August 2009, p. 1. This was whilst Cope had been mentioned as playing a role in protests in the Free State town of Jagersfontein where buildings were torched in July 2009.
86 Gwede Mantashe, 2009, ‘We are determined to succeed’, The Star, 3 August, p. 10.
87 Preliminary report findings, as reported in The Star, 24 July 2009, p. 2. ‘No justification for attacks, says Zuma’, p. 2. The municipalities that were assessed included Thaba Chweu, Albert Luthuli, Emalahleni, Emkhondo, Pixley ka Seme, Govan Mbeki, Steve Tshwete and Msukaligwa.
89 Kodwa, 2009, op. cit.
94 The Sunday Independent, 10 April 2011, p. 4. After initial exposure at Veeplaas, Zuma’s schedule was adjusted to skip over scheduled areas, and address another gathering from the safety of a police Nyala vehicle. This had become a common modus operandi for embattled ANC councilors, since at least 2007.
95 ANC, Media statement of the NWC on the 2011 local government elections outcomes, 24 May 2011, Johannesburg.
96 Susan Booysen, ‘New forms will emerge’, The Star, 19 April 2011, p. 10.
100 See, for example, City Press, 27 March 2011, p. 2; City Press, 20 February 2011, p. 4.
104 Sicelo Shiceka, Minister of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, interview with Tim Modise, After 8 debate, 3 August 2009.
105 Xolani Mbanjwa, The Sunday Independent, 23 August 2009, p. 1. The report recorded councillors’ illegal actions as inclusive of nepotism and irregular staff appointments, inflating tenders for personal profit, awarding tenders to companies that funded political campaigns, accepting
bribes and kickbacks from service providers, abusing council credit cards, vehicles and property, and selling council property.


111 See Booysen, 2002; op. cit.

112 See Atkinson, op. cit., p. 71.


115 Brigalia Bam, 2005, personal communication in discussion, 28 May 2005, Pretoria; also see Sunday Times, 5 June 2005.

116 ANC accusing Cope of being behind the Du Noon protests; Du Noon is a Cape Town informal settlement notorious for its lack of infrastructure.

117 North West struggles for local control, including so-called ‘Black Book faction’, see City Press, 2 August 2009.

118 Khayelitsha was out protesting shortly after the DA provincial government took over after the April 2009 national and provincial elections.


121 See Booyse and Stofile, op. cit.


123 See Booyse and Stofile, op. cit.

124 Also see UNDP, op. cit.


126 Richard Pithouse, cited in Ido Lekota and Anna Majavu, 2011, ‘Focus on deployment’, Sowetan, 31 March 2011, p. 11. Polling research showed that Malema had a substantial, demographically specific, following in the metro areas: 54–56 per cent of black-Africans from 18 to 34 years old ‘support what Julius Malema says and does’; TNS-Research Surveys, Media release, 27 September 2011.

127 In September 2009 an ‘election’ was held to determine Moutse residents’ preference. A large majority polled in favour of Mpumalanga; see ‘Moutse loved Mpumalanga’, City Press, 27 September 2009, p. 4.


129 Batho pele (People first) was an initiative to get civil servants to be service oriented, strive for excellence in service delivery, and commit themselves to continuous improvement in services delivered.

130 Joel Netshitenzhe, 2003, Question and answer session, launch of the GCIS Ten-year review, Magaliesburg, December.
137 See African National Congress (ANC), 2006, 2006 Manifesto: A plan to make local government work better for you, Marshalltown, ANC.
138 Councillors to live in the communities they represent see Atkinson, op. cit., pp. 65-66.
142 See ‘ANC wants drastic changes in way party candidates are selected’, Saturday Star, 23 January 2010, p. 2.
146 Sicelo Shiceka, interview with Freek Robinson, Fokus, SABC-TV2, 2 August 2009.
150 Buccus et al., 2007, op. cit., p. 17.
152 See, for example, Mayekiso, 1996, op. cit.
Public participation is a cause of frequent celebration, evidence of the extension and deepening of democracy beyond the rituals of electoral participation, also in South Africa. Public engagement and collaboration equally extended the ANC’s reach and helped it secure power in government and for the movement as the custodian of government.

Public participation was not just a constitutional imperative and government’s well-intentioned platform for continuous engagement with the people of South Africa. It was the ANC government’s way of co-opting both elites and ‘ordinary’ people into governance projects and ensuring the minimisation and delegitimation of public dissent or expressed resentment. Public participation in government projects helped build, sustain and regenerate ANC power. It helped government bring people into positions of co-responsibility, while sharing information about government achievements and listening to people’s complaints. Both ANC electoral and ANC government slogans reiterated that ‘together we can do more’. However, structured opportunities often faltered due to elitist co-optation, insufficient access, people failing to see the benefit of participation in the government’s preferred structures, the ANC’s ‘hijacking’ of participatory mechanisms and the transfer of intra-party factional interests into public structures.

The ANC’s diverse participatory power project is widely diffused and continuously revisited and re-engineered. The ANC’s strong people foundations substantially contribute to its continuous power. The proximity – sometimes fusion – of state and party under the ANC has facilitated the creation of hegemony.

Public participation likewise delivers evidence that the dream of democracy has been inadequately fulfilled: that politicians use public participation to help ensure co-optation and, through processes that channel participation, effectively maintain a

CHAPTER 5

Participation and power through cooperation, complicity and co-optation

Without general elections, without unrestricted freedom of press and assembly, without a free exchange of opinions, life dies out in every public institution … only bureaucracy remains active … Slowly, public life falls asleep, and a few dozen party leaders … command and rule.

Rosa Luxemburg

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Public participation likewise delivers evidence that the dream of democracy has been inadequately fulfilled: that politicians use public participation to help ensure co-optation and, through processes that channel participation, effectively maintain a
distance between the rulers and the ruled. The ANC in government faces hurdles in engaging the people in its governance projects. The opportunities are insufficiently diffused, people are often inadequately empowered to claim available spaces away from the local power mongers, and there is insufficient feedback to reassure participants of the meaningfulness of their inputs. Beliefs in the sincerity of government’s intentions falter.

The chapter assesses how the trends in public participation have affected ANC power, both as party-movement and as party-in-government. It explores the many variants on invited and claimed forms of public participation. It weighs up the ‘truly democratically inspired’ against the ‘engineered to redirect and remove the sting’ of discontent and aggrievement. The chapter’s inclusive approach to public participation recognises the linkages between different repertoires of participation. Forms of public participation often co-exist, rather than substitute for one another.

The range of public participation in South Africa presents a textured portrait of democracy. It is the picture of many government and governing party efforts to help make representative democracy work. It equally projects efforts from citizens to intervene and help correct fault lines and democracy deficits – government gatekeepers permitting. It is this complex of public participation that the chapter explores. The analysis covers the period from the late 1990s onward, takes an inclusive view of public participation, and highlights the interaction between the forms of public participation. It thus explores both electoral and between-election participation; it equally focuses on participation that is officially sanctioned or denounced by the ANC and government; and authorised by the state (either co-optive or initiated from below), or unauthorised (protest driven). The chapter stands in conjunction with the chapters on protest and elections.

**REGENERATING POWER THROUGH VARIATIONS ON THE THEME OF PARTICIPATION**

One of the built-in defects of liberal representative democracy is its distanced power elite. Between-election mechanisms or ‘multiple engines’, such as modern media and the expression of opinion and interests by direct action, are required to advance citizen control over government. Such mechanisms in South Africa come from two complementary sets of origins – generated by civil society, or originated-facilitated by the ANC government. The latter have in many instances been created to help build varied participation and continuous government-citizen engagement. In other cases they have been started to help government control participatory expressions and circumvent or manage dissent. These mechanisms have assisted the ANC-in-government to assert legitimacy. The ANC has equally been able to nurture local-level hegemony via networks that fuse state and party. Simultaneously many spontaneous and voluntary forms of participation, over which government has little control beyond the limits of legality or popularly-claimed legitimacy, challenge and oppose government.
South Africa's 1996 constitution tasked government to ensure compliance with the constitutional obligations of section 59 (1 and 2) regarding public participation and consultation. The post-1994 government entrenched the requirements for public participation in a range of institutional, policy and lawmaking processes. The formal recognition of public participation, such as its embodiment in the Constitution, marked a departure from apartheid-era authoritarianism. The new ethos was one of government expecting popular voices to emerge and government being consensual in its pursuit of change. The constitutional entrenchment signalled the commitment to facilitate and listen to popular expressions on policy and governance. Government also had to uphold consultative practice as evidence of responsiveness between elections and ongoing citizen engagement in government and policy.

Fung highlights aspects of public participation that have a direct bearing on the use of participation in contemporary South Africa: participatory mechanisms are generally used to enhance the legitimacy of public action, justice in public governance, and effectiveness in the implementation of public decisions. By involving citizens in the greater process of governing, there might be less resistance to proposed policies and greater legitimacy of the policy process, as Haus and Sweeting observe. Co-optive practices play an important role in the generation of legitimacy. Yet, citizens first need to become interested and mobilised to practise democratic participation as ‘citizen-activists’.

Public participation in its cooperative, consensual and mobilising form had a particular heyday in the times of early democracy in South Africa. The processes of policy and governance were seamlessly consultative and participatory. Early policy process phases, such as setting policy agendas and policy formation, by definition lend themselves to high levels of participation. This was further highlighted through the fervour of achieving democracy. The adoption and implementation of policy are associated with lower levels of participation, whilst policy evaluation and review again depend on popular inputs. South Africans also moved beyond the earlier mobilising thrusts with citizens tending to give elected representatives the mandate to get on with their work and deliver.

In South Africa’s first 17 years of democracy, organised civil society’s participatory status ranged from, at first in the Mandela days, highly articulated in mobilising around policy processes, to receding in the period of incorporation of civil society leaders into state structures in the Mbeki period. The relative decline was partly due to policy processes moving beyond the typical mobilising actions and into the domain of government. When citizens faced deficits in policy implementation they assessed their expectations in relation to experiences of delivery. Participation entered more adversarial spaces. The rules of engagement became more tenuous. In these times, and across the Mbeki and Zuma periods, the opportunities to give feedback tended to be more structured. They occurred, amongst others, in the form of izimbizo (under Zuma renamed the public participation programme) and ward committees, or co-optation of powerful opinion makers into high structures. At the extremes of disapproval and disappointment the alternative was protest or withdrawal from the political system. In between was a vast area where the average responses measured by public opinion polls talked to the popular perspectives in the spaces between co-optation and protest.
Participation by way of both the ballot and protest belongs to different genres than the decision-making and consultative processes that are typically designated ‘public participation’. Electoral participation has been the dominant public participation mode in democratic South Africa. Protest has grown year after year since 2004. Many of the other forms of participation have largely become operational when the representative mechanism linked to elected positions proved to be insufficient (Figure 1 provides an inclusive mapping of public participation in democratic South Africa).

**FIGURE 1: The complex of public participation in democratic South Africa**

The integration of public participation into the operations of government and the multiple phases of policy processes proved more challenging than endorsement on principle. Beyond phases of initial mobilisation and the expression of policy needs and preferences, public participation inevitably involved critiques of government actions and programmes. Hence the accumulation of challenges, approximately ten years into the democratic era, when participation in protest signalled substantial popular rejection of participation as ritualistic action in favour of the instrumental notion of participation as a measure for response and delivery. Since the early post-1994 days of democracy, South Africa has seen many versions of public participation, some revered and others renounced by power holders in party and government. The ANC (especially as the ANC-in-government) would be continuously challenged as to when to accept, tolerate, redirect or repress the expressions of experiences under democracy that came in the form of public voices.

The times of the Zuma administration typically saw a heightened civil society voice, with citizens leveraging government delivery through pro-ANC votes that combined with post-election outcries and protests. Through the Mbeki-Zuma transition, South
Africa had entered a period of vocal review and reassessment. The ANC-in-government acknowledged in concrete problem-talk rather than propagandistic government-speak what people on the ground had been talking about for a decade.9 Government rhetoric indicated willingness to follow through, listening to popular voices on things that had been going wrong. As the early days of the Zuma administration moved into the mid-term administration, the solutions offered and the level of implementation realised increased in volume yet still only saw modest and partial results.

The realisation of public participation in South Africa illuminates the powerful separate world of intra-ANC politics (addressed in other chapters). Unlike in the domain of public participation the intra-ANC action on issues of public policy and governance held the potential of direct influence and rapid action. The populist rhetoric of the ANCYL, for example, brought a chimera of action to many young people. Provocative ANCYL leadership pronouncements and challenges to ANC principals delivered reminders that young South Africans living with poverty and unemployment might not support the prevailing ANC leaders ‘until Jesus returns’. Youth League pronouncements could sometimes be more powerful than scores of community protests.

**STATUS OF PEOPLE IN PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN SOUTH AFRICA**

The constitutional entrenchment of public participation signalled the commitment to facilitate and listen to popular expressions on policy and governance. As it turned out, participation was easy and well tolerated when inputs were seeking consensus and mobilising support for government, such as in the early democracy days, or were solicited by government, channelled through preferred institutions, and offered within the parameters of prevailing ANC-government policy and governance practice.

When considering ‘people’s power’ (Chapter 3) and how it works in relation to ANC power, its two-directional nature, along with its two-origin character, stand out. The one origin of initiatives that nurture people’s power for the ANC is the ANC as organisation-movement-party, and the other is the ANC as incumbent government, that is in command of state power. The two-direction relationship is in the form of a top-down, bottom-up dichotomy. In top-down mode, the ANC engages with people and requests inputs, or as government creates structures and processes for citizens to access government and contribute to policy and decision making. In bottom-up mode, members and supporters, along with citizens in general, engage with the ANC, for example in ANC branch structures, or in unstructured processes. They also use the structures and processes to draw attention to, or demand, ANC or government-ANC action (Table 1). Top-down, the initiatives speak to the desire to truly hear people’s voices, and obtain feedback about their experience of governance. In other instances these initiatives are more selective or co-optive, choosing the voices that are convenient to be heard. Bottom-up initiatives notably have expressed frustration about not being sufficiently heard. They have taken the form of protest, and organisational or campaign mobilisation around specific interests.
TABLE 1: Two-origin, two-directional relationship between ANC and the people – illustrations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origins</th>
<th>ANC as movement</th>
<th>ANC in government</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Directions</td>
<td>Top-down</td>
<td>Bottom-up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Typical actions</td>
<td>Election campaigns, membership drives, branch organisation, encouragement to engage government through structures, opportunities for civil society to meet with leaders.</td>
<td>Voting, opinions presented through surveys, mobilisation for influence in branches and provincial structures, public debates and inputs in media.</td>
</tr>
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Fusion
Movement and government often fused, for example top-down in the use of state resources for election campaigning (such as launches, functions, government achievement advertising), or state contracts to entrepreneurs that were or became party benefactors, and bottom-up in communities that took intra-ANC battles into the local government domain. The epitome of the fusion was in the ANC’s standpoint that there is only one centre of power when it comes to the governing party in relation to government, namely the ANC.

Source: Author’s conceptualisation and monitoring of processes and practices.

Much of the South African public participation literature apportions blame for lowered levels of public participation, realised over time, to government actions that suppress and disempower citizens. Edigheji argues that the government elite’s failure to provide a vision of transformation has spilled over into its relationship with the people, stunting civic responses. Both Williams and Zuern found that community participation is hampered by the lack of sufficient community organisations. Pitthouse refutes perceptions that public participation requires civil society organisations to transform and aim at professionalised engagement in official structures for public participation.

Policy processes in both national and provincial government have lacked support (including resources) for the legislative and institutional capacities that have been developed to encourage public participation. Marais et al. highlight the shortcomings of public participation initiatives in Gauteng, with specific reference to the Integrated Development Planning (IDP) processes. Booysen shows that the democratic government often lacked clarity on how to operationalise participation, or left it in the hands of consultants. Buccus et al. focus on some of the specifics of capacity related implementation problems. From the viewpoint of government officials, they argue, mechanisms of public participation such as community development workers (CDWs)
and izimbizo (public participation programmes) revealed a lack of procedural clarity, internal politicking between role players, and a lack of officials to conduct consultation. Absence of the capacity to cope with participatory demands in local government also impacted on the perceived sincerity of government in consultation.\textsuperscript{18}

Except in activist circles, a culture of low community challenge to government’s lapses in effecting delivery and transformation prevailed up to the early 2000s, and has often been the case even since then. Ballard et al.\textsuperscript{19} map the hegemonically-supportive and counter-hegemonic positioning amongst the foremost social movements in South Africa and provide illustrations of persistent challenge in the activist domain. Booysen\textsuperscript{20} analyses the re-emergence from the mid-2000s onwards of communities in civil protest action. The challenges rendered through protest were overwhelmingly in support of the better operation of government (both in relation to effective representation and socio-economic transformation), rather than manifesting challenges to replace the governing party or the political system.

The challenge entered a new epoch approximately ten years into the democratic era when participation in protest mounted. The continuation of protests into the period of the Zuma administration led the ANC to recognise, perhaps anew, that there were policy deficits, problems with state institutions, as well as links with the people and the ANC support base in particular that needed to be revisited. The ANC repertoire of responses to protest and other confrontations suggested, however, that few answers that were new and commensurate to the challenge were forthcoming. The full assessment of the role of public participation in nurturing and sustaining – regenerating – ANC power can best be assessed in a comparative consideration of all forms of public participation.

**CHANGING PRESIDENTIAL ORDERS AND VARIATIONS IN PUBLIC PARTICIPATION**

Popular participation in the structures and processes that the ANC-in-power facilitated (or tolerated) varied across the periods of South Africa’s three democratic-era presidencies.\textsuperscript{21} Each of the presidents created structures and processes to elicit or channel public participation. Each of the presidencies had a different style of working with public protest and hegemonic challenges. Differences aside, the three presidencies shared unity of purpose. Throughout the period the ANC was still consolidating power and working as a movement to extend a cadre-anchored hegemonic base. This was the core of ANC community power, with circles of public participation in government processes, extending around it. Cadreship in this early post-liberation period simultaneously became more and more a mixed bag of, on the one hand, those committed and oriented to serving country, people and the ANC, and, on the other hand, cadres that fought for personal power and prestige, mostly with personal beneficiation wrought by direct and indirect access to or control over state power.

Many of the structures and processes that each of the presidents continued or instituted were aimed at offering opportunities for people’s participation in government process-
es, to bring government closer to the people, to inform people of services and initiatives, and let people feel part of the inner workings of government. Mostly, the institutions and processes were intended to advance feedback and buy-in, and regularly also cooptation. All of these actions would help build legitimacy and contribute to power, and would also provide cover in the extended times of uneven social transformation. They were intended to supplement the representative institutions in the three spheres of government. They served to foster direct ANC government-people links, unmediated by electoral processes, in which the ANC took care to project itself as the powerful and caring ‘parent’.

The periodisation demonstrates the changing landscape of public participation. Historically it cuts across the thematically organised section that follows. The periodisation delimits four periods in the evolution of public participation in South Africa, associated with each of the presidencies.

**Early post-1994 Mandela period: From liberation mobilisation to trust in state and government**

Around 1994 South Africa experienced seismic shifts in social and political organisation, which offered ‘macro-windows’, constituting special opportunities to participate and drastically affect both the content and direction of policy, and also impacting on governance. After the period of widespread contestation and mobilisation around policy issues of the 1980s and early 1990s, with the institutionalisation of a democratic government the bulk of participatory initiatives started shifting to the new government. For some time, community participation remained actively mobilised, predominantly focusing on policy formulation and affirmation of the new regime. This articulated with the preceding popular mobilisation.

Throughout this period (and subsequently) the legal and constitutionally sanctioned obligation to include public participation in policy making processes persisted. As the democratic government started formalising policies, popular consultation retained high-priority status. Change was imminent, however, as the democratically elected ANC government and the bulk of its policies became entrenched. The need for sustained activism started receding. Initiatives moved over to public sector hands.

**The Mbeki decade: Structures for co-optation and extended engagement**

From the late 1990s onwards South Africa moved into a complex and demanding space of post-liberation governance and public participation. The period prompted new layers of public participation, which were added to the prevailing complex. Enclaves of consensual civil society mobilisation remained, trust in government largely prevailed, electoral participation continued at high levels – and new government initiatives to elicit public participation in its processes of policy and governance took centre stage.

Two sets of actions characterised the era. First was the structuring of opportunities for consultation and participation – and, in effect, also for co-optation – in line with approaches set down by the Presidency of South Africa. There were co-optive actions related to fields such as business and women. Second was the implementation of extended opportunities designed to engage communities in the system of consultation.
and participation. Both actions stood in the context of government soliciting popular input when it felt it required inputs or acquiescence. In many instances, this took the form of co-optive practices that were designed to direct critiques into the state and thus make them more manageable.

The space for challenges unsolicited by government receded. The policy process stages of implementation and evaluation, which generally prevailed from the turn of the century onwards, also afforded fewer opportunities for popular participation. In the place of the initial high civil society activism came (often) a self-induced decline in civil society participation in policy phases. The era saw a convergence of participatory and governance initiatives. Government’s co-operative governance helped supplement weaknesses in representational mechanisms. It introduced mechanisms through which new opportunities for participation opened, albeit opportunities that were structured and directed from above. The increasingly institutionalised system of public engagement epitomised the Mbeki epoch. The initiatives failed to avert the wave of protests that erupted from late 2004 onwards.

The times of Zuma: From populist mobilisation to fusing party into state

With the transition from Mbeki to Zuma there were hopes that the ANC’s 2009 election campaign and its associated post-Polokwane populist mobilisation had signalled a new openness to popular input into policy and governance. The early Zuma era saw the realisation of fresh listening and quick government responses to pressures and protests, as when it was met with widespread protest within a month of assuming office.

Selective co-optive civil society engagement continued in the Mbeki style, albeit with some new or replacement structures and new civil society voices. As the Zuma administration consolidated, and reports on participation materialised, it became clear that the deepening of participation in the Zuma era substantially comprised entrenchment of the ANC as party-movement in the heart of public participation. The trend started in the Mbeki era, but was nurtured by the dictum of the Zuma era – the majority party is government, and that it has the right to assert itself over all structures because it had won the electoral mandate to be the governing party. Street committees illustrated the fusion of party and state on the level of participation. Ward committees were often ANC structures. To an even greater extent than before government outreach programmes were ANC events. Protest was the fall-back form of engagement with the ANC-in-government – and elections the time of playing party politics.

INCLUSIVE MAPPING OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

Divergent participatory opportunities and interventions were manifested in the period 1994-2011 (Table 1; Figure 1), all in relation not just to trends in the institutionalisation of democracy, governance and public policymaking, but also the degree to which democracy was delivering on social transformation. Cumulatively devised participatory options coexist in South Africa. New modes were added over time. The old had not
been discarded, and were mildly remodelled with the Mbeki-Zuma transition. Some forms of participation are in the liberal-democratic mode. Others suggest direct action and participatory democracy, bringing opportunities that link directly into the state, where the ANC is in control.

It is useful to differentiate between state-ANC sanctioned participation and spontaneous or bottom-up action, including protest. The state-sanctioned opportunities have not necessarily resulted in an overall strengthening of participation – defined as evidence delivered of turnaround in conditions of popular need, or change in the ‘lived reality’. The bulk of the participatory developments were intra-system and collaborative; the minority was adversarial and extra-system (hitherto largely without rejecting the government or the regime). Some of the forms of participation are also violent, and, as some argue, illegal. The chapter does not pursue the illegality dimension, because of the seamless transition from illegal to legal protest, and government’s mostly tolerant attitude towards protest.

The typology in Table 2 highlights the power and strengths wrought by, and weaknesses in, the forms of participation. It excludes forms of public participation that are aimed at accessing institutions and their office-holders for private gain, for example to gain access to tenders, contracts and other business deal (Chapter 13). It also excludes intra-ANC action that impacts government. Variations follow in terms of:

- **Opportunities** for popular participation in the processes of policy and governance in South Africa assumed different forms, depending on the stages of policy processes, electoral cycles, emphases in institutional development, prevailing community-based experiences of social transformation, government responsiveness, and government facilitation (or retraction) of opportunities and structures.

- **Types of participation** vary in terms of what the government hoped to achieve through the introduction, institutionalisation or tolerance of the particular mode. The motivations include constitutional obligation, belief in the deepening of democracy, aspirations to co-opt, institutionalise consultation or channel information to the people.

The development of public participation practice in South Africa opened new structured opportunities, which ranged from co-operative to co-optive. They differ in terms of whether they relate predominantly to citizens in general or whether they are more likely to feed into the ANC-the people bond. The seven modes identified cater for both bottom-up participatory actions (electoral participation, protest) and top-down initiatives (co-optation, co-governance, extended civil society opportunities, citizen engagement with the state; Table 2).

Opportunities for public participation are differentially available to South Africans. In addition, they are not uniformly taken up by citizens where available. Personal, social and cultural as well as political factors affect the degree of realised participation. These include poverty, gender and urbanisation, or cynicism about ‘rewards for the effort of participation’. Furthermore, opportunities to participate in governmental politics are
## TABLE 2: Typology of public participation in South Africa*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode of participation</th>
<th>Illustrations – actions, institutions, organisations</th>
<th>Character</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Participation through elections</td>
<td>Voting for national, provincial and local government; representation by elected public representatives.</td>
<td>Bottom-up – constitutionally guaranteed – democratic foundation, indirect exercise of power.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Participation in the core institutions of democracy, incl. Chapter 9 institutions</td>
<td>Constitutionally established institutions facilitating participation through, for example, public hearings, outreach programmes (e.g. ‘taking parliament to the people’) of national, provincial and local government.</td>
<td>Bottom-up – constitutionally guaranteed – yet with select relevance to citizens.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Co-optive engagement directed from the centre (centre-controlled participation) by designated civil society organisations</td>
<td>Presidency and cabinet clusters for government management engineer opportunities for direct consultation and public engagement in government processes; centre-need-defined consultation with civil society enclaves, often for specific institutional engagement; community policing forums.</td>
<td>Top-down – co-optive engagement, directed from the centre; selective consultation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Government communication as form of engagement (communicative participation)</td>
<td>Dissemination of information by government; coverage of policy and governance by electronic and print mass media; attempted control over mass media; application of movement censure to remain a ‘disciplined force of the left’; redirection of policy and governance dissent to intra-alliance debates and summits.</td>
<td>Top-down – communicative participation / informing; manipulation and control; manufacturing of consensus and consent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Participation in special state-created structures to extend representative institutions (facilitating community access to government)</td>
<td>Ward committees, izimbizo (public participation programme), community development workers, Project Consolidate, Thusong Service Centres and e-government.</td>
<td>Top-down – government design, anchored in consultant input; consultation, co-optation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Protest participation</td>
<td>Protest against ‘service delivery’ and government performance in areas such as housing, local services or in reaction against non-functional representative processes.</td>
<td>Bottom-up – citizen demand for government performance and accountability.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Also see Booysen 2008; 200928
more available in urban than in rural areas (except for participation in aspects of traditional government, which frequently comes with gender bias).

GOVERNMENT-SANCTIONED PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

Participation in government-sanctioned forms, with expressions of support, best help the ANC regenerate power. This section explores four of these forms, while Chapter 6 focuses on electoral participation.

Participation in the core institutions of the political system (elected and specialised)

Democratic South Africa brought a plethora of institutions and processes to establish and entrench the post-1994 culture of electoral, representative democracy. They were anchored in the constitutional state. In the post-foundational period, the Parliament of South Africa, along with provincial and local governments, instituted outreach and participatory programmes. They were aimed at bringing citizens into the fold of electoral and multi-party democracy, and at enhancing popular impact on the processes of policy making and governance. Legislative committees, Chapter 9 institutions, the encouragement of public submissions on legislation and special parliamentary programmes were nurtured to bring the institutions closer to the people. This also helped legitimate the institutions. The People’s Assembly and Youth Parliament were two specific initiatives (although recognised to have been weak). The national and provincial institutions, along with their local government counterparts, gave opportunities for representation and participation in special hearings and local ward activities (see section on ward committees and other local structures). In 2009-11, under the pressure of protest action, both parliamentary and provincial legislature delegations visited communities and either pledged better representation or condemned local authorities for lapses in delivery.

These institutional opportunities simultaneously suffered from a growing ‘responsiveness and connectedness gap’. The deficit clearly emerged in the time of the Mbeki administration, and endured thereafter. The effectiveness of representation, across the three government spheres, bureaucratic shortcomings and either insufficient citizen empowerment or citizen cynicism about the effect of public submissions worked to undermine special participation projects. Citizens were often unable to make full use of formal institutions for participation, since many of the opportunities favoured the type of participation that is possible from specialised NGOs, rather than individual citizens who may live in conditions of poverty and information deprivation. In addition, the ANC’s hegemonic push to position the party over the state saw it (evident on several occasions) manipulating public participation processes to ensure that supportive submissions would be obtained. This included scheduling participatory events in places that would be inaccessible to opposition parties.

There was also concern as to whether Parliament was standing its ground against a powerful executive, and exercising the oversight that would earn it public respect.
irrespective of political concordance or discordance between the two branches. The phenomenon of ‘parliament as lapdog of the executive’ was particularly evident in the Mbeki administration’s heyday. In the inter-presidential transition period of 2008–09, there was far greater vigilance, in particular of Parliament over bureaucrats. This was due to Parliament having swung in favour of the then Zuma faction of the ANC and top bureaucrats still being Mbeki era appointees (Chapter 10). In the Zuma period a hybrid system combined parliamentarians’ effort to exercise greater independence and oversight with continued deference, this time to the new executive. In 2011 ANC parliamentarians were cautioned to ‘go softly’ on their executive, thus not insisting too literally on accountability and unambiguous performance.

People’s beyond-election participation in the core democratic institutions thus comprised multiple opportunities. The projects suffered, however, from suboptimal citizen uptake (also due to cynicism), and manipulation by politicians for party and personal power. Reasons for low citizen engagement included trust in government to do the right thing irrespective of continuous participation or, conversely, insufficient empowerment and facilitation being extended to citizens. Some schemes also lacked credibility because of not having made a sufficient impact over time. ‘Taking parliament to the people’ was a case in point.

**Extension of executive and representative institutions for engagement, with emphasis on the local**

Openings for public participation emerged in the interfaces between citizens and the executive and legislatures, across government spheres and presidential administrations. Manifestations included the Integrated Development Plan (IDP) processes, the ward committee system, community development worker (CDW) initiatives, the izimbizo programme, and the ward committee system.

These projects initiated by the executive hoped to facilitate implementation related participation, assist government in delivery, help legitimate government, and supplement suboptimal representation and delivery. In other instances government hoped to gain popular assumption of co-responsibility in the processes of policy and governance. The conduits were designed to channel expressions of dissatisfaction. The mechanisms had co-optive and co-governance features, while they were also initiated with a view to consultation and communication. On occasion the goal was to share information, simply to inform, yet with the spin-off of making citizens better aware of what their government was doing for them – an act with obvious implications for the regeneration of power. The bulk of these initiatives were in the local sphere. The re-emphasis, from 2007 onwards, on a street committee system, was similarly motivated and had a special bearing on crime.

The **IDP process** at local level (with the Provincial Growth Strategies (PGSs) as the provincial equivalents) featured as a response to the constitutional requirement to involve communities in matters of local government. The associated IDP forums provided a structure for discussion, negotiations and joint decision making; they also monitored policy planning and implementation. Participants were drawn from members of council executive committees, councillors, traditional leaders, ward committee
representatives, heads of departments, senior officials from government departments, representatives from organised stakeholder groups, activists, resource people or advisors, and community representatives. IDP processes nevertheless performed poorly in terms of engaging with the people. Zue"{e}rn sees this failure in the context of top-down autocratic processes having eclipsed attention to mechanisms for bottom-up grassroots participation. She observes that these political spaces should have allowed for increased participation by civic organisations. Instead, the spaces were often occupied by ANC actors, thus limiting space for popular criticism.

The ward committee system was introduced to help build an interface between local government and communities, partly in the place of, and otherwise to supplement, the frequently dysfunctional mechanism of local representation as it was manifested from the late Mandela period onwards. It was to ‘provide community members the opportunity to express their needs, their opinions on issues that affect their lives and to have them heard at municipal level via the ward councillor’ and help ensure community familiarity with government projects. Ward committees were pitched as forming the basic units for participatory and democratic local government. By 2008-09, and continuing through to 2011, ward committee establishment was at a high level, yet effective operation remained low. In 2008 the then Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG; later renamed Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (Cogta)) noted the need to hold ward committees to account. Putu pointed to the imperative of capacity building and ward committees assuming ownership of projects, yet cautioned that this would expose the committees to further clashes with councillors. The DPLG recognised the need to provide support to ward committees, possibly through CDWs.

In 2009 and with the advent of a new wave of stronger community protests, the ward committees were being positioned afresh as the answer to help keep local government to account. At the same time, however, the Cogta *State of local government report* confirmed that ‘functionality remains a challenge’. This went along with the fact that 3,790 ward committees were by then reported to have been established in a total of 3,895 possible wards in South Africa. The same report referred to the ‘breakdown of local democracy’ and introduced a ‘Turn-around strategy: some diagnostic approaches’, after which each of South Africa’s municipalities was required to produce its own turnaround strategy for better service delivery in 2010. One of the solutions suggested by the minister at the time was for the ward committees to set up subcommittees to address specific issues. Even the SACP latched onto the idea of strengthening the ward committees with general secretary Blade Nzimande envisaging that ‘it will deepen community participation and ensure greater legitimacy’.

There was ample additional literature on the partisan nature of the ward committees. Reports abounded that ward committees were effectively monopolised by ANC representatives and supporters. It became another of the mechanisms that fused party and state operations. The committees were not equally accommodating of all community participants, being regarded as the stomping ground of in-groups with the local ANC. These in-groups also used their access to, and control over, information to ensure their
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The government’s ‘Public participation programme’, known up to the early part of 2010 as the ‘Izimbizo programme’ institutionalised direct interaction between communities and the executive, whilst also engaging elected representatives and officials. At first it was a presidential programme, but later became a generalised government participatory initiative, with events across sectors and spheres. Hartslief links the origins of the izimbizo programme to Mbeki’s 1997 reflection on the role of civil society in politics in South Africa. She identifies 18 functions that could be fulfilled by izimbizo, ranging from deliberative policy making and feedback on policy implementation to nation building and legitimation of African knowledge systems. The izimbizo programme unfolded in three phases: 2001-05: interactions in each province, with the whole of the political executive interacting with communities; 2005-06: municipal izimbizo, motivated by the issues that emerged from the first phase; and 2008-10: a shift of focus to building partnerships to address poverty and implement government action plans, with more sector-specific izimbizo.

The GCIS positioned 2009 and 2010 public participation weeks as continuations of what government had been doing since 2000. Government anticipated using the period of ‘heightened communication to outline visible and tangible government programmes available for communities to access’. The emphasis was on ‘reasserting communities as co-creators of solutions with the support of government’. The GCIS stated:

Public participation remains central to governance as it brings government closer to the people. This uniquely South African platform has over the years assisted communities to raise issues and share their views. This communication platform is part of the varied methods that government uses to better understand the needs of the people.

The programme tried to improve lines of accountability from both elected representatives and officialdom to communities, especially in as far as national and provincial executive members often participated (were required to participate) in the events. The format closely resembled that followed in the ANC’s 1999 ‘listening election campaign’. It also built on similar campaigns elsewhere in Africa. Mabelebele argues that, while at face value government presents izimbizo as a communication and governance model to deepen participatory democracy and public participation, especially for the poor, the government appeared to be using izimbizo to entrench the ANC’s ideological positions amongst the masses. In cases of bureaucratic bottlenecks, senior administrators were instructed to intervene, with follow-up conducted by the Presidency. The public’s early assessment of the initiative was welcoming. The izimbizo were seen as evidence of an executive that wished to engage and receive feedback about the issues of policy and governance. To an extent, the izimbizo pushed elected representatives and bureaucrats into action. In the positive version of government assessments, it was a
A two-way communication process that helped conscientise government members about communities’ frustrations and suffering. As Chabane asserted:

... the Izimbizo programme remains a unique approach to ensure that our messages reach the public unpolluted. It is one platform, among many, that we will continue to use. Research has shown that direct interaction with communities is seen as most valuable by citizens. The GCIS will make sure that Izimbizo platforms are used creatively as part of government’s participatory democracy platforms to build and strengthen strategic sectoral and general community partnerships.

Government’s less rosy assessments emerged when the Zuma administration tried to differentiate itself. It said that the izimbizo ‘engagements had deteriorated into platforms for continuous complaints by citizens’, that issues ‘were seldom adequately addressed or fed back to citizens’ and that the programme ‘was fraught with challenges in terms of effective intergovernmental coordination and alignment’. The concentrated focus of the outreach events to highlight government programmes and achievements, however, was welcomed. Outsiders often noted the party-political character of izimbizo. They were seen to resemble political rallies or ‘ANC party events’.

The South African government describes Project Consolidate as ‘a hands-on support and engagement programme, focusing on targeted municipalities’. It added to government’s engagements with communities directly, and indirectly through strengthening local capacity. It was launched in 2004, persisted as a separate programme until 2006 and subsequently was mainstreamed into local government in South Africa, as part of the ‘Five year strategic local government agenda, 2006-2011’. By August 2008, a total of 1,134 experts had been deployed to 268 of South Africa’s 283 municipalities, and these included 105 of the Project Consolidate municipalities. The experts provided technical assistance in, for example, engineering, finance, town planning, project management and human resource development.

By 2009 it had been recognised that the project was not delivering as anticipated – and that the problem of local government effectiveness was beyond the scope of Project Consolidate and its successor programmes. The Zuma administration launched a general survey of governance problems in all municipalities. Cogta confirmed, ‘these interventions [of Project Consolidate] have ... not been able to sufficiently address deep rooted problems and capacity challenges’. Instead, local governments were to be merged where especially small municipalities lacked the capacity to offer the palette of municipal services required from local government.

The presidential ‘hotline’ was instituted in 2009 by Zuma, following campaign and other promises, as an initiative to make government more accountable to the people – or to ensure that grievances do not migrate into opposition party support. The purpose was to encourage an all-round improvement in citizen care and liaison, improving citizen access: ‘to introduce a culture of putting the citizen first in all government departments as well as municipalities’ and ‘to create an interactive, accessible and responsive government’.
The scale of public response confirmed the need for the service. The hotline received 7,261 calls from 09:00 to 12:00 on its first morning in operation (and around 312,000 in its first month). The calls were handled by 21 hotline and public liaison staff in the Presidency, backed by 50 call centre agents at the State Information Technology Agency (Sita) and 43 public liaison officers of the premiers and 34 national departments. They were responsible for follow-up. The first-line support agents took the calls in 11 official languages, logged what they could and directed the queries to the public liaison offices in the Presidency, national departments and provinces. The average time taken to capture information for a call was between 15 and 20 minutes. In early 2010 the management of the hotline was transferred to the Performance Monitoring, Evaluation and Administration Ministry in the Presidency. Citizens were encouraged to provide detailed information to ensure effective investigation and follow-up. The calls commonly concerned complaints and cries for help. The issues at stake were housing, access to water and electricity, unemployment and requests for help in finding jobs and overturning dismissals, reporting corruption, access to grants, special pensions, identification documents (IDs), or corruption in the social grant system.

Post-launch, the euphoria receded. A month after the launch, the Presidency urged the public to exhaust other means of resolving complaints first before contacting the hotline. The presidential hotline was to be the last resort – when the public gets no joy at municipal, provincial or national departmental levels, ‘then they can escalate the matter to the presidential hotline’. Zuma stressed the introduction of a government culture of taking people seriously and helping them … and emphasised that government-wide, call centres needed to be sharpened in order to relieve pressure on the presidential hotline. Monitoring by the DA highlighted problems with the operation of the presidential hotline initiative, including that it:

- merely referred complaints to the relevant government department, ‘usually the source of the original problem’;
- had no power to enforce deadlines or sanctions on particular departments;
- sometimes claimed that reported problems had been resolved when this was not the case; and that
- registering complaints was a time-consuming and tedious process, something that an ordinary and perhaps poor citizen might not be able to do.

Information is scarce as to the exact performance levels of the presidential hotline, but a report on the national anti-corruption hotline (NACH) gives an indication. The Public Service Commission (PSC), in its 2010 report, observed that there has been no feedback on what has happened in 64 out of each 100 corruption cases that the public has reported to the national anti-corruption hotline. In 2008–09 there were 1,857 reports, and in 2009-10, 1,430. On the other 36 cases out of the hundred there had been feedback (but not necessarily reports on progress in investigations, convictions, etc.). By 2011, the situation remained effectively unchanged. According to the PSC:
The assessment established that there is a slow rate of feedback with respect to the cases being investigated. Of the 7,766 cases reported through the NACH and referred to departments since September 2004 to 31 June 2010, feedback was received on only 2,811 (36%) of them. This basically means that in 4,955 (63%) cases referred to departments and public bodies by the PSC, the responsible whistleblowers have no idea what progress (if any) is being made with their investigation. The PSC continues to be concerned that such a trend runs the risk of compromising the integrity of the NACH and diminishing public confidence in the government’s commitment towards fighting fraud and corruption.

The presidential hotline appeared to have been given another lease on life when it featured page-long in the July 2011 Vuk’uzenzele – handling complaints and responses. It pictured Zuma answering calls at the hotline call centre.80

The community development worker (CDW) programme, which also aims to supplement representational mechanisms and help citizens gain access to government services, was largely a product of the 2000s, but gained new urgency in the early economic-crisis days of the Zuma administration. It started in 2003 with the idea that there should be an echelon of multi-skilled ‘participatory change agents’ who would help government maintain direct community contact.81 The CDWs were envisaged to handle coordination and integration of services in the local domain, in line with cabinet cluster actions on national level.82 It was suggested, that the CDWs would help address the skills shortage in local government. However, ‘confusion existed as to their precise role and relationship to local role players’.83 A frequent complaint was that they acted as if they were a law unto themselves. This was despite the fact that in 2007 the CDWs’ host department, the then DPLG, reported on largely positive impressions, of government officials, along with ward councillors and ward committee members of CDW work.84

By 2008, the intention that the CDW initiative would bridge communication gaps was failing. Several thousand CDWs had been deployed whilst stocktaking indicated that roles and cooperative relationships with councillors and ward committees were deficient.85 In the days of the Zuma administration the CDW project, although poorly defined in terms of the specific functions to be undertaken, was being pulled in to help provide 60,000 out of the 500,000 job opportunities that Zuma spoke about in his first state of the nation address.86 The provinces, for example, were putting forward budgets, whilst how to operationalise them and performance standards remained opaque.87

The process of local government review of 2009 supported the retention of CDWs. The tense relationship between CDWs, councillors and ward committees featured in the review. The fact that CDWs were remunerated and were seen to be usurping functions of other local agents in contested local spaces made them unpopular. Gray and Mubangizi argue that given the institutional confusion within which CDWs operate, combined with the harsh practical realities in South Africa, CDW successes seemed most unlikely.88 On the positive side, the report stressed their impact on, for example, access to IDs, old age grants, delivery of food parcels and education of communities in their rights.89 CDWs were increasingly being linked to the Thusong Service Centres
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(TSCs; below), helping to bridge the gap between departments and community services. By 2010 government was deliberating on a CDW policy. The final policy document was expected in December 2010 and awaited in September 2011.

The plethora of government initiatives to build participation-intensive community-government interfaces and supplement for failures of elected representation formed a layer of engagement that extended the reach of the ANC-in-government. Projects such as Project Consolidate, the presidential hotline, ward committees and the izimbizo outreach programme helped complete a world in which the ANC directly related to the people. The initiatives were efforts to improve government, learn about problems, and help get popular buy-in to the ANC government’s ongoing efforts to correct shortcomings. De facto, it also brought the ANC a near-monopolisation of these engagement spaces. To a certain extent at the time they minimised opposition parties’ scope to capture spaces left in the wake of dissatisfaction with ANC governance. Yet, the initiatives all suffered crucial deficits and thus failed to leverage the full potential of direct popular power for the ANC. The Zuma administration’s conclusion to the investigation of what had gone wrong at the interface of local government and the much-vaunted public participation programme, identified six factors. These were equally applicable to the wider range of initiatives:

- lack of commitment by some municipal leadership to genuine public participation;
- lack of trust between municipalities and communities due to realised promises and perceptions that provision of services depended on political allegiances;
- limited investment by municipalities in public participation strategies, structures and processes such as ward committees, IDP and budgeting processes, communication systems and complaint management systems;
- weak civil society organs at local level that fail to engage effectively with municipalities;
- largely dysfunctional ward committees that are unable to call councils to account, do not involve communities in decisions about service delivery, and fail to get their reports onto local council agendas; and
- ward councillors that are unable to communicate effectively and consistently with communities, despite well-developed policy and legislative frameworks.

Co-optive and cooperative civil society participation, including co-governance

In the Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma periods citizens in general and civil society organisations in particular were often co-opted into participatory practices directed from the Presidency. These practices delivered cooperative and co-optive (in some areas partly corporative) governance. The period built on emphases on greater community involvement, in the idiom of shared responsibility. The Zuma-led ANC extended community-government co-responsibility for governance. It revised and replaced some of the specific structures, in particular the presidential advisory councils (Chapter 12).

Several policy structures and processes directed by the presidency impacted directly on public participation. First, in the period 1994-99 the offices of the president and the
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department president performed central directing and coordinating functions, with policy functions anchored in the office of the deputy president. From 1999-2008 the integrated office of the Presidency assumed these functions. In the Mbeki era the Policy Coordination and Advisory Services (PCAS) structures in the Office of the Presidency were added to monitor progress in delivery. The initiatives did not exclude civil society participation, although the inputs were institutionally contextualised and screened. This engendered formalised, commissioned civil society engagements, rather than spontaneous, unfiltered approaches. The ‘consultative public engagement’ orientation was demonstrated in Mbeki’s President’s Coordinating Council (PCC; to bring premiers into the central policy loop) and the cabinet office that was created for each of the six cabinet cluster committees to ensure policy coordination. In the Zuma administration the President’s Coordinating Forum (PCF) substituted for the PCC. The National Planning Commission (NPC) incorporated what was described as 20 ‘top-thinkers or opinion-makers from civil society’ to help facilitate comprehensive long-term planning in government.

Contrasted with good intentions, there were chasms between the ideal, documented procedures and the participatory manifestations. Under Mbeki, the Presidency’s operations became bureaucratised, often suggesting a world insulated from day-to-day popular participatory practices. The powerful special presidential advisers (some with civil society links) and the Forum of South African Directors-General (Fosad) linked with the cabinet committee clusters to streamline policy management and implementation, in a world far removed from direct popular engagement and the izimbizo repertoire. Mbeki’s presidential working groups were essential spokes in the wheel of that era’s approach to civil society involvement. The presidential working group on women was a specific case in point. Enlisting civil society women’s organisations and women in unions and business, participants believed it had made a difference in bringing in new policies and seeing them through to implementation. Under Zuma, women were given a ministry instead, shared with the portfolios of children and people with disabilities. There were problems with ‘participatory manifestations’ when ministers sequentially, albeit with some improvement, struggled to enable the department to tangibly realise changes in women’s standing in society.

Business organisations across the eras of the three presidencies of democratic South Africa were co-opted into high-profile participatory forums. Under Mandela the so-called Brenthurst group was a vehicle for business participation. As deputy president, Mbeki at the time had a council of advisers that met monthly with him. In his presidential term Mbeki regularly consulted with big business and black business working groups. From early 2000 until his 2008 exit, Mbeki placed high currency on his International Investment Council, including highly ranked international business people. In the early Zuma period business alignment was at first informal and with individuals, rather than institutionalised. Upon settling in, he announced the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) Council of 19 members. It was tasked with advising the government on black economic empowerment, draft codes of good practice and transformation charters, and reviewing progress in achieving empowerment. Cabinet, Cosatu, black business, black professional associations in law and accounting, the South African National Civics Organisation (Sanco), business in
general and a few academics constituted the council. Zuma was less proactive than Mbeki in advancing this line of engagement. He focused more on person-to-person and ANC business engagements than on constructing state-institutional bodies in the South African government. For example, the ANC’s Progressive Business Forum (in existence since 2006) undertook high profile international business visits, exploring business opportunities with, for example, the governments of Mauritius and China. The visits were controversial, raising suspicions of the ANC business body selling influence with ANC government leaders to business people joining it.

**Government and ANC communication as citizen engagement**

The operations of the **Government Communication and Information System (GCIS)** have been pivotal to communication between government and citizens. Across spheres all government departments have public participation programmes, and there are many public sector hotline numbers out there, but GCIS has a central role. The GCIS approach includes promoting awareness of the opportunities that democracy has brought, and how to access them.

The one-stop **Thusong Service Centres (TSCs)** were introduced in 1999 as multi-purpose service centres. They were originated to enhance South Africans’ access to government services, especially in townships and the poor rural areas. Typically they include the departments of home affairs, labour, social development, health, and the GCIS, the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA), along with telecentres, the South African Post Office, libraries, agricultural extension offices, municipal services and community development workers. The Thusong Service Centres and the **Batho pele**, Gateway e-Government projects were initiatives aimed at enabling citizens to tap into government policy information, thereby making services more accessible. Part of the CDW brief was to work in conjunction with the Thusong initiative to help bring services to people. By January 2011, there were 158 Thusong centres country-wide, having grown by about 20 in the preceding two years.

The Thusong centres, however, remained only partially operational. The access they brought differed geographically, with many South Africans continuously outside the loop. In addition, services were often poorly scheduled and government departments worked in silos in their Thusong operations.

These formalised initiatives for disseminating information on, and providing access to, government services still left the ANC frustrated. The ANC leaders felt that the people were too dependent on the commercial press, which the ANC felt was acting like opposition parties, often focussing on exposés and government lapses. The ANC-in-government hence increasingly extended its communication operations into the domain of **conventional media operations**. In the 2011 words of government spokesperson Jimmy Manyi: ‘The commercial media is censoring a lot of government information. Niyasivusa ukuba sizenzele (You are waking us up to do things ourselves).’ Manyi announced that government’s bi-monthly publication, **Vuk’uzenzele**, would be turned into a monthly newspaper with a print run of close to two million from 2011, and would become a fortnightly newspaper in 2012. The tabloid’s first edition, featuring President
Zuma on the front page and lining up cabinet members inside, commenced in July 2011. It was intended also to carry a monthly supplement, ‘Employment News’, with updates on government initiatives and advertisements on opportunities.\textsuperscript{115}

This initiative supplemented the late 2010 launch of the pro-government newspaper \textit{The New Age}. In its launch edition in December 2010, the editor of \textit{The New Age} promised to ‘support the government of the day, at all levels’. It denied holding a brief for any political party. The prosperous Gupta clan – a family from India that rose to fame on Zuma-ANC coattails, although with financial operations that preceded the Zuma era – owned the paper. They were close to Zuma and had a network of cross-cutting financial links to the Zuma family and others in high government positions. The ANC was divided over the Gupta influence, as evidenced in criticisms by the ANCYL, and the Umkhonto we Sizwe Military Veterans’ Association (MKMVA) rushing to Zuma’s defence – lines of division that were suggested to be informed by benefactor status.\textsuperscript{116}

Across presidencies the ANC has in effect intimidated non-ANC actors to play the ANC game. In the Mbeki days Anglo American’s Tony Trahar was pounded for saying that South Africa faced ‘political risk’. One of the major South African banks withdrew an anti-crime campaign due to the ‘fear that government has instilled in many corporate executives’.\textsuperscript{117} There are equally pressures for silence around many other ANC and ANC dynasty financial operations. Up to at least August 2011 Zuma refrained from speaking out on questions of his own, the ANCYL leadership, or other senior ANC functionaries’ business deals, which were exposed like clockwork in the privately owned media.

The ‘ANC media’ initiatives came in a period when the ANC government was threatening the media with the introduction of a \textit{media tribunal}. The tribunal idea worked as a threat to get the commercial media to be more responsible, exercising more self-censorship when it came to critiques of the ANC and ANC-in-government. The ANC was continuously irritated by the commercial press’s focus on ANC internal matters. Nkenke Kekana, an ANC Gauteng branch spokesman and former chairman of Parliament’s communications portfolio committee, observed that the tribunal had been a ‘suggestion’: ‘We will give self-regulation a chance and look at co-regulation before a tribunal.’\textsuperscript{118}

In related operations the ANC was at first going to push through the Protection of State Information Bill in 2011. It included severe penalties for anyone, including journalists, found in possession of (loosely defined as in the national interest) classified information. It took pressure from post-patronage ANC leaders such as former intelligence minister, Ronnie Kasrils, before the ANC agreed in mid-2011 to limit the bill’s provisions. The ad hoc parliamentary committee adopted the Bill and opponents failed to secure public interest defence for investigative journalists and whistle-blowers. In September 2011 the Bill was awaiting Parliament’s approval when ANC NEC objections triggered the ‘reopening of consultation processes’. The NEC argued that it should have had the chance to scrutinise the Bill before it goes to Parliament. Some NEC members stressed that the Bill could be used in ANC factional warfare.\textsuperscript{119}

Given the ANC’s near-hegemonic presence in South Africa, ANC measures to \textit{contain intra-ANC and intra-Alliance dissent} had direct relevance for public
participation and the ANC government’s engagement with citizens. The ANC demands that ANC cadres should live as part of the ANC as a ‘disciplined movement of the left’ that resolves problems internally. ANC actions contain these expressions, directing them internally through ANC conduits. ANC words delegitimise both internal dissent, and external debate, on policy issues among others. These actions and words extend beyond the widely accepted principle of all accepting a policy position or organisational ruling once it has become the official ANC position. This means that debate by leading names with much future leadership potential may not see the light of day – and when these persons achieve leadership positions one of their major foci needs to be the containment of the broad-church dissent to safeguard their own leadership positions. The ANC’s assertion that there is only one centre of power in the Alliance, the ANC, and the fusion between state and party (as for example in ward committees, and the provincial executive committees (PECs), and the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the ANC ruling over cabinet and provincial executives) mean that ANC ‘internal discipline’ directly impacted public participation.

The ANC in the times of Zuma also set out to bring to heel state institutions that were not consensually aligned to the ANC heart of the state. Sefara notes the succession of actions in killing off the Scorpions in the wake of Polokwane, against the relatively independent Deputy Chief Justice Dikgang Moseneke, against prosecutors and in lessening the independence of the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), and the threat of the media tribunal.

These details testify to a party-policy-governance machine that catered for civil society participation, albeit in a highly planned and structured manner. The unfolding participatory processes have shown that it was largely in the aftermath of unsolicited participation, such as that which emanated from protest action, that government became more inclined to effect policy changes.

UN SOLICITED, SPONTANEOUS AND PROTEST PARTICIPATION

Not all public participation processes were consensual or amenable to de facto co-optation into South Africa’s governance processes. Many were antagonistic and counter-hegemonic, or, occasionally autonomous but collaborative. The organised civil society mode of participation is differentiated from the protest category (Chapter 4) by virtue of its organised character, whether through intra- or extra-system organisation. It concerns civil society as defined in terms of non-governmental organisations, interest groups and social movements. These organisations use either conventional advocacy channels or operate, for example, through organised, social movement-driven protest. Social movement action relates to community protest action. However, social movements do not organise all community protests, hence the distinct categorisations.

Organised civil society participation in advocacy and hegemonic challenge

In the early phases of post-1994 democracy, citizen public participation was manifested
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Examples of the 1990s included ANC policy forums and NGOs individually or as the South African National NGO Coalition (Sangoco). By the turn of the century there was a widespread perception among NGOs and progressive trade unions that opportunities for participation were in decline. This was due to the absence of regular, meaningful consultative engagements between government, labour and civil society, including Cosatu and Sangoco.

In the latter part of the 1990s a range of civil society organisations, especially in the form of community-based organisations and their umbrella parent organisations, ceased being effective actors in explicitly influencing public policy. Community-based and nationally organised, politically oriented organisations, such as the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the subsequent Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) in the 1980s and early 1990s, had fallen away by the mid-1990s. They had elected to be subsumed into the ANC, recognising the ANC as the parent body. The argument at the time was that the unbanning of the ANC obviated the need for an autonomously organised civil movement. By early 2001 initiatives had been launched to try to reinvigorate civil society participation. At this time the South African National Civics Organisation (Sanco), an umbrella type organisation, promised to re-enter the political scene. The resumption of an active and goal-oriented role would help resurrect Sanco and its affiliates as a powerful cluster of policy actors. According to then Sanco president Mlungisi Hlongwane, ‘[b]eing in partnership with the ANC does not mean we have to become conduits of government. We must constructively criticise government’. This initiative failed and a paucity of organised civil society initiatives prevailed. This was at a time when civil society had become more corporatively involved with government.

By the time of the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) a loosely aligned civil society movement that included the Anti-Privatisation Forum (APF) and the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee (SECC) had started cooperating to realise goals of counter-hegemonic challenge. They hoped to change policy through contra-positioning, rather than consultation. In time, these initiatives started fading. Also intensely critical of government, the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) had a dedicated HIV/AIDS health sector focus. The TAC is predominantly a grassroots association that works to achieve effective access to certain drugs by HIV-infected people. It challenged the state to get policy change. Once successful, it cooperated with the state to implement policy.

In the Zuma period Cosatu increasingly fine-tuned a new dual role as ‘internal opposition’ within the Tripartite Alliance, remaining electorally loyal to the ANC. General secretary Zwelinzima Vavi was outspoken about the predator state over which the ANC was presiding, and the ANC’s multiple blind spots concerning poverty, unemployment and inequality. In late 2010 Cosatu convened a civil society conference in which the main focus was the failure of the ANC to address expectations on socio-economic transformation. The ANC condemned the initiative, whilst Cosatu assured the ANC of its loyalty and readiness to campaign for the ANC in the 2011
local government elections. This loyalty was supported by the conference reserving participation for a circle of civil society organisations with proven sympathies for the ANC. Come 2011 and with a view to 2012 succession Cosatu was playing a delicate game of balancing internal opposition and building succession alliances.

South Africa’s more protest-directed era of civil society mobilisation originated in the mid-1990s but only found its feet from late 2004 onwards. It brought regular cooperation between national and predominantly left-leaning civil society organisations and multiple community-based organisations. This grouping of counter-hegemonic agencies constituted the heart of social movements in South Africa. The Landless People’s Movement (LPM), founded in 2001, worked with the National Land Committee (NLC) on land reform. Together with the APF, the LPM was quoted as being most active in bringing cases to the attention of the Freedom of Expression Institute (FXI). On the informal housing front, there are the South African Shack Dwellers’ Organisation (SASDO) and Abahlali baseMjondolo, launched in 2005. It boycotted the 2006 and 2011 local government elections with the slogan, ‘No land, no house, no vote’. It seeks to impact on housing and service delivery issues such as electricity and water, and also promotes education. Hence, this organisation is active both in terms of protest and constructive bottom-up participation within communities. The APF remained one of the most vocal and consistently campaigning civil forces. It often acted in association with community groups and was also instrumental in some service delivery protests. Its partners included the Education Rights Project, the Coalition Against Xenophobia, Abahlali baseMjondolo, Amanzi Ngawethu (Water is Ours), the LPM, War on Want (fighting global poverty), and the Alexandra based Vukuzenzele Crisis Committee.

Various national, regional and other international organisations participate and extend civil voices in the process of policymaking and policy and programme implementation. Support for policy development takes the form of research undertaken on behalf of government departments. As one of many examples, in the late 1990s, the United States NGO, the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), offered research to the then Department of Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development on community attitudes to traditional leadership. In 2007-08 the Konrad Adenhauer Stiftung (KAS) made a contribution to the government’s ‘Towards 15 years of democracy …’ project.

Various South African research institutions, think tanks and NGOs contribute in the domain of civil society participation in governance and policy, many of them with the specific encouragement of government. These include, in various capacities, variable over time and not necessarily with guaranteed effect, the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), the University of Cape Town (UCT) Development Policy Research Unit, the Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD), the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS), the Community Agency for Social Enquiry (CASE), the Institute for Strategic Studies (ISS), and a wide range of individuals in academic research, applied research and particularly consultants. The field includes survey companies, such as TNS Research Surveys and Ipsos-Markinor, which have conducted public opinion polling in
cooperation with government agencies and the ANC over an extended period. These institutions are largely in consensual relationships with government. Others, such as the activist Centre for Civil Society (CSS) at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, and the conservative-liberal South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR) are in more contestational roles vis-à-vis government.

The demand for, and forms of, required and granted citizen participation in the processes of policy and governance thus varied from adversarial to co-optive, both boosting and undermining the power of the ANC in government. Adversarial civil society action contrasted with mechanisms ‘granted’ or institutionalised by government, and which resulted in more cooperative and consensual relations. The latter were often critical of government actions, yet were hardly counter-hegemonic.

**Mass media and de facto opposition**

The direct and active engagement of privately owned mass media in South Africa in the debates on policy and governance often demonstrates the media’s continuous participation in civic and government matters. Hobsbawn describes the media as a crucial engine through which citizens exercise control over the actions of government between elections. Both media coverage and editorials are often condemned by the ANC information and propaganda apparatuses. The ANC’s manufacturing of consensus and consent is the other side of the coin of public participation and encouragement to engage with government to express needs and assessments. The ANC is occasionally irritated by Alliance member Cosatu expressing public critiques (in ‘oppositional’ ways) and other public ANC squabbles on which the media focus. The ANC’s Mantashe accused the media of hatred of the ANC and hoping to ‘starve the ANC of its resources until it dies’ for their reporting on the ANC’s financial dealings through Chancellor House which won substantial contracts to supply Eskom.

This is in a context where media inputs are frequently responsible for policy amendments, government reassurances, and reviews of public actions. The media furthermore afford generous space to ANC debates on policy and governance. Much of this has reinforced its role as public watchdog. Space obviously also goes to the opposition – and to the media’s own assessments of the ANC and ANC-in-government. The media in South Africa frequently play the role that a ‘good opposition party’ might be playing. They often set the agenda and generate consciousness of what happens and what does not in the ANC and in government. Their critical thrusts often articulate with those of opposition parties – and this frequently alerts opposition parties to emerging issues. On the other hand, the media play a large role in disseminating ANC and (largely ANC) government messages, propaganda, events, etc. – albeit often counter-posed by more critical assessments. In the Zuma era the ANC became increasingly intolerant of the media acting as a conduit for critical coverage exposing malpractices. Coverage of Polokwane 2007 and the fact that Zuma was hounded by the media exacerbated the ANC’s irritation with the media. The perspective on ‘the media as opposition’ thus articulates with the frequent ANC criticism that ‘the media are the main opposition’.137
CONCLUSION

The institutionalisation of public participation in democratic South Africa largely derives from ANC government-driven initiatives, and has greatly contributed to the construction and regeneration of ANC power, both as party-movement and governing party. It has helped the ANC to be seen to be doing justice to the founding ideals that are embodied in the Freedom Charter and the Constitution of South Africa. It has also assisted the ANC in bridging the divide between serving the people whilst pursuing the fruits of high office.

Popular participation in the politics of South Africa often confirmed the legitimacy of the political order. High levels of electoral participation were benchmarks of the acceptance of the system, whilst high support levels for the governing party further confirmed acceptance. Even when participation became more adversarial, such as in protest, the ANC retained a substantial reservoir of consensual, co-optive participation.

The chapter assessed the ‘world’ of participatory options in South Africa between the relative extremes of protest and voting, ranging from constitutional and legislative imperatives, to co-option, compulsion and voluntary activities. Some government-created participatory opportunities were genuine, with the ANC-in-government engaging citizens so that government could learn from them and improve the quality of democracy. Others were toy telephones or paper tigers. The openings for officially sanctioned public participation often fit the description of co-optation and pacification of critical voices.

The ANC in government recognised the power that public participation bestows on government action, hence the large emphasis on co-optive forms of public participation, both in the times of Mbeki and Zuma. In the Zuma times there was an increased emphasis on the fusion of state and party in public participation. In both eras public participation was not just a constitutional imperative and government’s well-intentioned democratic platform for continuous engagement with the people. It was equally the ANC government’s way of co-opting both elites and ‘ordinary’ people into governance projects and ensure the minimisation and delegitimation of public protest, or other forms of expressed resentment. ‘Participation’ amounted to far more than listening to people’s voices. It became a pervasive project to manufacture consensus and co-optive consent. It accordingly built, sustained and helped regenerate ANC power.

NOTES

2 Parts of this chapter link to the author’s analysis in Susan Booysen, 2009, ‘Public participation in democratic South Africa: from popular mobilisation to structured co-option and protest’, Politeia, 28:1, pp. 1-27, and Susan Booysen, 2008, ‘Review of South Africa’s fifteen years of
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3 For Eric Hobsbawm, 2007, *Globalisation, democracy and terrorism*, London, Little Brown, pp. 96, 99, democracy refers to a constitutional state offering to guarantee the rule of law and various civil and political rights and freedoms; and that the state will be governed by authorities that ‘must include representative assemblies, elected by universal suffrage and numerical majorities of all citizens, in elections held at regular intervals between competing candidates and/or organisations’.


7 In much of the past decade, management and initiatives – both top-down and bottom-up – have centred on how to fill the gaps and stop the deficits, how to achieve what has not been forthcoming through the combination of political representation and bureaucratic action.

8 ‘Public participation’ in this chapter equates ‘public’ with citizens participating in individual, interest group, social movement or community contexts in relation to affairs that are of public interest, probably conducted with a view to get government action on issues of concern.


16 Susan Booysen, 2001, op. cit.

17 Buccus et al., 2007, op. cit.; also Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG), 2007, ‘Draft National Policy Framework for Public Participation, Public Participation and

18. See, for example, Chris Tapscott, 2006, The challenges of deepening democracy in post-apartheid South Africa, Paper delivered at the LORC seminar, Ryukoku University, 7 July, Kyoto.


21. Subsequent chapters in this book explore the details of the ANC in electoral and campaign engagement with the people-as-supporters and people of South Africa in general (see Chapter 6) and people’s engagement with the ANC, and ANC in government, through protest action (see Chapter 4).


23. Several public participation typologies exist and were considered in the development of the typology for this chapter. See DPLG, 2007, op. cit., p. 2; Hein Marais et al., 2007, op. cit. They use, for example, the motivations for and potential effects of public participation as the organising criterion.


26. There have been protest-linked arrests, but generally charges are withdrawn after some time – if not in response to community threat of further protest should charges not be withdrawn.


33. See, for example, Kowthar Solomons, ‘MECs promise to roll up their sleeves’, Cape Argus, 11 November 2009, p.3. In Gauteng, then ANC chief whip Mathole Motshela said that most of the resident demands were reasonable: ‘As you can see, projects are unfinished here [in Orange Farm] and there’s sewage in the street. More political oversight is needed to ensure that people given government contracts are completing them’; see Lebogang Seale, 2010, ‘Orange Farm protest disrupts schooling’, The Star, 3 March 2010, p. 2.


36 Interview (on condition of anonymity), ANC member of parliament, Johannesburg, 26 September 2010.


38 Gwede Mantashe, for example, challenged ANC MPs to ask parliamentary questions that would help ANC deployees to perform better – instead of ‘sweetheart’ questions. See ‘ANC wants drastic changes in the way party candidates are selected’, Saturday Star, 23 January 2010, p. 2.


40 The CDW system is designed to bring government closer to the people and ensure that ‘community members become directly involved in the delivery of state services. CDWs have primarily helped citizens to gain access to social services and have increasingly provided support to citizens in taking up economic opportunities’, see GCIS, South Africa Yearbook 2008/09, Pretoria, p. 296.

41 Imbizo is described by the government as ‘a forum for enhancing dialogue and interaction between government and the people. It provides an opportunity for government to communicate its Programme of Action and the progress being made. It promotes participation of the public in the programme to improve their lives’; see GCIS, South Africa Yearbook 2008/09, Pretoria, p. 288.

42 See Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG) with Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), 2007, National Community Development Worker Evaluation, Pretoria.


45 Zuern, 2002, op. cit.

46 In terms of the Local Government Municipal Structures Act, No. 117 of 1998, the functions of ward committee include to ‘prepare, implement and review integrated Development Plans (IDPs); establish, implement and reviews municipalities’ performance-management systems; monitor and review municipalities’ performances; prepare municipalities’ budgets; participate in decisions about the provision of municipal services; communicate and disseminate information on governance matters’ – see GCIS, South Africa Yearbook 2008/09, Pretoria, p. 289.


48 Ibid.


50 DPLG, 2007, op. cit.


64 Thabo Mbeki, 2005, State of the Nation address of the President Thabo Mbeki, Joint Sitting of Parliament, 11 February, Cape Town.


66 Chabane, 2009, op. cit.


70 Ibid., p. 291.


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79 Public Service Commission (PSC), 2011, Profiling and analysis of the most common manifestations of corruption and its related risks in the Public Service, Tshwane, p. 11.
81 Thabo Mbeki, 2003, State of the Nation address by the President Thabo Mbeki, Joint Sitting of Parliament, Cape Town, 14 February; Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA), 2004, A Handbook on Community Development Workers in South Africa, Presidential Programme, Pretoria.
83 Buccus et al., 2007, op cit., p. 17.
87 Fred Nel (Gauteng MPL), 2009, speech delivered in the Budget Debate on the Local Government Budget Vote, Gauteng Legislature, 6 August.
90 PSC, 2010, op cit. p. 44.
94 See Business Day, 4 April 1996.
95 Intergovernmental Relations Audit (IRA report), 1999, Towards a culture of cooperative government, for the Department of Provincial and Local Government, Pretoria, p. 57; Presidency Republic of South Africa (Cabinet Office), 2005, The functioning of the Cabinet, its committees and support systems, Pretoria, Government Printer.
98 Thabo Mbeki, 2004, State of the Nation address by President Thabo Mbeki, Joint Sitting of Parliament, Cape Town, 6 February.
100 This configuration was criticised by many, including Frene Ginwala, 2009, Ruth First memorial lecture, edited and as published in The Star, 24 August 2009, p. 13.
The ‘Ten days campaign’ on violence against women of late November 2009 highlighted the inadvertent switch to civil society and specifically NGO power in the absence of leadership by the Department of Women, Youth, Children and People with Disabilities at first under Minister Noluthando Mayende-Sibiya (replaced in the late 2010 cabinet reshuffle), appointed six months earlier. See Chandre Prince, 2009, ‘Ministry for women in a shambles’, City Press, 15 November 2009 p. 4.

See Sunday Times, 3 May 1996.

For illustrations, see Business Day, 15 September 2000; Mail & Guardian, 19-25 July 1996.


Government states that the ‘Thusong Service Centres are geared to bring government closer to the people and ensure that citizens, especially the poor, are able to access services close to where they live’; see GCIS, South Africa Yearbook 2008/09, Pretoria, p. 292. By January 2009, 130 Thusong centres were in place and government had strategised by 2014 to have a Thusong Centre in each of South Africa’s 283 municipalities. The Inhlazuka Centre offered the following services: office of the police service; post office; telecentre; library; departments of home affairs, social development, health, labour, education, cooperative governance and traditional affairs; community development workers, the Richmond municipality and GCIS, along with a canteen and a sports hall.


The Batho pele or ‘People first’ principles entail that public service is driven by dedication to professional development and service delivery, professionalism in the conduct of all employees, leadership and participation in service delivery, and being goal-oriented in undertaking governance mandates. The project was ‘revitalised’ in 2004, and departments were encouraged to develop and implement service delivery improvement plans (SDIPs). In the related ‘Know your service rights’ campaign, citizens are informed of the different types of services that government provides, and made aware of the means and institutions for exercising such rights and redress mechanisms, whilst it ‘discourages’ complacency among public servants, etc.; see GCIS, South Africa Yearbook 2008/09, Pretoria, pp. 285, 296.


See, for example, Matuma Letsoalo, 2011, ‘ANC institutions rush to Zuma’s defence …’, Mail & Guardian, 4-10 March 2011, p. 6.
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120 The point is illustrated by the case of Barbara Hogan, then Minister of Public Enterprises, expressing a non-sanctioned opinion that under-performing state enterprises could be sold off; see Karima Brown, 2009, ‘ANC lambasts Hogan for “thinking out aloud” on policy’, Business Day, 12 June 2009, p. 1.
123 The Sunday Independent, 8 October 2000.
125 These remarks from Sanco came at a time when the organisation was under pressure to sever links with the ANC. Various political and civic leaders prior to the April 2001 Sanco national conference questioned Sanco’s relevance in championing the plight of communities because of its close relationship with the ANC and government (see City Press, 15 April 2001). In the December 2000 local elections Sanco in the Eastern Cape had a number of members standing as candidates against the ANC in the province. Critics of Sanco’s close relationship with government pointed out that government had been pushing its own programmes (such as the removal of informal settlement communities and the cutting of water and electricity) without Sanco providing any opposition. Sanco members are often members of parliament, provincial legislatures or local councils. See City Press, 15 April 2001.
126 Anthony Egan and Alex Wafer, 2004, ‘The Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee’, case study for research project on Globalisation, Marginalisation and New Social Movements in Post-Apartheid South Africa, Centre for Civil Society and the School of Development Studies, Durban, University of KwaZulu-Natal.
128 Also see Aubrey Matshiqi, 2010, ‘Dissecting ANC’s hostile response to Cosatu-sponsored civil society conference’, Political Insight, 12 November, http://www.polity.org.za/article/xxx-2010-11-032010, arguing that the main ANC objection was due to its interpreting the conference as a move by Vavi for elected ANC position.
130 Zwelinzima Vavi, 2011, address to the Cosatu central committee meeting, Midrand, 21 June 2011.
133 Participant observation by the author.
The ANC in national electoral mode is a formidable force. Electoral performance and power stand at the centre of the ANC’s exercise and regeneration of political power. This support backbone affords the ANC the space to get on with the task of governance, in imperfect form and frequently in adversarial conditions – in the knowledge that nationally, in most of the provinces and the bulk of municipalities ANC power is secure, for now.

The ANC enjoys the substantial benefit that election times and between-election periods effectively, and for the majority of South Africans, constitute two different worlds. In national elections zone, ANC voters have repeatedly united ranks against one or another party political enemy. In the process, they have consistently endorsed the ANC by between 63 and 70 per cent nationally. The ANC suffered support-level setbacks in national-provincial election 2009 and local election 2011, but remained firmly in charge. Yet vulnerability is in the air: can the ANC sufficiently transform its governance project to bring definitive turnarounds and thereby secure electoral belief in times when the liberation dividend runs dry? Three key uncertainties hover: When will the dominant and governing party be held to account electorally for the shortfalls and failures in government delivery? When will the electorate seriously start punishing the ANC-in-government for practices of corruption and mismanagement? When will an opposition party be judged to be more deserving of popular trust than an imperfect ANC?

Section 3 first explores ANC electoral performance, mainly in the four sets of national-provincial elections from 1994 to 2009, supplemented with 2011 developments (Chapter 6). Despite relative ebbs and flows, the ANC’s juggernaut status has prevailed. Local government elections, however, reveal more vulnerability. The ANC’s 2004-09 support peak was significantly consolidated through the floor-crossing phenomenon (Chapter 7). It helped the ANC accumulate support, whilst wreaking havoc in the ranks of opposition parties. Two important case studies of the ANC’s ruthless dealings with challenger opposition parties look at the National Party (NP, Chapter 8) and the Congress of the People (Cope, Chapter 9). The first was the lingering foe that had to be eliminated for the ANC to assume unadulterated state power. The ANC effectively pushed the NP off the map and consumed its remains. Cope, born ‘from the loins of the ANC’, at first posed a threat to the ANC and then spectacularly disintegrated. The ANC wiped Cope away by all means necessary and as its final stroke ‘welcomed back home’ many of the dissenters. Chapter 6 includes Democratic Alliance (DA) encroachment. The core argument in the section is that the ANC’s project of sustaining and regenerating power massively depends on its electoral feats. The ANC will defend its ability to render these performances by all means legitimately available and legally permissible.
Elections are special ‘dialogue with the people’ times for the African National Congress (ANC). Elections are the inner sanctum of re-endorsement, recognising the ‘long road we have travelled’ even if ‘we have to do more’, ‘we have to try harder’, ‘we have to do this together’ and ‘we have to realise economic liberation’. The defeat and occasional destruction of opposition parties is less the result of direct attack than ‘fall out’ suffered by opposition parties in these times of ANC reconnection with the people. The ANC’s successive quests in national elections have built on its successful regeneration of the belief that the ANC is the authentic embodiment of the liberation ideals of the people, that the ANC-in-government is continuing to progress towards more complete transformation, and that opposition to the ANC largely lacks credibility and integrity – or is deficient in patriotism and revolutionary belief, aka the national democratic revolution.

Elections are pivotal to the ANC’s regeneration of political power. The ANC enjoyed an uninterrupted line of commanding party political and state power courtesy of its dominance across four sets of national and provincial elections. The provincial exception of the Western Cape and modest deviations in local election 2011 delivered signs that the electoral prowess of the juggernaut was not entirely invincible, even if still massive. The ANC’s electoral performances were also shadowed by internecine contests between intra-ANC factions, often with eyes cast on the next round of elections and appointments. Cracks and contradictions, both intra-ANC and inter-party, that were unlikely to go away emerged.

 Electoral victory and its reputation for electoral omnipotence have sustained the ANC in the face of many other weaknesses. Consistent electoral majorities of over 60 per cent were the ANC’s insurance against adversarial protest and people’s dissent. Elections have also been the ANC’s mechanism to mobilise and unite factions cyclically ‘for another five years’. Convincing election victories anchored in deep bonds between
the ANC and the people, especially black-African South Africans, have helped the ANC buy time to get governance in order. ANC strengths were evident in the ANC's 2009 conquest of the Congress of the People (Cope), managing the fallout from the ascendance of Jacob Zuma, using the campaign to reinvent the ANC image as caring and connected, and projecting the Zuma administration as a semi-regime change. Strengths were equally evident in continuing to separate protest and dissent from the times of elections. The electorate largely continued to reward the ANC electorally, confirming preceding mandates.

Yet, both election 2009 and local election 2011 took the ANC to points of convergence of remarkable continuous strength and unprecedented vulnerabilities. By all prevailing indications the ANC was past its electoral peak, albeit nowhere near any point of surrender or collapse. There was consensus that the advances that the Democratic Alliance (DA) had effected in 2011 were a wake-up call for the ANC. It remained to be seen whether the wake-up would convert into a turnaround to reclaim lost ground, especially with minority voters. Local election 2011 was the second election in a row in which the ANC's overall support declined, and the second in which KwaZulu-Natal provincial results boosted the ANC's national support levels. In 2011 the ANC slipped by a small overall percentage while DA support grew by more than the ANC had shed. The ANC retained a huge support buffer, yet the gap was narrowing. The DA proportionate gains were more significant than the additional ward and council victories it registered.

The 2009 election was characterised by intra-ANC dissent and contestation spilling over into inter-party politics. Internal positioning for the next round of regional, provincial and national ANC elections was frequently paramount in operations of both party and state. ANC internal dynamics carried substantial potential to undermine the ANC in the longer term. This was all the more significant, given that the state and party at this time moved in close synchrony and the limitations of the one reverberated in the other.

This chapter tracks the ANC's rise(s) and relative decline in electoral fortunes in the course of the four sets of national and provincial elections of South Africa's democratic era, also taking special note of the local election of 2011. There was the liberation election of 1994, the democratic consolidation election of 1999, the ten-year celebration of democracy election of 2004, and election 2009, which epitomised the reinvigoration of the ANC colossus in conditions of adversity. The 2009 election followed in the wake of bruising battles with Cope nationally and the DA in the Western Cape. The 66 per cent vote for the ANC returned it to its 1999 level of support. In the circumstances of ANC internal battles being pushed into the national and public domain, this result was still a substantial achievement. Beyond reflecting more than just popular electoral support, it signified the presence of a political party with control over the state and enough popular credibility to probably sustain itself in dominance for some time to come, albeit probably unable to stop the windscreen from cracking.

The chapter argues that the ANC, though aided by its direct and indirect use of state power, had shown itself to be dedicated to the path of electoral contest as the primary means of maintaining power. It was precisely the ANC's consolidation of its
electoral hold on state power that facilitated its command over the state. The continuously hegemonic liberation movement-party followed in its wake.

The rest of the chapter first links elections and ANC power, sketching the contours of this relationship. It identifies the predominant trends in the ANC’s four main elections, and positions these against the background of the capture and consolidation of state power. It focuses on the ascendency of the ANC in the span of the first three elections. It explores the ANC in election 2009 and examines whether 2009 and 2011 marked the turning point to serial declines. The role of opposition parties, mostly left behind in the dust of battle on the ANC’s road to renewed power, is emphasised. The analysis integrates the ‘two worlds’, ‘parallel democracy’ and ‘extended liberation grace’ phenomena as contributions to understanding the electoral power of the ANC.

**ELECTIONS AND THE ANC’S POWER PROJECT**

The ANC’s generation and regeneration of electoral power depend on both electoral and non-electoral dynamics. On the all-important non-electoral front, the two-worlds, parallel democracy and extended liberation grace phenomena help explain the ANC’s election performances in conditions of sub-optimal government performance and deficient socio-economic transformation.

- **The two worlds** are evident in there being one world in which popular opposition to the ANC is vibrant (expressed in critiques, debates, between-election dissent and protest), and another in which this opposition recedes as elections (and especially national elections) approach. ANC members and supporters, amongst others, band together in between-election periods and exercise opposition through protest and other critiques of the ANC and ANC-in-government. Yet they return the ANC to power come each election. The base of ANC supporters closes ranks and fights in unison against a party political enemy. Thus far only a modest proportion has abstained come election time.

- **The parallel democracy** trend is mostly manifested in continuous and vibrant intra-Tripartite Alliance contestation. The ANC often condemns this contestation, but it effectively substitutes for inter-party contests. Non-electoral, intra-alliance exchanges fulfil an opposition role of challenging ideas and policies. They also legitimise dissent and criticism of the ANC, serve as a buffer to absorb valid criticisms and then, in the special times of elections, again deliver support back to the ANC. Debates anchored in the ANC Youth League (ANCYL), and those conducted from branches upward into ANC policy conferences serve the same function.

- **The extended liberation grace** trend highlights the existence of a voting population that has not yet started penalising the ANC electorally, in substantive ways
that impact nationally, for sub-optimal performance in government. Hard work sustains the grace phenomenon. It includes continuous reassurances to the people, keeping alive as much as possible of the liberation-struggle character of the movement, and ensuring that opposition parties do not emerge or develop into positions where they pose a credible challenge.

Electorally, the power game for the ANC is both on the fronts of turnout and subjugation of opposition parties. The opposition party challenges that appeared to pose effective national-level contests to the ANC have largely been fleeting. One party is usually isolated as the embodiment of the opposition assault on the ANC. Over different elections the incarnations have been the National Party (NP), the Democratic Party (DP), the United Democratic Movement (UDM), the Democratic Alliance (DA) and Cope. The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) has been the regional and declining enemy in KwaZulu-Natal. The DA in the Western Cape in 2009 was the first opposition party to capture a province from the ANC.

By mid-2011, the only indication of a substantial and incrementally rising opposition party was the DA. It probably subverted the predictions over time that the only viable opposition party which could challenge the ANC would emerge through an ANC split and would be a party of the left. Once, fleetingly, it was believed that Cope might have been that opposition party, albeit not to the left of the ANC. The DA in 2011 appeared to have grabbed that space ... but without having done more than chip away at the racial ceiling of party support in South Africa.

FOURTH TERM AND THE CONFLUENCE OF ELECTORAL AND PUBLIC INSTITUTION POWER

The ANC’s four national election performances of 27 (26-29) April 1994, 2 June 1999, 14 April 2004 and 22 April 2009 first saw the ANC emerging with steadily growing majorities, from 63 to 66 to 70 per cent, and then falling back to 66 per cent. The 4 percentage point decline of election 2009 ordinarily would be modestly significant. It was never at issue whether the ANC would win the election. The important issue was how much of a dent would be inflicted on the ANC’s daunting majority. In a South Africa where the terms omnipotent, juggernaut and electoral colossus had become synonymous with the ANC, especially in election mode, any dent would be significant.

Given the 2009 decline, a maelstrom of different future trends emerged for the ANC in the electoral power stakes. Perhaps, the ANC had passed its apex and its love affair with the electorate had permanently passed the point of it being returned to power with a two-thirds majority, or, in future above-60 per cent majorities. Alternatively, the ANC might have the internal power and the power in relation to the electorate to continuously resurrect itself in the face of electoral threat. This could be through powerful (where required also underhand) election campaigns, closing ranks against enemies in opposition ranks, and persuading a population of voters that had been unevenly benefitting from
ANC rule that the ANC remained the party to best trust to deliver on the semi-allegorical ‘better life for all’. The ANC’s greatest advantage was the seeming existence of an electorate that really wanted to continue believing in the ANC, specifically also due to the forward trend in transformation and the delivery record over 17 years.²

### TABLE 1: ANC gains and deficits/losses in conquests over opposition parties and state institutions (national and provincial)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election and Electoral period</th>
<th>Conquest of opposition parties</th>
<th>Consolidation over state institutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GAINS</td>
<td>DEFICITS/LOSSES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994 and between-election period</td>
<td>Relative loss – failure to capture two of the provinces: KwaZulu-Natal and Western Cape under opposition control.</td>
<td>Gains control over the bulk of state institutions, especially in terms of GNU and electoral victory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANC control over many enclaves of apartheid state power remains to be established (e.g. in security, intelligence, parastatsals, judiciary); provinces under opposition power dilute ANC control over all of RSA.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999 and between-election period</td>
<td>Still no outright electoral victory in KwaZulu-Natal and Western Cape; floor-crossing facilitated takeover of Western Cape.</td>
<td>ANC control of public institutions confirmed; Mbeki brings coordination functions anchored in Presidency, starts controlling ANC through control of the state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Loss of authority due to personalisation of power by Mbeki; provinces and local government problems start manifesting.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004 and between-election period</td>
<td>ANC turns on itself in prolonged internal war.</td>
<td>Party reclaims control of state institutions, particularly after NGC meeting of 2005; re-establishment of control after re-population post-2007 of ‘Mbeki institutions’ (in the latter part of the period).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Loss of full control over several state institutions in the internal war of position, e.g. NPA.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### 2009 and between-election period

- Continues as the effectively unchallenged majority party, albeit amidst support losses in all provinces except KwaZulu-Natal.

- Loss of 2/3 majority in National Assembly; loss of the Western Cape to DA; internal war transforms into internecine factional warfare, assuming a life of its own.

- Establishment of central state planning in the Presidency of SA; gains full control of KwaZulu-Natal; repopulation of state institutions with symbols of new Zuma administration.

- Loss of the province of Western Cape; redesign of institutions whilst weaknesses are inherited – both provincial and local.

### Local election 2011*

- ANC’s main achievement is that it holds on to the bulk of its black-African support; evidence of return of some Cope support to ANC; advances in KwaZulu-Natal against the IFP.

- On a different dynamic to national-provincial elections, but ANC cedes support to DA, mostly that of so-called racial minorities – ‘coloured’, ‘Indian’, ‘white’.

- Retains the bulk of municipalities over which it has control, 198 with outright majorities; new inroads in KwaZulu-Natal, some courtesy of split vote due to IFP-NFP divide; retains fiercely contested metropolitan municipalities.

- ANC loses widely in Western Cape municipalities; DA only takes 9 typical ‘ANC constituency’ wards off the ANC.

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**Note:** * Local elections are generally excluded from this chapter, yet important trends in 2011, and the fact that the inclusion of aspects of this election enables the updating of electoral trends closer to the present, warrant select references to the 2011 event.

**Sources:** Author’s electoral and institutional tracking research project.

In the 2009 election, after the Cope split and other setbacks, the ANC moved back to within ‘smelling distance’ of its former two-thirds majority, ending on 65.9, compared with the 69.69 per cent of 2004. It had desired a repeat of its two-thirds majority as a specific symbol of high support. Yet, it still saw this result as evidence of an ANC that had turned the relative misfortune and decline of the preceding period into possible resumed ascendancy.

The ANC’s 2009 electoral decline – proportionately in eight provinces and nationally – was largely neutralised by the ANC still emerging with commanding national and provincial majorities, in all but the Western Cape. The ANC’s major achievement was that it had only suffered a relatively small loss, given the combination of internal fallout and divisions, a tumultuous run-up to the election, and disappointment with many aspects of ANC performance in government. The ANC’s national decline was moderated by its provincial victory over the IFP in KwaZulu-Natal. The rise in ANC support levels in KwaZulu-Natal to match those that the ANC had been enjoying in other provinces boosted its national support. The campaign for election 2009 also reju-
It reconnected with its support base in a thrust that generated expectations that the Zuma administration was going to make things better in South Africa. The ANC’s voting setbacks in some provinces, largely due to Cope (Chapter 9), and the rise in support of the DA could, however, not be disregarded. The challenge to the 2009 ANC was to demonstrate through credible governance in its 2009-14 term (Section 4) that it would not be necessary for voters to dabble with opposition parties.

The ANC’s relatively positive feats in election 2009 were to some extent the result of a semi-change of ‘regime’ that was manifested in the replacement of Mbeki with Zuma, and the promise of installing a new administration. The Zuma administration benefitted from distancing itself from the ‘Mbeki regime’. Although in the aftermath of the elections ANC policies and style of governance only changed modestly, the Zuma-Mbeki split affected the campaign in its totality. It was a debilitating yet reinvigorating struggle. The Zuma ANC gained by claiming to be different, promising to be more connected and caring, and signalling that it epitomised the entrance of the real liberation movement into government. Election 2009 formalised the ‘transition’ and a brief honeymoon period started. It ended through popular protest within a month of election 2009 when voters showed that they would hold the ANC government continuously accountable. Consistent ANC reassurances and demonstrations of effort in 2009-11 reaped a reward in the form of sustained patience. The ANC now had electoral power and time, but still needed to build improved public sector capacity and demonstrate principled public service – amidst intense, continuous competition for position in the ANC, in political-representative institutions and in the public sector.

