Estonian Approaches to Culture Theory
Aims & scope

The Approaches to Culture Theory book series focuses on various aspects of analysis, modelling, and theoretical understanding of culture. Culture theory as a set of complementary theories is seen to include and combine the approaches of different sciences, among them semiotics of culture, archaeology, environmental history, ethnology, cultural ecology, cultural and social anthropology, human geography, sociology and the psychology of culture, folklore, media and communication studies.
Estonian Approaches to Culture Theory

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Contents

List of illustrations .................................................. 7
List of figures ......................................................... 8
Notes on editors and contributors ................................. 9
Acknowledgements ................................................... 12
Preface: Estonian approaches in culture theory .................. 14
Valter Lang, Kalevi Kull
The paradoxes of the semiosphere .................................. 22
Mihhail Lotman
Culture and translation ............................................. 36
Peeter Torop
Husserl’s account of the cultural uniqueness of Western civilization ........ 66
Tõnu Viik
Principles of language sustainability ................................ 88
Martin Ehala
Landscape semiotics: contribution to culture theory ............ 110
Kati Lindström, Kalevi Kull, Hannes Palang
Where did the Asva culture go?
Three models of cultural behaviour in the Bronze-Age eastern Baltics .... 136
Valter Lang
Identity, difference and cultural worlds .......................... 164
Rein Raud
Human beings, religion and deviance:
does religiosity create a secure environment for living? .......... 182
Raul Tiganik, Anne Kull

The collective powers of religion:
scholarly interpretations and vernacular dialogue .......... 204
Art Leete

The folk and others: constructing social reality in Estonian legends .... 222
Ülo Valk

Avoiding uncertainty by making the past usable .......... 242
Aili Aarelaid-Tart

The diachronic approach to journalism culture .......... 262
Halliki Harro-Loit

Genre creation within memory collection .......... 284
Tiiu Jaago

From the construction of concepts to knowledge production:
the interdisciplinarity of folkloristics .......... 308
Kristin Kuutma

Index of names .......... 329
List of illustrations

EKM M 5324. © EAÜ 2014 .............................................. front cover
   Reprinted with permission ................................... 13
Tõnis Vint “Päikese tee” (“The Path of the Sun”) 1978. EKM G 11303. © EAÜ 2014  21
   © EAÜ 2014 ............................................................. 35
Sirje Runge “Ruum II” (“Space II”) 1977. EKM M 6305. © EAÜ 2014 ............... 65
Sirje Runge “9 ruutu” (“9 Squares”) 1976. EKM M 7418. © EAÜ 2014 .............. 87
   Reprinted with permission ...................................... 109
   EKM G 11667. © EAÜ 2014 ...................................... 163
   Reprinted with permission .................................... 181
Jüri Palm “Must ja hõbe” (“Black and Silver”) 1967. EKM G 27354.
   Reprinted with permission ................................... 203
   Reprinted with permission .................................... 241
   EKM G 10410. Reprinted with permission ......................... 261
List of figures

Location of anthropology in interdisciplinary field according to Lévi-Strauss ........ 45
Dimensions to classify the environment ....................................................... 52
Static and dynamic aspects in the concept of text ......................................... 58
Static–dynamic oppositions in cultural semiotics ............................................ 59
Model of the language community ................................................................. 93
The Extended Model of the speech community ............................................. 94
External factors influencing sustainability ...................................................... 100
Internal factors influencing sustainability ....................................................... 102
Vitality factors influencing sustainability ...................................................... 104
Fortified and hilltop settlements in the eastern Baltic region ......................... 139
Distribution of the north/west cultural model in the eastern Baltic region ........ 148
Relationship between church attendance and delinquent behaviour ............... 191
Landlords drinking coffee. Luist manor, Kullamaa parish, western Estonia ....... 229
Baron Johann Karl Girard de Soucanton with his wife.
    Kunda manor, Viru-Nigula parish, northern Estonia ............................... 231
A peasant woman from Saaremaa with a cow wagon ................................... 232
Estonian peasant with a barrow with vegetables .......................................... 235
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Acknowledgements

This volume was initiated at the annual meeting of the board of the Centre of Excellence in Cultural Theory (CECT) in Põhjaka manor, Estonia, November 17, 2011. All CECT research groups were invited to suggest fitting articles in order to compile an interesting contemporary overview of culture theory works in Estonia. We are grateful to those who responded to our call, although it was not possible to include all of the material received – nevertheless, the initial selection set the tone of the present volume. This volume is recognition of both the fruitful discussions of CECT board meetings as well as the willing nature of CECT researchers to be challenged by new ideas and create new forms of cooperation.