A crucial period awaited the ANC post-2009. It was a possible turning point 17 years into political power, with the cycles of popular patience with definitive delivery turnarounds seemingly becoming shorter, and the ANC’s imperfect command of state institutions and their incumbents was weighing heavily on its shoulders. The ANC had consistently been in better command of its electoral performance than of the performance of state institutions (Table 1). It was far from certain that the ANC as government could get public institutions and their incumbents to perform to match the level of popular expectations. The issue of provincial government and its future rationale for existence, the dysfunctionality of local government institutions, and capacitation in terms of appropriate human resources in all spheres of government often dominated government agendas. The project for the 2009-14 term of government was to synchronise party and state power. Political control was only the first step in getting public institutions to perform. Political intervention in various battles within the ANC also detracted from its control over state institutions.

Trends in the operation of public institutions (Chapter 10) show how the ANC continued to redesign many of the institutions in the bureaucracy to try and make them work in better synchrony with electoral mandates. Whilst the ANC had political control over the public institutions, their state-managerial operations were only partially under control. Often, the cadres the ANC deployed were revealed as not having met the requirements for the positions they filled. Deployment itself, especially at lower levels of government, often veered out of national ANC control.
THE ANC AND ‘OPPOSITION POLITICS’ BEYOND PARTY POLITICS

Elections reflect the state of party politics and party political opposition in a country, but hardly the state of opposition politics. In line with the ‘parallel democracy’ thesis, opposition politics in South Africa is far more varied than is suggested by a reading of electoral outcomes on the level of liberal-representative democracy. As in all political parties, there is internal contestation in the ANC to determine issues such as leadership and policy directions. Branches, regions and leagues (women, youth and veterans) are active in deliberations on ANC policy and leadership. Beyond internal contestation, four main variations on opposition politics can be differentiated in South Africa – party political opposition, civil society opposition, opposition as exercised de facto by the mass media, and intra-Alliance opposition.

Within the Tripartite Alliance, Cosatu and the SACP have over time practiced substantive oppositional roles. Their critiques elicit the ire of the ANC. The routine response in Zuma days was to convene alliance summits to consider differences and find solutions. In the time of Mbeki alliance meetings resembled a cold war and Mandela at times resorted to finger-wagging. The 2005-10 intra-ANC and intra-Tripartite Alliance struggles held many implications for multiparty democracy in South Africa. Many of the issues of contestation were handled in the safe and contained forums of the ANC and Alliance. Cosatu in the Zuma era (after the initial Cosatu hope that it would have substantive policy influence had been quashed) was playing an escalated oppositional role in highlighting corruption in government and the ANC, along with the ANC and ANC government’s policy flaws. It criticised the ANC for corruption and behaving as a predator state. The SACP had first raised the iniquity of tenderpreneurship. Cosatu stressed the ANC’s failures in addressing poverty and unemployment. Cosatu held a civil society conference to articulate critiques (Chapter 5). The ANC generally responded angrily to ‘predator!’ fingers being pointed at it. Mutual reassurances of respect, admiration and loyalty, and Cosatu’s campaigning for the ANC in local election 2011 soon followed. At its 2011 central committee meeting Cosatu argued that Zuma, in ways reminiscent of his predecessor, was side-lining Cosatu.

Elections, however, were the time of the Alliance joining forces against an opposition party enemy of choice. All of the Alliance-Cosatu opposition spaces were safe and contained. They were manifested as ANC-friendly. Some of the harshest critiques of the ANC were handled internally. The ANC massively benefitted from this parallel tier opposition. Come election time and contests against opposition parties, Cosatu and the ANC would reel the voting public in again, and their votes for the ANC would be largely secured.

HOW ELECTIONS WORK FOR THE ANC

Elections are powerful vehicles to build power for political parties. The power nurtured includes, but also extends far beyond, the power of the percentage support for the winning party versus that for opposition parties. This section dissects the multiplicity of power that South Africa’s elections help bestow on the ANC vis-à-vis the opposition (full results
for four national elections, Table 2; comparative local election results 2006 and 2011, Table 4). It relates ANC specifics to generic points about elections and the generation of political power, thereby mapping the nature and scope of ANC electoral power.

**Establishing the pecking order of political parties**

In direct relation to opposition parties in the multiparty context, elections determine the winning party and the hierarchy of political parties in the system. Elections and their associated institutions also marginalise the parties that do not participate.

The ANC has consistently emerged as the election winner in the four national elections from 1994 onwards. The main opposition party has varied over time on national

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**TABLE 2: Comparative history of the ANC’s performance in South Africa’s four national elections**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In each column: percentage vote (%) / number of seats / number of votes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>62.65 / 252 / 12,237,655</td>
<td>66.35 / 266 / 10,601,330</td>
<td>69.69 / 279 / 10,880,915</td>
<td>65.90 / 264 / 11,650,648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP/DA</td>
<td>1.73 / 7 / 338,426</td>
<td>9.56 / 38 / 1,527,337</td>
<td>12.37 / 50 / 1,931,201</td>
<td>16.66 / 67 / 2,945,829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COPE</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7.42 / 30 / 1,311,027</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFP</td>
<td>10.54 / 43 / 2,058,294</td>
<td>8.58 / 34 / 1,371,477</td>
<td>6.97 / 28 / 1,088,664</td>
<td>4.55 / 18 / 804,260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.73 / 7 / 269,765</td>
<td>0.92 / 4 / 162,915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDM</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.42 / 14 / 546,790</td>
<td>2.28 / 9 / 355,717</td>
<td>0.85 / 4 / 149,680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FF/FF+</td>
<td>2.17 / 9 / 424,555</td>
<td>0.80 / 3 / 127,217</td>
<td>0.89 / 4 / 139,465</td>
<td>0.84 / 4 / 146,796</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACDP</td>
<td>0.45 / 2 / 88,104</td>
<td>1.43 / 6 / 228,975</td>
<td>1.60 / 7 / 250,272</td>
<td>0.81 / 3 / 142,658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCDP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.785 / 3 / 125,280</td>
<td>0.75 / 3 / 117,792</td>
<td>0.37 / 2 / 66,086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAC</td>
<td>1.25 / 5 / 243,478</td>
<td>0.71 / 3 / 113,125</td>
<td>0.73 / 3 / 113,512</td>
<td>0.27 / 1 / 48,530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MF</td>
<td>0.07 / 0 / 13,433</td>
<td>0.30 / 1 / 48,277</td>
<td>0.35 / 2 / 55,267</td>
<td>0.25 / 1 / 43,474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azapo</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.17 / 1 / 27,257</td>
<td>0.25 / 1 / 39,116</td>
<td>0.22 / 1 / 38,245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APC</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.20 / 1 / 35,867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NP/NNP</td>
<td>20.39 / 82 / 3,983,690</td>
<td>6.87 / 28 / 1,098,215</td>
<td>1.65 / 7 / 257,824</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FA</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.54 / 2 / 86,704</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AEB</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.29 / 1 / 46,292</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100 / 400 / 19,533,498</td>
<td>100 / 400 / 15,977,142</td>
<td>100 / 400 / 15,612,671</td>
<td>100 / 400 / 17,680,729</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


level, changing from the NP in 1994 to the DP and subsequently the DA. The cross-election trends show that Cope was the most significant (albeit declining) new opposition entrant, with one of the most credible opposition percentages since the NP in 1994. The election results show that the small opposition parties either stagnated on miniscule and vulnerable niche support bases (especially the parties mobilising on ethnic-national grounds) and that small to medium-sized parties (the definition of ‘small and medium’ in South Africa includes all parties with below 20 per cent support and frequently well below that level) have often declined.

**Anointment through continuous victor status**

Elections and their results confer particular categories of status on political parties. The winning party may gain an outright majority, or a two-thirds majority, each of which confers a particular status. Repeated and/or substantial victories give the winner the status of ‘dominant’, or practically invincible.

The ANC succeeded in gaining support in the 63-70 per cent bracket in all four national-provincial elections. In two instances, 1999 (at first with the help of the Minority Front (MF), and after the MF crossed the floor on its own) and in 2004, it gained two-thirds or more. Therefore the ANC achieved the status of dominant party, and extended its dominance (also in provincial and local spheres) into the hegemonic domain given its firm grip on South African society and its determination to assert its rule.

**Popular statuses moderating accountability**

Political parties gain valuable popularly anchored statuses through their electoral performances. Broad-based support, especially if it extends across geographic and demographic ranges, bolsters legitimacy and credibility. The keeper of this status can survive crises of governance and turmoil in between-election periods, especially if it is relatively certain that, come the next election, the party will be able to approximately repeat its past performance. This is a profound source of political power, given that the electorate in open, democratic systems has the final say in realising its collective power. Elections in themselves are only good for highly intermittent accountability every five years or so. However, if political parties take electoral mandates seriously and are accountable to their electorates between elections, their power in relation to the electorate increases sustainability.

The ANC’s high popular-hegemonic status up to at least 2011 has been effectively incontrovertible. There are cracks, but the movement’s eminence remains daunting. The ANC has a strong general rapport with voters and citizens. The party-movement often comes under attack, but the same critics simultaneously defend it when opposition parties dare to attack. This status is further bolstered through the political culture in which citizens and voters find it acceptable to use a dual repertoire of ANC support, in which they will equally protest against governance by the ANC and extend electoral support to it.

**Campaigns as power instruments**

The popular power of political parties extends into the domain of election campaigns where the party does damage control using resources and campaign strategies to persuade voters that it has done justice to previous election mandates, and that it remains
in the voters’ interest to renew past mandates (or give a mandate to a new party) in order to best represent voter interests. Good election campaigns work well, especially in a context of lesser campaigns by smaller parties.

The ANC in its national efforts has used powerful election campaigns. It gives everything to regain potentially lost electoral support, persuade the electorate of its continuously good intentions, and reconnect and reassure voters, for example, about its commitment to serve them and hear their voices. The ANC expertly uses the public broadcaster, the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), to feed supporting information, in particular in terms of coverage of government activities and statements by top-government figures in the run-up to elections. The ANC fine-tunes national events and publicity about government projects, launches, etc. to bolster election campaigns. ANC campaigns are well-resourced and ANC business entrepreneurship and benefactors ensure that its campaign coffers do not run dry. The ANC has mostly conducted positive campaigns in the sense of emphasising ANC programmes and undertakings. One of its election strategies is to minimise explicit, high-level attacks on opposition parties, which would have afforded them recognition as opponents. By means of references to the ANC’s liberation history and the continuation of the struggle courtesy of legacies of the pre-democratic order, the ANC ensures that its followers understand that opposition votes would be tantamount to betrayal, if not ‘treason’.

Consolidation of internal power

Political parties use elections to integrate and consolidate their own organisational and membership bases. They focus on internal dynamics to unite against an external enemy. The election process brings parties’ active membership together to build branches, to nominate candidates and elect leadership. This process inevitably excludes some of those with leadership aspirations, but governing parties use the promise of state positions or contracts to minimise the fallout among powerful and influential members.

The ANC, as in its 2009 campaign, used elections and the related campaigns to mobilise against the fallout and rebellion that had marked the preceding period. Through the identification of and active work against the ‘traitor party’, Cope, it managed to simultaneously contain defection and unite its continuous support base. In preceding elections the enemy-traitor had been the NP, the DP/DA, and to some extent the UDM. This became more difficult when, from 2010 onwards, internal contestation was growing and members-leaders were determined not to go anywhere. Now it was all about capturing the organisation or enclaves of power within the party.

Importance of being in power

Elections emphasise the importance of state incumbency for governing parties – the importance of being in power. Parties almost by definition aspire to be in power, but when they realistically know they will not achieve that goal, they strive to gain sufficient electoral support to influence the governing party, as a minimum to visibly represent the interests of their own support bases. Incumbent political parties enjoy a vast advantage by virtue of being in government. They have access to state resources and subtly
but (mostly) legally use these to optimise electoral performance. It is often exceedingly difficult, as long as a political party remains reasonably credible in government, to turn that party out of government. The power of credible incumbency is exceptional.

The ANC’s power as a political party has become virtually inseparable from its standing as the governing party that has access to, and control over, state resources, tenders and deployment (as seen under ‘campaigns as power instruments’), plus the power to do things for voters. This has worked in favour of the ANC. The options available have helped contain internal discontent, dissent, defection to opposition parties, and withdrawal into inaction within the ANC. It has systematically and directly advantaged the ANC over the opposition. However, known corruption, maladministration, tenderpreneurship and predatory behaviour in the state institutions are certain to reflect increasingly negatively on the ANC.

**International stature through ‘good’ elections**

Participation in elections affords political parties a substantial amount of international respect and stature, as long as the elections achieve the status of ‘credible and legitimate’ – and provided the individual party has performed in terms of acknowledged standards of ‘free and fair’.

The ANC has gained an immensely positive reputation, and in effect power, through widely being seen as encouraging and facilitating credible, free and fair elections. However, the ANC was known to have been less than measured in its treatment of Cope campaigns in 2009. The ANC has also maintained a reasonable reputation for its demeanour in the between-election periods when it has generally respected the Constitution and constitutional principles and objectives. This afforded reasonable (although not unhindered by the ANC) space for opposition voices to emerge and opposition parties to organise.

**Turnout bestows legitimacy**

The turnout in elections helps confer electoral legitimacy on especially the winning party that is set to enter government. Apart from the proportion of valid votes that the ruling party gathers, parties get assessed in terms of the proportion their vote represents of the total population of voting age in a country, a percentage that is often substantially lower than the proportion of ‘valid’ (not spoilt) votes cast.

The ANC has gained power from the fact that its electoral majorities have been attained in conditions of high levels of registration and participation (Table 3). Its electoral support as a proportion of the total voting age population dips below 40 per cent. In this context it is important that voters have an unhindered opportunity to participate in elections. The ANC’s share of support remains far above that of any other South African political party.

**Dividends of sound election management**

The power of elections clearly works in conjunction with the power of effective election management. A political party’s electoral status ultimately depends on the credibility of
the process that brought it to where it is. Governing parties will also be judged on whether they have adequately resourced the election management body (or at least have done so commensurate with the resources of the country), whether they have respected the relative autonomy of the body, and whether or not they have tried to undermine its processes.

The ANC- in-government, along with supporting opposition parties, by all explicit measures has conducted itself in an exemplary way in resourcing and only minimally interfering with the work of the successive election management bodies. The Electoral Commission has, from its side, ensured high levels of effective and efficient election management and has overwhelmingly maintained values of impartiality in its dealings with the political parties.

**TABLE 3: Comparative turnout in four national elections in South Africa, 1994-2009**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vote and voter category</th>
<th>Year of election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turnout as a percentage of registered voters</td>
<td>No registration or voters’ roll</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valid votes cast</td>
<td>19,533,498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of spoilt ballots</td>
<td>189,475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of votes</td>
<td>19,722,973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of registered voters*</td>
<td>No registration or voters’ roll</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated voting age population (VAP)*</td>
<td>22,709,152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC’s percentage of VAP vote~</td>
<td>53.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage VAP registered*</td>
<td>No registration or voters’ roll</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage turnout of VAP*</td>
<td>86.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Local government trends:** For local election 2000 there were 18.5 m voters of whom 48.1% voted; in 2006 there were 21.1 m registered voters of whom 48.4% voted; in 2011 there were 23.7 million voters of whom 57.64% (approximately 13.7 million) voted.

ANC POWER IN FOUR SETS OF NATIONAL-PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS

The ANC in South Africa’s first four democratic elections overpowered all other political parties on the national level (Table 2). It continuously emerged with national majorities of 63 per cent ranging up to 70 per cent. The trends were largely sustained in local elections, with caveats such as the uncomfortable but hitherto demographically constrained advances of the DA (Table 4). Depending on the method of calculation, the ANC received either 63.65 or just below 62 percent of the nationally calculated vote in local election 2011. The ANC retained the loyalty of a vast majority of South Africans, with many in the minority groups moving to the DA, and overall ANC proportions, for the second election in a row, being bolstered by steep rises in its KwaZulu-Natal vote proportions.

TABLE 4: Changes of support between the 2006 and 2011 local government elections on the proportional representation (PR) ballot

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Local Election 2006</th>
<th></th>
<th>Local Election 2011</th>
<th></th>
<th>Change from 2006 to 2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total votes</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Total votes</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Total votes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>6,469,420</td>
<td>65.67</td>
<td>8,405,429</td>
<td>62.93</td>
<td>1,936,009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>1,608,154</td>
<td>16.32</td>
<td>3,216,006</td>
<td>24.08</td>
<td>1,607,852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFP</td>
<td>744,486</td>
<td>7.56</td>
<td>475,621</td>
<td>3.56</td>
<td>-268,865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>318,352</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>318,352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cope</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>296,624</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>296,624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDM</td>
<td>129,047</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>84,623</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>-44,424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACDP</td>
<td>128,990</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>78,737</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>-50,253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAC</td>
<td>109,816</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>54,846</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>-54,970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APC</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>54,332</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>54,332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FF+</td>
<td>94,140</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>53,931</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>-40,209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MF</td>
<td>42,530</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>53,042</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>10,512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azapo</td>
<td>30,321</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>26,300</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>-4,021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCDP</td>
<td>62,459</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>25,971</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>-36,488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID*</td>
<td>217,761</td>
<td>2.21</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-217,761</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>214,975</td>
<td>2.18</td>
<td>213,697</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>-1,278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>9,852,099</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>13,357,511</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>3,505,412</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * ID merged into the DA in Local Election 2011; NFP: National Freedom Party.
Sources: IEC results system, 2011 (accessed 30 May 2011, various pages); SABC results system, 2011; Local Government Research Centre, 2011.
In the national elections, the ANC dealt with a range of opposition party challenges, albeit mostly minor. It displaced the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), and oversaw its disappearance as a significant political party.\(^8\) It defeated the NP in 1994 by a ratio of more than three to one, dwarfed the DP in 1999, and subsequently absorbed the New National Party (NNP). It showed that new opposition parties such as the UDM, Independent Democrats (ID) and Cope might have captured the imagination but could not enter the stratosphere of ANC support. In 2009, whilst deflecting Cope, the ANC also accomplished its KwaZulu-Natal mission of establishing ANC dominance in the IFP heartland. The DA, however, continued to encroach. In the Western Cape provincial stakes it defeated the ANC, handing it its lowest-in-four elections vote percentage in that province. Local election 2011 acquired more importance than previous local elections. The DA intruded into previous ANC spaces, especially where the ANC had enjoyed the support of racial minorities. South Africa also started displaying more of a two-party character. It was especially the DA that gobbled up smaller opposition parties. Across three national elections – 1994, 1999 and 2004 – the ANC continuously grew its proportion of the vote. It went from 62.6 to 66.5 to 69.7 per cent. Through a series of floor-crossing episodes from 2003 to 2007 (Chapter 7), the ANC moved its total proportion of representation in the National Assembly to 74.25 per cent. Across the four national elections up to 2009, the ANC vote as a proportion of the total of eligible voters declined, from 53.8 per cent in 1994 (this election was not based on a voters’ roll while subsequent elections were) to 46.9 per cent in 1999, 39.6 in 2004 and 38.8 in 2009.\(^9\)

Evidently the ANC achieved its peak electoral standing in 2004. After that its position of indisputable dominance started appearing as more fragile, yet it still prevailed as often-dominant and continuously strong to very strong. The ANC’s greatest weakness, come the 2011 local result, was mirrored as the DA’s weakness – the ANC was losing minority support and the DA was tainted by having grown substantially, courtesy of minority support.

**ANC in Election 1994 – sealing the negotiation outcomes**

The ANC in Election 1994 successfully used the preceding political and constitutional settlement, in combination with its strong anti-apartheid resistance and liberation credentials, to establish a powerful electoral base. It managed to transition from the cooperative, compromise-seeking mode of negotiations into election contestation where attacks on political opponents through campaigning and vote-oriented mobilisation prevailed.

This transition was carried by the fact that the ANC had effectively, and by specific declaration since the early 1990s, become a political organisation that was oriented to liberal-representative democracy, that had been fighting for universal franchise, while aspiring to the ideals of socialism (rather than becoming socialist).\(^10\) Saul observes that the ANC in its surrender to capitalism had become ‘exhausted of both promise and purpose’.\(^11\) The ANC unfailingly maintained (in ANC rites, more than in government) that elections were the national democratic revolution part of the struggle, the phase that would incrementally lead to the egalitarianism and justice envisioned in the ideals of the Freedom Charter. Even in the course of the constitutional negotiations in the
early 1990s The ANC had repeatedly confirmed it would only gradually work to achieve the full realisation of social and economic rights.

In the early 1990s, the ANC was also keeping its form of struggle options open through Operation Vula as Plan B. Vula was a clandestine operation for mass insurrection, built on the premise that the NP government might have been insincere in committing to negotiations, and might still revert to force should negotiated outcomes become unpalatable.\(^\text{12}\) Jordan notes regarding this tactical flexibility of the ANC:\(^\text{13}\)

\[\ldots\] even as it embarked on the armed struggle the ANC and its allies did not paint themselves into a strategic corner. In MK's founding manifesto the option of a negotiated settlement was posed. The same tactical flexibility was demonstrated in the late eighties when insurrection became a realistic possibility, but the ANC nonetheless signalled a willingness to forgo the military option provided that negotiations in earnest, with the realistic prospect of success, commenced.

Despite such doubts, the negotiated compromise introduced democratic, multiparty elections, along with a compromise socio-economic order. Elections became the ANC's key future operational mode for the formal renewal of power.\(^\text{14}\) In other layers of the new South African democracy the ANC struck a direct and potent relationship with the people – a non-electoral space took shape where in due course grievances would be addressed through two-directional actions such as outreach and protest (Chapters 4 and 5).

The ANC's 1994 election campaign was a phenomenal event, anchored in extensive and finely tuned election research and high-profile campaigning.\(^\text{15}\) The ANC worked, among others, with pollster Stanley Greenberg and projected strongly positive campaign messages.\(^\text{16}\) The campaign facilitated the ANC's transition from liberation movement, to reconciling negotiator, to predominant partner in the Government of National Unity (GNU). Its extensive polling projects showed that its level of support among the well-sampled voting age population was over 50 per cent and far stronger than that of any other party. Polling also showed that Nelson Mandela was central to the ANC's popular standing – and that Mandela would have to be positioned as the face of the campaign. There were still many uncommitted voters, just over 20 per cent. The ANC needed to wrap up this support, project itself as ready to govern, focus on the primary issues (such as unemployment, political violence and housing) and, in the process, turn undecided voters in its favour. This was a core aspect of the campaign in which many potent issues of transformation and delivery were recognised.\(^\text{17}\)

Election 1994 leveraged the NP's (Chapter 8) formal exit from its prolonged rule and its shift from brutal oppressor into transition partner. It became the main opposition party. On 20 per cent of the national vote it was restricted through its junior partnership in the Government of National Unity (GNU). The other opposition parties performed well below the NP. The IFP scored 8.5 per cent of the national vote, the PAC filled a minimal slot, Azapo boycotted the election, and the white right-wing in electoral mode performed at levels too low to sustain impact.\(^\text{18}\) The IFP surpassed the ANC in
KwaZulu-Natal. There were suspicions of electoral fraud in the province and suggestions that the final result was the product of negotiation. As Lodge notes, however, ANC organisation in the province was in a poor state.\(^\text{19}\) Definitive evidence that the ANC had done better never emerged.

The NP’s inclusion, along with the IFP, in the GNU was constitutionally mandated, but it placed the NP in a contradictory relationship to power. It was ill at ease with being in government but out of power. It could not easily adopt adversarial stances to nurture its old constituency. The tension triggered the NP’s withdrawal from the GNU (see Annexure to chapter 6). It simultaneously made an attempt at self-renewal by ‘reinventing’ itself as the New National Party (NNP) of the mid-1990s. South African opposition voters, however, had already started to realign themselves with the Democratic Party (DP).

**ANC in Election 1999 – consolidating, capturing opposition parties**

The ANC emerged from election 1999 decimal points short of the magical mark of a two-thirds majority. It was evidence of consolidation of the 1994 victory. To edge its victory up to the definitive two-thirds level the micro MF with its KwaZulu-Natal support base aligned itself with the ANC in the national assembly.\(^\text{20}\) Floor-crossing introduced from 2003 onwards enabled the ANC to capture parliamentary support irrespective of the MF’s king-making act.

The 1999 campaign was the first of several to emphasise the theme that ‘more needs to be done’, that faster action was needed, and that the ANC, ‘together with the people’ (equally in 1999 and 2009) would be able to move faster. Winnie Madikizela-Mandela encapsulated the sentiment in telling voters the ‘picnic was over’. The ANC acknowledged that it had inherited deep and enduring problems. The apartheid government (rightly and in due course both rightly and opportunistically) was blamed for the severity of the problems facing the government.\(^\text{21}\) It was expected that the Mbeki regime would fill in the gaps that were glossed over, in the name of reconciliation and compromise, in the time of Mandela.

Election 1999 (and 2004) saw the opposition parties at a low. None gained more than 10 per cent of national electoral support. In the wake of election 1999, opposition parties were in minor and fractured positions in relation to the ANC.\(^\text{22}\) A total of 12 opposition parties in Parliament shared roughly 34 per cent of the national vote (Table 1). Indications of change in party politics were courtesy of the declining NNP, and emerging UDM. Election 1999 saw the first participation by the UDM, formed by ex-homeland leader Bantu Holomisa (expelled from the ANC after his allegations of corruption against the ANC’s Stella Sigcau) and former NP negotiator Roelf Meyer (after losing to Marthinus van Schalkwyk in a leadership battle that centred on future NNP directions). John Taylor, formerly ANC, was also involved in this first new and significant post-1994 party. The UDM brought suggestions of a racially inclusive opposition party emerging. The ANC targeted the UDM, amongst others with major intelligence revelations to cast doubt on Holomisa’s character. Its efforts at delegitimation worked and
the UDM was contained. The UDM secured 14 seats nationally (with an Eastern Cape bias), performing below expectations.

Having suffered declines between elections, the NNP in 1999 was superseded by the DP as the main opposition party. The NNP then went into final decline. The ANC required a new target for its electoral mobilisation. The DP’s so-called fight-back campaign was successfully turned back on the party and its leader at the time, Tony Leon. It was projected as smacking of reactionary longings, including racism. The projections, however, failed to stem the migration of NNP voters to the DP. The DP, aided by this migration, grew by close to 8 per cent to reach 9.6 per cent of the vote. It was a larger growth percentage than the ANC had realised, but in the politics of scale the DP remained relatively insignificant.

The ANC sealed its 1994 victory in 1999. It also definitively defeated all opposition parties. This victory was achieved with the assistance of the two alliance partners, and in particular the mobilising skills of Cosatu. The ANC’s own internal transition from Mandela to Mbeki was electorally and constitutionally smooth. Mbeki had been anointed as successor to the ANC leadership, and had already been deputy president of the country (and de facto executive president) since the mid-1990s. The ANC and South Africans in general rallied around Mbeki. For most of the next decade South Africa would be ‘Mbeki’s kingdom’.

Its 1999 electoral decline was the writing on the wall for the NNP, even if it still had to undergo the final plunge of the following five years. Its collapse continued post-election. Its own legs would not be able to carry it through the local government elections of 2000-01. From a weak position it negotiated with the DP and the DA was the result. When this relationship soured, the ANC made overtures to what remained of the NNP. The disputed floor-crossing legislation followed. It offered the NNP an exit mechanism from the DA into the ANC. In the run-up to the 2004 elections the NNP formally aligned with the ANC and was subsequently absorbed into the ANC (Chapter 8).

ANC in Election 2004 – the ten year glue, the internal cracks

Ten years into ANC rule, Election 2004 brought further confirmation of ANC dominance and the consolidation of its power. The ANC reached its 69.69 per cent electoral peak. For the third election in a row it proved that it was unequalled in party politics in South Africa. The ANC’s celebration was great. For the first time it emerged as the strongest party in all nine provinces, even if it was without outright majorities in the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal. It subsequently governed KwaZulu-Natal in coalition with the IFP. In some periods between 2004 and 2009 it governed the Western Cape, aided by the NNP factor.

The 2004 campaign was a taxing one for the ANC. It had vast achievements to show for its first ten years in government. Yet, evidence of governance deficits was pervasive. It had to project hope and demonstrate its sincerity in working for the further realisation of liberation ideals. Its campaign concept of ‘contract’ suggested this ongoing commitment. Major manifesto commitments included job creation, poverty reduction,
and turning the tide against HIV/AIDS. The ANC election message had to ensure that, despite many drawbacks, delays and deficits, the ANC would be trusted to work, more and better than ever. The celebration of ten years of democracy bolstered the campaign. The ANC either persuaded voters, or they would have continued voting ANC, irrespective of what it did. The ANC's position at the forefront of both the initial struggle for political liberation and the continuous effort to shift the socio-economic burden was enough for the bulk of the voters.

The result of the ANC's definitive victory over the opposition parties, along with its dominance in all provinces suggested that the inter-party political battle had been settled, for now. This time around, 11 opposition parties shared the 30 per cent of the national vote that the ANC did not take. The 2004 result proclaimed that there was no opposition party that even vaguely threatened the ANC. The ANC's governance project seemed largely on track. There were deficits, but voters saw hope. Despite occasional alliance partner divergence and dissent, the ANC believed it was solidly on the road to gradual improvement of governance and delivery. Yet, all was far from perfect. In the next period, succession wars would also effectively substitute for inter-party contestation.

The 2004-09 interregnum – internal struggle converted into 2009 campaigning

Post-2004 the ANC rapidly descended into a spiral of debilitating internal contestation. It pushed South Africa to levels of uncertainty that exceeded the turmoil associated with electoral contests in the country. Safe from inter-party contestation the ANC literally turned on itself for renewal – or for the excitement of contest. The ANC civil war that followed saw Mbeki and his associates subjugated as the Mbeki opponents mobilised around the figure of Jacob Zuma (Chapter 2). The fallout held implications for the ANC's support that it hitherto had not encountered in elections and opposition politics. The anti-Mbeki camp housed three, occasionally-overlapping, categories of Zuma-ists: those who adored Zuma for the person he was, those who saw in him the most certain way to rid South Africa of an entitlement-afflicted president, and alliance members the SACP and Cosatu that saw in Zuma the best chance since the RDP to sway policies in more pro-worker, pro-poor and state-interventionist directions. The divisions were reproduced across the country, and mobilisation ripped through ANC structures, down to branch level.

In twists on the theme of liberation movement meets liberal democracy, the Zuma-Mbeki succession struggle was made to work for the ANC come the preparations for election 2009. Leadership succession often substituted for, or significantly blended with, campaigning on issues of policy and governance. The ANC capitalised on the often-implicit notion that with the ousting of Mbeki there was an opportunity for renewal, for more-sincere-than-ever attention to the needs of the people, and a new popular interface of contact, accountability and responsiveness. The mobilisation to protect Zuma from Mbeki's state forces rekindled sentiments of mobilisation against an enemy force. This time around, the enemy was Mbeki and his de facto protégé party, Cope (Chapter 8). The ANC in effect designed a straw doll internal opposition (Mbeki) that could be defeated whilst it stirred up memories of resistance and linked these to the excitement around the election.
The 2008-09 ANC split-off was ambiguous. It was soon clear that the emergent party would neither surpass the ANC at the polls, nor acquire a threatening opposition presence. Conscious of their career and political futures many with Mbeki-camp origins chose to publicly convert to the Zuma ranks, even if their hearts were with the breakaway group. The Zuma-ANC pulled out all the stops to ensure that key figures would not feel sufficiently alienated or marginalised for Cope to become irresistible come election 2009 and the political times beyond. This approach was evident from the moment of the announcement of the September 2008 post-Mbeki cabinet in the Eastern Cape and the clean out operations of early November 2008, through to the ANC candidates’ lists of late March 2009, the 2009 post-election appointments, the cabinet purge of late 2010, and the 2011 initiatives to reunite the two parties.

ANC in Election 2009 – going on to 2011 and 2014

The ANC emerged from Election 2009 paradoxically both emboldened and weakened. The internal revolt of 2005-09 had caused the weakening. It impacted on the ANC’s electoral performance and undermined its performance in government through the associated divisions and paralysis. The ANC’s legacy and status, along with its command of state power, nevertheless steered it through the internal disarray. The certainty that Cope would not eclipse the ANC in the polls – even when it was still thought that Cope would do better than its eventual 7.4 per cent national support – helped contain the defection rate. The ANC’s status as patron in charge of patronage was priceless. The setbacks suffered could still be neutralised.

This section explores aspects of the ANC’s 2009 election performance that affected its regeneration of political power, and bear on the ANC’s 2014 election operations.

The people and ‘JZ’ as the ANC campaign

The 2009 campaign used the slogan ‘working together we can do more’, a variation on the previous elections’ ‘We have a plan’ and ‘Now is the time’ (1994), ‘Change must go on at a faster pace’ (1999) and ‘A people’s contract to create work and fight poverty’ (2004). The 2009 campaign was inseparable from the ANC’s counter-onslaught against Cope, its self-rejuvenation and turning around a range of critical voter sentiments. Campaigning had last been this spirited in 1994. The ANC swept across provinces in motorcades, buses and helicopters to mobilise around the continuation of the struggle (although frequently undergirded by non-delivery amnesia, poorly set-out plans as to why, post-election, the new ANC-in-government would be able to do more than the pre-election ANC-in-government, and of evidence of less than pristine commitment to clean and corruption-free governance).

The messages resonated with masses that continued to want to believe that the time of the ANC’s miracle and of hope for miracles had not passed. Voters continued to trust that the ANC would still deliver the full basket of changes that had been promised since 1994. The Jacob Zuma ANC seemed to confirm to the mobilised rally-goers and voters that the door had not shut on a better life for all: abandoning the ANC in 2009 might be a declaration that the votes of 1994, 1999 and 2004 had been wasted. Electoral support
was credibly sustained. The trends established in 2009 would be broadly continued in local election 2011. Albeit in decreased proportions compared with 2006, ANC voters remained with their party – or abstained.

The ANC 2009 campaign stood in the light of the Zuma trials. Zuma was sanctified in constituencies that mattered to the ANC in election 2009. The populism that arose around the Zuma trials rekindled memories of pre-settlement, pre-compromise days of unadulterated expectations of what South African democracy could deliver. Courtesy of popular appeal and populism Zuma appeared exempt from albatross status. Contributing to the 2009 ANC campaign’s vibrancy, this was the anti-Mbeki rebellion and identification with a martyr – martyrdom as relic of the Mbeki era in which ‘the state’ (Mbeki) brought political charges against Zuma, to discredit him and prevent him from becoming president.

Zuma’s resistance against the Mbeki dictates hence substituted for continued resistance against the compromises and delayed delivery after 1994. In Zuma many ANC supporters saw confirmation that the failures in the preceding democratic period were not entirely their own. (Some opportunistically pretended to believe this.) A new beginning was proclaimed. Perhaps the pre-1994 project was still on track. A new form of populist power in South Africa arose. However, unlike the case of the Russian narodniki, it was top-down mobilisation that took its cue from the leadership (that emerged victorious from Polokwane) rather than the masses that were becoming proactive and re-mobilised from the bottom up.

Election campaign 2009 was the first campaign that truly gave the impression of an ANC that had to work for voter support. Yet, it did it with aplomb and political vigour, also carrying the explicit Mandela endorsement, courtesy of Mandela’s grandson’s standing in the Zuma camp. The popular response and eventual endorsement were overwhelming.

**ANC-Cope-DA contest**

Cope was a major reason for the 2009 decrease in ANC support (Chapter 9). Its relatively modest achievements were nevertheless the main reason for the decline in the proportion of ANC electoral support in seven of the nine provinces (Table 6). Approximately 62 per cent of Cope’s national support came from (previous) ANC voters, 13 per cent from the DA, and 8 per cent from the UDM. The ANC’s rise in KwaZulu-Natal largely compensated for overall losses and gave it about one-fifth of its national support. The ANC’s losses in the Western Cape were due to the DA’s effective mobilisation of its traditional multi-class white constituency, and the switch of some of the coloured middle class from the ANC to the DA. Still, the ANC largely fended off the Cope challenge. Although Cope did not threaten the ANC’s election standing, the party captured a significant enough chunk of ANC support to emerge as the official opposition in five of the nine provinces, displacing both the DA and the UDM from previously held positions. In addition, the UDM’s 2009 decline was more at the behest of the ANC than of Cope. Late in the campaign Cope suffered a middle-class swing away from it to the DA.

The ANC-Cope contest was fierce, both in terms of contestation of image and political action. Cope played on perceptions of the ANC as arrogant in power, often
disconnected from the masses, disrespectful of many of the gains of liberation, and inhabited by comrades with dubious commitment beyond self-enrichment. Cope’s criticisms of the ANC focused on noted disrespect for the Constitution, rule of law, and practices of corrupt, bungling government. Later in the campaign, these claims were subdued when the infant Cope had to fend off ANC assaults.

ANC, the 2009 election result and the 2011 aftermath

The ANC’s 65.9 per cent of the vote was an achievement of note. The organisation had been riven with dissent, suffered a split-off that hurt, came to live with the realities of an incomplete Cope split and residual pro-Mbeki loyalties, and was subject to citizen discontent linked to partial delivery on earlier mandates, and maladministration and corruption in the state. Below the surface of the national victory the ANC’s relative 2009 decline was tangible in the provincial trends (see Annexure to Chapter 6; Tables 5 and 6).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANC provincial vote percentage, followed by number of ANC votes in brackets</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>84.4 (2.5 m)</td>
<td>73.8 (1.6 m)</td>
<td>79.3 (1.8 m)</td>
<td>68.8 (1.6 m)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free State</td>
<td>76.6 (1.0 m)</td>
<td>80.8 (881 k)</td>
<td>81.8 (827 k)</td>
<td>71.1 (735 k)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gauteng</td>
<td>57.6 (2.4 m)</td>
<td>67.9 (2.5 m)</td>
<td>68.4 (2.3 m)</td>
<td>64.0 (2.7 m)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaZulu-Natal</td>
<td>32.2 (1.2 m)</td>
<td>39.4 (1.2 m)</td>
<td>47.0 (1.3 m)</td>
<td>63.0 (2.2 m)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limpopo</td>
<td>91.6 (1.8 m)</td>
<td>88.3 (1.5 m)</td>
<td>89.2 (1.4 m)</td>
<td>84.9 (1.3 m)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mpumalanga</td>
<td>80.7 (1.1 m)</td>
<td>84.9 (959 k)</td>
<td>86.3 (959 k)</td>
<td>85.6 (1.1 m)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Cape</td>
<td>49.7 (201 k)</td>
<td>64.3 (211 k)</td>
<td>68.8 (219 k)</td>
<td>60.8 (246 k)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West</td>
<td>83.3 (1.3 m)</td>
<td>80.0 (1.0 m)</td>
<td>80.7 (1.1 m)</td>
<td>72.8 (784 k)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Cape</td>
<td>33.0 (706 k)</td>
<td>42.1 (668 k)</td>
<td>45.3 (709 k)</td>
<td>31.6 (621 k)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The rise and electoral presence of Cope at the time suggested a new era in multiparty election politics. Credible as Cope’s feat was, it also told the tale of the ANC crushing the attempt to get a dissident party off the ground. The ANC’s setback would have been far greater had it not embarked on a powerful counter-campaign. Cope returned a modest result, in the context of ANC dominance, the ANC’s drive for vengeance against Cope and the dismal electoral fortunes of most post-apartheid opposition parties.

CSIR modelling (Table 7) shows that roughly 92 per cent of the ANC voters of 2004 had again voted ANC in 2009. The 8 per cent who changed their vote was close to the 7 per cent vote for Cope, although Table 6 shows the diversity of vote switching...
in election 2009. The same data illustrates how exceptional the ANC is when it is compared with the three other parties with high voter retention in 2009 – the IFP (93 per cent), UDM (95 per cent) and the United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP; 97 per cent). Subsequent 2011 analyses again showed a 92 per cent loyalty percentage for the ANC, compared with the previous 2006 local result. In 2011, 2.6 per cent of the ANC supporters migrated to the DA. The DA had realised 99 per cent retention in 2011, compared with 2006, while the other opposition parties lost their high-retention statuses and ceded support to the DA and NFP.

### TABLE 6: Trends in ANC provincial election performances from Election 2004 to Election 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provinces</th>
<th>Number of provincial votes for the ANC</th>
<th>Proportion of provincial vote for the ANC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Votes UP</td>
<td>Votes DOWN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gauteng KwaZulu-Natal Mpumalanga Northern Cape</td>
<td>Eastern Cape Free State Limpopo North West Western Cape</td>
<td>KwaZulu-Natal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** The number of registered voters rose by roughly 2.5 m from 20.7 m in 2004 to 23.2 m in 2009.

**Sources:** Detailed tables listed in chapter appendix on provincial election results over four elections.

**Provincial election trends**

A comparison of the provincial results of elections 2004 and 2009 reveal more ANC vulnerability than the national trends suggest. This is evident from the total number of votes the ANC attracted, and the proportion of votes the ANC garnered in each of the provinces. One of the results of the ANC’s reduced performance was that political power in the Western Cape rotated back to the DA. The ANC thus suffered a reversal from having been the strongest party in all nine provincial elections in 2004. The ANC’s massive consolidation of power in KwaZulu-Natal compensated, keeping the ANC national percentage result in the mid-60s, rather than pushing it down to the early 60s.

The ANC increased its total votes in only four out of the nine provinces, namely Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal, Mpumalanga and the Northern Cape (Table 6), in the context of the number of registered voters having risen by approximately 2.5 million. Its two biggest provincial losses were in the Eastern Cape (down by 246,309) and the North West (down
TABLE 7: Party political origins of political parties' 2009 election support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>2009 Result %</th>
<th>ANC</th>
<th>DA</th>
<th>IFP</th>
<th>UDM</th>
<th>ID</th>
<th>NNP</th>
<th>ACDP</th>
<th>FF+</th>
<th>UCDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>65.90</td>
<td>60.91</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>2.92</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>16.60</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>12.28</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COPE</td>
<td>7.41</td>
<td>4.61</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFP</td>
<td>4.55</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>4.26</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDM</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FF+</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACDP</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCDP</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Percentages do not necessarily add up to the total in column 2, because support may also have come from more obscure parties that are not listed; the figures in bold indicate the parties' proportion of vote retention from 2004 to 2009.

substantial between-election performances as party and as government if it was to forestall further provincial declines in 2014. It was crucial for the ANC to prevent an image of serial decline from taking hold. Local election 2011 showed that the ANC had not stopped the erosion in the two years since 2009.

In local election 2011 in the Western Cape the ANC took 33.7 per cent of the PR vote and 40.2 in 2006 – compared with the DA’s 57.7 (Table 9) in 2011 and 33.3 in 2006. The ANC also suffered substantial Eastern Cape and Gauteng losses. In the Eastern Cape the ANC’s vote proportion dropped by about 10 per cent in 2011 compared to 2006. In both the Northern and Western Cape the ANC PR proportions were down by about 7 per cent across the most recent two local elections. In Kwazulu-Natal in 2006 the ANC won 46.7 per cent of the provincial vote, compared with the 56.8 per cent of 2011. Its provincial election result was a 47 per cent proportion of the vote in 2004, and 63 per cent in 2009.49

TABLE 8: Proportional party support across eight national and local elections, 1994-2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>62.6</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>59.4</td>
<td>69.9</td>
<td>67.7</td>
<td>65.9</td>
<td>62.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA (DP)+NP*</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFP</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cope</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDM</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAC</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACDP</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MF</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azapo</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FF+</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCDP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: * In some instances the IEC website combines the support for the DP and NP/NNP; the current table does not dissect it; ** stated by the IEC website to be the percentage for the PR component of the local vote; *** Stated by the IEC website to be the percentage for the ‘Party overall’; **** Percentages on the PR ballot.

### TABLE 9: Comparison of the ANC and DA local election results by province, 2006 and 2011 (all figures in percentages and based on PR results)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>African National Congress (ANC)</th>
<th>Democratic Alliance (DA)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>81.8</td>
<td>71.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free State</td>
<td>76.6</td>
<td>71.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gauteng</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>59.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaZulu-Natal</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>56.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limpopo</td>
<td>84.0</td>
<td>80.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mpumalanga</td>
<td>80.5</td>
<td>78.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West</td>
<td>76.6</td>
<td>74.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Cape</td>
<td>69.9</td>
<td>63.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Cape</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>33.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** * Percentage-proportionate declines for the ANC were in some instances still based on increases in the number of votes received.

**Source:** Author’s compilation, extracted from the SABC Elections Results System, 23 May 2011; also see Justin Sylvester and Sithembile Mbete, 2011, The 2011 LGE: Separating the reality from the spin, Idasa, using the same data.

### SYNTHESIS OF ANC POWER THROUGH PARTICIPATION IN LEGITIMATE ELECTIONS

The reputation of South Africa’s elections has been boosted by consistently credible levels of participation, besides the generally consensual acceptance of results. These factors contributed to the ANC’s imposing majorities, and to the ANC being accepted as the legitimate holder of political power. The fact that the ANC facilitated and resourced the holding of independent elections without apparent undue interference contributed to its standing. The ANC’s commanding position is nevertheless diluted when its vote as a proportion of the total voting age population is considered.\(^{50}\)

The number of voters that participated in each election, and specifically the number of valid votes cast, is an important criterion in assessing the credibility of elections. The number of valid votes cast from 1994 to 1999, 2004 and 2009 ranged from, respectively, 19.5 million, to 16.0 million, to 15.6 million and 17.7 million (Table 2). The registered electorate had increased by approximately 2.3 million from the second to the third election, and another 2.5 million into the fourth election. The national participation rate across the four elections has consistently been above 75 per cent (Table 2). The liberation election of 1994 was in a category of its own, given that it was conducted without a voters’
The percentage polls for the two subsequent elections (1999 and 2004) were, respectively, 89.3 and 76.7 per cent. Up to the 2009 election there had, however, been a downward trend in electoral participation on the national and provincial levels. Election 2009 brought a minor trend reversal. Both turnout and registration mildly increased in 2009 (Table 2) – national-level turnout by 0.6 percentage point and turnout amongst all eligible voters (after having decreased to 57.8 per cent in 2004) rose by 1 percentage point in 2009. The legitimacy of elections, as evidenced through participation in elections, has thus been high and has helped sustain the ANC’s ‘power through elections’.

Several authors draw attention to the fact that ANC national voting support in South African elections in general amounts to well below 50 per cent of total voting age population in the country (Table 3). This percentage has declined consistently over the four multiparty democratic elections, moving from 53.8, to 46.9, 39.6 and 38.8 per cent. In terms of these statistics, the ANC’s support measured against total voting age population in South Africa only declined by 0.8 percentage point from 2004 to 2009 (39.6 to 38.8, Table 3) whereas the ANC’s actual voting support declined by 3.79 percentage points in the same period (69.69 to 65.60, Table 2).

Even if the ANC’s share of support in terms of percentage of voting age population dipped below the 50 per cent levels in all elections subsequent to 1994, its support level was substantially higher than any opposition party could realise. The ANC could also govern with the knowledge that high percentages of South Africans believe in democracy and feel that the system works, even if they do not follow through with voting in elections. In 2004, for example, at a time when the ANC’s electoral support was dipping to below 40 per cent of the voting age population, in an AfroBarometer survey, 67 per cent of South Africans reported that they were either satisfied or very satisfied with how democracy worked in South Africa.

In a 2005 Markinor survey 59 per cent of South Africans stated their belief that democracy in South Africa represents the will of the people. In other parts of that survey, 85 per cent of the respondents stated that democracy was the best system of governance, and 72 per cent was happy with democracy as the system of governance. The trends thus confirmed that the ANC’s 40 per cent and lower vote amongst the total voting age population signals neither a crisis of legitimacy, nor a serious dilution of citizen support. Five years later in mid-2010 these trends were confirmed (Figure 2 in chapter 3) in the continuous evaluation of whether the country is moving in the right or wrong direction. The turmoil of 2008-09 was reflected in the poll, which also demonstrated recovery and stabilisation from mid-2010 onwards.

**WHY SOUTH AFRICANS VOTE ANC**

South African voters – and especially black-Africans – have hitherto rarely turned away from the ANC to endorse opposition parties. They have largely trusted the ANC – imperfect in its mastery of national governance and strong but flawed in its organisational character – to represent them better than any other political party. These reasons have indicated a
special type of rationality, considering the ANC as the most likely to advance their dreams. There is also a deep sense of trust, largely anchored in liberation-from-apartheid status, which has helped engender this special type of rational choice. Race superficially appears to indicate party and vote support, yet apartheid and its legacies have rendered it quite rational for South African voters to let race help determine their vote. Rationality and race blur, and party identities frequently reflect a crossover between the two.

Exceptions to these trends happened, and appeared to be on the increase. First, the Cope case of 2009 involved disillusionment with the ANC’s ‘robust’ campaigning to ensure that Zuma would succeed Mbeki, combined with the seeming disrespect for the law and legal system that accompanied this campaign. Cope was the first instance of note where discontented ANC followers voted in considerable numbers for an alternative party. Previously, they would have been more likely to abstain. The ANC thus lost part of its status as the automatic home for black-African voters. Second, unhappiness with ANC integrity and its representation of communities led to some voters defecting to the DA, both in some by-elections and local election 2011. In local election 2011 in the Western Cape the ANC took 32.80 per cent of the vote and 37.91 in 2006 – compared with the DA’s 60.92 in 2011 and 41.85 in 2006. The ANC also suffered substantial Eastern Cape losses. In both Gauteng and the Eastern Cape the ANC’s vote proportion dropped by about 10 percentage points in 2011 compared to 2006. ANC voter support was 8 percentage points down in the Northern Cape and the North West. In Kwazulu-Natal in 2009 the ANC won 64 per cent of the provincial vote, compared with percentages of 47 and 57 in the 2006 and 2011 local elections. Such shifts, however, still only rendered weak, unconsolidated support for a party like the DA. Defecting back to the ANC remained a serious option, especially in national as opposed to local elections. The 2011 local elections showed how the DA advanced proportionately in former ANC hegemonic territory, where party identities had somewhat loosened up in the wake of the Cope experience.

Even if on occasion tormented and traumatic, the ANC maintained a special relationship with the bulk of the people of South Africa. It reinvented and rejuvenated this relationship over time, including reconnecting on a massive scale in 2009. The ANC comes with its liberation movement credentials and reputation of having conquered apartheid. This weighs heavily, despite the ANC in exile sometimes succumbing to human rights abuses, or the post-liberation ANC becoming involved in unsavoury practices. The ANC has been associated with icons like Oliver Tambo and Nelson Mandela. Post-liberation a second tier of almost- and semi-saints stepped in. ANC post-liberation discourses have helped make the name of the ANC as embodiment of struggle and liberation live on. The ANC-in-government obviously effected far-reaching transformation from 1994 onwards, and earned recognition for that. Its official discourses continuously reminded South Africans of the achievements, preferably the present in comparison with 1994, in order to make the advances stand out. By 2011 apartheid was probably the most frequently cited reason for performance and delivery shortfalls. Similarly, history, memories of the past and both real and inferred linkages between the predominant opposition party, the DA, and the past, lived in people’s minds, while ANC campaigns (such as in 2011) reiterated references to this obvious vote magnet.
South African voters appreciate power and the exercise of power, preferably but not necessarily responsibly and accountably. They tend to be happy to forgive their ANC, almost biblically, many times over, and, if not, often preferred to abstain. They prefer backing winners, and know that nationally and in most provinces the ANC is under no threat of being supplanted as the predominant political power. To ensure maximum beneficiation from ANC rule, the elites know it is important to publicly demonstrate their allegiance. Elites have not hesitated to use patronage to mobilise followers. These processes peak in times of voter recruitment. ANC voters are also tolerant of displays of crude consumerism. In large numbers, they optimistically see these displays of wealth as something to aspire to, and indications of what may still become theirs.

It has been an ultimate opposition party quest in South Africa to crack the ‘racial ceiling’ of party support. The opposition party vote in South Africa has frequently been quite racially predictable, although with exceptions. ANC support has consistently included white, coloured and Indian voters. Yet, these ‘racial groups’ in general have leaned towards opposition parties. There was the perception that minority rights and interests would be better represented through the voices of opposition parties, because the primary ANC constituency was black-African. Until the 2009 election, the coloured vote had tended to be class-specific, with middle classes more likely to vote ANC and working classes first voting NP and later DA. Community case studies of election 2009 showed that the coloured middle classes facilitated the DA’s capture of the Western Cape (in addition to white and working class coloured voters turning out in larger numbers than before).

These trends became even more pronounced in local election 2011. Coloured voters, across class bases, scrambled to vote DA. The DA result was in substantial part also due to election day defection by other opposition party voters to the DA. The DA also ‘raided’ the Freedom Front-Plus – about half of its 2009 voters migrated to the DA. The African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP) was a further victim. The Independent Democrats (ID) had been half-swallowed by the DA already, having offered itself when its 2009 result left it with less than 1 per cent of the vote nationally. Finally, the DA won over a substantial chunk of the support that had gone to Cope in 2009. The rest went to the ANC or remained with the diminished Cope.

‘Black’ opposition parties with consistent support and representation were often ethno-cultural. These included the IFP and NFP (both drawing their identity almost exclusively from the isiZulu culture and the former bantustan), the UCDP (seTswana and identified with the former Bophuthatswana bantustan) and the Eastern Cape-based UDM (largely isiXhosa, with Eastern Cape ethno-cultural identity). The UDM has had its small, core support in followers of the former Transkei bantustan leader, Bantu Holomisa. It was only in the early UDM days when its ‘white leg’ under former NP member, Roelf Meyer, was evident, that the party drew cross-racial support.

The DA hoped to accumulate local and provincial victories over time, to extend by stealth into ANC core support areas. One specific DA target, the North West province, posed a test to the ANC, given the dismal state of the province’s municipalities. The 2011 local election results showed, however, that blood is thicker than service delivery!
The ANC had also achieved a substantial majority in 2009, despite being weakened, both as party and in government, by the factionalism which wracked the North West ANC. The ANC-controlled provincial government was often dysfunctional, and corruption and malfunctioning local governments were rife. At the time of the 2011 election all municipalities in the province were under investigation for mismanagement or corruption, and many had collapsed. Future elections were likely to show that in such extreme circumstances trust in, and loyalty to, the ANC, along with citizens’ extension of ‘liberation movement grace’, did not cover disgrace.

South Africans vote on a complex amalgam of identity (class and/or ethno-cultural, race), policy-issues (on which parties have to prove their positive images, show that they deserve support, and relate behaviour to values) and campaigning by leadership (that projects identities and concerns about issues, but also draws on credibility earned over time). The evidence on partisanship and the reasons for electoral support thus spans the spectrum of class and identity, inclusive of history and liberation, to issue voting that is also associated with the suspension of punishment for non-performance.

The ANC has been consistent in earning and sustaining the reputation as the party that is most likely to serve the interests of the bulk of the population. Both the ANC’s liberation movement dividend and the poor positioning and performance of opposition parties contribute to this. The ANC has retained the image of being the party that serves the people, despite evidence of problems in government and the movement. It will be crucial for the ANC to get the people to continue believing that the black economic empowerment (BEE) class, Wabenzi’s, tenderpreneurs and others, do not constitute the entire ANC for which they vote. The ANC is moving towards a point where its specific performance in government, and its leadership in government, will shape its electoral future. For the time being, the phenomenon still mainly took the shape of voters threatening withdrawal from the ANC, and dabbling with modest opposition voting.

‘TWO WORLDS’, ‘EXTENDED LIBERATION MOVEMENT DIVIDEND’ AND ‘PARALLEL DEMOCRACY’

For South Africa’s opposition parties to notch up advances they would need to significantly dent the ANC’s electoral base and, in the broader between-election periods and non-electoral domain, conquer the powerful ANC-citizenry dynamic and establish party political opposition as the only opposition game in town. Three phenomena, those of ‘two worlds’, ‘extended liberation movement dividend’ and ‘parallel democracy’ – first conceptualised at the start of this chapter – constitute substantial obstructions to such opposition advances.

The two-worlds phenomenon is central to this book’s analysis and hindered greater opposition advances in election 2009 and local election 2011. This is because popular opposition to the ANC is vibrant, but recedes as elections approach. The broad base of ANC supporters – and to a lesser extent the minority voters – then unite to fight in unison against some or another real or exaggerated party political enemy. An illustration is citizenry in the between-election periods regularly exercising opposition through
protest against ANC government, yet returning the ANC to the polls come election times. Ironically, the more assertive and strident an enemy opposition party becomes, the stronger the popular determination to defend and support the ANC.

Elections, time after time and at least until election 2009 and local election 2011, brought the bulk of the mobilised electorate to restate ANC support.\textsuperscript{64} Elections were not the time or place of reckoning for an under-performing ANC. Similarly, Webster refers to South Africans separating elections from delivery, or ‘uncoupling economic development from democracy’.\textsuperscript{65} Cherry notes that in the KwaZakele community in the Eastern Cape the people rebel against the ANC councillors that they had elected.\textsuperscript{66} Booysen in empirical research identifies a South African political culture of combining the ballot and the brick, or protest and voting (Chapter 4). Opposition parties so far have had marginal space in this ANC-people relationship. The ANC, time after time, could rely on the likelihood that a good election campaign, especially if targeted against a well-profiled ‘enemy’\textsuperscript{68} and positioned as protection of the liberation and post-apartheid gains, could ensure convincing electoral performances. In addition, the heartlands of ANC support in rural South Africa seemed to remain stable in their ANC endorsements.

Waves of protests enveloped many parts of the country. Especially from 2004 onwards,\textsuperscript{69} protests became ingrained as part of the electoral cycle and as a pressure release valve that allowed voters, at election times, to again cast their ballots for the ANC. In the aftermath of election 2009, citizens again used protest to set limits to their voting support. The 2009-11 protests materialised in the context of unabated unemployment, persistent poverty and increased inequality, accompanied by reports of far-reaching local government failures and a repeat global recession that was taking a severe toll.\textsuperscript{70} Communities were demonstrating feelings of desperation, after having returned the ANC with huge electoral majorities a few months before. In the culture of the time this did not result in loss of electoral support for the ANC.

The ANC clearly benefits substantially from the \textit{two-worlds phenomenon}. It confirms that the electoral game thus far has been a once-per-five-years celebratory event, largely affirming the movement that remains adored even if it has also shown itself to be palpably fallible. The non-election ANC makes mistakes, yet in seamless elections rhetoric explains the ‘challenges’ in terms of the ongoing struggle against decades or centuries of injustice. It suffers community protests yet in elections gets out the pro-ANC vote. It fails many people in delivery and embarrasses many through leadership and policy choices, yet rallies the masses to turn out as reverent election loyalists. Frustrations and anger with the ANC as manifested from the late 1990s onwards have hardly been reflected in election results. Elections appear as a contained ‘world of their own’.

The \textit{extended grace} occurrence highlighted the existence of a voting population that had not yet started penalising the ANC electorally, in any substantive and nationally-evident way, for sub-optimal performance in government. There is little doubt that South African voters treasure the five-yearly opportunities to embrace the moment of 1994. They celebrate their franchise and the (indirect) power that they exercise through the vote. This is due to the trauma of the apartheid past, and its antithesis in the ‘miracle election of 1994’.\textsuperscript{71} This electoral embrace, however, contrasts with expressions of
discontent with the ruling party. Following election 1994, there was widespread talk of patience with government. After election 1999 it was not unusual to hear people and government alike talk about apartheid having been constructed over decades and that it would not be possible to overturn the effects in the space of a few years, or to ‘build Rome in a day’.  

The parallel democracy trend equally undermined opposition party initiatives. Here, reference is to continuous and vibrant intra-Tripartite Alliance contestation, which often substituted for inter-party contestation. Both Cosatu and the SACP were key players. With the SACP increasingly integrated into government, Cosatu stepped up its role post-election 2009. The period was characterised by numerous cases of acrimonious ANC-Cosatu/SACP contestation. Cosatu and the SACP were outspoken about elite enrichment and public sector corruption. Yet little evidence emerged that the internal contestation was spiralling out of control and that a split would result, ready for the picking by an opposition-alliance-in-the-making. Cosatu’s role served as a lightning conductor. It helped ensure that dissatisfaction with the ANC would not become available to opposition parties. Come election times – as indeed again happened in local election 2011 – Cosatu would again step up its act to convert its patriotic between-elections opposition into ANC election support.

Opposition party politics hence were not the only opposition game in town. The ANC’s two Tripartite Alliance partners, Cosatu and the SACP, remained at the centre of ‘opposition politics’. The ANC Youth League (ANCYL) also contested for oppositional space to the ‘main ANC’, alongside Cosatu and the SACP. The MK Military Veterans and the ANC Women’s League played too, yet more in internal alliance formation than full contestation. It was within the heart of power, the extended Tripartite Alliance, that much of the policy and succession contests that mattered unfolded. Party politics was an important yet separate show – relatively marginalised from this axis.

The road towards 2014, however, is likely to be more daunting, requiring the ANC to deliver whilst increasingly at the crossroads of potentially fragile popular trust, uncertainties about youth rebellion, increasing expectations in the wake of patient popular endorsements, and standing at the helm of a government that remains undermined by variable performance, continuous deficits of public service skill, corruption and maladministration, and variable leadership commitment to public service above all. The question of durability therefore concerned the extent to which the ANC by 2014 would remain able to pull off the deed of erecting walls of amnesia and populist forgiveness around electoral crusades. Electoral support for the ANC hitherto had been largely ring-fenced from being mortally damaged by internal dissent, war and breakaways, and outbreaks of waves of protest.

**CONCLUSION**

The ANC’s election 2009 and local election 2011 electoral support dipped, but was still remarkably high, even if manifested in a context in which defeats at the polls of
governing parties have been rare. Even in 1994, the defeat of the NP had been through conceding defeat by means of unbannings and negotiations. Changes in the post-1994 period were also more likely to be through developments such as between-election party alliances, assimilations, and splits. The 2009 election nevertheless, and more than any of the preceding three, required the ANC to prove that it was still the liberation party-movement that was trusted by the people of South Africa to rule them and to change their lives for the better.

By this time the main party political changes had been manifested as the implosion and assimilation of the NNP, the emergence of the DA as main and growing but still modestly sized opposition party, Cope splitting off from the ANC (damaging it in 2009 and then diffusing into a smaller Cope, the DA and back to the ANC in 2011), the rapid decline of the regionally anchored IFP, also through the NFP splitting off from the IFP, the survival amidst decline of several splinter and floor-crossing parties, especially the UDM and ID (the latter gradually merging into the DA), the decline of other already small opposition parties such as the ACDP and the UCDP, and the continuation on micro-levels of support of ethnic, nationalist or former liberation-focus parties such as the Freedom Front Plus and the PAC, respectively.76 The ANC continued to dwarf the opposition parties. The colossus and juggernaut effect lived on.

Yet, the ANC circa 2009-11 was more weakened than the story of electoral percentages suggests. The slight 4 percentage point knock in its results in 2009 in comparison with 2004, and the 2.7 percentage point proportionate-level decline in 2011 compared with 2006, brought the knowledge that some or another opposition party would be knocking on the door to capture electoral support from the ANC. In order to stop the wave of weakening ANC support – gradual though it may be for the time being – the ANC needed simultaneously to sharpen its governance act, and to ensure that internal contests did not distract it from getting truthful election campaigns in place and from doing effective government. Simultaneously, the ANC had to play to two crucial voter audiences, besides its core constituencies in order to shore up its support and be ensured of regenerating power. These were the young, born-free generation (often unemployed and socially disadvantaged) and the racial minorities (often feeling socially threatened). Much of the ANC’s power project would depend on whether it could successfully negotiate this maelstrom.

NOTES

4 To illustrate, see Susan Booysen, ‘Cope’s campaign strategy shook ANC into action’, *Sowetan*, 23 April 2009, p. 12.


Tim Cohen, 2011, ‘Zuma is the loser, despite ANC poll win’, Business Day, 23 May 2011, p. 10, gives a summary as to the nature of calculation difference. In essence the argument is that the IEC calculations included district council votes, on arithmetic which slightly biases results in favour of the ANC.


Also see Courtney Jung and Ian Shapiro, 1995, ‘South Africa's negotiated transition: democracy, opposition and the new constitutional order’, Politics & Society, 23:2.

The author was one of a team of researchers that did qualitative and quantitative research to inform the ANC campaign in the period 1992-94.

Also see Stanley B. Greenberg, 2009, Dispatches from the war room: In the trenches with five extraordinary leaders, New York, Thomas Dunne Books.


On the eve of local election 2011 the MF leader, Amichand Rajbansi, announced that the MF would never again enter into an alliance with the ANC.


See Booyzen, 1999, op. cit.


The idea featured at an ANC think-tank that was convened at the ANC's Luthuli House,
Johannesburg, in which academics and intellectuals also reflected on the strengths and weaknesses of the ANC to date. The author was part of the think-tank.


30 For an illustration as to how Cosatu kept tabs on possible policy development in the ANC, see Cosatu Central Executive Committee, 2009, ‘Policy positions of the ANC and Government: Audit of the ANC Elections Manifesto, State of the Nation speech, and Budget against the Polokwane Conference Resolutions’, 23-25 February 2009, Johannesburg. On how Cosatu worked to counter the Cope campaign, see Cosatu Central Executive Committee, 2008, ‘Defend our movement! Advance the gains of Polokwane! Expose and isolate the black DA!’ November, Johannesburg.


32 The ANC’s election manifesto gave expositions of its policy positions and directions; see ANC, 2009, Election Manifesto, Johannesburg.


37 Lodge, 1999, in Reynolds (ed.), op. cit., pp. 32-38, provides an overview that reflects the spirit of the campaign.


41 See Ipsos-Markinor, 2008, ‘A credible alternative to the ANC – are voters ripe for the picking?’ Press release, 12 December as to the illustration of voters being ready for an alternative opposition party.

42 Post-2004 the UDM was the official provincial opposition in the Eastern Cape (its vote share was 9.2%, which delivered 6 seats in the provincial legislature). However, the DA subsequently displaced it in the course of floor-crossing practices.


For a full analysis, see Zaid Kimmie, Jan M. Greben and Susan Booyens, 2010, ‘The effect of changes in registration and turnout on the results of the 2009 South African election’, Politeia, 29:1, pp.103-123.

Trends from the SABC 2011 elections results system; also reported in Justin Sylvester and Sithembile Mbete, 2011, The 2011 LGE: Separating the reality from the spin, Institute for Democracy (Idasa), 25 May 2011.


Also see Tom Lodge, 1999, South African politics since 1994, Cape Town and Johannesburg, David Philip Publishers, p. 69.


Also see Lodge, 1999, South African politics ..., op. cit., p. 69.


Author’s insights from assessing detailed voting records overlaid with GIS mapping at the SABC electoral centre, Pretoria, 23-24 April 2009; also see Courtney Jung, 2000, Then I was black: South African political identities in transition, New Haven, Yale University Press.

Trends in this paragraph anchored in CSIR modelling of the voting trends of demographic clusters in elections in South Africa.

Argument in this section is further supported by Susan Booyens, 2010a, ‘Party opposition perpetually on the verge of promise – South Africa’s Election 2009’, Journal of African Elections, 8:2; and Susan Booyens, 2010b, ‘Opposition party weaknesses in challenging the ANC – explanations through the prism of “two worlds”, “parallel democracy” and “liberation grace”, presentation to biennial conference of the South African Association of Political Studies (SAAPS), Stellenbosch, 1-4 September 2010.

Booyens, 2010a; 2010b, op. cit.


70 It was only the November 2009 release of third-quarter economic data that suggested that South Africa was slowly emerging from its nine-month recession.


73 In a notable instance, Cosatu general secretary Zwelinzima Vavi named two cabinet members as guilty of corruption due to tender advantages and living a high life off taxpayers and at the cost of the poor. The ANC at first threatened disciplinary action, but then decided not to proceed. For an overview, see Xolani Mbanjwa, 2009, ‘Mass action possible despite talks – union’, http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=13&art_id=vn20090609051407103C9493 17 (accessed 15 June 2009). Both the accusations and counter-actions at the time suggested that intra-alliance fall out was intensifying. However, it remained possible that the differences would be settled (at least for the time being) through alliance summits and council meetings. This was a typical way of addressing intra-alliance differences in the Zuma era.

74 It has been a long-standing scholarly-activist advocacy ‘project’ that the alliance needs to split, and that this would be the ultimate trigger for a strong opposition to emerge. For example, see Adam Habib and Rupert Taylor, 1999, ‘Parliamentary opposition and democratic consolidation in South Africa’, Review of African Political Economy, 26:79, March, pp. 109-115.


76 It is to be recognised that ‘ethnicity’ or experience of ethnicity is not cast in stone. There are three interactive dimensions to ethnicity, viz. primordial, instrumental and socially constructed. See Crawford Young, 1994, ‘Ethnic diversity and public policy: An overview’, unpublished manuscript, cited in Jackson, 2005, op. cit., p. 224.
## ANNEXURE TO CHAPTER 6

### ANC PERFORMANCES IN FOUR SETS OF PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS, 1994-2009

**TABLE A: The ANC in provincial legislature results, election 1994**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>% Vote</th>
<th>Number of votes</th>
<th>Number of seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>EASTERN CAPE</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC)</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>59,475</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>African National Congress (ANC)</td>
<td>84.4</td>
<td>2,453,790</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party (DP)</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>59,644</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Party (NP)</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>286,029</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>**Total *</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2,908,906</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other parties contesting but failing to win representation (percentage of votes gained in brackets): FF (0.8), ACDP (0.51), African Democratic Movement (0.17), Merit Party (0.07), IFP (0.17).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>% Vote</th>
<th>Number of votes</th>
<th>Number of seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>MPUMALANGA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vryheidsfront/Freedom Front (FF)</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>75,120</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>African National Congress (ANC)</td>
<td>80.7</td>
<td>1,070,052</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Party (NP)</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>119,311</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>**Total *</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1,326,068</td>
<td>30</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Other parties contesting but failing to win representation (percentage of votes gained in brackets): PAC (1.63), Rights Party (0.07), ACDP (0.48), ADM (0.38), DP (0.56), IFP (1.52).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>% Vote</th>
<th>Number of votes</th>
<th>Number of seats</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>KWAZULU-NATAL</strong></td>
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<td>Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)</td>
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<td>African National Congress (ANC)</td>
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<td>Democratic Party (DP)</td>
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<td>78,910</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minority Front (MF)</td>
<td>1.3</td>
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<td>National Party (NP)</td>
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<td>410,710</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)</td>
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<td>1,844,070</td>
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<td>**Total *</td>
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Other parties contesting but failing to win representation (percentage of votes gained in brackets): FF (0.51), Workers’ International to Rebuild the Fourth International (SA) (0.13), ADM (0.22), Africa Muslim Party (AMP) (0.49).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>% Vote</th>
<th>Number of votes</th>
<th>Number of seats</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>NORTHERN CAPE</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Vryheidsfront / Freedom Front (FF)</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>24,117</td>
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<tr>
<td>African National Congress (ANC)</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>200,839</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democratic Party (DP)</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>7,567</td>
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<td>National Party (NP)</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>163,452</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong>*</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>403,772</td>
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Other parties contesting but failing to win representation (percentage of votes gained in brackets): ACDP (0.40), ADM (0.18), IFP (0.42).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>% Vote</th>
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<th>Number of seats</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>LIMPOPO</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Vryheidsfront / Freedom Front (FF)</td>
<td>2.2</td>
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Other parties contesting but failing to win representation (percentage of votes gained in brackets): PAC (1.27), United People’s Front (UPF) (0.53), Ximoko Progressive Party (XPP) (0.26), ACDP (0.38), ADM (0.19), DP (0.21), IFP (0.12).

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Province</th>
<th>% Vote</th>
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<th>Number of seats</th>
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<td>African National Congress (ANC)</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong>*</td>
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Other parties contesting but failing to win representation (percentage of votes gained in brackets): PAC (1.74), ACDP (0.35), ADM (0.23), DP (0.5), IFP (0.38).

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Province</th>
<th>% Vote</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>FREE STATE</strong></td>
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Other parties contesting but failing to win representation (percentage of votes gained in brackets): PAC (1.81), ACDP (0.45), ADM (0.15), DP (0.57), Dikwankwetla Party of South Africa (DPSA) (1.26), IFP (0.51).
### GAUTENG

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes</th>
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<th>Seats</th>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)</td>
<td>25,542</td>
<td>0.6</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>African National Congress (ANC)</td>
<td>2,418,257</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party (DP)</td>
<td>223,548</td>
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<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Party (NP)</td>
<td>1,002,540</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>21</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)</td>
<td>153,567</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>4,198,250</td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>86</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other parties contesting but failing to win representation (percentage of votes gained in brackets): Women’s Rights Peace Party (WRPP) (0.17), XPP (0.08), ADM (0.1), Africa Muslim Party (AMP) (0.31), DPSA (0.12), Federal Party (FP) (0.39), Luso South African Party (LSAP) (0.13).

### WESTERN CAPE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vryheidsfront/Freedom Front (VF/FF)</td>
<td>44,003</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)</td>
<td>25,731</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African National Congress (ANC)</td>
<td>705,576</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democratic Party (DP)</td>
<td>141,970</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Party (NP)</td>
<td>1,138,242</td>
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<td>23</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>2,137,742</td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>42</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other parties contesting but failing to win representation (percentage of votes gained in brackets): PAC (1.06), South African Women’s Party (SAWP) (0.12), Green Party (GP) (0.12), Wes-Kaap Federaliste Party (WKFP) (0.3), Worker’s International to rebuild the Fourth International (SA) (0.04), ADM (0.09), Africa Muslim Party (AMP) (1.0), Islamic Party (IP) (0.78), IFP (0.35).

**Note:** *All totals in this table represent, inclusively, the votes and percentages of parties that won representation in the provincial legislatures.*

**Source:** Compiled by author, based on [www.elections.org.za/Elections94.asp](http://www.elections.org.za/Elections94.asp), various pages (accessed 3 June 2008); Reynolds (ed.), 1994, pp 201-211.
### TABLE B: The ANC in provincial legislature results, Election 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>% Vote</th>
<th>Number of votes</th>
<th>Number of seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>EASTERN CAPE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African National Congress (ANC)</td>
<td>1,606,856</td>
<td>73.80</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party (DP)</td>
<td>136,859</td>
<td>6.29</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>New National Party (NNP)</td>
<td>70,141</td>
<td>3.22</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC)</td>
<td>24,837</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Democratic Movement (UDM)</td>
<td>296,015</td>
<td>13.60</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong>*</td>
<td><strong>2,177,266</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>63</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Other parties contesting but failing to win representation (percentage of votes gained in brackets): ACDP (0.96), AUM (0.17), Federal Alliance (FA) (0.16), IFP (0.33), FF (0.33).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>% Vote</th>
<th>Number of votes</th>
<th>Number of seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>FREE STATE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African National Congress (ANC)</td>
<td>881,381</td>
<td>80.79</td>
<td>25</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democratic Party (DP)</td>
<td>58,163</td>
<td>5.33</td>
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<tr>
<td>New National Party (NNP)</td>
<td>56,740</td>
<td>5.20</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vryheidsfront / Freedom Front (VF/FF)</td>
<td>22,996</td>
<td>2.11</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong>*</td>
<td><strong>1,090,908</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>30</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other parties contesting but failing to win representation (percentage of votes gained in brackets): ACDP (0.9), AUM (0.4), FA (0.81), IFP (0.47), PAC (1.15), Socialist Party of Azania (SOPA) (0.11), Unemployment Labour Alliance (ULA) (0.27), UCDP (0.78), UDM (0.78).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>% Vote</th>
<th>Number of votes</th>
<th>Number of seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>GAUTENG</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)</td>
<td>42,581</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African National Congress (ANC)</td>
<td>2,485,064</td>
<td>67.85</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party (DP)</td>
<td>658,231</td>
<td>17.97</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Alliance (FA)</td>
<td>32,493</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)</td>
<td>128,717</td>
<td>3.51</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New National Party (NNP)</td>
<td>142,563</td>
<td>3.89</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Democratic Movement (UDM)</td>
<td>71,604</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vryheidsfront / Freedom Front (VF/FF)</td>
<td>45,749</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong>*</td>
<td><strong>3,662,790</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>73</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other parties contesting but failing to win representation (percentage of votes gained in brackets): AUM (0.31), Azapo (0.16), Labour Party (LP) (0.03), PAC (0.73), Socialist Party of Azania (SOPA) (0.05), UCDP (0.23).
### KWAZULU-NATAL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)</td>
<td>53,745</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>African National Congress (ANC)</td>
<td>1,167,094</td>
<td>39.38</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party (DP)</td>
<td>241,779</td>
<td>8.16</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)</td>
<td>1,241,522</td>
<td>41.90</td>
<td>34</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minority Front (MF)</td>
<td>86,770</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New National Party (NNP)</td>
<td>97,077</td>
<td>3.28</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Democratic Movement (UDM)</td>
<td>34,586</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,963,358</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>80</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Other parties contesting but failing to win representation (percentage of votes gained in brackets): AUM (0.20), Azapo (0.17), FA (0.33), Mass United Movement (MUM) (0.08), PAC (0.26), SOPA (0.12), FF (0.23).

### MPUMALANGA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African National Congress (ANC)</td>
<td>958,504</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democratic Party (DP)</td>
<td>50,426</td>
<td>4.46</td>
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<tr>
<td>New National Party (NNP)</td>
<td>27,925</td>
<td>2.47</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Democratic Movement (UDM)</td>
<td>16,039</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vryheidsfront / Freedom Front (VF/FF)</td>
<td>19,171</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,129,536</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>30</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other parties contesting but failing to win representation (percentage of votes gained in brackets): ACDP (1.12), AUM (0.40), Azapo (0.10), FA (0.80), IFP (1.42), PAC (0.65), Sindawonye Progressive Party (0.38), UCDP (0.23).

### NORTHERN CAPE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African National Congress (ANC)</td>
<td>210,837</td>
<td>64.32</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democratic Party (DP)</td>
<td>15,632</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>New National Party (NNP)</td>
<td>79,214</td>
<td>24.17</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vryheidsfront / Freedom Front (VF/FF)</td>
<td>5,446</td>
<td>1.66</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>327,772</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
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</table>

Other parties contesting but failing to win representation (percentage of votes gained in brackets): ACDP (1.53), AUM (0.53), Azapo (0.41), FA (0.53), IFP (0.53), PAC (0.66), UDM (0.9).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>% Vote</th>
<th>Number of votes</th>
<th>Number of seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LIMPOPO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)</td>
<td>18,281</td>
<td>1.10</td>
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<tr>
<td>African National Congress (ANC)</td>
<td>1,464,432</td>
<td>88.29</td>
<td>44</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democratic Party (DP)</td>
<td>23,486</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>New National Party (NNP)</td>
<td>28,159</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC)</td>
<td>23,325</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Democratic Movement (UDM)</td>
<td>41,700</td>
<td>2.51</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total*</td>
<td>1,658,694</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other parties contesting but failing to win representation (percentage of votes gained in brackets): AUM (0.40), Azapo (0.54), Dabalarivhuwa Patriotic Front (DPF) z(0.50), FA (0.32), IFP (0.34), FF (0.65), XP (0.83).

NORTH WEST

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>% Vote</th>
<th>Number of votes</th>
<th>Number of seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African National Congress (ANC)</td>
<td>1,030,901</td>
<td>78.97</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party (DP)</td>
<td>42,593</td>
<td>3.26</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New National Party (NNP)</td>
<td>29,931</td>
<td>2.26</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP)</td>
<td>124,874</td>
<td>9.57</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vryheidsfront / Freedom Front (VF/FF)</td>
<td>17,964</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total*</td>
<td>1,305,441</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other parties contesting but failing to win representation (percentage of votes gained in brackets): ACDP (0.94), AUM (0.51), FA (0.55), IFP (0.52), PAC (0.74), UDM (1.29).

WESTERN CAPE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>% Vote</th>
<th>Number of votes</th>
<th>Number of seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)</td>
<td>44,323</td>
<td>2.79</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>African National Congress (ANC)</td>
<td>668,106</td>
<td>42.07</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party (DP)</td>
<td>189,183</td>
<td>11.91</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New National Party (NNP)</td>
<td>609,612</td>
<td>38.39</td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Democratic Movement (UDM)</td>
<td>38,071</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total*</td>
<td>1,587,978</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other parties contesting but failing to win representation (percentage of votes gained in brackets): AUM (0.18), Federal Alliance (FA) (0.26), IFP (0.18), National Coalition Party (NACOPA) (0.07), PAC (0.49), People’s Liberation Party (PLP) (0.06), Government by the People Green Party (GPGP) (0.15), FF (0.40), Workers International Vanguard League (WIVL) (0.04), Africa Moral Party (AMP) (0.6).

Note: * All totals in this table represent, inclusively, the votes and percentages of parties that won representation in the provincial legislatures.

TABLE C: The ANC in provincial legislature results, Election 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>% Vote</th>
<th>Number of votes</th>
<th>Number of seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>EASTERN CAPE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African National Congress (ANC)</td>
<td>1,768,987</td>
<td>79.27</td>
<td>51</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Democratic Movement (UDM)</td>
<td>205,993</td>
<td>9.23</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democratic Alliance (DA)</td>
<td>163,785</td>
<td>7.34</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pan Africanist Congress (PAC)</td>
<td>22,324</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>2,231,543</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other parties contesting but failing to win representation (percentage of provincial vote gained in brackets): ACDP (0.78), ID (0.78), NNP (0.63), FF+ (0.26), IFP (0.20), Azapo (0.17), SOPA (0.15), UCDP (0.12) and NA (0.07).

| **FREE STATE**   |        |                 |                 |
| African National Congress (ANC) | 827,338  | 81.78           | 25              |
| Democratic Alliance (DA) | 85,714   | 8.47            | 3               |
| Freedom Front + (FF+) | 24,946   | 2.47            | 1               |
| African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP) | 13,119   | 1.30            | 1               |
| **Total**        | 1,011,606 | 99.98          | 30              |

Other parties contesting but failing to win representation (percentage of provincial vote gained in brackets): PAC (1.18), DPSA (0.97), UDM (0.88), NNP (0.82), UCDP (0.77), ID (0.52), Azapo (0.35), IFP (0.35), NA (0.12).

| **GAUTENG**   |        |                 |                 |
| African National Congress (ANC) | 2,331,121 | 68.4            | 51              |
| Democratic Alliance (DA) | 708,081  | 20.78           | 15              |
| Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) | 85,500   | 2.51            | 2               |
| African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP) | 55,991   | 1.64            | 1               |
| Independent Democrats (ID) | 51,921   | 1.52            | 1               |
| Freedom Front + (FF+) | 45,648   | 1.34            | 1               |
| United Democratic Movement (UDM) | 33,644   | 0.99            | 1               |
| Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) | 29,076   | 0.85            | 1               |
| **Total**       | 3,408,308 | 99.99          | 73              |

Other parties contesting but failing to win representation (percentage of provincial vote gained in brackets): NNP (0.76), UCDP (0.26), Azapo (0.25), Christian Democratic Party (0.23), National Action (0.14), Peace and Justice Congress (0.09), SOPA (0.09), Economic Freedom Movement (0.05), Pro-Death Penalty Party (0.05), Black People’s Convention (0.04).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>% Vote</th>
<th>Number of votes</th>
<th>Number of seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>KWAZULU-NATAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African National Congress (ANC)</td>
<td>1,287,823</td>
<td>46.98</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)</td>
<td>1,009,267</td>
<td>36.82</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Alliance (DA)</td>
<td>228,857</td>
<td>8.35</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority Front (MF)</td>
<td>71,540</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)</td>
<td>48,892</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Democratic Movement (UDM)</td>
<td>20,546</td>
<td>0.75</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>2,741,65</td>
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<td>80</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Other parties contesting but failing to win representation (percentage of provincial vote gained in brackets): NNP (0.52), ID (0.49), FF+ (0.28), Azapo (0.26), PAC (0.19), SOPA (0.18), CDP (0.18), Izwe Lethu Party (0.18), UCDP (0.14), Peace and Development Party (0.12), Royal Loyal Progress Party (0.11), Independent African Movement (0.06).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>% Vote</th>
<th>Number of votes</th>
<th>Number of seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>LIMPOPO</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African National Congress (ANC)</td>
<td>1,439,853</td>
<td>89.18</td>
<td>45</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democratic Alliance (DA)</td>
<td>57,930</td>
<td>3.59</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Democratic Movement (UDM)</td>
<td>27,780</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)</td>
<td>20,418</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,614,514</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>49</td>
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</table>

Other parties contesting but failing to win representation (percentage of provincial vote gained in brackets): PAC (0.94), Alliance for Democracy and Prosperity (0.62), FF+ (0.60), Ximoko Progressive Party (0.59), Azapo (0.51), NNP (0.46), UCDP (0.22), ID (0.17), NA (0.14).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>% Vote</th>
<th>Number of votes</th>
<th>Number of seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>MPUMALANGA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>African National Congress (ANC)</td>
<td>959,436</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democratic Alliance (DA)</td>
<td>77,119</td>
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<tr>
<td>Freedom Front + (FF+)</td>
<td>13,732</td>
<td>1.24</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,111,692</td>
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</table>

Other parties contesting but failing to win representation (percentage of provincial vote gained in brackets): ACDP (1.09), UDM (1.00), IFP (0.96), PAC (0.69), Sindawonye Progressive Party (0.53), NNP (0.46), ID (0.31), Azapo (0.19), UCDP (0.17), SOPA (0.13).
### NORTHERN CAPE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African National Congress (ANC)</td>
<td>219,365</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democratic Alliance (DA)</td>
<td>35,297</td>
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<tr>
<td>Independent Democrats (ID)</td>
<td>22,485</td>
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<tr>
<td>New National Party (NNP)</td>
<td>23,970</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)</td>
<td>5,995</td>
<td>1.88</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Freedom Front + (FF+)</td>
<td>4,948</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>318,702</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.01</strong></td>
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</table>

Other parties contesting but failing to win representation (percentage of provincial vote gained in brackets): Azapo (0.52), UDM (0.45), PAC (0.43), UCDP (0.33), IFP (0.24), Cape People’s Congress (0.12).

### NORTH WEST

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African National Congress (ANC)</td>
<td>1,048,089</td>
<td>80.71</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP)</td>
<td>110,233</td>
<td>8.49</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Alliance (DA)</td>
<td>64,925</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Freedom Front + (FF+)</td>
<td>17,123</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,298,563</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.01</strong></td>
<td><strong>33</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Other parties contesting but failing to win representation (percentage of provincial vote gained in brackets): ACDP (1.17), UDM (0.96), PAC (0.84), ID (0.44), NNP (0.43), Azapo (0.29), IFP (0.25) NA (0.11).

### WESTERN CAPE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African National Congress (ANC)</td>
<td>709,052</td>
<td>45.25</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democratic Alliance (DA)</td>
<td>424,832</td>
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<tr>
<td>New National Party (NNP)</td>
<td>170,469</td>
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<tr>
<td>Independent Democrats (ID)</td>
<td>122,867</td>
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<td>African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)</td>
<td>53,934</td>
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<td>United Democratic Movement (UDM)</td>
<td>27,489</td>
<td>1.75</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,566,949</strong></td>
<td><strong>99.99</strong></td>
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</table>

Other parties contesting but failing to win representation (percentage of provincial vote gained in brackets): Africa Muslim Party (0.70), New Labor Party (0.67), FF+ (0.62), PAC (0.42), UCDP (0.23), Green Party (0.21), Peace and Justice Congress (0.21), NA (0.14), IFP (0.14), Cape People’s Congress (0.13), Azapo (0.09), Moderate Independent Party (0.06), Peace and Development Party (0.05), Universal Party (0.05).

**Note:** * All totals in this table represent, inclusively, the votes and percentages of parties that won representation in the provincial legislatures.

### TABLE D: The ANC in provincial legislature results, Election 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>% Vote</th>
<th>Number of votes</th>
<th>Number of seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>EASTERN CAPE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African National Congress (ANC)</td>
<td>1,552,676</td>
<td>68.82</td>
<td>44</td>
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<tr>
<td>Congress of the People (Cope)</td>
<td>308,439</td>
<td>13.67</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democratic Alliance (DA)</td>
<td>225,310</td>
<td>9.99</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Democratic Movement (UDM)</td>
<td>93,196</td>
<td>4.13</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Independent Congress (AIC)</td>
<td>17,306</td>
<td>0.77</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>2,256,088</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>63</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Other parties contesting but failing to win representation (percentage of provincial vote gained in brackets): ACDP (0.53), APC (0.2), Christian Democratic Alliance (0.07), ID (0.45), IFP (0.10), National Democratic Convention (0.09), New Vision Party (0.06), Pan Africanist Movement (0.09), UCDP (0.08), FF+ (0.2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>% Vote</th>
<th>Number of votes</th>
<th>Number of seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>FREE STATE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African National Congress (ANC)</td>
<td>734,688</td>
<td>71.10</td>
<td>22</td>
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<tr>
<td>Congress of the People (Cope)</td>
<td>120,018</td>
<td>11.61</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democratic Alliance (DA)</td>
<td>119,844</td>
<td>11.60</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom Front + (FF+)</td>
<td>20,780</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,033,322</td>
<td>100</td>
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</table>

Other parties contesting but failing to win representation (percentage of provincial vote gained in brackets): ACDP (0.73), APC (0.31), DPSA (1.09), ID (0.16), IFP (0.22), Nadeco (0.10), PAC (0.33), Peace and Justice Congress (0.04), UCDP (0.33), UDM (0.36).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>% Vote</th>
<th>Number of votes</th>
<th>Number of seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>GAUTENG</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>African National Congress (ANC)</td>
<td>2,662,013</td>
<td>64.04</td>
<td>47</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democratic Alliance (DA)</td>
<td>908,616</td>
<td>21.86</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td>Congress of the People (Cope)</td>
<td>323,327</td>
<td>7.78</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Freedom Front + (FF+)</td>
<td>67,660</td>
<td>1.63</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)</td>
<td>61,856</td>
<td>1.49</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)</td>
<td>36,099</td>
<td>0.87</td>
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<tr>
<td>Independent Democrats (ID)</td>
<td>25,243</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>4,157,048</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>73</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Other parties contesting but failing to win representation (percentage of provincial vote gained in brackets): African Christian Alliance / Afrikaaner Christen Alliansie (0.60), APC (0.12), Alliance of Free Democrats (0.03), Azapo (0.21), Christian Democratic Alliance (0.07), Great Kongres of South Africa (0.05), Movement Democratic Party (0.14), Nadeco (0.04), New Vision Party (0.03), PAC (0.31), UCDP (0.24), Women Forward (0.05).
## KWAZULU-NATAL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African National Congress (ANC)</td>
<td>2,192,516</td>
<td>62.95</td>
<td>51</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)</td>
<td>780,027</td>
<td>22.40</td>
<td>18</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democratic Alliance (DA)</td>
<td>318,559</td>
<td>9.15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minority Front (MF)</td>
<td>71,507</td>
<td>2.05</td>
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<tr>
<td>Congress of the People (Cope)</td>
<td>44,890</td>
<td>1.29</td>
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<tr>
<td>African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)</td>
<td>23,537</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>3,482,987</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>80</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Other parties contesting but failing to win representation (percentage of provincial vote gained in brackets): Al Jama-AH (0.22), Great Kongres of South Africa (0.05), ID (0.02), Nadeco (0.2), PAC (0.07), Sadeco (0.11), UCDP (0.05), UDM (0.23), FF+ (0.17), Women Forward (0.05).

## LIMPOPO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African National Congress (ANC)</td>
<td>1,265,631</td>
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<tr>
<td>Congress of the People (Cope)</td>
<td>112,325</td>
<td>7.53</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democratic Alliance (DA)</td>
<td>51,858</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,491,072</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>49</td>
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</table>

Other parties contesting but failing to win representation (percentage of provincial vote gained in brackets): ACDP (0.69), APC (0.30), Alliance of Free Democrats (0.07), Azapo (0.38), Black Consciousness Party (0.10), IFP (0.06), New Vision Party (0.44), PAC (0.53), UCDP (0.09), UDM (0.35), United Independent Front (0.12), FF+ (0.61), Women Forward (0.07), Ximoko Party (0.23).

## MPUMALANGA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African National Congress (ANC)</td>
<td>1,110,190</td>
<td>85.55</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democratic Alliance (DA)</td>
<td>97,204</td>
<td>7.49</td>
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<tr>
<td>Congress of the People (Cope)</td>
<td>37,789</td>
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</tr>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,297,775</td>
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Other parties contesting but failing to win representation (percentage of provincial vote gained in brackets): ACDP (0.51), APC (0.37), Azapo (0.23), Christian Party (0.19), ID (0.12), IFP (0.50), Nadeco (0.11), PAC (0.32), Sindawonye Progressive Party (0.49), UCDP (0.07), UDM (0.26), FF+ (0.89).

## NORTHERN CAPE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African National Congress (ANC)</td>
<td>245,699</td>
<td>60.75</td>
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<tr>
<td>Congress of the People (Cope)</td>
<td>67,416</td>
<td>16.67</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democratic Alliance (DA)</td>
<td>50,817</td>
<td>12.57</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Independent Democrats (ID)</td>
<td>19,995</td>
<td>4.94</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>404,418</td>
<td>100</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other parties contesting but failing to win representation (percentage of provincial vote gained in brackets): ACDP (1), APC (0.34), Azapo (0.60), Christian Democratic Alliance (0.12), IFP (0.19), New Vision Party (0.22), UCDP (1.21), UDM (0.15), FF+ (1.24).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>% Vote</th>
<th>Number of votes</th>
<th>Number of seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>NORTH WEST</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African National Congress (ANC)</td>
<td>783,784</td>
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<td>Congress of the People (Cope)</td>
<td>89,573</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>Democratic Alliance (DA)</td>
<td>88,728</td>
<td>8.25</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP)</td>
<td>56,678</td>
<td>5.27</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong>*</td>
<td>1,075,323</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other parties contesting but failing to win representation (percentage of provincial vote gained in brackets): African Christian Alliance (0.16), ACDP (0.69), APC (0.29), IFP (0.15), ID (0.46), Movement Democratic Party (0.41), Nadeco (0.09), PAC (0.26), South African Political Party (0.17), UDM (0.51), FF (1.61).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WESTERN CAPE</th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Alliance (DA)</td>
<td>1,012,568</td>
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<tr>
<td>African National Congress (ANC)</td>
<td>620,918</td>
<td>31.55</td>
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<tr>
<td>Congress of the People (Cope)</td>
<td>152,356</td>
<td>7.74</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Independent Democrats (ID)</td>
<td>92,116</td>
<td>4.66</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)</td>
<td>28,995</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong>*</td>
<td>1,967,751</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other parties contesting but failing to win representation (percentage of provincial vote gained in brackets): APC (0.09), Al Jama-AH (0.46), Azapo (0.07), Cape Party (0.13), Christian Democratic Alliance (0.20), National Alliance (0.10), Nadeco (0.02), National Party of South Africa (0.17), PAC (0.23), Peace and Justice Congress (0.03), UCDP (0.08), UDM (0.71), United Independent Front (0.06), Universal Party (0.03), FF+ (1.43).

**Note:** All totals in this table represent, inclusively, the votes and percentages of parties that won representation in the provincial legislatures.

The ANC was not content with just winning overwhelming, if not two-thirds, majorities through elections. It also introduced and used floor-crossing to aid in the definitive conquest of opposition parties. In this way it constructed a reservoir of representative power. The ANC thoroughly exulted in this effect while it lasted. In the end it was rebellion within the ANC that ended the orgy of party political greed in accumulating public representatives. The resistance came from aggrieved members that revolted against opposition party defectors parachuting in and bypassing loyally serving and long-term committed cadres in the award of prized ANC positions.

Elections in conjunction with floor-crossing worked to deliver the ANC’s heyday of power in the party political domain, as evidenced in the 2004-09 period. The ANC reached its peak of electoral power in 2004. This zenith was further extended through floor-crossing. At the time of the demise of floor-crossing in 2009 the ANC had amassed 74.25 per cent of members of Parliament.

Floor-crossing was kind to the ANC’s pursuit of ever-larger majorities. The ANC was the only party that consistently benefitted from it. It used floor-crossing to subject, undermine and distract opposition parties, and generally to consolidate and extend its electoral gains. The ANC targeted the Democratic Alliance (DA), Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), United Democratic Movement (UDM), Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) and the Independent Democrats (ID). Floor-crossing devastated several of the opposition parties, and undermined others, in between-election wars of attrition.

Floor-crossing moved from the status of a side-game to become part of the central power game. It preoccupied both winners and losers to such an extent that processes of representation, and of policy and governance, suffered. Between every two elections there were two floor-crossing windows. Amidst scheming to optimise floor-crossing gains and mobilising for Polokwane politics ANC cadres’ time was at a premium. The
period came to epitomise power over other parties and within the ANC for the sake of power and the control it brings.

The ANC’s strength in floor-crossing fed off its juggernaut movement reputation and its control over the bulk of the levers of state power (and thus control over the bulk of state-linked opportunities and positions). These sources of power helped the ANC to become virtually invincible in the floor-crossing stakes. It was aided by the formal floor-crossing legal rule that a minimum of 10 per cent of a party’s representatives in a particular institution had to band together in order to defect. The fact that it could offer other parties’ representatives guarantees of political futures come the next election, favourable non-parliamentary (or provincial legislature or municipal council) career options, future list positions and even monetary rewards further handicapped other parties. Opposition parties, and especially the micro-parties, suffered under floor-crossing. With limited resources they could hardly compete to retain members who received attractive offers. At times they were fully distracted by the need just to hang on to their representatives and had less time and energy to oppose the ANC on matters of policy and governance. With opposition parties on the defensive the ANC had relatively free rein.

When the ANC reached its peak of proportionate inter-party power at the time of the 2007 series of floor-crossings, the movement seemed to be on an unstoppable trajectory. In no electoral or floor-crossing event in the period from 2002-07 did the ANC suffer setbacks in its overall standing in representative institutions on national and provincial levels. Moreover, it only lost a handful of municipal seats.

The term floor-crossing is used to denote a particular form of defection – one that takes place within elected, legislative institutions and through which the defecting representatives migrate to another party, taking a seat or a small proportion of the vote with them. The elected representative thus resigns from a particular party and joins another. Floor-crossing internationally is often characterised by relatively small numbers of party politicians changing allegiance, thereby affecting the balance of power and government incumbency. The chapter demonstrates how the mechanism for defections in the form of floor-crossing in South Africa at first accelerated a process of adaptation and stabilisation of the party system in a transitional, post-democratisation period, but after that decayed into farcical party political exploits that detracted from functions of representation and deliberation.

The chapter thus focuses on a period of bifurcation in party politics in South Africa – in which the ANC continuously grew and opposition parties not only suffered a declining proportion of seats in representative institutions, but also saw the proliferation of minor, mostly one-MP parties with a minimal impact on politics. The analysis first positions floor-crossing developments in a specific period of South African politics by taking cues from the comparative international context and draws out the interface with electoral systems and stabilisation in party systems. The second half of the chapter focuses on the manner in which proportionality sequentially became distorted. Towards the point of its termination in 2008-09 floor-crossing was eclipsed by growing intraparty resentment and new inter-party dynamics.
THE TUMULTUOUS PARTY POLITICAL SETTING

From 2000-07, South Africa’s political parties became embroiled in a chain of alliance and defection events that re-shaped power balances nationally, provincially in two of the nine provinces, and in a host of local governments. It took a further two years to 2009 to legally reverse the system. The period was ethically uncomfortable, as political parties (in particular the ANC) let opportunism and party-interest rule. It was a discomforting time, as opportunists and ‘crosstitutes’, in the robes of discoverers of common-ground values and shared policy principles, pranced across the political landscape.

Floor-crossing facilitated and accelerated the reorganisation and stabilisation of the party system in South Africa. It wiped up small and dying political parties and, most of all, bolstered the ANC’s power over opposition parties. Outcries against both the 2003 amendment of the South African Constitution to create window periods for defection, and the argued disproportionality of representation that resulted, came full circle in the abandonment of floor-crossing ... This step was taken with the support of the ANC, but only after the ANC had gained substantial benefits.

The concerns were that significant party changes were materialising through mechanisms beyond electoral verdicts, and that post-floor-crossing representation deviated from electoral proportions. The cumulative changes in party electoral strengths, however, suggested that elections and floor-crossing in this period had often worked in tandem (on national level and in some provinces) to accelerate electoral reconfigurations of party politics in South Africa. Elections took their lead from the new levels of support in representative institutions that the ANC had acquired in preceding floor-crossing sessions. Election 2004 amplified the boosted support that the ANC gained in the preceding spate of floor-crossings. This put paid to the criticism that floor-crossing at the time had created disproportionality in terms of the electoral system of proportional representation (PR). In the two subsequent floor-crossing windows from 2004-09 the ANC further climbed the parliamentary percentage ladder to the pinnacle of 74.25 per cent of MPs in Parliament on the eve of Election 2009. This time around, the floor-crossing dividend had bloated ANC support beyond what was electorally sustainable, particularly in the aftermath of the Cope division. Parliamentary election 2009 cut the ANC’s boosted standing, courtesy of floor-crossing, by roughly 8 percentage points.

In contrast with coalition and defection politics internationally, South Africa’s national-level floor-crossing did not aim at constituting a new national governing majority or ousting an incumbent from power. On the provincial level, however, the ANC did have these designs. Here, events were motivated, first, by the desire of the governing ANC to consolidate its 1994 victory by also taking control of the two provinces of the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal, in which the ANC had not achieved outright majorities in the 1994 and 1999 elections. The defection-alliance cycle was also driven by the ANC’s pre-emptive desire to prevent the support base of the fast-disintegrating former apartheid governing party, the New National Party (NNP) from falling into the...
hands of the de facto NNP successor, the DA. These designs were partially realised. In the Western Cape a Faustian deal with the NNP propelled the ANC into provincial power (the ANC subsequently fell from power again, through an electoral verdict in 2009 that endorsed the DA). In KwaZulu-Natal the ANC fell short of consummating a new non-electoral provincial majority due to political volatility and tensions between itself and the IFP. (It would subsequently win that province electorally, with an outright majority.)

Objections against floor-crossing were amplified when the 2005 floor-crossings showed up the farcical, albeit legal, abuses of the system. Exploits had little connection with representation of the ‘will of the people’ and everything to do with personal and party political greed. The floor-crossing windows had become a platform for deceitful political behaviour, the method of choice to resolve internal party disputes and escape discipline was to form ‘one-MP/MPL parties’, and to secure the public funds allocated to represented political parties. The words circus, farce and crosstition became synonymous with floor-crossing in South Africa. The smaller parties spent their meagre financial resources on legal action to try and stem the outflow to parties that could offer more than they could. By late 2007 all parties were enthusiastically condemning floor-crossing. This did not prevent them from scooping up the last of the spoils in the final 2007 floor-crossing window. The crucial signal that ended it was internal ANC revolt. The floor-crossing legislation was reversed by Parliament in 2008 and formally signed into oblivion by the president in early 2009. Its impact lived on.

**ALLIANCE FORMATION, FLOOR-CROSSING AND ELECTORAL SYSTEMS**

International comparisons, including with some of the transitional democracies in Southern Africa, shed light on the particularities of floor-crossing in the South African case. This in turn illuminates the role of floor-crossing in emerging party systems. Specifically, it demonstrates how floor-crossing oiled the momentum of an ascendant governing party, further garnering and consolidating power in legislative institutions.

Floor-crossing twinned with the formation of party political alliances is commonplace in multiparty democracies. In the case of South African it was not. South Africa also stood out because of its closed-list proportional representation (PR) system. Floor-crossing is far less likely to be found in PR systems. Internationally the focus was commonly on legislators’ manoeuvres to bypass the limitations placed on floor-crossing. The predominant international trend at the time when floor-crossing was introduced in South Africa was for countries to contain or regulate it. Instead, South Africa relaxed the constitutional restrictions on floor-crossing.

**Floor-crossing as a common party political pastime**

Floor-crossing as defections between political parties in legislative institutions is a recognised, sometimes even endemic, international occurrence. It is common in, for example, Russia, the Philippines, France, Italy and Brazil. Papua New Guinea’s fragmented and
unstable party system\textsuperscript{10} is often cited as an example of endemic floor-crossing. Pakistan, Bangladesh, Zambia and Malawi have regular, rather than frequent, inter-party defections. Malawi has had a series of defections leading to realignment and changes in government incumbency. In 2005 the president was expelled from his party. Then, through defections, he constructed a new party in Parliament to sustain him in power. In the subsequent 2009 election he was re-elected on the new party ticket.\textsuperscript{11} In Uganda, the People’s Congress from 1964 until the institution of the non-party system could govern on its own as a result of abundant floor-crossing.\textsuperscript{12} In the case of Pakistan, the pre-eminent party’s governing majority was assembled partly by encouraging defections from its rivals.\textsuperscript{13} The United States of America is a system where floor-crossing is permitted, yet happens infrequently. In May 2002, for example, control of the US Senate temporarily changed from Republican to Democratic when an independent switched his vote to the Democratic Party.\textsuperscript{14} The Australian senate and Canadian parliament have had comparable experiences.\textsuperscript{15}

Majoritarian systems with no anti-defection legislation include the United Kingdom, Canada and the USA. PR systems without any restrictions occur in a few countries, such as Denmark, Germany, Israel and Sweden. In contrast, a total ban on floor-crossing characterises many of the new multiparty democracies in Africa,\textsuperscript{16} including Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Despite its international presence, the 1996 South African Constitution prohibited floor-crossing. This prevailed until political pressure for the introduction of floor-crossing succeeded in 2002-03.

**Against the grain of the electoral system**

The party systems of both South Africa and some of the other liberation-movement countries of Southern Africa have strong roots in PR electoral systems. South Africa’s original (and subsequent) rejection of floor-crossing related, amongst other things, to its subscription to the PR system, and specifically the closed-list format.\textsuperscript{17} Schrire\textsuperscript{18} pointed out that there are a few systems with closed-list PR electoral systems that have permitted defection. The Institute for Democracy in South Africa (Idasa) noted that there was little precedent for virtually unhindered floor-crossing in closed-list PR systems.\textsuperscript{19}

There is conflicting debate on the conciliatory impact of the PR system,\textsuperscript{20} but the choice of PR is frequently seen as contributing to peacemaking and reconciliation.\textsuperscript{21} This was a primary motivation for the adoption of PR on the level of national and provincial elections in South Africa, as was the case in Mozambique and Namibia. In the Southern Africa cases PR did not directly spawn several strongly contending parties, as is generally expected. Rather, systems of one-party dominance evolved in South Africa and Namibia, with Mozambique moving in this direction.\textsuperscript{22}

Whereas political expediency united the major South African parties of the early 2000s in support of floor-crossing (including the ANC, DA, NNP and UCDP), specialised civil society actors, electoral authorities, intellectuals and a few small opposition parties opposed changing the Constitution to permit floor-crossing. In a tug of war another group of intellectuals helped rationalise the political imperatives of the
time. Supporting floor-crossing within PR, Steytler argued that defections could provide a ‘corrective of current disproportionality’, accommodating mid-term changes in public opinion. Schrire concurred – floor-crossing would permit the between-elections reflection of change in the levels of popular support for parties. Rapoo argued that public representatives are in their positions by virtue of the parties and the parties’ lists. The party’s ‘ownership’ of representatives could thus legitimately override proportionality.

Limiting the excesses of floor-crossing—and rationalising the bypassing

Three ‘degrees’ of floor-crossing are recognised: absolute freedom to cross the floor (flowing from the member’s so-called ‘free mandate’), total prohibition on crossing the floor (derived from the notion of ‘imperative mandate’), and a qualified freedom to defect. Full freedom to defect tends to be associated with fully institutionalised democracies, with stabilised party systems, rather than with democracies where there is a combination of volatility in the balance between parties and fluidity in the party system. Qualified defection may take the form of freedom to leave one party, but with seat retention only for independents (Portugal and Argentina). Malawi and Kenya are instances where the national constitution stipulates resignation and by-election.

Many of these systems can relate tales of endless lists of tricks to bypass restrictions. Constraints on floor-crossing thus often prove ineffective, even farcical. Parties and representatives find loopholes to bypass legal and constitutional constraints. Cases in point include Zambia, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. In Pakistan it was argued that ‘defections’ do not apply to the period between the election and the first assembly of the new Parliament. Malawian floor-crossing antics occurred despite the country’s ban on floor-crossing when the president remained in power after resigning and forming a new party arguing that the anti-defection limitations only applied to existing parties. Miskin describes New Zealand’s 2001 implementation of restraining legislation as a dismal failure. She notes that India witnessed more defections subsequent to its adoption of constraining legislation than before. In a drawn-out Bangladeshi battle the ruling party defied the speaker, the supreme court and finally the country’s electoral commission when these institutions tried to restrain defections and patronage practices.

Given its threshold and window-period provisions, the South African system applied a qualified freedom. Floor-crossing was limited to window periods occurring twice in each between-election period. The 10 per cent minimum rule before members of a particular party could defect also prevailed – and favoured the big parties, in particular the ANC.

South Africa’s floor-crossing was increasingly discredited by the flourishing of unseemly practices. Foremost was the undignified demeanour of the parties and their agents and the way in which the floor-crossing window periods came to represent a parade of unseemly and underhand behaviour by the political parties. Floor-crossing became the method of choice to solve disputes in small parties. The final tipping point...
against floor-crossing materialised in the outcries of ruling party loyalists. Offended by
the way in which defectors became elevated and celebrated in their new ANC political
home, many (but far from all) in the ANC revolted against the practice. ANC members
themselves therefore triggered the turning of the tide against floor-crossing – but only
once the measure had served its purpose for the ANC.32

Consolidation of the party system

It is generally acknowledged that party systems remain in flux, or ‘unconsolidated’ to
use Pridham’s word,33 for at least the first decade of the existence of new democracies.
South Africa’s seven-year floor-crossing era of 2002-09 started eight years into the
country’s multiparty democracy and prevailed until the 15-year mark. The process did
indeed help to wash out the formal remains of the oppressor party, the NP. It facilitated
the emergence of the DA as the foremost opposition party – by helping it to absorb
components of the NNP. It also helped ensure that these public representatives could
exercise their choice of remaining in the DA when the NNP formally aligned with,
and then was absorbed into, the ANC. It also brought extra pressures to bear on the
smaller parties to perform or perish, and many succumbed. Above all, it helped the
ANC to entrench its dominant position in South African politics.

Party-system stabilisation in South Africa shows a closer resemblance to the domi-
nant-party trend of Southern Africa than, for example, to the process of bloc-building
that materialised in countries of East Central Europe.34 The dominant-party political
system in South Africa also did not suffer the type of disruption that resulted from floor-
crossing in Zambia and Malawi. In Zambia, the governing Movement for Multi-Party
Democracy (MMD) emerged out of parliamentary defections before it was put to
electoral test.35

Floor-crossing was a useful spoke in the wheel of the ANC regenerating political
power. It played out alongside mechanisms of internal party fallout and breakaway,
multiparty elections and continuous movements in opposition party alliances, both with
and without the aid of floor-crossing. The cumulative practical result of the floor-crossing
and election chain in South Africa was a party system that became further consolidated
in the dominant-party mode, combined with both modest opposition consolidation and
the proliferation and fragmentation of opposition parties (Table 1).

The triggers in the case of South Africa

The final decline of the NNP was the catalyst for the defection-and-alliances period.
From 1999-2001, the momentum of alliance building had briefly swung the way of
opposition parties. An opposition alliance with the potential to whittle away the gov-
erning party’s slim two-thirds majority at the time – the DA – was constituted by
aligning the growing DP and the faltering NNP. The initiative was reversed when the
two parties failed to integrate. The ANC then hijacked the initiative through the floor-
crossing mechanism. In the process, the ANC gained a symbolic victory by swallowing
the former oppressor party (Chapter 8). It also extended its catch-all, ‘broad-church’
base. The DA had, however, already scooped up most of the NNP support.
### TABLE 1: Party political power change through elections and floor-crossing, 1994-2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>1994 Election: % support (No. of MPs)</th>
<th>1999 Election: % support (No. of MPs)</th>
<th>2003 Election: Floor-crossing: % MPs (No. of MPs)</th>
<th>2004 Election: Floor-crossing: % support (No. of MPs)</th>
<th>2005 Floor-crossing: Change in No. of MPs</th>
<th>2007 Floor-crossing: % MPs; (No. of MPs)</th>
<th>2009 Election: % support (No. of MPs)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>62.65 (252)</td>
<td>66.50 (266)</td>
<td>68.75 (+9-275)</td>
<td>69.69 (279)</td>
<td>+14=293</td>
<td>74.25 (+4-297)</td>
<td>65.9 (264)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA (DP 1994-99)</td>
<td>1.73 (7)</td>
<td>9.50 (38)</td>
<td>11.50 (+8-46)</td>
<td>12.37 (50)</td>
<td>-5, +2=47</td>
<td>11.75 (47)</td>
<td>16.66 (67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cope</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7.42 (30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFP</td>
<td>10.54 (43)</td>
<td>8.50 (34)</td>
<td>7.75(-3=31)</td>
<td>6.97 (28)</td>
<td>-5=23</td>
<td>5.75 (23)</td>
<td>4.55 (18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NNP (NP 94)</td>
<td>20.39 (82)</td>
<td>7.00 (28)</td>
<td>5.00 (-8=20)</td>
<td>1.65(7)</td>
<td>-7=0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDM</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.50 (14)</td>
<td>1.00(-10=4)</td>
<td>2.28 (9)</td>
<td>-3=6</td>
<td>1.5 (6)</td>
<td>0.85 (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACDP</td>
<td>0.45 (2)</td>
<td>1.50 (6)</td>
<td>1.75(+1=7)</td>
<td>1.6 (7)</td>
<td>-3=4</td>
<td>1 (4)</td>
<td>0.81 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAC</td>
<td>1.25 (5)</td>
<td>0.75 (3)</td>
<td>0.50 (-1=2)</td>
<td>0.73 (3)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.25 (-2=1)</td>
<td>0.27 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCDP</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.75 (3)</td>
<td>0.75 (3)</td>
<td>0.75 (3)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.75 (3)</td>
<td>0.37 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FF+ (FF 94)</td>
<td>2.17 (9)</td>
<td>0.75 (3)</td>
<td>0.75 (3)</td>
<td>0.89 (4)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1 (4)</td>
<td>0.84 (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FA</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.50 (2)</td>
<td>0.50 (2)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AEB</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.25 (1)</td>
<td>0.00 (-1=0)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azapo</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.25 (1)</td>
<td>0.25 (1)</td>
<td>0.25 (1)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.25 (1)</td>
<td>0.22 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MF</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.25 (1)</td>
<td>0.25 (1)</td>
<td>0.35 (2)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.5 (2)</td>
<td>0.25 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID</td>
<td>FORMED IN 2003</td>
<td>0.25 (+1=1)</td>
<td>1.73 (7)</td>
<td>-2=5</td>
<td>1% (-1=4)</td>
<td>0.92 (4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0.25 (+1=10)</td>
<td>0.1 (0)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.25 (+1=1)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIM</td>
<td>0.25 (+1=1)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADP</td>
<td>0.25 (+1=1)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIC</td>
<td>0.25 (+1=1)</td>
<td>0.1 (0)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FD</td>
<td>FORMED IN 2005</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.25% (1)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nadeco</td>
<td>4 (from IFP)</td>
<td>1% (4)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIM</td>
<td>1 (from DA)</td>
<td>- (-1=0)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UIF</td>
<td>2 (from UDM)</td>
<td>- (-2=0)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPSA</td>
<td>1 (from NNP)</td>
<td>- (-1=0)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APC</td>
<td>FORMED IN 2007</td>
<td>0.5% (+2=2)</td>
<td>0.20 (1)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>400 (100)</td>
<td>100% (400 MPs)</td>
<td>100% (400 MPs)</td>
<td>100% (400 MPs)</td>
<td>100% (400 MPs)</td>
<td>100% (400 MPs)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The main 2002-07 chain of defection and alliance events (Table 2) demonstrates the ANC's gradual capture of the spoils. The ANC carried the gains made from floor-crossing in 2003 forward into the April 2004 national and provincial elections. The election increased ANC electoral support on national level. Local level defections in late 2004 indicated the likely continuation of ANC gains, albeit in scaled-down form. The proportions of change became smaller in the two further rounds of floor-crossing in 2005 and 2007 (Tables 1 and 3). From 2004-07 the ANC gained representatives from opposition parties largely in individually based floor-crossings, as opposed to realignments of parties. This trend continued until floor-crossing was abandoned in 2008-09.36

THREE ROUNDS OF POWER SHIFTS THROUGH FLOOR-CROSSING

A periodisation in terms of three rounds of power-shifts in the life-span of floor-crossing in South Africa illuminates both its changing character and consistency in accumulating power for the ANC. In total there were nine sets of floor-crossing windows, with three sets each on national, provincial and local levels. The provincial and national windows were always concurrent. In 2007 the local window coincided37 with the national and provincial windows. The specific windows started in October 2002 and ended in September 2007 (Table 3). In total, just over 1,400 public representatives switched party affiliations and allegiances in this period – with the bulk in the local sphere, and especially in the early periods when other parties were claiming the NNP remains.

ROUND ONE: Floor-crossing moving the earth

The first round of power shifts deals with the set of local government floor-crossings of 2002 and the subsequent 2003 national and provincial government defections and new party formations (Table 3).
**TABLE 2: South Africa’s floor-crossing saga**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Political build-up, introduction, full flight and implosion of floor-crossing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>• Constitution of South Africa specifically rules out floor-crossing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>• DP moves a motion in Parliament to propose introduction of floor-crossing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>• April election dramatically weakens the NNP, NNP explores ways to survive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• NNP and DP form provincial government in Western Cape ‘to keep the ANC out’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>• NNP, DP and FA form the DA in June, under pressure to contest local elections as one party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• DA contests December local government elections; performs reasonably well, captures, for example, Cape Town Unicity council.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>• DA submits proposal to the deputy-president and speaker’s office on best options for lifting anti-defection clause.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Scandals in DA in mid-2001 (especially in its NNP component), e.g. Cape Town road-naming, and mutual distrust weakens the DP-NNP’s DA alliance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late 2001</td>
<td>• NNP Federal Council suspends NNP participation in DA; NNP withdraws from partnership with DA on Western Cape provincial level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Original DP-NNP-FA proposal to circumvent anti-defection now also championed by ANC – the ANC motivation is to unravel the DA on local level; DA continues to support the measure because it is set to gain from NNP representatives that had switched allegiance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• ANC and NNP explore options for future cooperation, but face dilemma that there is no way for elected representatives to defect.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-2002</td>
<td>• National Assembly adopts four bills to allow elected representatives at all levels of government to switch parties without losing their seats – supported by ANC, DA, NNP, FA, UCDP; 86 per cent of MPs support the legislation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Legal challenges immediately ensue against the legislation, moving from the Cape High Court to the Constitutional Court.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late 2002</td>
<td>• The Constitutional Court rules that a procedural flaw in the adoption of the legislation means that only local level defections may proceed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The window for local level defections starts in October; the DA retains a significant number of former NNP councillors, whilst just over one-third return to NNP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Cooperative governance agreement between ANC and NNP formalised in November.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early to mid-2003</td>
<td>• Constitutional amendment and introduction of amended law to facilitate floor-crossing on provincial and national levels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Series of contestations of power through defections and rearrangement of provincial executive power in KwaZulu-Natal, affecting the ANC-IFP relationship.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March – April 2003</td>
<td>• President Mbeki signs the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Amendment Act, No. 2 of 2003 in March.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Defection window period for national and provincial government starts in March; ANC and DA are the main beneficiaries; ANC attains overall majority of representatives in Western Cape government, but retains executive power-sharing with NNP.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The intense contestation between parties in the first period of floor-crossing alternated between the national, provincial and local government levels. The combination of defections and party alliances on the provincial and local levels in 2002-03 propelled parties in and out of power. Subtle changes in party representation triggered changes in the overall balance of power. Simultaneously on the national level, the colossus status of the ruling party was advanced and opposition threats to the ANC reduced. Changes in the strengths of the parties in the representative institutions due to floor-crossing matched and sometimes exceeded those that could be expected from elections.
### TABLE 3: The scope of floor-crossing and power shifts across levels of government in South Africa’s floor-crossing era

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Floor-crossing window</th>
<th>National (Number of MPs crossing) Total in National Assembly: 400</th>
<th>Provincial (Number of MPLs crossing) Total in SA: 430</th>
<th>Local &amp; metro (Number of councillors crossing) Total in SA: 8,951</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>FIRST ROUND OF POWER SHIFTS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-23 October 2002: Local</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>555 (61% constituted by moves from the DA to NNP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 March – 15 April 2003: National, provincial</td>
<td>23 (61 if DP MPs that crossed to form the DA are included)</td>
<td>21 (55 if the DP MPLs that crossed to form the DA are included; majority shifts in two provinces of Western Cape, KwaZulu-Natal)</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SECOND ROUND OF POWER SHIFTS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-15 September 2004: Local</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>486 (in 164 municipalities; 31 majority shifts in councils)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-15 September 2005: National, provincial</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>THIRD ROUND OF POWER SHIFTS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-15 September 2007: National, provincial, local</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>250 (in 128 municipalities; 12 majority shifts in councils)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>55</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1,291**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>****</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,406</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** * Crossing refers to both defection to other parties and joining of a specially formed new party. ** Faull cites an alternate figure of 1,302, and this is also cited in the parliamentary publication In Session, 9: 7, July 2009. However, the official figures released over time added up to 1,291. This also impacts on the overall total.

Disintegration and substitution of party alliances

The defection and alliance events originated in the 1999 elections when the NNP not only suffered a terminal setback in its national level support, but also lost the overall majority it had won in the 1994 election in the Western Cape. The province had been the NNP’s mainstay (Tables 1 and 4). Jointly, the NNP and the DA in 1999 mustered just over 50 per cent of the Western Cape provincial vote. The two formed a de facto governance alliance to constitute the Western Cape provincial government. The ANC in the province was now marginalised, despite being the largest single party in election 1999 – largest, but short of an outright majority. The next step for the DP and NNP opposition was to constitute a new identity, a shared one in the form of the Democratic Alliance (DA). This mid-2000 event was just in time for the local government elections of late 2000. The alliance could shield the NNP from electoral annihilation. In the local elections the new DA captured power in a range of municipalities, especially in the Western Cape.

The prevailing anti-defection clause in the 1996 Constitution prohibited the DP and NNP legs of the DA from extending their local level alliance into national Parliament and provincial legislatures. They would forfeit their seats should they consummate their new party identity in those forums (they were however permitted to form a governing alliance in the Western Cape, without merging the parties). Both became confirmed advocates of floor-crossing.

The DA in its NNP alliance failed to consolidate. By 2002 it had become internally conflict ridden. The fall out resulted in ungovernability in both the Western Cape provincial government and several local municipalities. Simultaneously, the DA was a thorn in the flesh of the ANC, particularly in its control of the Western Cape provincial government. The ANC started strategising around the advantages that it could derive from an association with the NNP. On the national level, an ANC–NNP link would deprive the DA of a support bloc that had been bolstering the DA’s standing. The ANC developed a three-part strategic objective of exorcising the NNP from the DA, persuading it to link up with the ANC, and jointly taking over provincial power in the Western Cape (Chapter 8). Floor-crossing was to be the mechanism for achieving this.

The ANC precipitated the implosion of the DA as alliance through its intensified overtures to the NNP. The NNP suspended its participation in the DA and withdrew from the Western Cape provincial governing partnership. At provincial level, the NNP’s breakaway from the DA was possible because members were elected in 1999 on the pre-DA NNP ticket and could thus act on their own new party identity. At local level, however, NNP representatives were trapped in the DA, having been elected on the DA ticket in 2000. Withdrawal would entail forfeiting their seats. The developments arrived amidst the realisation by many NNP MPs, MPLs and councillors that the death of the NNP was imminent. Jumping ship was preferable to sinking with the ship.

The ANC now advanced to the stage of legitimating and consummating the ‘cooperative governance’ agreement (less than a full alliance) with the NNP (Chapter 8). To consummate the ANC-NNP cooperative agreement on all levels of government floor-crossing legislation was crafted. The legislation created window periods of 15 days...
TABLE 4: Provincial change in party representation: Case studies of Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal, 1999-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>1999 Provincial election: Vote % (Number of MPLs)</th>
<th>Number of provincial defectors</th>
<th>2003 Provincial floor-crossing: New % (Number of MPLs)</th>
<th>2004 Provincial Election: Vote % (Number of MPLs)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WESTERN CAPE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>42.86 (18)</td>
<td>+4</td>
<td>52.38 (22)</td>
<td>46.28 (19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP / DA</td>
<td>11.90 (5)</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td>16.67 (7)</td>
<td>26.92 (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NNP</td>
<td>40.48 (17)</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>23.81 (10)</td>
<td>9.44 (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDM</td>
<td>2.38 (1)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.00 (0)</td>
<td>1.85 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACDP</td>
<td>2.38 (1)</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>4.76 (2)</td>
<td>3.78 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID (new)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>7.97 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NLP (new)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>2.38 (1)</td>
<td>0.61 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other **</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Combined 3.1 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100 (42)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>100 (42)</td>
<td>100 (42)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

KWAZULU-NATAL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>1999 Provincial election: Vote % (Number of MPLs)</th>
<th>Number of provincial defectors</th>
<th>2003 Provincial floor-crossing: New % (Number of MPLs)</th>
<th>2004 Provincial Election: Vote % (Number of MPLs)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>40.00 (32)</td>
<td>+3</td>
<td>43.75 (35)</td>
<td>47.47 (38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFP*</td>
<td>42.8 (34)</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>40.00 (32)</td>
<td>34.87 (30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP /DA*</td>
<td>8.75 (7)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>7.50 (6)</td>
<td>10 (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDM*</td>
<td>1.25 (1)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1.25 (1)</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NNP</td>
<td>3.75 (3)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>2.50 (2)</td>
<td>0.58 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACDP*</td>
<td>1.25 (1)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1.25 (1)</td>
<td>1.8 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MF</td>
<td>2.50 (2)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2.50 (2)</td>
<td>1.86 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID (new)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.75 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDP (new)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>1.25 (1)</td>
<td>- (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Combined 1.67 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100 (80)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>100 (80)</td>
<td>100 (80)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: * The IFP 2003-04 alliance members carry an asterisk; the ANC-NNP-MF alliance had a total of 41 out of the 80 members.
** These micro-parties were old, new or defection parties.
Key: MPL: Member of Provincial Legislature.
Sources: Idasa, 2003; Author’s monitoring of defections trends; IEC 2005.
per window for floor-crossing on two occasions in every between-elections period. It opened the door for party political realignment, individual movement between parties, and individual public representatives to form their own micro-parties.

**Legal and constitutional manoeuvres**

A chain of defections and alliances took shape through legal and constitutional wrangling. In mid-2002, the South African Parliament adopted the floor-crossing legislation. Four bills allowed members of Parliament, provincial legislatures and municipal councils to switch parties without forfeiting their seats. The *Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Amendment Act, No. 18 of 2002* and the *Local Government: Municipal Structures Amendment Act, No. 20 of 2002* pertained to local level changes in representatives’ affiliations. They provided for the two 15-day window periods per elected term (plus one additional period immediately following the adoption of the legislation) during which the elected representatives could change their party affiliations without losing their seats. The *Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Second Amendment Act, No. 21 of 2002* and the *Loss or Retention of Membership of National and Provincial Legislatures Act, No. 22 of 2002* (the ‘Membership Act’) enabled corresponding processes on national and provincial levels.

Parliament passed the legislation with an 86 per cent majority. Several opposition parties, including the DA and some micro-parties, boosted the ANC’s then 67 per cent parliamentary majority. The opportunistic dividing line was between parties expecting membership gains, and those anticipating losses to bigger players. The UDM (mainly with Eastern Cape support) and the IFP (with support concentrated in KwaZulu-Natal) challenged the legislation in the Cape High Court. The Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC) and Idasa supported the non-defection position. Both emphasised the iniquity of floor-crossing within a proportional representation electoral system. The IEC chairperson implored that the floor-crossing legislation should wait for the report of the Electoral Task Team, which had been tasked with advising on a future electoral system for South Africa.

The Cape High Court referred the legislation to the Constitutional Court, which suspended the commencement of the legislation. Some months later, it indicated appropriate routes to give effect to floor-crossing. It ruled that floor-crossing was consistent with the founding values of South Africa’s Constitution and its Bill of Rights. It further ruled that defection in a PR system was not inconsistent with democracy. It added that whereas ‘between elections voters have no control over their representatives, unhappiness should be dealt with in the next election’. It upheld floor-crossing at local government level. It also upheld, however, on technical grounds the UDM-IFP challenge to the *Membership Act* (intended to enable floor-crossing at national level). The legislation, it stated, ‘impermissibly amended the Constitution by means of ordinary legislation rather than a constitutional amendment’. Parliament then passed a constitutional amendment – the *Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Amendment Act, No. 2 of 2003* – giving effect to floor-crossing in provincial legislatures and the national Parliament. The president signed the Act in early 2003, affording members of the national assembly and provincial legislatures an immediate two week-period to defect.
Scramble to defect

The first rush to defect at local level happened in 2002. A total of 555 municipal councillors, including 29 district councillors, crossed. Of these defectors, 217 were not connected to the NNP. This was significant, given that floor-crossing came about primarily to help the NNP extricate itself from the DA. It turned out to have a far broader reach. The ANC gained 128 councillors, whilst the DA lost 417 (largely returning to the NNP). The figures veil the fact that after defection the DA still had significantly more councillors than it had as the DP, prior to its NNP dalliance. Many councillors opted not to return to the NNP, remaining instead in their new DA base – as their national counterparts would do in 2003. At the close of the first local-level window period of floor-crossing, power had changed hands in 21 municipalities. In some instances, this was due to a single defection. The ANC was the new dominant party in eight of the councils where power had changed hands. The ANC, arguing the case for ‘the minor significance of floor-crossing’, stressed that ‘less than 10 per cent’ of the total number of councillors used the floor-crossing window to change parties.

In his exploration of the reasons for floor-crossing, McLaughlin found that whilst many instances were related to the party political fall out between the DA and NNP, local defections were impacted by, amongst others, the ‘internal market’ of the councils that put power ‘up for grabs’ and facilitated the decision to defect. PR and ward councillors were roughly equally likely to defect, even if there were different driving forces behind their actions.

From mid-2003 until early 2004 the constitutional and legislative changes took effect and triggered further rushes to defect, now on national and provincial levels. Nationally, the movement was mostly away from declining opposition parties to the bigger opposition and ruling parties. At the same time many micro-parties emerged. In what was to become characteristic of floor-crossing in South Africa individual representatives from parties with representation in legislative bodies, for example from the IFP and PAC, defected to form their own small (often single-MP) parties. In the case of the PAC, Patricia De Lille defected in 2003. (The fragmentation of the PAC would be repeated in 2007 when PAC deputy president, Themba Godi, and former secretary-general, Mofihli Likotsi, left to form the African People’s Convention (APC)).

The ANC consolidated its parliamentary majority at well above the two-thirds mark. The DA lost MPs to the now separated NNP, but was strengthened by former NNP members who had changed allegiance to the DA. The new DA emerged significantly stronger than the original DP. The worst affected was the NNP. Defections stripped the NNP of its status as a potent aspiring alliance partner to the ANC. Several minor opposition parties were dented, in particular those that were already in decline, or were of micro-status prior to the defections, such as the UDM, the PAC and the Afrikaner Eenheidsbeweging (- Unity Movement, AEB). UDM shrinkage was due to defection to the ANC. Playing for career advantage, its representatives leapt either to the ANC or the DA. In the process six new one-MP parties arrived in Parliament. Only one of them, the ID, would survive the 2004 election (Table 1). The ID also survived the 2009 election (before starting incorporation procedures with the DA in 2010).
Power holding and opposition party statuses in the provinces changed. A total of only 21 of the 430 members of provincial legislatures changed their party alignment. Yet, because these persons had been strategically targeted for defection, the provincial power holding repercussions were far-reaching. In KwaZulu-Natal, the IFP tried to restrain its members, using threats to call a provincial election. It remained in power, despite the

### TABLE 5: Main new political parties formed in a selection of floor-crossing periods in South Africa*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Floor-crossing window</th>
<th>Political parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002 municipal</td>
<td>Reconstitution of NNP; five completely new parties formed were the Universal Party, Black Consciousness Party, Sport Party, Phumelela Ratepayers’ Association, Belastingbetalersvereniging.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003 national / provincial</td>
<td>Floor-crossing parties formed were the Independent Democrats (ID), National Action (NA), AfricanIndependent Movement (AIM), Alliance for Democracy and Prosperity (ADP), Peace and Justice Congress (PIC); in crucial provinces new parties included New Labour Party (NLP) in Western Cape, Peace and Development Party (PDP) in KwaZulu-Natal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005 national / provincial</td>
<td>Federation of Democrats (FD); National Democratic Convention (Nadeco; instituted when 4 IFP MPs and 4 MPLs crossed the floor to form the new party); Progressive Independent Movement (PIM); United Independent Front (UIF; led by the former Deputy Leader of the UDM was formed through the defection of 2 MPs and 4 MPLs from the UDM ); United Party of South Africa (UPSA).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007 national / provincial</td>
<td>2 new parties become represented; 11 new political parties were registered nationally from June to the beginning of floor-crossing in 2007: Christian Democratic Alliance (CDA; includes parties such as ACT, Alliance for Community Transformation), CDP (Christian Democratic Party), PCP (Party for Christian Principles) as well as the FD (Federation of Democrats) the latter giving the CDA representation in National Parliament ); Federal Congress (FC), National Alliance (NA), Social Democratic Party (SDP), National People’s Party (NPP), People’s Democratic Movement (PDM), African People’s Convention (APC), New Vision Party (NVP), Civic Alliance of South Africa (CASA), South African Political Party (SAPP), Federal African Convention (FAC) and Eden Forum. Provisional: Western Cape (National People’s Party, Social Democratic Party, South African Political Alliance); North West (South African Political Party, African People’s Convention); Limpopo and Eastern Cape (New Vision Party); KwaZulu-Natal (Federal African Convention, Federal Congress); Gauteng (Independent Ratepayers Association of SA).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007 municipal</td>
<td>Eden Forum (which is registered municipally); National People’s Party (NPP).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** *The IEC did not release information on all window periods; the information in this table is an illustration of trends.**

**Sources:** IEC floor-crossing results for various periods; IEC election results; IEC statements on party political trends.
ANC’s ascendance through floor-crossing to a slight outright majority. For reasons of political volatility in the province, the ANC refrained from claiming provincial power. (The ANC did, however, win an outright majority in the 2004 election.) The UDM in the Eastern Cape lost its status as official provincial opposition – but regained it in the 2004 election, before losing it to Cope in 2009. In the Western Cape government the DA was demoted from governing partner to official opposition. The ANC scooped the now minor NNP into its governing alliance. With the aid of defections, the ANC was, for the time being, in control of all nine provinces.

Whereas the floor-crossing legislation was originally intended to rescue NNP members from the troubled DA waters, its impact was thus realised across political parties and provinces to reconfigure substantial parts of the status quo ante (Tables 3, 5 and 6).

**ROUND TWO: NNP remnants for sale, legal scramble to protect electoral bases**

The second round of power-shifts started with the local floor-crossings of 2004, but mainly concerns the changes resulting through the national and provincial floor-crossings of 2005 (Table 3).

The 2004 national and provincial elections mostly sustained the momentum and direction of change that floor-crossing generated in 2002-03. The result of election 2004 in many instances confirmed the floor-crossing advances that the ruling and main opposition party had made, especially on national level. It also further extended their enlarged majorities due to earlier defections. Disproportionality did, however, emerge in some provincial and local cases.

**Commotion in local defections**

In the second local-level window for defection – September 2004, five months after the 2004 elections – 459 councillors (486 with the inclusion of district councillors) crossed the floor in local councils. The phenomenon of serial defection emerged – defection in 2002 did not mean that permanent new political homes had been found. The 2002 defectors were often again up for grabs by predator parties in 2004.

The NNP remained the biggest single source of defections, accounting for 290. The ANC had gained 128 councillors in 2002. The 2004 local government defections swelled its number of councillors by a further 336. By this time, the defections literally amounted to the dissolution of the NNP at local level. The DA lost a total of 417 of its councillors in 2002, but only 44 in 2004. It thus retained a large proportion of the NNP councillors that had originally joined the DA through the DP-NNP alliance. The total number of councillors defecting and the number of local councils where defections brought power shifts had tapered off from 2002 to 2004. At the close of local floor-crossing in 2002 power had shifted in 21 municipalities – this number was halved to 10 in 2004. This was out of a total of 283 municipalities in South Africa at the time. After the 2004 local window, 80 NNP councillors remained across the country – having refused to join the ANC in this window. It was largely due to their presence that the
NNP effectively continued to exist at local level up to the end of the local government term and on to the eve of the announcement of the 2006 local election result.53

A comparison of 2004 local level floor-crossing outcomes and the 2006 local government elections shows evidence of disproportionality. As Idasa noted with regard to the city of Cape Town:54

The 2006 local government election results for Cape Town highlight further distortions in representation. Through two local government floor-crossing windows the ANC increased its representation in the 200 member city council from 77 seats (on the back of 38.54 per cent support in the 2000 elections) to 105 seats (or 52.5 per cent of representatives). The DA saw its representation shrink from 107 seats (53.49 per cent support in 2000) to 70 (35 per cent representation). In the 2006 election the ANC was returned to an expanded 210 seat council with 81 seats representing 37.91 per cent of the 2006 result. The DA won 90 seats with 41.85 per cent of the vote. The effect of the two defection periods in the first term of local government had thoroughly skewed representation for the two major parties in the City of Cape Town council. When held up to public scrutiny through the ballot box, the correction was significant.

Gains, losses and disproportionate gains

The power shifts in the 2005 national and provincial bout of floor-crossings brought further confirmation of pre-2004 defection balances, and the 2004 election result. Instead of reversing the seeming disproportionality that defections were seen to have created in the representation levels of parties in 1999, the April 2004 national and provincial elections showed that the changes that had resulted from floor-crossing were largely confirmed and further advanced. The only significant provincial disproportionality that resulted from defections was in the Western Cape. In KwaZulu-Natal, the changes wrought by defections were further advanced through the elections (Table 4). It appeared that it was largely the opposition stronghold of the Western Cape that had been affected through disproportionality.

The disintegrating NNP again provided the main source of predation for the DA and ANC in the September 2004 floor-crossings, to the extent that it had any support left. The NNP on national level had receded from 7 per cent support in 1999 to, 5 per cent through floor-crossing in 2003 and to below 2 per cent in election 2004. Due to the NNP’s April 2005 decision to merge with the ANC and not to contest further elections, its remaining representatives had to use the September window to lodge themselves in the ANC. On the eve of the 2005/2006 local government elections the party was to formally dissolve and be absorbed into the ANC.

The stepped decline of the other significant opposition party, the KwaZulu-Natal based IFP, followed the same direction as the NNP, but at a more moderate pace. It declined from 8.5 per cent in election 1999, to 7.8 per cent through the 2003 defections, to 7 per cent in election 2004 (and eventually to 6 per cent in the 2007
floor-crossings, 5 per cent in election 2009, and just below 4 per cent in the 2011 local elections). The UDM, in contrast, was able to achieve a marginal correction of disproportionality resulting from floor-crossing: floor-crossing had reduced its 1999 support level of 3.5 per cent to 1 per cent, and election 2004 reinstated it to 2.3 per cent. In the Eastern Cape elections also restored the UDM to its pre-defection position of official provincial opposition.

**Political parties fending off raids on representatives**

The 2005 floor-crossings were noted for their repertoires of legal actions by opposition parties trying to thwart the defection of individuals and factions. It was especially the UDM, IFP and ID that had to contain fallout. They countered the threatened depletion by pre-emptively suspending members suspected of plotting floor-crossing. They also took legal action shortly before the window opened. The members, in turn, challenged their suspensions in court.

The UDM suspended a group that subsequently formed the United Independent Front (UIF), after the UDM’s legal action failed. The ID was successful in upholding its expulsion of a provincial leader and fending off his defection. In an extension of the manoeuvres the ID’s De Lille attempted to use the window to engineer a merger between the ID and the defectors from the UDM, who had by then constituted themselves as the UIF. The IFP failed to stave off defections, and a group that called themselves the National Democratic Convention (Nadeco), led by former IFP leadership challenger Ziba Jiyane, split off. In this round of floor-crossings the DA suffered a telling loss – that of four of its five black MPs (then prized entities in the DA) to the ANC. The one remaining black DA MP, Craig Morkel, left to form the Progressive Independent Movement (PIM). This was to escape DA party discipline in the wake of the Travelgate scam involving MPs.

The allegation by the DA’s Radley Keys about money changing hands to help inflict damage on other parties (similar statements were made in other floor-crossing periods) reflected the spirit of the time:

> One of our MPLs was … told to name his price during this last floor-crossing period … This is an obvious attempt to denude the DA of black representatives and paint the DA into a corner of being a whites-only party.

Election 2004 also corrected a minor disproportionality that had arisen through the five one-MP parties that had been created in parliamentary defections. Besides the ID, which survived elections, the other one-person defection parties either did not participate or disappeared in electoral combat. The most prominent trend arising out of the 2005 national floor-crossing window was therefore the continuous consolidation of the already powerful ANC, and the splitting off of factions from two important opposition parties, Nadeco from the IFP and the UIF from the UDM.

The floor-crossing spectacle of 2005 helped seal its demise. The party realignment function of distributing the remains of the NNP had been completed. In the process,
parties had learnt of the benefits to be scored from floor-crossing by increasing their percentages of representation in legislative bodies. Floor-crossing descended into an abyss of underhand recruitment of one another’s representatives. Offers included monetary and status rewards. The money offered would easily be recouped through the enhanced public funding that was to be gained through increased representation. The 2005 state of floor-crossing was far removed from the original calls for floor-crossing as necessary to reflect changes in public opinion in the ‘long’ period of five years between elections. Come 2005, the practice was commonly seen as one in which the interests of individual politicians and their parties prevailed over the needs of constituents.\textsuperscript{60} Parties nevertheless embraced the remaining third round of floor-crossing.

**ROUND THREE: A weak and discredited show**

*The third round of power shifts through floor-crossing concerns the events of 2007, when floor-crossing happened concurrently on national, provincial and local levels. This was the last window prior to its abolition (Table 3).*

By 2005 the major floor-crossing function of political realignment had run its course. Floor-crossing practices had become absurd and delegitimated. Two opposition parties had already unsuccessfully submitted private member’s bills to move for ending the practice.\textsuperscript{61} Abolition pleas increasingly also emerged from ANC ranks. By now there was more currency in denouncing floor-crossing as immoral or farcical, than in reaping the fleeting allegiance of a few dubious representatives from other parties.

**Maligned, but still seductive**

As the final floor-crossing window opened, the practice had already been thoroughly maligned. Still, undeterred political parties and their public representatives readied themselves to collect the final spoils. Recruitment across party lines and the formation of minor parties continued. Ongoing motivations included the public funds that could be earned through the successful enticement of a handful of representatives of other parties, the benefits of party-leader levels of remuneration, alternate parties that could offer more favourable election list positions, the disbursement of patronage by parties that held power, and the toppling of some local governments.\textsuperscript{62}

ANC calls for change\textsuperscript{63} had started matching those of several opposition parties. For the ANC the opportunities for relatively minor between-election inroads into opposition representative ranks were by now thoroughly outweighed by resentment from within of the advantages that had been granted to newcomers that had not ‘served their time’ or worked their way up through the ranks of the movement. The debate included ANC references to floor-crossing as a largely unsuccessful ‘experiment’, which had led to ‘circus’ situations in some municipalities, including the Cape Town metro. The ANC averred that floor-crossing had never been intended to descend to this level.\textsuperscript{64}
### TABLE 6: Review of main ANC gains through floor-crossing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Window period</th>
<th>Main trends in losses and gains</th>
<th>Major ANC benefits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>2002 Councillors</strong></td>
<td>Losses: DA loses 417 in total, including 340 to the NNP, 51 to the ANC, 19 to independents, 2 to Sport Party, and 1 to IFP (1); ANC loses 16 to other parties. Gains: NNP gains 354, ANC 104, incl. 21 from UCDP in North West; DA gains 17 from various parties; ANC gains 22% of crossings country-wide.</td>
<td>Dissolution of the DA alliance on local level, with the DA retaining a large component of the former NNP support, albeit with substantial numbers returning to the NNP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2003 MPs</strong></td>
<td>Losses: UDM loses 10 out of 14, mostly to ANC. Gains: DA grows to 46 from NNP.</td>
<td>ANC gains two-thirds majority in National Assembly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2003 MPLs</strong></td>
<td>Losses: NNP ceases to exist in KwaZulu-Natal legislature. Gains: ANC gets outright majority in Western Cape (courtesy NNP and UDM MPLs), increasing its representation by 3.</td>
<td>Impact in provincial legislatures in Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal where delicate power balances are affected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2004 Councillors</strong></td>
<td>Losses: DA loses 46; UDM loses 54; IFP loses 25; PAC loses 22; ACDP loses 13. Gains: ANC gains more than 330, mainly from NNP; DA gains 66 from NNP; ID gains 39 off zero base (it had not yet existed in the 2000 local elections); UDM gains 1; IFP gains 8; PAC gains 2; ACDP gains 5.</td>
<td>The composition of 164 councils was affected; the ANC gained the most by far, followed by the DA and the ID.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2005 MPs</strong></td>
<td>Losses: NNP dissolves and 6 out of 7 MPs go to ANC, 1 goes into new party UPSA; IFP loses 4 MPs to new Nadeco; UDM loses 2 MPs to UIF. Gains: ANC total increases by 14, from 279 to 293.</td>
<td>The main impacts are the further accumulation of MPs by the ANC and the splintering of several of the opposition parties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2005 MPLs</strong></td>
<td>Losses: NNP – all but 1 MPL move to ANC; IFP loses 4 KwaZulu-Natal MPs to Nadeco; UDM loses 4 MPLs to UIF. Gains: ANC is the main beneficiary through official dissolution of NNP.</td>
<td>ANC for first time gains outright majority in Western Cape legislature; NNP disbands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2007 MPs</strong></td>
<td>Losses: ID loses 1; PAC loses 2; UIF loses 2; IPSA and PIM lose 1 each. Gains: ANC gains 4; APC gains 2; National Alliance gains 2.</td>
<td>ANC support moves up to 74% of MPs; floor-crossing antics delegitimises the practice.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In terms of power-shifts and public standing the third round of floor-crossing was a weak and discredited shadow of its 2002-03 self. Relatively major movements between parties had diminished by 2007. Floor-crossing levels were down in all three spheres of government (Table 3). The most important national move, albeit miniscule, was a further split in the PAC, this time launching the African People’s Convention (APC). A total of seven MPs changed their parties, including the two that went to the APC (making the PAC a one-MP party), with the others coming from the ID, UIF and PIM. These parties were all in the ranks of unstable and micro-sized floor-crossing parties. In the provincial stakes, a total of 13 MPLs crossed the floor, mostly also in operations that wrapped up the remainders of former bouts of floor-crossing. There were no significant power shifts.

Local levels of floor-crossing, as in the case of the provincial, were down to about half of the second round of power shifts. It nevertheless affected 128 councils, bringing power shifts in 12. The two opposition-leaning provinces of the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal were the most affected. With five councils experiencing power shifts in each of the two provinces they accounted for ten out of the 12 local-level power changes. As in the previous rounds, the ANC was the main beneficiary, scoring 53 new councillors across the country. They came from a range of parties, including Nadeco in KwaZulu-Natal.

The ANC was closely followed by the APC, which instantly had 36 founding councillors, courtesy of the PAC. The PAC lost 41 councillors, and the ID 27. They found a new home in the freshly formed National People’s Party (NPP). The NPP was formed with the backing of African Muslim Party (AMP) councillor Badih Chaaban. Chaaban claimed to be aiming at toppling the Cape Town city coalition government, then headed by DA leader Helen Zille. Confusion prevailed in this head-over-heels operation. The ID expelled suspected defectors on the eve of the window. Some ID councillors had withdrawn their declarations of intention to defect to the NPP shortly before the window opened. In the end, some councillors had lost track of which party they
belonged to. In an attempt to show that it was not fatally wounded, the ID produced research showing that other small parties had suffered a worse fate than it: ‘... the UCDP lost 20 per cent of its councillor caucus across the country, the PAC lost 41 per cent, the UIF 54 per cent and Nadeco 91 per cent ...’. Floor-crossing had boomeranged on several of the parties it had given birth to.

**The ANC’s ambiguous farewell to floor-crossing**

The ANC still played for time, retaining the final 2007 window to be able to reap its benefits. It scheduled the review of floor-crossing for consideration at its mid-2007 policy conference. Two of the conference commissions made contradictory recommendations for and against retaining floor-crossing. Arguments in favour stressed floor-crossing as a useful mechanism in times of political fluidity. Arguments against emphasised opportunism, persons joining the ANC without being familiar with its policies and principles, and the use of floor-crossing as a short-cut into leadership positions. The ANC's December 2007 national conference was more decisive. It resolved:

> Floor-crossing should be abolished and ... public representatives of other political parties should be encouraged to join the ANC regardless of whether or not they retain their seats.

With the ANC verdict in place, the legislative ball was set rolling in 2008. Matching the 2002-03 legislative introduction; a trio of bills had to be amended to scrap floor-crossing in the three spheres of government. These were the Constitution Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment bills and the General Laws Amendment Bill. ANC MP and parliamentary committee chairperson Yunus Carrim effectively articulated the multiple ills that had come to characterise floor-crossing, but which the ANC had opportunistically been tolerating, despite misgivings at the time of introduction:

> ... we now want floor-crossing abolished, not because it’s boring, but because it has become unseemly, unacceptable. There have been unintended consequences of the floor-crossing legislation that serve to undermine our democracy. While some people have crossed the floor for ideological and policy reasons, many have done so for very individualistic reasons, including in search of monetary gain and personal promotion ...

This has been especially the case at local government level. Floor-crossing has become a circus in some municipalities, not least a major metro like Cape Town. It has led to instability and undermined service delivery, with unnecessary changes in administration with major re-shuffles of councillors through floor-crossing. And in this august House, no less, there is the curious phenomenon of one-person parties with no obvious electoral base or known policies at all. Obviously, it was never intended that floor-crossing would be reduced to this farce and it had to be ended.
The reversal to the 2002 status quo ante with no floor-crossing in South Africa was finally signed off by the president in early 2009.

**THE FATES OF FLOOR-CROSSING PARTIES**

As in the case of election 2004, election 2009 on national and provincial levels continued the process of eliminating most of the minor political parties that originated from defections. In Parliament, 13 political parties gained representation in 2009, and only four gained more than four per cent of the national vote. None of the ‘big four’ were floor-crossing parties (although the ANC, DA and occasionally the IFP had benefitted from floor-crossing). The other nine represented parties each gained less than one per cent of the national vote. Two floor-crossing parties – the ID (2003 floor-crossing) and APC (2007 floor-crossing) – were in this group. Both were confirmed as micro-players in the party political stakes. The ID in 2009 declined from its 2004 ‘high’ of 1.7 per cent of the national vote, now registering 0.9 per cent. The APC scored 0.2 per cent of the parliamentary vote. Its base-party, the PAC, achieved 0.4 per cent.

The floor-crossing parties had equally unsubstantial performances in the provincial legislatures. In all nine legislatures in floor-crossing party ranks it was only the ID (5 provincial legislature seats around the country, i.e. in Gauteng, the Northern and Western Cape) and the minor African Independent Congress (AIC) that managed to win (1, in the Eastern Cape) provincial legislature seats. Neither the PAC nor the APC gained provincial legislature representation. Besides the ID (5) and AIC (1), it was only the ANC (292 MPLs across the nine provinces), DA (65), Cope (36), IFP (19), UDM (3), ACDP (3) and the FF+, Minority Front and UCDP (2 each) that won provincial legislature representation. The floor-crossing parties won well below 1 per cent of the respective provincial votes.72

These dismal performances were not for lack of effort. In one attempted trend-defying action in election 2009 Nadeco cooperated with Stanley Simmons of the National Alliance (NA). Nadeco had split-off from the IFP in 2005 (and had itself subsequently split giving rise to the South African Democratic Congress, Sadeco). On the eve of local election 2011 Sadeco and its small band of office bearers, led by Ziba Jiyane, joined the DA. The NA was the floor-crossing party started by the sole former NNP MP that had not moved to the ANC in 2005. Before forming the NA, he had briefly been the sole parliamentary representative of the United Party of South Africa (UPSA). Neither of these parties, individually or in alliance, now won representation in any of the legislatures.

In the post-2009 election period minor opposition parties, including some defection parties, started cooperating with a view to constructing support bases that could offer enhanced percentage-standings in the provincial and national domains. Cope early on initiated a strategy to incorporate compatible unrepresented political parties. Without achieving an impact it merged with the two-year old 2007 floor-crossing party, the New Vision Party (NVP). The NVP had been formed by, amongst others, Ike Kekana, a for-
mer leader of the UIF, the UDM split-off. The NVP contested nationally and in three provinces in 2009. It failed to win any seats.

Approximately two months after election 2009, overtures between the DA, Cope, the UDM and the ID to explore possibilities of closer cooperation started. Only the DA and ID advanced into a tentative newly forged identity. In August 2010 a memorandum of understanding between the two parties introduced dual membership, with ID leaders taking out DA membership and embarking on a phased integration process to culminate in full integration by 2014. The ANC stated that it was ‘very unfortunate that the ID allowed itself to be elbowed-out of the South African political landscape by the DA’.

CONCLUSION

Floor-crossing substantially contributed to the ANC’s consolidation of power in the legislatures across the country. Besides further leveraging such dominance, floor-crossing pushed the ANC into (vulnerable, and ultimately reversible) provincial power in the Western Cape and in a range of municipal councils, disrupted the effective operations of many an opposition party, and at the time boosted the ANC’s image of omnipotence. The power effect for the ANC was enhanced levels of representation and legislative control, and the distraction it caused for other political parties. The ANC, along with some of the opposition parties, simultaneously suffered ridicule because of practices of buying defectors, through monetary inducements or the lure of positions and benefits. The ANC suffered internal damage through rebellion against promotions and appointment of defecting newcomers to positions aspired to by long-serving ANC members.

By 2011 the ANC had thoroughly disenchanted floor-crossing, and was by then accusing manoeuvring opposition parties of resorting to strategies akin to floor-crossing. The case in point was the DA’s phased merger with the ID – while cooperating with separate party identities on national and provincial levels, the two merged in the 2011 local elections. In luring back ‘Copers’ the ANC has been continuing many of the inducements previously associated with floor-crossing, albeit without the gratification of instant new seats to returnees.

The floor-crossing era in time will stand out as having been a constituent element in building a near-three-quarters parliamentary majority for the ANC up to election 2009. With the aid of floor-crossing, the ANC gained a host of defections from opposition parties. It benefitted far more than any other political party in South Africa from the practice. The ANC also indirectly benefitted from floor-crossing through the havoc that it sowed in opposition ranks. Most suffered more losses than gains. This affected the opposition voice in general, but also specifically affected party morale and capacity to focus on matters of governance and opposition. Floor-crossing reinforced the vulnerability of opposition parties in South Africa.

Floor-crossing contributed to an elaboration of the ANC image of monolithic invincibility. The ANC never failed ‘to perform’ in any floor-crossing window. Yet the
ANC was maligned for its ability to lure select opposition party representatives, courtesy of its ability to broker public positions or, as some suggested, monetary inducements and favourable ANC list positions. This was a double-edged sword. Many in the ANC ranks, in pursuit of upward political mobility, felt thwarted by the inside-fast-track for defectors. When the ANC finally let go of floor-crossing it could claim that it had never been intended to become debased, opportunistic and devoid of political integrity. This was after the ANC had reaped direct power advances through capturing opposition party representatives, and indirect power through destabilising several of the opposition parties for the best part of a decade.

NOTES

3 This is different from voting with another party on a particular measure; see Sarah Miskin, 2002-03, ‘Politician Overboard: Jumping the Party Ship’, Research Paper 4, Politics and Public Administration Group, Australian Parliament.
4 ‘Stabilisation’ denotes a process that potentially precedes institutionalisation. ‘Institutionalisation’ of political parties in this chapter denotes a party’s reification in the public mind ‘so that it exists as a social organisation apart from its momentary leaders, while regularly engaging in valued patterns of behaviour’; see Kenneth Janda, 1980, Political parties: A cross-national survey, New York, The Free Press, p. 19. ‘Party system’, as Jan-Erik Lane and Svante Ersson, 1987, Politics and society in Western Europe, First edition, London, Sage, p. 155 assert, refers to a set of parties operating within a political system in an organised pattern, whilst ‘dominant party system’ points to a situation where opposition parties are free to operate and contest elections, yet they are weak and rarely win.
5 This part of the chapter draws on Susan Booysen, 2005, ‘The will of the parties versus the will of the people! Defections, elections and alliances in South Africa’, Party Politics, 12:6, pp. 751-770.
6 The ANC’s first elected MPs in Parliament in South Africa were floor-crossers who had left the DP in the early 1990s to represent the ANC, once the ANC was unbanned. They were Rob Hasswell, Pierre Conjé, Dave Dalling and Jannie Momberg. Wyndham Hartley, 2005, ‘Crosstitution the oldest profession in checkered history of SA politics’, Business Day, 15 September 2005, p. 5 also points out that in order for the NP in the early 1990s to introduce the transitional changes it had envisaged, it had to take control of all three then houses of Parliament and MPs were induced to leave the Labour Party, National People’s Party and Solidarity.
7 The term was first popularised by the IFP. See, for example, Xolani Mbanjwa and Nomfundo Mcetywa, 2005, ‘IFP members vow not to be “crosstitutes”’, Cape Times, 28 August 2005, http://70.84.171.10/~etools/newsbrief/2005/news0905.txt (accessed 2 December 2009).
8 See Susan Booysen, 2005, op. cit.
9 This section extends, adapts and updates Booysen, 2005, op. cit.


15 See Miskin, 2002-03, op. cit. and *The Herald*, 23 May 2005, respectively.


22 South Africa, however, also had an ongoing debate – continuous in late 2011 – that argued for the introduction of a mixed system. The German system was often cited as a model.


25 Steytler, op. cit., p. 222.


31 The leaders (mostly the only members) of founded micro-parties in the National Assembly, for example the UIF, PIM, FD and UPSA, immediately qualified for an additional R50,000 salary as party leaders. Their parties would also receive the standard funding of political parties, commensurate to size and length of the remainder of the parliamentary term, along with constituency allowances. See Angela Bolwana, 2005, ‘Floor-crossing affects parties’ bank balances’, *The Mercury*, 19 September 2009, http://www.themercure.co.za/index.php?fSectionId=283&fArticleId=2881742 (accessed 16 August 2009). Judith February (Idasa), confirmed the profitability for parties of gaining even one MP, or for becoming party leaders, interview, SABC-AM Live, 19 September 2005.

32 See, for example, the critiques by Blade Nzimande, 2007, *Notes for the speech delivered by the General Secretary of the SACP, Cde Blade Nzimande to the ‘State of South Africa’s Democracy’ Symposium, 20 July 2007*, Pennington (Durban South), http://www.sacp.org.za/main.php?include=


Floor-crossing took place in September of the fourth year between elections. Because the election was in April 2004, April 2007 was the start of the fourth year, and September 2007 was hence within the fourth year.


Paul Graham, 2003, ‘Opening the door to crossing the floor’, *Democracy in Action*, 11:1, pp. 6-7; Idasa, 2002, First Amicus Curiae’s written argument, Case No. CCT 23/02, Constitutional Court of South Africa.


By virtue of the consistent support of the Minority Front’s one MP, the ANC passed the two-thirds mark in 1999 (also see Chapter 6).

See Eiseman, 2002, op. cit. In 2003 the Task Team report condemned floor-crossing within PR, describing it as opportunistic, inappropriate and an injustice to the system of proportionality. It also chose to retain the existing electoral system.


United Democratic Movement v President of the Republic of South Africa & others (African Christian Democratic Party & others intervening; Institute for Democracy in South Africa & another as Amici Curiae) (No. 2) 2003 (1) SA 495 (CC); Devenish, op. cit.; Constitutional Court, 4 October 2002, Summary of Judgment, Johannesburg.


McLaughlin, 2009, op. cit.

Ibid.

In the case of the DA, this statement is true in comparing the DP’s 1999 and 2004 results, discounting its fleeting alliance with the NNP.


56 UIF leader Malizole Diko died in 2006, leadership struggles ensued, but Limpopo MPL Ike Kekana became acting leader. The UIF became part of the ruling municipal alliance in Cape Town.

57 See Angela Quintal, 2005, ‘De Lille fails in frantic party merger bid’, *The Star*, 16 September 2009, p. 5. Two of the MPs ‘at stake’ were Lennit Max and Avril Harding. In August 2008, the ID was involved in at least seven legal actions to prevent and contain representatives from walking away with their ID seats. See Maygene de Wee, 2007, ‘De Lille veg hand en tand in hof om behoud van OD-setels’, *Rapport*, 2 September 2007, p. 5.


70 The formal designations of the legislative measures were: Constitution 14th Amendment Bill; Constitution 15th Amendment Bill; and the General Laws (Loss of Membership of National Assembly, Provincial Legislature or Municipal Council) Amendment Bill.

72 See Annexure to Chapter 6, for full details of the provincial results over four elections.


74 Helen Zille and Patricia de Lille, 15 August 2010, Memorandum of Understanding, ‘A step closer to the total realignment of South African politics’, Kempton Park.

CHAPTER 8

Subjugation and demise of the (New) National Party

… is it not the supreme exercise of power to get another or others to have the desires that you want them to have – that is, to secure their compliance by controlling their thoughts and desires?

Steven Lukes, 1974

The protracted death of ANC nemesis, the National Party (NP, later the New National Party (NNP)), was an extraordinary part of the ANC’s ascent into power. The ANC gained in many ways from the demise of the NP. Its political nemesis that had retained power in the state structures, and in the ranks of the supporters of this opposition party, disappeared. The ANC won some additional elite and popular support. More than this, it was the symbolism of conquering the former oppressor that gave the death of the NP a special place in the ANC’s consolidation of political power.

The NP’s embrace of the negotiated transition and its subsequent handover of power emphasised some NP pragmatism and conversion of its leadership. Yet, ultimately it was the strain from the ANC’s struggle to capture state power that had constituted the relentless pressure that forced the NP first into negotiations and second into inevitable decline. The NP had been artificially propped up by the 1980s National Security Management System (NSMS), its hit squads under the cover of the Civil Cooperation Bureau (CCB) and a vast military-industrial-NP complex. Its entrance into negotiations cut the umbilical military-political cord, while semblances of popular endorsement relentlessly dissipated. The pending death of the NP was patently evident in the decade from 1996 to 2006, despite the party’s stalling tactics. This decade saw the relentless decline of the former apartheid monolith. Its party political presence faded and voter support dissipated. Staggering from one looming demise to the next, the renamed-reinvented NNP repeatedly metamorphosed. It leapt into alliances first with the DP-Democratic Alliance (DA), and then the ANC. The NNP emerged emaciated and power-stripped from the DA alliance. It barely preserved a shell attractive enough to sweeten its self-sacrificial offer to the ANC. It went from juggernaut of racial engineering and apartheid political power for the five decades from the 1940s to 1980s, to change...
agent in the 1980s to 1990s, to ultimate party political casualty of early democratisation. This chapter focuses on the decade of its final decline, 1996-2006. The annexure to this chapter sets out the clashing ANC-NP power trajectories from 1911-1994.

The NP's last decade was a prolonged dance with death. Nearly as spectacular as the NP's relentless decline, was the party's obsession with holding onto power by recreating itself in some new image in the post-1994 age of the ANC. There were many writings on the wall for the apartheid-monolith-turned-Damascus-road-negotiator. O'Meara's 1994 analysis of the dark past era of NP politics highlights this historical decline. A post-1994 graph of the NP's imploding national-level voter support further demonstrates the trend. It declined from having 20 per cent of national electoral support in 1994, to 7 in 1999 and 1.7 in 2004. In 1994 and in the aftermath of the Government of National Unity (GNU), the NP grasped at straws trying to pursue grand strategies to exorcise the ANC of communists and align itself with the 'non-communists'. Instead, alliances worked in tandem with floor-crossing and failed attempts at reinvention to produce ever diminishing support for the former oppressor party. Its final defeat came in the form of its absorption into the ANC, veiled in the rhetoric of virtuous reconciliation and nation building.

The impact of the last decade of the NNP's existence is of interest precisely because of the remarkable rituals that the party engaged in, especially its alignment with its former nemesis, the ANC, after failed attempts to transform itself into an opposition party. Still, its final quest to survive lapses into obscurity in comparison with the social engineering and gross human rights violations perpetrated in the NP's more than four and a half decades in power.

The chapter explores the decade of coexistence of the ANC and NP-NNP post-1994, focussing on five phenomena that built the latter's downward decline and eventual disappearance into the ANC – elections, defections and floor-crossing (Chapter 7), leadership exits, alliances, and failed attempts at identity reinvention. Despite a litany of efforts, and courtesy of panic-driven strategic (mis)calculations, the NNP failed to survive the transition. The process culminated in its unambiguous conquest by the ANC. Yet, as the party that 'perfected' 'separate development' – apartheid – the NNP had an enduring socio-economic impact that has extended far beyond its death, especially in the structural consequences of its policies. The ANC gained much symbolically, and a small amount in terms of popular support, yet it has also suffered greatly through the lasting policy inequities that the NP bestowed on South Africa. The ANC also benefitted, ambiguously, from these legacies. In post-NP election campaigns, even a suggestion of a parallel between the subsequent white-dominated opposition and the NP would help to delegitimise opposition parties in the popular mind.

The main analysis in the chapter tracks the sequence of identities that the NP-NNP assumed in its final decade to position itself against the ANC. They took the form of an autonomous new party in opposition to the ANC (1996-99), the ‘opposition presence’ builder (in alliance with the DP-DA, from 2000-01), and protagonist for ‘patriotic opposition’ whilst being subsumed by the ANC (2001-06). These three acts follow in the wake of 83 years of battle in a war of subjugation and liberation between the ANC and NP, from 1911-94.

Subjugation and demise of the (New) National Party
ANTECEDENTS TO THE NP AS ‘VIRTUOUS NEGOTIATOR’

The NP first gained parliamentary representation in the 1915 election – the year after it was established (Annexure to Chapter 8) – when it won 27 seats. It grew, and ruled South Africa for roughly a decade from 1924 onwards. It regained control in the historic 1948 elections, with a majority of seats but short of a majority of votes. It went on, however, from one white election to the next, winning increasing majorities (Table 1). Its uninterrupted but problematic 46-year rule ended in 1994, having suffered breakaways and extra-system resistance. From decades of oppression and brutality, partly redeemed by a (self-proclaimed) Damascene turn to negotiations and ceding of power, arose a ‘new-born’ democratic and seemingly reconciliatory party.

The specific turning point arrived in the late 1970s. From this time onwards the NP had increasingly offered schemes (new constitutional dispensations and new rationalisations) to preserve and justify clinging to power, conceding that it was occupying contested terrain. By the mid-1980s widespread popular revolt combined to build up pressure with international sanctions and the national business community increasingly flouting the dictates of economic apartheid. These were the intra- and extra-system left liberal and radical pressures, the one side of the growing pincer grip on the NP.

On the right-wing side a series of developments started limiting the NP’s options. The two splits to the right, in 1969 (the Herstigte Nasionale Party, HNP, or ‘Reformed National Party’) and in 1982 (the Conservative Party, CP) are well recorded. By 1992 CP support stood at 41 per cent of the white electorate, compared with the 19 per cent of 1983. Realignment and the rapid decline of the NP gathered momentum as left-leaning extra-parliamentary politics started turning into the political mainstream. In 1987, Denis Worrall resigned as South African ambassador in London and formed the Independent Movement (IM) to fight that year’s election. Another liberal former Nationalist, Wynand Malan, won the IM’s only parliamentary seat in that election. Malan left the IM and with others formed the National Democratic Movement (NDM). The new groupings joined forces with the Progressive Federal Party (PFP) to form the Democratic Party (DP) in April 1989. The NP government called the election for September 1989, in which the NP lost 12 seats to the DP and 17 to the right wing CP. The CP had by now positioned itself as the torchbearer of Afrikaner nationalism.

Both the NP’s left and right intra-system decline and the extra-system revolt and international pressure thus propelled it into negotiations for the transition to democracy. It started exploring options of negotiations, and tried to use its negotiation positions to constrain the ANC’s future popular standing.

Many had marvelled at the NP’s willingness to ‘negotiate itself out of power’ – but for the NP it was a case of self-preservation in the face of pressures closing in on it from two sides. Dubow reminds us that it was not (just) a case of ‘cool political calculus’ but also the display of a party taking itself out of power. He refers to this as a ‘deeper process of psychological acclimatisation’. De Klerk’s pragmatism helped launch the NP into the negotiations. For him and the NP, negotiations constituted a foothold into a future where its ‘skills and experience’ could be rewarded with political power. Phillips
observed that the NP was looking to safeguard white rights, and saw negotiations in
terms of a conservative cross-racial alliance, a constitution that would safeguard group
rights, or an alliance with parts of the ANC. Further objectives included the devolution
of power, and establishment of a constitutional state.

Many of the NP’s negotiating objectives would be successfully pursued, on one
level. On other levels, the negotiations showed that whilst victories could be claimed,
these were prone to erosion: as the joint trajectory with the ANC took shape, new
contents and compromises would continuously take hold. In defence of his ‘sacrifices’,
De Klerk explained:
The decision to surrender the right to national sovereignty is certainly one of the most painful any leader can be asked to take. Most nations are prepared to risk war and catastrophe rather than to surrender this right. Yet this was the decision we had to take. We had to accept the necessity of giving up on the ideal on which we have been nurtured and the dream for which so many generations had struggled and for which so many of our people have died.

The Interim Constitution of 1993 and the NP’s 1994 inclusion in the GNU seemed to confirm the NP hopes of an ‘invincible place in the sun’. At the 1994 onset of multi-party democracy NP leaders believed that through repositioning the NP would reinvent itself as a significant post-liberation party, working alongside the majority ANC. However, the NP failed to get guaranteed power-sharing in the final 1996 constitution. De Klerk and his NP from early GNU days onwards came under concerted voter criticism for failing to defend Afrikaner interests. Simultaneously, internal succession battles and displays of ambition by aspiring successors exposed NP fault lines.

The NP from the mid-1990s onwards was no longer master of its own fate – if indeed it ever was, given the national and international contestation that its racial engineering and oppression had elicited. The post-1994 NP, however, no longer had the political support base, credibility of programmes (as it once had, mainly in the eyes of the majority of the white community) and leadership to carry it forward. Its antics for growth and survival failed to re-anchor it.

BENCHMARKS IN A DRAWN-OUT DECADE OF DECLINE AND DISINTEGRATION

A vexing aspect of the post-settlement decade was the length of time it took to root the NP-NNP, in name if not in legacy, out of the political system. The NP clung to all the vestiges of power it could find. All of a series of elections, alliances and floor-crossings were required to eliminate it. These processes had enhanced importance due to the failures of identity reinventions and serial leadership and voter attrition. By the time of its final antics, the NNP had already effectively ceased to exist. Its main 1994 and post-1994 leaders, including FW de Klerk and Roelf Meyer, had long since left the party,17 the NNP as it remained had no effective ideology and policy programme, and its support base had largely dissipated. The process of attrition of the NP-NNP was relentless, despite numerous efforts to steer it onto alternative paths.

The trajectory of the NP’s final decade shows how the party moved from the extremes of villain of the final days of oppression and suppression, to ‘heroic’ co-agent of change, to the pathos of a party that vacillated between the roles of junior partner in power and opposition, and the embarrassments of jumbled efforts to make alliances for survival. In the process, the NNP straddled the range of possible party statuses in relation to government and opposition. It moved from governing party, to partner in the post-1994 GNU, to main opposition party in 1996, attempted reinvented party in 1996/97, secondary opposition party from 1999 on, opposition alliance partner in
various forms from 2001 on, and subsumed partner of the governing party, in 2005/06. There was a ‘dizzying flight to opposition and back again’.¹⁸ Deft party political moves, however, failed to be matched by popular endorsement. The (N)NP increasingly limped from election 1994 to 1999 and finally 2004.

There were notable benchmarks in the precipitous NP decline. This section extracts these events. The next section zooms in on characterisations of the three specific party identities that the NP chronologically assumed in its final decade.

The 1994 election and a new game for the NP

The NP entered the 1994 liberation elections, convinced that the electorate would reward it for its role in facilitating peace and ending apartheid … and for its seeming potential at the time to play an important role in post-apartheid government. In a South Africa that remained largely racially defined, the NP could bargain on strong white (Afrikaans and English speaking) and so-called coloured support.¹⁹ It also built on a small proportion of Indian and African support, mostly relics of the co-optation of its previous projects of bantustan and co-government projects. The 1994 election result gave the NP a credible 20 per cent national voter support, anchored in high national turnout.²⁰ The Interim Constitution of 1993 also guaranteed it one of the deputy presidencies in national government and a number of cabinet positions. It was thus assured (along with the IFP) of a role in the 1994-1999 government, albeit in a position subject to the ANC. The NP had not fully comprehended how subject this would be.

GNU contradictions, NP withdrawal and repositioning

The GNU phase commenced with the installation of the democratic government in early May 1994. The NP battled to find its new feet. Being junior partner in government it could do little to stop the ANC from running government and policy initiatives the ANC way. The ANC had no hesitation in exercising its power. All eyes were on the ‘ANC-in-government’ and the ‘new ANC government’. Minority partners were eclipsed. This left the NP frustrated. It often felt publicly humiliated. The NP’s identity crisis of opposition versus government started to unfold. Significantly, the NP started suffering a loss of support to the DP. NP supporters rebelled and ‘voted’ for an opposition role. The NP exited the GNU to rescue its support base.²¹ Thabo Mbeki, in his role as president of South Africa in 2005, related the NP’s conflicted behaviour:²²

More than anything else, narrow partisan concerns about the electoral future of the NNP persuaded the leadership of the NNP that its future lay in playing a role as our country’s ‘official opposition’, rather than as a junior partner in the GNU. This leadership thought it had the possibility, once it left the GNU, to win back those who had come to see the (liberal) DP as the best guarantor of white interests.

The NP imagined indeed that its withdrawal from the GNU (1996) would establish it as an opposition party of note. Both internal contestation and a changed political landscape, however, took a toll. An internal lobby started pressing for the replacement of
NP leader, FW de Klerk.\(^\text{23}\) It succeeded and De Klerk stepped down. Ambitious Martthinus ‘Kortbroek’ van Schalkwyk had been one of the major agitators for withdrawal from the GNU.\(^\text{24}\) Van Schalkwyk took over the helm on 8 September 1996. ‘Kortbroek’ (short pants) related mostly to the fact of an ambitious underling seizing upon a weak moment to step into senior shoes.

The NP tried to follow through on its out-of-GNU, new leadership image. It embarked on a reinvention in the form of the New National Party (NNP, in 1996). It attempted to distance itself from all of its apartheid past, a demure GNU position and the leadership that had steered it through the transition from governing to minor-governing-party-partner. It wanted to project itself as a moderate, non-racial federal, opposition party. The repositioning failed to have an electoral impact (Table 2).

**Local government elections of 1995/96 and by-elections thereafter**

The NP reinvention overlapped in time with the NP’s local election humiliation of 2000. The local government elections of 1996 were the last big occasion where the NP managed to muster a credible electoral performance. Its 1994 support was roughly maintained in the 1995/96 elections for interim local government. It gained 18.3 per cent of the nationally calculated vote.\(^\text{25}\) However, the opinion polls had started reflecting a migrating electorate. A series of ward by-elections from 1997 to 1998 indicated the NNP’s voters shifting allegiance to the DP. The class base of this vote was important: the lower middle and working class whites had formed the backbone of NP support. The DP increasingly became their new political home.

**Final nail of election 1999**

Election 1999 effectively sealed the death-fate of the NNP. Opinion polls showed a bleak future. The NNP’s support base was collapsing – but would yet see further collapse in the 2004 election (Table 2). In the times of desperation, communist and trade union influence in the ANC governing alliance remained a favourite NNP fear-instilling tactic. NP campaign director Boy Geldenhuys admitted that 1999 was ‘probably the last chance we have to use this one’ [the ‘communist threat’].\(^\text{26}\) When Van Schalkwyk assumed the leadership he had grand designs of ‘splitting the ANC’ and aligning with what he saw as ‘the non-communist ANC faction’.\(^\text{27}\)

In one of the largest drops in democratic South Africa’s party election support, the NNP’s 1999 national support level declined by 13.5 percentage points (Table 2). It signified a 72 per cent decline (2.9 million votes fewer) compared with its result five years earlier. The DP nationally in 1999 received 1.2 million more votes than its 1994 total. The result confirmed the NP’s support had migrated, mostly to the DP. Other former NP supporters abstained or scattered among the other parties. Yet, the NNP retained a trump card – substantial Western Cape and Northern Cape support, centred on the coloured voting bloc.

**(D)alliance with the DP**

Given the NNP’s election 1999 provincial results, the NNP and DP continued to cooperate, and constituted a majority government in the Western Cape.\(^\text{28}\) The NNP had
already been cooperating with the DP in the Western Cape legislature since 1997. In 1998 it invited the DP to join it in the province’s executive. In 1999, fearing annihilation, the NNP bolstered the existing cooperation,\(^9\) loath to advance into the 2000 local government elections on its own. To save itself from embarrassment, in mid-2000 it entered into an alliance with the DP and the small Federal Alliance (FA) to constitute the DA. The alliance shielded the NNP in the 2000 local government elections, and also rapidly expanded the standing of the DP through an increase in seats. Hence the result formed a foundation for future DA extension.\(^{10}\) Nationally calculated, the DA won 24 per cent of the local government election vote in 2000.

### Table 2: Comparative electoral decline of the NP in the decade of 1994-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTY</th>
<th>Result 1994</th>
<th>Change 1994 to 1999 in level of voter support</th>
<th>Result 1999</th>
<th>Change 1999 to 2004 in level of voter support</th>
<th>Result 2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No. of votes</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No. of votes</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% and no. of vote change compared with 1994</td>
<td></td>
<td>% and no. of vote change compared with 1994</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>62.6</td>
<td>12.2m</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>10.6m</td>
<td>69.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NP/NNP</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>4.0m</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>1.1m</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP/DA</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.3m</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>1.5m</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFP</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>2.1m</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>1.4m</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDM</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>0.6m</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACDP</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.1m</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.2m</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FF/ FF+</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.4m</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.1m</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCDP</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.1m</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAC</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.2m</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.1m</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ditching the DA

The hastily consummated DA was fraught with tensions. On 26 October 2001 the NNP Federal Council suspended the NNP’s participation in the DA, simultaneously withdrawing from its Western Cape provincial governing partnership of 1999. The DP/DA held on to the DA name. Instead of being a saviour, the DA thus leached onto the remains of NP energy and organisational infrastructure. After this little remained of the post-1994 NP. The NNP’s breakaway from the DA in the Western Cape was possible because members were elected in 1999 under the pre-DA, NNP banner. The NNP now flaunted its wares to the ANC, which was keen to use the desperate NNP to capture the Western Cape from the DA, and further expand its presence in Parliament and local government. On the local level, several councils could be captured from the DA. The realignment, however, could only be given full substance if elected representatives were able to defect from their original parties.

Floor-crossing and cooperative engagement with the ANC

The NNP had nowhere to go but to rediscover the virtues of ‘cooperative and constructive opposition’ – code words for joining forces with the ANC, whilst acting out the pretence of remaining in opposition. The NNP insisted that it had commenced a ‘cooperative arrangement’ with the ANC, differentiating this from an alliance. Then president Mbeki lauded the move as ‘a decision that … cannot but be described as courageous and far-sighted’. Of course, realignment with the ANC would enable the NNP to retain some Western Cape provincial power. Floor-crossing would help save the NNP in the period of crisis following its fall out with its DA alliance partner. However, floor-crossing was also the mechanism that would further feed into the demise of the party. The floor-crossing saga of 2002–03 was a drawn-out, intricate process of legal and constitutional wrangling (Chapter 7). The spate of local floor-crossing in 2002 saw the NNP recouping much of its contingent of councillors. Many councillors, however, stayed behind in the DA.

The result was a big difference at provincial level in the two opposition-controlled provinces of the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal. The NNP-ANC cooperation propelled them into power in the Western Cape provincial government. The NNP got a premiership – Van Schalkwyk became the new premier. The KwaZulu-Natal power balance also changed as the ANC achieved a majority. Yet, the volatility in the province, with the IFP fighting against floor-crossing, prevented the ANC from asserting its power at this stage and especially on the basis of floor-crossing. It was only five months after the NNP’s withdrawal from the DA that the ANC and NNP announced the formation of a joint task team to ‘chart the way forward’ to give substance (including high political positions, the NNP hoped) to their cooperative plans. This was a strategic manoeuvre of the ANC to ensure that it would not hand the NNP rewards of power and position, which could turn out to be disproportionate to its performance in the forthcoming Election 2004.

Decimation in the 2004 election

The NNP was the major casualty of Election 2004. It contested under the cloud of a confused identity, projecting itself as ‘constructive’ opposition in alliance with the
ANC. The electorate scoffed at this message. The NNP’s mere 1.7 per cent national electoral support, and diminished status in the Western Cape, meant it had lost both voter support and its bargaining power with the ANC. It emerged as just another micro-party (Table 2). As a gesture of courtesy from the ANC, Van Schalkwyk got a junior cabinet position. The voters had deprived him of the power to bargain for continuing as Western Cape premier, or for a cabinet portfolio of note. Just a handful of close-circle Kortbroek lieutenants remained to make themselves useful to the ANC.

On 8 August 2004, Van Schalkwyk announced how the remains of the NNP would be distributed: all remaining NNP elected representatives would be ‘encouraged’ to become ANC members. They would either cross the floor in 2005, or complete their local government terms until the eve of the announcement of the 2006 local government election results. The NNP managed these final rites under the veil of serving the national interest of non-racialism, reconciliation, nation building and, ultimately, constructive co-governing. Van Schalkwyk meekly defended his adoption of the ANC as final resting place for the NP:

The ANC does not need votes from the NNP or any other party for that matter. But … it [the NNP aligning with the ANC] will contribute, I believe immensely and fundamentally, to something the ANC is committed to, which is building non-racialism.

The NNP held its final Federal Congress from 9-10 April 2005. The last of the NNP public representatives would indeed defect in the September 2005 floor-crossing window. By the time of the last sessions of the floor-crossing era, in 2007, the NNP would no longer be there.

The final local whistle of 2006

In its final years, the less power the NP had, the closer it aligned itself to the ANC. The last of the NP’s many final moments arrived with the announcement of the results of local government election 2006. These elections signalled the first South African election since the NP’s formation in 1914, and most notably since 1994, that the NP-NNP had not contested, either independently or in alliance. The announcement of the local result was the moment at which the NNP ceased to exist. After a decade-long and tortuous dance with death, the NNP was thus finally put to rest in early June 2006. The ANC had conquered what had become a bone dry, ideologically blank and policy-bereft vessel. Its only ‘asset’ was the ‘NP’ in the ‘NNP’, the name of the oppressor-turned-new-patriot. The election result was announced and the NNP cancelled its registration with the Electoral Commission, as the formality required to end the life of a political party.

Another new National Party

In the run-up to election 2009 there was a sudden and short-lived appearance of yet another new National Party. On 5 August 2008 a party using the National Party name
was formed by Juan Duval Uys, David Sasman and Abdullar Omar and registered with the IEC. The three movers were from chequered backgrounds, mostly from the National People’s Party (NPP, associated with dirty tricks in Cape Town municipal floor-crossing that had attempted to break the DA-led governing alliance). It had no organisational connection with the by now defunct NNP. This NP, mark 2008, advocated a non-racial democratic South Africa based upon the policies of FW De Klerk’s NP. However, both De Klerk and Van Schalkwyk scorned the 2008 reincarnation. The party was a poorly conceptualised and opportunistically conceived initiative. Even before the election, in early February 2009, an application to clarify the NP’s leadership was heard in the Cape High Court. A faction led by former Cape Town city councillors, Achmat Williams and Omar, brought an application to interdict Uys from claiming to be the party’s president. In early February 2009, Uys alleged that 42 out of the party’s 50 top officials had followed him to join Cope, along with the party’s paid-up members. Finances were cited as a major reason for the move. This National Party submitted lists for only a few of the 2009 provincial elections. It failed to win any representation, anywhere. By 2011 this NP’s website promised 2014 action.

THREE CONSECUTIVE NP IDENTITIES IN ANC-CONTROLLED SOUTH AFRICA

Three sequential identities, constructed in direct relation to the ANC, materialised in the NP’s post-1994 existence. First, there was the tormented identity of the NP entering and exiting a GNU (1994-96) agreement with the ANC. For the NP this was the graceful way out of the negotiated settlement and its derived subjugated position. In this time the NP-NNP tried to reinvent itself as an autonomous opposition party to the ANC. It repositioned itself, along with renaming and replacing leadership. Second, in early 2000, the NNP rushed into the hastily constructed alliance with the DP, constituting the DA. The NNP emerged with huge chunks of representatives whittled away and much of its branch and organisational infrastructure captured by the DA. Third, in 2001 the NNP rushed out of the DA, into the arms of the ANC. This was another hastily conceived alliance from the side of the NNP. The NNP by now had little to offer; for the ANC it was an opportunistic and symbolically perfect arrangement. It drew on the NNP’s remaining ‘asset’ of a Western Cape support base that would deliver provincial government to the ANC. This pill was sweetened through the cooperative agreement that would facilitate executive power-sharing with the ANC. The NNP proportion of the vote in the Western Cape, even if diminished, secured a provincial majority for the ANC in 2004. By 2009, with the old identities whittled away, the ANC lost the province to the DA.

In the analysis of the NP party identities, the section takes stock of elections, leadership changes and attrition, and floor-crossing that informed emerging alliances and NNP reinventions. The characterisations intersect with the previous section’s historical benchmarks, microscoping in on the details of power shifts.
IDENTITY ONE: The reinvented post-1994 NP

The negotiated settlement of the early 1990s ensured the end of the NP as ‘grand’ governing party, and the GNU did not resuscitate its former ‘glory’. The NP had largely finished playing its role of reconciliation and co-facilitation of the transition. It now served as symbol of the transition, yet its active role was limited. The NP was poorly prepared for an opposition party role. Its experience was of oppressive state power.

Eclipsed GNU partner

GNU status did not serve NP objectives of self-preservation, which would have required the NP to demonstrate to its followers that the ANC was not all good and great. The elite settlement was largely accepted by NP supporters. Yet upon implementation the NP failed to carry voter trust that the party would continue to play a significant role in the democratic dispensation. The ANC’s policy shifts also minimised the potential NP role as ‘moderating’ influence. Big business accepted the ANC government and scaled down support for the NP. Simultaneously, the NP felt hamstrung through co-responsibility for government decisions. Internal disunity and turmoil resulted, and in a vicious-circle effect this exacerbated the NP’s lack of performance in the GNU. There was a barrage of internal debates about whether the party had ‘sold out’ white voters in the transitional negotiations. Voters spurned the NP’s new soul-searching. NP decay and disintegration increased.

The NP had to step in to secure its support base, which was still driven by an opposition orientation. The NP failed to negotiate the entrenchment of executive power-sharing in the final 1996 Constitution. In late June 1996 the NP thus elected to exit the GNU to try and assert itself as an opposition party without the obligations of being in an executive power-sharing arrangement.

Leadership attrition

The GNU problems caused leadership vulnerability. The NP was no newcomer to defecting or absconding leaders. Before and after 1994, it had lost leaders to the Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP), the Conservative Party (CP), the Freedom Front (FF) and the Independent Movement (IM), and would later lose more to the United Democratic Movement (UDM), the Democratic Alliance (DA), the Congress of the People (Cope) and the ANC.

Recurrent leadership attrition intersected with an existential crisis of the party and involved FW de Klerk, architect of the post-1990 NP. The new leadership problems indicated deep divisions on the future NP path. Faction fighting in 2005-07 was driven by split opinions on whether the NP should become a more modern, revisionist party, or should be modelled as a traditional, conservative party. Roelf Meyer, the constitutional negotiator who headed a committee to design the transformation of the NP, reckoned that survival depended on complete renewal, with the NP re-established as an inclusive and definitively post-apartheid party that would be Christian-democratic and social-Christian. Van Schalkwyk, then NP executive director, crossed swords with Meyer’s direction, propagating sticking to the NP’s core values and remaining closely connected to the Afrikaans and coloured-based NP support anchors.
### Table 3: NP-NNP leadership attrition under pressure of ANC consolidating power – main departures 1996 onwards

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Reason for departure</th>
<th>Destination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pik Botha, Chris Fismer, Dawie de Villiers, Leon Wessels, Tertius Delport and others</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>The withdrawal from GNU in June 1996 is experienced as a move to the right – several in the relative left in the party quit in protest; faction fighting on the road ahead for the NP, along with specifics of challenging the authority of De Klerk and being punished with the loss of leadership.</td>
<td>Most exit politics, for example to embark on legal or business careers; some later find higher state appointments or join the ANC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roelf Meyer</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Internal succession struggles and different visions for NNP; up to 1997 seen as heir apparent to De Klerk – position goes to Van Schalkwyk.</td>
<td>Forms UDM with Bantu Holomisa for 1999 election; resigns from UDM 2004 and concentrates on business.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FW de Klerk</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Thirteen months after leading NP out of GNU he resigns as RSA deputy president; power struggles; internal battle for direction of NP.</td>
<td>Exits active party politics and resigns as leader; resigns from NNP in 2004 upon NNP announcement of joining ANC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sam de Beer</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Disillusionment with remaining NNP leadership, leaves with several others.</td>
<td>Joins UDM initiative in 1998, resigns from UDM in 2001; becomes ANC MPL in Gauteng.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrick McKenzie</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>No longer identifies with the NNP, at least not in post-De Klerk era.</td>
<td>Joins ANC and becomes candidate in 1999; elected as ANC MP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pik Botha</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Botha exits government when De Klerk withdrew from GNU in 1996.</td>
<td>Declares support for Mbeki and ANC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerald Morkel</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Province, exits NNP to remain with the DA upon the break-up of DA.</td>
<td>Premier of Western Cape (1998-2001), Mayor of Cape Town (2002), goes to DA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheila Camerer</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Long-term dissatisfaction with the Van Schalkwyk style of leadership.</td>
<td>Returns to DA soon after its split with the NNP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Marais</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Corruption charges and disowned by the NNP; Premier of Western Cape (2001-02) steps down after allegations of sexual harassment.</td>
<td>Mayor of Cape Town (2001), Van Schalkwyk takes over; leaves NNP in floor-crossing to form 1-person New Labour Party (NLP).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
De Klerk asserted his preference, dissolved the Meyer committee and endorsed Van Schalkwyk’s position, signalling his rise up the NP hierarchy.

Dethroned as de facto crown prince to De Klerk, Meyer resigned and started the Process for a New Movement, a new party initiative. Several colleagues followed Meyer. They cooperated with expelled ANC leader and former Transkei military and bantustan leader, Bantu Holomisa, who was driving the parallel National Consultative Forum. The two joined forces to establish the UDM in the run-up to election 1999. Later, when the UDM was no longer playing the racially inclusive party game, most of the defectors resigned and joined the ANC.

In August 1997, 13 months after leading the NP out of the GNU and resigning as deputy president of South Africa, De Klerk resigned as NP leader. He no longer felt ‘sufficiently enthusiastic about opposition politics’. In a four-way contest Van Schalkwyk became the NP leader a month later. In Van Schalkwyk’s favour at the time was the argument that he would bring in support because he had not been directly and visibly complicit in apartheid wrongs, even if he had been a youth and student leader of the NP in the 1980s. The NP’s withdrawal from the GNU, switch to the role of opposition party, De Klerk’s resignation as leader, and Van Schalkwyk’s assumption of party leadership amplified its downward spiral, rather than triggering resuscitation. Leaders and representatives left the NP in droves (Table 3). Some formed other parties; others withdrew from politics. When they stayed in politics, they tended to end up in the ANC or the DA.

Reinventing the post-GNU NP

From early 1996 onwards, the NP projected itself as a party with a new vision for multiparty politics in South Africa. It aspired to strength and vigilance as opposition party,
working for ‘genuine’ multiparty democracy, dissociated from the apartheid party. Its focus on cooperation between opposition parties belatedly addressed conservative fears of the NP having ‘sold out’ in negotiations. This suspicion had been sustained post-1994 when the (obvious) realities of the ANC takeover took hold. Exiting the GNU in response to fears that it had left its voters behind was a move to the right. The emphasis moved to strategic positioning in relation to national issues, whilst looking out for minority interests. These endeavours led the largely NNP-loyal The Citizen newspaper to observe that the attempted shake-up appeared to be ‘a panic measure, forced on (the NNP) by falling support and party division …’

The 1996 version of the NP was far removed from the self-congratulatory party of the 1994 election campaign. That campaign was soaked in moral rectitude, boasting responsibility for the transition. Come 1996, and anticipating the 1999 campaign, the NNP returned to the campaign basics of trying to retain core support and achieve leader recognition. From 1997 Van Schalkwyk’s preferences for conservative reinvention ruled in the NNP. On 27 November 1997 the party was proclaimed to have become the New National Party.

**Devastating by-election results**

Whereas the national electoral trends presented the definitive benchmarks of decline, it was a set of 1997/98 local government by-elections that first signalled the NP’s pending disintegration. The batch included the 1997 by-elections of Kempton Park and Newlands (Johannesburg), both in Gauteng. Then DP leader Tony Leon recognised that the by-elections held the status of the ‘Wakkerstroom’ of the DP (with reference to the Wakkerstroom parliamentary by-election in the mid-1940s that signalled the NP’s 1948 electoral rise).

It was especially the Newlands, Johannesburg by-election that illustrated the trend. The mixed-class, overwhelmingly white ward included the white working class suburb of Newlands. The voters adopted the DP as their new party political home. Corresponding trends were evident in by-elections in Margate, Boksburg, Kempton Park and Witbank. The writing on the wall became even bolder when the NP in 1998 lost to the DP in Bergvliet in the Cape, Brakpan on the Gauteng East Rand and Rosettenville in the south of Johannesburg. The NP had earlier described Rosettenville as the safest seat in the country. The Van Schalkwyk NP tried to stem the tide, projecting itself as a vigilant opposition party to the ANC. However, as Leon noted, the NP had ‘too much baggage left in the boot and not enough horsepower remaining in the engine’.

Van Schalkwyk was not giving up. He averred that a bigger, multi-fronted voter shift was underway. The NP would emerge as a racially redefined party. He had detected a trend in which the NNP was indeed losing voter support to the DA, but was compensating for this by capturing new support from the ANC. Without being time-specific, he cited an analysis of just over 100 by-elections from the time of the 1994 election to May 1998 that showed that the NP had won 40 of the 70 seats it had contested, 13 of them from the ANC. He argued ‘growth potential’! His NP was the only opposition party ‘capable of taking seats from the ANC’.
Failed re-imaging and misreading the voters

The NNP insisted that the opinion polls and the 1997/98 by-elections were under-representing its support. Its 1999 election campaign would turn things around. The expensive campaign projected the ANC as ‘incompetent’ and ‘oblivious to the essentials of good governance’. This too failed to stem the NNP’s slide. The campaign metamorphosed into a holding operation to tie the NNP over until opposition parties could merge. On the eve of the election the NNP conceded that it would be content just to keep half of its 1994 support.

The national and provincial election results compounded the evidence of the NNP’s fall. Nationally it plummeted from 20 per cent in 1994, to 7 in 1999. The NNP won 28 parliamentary seats in 1999, compared with the 38 of the DP. Within five years the NNP’s support declined from 2.9 to 1.1 million votes (Table 2; a 72 per cent drop). The period from 1999 to 2004 would bring a further 73 per cent decline, taking NNP support from 1999’s remaining 1.1 million to approximately 257,000. The NNP’s national-level electoral support would thus dwindle to 1.7 per cent in 2004. The NNP electoral fall is further illustrated through its faltering provincial election results, with dismal presences in all provinces except the Western and Northern Cape (Table 4).

Following election 1999 the NNP was the first opposition party to pronounce itself in favour of a unified opposition movement to the right of the ANC. In anticipation of the local government elections of 2000, the NNP reverted to warnings of the dangers of ANC ascendance, should opposition parties not unite. This prepared the groundwork for ‘identity two’.

**TABLE 4: National Party electoral performances in the provinces**

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<thead>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(in brackets the number of provincial legislature seats won by NP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Election</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape (63)</td>
<td></td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>3.22</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free State (30)</td>
<td></td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>5.20</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gauteng (73)</td>
<td></td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>3.89</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaZulu-Natal (80)</td>
<td></td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>3.28</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limpopo (49)</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mpumalanga (30)</td>
<td></td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>2.47</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Cape (30)</td>
<td></td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>24.17</td>
<td>7.52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West (30)</td>
<td></td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>2.29</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Cape (42)</td>
<td></td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>38.39</td>
<td>10.88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** Reynolds, 1994, pp. 202–3; Schulz Herzenberg, 2005, p. 179.
IDENTITY TWO: Schizophrenic about-turns in the DA and ANC flirtation

Once the NNP started spiralling downwards and realised that its days as an autonomous party were numbered, it strategically manoeuvred to lodge itself in an opposition party alliance. The resultant DA alliance posed no general threat to the ANC, but had the potential to bolster opposition cooperation in the Western Cape and capture the province from ANC control. The DA dalliance period spanned a mere two years, yet it catalysed party politics … and pushed the NNP into further collapse.

As in the NNP’s time as reinvented autonomous opposition party, it was prevailing election results and feared forthcoming results that propelled party realignment. In 1999, the NNP not only suffered terminal national decline, but also lost its overall majority in the Western Cape. The NNP and DP then jointly formed the provincial government of the Western Cape, with the primary motivation of keeping the ANC out of power. The ANC, the largest single Western Cape party, was marginalised. The NNP, however, remained in shock and also needed to stave off annihilation in the pending local government election 2000. Extended cooperation with the DP was its answer.

Extending DA identity into elected institutions

The NNP’s fate in its alliance with the DP was sealed in a flurry of meetings between the DP’s Leon, the NNP’s Van Schalkwyk, and their key lieutenants in mid-June 2000. Courtesy of its pitiable 1999 election performance, the NNP had little bargaining power. Leon went for the jugular and secured the best terms for the DP leg of the DA.

The next move for the DP-NNP anti-ANC alliance was to give effect to and extend their joint new identity beyond local government. The anti-defection clause in the South African Constitution of 1996 then in force meant that the DP and NNP had to maintain separate operations in provincial legislatures and Parliament. The DA could not be consummated on these levels without relinquishing seats. The result was the saga of legislative and constitutional change to enable floor-crossing (Chapter 7).

DA-alliance unravelling

Consolidation of the DA as an opposition force, however, was doomed. The two parties clashed, including on leadership issues. Philosophical-identity and internal management differences further bedevilled the relationship. NNP legacies of fundraising and municipal governance scandals raised additional problems for the new alliance. The tensions became manifest when it emerged that the NNP, regarding itself as organisationally the stronger of the two parties, was revealed to have been strategising to take over the DA. This was to have happened through the construction of a membership base to dominate future conferences. In turn the NNP learnt that the DP’s Ryan Coetzee had been strategising to marginalise NNP leaders in the DA, including the NNP’s Peter Marais. Marais’ support in Western Cape working class coloured communities was the strongest remaining pillar in the NNP repertoire. Once reports on mutual undermining strategies and leadership clashes became public the alliance edifice
collapsed. The conflict-ridden DA brought ungovernability to both the Western Cape government and local municipalities.

In November 2001, the NNP Federal Council suspended the NNP's participation in the DA, simultaneously withdrawing from its Western Cape provincial partnership (in the 1999 provincial elections, prior to the formation of the DA, its members were elected as NNP representatives). The NNP was shell-shocked. The DA virtually obliterated the NNP as it lost many of its representatives to the DA and the DA captured much of its organisational infrastructure. The NNP's saviour for the time being was that its members could break away from the DA in the Western Cape government because they had been elected in 1999 under the pre-DA, NNP banner. This opened prospects for an ANC-NNP provincial deal to oust the DA, and possibly also for the ANC and NNP to cooperate in the Cape Town metropole.

**Rapprochement with the ANC**

Those who had felt trapped in the DA viewed closer cooperation with the ANC as their only escape. A relationship with the ANC would obviously also help at the polls. The NNP was attractive to the ANC, largely because of its potential to contribute coloured voters to building a new majoritarian government in both the Western Cape and the Cape Town metropolitan government. These dynamics prevailed in negotiations, for example between the ANC's Mosiuoa Lekota and Van Schalkwyk. Lekota, national chairperson of the ANC at the time, addressed the NNP's Federal Congress and negotiated much of the terms for incorporation. The NNP and ANC commenced their 'cooperative engagement' liaison.

Conscious that the NNP might be a hollow shell, the ANC insisted on a phased deal. The immediate phase was the formation of the coalition government in the Western Cape. There would be an NNP premier and the two parties would each have six seats in the provincial executive. The deal included an ANC mayor for Cape Town, which would be put into practice once local-level floor-crossing became possible in 2002. (The DA lost control of the Cape Town council in October 2002.)

It took from November 2001 (when the intended cooperation was announced and the ANC's NEC spelt out the criteria for cooperation) until March 2002 for the statement to emerge that the ANC and NNP would form a joint task team to chart the way forward for the full implementation of their cooperation agreement. The 2001 agreement stated the objective of appointing NNP members of the provincial legislatures (MPLs) to the provincial executive councils and a member to the executive councils controlled by the ANC. By March 2002, Lekota argued that in the second phase more than jobs were at stake. This confirmed that the original agreement would not be implemented to the extent that the NNP had hoped. By now, it was powerless to object. The NNP in the end felt let down with the limited executive power-sharing it obtained from the ANC (one of the original understandings of the deal). Van der Westhuizen confirms that Lekota had run up against 'intractable resistance in the ANC. The argument … Why throw the mortally wounded party of apartheid a lifeline?'

Part of the second phase was the enactment of legislation to enable floor-crossing
and the conquest of some of the 27 councils that were under DA control. The phased rollout of the ANC-NNP courtship meant that the NNP still had to undergo, on its own, its final and mortally bruising electoral experience of the 2004 national and provincial elections. This final exposure was essential in order to help secure the Western Cape for the ANC.

**Consummation through floor-crossing**

The consummation of the NNP-ANC relationship happened in the form of cooperative governance (‘less than a full alliance’) between the ANC and NNP. NNP representatives in local governments, having been elected as DA members in the elections of 2000, could not exit the alliance. The impasse was unblocked through the 2002 floor-crossing legislation, enacting ‘window periods’ for floor-crossing. Members of Parliament, provincial legislatures and municipal councils could switch parties, in certain conditions, without forfeiting their seats. It was designed specifically to get the NNP representatives to cross the floor into the ANC and hand power to the ANC (Chapter 7).

**IDENTITY THREE: Subsumed into the ANC**

The ANC was intent on maximising own advantage, both in terms of the ‘coloured voting bloc’ of the Western Cape that it hoped the NNP could deliver and the honour of the final humiliating absorption of its erstwhile nemesis. It was the ANC’s time to capture the final trophy, albeit in the form of an emaciated and serially humiliated NNP. The ANC’s 2005 words reflected the significance it attached to the final conquest of the NNP:

> History determined that these two historic political movements of our century [the ANC and NNP], standing at opposite ends in the contest between the coloniser and the colonised, would, at least for eight decades, lock horns in a protracted struggle between two epochs in the evolution of human society. In the end … the ANC emerged as the victor, and the NP the vanquished.

The NNP deal enabled the ANC to assert control over the Western Cape and the Cape Town metro, even if these gains would be reversed come elections 2006 and 2009. One of the few remaining prizes in 2009 was the Western Cape premiership. It went to Van Schalkwyk. In subsequent times, it emerged that the ANC’s ‘NNP strategy’ could not deliver, courtesy of the political migration of the coloured voting bloc. A large proportion of the Western Cape coloured support chose not to become subsumed into the ANC. In the 2010 words of the ANC, ‘ANC support in the province amongst Coloured voters almost halved, and in Cape Town we lost two thirds of support since the 2004 elections, most of this to the DA’.

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The NNP’s final, phantom reinvention

Throughout its decade of sequentially and narrowly averting death the NNP had attempted to reinvent, and make itself presentable to voters and other political parties alike. Its reinventions often concerned styles of opposition, and reconciliation, nationalism, patriotism and constructive engagement, rather than substantive policy issues. For example, it would claim to make identity sacrifices in service of the national good. The following NNP spin line illustrates the phenomenon:\textsuperscript{88}

The NNP welcomes President Mbeki’s emphasis on the need for all South Africans to be co-builders of the new South Africa … It is through an inclusive approach that solutions will be found to serve all the peoples of South Africa.

Van Schalkwyk’s pitch was that they were contributing to finally ending the ‘division of the South African soul’. NNP last-ditch stalwarts, such as Renier Schoeman, lauded the process from November 2001 onwards as the NNP’s ‘historic new relationship with the ANC’. The NNP was aware that this would be too little to ensure votes in its final electoral contest, election 2004. Its campaign net had to be cast wider. It (again) positioned itself as the constraining influence on the ANC, which racial minority groups ‘required’ in order to ensure a moderated ANC.\textsuperscript{89} NNP secretary general, Daryl Swanepoel argued that the ‘… challenges facing this country are too important to be left in the hands of the ANC alone. All South Africans should be involved in this new struggle for prosperity for all’.\textsuperscript{90}

The NNP of 2005 had become ideologically, policy- and programme-wise bereft of new ideas. A power-laced death was the best it could negotiate. The ANC was ready to laud the ‘courage and wisdom’ of the belated and self-preserving move of the handful of Nats that had on no occasion in the preceding decade felt inclined to align with it. The ANC and Mbeki were gracious in this conquest. Mbeki slammed those who criticised the move as one that fosters ‘an anti-democratic one party state’, including critical voices inside the ANC.\textsuperscript{91}

The drum they beat is but a noisy nuisance. It is not a weapon of which the democratic and non-racial order need be afraid. And the masses of our people will not be persuaded by empty noise to abandon their long established national movement for democracy and non-racism, which members of the New National Party have opted to join and support, merely because of a drum that is nothing more than a noisy nuisance.

Unfolding floor-crossing and the ANC’s capture of power

The ANC-NNP liaison bore its first tangible fruits in October 2002 when the DA lost control of the Cape Town metropole to the ANC-NNP grouping. The Constitutional Court the week before had permitted floor-crossing. Now 27 Cape Town councillors (elected in 2000 under the new DA banner) left the DA and returned to the NNP. A
total of 24 were needed to give effect to the manoeuvre. At stake for the NNP was the trade-off of two deputy ministerial appointments. Van Schalkwyk defended the NNP’s 2002 move to align with the ANC in the takeover of the Cape Town unicity: ‘Opposition to the right of the ANC is dead. The need now is to strengthen the centre.’

In the 2003 edition of floor-crossing, a group of senior NNP leaders elected to ‘return’ to their temporary recent home, the DA (after only a few months back in the NNP). They included Sheila Camerer and Tertius Delport. When it became clear in the subsequent floor-crossings and cooperative governance agreements with the ANC that the NNP was ready to be subsumed into the ANC, the largest contingent of its local level leadership used the floor-crossing opportunity to find new political homes, mostly in the ANC and DA. A significant group of senior NNP leaders, in all spheres of government, did not return to the NNP and further depleted the Van Schalkwyk initiative. The final floor-crossing session, in which the NNP was sequestrated in Parliament, would follow in September 2005 – but only after the NNP had suffered election 2004.

**Death-knell of election 2004**

Despite NNP and ANC cooperation, the NNP had to fight election 2004 without the ANC security blanket. It was a strategic choice made by the ANC to test NNP electoral strength before committing to power-sharing deals on positions.

The NNP pre-election propaganda wanted to ‘regenerate the 1994 ethos of reconciliation and cooperation’. But the faltering party was an unconvincing message bearer. White South Africans who wanted to align with the ANC had not required the NNP to mediate the step. The NNPs’ campaign stressed that the NNP, at the side of the ANC, would be the voters’ voice to represent the interests of the whites, coloureds and Indians. The concrete examples they could offer to demonstrate this ability were … getting overseas voting, and stopping the ‘kill the boer’ slogans.

In late January 2004, NNP leader Van Schalkwyk still held out the possibility that the NNP could, in the event of ‘collapsing ANC support in Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal’ come to the rescue of the ANC. In the end, the NNP failed to win seats in either of these two legislatures (Table 5 for Gauteng illustrates the trend). Suggestions of the likely 2004 NNP outcome had been on the wall for some time in the run-up to the election. Opinion polls reported 6 per cent support in May 2002, AfroBarometer gave it 3 per cent in October 2002 and Markinor arrived at 4 per cent in November 2003, and 1.8 per cent in January – February 2004.

The NNP nationally declined to a low of 1.7 per cent of the valid votes. It had lost more than 90 per cent of its 1994 electoral support. The provincial trends amplified the devastation that the 2004 electorate delivered. In Gauteng the NP declined in the space of the three elections from 1994 to 2004 from 24 per cent of the provincial vote to 0.76 per cent (Table 5). The NNP’s provincial result in 2004 in the Western Cape (Tables 3 and 5) was marginally less dismal. The NNP won a total of five seats (7 per cent of the provincial vote). These seats, along with the 19 of the ANC, were adequate to secure a provincial legislative majority. However, the message of the five seats, seen in the context of elections and floor-crossing in the Western Cape, was that of a
vanishing party. With the final result at the IEC results centre in Pretoria on the Friday after the Wednesday’s voting, Van Schalkwyk was absent. On the IEC centre floor other NNP candidates were publicly shedding tears.

On 14 September 2005 the NNP MPs finally disappeared from Parliament. The final seven MPs, elected in 2004, crossed (six to the ANC and one, Stan Simmons, to a new ‘one-MP party’, the United Party of South Africa, (UPSA); Chapter 7). On provincial level in the Western Cape, the last remaining NNP MPL, Johan Gelderblom, crossed to the ANC. 80 NNP councillors remained at local level and would stay until the announcement of the result of local government election 2006, in which the NNP did not participate.

**TABLE 5: Slippage in NNP electoral support in Gauteng – trends over three elections, 1994-2004**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Percentage support and number of seats</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Percentage support and number of seats</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Percentage support and number of seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strongest opposition party</td>
<td>Second strongest opposition party</td>
<td>Third strongest opposition party*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>NP</td>
<td>24.0 (21)</td>
<td>FF</td>
<td>6.2 (5)</td>
<td>DP</td>
<td>5.3 (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>DP</td>
<td>18.0 (13)</td>
<td>NNP</td>
<td>3.9 (3)</td>
<td>IFP</td>
<td>3.5 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004*</td>
<td>DA</td>
<td>20.9 (15)</td>
<td>IFP</td>
<td>2.5 (2)</td>
<td>ACDP</td>
<td>1.7 (1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** * NNP in 2004: Wins 0.76 of provincial voter support and 0 seats.

**Sources:** Independent Electoral Commission, [www.iec.org.za](http://www.iec.org.za), range of windows over time; Susan Booyzen and Grant Masterson, 2009, ‘South Africa’, in *Compendium on Southern African Elections II*, Johannesburg, EISA.

**POST-MORTEM OF NNP DEMOGRAPHIC AND IDEOLOGICAL POSITIONING**

As early as 1994 the demographic composition of the NP’s membership and supporters started changing in a way that would lead to its eventual fate. Coloured voters came to constitute, for example, 45 per cent of the NP’s Western Cape membership. The NP had to some extent reinvented itself and presented itself as the new-era cutting edge party that could be trusted. A primary NP campaigning platform was that it would be the best representative of minority interests, and that it would be the best government for the Western Cape. The fact that the NP had realistic prospects of winning provincial power made it a serious option to vote for. The NP fundamentally targeted those voters that feared the ANC. They were prone to rewarding the NP for taking South Africa forward into a negotiated settlement; for negotiating a constitutional state and relative devolution of powers.
Come election 1999, the NNP was thoroughly aware of the rise of the DP and its own loss of traditional voter constituencies in the white community. The party had also undergone far-reaching changes, it left the GNU to play a more assertive opposition role, and De Klerk had been replaced by Van Schalkwyk. It was faced with an exceedingly difficult task – to present itself as an opposition party in a space that the DP had started occupying. It projected itself as the party that could make a difference, not a party of ‘perpetual opposition’. ‘Ian Smith is still fighting two-thirds’, was its backhanded attack on the DP. This was intended to differentiate it from the DA’s aggressive ‘fight-back’ campaign. It tried to condemn the DP as a party for wealthy and reactionary whites. The NNP attacked the DA, yet tried to project itself as actually in contest with the ANC. It hammered the ANC on corruption, nepotism and arrogance. It tried to project itself as the major catalyst of getting things on track again. ‘Let’s get South Africa working’, was its refrain.

The NNP in the 2004 election suffered from the combined effect of its break-up and withdrawal from the DA, realignment with the ANC, and the spectacles of floor-crossing. The NNP created the image of a party that was panicking, falling about for options, indecisive and fundamentally a party without a future. It was firmly on the cards that post-election the NNP would move closer to the ANC. Apart from the factor of antiquated ‘blood-loyalties’, there was little reason now to vote for the NNP rather than for the ANC. Van Schalkwyk enjoyed little credibility and esteem, even in the heart of the NNP support base. A well-conceptualised menu of campaign issues (those of top priority to South Africans) could also not convince the electorate to vote NNP.

The NNP attempted to define a centrist ideological niche position for itself. Its distinctiveness was to include advocacy of consensual, instead of Westminster attack-style, opposition. It continued with its seven-year-old slur that the DA was the home of reactionary whites. Nothing worked. More than half of the NNP’s 1999 supporters chose neither to vote for the NNP nor for the ANC. The coloured voting bloc of the Western Cape came through as the saviour of the NNP, and gave the NNP its only touch of negotiating power with the ANC. The most surprising aspect of NNP support in election 2004 was probably that the party had still managed to gain 1.7 per cent of the national vote. Its core support, including the coloured voting bloc and in particular the coloured working class, had already started migrating to the DA. In elections 2009 and 2011, many of the coloured middle classes would follow.

WHEN DID THE NNP DIE?

In a morbid fascination with the fate of oppressor parties at the hand of liberator parties, it is useful to consider when the NP-NNP really died. Most evidence points to the process of mortal decline originating with the NP’s conflicted GNU experience. The NNP had not negotiated itself out of power. The unbannings and negotiations combined with the massive popular power of the ANC to render the NP’s loss of significant power non-negotiable. The process could not be stopped. Despite the NP’s
original designs to emerge as still-powerful, it had to go with the transitional flow. Its multiple attempts to resurrect some form of power testified to its disbelief that it was destined to die.

The relic that the NP had become was wracked by internal contest and inability to define an opposition foothold. It could not shore up power, even as opposition party, and could not preserve credibility. The exact point of no return is hard to define. Perhaps it had started dying in the 1970s with internal student revolts and the exodus to join liberation armies, or in the late 1980s when the internal opposition started eating away at its white support, both from its left and its right. The 1970s’ civic revolts were a turning point in the NP’s growth trajectory in its white, Volksraad, elections. Its ‘Damascene act’ of the early 1990s might have been an attempt to avoid death in the pre-democracy days. Whichever of these answers is accepted, the mappings show that it was a protracted death. By the time it got subsumed into the ANC the NP-NNP was an emaciated party with no prospect of rehabilitation.

In a final twist, election 2009 flashed evidence that ‘the NP’ had possibly not died and that it remained available for bizarre retro-reinventions. In what journalist Wyndham Hartley described as ‘a bold step backwards’, a new August 2008 version of the NP under a variation of the old party logo of an orange rising sun registered for participation in election 2009. This one, however, was stillborn (Chapter 7). For many the NP had not really died, but had metamorphosed into the current day DA. On considering the electoral trends in Table 4 on the NNP’s provincial vote percentages over time, it is remarkable that the NP’s best performance as an opposition party in democratic South Africa, its 20 per cent nationally in 1994, along with some good provincial performances, are virtually replicated (albeit a touch lower in most instances) in the DA’s performance 15 years later in the 2009 national and provincial elections.

It is well known that NP leaders, substantial numbers of elected representatives and voter-supporters have migrated to the DA. The DA has also moved on. Yet, the 2009 resemblance in voter support trends across the provinces is uncanny. This indicated both a return of opposition to earlier levels, in line with the ANC’s corresponding shrinkage, and that the DA up to that point had not escaped the racial ceiling that had plagued it. Of course, the ANC in election 2009 had also returned to roughly its 1999 level of support. In the 2011 local election the results showed renewed evidence that the DA remains haunted by the NP albatross. Its Western Cape support (as the other side of the coin of the ANC shedding minority support) brought evidence of a re-racialisation of party politics that put paid to the idea that it was the ANC that had inherited the NP.

**CONCLUSION**

The history of the NP’s last decade is in itself an epic of a party that was eclipsed by its erstwhile nemesis, the monolithic ANC. It was the tortuous route in and out of coop-
erative governance ‘alliances’ (in 1994 into GNU, in 1996 out of GNU); devastation in election 1999; losing out in municipal by-elections; entering the DA alliance in 2000 (and countering DA scavengers); pulling itself out of the DA in 2001; setting in motion a chain of defection, floor-crossing, and alliance with the ANC, whilst shedding support in all directions; decimation in election 2004; humiliation by the ANC upon the readjustment of the cooperative deal to match the 2004 result; final evacuation of the NNP shell with floor-crossing in 2005; and the last of the councillors slipping away when the 2006 local election result was announced.

In many ways the death and disappearance of the NNP set a track that would be mimicked by the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), the second GNU partner to the ANC in the 1994 transitional dispensation. The IFP decline was slower. It limped from one election to the next, from alliances to introspective reinventions, yet consistently declined in support. In Election 2009 the IFP remained the party with the fourth biggest national standing, yet had declined to 4.6 per cent support. Come local election 2011, and the split-off of the National Freedom Party (NFP) it was left with 3.57 per cent and no apparent prospect for future growth.

Even in this last decade, the NP had had an illusory self-vision as a continuing big league player. After it lost state power in 1994 it gradually wound its way back into state power, even if in a subordinate role in relation to the ANC. It retained its delusions that it had to be in a special relation to government power … and failed to imagine itself as a minor opposition party. It chose death at the hand of the negotiator-victor, gratuitously veiled as great actions of reconciliation and niche representation, rather than suffering the ignominy of membership of the band of micro-opposition parties in South Africa. The NNP had clearly exhausted its options for keeping itself alive.

In its death, the NNP was not so exceptional. Moribund political parties the world over spend their final years reinventing themselves, mutating and aligning until the final, failed transmutation eliminates the previously autonomous party. The rest is history. The adoration that the NP elicited in the early 1990s – for being exceptional in its willingness to ‘negotiate itself out of power’ – was eclipsed. The ignominious series of exits by coteries of leaders, undignified defections and the uncontested clamour for power and position by its final sets of leaders, in the end, remained the post-1994 legacy of the (N)NP.

The ANC, treasuring the symbolic value of the victory, embraced the conquest and honoured it with statements on reconciliation and humility in the face of the final defeat of the colonialist-apartheid foe. For the ANC, this victory was of minor vote value, yet in symbolic terms it was immense. It was an essential part of the ANC’s consolidation of power. For the ANC there remains a burdensome contradiction in proclaiming ‘final victory over the party of apartheid’ whilst in the performance of ANC administrations the legacies of apartheid are recognised as deterrents to more comprehensive socio-economic transformation in post-apartheid South Africa.
NOTES


2. The NNP designation is used from the official renaming of 1998 onwards. In general references to the party, the text simply uses ‘NP’.


6. NP constitutional engineering of the 1980s saw the introduction of the ‘Tricameral Parliament’ – National Parliament now comprising three houses, a separate one for each of the white, coloured and Indian population groups. The initiative helped polarise communities, with many vehemently opposed to participation. It also inadvertently helped galvanise the internal revolt of the 1980s. The tricameral institution always suffered from illegitimacy. These constitutional reforms thinly veiled the fact that the military-security complex, the so-called National Security Management System (NSMS) in effect governed South Africa. See, for example, Jacklyn Cock and Laurie Nathan, 1989, *War and society: The militarisation of South Africa*, Cape Town, David Philip.


14. Note that minor discrepancies occur between different sources consulted for this table, also between official sources.

15. Danaher, op. cit.


18. This phrase is from Southall and Daniel, 2005, op. cit., p. 49.

Turnout in 1994 was not racially differentiated. White South African voter turnout peaked in 1958 at 90 per cent. By 1975 it had fallen to 75 per cent and in 1987 white electoral participation was down to 68 per cent. See Tom Lodge, 2002, ‘South Africa’, in Tom Lodge, Denis Kadima and David Pottie (eds.), *Compendium of Elections in Southern Africa*, Johannesburg, EISA, pp. 292-294.


Marthinus Van Schalkwyk, 1997, NNP leader, Interview, Cape Town, October 1997. In an ironic twist, it was Van Schalkwyk who later took the NNP back into cabinet when he specifically was rewarded by the ANC for collapsing his NNP into the ANC.

See Sparks 2003, op. cit., p. 133.


Interview with Van Schalkwyk, 15 September 1997.

KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape were the two provinces, at the time, not yet under control of the ANC, a situation that was reversed in the 2004 provincial elections, and again changed in 2009.

Susan Booyzen, 1999, Pre-election briefing … op. cit.

Clause 14 of the New NP/DP merger agreement contained a mechanism to ensure an even spread of DP and NNP candidates across a municipal area. It was agreed that municipal caucuses would be in proportion to the number of votes each party won in the 1999 election; see Troye Lund, 2000, ‘DA settles sticky candidate business’, http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=13&amp;art_id=ct20000824121013395P232672 (accessed 11 November 2000).

In this regard, Colette Schulz Herzenberg, 2005, ‘The New National Party: the end of the road’ in Jessica Piombo and Lia Nijzink (eds.), *Electoral politics in South Africa: assessing the first democratic decade*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 168 notes that the NNP had advanced three notions of cooperative governance, (1) participation in the GNU (working with the ANC whilst opposing it), (2) the NNP’s 1999 election campaign of ‘constructive opposition’, and (3) in terms of cooperative governance working with the ANC after the break-up of the DA alliance. The analysis in this chapter differentiates four phases.

Some liberal analysts lamented the disservice to multiparty democracy of having any opposition party swallowed ‘by the super-dominant ANC’, see Lawrence Schlemmer, 2004, ‘NNP strikes a blow against democracy’, *Focus* 35, p. 32, Johannesburg, Helen Suzman Foundation.


NNP secretary general in the party’s final days, Daryl Swanepoel, averred that it ‘is now that the GNU has broken down that we realise exactly how important that concept was …’, speech, symposium of the ANCYL, University of the Western Cape (UWC), Cape Town, 19 April 2003.


See Marthinus van Schalkwyk, 2004, ‘An NNP role in ANC delivery’, *This Day*, 29 January 2004, p. 11. He stated, for example: ‘The NNP welcomes president Thabo Mbeki’s emphasis on the need for all South Africans to be co-builders of the new South Africa’ and ‘The NNP chooses to put the national interests of all South Africans above narrow party political interests and to be part of the solution in our country’.


40 Duval Uys was publicly dubbed a sex-blogger. He was arrested at his mother’s house in Kroonstad, see Constitutionally Speaking, blog of Professor Pierre de Vos, http://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/ juan-duval-uyx-finally-arrested/ (accessed 11 November 2009). Charges of having defamed the ID’s Simon Grindrod were later withdrawn in a Cape court.


46 In some instances there was continuous contestation. For example, Peter Marais, previous Western Cape premier and prominent Cape Flats politician, was expelled from the NNP in January 2003, along with David Malatsi (previous deputy social development minister), for alleged corruption. These leaders continued insisting that NNP leader Van Schalkwyk had been complicit in the party receiving controversial donations from donors that stood to benefit from certain environmental policy decisions (see Norman Joseph, 2005, ‘Lê ’n leuentoets af, vra Marais van Marthinus’, Rapport, 2 October 2005, p. 10). Van Schalkwyk in turn testified that he had only at a late stage become aware of the donations and then referred the matter to the public protector, see South African Press Association (Sapa), ‘Van Schalkwyk testifies against Malatsi’, Business Day, 27 September 2005, p. 3.


48 They were mainly Annelizé van Wyk, Gerhard Koornhof, many in the NP youth wing in Gauteng, and a while later Sam de Beer also joined.

49 Six NP cabinet members also left their positions.


51 Van der Westhuizen, 2007, op. cit., p. 265 elaborates on the role that the Nasionale Pers media group (Media-24) played in the Van Schalkwyk rise.

52 Giliomee and Mbenga (eds.), 2007, op. cit., pp. 412-3 note the policy factors that became more liberal, civil servants giving up on the NP as guarantor of their interests, security forces’ dismay at the NNP failing to negotiate a general amnesty, Afrikaans medium of instruction in schools and universities being left vulnerable, Afrikaans in public media being relegated, cabinet members having to work within the policy framework of the ANC – and the ANC criticising De Klerk when he publicly aired disagreements over issues that had been tabled before cabinet.


55 Author’s interview with Tony Leon (DP leader), Johannesburg, 20 June 1997.

56 Interview, Tony Leon, 28 August 1997, Johannesburg; author’s observation and analyses of the Newlands by-election.


61 Author’s interview with Boy Geldenhuys (NNP MP), Cape Town, 13 March 1999.


63 Johan Kilian, as quoted in Beeld, 23 March 1999.

64 C. van den Berg, 1999, NNP, Interview, Durban, May 1999.

65 As noted in Die Burger, 16 August 1999.

66 Jan Hofmeyr and Bruce Rice, 2000, Working with the African National-led Congress: Commitment-led marketing, Chichester, John Wiley & Sons.


69 Phrase used by Sparks, 2003, op. cit., p. 11.

70 After outrages, the Cape High Court halted the legislation and deferred it to the Constitutional Court of South Africa. The Constitutional Court first suspended the commencement of the legislation and ruled that floor-crossing was consistent with the founding values of South Africa’s Constitution and its Bill of Rights. The Court also ruled that defection in a PR system was compatible with democracy and noted that unhappiness in terms of the principles of proportionality ‘should be dealt with in the next election’ (Constitutional Court, 2002). It upheld floor-crossing on local government level. It also upheld, however, the UDM-IFP challenge of the Membership Act (intended to enable floor-crossing on national level), but on the technical grounds that the legislation ‘impermissibly amended the Constitution by means of ordinary legislation rather than a constitutional amendment’ (George Devenish, 2003, ‘Political Musical Chairs – The saga of floor-crossing and the Constitution’, Seminar paper, Howard College, University of Natal, 25 April, Durban, p. 7; Constitutional Court of South Africa (4 October 2002) Case No. CCT 23/02, http://www.concourt.gov.za/files/udm). After this ruling, Parliament passed the constitutional amendment in the form of the Constitutional Amendment Act 2003. The president signed the Act in early 2003, giving members of the National Assembly and provincial legislatures two weeks to defect without losing their seats.


73 The finances of the NP remained a mystery. Some suggested that the NNP had effectively bankrupted itself in the 1999 election. Jeremy Michaels, 2002, ‘ABSA explains its decision on NNP’s debt’, The Star, 26 October, p. 1 supports this notion. It was said that after the 1999 election, the NNP had owed ABSA R6.2 million. The bank felt there was no way of recovering it from the NNP. Elsewhere, however, it was speculated that one of the reasons for the NNP-DA fall out was that the NNP was not bringing all of its finances and assets into the deal. In 2000 the NNP swapped its 40 Burg St head office in Cape Town, used since 1982, for cheaper premises – it had also reduced head office staff after the 1999 election. See Jacob Rooi, 2000, ‘NP se nuwe hoofkantoor goedkoper’, Rapport, 30 April 2000, p. 5.
Subjugation and demise of the (New) National Party

74 See Van Der Westhuizen, 2007, op. cit., p. 274.
77 Mosiuoa Lekota was a central ANC player in bringing the NNP into the ANC, negotiating terms for incorporation. Also see Lodge, 2002, Politics in South Africa, op. cit., p. 41 on Lekota’s relations with Afrikaners in the time when he was premier of the Free State. Van der Westhuizen, 2007, op. cit., p. 344, citing Charles Redcliffe in Beeld, 21 June 2002, who notes the involvement of Essop Pahad, Steve Tshwete and Penuell Maduna, at the time all top ANC leaders.
80 Van Der Westhuizen, 2007, op. cit., p. 280.
83 Also see Southall and Daniel, 2005, op cit., p. 49, noting that the ANC had courted the NNP out of convenience and contempt.
85 See Sparks, op. cit., p. 13.
90 NNP, 2004, op. cit.
93 Marthinus van Schalkwyk, April 2004, SABC-TV1, Asikhulume Debate.
94 Public media releases on the results of opinion polls; range of media.
95 Susan Booysen, 2004, op. cit.,
96 Ibid.
100 See the NNP's February 2004 election manifesto.
### ANNEXURE TO CHAPTER 8

#### COMPARATIVE NP AND ANC POWER TRAJECTORIES

**Clashing NP and ANC power trajectories: NP and its state power over the ANC, 1911-1994**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Main NP electoral, succession and constitutional events</th>
<th>Acts of ‘state security’, NP regime oppression, main trends in ANC resistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>The South African Party (SAP; led by prime minister Louis Botha) is formed. Botha drops Hertzog from his cabinet in 1912 (in 1914 Hertzog would lead his faction out of the 1913 congress of the SAP).</td>
<td>African National Congress (originally the South African Native National Congress, SANNC) is formed with John Dube as president and Sol Plaatje as secretary general (8 January 1912) in Bloemfontein; intends bringing all Africans together to defend their rights.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>The National Party of the Free State is established under leadership of Afrikaner nationalist General JBM Hertzog in Bloemfontein, 14 July 1914. The other three provinces follow suit. This party first wins parliamentary representation in the 1915 election (27 MPs).</td>
<td>1913 Land Act strips black South Africans of their rights to land already occupied, making it possible for them to obtain land rights only in areas demarcated by the government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>Louis Botha dies and General Jan Smuts becomes leader of the SAP and prime minister.</td>
<td>The SANNC adopts its constitution in 1919 and is renamed the African National Congress (ANC) in 1923.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>An election brings the National Party (NP) into power in coalition with the Labour Party, under leadership of General Hertzog (in the Pact government). They govern South Africa for close to a decade – in 1929 the NP for the first time wins power on its own, with the assistance of a minority of coloured voters.</td>
<td>Josiah Gumede is elected ANC president (1927). Pixley Seme becomes ANC president (1930). The 1927 ANC annual conference defends the black vote and the right to own unlimited land (Hertzog intends removing the Cape African vote, this is formalised in 1936).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>A Hertzog-Smuts coalition wins the election (1933). The NP splits into two factions, the Smelter (Fusionist) faction, and the Gesuiwerde (Purified) faction, the latter concentrated in the Cape Province, under leadership of DF Malan. The Smelters merge with the SAP to form the United Party (UP, December 1934). The Purifieds regroup under the National Party label and become the official opposition to the ruling UP.</td>
<td>The Second Native Trust and Land Act further restricts black land ownership (1936). The ANC mobilises against the legislation. The ANC becomes more aggressive and confident in asserting rights. This happens in response to the threat posed by DDT Jabavu’s All African Convention (AAC).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Hertzog defeated as the UP splits over going to war against Germany. Smuts constitutes a government and enters World War II. Smuts government more tolerant of modest degrees of integration, and social spending on black South Africans increases – this liberalisation is stopped under threat of the Nats. In January 1940 Malan’s NP and Hertzog’s supporters merge into the Reconstituted (Herenigde) National (HNP) Party led by Hertzog.

Dr Alfred Xuma is elected ANC president (1940). Xuma invests in branch organisation. Formation of the ANC-Youth League is authorised in December 1942. Quick initiatives are taken by Anton Lembede, along with Nelson Mandela, Jordan Ngubane and Walter Sisulu. YL becomes prime mover behind the 1949 Programme of Action and the 1950s Defiance Campaign.

UP wins the election. It becomes a Smuts priority to unite whites, rather than reach out to ‘non-whites’. The NP rejects an electoral pact with the Ossewa Brandwag (OB) and New Order, local Nazi organisations. Malan defends the ‘ballot box route’.

The Natives Representative Council demands that all discriminatory laws be removed.

In 1948 election, the revitalised Herenigde National Party and its Afrikaner Party coalition partner win a majority of parliamentary seats (but not a majority of votes) and commence governing until 1994. Malan becomes prime minister.

Formation of ANC Women’s League (1948). In 1950 the Group Areas Act and Suppression of Communism Act are passed – most of the apartheid legislation is passed from 1948-1953.

NP wins election with increased majority. Removal of coloured voters from the common roll (1951-56). Launch of the Defiance Campaign (1952) and Chief Albert Luthuli is elected ANC president.


NP wins increased electoral majority. Strijdom dies and Hendrik Verwoerd succeeds as prime minister. Verwoerd announces the plan to remove all African representatives in Parliament and moots the notion of ‘independent homelands’.

Bantustan enabling legislation is adopted. A rebel faction splits from the ANC to form the PAC under Robert Sobukwe (1959). 69 protestors are killed in Sharpeville massacre (1960) and state of emergency declared. ANC and PAC are banned after taking up anti-pass campaigns. Thousands arrested (1960).
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<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>South Africa becomes a republic and leaves the Commonwealth. The NP wins an increased election majority.</td>
<td>All are acquitted in Treason Trial. ANC launches armed struggle against the NP government and the first acts of sabotage take place (1961). The formation of Umkhonto weSizwe (MK), ANC’s military wing, with Mandela as first commander in chief follows (1961). Mandela arrested, Thabo Mbeki goes into exile. Rivonia Trial takes place and ANC leaders are sentenced to life imprisonment (1964). Detention without trial is introduced (1965).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>NP wins election with increased majority. Verwoerd is assassinated. John Vorster becomes prime minister.</td>
<td>Luthuli is killed after being hit by a train in what is widely thought to have been an assassination. Oliver Tambo takes over as leader (1967). Steve Biko and associates break with the National Union of South Africa Students (Nusas) and start the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP; Reconstituted NP) breaks away from the NP in protest against Vorster permitting a French rugby touring side to include a black player. An early election is held in April 1970 and HNP wins 3% (of white vote) but no seats.</td>
<td>ANC holds conference in Tanzania where it decides to open membership to all races (1969).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Information department scandal leads to downfall of Vorster. PW Botha takes over as prime minister in 1978. The government lifts curbs on black labour, permits black trade unions.</td>
<td>Soweto student uprising (1976), followed by exodus of young people to be trained for the armed struggle. All Black Consciousness (BC) organisations are banned. BC leader Biko dies in police custody (1977).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>PW Botha introduces the ‘Tricameral constitution’ that installs separate white, coloured and Indian houses of Parliament (20 August).</td>
<td>The constitutional reforms veil increasing institutionalisation of military-security complex government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Denis Worrall and Wynand Malan break from the NP to form an independent movement.</td>
<td>Internal resistance and unsurpassed repression and state security clampdowns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>In December the all-party Congress for a Democratic South Africa (Codesa) negotiations start.</td>
<td>Mandela elected ANC president, replacing the ailing Tambo (1991).</td>
</tr>
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<td>------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>In March De Klerk and the NP win two-thirds majority in a whites-only referendum to endorse negotiations with the ANC. In May Codesa 2 convenes and then breaks down.</td>
<td>ANC’s first conference held in SA since banning (July in Durban). ANC withdraws from formal negotiations and Tripartite Alliance begins rolling mass action (June). Boipatong massacre (June). Bisho ambush (September) affect negotiations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>In March the Multi-party Negotiation Process (MPNP) commences. In June the white right wing attacks the negotiations centre and in November the Interim Constitution is adopted through the MPNP.</td>
<td>Chris Hani is assassinated (April). Tambo dies from stroke.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>An armed white right-wing Volksfront invasion of Bophuthatswana, first in cooperation with the local army to prop up Lucas Mangope who had refused to let the people participate in the upcoming election (March). Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) enters election at last minute. NP comes in second place in South Africa’s first democratic elections (April). NP celebrates its 80th anniversary (July).</td>
<td>ANC wins historic first democratic and multiparty election. Mandela is inaugurated as first president of democratic South Africa.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The rupture between the Congress of the People (Cope) and the mother body of the African National Congress (ANC) was fraught with personal and political sacrifice. It happened in the extended heat of Mbeki’s Polokwane defeat and a period of antagonistic populist mobilisation. For a short while it appeared as if the original liberation movement ideals and 1994 settlement principles were under threat. When the anger subsided and the ANC returned to stasis the new party’s foothold faded.

What was left caved in under internecine leadership duels. Cope joined the ranks of the micro-parties, as judged in the 2011 local elections, yet retained residual power bases in Parliament and the provincial legislatures, courtesy of the 2009 electoral verdicts. The curse of Cope was that it captured its high levels of national and provincial representation on the wings of the last of the Polokwane revolt. Its official representation was far higher than post-election support mobilised on the ground. It was falling apart, but courtesy of its special origins could not just be another micro-party. It was a haunted anomaly, which would not go away.

The story of Cope that unfolds in this chapter is equally an ANC story. Cope carried both the strains of an ordinary small and new opposition party, and a party burdened with the reputation of being the offspring of the ANC. Cope had broken away but had hardly cut the umbilical cord. It remained defined by its relationship to the ANC. It was expected to be a ‘legitimate opposition party’, with legitimacy closely linked to the status of opposition-cracking-the-race-ceiling. The Cope tale was that of a party that emerged with fanfare in a time of intense polarisation in national and ANC politics, survived an election, and then had to shape and grow itself in times of the normalisation of the ANC and national politics. It complicated matters that Cope was beset with internal leadership, organisational, identity strife and hence institutionalisation...
problems. By 2011, Cope still had a chance of carving out a position as a minor-opposition-party comprising only one of the original Lekota or Shilowa factions, provided it could survive leadership and funding woes, and would be attractive enough – after shedding ANC returnees – to be courted as an opposition alliance partner.

In its very early heyday, before ANC counter-operations and Cope’s self-destruct, Cope was potentially a serious threat to the ANC, the beginning of a new era of opposition politics that would counter the ANC. Its arrival on the South African party political landscape was linked to the expectation that it could become an opposition force that would change South African party politics like no opposition party in post-liberation South Africa had managed. Cope seemed to have the potential to weaken the commanding hegemony of the ANC.

The reality was the antithesis. Cope’s organisational and leadership problems accumulated to make the party a parody of the original opposition dream. Its potential paled as the realities of competing against the ANC juggernaut dawned. Around three years after the founding of Cope the most notable evidence of the party’s existence consisted of now unlikely-to-be-repeated election percentages, internecine factional leadership feuds and their fallout, and a local election result that confirmed the anomaly of the 2009 electoral verdict.

The chapter’s central focus is on the Cope-ANC contest. It explores the nemesis relationship, delving into the ANC’s subjugation of the Cope threat. It recognises the extent to which the ANC’s counter-assault defined the process of Cope’s emergence and decline. It positions Cope against the background of the ‘regular’ opposition parties. It tracks the evolving Cope identity, moving from the early highs of breakaway and launch, to its troubled 2009 campaign, its modestly successful 2009 result, and its post-election self-destruction and consolidation at the low level of 2011. It explores Cope’s search for identity, policy, leadership and organisational capacity – and counterposes these processes to the leadership saga that defined and destroyed Cope.

AFFIRMATION AND NEGATION OF ANC POWER

The Cope experience both affirmed and undermined ANC power. Cope challenged the ANC to become rejuvenated. Cope was an opposition party that came from the ‘loins of the ANC’ with cross-demographic bloc appeal. Cope was the ‘sacrifice that had to be made’ to redirect the ANC. In the post-election-2009 period the ANC was at pains to be seen to be working both with and for the people, and in particular in the interest of its core constituency of voters that is hugely poor, often unemployed and in need of further social redress. This reminded the ANC that it had to be convincingly positioned as caring. The 2009 campaign exposed top leadership as unaware of many of the dreadful conditions on the ground. The ANC accepted these challenges and grew stronger for it. The advent of Cope also weakened the ANC. The break was not a clean one. Suspicions lingered and public sector paralysis prevailed. As late as 2011 the Polokwane divisions directly impacted public sector appointments. Inside the ANC
factional politics entered a heyday. The catharsis of Cope destroyed an innocent belief in the ANC that it was an indivisible liberation movement.

Potential future dissidents also learnt what could happen to a new party should it dare to go a similar route. They saw the evidence of a ruthless ANC machine rolling out to stop Cope. The ANC precipitated Cope’s decline. Its operations to counter Cope stopped the rupture in its tracks. The ANC targeted Cope’s funding operations. Its election campaign convinced the electorate of its continuous credentials, and the need to ‘come home’. The ANC had no problem retaining ownership of the liberation credentials. Its control over the levers of state power and patronage did not falter. Career and business opportunities that suffered under the burden of association with Cope spoke loudly.

The ANC learnt the need to contain internal competition and its fallout. It amended its ways to minimise the chance of Cope-like situations recurring. The result, however, was an ANC pressure cooker of internally directed political stresses. The post-Cope ANC knew what problems had to be contained, and it knew how to do some of the containment. However, it was no longer a party-movement that was in full control of its internal dynamics. In the course of the next three years the ANC partly recovered. By the time of its 2010 NGC, the post-Polokwane ‘new ANC’ could at last be regarded as reconsolidated. However, the lid placed on contestation had to be combined with soft action on internal problems in order to retain organisational unity.

THE STRUGGLE FOR PREDOMINANCE AND IDENTITY

It was a heavy burden that came to rest on Cope’s shoulders. In many respects the time in 2008-09 appeared right for an opposition party of credible political-demographic standing to enter the political fray. Cope as emerging party seemed capable at first of rising to the occasion. However, by 2011 Cope had collapsed into a 2 per cent party. It had gone from ‘special origins’ to ‘condemned micro-party’. The assertions and debates on Cope’s identity – what it came to represent, and the meaning of it having split off from the ANC – came to constitute the bulk of its burden, and of the reasons why the ANC saw it as non-negotiable to crush the upstart.

Cope’s identity at the time of its formation rested on an anti-agenda. It was to be all that the ANC was seen not to be at the time, in the ambit of demeanour in mobilisation, protection of values in the honoured ANC ‘congress tradition’, and adherence to the Constitution of South Africa.4 Cope thought of itself as the real guarantor of the original ANC values, as well as the principles that were associated with South Africa’s constitution. Mosioua Lekota declared that he ‘never left government or the ANC because Mbeki lost his job …’, but because of principles, and because of the ‘lie in the Nicholson judgment’ of September 2008, which alleged government executive interference in the prosecution of Jacob Zuma for corruption.5

Constitutionalism, the rule of law, the electoral system and procedures for policy implementation were the big ideas that Cope hoped to appropriate. Cope’s problems
in counter-positioning itself to the ANC showed in the tentative policy positions adopted at its launch conference. Its edge was limited, proposing modestly different policy implementation options. The ANC's continuous counter-attacks used the message of imposters committing 'identity theft'. Cope’s Hilda Ndude in Parliament quoted Jacob Zuma as saying that ‘… when a witch is a family member, we know that it’s more dangerous than an enemy from outside’.6

**New broad church?**

Cope’s failure in the identity stakes, in its aspiration to be the original ANC7, was aided by non-defection of ‘big names’ (especially Thabo Mbeki, the inspiration, if not the brains behind Cope; below)8 and a support base that emerged as a new broad church of all who were opposed to, snubbed or antagonised by the ANC. Cope linked angered9 former ANC figures to a host of others that had never been part of the internal or external liberation movement. Many could identify with values and principles that fleetingly counter-positioned Cope to the ANC.

Grassroots ANC supporters that had become disillusioned with ANC government delivery, rather than with the treatment of Mbeki, became recognised for their contribution to Cope’s electoral performance. Cope’s 2009 voter support largely emanated from the disaffected, often alienated poor, unemployed and informally housed black-African urban and metropolitan communities.10 Voter support in election 2009 showed the side of Cope that extended beyond the Mbeki shadow – that of a potential constituency that gave Cope a protest party identity. These were the followers that wanted to punish the ANC for insufficient government attention to their problems, irrespective of the treatment that had befallen Mbeki.11

Their interests diverged from those of the angered middle class fragments that were in Cope by virtue of their allegiance to Mbeki. Cope grabbed the imagination of some community progressives who had not closely identified with the ANC. Cope also became a home for opportunistic political reactionaries who would mount any horse that could hurt the ANC. In its quest to prove growing support, a desperate Cope welcomed all aboard. They ranged from former NNP supporters to the discredited Western Cape NP politician Peter Marais. When it came to constituting branch structures, local contests wreaked havoc. Maverick branches often had a life of their own.

This diverse and often opportunistic following, along with epic upper-level factional battles, compounded Cope’s identity problems. The leading figures, mostly former ANC stalwarts, faced the challenge of marrying the initiative’s angry origins with the expectations of the new constituencies. The multiple strains of leadership complicated efforts to get Cope’s organisational infrastructure off the ground. Most disruptive was the competition for supremacy within the ANC leg of the party. These pressures were consuming a Cope that was simultaneously subject to organisational pressures of operating as a party with representation across the legislatures, and trying to get its elective and policy conferences under its belt ... without having them hijacked by the opposing Cope faction. As Cope became increasingly engrossed in leadership struggles, even the identity battles turned into a luxury.
The Mbeki shadow and beyond

One of the biggest Cope ironies was that Mbeki, whose treatment by the ANC triggered the party, would never emerge from the silent, invisible wings onto centre stage. Mbeki steered clear of ANC events and endorsements, but never resigned. This was while the whole Cope plot carried the ‘Mbeki’ stamp. Early on the Mbeki factor was manifested in supporters’ singing Mbeki praise songs at Cope events. Some of his closest associates, including Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, Mluleki George, and Smuts Ngonyama, paraded in the Cope fold. Cope disassociated itself and even staged the occasional public attack on Mbeki. When asked about the evidence of political conspiracy leading the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) to drop its charges against Zuma, national leader Lekota proclaimed: ‘We have never been affected by activities of people who never had the mandate of Cope to do what they did.’ Methodist Bishop Mvume Dandala, following his selection as Cope’s 2009 presidential candidate, attempted to take the disinheritance further, stating that the ANC under Mbeki had been unfit to govern.

Cope could neither be delinked from the defeat of the Mbeki faction of the ANC at Polokwane, nor from the fact that, as the ANC circa election 2009 regained its composure, Cope lost its glitter. Cope’s Simon Grindrod (inherited from the Independent Democrats, ID) in his resignation memorandum in mid-2009 argued that ‘continual references by Cope leaders to former President Mbeki appear out of place and confusing given that he remains a committed member of the ANC’.

The ANC used Mbeki as a weapon against Cope, especially in the 2009 election campaign. It depicted party members as bad losers who refused to accept the outcome of internal ANC democracy. Zuma noted apropos of the formation of Cope: ‘People who left took the question of preferences [in terms of the leaders they want elected] beyond its normal boundaries … their candidate did not win. They were not able to accept the democratic reality that if there were more than one candidate, only one should win …’ ANC associates projected Cope as elitist, intent on ensuring that the big capitalist class that had materialised under Mbeki would have the time to mature.

In Cope’s 2009-11 ongoing crisis the reasons aired for resignations by leaders (Mlungisi Hlongwane, Lynda Odendaal, Simon Grindrod, Allan Boesak, Mvume Dandala, Charlotte Lobe, Onkgopotse Tabane) showed that in-the-wings power mongering linked back into the Mbeki axis. Whereas Hlongwane and Boesak mostly referred to infighting and factionalism, Odendaal suggested that the Mbeki presence was evident in the schemes by Mbhazima Shilowa (Cope’s first deputy president) to displace Lekota. Shilowa went on record that he was innocent of factional behaviour, and that he had consistently supported having Lekota at the head of Cope. Tabane’s (Shilowa faction) November 2010 resignation letter referred to Cope’s Congress National Committee (CNC) meetings as ‘brawl’ sessions characterised by ‘collective loss and lack of vision for our party by our national leadership’. By the time the entire Shilowa faction was marginalised in 2011, mostly through legal action (Table 1), the Mbeki legacy appeared to be contained. The downside was that there was not much left of Cope.
EXTERNALISING INTERNAL OPPOSITION

Within the space of two years Cope had moved from its instantaneous cusp of party fame, to a modest and for the time being credible election performance, and into the quicksand of fighting off implosion due to leadership and organisational failures. Intra-ANC and intra-alliance contestation again occupied centre stage.

The significance of Cope’s emergence was largely in its sensitive positioning at the interface of liberation movement politics and liberal democracy. It had externalised intra-ANC battles into an inter-party, liberal-democratic domain. Cope’s emergence caused the two parallel streams of internal ANC democratic processes and national electoral democracy to converge. It built on the roughly three-year war that evolved around the Zuma-Mbeki succession. The lines of division were deep and unforgiving, whilst the policy and ideological differences were hard to identify.

Cope hence differed from the United Democratic Movement (UDM), the ANC-breakaway party of 1996 (with first electoral participation in 1999). Cope also posed a very different type of threat to the ANC compared to the former (New) National Party (NNP). The NNP was a dying party, whilst Cope, at least at first, was not. The NNP had been a threat in its status as custodian of apartheid state power, which had to be conquered. It was a thoroughly external confrontation. Cope in contrast was mobilising with one foot in the ANC homestead. The UDM split off the ANC was a one-person driven event. It mobilised largely in the geographically-limited, former Transkei bantustan networks. It turned in modest national electoral performances and a fair Eastern Cape provincial presence. The Cope-related divisions permeated both party and state, whilst the UDM dissent was more easily isolated. Cope’s first electoral performance was also more than double that of the UDM, and its electoral support was provincially and demographically far more diffuse.

Cope’s performance in Election 2009 was remarkable in that Cope achieved, in a short space of time, more than other opposition parties in democratic South Africa had mastered. Yet, Cope was always going to be measured against the high expectations at its birth. Its prospects were first linked to the Polokwane division in votes for Mbeki and Zuma. Next, there were impressionistic expectations of Cope securing between 15–20 per cent of the national vote. Cope’s eventual 7.4 per cent national support was supplemented with an all-province presence, and official opposition status in more provinces than the DA. Cope acted as party-political catalyst. Its impact included opening up more space for opposition politics. The extraordinary counter-campaign by the ANC served to pin Cope into a tight corner. By the time of Election 2009, Cope came to constitute a modest and contained opposition party. For a short time in Parliament post-election 2009 Cope was the ANC’s strategic opponent.

Cope, however, failed to effect any leap that would elevate it over other struggling small opposition parties, including financially. As the Cope challenge was cut down to size, so was potential funding. Faltering funding, a central cause of its decline was largely due to the ANC watching the private sector sources that might still desire state contracts. Funding diminished even as Cope was starting its election campaign. The global
financial crisis helped promised funding to evaporate. Occasionally credible Cope performances failed to reopen the window of opportunity to feed off ANC fall out. Cope acknowledged this through its opposition collaboration talks from July 2009 onwards, held with especially the DA, UDM and ID. Cope attempted to bring forward its elective-policy conference to May 2010, hoping to gain improved status and bargaining power. The conference was disrupted and aborted. This act replayed in December 2010, with increasingly devastating consequences for its viability. Acts of financial desperation also led to the opportunity to marginalise Shilowa in 2011 following the 2010 decision to (mis)use parliamentary funding for campaign and staff expenses.27 By mid-2011, the in-charge Lekota grouping was trying to recoup costs of ‘vexatious litigation’ by the Shilowa group by serving writs for the attachment of the contents of Shilowa’s residence.28 Cope, once the hope for the future opposition, could not surmount the combination of ANC onslaught and internal sabotage. The latter was so perfectly executed the ANC could not have done it any better itself.

EBB AND FLOW OF COPE’S CHALLENGE TO THE ANC

The rise and decline of Cope deserves special attention given its status of ‘biggest party political challenge yet posed to the ANC’. In the process of assessing Cope, we learn much of the ANC. Cope became the first opposition party in democratic South Africa to shake the ANC at its roots. Cope had a lasting impact in that much of the weak ANC popular support had been shaken out of the ANC and potential remained available in the ‘voter market’ for other forms of expression of anti-ANC anger. Cope’s impact on the ANC’s hold on power is best illustrated by mapping its high points and turning points, alongside the ANC ripostes (Annexure to Chapter 9).

Five sets of events marked Cope’s emergence and presence in party politics. They spanned the period between the elections of 2004 and 2011. The first set was the build-up and polarisation from 2005 onwards. The interregnum between the ANC’s Polokwane conference (December 2007) and the recall of Mbeki (September 2008) was one of the most acrimonious in the ANC’s existence (Chapter 2). The second was the events from the recall to the launch of Cope (December 2008). The third was the campaign and election of 2009 (up to April 2009). The fourth followed when Cope tried to find its opposition party feet, vacillating between tackling the future on its own, or sheltering in some collaborative agreement with other opposition parties, and suffering through tortuous processes of leadership squabbles and resignations, and declines in the opinion polls.29 The fifth was the 2009-11 period of decline and consolidation as a minor party, with Cope afflicted by mutually compounding financial and leadership woes and decisions of note being taken by the high courts of the country.

A review of the events and developments constitutes a case study of the fate and fortunes of an opposition political party that had aspired to operate in ANC territory.
Build-up to Polokwane and the Mbeki recall

Soon after election 2004 the ANC entered a spiral of internal contestation between Zuma and Mbeki, centring on incumbency and succession. The ANC polarised into antagonistic Mbeki and Zuma blocs that took shape throughout the provinces and other ANC structures. In the anti-Mbeki camp were Zuma-ists of mainly three, often overlapping types: those who saw in Zuma the desirable democratic alternative to Mbeki; saw Zuma instrumentally as the most certain way to rid the ANC of a president who appeared to feel entitled to the top leadership position; and alliance members, the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu), who saw in the Zuma ascendancy the best chance since the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) to sway policy in more pro-worker, pro-poor directions. The ANCYL took centre-stage in mobilising for Mbeki’s ousting. The end of the Mbeki era arrived with the Mbeki camp’s Polokwane defeat (Chapter 2).

Breakaway and the launch of Cope

Despite speculation immediately post-Polokwane that the ANC would split, it was only with the advent of the September 2008 Nicholson obiter and Mbeki’s 19/20 September 2008 recall and forced resignation as president of South Africa that the split rapidly started materialising. Nicholson constructed the political storyline: a Mbeki-ist strategy of executive interference with the independence of the NPA. This, he argued, amounted to a political conspiracy to sideline Zuma. When Mbeki signalled his intention to appeal, the ANC’s NEC recalled him. Cope formally emerged in December 2008.

Droves of senior ANC figures were expected to follow the Lekota–Shilowa defection bridgehead. Many sympathisers, however, decided it was not the time yet for a break, that it was the right idea led by the wrong people, that the ANC was bigger than the conflicts and candidates of the moment, or that their bread remained best buttered on the ANC side. A purge of Mbeki-ites from positions of state power followed, forcing many potential Cope sympathisers to opt for publicly declared conversions to the Zuma camp.

The low defection rate was also courtesy of the ANC’s countering of defections through cabinet and premiership reappointments (in the majority of cases), and inclusion in credible electoral list positions (the final list was deliberately held over until late March 2009). Later, non-defection resulted from the realisation that Cope was failing to emerge as a political force. Cope needed more big names, but they carried Mbeki baggage and would have been damaging. On community level the clean-out operations such as those of early November 2008 in the Eastern Cape served as an important lesson on ‘consequences of dissidence’. For example, the ANC expelled Amahlati councillors due to pro-Cope activities in the run-up to election 2009. The public service cycles of Cope-related clean-outs were expected to run up to at least 2012 (Chapter 10).

The only euphoric part of Cope’s new presence turned out to have been the early days of mobilisation and launch. It was the time of contesting ownership of the Congress heritage with the ANC. But as soon as the ANC had time to regroup, Cope was pinned down
in a trench from which it only occasionally emerged. Its mobilisation was consistently countered by the ANC (and the DA). The challenge to name Cope was a major early ANC blocking exercise. The ANC was adamant that the new party would not be called ‘Congress of the People’.

... the NWC decided that the ANC has a responsibility to protect the history of the organisation. The ANC will therefore oppose any attempt by any persons to appropriate the political heritage of the ANC to advance their own political ambitions ... The ANC adopted the Freedom Charter at its own national conference as the central vision of the movement for a democratic society ... The current ANC generation has a responsibility to history, and to future generations, to preserve the symbols and political heritage of the movement.

Cope’s launch conference was a loosely constituted jamboree, devoid of preceding branch structure organisation. Leadership nominations emerged from informal provincial structures. ‘Leadership (s)elections’ were a midnight designer event at the launch conference. The driving personalities deliberated. Race, province, former ANC seniority, financial contributions and gender were qualifiers. The leadership largely converged with the self-chosen group that had been heading the Cope initiative in the preceding months. Lekota announced in exaggerated gestures to the December 2008 conference that the new interim leadership had been ‘nominated by consensus, by you, the delegates’. The hierarchy of leaders often lacked popular and inter-leader legitimacy. Conference confirmed Lekota as president, but Shilowa did not accept this.

The Congress Working Committee (CWC) was confirmed as the top-decision-making body, anchored in the CNC.

Cope’s own flaws – arising from leadership differences, ambiguous policy positions, unclear targeting and organisational and funding problems – contributed handsomely to the party’s woes. By the time the Cope initiative became formalised in late 2008, the ANC still had time to regroup, allay fears and mend pertinent ways. In the pre-election period of September 2008 to early March 2009, the ANC countered Cope at all levels, from grassroots organisation and defections, to resisting the naming of Cope, disrupting mobilisation and meetings, gradually turning the tables through by-elections, and declaring the door was open to returning prodigals.

**Cope campaigning against the ANC for honours in election 2009**

By the time of the official March campaign period for election 2009 the ANC had largely subdued Cope. Cope was tainted by ANC-fuelled innuendo of agendas of anger, bitterness and inability to accept Mbeki’s defeat. ANC scorn and delegitimisation impacted on Cope. Many voters who questioned aspects of the ANC’s 15-year rule chose not to follow Cope.

Cope used three types of campaign messages. First, in view of the proximity of the election, Cope’s very formation, and in particular its consultative convention and inaugural conference, constituted campaigning. Second, in default the ANC’s campaign errors
did the campaigning for Cope. However, this was only in the early period before the ANC’s turnaround. Third, was its conventional campaign, which was late, low-key and severely constrained by budgets and staff. Cope identified the party’s lack of funds and the inexperience of staff as two major causes of its low-profile campaign. To illustrate, its principal campaign manager was appointed only two months before polling. His predecessor had been overwhelmed and then defected back to the ANC. Cope’s public relations function faltered and marketing operations consumed about R3 million of the total R12 million campaign budget. Instead of the anticipated varied campaign themes, Cope confined itself to the launch-conference message of ‘A new agenda for change and hope’.

The ANC unleashed its formidable election apparatus on Cope, using propaganda and the positive aspects of its then 14 years in power. Its approach was to ‘not legitimise’ Cope through recognition. In ANC eyes Cope was as an illegitimate impostor and a thief with sinister motives. Zuma pronounced that ‘[a]s the ANC, we cannot elevate Cope above other parties that are contesting the elections’. Cope, however, was the electoral enemy that had to be countered, apart from the DA in the Western Cape. The ANC launched a multi-pronged attack, and Cope was pinned down. ANC community-level activists used intimidation and threats, disrupted and broke up meetings, occupied meeting venues, and organised counter-rallies. Obstruction was evident prior to official promulgation of the election in early March 2009 – and the Electoral Commission’s code of conduct becoming operational. The ANC ensured that the mop-up of Cope dissent would be done in time for observer reports to reflect on the free and fair nature of the elections. Cope was probably also infiltrated by ANC sympathisers to sabotage it from within.

As the ANC went into corrective mode, Cope’s campaign ammunition diminished. The ANC strategy was ‘that what we do right attracts people back and keeps them in the fold, so we should focus on what we should do right’. The ANC benefited from the use of the power of incumbency, threatening or activating loss of jobs or access to services to those displaying Cope sympathies; and the timing of government delivery cycles, including the delivery of food parcels and the opening of relatively recently constructed public amenities or infrastructure.

Cope was one of a handful of parties that contested election 2009 both nationally (Table 1) and in all nine provinces. It was a substantial feat for a resource- and infrastructure-starved new party to construct comprehensive lists for the national and nine provincial elections. The rank-and-file component of the lists were finalised without major controversy, after the submission of detailed application forms. At the top-leadership level, however, the choice of presidential candidate turned the tables on Cope. The Mbeki shadow fell over this selection. Shilowa was seen as ‘the Mbeki man’, despite Lekota appearing as the more accomplished of the two. Barney Pityana headed a selection committee, set up in terms of Cope’s interim constitution. A Shilowa grouping backed Dandala in order to defeat Lekota. It was only upon second deputy president Odendaal’s July 2009 resignation that it emerged that ‘[b]usiness professionals working with Shilowa and Barney Pityana and whoever else behind the scenes … concocted’ the deal to bring Dandala in as a compromise candidate and thereby prevent Lekota from becoming Cope’s presidential candidate.
### TABLE 1: Cope’s 2009 national electoral performance in comparative party context

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>1994 Election: % support (no. of MPs)</th>
<th>1999 Election: % support (no. of MPs)</th>
<th>2004 Election: % support (no. of MPs)</th>
<th>2009 Election: % support (no. of MPs)</th>
<th>2011 Local Elections* (Ward + PR, excl. district councils)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>62.6 66.50 (266)</td>
<td>69.69 (279)</td>
<td>65.90 (264)</td>
<td>61.95</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA (DP)</td>
<td>1.7 9.50 (38)</td>
<td>12.37 (50)</td>
<td>16.66 (67)</td>
<td>23.94</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cope</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7.42 (30)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFP</td>
<td>10.5 8.50 (34)</td>
<td>6.97 (28)</td>
<td>4.55 (18)</td>
<td>3.57</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NNP</td>
<td>20.4 7.00 (28)</td>
<td>1.65 (7)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDM</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.50 (14)</td>
<td>2.28 (9)</td>
<td>0.85 (4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACDP</td>
<td>0.5 1.50 (6)</td>
<td>1.6 (6)</td>
<td>0.91 (3)</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAC</td>
<td>1.3 0.75 (3)</td>
<td>0.73 (3)</td>
<td>0.27 (1)</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCDP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.75 (3)</td>
<td>0.75 (3)</td>
<td>0.37 (2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FF+ (FF)</td>
<td>2.2 0.75 (3)</td>
<td>0.89 (4)</td>
<td>0.83 (4)</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FA</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.50 (2)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AEB</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.25 (1)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azapo</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.25 (1)</td>
<td>0.25 (1)</td>
<td>0.22 (1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MF</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.25 (1)</td>
<td>0.35 (2)</td>
<td>0.25 (1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.73 (7)</td>
<td>0.92 (4)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APC</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.20 (1)</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>100% (400)</strong></td>
<td><strong>100% (400)</strong></td>
<td><strong>100% (400)</strong></td>
<td><strong>100% (400)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Note:** Local government election results are not directly comparable with national and provincial elections. They are cited because they are one of the best available indicators on Cope’s comparative-to-other-parties standing by 2011.

Finding opposition party feet in the feats of Cope’s 2009 election result

Simply as ‘any opposition party’ Cope did well in election 2009; as protagonist to split the ANC it failed. Far short of fulfilling the optimism that seized its early campaign, Cope nevertheless achieved an election result that held political significance, given solid performances, in the national assembly and in the provincial legislatures. Cope distinguished itself from other opposition parties in being relatively free from the regional-provincial and race ceilings that other parties suffered. Dwarfed by the ANC and overshadowed by the DA, Cope achieved third place nationally (out of 26 parties contesting the election), gaining its 7.4 per cent of the National Assembly vote (Chapter 6). Of the 26 parties, 13 did not achieve the parliamentary representation cut-off point of approximately 45,000 votes. Nine of the parties that had won representation recorded national percentages of below one per cent. Cope also outperformed the long-existing IFP.

Cope’s 2009 ‘growth’, off a zero-base, was well-distributed across provinces (with weak performances in KwaZulu-Natal and Mpumalanga) (Table 2). Just under a quarter of Cope’s national support was from Gauteng. Despite coming in third in Gauteng, Cope won its largest numerical provincial support there, followed by the Eastern Cape.

### TABLE 2: Cope’s and the ANC’s relative performances in provincial elections, 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provinces in order of Cope performance (as % of vote)</th>
<th>Cope provincial results</th>
<th>ANC provincial results</th>
<th>Cope’s ranking against the other parties in provincial elections</th>
<th>Other parties percentage (%) of provincial support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vote count</td>
<td>% Provincial support</td>
<td>Vote count</td>
<td>% Provincial support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Cape</td>
<td>67,416</td>
<td>16.67</td>
<td>245,699</td>
<td>60.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>308,439</td>
<td>13.67</td>
<td>1,552,676</td>
<td>68.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free State</td>
<td>120,018</td>
<td>11.61</td>
<td>734,688</td>
<td>71.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Cape</td>
<td>152,356</td>
<td>7.74</td>
<td>620,918</td>
<td>31.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West</td>
<td>89,573</td>
<td>8.33</td>
<td>783,784</td>
<td>72.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gauteng</td>
<td>323,327</td>
<td>7.78</td>
<td>2,662,013</td>
<td>64.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limpopo</td>
<td>112,325</td>
<td>7.53</td>
<td>1,265,631</td>
<td>84.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mpumalanga</td>
<td>37,789</td>
<td>2.91</td>
<td>1,110,190</td>
<td>85.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaZulu-Natal</td>
<td>44,890</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>2,192,516</td>
<td>62.95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** * Second position indicates provincial official opposition status. Cope had narrow margins over the DA in the Free State and North West. In the 2011 local elections (on provincially projected counts) Cope lost all five ‘official opposition statuses’ to the DA.

and Western Cape. The DA’s 2009 growth, in contrast, was overwhelmingly attributable to an arresting Western Cape showing, in which the white and so-called coloured categories of voters (across different class positions) rallied to endorse the DA. In vote numbers, Cope became the official opposition in five of South Africa’s nine provinces – the Eastern Cape, Free State, Limpopo, Northern Cape and North West. Cope displaced both the DA and the UDM from previously held official opposition status. Cope narrowly displaced the DA as official opposition in the Free State and the North West. Gauteng and Mpumalanga were the only provinces where the DA retained its status as the official opposition. As a proportion of the provincial vote, Cope’s strongest province was the Northern Cape, followed by the Eastern Cape, Western Cape and Free State.

Cope was an important cause of the drop in the ANC’s 2009 proportion of the vote from 69.7 per cent in 2004 to 65.9 per cent in 2009. CSIR calculations in the aftermath of the 2009 election offered details on the party political origins of Cope’s national proportion of 7.42 per cent. The main source was the ANC, contributing 4.6 of the 7.41 percentage points, the DA 0.98, the UDM 0.59, and the ID 0.41, with small contributions also from the ranks of the IFP and UCDP (Table 3). The 2009 Cope successes were thoroughly inversed in local election 2011. This time around Cope was dramatically shedding its 2009 gains: trends from a CSIR defined demographic cluster of mainly black-African voters show that only 33.7 per cent remained loyal to Cope – 56.5 per cent now voted for the ANC and 7.9 per cent found their way into the DA. In the white-dominated CSIR cluster 85.5 per cent of the 2009 Cope voters now voted for the DA, and 8 per cent for the ANC.

The 2009 election revealed the then socio-economic electoral base of Cope. As evident from the pre-election polls, Cope drew support across class and race boundaries. Far from being a middle-class party, voting in this election showed that the bulk of Cope’s electoral support came from poor communities with high rates of unemployment. Shilowa confirmed this trend: ‘There were white, middle-class and elite people who voted for Cope … [But] the bulk of our support was from the poor … In Gauteng more than 90 per cent of the over 300,000 who voted for Cope were working class.’ In most provinces, Cope’s support was more urban than rural and was often notable in informal settlements. For Cope to advance, it would thus have had to solidify this niche position in opposition politics, and give voice to aggrieved former ANC supporters in poor and informal communities. Cope fully realised the importance of this, but was often helpless when it came to acting on it. The 2011 local results showed that Cope had indeed lost its urban-poor foothold. In exchange, its 2011 local election support came largely from the rural poor. Its strongest positional provincial standing was in Limpopo, and proportionately it did best in the Northern Cape.

These results could have helped sustain Cope through the 2009-14 term. Yet by 2010-11 Cope seemingly had pushed itself onto a path of self-destruction, mostly courtesy of leadership struggles. Alternatively, a more modest, split-Cope – freed of the dual Shilowa-Mbeki axis – still had a chance to carve out a position on its own, or, more likely at the time of 2011, in alliance with a realigning DA-driven opposition thrust.
Decline, implosion, down the slippery slope

In its precipitous period from election 2009 to local election 2011 Cope came face to face with the accumulated results of problems with leadership, branches and funding. In December 2009, Cope membership was estimated to be between 150,000 and 200,000, far below the 400,000 members that Cope claimed to have at the time of its Bloemfontein launch.72 In the run-up to election 2009, Cope leadership had instructed its members to focus on recruiting support rather than membership, after local Cope leaders had caused havoc using recruitment numbers to leverage power bases for themselves in the new party.73

The Shilowa-Lekota acrimony affected party-building. Reports abounded of branches and emerging regional structures torn by divided loyalties. Through 2009-11, Cope remained vague as to its exact progress in branch-building. Cope had ‘inherited’ branches from the ANC,74 especially in the Northern and Eastern Cape (whole branches or key branch functionaries defected). These branches had often at best been semi-functional. The branches became obstacles when the new local leaders used them to act as gatekeepers and establish personal power fiefdoms.

Cope suffered from the division of scarce staff between Parliament (Cape Town) and head office (Johannesburg). Most senior members (with the exclusion of Lekota, at first) who had been elected entered Parliament and provincial legislatures. Headquarters were under-capacitated. In August 2009, the CNC had recommended that the national treasurer (Hilda Ndude, whose suitability for the position was also questioned), national organiser

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Proportion in percentage points of Cope’s 7.41 % support obtained from</th>
<th>Percentage (%) of Cope support derived from main parties</th>
<th>Estimated number of votes captured from main parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>4.61</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>815,056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>173,265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDM</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>104,313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>72,489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCDP</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>33,592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NNP</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>26,520</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Exlained portion of Cope national support* 93.3 1,225,235

Notes: * These six sources of Cope support thus account for an estimated 93.3% or 1,225,235 of Cope’s national support total; the other 6.3% cover other minor parties or people without prior vote identities. Cope’s 5 percentage point decline from 2009 to 2011 showed the unsustainability of the 2009 result.

Source for proportions in column 2: Kimmie, Greben and Booysen, 201071 (columns 3 and 4 calculated by Booysen).

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(Mluleki George) and national spokesperson (Phillip Dexter) be moved from Parliament to headquarters. However, Cope lacked the resources to remunerate them independently.75

When Dandala resigned from Cope and as parliamentary leader in mid-2010, Lekota migrated to Parliament, as parliamentary leader – now also being assured of a salary.

Cope was amongst a host of other unrepresented, new and small political parties that could not match ANC resources.76 Along with other unrepresented parties, Cope pre-2009 was ineligible for the IEC-managed state funding to conduct their campaign, allocated in terms of the Public Funding of Represented Political Parties Act, No. 103 of 1997 and the Public Funding of Represented Political Parties Regulations, 1998.77 Cope campaigned ‘on credit’, anticipating post-election IEC funding. Business fears that giving financial support to Cope would harm good relations with the ANC were a major reason for Cope faltering. In its early stages the economically empowered urban black middle classes had flocked to exploratory Cope meetings.78 Prospects of financial backing dissipated as the ANC’s fight-back took hold. Donors like Wendy Luhabe (married to Shilowa) and Saki Macozoma were said to have contributed. Shilowa later described Macozoma’s contributions as ‘a myth’.79 Former second deputy president Odendaal contributed Sandton office space. Cope’s early campaign target was said to be an ambitious R40-60 million, but it later gave the eventual campaign budget as R12 million.80 The economic downturn meant that promised backing of R5-10 million turned into R1-1.5 million.

Cope struggled to settle campaign debts.81 Despite post-election IEC payments, Cope was still struggling to settle election debts more than a year after incurring the expenses.82 It materialised in 2010 that Cope had used parliamentary funding to pay off elections debt – the issue at the centre of the Lekota-Shilowa showdown. Shilowa was stripped of his position as chief whip and expelled from Cope on 8 February 2011 – an expulsion that he continued to challenge in the courts. Tabane (in the Shilowa camp) claimed in his resignation letter that all leaders had jointly presided over the decision to use the funds in this way.83

Cope’s leadership vulnerabilities multiplied. There were several regional contests in which factionalism ruled (linked to the national leadership strife).84 The problems in general had started five weeks before election 2009 and continued relentlessly through much of 2011. In 2009 campaign times campaign manager, former Sanco president Mlungisi Hlongwane accused Cope of tribal tendencies, promoting Xhosa speakers, and then defected back to the ANC. Cope made counter-claims that Hlongwane faced bankruptcy due to the ANC threatening to withhold Eskom power supply connections to a business that he had been starting up.85 The incident flagged the ANC campaign of ‘returning home’, which ran both before and subsequent to the elections. The ANC actively pursued the return of Cope leaders. In its internal elections report, ANC secretary general Gwede Mantashe, pinpointed ANC strategy as getting people to return to the ANC and publicly parading the returnees. This would help discredit Cope.86

Other leaders continued the exodus – and the process reached a point of catharsis when Shilowa was expelled in 2011 and his faction did not contest local election 2011. The main post-election 2009 attrition started when second deputy president president Odendaal quit her parliamentary seat, leadership position and membership, citing the continuous undermining of Lekota.87 In the same period Simon Grindrod invoked controversy by...
going public with Cope organisational and election report details. Western Cape leader, Alan Boesak, followed in November 2009. Dandala was continuously criticised for low-key and slow-in-response parliamentary leadership. In late July he offered to step down, but was then dissuaded. His resignation followed in mid-2010. Late May saw the attempted removal of Lekota by a chaotic conference. Following a series of legal actions Lekota retained his position (and moved in as parliamentary leader).

Cope was in an anarchic state of factionalised dissolution. Court cases demarcated the territory in which the two elephant bulls used an initial upper hand in internal mobilisation (Shilowa camp) followed by court action that resorted to Cope’s interim constitution (Lekota camp) to counter each other. Manoeuvres included the conference in May 2010, which ousted Lekota, Lekota’s legal victory to undo the conference result and be reinstated as leader, accusations by the Lekota camp of financial mismanagement against Shilowa, auditors’ reports in which Shilowa was implicated, statements that the auditors were complicit in framing Shilowa, an attempted rebel conference in October, and confessions that Cope had no funding to hold its constitutionally required conference by December 2010. The conference still happened, mostly under pressure of the Shilowa camp. The conference collapsed, however, under pressures of factional counter-recruitment of delegates. The Shilowa group attempted to install a new leadership anyway. The act did not survive court rulings. In 2011 Shilowa was removed as chief whip. More of Shilowa’s associates left, confirming that the scales were tipping in Lekota’s favour. In February 2011 Shilowa was expelled, but the battle for ownership of the modest Cope name, resources and public representatives steamed ahead. Post-local election 2011, just as hints of peace in Cope surfaced, Lekota right-hand man Dexter suggested in a discussion document that Cope needed to be relaunched, but the document was not discussed in the subsequent CNC meeting.

Judged by public ANC statements on welcoming back returnees and preaching forgiveness, indirect ANC action to help implode Cope had been successful. The timing of several of the leadership moves displayed an uncanny sense of optimal planned damage. The ANC’s interim Western Cape leader, Membathisi Mdladlana, invited Boesak to return to the ANC, saying ‘Cope is just a party of silly desperados that’s just playing on people’s sentiments’. In the aftermath of local election 2011 it emerged that the ANC and some in Cope had been talking about the ANC absorbing Cope, mostly just before the election. Post-election Cope further disintegrated with some of those elected striking alliances with the DA, others with the ANC. The hapless 2011 state of Cope and the dwindling chances to stabilise it had a momentum of their own. It appeared to be thoroughly in self-destruct mode.

COPE’SIDEOLOGICALAND POLICY COUNTER-POSITIONING TO THE ANC

Cope was a party of identity contrasts, and much of this problem was rooted in its ambiguous, ‘sharedparentage but personality and procedure fall out relationship’ with the ANC. Its differences with the ANC were largely on issues of procedural and consti-
tutional values, which bolstered the leadership fall out. In the substantive policy field there was little to differentiate the two. The party won solid support in 2009 and survived the 2011 local elections, but this could not stem the de facto implosion. There was only a minimal policy base that could contribute to a Cope policy-ideological presence.

Come the formation of a new party, the pressure had been on Cope to identify substantive policy approaches of its own and to justify its existence. In the subsequent two years, however, Cope’s ideological and policy positioning became, in effect, irrelevant. There was little time, given the de facto preoccupation with leadership, to focus on policy development. The initial policies, however, remain of interest as a study in how a breakaway party from the ANC attempted to contrast itself to the ANC.

Cope focused on procedural policy and constitutional values. The party latched onto the ANC’s perceived disrespect for the constitution and rule of law, as inferred from the treatment of Mbeki and the handling of the Zuma case. This worked only whilst the memories were alive of the ANC in a mode of raucous mobilisation for the Zuma ascent. With the Zuma rise to power confirmed, the lessons from Cope taken to heart by the ANC, and Cope beset by problems of its own, it was difficult to compete. The problem became even more acute when Cope conquered a voter constituency which, largely, was more advanced in opposition to the ANC than the top Cope leadership was.

**Counter-positioning on procedural policy**

Cope was a reactive party formation, driven by the event of the unceremonious ousting of Mbeki and the ‘crudeness, belligerence and demagogy that characterised the new ANC leadership’.

Many also argued that it was class interests, rather than ideological divergence that had triggered Cope. The same class interests that pulled the ANC apart would also be manifested in Cope. The protest-party side of Cope emerged in reaction to the careerism and patronage that the founding members had identified as lethal flaws in the ANC since liberation. In some of its attacks Cope accused the ANC of being unaccountable and arrogant in relation to the community, and dismissive of the rule of law, the Constitution and many of the institutions of democracy. Macozoma argued: ‘[The ANC is] dying a natural death by [its] arrogance. You don’t shout people down; you win them over with ideas. People are outraged by the ANC, by the swearing, the comments.’

Under pressure to build an identity for the new party, Cope adopted a policy document at its Bloemfontein founding conference. The policy directions were endorsed without much delegate interest in fleshing out specifics. The document carried little gravitas, despite offering pertinent critiques. Its effective focus was on procedural policies, especially those pertaining to the way in which the ANC government was operating and its perceived truthfulness to the foundational principles of South African democracy.

In the subsequent period the ANC reduced the amount of ammunition it supplied to Cope. The ANC was re-inventing itself, amending its ways precisely in the manner that Cope had set out in its critiques. The ANC issued reassurances, promises and confessions (for example, of having been arrogant). By 2010-11 when the ANC was more prone to errors in policy and governance, Cope was too emaciated to attack it.
Attempted ideological differentiation

Cope focused on what had gone wrong in the period since the ANC started ‘deviating from the ideals of the liberation movement’, roughly equated with the run-up to December 2007. Cosatu, in turn, asserted that ‘Cope had abandoned all progressive policies of the Freedom Charter’.\(^{101}\) Cope wanted the electorate to believe that it was the party that would ensure that government operated in line with South Africa’s founding constitutional ideals, while being in touch with popular needs. Cope stressed that with respect to what was being practically implemented by the ANC,\(^{102}\) the two parties were on par, yet with Cope as the more honest one in its willingness to practise what it preached. The ANC, it argued, had become weak in upholding clean, accountable government. Cope suggested a mixed economy within the confines of capitalism and the free market.\(^{103}\) The state would make policy in co-operation with the private sector. In effect, this was precisely the position of the ANC, even if the ANC would dress this in the robes of the national democratic revolution (NDR) and the driving forces of that revolution. Cope used the notions of ‘progressivism’ and ‘political progressivism’ to find a non-ANC niche position. It indicated a belief in and the advancement of human rights, social justice, sustainable democracy, human development, the rule of law, and equality,\(^{104}\) along with democratic governance, political and economic accountability, international co-operation and solidarity, as well as political dialogue and consensus. It contrasted this with conservatism and class-based liberalism. Cope did not get around to translating this into practical alternatives to the ANC-in-government.

In its early days, Cope’s policy standing became compromised in controversies over black economic empowerment (BEE) and affirmative action. Initially Cope was pushed into declaring that some aspects of the ANC’s policies needed revision.\(^{105}\) In Bloemfontein, Lekota suggested revisions of the policy so as not to discriminate against whites.\(^{106}\) Party spokespersons and leaders subsequently reassured voters of Cope’s commitment to BEE.\(^{107}\)

Cope emerged as largely dressed in the same policy robes as the ANC, averring that it would be better at \textit{implementation}. Dandala noted: ‘Our manifesto emphasises values that would see a government led by Cope become better able to implement policies than an ANC government.’\(^{108}\) He articulated the differences as honest leadership, refusal to tolerate corruption, elimination of cronyism, discontinuation of the cadre deployment system, firm monitoring, separation of party and state, and the direct election of top leadership.\(^{109}\)

REFUGE IN COLLABORATION, ALLIANCES AND RECONCILIATION?

At the pre-Cope convention of November 2008 opposition parties were as euphoric as the new initiatives’ masters. There were prominent roles for party leaders such as the DA’s Helen Zille and the UDM’s Bantu Holomisa. It was early days – aftermath of the Mbeki recall, divisions in the ANC, uncertainty as to how the weakened ANC of the time would weather the surge. There was hushed talking as to constructing opposition majorities in some of the provinces. The realities of ANC recovery and the opposition’s
generally modest election results brought a new context. In the immediate election aftermath Shilowa proclaimed that Cope would not be jumping into alliances, yet would keep open options on cooperation:⑩

Alliances, at this point in time, are out of the question, but we will cooperate with others on specific issues … Cope will not go into a coalition which it does not lead, where its identity will be subsumed by others … It is important to build our own brand …

Three months on, Cope was actively exploring cooperation with other opposition parties, including the DA. This had became more pertinent, given Cope’s post-election slippage. In July 2009 Cope signed an agreement to explore cooperation with the ID and UDM.⑪⑫ They agreed to conduct this exploration both inside and outside of Parliament, in relation to the 2011 local government election and the 2014 national and provincial elections. Two weeks later Shilowa and Zille, along with respective lieutenants, held ‘talks about talks’. One of the options at the time was to fight the 2011 local elections on a joint platform.⑪⑬ These steps were linked to opposition party cooperation in winnable wards and municipalities. Shilowa stressed that this would need to be about ‘what we as opposition parties can deliver, rather than ganging up against the ANC’.⑪⑭

Cope argued that the parties’ shared vision, values and agendas meant that there was an imperative for future cooperation. Cope stressed that there would be no need to dissolve itself or merge with other parties. Rather, ‘for the immediate future’ there was the need for cooperation and a shared platform.⑪⑮ In the longer term the formation of a ‘united, alternative and progressive party’ could develop out of talks, joint action and debate in the respective parties’ ranks.⑪⑯ Cope’s strongest ‘bargaining chip’ in securing a future in opposition politics for itself, was its black-African support. It was at times treated as a commodity that could be traded for the funding that the DA would bring into a deal.⑪⑰ Cope’s youth wing was opposed to cooperation, desiring a more autonomous stance.

As Cope slipped into its abyss of self-destruction talk about alliances faded. From 2010 onwards it was no longer in a condition to conduct talks. It was preoccupied with personalities and factions and entirely unattractive to other opposition parties. Other opposition developments eclipsed the once-regarded-as-pivotal opposition role for Cope. In August 2010, the DA and ID announced a process of gradual absorption by the DA of the ID (by now a 1 per cent party on national level, but with reasonable Western Cape standing). The DA in local election 2011 took modest strides to claim a bit of the opposition space amongst black-African voters that the Cope experiment had shown to exist.

Part of Cope’s cosying up to the DA also helped trigger other Copers’ rapprochement with the ANC. Reconciliation with the 2007 enemy for many still remained far preferable to unity or cooperation with a party that reminded them of the ANC’s arch enemy, the NP, as partly reincarnated in the DA. Hence, individuals and groups returned to the ANC, and some remained in drawn-out talks for conditions of return. Still others remained in Cope, by design or default assisting in the continuous implosion of Cope, to the benefit of the ANC.
Cope will in all probability, if and when the leadership issues are and remain resolved, retain attraction to other opposition parties. Opinion polls by Ipsos-Markinor showed that Cope had kept its third position in the party stakes in 2009 and 2010. It slipped to fifth in the 2011 polls, the regional IFP and NFP edging in ahead of it compared with its 2009 election position. Its national support was down compared with voter support in 2009, but still testified to popular perseverance, despite Cope being generally rudderless. The 2011 result was roughly in line with the December 2009 percentage of 2.2 in the Ipsos-Markinor poll, and the 3.6 per cent of May 2010. Its support continued to be largely black-African, but with notable support from coloured and white South Africans. There was a constituency out there that seemed not to care too much about Cope’s public spats – that saw in Cope an opposition party other than the DA-ID that opposed the ANC, even if just through its presence.

**CONCLUSION**

Initially and on the surface, Cope had appeared to be a political party unlike any other that had emerged in the opposition domain in South Africa since 1994. Its ANC provenance was significant. It seemed to have the potential to catalyse a decline of ANC dominance and hegemony. In contrast, Cope would fail in its challenge to the ANC. Instead of the earlier grand-to-modest expectations, Cope would be a short-term catalyst in moving the ANC, more than any other opposition party in democratic South Africa, to reconnect with its roots (as party) and to try anew to bring greater dedication into ANC government operations. Thereafter Cope would decline into the ranks of a host of micro-sized South African opposition parties. The ANC, both in its 2009 election campaign and in the governance period of the Zuma administration, responded to the Cope critiques. It offered reassurances on its respect for the judiciary and was restrained once in government. It promised to uphold the rule of law and pledged better accountability and humility in regular engagement with citizens. In the first few years of the Zuma administration the ANC repeatedly pronounced itself set on bringing improvements in representation, accountability, and clean government.

The 2009 election result stands as a monument of the main achievements of Cope as a fledgling party that emerged and established a national presence whilst under ANC siege. Cope was the main reason for the ANC’s below-two-thirds majority. Cope had won a multi-class and non-racial demographic base, and its voter support largely came from the unemployed and working classes, giving it much to work with in party politics in South Africa ... had it acquired the leadership and institutional capacity to match the task. Cope also stands as testimony to the ANC’s (hitherto) electoral invincibility. Its 2009 performance showed that Cope had already moved beyond its peak. Even in 2009 anger with and protest against the ANC did not really wound the ANC.

Yet Cope brought the generic message that the ANC was not beyond being challenged by a new opposition party. Even if Cope was vulnerable and in the end ephemeral it signalled that the ANC was not sacrosanct in its bond to liberation. It
could and would be challenged, if not effectively by Cope, then by another opposition party sometime in the future. Both Cope’s 2009 performance and the perseverance of its support, albeit diminished, confirmed that there was a hinterland of support\textsuperscript{118} for a party like Cope. There were ANC voters that had become available for an opposition party to capture. Cope was the 2009 beneficiary; in 2011 the DA and Cope shared whatever had remained available to an opposition party. It was unlikely that this support base would ‘wait’ for Cope to sort out its leadership, policy, organisational and funding problems. In future it might be re-galvanised to constitute support for another political party; it could also flow into a pool of alienation.

The case study of Cope was also important for shedding light on the typical fate that may befall split-off parties that exit from the ANC and aspire to rise above the ranks of relatively inconsequential opposition parties. It showed how the ANC deals with dissident parties to restrict their emergence and contain their development. As the bottom line, the ANC dealt mercilessly with Cope. The effect has been to discourage, contain and to show that it takes no prisoners in opposition party formations from the ‘loins of the ANC’. As a result there is probably a smaller chance for a short- to medium-term repeat of the Cope experiment. This could mean the generation of anomie and alienation from electoral and party politics. It could also mean elevated internal contestation inside the ANC and the alliance. The battle, for now, remained about control of and predominance in the ANC and in the Alliance.

\section*{NOTES}
2. Expression used by Pallo Jordan, 2008, ‘A letter to Comrade Mtungwa, an old comrade and dear friend’, address to the Platform for Public Deliberation, University of Johannesburg, 14 November 2008, noted: ‘In many respects, Election 2009 will be remembered for the participation of an opposition formation sprung from the very loins of the ANC and led by former ANC leaders …’
4. More details follow in the chapter’s section on the policy and ideological positioning of Cope.
5. The Nicholson obiter of 12 September 2008 asserted that Mbeki had operationalised a plot against Zuma. Also see Mosiuoa Lekota, interview, SABC-SAFM, 7 April 2009.
8 Mandy Rossouw and Mmanaledi Mataboge, 2011, ‘Copers recross to ANC’, Mail & Guardian, 14-20 January 2011, p. 2 report on WikiLeaks information that Cope policy documents carried all the ‘hallmarks of Mbeki’s letters from the ANC’.

9 The ANCYL’s Julius Malema once observed: ‘Never form a party when you are angry, when you smile that party is over.’ See André Grobler, 2011, ‘Zuma: “The work for democracy is going on”’, Mail & Guardian Online http://mg.co.za/article/2011-05-08-zuma-the-work-for-democracy-is-going-on/ (accessed 8 May 2011).


12 Author’s observations at the Sandton convention of November 2009, and the Bloemfontein conference of December 2009; also see Janet Cherry, op. cit.

13 Mbeki appointed Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka in 2005 to replace Jacob Zuma as deputy president of South Africa. Ngonyama was the ANC spokesperson under Mbeki, and George was a deputy minister and Mbeki’s chief campaigner in the Polokwane race.

14 Ibid.; Mvume Dandala, ‘ANC under Mbeki was unfit to govern, says Dandala’, Business Day, 16 April 2009, p. 3.

15 Also see Raymond Suttner, 2009, ‘Why is this election different from all others? ANC, Cope and the way forward’, Seminar presented at Centre for Policy Studies, Johannesburg, 25 February 2009.

16 Simon Grindrod, 2009, Confidential memorandum, CWC members only – To President and Cope Working Committee, ‘Challenges to Cope and recommendations’, 9 June 2009. The memorandum was leaked and received widespread publicity.


18 Rok Ajulu, ‘Cope’, Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA) seminar on opposition politics, 8 April 2009.

19 The critiques from the resigning leaders were met with attacks from the remaining leaders regarding their failure to fit in with the party (Anele Mda, then youth leader before her own suspension, regarding Grindrod: ‘He is really not one of us …’), naivete and lack of political experience (Juli Kilian, regarding Odendaal: ‘It was unfair to appoint her to a key position, knowing that she had no political experience’), see for example Sunday Times, 12 July 2009, p. 6; Die Burger, 11 July 2009, p. 1.

20 Lynda Odendaal, 2009, in an interview with Talk Radio 702, 9 July 2009, said that Shilowa was part of an ‘opportunistic’ faction that wished to remove Lekota as Cope interim president. In March 2010 Odendaal, a former political novice who had helped bankroll earlier Cope operations, joined the ANC.


26 Mbhazima Shilowa, 2009, telephonic interview. The statement was in the context of Cope having nominated a presidential candidate to oppose the election of Jacob Zuma as president of South Africa when it came to a vote in the National Assembly. The DA did not and chose to abstain.


30 *Congress of the People (Cope) Inaugural Congress Programme*, Bloemfontein, 14–16 December 2008.


32 ‘Cope’ in this essay is also used to denote actions that preceded that formalisation of the Cope initiative.

33 Susan Booysen, ‘Cope: fleeting phenomenon or substantive opposition?’ *EISA Election Update*, February 2009, Johannesburg, EISA.

34 Also see Macozoma, quoted in Kgosana, op. cit., ‘Defector Macozoma’.

35 Cedric Frölick, telephonic interview, 3 November 2008 (on ANC grassroots action); also see Mmanaledi Mataboge, 2009, ‘Cope must elect leaders to survive’, *Mail & Guardian*, 17-23 July 2009, p. 18 (on some more prominent people driven from their jobs).

36 SABC-SAFM, 8 March 2010, 08:00 news bulletin.

37 Several legal battles marked the process of naming the new party. The saga entailed, first, the ANC objecting to the consultative launch event being called the South African National Convention. Second, the ANC pre-emptively contested the new party calling itself the South African National Congress. Third, the name of Shikota (short for Shilowa and Lekota) was used in lieu of an official name, which was still pending. Fourth, the initial choice of the name of South African Democratic Congress (SADC) was abandoned upon discovering that the name was already taken, by one of the floor-crossing split-offs from the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). Fifth, the decision to use Congress of the People (Cope) followed. The ANC objected and the case was heard in the Pretoria High Court on 10 December 2008. The judgment, two days later, dismissed the ANC’s application with costs.


40 Mosiuoa Lekota, Cope Inaugural Conference, remarks during leadership announcement session, Bloemfontein, 16 December 2008.


Cope used the public relations company Fleishman-Hillard and, for marketing, BDSO Networks. For specific campaign content, also see Chitja Twala, 2011, ‘The Congress of the People (Cope): A new political dynamic during the April 2009 campaign and election?’ Journal for Contemporary History, 35:3, pp. 89-111.


See for example statements in the organisational report by Phillip Dexter, Cope’s head of communications, which notes that Cope had had to contend with destructive forces, both inside and outside the party, intent on destroying Cope. He also warned that these forces were trying to get Cope members to ‘focus on mistakes and failures’ that arose during the party’s formation; see The Star, 7 July 2009, p. 6.


Juli Kilian, telephonic interview, 2009, op. cit.


Based on author’s observation of Lekota and Shilowa performances on stage in relation to the audience, and in media briefings. Lekota came across as better informed.

See, for example, Sibongakonke Shoba, 2009, ‘Cope needs to listen to what members want’, Business Day, 15 July 2009, p. 3.


Also see Booysen in Southall and Daniel (eds.), 2009, op. cit.

Plus 94, op. cit.; Kimmie et al., 2010, op. cit.

The 7.42 per cent is based on the percentage of valid votes and represents Cope’s share of votes allocated to political parties; Cope had 7.3 per cent of all votes cast, thus of the total of valid and spoilt votes.

Post-2004 the UDM was the official provincial opposition in the Eastern Cape (its vote share was 9.2 per cent, which delivered 6 seats in the provincial legislature). However, the DA subsequently displaced it in the course of floor-crossing practices.


See Plus94, Results of opinion poll, op cit.

Jan Greben, 2009, personal communication.

Mbhazima Shilowa, 2009, telephonic interview.

Ibid.


Kimmie et al., 2010, op. cit., pp. 101-23.
The reported membership was presented to an inaugural conference media briefing, Bloemfontein, 15 December 2008. It held up to journalists’ interrogation.

Juli Kilian, telephonic interview, 2009, op. cit.

Ibid.


All political parties represented in the national or provincial legislatures are entitled to a percentage of the public funding for political parties, in any financial year for which they are represented in those legislatures. Parties are allowed to roll over up to 50 per cent of annual Electoral Commission disbursements from any particular financial year to the next, as long as it falls within the five-year electoral term. Some parties roll funds over with a view to accumulating for forthcoming campaigns. See Susan Booyse, 2009, ‘South Africa: Political Parties and Political Participation’ in Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS), Democracy Report 2009, Bonn, KAS.

Observation of a pre-Cope rebel group meeting in Parktown, Johannesburg, October 2008.

Mbhazima Shilowa, 2009, ‘So many questions’ with Chris Barron, Sunday Times, 1 November 2009, p. 11.

Juli Kilian, telephonic interview, 2009, op. cit.


Tabane, 2010, op. cit.


SABC-SAFM radio news bulletin, 08:00, 26 March 2009.


Morudu, op. cit., p. 19.

On the latter, see Jordan, 2008, op. cit. Jordan links the rise of Cope to the collective failure of the post-2002 ANC leadership (inclusive of both Zuma and Mbeki) to address the contradictions of class formation and capital accumulation that the post-1994 policies had brought about. Many in the emerging classes had come to treasure their access to public sector positions and the control of these positions over resources. These developments were also articulated in the ranks of the ANC, with, for example, ANC structures and members being active in capitalist enterprise and its associated practices.


Susan Booysen, ‘Cope’s campaign strategy shook ANC into action’, Sowetan, 23 April 2009.


Also see Cosatu Central Executive Committee, 2009, ‘Policy positions of the ANC and government: Audit of the ANC elections manifesto, State of the Nation speech, and Budget against the Polokwane Conference resolutions’, Johannesburg, Cosatu Head Office, 23–25 February 2009.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Mbhazima Shilowa, 2009, telephonic interview, op. cit.


Mbhazima Shilowa and Helen Zille, 21 July 2009, Summary of discussions between representatives of the Congress of the People (Cope) and the Democratic Alliance (DA), Cape Town.


In one early manifestation, Cope and the DA released a (controversial) joint policy document on labour brokers; see Mandy Rossouw, 2009, ‘DA and Cope go on first date’, Mail & Guardian, 2-8 October 2009, p. 8.

116 Lekota protested that Cope would only be ‘used’ by the DA should Cope wish it to be; Mosiuoa Lekota, 2009, ‘Dankie, Boesak – en voorspoed’, in column Die vraag is, Rapport, 10 November 2009, p. 3.


# ANNEXURE TO CHAPTER 9

## DEVELOPMENT OF COPE AND COUNTER ACTIONS BY THE ANC

### Developments and turning points in the life of Cope, 2008-2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Cope event</th>
<th>ANC riposte</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12 September 2008</td>
<td>Judge Nicholson’s obiter dictum in Zuma case, Pietermaritzburg, fingers Mbeki with plotting to keep Zuma from power.</td>
<td>Unleashes a series of events that precipitate the Mbeki recall.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 September 2008</td>
<td>Recall of Mbeki as president of South Africa formalises Polokwane polarisation; dissidents resolve to start breakaway party.</td>
<td>ANC starts taking stock, still uncertain as to whether a breakaway would result.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2008</td>
<td>Serving of ‘divorce papers’ – Lekota tenders his resignation from ANC; point of no return for the breakaway group.</td>
<td>ANC reminds South Africans of the ‘Polokwane losers’, including Lekota.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October – November 2008</td>
<td>Quest for party names and backers, the time of anticipation about credible opposition.</td>
<td>ANC serves notice that new party will be challenged on all fronts; ANC opposes several party name options proposed by Cope.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-2 November 2008</td>
<td>South African National Convention, Sandton – pre-launch consultative conference indicates backing and organisational ability.</td>
<td>ANC task teams take stock on the ground, across the country – who is in the community, who is in Sandton?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November – December 2008</td>
<td>Interim leadership; registering as a party; unveiling of logo; progress slows down.</td>
<td>Cope pinned down by the ANC – action against dissident community leaders and representatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-16 December 2008</td>
<td>Launch conference, Bloemfontein; outline of policies and selection of leadership.</td>
<td>ANC strategises for January 8 ANC anniversary statement, it minimises references to and recognition of Cope.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2008 – March 2009</td>
<td>Series of municipal by-elections, notably in Northern, Eastern and Western Cape in which Cope initially takes slices of ANC support, then starts failing because Cope councillor candidates are the (ANC) ones previously discredited in communities.</td>
<td>ANC falters in December 2008 by-elections due to poor organisation, then recovers and regains momentum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>January 2009</td>
<td>Mobilisation, planning and attempts to solicit defections.</td>
<td>Quiet period for ANC, whilst constructing community anchors for anti-Cope assault.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2009</td>
<td>Launch of election manifesto; start of campaign; leadership strife; funding problems; attempts to recruit members change to recruitment of voters.</td>
<td>ANC enters full campaign mode, popular mobilisation; Cope meetings disrupted, and ANC gives assurances that it would ‘speak to branches to restrain ANC supporters’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2009</td>
<td>Extensive candidates’ list produced, but presidential candidate issue sabotages campaign; campaign formally commences; late attempt to regain momentum; replacement of campaign management.</td>
<td>ANC goes into ‘tolerant of opposition’ mode upon formal declaration of campaign period.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2009</td>
<td>Final campaign and Cope shows further loss of momentum; reports of more leadership strife; low campaign profile – last minute media and campaign materials.</td>
<td>ANC confirms that it has regained lost ground.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-24 April 2009</td>
<td>Election and result – on 7.4% Cope performs lower than original expectations, yet is third biggest party; leadership remains at odds.</td>
<td>Commanding victory for ANC; the proportion of national ANC votes lost was largely due to Cope’s inroads.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 May 2009</td>
<td>Indirect election of president of South Africa and Cope opposes nomination of Zuma.</td>
<td>ANC shows that it regards Cope as ‘just another opposition party’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-July 2009</td>
<td>Leadership fall out with resignations of second deputy president Lynda Odendaal, and Simon Grindrod; Cope youth movement suffers internal strife.</td>
<td>ANC watches drama unfold ... whilst luring Copers back.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 July 2009</td>
<td>Exploratory discussions on degrees of collaboration between Cope and DA; follows directly after Cope talks with ID and UDM.</td>
<td>Selective rapprochement starting to happen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July – November 2009</td>
<td>Range of internal rifts and other in-house problems in Cope; Western Cape Cope leader Allan Boesak resigns.</td>
<td>Cope defined as a tormented and disoriented opposition party, seems to be getting unstuck.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2009</td>
<td>Retrospectives on ‘first year of Cope’; low turnout at Kimberley anniversary rally; membership estimated at 150,000–200,000; Cope has only established 10% of the anticipated branches.</td>
<td>ANC rejoices in Cope glitter having worn off.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Cope event</td>
<td>ANC riposte</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>January – March 2010</td>
<td>Ipsos-Markinor reports Cope support declined to 2.2% nationally; Cope youth wing calls for sacking of interim Cope national leadership; Shilowa accused of being behind youth rebellion; Lekota accuses youth wing of ill-discipline; both leaders accused by youth of being weak; Cope still struggling to get many branches off the ground; opposition party deliberations on cooperation.</td>
<td>ANC largely ignores Cope – also because it is bogged down in intra-alliance struggles for dominance and policy influence – often with a view to its next elective conference in 2012.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May – June 2010</td>
<td>Anticipated formal Cope conference for official leadership election and policy adoption collapses after hijacking by Shilowa faction; Lekota takes successful legal action to reverse conference elective actions.</td>
<td>With Cope seemingly in self-destruct mode, the ANC mostly observes, otherwise continues to publicly welcome back returnees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July – October 2010</td>
<td>Ipsos-Markinor reports a slight revival in Cope support, up to 3.6%. Most of the support is concentrated in Gauteng; it continues to be spread across race and age groups; allegations of financial mismanagement against Shilowa; the ‘two Copes’ co-exist acrimoniously.</td>
<td>The ANC in the same poll is down to 66%, from the 71% at the end of 2009.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November – December 2010</td>
<td>Forensic audit of Cope parliamentary finances by KPMG is released – centres on R5 million (of R20 million parliamentary funds) and misuse of the rest; funds spent in January 2010 to pay 2009 election debts, Cope also revealed not to be deducting tax from employees salaries; the Lekota faction appears to be gaining the upper hand; Lekota talks about ‘strengthening efforts to have a conference’; Shilowa hangs in, hoping to be rescued by a conference vote.</td>
<td>With Cope factions at war, little is left for ANC to do. ANC continuously still welcoming back a trickle of returnees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-17 December 2010</td>
<td>Irene, Pretoria, Cope national conference convened; Lekota obtains interdict to stop conference from electing leaders; conference disintegrates; Shilowa faction elects leadership under a tree; legal action ensues.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2011</td>
<td>Shilowa ‘copers’ JJ Tabane (spokesperson), Lunga Kepe (youth leader) Andile Nkulu and John Ngcabetsha in talks to rejoin the ANC (all in business).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## February 2011
Shilowa expelled from Cope (8 February); Gauteng High Court application suspends Shilowa from performing party duties after he was found by an internal disciplinary hearing to have wrongfully authorised the transfer of R5 million of parliamentary funds into the party’s account; Shilowa-Cope approaches Cape High Court to have Lekota’s presidency decreed invalid, to set aside suspensions, and stop Lekota from submitting names.  

With Cope factions at war, little left for ANC to do. ANC continuously still welcoming back a trickle of returnees.

## March 2011
Cope-Shilowa announces it will not campaign or field candidates for local elections 2011; do not state who they will support in election; officially only the Cope-Lekota will contest elections; however, on the ground in Eastern Cape, for example, the Shilowa faction was nominating candidates.  

ANC fully preoccupied with fighting off candidate revolts of its own.

## April – May 2011
13 April 2011 Shilowa makes application to Johannesburg High Court: urges court to declare that under Cope constitution term of office of the 2008 leadership ended on 16 December 2010, and that national congress of December 2010 took legal and binding decisions; IEC officially acknowledges list of Lekota-Cope candidates after Western Cape High Court dismisses application to prevent Lekota-Cope from submitting party lists to IEC.  

In Mquma local municipality in the Eastern Cape ANC members (and former councillors) join Cope (the ANC had expelled them in 2010 suspecting Cope sympathies).

## May 2011
In local election 2011 Cope got 2.1% support, nationally calculated (on PR plus ward calculations). It ended in fifth position, after the ANC, DA, IFP and NFP. It won 236 local government seats across the country and won a presence in 55% of the councils.  

The ANC’s attention had by now completely shifted away from Cope. The DA had now become the main ANC electoral opponent.

## June – September 2011
Cacophony of Cope voices and initiatives, ranging from discussion documents on reinventing Cope, to local alliances with the DA, rebels going with the ANC in post-local election constitution of local governments, talks about ‘genuine’ reconciliation between Shilowa and Lekota, indications of pending alliance talks with the DA, and high court action to determine who leads Cope continues. The Lekota Cope holds a policy conference.  

The ANC continues welcoming back more returnees. The ANC engages Cope in absorption talks, mainly a pre-election initiative that leaks after the election.

**Sources:** Author’s monitoring through research observation and media tracking, 2008-11.
The ANC towards the mark of 20 years in power increasingly relied on government performance to ensure continuous electoral prowess. Despite glaring flaws, ANC history and identity, along with the manifested positive changes, continued to sustain the ANC. But this effect was not guaranteed to persist. It was inevitable that in future the liberation dividend would fade and the ANC would come to be judged mainly on governance record. Its identity and image as modern party would increasingly be separated from the historical liberation movement.

Election 2009 reinvigorated the ANC. There was a renewed trust that this time around the ANC governance undertakings would lead to definitive change. Post-election, however, substantiation of the election ecstasy was modest. The ANC-government gap had been closed under Zuma, but both intra-ANC and alliance contests were imported into the state. It caused a variation on the theme of governance paralysis that had been linked to the 2007 succession struggle. Now it combined with widespread lack of sufficient state capacity, slow realisation of turnarounds, increasing evidence of state corruption and mal-governance that would lessen the prospects for state proficiency, and the ANC centrally losing control over local enclaves of state-business convergence. The ANC was taking corrective action – the scope and appropriateness to the scale of the problem was the question of the period.

Section 4 explores ANC governance. Institutional design and public policy, along with leadership, are central to the ANC’s governance project. State institutions and the processes and power that link them leverage transformation and delivery. In the ANC’s ‘wars’ of internal transition the institutions effectively doubled as trenches (Chapter 10). The Presidency of South Africa retained its centrality to governance, irrespective of the presidential incumbent, albeit with the balance of power under Zuma in the portals of the ANC (Chapter 11). Modest institutional redesign, deployee-appointee changes, and presidential style changed from Mbeki to Zuma. But despite fierce contests and intense alliance-partner fall outs, policy remained remarkably consistent (Chapter 12). The core argument in the section is that the coalface of ANC-in-government ultimately signifies the weakness of the ANC. The ANC has the trust of the people and the power that elections bestow. Yet, the weaknesses of the organisation fuse with governance challenges to render the ANC vulnerable, despite its immense strengths.
The Zuma administration entered into state power at a time when the ceilings on delivery had become manifest. Phenomenal achievements had been posted. There were, however, bottlenecks and obstructions in effecting delivery to narrow the inequality gap and capture elusive prosperity. The ANC was under substantial pressure to get more of the fundamentals in order, for example, in education, health, local government, and integrity in governance. Substantial and continuous deficits, combined with beliefs that the ANC had not done its best, threatened to undermine the ANC’s people relations.

To limit such undermined relationships the ANC would have to maintain a tight hold over state power, ensuring that state power works to reinforce both tiers of ‘parallel democracy’ in which the ANC operates – the electoral and comparative party power world, on the one hand, and the ANC in its own world of relations with the people, its organisational world, and the alliance world, on the other hand. The ANC had to use state institutions\(^1\) to leverage policy implementation and delivery. The ANC’s task was vastly complicated by the fact that parts of its organisational struggles and wars for intra-ANC strategic advantage over rivals were playing out in exactly the state-institutional domain where it had to invest in its own political future. It was no iron law, but its own battles beyond the earlier capture of state institutions from the apartheid ancien régime frequently disrupted and paralysed, rather than facilitated and leveraged, improved state-institutional performance (and realisation of policies). In due course, the ‘first transitions’ were partnered by a triptych of interdependent new battles that would undermine the ANC’s hold over state-institutional power – political factionalism and contestation for positions, corruption, and deficient state capacity. Some of the

\[^{1}\text{State institutions} \text{as site of struggle in ANC wars}\]

\[\text{The winners of political struggle ‘… want to build effective agencies for themselves. But because they do now own public authority and fear its future capture by opponents, they must also protect their agencies from political uncertainty through all manner of insulating devices – formal procedures, criteria, deadlines, decision rights – that hobble agency performance’.}\]

\[\text{Terry M. Moe}\]
latter was due to poor institutional design and deficient associated processes; other parts could be traced back to negotiations and constitutional design.

A far-reaching war for institutional control by individuals and groupings within the ANC, fought across state institutions in the wake of Polokwane and ever since, is a case study in the extension of political control over the public sector. The Zuma-Mbeki rift was but one period in the history of the ANC and the ANC-in-government in democratic South Africa. The significance was much wider. It was informed by the ANC’s reaction to Mbeki who had used state power to govern the ANC. The counter-cry now became for ANC power to be asserted over the state. This legitimate desire in the context of a party being democratically elected to govern becomes less fortunate if direct party control over the state prevents the state from singularly pursuing policy objectives, serving all citizens equally. It sets the incumbents free to treat state territory as personal-organisational fiefdoms.

The period that followed Polokwane saw a more direct ANC exercise of power over the state than had been the case in the Mandela and Mbeki eras (although far from absent then). This was evident in appointments to senior government positions, decisions on policy and governance, and continuous contestation for ascendant power groupings to access public positions, either for control over resources or simply for positioning in the high politics game of king-making and personal promotion. The essence of the current case study is that the Zuma Polokwane victory needed to be consummated in the state domain, and thereafter followed a rolling wave of action to populate, politically control and mobilise state institutions for purposes such as ANC-organisational peace. The need for change and turnover became faster and more frequent, affecting all political and also bureaucratic state institutions repeatedly from early 2008 onwards.

Two waves of institutional battles thus affected the ANC-in-government from mobilisation for Polokwane onwards. First, there was the series of post-Polokwane replacements, or purges, to give effect to the approximate intra-ANC ‘regime change’. The wave continued until the formal assumption of power by Zuma through election 2009. It mostly affected national and provincial government, and the top levels of the public sector (both in political and administrative appointments). Second, was the period of (often) more low-level, yet continuous contestation and changes in all three spheres of government. National, provincial and local-level changes were evident in the executives and legislatures or councils, along with the bureaucracies. The changes and threatened changes pushed government into a mode of reduced stability and certainty, moderated by the fact that inadequate prior performances had rendered change necessary. Yet continuous politically-inspired change was now affecting the ability to govern. The ANC-in-government was in a double bind.

Five of the post-Polokwane effects were the substantial ANC-factional politicisation of public institutions, the diffusion of intra-state factional (or any other ANC-interest grouping) mobilisation for control over certain institutions, a proclivity to align access to and control over public institutions with personal interest, the ANC top structures’ increasing loss of control over the lower-level power enclaves fighting for control over public institutions, and counter-positioning amongst ANC deployees on the issue of
corruption and maladministration. These factors, superimposed on the issues of state institutional design and severe constraints in human resources and institutional capacity, undermined state power as held by the ANC at a time that was critical for advancing ANC governance. They often engendered distraction from core governance and policy work and, in severe cases, led to paralysis or distraction through the subjugation of governance to movement politics. The essential fault line (recognised by the ANC since at least the late 1990s, and elaborated in ANC documentation) was the tension between using the state as vehicle to serve the people versus access to the state to facilitate intra-party constituency nurturing through personal beneficiation, with attention to public service as a by-product at best.

This chapter first considers generic issues of the party-state relationship, the ongoing state-institutional war unleashed through the Zuma-Mbeki succession struggle, and the state as a site of ANC political (including inter-candidate) struggles. It follows through with the second wave of institutional battles. The chapter argues that the post-Polokwane and post-election 2009 period pushed South Africa, and the ANC, into a new domain of being continuously vulnerable to internal ANC contestation. The specifics of South Africa’s public institutional wars are also linked to the debate on the centres of power. A periodisation of the ANC in the course of its first 17 years in power illuminates the ongoing changes. The emphasis is on how the ANC gained, elaborated, maintained, lost some, and potentially resuscitated its power-holding over the state, but then fell victim to incessant changes to government deployment under the pressure of political control over the state. There is a move to limit deployment, but by mid-2011 it still lacked substantial concretisation. The chapter stands side-by-side with Chapter 11 on the presidencies of South Africa, and details of the ideological and policy substance of institutional contestation in Chapter 12.

THE ANC IN COMMAND OF THE STATE

Contention in the relationship between party and state is inescapable. A basic reason is that political parties capture state power on the basis of electoral contestation (incorporating policy platforms) – and then have to transition into government that will rule in the interest of all. Party and state represent the two ends of a continuum. The in-between, lived reality is the coexistence of party and state in balances that change over time and in relation to the issues. It is the lifeblood of democratic mandates that the will of the majority prevails and that the majority party has the right, if not obligation, to realise its policies. Yet, there is an important difference between the majority party governing for the national good and the governing party appropriating the state to beneficiate its elite followers and thereby prolong its own tenure.

The ANC has encountered questions of the appropriate party-state blend at various points in its time in power. South Africa historically has meshed the two. The state has been subjected to the governing party, both before and after 1994. When the Zuma-Mbeki transitional contest in the ANC heightened, South Africa was submerged in
fierce demonstrations of institutional warfare, in pursuit of the prizes of strategic deployment and control over institutions. This was ostensibly to further a more-in-touch governance project. Evidence accumulated that modest reviews and changes were effected in the time of the Zuma administration. Many of the Mbeki era problems resisted change. In this period the movement in government was often more focused on personalities, factions, and leveraging of future power in ANC contests (especially regional, provincial and national ANC elections), than on singular foci on public sector improvement (even if the latter did significantly feature in formal proclamations). The meshing assumed new forms in the Zuma era of governance. Two reasons were the Zuma-ANC’s insistence that the ANC was elected to rule and thus has the right to direct government, and variations on the theme of succession battles finding resonance in public sector deployment.

Party-state relations in this era were characterised by layers being added to the Zuma-Mbeki divisions. The latter persisted in lower key, and morphed as individuals changed allegiances back to the ANC and found renewed favour in the period between Polokwane and Mangaung. Re-population of institutions co-existent with the new lines of division for both the Mangaung round of succession battles, and far less grandiose factional power struggles throughout the national, provincial and local state bureaucracies, and provincial and local governments. These often pivoted around alliance lines, and reflected on the 2010 onwards occasional mobilisation against enrichment from public position from the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) and occasionally the SACP. A new layer of intra-ANC battle lines, of ‘nationalists’ versus ‘communists’, was being drawn with a view to Mangaung 2012. In the run up to Mangaung (and likely to grow thereafter) a further layer of the battle between the ‘clean’ and the ‘corrupt-implicated-complicit’ appeared to be forming. Thus, whilst one layer was still being phased out, contesting factions were already pre-emptively eyeing institutional placements and powers with a view to facilitating future ANC succession battles. This one was the central focus, yet there were multiple lines of division, especially on the local level, and these were often escaping centralised ANC management.

It was due to the cord between party and state, and the ANC’s achieving full authority over the state in the Mbeki period that pandemonium prevailed in state corridors when the Congress of the People (Cope) fell out materialised. Suspected Cope sympathisers were purged, or tolerated, forgiven and accommodated or reintegrated in the Zuma administration for the sake of subverting the Cope threat. These acts were still unfolding in 2011. The next line of institutional defence from mid-2009 onwards was the subversion of the lingering ‘1996 class project’. New lines of division for influence over state institutions and their policy mandates opened up. Ascendant ‘left partners in the alliance’, especially Cosatu, saw red when the now-Zuma-loyal (but seen to be 1996 class project) Trevor Manuel was elevated into the Zuma-left conceptualised National Planning Commission (NPC). It signalled a new phase in the institutional war. It was undergirded by the camps that came to aspire to assume control of the ANC in the 2012 Mangaung centenary conference. The phenomenon of the ‘conference coup’, as executed at Polokwane, imparted the need to forever ensure that potential intra-ANC
enemies do not gain useful state footholds. This left-heyday, however, was challenged within months by ‘nationalists’ (advancing patriotic capital through variations on the theme of nationalisation) resenting the ascendancy of the SACP in the alliance and into government, and its presumed influence over the ANC (even if minimally realised in terms of policy positions). The ‘nationalists’ were eager to find lines along which to mobilise for a next round of leadership replacements. Cosatu, however, complained that the SACP had become absorbed into the Zuma government’s moderated projects and had ceased by late 2010 to pressurise for improved policy and governance.

**DIAGRAM 1: Transferring ANC power into the state domain through deployment**

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**STATE AS SITE OF INTRA-ANC STRUGGLES**

In times of transition and contestation intra-ANC struggles have consistently spilled over into the state (Diagram 1). The ANC victory over apartheid obviously had to be translated into the ANC populating and establishing control over the state institutions. The early democracy days saw a rapid, generally legitimate and large-scale repopulation, albeit with extensive retention (also due to the Slovo ‘sunset clauses’). Mbeki had a relatively free hand, given the expectations for decisive moves to consolidate the democratic transition on all fronts. Given the need for change and proof that appointments would be optimally geared to the pursuit of excellence in government, Mbeki’s (personal-politically opportunistic, trying to build high-level loyalty to himself) high rate of retention of cabinet members in 2004 was controversial and often not even expected by under-performing cabinet members themselves.6

The assumption of power by the Zuma administration (starting in early 2008) brought high levels of change among incumbents in public institutions, both voluntary and forced. For the new top-powers it was imperative to substitute Zuma devotees for Mbeki loyalists. The process was moderated by the need to win Mbeki supporters over through ensuring job or income security for senior deployees, especially in senior state...
administration, to ensure that there would be lessened scope for Cope intra-state power bases. Yet new lines of division and contestation continuously emerged and would impact on the ANC’s exercise of state power.

No state structure was spared scrutiny and no individual was exempt from possible removal. Due to both the urge to drive out all unconverted residuals of the Mbeki era, and to make space for others to drink at the trough, clean-outs of state structures blossomed. Given that state institutions were often performing below-standard, and that there was much suspicion (or knowledge) of corruption in public institutions, purges often blended into cleaning-out actions. Where action against corrupt officials followed, it was in many instances eased by the fact that the guilty party had been Mbeki-aligned. Natural attrition and turnover were equally used to effect ANC political turnover. The contracts of a range of senior civil servants, including top-level political appointments, were not renewed when their terms ran out.

The presidential succession deployment politics reinforced the fact that state institutions in South Africa had frequently been the trenches for power struggles of varying intensity and impact. The objectives varied over time. Some concerned personal social and financial well-being; others had more systemic and noble imperatives. Six main objectives and processes in the struggle over occupancy of South Africa’s state institutions were evident in the Mbeki-Zuma duel period and beyond. They are differentiated in terms of their systemic and transformative nature, and those relating to the political domain and self-beneficiation:

**Systemic and transformative**
- The purpose is to subjugate the forces of apartheid and ensure that public sector bureaucratic institutions are liberated along with the representative and adjunct institutions that could be taken over through elections (and the associated power of the elected institutions to appoint and nominate). Seventeen years into democracy, this objective was largely achieved.
- Control over state institutions to ensure that rightful benefits will be brought to those who have been liberated from the preceding oppressive and discriminatory systems and ensure that well-intended public policies be effectively and efficiently implemented. This was also a continuous process in the period from liberation onwards. Delivery failures were often linked to the self-centredness of the ANC power elite.
- In the period 2011-12 there were tentative signs of a possible new transformation – one of a rejuvenated (perhaps ‘purified’) ANC in which forces that linked continuous ANC state power to clean administration and the absence of personal gratification courtesy of state deployment increasingly locked horns with their ANC counterparts. The victors were still being determined.

**Political domain struggles and personal beneficitation**
- Many people in the ANC and close to the ANC felt forgotten and marginalised, and often also victimised by Mbeki and his consorts in the key gatekeeping
ANC POWER AND STATE POWER

positions of the state, and across the levels of government. They mobilised to oust Mbeki-ites. The subsequent period saw the reinvention of this objective. New gatekeepers were being eyed with suspicion for their possible use of state organs for ANC ascendancy.

- ANC structures were first controlled by Mbeki cliques and then by Zuma deployment checkers. Many in respective presidential camps saw the state as the final trench for the defeat of opponents’ control over opportunities in and with the ANC. The Zuma camp’s control became diffused when new succession lines opened within the party.

- The objective to gain control over the corridors of power in order to find gainful employment, and (personally or through relative and acquaintance nominations and tip-offs as to opportunities) ensure the selective award of tenders and other contracts, was rife in the Mbeki and Zuma times. Turnover of beneficiaries was a principal driving force in the transitions.

It was widely accepted and frequently shown that election into ANC position and significant deployment was the first step towards financial well-being. The phenomenon was explored by Suttner and Jordan, and reflection on it featured in ANC deliberations at least from 2000 onwards. It featured prominently in lobbying for turnover in public sector employment and political representation. In 2009, when the 2012 ANC succession battle took off, the anti-Gwede Mantashe lobby, for example, revolted against Mantashe stepping in to try and ensure the relative separation of business and ANC politics. Mantashe had been taking initiatives to get ANC leaders to declare business interests and fight the practice of ‘facilitation fees’ to introduce people to Zuma. Cosatu was also vehement in its condemnation of the practice and became a high-profile campaigner for checks on politicians’ ‘self-enrichment courtesy of public sector’ projects. ANC head office occupants confirmed that in the Mbeki days and with Luthuli House under Kgalema Motlanthe it was common for the head office to endorse business deals for its members. A new drive for patriotic capital from the nationalist camp – confirming a trend evident for some time – was a 2011 variation on these themes.

**From state rule to party rule, with no place for ‘two centres of power’**

Much of contemporary ANC rule is to be understood through the lens of Mbeki’s attempted subjugation of the party to the state (Chapter 11), and the counter-reactions to this. He came to blend party and state matters, yet with the state, over which he remained in charge, effectively superseding the party when Mbeki was running into trouble. Mbeki’s downfall was that he underestimated the ANC’s hierarchical leadership culture and overestimated the reverence for his position at the top of the stack. He came to associate endorsement over several years of the actions of the top leadership with a green light to institute supreme-leader rule. His cabinet came to rule over ANC National Executive Committee (NEC) meetings. This made for a state inner sanctum that largely doubled as the NEC-National Working Committee (NWC) ruling body of
State institutions as site of struggle in ANC wars

the ANC. In Zuma days the practice continued, yet now with deeper consensus and a (seeming) ANC-authentic orientation.

Mbeki’s attempted state rule over the ANC helped reduce oversight. The process is illustrated through the practice in the Mbeki days of all cabinet members not just attending the meetings of the ANC’s NEC (most had NEC status), but also leading in many NEC meetings. Former ANC speaker of Parliament, Frene Ginwala, observed: 11

The distinction between the party in government and the executive was blurred when it became the practice for all cabinet members to attend meetings of the ANC NEC. This devalued the contributions of the elected NEC members, gradually, policy debates were introduced and led by cabinet ministers ...

The rebellion of the mid-2005 ANC National General Council (NGC) was the watershed. It ended the Mbeki era’s use of the state to rule the ANC. The ANC, with the aid of Tripartite Alliance partners Cosatu and the SACP, turned the tables (Cosatu in some ways had commenced this process in its 2003 congress; Chapter 11). Government officials, including ministerial advisers, had previously stepped in to draft resolutions or other conference documents; the 2005 NGC expelled them and asserted ANC control. 12 A period of three years-plus of far-reaching political mobilisation and turnover in occupancy of state positions followed.

The debate on the ‘two centres of power’ dominated ANC and Alliance discourse about the articulation between party and state. It was used in the context of the right of the ANC as the governing party to make appointments of its choice, including to the highest office in the land, through its policy of cadre deployment and the operations of its national and provincial deployment committees. It often focused on whether the ANC president and senior NEC members would also be deployed in the political national and provincial government executives of the country. It was increasingly regarded as a pre-condition for the smooth operation of the government to have a consolidated, single centre of power – with the party as the centre (and the ANC leg of the Alliance signifying this ‘party’). When in the early operations of the Zuma administration SACP persons were seen to exercise much power, a debate ensued as to whether ‘three’ or ‘multiple centres’ had become the norm. The two-centres came to haunt the ANC when gender quotas for top-level appointments – with the premiers as top example – failed to articulate with women’s seniority in the ANC provincial hierarchies. The multiple-centre-of-power disputes also extended into whether the ANC or the Alliance was the centre of power in the Tripartite Alliance. The ANC won.

ANC secretary general Mantashe specifically addressed this theme: ‘I phone the people in [Zuma’s] office and say “bring this to his attention”.’ Mantashe remarked that he saw the debates about who was running South Africa as flattering to the ANC because they showed that power was now vested in Luthuli House, as the Polokwane resolutions envisaged it to be. ‘I took that as a compliment’. 13 Journalist Moshoeshoe Monare observed with regard to the early Zuma period: ‘The country’s president is now willing to stop everything and take a call from Vavi. Ministers are readily available to
travel to Cosatu’s headquarters … The loudest ministers in cabinet meetings are Left-leaning, and the ANC is now willing to “engage”.

The Zuma period was one of direct ANC national, provincial and branch structure impact on (and even meshing with) the government executives, with occasional direct reach into the legislatures. The provincial and local deployment committees, in which the elected ANC executive members took central roles, frequently dictated appointments and government decisions. Such influence was in areas such as appointments and tendering-contracting. Provincial premiers who were not in the ANC provincial top official positions suffered, even if they had the sanction of being appointed by Zuma. Gauteng, the North West and Eastern Cape were cases in point. There was little space for ‘two centres of power’. In the North West there were several instances before and after election 2009 when the Provincial Executive Committee (PEC) would instruct the premier and provincial government to take particular actions. The PEC directly prescribed the required appointments to the provincial government executive. In late 2010 ANC full-time deputy secretary general, Thandi Modise, also became North West premier. A person who was powerful in the national structures was brought in to settle the provincial ANC hierarchy. From September 2009 onwards there had been pressures for the new ANC Eastern Cape provincial leadership (the chairperson was SACP national treasurer Phumulo Masaulle) to let these leaders replace provincial premier Nxolo Kieviet (appointed after the 2009 election, on the gender ticket for the ANC to meet the criterion of 50 per cent women premiers). In Gauteng in 2010 the premier was obliged to yield and appoint loyalists of chairperson Paul Mashatile to her provincial executive and to the post of director-general of the province. In all three provinces – all with women premiers – powerful ANC provincial chairpersons watched over their premiers.

The Zuma presidency had to balance high-level executive power (which included a fair amount of presidential autonomy) with the expectation that he would continue operating in collective and continuously consultative modes. The latter prevailed. Much of the wall between Luthuli House and the West Wing of the Union Buildings was razed to the ground. There was an easy blend and many direct interfaces between party and state (Chapter 11). As in the Mbeki days, but with the locus of power now in the party rather than the state, the ANC’s Polokwane NEC had high representation in the May 2009 cabinet (it was slightly reduced in the October 2010 cabinet reshuffle); and the eligible NWC members (those who were not in full-time ANC positions) were well-represented in cabinet. Significant developments in state and party included Zuma favouring Trevor Manuel to head the at-first-significant NPC, Zuma limiting the impact of Cosatu-aligned Minister of Economic Development, Ebrahim Patel, Zuma allowing leeway for ANC nationalists to restrain SACP influence and, generally, playing it safe in party and state when it came to actors that could mobilise against him in future succession battles. Two trends to watch were interventions to correct deployment that had gone manifestly wrong, and Zuma having his hands so full in managing realised and potential political fallout, especially with the Alliance and ANCYL, that little time remained to steer decisive governance action (Chapter 13).
PERIODISATION OF THE ANC IN RELATION TO THE INSTITUTIONS OF STATE POWER

The ANC from 1994 to 2011 progressed through five distinct periods in relation to the institutions of state power, demarcated in relation to the presidencies of Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma. Thematically blended in the previous sections, this section dissects each of the periods. Criteria for assessment are the ANC asserting control, consolidating control, or securing, regenerating and resuscitating the control already won. The first phase was the early-democracy time of the ANC as electorally victorious party claiming authority over state institutions. Second followed the early period of Mbeki’s design and elaboration of state institutions, at a time when he operated with full ANC blessing. Mbeki’s second period (the third analytical period) is distinguished by his administration’s paralysis through internal ANC fallout. The fourth was the Mbeki-Zuma war period of 2005-09, which often had as outright objective the capture of institutions. The cases of the Scorpions, the appointment of the Judicial Service Commission (JSC), the selection of constitutional court judges and asserting influence over them, the determination of the operations and appointment of the Director of Public Prosecutions, and the conversion of Parliament and provincial legislatures, were instances of the Zuma camp taking out insurance that their candidate would, first, not be effectively prosecuted (or persecuted), and, second, would be there to fulfil his challenge to Mbeki. The period included the caretaker presidency of Kgalema Motlanthe. The fifth period followed with Zuma’s formal assumption and consolidation of his presidential power. After an initial period of consensual ascendance of the alliance partners, Zuma and the top ANC leaders were confronted with the mission to control the multiple sites of state institutional struggles.

MANDELA PERIOD – early capture of state power (1994-99)

The period, starting in 1994, of giving substance to the capture of state power was one in which many state institutions were re-engineered (designed and positioned) to give effect to the post-apartheid order – to fit in with the new spirit of reconciliation and inclusivity, but also embody new ideological directions.19 Somewhat constrained by the constitutional settlement’s ‘sunset clauses’,20 the ANC oversaw the gradual population of the state structures with civil servants that were seen to be able to actively promote the new political and administrative order.

The first definitive confirmation of the ANC stepping into state power came with the 1993-94 Transitional Executive Councils (TECs) and joint ANC-NP management of the state in the run-up to election 1994.21 The Interim Constitution mapped the core state bureaucratic and political institutions that would assume primacy. The political transitions on national and provincial levels were instantaneous in that they immediately took effect following the April 1994 election. Many preceding institutions lapsed. The democratic government still needed to phase out the residual bureaucracies that had accompanied, for example, the bantustan governments. It was taxing to merge the institutional infrastructures of security, health and education. It was only in the
late 1990s that the legislative frameworks for democratically elected local government became institutionalised. The local institutions, at the community coalface, followed later. In many ways they would bear the brunt of subsequent community dissatisfaction.

Institution-building in the Mandela presidential period was determined both by the constitutional settlement and investigations launched by the ANC. The institutions projected messages of compromise and inclusivity in order to help consolidate the transition and set foundations for nation-building. Examples included:

- Shared executive power with both the NP and the IFP represented in cabinet, and the NP also holding one of the two deputy presidencies;
- A proportional representation system to elect Parliament, provincial legislatures and half of the municipal councillors, applied without a minimum threshold, meaning that small parties would win representation and feel included;
- Recognition of provinces, as a compromise that included some semi-federal characteristics in the new South African state (the exact configuration of provinces was being reconsidered, the ANC summit of December 2010 was taking the issue forward into the ANC’s 2012 policy conference);
- The National Council of Provinces (NCOP) which was intended to ensure that provincial-regional interests would have a guaranteed say in matters specifically affecting them; and
- The guarantee that South Africa would in essence be a constitutional state, recognising the Constitution as the highest authority in the country, and affording supreme status to the Constitutional Court in assessing compliance with the Constitution.

State institutional transformation required more than constitutional settlements and needed supplementation through specific legislation and matching appointments. Since 1994, the ANC had been deploying ANC cadres to key positions in the state and required that they remain under party discipline. There was widespread ANC acceptance that it was democratic for the dominant ruling party to control the levers of state power. Initiatives for appropriate incumbency were strengthened through major legislative actions. Elaborate legal frameworks emerged to give substance to the functions and relations of national, provincial and local government. Specific Acts included the Employment Equity Act of 1998 and the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) Act of 2003. New appointments obviously went predominantly to the formerly racially excluded, interpreted as mainly black-African South Africans. (These were to be lingering issues, still only partially resolved in 2011.)

To further facilitate the transformation process, the award of government contracts had equity requirements. This meant that government contracts would only be awarded if the company profile scored high on racial equity and empowerment criteria. BEE supported institutional differentiation in as far as the state and its resources reached into civil society, and particularly into the business and business arms of civil society to help rearrange the associated class baggage of white middle-class domination.
irrespective of the political transition.25 These processes continued well beyond the early founding phases. By 2011 government recognised ‘complex fronting’ to evade BEE requirements.26

MBEKI PERIOD I – ANC control and elaboration of state structures (mid-1990s-2004)

The ascent of Mbeki signified a period of fine-tuning and elaboration of state institutions. Mbeki emphasised the development of state institutions to facilitate the coordination of state business and structure policy implementation. Much of the details of this period were situated at the top of the institutional hierarchy, and specifically in the Presidency27 (Chapter 11). The impact was felt on the top-executive levels of power, with responsibility for the political and bureaucratic executives to coordinate and steer government work into fine-tuned implementation. The project turned out to be longer-term – at the time of Mbeki’s exit it would still need to be pushed towards full implementation. Targeted employment of ANC cadres to strategic positions was widespread – and subject to intra-ANC presidential preferences.

Other points of impact included the fleshing out of local government institutions and the early development of the Mbeki system of izimbizo. The izimbizo were part of his repertoire to get provincial and local government representatives and officials to engage with the communities they were expected to serve (Chapter 5). Mbeki attempted further executive reorganisation, also in pursuit of integration and coordination of state functions that would translate into more policy objectives being realised on the ground. This found substance, for instance, in his and Joel Netshitenzhe’s envisioning of super-ministries to try and pull together public sector operations.

MBEKI PERIOD II – interregnum of contest and paralysis (2005-08)

Few state institutions escaped the ANC’s civil war of the time. Intense new politicisation of the state apparatus resulted, along with the institutionalisation of internal ANC contestation at a high and distracting-destructive level. The Zuma camp’s quest to replace Mbeki would extend beyond his mere removal as ANC president – into minimal institutional re-engineering, yet maximum redeployment. The state-institutional footprint of Mbeki’s tenure as president of South Africa was deep and elaborate. New institutional design that had been realised under Mbeki’s tutelage and his strategic appointments demarcated the state fortress that needed to be conquered before the planned Zuma takeover could be effective. This was not just a story of ‘good governance’. Mbeki (imagining himself indispensable to party and country) had entrenched himself within the labyrinths of the Presidency’s power configurations. Apart from having hand-crafted the presidency’s institutions (although anchored in a commissioned investigation), Mbeki had overseen a decade-plus of cadre deployment. He basked in deployee loyalty and the ANC organisational culture of hierarchy and deferment.

An intense struggle ensued to dislodge the unwilling-to-depart incumbents and wrest control of state institutions28 in both representative and bureaucratic domains. The drive was fuelled by many ‘occupied’ institutions being seen to have aided and abetted
ANC POWER AND STATE POWER

the perceived (or real) conspiracy to foreclose Zuma’s ascendancy. It could not wait until the expected April 2009 end of the Mbeki tenure, given that Mbeki had been using state power to prevent Zuma’s rise.29 The strategic objectives now were to edge Mbeki out of the public institutions that gave him his power, ensure that he would relinquish designs to an extended term as ANC president, and simultaneously make way for a new group of incumbents. The Zuma side’s operations to transfer Polokwane’s party-based change into the state domain initially suffered from the controversy of its candidate being entangled in a web of legal charges, crossing the legislative-executive versus judicial divide.30

Bureaucratic mayhem prevailed as the processes of exorcising the Mbeki influence reached through the ranks of top state office-bearers and into the tiers of mid- and lower-level bureaucrats. The strategy in this interregnum was mostly not to try and remove political and bureaucratic functionaries from their public positions, but rather to cut them off from their ANC roots and deprive them of that base of legitimacy. Political mobilisation resulted in widespread paralysis in the run-up to, and in the wake of, Polokwane. Fearing that they could antagonise Zuma-ists and jeopardise their jobs many bureaucrats preferred deferment to action. There was a frequent preoccupation with not taking decisions that could antagonise the rising camp. Many reports from public service corridors noted that ‘nothing much is happening these days’.31

ZUMA PERIOD I – repopulating and taking control (2008-09)
The Zuma camp used the legal (Nicholson) and semi-legal National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) moments to formally enter the corridors of state power. In September 2008 Nicholson ruled that Zuma should have been given the opportunity to make representations before being recharged (and commented widely on Mbeki in effect conspiring to side-line Zuma). By now it was a fait accompli that Zuma was going to be president of South Africa come election 2009. The new battle became whether Mbeki was going to be allowed to see out his term as president of South Africa. He was not. In March 2009 the NPA revealed taped telephone conversations that suggested that Mbeki had a hand in the timing of the post-Polokwane December 2007 recharging of Zuma. The moment was embraced to withdraw all charges against Zuma and clear him for ascent into state presidential power.32

Upon Mbeki’s September 2008 ousting, the (mainly) internal ANC war metamorphosed into assuming state power. There was a compulsion to root out the ‘remnants’ of the Mbeki administration. But forward-looking strategic considerations prevailed, looking at both retention of some skills and the need to thwart defection to the Mbeki-associated Cope (Chapter 9). The task was eased by the fact that many Mbeki sympathisers in the bureaucracy switched loyalties to maintain their careers. The rising Zuma administration knew that these civil servants felt vulnerable and were likely to work diligently to implement the wishes of the new administration.33 Once it became clear that the Zuma forces were unstoppable, the rest of the transition was politically relatively smooth.

A continuous sub-theme was the interface of the ANC and business. Mbeki-aligned
persons had been benefitting from major state contracts, and the rising camp often felt economically side-lined. Pro-Mbeki persons, organisations and companies getting preferential access to top empowerment deals were greatly resented. The pre-emptive moves to take Mbeki and his consorts out of power hence helped prevent the Mbeki-camp appropriating more of what was effectively regarded as ANC ‘family silver’. More broadly, there were many instances of the ANC’s Luthuli House (both in the times of Mbeki and Motlanthe) facilitating business and broader empowerment deals, often with top level cooperation.

**ZUMA PERIOD II – new cycles of contest (2009 onwards)**

The 2009-onwards period was far removed from just a denouement and celebration of victory in the war fought from institutional trenches. It did not end with the capture and confirmation of the Zuma group in state power. The clearing out of Mbeki-ites continued, but was overlaid with two new variants of ANC struggle in the trenches of public institutions. The first was at high government level where senior ANC deployees tested the waters for future top-ANC incumbency from the safe base of government deployment. The second was wide-ranging positioning for ascendancy in the 2011 local government elections. Aspirant councillor candidates were accused of strategising against incumbents and that protest was part of their strategy. Some were backing aspirant councillors in order to gain inside tracks to future contracts. Top-ANC structures were concerned that they were losing control over these contests and associated deployment. Community protests seamlessly blended with anti-ANC protest when ANC PEC and regional executive committee (REC) structures overruled community choices for candidates in local election 2011.

Continuous purge attempts followed purely to make way for other politically ambitious functionaries, who were closer to a minister or a senior NEC member than the incumbent was, or who wielded less power vis-à-vis the minister than the incumbent. Such was the case of International Relations and Cooperation director-general, Ayanda Ntsaluba, who survived an attempted purge campaign (and then voluntarily exited his position in early 2011). To illustrate, a National Education, Health and Allied Workers’ Union (Nehawu) statement, addressed to Zuma in the early days of the new administration pushed for Ntsaluba’s removal:

> Luthuli House, including national leadership of workers unions, will not and cannot be fooled to know where Dr Ntsaluba’ political trajectory points and how harmful it could be to the new administration in general.

The already complex layering of intra-state-institutional contests through the preceding periods was further extended with the dividing lines centred on rooting out corruption and mismanagement, partial though the actions may have been. The appointment of Transnet CEO, Siyabonga Gama, illustrates the point. Under investigation for contracting beyond his levels of authorisation, the Zuma ANC (including the ANCYL and the chairperson of Parliament’s portfolio committee on public enterprises) insisted
that he should be appointed. Opponents wanted to see the investigation for alleged breaches of corporate governance completed. At the heart of this matter was the fact that the Mbeki-appointed Transnet council wanted Gama investigated. His supporters were willing to forego the investigation in order to thwart the Transnet board.39 The issue dragged on. In another example, in late 2010 then Minister of Public Works, Geoff Doidge, was sacked from cabinet (with a subsequent ambassadorial appointment). At the time he had put on lease agreements for new police headquarters in Pretoria and Durban, totalling close to R2 billion and involving property magnate Roux Shabangu, well connected in top ANC circles. His successor, Gwen Mahlangu-Nkabinde, rapidly approved the deal. It was cancelled, however, in 2011 when Public Protector Thuli Madonsela released her findings on an investigation into the Pretoria deal.40 She followed through with an investigation into the Durban Transnet Building deal with findings of ‘unlawful-maladministration’.41 The two elephants in the room were the extent to which Zuma would be held accountable, and the articulation between the budding ‘ANC of integrity in government’ and the good governance and integrity unit that was being set up in the public protector’s office.

The process was concurrent with Zuma administration statements on action on corruption. Anti-corruption calls were made by many in the ANC cutting across factional lines, with Zuma calling for no tolerance on corruption. Whilst much of this campaign was genuine, both new loyalties and aid to the Zuma camp played roles. There was no clean-sweep to investigate all who were suspected of misdeeds. Having been suspected of corruption in the Mbeki era in some instances placed individuals alongside Zuma as the persecuted. ANC secretary general Gwede Mantashe supported the anti-corruption lobby combining with Cosatu’s 2010 stepped-up pressures. Mantashe remarked in August 2009 on the administration’s feats in countering corruption, stating that within ‘three months of president Zuma being in office, more heads of department have been investigated and suspended for corruption than in 10 years’.42 In the next few years the calls continued and select, but far from wall-to-wall, actions were evident. The Public Service Commission in October 2010 and again in 2011 showed that conclusion of corruption investigations in the public sector was the exception rather than the rule.43 In 2011 the Council for the Advancement of the South African Constitution (CASAC) noted that the organisations tasked with the combat of corruption lacked true independence.44 Simultaneously, the public protector faced huge conflicting pressures to either go soft in her investigations involving the SAPS or to pursue them with integrity.

‘New state-institutional battle fronts’ were therefore evolving. The dividing lines were increasing with contests between the alliance left and the Youth League (formed around the 2012 Mangaung succession lines), between Cosatu (at an earlier stage it was the SACP) and the ANC, for example on the blend of business and politics, and mutually between multiple local-level enclaves of ANC and ANC-associated power. The new dividing lines layered onto the old. There were implications for the ANC-in-government to get things right, get the state institutions optimally functional, make more of a definitive difference to people’s lives and try to demonstrate to the people that deficits were not due to a lack of integrity in government.
CADRESHIP, DEPLOYMENT AND HEGEMONY

Strategic deployment of ANC cadres played an important role in the ANC taking control of the post-liberation state. Heading these operations, the ANC's deployment committees on national and regional levels played a crucial role in state transformation, contributing to reasonable success in deracialising the public service. This helped ensure that bureaucratic sabotage by reactionary forces intent on undermining the democratic order would be minimised. Centrally controlled deployment also helped establish the ANC as a neo-patrimonial gatekeeper over access to positions of state employment and promotion, a process in which ANC top-structures would be widely recognised as the lawful and legitimate performers in these roles. It equally helped build ANC hegemony. When fully operational and effective, the deployment committees would determine deployment into civil society and intra-ANC positions, including electoral lists. The ANC's range of national and regional deployment committees ebbed and flowed over time as the movement battled intra-organisation positioning, optimisation of state governance, factionalism, careerism, opportunism, desperation for employment, and the organisational dilemmas of having to act against corrupt comrades.

Elements of 'cadre policy' in the ANC can be traced back at least to the ANC's 1985 Kabwe conference. The deployment policy of the ANC when in state power started with the 1997 Mafikeng conference. The national deployment committee was first formally established in 1998 (Table 1), thus implementing the 50th conference resolution (the regional and local committees followed). The resolution called for the establishment of deployment committees throughout the ANC organisational hierarchy. It recognised that the 'ANC needs to put in place its own policy and code of conduct to guide those of its cadres deployed to the public service'. There were concurrent discussions about curtailing corruption and the need for guidelines on ethics. The conference resolved to establish a deployment committee. It would be headed by ANC deputy president at the time, Jacob Zuma. It advised the NEC on all matters of deployment.

Initial steps taken on the deployment component of the ANC's cadre policy included to locate the responsibility for the deployment and accountability of public representatives in the office of the secretary general. The secretary general was to make decisions on deployment to key positions in different centres of power by ANC officials and/or the NWC, compile guidelines for the ANC list conferences and draft provincial discussion papers on deployment. The NEC in August 1999 would decide on the deployment of premiers. The ANC's objective with deployment policy included to build a 'comprehensive and co-ordinated plan to deploy cadres to other critical centres'. The absence of such a plan had led to 'a situation where individuals deploy themselves, thus undermining the collective mandate. Another consequence is that experienced cadres are sometimes displaced, de-activated or at best, under-utilised. This has contributed towards the slow pace of transformation in some critical areas …' The plan had to focus on the 'key centres of power' of national headquarters of the ANC, provincial offices of the ANC, regional offices of the ANC, constituency offices of the ANC, national Parliament, provincial legislatures, metropolitan councils, metropolitan executive councils, and the civil service.
**TABLE 1: Select developments in the work of the ANC’s national deployment committee (Natdepcom) and associated structures**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Deployment committee developments</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>A de facto deployment committee is first established, chaired by Walter Sisulu. It follows on earlier deployment practices maintained in the ANC in exile.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>A 50th conference (Mafikeng) resolution calls for the establishment of deployment committees in the NEC, PEC, REC and branch executive committees (BECs). The National Deployment Committee’s (Natdepcom) mandate is defined in the context of the 50th conference resolution that tasked the committees with identifying key centres of power within state and society, deploying cadres to these centres, and ensuring that they remained accountable to the party after deployment. Zuma assumes chairmanship in 1997. Cadres will be deployed to ‘all centres of power’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>National deployment committee is established by the ANC NEC meeting of 7-8 December 1998. Provincial and local deployment committees follow. The ANC adopts a cadre policy and development strategy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Towards 2001 questions are raised by NEC members about the integrity of the Natdepcom. The questions undermined the capacity of the committee to fulfil its work. Operations of the committee are suspended. The NEC mandates the NWC to address the concerns raised about the Natdepcom, but it does not manage to do so. Deployment from this point onwards is done by ANC officials who report to the NWC and NEC, effectively constituting a new ‘deployment committee’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>ANC’s 51st conference (Stellenbosch) formalises the decision to suspend the particular deployment committee. Motlanthe addresses the media on the reasons for the step, including accusations of bias after the preceding deployment of mayors, and uneven operation across provinces, including the PECs in some provinces acting as deployment committees. De facto, deployment is handled by the hierarchy of ANC structures reporting to the NWC and NEC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Report that Zuma will withdraw from / has become inactive in ‘participating in the deployment committee’ following his suspension (although subsequently overturned) as deputy ANC president and his removal as deputy president of South Africa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Illustration of operations of the Natdepcom in an NWC resolution for a special NWC meeting to finalise the deployment of mayors in metros and district councils where the ANC has the majority.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>ANC’s 52nd conference (Polokwane) adopts a resolution mandating the leadership to ensure the implementation of the 1997 resolution on deployment and to strengthen the national deployment committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>The deployment committee evaluates the performance of all its public representatives, while ANC deputy president Motlanthe heads the deployment committee; Motlanthe takes the lead in the appointment of replacement premiers for the Eastern and Western Cape. Deployment committee operations are further illustrated through the series of neutralising steps taken after the Buffalo City councillors ousted the mayor without involvement of the relevant deployment committees: A co-convener of the Amathole Regional Task Team, said deployment of public officials, including fired mayor Zintle Peter, was the sole responsibility of the ANC PEC, which delegated its authority to the provincial deployment committee.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The ANC stressed that ‘this should not be a mechanical process of simply deploying your troops, but should go hand-in-hand with the movement having a programme of engaging with the institutions we seek to transform – hence the importance of our decision for the continual mass presence of the ANC’.53

The issues of integrity of cadreship, and ANC appointments, had emerged as major issues of concern, and in 1999 an Umrabulo position paper noted:54

Being a member of the ANC today is perceived as opening up possibilities of material and social advancement, either in the form of public or civil service positions or opportunities for enrichment through government economic empowerment programmes.'

The ANC’s NGC meeting in 2000 in Port Elizabeth paid tribute to the ‘body of cadres that consistently and tirelessly perform the necessary revolutionary duties. This is the clear cadre core that is committed to the revolution and on which the movement largely relies’.55 Yet, the document continues, the ANC’s cadreship problem, circa 2000, was profound:

… we have not sufficiently increased the number of those revolutionary cadres of the movement committed to the transformation agenda. Political activism among most of our members has drastically declined, leaving wide scope for such tendencies.

Sources: ANC conference documentation, NEC statements, NWC statements, ANC select annual reports, NGC documentation and select media reports; author’s monitoring.
as careerism, rampant self-interest, corruption and other anti-people activities to thrive. The political culture, tradition and values of our movement have, in some instances, been deeply eroded. Our membership is mainly engaged in activities of the ANC when it is time to have AGMs, conferences or during election campaigns. A comprehensive review of our political education work since the unbanning indicates that our programme has not been able to produce enough cadres grounded in the politics, organisational values and culture of the movement.

By 2000 the ANC thus recognised the imperative of strengthening political education and ensuring that the deployment committees would function to avoid factionalism. Subsequent years saw references to the deployment committee in action, deliberating and consulting with provinces and regions on the appointment of public sector functionaries such as mayors. Around 2001, questions were raised by NEC members about the integrity of the national deployment committee. The capacity of the committee had been undermined. After its brief and controversial formal existence, the deployment committee was suspended in 2001, and operations were assumed by ANC officials who derived legitimacy from elected office.\(^56\) The NWC had been mandated by the NEC to address the concerns raised about the national deployment committee, but by all indications were unable to do so. The function became diffused. Deployment from this point onwards was done by ANC officials in PECs, RECs and branches who reported to the NWC and NEC, with the NWC and top officials continuously engaged in national deployment.

Meanwhile the inherent cadreship problems that the ANC grappled with were not going away, thus increasing the need for effective deployment screening. The secretary general’s report to the 2002 Stellenbosch conference noted, inter alia:\(^57\)

The 1994 breakthrough opened up new opportunities for material and social advancement through positions in the public and private sector and for economic empowerment ... The occupation of positions of power and the material reward this offers could create some ‘social distance’ between individuals and constituencies they represent ... This could render some in the revolutionary movement complacent, concerned with maintaining their positions and even indifferent to the conditions of the poor.

Amidst intense polarisation from 2005 onwards the ANC recognised its vulnerability given the weaknesses of deployment. Attempted ANC interventions continued. The ANC’s mid-2006 internal discussion document on retaining its status as the champion of the poor mooted the idea of ‘government collectives’ as constitutional structures within the ANC to manage the negative effects of being state incumbents, which included careerism, competition for status and corruption.\(^58\) Turmoil in ANC ranks in the wake of the Zuma trials and non-trials exacerbated problems with deployment operations in the ANC. These problems were catapulted to new heights with the advent of the 2008 Cope split-off. Mobilisation in the Zuma camp in particular had brought to
the fore many faces that had sensed opportunist scope. The ANC’s Potgieter-Gqubule notes the shadow culture that emerged around ANC internal elections.59 As the ANC noted in 2007,60

We do appreciate the genuine sense of solidarity among cadres within the movement with the Deputy President. However, we need to be vigilant against unhealthy forces who seek to attach themselves to this campaign. Some of these forces would be driven by opportunism, others by a counter-revolutionary agenda to weaken the ANC and undermine transformation, and yet others by attempts to hide behind the campaign to pursue illegal and corrupt activities.

In Polokwane the ANC resolved that the deployment committee should be strengthened, given that the ANC ‘remains the key strategic centre of power, which must exercise leadership over the state and society’.61

Conference thus instructs the incoming NEC to review the political management of the deployment process and ensure the implementation of the 1997 Resolution on Deployment, with a view to strengthening collective decision-making and consultation on deployment of cadres to senior positions of authority. This includes strengthening the National Deployment Committee.

Subsequently, the ANC compiled the candidates’ list for the 2009 national elections. It undertook that incompetent ANC politicians would be purged when the party evaluated the performance of all its public representatives. ANC deputy president Motlanthe headed the deployment committee at the time.62 Alliance members SACP and Cosatu were concerned from 2007-10 that their high investments in future deployment, through the backing of the Zuma campaign to oust Mbeki, were failing to pay off. An alliance deployment committee was only functional at the national level at the time,63 but provincial executives played powerful sub-national deployment roles. The SACP noted, for example, that it had confronted many problems with the way in which the alliance had been functioning ‘on the ground, [in] deployments and electoral list processes’. It was a particular concern ‘also [to be] meaningfully consulted on appointments of members of the executives, something that is normally outside the purview of deployment committees.’64 Cosatu was equally concerned: ‘We have been lagging behind. Our deployment committee will ask (the ANC list conference) if these comrades cannot be included.’65 The labour organisation scheduled the inclusion of Cosatu representatives on deployment structures at branch, regional and provincial levels for discussion in the late 2009 alliance meeting. The issue was eclipsed as major alliance peace-keeping overpowered the agenda.

In a 2009 post-election denouement a new document prepared by the ANC’s deployment committee implored that the appointments to state positions should henceforth be open to non-ANC members, or all South Africans, including opposition party members.66 It had become imperative to complement and substitute for some of the per-
formance aspects of post-liberation deployment that had failed to bolster ANC performance in government, or had detracted from it, the ANC argued. Judging by statements and preliminary initiatives in the early Zuma administration, there was a stronger sense than before that ‘now was the time’ to get things right. In some respects therefore, 17 years into democracy, the ANC’s hegemonic project might have moved beyond narrow loyalist scrutiny. In 2010 NGC documentation the ANC was critical of its deployment committees, referring to the need for the committees to be predictable, transparent and accountable in their work.\textsuperscript{67} There was recognition that in future the ANC’s electoral fortunes would depend more on performance than on a deep sense of loyalty, which on occasion has been showing signs of fading.\textsuperscript{68} It was an altogether different matter whether the ANC would ring in sufficient changes to subvert the problems of inappropriate deployment, lack of state capacity, and deployment or retention that enabled personal gratification through corrupt dealings.

A small move to split party from state came in April 2011 with the Municipal Systems Amendment Bill (promulgated by Zuma in July 2011) to prohibit municipalities from employing local party officials. It originated in 2009 when trouble between ANC factions spilled over into government. Local government, even more than other spheres, had become a site for ANC factional warfare and allocation of patronage. Zuma, in his 2011 Freedom Day speech said that the ‘blurring of the lines between political and administrative aspects of governance has tended to affect service delivery in the outgoing municipal administrations. We have to ensure the employment of qualified and experienced personnel’.\textsuperscript{69} The ANC’s predicament of the time showed in Cosatu pointing out that the law could contradictorily be used by factions in the ANC to sideline political competitors.\textsuperscript{70} Employment-deployment issues also caused the ANC’s local election 2011 list problems. Upon announcement of candidate selections from the community-generated lists, candidates turned on one another, ANC offices were stormed and some sent delegations to Luthuli House. In many cases nominations would have guaranteed employment for candidates. In defiance of calls to use deployment with circumspection, the Mpumalanga PEC recommended that all available government jobs in the province be reserved for the 2,919 unsuccessful aspirant candidates.\textsuperscript{71} Hoping to defuse this phase of the war for employment-deployment, the ANC launched an investigation shortly after the 2011 local elections.

By 2011 the ANC had thus become entrapped in deliberations on when (and if) ‘redeployment’ – the soft alternative to sacking comrades – was necessary. There was widespread recognition that the ANC’s performance in government was increasingly and directly affecting the longevity of its power. Yet, loyalty to comrades was the other side of the coin – with power-bloc construction and aversion to alienating potentially powerful ANC players and their followers frequently an unspoken bottom-line. Maharaj, by then (state) presidential spokesperson to Zuma, illustrated the aversion to comradely redeployment:\textsuperscript{72}

\begin{quote}
We don’t like to drop a person. And that is a good quality. It is an error on the right side of history. We wouldn’t be what we are if we don’t care for people …
\end{quote}
SELECT INSTITUTIONAL DOMAIN WARS

The domain battles in this section are a series of small case studies of institutional battles in the struggle for ANC dominant-groupings’ control over state institutions. They centre on the conflictual period from 2007 onwards. Given the institutionalisation of intra-ANC and -alliance conflicts, they are likely to hold relevance to future high-contest times as well. The cases were exceptional in that they originated in a period of concerted mobilisation. The domain wars were in continuous flux. The battles declined but did not cease when the Mbeki-Zuma transition was completed. New lines of mobilisation were continuously unfolding. The cases highlight detractions from the focused operation of state institutions, whether representative, bureaucratic or judicial. State subjugation to party battles spread in this time to the judiciary, presidency, cabinet, premiers and mayors, directors general, ministerial advisers, parastatals, parliament, provincial legislatures and municipalities, the security apparatuses, and the state bureaucracy.

The section maps a selection of the institutional struggles with a view to learning how internal ANC politics impacted the state domain.

Judiciary

The judiciary and prosecuting authorities as site of struggle were illuminated through the faulting of the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), threats against judges that ruled against the rising ANC president, Jacob Zuma, and Zuma’s heat-of-the-battle ‘judges are not gods’ statement. The challenges had implications for constitutionalism and the rule of law. They breached the divide between the executive and legislative branches of government (easily conflated in modern politics) and the judiciary (seen to be essentially separate). In the post-2009 election period contestation continued through battles around the operation of, and appointments to, the JSC, a body pivotal to the judicial landscape. Most judges are appointed on advice from the JSC. The JSC also advises government on matters relating to the judiciary and any other matter concerning the administration of justice. There is an overlap with executive power in that the president and ruling party have a say in the appointment of judges.

The unease about executive predominance over the judiciary was further highlighted with Zuma’s attempted extension of the term of Chief Justice Sandile Ngcobo in 2011, first using the prevailing Judges’ Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Act 47 of 2001, and then a July 2011 amendment when civil society and law academia challenged the first move as unconstitutional. Ngcobo declined reappointment on the eve of the Constitutional Court ruling that the attempts to extend his term were inconsistent with the Constitution and hence invalid. Zuma next put forward his sole nominee, Judge Mogoeng Mogoeng. Civil society, amongst others, protested, given Mogoeng’s judgement histories in some cases involving gender and sexual orientation. Zuma was determined to get Mogoeng appointed, and with the JSC composition that guarantees ANC-compliant decisions, Mogoeng came with JSC recommendation to boot. The hovering question was whether the new Chief Justice would be an ANC
compliant appointee (grateful to those who secured his appointment) or whether he would set out to prove his critics wrong.

Antagonistic altercations concerning the prosecution of Jacob Zuma had introduced the contemporary period of contestation of who rules – the Constitution and the judiciary, or the ANC through its popular election. The motivation around the prosecution of Zuma was to try and ensure that the judiciary would be generally compliant and supportive of the emerging Zuma order. In order for the ruling party to ensure ANC-supportive operations of the judicial institutions, it was imperative to enter into these bodies and insert the appropriate office holders to ensure that the constitutionally guaranteed judicial influence would not be at variance with the wishes of the ANC. Along with pressures for judicial subordination, the ANC exercised constitutional respect and political restraint.

The JSC members include three ruling party MPs, and another four members are nominated by the president. Eleven categories of JSC appointments render a standard 23 members, or 25 when matters of a specific High Court are under consideration. With the necessary ANC support in the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces (NCOP) the ANC can control the JSC. The president as head of the national executive, after consulting with the JSC and leaders of the parties represented in the national assembly, appoints the president and deputy president of the Constitutional Court, and after consulting with the JSC, he appoints the chief justice and deputy chief justice. The ANC made it clear that it saw no imperative to guarantee seats to opposition parties. In 2009 it reallocated one customary NCOP DA delegate to the ANC.

The JSC is thus not subject to a direct ruling party executive-legislative majority, but independence has been affected by the powerful position of the executive. In 2009, when the term of several JSC incumbents expired, and new Constitutional Court judges were appointed, there were simultaneous pressures for further judicial transformation. There was also the likelihood of the reintroduction by the justice department of an earlier draft constitutional amendment to give the justice minister final control over the budget and administration of courts. The stated aim was to improve the efficiency of the judicial system. Polokwane resolutions supported the proposal.

Détente followed between government and the judiciary after roughly half a decade of battles about the nature of the transformation process in the courts and the charges against Zuma. In the ANC’s campaign period, particularly since the NPA’s dropping of the Zuma charges two weeks before the April 2009 elections, choruses of ANC voices proclaimed the virtues of constitutionalism, independence of the judiciary and non-interference (besides tolerance of political opponents). Justice Minister Jeff Radebe undertook to consult on high court legislation and Zuma reaffirmed assurances on an independent judiciary, noting ‘(a)s the executive we respect without reservation the principle of judicial independence and the rule of law’.

The truce remained subject to the next round of governing party actions to ensure that the judiciary would not supersede the influence of the ANC over the directions and details of substantive or procedural policy in South Africa. The truce, however, was
State institutions as site of struggle in ANC wars

eased in on the back of an ANC government confident that it had the judiciary, including the JSC, ‘under control’. The JSC, however, was so confident in its good standing with the ruling party that in at least two cases in 2011 it acted in disrespect or disregard of rulings of the Western Cape Bar and the Supreme Court of Appeal.84

When Zuma remarked in mid-2011 that ‘(t)he powers conferred on the courts cannot be superior to the power resulting from the political and consequently administrative mandate resulting from popular elections. The executive, as elected officials, have the sole discretion to decide policies for government …’ some interpreted it as a show of power to rule in the judiciary after the Constitutional Court had earlier found the legislation that had killed off the Scorpions unit, and established the Hawks, to be unconstitutional. Mantashe echoed these sentiments, saying:85

… there is a great deal of hostility that comes through from the judiciary towards the executive and Parliament, towards the positions taken by the latter two institutions. Unless this issue is addressed deliberately it’s going to cause instability. It undermines the other arms of government and this could cause instability.

**Directorate of Special Operations, Scorpions**

The Directorate of Special Operations (or ‘Scorpions’), the joint investigative-prosecutorial agency formed to deal with cases of high crime, occupied much of the heated interface of the Zuma-Mbeki struggle ... and the extended period of mopping up the institutional victims of the period. It illustrates how the ANC’s Polokwane resolutions linked to the procedures and requirements of parliamentary democracy. There was widespread public support for the Scorpions, given the imperative for the South African state to be seen to be combating corruption.86 The Scorpions’ Achilles’ heel was that it appeared compromised by biased attention to misdemeanours of Zuma and his associates. The Scorpions were despised and feared by many in the ANC due to having discredited several popular leaders, including Zuma, Tony Yengeni and former Limpopo premier Ngoako Ramathlodi. The SACP’s Blade Nzimande asserted that the laws assumed that the ‘new leadership of the country is inherently corrupt and therefore we need to create a specialised unit to watch over it’.87 Evidence of the Scorpions-centred institutional warfare came, for example, in the notorious so-called Special Browse Mole Report that was commissioned by the former head of the Scorpions, Leonard McCarthy, in 2006. A senior special investigator, Ivor Powell, compiled the Browse Report, based on open sources of information, but was required to insert some information provided by McCarthy, who also wrote the recommendations. The Scorpions unit was disbanded a year after Polokwane 2007.

The ANC planned the process around disbanding the Scorpions to be legally compliant. An ANC subcommittee in Parliament was appointed to ensure that it would run the way the ANC wanted it to run.88 The process was subject to public consultation and open to public submissions. The ANC took quick evasive action when opposition parties orchestrated a flood of submissions arguing for the retention of the Scorpions.
In March 2009 the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigations (the DPCI or ‘Hawks’) replaced the Scorpions. It handed over the prosecutorial aspect of its work to the existing NPA. In 2011 the Constitutional Court held that legislation establishing the Hawks was unconstitutional because the Hawks were not independent. The Hawks were located in the police and reported to the ministerial committee. The Scorpions, in contrast, had been located in the NPA. The Constitutional Court suspended its ruling for 18 months, giving the government time to correct the legislation.

In other extensions to the tale of clashing executive and legal authorities, the High Court ruled in August 2009 to prevent Zuma from appointing a successor to Vusi Pikoli, suspended national director of public prosecutions (NDPP), pending the outcome of Pikoli’s legal bid to be reinstated. In the days before the ruling, Zuma had urged the High Court not to interfere in his plans to appoint a permanent replacement. In documents filed at the court, Zuma’s lawyers argued that it was not for the courts to instruct him how he should fulfil his constitutional duty to appoint a new NDPP. The Ginwala Commission regarded Pikoli as fit to hold office. Despite this vindication, Pikoli was dismissed – with Parliament’s acquiescence. Still, compromise was made to prevail. Pikoli next received a negotiated exit-dispensation and Menzi Simelane became the new NDPP. This appeared to signal that the Zuma administration was ready to move into a ‘post-war’ phase and resuscitate the practices of constitutionalism and compliance with the rule of law. However, in further developments Simelane seemed intent on pursuing Willie Hofmeyr, head of the Asset Forfeiture Unit and Special Investigating Unit, for going after, amongst others, high-level ANC politicians entangled in corruption allegations. Simelane suggested, in turn, unprocedural action by Hofmeyr.

Presidency

The Presidency of South Africa was a primary focal point of the period of institutional wars (Chapter 11). It was tailor-made for the 1999 incumbents’ needs. The SACP regularly reminded the country that the Presidency centralised power. The Presidency, always constitutionally powerful, gained its full institutional hold following its redesign in the early Mbeki times. Designed under the mantra of managerialist efficiency and development, the architecture could leverage improved delivery. It also bolstered Mbeki’s control and oversight.

In the immediate post-Polokwane period, the ANC’s then newly elected treasurer general proclaimed that the Mbeki government would be expected to take orders from the ANC – and that those who failed to comply with ANC instructions would be fired. The next phase was to oust Mbeki. Options included removal through a motion of no confidence or an early election. The Nicholson obiter dictum offered the opening for the ANC NEC ‘simply’ to recall deployee Mbeki. The Presidency retained its battlefront position in the time of the Zuma administration. For example, a new battle flared around the continuous influence of former Minister of Finance, Trevor Manuel, heading the NPC – until the NPC was reduced to a less central role in the new administration. Manuel was thus prevented from settling in too close to the heart of presidential power. Crucial trademarks of the Zuma presidency was that of a vigilant
president, ensuring that an inner circle of confidantes were the gatekeepers, whilst he operated in ANC mode within the (state) Presidency.

**Cabinet**

The cabinet and the provincial executives remained continuous ultra-sites of institutional struggle. Mbeki's political influence over cabinet and the provincial executives had cemented these institutions as struggle sites. Kgalema Motlanthe's September 2008 cabinet elevated Zuma-ists whilst retaining safe numbers of Mbeki-ists, hence containing the Cope threat. Zuma used his first cabinet as an inclusive and reconciliatory mechanism. The leading lights in the Zuma campaign, confirmed into the NEC and NGC, were handsomely rewarded. Those who had supported Zuma throughout the trials and non-trials received several of the highest positions. Cabinet numbers were swelled by six. Zuma cut some of the Mbeki-ists' appointments in the 2010 cabinet reshuffle. In this reshuffle Zuma made enough changes to foster feelings of vulnerability in his executive. Those axed included incompetents, underperformers and the corrupt, but also Doidge and then Minister of Public Enterprises, Barbara Hogan, who both had crossed the line by questioning policy or financial deals. The Mbeki cabinet in contrast had been overwhelmingly sycophantic (dissenting voices included Jeff Radebe, Pallo Jordan and Lindiwe Sisulu), with under-performing ministers consciously owing continuous appointment to their master. Zuma took care to ensure compensatory appointments, especially as diplomats, for side-lined members of the national and provincial executives.

Mbeki had promised to crack the whip on underperformers in the national and provincial executives but had hardly ever done so. Zuma promised to pursue cabinet performance and enforce accountability. There was slow progress as cabinet members appointed deputy directors general in 2010 to help them cover their performance areas. Assessment of cabinet performance in many respects depended on the quality of presidential leadership and its ability to generate an integrative vision and steer cabinet members accordingly. By 2010-11 the Zuma presidency was falling short on centrifugal leadership and this turned his executive – being the place where the powerful reside – into a battleground for Mangaung mobilisation.

**State bureaucracy**

Zuma was sensitive to his administration's dependence on the political will of the civil service, especially the top echelons. The Mbeki-Zuma transitional war had triggered a prolonged state bureaucracy political battle. This wave of actions, across the spheres of government, was distinct from routine attrition and replacement. The political wave mostly started at the top, and worked through the ranks. As new top-executive appointments were made, both in the original Zuma-Mbeki transition and in subsequent intra-Zuma-period substitutions, they triggered new waves of turnover. Paralysis, delays, procrastination, non-implementation and fear of decision making often accompanied these changes.

Intra-ANC politics prevailed in the workplace. Decisions and actions were held in abeyance for fear of making mistakes and endangering jobs, or politically opportunistic.
advice was offered in order to please new political principals, despite the better insights of advisers. Civil servants in the lower ranks feared that making mistakes would expose them to the ascendant in-group whose members were awaiting their ‘turn to drink from the trough’. At several points, reports abounded on the bureaucracy effectively having ground to a halt. Many felt vulnerable, and would blindly endorse proposed actions, or produce backup presentations and briefing documents for political principals. Some reported that their departmental futures depended on them submitting departmental performance monitoring information that would make government look good. There was continuous vigilance on the alignment between existing or prospective employees, and the next generations of political hopefuls. Several directors general lost their jobs or resigned in the face of their political principals ruling that their watchful vigilance had been excessive.

Parliament and the ANC parliamentary caucus

The ANC parliamentary caucus continuously changed its status from lapdog to vociferous critic (and variations in-between) – mostly depending on the configuration and sensitivity of political principals. The ANC parliamentary caucus in the Mbeki days was compliant and subdued, mostly taking their cue from above. A tumultuous and vigilant period followed in the Mbeki-Zuma transition. A largely consensual post-2009 relationship followed, politically enforced by the ANC.

When Mbeki’s fortunes turned many crossed the intra-ANC line and nurtured a Prague spring of holding the executive (largely still Mbeki-ites or Mbeki appointments) to account. MPs and committee chairpersons welcomed the new oversight space, but failed to interpret it as relative to their relationships with the prevailing ANC in-group. In the Mbeki past they would have faced redeployment should they have criticised executive principals. The oversight legroom of this particular transitional period was still confined to patriotic oversight of the ANC by the ANC. When DA MP David Maynier revealed details of South Africa’s arms trade with suspect regimes, the Speaker of the National Assembly, Max Sisulu, recommended that parliamentary rules on ethical behaviour be changed so as to disallow such revelations.

Only a handful of committees had taken their ministers to task in the Mbeki era. Notable cases were the justice, correctional services (under Denis Bloem), and transport (under the SACP’s Jeremy Cronin) portfolio committees. In earlier times, the joint standing committee on intelligence was noted for its rejection of the inspector general of intelligence’s probe into the hoax email saga, questioning the credibility of his findings. In the Polokwane aftermath the ANC’s NEC moved in to turn Parliament in favour of Zuma. ANC national chairperson Baleka Mbete ran the political committee in Parliament. Mbete had often been vocal on the Mbeki executive interfering with legislative work. The MPs had much to win – especially promotion and 2009 ANC list positions. Those who had been wronged by Mbeki, along with colleagues fingered in the Travelgate scandal, were in the forefront of offering enthusiastic support for Zuma. In the Zuma period the ANC caucus was tightly controlled by ANC chief whip and high-ranking NEC member, Mathole Motshekga. Most committees followed ANC lines and deferred to their ‘chiefs’. The committee chairperson
shuffle of late 2010, following the cabinet and deputy-minister reshuffle that promoted several former chairpersons, also saw demotions, some of which could be linked to not toeing the ANC line. In particular, chairperson of the portfolio committee on defence and military veterans, Nyamizeli Booi, was removed. The ANC was unhappy with the committee’s tense relationship with Minister of Defence and Military Veterans, Lindiwe Sisulu. The committee had had several stand-offs with Sisulu, trying to hold her accountable to Parliament.

These changes held adverse implications for a continuously activist role for Parliament. In 2011 Motshekga and deputy speaker Nomaindia Mfeketo told their ANC parliamentarians to be more respectful to ministers, directors general and heads of state-owned enterprises that appeared before parliamentary committees. Following an ANC caucus lekgotla, the ANC stressed continuous commitment to Parliament not forgoing its responsibility to hold the executive to account. Motshekga urged differentiation between ‘probing, robust, carrying a mandate without fear or favour’ and ‘behaviour that harasses, wags fingers, ridicules, belittles and generally disrespects’. The conflict also preceded attempts by several ANC committee chairpersons to bar the media from their proceedings, given that the media had been exposing committee clashes. Speaker Sisulu then ruled that no committee may be closed to the media without his consent. There were also conflicts between opposition parties and the executive due to ‘inadequate, vague and late’ responses to parliamentary questions.

**Scopa**

Parliament’s watchdog standing committee on public accounts (Scopa), often in the crossfire of institutional wars, exerted reputable oversight, considering that it was also subject to constraining job descriptions and limited information. It was mostly chaired by opposition parties sympathetic to the ANC (Table 2). Headed in recent times by Themba Godi of the African People’s Convention (APC, formerly of the PAC) it took several ministers to task, including former Minister of Housing, Lindiwe Sisulu, regard-
ing Cape Town’s Gateway housing project. With the objective of improved accountability Godi worked to get ministers to accompany their directors general when appearing before Scopa.\textsuperscript{112} This ruling was reversed by ANC chief whip Motshekga, arguing that the ministers ‘have a country to run’. He was then obliged by ANC MPs to retract.\textsuperscript{113} Godi survived the late 2010 chairperson reshuffle.

**Local government**

Local government was often the site of intra-ANC contests. These contests, in turn, impacted on capacity to change and deliver better. Local level councillor and bureaucrat purges were often brutal, for example in the wake of the formation of Cope in 2008-09 and in run-ups to local government elections, both in 2006 and 2011. In extreme instances councillors and local officials were hounded out of office, and held responsible for poor council performances and for organising protests (Chapter 9). A large part of the local battle, however, was to be contested in the Zuma term. Mobilisation for position and access to political power or economic empowerment via the state was rife.\textsuperscript{114} The timely-warning character of the community protests helped egg the Zuma administration on to try to strengthen the ANC in its control over the bulk of local councils.

The local wars were conducted in a setting of frequent local government dysfunctionality, across the Zuma and Mbeki periods. Government chased turnaround plans, which serially underperformed,\textsuperscript{115} and both communities and the ANC (down to branch structures) were tormented in trying to find the balance and convergence between system redesign and incumbent turnover. A selection of details illustrates the essential instability on the local level – and the twin streams of hitherto less than effective government strategies to turn local government around. Mbeki had envisaged the ‘further strengthening of the system of local government’, inter alia through additional financial and human resources.\textsuperscript{116} This would entail substantial changes to the structure, powers, functioning and financing of local government.\textsuperscript{117} The 2004 Project Consolidate, ‘a hands-on local government support and engagement programme’\textsuperscript{118} was designed to help stabilise and improve local service delivery, the mechanism facilitated central government interventions in policy implementation without affecting the status and powers of provincial government. Mbeki\textsuperscript{119} offered further measures to ensure better service delivery through human resource development and secondment. Project Consolidate was first reported to have helped bridge policy implementation deficits in 139 of South Africa’s 284 municipalities (2006). The Government Communication and Information System (GCIS) reported that by late 2006, 218 experts had been deployed to 80 municipalities, which increased to 139 in 2008.\textsuperscript{120} It was not for lack of trying by his predecessor that Zuma observed: ‘We must strengthen the democratic institutions of state, and continually enhance their capacity to serve the people.’\textsuperscript{121} By 2010-11 Project Consolidate was reported to have failed. The then Minister of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, Sicelo Shiceka, noted in 2011 that less than half the Project Consolidate municipalities had received unqualified audit reports in 2009/10, and many were deteriorating rather than improving.\textsuperscript{122} The slate of initiatives, however, was renewed and advanced by the Zuma administration. The five-year Local Government
Strategic Agenda (LGSA, 2006–11) and the Local Government Turnaround Strategy (LGTAS, 2009–14) followed. The LGTAS acknowledged, for example, that there were leadership and governance challenges in municipalities, financial capacity and management of many municipalities was poor and many municipalities were unable to deliver basic services or grow their economies. This background of serial inability to find definitive solutions, at least up to 2011, shows the fertile terrain for continuous intra-ANC contests. The intensifying pressures for delivery combined with an accumulation of waves of factional and individual contests.

The institutional battles and voids in authoritative actions highlighted the pervasiveness and the continuity of ANC battles conducted from the institutional trenches. There was hardly a chunk of state territory that was not affected.

COMRADES IN BUSINESS AND STATE-BUSINESS

Personal beneficiation of political and bureaucratic functionaries through their closeness to state political power is by far not the only motivation to be in public service anywhere and certainly not in South Africa under the ANC either. All employment brings remuneration and employment benefits. These benefits alone make loyal and other ANC cadres scramble and contest for deployment. However, political and public sector employment also brings opportunities for legal-and-fine, legal-but-inappropriate and illegal or underhand personal enrichment. The term ‘crude cronyism’ extended this repertoire. Such opportunities are accessed by virtue of office-holding and family or business interests close to those in office. The existence of in- and out-groups in ANC ranks is closely associated with leveraging opportunities. This has made positions in public institutions, political office and the bureaucracy, launch pads for increased affluence.

State-business practices in South Africa came to include the award of tenders to persons in ways that bring benefits to those in public office, politically influential individuals effecting awards of state contracts and receiving payments for the leveraging, the inflation of tender amounts, double-payments on contracts, public representatives and officials operating businesses as side-lines, or holding directorships in companies or closed corporations with which the state deals. There was often a fine line between these activities and legitimate black economic empowerment (BEE) deals from which representatives and officials gained, either during or shortly after their public deployment (the ANC government was continuously reluctant to implement proposals for a cooling-off period, post public sector employment; more below). Politicians and officials in all spheres of government were involved. Many simply remained on the right side of the law by declaring their interests. Declarations were sympathetically handled by the ANC, and there was great tolerance for spectacular business involvement or indirect benefits derived by full-time politicians and bureaucrats alike. De facto intra-ANC legitimacy came by virtue of the continuous racial imbalances in the class structure of society, acceptance of social hierarchies, and legality. Noting the ANC’s concern, for some time, former director-general in the Presidency, Frank Chikane, wrote:
I picked up a worrying trend that the ordinary, innocent comrade who was ready to die for the liberation of our people was beginning to be sucked into corrupt practices. During the Struggle, they had resisted the temptation of money, but now, they were ready to be bought for a song to sell out their own people. They stole pensions and grants.

The epitome of comrades-in-business was Chancellor House, the investment arm of the ANC. Opaque in much of its business dealings, it was centrally involved in multiple business operations that accumulated wealth to the extreme advantages of the ANC and associated individuals. It helped ensure that the ANC would have financial viability – and regenerated political power – far beyond dependence on public funding of political parties, parliamentary funds for constituency work and membership dues. It meant that the ANC could out-campaign any opposition party. It meant that the ANC had leeway to botch government and then do electoral overrides come ballot time, reminding citizens and supporters of progress, good intentions and noble origins. There were also wider implications of an ANC pursuing commercial gain and capital accumulation – that of ‘corruption of public systems’, as described by Njabulo Ndebele:

The party of a government in power, which competes with its own citizens for commercial gain, can be tempted to seek a monopoly over political and economic power by any means and for as long as possible. It can transform (or deteriorate) into a commercial syndicate carrying out some of its business clandestinely in the shadow of its political legitimacy.

It can display at least four defining features of governance in a country in which the identities of nation and dominant party have coalesced, even in a democracy: secrecy and selective messaging through media control; paternal surveillance through state security agencies, with the army partly transformed into a school for patriotism (and the chilling prospect that it can be deployed against the ‘unpatriotic’); populist self-assertion where quantity (a million-member campaign, accumulation of ministries) is valorised above the selective, qualitative rigours of a professional yet caring state; and enormous wealth and privilege for those at or close to the centre of power.

There was the ANC that was the liberation struggle icon, which cared for people and tried to make this real through a multitude of policies and programmes in democratic government in South Africa. There was also the ANC that was simultaneously turning itself into a business giant that super-enriched party elites and their associates, and was taking out insurance against prolonged underperformance in government. As a wealthy party it would be able to ensure that it could attract members and identifiers through proffering positions and benefits, when more pure motivations failed. Ample resources would equally give a faltering and deficient ANC government, come election times, the ability to flash the messages of (select) performances, and advances over the apartheid past. This was the ANC, and its alliance partners, that accused the media of
promoting ‘a message of despair’ and ‘siding with opposition parties’ in efforts to delegitimize exposures and criticism, and preserve-promote its construction of the reality of the lives of the South African people.

By 2011, the ANC was ensnared with, and probably entrapped in, a new world in which government members across the ranks were becoming rich through business interests that many struggled to declare. Family members and close associates were beneficiaries of deals leveraged through positions of in-state deployment. Syndicates rigged contracts and other procurement processes, whilst anchor persons, including high-level incumbent politicians, were not suspended – on the presumption of ‘innocent until proven guilty.’ These suspect (even if occasionally legal) activities were exacerbated by widespread evidence of government mismanagement, wastage and of senior government figures visibly living out projections of entitlement to the good life.

**Hot-and-cold on anti-corruption initiatives**

It was often complex to differentiate ‘clean’ from ‘corrupt’ in the time of ANC governance under Zuma on all of local, provincial and national levels. The issues had prevailed before, but became obfuscated in the time of a presidency that managed to let charges of economic beneficiation ‘vanish’ upon ascendance into power, and MPs whose Travelgate schemes with travel agents only barely kept them eligible for representative status. Business and government had become intermingled, with politicians seamlessly traversing the boundaries between the two. Share-holding was commonplace, directorships pervasive, and direct business involvement (quite often questionable) tolerated as long as it was declared. Business sidelines were equally tolerated, albeit with more explicit public attention to possible transgressions in the Zuma period.

The Zuma administration declared a re-emphasis on ethics. Fanned by the global economic crisis’ impact on South Africa and calls for austerity, some clampdowns on extravagant top-government expenses followed. National and provincial executive members were forced to (somewhat) moderate expenditures on official vehicles. Both Cosatu and the SACP lodged calls for the separation of business and politics, specifically in relation to top officials entering into lucrative deals with the state, often in ways from which they would gain direct benefit. Successful revelations of other extravagances, such as excessive hotel accommodation due to various types of dissatisfaction with official accommodation, became a favourite subject of newspaper exposés. There were promised reviews of the Government Handbook, which set down the rules on what expenditures were permissible and what not. It was only in May 2011 that the revised handbook was made available for public scrutiny, following extreme financial abuses by some top-government persons. These trends related to the NGC of September 2010 averring that the movement was facing the danger of separating from its mass base. The August 2011 government framework for anti-corruption policy, the Public Service Integrity Management Framework, upon first release still permitted government officials to own shares in companies that do business with the state, and accept gifts from companies doing business with their departments if it would be culturally disrespectful to decline.
The Zuma administration managed to gain credibility – impacted, however, by President Zuma in 2010 being revealed not to have declared his own interests ten months after assuming presidential office.\textsuperscript{132} The Executive Members Ethics Act of 1998 and the related Executive Ethics Code require the disclosure of all financial interests and liabilities of cabinet members, their spouses and children.\textsuperscript{133} The Zuma declaration scandal undermined his administration’s credibility. In the state domain Zuma authorised several Special Investigation Unit (SIU) investigations and they succeeded in unearthing corruption in the police, the Department of Public Works, and local government. Yet, Zuma alone could authorise its investigations and this was a president with fragile\textsuperscript{134} political tenure. Fear of ‘acting against our side’\textsuperscript{135} obstructed action by the president and those around him. Back to the personal, a wealth of government and business contracts went (openly) to persons close to Zuma. ‘Guptarisation’ came to indicate the expansion of business opportunities directly or indirectly facilitated by Zuma for the Gupta family. Zuma family members thrived on private employment in the Gupta dynasty.\textsuperscript{136} Members of the ANC’s NEC and NWC anonymously expressed concern about these dealings rupturing the ANC. In its 2011 campaign against Zuma, the ANCYL even threatened to ask for the reopening of the investigation into the arms deal.\textsuperscript{137}

Whilst the ANC prided itself in announcing initiatives to detect, counter and prosecute, individuals ranging from Frene Ginwala to Sipho Pityana and Jay Naidoo (all of whom had gained some distance from the ANC) noted the lack of independence from the governing party and executive of such initiatives.\textsuperscript{138}

**Leveraging opportunity and wealth by association with the ANC**

Much of the reasons for the vehemence in making the political wheel turn away from Mbeki had been to leverage opportunity and wealth away from an in-group that had financially benefitted from insider status. The governing party was and remained the key to the door.

The theme of class formation and material benefits from positions in the political, public, private and non-governmental sectors permeate both the BEE literature\textsuperscript{139} and political practice. Political authors such as Pallo Jordan and Raymond Suttner address this.\textsuperscript{140} Jordan linked the rise of Cope to the collective failure of the post-2002 ANC leadership (inclusive of both Zuma and Mbeki) to address the contradictions of class formation and capital accumulation that the post-1994 policies had brought about. Many in the emerging classes had come to treasure their access to public sector positions and the control these positions brought over resources. The developments were articulated in the ranks of the ANC, with, for example, ANC structures and members being active in capitalist enterprise and its associated practices. Suttner argued:\textsuperscript{141}

The Zumafied ANC is fundamentally a coalition founded on greed and lust for power and thirst for loot. It has drawn on the dregs of the earth who sit alongside some refined or seasoned ANC leaders. They are united by a desire for wealth and position. But there are not enough positions to meet everyone’s needs, nor
enough wealth to pillage. Consequently there are some who will emerge dissatisfied and that may create instability of a similar kind when some were excluded from the Mbeki patronage system.

The ANC’s cadre document, Through the eye of the needle, first adopted at the NGC of 2000 and affirmed at Polokwane, was a distant reminder of the political ideal that now bore limited semblance to the practices in the political present. On several other occasions the ANC had taken action to constrain its deployees. A paper presented to the July 2006 NEC meeting said that BEE had unintentionally created a capitalist class that was fostered through close connections between the ANC and the state. Moeletsi Mbeki argued:

One of the most destructive consequences of the reparations ideology is the black elite’s relationship with, and attitude to, the South African state. As the state is said to have been party to the disadvantaging of the PDIs [previously disadvantaged individuals] it is therefore also perceived to owe them something … By extension the assets of the state are seen as fair game. The approach of the black elite to the state is, therefore, not that of using the state to serve the needs of the people but rather of using it, in the first instance, to advance the material interest of PDIs …

In the aftermath of the 2009 protests and some ANC-government pronouncements against corruption in government, ANC secretary general Mantashe was gunning for the ‘blood’ of those who made money out of being in the ANC. Resentment took the form of Mantashe being threatened with displacement by the ANC Youth League’s Fikile Mbalula come the 2012 ANC elections. Blade Nzimande added his voice, pinpointing the problem of government agencies. There were more than 200 government agencies nationally and provincially, and Nzimande urged that more coordinated state intervention was needed to avoid corrupt activities. Cosatu’s Zwelinzima Vavi fuelled ire when he added the proposals for lifestyle audits of high-level political functionaries.

Some of the calls were for senior bureaucrats to be precluded from business dealings with their former departments for prescribed cooling-off periods. Enacting such measure had been under continuous consideration for years, starting well before Zuma’s presidential entrance. Yet nothing had yet come of it – often because the action could lead to discontent and fallout that the ANC was not prepared to face.

**BEE and BBBEE in leveraging ANC power**

BEE, broad-based black economic empowerment (BBBEE) and intra-state equity action were requisite components of ensuring that the post-apartheid state would disseminate power over a broader front than the political domain – in which equality came in the form of the power of the vote and basic human rights. Essop Pahad, then minister in the Mbeki presidency, in 2003 shed light on tensions in the class rebuilding project to which the ANC had fallen victim:
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… we have had to recognise in a spirit of realism in the Presidency and government that the gross wrongs of history had to be put right without running the risk of reducing investment confidence through unpredictable and over-politicised economic policies. We also had to be careful not to nurture the emergence of a small and privileged black elite, which process would inevitably militate against a broad-based development trajectory for the policy. So it took time to put the finishing touches to BEE.

Both the achievements and the shortcomings of BEE were manifold. It advanced transformation but was no silver bullet. It helped create a black middle class and shaped the so-called ‘black diamonds’ into a now-diversified middle-class structure. It was also both the bureaucratic class and the black business class, and often the one in conjunction with the other, which prevailed in the enrichment domain. The colour of poverty in South Africa remained overwhelmingly black. Yet, South Africa with BEE was a more transformed place than it would have been without it. The drive of BEE and BBBEE helped to spread the beneficiation ambit wider and contributed to lower middle classes and the poor potentially benefitting more. The process, however, was slow and flawed. BEE somewhat rearranged race-class formations, but simultaneously highlighted to continuously disadvantaged black South Africans that the good life was a train that might not be stopping in the local station any time soon.

With the 2009 economic recession, and onwards into the mooted double-dip recession of 2011, available BEE deals dipped. Effects included sharpening the demand for deployment in the public and political sectors, and more attention focussed on those with mega-access and continuous mega-deals. A prominent example was the Gupta family who gained part of the ArcelorMittal SA (AMSA, steel producer, privatised in 1989) R9 billion empowerment deal with the Ayigobi Consortium in 2010, yet legally they were not BEE beneficiaries (due to their post-1993 naturalisation as South Africans). Duduzane Zuma, son of President Zuma, was part of the Ayigobi Consortium, which included Oakbay Investments owned by the Gupta family. The deal in which AMSA would have sold 26 percent of itself to Ayigobi fell through in August 2011. The related deal in which a wholly owned AMSA subsidiary would have bought Imperial Crown Trading (ICT) – to whom the Department of Mineral Resources had allocated a 21.4 per cent prospecting right to Kumba Iron Ore’s Sishen mine area – was canned when some of the conditions were not met. The awarding of this right was subject to legal challenge by Kumba. As part of the original deal AMSA had offered to buy ICT for R800 million and include the ICT shareholders in the BEE deal. The twin deal would have placed the ‘highly politically connected’ (for example to Zuma, Motlanthe and Phosa) in unequalled pound seats. In July 2011 it had also been revealed that the Hawks were investigating ‘collusion, conspiracy and fraud’ in the deal.
CONCLUSION

The epoch of intense state-institutional warfare between intra-ANC groupings demonstrated the implications of party contests being conducted in the heart of representative institutions and the state bureaucracies. The battles impacted widely on government and state operations, affecting institutional capacity and distracting from the focus on the core issues of governance. The institutionalisation and consequent continuation of inter-faction conflict took its toll. From these recent experiences it was taxing to find the benefits for the ANC’s power regeneration. State capacity was affected by paralysis and turnover, and this would impact on the ANC’s ability to advance transformation and delivery, and maintain good relations with its constituency.

At the height of the first wave of institutional war of 2005-08, the time of the quest to populate and/or subject institutions to the will of the political party, it was asked whether a sufficient ceasefire could emerge between the sides in order to minimise the urge for institutional abuse, and whether there could be a return to days of (relative) separation between party and state.149 This chapter’s focal period, inclusive of the years 2009-11, instead indicated the intense delegitimation of barriers between the party and state. Under the Zuma ANC, the one centre of power would be seen as one of the ultimate reflections of democracy, of the rule of the people as expressed through multiparty elections.

In the times of 2009-11, amidst the second wave of institutional war, there was increasing evidence of the coexistence of one centre of power at the higher echelons of the ANC and the multiplying of many local centres, vying for local positions in councils and municipalities, or for financial contacts with those who might gain access. It was a time of incessant mobilisation in which representation and service frequently took a back seat. It was, of course, also a time of persistent unemployment, where deployment by the ANC (or good relations with employees) could make a world of difference to lives. Through the periods of analysis there was a growing legitimisation of the positions of the state annexing patriotic capital and moving the state-business interface into the private domain. The ANC saw the size of the eye of the needle seemingly shrinking.

NOTES

2 State institutions comprise legislative bodies, including parliamentary assemblies and subordinate lawmaking institutions; executive bodies, including governmental bureaux and departments of state; and judicial bodies (primarily courts of law). State institutions are located on national, regional and local levels. These are states with political institutions that promote autonomy and capacity.
3 To recap, power refers to the ability to achieve whatever effect is desired, whether or not in the face of opposition; power is a matter of degree – it can be conferred, delegated, shared and limited;
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it may be based on consent or coercion; power may be exercised through influence or through control. See Roger Scruton, 1982, *A dictionary of political thought*, New York, Hill and Wang, p. 366.

4 Blade Nzimande, 2006, ‘The class question as the “fault line” in consolidating the National Democratic Revolution’, *Umsebenzi Online*, 5:57, 7 June 2006, http://www.sacp.org.za/main.php?include=pubs/umsebenzi/2006/no57.html (accessed 20 September 2009). Nzimande writes, for example: ‘One of the main arguments in our Discussion Document is that since 1996 (perhaps even prior to that) a particular class project has consolidated itself and has become dominant in our movement and the state, spreading its influence to other layers of society, including sections of the media. This class project is a combination of certain objective processes of class formation in a democratic South Africa, and of deliberate policy choices followed by the government and capital, especially since the adoption of GEAR in 1996.’

5 Also see Susan Booysen, 2009, ‘Sites of struggle in a bruising war for control of the ANC’, *Business Day*, 16 April, p. 9.


7 This citation was one of the chants used by the pro-Zuma ANC conference delegates in Polokwane in December 2007. It was translated to the author at the scene by conference delegates. It was used in the run-up to the ANC election, as rival crowds gathered and chanted on the conference lawns.

8 Dr Mark Orkin, director general of the Public Administration Leadership and Management Academy (PALAMA), was one such case.


12 Based on anonymous interview with ministerial adviser, 2005, Tshwane, 20 August.

13 Mandy Rossouw, 2009, op. cit.


15 PECs consist of elected, co-opted and ex officio members, mirroring the national-level NEC. The provincial working committee (PWC) comprises the chairperson, deputy chairperson, secretary, deputy secretary and treasurer of the province and the chair or secretary of the three leagues in that province, and not less than one quarter of its directly elected members. The PEC
elects the additional members of the PWC from among the directly elected additional members of the PEC; see Rules 19 and 20 of the ANC constitution, 2007.


20 In 1992 an adapted form of Slovo’s ‘Sunset Clause’ document, allowing for a form of power sharing with the government, was adopted by the ANC’s NWC. Slovo also advocated ‘(a)n approach to the restructuring of the Civil Service (including the SAP and the SADF) which takes into account existing contracts and/or provides for retirement …’; see http://www.sacp.org.za/people/slovo/negotiations.html (accessed 30 September 2008).

21 See The Star (political reporter), 2003, ‘TECs off the ground’, 12 December 2003, p. 3.


23 Giliomee and Mbenga, op. cit., p. 420.

24 Legal framework of local government: Organised local government in South Africa came into existence in terms of the Organised Local Government Act, 1997 (Act 52 of 1997). The Constitution provides for three categories of municipalities, as this was further directed by the Local Government: Municipal Structures Act, 1998 (Act 117 of 1998), which contains the criteria to determine whether municipalities will be metropolitan municipalities (category A), local municipalities (category B) or district municipalities (category C). South Africa has nine metropolitan municipalities. The non-metropolitan areas consist of local councils and district councils. Along with this act came the Municipal Demarcation Act, 1998 (Act 27 of 1998). The Local Government Municipal Systems Act, 2000 (Act 57 of 2000) established a framework for planning, performance-management systems, the effective use of resources and organisational change in business context. The Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act, 2003 (Act 56 of 2003) aimed at modernising municipal budgeting and financial management. It is designed to foster transparency through budget and reporting requirements. It was a critical element of the overall transformation of local government in South Africa (see Government Communication and Information System (GCIS), South Africa Yearbook 2008/09, Pretoria, p. 290). The Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act of 2005 (Act 13 of 2005) aimed at improving integration among the spheres of government, both in policy development and administration; see GCIS, op. cit. pp. 290, 294.


26 Rob Davies, Minister of Trade and Industry, Forum at 8, SAFM-SABC, interview with Xolani Gwala, 6 May 2011.


This argument, coincidentally, articulates with the gist of the Nicholson obiter dictum, but precedes it and was in no way dependent on it. It is argued on the basis of strategic analysis and the fact that charges were pursued against Zuma, and not against many other public figures that could arguably have been equally pursued.


Group discussion with students in the Masters of Management in Public Policy (MMPP) at the University of the Witwatersrand, who were employed at various levels in the public sector, across the three spheres of government.


Interview with ministerial advisor and civil servant, anonymous, 29 August 2009, Cape Town.

The intense awareness of the phenomenon of state riches going to the ‘other party’ was tangible in the quotation: ‘The issue [of Telkom’s sale of Vodacom to the parastatal’s empowerment shareholder, the Elephant Consortium, to politically connected individuals close to Mbeki and Cope] had been discussed in the alliance and the ANC and there was general disquiet, [over the sale] of what we thought was the family silver, and general unhappiness’ by Siphiwe Nyanda who was solidly in the Zuma camp (quoted in Buddy Naidu, 2009, ‘Nyanda cool on MTN deal’, Business Times, 13 September, p. 1).


Interview, 2010, ANC deployment committee member (on condition of anonymity), Johannesburg, 26 August 2010.


Public Protector South Africa, 2011, Against the rules too, Report of the Public Protector in terms of Section 182(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 and Section 8(1) of the Public Protector Act, 1994 on an investigation into complaints and allegations of maladministration, improper and unlawful conduct by the Department of Public Works and the South African Police Service (SAPS) relating to the leasing of SAPS office accommodation in Durban’, 14 July 2011. Upon expiry of the 60 day period given to the relevant minister to respond, two sets of ANC-in-government strategies emerged: (a) President Zuma would not be rushed into ‘haphazard’ responses (Mac Maharaj), and (b) the fact that Zuma had referred the two reports to parliamentary committees meant in terms of parliamentary rules that opposition parties were not allowed to pose questions in general parliamentary session. See Wyndham Hartley, 2011, ‘Madonsela vows to defend findings’, Business Day, 13 September 2011, p. 4.


State institutions as site of struggle in ANC wars


Deployment entails that the cadre will implement the will of the leadership of the party as primary directive. The cadre is loyal, in service of the party, and the party’s interests override those of the individual. It is closely linked to Leninist democratic centralism. Since there is no comprehensive and/or publicly available record of ANC deployment processes, this section is a reconstruction based on snippets of information that have become available from the ANC.


Niehaus uses the concept of neo-patrimonialism to help explain the phenomenon that is analysed in Chapter 4, viz. that of protesting against ANC government yet voting for the ANC; see Isak Niehaus, 2006, ‘Doing Politics in Bushbuckridge: Work, welfare and the South African Elections of 2004’, Africa, 76:4, pp. 526-548.

Hegemony refers to a social group’s dominance of society. The subordinate levels of society consent to the ruling class’ exercise of social and economic dominance in pursuit of a common good. Antonio Gramsci, 1994 in Frank Rosengarten (ed.), Raymond Rosenthal (trans.), Letters from prison, Vol. 2, New York, Columbia University Press, p. 67 described hegemony as ‘a balance between the political Society and civil Society or hegemony of a social group over the entire national society, exercised through the so-called private organizations, such as the Church, the unions, the schools’.


There was evidence of different types of ‘deployment committee’ operations. It would mostly be the NEC or PECs that assumed responsibility. However, some, in turn, mandated deployment committees, as in: ‘Majodina, who is also a co-convener of the Amathole Regional Task Team (RTT), said deployment of public officials, including Peter, was the sole responsibility of the ANC provincial executive committee (PEC), which sub-delegated its authority to the provincial deployment committee’, see Mayibongwe Maqhina, 2008, ‘Mayor sacked against orders’, Dispatch Online, 13 December 2008.


68 For an illustration of this sentiment, see Mandy Rossouw and Matuma Letsoalo, 1 May 2009, op. cit. They quote a senior ANC official saying: ‘Look how many seats we lost in Parliament – it shows that this loyalty voting thing is fading away. We now have to make sure that we deliver so that we have something to show people the next time round.’


73 Richard Calland, 2005, Anatomy of South Africa: Who holds the power, Cape Town: Zebra Press, identified six ‘pillars’ of power in South Africa, viz. the Presidency, Treasury, ANC, informal networks, transnational corporations and domestic business, and civil society. The intra-state ones amongst them were all subject to contestation to shift control away from Mbeki.


75 See Moshoeshoe Monare, 2009, ‘Concourt is not God, says Zuma’, The Star, 9 April 2008, p. 9; also see Maureen Isaacson, 2009, ‘Whip-cracking Zuma turns man of action’, The Sunday Independent, 16 August 2009, p. 7. Zuma’s words in interview with Monare included: ‘… you can have a judge of whatever level making a judgment (and) other judges turning it and saying it was wrong. (This) just tells you they are not necessarily close to God. And therefore we have to look at it in a democratic setting: how do you avoid that?’ He added that the JSC therefore should review the status of the Constitutional Court.

South Africa’s judicial officers are appointed through a hierarchy of nominations and designations, which blend executive action, action by the legal profession and judicial consultation. The JSC advises government on matters relating to the judiciary and any other matter concerning the administration of justice. It usually meets twice annually specifically to fill judicial vacancies, including vacancies in the Constitutional Court.


78 See Moipone Malefane, Kim Hawkey and Prega Govender, 2008, ‘ANC’s war’, Sunday Times, 6 July 2008, p. 1. This followed judges of the Constitutional Court accusing Western Cape Judge President John Hlope of improperly trying to influence two of its judges concerning the corruption case of the ANC president. The Weekender reported that the ANC had denied that Mantashe had used the words; variably, it was also stated that he had used the words but that it had not been aimed at the judges, See, ‘Mantashe misquoted, says ANC’, The Weekender, 14 July 2008.


81 Issues that were regularly included in imploiring the further transformation of South Africa’s judicial system included poverty as barriers to access to justice (including long distances of travel), the cost of obtaining legal services, differential access to different race groups, language differentials, and the effect of procedures and processes on determining access; see Hanti Otto, 2009, ‘Justice must be accessible to the poor – Zuma’, The Star, 7 July 2009, p. 6.

82 This was in contrast, however, with Radebe in June 2009 also vowing to push through with the bill, and implying that consultation would have the purpose of ensuring a two-thirds majority in Parliament, required because the passing of the law would require constitutional change; see Angela Quintal, 2009, ‘Radebe vows to push through bill transforming judiciary’, The Sunday Independent, 14 June 2009, p. 1.


89 The Hawks was headed by former Western Cape deputy provincial commissioner of police and Robben Island political prisoner Anwa Dramat; see Ernest Mabuza, 2009, ‘Scorpions make way for the Hawks’, Business Day, 7 July 2009, p. 3; Dumisane Lubisi, 2009, ‘Scorpions officially form part of police from today’, City Press, 1 March 2009, p. 2.


95 Other sections in this chapter deal with the provincial executives.

96 One ministerial consultant told the author that his minister, along with colleagues, was ‘utterly surprised’ at being reappointed in 2004, given huge departmental problems and questions about ability to do the job in the 1999-2004 term.
97 See Moshoeshoe Monare, ‘Inefficiency and incompetence may hamper Zuma’s ideals’, The Sunday Independent, 7 June 2009, p. 11. Mandy Rossouw and Matuma Letsoalo, 2009, ‘President’s power surge’, Mail & Guardian Online, 1 May 2009, http://www.mg.co.za/printformat/single/2009-05-01-presidents-power-surge, note a senior ANC official as observing: ‘They must be reminded that it is the ANC that wins elections, not the government.’ The official said the party was determined to implement Zuma’s threat to fire under-performing ministers.

98 Also see Brendan Boyle, 2010, ‘Zuma must hand over the baton to capable leaders’, Sunday Times, 14 March 2010, p. 7.

99 See Jacob Zuma in interview with the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), reported in The Star, 8 June 2009, p. 6.

100 Interview, 2009, ministerial adviser (on condition of anonymity), Pretoria, 20 August 2009. He referred to widespread instances of vacillation in decision making, and to civil servants offering the policy advice that they believe their political and senior departmental principals wish to hear. Their motivations were seen to be job security and prospects for promotion.


102 Interview, 2011, senior employee of a provincial department on monitoring, who related cross-province experiences, Johannesburg, 3 February 2011.

103 See for example Mandy Rossouw, 2008, ‘DGs shudder at Zuma chill’, Mail & Guardian, 1-7 February 2008, p. 4. Scopa chairperson Thembekile Godi insisted that the new vigilance was not just a factor of Polokwane, but equally due to the new oversight model that Parliament had been working on.


105 See, for example, Jessie Duarte, 2009, ‘ANC media statement on acquittal of NEC member Billy Masethla’, 15 January 2009.


108 The new November 2010 parliamentary committee chairpersons were: Eric Kholwane (Communications), Jerome Maake (Defence), Hargeaves Magama (International Relations and Cooperation), Hope Malgas (Basic Education), Peter Maluleke (Public Enterprises), Maggy Maunye (Home Affairs), Malusi Motimele (Defence and Military Veterans), Mamagase Nchabeleng (Labour), Sisa Njekelana (Energy), Dorothy Ramodibe (Women, Children and People with Disabilities) and Thandile Sunduza (Arts and Culture). The new caucus chair was Jerry Thibidi.


113 See Nkululeko Ncana, 2010, ‘Ministers who flout Scopa can be charged’, Sunday Times, 14 March
2010, p. 4. In a statement the details regarding the chief whip were denied, see Moloto Mothapo, 2010, ‘Comments by ANC MP in the Sunday Times’, statement by the office of the ANC chief whip, ANC parliamentary caucus. 14 March 2010.

114 Kgalema Motlanthe, 28 November 2010, Interview SABC-TV3 News, at an ANC local election campaign event.


126 Named after the Johannesburg downtown building in which struggle icons Oliver Tambo and Nelson Mandela had their 1950s legal practice.


130 A Public Service Commission (PSC) report, released August 2009, showed there were 434 senior managers who may have conflicts of interest, such as having private business interests linked to their departments; and an auditor general report, earlier in 2009, revealed that 49 employees
were directors or members of companies or close corporations doing business with national departments, and 46 of these did not have the approval to perform other remunerative work (the total amount paid to these businesses in the period under review was R35.7 million).


136 See, for example, Makhudu Sefara, 2011, ‘If Blade can be swayed by the Guptas, who is next?’, p. 16 and George Matlala, Diane Hawker and Gcwalisile Khanyile, 2011. ‘Fat cats coin it’, p. 1, both in *The Sunday Independent*, 13 March 2011. There were many similar employment and enrichment opportunities, beyond the Guptas. See, for example, Gcwalisile Khanyile, 2011, ‘Another Zuma relative nets R1 m’, *The Sunday Independent*, 26 June 2011, p. 6.


146 Essop Pahad, 2003, op. cit. Pahad reported: ‘Affirmative action in the workplace was … launched relatively early in the Employment Equity Act of 1998, and through internal programmes in individual government departments before that … great strides have been made on employment equity within the public sector although the gender bias in senior management is still skewed in favour of males. But we have come a long way since …’


149 A concrete indicator of the close party-state relationship was also the seeming duplication of the ANC and the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (Cogta) surveys of what had been leading to the service delivery protests in the period from May 2009 onwards. Mantashe remarked on 8 September 2009, addressing a meeting at the Tshwane University of Technology, that the ANC had completed its survey of municipalities and knew what the problems were; see Gwede Mantashe, 2009, speech delivered at the Tshwane University of Technology, 8 September, ANC electronic email media release, 8 September 2009.
The alternation of presidencies in South Africa has helped the ANC weather the storms of being in power yet powerless to bring full transformation to democratic South Africa. The ANC under Nelson Mandela was the great symbol of political liberation, reconciliation and nation-building. The Mbeki presidency brought the promises of ‘down to work’, ‘real transformation’ and ‘steady progress’. As the Mbeki presidency stagnated under the weight of succession struggle, the pending Zuma presidency became depicted as the one that would reorient and ring in the mission liberation links. As the Zuma presidency sagged under the burdens of recalcitrant transformation, state and governance deficits and global recessions(s), and successors remained under wraps, it remained to be seen how continuous presidential succession, this time around, would be positioned to nurture power for the ANC.

A lesson of the ANC-South African presidents in the first two decades of democracy has been the demonstration of the necessity for the South African president to be in good standing with the ANC. The final power holders in all instances have been ANC movement forces, even if at times with Mbeki it seemed that state power was enough to make the president of the country rule supreme. The transition to Zuma presented the contrast of the president subjecting himself to ANC power, and steering the ANC in this servant-to-the-movement mode.

The Zuma period brought the party right into the state to tower over the state. Its renewal of governance processes started with the restructuring of the Presidency. Activation turned out to be a drawn-out process. Potential evidence of realising management and substantive delivery goals for government were delayed and the next ANC presidential struggle threatened to interrupt it, as had happened from 2008–09.2

Beyond external dependency on the ANC and presidential standing in relation to
the ANC, presidencies derive much of their power from the internal structuring of the institution of the Presidency in the state, and its governance effects on society. The Presidency reflects much of the presidents’ orientations to the linkage between the party and the state. The structuring and operations of the Presidency are thus central to political power in the country.

The chapter explores presidential institutional operations in the heart of the state. It analyses how presidents worked with the ANC to imprint their signature institutions on the state landscape. The main focus is on the two presidencies of Zuma and Mbeki. It shows the continuous tension between the seductive counter power point of the Presidency of South Africa, and the power of the ANC president and the ANC’s top leadership. The party-state boundary definitions are central considerations. They insulated or exposed presidents, gave them the space to operate with relative autonomy, or helped them bide their time whilst solutions to political problems were being pursued.

The chapter equally focuses on power relations in the Presidency of South Africa and the influence that varying constituencies – including the ANC, Tripartite Alliance partners, the ANC leagues and business organisations and individuals – wielded over the Presidency. Even at the best of times for the ANC there was no one-on-one relationship between ANC policies and state policies, or between ANC governance and state governance. Instead, because of the immense constitutionally-defined power of the (state) Presidency, there was continuous positioning for influence over policy and matters of governance. A fundamental difference between the Zuma and Mbeki presidencies was that in the time of Zuma these influences were channelled via the ANC, leaving no doubt as to ‘who governs’ in the stakes between state and party.

Policy and policy influence, assessed in Chapter 12, stand side-by-side with the exploration of the institutions and powers that the respective presidents brought to bear on their tasks of governance. One of the chapter foci is hence Mbeki’s elaborate institutional infrastructure, with its noble intentions yet modest policy-governance delivery. This labyrinthine ‘kingdom’ gave Mbeki a sense of omnipotence. Zuma attempted to create a new identity for the Presidency. Institutional changes and reallocation of functions, also to line departments, followed. The analysis recognises that institutions are more than positions and associated ‘offices with ascribed functions’ – they embody both these formal aspects and the associated culture, personalities, interinstitutional powers and articulation, incumbency criteria, purpose and processes that make the institutions what they are. The chapter concludes with fault lines in and tests to the power exercised by the Presidency.

PRESIDENTS NEGOTIATING THE BALANCE BETWEEN STATE AND PARTY POWER

The story of the presidents of democratic South Africa is a tale of how the presidents could in the end only be as big as the political space that the ANC had permitted
them to establish. South Africa’s first four democratically determined presidents – Mandela, Mbeki, Motlanthe and Zuma – each brought lessons as to the power and the limits to power of the Presidency of South Africa. Those who prevailed in good standing would be the presidents that accurately read the mood of their organisation at their time. This section explores the ANC power lessons that the presidents of South Africa learnt, also with reference to the presidents’ differential levels of autonomy from the ANC.

**The lesson to rule with, not over, the ANC**

Mandela from 1994-99 showed how the symbolism of achieving liberation could be carried forward, even if frequently centred around one person, but also how a total system could gain power from reconciliation and nation-building visibly supported by the bulk of the top leadership. The Zuma and Mbeki presidencies experienced divergent problems. It was Mbeki’s success in the Presidency, the introduction of structures and processes for effective governance, which granted him power beyond Luthuli House. When his ANC-anchored political power faded, he relied on the Presidency to try to govern the ANC. Mbeki had frequently consulted, but ANC-groundedness was lacking, even if formally in existence. The Mbeki presidency imploded and the ANC reclaimed its power. Zuma entered and occupied the Presidency with powerful ANC endorsement. He instituted modest, projected as major, institutional and procedural changes. He took care not to be seen to be rising above the ANC. Important decisions were taken in visible consultation with the top officials of the ANC. The Zuma presidency was haunted, however, by issues of leadership strength, personal credibility at several points in time, lack of decisiveness and apparent determination not to make enemies.

Mbeki, in much of his 1999-2008 term (although he was already effectively in charge of government as deputy president under Mandela from 1994 on) showed how his manoeuvring and strategising could secure the capture and occupation of the top-power position. The Mbeki double-term also showed how policy and institutional redesign and positioning that were close to paper-perfect could fall short of delivering long-term power. He intended the Presidency to bring policy perfection to South Africa, yet the ANC and ANC-in-government learnt the skill of euphemising policy failures and changing policy – by stealth or by exaggerated proclamation according to the unfolding national democratic revolution. The lasting lesson that followed in the wake of the Mbeki presidency was not to try and rule over the movement from the Union Buildings West Wing or Mahlamba Ndlopfu, but to work consensually. This period showed how movement democracy, informed by the power of mobilised branches, regions and provinces, remained bigger than the president … and that no organisational labyrinth of state power or loyal long-term cabinet appointees could substitute for this.

Kgalema Motlanthe and Zuma were complicit in much of the downfall of the Mbeki presidencies, both in the ANC and the state. Courtesy of ANC mobilisation against Mbeki, co-directed by Motlanthe as then ANC secretary general, Mbeki’s policy and
organisational-cum-people shortcomings were used to leverage ousting him from power. Mbeki was used to personify several of the composite grassroots failures of the ANC. There was wide frustration among many cadres and branch, regional, provincial and national ANC structures that they were being excluded from Mbeki’s circle of political and economic power. The brief Motlanthe incumbency related the story of a person who, despite ability and likely appetite, did not push against the constraints of party mandate – even if some in the ANC preferred him as presidential candidate over Jacob Zuma. Motlanthe recognised the party roots of his presidency, and exercised power accordingly.

The rise of Zuma showed the power of popular and organisational mobilisation in the ANC – along with the power offered through a particular type of ANC-internal rebellion. In Zuma the ANC identified the Mbeki nemesis that could be used to symbolise a continuous ANC struggle. Zuma brought the symbolism of internal ANC struggle to life when he successfully ended his bruising eight-year legal battle against being charged for several alleged improbities, real or trumped-up. Zuma constructed a modern-day popular struggle reputation through his 2005-07 ‘anti-persecution’ campaign and his 2009 election campaign as the president who could connect with the people, bring the ANC back into the ambit of popular excitement and resuscitate hope. His immediate post-election responses, in particular in relation to the community protests at the time, bolstered his strengths – along with his willingness, at least at that stage, to be the ‘son’ of the ANC. To some he appeared as the president ‘who sees statesmanship as not only steering the ship of state, but also remaining in close contact with the people’. Most of the ANC’s gains, courtesy of the period of struggle-presidential transition persisted, albeit in gradually fading format.

**Two presidents’ differential autonomy from the party**

The presidents of South Africa differed in the amount of autonomy from the ANC that they maintained. The presidents were only sustainably effective in their positions of ‘state deployment’ as long as the ANC supported, or at minimum condoned their indulgences with the exercise of state power. The state office came with a dynamic of its own, and, virtually by definition, brought distance or the temptation to establish distance. Table 1 compares the details of the three main presidencies (Mandela, Mbeki and early Zuma) on the dimensions of party and state power.

It was the power of the national presidency that helped trigger Mbeki’s ‘troubles with the party’. The other main and interlinking factor was Mbeki’s resentment of ANC mobilisation for a successor, when he was not ready to stand aside. Especially in the period from 2005-08, the ANC rebelled against Mbeki’s use of state office to assert authority over the ANC. Mbeki tried to entrench his influence over future presidencies by engineering the rise of a (state) presidential candidate of his choice. He cut down on his weekly contact sessions with Luthuli House. He sent out his cabinet troops to spread the message of his and their good deeds. Mbeki thought that he had the intra-state-deployed-cum-senior-ANC line-up to make the combination of loyalty and performance work for him come the time of the ANC election of 2007.
TABLE 1: Party and state power dimensions of the three* main presidencies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>President</th>
<th>Power in relation to ANC</th>
<th>Power in the Presidency of South Africa</th>
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<tr>
<td>Nelson Mandela</td>
<td>Reluctant, gradual acceptance by ANC top structures of Mandela as the uppermost ANC leader. This was largely prompted by popular standing, whilst the sub-layers of leadership got on with running the movement and organising succession. Mandela’s power lay in his conciliatory and nation-building priorities. In 1997 Mandela stepped aside as ANC president and Mbeki stepped in as the unopposed new ANC president.</td>
<td>Mandela ran a limited-scope president’s office whilst Mbeki assumed responsibility for much of the daily running of the government, especially after the decks were cleared with the departure of De Klerk from the GNU. A Presidential Review Commission (PRC) recommended the expansion of the office of the president. By the time Mandela exited, Mbeki was fully prepared to assume office and restructure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thabo Mbeki</td>
<td>Mbeki for a long time had a solid standing in the ANC, with full, easy endorsement for a second term, despite some serious policy misgivings. He was re-elected ANC president in 2002. He was in ANC favour, until he wanted to overstay his term and determine his own successors. He was seen to have schemed to keep Zuma from becoming his successor – and he was scorned. The ANC’s NEC forced Mbeki out of power nine months before the scheduled end of his term.</td>
<td>In 2001 the expanded and strengthened Presidency of South Africa was introduced. It assumed a central role in the management and coordination of government business. It maintained a separation between party and state. The small empire of the Presidency won a reputation for centralisation of power, even if it was with the goal of achieving integration and coordination of government business. The presidency fell short of definitively turning around governance in order to secure bigger differences on recognised problems. Too many problems of governance remained on the agenda, despite the elaborate, sophisticated apparatus for policy coordination and governance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacob Zuma</td>
<td>Zuma won the tough Polokwane election battle. He grew organisationally, and played a substantial role in the ANC’s 2009 election victory. Soon after entering state power he received endorsements for a double term, due to coming across as a consultative and people-oriented leader. These qualities were played down as the ANC clamped down on ‘premature’ candidacies. The ANC was not ready to risk another drawn-out round of divisive succession battles. Succession possibilities became more complex when Zuma’s weaknesses were</td>
<td>Zuma had to work with the essence of the Mbeki Presidency’s apparatus, also obviously succumbing to the benefits of working with the aid of an elaborate infrastructure. He made slight changes to structures, brought two full ministers into the Presidency, for some time accommodated previous regime ministers that could not get cabinet positions, and appointed new staff – whilst emphasising the National Planning Commission (NPC) and the Performance Monitoring and Evaluation (PME) unit with the coordination and</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Mbeki was thus the custodian of a period of distance between the ANC president and the South African president. Without the ANC presidency Mbeki was vulnerable. This showed in his last State of the Nation address in 2008. It confirmed that power had slipped from his hands since his Polokwane defeat two months before. The performance triumphalism of his previous addresses had evaporated. It confirmed, in the words of Bantu Holomisa, that Mbeki had ‘lost control of his party and as a result is fast losing his grip on the government’.\(^\text{10}\) Mbeki, wrote Quintal\(^\text{11}\), had been ‘feted as Mr Delivery and the nation even bought into his Age of Hope, Mbeki is now dismissed by some as little more than a cliché – a lame duck – whose one defining legacy, a strong economy, is under threat’. With regard to the 2007-09 part of the interregnum Pottinger\(^\text{12}\) remarked that by early 2008, ‘the country had entered into an uneasy interregnum that had created ominous vacuums on the state function’. The Mbeki grouping still held the power, but the Zuma grouping had the forward momentum to assert dominance.

The Nicholson obiter of 12 September 2008 triggered Mbeki’s exit from state power. Gordin\(^\text{13}\) highlights three aspects of the judgement that led to Mbeki being pushed out of state power nine days after the obiter dictum:

- Although stating that he did not pronounce on Zuma’s guilt or otherwise, the whole process of charging Zuma had been flawed. The 2007 process was faulted and the NPA would have to start all over again.
- Nicholson delivered a slap in the face to the NPA and three NDPPs involved with the case over the years, Bulelani Ngcuka, Vusi Pikoli and Mokotedi Mpshe, for their cooperation with the executive.
- Nicholson backed Zuma’s claims of a conspiracy against him,\(^\text{14}\) arguing that Mbeki and his cabinet had to take responsibility for abusing the prosecuting authority to try and eliminate Zuma from the titanic struggle for the ANC presidency.

\(\textbf{Note:}\) * Kgalema Motlanthe was president from September 2008 to April 2009, stepping into the space left by the recalled Mbeki.

\(\textbf{Source:}\) Author’s compilation.
The ANC forced Mbeki out of state power (he had ceased to be ANC president nine months earlier), by ‘recalling’ him following deliberation by the ANC NEC. This obviated ‘the need’ for instituting charges of serious misconduct against Mbeki, in terms of section 89(1) of the Constitution, or dissolving Parliament and calling an early election in terms of the Constitution’s section 50(1). The charges that had been punted against Mbeki concerned issues of governance and policy, but were hardly more serious than anything that had prevailed before the fall out with the ANC. Earlier the Electoral Commission had indicated to the ANC that it was not ready for an early election. Mbeki accepted the decision, but only once he saw the 89(1) spectre on the wall. His quest to rule the ANC on the basis of state power, whilst retaining influence and securing his legacy through virtual anointment of a successor, had ended.

In contrast, the ANC and Zuma in the early days of Zuma’s (state) presidency operated consensually and Zuma was so closely attuned to ANC wishes and actions that the two presidencies could hardly be differentiated. A central trend was that under Zuma the Presidency was altogether downplayed, but it quietly proceeded with its established processes, and largely with the policies instituted under Mbeki. (The shift to a developmental state orientation and greater state involvement in the economy were significant, yet only incrementally different from policy in the late-Mbeki period, Chapter 12.) Zuma explicitly retained a high profile in the work of the ANC, ensuring that his public profile was balanced between ANC work and state work. After serial faux pas with spokespersons in the Presidency, Zizi Kodwa, Zuma’s ANC spokesperson also took over in the Presidency and became head of Zuma’s office in the Presidency. In July 2011 Mac Maharaj replaced him, a move that was said to be informed by Zuma wanting to assert stronger control over government and the ANC, and reducing perceptions of him being too vulnerable to the ANC Youth League (ANCYL).15

Zuma’s (state) presidency work had become increasingly conflicted through the multiple lines of division within the ANC, in the ANC-ANCYL configuration, and amongst the Tripartite Alliance members (for example communists or workerists versus nationalists) that were opening in the ANC’s largely unspoken Mangaung 2012 succession struggle. The two alliance members were closely integrated into the Zuma-ANC’s top leadership and the SACP also into government structures.16 Zuma’s solution was to maintain peace in the Alliance. Suppression of dissent and conflict, calling on internal discipline and using ANC and alliance channels to vent problems, along with occasional alliance summits and deferring Mangaung campaigning through instruction to await the official ANC green light and a code of conduct on the activity, otherwise ambiguous was the composite strategy pursued.17

‘REINVENTION’ OF THE PRESIDENCY – CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN THE ZUMA PRESIDENCY

Analysis of the ANC in 17 years of political power in democratic South Africa inevitably comes with some Mbeki focus. Mbeki occupied presidential power for close
on 10 of the 17 years and effectively more, given his executive deputy presidential role under Mandela. The changing processes of policy coordination emanating from the Presidency of South Africa\textsuperscript{18} from the early 2000s onwards were motivated through arguments of policy-governance actions becoming freed from ‘silo operations’ and embracing ‘integrated governance’.

The Zuma administration proceeded on the Mbeki-era canvas, practising far less of a break from the Mbeki order than what was evident on the ANC political front. Mbeki had established a seductively powerful presidency template that suited the exercise of presidential power.\textsuperscript{19} Zuma effected peripheral changes. The presidential institutional apparatus was potentially powerful enough to sow tension between the Presidency and the party. The fact that Zuma remained close to the ANC, and in particular also the top officials, and spent much of his government time on ANC work, helped him remain on a useful trajectory of hands-off-daily-government-business. He did not disappear into the Presidency.

With the Zuma administration’s formal ascent into state power came the expectation that it would be in touch with the people, armed with fresh approaches, and driven to find new or elaborated solutions to the vexing problems of delivery and more complete transformation. On the institutional and policy front, the Zuma camp came only partly prepared for the challenge. The Polokwane war (Chapter 2) and the 2009 election campaign (Chapter 6) had been their prolonged preoccupations.

When the administration stepped into power in May 2009 it was armed with a modest policy programme (Chapter 12) that was safely within the parameters of ‘mild Polokwane’. The Polokwane resolutions directed the new presidency. The June 2007 policy conference and Polokwane were mooted as a ‘shift to the left’ in as far as the developmental state was embraced. However, the left shift at best materialised as mild, and in places of mirage-status. The September 2010 NGC affirmed Polokwane policy and elaborated on progress with implementation – the National Health Insurance (NHI) was a prime example, even if full realisation was a multi-year objective.

The Zuma administration was equally armed with a modest institutional renewal project, as anchored in the Presidency. The over-representation of the newness of initiatives was one of the benchmarks of the early Zuma period.\textsuperscript{20} The changes were presented as major correctives on the governance shortfalls under Mbeki. Few new structures were introduced: the National Planning Commission (NPC), as a ministry within the Presidency, and a dedicated Ministry for Performance Monitoring and Evaluation (PME) were the lead initiatives. The NPC was linked to the Polokwane resolutions, which had envisaged:\textsuperscript{21}

A strengthened role for the central organs of state, including through the creation of an institutional centre for government-wide economic planning with the necessary resources and authority to prepare and implement long and medium term economic and development planning.

The national planning facility was projected as confirmation that long-term planning had at last been acknowledged as important. The NPC\textsuperscript{22} and PME\textsuperscript{23} were, however, quite
limited in their newness. While the planning function was now elevated to full ministry status, it was an elaboration of the work previously done on a smaller scale and with uneven success by the Policy Coordination and Advisory Services (PCAS) in the Presidency. The PCAS initiatives around the scenario studies that were undertaken in the Mbeki period were some of the planning initiatives of the time. The Presidency's 10-year and 15-year reviews had fed into the preceding planning processes. The Mbeki presidency’s template for policy planning and coordination (Diagram 1) had become well entrenched. Some anticipation of greater change built up in 2011, with the NPC’s release of its ‘Diagnostic Overview’. This precursor to the late 2011 vision and planning document simply documented the state of South Africa’s delivery deficits, 17 years into democracy.

The new PME ministry was rooted in the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) initiatives in the Presidency of the preceding half decade. The Zuma administration policy document had low-key references to the antecedent government-wide monitoring and evaluation system (GWMES). Zuma explained the difference between the old and the new, also with reference to planning and performance assessment in the Presidency:

… [W]e are indeed beginning to do things differently. You’re in a better position to say to departments ‘What have you done to fulfil the plan?’ Previously, we would say, ‘Are you working well’ and they would say ‘yes’ and give a report that could excite you, but it was just talking to the sky. Here you’ll look at that report against the plan and ask if it’s taking us forward … If people are complaining that there is no delivery, how do you monitor that? So we established the performance monitoring and evaluation (ministry). The reconfiguration … tells you we are here to do things differently and to change the tempo and manner in which the government has been operating.

The new administration wanted to be seen to have made a clean break with the Mbeki order. Thus, when the new NPC minister, but ‘old’ Minister of Finance, Trevor Manuel, proactively and rapidly worked with the Presidency to produce a national planning green paper, his zealousness set off discordant notes with the alliance-left. The NPC was centrally positioned and the new order saw red. Accompanied by reassurances that Cabinet, and not the NPC, was the government ‘centre of power’, final and moderated NPC plans were adopted. Former presidency director-general Frank Chikane remarked that much work had been done institutionalising the way things were done, including by way of producing manuals so that an incoming government could ‘hit the ground running’. The de facto continuity between the old and the new was further emphasised in the announcement that auditor general, Terence Nombembe, in 2010 was going to release the first report by his office on five years of service delivery by national and provincial government. The project had commenced under his predecessor, Shauket Fakie. It assessed government outputs in terms of existence, numbers and quality. Chabane acknowledged this initiative as mainly focusing on validating the credibility of performance information. He stressed that it was not outcome information that was being assessed, but rather issues of process and compliance. Nombembe asserted that his office had been gathering
Between centralisation and centralism

informati on down to the level of whether water flowed when a tap was turned, since 2005. Nombembe said that his office had emphasised ‘early warning signals so no one can say they did not know. At the moment, with the lack of early warning signals, things happen only when we issue our reports so we create an environment where things happen late in the day and nothing can be done about them’. Under Mbeki, the Presidency had also produced The Development Indicators Mid-Term Review of 2007 to take stock of government’s performance in meeting its own policy objectives.

Come Chabane’s introduction of his budget vote to the National Assembly in June 2011, opposition MPs assailed him for delivering little.32 The September 2010 Presidency Annual Report for 2009-10 had furthermore detailed the performance contract processes (not content specific to cabinet members) and the daunting tasks of turning government systems into outcomes-based modes. Anecdotal reports suggested that the monitoring information fed into the system was frequently of dubious quality.

Source: The Presidency, 200631

Recommendations – framework of planning cycle

DIAGRAM 1: Illustration of governance planning cycles, 2005 onwards

Source: The Presidency, 2006

Key: PoA: Plan of Action; SoN: State of the Nation; IDP: Integrated Development Plan; MTSF: Medium-term Strategic Framework; MTEC: Medium-term Economic Committee; BPS: Budget Policy Statement

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DIAGRAM 1: Illustration of governance planning cycles, 2005 onwards

Source: The Presidency, 2006

The Zuma administration was thus struggling to find its feet in a definitive way. It relied on institutional renewal in the Presidency to give the forward thrust. Towards the halfway mark of its 2009-14 term these institutions were still out to prove themselves, and new policy initiatives were only haltingly taking off.

**PRESIDENTIAL DOMINANCE, PRESIDENCY CENTRALISATION AND CENTRES OF POWER**

It is widely accepted that the Presidency under Mbeki brought centralisation of power (in government), and this was a major reason-rationalisation for ANC action against him. The processes of centralisation had been anchored in accepted constitutional mandates and governance practices, even if they attained notoriety. It was less controversial for Mbeki to have established the system of coordination to integrate government business (even if obviously centring on the Presidency) than it was for him to minimise direct ANC engagement with policy and governance (except through his circles of associates) and marginalise the alliance partners. Mbeki was also skilful in effecting integration-coordination, always ensuring that his actions were constitutional and formally in line with ANC requirements.

These trends showed that the ANC’s problem with Mbeki was less with centralisation than with the location of the primary centre of power away from the ANC. The task of creating the Presidency’s institutional infrastructure had been mandated by ANC conference, which helps explain the continuity beyond Mbeki. For example, the 1997 Mafikeng conference tasked government to ensure, with regard to policy coordination in government:

> The Coordination and Implementation Unit in the Presidency be reviewed to ensure it fulfils the function of coordinating and monitoring the implementation and achievement of national policy priorities. This structure must be duplicated at provincial level …

James Ngculu, former Western Cape ANC chairperson, lauded the Mbeki presidency for being ‘organised, methodical, focused and outcomes-driven’. He identified factors that contributed to assertions of centralisation of power by Mbeki’s detractors. In the make-up of the Presidency he identified policy-planning and coordination, and argued that it could be linked to centralisation in that it required the creation of a uniform set of policy imperatives that had become an essential part of costing government’s delivery programme. Other factors – with Ngculu’s defences of Mbeki in brackets – were the president’s appointment of judges (‘internationally practiced’), presidential prerogative over the appointment and dismissal of cabinet and deputy ministers (‘a constitutionally established process’), foreign policy-making (‘a high-achievement area for government’), economic policy-making (‘right policy with best possible track record’), and Mbeki lacking in inclusiveness (‘Mbeki has a wide programme of con-
sultation, albeit not with alliance partners’). Blade Nzimande noted the NGC resolution that the manner in which these powers were exercised had to be closely guided by democratic consultation.

**Construction of the centralisation fall out**

Mbeki at the point of his early second-term and before he had indicated his intention to pursue a third term as ANC president, antagonised both Luthuli House and the two alliance partners through his exercise of presidential powers whilst peripheralising the ANC in matters of the state. Mbeki always maintained the opposite, arguing that he was giving effect to ANC policies; that his administration’s policies had not deviated from ANC prescriptions. It was on these grounds that Zuma in 2006 could add his voice to those that had been accusing Mbeki of ‘over-centralisation’ of power in the Presidency. Pro-Mbeki ANC spokesperson at the time, Smuts Ngonyama, denied ‘centralisation’ but conceded ‘concentration’. The cabinet, under Mbeki tutelage, denied that South African democracy was being threatened by an over-centralised executive. The SACP was scathing in its retort:

> The dismissal of the genuine observations of the central committee of the SACP as ‘false assertions’ and ‘fulminations of the imagination’ demonstrates a rather disturbing intolerance towards well-considered criticism …

The ANC largely condoned the Mbeki initiatives in establishing institutional infrastructure for policy coordination from the Presidency – until the 2005 NGC fall out and the ensuing anti-Mbeki mobilisation claims that the incumbent president was trying to be an autonomous, perhaps autocratic, force of his own in insufficiently consulting with and following the directives of the ANC and the Tripartite Alliance partners. These matters of both policy and style of government were exacerbated by Mbeki’s efforts to sideline Zuma as deputy president of the country and the ANC. An illustration of the policy revolt against Mbeki (instead of the ANC) as decision-maker was the effort to pass a dual labour market system (by Mbeki and then Deputy Minister of Finance, Jabu Moleketi) at the 2005 NGC. The NGC revolt also eliminated the initiative to create super-ministries, which could also be construed as power concentration. The proposal briefly resurfaced in 2008. Then it came as an ‘SACP initiative’. The proposals were considered but rejected under resistance from cabinet colleagues in the early days of the Zuma administration. In contrast with the suggestions that he had acted unprocedurally in arriving at policy decisions, Mbeki reacted to the 2008 Tripartite Alliance summit by saying ‘(t)hese people need lessons on how government is run. You can’t ignore ANC and government processes and try to hold people ransom with new demands …’ An ANC official insisted that Mbeki had followed ANC protocol to the letter in policy matters:

> The ANC Lekgotla came up with priorities which were discussed at the cabinet Lekgotla, which was attended by both government and the ANC. The decisions
there were consolidated into the president’s State of the Nation address before being adopted by government departments.

With the hindsight of where Mbeki had erred strategically, Mbeki associate Jabu Moleketi remarked that ‘the key thing [that Mbeki should have done] was to keep in touch with people who disagree with you, not to be dismissive’.45

**Mbeki growing bigger than his ANC deployment**

In the wake of liberation and democratic elections in 1994, the policy and governance influences of the strong executive had been reasonably balanced by the institutions of electoral and representative democracy. From the late 1990s on, this focus increasingly ceded space to deliberations on the need for a stronger presidency and the subsequent Mbeki institutions of policy coordination.46 Contradictory governance thrusts also started operating in 1997 and contributed to tension around Mbeki who was seen to be growing bigger than his ANC deployment. Consensual relations between the ANC and top structures in the state (which would integrate the ANC right into state-centralised power), contrasted with state presidential power developing a dynamic of its own. At the 1997 ANC Mafikeng conference the ANC received the formal mandate from delegates to bring ‘all centres of power’ under its control. A high-level 1998 document determined that transformation of the state entailed extending the power of the national liberation movement ‘over all levers of power: the army, the police, the bureaucracy, intelligence structures, the judiciary, parastatals, and agencies such as regulatory bodies, the public broadcaster, the central bank …’47 The ANC formalised its policy of cadre deployment to key positions, whilst requiring deployees to remain under party discipline and work consensually with the movement.

In 2001, the early centralisation trends in the Mbeki presidency48 were interpreted in line with the need for the accelerated implementation of policies. The jury remained out on the extent to which centralisation and presidential autocracy would prevail over processes of consultation and the use of the constitutionally-recognised political and policy institutions. By approximately 2005, the balance between popular engagement and strong executive policy action had largely given way to contracted and centrally initiated popular engagement (Chapter 5). As the details of the system of coordination settled, scrutiny switched to the labyrinth of forums and institutions, their impact on governance and whether they would constitute the magic wand to pull off the governance project. It was evident that the network of presidency-anchored institutions increasingly dominated.49 Lower popular participation stood in the context of changing participatory expectations that accompanied policy implementation,50 the major policy activity of the time. The contraction was manifested in, for example, control of policy contestation (as demonstrated in government’s imbizo programme), and the absorption of policy influences through centrally designed mechanisms (through elite consultation and co-optation into think-tanks and consultative forums).

Mbeki thus used a system of closed circles to leverage decision making, largely within the ambit of adopted, or post-adoptions-approved policies, including the Growth,
Employment and Redistribution Strategy (Gear). Mbeki held Luthuli House at arm’s length, even in good times, differentiating state from party work. He assumed the right to get on with state business without continuous deference to the ANC. The process and institutional shortcomings in the Mbeki administration were thoroughly mapped over the years. These were due to both self-insulating and self-contented actions and orientations in the Presidency. The web of institutions, mechanisms and processes that resulted once the ANC was in power was not constitutionally defined. It tended to move government business away from being both constitutionally legitimated and anchored in ANC base structures. Mbeki contained and largely prescribed the influences that would penetrate his presidential realm. It was especially in the later Mbeki years that his presidency accepted that popular needs were known, for example, through continuous GCIS monitoring and, second, that government had the popular mandate through electoral affirmation to proceed on its agreed policy trail. Idea catchers in the Presidency and GCIS channelled feedback into the heart of policy-making, the apparatus for coordination in the Presidency.

Mbeki rose on the wings of his centralisation thrust, coordination in order to govern, relative autonomy of the president in the state context, and in policy implementation through the complex set of state institutions focused on the core institutions of the Presidency. A gap opened between state and party and Mbeki started overestimating the state power that he wielded. It triggered his 2007-08 downfall.

Once Mbeki was ousted as ANC president, pressures mounted for him to relinquish the presidency of South Africa. The ANC pointed out the mistakes that had happened (interpreted as a crisis that emerged) with Mbeki at the helm. The SACP and Cosatu were bolstered by voices in the Polokwane ANC (for example that of treasurer general Mathews Phosa) and argued that the Mbeki presidency’s crisis necessitated an end to his term, in the interest of the country. Substantiation of the crisis included: the SABC fiasco in which CEO Dali Mpofu and news chief Snuki Zikalala were suspended; bitter exchanges between government, the Presidency and prosecutions chief Vusi Pikoli at the Ginwala inquiry, investigations into the arms deal that could implicate Mbeki’s government, and the Eskom electricity crisis. Presidency director general Chikane defended Mbeki’s achievements, which he noted as steady economic growth, stability, delivery, job creation, a dent in some inherited poverty, social grants for about a third of the nation, high respect in capitals of the world, a stint in the UN Security Council, a deepening democracy, respect for the law, settlement in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and so forth, as ‘a legacy that no one will steal from him’. Irrespective of the exact balance, and despite the fact that these crises were not exactly extraordinary to South African politics, Mbeki as South African president had become vulnerable. The Polokwane ANC was at the point of reclaiming the pinnacle of state power for the ANC.

Veering between one, two and three centres of power
The Zuma period of state governance brought changes in alignment of centres of power. Towards mid-2008 it was as if the ANC alliance was run by the SACP and Cosatu. The two partners made announcements about alliance summit outcomes, announced policy critiques of ANC Polokwane resolutions, suggested restructuring of state departments,
and promoted the idea of a national planning commission as a major advance for the coordination of economic planning. In effect there were three centres of power – state, ANC and alliance partners. The ANC was reeling from the struggles between Mbeki and Zuma forces in the state, which were in the process of gradually realigning with the ascendant Zuma-ists. Yet, the ANC was Zuma’s sure power base and the ANC and state power started resembling an integrated centre of power. This process helped the ANC reassert itself as the centre of power in the Alliance. Alliance lobbies that co-engineered the rise of Zuma started perceiving threats to their influence, as early as September 2009.

The crux of Zuma-ANC centring of power was the new location of ‘centre’. The centre, at least up to 2011, was in the ANC, along with the direct ANC-Presidency linkage. Zuma as president was not to be watched over like Mbeki was. The Presidency was more open to scrutiny. Much of the Mbeki-era consultation with working groups, was now externalised, away from the Presidency. There was a voluntary subjugation of government (inclusive of the Presidency) to the ANC. Many noted, however, that the Presidency had expanded under Zuma, and that Zuma had appointed a range of his close associates to the Presidency.

Beneath these overall trends, contestation was continuous within the Zuma presidency. The contest between the new Zuma-centre for influence over presidency stalwarts like Joel Netshitenzhe and Trevor Manuel (new in the Presidency but associated with the Mbeki order) were first settled. Next arose the struggle between the new, diverse cohort of power brokers within the ANC, the Tripartite Alliance, and patriotic business that lined up for inclusion in the Zuma era presidential networks of influence. Beyond that, others with presidential aspirations were studying how Zuma was manufacturing entrenchment through the tight articulation of the ANC and South African presidencies.

CLUSTERS OF INFLUENCE ON POLICY AND GOVERNANCE

Government’s policy and governance initiatives across the first three main presidencies were contextualised through institutional and organisational sources of influence that changed incisively from the Mandela, to the Mbeki and Zuma administrations – even if realised amidst broad ANC continuity. The Mbeki process-institutional imprint was undeniably large, and the Zuma administration merely adjusted the template.

The Presidency of South Africa, both constitutionally and by ANC legitimation, stands at the heart of state governance and policy. It is simultaneously a powerful policy influence and actor, and the target at which party, alliance, government and civil society direct their efforts to win influence. Each president ordained a new hierarchy of power within the top agencies trying to exert influence. A differentiation of three clusters of influence over policy and governance – primary, secondary and tertiary – helps assess the levels of influence in and over the Presidency. Primary cluster suggests influences and actor-actions at the heart of the exercise of power, secondary suggests a more distanced, arms-length relationship, and tertiary refers to influences that are peripheral or intermittent, yet still figure on the radar. Table 2 records the comparative clusters of
influence on the primary, secondary and tertiary levels. This section maps the changing clusters of primary influences on policy and governance, as determined by acceptance, accommodation and facilitation by the presidents and presidencies. The clusters encapsulate persons, agencies, forums and institutions.

The processes under the respective presidents propelled new actors into the centre of policy influence yet also showed continuity. The main change in the transition from Mbeki to Zuma was in bringing the ANC (back) into the state (Zuma), rather than pushing the party out (Mbeki). Under Zuma the broad policy directions and frameworks were far more ‘set’ than under Mbeki. ANC determination of state policy was supreme. This meant that other influences, more than in the Mbeki times, tended to be technical, detail-oriented and focussed on implementation.

**Presidency and Treasury – Cabinet and NEC-NWC**

The Presidency and Treasury under Mbeki were synonymous with the concept ‘primary influence cluster’, assuming the coordination and planning roles in government. In the Zuma administration they remained right at the core, yet were equivalent in influence to the top structures of the ANC (the NEC and NWC), and the Cabinet, acknowledging that Cabinet largely converged with the top ANC structures. The latter system gained inclusivity, consultation and legitimacy.

Under both these presidents the Cabinet was overwhelmingly consensual in relation to the president. Cabinet members in the Zuma period were subject to far more ANC scrutiny than in the Mbeki years. Then the ANC was selectively represented in presidency action largely through those NEC members who became entrenched in the Mbeki cabinet (to the extent that the ANC NEC de facto became an extension of Mbeki’s cabinet). The phenomenon intensified in Mbeki’s second term ... up to a point the Presidency’s policy unit acted as a project manager, moving departments along in their work, and acting as a clearinghouse of ideas, in the process also setting terms of debate within government. The functions included the development of policy, initiation and implementation of legislation, coordination of state departments and their associated administrations in policy implementation.

The Presidency under Zuma was set to continue the execution of the powerhouse functions that the Mbeki days offered, yet with the Cabinet now acting in continuous interface with the ANC. Top ANC officials declared that they could pick up the phone and take up issues with Zuma as national president. Zuma’s 2009 Cabinet appointments and the 2010 reshuffle showed an open relationship, yet remained similar to the preceding order in that the Cabinet by now again largely reflected the ANC slate. The Cabinet was in direct consultation with the ANC’s top officials. Collins Chabane, Minister in the Presidency, observed with regard to Cabinet:

> We [the ANC] have to keep the reins tight and pull them back when they step out of line. Before they could do whatever they wanted, and although they broadly followed ANC policies, there were some things we did not agree with. They must be reminded that it is the ANC that wins elections, not the government.
TABLE 2: Primary, secondary and tertiary clusters of realised influence in the Mbeki and Zuma eras of policymaking, implementation and governance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRIMARY CLUSTERS OF AGENCIES INFLUENCING GOVERNANCE AND POLICY</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet</td>
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<tr>
<td>Luthuli House / ANC NEC and NWC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alliance partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet office / Secretariat</td>
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<tr>
<td>Special presidential advisers</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### PCAS / National Planning Commission & Performance M&E

**Mbeki:** PCAS is the engine room for scrutiny and new initiatives; does monitoring and evaluation, test proposals against strategies, advise President on interventions; services political principals like Presidency and Fosad.

**Zuma:** PCAS incorporated into new architecture of the NPC and the Performance M&E department, enhanced function with full ministerial statuses for the two functions; variable operationalisation of their work detracts from influence.

### Department of Finance / Treasury

**Mbeki:** Crucial gate-keeping through MTEF, later moderated by MTSF; frequent resentment by alliance members of marginalisation vis-à-vis the Treasury.

**Zuma:** Central policy-making function in Zuma’s interface with top-ANC officials and ANC conference and summit structures and events; Treasury sets the tone. Treasury now acts with more political awareness than in the Mbeki days, albeit not always on labour issues.

### Fosad

**Mbeki:** Processes ministerial initiatives and policy unit guidance; undertakes research for Makgotla.

**Zuma:** Retaining supportive managerial and research tasks.

### Presidential working groups

**Mbeki:** Ideas and coordination of initiatives often originate here.

**Zuma:** Changed foci and structural changes, but the concept is retained.

### SECONDARY CLUSTERS

#### Presidential advisers

**Mbeki:** See primary cluster.

**Zuma:** Partial parking zone for former Mbeki-ists to be kept on board; also a few trusted loyalists.

#### Alliance and labour

**Mbeki:** Under-privileged status, often overruled if even considered.

**Zuma:** See primary cluster.

#### Business and international finance organisations

**Mbeki:** Strong influence, often direct, throughout process; also manifested in primary cluster via special working groups (especially with regard to black economic empowerment action).

**Zuma:** Similar to influence as under Mbeki, although going to a changed in-group – to chagrin of lobbies in ranks of alliance partners. The ANC and its business associates tend to step into this ‘state space’.

#### Parliament

**Mbeki:** Channel for indirect policy influence, often via ANC structures.

**Zuma:** Some evidence of stronger oversight of the executive, but also highly variable and not in terms of original policy influences; remains significantly subservient to executive of the day.

#### ANC study groups in Parliament

**Mbeki:** Influence for enhanced implementation; tendency to become more technical, e.g. in preparing for committee meetings.

**Zuma:** Influence similar to Mbeki era, with only occasional glimpses of independence from the ANC and the executive.

#### ANC caucus

**Mbeki:** Sounding board, affirmation mechanism – receptive, not initiator; source of rebellion in Mbeki’s exit days.

**Zuma:** Elevation of role, yet still in execution of the wishes of the executive of the day. Acts to protect the executive from parliamentarians holding them to account.
Executives (over legislatures)

There is little doubt as to the primacy of government executives over legislatures in South African politics, and government executives largely overlapped with the ANC executives. The relations between the two were defined by subservience of the legislative powers to the executive, even if subject to ebbs in legislative assertiveness. The focus in the Mbeki days was which component of the executive was prevailing and how that agency was constructed. There were his bureaucracy and cabinet executive, and both were serving overwhelmingly at his behest. Cabinet remained central to the processes of policy and governance, but its influence was secondary to that of the Presidency (albeit with partial membership overlap between the two). The Cabinet was overwhelmingly subservient. There was convergence between seniority in Cabinet
and in ANC NEC ranks. The executive was recognised as Mbeki’s kingdom. The ANC was mostly (earlier on under Mbeki) quiet or (later) ineffectively outspoken in its subjugation (until Polokwane’s revenge). The NWC largely overlapped with the Cabinet in-group. Mbeki nurtured and retained his Cabinet with minimal reshuffling, even at the point of the new 2004 term. Ramphele remarked on the related sphere of job security in the public sector in general:

... Despite underperformance in many areas of delivery of political goods, President Mbeki has yet to dismiss any public official for incompetence. The only dismissals have been justified on the basis of breakdown in relationships or insubordination.

Examples of dismissals were the director general of national intelligence, Billy Masetlha in 2006, deputy Minister of Health, Nozizwe Madlala-Routledge and Vusi Pikoli, director of public prosecutions, in 2007. Most became Zuma converts.

With the evolving chasm between Mbeki and the ANC, the balance of power between the political executive (primarily Cabinet) and the powerful bureaucracy within the Presidency became more tenuous. In the aftermath of the December 2007 NEC change, Mbeki refused to effect Cabinet changes to synchronise Cabinet and the new ANC NEC. It took two months before he acceded to the March 2008 ANC request for him to deploy Kgalema Motlanthe to Parliament, and longer before Motlanthe was appointed to Cabinet.

Zuma times largely saw a continuation of trends, bar acrimony between Cabinet and NEC. The 2009 Cabinet was strongly anchored in the NEC, and virtually no one on the NWC was not also in Cabinet (except those who served as full-time ANC functionaries, and North West premier Modise). The balance of power under Zuma was in NEC-NWC and ANC top official hands. The 2010 cabinet reshuffle saw three NWC members lose cabinet deployment (Siphiwe Nyanda, Makhenkesi Stofile and Noluthando Sibiya-Mayende), but other NWC members gained promotion and the balance was not disturbed.

From 2010 onwards it was clear that the ANC and Presidency top circle top officials were towering over top bureaucrats. Individual ‘flaws and past misdemeanours’ of appointees were well known to the top circles in the ANC, to the extent that the appointees knew they were vulnerable and would ‘jump to conform and comply’. Most who were continuously employed from the Mbeki days onwards knew their vulnerability in their positions at the behest of the political executive, and frequent director general turnover in the Zuma period testified to the supremacy of the super-politicians – those with overlapping ANC and government seniority.

**Cabinet Makgotla**

The Makgotla had continuous, cross-presidential primary influence cluster status. The Zuma administration continued with the inclusive forum as a crucial spoke in the governance wheel. The Makgotla are the extended cabinet meetings of January and July...
each year, where cabinet members are joined by the president’s advisers, departmental
directors general, provincial directors-general, premiers, metropolitan municipality may-
ors and leadership of the South African Local Government Association (SALGA) to
talk about essential issues of governance and policy, often on the basis of research by the
Presidency and its associated departments, and the Forum of South African Directors-
general (Fosad). Inclusivity in the Makgotla was to carry forward coordination of the
functions of national, provincial and local government. In the time of the Zuma admin-
istration the Cabinet Makgotla were closely and explicitly twinned with ANC executive
Makgotla, with these special Cabinet meetings following just after the ANC meetings.
The Makgotla played an essential role in setting out and coordinating government pri-
orities, building directly or indirectly on the policy base set out by the ANC. It is largely
ANC policy mandates that the Makgotla convert and prioritise into government pro-
grammes, thus rendering the Makgotla powerful in bureaucratic-administrative, more
than just in policy-decision-making, capacities. As DA Western Cape Premier, Helen
Zille, was a high-level non-ANC Makgotla participant from 2009-onwards.

**Cabinet office, cabinet clusters and interministerial committees extended into performance monitoring and evaluation**

A high proportion of policy and governance activities reside in the domain of the pow-
erful bureaucratic executive. However, given that they implement and support, rather
than take high-level political decisions, their forms of power are less politically con-
tested. Cabinet committees reach back to the Mandela administration. The Mbeki
period excelled at introducing detailed design initiatives, aimed at steering South Africa
into efficient governance. The Mbeki government’s so-called ‘integrated cabinet
decision process’ was envisaged to facilitate cross-sectoral planning and implementation,
to enhance coherence in decision making, and in the alignment of sectors with national
priorities. The focus of this process was on cross-cutting issues, strategic policy matters
and legislation. It linked the political and bureaucratic executives into institutions
that were located in the Presidency. The cabinet office provided administrative
support to the cabinet committees. The initiatives, however, still did not have all the
necessary effects.

Many of these structures and associated processes became institutionalised as building
blocks of government. For example, the cabinet office under Mbeki was the fulcrum for
the cabinet activities and coordinated the implementation of government’s plan of action
(PoA). The cabinet secretariat (with the PCAS under Mbeki) was designed to ensure
integration in government action. The essence of this arrangement was continuing post-
Mbeki, albeit with changing roles for the PCAS and the NPC stepping into the fold.

The Zuma administration recognised that coordination was not working as antici-
pated in the design. Strategic priorities were not being realised and the Zuma group
felt that the Mbeki apparatus lacked the ability to make effective interventions. Early
Zuma administration interventions comprised initiatives to get more regular reports to
bring problems to the surface, enhance implementation of government-wide monitoring
and evaluation, and tie senior public servants into performance contracts. The initiatives
### TABLE 3: Comparative cluster organisation in the Mbeki and Zuma administrations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mbeki administration</th>
<th>Zuma administration</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>New clusters</strong></td>
<td><strong>Departmental allocation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iii) investment and employment</td>
<td>Arts and Culture, Basic Education, Health, Higher Education and Training, Labour, Science and Technology, Sport and Recreation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(v) justice, crime prevention and security</td>
<td>Correctional Services, Defence, Home Affairs, Justice and Constitutional Development, Police, State Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(vi) governance and administration</td>
<td>Defence and Military Veterans, International Relations and Cooperation, Finance, State Security, Tourism, Trade and Industry, Water and Environmental Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(vii) governance and administration</td>
<td>Cogta, Home Affairs, Justice and Constitutional Development, Finance, Public Service and Administration, Performance Monitoring and Evaluation and Administration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

linked into the Zuma era’s steps to extend the system of PME in the Presidency. It was thought that it would be smart enough to determine Zuma’s legacy. By 2010/11 the signals were that the PME function remained understaffed, and suffered from manipulated and massaged monitoring information that was being pumped in.

The system of cabinet committees and cabinet clusters to support the work of cabinet and enhance coordination was restructured but retained in the transition between the two administrations. A mild restructuring was projected as an important correction of the Mbeki processes. From 2006 to May 2009 there were five cabinet clusters and six cabinet committees. Zuma introduced a cluster structure comprising seven cabinet clusters (Table 3). Correction of policy implementation did not follow automatically. The continuous deficits were ascribed to the absence of strong policy platforms and ministerial sensitivity to who was chairing their particular committees.

Inter-ministerial committees (IMCs) played important roles in the Zuma administration. They functioned on an ad hoc basis to deal with specific matters. Government problems or preparations for specific events were passed on to the IMCs. The IMCs report to cabinet via cabinet committees. In most cases they were constituted by the relevant-to-the-issue ministers. The ministers were supported by skilled technical teams, comprising, for example, directors general, officials and specialists. Examples included IMCs to generate a national programme on climate change, on HIV-Aids, on crime and corruption. In several instances the existence of an IMC was seen as evidence that issues were being handled.

**Individual cabinet members**

Individual cabinet members remained at the heart of policy decision making and influence, across presidential eras. Whoever the president, there was contestation over positioning in the inevitable ‘hierarchy of the very influential’. In the Mbeki cabinet there were invariably some that were recognised as dominating in policy debates. Others were vulnerable, especially where they circumvented ANC structures and launched controversial policy initiatives. Individual cabinet members in the Mbeki era singled out in the mid-2000s as particularly important in the influence stakes included finance minister Manuel, deputy finance minister Moleketi, public enterprises minister Alec Erwin, as well as minister in the presidency, Essop Pahad. Others noted Pallo Jordan as a powerful independent voice, or Jeff Radebe and Lindiwe Sisulu as dissenters. Essop Pahad was influential as cabinet member, personal adviser and presidential ‘fixer’. His political responsibilities included the GCIS, the International Marketing Council, the Media Development and Diversity Agency and the National Youth Commission.

With Zuma’s entrance, the Mbeki top-dogs’ influence evaporated. The NEC-NWC-anchored cabinet appointments of May 2009 formalised the rise of the new guard in the ANC. Cabinet members were firmly bound by Polokwane policy resolutions and their government’s short list of priorities, both serving to ‘predestine’ policy initiatives. Yet within these parameters, there was scope for individual effects. Part of the 2009 turnover strategy was the restructuring of government departments (Box 1). The
October 2010 reshuffle followed the same pattern, but Zuma used it strategically to help consolidate his position in the run-up to Mangaung 2012. Contestation nevertheless continued, especially with the SACP and Cosatu remaining uncertain as to how much influence they had bartered through their support in the Zuma war of ascendancy. At first there were fears that Manuel, as minister of the NPC, would eclipse the left star of economic development minister, Ebrahim Patel, and trade and industry’s Rob Davies.\textsuperscript{84} Patel and Davies’ policy platforms were confirmed. In late 2009, the ANC NEC and cabinet validated a scaled-down version of the NPC.\textsuperscript{85} In the course of 2010, the SACP as an identifiable voice in Cabinet quietened, now seemingly fully integrated in government.

\textbf{Special presidential advisers}

Special advisers in the Presidency constituted a layer of policy influence, which, on occasion, surpassed that of Cabinet. The advisers, along with other senior presidency officials, serve in terms of contracts linked to their principals. The power mongers of note under Mbeki were Netshitenzhe, Chikane and Mbeki’s changing group of special advisers, namely Mojanku Gumbi (extremely influential legal and any-other-matter adviser), Titus Mafolo (political adviser and speechwriter), professor Wiseman Nkuhlu (economic adviser, and later Cope politician, who was mainly concerned with the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (Nepad) secretariat), and Billy Masetlha (influential security adviser before he was redeployed to the National Intelligence Agency and became a Zuma man in the presidential succession race).\textsuperscript{86}

The first set of Zuma advisers constituted a three-way compromise corps and then had less status than the Mbeki advisers. They comprised former Mbeki cabinet members rewarded for their new (non-Cope) allegiance, prominent Zuma campaign supporters, ANC seniors who also had to be rewarded and close confidantes or comrades who would also be making tangible contributions to the new presidency. The new group included Mac Maharaj (confidante, strategist), Vusi Mavimbela (until his 2010 resignation), Charles Nqakula (former Mbeki cabinet member, political adviser until 2010), Mandisi Mpahlwa (former Mbeki cabinet member, economics adviser; appointed ambassador to Russia in mid-2010), Ayanda Dlodlo (Zuma’s parliamentary counsellor, former MK Military Veterans Association general secretary, NEC; appointed deputy minister in 2010), Lindiwe Zulu (international relations adviser, former ambassador to Brazil, previously Luthuli House spokesperson) and Bonisiwe Makhene (legal adviser, former deputy chief state law adviser in the Department of Justice).\textsuperscript{87} The power mongers in the Zuma presidency were at first recognised as chief of staff in the president’s private office, Lakela Kaunda; director general Mavimbela (until his 2010 resignation); chief operations officer Jessie Duarte (taking the place of Trevor Fowler until her resignation in 2010); deputy director-general Vusi Mona (until his 2010 resignation); and Zuma’s spokesperson Vincent Magwenya (resigned in 2010). Later they were Kaunda, Zizi Kodwa (head of Zuma’s office from 2010 on, and replaced as spokesperson by Maharaj in 2011), and also Maharaj, Zulu and Dlodlo.\textsuperscript{88} The Zuma presidential corps was subject to multiple changes, several of which were linked to the predominance of Kaunda.
ANC POWER AND STATE POWER

Policy coordination and advisory services (PCAS) and the National Planning Commission (NPC)

The PCAS (or policy unit) had the core mandate to facilitate integrated and strategic policy formulation, monitor and evaluate policy implementation, advise the Presidency on interventions, contribute to the implementation of specific projects or programmes, and undertake special programmes on gender, children and people with disabilities.89 Many of the PCAS functions became elaborated, extended, separated and elevated into the NPC and the PME.

The policy unit in the Mbeki period was the engine room that generated and scrutinised policy proposals. Joel Netshitenzhe was the PCAS head. (He stepped down a few months into the time of the Zuma administration, when the unit was to be superseded by the NPC.) Boyle's 2004 illustration90 of the policy-related importance of Netshitenzhe as the CEO of PCAS sheds light on the operation of the Mbeki presidency. GCIS produced the generic communication strategy for the government after the January cabinet lekgotla, ‘identifying key issues for the year ahead such as crime prevention, economic growth or poverty alleviation’ (Diagram 1). Netshitenzhe then advised on presidential interventions. Before each cabinet meeting his team drafted a current affairs overview, with proposals for action. As PCAS head, he helped prepare position papers. The 2003 macro-economic review that dealt with the quantification of the successes of the first ten years of South Africa’s democracy was an example. Netshitenzhe also cooperated with the Treasury in preparing the five-year Medium-term Strategic Framework (MTSF) that defined key challenges. It matched the Medium-term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) and defined government’s programmes. The deputy director-general of the PCAS would oversee the five chief directors in the Presidency (Organogram 1).91 PCAS had primarily serviced the political principals of the Presidency, along with those of Fosad and its clusters (in order to provide service to relevant cabinet members). Hence, it was argued that the PCAS had to be strong in coordination, given the diversified and complex mechanisms of delivery, including public-private partnerships. PCAS was also designed to deal with so-called transversal issues. It tested policy proposals against both the government’s agreed strategies for the following three to five years, and the MTEF.92

PCAS rule abruptly ended when the Zuma administration dissected institutions, and apportioned blame for the predecessor’s failures. The policy unit, it observed, had lacked sufficient capacity to plan and ensure regular monitoring, along with interventions when strategic priorities were not realised.93 The policy unit would henceforth become part of the NPC, and the NPC would fill a major void. Manuel enthused:94

We recognise that this approach will indelibly alter the way in which government operates, enhancing the sense of mutual accountability of ministers, of public servants, of departments and of spheres of government to each other …

The Zuma Presidency (Organogram 2) operated with six deputy director-generals (DDGs) – for communications, cabinet, strategy and operations, private offices of the
The president and deputy president, and policy coordination; and 16 chief directors – in charge of the office of the director general, strategic management, the chief financial officer, communications support services, communications spokesperson president, communications spokesperson deputy president, cabinet operations, cabinet secretariat, legal services, protocol, corporate services, private office of the president, office of the deputy president, special projects, monitoring and evaluation, and Fosad.

Fosad was well-institutionalised and sufficiently neutral in bureaucratic-governance terms to continue as a powerful institution in the Presidency. In the Mbeki and Motlanthe eras, it had provided the base for the directors general to process ministerial initiatives and policy unit guidance. As an earlier task, Fosad and the cabinet clusters had been engaged in strategising about capacity and organisation of the state, signifying Fosad power over the meta-policy of government organisation.

In total, these political and bureaucratic structures were centrally positioned to influence policy and governance operations for continuous implementation across presidential periods. In the Mbeki period they were not necessarily at odds with the ANC, but the day-to-day explicit frame was not there. In the Zuma era their operations were more explicitly positioned within the parameters of ANC policies and with full acknowledgement of the centrality of the ANC to the Presidency.

BOX 1: Restructured and renamed national government departments, May 2009

- The Department of Minerals and Energy was split into the departments of Mining and of Energy, each with a minister.
- The Department of Education was split into the departments of Basic Education and of Higher Education and Training.
- The Department of Housing was to be called the Department of Human Settlements ‘to take on a more holistic focus’.
- A new department of Rural Development and Land Affairs was an initiative that was ‘part of our key priorities for the next five years’.
- The Department of Water Affairs and Forestry became the Department of Water and Environmental Affairs.
- The Department of Economic Development was established to focus on economic policy-making. The implementation functions remained with the Department of Trade and Industry. Subsequent to establishment it became clear that the department would be tasked with development and some coordination of economic policy.
- A new Department of Tourism was created.
- The Department of Agriculture became the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry.
- The Department of Provincial and Local Government became Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs; and International Relations became International Relations and Cooperation.
- A new Ministry was created for Women, Youth, Children and People with Disability, ‘to emphasise the need for equity and access to development opportunities for the vulnerable groups in our society’.
ANC as reinstated primary cluster member

The bulk of the preceding section centred on the reinstatement under Zuma of the ANC in the heart of public policy in South Africa – in the (state) Presidency. This section briefly highlights the Mbeki base on which the Zuma administration acted.

In the mid-2000s, Mbeki had regularly spent time (even like clockwork, Monday mornings) at the ANC’s Luthuli House, for meetings or general liaison with top ANC officials. From 2005 this interaction dwindled. Mbeki became distrusted for the way in which he had facilitated, or refrained from acting to stop, the prosecution of Jacob Zuma on charges that many saw as trumped up, or judging Zuma as guilty without trial, albeit never exposed to courtroom interrogation.

In the Mbeki era there was increasing contraction of policy functions into a core that was mostly constituted and directed by the Presidency of South Africa, with the objective of coordination of the policy process. This had meant that the Presidency assumed the roles of primary policy actor, gatekeeper of contestation and architect of which influences would enter the category of ‘primary’. Many of the policy functions were indeed exercised in conjunction with ANC structures and defined points of entry for ANC influences into the government’s policy apparatuses. Yet, these were confined and earned the wrath of the ANC for the power base of the Presidency. As Netshitenzhe noted: ‘The understanding is that you need to create as much space as possible for those in the government to manoeuvre within the parameters that have been set out by the party.’ In Cosatu ranks discontent with the Mbeki incumbency was first raised at its 2003 congress. The ANC’s July 2005 NGC showed a revolt from the branches, along with alliance partner Cosatu against Mbeki’s marginalisation of both ANC and more left-aligned policy actors.

The Zuma era had the top-echelon of the ANC and the Presidency closely aligned and engaged in central policy and governance roles.

RECASTING THE ARCHITECTURE OF COORDINATION, INTEGRATION AND PLANNING

The coordination and integration of policy and governance functions was an important driving force in the successive presidencies. They realised that both decentralisation of functions of policy and governance to the provincial and local spheres of governance, and overlaps and duplication in the inter-departmental domain (as well as failures in delivery due to non-coordination), necessitated coordination and integration. The Mbeki administration invested in the design of a system with horizontal, vertical and cross-sectoral mechanisms and procedures for coordination. Gumede enthused that ‘South Africa has just truly entered a phase of integrated governance’. The Zuma presidency pitched its inventions and additions as measures to achieve better coordination of the spheres and sectors of governance. Coordination structures and processes were retained or, reshaped, renamed and expanded. The new administration added to the coordination thrust through the NPC initiative and the extension of
performance monitoring and evaluation.\textsuperscript{103} For example, the presidential coordinating
council (PCC)\textsuperscript{104} was replaced with the President’s Intergovernmental Forum.\textsuperscript{105} It com-
prised the president, ministers in the Presidency, any other minister or deputy-ministers
invited by the president, the nine premiers and representatives of local government.

On the \textit{horizontal} level, the cabinet clusters (reorganised by Zuma; Table 3), Fosad,
as well as the PCAS and NPC systems provided the structures through which policy
coordination and government integration was built. The processes of linkage included
the extended cluster committee meetings, Makgotla deliberations, the Integrated
Planning Framework, the MTSF, the MTEF in relation to the Medium-term
Expenditure Committee (MTEC), as well as monitoring and evaluation processes
driven from the Presidency. The MTSF at first worked in a three-year cycle, but was
expanded to articulate with the five-year electoral mandates (Diagram 1).\textsuperscript{106} It informed
all policy work, guiding planning and implementation of policy and informing resource
allocation. The MTSF extended predictability to government budgetary actions – in
October or November of any particular year it was possible to get indications of what
was to be expected in the following three years.\textsuperscript{107} The MTSF set policy priorities and
facilitated planning and budgeting. The \textit{South African Yearbook} around the time of the
formation of the system elaborated: \textsuperscript{108}

The rolling three-year MTEF is a critical tool for planning and aligning plans
with the available budgets. The Public Finance Management Act (PFMA), 1999
(Act 1 of 1999) … requires all state departments to adhere to norms of strategic
and transparent management and utilisation of state finances. The PFMA, 1999
also serves to strengthen the management capacity of the public service. It
enhances managerial responsibility through decentralisation, while strengthening
accountability for specified objectives and set targets.

The Zuma administration’s changes approximated a minor reshuffle and extension.
The principles of the cluster system were not questioned. Zuma continued a reliance
on technocratic-institutional solutions, as evident in the introduction of new ministries
and reshaping of portfolios. In contrast with Mbeki, however, Zuma did not set himself
up as a technocratic mastermind who was, in the words of Davis,\textsuperscript{109} ‘on top of every
detail of the government’s policies and programmes’. Instead, he delegated to those he
had positioned around him.

\textit{Vertical} coordination and integration were facilitated through the President’s
Coordinating Council / Intergovernmental Forum; continuous from Mbeki to Zuma at
the highest level, the Ministerial Forum (of national Ministers and Provincial MECs or
Minmec as the line-function interface), offices of Fosad, heads of department (HODs),
the cabinet clusters and the Treasury.\textsuperscript{110} Officials in Fosad, HODs, and clusters backed up
the vertical process. The processes and institutions became institutionalised, operated
through the transitional Motlanthe period, and were integrated into the operations of
the Zuma administration.
ORGANOGRAM 1: Structure of the Presidency of South Africa, Mbeki era

ORGANOGRAM 2: Structure of the Presidency of South Africa, Zuma era

The Mbeki administration’s initiatives on integration, coordination and planning (to effect implementation) made a difference but were no cure-all. The legislation, in the form of successive Division of Revenue Acts, that was introduced annually to govern fund allocation to the spheres of government in the period 2005 onwards, for example, contained conditions to improve cabinet ministers’ leverage over their counterparts in provinces and municipalities. According to the Division of Revenue Act 1 of 2005 the cabinet member responsible for a concurrent national and provincial legislative function had the power to determine a monitoring system for the performance of provinces or municipalities. The minister was permitted to make recommendations to a province or municipality to effect improvement of ‘service delivery performance and compliance with national legislation’,\textsuperscript{111} The Act also catered for the eventuality that should national ministers and their departments anticipate failures in the implementation of policies and programmes on service delivery in the other spheres of government, they may issue instructions on the detail of departmental management, including staff issues, governance and administration. It was specified that premiers and mayors must ‘take into account’ such recommendations. Ismael Momoniat, then DDG for intergovernmental relations in the Treasury, conceded that the constitution limited government’s scope for action, but stressed that ‘the new measures provide for improved accountability in a system that has so far enabled provinces to get away with under-expenditure’.\textsuperscript{112} Despite these efforts vertical co-ordination continuously suffered from poor articulation between the spheres of government.

From mid-2007 onwards, a process of review of the functioning of provincial and local government was conducted.\textsuperscript{113} Its finalisation stalled with the advent of the transition to Zuma and the ANC’s imperative in the run-up to the 2009 elections not to alienate provincial or local players. In the aftermath of the elections the debate on the future of provinces was resuscitated.\textsuperscript{114} In late October 2009 the new administration, through the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (Cogta) released the \textit{State of Local Government in South Africa, Overview Report}.\textsuperscript{115} Municipalities were tasked to produce turnaround strategies by early 2010. A generalised national turnaround strategy followed and eyes turned towards implementation, by all indications a slow process. In December 2010 the ANC implemented the 2010 NGC decision to convene a summit on the future of the provinces.\textsuperscript{116} Policy proposals were forwarded to the ANC’s 2012 policy conference.

Much of the vertical coordination of the implementation of the government’s \textit{plan of action} (in effect, all previously enacted and continuously relevant policies) had a bearing on intergovernmental relations. Over time government had several initiatives to work towards the provinces and local government structures achieving effectiveness. The repertoire included the central management of important programmes,\textsuperscript{117} and the Division of Revenue Act (No. 1 of 2005). The Municipal Infrastructure Grant (MIG) was another measure to help the centre monitor the provinces’ and municipalities’ implementation of policy. To illustrate, only 56 per cent of the 2004/5 MIG had been allocated to municipalities by the end of 2004.\textsuperscript{118} This was ‘a reflection of lack of all-round capacity particularly in technical areas with regard to water, sanitation and public works projects’.\textsuperscript{119} The wise application of allocated funds continued as a problem well
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into the Zuma period. The processes of performance evaluation constituted one attempt by the new administration to come to terms with the challenge.\textsuperscript{120}

**Cross-sectoral coordination** was facilitated through presidential advisory councils, special interest offices in the Presidency, and mechanisms of monitoring and evaluation.\textsuperscript{121} By the time of the Zuma administration there was already a set of these institutions and processes. It then retained the bulk and more were crafted. Cabinet and the president’s coordinating council were recognised as two of the key planning institutions that already existed in the Presidency of South Africa. The NPC was added (Diagram 2), consisting of external commissioners, a ministerial committee on planning to provide guidance and support to the planning function, and a secretariat to support the commission’s work. It was envisaged that the planning ministry, in conjunction with other ministries, ‘would interact with broader societal stakeholders in the development and implementation of a national plan’.\textsuperscript{122}

The NPC documentation noted that the prevailing planning cycle needed to be improved and planning be directed by a well-conceived national vision. It affirmed that the government’s programme of action would be derived from the MTSF. The ‘MTSF for 2009-2014: Together doing more and better’ was adopted by the incoming administration, with the cycle mapped, as before, in terms of (i) the annual update to be adopted by the July cabinet lekgotla, (ii) government departments and provinces also in July forwarding initial budget submissions, (iii) the October presentation of the medium-term budget policy statement to Parliament, (iv) the integration of the programmes in the course of December, (v) adoption by the January cabinet lekgotla, (vi) following through with incorporation of themes into the February state of the nation

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**DIAGRAM 2: National Planning Commission in the Presidency of South Africa**

- **President and Cabinet**
  - Responsible for policy decision-making

- **Ministry in the Presidency for National Planning**
  - Advises cabinet on NPC outcomes
  - (chaired by NPC Minister)

- **Ministerial Commission on Planning**
  - Advises cabinet on NPC outcomes

- **National Planning Commission**
  - (Experts, representative of major social forces in society)
  - Work with government on long-term vision and strategic plan; provide input on cross-cutting developmental issues

- **Secretariat to the Commission**
  - Support work of NPC and Minister; work with key centres of excellence

**Source:** NPC Green Paper, September 2009, p. 22; Revised Green Paper, December 2009.
address, and (vii) these being embodied in the government’s programme of action, which is an annual statement of government priorities.123

The Green Paper on national strategic planning was initially contested,124 but in late 2009 the Tripartite Alliance summit confirmed Manuel’s position and proposals for the composition of the NPC, acknowledging the need for civil society representation.125 The Green Paper gave the president overall responsibility to appoint both the 20-person commission and the cabinet ministers to assist the planning minister. It was effected in 2010. The Mbeki ghost of centralisation was still haunting planning initiatives. Manuel argued that the proposed arrangements did not constitute centralisation: ‘The state has an enormous responsibility. And that means you don’t have to try to centralize everything’.126 Chabane stressed that the ministry of PME was intended neither to centralise nor to police ministers. The NPC Diagnostic Report alluded to weaknesses in governance processes that directly linked to centralisation – whether in Mbeki formulae, or in the Zuma formulae of centralisation of state operations around prevailing ANC incumbents.127

CONCLUSION

The problems of getting government to work, without being seen to centralise power, afflicted both the Mbeki and Zuma administrations, albeit in different manners. The emphasis on capacity-generation for enhanced policy implementation was evidenced in a range of high-level government initiatives, across the presidencies. Mbeki established many of the foundations, and Zuma extended and elaborated them.128 Mbeki’s institutional and process designs anchored his presidency, but also helped deliver disconnection from the ANC. He had become alienated from large components of the ANC, and certainly from the top ANC, Cosatu and SACP leadership.129 The institutional design was strategic and seemingly well-targeted. Yet, when it came to closing the gap between good intention and definitive state performance, the labyrinths of institutions that had been spun around the Presidency revealed shortcomings. The Zuma administration brought a few important extensions, whilst the essence of the system remained intact. The principal difference was that the Presidency of South Africa through core personalities and close contact was now actively linked to the ANC. By August 2011 it was clear that public service operations had been destabilised by policy and institutional adaptations that were instituted as evidence of problems being addressed. It was to be seen how the Presidency’s NPC would step into a political battleground to turn the ship of the ANC state around.

The ANC project of generation and regeneration of power was both served and undermined by the presidencies of South Africa. Optimally functioning presidencies ensure effectiveness in policy and governance, including the implementation of ANC (and government) policy. A well-functioning presidency clearly links to the generation of popular power, and the continuous generation of trust in the ANC as government helmsman. The period of ANC power contests occupying the Presidency of the country caused paralysis and procrastination. Under both presidencies there were slow and mixed levels of
success. Given the scope of the tasks of optimising policy implementation through coor-
dinated and longer-term planning, along with monitoring, change was of necessity going
to be longer-term. Much of the endeavour depended on the municipalities and provinces
shaping up, besides national government departments improving their performances and
the Presidency effectively designing and coordinating the changes. The ANC’s task was
to pinpoint sufficient markers of progress to keep the people of South Africa trusting that
ANC power in the Presidency was working for them.

NOTES

1 Mbeki on several occasions quoted from WB Yeats in public speeches and, on occasion, also
used this particular quote. The quote, however, has ironic relevance to Mbeki’s ousting from the
Presidency of South Africa. See WB Yeats, 1921, The second coming, poem in Yeats’ collection of
verses, Michael Robartes and the Dancer.

South Africa, p. 75, referring to planning activity in the Presidency having been suspended from
September 2008 to June 2009, ‘pending the finalisation of the political transition’.

3 See for example Aster Kumssa and Isaac Mbeche, 2004, ‘The role of institutions in the develop-
ment process in Africa,’ International Journal of Social Economics, 31:1, pp. 840-857; Garrath
Williams, 2006, “Infrastructure of responsibility”: The moral tasks of institutions’, Journal of
Applied Philosophy, 23:2, pp. 207-221.


5 David Moore, 2009, ‘South Africa’s depression/recession, the national democratic revolution
and the developmental state: a “Development Studies” perspective’, Diskoers / Discourse,
November 2009, University of Johannesburg.

6 ‘New Dawn’ official residence of the president of South Africa formerly known as Libertas.

7 Interview with Mzwanele Mayekiso, 26 September, 2008, Johannesburg; Makhudu Sefara, 2008,
News/0,186187_2427041,00.html (accessed 3 January 2010).

8 Moshoeshoe Monare, 2009, ‘Shaping up to the toughest job’, Sunday Argus, 16 August 2009, p. 20;
also see Chapter 2.


11 Angela Quintal, 2008, writing on the eve of Mbeki’s last State of the Nation address, see ‘Mbeki’s
bid to salvage legacy’, The Star, 7 February 2008, p. 15.


13 Jeremy Gordin, 2008, Zuma – a biography, Johannesburg and Cape Town; Jonathan Ball
Publishers, p. 278.

14 This was despite Zuma, in papers filed in the Pietermaritzburg High Court in July 2007, stating that
he did not have any evidence to prove the claim of political conspiracy; see Jackie Mapiloko and

15 See, for example, Moipone Malefane, 2011, ‘President bolsters power base’, Sunday Times, 10
July 2011, p. 4; Marianne Merten, 2011, ‘Master tactician – a communicator?’ The Sunday
Independent, 10 July 2011, p. 4.
For example, the SACP’s Blade Nzimande argued strong policy influence and being consulted by President Zuma, *Forum at 8*, SABC-SAFM, interview, 26 July 2011.


Government Communication and Information Services (GCIS), *South Africa Yearbook 2000/01*, Pretoria, Government Printer, p. 49 noted: ‘The integrated manner in which programmes are pursued reflects the interconnectedness of the challenges which face the South African Government and society. The recent introduction of a Planning Framework for government is designed to integrate and synchronise strategic and policy processes with the budget cycle. Supporting it is a number of efforts to enhance the monitoring and evaluation of government programmes, of a kind that goes beyond merely financial information to include social impact and outcomes, outputs against set targets, extent of equitable delivery and accessibility of services.’


The scenario planning initiative was an ongoing special project in the Mbeki presidency, with the objective to answer the question: What challenges will the government face in the second decade of freedom and at its culmination? (in relation to the 2003 initiative). The scenarios were intended to assist long-term planning by clarifying assumptions about the future, facilitate the use of a common language and test the rigour of government policies and strategies. See [http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/docs/reports/annual/2003/chapt6.pdf](http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/docs/reports/annual/2003/chapt6.pdf) (accessed, 5 October 2009).


guide to the national planning framework, Presidency, Pretoria.


33 Blade Nzimande, 2006, said: ‘The Presidency is overly powerful and concentrated... our democracy is excessively presidential’, ANC Daily News Briefing, 2 June 2006; see http://70.84.171.10/~etools/newsbrief/2006/news0602.txt (accessed 6 October 2009).


41 In June 2005 he succeeded in replacing Zuma as deputy-president of the country, but the ANC forced his reinstatement.


Implementation is used in the context of the need to see the full and multi-stage process of policy implementation as an integral part of the policy making process. The meaning of policy goes beyond the original inspirational statements of policy – has continuously to be identified as that which is manifested / realised on the ground. That is where the real evidence of policy is found.

See, for example, Brendan Boyle, 2008, ‘Open season …’, op. cit.; Quintal, 2008, op. cit.; Mark Gevisser, 2007, Thabo Mbeki – The Dream Deferred, Johannesburg and Cape Town, Jonathan Ball offers insights into how Mbeki related to the ANC political project.


Many, especially in the Mbeki camp, in the ANC formalistically disputed the notion of two (or three) centres of power. They argued that it would be unconstitutional for the ANC to instruct the executive, given that an unelected mandate cannot tell the elected what to do, and that the three branches of government hold the constitutional authority to act. See Mpumelelo Mkhabela and Paddy Harper, 2008, ‘One party, worlds apart’, Sunday Times, 20 July 2008, p. 18.


The analyses are anchored in the several preceding rounds of research by the author, which are now updated and reassessed. The previous analyses include Susan Booyesen, 2001, ‘Transitions and trends in policymaking, … op. cit., pp. 125–144 (note 22); Susan Booyesen, 2006, ‘Public policymaking … op. cit. (note 27); Susan Booyesen, 2005, ‘Channelling and tweaking …, op. cit., p. 33.


As quoted in Mandy Rossouw, 2009, ‘President’s power surge’, Mail & Guardian, 1-7 May, p. 2.

Manamela Ramaphole, 2008, op. cit.


Interview with ministerial adviser, 2009, granted on condition of anonymity, Johannesburg, 22 August 2009.

For example, presidency appointees Joel Netshitenzhe and Alan Hirsch were described as remnants of the ‘1996 class project’ (a derogatory term coined by the left to refer to those who ran the economy under the Mbeki presidency) by Cosatu at its 21-24 September 2009 Midrand congress.

There was a gradual extension in participants over the years. For example, from mid-2005, the deputy ministers, as well as the premiers and national and provincial directors-general, were included in some special extended Cabinet meetings (see Business Report, 13 May 2005, p.1). In July 2005 provincial premiers and directors general were for the first time included in the Cabinet Lekgotla and the metropolitan mayors first joined in late 2006.


Fosad is a forum of all heads of national government departments and the provincial directors-
Between centralisation and centralism

general. Fosad was established in 1998 by the Cabinet as a support structure to the Cabinet and the restructured Cabinet committees in their approach to integrated governance, aimed at integrating planning, decision making and service delivery in accordance with the Constitution. The Fosad secretariat provides administrative support to Fosad, the Fosad management committee and the chair of Fosad. This involves close interaction between the Fosad secretariat, chairs and co-chairs of DG clusters, the presidency and departments (see http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/docs/reports/annual/2003/chapt6.pdf, accessed 5 October 2009).

71 The ANC daily news briefing, 1994, ‘Meeting of the cabinet, 1 June 1994’ noted that the ‘Cabinet has started the process of creating Cabinet Committees to deal with, and ensure efficient management of, various areas of government. Details in this regard will be announced in due course’, 2 June 1994.


77 Mohammed Jahed (member of the ANC transition team to prepare for Zuma’s assumption of power), 2009, interview, Johannesburg, 10 May 2009.


79 Interview with senior provincial bureaucrat responsible for collating monitoring data, anonymous, Johannesburg, 15 February 2011; interview with senior Presidency official with insight into monitoring data reaching the Presidency, anonymous, 10 December 2010.


81 Interview with Presidency official, anonymous, Pretoria, 14 April 2011; also see The Presidency Annual Report 2009 – 2010, op. cit., p. 58.


84 Patel, according to many reports, was the left’s prize won in the final stages of putting together the Zuma cabinet. Cosatu at its September 2009 congress amplified its concerns that the hard-won Patel space was being superseded by the space that Manuel as planning minister had been carving out through the Green Paper on the National Planning Commission, 2009, op. cit. Manuel’s wings were clipped.

85 See Moipone Malefane, 2009, ‘Alliance at odds over who calls the shots’, Sunday Times, 15 November 2009, http://www.timeslive.co.za/sundaytimes/article194501.ec (accessed 20 November 2009) and Sibusiso Ngalwa, 2009, ‘Manuel 1: Cosatu 0’, The Star, 16 November 2009. Zuma stamped his authority on the Tripartite Alliance, telling delegates to the three-day summit that Minister of Planning Manuel would remain the political head of the NPC. ANC secretary general Gwede Mantashe told the media after the three-day alliance summit that the summit had also agreed on Manuel’s suggested composition for the commission.


91 Ibid.

92 The advisory forum in the presidency comprised, inter alia, DGs, HODs and clusters. It handled strategic issues, as they arose. Its policy impact, however, remained moderate. Reasons included the realities that its activities were not sustained throughout the year, and that DGs relegated cluster work to secondary status, work that would follow only after their core departmental responsibilities.

93 Jahed, 2009, op. cit.

94 Trevor Manuel, 2009, Response by the Minister in the Presidency responsible for Planning, Trevor Manuel, on the occasion of the debate on the President’s State of the Nation address, Parliament of South Africa, 5 June.

95 Thabo Mbeki, 2005, President’s Budget Speech, 15 February, Cape Town.


100 2003 was also the year in which Bulelani Ngcuka, national director of public prosecutions (NDPP) at the time, announced to the media that there was a prima facie case against Zuma, but that he would not prosecute him.


104 The PCC is a statutory body that meets regularly to coordinate and align priorities, objectives and strategies across national, provincial and local government and other reports dealing with the performance of provinces and municipalities, among others. The PCC will discuss amongst other issues, the national fiscal framework, health and education; http://www.thepresidency.gov.za (accessed 30 April 2010).

105 National Planning Green Paper, op. cit.


110 See for example Cabinet Office, Presidency of the Republic of South Africa, 2005, The functioning of the Cabinet, its committees and support systems, Johannesburg, Mvelaphanda.
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111 Division of Revenue Act, No. 1 of 2005, Cape Town, Parliament of South Africa.
112 Dawes, 2005, op. cit.
113 This was in the form of the provincial and local government review as part of the White Paper process; see Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG), 2007, Policy process on the system of provincial and local government, background document, Pretoria.
116 ANC NGC, 23 September 2010, media briefing, Durban.
119 Weekend Post, 12 February 2005.
121 Robertson, 2004, op. cit.
122 Presidency, Green Paper, op. cit. p. 22.
129 In the last years of his reign Mbeki, for example, had accused Cyril Ramaphosa, Tokyo Sexwale and Mathews Phosa of plotting against him, he had suspended Billy Maseltha (see Zukile Majova, 2007, ‘Billy Maseltha: “Mbeki dumped me”’, Mail & Guardian, 21-27 September 2007, pp. 6-7), edged out Siphiwe Nyanda, fired Nozizwe Madlala-Routledge, crossed swords with Julius Malema, instituted (but failed to draw to conclusions) charges against Mac Maharaj and Ngoako Ramathlodi, and appointed provincial premiers over the heads of provincial heavyweights. The latter act was repeated by Zuma, courtesy of gender quotas.
Democratic South Africa at its worst was preferable to apartheid South Africa at its best, yet its deficits and fault lines were frightening.

This was not for a lack of policy proposals and adoption. More than 17 years of policy action had brought extensive change, yet fell far short of both the ideals of the Freedom Charter and the 1994 humanitarian benchmarks. Change was differential, as evident in race-class-gender permutations. Policy debates shifted over time. They veered between statements of ‘change pending’, ‘good policies, but failures on implementation’, ‘Mbeki-ites failing the people’, ‘improve representation and accountability by representatives’, and ‘root out corruption’, to the muted ‘new initiatives in the Zuma administration’, ‘implement the Polokwane resolutions’ and ‘we did not know’ (about severe conditions on the ground circa local election 2011). The ANC was conflicted between when to claim policy successes and when to acknowledge failures. The ‘challenge’ was to get replacement and supplementary policies adopted, while building state capacity and public sector integrity and dedication to unambiguously serve the people. It was a tall but unavoidable order. Without realising it, the ANC in the longer term would be increasingly dependent on propaganda and manipulation of popular consciousness to secure continued belief in it and to renew its power.

Concerted policy implementation would have been much more achievable in South Africa, had policy not also been at the heart of political contestation – frequently being the code or proxy speak for contests and lines of division. Simultaneously, significant players clamoured for positioning to direct and control policy. The substantial intra-ANC and intra-Alliance contests clouded policy pursuits. Policy was a form of political combat in party and in state, central to the ANC succession battles in the 2009-onwards Zuma administration, and it became a proxy strategy in campaigning for Mangaung

*The system is changing and the challenges are changing. One can never respond to new challenges by trying to reproduce the responses which had their efficacy in a previous period.*

Samir Amin, 1997

CHAPTER 12

Policy, pursuit of the ‘turn to the left’ and the paradox of continuity
2012. In the Polokwane round it was situated amidst intense turmoil and potential instability, mostly to do with leadership replacement. For some, Polokwane was the moment to get policy change; others used accusations of policy failure and advocacy as a vaguely defined instrument to get leadership turnover.

ANC and ANC-in-government policy action since 1994 rendered a cumulative product that combined social-welfarist social concern with the poor and oppressed, with liberal-democratic and conservative-neoliberal components … and the collective policy amalgam fell short of expectations of bringing in jobs, reducing poverty and inequality, and making communities feel the 1994 dream was within their grasp. The ANC fostered a balance between neo-liberal economic fundamentals that had been associated with the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (Gear) strategy, replaced-supplemented with the New Growth Path (NGP) in 2010, commitment to a development-state-cum-welfare-state, the interracial movement of capital, and policy determination through global policy networks. The ANC’s ideological policy amalgam by 2011 only hinted at the deep ideals of preceding contestation. The blend of left-social democracy, state responsibility (for social-grant socialism), combined with national and liberal thrusts, revealed paradoxes which were explained through the ‘current stage of the national democratic revolution’ while awaiting full and substantive democracy. This would have been a steadfast track, had the 1994 socio-economic ideals not been so far removed from the 2011 reality.

The chapter tracks an extraordinary period of policy contestation in 2005-11, which accompanied the ANC’s succession wars, the years of the Zuma administration, and two ANC succession races (in which the ANCYL variably positioned itself). It was through twinning with the succession battles that the ANC alliance partners, Cosatu and the SACP, tried to broaden prevailing policy parameters. Direct policy influence and immediately-amended policies was their first prize. The second prize was positioning for policy influence within the heart of government. Zuma succession struggle debt was their bargaining chip, along with reminders of the policy planning and implementation deficit that was passed on from the Mbeki era. The ANC’s insistence that it was bound by its Polokwane policy resolutions and its reminders – in similar vein from Mbeki and Zuma – that the ANC was not a socialist organisation affected their capture of these prizes. Mbeki, Midrand 2007, famously stated that the SACP ‘has always understood that it could not delegate its socialist tasks to the ANC, consistent with the fact that the tasks of the socialist revolution could not be delegated to the national democratic revolution...’ Zuma reiterated this at a later stage. That time around, given friendlier alliance dynamics, the partners did not object. The ANCYL’s calls for ‘economic liberation’ circa 2009-11 supplemented the policy debates – whilst dramatically meshing policy, succession and individual beneficiation.

The chapter highlights the setting and discourses of policy change, and then dissects the policy debates of 2005-11. The focus is on the interfaces between ANC policy, succession and the longer-term generation of popular power through successful policy. The constructs of ‘interface of policy and succession’ and ‘concentric contests for succession, party-state predominance, and alliance centres of power’ structure the chapter.
The ANC presidential succession of December 2007, the national-South African presidential succession of April 2009, and subsequent positioning for Mangaung 2012 exposed the interfaces between policy and succession politics. At times the battles for supremacy of the ANC over the state, and of alliance partners and sympathetic segments of the ANC for dominance over the Tripartite Alliance, stood at the centre of this crossing point. The succession events came to symbolise policy contests, struggles for optimal policy content, the need to subvert deficits, and positioning of the state and its functionaries in relation to private capital. Due to concentrated attention to policy and stock-taking – and even if policy came to be used as a weapon in succession battles – the succession periods delivered windows for change. Much would remain unaltered once the dust had settled, but the push to reassess and justify retentions heightened accountability and delivered reminders of the responsibility to get ‘best policy practice’ activated. The primary challenge come 2011 was to show that implementation would be pursued with as much political will as policy and policy-institutional design.

Direct actions of policy contestation are important. They include positions put forward in policy debates and proposed policy alternatives. In conditions of intra-party succession (where derived consensus and internal discipline are valued and enforced) policy contestation in indirect guises rivals the ‘direct’. Such policy challenges came in guises of attacks on personality, leadership style, custodianship of liberation movement character, representation of the working class, and organisation of the state policy processes. The literature on policy-making is rich in insights into policy making processes and models to assess change and continuity. Yet, it offers little analytical guidance for policy contestation in instances of intra-party succession. To this end, the chapter identifies two intersecting constructs to analyse the South African case:

- The first is simply the policy-succession interface. The analysis explores details of how policy affected successions, and the manner in which successions impacted policy (Figure 1).
- The second comprises three concentric battles that continuously characterise policy contestation – succession battles, the battle for primacy amongst Tripartite Alliance partners, and the battle of state-versus-party (Figure 2).

The policy contests – sometimes mock contests – played out in politics and ideology in a domain demarcated by institutions and populated by intra-ANC factions, provinces and leagues, and the two alliance partners. For the Alliance the 2007-09 succession was about capturing the heart of the ANC-in-government, to assert themselves as dominant policy forces, in a movement in which they had become alienated. Alliance members were the main protagonists in first challenging Mbeki’s relative insulation from the ANC in the west wing of the Union Buildings, then the Zuma administration’s insistence on the ANC being the centre of power, and then to battle in the complex Mangaung alliances. The 2010-11 alliance positioning was even more complex. The
ANCYL was trying to claim a status superior to the alliance partners, the SACP was effectively integrated in the Zuma government (with sub-optimal policy influence), the ANC repeatedly asserted itself as the Alliance’s centre of power, and Cosatu was hovering as watchdog over the ANC predators in government.

**FIGURE 1: Basic contestation interface of policy and succession**

**FIGURE 2: Converging battles in policy contestation**

**UNFOLDING DEBATES AND DISCOURSES ON ‘LEFT TURNS’ IN ANC POLICY**

The notion of ‘multiple policy streams’, of policy problems, solutions, and elections of policy actors, captures the essence of policy activity in policy implementation, refinement and supplementation in South Africa. The focus period of this chapter, 2005-11, was part of the long chain of policy contestation, with ongoing developments in policy debates and actors in the party, state domains and international-global domains. Windows of opportunity for reconsideration and renewal arose.
Successions often bring unique expectations and promises of policy change, but often also limited prospects of realising initial hopes. South Africa’s 1994 transition, for example, brought systemic change, yet also carried enduring ideological and policy compromises – to the extent that by 2011 the Constitution of 1996 came under pressure, for example for entrenching the right to private ownership of land. The policy contests across the two main succession periods were paradoxically fierce and the bearers of modest outcomes. They gained ferocity through their twinning with the Alliance’s anti-Mbeki struggle, which followed through into a contest first to find ultimate positioning for influence in the Zuma administration, and then to morph into small, gradual policy influences. The policy-ideology arguments have their roots in a continuously ambiguous positioning of the ANC, frequently playing with socialist inspiration of the Freedom Charter’s ‘the people shall own’, whilst, when convenient in modern times, claiming that it draws inspiration rather than direct instruction from the Charter. The ANC’s economic policy positioning is the clash between the Freedom Charter, the influences of global policy networks, and the beneficiation of the ‘political class’. Variations on this theme unfolded under the successive presidents.

**Positioning of the alliance partners**

It was frequently hoped that the acrimony of the Zuma-Mbeki contest and the alliance partners’ alignment with the Zuma camp, along with the Zuma camp’s large measure of dependence on them for mobilisation, would bring tangibly left-leaning policies … despite the ANC’s 2007 policy conference and its 2009 election manifesto rendering at best mildly left emphases. So eager were the alliance partners and enclaves in the ANC for left-change (that would also help differentiate them from Mbeki-ists) that they proclaimed left victories left, right and centre. The problems and ironies of left positioning in South Africa are well illustrated in the work of Dale McKinley, Michael Sachs, Mazibuko Jara, and many others. Sachs points to the problems that the SACP has in differentiating its own programme:

So the ANC sees the private sector as the main agent of accumulation and the state’s role is to structure and regulate accumulation and redistribute part of the surplus it generates. The SACP would rather see a much greater substitution of public for private capital in the accumulation process. In either case, however, we are still talking about the accumulation of capital in a (capitalist) mixed-economy, or at least the SACP programme offers no explanation to the contrary.

McKinley argues that both Cosatu and the SACP leadership bought into the ANC’s ‘nation building’ and ‘corporatist consensus’ sales pitch (rationalised by constant reference to the Stalinist era-inspired theory of the ‘national democratic revolution’), thus placing the key components of the political left in a classic strategic cul-de-sac. This was a situation:

… where the pursuit and advancement of an anti-capitalist struggle is effectively co-determined by capital itself, and by a state already wholly committed to securing
the core interests of capital. When, as they did throughout the better part of the
1990s, Cosatu and SACP leaders tell the workers and poor that the best (and
only) strategic option is to manage better their own exploitation, and hope that
somewhere down the road it will lead to ‘socialism’, the entire meaning of what
is ‘left’ is put into question.

Hence resulted the position, McKinley argues, where the two alliance partners had
effectively chosen to be junior partners in an alliance they ‘will never run and control
(but might have key positions in)’, and thus practice a politics of offering critiques of
existing policy implementation and arguing for policies that have a more pro-poor char-
acter or more state involvement; engage in occasional campaigns and activities designed
to ‘show’ that the working class is still a force to be reckoned with and simultaneously
continue to be part of an ANC electoral machine and to participate in an ANC-run
state through its various institutional mechanisms.14

A substantial part of policy debate is the extent to which activist society reckons
the ANC should change, and whether it should turn more socialist, and with what
component building blocks. The SACP at times was in altercation with the ANC as
to the extent of its socialism, and has also supported campaigns such as the early Cosatu
strikes against ANC plans to privatise certain state-owned enterprises. In 2002 the
SACP softened its stance on the ANC when senior government members gave it
assurances of investments in key sectors like transport, energy and infrastructure, more
emphasis on development at local level, support of micro-businesses, including co-
operatives, mobilisation of domestic resources as the main driver of industrial and
growth policy, and government’s pursuit of an integrated anti-HIV/Aids strategy
premised on the thesis that HIV causes Aids and that government believes in the rollout
of antiretroviral treatment (the latter in reaction to afflictions of the Mbeki regime at the
time).15

At its 2007 conference SACP deputy general secretary Cronin told conference that
‘the ANC is not a socialist organisation but our ambition is to ensure that it becomes
a socialist organisation.’16 These points illustrate the discrepancy between the SACP
and Cosatu frequently having acted as the conscience of the ANC, placing essential
policy issues on the agenda – but settling for scaled-down, presently-possible socialist
alternative actions. In 2006 the SACP asserted that the ANC leadership of the 1960s
and 1980s understood that the ultimate aim of the struggle was socialism (although
not declaring the liberation movement as a socialist organisation). The NWC argued
that the SACP strategy was to co-opt the ANC, formally, as an organisation pursuing
socialism, and then to condemn it as having betrayed the socialist project.

The debate is further complicated when the SACP is accused of not actually being
socialist, as was argued by Philip Dexter.17 He noted that ‘… there has been an attempt
to interpret the SACP programme to mean socialism is the future, but because we want
it now, we will pretend that the conditions exist for socialist policies to be implemented
by the ANC government’. The ANC’s failure to do so, argued Dexter, was then char-
acterised as being the result of a ‘class project’ whose interest would be to stop the
advance of socialism. As Cronin explained, for the SACP it had become a gradualist process, which is not characterised by a sudden revolution that rings in socialism.\textsuperscript{18}

We have to forge building blocks of socialism here and now, on the terrain of capitalism itself … It means struggling to de-commodify basic things like healthcare, education, the right to shelter, a sustainable environment, mobility, and a job.’

In strengthening the notion that the left alliance partners are merely modestly left, Cosatu, by 2009 had toned down its 2006 resolutions. The 2006 resolutions had targeted the government’s macroeconomic policies, the jobs and poverty campaign, and inflation targeting. Cosatu’s decision to abandon some of the resolutions three years later was due to its faith that the (then new) Economic Development minister, Cosatu’s Ebrahim Patel, meant that Cosatu for the first time, had ‘someone who knew how to tackle the macro- and micro-economic policies’ in government. (By 2010 Cosatu criticised aspects of Patel’s NGP proposals; by 2011 it resolved that it was a starting point but needed to be overhauled).\textsuperscript{19} The trend was equally true for the ANC in 2007. Its discussion documents and resolutions were not as bold as the 2005 National General Council (NGC) discussions and resolutions. The concept of the developmental state was as much about principled state positions on ownership of key assets as it was about modest solutions to the problem. Mbeki and some of his cabinet associates had been planting select notions of a South African developmental state in government discourse, conveying a sense of closer identification with achieving developmental goals.\textsuperscript{20} By the time of the 2007 policy conference the idea of a South Africa-specific developmental state was ripe for the picking by the rising faction. The idea of the developmental state was ‘launched’ and both the ANC and the SACP went along with the idea signifying ‘a move to the left’.\textsuperscript{21} It was as much about public sector infrastructure provision as it was about industrial policy aimed at getting the private sector to do the right things in the economy. This contrasted with the Asian developmental state and its use of state-led macroeconomic planning, in partnership with a private sector that did the work. The ANC’s document was about the difficulty of working in a democracy where the state cannot simply tell the private sector what to do, but rather had to form partnerships.\textsuperscript{22} Cronin asserted policy influence for the SACP in the Zuma administration’s adoption of a comprehensive state-led industrial policy programme and ‘a new growth path that actively addresses the many systemic flaws in our current reality …. These perspectives are now increasingly accepted in government’. \textsuperscript{23}

\textbf{The debate about leftward shift, or not}

Cronin’s soft approach on building blocks towards socialism helps bridge the arguments as to whether there had been ‘a move to the left’, or not. The assumption of policy change was also neatly countered when Zuma played to international and investor audiences. For example, Zuma told several international audiences over time that ‘nothing will change’ under his presidency of the ANC and the country. Morris observed: ‘Some have said that if Zuma is in charge of the administration it will move Left because
of his support from the trade unions … and from the SA Communist Party … and therefore that the economic policies of the government will change …. But I am grateful for the opportunity to explain and would love to tell you … that nothing will change.‘24 Netshitenzhe, in addressing the push from the ‘left’ to gain more influence over government and the ANC, observed:25

What is left? As far as I know, the ANC is a disciplined force of the left. We seek to create a national democratic society informed by the best attributes of a developmental state and those of social democracy. In the context of challenges facing our society and the realities of the domestic and global balances of forces, I cannot imagine anything more left than this.

Minister of Finance in the Zuma administration, Pravin Gordhan, largely agreed, remarking that the ‘left’ is about reminding the ANC and government to look after the poor, and this is ‘what we have been doing for many years, and we are continuing to improve on this’.26

SACP general secretary Blade Nzimande27 had argued that the ANC’s leftward Polokwane shift was evident in the ANC’s resolution that the state and not the market should lead macroeconomic growth, including through an industrial policy. The developmental state model was argued to have reversed the government’s earlier economic blueprint, Gear, which between 1995 and 2000 advocated open markets and privatisation as a panacea for low growth rates. From a left-of-the-SACP perspective, Jara28 remarked that the ANC resolutions, which were largely supported by the alliance partners, were consistent with a capitalist developmental state:

… such a state recognizes increasing socio-economic inequality and political dissatisfaction among the poor. So we have seen greater infrastructural spending, slight increases in social grants, incremental increase in public-sector salaries and some rhetorical critique of the ‘free market’ by Mbeki himself ...

There was fair consensus – except within the Alliance – that the Polokwane resolutions did not constitute a leftward shift.29 The ‘left’ in the Polokwane proposals was evident in the wider casting of the social security net in proposals for national health insurance, higher age ceilings for the child grant, extension of free education to higher grades, and giving the state an expanded role, for example in forming state mining and banking companies. To illustrate, Zwelinzima Vavi saw Cosatu’s impact on government in the ‘unmistakably left policies won in Polokwane’. ‘Left’ for him was evident in government stances on decent work, free education, access to health services, rural development and food security: ‘These are left policies’.30

Desai noted that the anti-capitalist rhetoric was ‘an attempt to gain lost ideological ground’, rather than ‘grappling with a new vision’.31 This was in contrast to Cronin’s post-policy conference interpretation.32 Despite ambiguous rhetoric, the ANC was also frank about its subsequent December 2007 economic policy resolutions nevertheless not
constituting a paradigmatic shift, noting that the ‘critical challenge we now face is not the elaboration of an entirely new policy paradigm, but the identification of critical interventions that will enable us to accelerate implementation.’ With Zuma’s rise into state power, there remained a continuous expectation of more definitive pro-poor policy switches.

The global crisis next helped neutralise demands for hugely expansive state budgeting. In addition, the ANC mainstream, an amalgam of ideological strains, eclipsed and blended with the left. Zuma let government be steered into continuously moderate directions, only incrementally changing in terms of the ANC’s mildly left Polokwane policy resolutions. Policy review and correction came to stand alongside a need to be seen to cut extravagances and be outspoken about corruption in state operations. There was an acknowledgement that problems of state management, unless addressed within limitations of financial constraints and the global economic crisis, would lead to unsustainable burdens on state operations. It was this ceiling that 2010-11 initiatives on national health insurance (NHI), and retirement and other social benefits for military veterans hit.

Contemporary ANC policy practice facilitated ambiguity. ‘Nationalisation’ illustrated this point. The ANC from 2009-10 repeatedly assured private capital that nationalisation was not ANC policy. The Polokwane resolutions ordered that a state mining company be established (and this was done – it already partially existed). It is assumed that mineral resources belong to the state and its people (already encapsulated in previous legislation), and mining companies thus pay substantial royalties to the state. A significant debate between the ANCYL (in favour: in the form of creation of ‘patriotic capital’ which is intent on transferring ownership to patriotic forces – read ANC aligned that are associated with the state) and the SACP’s Cronin (against: limits of the possible in the current conjuncture) and Nzimande (‘we are for socialisation as ownership of the means of production by the people’, ‘nationalisation is just one instrument through which you can do it’) kept the issue alive. The possibility that the pro-standpoint was linked to black economic empowerment (BEE) companies needing bailouts clouded the debate. Like all policy initiatives, the ANC effectively instructed that it be placed on the agenda for forthcoming meetings of ANC policy structures, specifically the 2010 NGC and 2012 ANC policy conference. The NGC resolved to research and report in Mangaung. This followed ANCYL rallying and the reluctance of the ANC main body to antagonise and precipitate a fall out with the ANCYL at the elective conference, given its kingmaker-foot-soldiers status. The ANCYL continued proclaiming that nationalisation would become ANC policy. Zuma consistently refrained from rebuking Malema. The de facto concentric point in these debates was the construction of ‘patriotic African capital’.

**POLICY RESULTS IN THE TIME OF ZUMA**

The ANC government since 1994 delivered contradictory policy results. ‘Except’ in certain class terms and in the continuation of trends of widespread poverty and underdevelopment, South Africa became a vastly changed place compared with the colonial and apartheid epochs. Popularly consulted and democratically oriented new policies,
many of which were effectively implemented, shaped a new order. Changes veered from neo-liberal to social-democratic. They included quality of life improving over a wide front, the middle classes being racially reconfigured (especially if a low mid-income criterion was applied, as was the practice in South Africa), more high-level private and public employment opportunities for black South Africans opening up, educational opportunities widening, and state social grants alleviating poverty. Many South Africans benefited from some level of free basic services, and access to healthcare and housing. Amidst the mirage of jobs they had the social wage.

As Suttner^44 reminds us, however, the transition and subsequent years confirmed far-reaching compromises. There were policy successes, but the structural problems in the economy persisted. Massive unemployment endured. Many euphemistically-named policy deficits characterised life in South Africa (and they became integrated into the wars of political succession and elections).^45 Socio-economic inequality increased in the post-1994 period up to the 2009 point where South Africa had the highest Gini coefficient in the world (and this persisted up to at least 2011),^46 poverty remained rampant and was exacerbated by the global and South African economic crisis, and the economy barely managed net growths of employment before the effects of the global crisis set in. Actual job creation fell short of sustained overall reduction in unemployment rates. South Africans suspended their belief that government’s ‘job creation initiatives’ would deliver tangible results. Many of the basic and other social services were of poor or uneven quality, even if constituting improvements on the past. The social welfare function of the government expanded, especially from 2004 onwards, yet it insufficiently compensated for the lack of employment and the pervasiveness of poverty. There were many questions too about the sustainability of high levels of grant uptake in a state that was suffering the effects of a global (potentially ‘double-dip’) recession.

The rest of this section is a case study of the process of policy manoeuvring in the course of the Polokwane contest, the transitional period between Polokwane and election 2009, and the Zuma administration. It reveals the extent to which fierce contests hatched modest returns, and might well indicate trends in future contests.

**How much policy change?**

Policy contestation in the times of high-level political succession in South Africa was in the genre of same-party continuation and intra-party contestation - a situation that is usually equated with limited scope for policy review. The particular South African case, however, was more than simply intra-party competition. Intra-party and alliance policy contestation frequently replaced conventional opposition politics in the stakes of policy deliberation.

The ANC sees itself as ‘a disciplined movement of the left’ that strictly contests through internal processes. Lower ANC structures such as branches and regions impact, up to the point of adoption – and then they defend the policy, unless critiques are internally invited in preparation for policy conferences. A substantial part of the onus for policy advocacy hence moved to the Tripartite Alliance.\[^47\] This contestation was elaborated in the time of the Mbeki-Zuma succession struggle, when Alliance partners had
more freedom to criticise than those operating inside the ANC. The ANC itself was critically aware of the ‘postures’ suggesting that the ANC itself was insufficiently committed to the eradication of poverty and needed alliance partners to help remind it. The succession struggle demonstrated the opening of special intra-ANC and intra-Alliance spaces for policy contestation (Table 1).

The ANC’s 52nd national conference resolutions had an activist orientation, leaving behind the 51st conference’s tone of ‘urging government to continue’ (which had entailed doing almost whatever the conference had already asked government on previous occasions to do, but which had not yet been achieved). In the end, however, the policy change achieved was modest and non-paradigmatic. The 2007-09 leadership succession brought in more intra-ANC policy contestation. Even those who were not antagonistic to Mbeki policies mobilised around policy deficits of the time (including where these were being addressed). Policy-speak infused mobilisation for that leadership contest. Because of policy failures – both opportunistically and justifiably associated with the Mbeki administration – there was a presumption that the replacement of Mbeki would bring policy change (excluding the personalities that had been consciously opportunistic in using policy as an instrument to force Mbeki’s exit). The ANC played along, given that associating ANC policy failures with Mbeki (more than was the case) could relieve the ANC of a degree of the blame.

Zuma hence, rightly or wrongly, became associated with prospects for ‘policy change’. Gradualism of implementation and imperfection of realised content characterised the

<table>
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<tr>
<th>TABLE 1: Facets of policy change and renewal in the Zuma administration</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Changes in appointments</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Cabinet sees balances in appointments and compromises, debates over Minister of Finance; changes in first place to accommodate loyal supporters in ANC-leg of Alliance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Cabinet reshuffle of 2010 deviates from the 2007 ‘in-list’ and projects strategy for 2012 ANC succession, including ANCYL as occasional ‘fourth member of Tripartite Alliance’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Changes in policy and associated institutions</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Alliance partners bring high expectations for policy impact – contrasted with Mbeki era.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Implementation failures known, institutional and process reinventions follow.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• After institutional renewal phase, struggles prevail to follow through with output-outcome changes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• President and his deputy lead commissions to fast track public-private cooperation in infrastructure development and job creation, respectively.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Obstacles to policy implementation / realisation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Policy deficits and dilution of original intentions rule.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Inability to ensure systematic capacity in the public service.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Low accountability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Slow and sporadic realisation of action against public sector corruption and mismanagement – increased efforts from late 2010 onwards.</td>
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</table>
initiatives that could be identified as somewhat left. The Zuma administration’s policy programme can be usefully dissected in terms of a continuum of policy change. Figure 3 maps the questions of ‘in what respect?’ and ‘to what extent?’ The assessment recognises that the appointment of individuals, as well as the institutional scope offered to new voices, could be precursors of policy change, whilst the presence of these two factors does not necessarily prompt policy change. Apart from Figure 3’s illustrations, other policies were being reconsidered, without major changes having been realised by 2011.

**FIGURE 3: Extent of policy change, a continuum with application to South Africa, with select illustrations**

1: Minor changes and extensions of operational aspects and implementation modes – policing, monitoring
2: New laws, projects, priority areas lifted out from previous positions – rural development, local government
3: Adaptation of reach of existing policy to offer new emphases – child grant, schooling
4: New policies to bring changed roles for state – trade policy, state mining and banking, national health insurance, and reform
5: Abrupt change in growth model – no current illustration (although the NGP aspired to this)
6: Fundamental repositioning of state in relation to private capital, new model of accumulation introduced – no current illustration (nationalisation over a wide front would be an illustration, creation of patriotic capital not)

**The embraced-disinherited ‘Gear’**

The Gear ‘policy story’ is one that speaks to the heart of the body politic of South Africa post-1994. Gear was a macro-economic strategy (many aver ‘never a policy’) that haunted the ANC, well into the Zuma period. It arrived contentiously, whilst the high hopes of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) and the idealism of fast and far-reaching transformation still prevailed. Introduced in technocratic fashion, it failed to follow conventional, expected consultation routes. It was disputed whether it was an ANC policy, and the matter was put to the ANC’s 1997 elective conference in Mafikeng. It endorsed Gear. Mbeki reiterated the view that Gear was part of the RDP and a collective ANC policy.

Even if it had been apparent since at least 1992 that the Mandela-Mbeki ANC was not going to follow a socialist developmental path, ‘the bubble was clearly and publicly burst with the ANC state’s 1996 unveiling of the neoliberal Gear …’ Gevisser traces the roots of this shift. He argues that by 1988 Mbeki and ANC radicals were living on different planets. Whilst Chris Hani cautioned the Soviets to be prepared for another
decade of struggle, Mbeki was anticipating the unbanning of the ANC within a short space of time. He was quietly steering the ANC towards a negotiated settlement. The communists would be sidelined.\textsuperscript{53} The strategic exercise of developing the Mont Fleur Scenarios\textsuperscript{54} (along with a series of other scenario exercises) confirmed the guided ‘resocialisation’ of a core group of ANC intellectuals and decision makers. Mandela himself is said to have decided in 1992 that the ANC could not go the nationalisation route. It happened at a World Economic Forum (WEF) meeting in Davos.\textsuperscript{55} Sparks remarks how Mandela changed a prepared speech to refer to ‘a mixed economy in which the private sector would play a central and critical role …’\textsuperscript{56}

Informed by neo-liberalism, Gear was supported by investors and the international financial community. Neo-liberalism, embraced by the Mbeki government in its early years, included the reduction of public expenditures and greater reliance on markets and the private sector to step in and thus indirectly ‘assume responsibility’ for the delivery of public goods, limited social welfare, a lean state that privatises as much as possible, monetarist policies that aim to lower inflation and maintain fiscal balances, raised interest rates, the liberalisation of conditions of trade, and flexible labour markets that are minimally regulated. Gear continued to prevail at the time when it was increasingly clear that objectives of the far-reaching reduction of unemployment, poverty and inequality were not being reached, by far. It was often argued that Gear was the cause of these ailments. Gear had anticipated, and then realised:\textsuperscript{57}

- It anticipated raising the growth rate by 6 per cent by 2000, when it would be creating 400,000 jobs per year. \textit{Growth rates were far lower, and the rate of job creation much lower than anticipated.}
- It envisaged rapid growth in public and private sector investment with more than $500 million in additional foreign direct investment entering the country annually. \textit{Instead, public sector investment fell and the private sector investment boom entirely failed to materialise.}
- It believed government would cut its fiscal deficit by an average of 3.7 per cent in the Gear period. \textit{This target was surpassed.}

Gear protagonists summarise the failures as an overestimation of the public sector’s ability to deliver, not realising the constraining effect of skills shortages on investment, and not realistically assessing the links between skills and employment creation. Gear became diluted. Supplementary policy initiatives followed. These included the minimisation of state asset privatisation. Gear nevertheless remained the mantra for the identification of policy in the Mbeki period. Retrospective comments from Jabu Moleketi (Deputy Minister of Finance under Mbeki) and Trevor Manuel (Mbeki’s Minister of Finance) shed light on the former ruling group’s views on their Gear mistakes:

\textit{Moleketi:}\textsuperscript{58} Gear was presented as a silver bullet and that was a mistake. We thought this thing was going to solve everything. It doesn’t. You need other very effective policies complementing a macroeconomic stability programme like that.
Green on Manuel’s approach to Gear: Gear made the mistake of assuming it had control over more instruments than it actually did, as Manuel later acknowledged. It assumed lower (but positive) interest rates that would stimulate growth. This did not begin to happen until 1999. In fact, in the wake of the turbulence caused by the Asian market crisis in 1998, the Reserve Bank put up interest rates no fewer than eight times … That inhibited investment and with that employment. It was only in 2001 that employment figures began to show a steady growth … But, perversely, unemployment rose too …

Subsequently, the battle not only moved into a post-Gear phase, but many of the labels of the time became obsolete. Reflecting on when Gear had started metamorphosing into post-Gear, Netshitenzhe observed that from ‘2000 onwards we were already in a post-Gear period. The stabilization of the economy had been achieved. By 2002, “the real fruits of Gear” [were] beginning to manifest themselves in terms of real exponential growth in social expenditure’. Social expenditure rose steeply in the provision of goods such as housing, education, healthcare and social security. The expenditures, however, often filled in gaps to stave off desperation, rather than build up to a social wage of significance. As Kollapen noted in the midst of that period of rising social expenditures, South Africa remained:

… [a] deeply unequal society, and important policy interventions, as well as legislative enactments such as the Equality Act and the Employment Equity Act, have not achieved the desired transformative objectives. The transformation of the economy in terms of access, ownership, control and opportunities proceeds at a crawling pace…

Long and winding road to the NDR

The contrast in the phrase ‘great change yet unacceptable deficits’ can be used to mark the policy achievements of the ANC’s first 17 years in government power. It rekindled the deeper debate around the compromises of the 1990s’ negotiation and assumption-of-state-power times. In succession politics it resonated in the Mbeki-Zuma duel – with Mbeki portrayed as the driver of compromises and Zuma (if only at the height of the succession war) as the spirit of populism and left-renewal. The spirit of insurrection was rekindled. Mbeki was interrogated at the June 2007 ANC policy conference as to his disinheritance of the ‘Green Book’, a revolutionary set of guidelines that he helped write in the late 1970s. Framing this debate was the affluence and opulence undergirding the policy conference. The contrasts told the concurrent tale of ANC comfort with the continuous ideological compromise that had become entrenched in mainstream ANC policy and governance practices. This was a distinct post-liberation political movement.

The ANC had moved from its claimed position as the ‘revolutionary left’ to a more conservative Third Way and back again to a form of social democracy driven by cooperative relations with capital, first under Mbeki, then Zuma. Its centrist positioning
remained half-concealed under layers of revolution-speak. All policy progress was measured against the ideals of the national democratic revolution (NDR), and much of the intra-alliance debate (and fall out) concerned the extent to which socialism could be brought into the NDR. The top ANC leadership, whether Mbeki or Zuma, used the rhetoric of the anti-apartheid armed struggle, linking contemporary struggles to the imperatives of national liberation and broad societal transformation. Socialism as ultimate ideal was not directly excluded, even when the ANC proclaimed that it was not a socialist organisation. Prevost points out that the rank and file ANC base, along with alliance partners the SACP and Cosatu:

… continue rhetorically to embrace positions that alternate between the revolutionary left and social democracy … The political rhetoric of both organizations remains explicitly focused on the goal of ultimately building socialism in South Africa. Key activists, especially in Cosatu, see themselves as standing in opposition to the ANC government while still seeing themselves as members of the ANC party through the Tripartite Alliance and as individual ANC members.

Moore explains the stultified relations between ultimate socialism and the problems of the national democratic phase, with emphasis on how the NDR phase may be abused. The NDR, with the task to spell out the role of leftist leaders in Third World societies before and after the liberation from colonialism or minority rule, came to be a frequent rationalisation of the problems in achieving socio-economic justice – or policy delivery and transformation, in the language of this chapter. The continuous postponement of the socialist revolution is hence easily explained through the continuously incomplete development of capitalism.

**Polokwane linking delivery deficits, procedural policy, and bartering for influence**

The succession-related policy assault on the Mbeki presidency climaxed in the 2006–08 attacks by the SACP and Cosatu. The alliance attack was inspired by the need for the loosely defined left to be taken seriously in its alliance status, more systematically consulted in policy, and shown evidence of impact. It also resulted from the need of those wishing to remove Mbeki from power to construct a policy platform. The alliance attacks combined substantive assaults (the Gear legacy prevailed; specific left policy alternatives were in low evidence, and would have had to come through the branches) and procedural policy (Mbeki’s handling of presidential power). The Alliance observed the impact of the centralisation of policy prioritisation in the Presidency and the entrenchment of the key policy actors in and around the Presidency of the country and inferred links to policy deficits and delivery leakages. Cosatu’s Vavi pronounced that the ANC and South Africa under Mbeki had been drifting towards dictatorship. Fever pitch was struck both in the Polokwane run-up and the mid-2008 campaign to oust Mbeki (Chapter 2).

Alliance partners effectively delegitimated Mbeki and constructed a counter-process, averred to ring in new policies in Polokwane. It was a carefully calibrated process. They
### TABLE 2: Policy development process in the ANC: Case study of the 2007 policy and elective conferences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dates or phases</th>
<th>Steps in the process</th>
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<tr>
<td>February–March 2007</td>
<td>Discussion papers are drafted by relevant NEC sub-committees, and distributed to all structures. There are three sets of documents: policy discussion documents (11 papers on various areas of public policy), draft strategy and tactics, and the organisational review discussion document.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2007</td>
<td>Training of branches at regional and sub-regional level on the contents of the documents and the main questions for discussion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2007</td>
<td>Branch general meetings discuss the papers. Reports of discussions, including draft resolutions, are submitted to regions and provinces. Regional general councils are held.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By 31 May 2007</td>
<td>Provincial general councils (PGCs) are held to discuss the positions coming from the branches. Provinces submit draft resolutions to Luthuli House.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 June–1 July 2007</td>
<td>National policy conference (working in commissions) deliberates the outcome of the PGCs and the discussions of other structures – the conference produces draft resolutions, which are now distributed to all ANC structures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2007 onwards</td>
<td>Draft resolutions are discussed in branch general meetings, branch positions are reported back to regional and provincial structures. The outcome of these discussions forms the basis of the mandates that will guide the national conference delegates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-20 December 2007</td>
<td>At national conference delegates divide into commissions to discuss the draft resolutions, the draft strategy and tactics document, and proposed constitutional amendments. The commissions place draft resolutions before the conference plenary, the conference adopts the final resolutions. If consensus does not emerge the matter can be referred to a secret ballot if at least one-third of the delegates demand it. The conference resolutions become the policy of the ANC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-24 September 2010</td>
<td>ANC’s 3rd NGC meeting, Durban, takes stock of progress on realisation of Polokwane policy resolutions. The event commences the next ANC policy cycle for the mid-2012 policy conference and the December 2012 ANC 53rd elective conference.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** ANC, 2007, A basic guide to the ANC 52nd national conference, Media background briefing, Luthuli House, Johannesburg, 25 April 2007; author’s monitoring of ANC NGC meeting, September 2010.
presented the Mbeki-ANC and its economic policies as reactionary-conservative, going silent on post-Gear developments that included an interventionist state, suspended privatisation and corporate and upper-end income taxes amongst the highest in the world. References to the developmental state had started around 2001.

Motlanthe explained in Polokwane that policy change would only come via the route of ANC national policy conferences:

... the ANC convenes a national policy conference every five years and the recommendations there form the basis for debates at the national conference, where they are either adopted or rejected. Once they are adopted they become policy and will not be changed for that five-year cycle.

The ANC’s elaborate policy processes start in the branches and leagues and go through months of deliberation (Table 2). If shifts from the Polokwane template were required, this would thus have to be taken up by entering the track for the next policy conference, as happened in 2010 with the ANCYL’s advocacy for nationalisation of the mines. To strengthen their minimal Polokwane policy-shift gains, Cosatu and the SACP campaigned for appointments in institutions conducive to policy influence (Table 2). Frustration again awaited them, as epitomised by the appointment of the Minister of Economic Development. This ministry encountered a combination of setting-up and shared territory issues through its co-existence with the ministries of Finance, and Trade and Industry. In February 2010, Cabinet approved the implementation of the second 2010/11–2012/13 Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP II), which was envisaged to help alter the structure of the economy to support decent work and sustainable livelihoods. IPAP II expanded the first plan with more focus on scaling up industrial policy interventions to alter the structure of the economy that supported decent work and sustainable livelihood. Policies and budget statements emanating from these departments also stood alongside the Minister of Economic Development’s NGP of November 2010. Zuma in his State of the Nation address told South Africa that the NGP would ‘guide our work in achieving these goals [of job creation], working within the premise that the creation of decent work is at the centre of our economic policies’. Minister of Finance, Gordhan, asserted in his budget speech that it would ‘lead to rapid creation of jobs that will ensure an equitable distribution of benefits, that will reduce inequality, ignite industrial development and transform rural and urban communities’.

Both general ideological and specific policy substance challenges found vague expression in the positions of the opposing ANC camps in the time of Polokwane (Table 3). Suttner adds another dimension in noting that de-ideologisation in this period strengthened the belief that ‘it will not be programmatic questions that will ultimately lead to one or other decision, but questions of top jobs and patronage’. This was often substantiated in the practice of policy contestation.

The loosely defined Polokwane ‘left’ camp (a sub-group of the anti-Mbeki camp) existed more by association and general sentiment than by specifically elaborated policy
TABLE 3: Elusive left policy shifts, and positioning for policy shifts, in the ANC and government under Zuma

‘Change’ in this table is conceptualised as change away from Mbeki-era positions towards the Polokwane policy positions of 2007

<table>
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<tr>
<th>In terms of ...</th>
<th>Evidence for policy change</th>
<th>Evidence against policy change</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Possibilities of change through personalities and appointments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indebtedness to alliance through campaign support</td>
<td>Cosatu and SACP play large role in Zuma trial and election campaigns.</td>
<td>Protection of ANC as centre of power and decision making.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet under Zuma</td>
<td>Turnover high in cabinet appointments, Ebrahim Patel the left’s prize to balance Manuel.</td>
<td>Retention high, but incumbents become loyal to Zuma and all revert back to ANC positions that also prevailed under Mbeki.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resignations</td>
<td>Joel Netshitenzhe’s resignation. Lower levels of civil service bring phased but systematic renewal.</td>
<td>From second-tier down bureaucrats at first remain in place. Subsequent changes often benefit Mangaung goals.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Institutional and procedural policy change

| National Planning Commission                        | Long-envisioned by left and Manuel’s central placing in ‘their’ position contested. Alliance partners over-ruled, but scaled-down NPC follows. | Uncertain whether left will prevail. Interim evidence for ‘new marginalisation’, but SACP happy with piecemeal changes. |
| Restructuring of state departments                  | Zuma projects it as ‘indication of a policy shift’ (procedural policy). | Largely business as usual, also militarisation of police. |
| Cluster organisation                                | Reshuffling of the decks, cutting across prevailing lines of power. | Reorganised in manner designed to help defuse turf battles. |
| Parliament                                           | Parliamentary committee gives Manuel cold shoulder in NPC hearing; NPC turns into consultative process. | Parliament subject to being subdued by cabinet; ANC NEC lays down line of accepting Manuel’s Green Paper. |
| ANC and Alliance initiatives                        | ANC and Cosatu uphold regular meetings to confirm their cooperation. | Consulted, represented in government, but ANC as centre prevails. |

Change in policy content

| General orientation                                  | New style and urgency of emphases on pressing problems of poverty, unemployment and inequality; resolve to correct them, policy alternatives slow in the coming – stress on state role in job opportunities. | Emphasis on directly addressing key issues. Struggle to be converted into recognisable policy action. Flawed and delayed realisation of progressive content. |
| Gear / NGP                                           | Gear continuously attacked (little recognition of post-Gear phase). NGP brings some progress, yet regarded as sub-expectation by especially Cosatu. | Attacks serve mobilising role, whilst country had advanced beyond Gear. NGP’s job creation, skills coordination, etc. proposals a drop in the ocean. |

Source: Author’s research and monitoring.
substance. The camp professed strong bonds with the poor, a populist orientation, offered mildly alternative economic policies such as later materialised in Cosatu’s ‘Growth Path’ of September 2010,79 and occasionally drew in the vision of a socialist society. A secondary line of policy positioning thus opened: even if Zuma did not offer left policy alternatives, he would offer the scope for ‘more openness’, listening and consulting.

This linked to the notion of influence once in power. Zuma was also supported by political actors who hoped that they could back him in exchange for rewards once in power. This would open policy space for the Tripartite Alliance members who had been hurt in the intra-alliance skirmishes. This option had few immediate returns, and even fewer longer term guarantees. The ANC could still revert to being the non-negotiable centre of power in the Alliance, and assert its right to determine policy directions in the final instance. Such a turn emerged from late 2009 onwards, although the SACP would argue that even in the moderated mode its priorities (relative to what was possible) were being realised.80

Zuma era trademarks

The early Zuma administration expressed determination to focus on poverty, unemployment and inequality – in conjunction with the policy priorities of health, education, rural development, decent work and livelihood, and crime and corruption.81 Zuma’s May 2009 State of the Nation address introduced modest interventions.82 The extent to which these factors would add up to policy change, even a number of years later, remained in the field of conjecture. Indications came from national budgets and medium term budget policy statements. The evidence supported intensification of implementation of existing policies, and the phased introduction of others, such as the extension of the upper age for the child support grant, better access to education, the gradualist introduction of NHI, industrial policy frameworks, and job creation plans (overwhelmingly in cooperation with the private sector).

Come the time of the 2010 and 2011 State of the Nation addresses, newness had worn off. Zuma’s 2010 address failed to confirm the new compassion and dedication of the ANC campaign and early administration. Zuma’s personal crises of multiple wives and fiancées and a mistress, along with non-declaration of assets (in part blamed on poor presidential office support),83 a preceding period of intense Alliance contests, and performance assessment and planning activities that were slow to get off the ground combined in 2010 with an absence of upfront leadership or a clear vision of where South Africa was heading. The Zuma administration was continuously on the defensive – working to resuscitate the president’s image, persuading the people that the delivery project was indeed on track (Table 4), that local government turnaround was just around the corner, and that government meant business on addressing public sector corruption and mismanagement (whilst suffering revelations on private get-rich deals or protection of those who engaged in them). The 2011 address showed a president that was now personally in charge, with a confidence boosted by his 2010 NGC success, and an improved personal image. New policy initiatives, however, were limited, and at best promised possible and gradual improvements.84

The ANC’s 2010 NGC was a jamboree of directing policy traffic. Updates from the ANC and government encapsulated in its discussion documents fed into it. It deliber-
ated and issued resolutions, most frequently for further work to be done (illustrations in brackets) – by the ANC (‘work on the integrity committee, code of conduct, community service’), NEC (‘lead by exemplary conduct’), ANC conferences or summits (‘convene a summit on provincial government’, ‘discuss alliance partner education charter’), the alliance partners (‘mobilise society to support education goals’), the state (‘improve state performance’), government (‘improve implementation of ANC policies’), and Parliament (‘take action on the media, gender equality’). Contentious issues like nationalisation, local government, the future of the provinces, and regulation of the media were transferred for research, summits, or investigations by Parliament, and effectively deferred to the 2012 policy conference.

**INTERSECTING ‘DUAL CENTRES OF (STATE) POWER’ AND ‘CENTRE OF (ALLIANCE) POWER’**

Ideology, policy and problem-solving ideas were never insulated from the battles over dual centres of state power and which of the alliance partners were the most powerful. The battles were intense in the time of the Zuma administration, but not hostile as in the Mbeki days. The Zuma administration entered with a combination of debt to alliance partners, high popular expectations of a more caring, listening and better performing government, and activist circles (Tripartite Alliance and beyond) pushing for leftward shifts in policy. Simultaneously, the ANC insisted that it remained the centre of power of the Alliance (as opposed to the Alliance as the central entity), and this was repeatedly confirmed.

**‘Party-versus-state’ and ‘dual centres of power’ contests**

The ‘dual centres of power’ engagement highlighted the party-versus-state struggle for influence over policy and governance. It applied to whether the ANC president was also the president of the country, or whether the ANC provincial chairpersons were the premiers in the respective provinces (or PEC members were in the executives of provincial governments). The Mbeki-Zuma case study epitomised the essence of this contest, and held lessons for the ANC as to the necessity of managing this stress line and in particular its interface with policy. The ‘dual centres of power’ discourse at the time of the Mbeki-Zuma succession struggle (Chapter 2) served as a substitute for direct attacks on the incumbent (Mbeki), and both of the ‘centres’ and the personal attacks were often anchored in policy. It created the pretence of intense policy contestation. Zuma camp protagonist Mathews Phosa spelt out the policy problem of long-term incumbency in the context of the Mbeki problem, noting the hierarchy of policy and succession:

The biggest danger of a leader serving too long is that such a person becomes institutionalised, and that the structures and policies of the governing party and the government become a mere reflection of the thoughts of the leader. Institutions themselves become extensions of the person, rather than that of sound policy or the policy priorities of the governing party.
### TABLE 4: Select policy successes and failures – indicators 2006-11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy</th>
<th>Policy achievements</th>
<th>Policy failures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>General economy</strong></td>
<td>Economic growth of 4.9% in 2006; 5% average growth over 3 years up to 2007; GDP growth of 2.8% in 2010 (after the economy had contracted by 1.7% in 2009); improved ratings by international agencies; living standards rising in many quarters; economy expands at an annualised rate of 4.8% in first quarter 2011, and this decreases to 1.3% in the second quarter.</td>
<td>Economic growth path prior to recession already unsustainable as it was mainly driven by strong commodity prices, capital inflows and high consumer demand; high spending on projects with little developmental impact; rural poverty and scarcity of rural jobs were rampant; recession knocked most indicators; new 2010 initiatives announced at the same time that new indicators come in lower than those that new projections use, trend continues in 2011.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capacity of the state</strong></td>
<td>Progress in integration of government, intergovernmental relations framework, and interventions in cases of provincial and local crisis; renewals and extension of Presidency; performance agreements launched in 2010 and many top-level ones signed by 2011; some improvements in municipal governance as evidenced in 2011 (for 2009/10) auditor-general report.</td>
<td>Capacity, including capacity to spend at local level remains a major challenge; huge incidence of qualified audits and other major failures (despite some improvements) – revelations of mismanagement and corruption increase and action forthcoming only at very slow rate; corruption and mismanagement are obstacles that permeate government institutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social welfare</strong></td>
<td>Social assistance worth about R97 billion was going to about 15 million South Africans in 2010-11; the total for January 2010 was 13 million social grants (including 2.5 m old age, 1.3 m disability, 0.5 m foster-care, and 9.4 m child-support), and a total of 15 million reported in 2011.</td>
<td>Among poorest 40% of households, dependence on social grants more than doubled from 2000-09; evidence of the lack of other initiatives; growing reliance 2010-11 on state-dispensed social grants and social wage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Black middle class; inequality</strong></td>
<td>BEE has been successful in creating a black middle class with notable successes for empowerment. The 2011 grant of security of tenure to 400,000 of the 1.2 million households in South Africa’s 2,700 informal settlement areas by 2014 was expected to widen the (lower) middle class building project.</td>
<td>The extension of a black middle class that will never include more than a fraction of the black population; South Africa’s Gini coefficient grows to highest in world.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Job creation</strong></td>
<td>2 million jobs created in the first 10 years of democracy; in the two years to September 2006 over a million new jobs were created; both broad and narrow unemployment decreased since 2004; more than 250,000 people given work experience through the Expanded Public Works Programme; 2009 promise of 500,000 work opportunities (crisis measure); New Growth Path aims at 5 million new jobs by 2020; in August</td>
<td>Low rate of job creation will not halve unemployment by 2014; continued absence of a job creation policy that meets South Africa’s employment needs; jobless growth at times; many who do have jobs earn poverty wages and these are often casual jobs; 2009 sees loss of close to 1 million jobs (will take several years to just recover them) and more losses in 2010-11. Unemployment rises to 25% in first quarter of 2011 and 25.7% in the second (after</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Service delivery

Massive service delivery backlogs were shrinking, even if delivery was undermined by new forces of migration, rising expectations, lack of maintenance.

Regional electricity distributor policy, that would deprive municipalities of sources of income and take lines of accountability further way from communities; sanitation targets lagging; price increases and lack of affordable, quality services are big issues.

### Land

Close to 90% of all land claims settled, and the end of restitution processes in sight; recognition that the process needs to be speeded up; publication of the Green Paper on land reform (it brings in the Land Management Commission and the land valuer-general to help overcome hurdles the government faces in acquiring land for redistribution; the Paper raises questions of constitutionality).

Land redistribution is undermined by agricultural liberalisation and market mechanism; 90% of settled new farmers fail to farm productively; land reform lagging (opinions differ on extent of ‘land hunger’ among South Africans) and limited evidence of overall changes in apartheid lines of land use.

### Education

Access to education is continuously improving; work to accelerate and improve the outcomes of education; Polokwane brings progressive access to free education.

Dysfunctional education system with ineffective curricula, low retention rates, and lacking evidence of rising quality; no definitive new solutions on horizon.

### Health and HIV/AIDS

More than 220,000 people receive antiretroviral treatment (although well below optimal rollout rates); new governance structures put in place; NHI adopted as government policy and Green Paper published.

Health system is frequently dysfunctional, often lacks quality of services and has had to rely on civil society pressure (such as the TAC) to push government into action; new NHI system envisaged to take 14 years to full implementation and this dependent on dramatic improvement of health infrastructure.

### Crime

Decrease in incidences of some forms of crime; the 2011 statistics record a drop in violent crime, but incidence rates remain high in comparison with international trends.

Crime is pervasive, affecting all communities; rise and decline in the incidence of violent crime alternate.

### Water, sanitation, electricity

Access to water improved from 59% in 1994 to 83% in 2006; 2008/09 12 m households with access to potable water and 91.8% in March 2009, up to 93% in 2010; anticipated (2011) that all households would be electrified by 2012 (3.9 million houses had been electrified by 2011, since 1991) and access put at 84%; access to ‘decent sanitation’ 77% in 2011 (up from 50% in 1994).

Many communities still suffer from lack of easily accessible clean water; amount of free basic water is insufficient to serve the needs of poor families; elusive targets to eliminate toilet backlogs; statistics reflect the delivery and do not account for lack of maintenance or dysfunctionality of installations; free basic electricity amounts often insufficient and higher amounts often not affordable.

This reasoning combined with aspects of Mbeki’s personal and policy decision making styles to build the repertoire of indirect, policy-related assaults on him. His inaccessibility to alliance partners, which included an inclination to dictate whom he would consult on policy matters, drove this line of attack. Uys noted that ‘… Mbeki’s mistake … has been that in his aloof and arrogant way he let the chasm between government and labour-left widen to a point where old-style “African socialism” challenges global “capitalism”’. Mbeki was consultative in exercising policy functions in the Presidency of South Africa, but this was with constituencies of his own choice or making. He consulted with many variations on big and/or black business, religious and cultural groups, and his International Investment Council, yet would not grant the alliance members an institutionalised setting for policy influence, or effectively facilitate the work of the National Economic Development and Labour Council (Nedlac).

A July 2007 SACP conference resolution called for the Alliance to be redesigned to have higher participation in state institutions. The September 2007 Cosatu central committee meeting referred to Mbeki’s leadership as lacking ‘democratic participation, with Cosatu and the SACP, and to some extent the ANC itself’. The centralisation of power in the office of the Presidency of South Africa sidelined Cosatu. An interlinking argument in the indirect policy campaign was that Zuma (unlike Mbeki) ‘does not believe he knows it all’, and would therefore be prepared to increase consultation with the alliance partners.

The 2007 ANC policy conference adopted the compromise centres-position that there should ‘preferably’ not be a third term for an ANC president, given that it would result in the generally undesirable two centres of power (even if not prohibited by the ANC’s constitution; Chapter 2). The outcome was a defeat for Mbeki, but simultaneously short of the Zuma camp’s 2006 plan to get the policy conference to propose that the ANC deputy president should automatically become the ANC president. The policy conference (influenced by Cosatu and the SACP) also argued for systematic consultation and guaranteed, regular opportunities to co-determine public policy. The ANC leadership argued that many of its detailed policy decisions were simply a function of giving effect to the conferences’ policy mandates. In addition, the so-called ‘extra-parliamentary ANC’ then accused the ‘Mbeki-led ANC’ of allowing business to influence government policies, thus nudging the ANC to become a centre-left party, along the lines of European social democratic parties. The conference debate affirmed that the alliance interface would be continuously advanced. The policy conference advised that state bureaucrats, who in the spheres of government had become too independent of the ANC, should be reined in and made more accountable to ANC political structures.

The transitional period under Motlanthe as national president (2008–09) and Zuma as ANC president (2007 onwards) did not get bogged down in the duality of power centres, and policy initiatives were put in abeyance pending Zuma’s succession. It was understood that Motlanthe’s tenure was a caretaker one, directly representing the ANC in the state organs. There were checks on Motlanthe to ensure that he would not develop aspirations that could undermine Zuma, whilst possible prosecution was still hovering over Zuma’s head. In the wake of election 2009 the desired one centre of ANC-government power was established, at least on the national level. It was clear that the ANC was the agency
in charge of the state. It asserted this role by virtue of being the elected majority party. The provinces, however, suffered ongoing instability. This was courtesy of the ANC’s adherence to the gender quota – on this level. The ANC upheld the need to have 50 per cent women premiers in the eight provinces under its control. None of the women premiers, however, were ANC provincial chairpersons. Shakiness was evident in the Eastern Cape, North West and Gauteng (Chapter 10).

However, a two-part illustration of the contest over centres of power surfaced in October 2009. On 20 October Zuma reprimanded ANC legislative functionaries, such as chief whips, for giving instructions to mayors. He proposed a separation between political and executive office.93 (The proposal, with specific application to local government, was carried at the NGC of 2010, adopted by Parliament in early 2011, and eventually signed into law by Zuma in early July, amidst resistance both from inside the ANC and Cosatu, and especially the South African Municipal Workers Union (SAMWU)). On 20 October 2009, Joel Netshitenzhe, top official in the Presidency from the Mandela and Mbeki periods, resigned.94 Days before, he had warned that the ANC should not micro-manage government. The alliance partners, the ANC and the Young Communist League attacked him for the statement. In the contest as to who was in charge of determining state policies and running their implementation,95 the pendulum was in the court of the ANC.

It became routine to identify contests and arguments as (undesirable) manifestations of rival centres of power. For example, at times Cosatu was said to constitute a third centre, besides party and government, when it asserted itself over government or the ANC. Remaining Mbeki-ites, especially in the Presidency, and in particular Joel Netshitenzhe and a handful of others, were also equated with additional centres of power. Netshitenzhe’s departure symbolised the final retreat of the Mbeki-ite residual centre of power.96 Once removed from these centres rapprochement kicked in.

Cosatu-SACP quest to crown the Alliance as centre of power and policy influence

If the ANC, for the time being, had won the battle for supremacy over the state and public policy, the two alliance partners of Cosatu and the SACP were in far more tempestuous relationships over ‘who is supreme within the Tripartite Alliance?’, and ‘how does this, irrespective of ultimate alliance supremacy, translate into influence over policy and governance in the state?’.

The intra-alliance battle was continuous, but adopted different nuances over time under the respective presidents. The party-state battle was the ANC’s quest to be continuously, explicitly and primarily engaged in important government policy decisions. Under Zuma this guarantee was achieved. The next battle then became for deployment into government positions to enable follow-through on policy, and to marginalise the representatives of Mbeki’s ancien régime. The alliance partners’ battle for primacy over policy directions comprised the SACP and Cosatu attempting to assert themselves as the leading ideological and policy forces in the Alliance and in effect also in government. Cosatu briefly occupied this position from 1994 until Gear, and from 2005-09 the alliance partners claimed the succession space to assert influence within the Alliance.
The battle for supremacy within the Tripartite Alliance gained momentum with the relative policy fluidity of the early period of the Zuma government. New divisions surfaced when ANC factions started objecting to SACP and Cosatu ‘taking-over’ the ANC. This objection was revealed as a mobilisation platform of the so-called nationalists for Mangaung positioning. Prominent ANC functionary Billy Masetlha publicly raised this resentment, first in the early Zuma-era. The ANC officially distanced itself from Masetlha’s sentiments, reaffirming the Alliance and urging for positioning such as that of Masetlha to be taken forward into the Alliance Summit of November 2009. Subsequent spats in 2010 were again dealt with in special summits, such as the one of early 2011 to resolve Cosatu’s 2010 ‘opposition role’. The summits were bi- or trilateral. The resulting statements were inevitably conciliatory. The succession struggle positioning again surfaced in 2011, when revelations of ‘plots’ for 2012 succession (again) contrasted ‘nationalists’ with ‘communists’. This time around, ideological epithets were signals to oppose Zuma, along with Gwede Mantashe as secretary general, and probably some other ‘communists’ in government. More nuanced mobilisation lines could still emerge, but this one was broad and convenient enough to carry to camps across foothills towards Mangaung.

These trends built on a base, such as was evident in 2009, of concern that alliance members were maintaining dual or triple active memberships – and that their ‘first port of call’ was suggested not to be the ANC. The power mongers in the ‘ANC-ANC’ (as opposed to the SACP-ANC and Cosatu-ANC) wanted them marginalised to limit their power over policy and succession. They argued that these persons were using ANC organisational and government positions to advance policy agendas that had not been passed by the ANC. Alternatively, they were seen to be using their public sector positions in an ‘oppositional’ manner, rather than joining forces with the ANC to make the best of government (this would imply a subjected position for the two alliance members). The backlash was aimed at a range of office-holders, and in particular against Mantashe, who was also SACP chairperson. General secretary of the SACP, Nzimande, was Minister of Higher Education in the ANC government (and on occasion said to have higher ambitions). On the lower levels there were multiple overlapping memberships and positions, including in the Eastern Cape, where the provincial ANC chairperson, Phumulo Masualle was the SACP national treasurer. The ANC’s Limpopo premier, Cassel Mathale, intervened reminding those wanting to change the ANC’s direction to socialism that the ANC alone was the ruling party in the country: ‘When we attained democracy the colour of the flag that was raised was black, green and gold. We did not raise a red flag.’

The Alliance Political Council soothed intra-alliance tensions. For example, one statement said the Alliance Summit reaffirmed its commitment to strengthening the ANC-led Alliance as a ‘strategic political centre that will act together as a revolutionary formation to advance the objectives of the revolution.’ In raising the white flag, both the SACP and Cosatu in 2010 acknowledged the ANC as the leader of the Alliance. This was in response to the frontal attack led by the ANCYL’s Julius Malema, seen to be acting as proxy for more senior ANC members directing the skirmish from the wings, with a view to succession.
The ANC’s cunning in maintaining itself as the bearer of the policy veto was illustrated in the politics of the Zuma era. Zuma relied on the mobilisation spark provided by the alliance partners. He urged workers to play a more meaningful role in ANC policy formulation. Workers had the power to help the ANC win elections and could use this same power at the ANC policy conference to discuss policies that would benefit them, he said. The alliance partners, and especially Cosatu, were satisfied with the policy positions adopted at the two 2007 ANC conferences. The partners worked tooth and nail to support Zuma and the ANC in the 2009 elections. They gained favourable appointments and institutional positioning. Yet, in the wake of the 2009 election, the ANC again stressed that it remained the centre of power, despite softened declarations on the Alliance and the contributions of the partners. The partners had gained substantial ground compared with the Mbeki period. Their 2009-11 position, however, was frustrating. Vavi, for example, would be invited by Zuma to discuss Reserve Bank succession and Cabinet appointments. At the same time, many of Cosatu’s growth path proposals remained out in the cold. Similarly, in late 2010 Mantashe took issue with Cosatu ‘acting like an opposition party’, whilst Cosatu almost simultaneously announced that it was at the point of starting its local government elections campaign for the ANC. Relations between the SACP and Cosatu subsequently dipped further, followed, as usual, by peacemaking.

No matter how hard the alliance members worked to get a guaranteed foot in the door of policy influence, definitive victory evaded them. The main reasons were the ANC itself moving into a more state interventionist and welfarist programme, subsequent to the Gear heydays, and that the left alliance partners themselves had a modest repertoire of policy alternatives. There was a substantial convergence between the ANC and the mainstream left. The ‘left’, as represented in the two alliance partners, was hardly left of the ANC. A direct mid-2007 comparison between the ANC’s policy resolutions, and positions adopted at the SACP’s July 2007 conference and the central executive committee of Cosatu in the same period showed at best modest, if not marginal, policy differences between the three partners.

**Policy conversion in the shifting battle between party and state**

From the mid-2000s on the ANC government increasingly emphasised that ‘good policies are in place’, but implementation was deficient. Accordingly, the fulcrum became capacity-building of state institutions to help do justice to the policies. This was echoed in alliance statements. The Mbeki government’s approach was that policy critiques should be muted or moderated – ‘be quiet while we deliver’. Critics emphasised that the shortcomings, rather than the successes, needed to be stressed and reviews done in order to get sustained transformation. These reviews often concerned the institutions and their associated processes, and the incumbents and the process of deployment that put many there. The assessments equally came to focus on the barriers to delivery that corruption and mismanagement erected.

Policy conversion in South Africa – moving from good policies to matching implementation, which did not dilute the original intent – was a substantial problem for the ANC government, irrespective of whether it was the party that was directly instructing,
or the party issuing orders via elected institutions and derived executive-bureaucratic mandates. When these entered the standard routes, the usual bureaucratic obstacles of competing time and resources, and skills, entered the equation. Where the ANC directly intervened, with the sanction of seniority, it was likely that more resources and immediate attention would be concentrated on the problem. However, this attention would be selective, not sustainable across the range of policy conversions required, and could be the platform for corruption. The elected ANC representatives took more distanced roles. The izimbizo or community outreach programmes that started on senior executive level, specifically with the President, aimed at bringing elected representatives on board to help monitor delivery and community feedback. However, they faltered on both the interfaces of representative-community and representative-bureaucracy (Chapter 4).

The rule of the party over appointments had a far-reaching impact on policy conversion. The ANC, in a tentative and partial reconsideration of cadre deployment policy, started arguing – albeit not implementing in noticeable haste – that the right, fully qualified appointments needed to be made to help get policy conversion. One of the ANC’s specific foci at this time was local government, the shortage of qualified staff, and the serial misfiring of turnaround strategies.

The complexity and multiplicity of institutions in government operations meant that ANC policy initiatives were filtered through elaborate mechanisms that tended to dilute policy interventions. The Presidency’s M&E system under Mbeki, in the context of generally weak provincial and local government systems, had the power to assume much responsibility for intervening in policy correction at all levels – from the Presidency down to the level of municipal governance, and could prescribe to the ANC wherever it was in power. The Zuma Presidency’s more dedicated M&E system cast the net wider to try and convert local government into better policy performance, but simultaneously worked on the level of crisis interventions, for example, to put local municipalities under special management or by multiple statements of intent create an aura of determined action on political and public sector corruption. The problem was that around the mid-term mark in Zuma’s 2009–14 term this anchor point of the administration was also misfiring.

CONCLUSION

Policy contestation was at the centre of the fluid times of struggle for ANC succession, establishing the identity and policy character of successive ANC administrations, and generally building the identity of the ANC. On the one hand, policy issues or inferred ideological orientations were exploited to gain advantage over opposing candidates, either within the alliance or within the ANC itself. Policy caveats provided platforms for attacks on opponents. Yet, policy fluidity brought essential spaces for review and change – although the opportunities were not optimally used. Despite posturing and positioning, the policy train of the ANC steamed on – overwhelmingly on the existing tracks.

The question arises whether the policy debate and practice had truly been advanced, courtesy of the transition to and establishment of the Zuma administration.
Alternatively, these events may mostly have offered useful ammunition in a context where both the state and ANC policy business would continue – either irrespective of the contestation of the time, or with minor accommodation of more inclusive Alliance and ANC consultation. It was certain that the window of opportunity that was offered by the succession, election 2009 and the establishment of a new ANC administration brought institutional reinvigoration for the ANC, along with a fresh commitment, even within continuous policies, to make a more definitive societal impact. These contests had thus worked for the ANC in its processes of regenerating power.

The policy-related contests helped the ANC regenerate power in government, in relation to the people, and also organisationally. It was, however, an ANC that had probably left behind another chunk of the idealism of revolutionary – or simply dramatic and far-reaching – change (except in terms of arguing the ongoing NDR), inspired by definitive egalitarianism and social justice. It was an ANC that accepted social inequality and became re-committed and re-connected to the people, yet was by now accepting the limits of the change it seemed destined to bring.

NOTES

2 Dubow, noted that the 1990s saw ‘the re-emergence of the ANC as a social democratic-inclined party to an extent that would have been inconceivable a decade before’, see Saul Dubow, 2000, The African National Congress, Johannesburg, Jonathan Ball Publishers, p. 108.
3 Government released the Gear strategy on 14 June 1996. It had been put together over a period of seven months. It emerged from a 15-member Gear technical team. The team included economist Iraj Abedian (one of the team coordinators), Servaas van den Berg, the Presidency’s Alan Hirsch and economist Stephen Gelb.
4 The fact that the ANC is ‘not a socialist organisation’ is clear and obvious to all who follow the ideological battle at the centre of differentiating the ANC and SACP. Yet, given the frequency of proclamation of left victories, and SACP (in many respects also Cosatu) claiming predominance in many policy advances, the issuing of such statements is significant.
6 Jacob Zuma, 2009, address to the SACP Congress by the president of the ANC, Polokwane, 12 December 2009, emphasised at length that the ANC leads the Tripartite Alliance and that all Alliance partners have the responsibility to engage in disciplined debate whilst implementing the ANC’s election manifesto.
nance, reflexivity and accountability, Buckingham, Open University Press; and Nikolas Zahariadis, 1999, ‘Ambiguity, time, and multiple streams’ in Paul Sabatier (ed.), Theories of the policy process, Boulder, Col., Westview Press. These authors’ work informs the understandings in this chapter.


In Africa and beyond, far-reaching policy reviews followed in the wake of decolonisation and the establishment of indigenous governments. Policy review and renewal also came after new parties or their candidates won power in parliamentary or presidential elections. In instances in Southern Africa’s Zambia and Malawi, new parties and coalitions brought new action against corruption, if not new substantive policy directions. In Namibia and Botswana the intra-party anointment of successors within strong majority parties prevailed, resulting in negligible levels of policy change.

10 Dale T. McKinley, 2008, ‘The Crisis of the Left in Contemporary South Africa’, Mediations, 24:1/Fall, pp. 68-89, p. 72, www.mediationsjournal.org/articles/the-crisis-of-the-left-in-contemporary-south-africa (accessed 28 October 2009), p. 76 notes: ‘... the question as to what constitutes the “left” is apropos. The SACP and Cosatu … cannot define what this means because any slight seemingly progressive change in ANC and government policy that has occurred, or might occur, is interpreted as a victory for the left, precisely because to interpret it otherwise would be to undermine the larger claim and position that it is necessary and imperative for the SACP and COSATU to remain in alliance with the ANC; and also because any deeper and more realistic interpretation would undermine the entire theoretical construct of the NDR upon which the alliance rests, as well as the present political positioning of both the SACP and COSATU. The same applies to the SACP resolve, at its own 2007 Congress, that the state should lead macroeconomic growth instead of the market, without any meaningful discussion of what this concretely means in relation to the ANC’s ideological commitment (confirmed over and over again) to a capitalist macro-economy which the ANC-run state has practically led and implemented.’ Most of the authors cited in this section have had altercations with the SACP, given their critical stances.


12 McKinley, 2008, op. cit.

13 McKinley, 2008, op. cit., p. 73.


19 This followed on the ANC’s 2002 national conference resolution that the ANC should ‘seek to build a developmental state, capable of implementing the objectives of our national democratic revolution …’


23 Cronin, 2011, op. cit.


29 Moleketsi (quoted in Chris Barron, 2009, ‘Gear champion changes down with no regrets’, Sunday Times / Business Times, 13 September, p. 9.) on whether there was change in ANC policy towards nationalisation in 2009: ‘What I’d listen to is what government says, what Gwede Mantashe says. I’d listen very carefully to what the president of the country is saying. I’d reach the conclusion that there is no indication of a policy change.’


35 For example, Mathews Phosa, 2009, ‘Zuma will build on ties with Europe’, Cape Argus, 5 November 2009, p. 15 (edited version of Phosa’s address at an ANC business forum in London). The speech reignited ANCYL attention. Also see Sapa, 2010, ‘Business Unity SA “pleased” with Zuma’s policies’, Mail & Guardian Online, 19 March 2010, http://www.mg.co.za/article/2010-03-16-business-unity-sa-pleased-with-zumas-policies. The ANC again reiterated that nationalisation was not ANC policy when, post-local election 2011, it tried to explain that it could not have been a leftward shift that had chased away voters.


39 For a comparative summary of the Cronin-Malema debate on nationalisation, see Jeremy Cronin (abridged version of Umsebenzi article), Julius Malema (edited and abridged version of his response to Cronin’s article), ‘Should we nationalise the mines?’ Weekend Argus, 21 November 2009, p. 25; also see Moffet Mofokeng, ‘Young Communists demand nationalisation of mines’, City Press, 5 July 2009, p. 4.
40 Trevor Manuel, 25 September 2010, NGC media briefing, Durban, also alluded to this issue; also see Steven Friedman, 2011, ‘Little sense in talking to “sensible” ANC leaders’, Business Day, 13 July 2011, p. 9.
41 For example, Julius Malema on the expropriation of white land: ‘We have to buy land from whites when they did not even buy land from us. This is confirmation that we must get the land for free’, Sowetan, ‘We will expropriate white land – Malema’, 9 May 2011, p. 4.
45 Also see PCAS, 2007, Review of Development Indicators, as reported in City Press, 4 June 2007, p. 30.
46 Haroon Bhorat, 2009, ‘South Africa most unequal society’, http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/279796 (accessed 20 October 2009). Bhorat’s study recorded the Gini of 0.679, thereby placing South Africa as the country with the highest Gini in the world. The figure would be affected if the so-called social wage is factored into the equation (whereas this would slightly differently reflect the scope of inequality), other countries doing the same means it would not necessarily relieve South Africa from this status.
47 The SACP was reported in 2010 to have a membership of 114,600 members (Malesela Maleka, 2010, SACP second largest party in SA - Central Committee, statement, 28 November 2010, and ‘more than 130,000’ in 2011 – Blade Nzimande, Forum at 8, SABC-SAFM, 24 July 2011), but SACP members are also well-represented in both ANC and Cosatu leadership positions; see Terry Bell, ‘Debate needed on Cosatu’s SACP agenda’, Business Report, 2 October 2009, p. 16. Cosatu membership was 1,899,634 in 2008; report by the National Labour and Economic Development Institute (Naledi), presented to the 2009 Cosatu congress as part of the secretariat’s report. The six top unions then were (1) the National Union of Mineworkers, (2) the South African Democratic Teachers Union (Sadtu), (3) public sector union National, Education, Health and Allied Workers Union (Nehawu), (4) the National Union of Metalworkers of SA (Numsa), (5) retail and service sector’s South African Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers Union (Saccawu), and (6) the South African Metal Workers Union (SAMWU). By 2011 the total Cosatu membership was 2,070,739, compared with the total number of employed people in South Africa of 9,052,806 (http://groups.google.com/group/yclsa-eom-forum/browse_thread/thread/56af0700c51ad579, accessed 28 July 2011).
48 Interpretation of remarks by Joel Netshitenzhe, 2007, address to Graduate School of Public & Development Management (P&DM), University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 25 June 2007.
49 Gauged from the author’s analysis of ANC conference documentation.
52 McKinley, op. cit., p. 71.
56 Allister Sparks, 2003, Beyond the miracle – inside the new South Africa, Johannesburg, Jonathan Ball Publishers, p. 175.


Ibid., p. 519.


See, for example, Blade Nzimande, 2006, speech by SACP general secretary, ‘Assessing options of the working class and its relationship to state power in a democratic South Africa’, NUM Congress, Gallagher Estate, Midrand, 24 May 2006. ‘The Green Book’ was a report of a commission appointed by a joint meeting of the NEC and Revolutionary Council in Luanda. It met between 27 December 1978 and 1 January 1979. It was headed by Oliver Tambo, and included Thabo Mbeki, Joe Slovo, Moses Mabhida, Joe Gqabi and Joe Modise. Mac Maharaj joined some sessions.

The author observed the conference proceedings in her capacity as researcher. Signals of opulence were seen in, for example, dress, accessories and means of transport.


This is a long-standing point of contestation in the ANC and Tripartite Alliance. In 2007, for example, Cosatu took on Jabu Moleketi and others, who had accused Cosatu of ‘trying to turn the ANC into a socialist organisation’. See Thokozani Mtshali, 2007, ‘Cosatu hits back after ANC attack’, Cape Argus, p. 12. There was a virtual repeat of this engagement in 2009. Vavi, in a statement, said: ‘Suddenly we have been reminded of what we thought we buried in Polokwane rearing its ugly head - “the ANC is not a socialist organisation”. We have been accused of wanting to impose socialism on the ANC. The voices of this small minority accusing us of hijacking the ANC for narrow reasons have been growing louder and louder.’ See Zwelinzima Vavi, 2009, ‘Our enemies in the ANC are plotting regime change – Cosatu’, Overview of the political situation post-10th Cosatu National Congress, 30 November 2009.


Mike Muller highlights Cosatu’s acknowledgment that Gear ‘was not really a deviation from the RDP. They [Cosatu] could probably have lived with the outcome – though they had proposals for doing things a little differently. What irked them was their exclusion from effective participation in its formulation’; see Mike Muller, 2006, ‘Crossroads a chance to take stock’, Business Day, 26 September 2006, p.9.

To illustrate, Cosatu general secretary Zwelinzima Vavi states that Mbeki has ‘on countless occasions personalised debates … and misrepresented facts in order to deliberately ridicule the genuine concerns of others … [Nobody had] escaped Mbeki’s attacks, including other leaders he served with in the [ANC] national executive committee, some of whom he had accused on national television of plotting to stage a coup’; Sunday Times, 27 May 2007, p. 15.


Then Minister of Public Service and Administration, Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi, for example, used the idea in relation to the South African state in her inputs at the conference of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences, Delhi, India, 2001.

The ANC ‘corrected’ Julius Malema onto this route after his nationalisation calls; see Carien du Plessis, 2009, ‘ANC orders Malema to rethink nationalisation call’, Cape Argues, 10 November 2009, p. 5.


Also articulated in the ANC 2009 election manifesto, ‘Working together we can do more’, 13 February 2009.


Jacob Zuma, 2011, State of the Nation address by His Excellency Jacob G Zuma, President of the Republic of South Africa, at the Joint Sitting of Parliament, Cape Town, 10 February 2011. These undertakings were confirmed in the ANC’s 98th anniversary statement, delivered by ANC president Jacob Zuma, Kimberley, 9 January 2010.


For an incisive analysis of the earlier initiatives and their progress through ANC and government structures from 2004 onwards, see Joel Netshitenzhe, 2008, ‘The shift is not ideological’, Mail &
Guardian, 31 October – 6 November 2008, p. 23. Gaye Davis, 2008, ‘One super-cabinet to rule them all’, The Star, 29 October 2008, interviews the SACP’s Jeremy Cronin who acknowledges the origins three or four years earlier and elaborates the SACP’s support for the system.


ANC statement in response to comments made by Billy Masetlha and others in the Mail & Guardian, Jackson Mthembu, ANC national spokesperson, 11 October 2009.

The trend was confirmed in NEC statements, for example, see Gwede Mantashe, 2010, Statement of the ANC National Executive Committee of 12–13 March 2010, 14 March 2010, Johannesburg.


Statement of the Alliance Political Council, Johannesburg, 13 October 2009, issued by Patrick Craven.

Speeches by Blade Nzimande (SACP), S’dumo Dlamini (Cosatu) and Julius Malema (ANCYL) at the ANC’s 98th anniversary celebrations, Kimberley, 9 January 2010.


Comparative policy database created by Booysen and research assistant Ann Mayher, June-December 2007, based on the respective alliance partners’ announcements and documents.

‘The policies we require are firmly in place … The task we will all face during the decade ahead will be to ensure the vigorous implementation of these policies’, according to Thabo Mbeki, 2004, State of the Nation address, 6 February 2004, Cape Town.


This phrase was the subtitle of an address by Ferial Haffajee, former editor of Mail & Guardian, at Wits University democracy debate, 2007.

Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu), 2007, Central Committee documentation, ‘The NDR and socialism, the NDR and capitalism’.

Argued, among others, in an ANC NGC media briefing, Durban, 23 September 2010.

An analysis of the July 2007 SACP and September 2007 Cosatu policy proposal for strategic interventions reveals that they offer few policies and other proposals that are not roughly in line with those in and being considered in government.

Policy Coordination and Advisory Services (PCAS), Presidency Republic of South Africa, 2005, Proposal and implementation plan for a government-wide monitoring and evaluation system, Pretoria.

The ANC’s levels of power have been declining in all four domains considered – organisation-movement, people, elections and the state. Whilst not triggering collapse, there is much more uncertainty circa 2011 about the ANC’s ability to regenerate power than at any previous point in the period since 1994. The co-declines across the four power domains indicate the severity of the challenges ahead for the ANC. The ANC retains incredible strengths. It remains in a powerful and direct relationship with the people. There are penetrating criticisms, but these have not been translating into citizen disinheritance of the ANC. Intermittent punishment of the ANC, many threats to punish it and minority migration have happened. The ANC has suffered electoral declines, yet it remains in a different stratosphere from the opposition parties. It has both the resources and the will to reverse losses where these are suffered. The ANC’s greatest contemporary weakness is its flawed management of the state. ANC problems tend to become state problems. Yet, the ANC offers abundant undertakings to turn around local government, provincial government, and extensive intra-state collapses in probity. Thus far, South Africans largely appear to accept the reassurances, or at least continue giving the ANC another chance to get things right. Most contradictory of them all, is the ANC as party-movement. The ANC combines immense organisational powers of mass membership and mobilisation, with agonising deliberations on farcical branches and cadres that cannot ‘pass through the eye of the needle’. The chapter takes stock of the overall strengths and the weaknesses that the ANC experiences in the four domains, and draws out conclusions on its regeneration of power.
ANC at a critical conjuncture – movement, people, elections, governance

... political legitimacy rests on the tacit normative idea that government stands in the same relationship to its citizens that a father does to his children.

Schatzberg, 2001

The early to mid-phases of the ANC’s fourth term in power displayed both incredible ANC strengths, and disconcerting weaknesses and vulnerabilities. In between, it showed projects to shield the movement, in organisation and in government power, from power decay. The exact balance was difficult to fathom. The answer to the vexing question of ‘how long will the ANC remain in power?’ was in the complex interface between movement, people, election outcomes, and performance in government. In the words of an ANC intellectual, the decline of ANC electoral power (one of the facets explored in this book) ‘is like an ocean wave rolling towards the coast … it will happen but we do not know the distance to the shore’.2

The ‘state of the ANC’, circa 2011-12, was contradictory. There was the great historical movement, in power since 1994, in a continuously strong and trusting, even if somewhat eroded, relationship with the people of South Africa. It was a party that electorally continuously enjoyed a juggernaut status, despite some fraying at the edges and deficit standings in minority communities. In government it was on continuous improvement rolls, even if insufficiently conceptualised and poorly executed. It simultaneously battled the balance between comradely deployment and ruthless pursuits of performance. Organisationally it was a giant on porous legs, courtesy of a plethora of internal contests for position, privilege and influence over state resources, whether for personal or people gains. The mass movement’s branches were often in a sorry state. These paradoxes mean that there are only complex answers to questions of ‘how long will the ANC remain in power?’ It had lost some of its power. But the ANC was still at a point where it could self-correct. Even if it did not, or did so ineffectively, it still stood some good chances to retain power for some time to come.

The ANC had done an incredible amount in its first decades in power, on the fronts of organisation, people, elections and government. Its interventions confirmed that it had
made progress towards the 1994 ideals. In the process, it was actively working to regenerate its organisational and government power. Mostly, this was not power for the sake of power, but power in order to make good on liberation ideals and socio-economic (rather than merely political) liberation. The ANC obviously wishes to remain in power, ‘until Jesus comes’, or, for any other indefinite period of time. Yet, the ANC is not in full control of this mission. There have been slips and failures. The ANC has often had to step in to undo self-inflicted damage. The multi-dimensional (movement, people, elections and government) character of the project for the regeneration of ANC power meant that the ANC has had backup in bad times. This affords the ANC the space to work to regenerate power lost on one front, on the other fronts. When one part seemed to be vulnerable, others were steaming ahead. In addition, these power operations were simultaneously happening on two parallel tiers of democracy. The continuously deep ANC link to ‘the people’ gives it insurance against both failures in government and the threat of declines in electoral support.

The sections in this book have shown how ANC operations across the four faces and two parallel levels of political power have mutually complemented one another. This chapter now synthesises the composite strengths and weaknesses of the ANC in South Africa. Whilst briefly reviewing the ANC in electoral politics and in relation to the people, the chapter predominantly focuses on two fast-evolving and interactive areas of ANC vulnerability – the ANC as organisation-movement, and the ANC in state and government. The assessment illuminates the ‘state of the ANC’ on the eve of the movement’s 2012 centenary.

This chapter stresses how the emerging vulnerabilities could impact on the ANC’s alternative futures on a scale of ‘unambiguously powerful and in power’, ‘on a slope of gradually and hesitatingly losing power’, to an extreme of ‘out of power’. 

### STOCKTAKING OF THE FOUR FACES OF ANC POWER

The ANC, circa 2011, was still a juggernaut, in command of electoral politics and in charge of the South African state – in neither case perfectly, but not at the point of substantial challenge. It also remained in a special relationship to the people. Organisationally it projected immense strength, and was far stronger than any potential rival. Yet striking caveats are evident. The consideration of strengths and weaknesses of the ANC offers a bucketful of mixed fortunes, concurrent achievements and lapses. It raises the issue of the ANC as omnipotent organisation, specked with flaws and cracks; of an ANC firmly entrenched in state power, fraught with lapses and deficits; with few substantive turn-around prospects any time soon, but assured of dominance in occupation for many years to come. This book’s dissection of the four faces of ANC power – movement, people, party politics and state – offers an estimation of the ebb and flow of ANC power.

#### Regeneration of power through electoral, multiparty politics

The ANC still enjoys a huge reservoir of trust and ‘extended liberation grace’ in its relationship with the people of South Africa (Chapter 1). Yet it is moving closer to a
point where much of its electoral support will depend on a confluence of performance in government and organisationally pulling the ANC together to achieve undiluted dedication to the project of governing, only possible if the movement is not distracted by organisational warfare.

Despite lapses, the ANC remained unrivalled in the electoral stakes (Chapters 6, 7). The DA’s gains in the 2011 local elections posited footholds in the ANC’s core black-African support base that were beyond the ANC’s comfort zone (public statements notwithstanding; Chapter 6). Yet, the margin of remaining support was huge, unlikely to become lethally eroded any time soon. Opposition parties in their prevailing configurations at best offered intermittent or gradually accumulating threats. The ANC in 2009 lost about a million of its previous voters to Cope (Chapter 9). The Cope conundrum was contained. Next, in 2011, the DA showed evidence of growing opposition by stealth. The ANC lost approximately 2.6 percentage points of its 2006 local election support to the DA. The DA disproportionately gathered minority votes, and swallowed much of the support of other micro-opposition parties.

The IFP in KwaZulu-Natal and the DA in the Western Cape shed light on the state of the ANC. The ANC’s 2009 provincial eclipse of the IFP (enabled by a surge in urban-metropolitan ANC support) helped veil the multi-province decline of the ANC vote – its vote proportion having declined in a majority of the provinces and, in 2011, in all provinces except KwaZulu-Natal. The DA’s remarkable outright Western Cape victory of 2009 (continued in 2011) was not due to extensive voter realignment. Rather, it was courtesy of higher turnout amongst the DA’s traditional white and coloured voter base and, to some extent, a movement to the DA of some of the coloured middle class, which had previously mostly been ANC-aligned.

ANC power had also been regenerated courtesy of the collapse of the Cope threat. Its fate at the hand of the ANC was a ‘message from God’ as to what might happen to dissidents breaking away from the ANC. This meant that leadership contests would most likely rage internally in the ANC, rather than become externalised into party politics. Citizens’ disappointments and frustrations were largely not expressed in elections, but rather in the between-election periods (Chapter 4) when they directly engaged with the ANC in its roles of state and government, rather than in elections and in contest with other opposition parties. ANC internal divisions were under control and no new Cope (Chapter 9) was looming. In another mode, the disappearance of the NP (Chapter 8) also demonstrated challenger fates.

ANC power hitherto has been shielded by the ‘different world’ status that ANC supporters have been practising – ‘elections is the time of uniting ranks against an opposition party’. Grievances about elusive rights were not ‘dragged into party politics’ (elections). The ANC, however, was not assured of the indefinite continuation of these trends. Its electoral strengths were increasingly fragile and opposition could not be contained to internal contestations. The ANC was in need of regeneration to stop opposition party creep that could become incontrovertible.

The ANC’s own opposition arrangement with the Tripartite Alliance strengthened its hand vis-à-vis the opposition political parties. The Alliance was the platform for
internal debates and contests (Chapter 2). The Alliance aided the notion of contained internal opposition within the safe parameters of not ceding power to opposition parties. This was legitimate opposition, all around, coexisting with the multiparty electoral domain. Vigorous, at times even acrimonious, debates were fought within the confines of the broad church. The Tripartite Alliance was not splitting to trigger the formation of a workerist opposition party.

It was also inconceivable that the ANC with its substantial electoral apparatus and election campaign mobilisation capacities would afford opposition parties the strategic space to effectively mobilise in election situations – unless the limp 2011 campaign was the sign of things to come. Introspection in the aftermath of bruises inflicted in 2011 suggested a state of national mourning … because the ANC had lost between 2 and 4 percentage points of its previous national total (while remaining roughly three times as strong as its closest party political rival). The ANC’s main concern was uncertainty as to how it would stop the process, given the organisation’s wracked state when it came to positioning for internal ANC elections, and its preceding inability to prevent these battles from spilling over into the state. The ANC was determined not to go the route of Zimbabwe’s Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) of protecting electoral standing through party and state violence. But it would use all means legal and sufficiently legitimate to forestall electoral collapse.

The ANC suffered problems of representation that were linked to the proportional representation (PR) system. The main reason for disappointment with public representatives, however, was their failure to maintain close contact with their communities. The MPs over time had suffered credibility knocks due to parliamentary scams such as Travelgate’s abuse of travel allowances. Few heads rolled. Constituency offices were frequently ineffective. There was variability in oversight of the executive (and specific executive discouragement of it), and juniorisation in parliamentary ranks. Elected representatives were shielded from direct voter scrutiny, except for the municipalities’ ward councillors … and they became protest targets to absorb community discontent. Parliamentary outreach projects hardly exposed representatives to the critical mass of suboptimal representation. The executive took some responsibility in both planned and community-prompted engagements. It was in Mpumalanga protests in 2010 (Chapter 4) that demands for accountability cut through the spheres of representatives and held the national executive directly responsible. The ANC’s regenerated power was often despite the quality of representation.

**ANC organisational regeneration of power**

The most effective power of all potentially lies in the ANC as movement-organisation (Chapters 1, 2). Organisationally, the ANC cross-cuts the four faces of power that this book assesses. The ANC’s dual power project of simultaneously operating on two parallel levels of democracy is synonymous with the movement. It operates both in the world of ‘elections, voters and representative democracy’ and in a world of ‘direct engagement with the people’, unmediated by the exploits of liberal democracy. The ANC’s stature in party politics, and in its command of state power, nurtures its organic, people’s relationship.
The ANC has a level of hegemonic presence that no other political party approximates. It is well-resourced, and ensures that it stays that way, if necessary through the leveraging of state resources, attempted control over media and information, and the movement acting as a business operative, dressed in patriotism and empowerment. The well-resourced ANC was also taking out insurance, through generating income, that it would retain the power for future electoral and direct ‘people’ regeneration of power. It was the richest party in South Africa. It seamlessly leveraged state power for financial deals – with the state and by ANC benefactors. The ANC’s Chancellor House business operations, largely veiled from public scrutiny, dealt in mega-scoring business deals with the state. Chancellor House would help guarantee the ANC the resources to counter opposition advances, including electoral initiatives.

The ANC also suffers organisational flaws that undermine the regeneration of power: opportunism, careerism and preoccupation with movement position and power – for what it can leverage in terms of state power – dominate many ANC operations. Talk about the need for containment was far more widespread than actual action to eliminate it. Action can stimulate reaction and trigger revenge, which leaders aiming at elected office in the organisation wish to avoid at all cost. Intra-ANC silences and ‘diplomacy’ – whether on colleagues’ extravagances in employing state resources, being preoccupied with lucrative business operations whilst in full-time ANC and/or government employment – were often due to internal ANC positioning for future leadership … and pots not being in the position to call the colour of kettles.

ANC organisational power is significantly boosted through its Tripartite Alliance relationship. The alliance members play the role of internal opposition, without directing votes away from the ANC. Cosatu has been central to all ANC multiparty election campaigns. Cosatu and the SACP’s battles for centrality of influence (Chapter 2) nurture the idea of inclusivity and a ‘world of opposition’ within the parameters of the Alliance. In the early days of the Zuma administration the alliance partners imagined ‘open doors’ for their exercise of influence and power. It soon emerged that the alliance partners were in solely on the ANC’s terms and with the ANC as leading partner and centre of power. Their role was also divisive in that the ANCYL and associated others contested, as ‘nationalists’ against the ‘communists’ and ‘unionists’, especially in the early run-up to Mangaung. The ANCYL argued that the ‘left’ (Cosatu and the SACP) was attempting an ANC takeover. Many top leaders supported them in principled argument, opportunistic mobilisation or covert backing.

Alliances, however, were malleable – as supple as the ideology and policy differentiations in the movement. The ANC attempted to contain dissent and mobilisation that was not under central control, both in leadership contests and in ideology-policy debates. Evidence included the often-stated notion of the ‘ANC as a disciplined movement of the left’. It fiercely protected ‘democratic centralism’ (Chapters 1, 11) and the obligation of cadres or members to accept the wisdom of the centre. In some respects the ANC was incredibly successful – at least on the surface. Transgressors knew that being faulted on this rule would trigger delegitimation. It did not prevent them, however, from mobilising, planning and plotting to circumvent the centre, when the centre itself was seen
as a political faction. These processes were a small part of the ANC working to manufacture consent. The use and occasional attempted control of mass media, privately and publicly owned, to diffuse authorised ANC messages was another offering (Chapter 12).

The ANC in the final instance can only be as strong as its branches and membership are. There were many indications in ANC meetings and documents that all was not well with this part of the ANC. The case study of mobilisation for Polokwane (Chapter 2) reveals much about the branches in general. From the ANC’s conference and the NGC state of the organisation reports we learn that many ANC branches are inactive, but are revived for special occasions such as national ANC conferences, chequebook and fly-by-night branches exist, and many are the fiefdoms of local power mongers. Branches are (and were in the run-up to Polokwane) manipulated to ensure support for particular candidates. ANC top officials know precisely where the dormant or failed branches are. Through branch support and the coordination of delegate determination, elective conferences can be won before they start. Within some branches membership statistics have been manipulated. In recent years this has impacted on the ANC’s provincial conferences. Mantashe described membership auditing as a farce – but averred that the provinces are working on cleaning up the system.8 The ANC’s Imvuselelo campaign for a million members by 2012 had to prove solid auditing foundations.

The quality of cadres has been a consistent issue in the ANC. It is one of the strongest potential facilitators of inability to continue regenerating power. It first surfaced at the ANC’s first NGC in 2000. Through the eye of the needle considers in detail the requirements for good cadres. The ANC’s frequent references to corruption in public office, careerism, and ‘service’ as a concept foreign to ANC deployees tell the story of the vast scope of the problem. The ANC regards meetings such as the 2010 NGC as its biggest political school, and an opportunity for the socialisation and resocialisation of both the branch delegates that attend and those they will spread the message to back in the branches.

**ANC regenerating power in relation to ‘the people’**

A large proportion of the people of South Africa identify with the ANC, approve of the leadership, trust the organisation, continue to believe that the ANC is taking the country in the right direction, tolerate weaknesses and misdemeanours, and will their movement on to correct itself and better execute its popular mandate (Chapter 3). They continue to protest (or condone protest) against the ANC-in-government, but continue to alternate the brick (protest) and the pro-ANC ballot (Chapter 4). At worst, the bulk of these black-African voters – the core ANC constituency – abstain from voting, in preference to issuing an opposition vote. Or, they choose to vote ANC in anger, rather than cede seats to the DA. These trends held in local election 2011. Positioned in the electoral domain, they also speak to the parallel level of democracy in which the ANC connects to the people. They offer evidence of the ANC in 2011 still retaining immense ability to regenerate power. The tipping points for these relationships to disintegrate remain uncertain.

The 2011 ANC government was unlikely to experience the luxury of another 17 years of popular patience, without working hard to nurture it – and the ANC itself
keeping its people-bond going. At first in democratic South Africa there was the plethora of high expectations, of hope that full political and socio-economic rights realisation would soon convert into (much) ‘better lives for all’. The early days saw many a debate about ‘promises’ of the type that the popular tongue claimed the ANC had committed itself to in its 1994 campaign. The time of patience followed. In defence of their ANC government, people often argued that ‘Rome was not built in a day’, or ‘delivery is like the rain … it always first rains somewhere else’ (Chapter 1). The ANC offered Zuma’s rise to power, a ‘second transition’, as the new hope. A reinvigorated ANC government was hoping for a clean slate to start over. Instead, it was handed protest and negotiated, seemingly conditional, extra time to get things right. Seventeen years into democracy and ANC government, trust was resilient, yet patience was more conditional and support often specifically pitched as forgiving (‘I support the ANC, despite …’).

The analysis recognises the popular need in South Africa to continue believing in ‘our liberation movement’, to keep on trusting that the preferred political party-movement remains the one that can be relied on to pursue the people’s interests and help them achieve the better life, or, in many instances, a continuously modestly improving life. The ANC to the bulk of the black-African voters is not just patron, but parent as well. South Africa is a country of elections and multipartyism. But party political ‘alternatives’ were often superfluous where people continued the parallel level of democracy, directly engaging with and protesting against their parent-patron party, and, come election time, rallying to unite ranks against a party political enemy of choice.

Democracy in 1994 in South Africa had also started with high expectations of government ‘for and by the people’. The Constitution and many pieces of subsequent legislation stressed public participation and substantive transformation (Chapter 5). The early-democracy phases of consultative, participatory policy formulation were the easy parts. Several subsequent government initiatives followed to solicit direct feedback from the citizens on how policy implementation (or the lack thereof) was affecting them. These ranged from izimbizo to a range of co-optive structures in and around the successive presidencies of South Africa, and legislative institutions. Opportunities for public participation in the affairs of government were structured so as to offer largely controlled settings for limited and channelled participation in processes of policy and governance. They often served roles of legitimisation of government decisions, with opposition voices in the ANC and beyond marginalised. The opportunities abounded, but the impact fell short of meaningful participatory democracy.

Between-election protest behaviour (Chapter 4) alternated with strong electoral mandates for the ANC. The phenomenon of coexistence of electoral support for and protest against (mostly) the ANC-in-government persisted. ANC and government investigations showed that it was often ANC members behind community protests. There was evidence of shortening periods of grace extended to the ANC. The protests of May 2009 came within a month of the ANC’s 2009 election victory. The protests of February 2010 demonstrated that protest was continuously evolving: there was a convergence of service delivery, xenophobic, cross-border and poverty-unemployment protests. The 2009-10 protests specifically started holding national government respon-
sible for making good on local demands, a link that had hitherto not been as explicit. In the 2010-11 cycle protesters regularly retaliated against police’s rubber bullets – mostly with stones, occasionally with bullets. Communities did not hesitate to do bottom-up fusion of party and state. Problems with ANC local election candidate lists seamlessly metamorphosed into service delivery protest.

The people needed to remain persuaded to continue extending popular trust in the ANC (Chapter 3). They had to find the proof that the parent still cared enough to ‘bring the food home tonight’. Protest was used to tell the erring parent that the relationship with the community should not be taken for granted. The alternation of political parties in and out of power in this epoch was not yet an option. Inter-party political dynamics only had a limited impact on the ANC’s relationship with the people.

**Regeneration of power through government performance**

Much of the ANC’s contemporary government-delivery project centred on policy and accompanying institutional arrangements to give effect to the plans (Chapter 10). There were heightened expectations, come the time of the Zuma administration, that policy change would bring a sea change. The promotion in government of the ANC’s Polokwane resolutions as a more caring, state interventionist and developmental version of the preceding policy order stimulated expectations (Chapter 12). A gradual scaling down started with the ANC’s 2009 election manifesto. It was less upbeat than the preceding two years’ statements of policy-and-practice intent. Between the lines, the factors of global and national recession spoke loudly. By the time of assuming power, the Zuma administration was falling back on limited institutional restructuring, a few strategies to bring better policy realisation (including monitoring and evaluation), along with incrementalist policy adjustments. It was going to be another phase of gradualism.

The shortcomings and fault lines in government performance were glaring, both on policy and government-institutional fronts. The problems epitomised the shortfalls against the 1994 expectations. The problems of unemployment, poverty, inequality and underdevelopment, and a multitude of companion problems, were stubborn. Targets were missed because of both inefficiency-ineffectiveness, and elusiveness and shifting targets. Many of the causes and solutions were in global policy networks, rather than just in the hands of the government. The complex of local causes ranged from regional and rural-urban migration of populations, to the pursuit of inappropriate policies, unsuitable organisation of state power and its diffusion between the spheres-levels of power, institutional lack of capacity and the failure of cadreship through corruption, tender manipulation and elevating the pursuit of personal power and position over first and foremost serving the people of South Africa (Chapters 10 and 11).

Evidence of the vulnerability of the alliance-in-government was manifest in the policy domain (Chapter 12) where policy innovation was desperately needed (beyond the cases where public sector ineptitude had sabotaged implementation of otherwise sound policy). Policy to impact on the issues of the day came to a head with Zuma’s 2010 State of the Nation address. Impatience for signs of a stepped-up act was tangible. It had been implied, and stated in the heat of the 2009 election campaign, that the newcomers
would better achieve the popular mandates that the Mbeki-ists had neglected. The address and the national budget statement ended the reverie. Leading Cosatu members, including Vavi, concluded that the Zuma administration was trudging along old growth paths and discredited Mbeki-ist trajectories. In September 2010, Zuma sought rapprochement and Cosatu saw new light in NGC speeches, which again was dimmed with the emergence of details of the New Growth Path in 2010-11. The State of the Nation address 2011 brought more trust that the ANC-in-government was applying itself to job creation, albeit with a repositioned and focused mix of the old and the new, in the mode of ‘only possible with private sector help’.

Shortcomings in government performance also resulted from poor-fit institutions, maladministration, corruption and government arrogance. Finance minister Pravin Gordhan noted ‘[c]orruption is happening on a broad scale’.\textsuperscript{13} Other state agencies corroborated this (Chapter 10). The ANC-in-government exercised patronage, and was a source of employment and career advancement. It agonised about the pitfalls of deployment, but continued hoping that trusted cadres would self-correct to make the governance project imprint more coherently. There were many instances of local and provincial infighting to secure positions of political power and socio-economic self-empowerment via state deployment. This happened despite ANC efforts to correct the problem. There were approved purges of incumbents (local and provincial, in particular). There were national ANC efforts, from the ANC’s first NGC meeting of 2000 onwards, to resurrect the cadres that were once believed to be prepared to serve selflessly.

Government performance was badly impacted through the paralysis that resulted from the ANC succession wars from 2005 onwards, which also metamorphosed into positioning for 2012 Mangaung factional mobilisation. State institutions continuously constituted the trenches for intra-ANC warfare. These wars were increasingly overlain by nationalist/communist/unionist lines of mobilisation for the next succession battle. From 2011 onwards there were embryonic signs that evidence of corruption was going to be used – overtly and covertly – as pressure to stand or not to stand for ANC and government positions. The predominance of this voice, however, was far from proven.

Redesigned state institutions in monitoring and evaluation (M&E, Chapter 10) – with central positioning in the Presidency to help reinforce the determination of the Zuma era – were set to falter for lack of ability to implement an accurate system in conditions of both imperfect and good-news reporting. National, provincial and local governments first polished M&E reports, and infused them with appropriate political, developmental and achievement spin, before clearing the reports for submission to the political chiefs.

Policies sometimes faltered at the point of implementation because the spheres of government were ill-aligned and functions insufficiently coordinated – despite many institutional design efforts to address the problem. Local government turnaround strategies, when diffused to local municipalities, lost the veneer of meaningful interventions. But the Zuma administration did buy time. Bureaucrats were often under- or unqualified and were insufficiently benefiting from a plethora of training programmes. Representatives, especially but not exclusively on local level, frequently failed to identify with the communities they were elected or appointed to serve. In the time of the 2011
local government elections positioning for succession in local power often fuelled community protests. This happened in a context where local candidate rivalry and tenderpreneur instigation (to discredit incumbent councillors or bureaucrats and their tender sweethearts) were prime causes of defective delivery.\(^\text{14}\) The most profound fragility, sabotaging the regeneration of ANC power, was in the long-standing community observations of lack of accountability that combined with pervasive evidence of corruption.

**On the balance of forces ...**

All four faces, cross-cutting with the ANC concurrently operating on the two parallel levels of democracy, combined to generate and regenerate the political power of the ANC. Weaknesses and flaws, cracks and contradictions abounded. Yet, on the balance of forces, the ANC by 2011 remained entrenched in power and was continuously regenerating its own power – both in and far beyond the superstructure of elections. Equally, however, the flaws and stumbling blocks were rearing their heads. The sustainability of ANC all-round power had increasingly come to depend, circa 2011, on performance in government – as constituted through leadership (along with credibility and integrity) and governance (through more equitable delivery, and results-bearing intra-state alignment of policies, processes and institutions). There was a continuous popular need to believe in ‘the liberation movement in government’, to keep on trusting that the widely preferred political party-movement remained the one that could be best trusted to pursue popular interests.

Come 2011 and beyond, the beliefs in the ANC were without 1994’s innocence and idealism. The ANC’s hegemonic status had declined, although it was far from lost. The ANC was fighting against itself, and against time, to salvage the government project from frequent ineptness and mismanagement. Whilst the liberation movement dividend was far from exhausted the correction of governance was pitted against ANC organisational instincts that dictated that it needed to preserve peace, harmony and, above all, not antagonise power brokers that held the key to power and position for the future leaders.

The ANC organisational interface with the state – and, in places, superimposition of the ANC on the state – was a potential strength in as far as this could facilitate concerted policy action and governance. However, it hardly happened this way. In the provinces, Provincial Executive Committees (PECs) often dictated to the provincial governments. The dictates were overwhelmingly focused on appointment of loyalists. Qualifications and experience were secondary – although in many cases it would not have made a difference, because the predecessors had been appointed on the same basis. Early cracks in the assertion that the ANC *was* government emerged when the SACP ascended into top ANC positions in the Eastern Cape and it became necessary to differentiate between the members of the Alliance being in party power and in state power. ANC cadres felt threatened, fearing marginalisation from key positions (and loss of control over power and positions). Come the personal vulnerabilities of the president (seen to be weak on personal probity, leadership and decisiveness in government) and a range of cabinet members, party problems seamlessly translated into public power problems – and public sector problems impacted the character and dignity of the former liberation movement.
Table 1: The 2011 state of ANC regeneration of political power over four faces and on parallel levels of democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regenerating power</th>
<th>Weaknesses in regenerating power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ANC as organisation / movement</strong></td>
<td>Branches are often weak and phantom; can be manipulated for conferences and elections. Quality of cadres is an ongoing concern since at least 2000 due to careerism, opportunism, self-interest. Motivation of self-enrichment, opportunities often highly visible amongst top leadership. Decline of democratic centralism and internal discipline causes the ANC top leadership to lose control of centripetal forces, risking factionalism and proliferation of decentralised power enclaves. Incessant leadership struggles, positioning for the next election dominate much of party deliberations, even nomination of ANC candidates for local election in 2011.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal presence that is close to hegemonic tends to self-sustain. By far the dominant party political game in town; thus projects itself into continuous public focus. Well-resourced and investments growing; campaigns and resources attract people into the movement. Alliance brings opposition into self-contained world of ANC, legitimising criticism and then pulls it back into the ANC. Doing work on membership and branches; claims to have a branch in every ward; actively pursues growth. Survives serious leadership struggles and uses them for organisational renewal. Uses ANC meetings such as NGC to socialise new generations of ANC cadres. Zuma leadership became accepted and consolidated. ANC works hard to keep memory of past and of oppression alive, along with the ANC’s liberation role.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>State of regeneration</strong></td>
<td><strong>ANC works on rebuilding branches but weaknesses are also self-regenerative; the central ANC no longer has the power and authority of a decade ago; Imvuselelo centenary campaign for 1 million membership and centenary celebrations likely to fill in the gaps; the central problem of quality and dedication of cadres not addressed.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ANC in relation to the people</strong></td>
<td>Ballot-and-brick repertoire could be a period effect that will lapse at certain point; the tipping point remains uncertain and ANC does not know how much of this borrowed time it has. Dark corners of protest (also xenophobic) show that anarchic tendencies combine with community power vacuums. Widespread poverty, unemployment and inequality render ANC fragile – not in ANC’s power to correct these phenomena. Public participation is often without meaning. Younger generations find it increasingly difficult to associate with the ANC’s historical liberation ethos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People respond to ANC mobilisation, give endorsements; evidence is found in the ANC by far remaining the most trusted party. People show visible adoration at appearances of iconic leaders. People identify with ANC, and this helps constitute their identity in continuously semi-transformed South Africa. Follow ballot-and-brick repertoire to exercise protest within ambit of ANC support – first protest, then vote ANC; this relationship is sustained through 2011. People relate to ANC in both parallel tiers of democracy – a world foreign to opposition parties is available to the ANC.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>State of regeneration</strong></td>
<td><strong>ANC retains the ability to ‘speak to’, connect with people; its credibility and power work as mutually reinforcing; the ballot-brick repertoire seems to be continuous for now; ANC campaigns attempt to bring its people-relationship into the state – but with mixed success.</strong></td>
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</table>
**Elections and multiparty politics**

ANC remains the dominant colossus, at 60 per cent plus support levels. ANC subverts Cope onslaught and Cope’s fate serves as reminder of ‘(no) life after the ANC’. ANC suffers decline, yet remains by far the strongest party in 8 provinces, continuously expanding in KwaZulu-Natal. ANC supporters show repeated willingness in time of elections to close ranks against a party political enemy – elections still overwhelmingly not the time of reckoning for the ANC. ANC support is particularly unrelenting in black-African communities – the bulk of electorate. ANC has more resources than any other party to keep campaigns and persuasion going.

**State of regeneration**

Well-resourced campaigns; opposition has limited ability to compete; DA working on gradual inroads and promoting status as ‘winner’ that can take on ANC; elections retain status as phenomenon that is isolated (in a different world) from ‘real-life, between-election’ politics, overall a continuously phenomenal anchor of support.

**ANC in the state**

ANC is widely in control of the state – and this power attracts people into the ANC. Power generates power. ANC through state control is a source of jobs and careers – ‘stay in the good books of ANC’. ANC mobilises and uses state resources to enhance governing party profile, also in election times. ANC-in-government is the dispenser, the patron that ensures social grants and other benefits. This is recognised as the ‘ANC doing good’. ANC and government have multiple plans; statements to end corruption and mismanagement. ANC is working on monitoring and evaluation; planning to help secure better conversion of policies into realised effects, also through redesign of state institutions.

ANC-in-government is the custodian of high levels of visible corruption, mismanagement, exploitation of state resources for personal benefit. The ‘dubious but legal’ is well tolerated – and emulated. There is little hesitation to pursue business interests through the state. There are serious questions on deployed cadre commitment to serve, and public sector is thoroughly invaded by these appointees.

ANC is working to clean up, or present an image of it cleaning up, the decay in the heart of the state; lack of integrity and lapses in ‘ANC working in the best interest of the people in the state’ is a core point of weakness of ANC, along with inability of ANC to make more of the policies experienced as realised.

The days of two-thirds electoral majorities may be in the past, except if ANC makes dramatic turnarounds. National decline by only 4 percentage points in 2009 courtesy of surge in KwaZulu-Natal; and 2-4 percentage points (depending on calculation method) in local election of 2011. ANC 2009 vote proportion down in 8 provinces; and actual number of votes down in 5 provinces (total number of votes in national election up by just over 2 million compared with 2004). Occasional murmurs surface about new political parties – business-driven, labour, civil society.

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SYNTHESIS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REGENERATION OF ANC POWER

The ANC’s enduring project of building and sustaining power has been subject to many ebbs and flows. Yet, there was the eminent possibility half-way into the 2009 Zuma term that many of the chances for renewal to emulate preceding strengths had been eclipsed. It was likely that the ebbs would grow and the flows contract. The observed declines, up to 2011, were still not calamitous. They constituted dips from the ANC’s heights of power. Despite the declines the ANC retained immense, cross-domain power. The possibility of reversals remained, as did the chance of further decreases. The ANC’s weaknesses in organisation and government, however, militated against recovery of previous ANC peaks.

This conclusion is anchored in the convergence of declines in ANC power over all four power domains that the book tracked. The domains spanned the ANC organisationally and in its Tripartite Alliance formation, the ANC in relation to the people, the ANC vis-à-vis other political parties and in electoral power, and the ANC in state and government.

The ANC was hard at work to stem declines. Its 2012 centenary celebrations will be its huge window of opportunity to bring back much of the reverence that characterised popular responses to the ANC as it entered power in 1994, and to reinstate the party as ascendant instead of declining. The ANC’s status remained close to hegemonic, and it was continuously working to regenerate hegemony. It was, however, undeniably entering the post-hegemony stage. Disappointments and disenchantment had gained footholds which the ANC still might contain, but was unlikely to reverse.

This was a situation of weakening, with much fragility and vulnerability hovering, but not a crisis, for the ANC. The weakening encompassed issues of government, leadership, public ethics, policy and institutional renewal and innovation, along with intra-alliance and intra-ANC problems transferred into the state. Table 1 summarises the arguments that inform the conclusion of the ANC on a scale position of ‘down but dominant’. It shows the bottom line that ‘declines are evident and the ANC is working on them’. The trend lines in Diagram 1 indicate how the ANC’s project of building and sustaining power had been unfolding across the four domains that the book has mapped. The trends are based on the qualitative interpretation of the information and analyses that were presented in the preceding chapters, and which are summarised in Table 1.

Taken compositely across the domains, the trend lines show that ANC power in the four domains has in all probability moved beyond the peaks that were experienced in the years prior to the Mbeki exit. Mbeki’s departure – which at the time had been widely experienced as a rejuvenating development – possibly arrived too late for the reinvigoration to take hold firmly. The divide between the electoral and the non-electoral was widening. The Zuma administration brought (extra but not altogether new) plans to address policy conversion, government delivery, and ethics in government. The allusions that the Zuma ANC was to usher in a new time of caring and connection with the people were strong on assertion, weaker on realised evidence. This was not for a lack of caring and concern on the side of many in the ANC. Nor was it for a lack
of many sincere intentions and honourable names in the ANC and government. The relative lapses, assessed halfway into the 2009-14 ANC-Zuma administration’s term, came amidst competition of personal and intra-ANC group interests to top the agendas of daily government and state operations. The ANC’s Polokwane war was being matched by the undercover 2012 ‘Mangaung war’ and in manifold smaller sites of incessant contestation for access to local and provincial positions.

The irreverent and disdainful mobilisation that characterised the Zuma entrance unleashed dynamics of challenge and contestation that changed the ANC from within. The emergence of Cope was only one significant moment. Fall out among the haves and have nots in the power stakes in the party and alliance were incessant in the time of the Zuma administration. A pivotal factor was the ostensible (perhaps real) intent of the SACP-Cosatu alliance component to take over crucial enclaves of power over policy and governance, and dictate future succession in the ANC. At a later 2010 point, the SACP fell silent, thoroughly fused into ANC government. Cosatu tried to pull the SACP back, but the SACP’s best chances to retain power over succession were in supporting Zuma in government and positioning in this ‘alliance’ to gain or retain the Mangaung 2012 upper hand. The actions were clearly informed by spectres of losing control over future power and position. The ANC provincial chairpersons were waiting in the wings to deliver the delegates that would decide. The ANCYL remained the wild card – mostly playing its Mangaung cards close to its chest, along with other movement seniors, besides pushing for a ‘generational mix in leadership’ that roughly translated into ‘more ANCYL former-presidents in the ANC top-six’.

Diagram 1: Summative trends in ANC power into the current conjuncture

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Four faces of ANC power</th>
<th>Trend in core domain of ANC power – up to mid-2011</th>
<th>Themes in analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governance, public institutions</td>
<td>[Graph]</td>
<td>Policy, institutions, presidency, governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elections and opposition politics</td>
<td>[Graph]</td>
<td>Four elections and local government election 2011, Cope, National Party, floor-crossing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People</td>
<td>[Graph]</td>
<td>People’s power, protest, public participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC as organisation - movement</td>
<td>[Graph]</td>
<td>Backdrop and active contents in all parts of the analysis, including Polokwane-Mangaung war, protest, institutions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Author’s monitoring and interpretation.
The ANC’s alliance battles worked both for and against it. The existence of the Alliance in itself helped shield the ANC from externalised, party political opposition. Cosatu gained legitimacy by voicing critiques, both on government and policy realisation. The Alliance was also a forum for policy debates that influenced the ANC more than opposition parties. Strong contestation was being manifested in this parallel democracy. The alliance battles for centre of power also distracted the ANC. The ANC 2009–11 won several battles to have itself reconfirmed as the centre of power vis-à-vis having the Alliance proclaimed as the centre. Obvious in many ways, this process had been necessitated in the aftermath of alliance members boosting Zuma’s ascendancy.

Power-deflating trouble started this time around when Cosatu called for checks on probity in governance and also took aim at the ANCYL. Vavi’s call for a lifestyle audit was seen as ‘a leftist plot’ on, for example, Malema, who suggested that these were forces opposed to his suggestion for the nationalisation of mines ... except, this time around, the ANCYL was seen by the SACP to be campaigning in favour of partners in mining business who needed bailouts. These were the confused and conflated lines of internal alliance and ANCYL warfare that propelled the ANC, circa 2011. The developments inform the slight downward trend in ANC organisational-alliance power as the period of analysis drew to a close. Two of the greatest power mongers within the ‘extended’, four-partner ANC alliance with the inclusion de facto of the ANCYL – Cosatu and the ANCYL – were fighting for control over future succession, influence, and control over the governance project. The ANC was frequently distracted and the ANC-in-government often paralysed by the raging battles. The ANC core, its provinces and regions, were still to show their hands.

The processes at times prevented the ANC government from operating to best capacity, or achieving a dedicated focus on governance and delivery. There were many efforts to improve and advance aspects of policy and the institutions of government. Institutional redesign, often in effect denying the anchors in the Mbeki era, was in the forefront. The power relations between the institutions were attended to, post-fall out. Redesign was paired with greater emphasis on the coordination and integration of government services. Improved implementation and accountability, amongst others leveraged by monitoring and evaluation, were stressed as priorities. Two years plus into the Zuma administration much of the early momentum had dissipated. New plans and strategies were slow in taking effect. Municipal turnaround strategies were held out as a panacea, whilst local councillors and officials were implored to make government work at the highly visible local level. And protest continued.

The ANC wars on what constituted corruption, and what was legitimate and legal enrichment, directly affected governance. The wars were linked to mobilisation for the ANC’s 2012 Mangaung elective conference. The wars were not going to go away, even if they were likely to metamorphose continuously as the event approached. The wars formed a complicating and destructive crust around the ANC’s governance project. Candidacies-and-corruption was an emerging sub-theme that was set to affect both availability and alliances.

The unevenness of local-level delivery and socio-economic transformation also led to
the potential for increased movement away from ‘protest combined with continuous ANC electoral support’. The 2009-11 protests – ranging from violent and angry to peaceful, passive and comradely – followed on the heels of the national and provincial polls. They continued both before and after the 2011 municipal elections. They demonstrated growing impatience. Participants were frequently unemployed young people, likely to be without full secondary school qualifications, part of the ‘democratic bulge’ of the late 1990s, and increasingly unlikely to find employment any time soon. Their presence constituted a call for new policies or more effective policy conversion. Many were ANC supporters, even ANC members. Aspiration to replace incumbent councillors also featured as a reason for protest, but always in the fertile ground of deficient representation and delivery. Because of growing national government assumption of responsibility to get the local right, and multiple high and top-level government direct interventions, it increasingly became both national and local government that was being held to account.

The question arose as to whether the ANC and South Africa were sitting on a time bomb of rising frustrations and popular volatility, in the light of the coexistence of spectacular delivery and unbelievable failures. The three scourges of poverty, unemployment and inequality would not go away. Disappointments, frustrations and suffering abounded. Communities had ample reason to turn to bricks, tyres and matches to reinforce the realities of suffering. Suffering was in wide evidence, circa 2011, also in the aftermath of the global and South African recession. Unemployment continued rising, whilst government produced policies and plans, and even more variations on the theme. The welfare net in South Africa increasingly expanded, to around 15 million recipients by 2011, growing to cast South Africa as a country foremost in the welfare stakes, courtesy of both social grants and the social wage. These two factors slightly softened the edge of South Africa in 2009 gaining the status of ‘highest Gini coefficient in the world’. Political opportunism and criminality, also in the repertoire of reasons for protest, were present but could not block out true (and often relative) deprivation.

In the communities across South Africa the socio-economic banes combined with either plainly poor service delivery – rendered through inefficiency, corruption and disdain from public representatives and officials – or discontent because of anger with the promise of the good life under democracy evidently passing people by. In many areas of protest service delivery was indeed far from non-existent (or poor). Yet, there was hardly a chance of the average poor township dweller or rural South African ever achieving the high life of the political insiders and high flyers. Government services and grants revealed the caring parent that was detested and lamented, yet brought to people much if not most of what they had in these adverse conditions.

The intrigue of the four declining trend lines was whether the line of ANC electoral support would further decline. The ANC in both election 2009 and local election 2011 suffered relatively mild setbacks, first largely courtesy of the breakaway Cope and then due to DA encroachment and modest turnout by ANC supporters. While Cope itself entered a track of apparently mortal decline, its support confirmed the potential of a reservoir of voter alienation, a substantial proportion of which could equally be switched to another opposition party. The ANC’s KwaZulu-Natal support, which grew to the

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level of support the ANC had been enjoying in other provinces, rescued the ANC from being pushed down to a 60 per cent level of national support in 2009 and 2011. On 66 per cent national support (and 62 per cent nationally calculated on proportional basis for the 2011 local elections), the ANC retained a solid national standing, yet with caveats and vulnerabilities. One of the big questions at the time was whether the ANC would be able to resuscitate its grassroots branch organisation (away from politically manipulated, opportunistic structures that were often fiefdoms for local power mongers), and esteemed community standings, in order to further deflect the conversion of community discontent into protest … Or, to prove that the DA could not break the racial ceiling and capture a bigger protest vote in places where both ANC and government structures exposed a vulnerable underbelly.

South Africa’s curse of seriously flawed governance was substantially precipitated by ANC processes of internal warfare and growing disregard of ‘the ANC as a disciplined movement of the left’. Extension of the organisational battles into trenches of state organisations frequently happened through cadre deployment. There was evidence of the possibility that the battles had found fertile ground in the state institutions, and had become institutionalised, if not endemic. Substantial amounts of governance and delivery happened despite these ANC processes in the heart of government.

The ANC’s party political future was increasingly tied to the organisation pulling itself out of the prevailing quagmire of low-intensity and multi-fronted ‘crisis’. The chapters in this book have highlighted critical dimensions of the ANC in relation to the people, in elections and party political combat, in intra-alliance contests, and in its operations of state and government. They have shown the volatility of popular trust in government. There were policy limitations that delivered protests. The protests were known as ‘local’ and were linked to ‘service delivery’, but their scope was much broader. The reservoir of potential protestors was large. There were transitional leadership questions. The times of 2008-11 created expectations that the incoming ANC leadership would rise to the occasion. The indications were unleashed that, instead, the ANC was declining in electoral power, and was not bringing in sufficient new policies and institutional-process initiatives to elevate governance onto higher plains. Top leadership was strong in ANC mobilisation, but frequently weak in asserting directions for the country. Much was happening, but more was needed to bring higher performance in substantive delivery and definitive turnarounds.

However, the ANC’s electoral strength remained formidable, even if probably post-peak. There were few signs of imminent collapse. The ANC’s welfarist government policies and projects brought the status of caregiver that was a worthy successor to liberator. The ANC top leadership might have been suffering credibility deficits, and the state institutions and the representatives and officials were frequently faltering. Yet the ANC-controlled state delivered on many fronts, and the people of South Africa continued relating to and trusting the ANC far more than any other party. The convergence of the four power lines in a concerted co-decline would pose the bridgehead to crack the ANC as electoral fortress. This was not happening, although five to ten years earlier the answer would have been far more emphatic that the juggernaut was
standing strong. The simultaneous flaws in leadership in government, weaknesses in ANC leadership, continuous contests and paralysis along with capacity failures in state institutions, insufficient policy determination and conversion, and an organisational status that required continuous concerted work, raised questions of whether this would be too heavy a burden on ANC shoulders.

Yet on overall balance, there was enough progress and attention to the crises to make the ANC tick over, to generate the momentum of dealing with and restoring the organisation. The ANC's electoral prowess meant that even if there were losses to opposition parties, it was going to saturate 'threatened' provinces and wards with high-level visits, reassurances and targeted delivery. A comparable process was unfolding on the side of the ANC operating in the state. Continuous movement was generated in the problem areas, enough to show that the government was attending to the problems, and that concerns were being addressed. There was a moving target and the ANC was benefitting from the fact that there was so much outstanding that it would continuously be able to claim progress.

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NOTES


3 Local politics was fuelling protest, said Shiceka, adding: 'people are positioning themselves for 2012. That’s what you find in a number of municipalities …'; see ‘Power struggle breeds discontent’, The Sunday Independent, 14 February 2010, p. 6. Also see Zukile Majova, 2010, ‘Zuma will visit hot spots’, Sowetan, 25 March 2010, p. 4. Zuma argued in the online Letter from the President that it was necessary for leaders to visit the protest-affected areas to ascertain whether the protests were delivery-oriented or caused by infighting.

4 In mid-2011 the ANC took several steps to protect its councillors from community wrath. Measures included offering ANC constituency offices as work bases to ANC councillors, and in a few instances bodyguards. See SA Local Government Research Centre, 2011, The SA local government briefing (supplementary), July, p. 25.

5 In February 2010, in the course of the protest in Siyathemba, Balfour, Zuma was called to come and account to the community. Several other high-level politicians and bureaucrats went instead. Shiceka was also directly drawn into the Moutse, Limpopo protests; see Sipho Masombuka, 2010, ‘We’ll make it ungovernable’, Sowetan, 15 February 2010, p. 10.


Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, 1999, *Africa works: Disorder as political instrument*, Oxford, James Currey in association with the International African Institute, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, offer pertinent insights into patronage and its contribution to political process in Africa. These perspectives, however, do not capture the full picture of the South African system.

Minister of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs at the time, Sicelo Shiceka, tried to turn this trend again when, upon visiting the Mpumalanga township Siyathemba on 18 February 2010, he expressed his dissatisfaction with the local council; see ‘Power struggle breeds discontent’, *The Sunday Independent*, 14 February 2010, p. 6.

In a 1997 research project, a young man from Soweto remarked: ‘You expect the father to go out and get food. If he comes with it, you eat and sleep. But if he returns without food, we stop getting along’. See Susan Booyzen, 1997, ‘Life in the new democracy’, commissioned research project and report, Matla Trust ‘Democracy and citizen education project’, August.


See Luzuko Pongoma, 2010, ‘Tenderpreneurs blamed for mayhem’, *Sowetan*, 3 March 2010, p. 9. Some of the specifics included pressure to localise tenders. Opposition parties Cope, the DA and IF were accused of exploiting the grievances of residents. This further combined with intra-ANC rivalry to discredit incumbent councillors and thereby make space for new blood come the 2011 local government elections.

Jeremy Cronin (abridged version of *Umsebenzi* article), Julius Malema (edited and abridged version of his response to Cronin’s article), ‘Should we nationalise the mines?’ *Weekend Argus*, 21 November 2009, p. 25.


**Acronyms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AA</td>
<td>affirmative action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAC</td>
<td>All African Convention</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACDP</td>
<td>African Christian Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>AEB</td>
<td>Afrikaner Eenheidsbeweging (Unity Movement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>African Independent Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>APC</td>
<td>African People’s Convention</td>
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<td>APF</td>
<td>Anti-Privatisation Forum</td>
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<td>AMP</td>
<td>African Muslim Party</td>
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<td>AMSA</td>
<td>ArcelorMittal South Africa Ltd.</td>
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<td>ANCWL</td>
<td>African National Congress Women’s League</td>
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<td>ANCYL</td>
<td>African National Congress Youth League</td>
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<td>APC</td>
<td>African People’s Convention</td>
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<td>AsgiSA</td>
<td>Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa</td>
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<td>AWB</td>
<td>Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging</td>
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<td>Azapo</td>
<td>Azanian People’s Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>BAE</td>
<td>British Aerospace Enterprise</td>
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<tr>
<td>BBBEE</td>
<td>broad-based black economic empowerment</td>
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<tr>
<td>BC</td>
<td>Black consciousness</td>
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<tr>
<td>BCM</td>
<td>Black Consciousness Movement</td>
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<td>BEC</td>
<td>Branch Executive Committee</td>
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<td>black economic empowerment</td>
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<td>BPS</td>
<td>budget policy statement</td>
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<td>CASAC</td>
<td>Council for the Advancement of the South African Constitution</td>
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<td>CASE</td>
<td>Community Agency for Social Enquiry</td>
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<td>Constitutional Court</td>
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<td>CCB</td>
<td>Civil Cooperation Bureau</td>
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<td>CCS</td>
<td>Centre for Civil Society</td>
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<td>CDW</td>
<td>Community Development Worker</td>
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<td>CDE</td>
<td>Centre for Development and Enterprise</td>
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<td>CLC</td>
<td>Community Law Centre</td>
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<td>CNC</td>
<td>Congress National Committee</td>
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<td>Codesa</td>
<td>Convention for a Democratic South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cogta</td>
<td>Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cope</td>
<td>Congress of the People</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cosag</td>
<td>Concerned South Africans Group</td>
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<td>Cosatu</td>
<td>Congress of South African Trade Unions</td>
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<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>Conservative Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPF</td>
<td>Community Policing Forum</td>
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<td>CPS</td>
<td>Centre for Policy Studies</td>
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<td>CWC</td>
<td>Congress Working Committee</td>
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<td>DA</td>
<td>Democratic Alliance</td>
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<td>DDG</td>
<td>Deputy director-general</td>
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<td>DLF</td>
<td>Democratic Left Front</td>
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<td>DP</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
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<td>DPCI</td>
<td>Directorate for Priority Crime Investigations (the Hawks)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPLG</td>
<td>Department of Provincial and Local Government</td>
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<td>DSO</td>
<td>Directorate of Special Operations (the Scorpions)</td>
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<td>EISA</td>
<td>Electoral Institute for Democracy in Southern Africa / Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa</td>
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<td>FA</td>
<td>Federal Alliance</td>
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<td>FA</td>
<td>Freedom Alliance</td>
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<tr>
<td>FF+</td>
<td>Freedom Front Plus</td>
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<td>Fosad</td>
<td>Forum of South African Directors-general</td>
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<td>FXI</td>
<td>Freedom of Expression Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCIS</td>
<td>Government Communication and Information System</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEAR</td>
<td>Growth, Employment and Redistribution Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNU</td>
<td>Government of National Unity</td>
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<td>GWMES</td>
<td>Government-wide monitoring and evaluation system</td>
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<td>HNP</td>
<td>Herstigte Nasionale Party</td>
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<td>HOD</td>
<td>head of department</td>
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<td>HSRC</td>
<td>Human Sciences Research Council</td>
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<td>ICT</td>
<td>Imperial Crown Trading</td>
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<td>ID</td>
<td>Independent Democrats</td>
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<td>Institute for Democracy in South Africa</td>
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<td>IDEA</td>
<td>International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Integrated Development Plan</td>
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<td>IEC</td>
<td>(Independent) Electoral Commission</td>
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<td>IFP</td>
<td>Inkatha Freedom Party</td>
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<td>IGD</td>
<td>Institute for Global Dialogue</td>
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<tr>
<td>IM</td>
<td>Independent Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMC</td>
<td>Inter-ministerial Committee</td>
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<td>International Organisation for Migration</td>
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<td>IPAP</td>
<td>Industrial Policy Action Plan</td>
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<td>ISS</td>
<td>Institute for Strategic Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jipsa</td>
<td>Joint Initiative on Priority Skills Acquisition</td>
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<td>JSC</td>
<td>Judicial Services Council</td>
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<td>JSCI</td>
<td>Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence</td>
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<td>KAS</td>
<td>Konrad Adenhauer Stiftung</td>
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<td>LGSA</td>
<td>Local Government Strategic Agenda</td>
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<td>LGTAS</td>
<td>Local Government Turnaround Strategy</td>
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<td>LPM</td>
<td>Landless People's Movement</td>
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<td>MCC</td>
<td>Msukaligwa Community Committee</td>
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<td>MCC</td>
<td>Meqheleng Concerned Citizens</td>
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<td>MDF</td>
<td>Masiphumelele Development Forum</td>
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<td>MDM</td>
<td>Mass Democratic Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>monitoring and evaluation</td>
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<td>MF</td>
<td>Minority Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIG</td>
<td>Municipal Infrastructure Grant</td>
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<td>MINMEC</td>
<td>Ministers and Members of Executive Councils</td>
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<td>MK</td>
<td>Umkhonto we Sizwe</td>
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<td>MKMVA</td>
<td>Umkhonto we Sizwe Military Veterans' Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPL</td>
<td>Member of the Provincial Legislature</td>
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<td>MPNP</td>
<td>Multiparty Negotiation Process</td>
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<td>MTEC</td>
<td>Medium-term Expenditure Committee</td>
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<td>MTEF</td>
<td>Medium-term Expenditure Framework</td>
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<td>MTSF</td>
<td>Medium-term Strategic Framework</td>
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<td>NA</td>
<td>National Alliance</td>
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<td>NACH</td>
<td>National anti-corruption hotline</td>
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<td>Nadeco</td>
<td>National Democratic Congress</td>
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<td>Natdepcom</td>
<td>National Deployment Committee</td>
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<td>NCOP</td>
<td>National Council of Provinces</td>
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<td>NDI</td>
<td>National Democratic Institute for International Affairs</td>
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<td>NDM</td>
<td>National Democratic Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDPP</td>
<td>National Director of Public Prosecutions</td>
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<td>National Directorate of Public Prosecutions</td>
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<td>NEC</td>
<td>national democratic revolution</td>
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<td>National Executive Committee</td>
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<td>Nedlac</td>
<td>National Economic Development and Labour Council</td>
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<td>Nepad</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa's Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nehawu</td>
<td>National Education, Health and Allied Workers' Union</td>
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<td>NFP</td>
<td>National Freedom Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGC</td>
<td>National General Council</td>
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<td>NLP</td>
<td>New Labour Party</td>
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<td>NLP</td>
<td>New Growth Path</td>
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<td>NHI</td>
<td>national health insurance</td>
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<td>NIA</td>
<td>National Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>NLC</td>
<td>National Land Committee</td>
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<td>New National Party</td>
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THE ANC IN PARTY POLITICS AND ELECTIONS

NP  National Party
NPA  National Prosecuting Authority
NPC  National Planning Commission
NPP  National People's Party
NSFAS National Student Financial Aid Scheme
NSMS National Security Management System
Nusas National Union of South African Students
NVP  National Vision Party
NWC  National Working Committee

OB  Ossewa Brandwag

PAC  Pan Africanist Congress
PCAS Policy Coordination and Advisory Services
PCC  President's Coordinating Council
PCF  President’s Coordinating Forum
PEC  Provincial Executive Committee
PFMA Public Finance Management Act, No. 1 of 1999
PPP  Progressive Federal Party
PGC  Provincial General Council
PGS  Provincial Growth Strategy
PIM  Progressive Independent Movement
PME  Performance Monitoring and Evaluation
PoA  plan of action
POS  Political opportunity structure
PR  proportional representation
PRC  Presidential Review Commission
PSC  Public Service Commission

RDP  Reconstruction and Development Programme
REC  Regional Executive Committee
RTT  regional task team

Saab Svenska Aeroplan AB (aktiebolag) / Swedish Aeroplane Company Limited
ABC South African Broadcasting Corporation
SACP South African Communist Party
Sadeco South African Democratic Congress
SAIRR South African Institute of Race Relations
Salga South African Local Government Association
SALRC South African Law Reform Commission
Sanco South African National Civics Organisation
Sangoco South African National NGO Coalition
SANNC South African Native National Congress
SAP  South African Party
SAPS  South African Police Service
Sasdo South African Shack Dwellers’ Organisation
SASS South African Secret Service
SCA  Supreme Court of Appeal
<table>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>SCA</td>
<td>Soshanguve Civic Association</td>
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<td>Scopa</td>
<td>Standing Committee on Public Accounts</td>
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<td>SECC</td>
<td>Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>SITA</td>
<td>State Information Technology Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIU</td>
<td>Special Investigating Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>SoN</td>
<td>State of the Nation</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAC</td>
<td>Treatment Action Campaign</td>
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<td>TEC</td>
<td>Transitional Executive Council</td>
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<td>Thusong Service Centre</td>
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<td>UCDP</td>
<td>United Christian Democratic Party</td>
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<td>UCT</td>
<td>University of Cape Town</td>
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<td>UDF</td>
<td>United Democratic Front</td>
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<td>UDM</td>
<td>United Democratic Movement</td>
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<td>UIF</td>
<td>United Independent Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UP</td>
<td>United Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>UPSA</td>
<td>United Party of South Africa</td>
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<td>VAP</td>
<td>voting age population</td>
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<td>WEF</td>
<td>World Economic Forum</td>
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<td>WSSD</td>
<td>World Summit on Sustainable Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZANU-PF</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front</td>
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