We would like to thank the volume authors for their kind responses to editing their articles and for enduring the long process of compiling this volume. Our ambition to introduce modern Estonian art parallel to contemporary culture theory was encouraged by the Art Museum of Estonia – we are especially happy that our collaboration began with this volume.

We are grateful to Marek Tamm for some good ideas that we have used in the introduction. We would also like to thank Daniel E. Allen, our language editor and keeper of our house style, our editor Anu Kannike, and our managing editor Monika Tasa.
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Preface: Estonian approaches in culture theory

Valter Lang, Kalevi Kull

Credo

Culture depends on its self-description. This means that the development of any culture cannot be understood without knowing what the people knew about their culture. Likewise, theoretical knowledge, including local studies in the field of culture theory, can play a remarkable role in cultural self-awareness. Therefore, culture theory studies in Estonia do not represent only a certain field of local science; these studies, in the vanguard of the self-understanding of culture in Estonia, represent an obligatory part of the culture itself.

Culture is everything that symbolic communication does. While the capacity to build symbolic relations is the basis for the faculty of language, it is also responsible for the diversity and power of culture. This includes not only human relations and artefacts, but also accounts for our relationships with place and cross-temporal phenomena. Thus the framework of culture theory should also deal with the modification of landscapes, and with the sustainability of the ecosystem that contains a culture and is related to it. Culture is a chronotope, a spatio-temporal world that meaning-making humans are permanently creating; culture is also a semiosphere, a space of signs. These formulations represent the approach developed by contemporary Estonian culture theorists.

Progenitors

Estonian research in cultural theory has received worldwide attention since the 1960s, due to the pioneering work of Juri Lotman on the semiotic theory of culture. However, the history of professional culture theory research in Estonia can be traced back at least two centuries. Initially, the impact of Victor Hehn, Leopold von Schroeder, and Hermann von Keyserling, is visible. Upon closer inspection, a veritable group of scholars opens up.

At the beginning of the 19th century, probably under the influence of Gottlob Benjamin Jäsche (1762–1842), philosophy professor of the University of Tartu and

a pupil of Immanuel Kant, the rationalist approach gained popularity in Tartu. This aspect did not diminish the scope of studies, rather it broadened the diversity of approaches, adding the emphasised dimension of depth to each of them. Carl Gustav Jochmann (1789–1830), who was born in Pärnu and later travelled in Europe, wrote influential essays on cultural philosophy, yet his relationship to Estonia remained disconnected. However, University of Tartu grew into one of the major intellectual centres of 19th-century Europe and gave rise to numerous studies that have underpinned the deep investigations of culture. For instance, Karl Ernst von Baer (1792–1896), who was an eminent scholar in many fields – biology (including embryology, ecology, theory of development and evolution), anthropology, geography, history – carried out outstanding research in ethnology. Historian of culture Victor Hehn (1813–1890), who studied and taught in Tartu, wrote a remarkable work on the domestication of plants and animals. Gustav Teichmüller (1832–1888), a long-term philosophy professor in the University of Tartu, made an extensive study of the history of concepts. Linguist Jan Baudouin de Courtenay (1845–1929), a professor at the University of Tartu from 1883 to 1893, developed an early structuralist approach. Indologist Leopold von Schroeder (1851–1920), who was also interested in general linguistics, studied human ethology. Adolf von Harnack (1851–1930), who studied theology in Tartu (and later established the Keiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft, now the Max Planck Society, in Germany), performed a study of early Christian culture. Alexander von Staël-Holstein (1877–1937) was an Estonian (Baltic German) orientalist – this field has been permanently present in Tartu. Biologist and philosopher Jakob von Uexküll (1864–1944) made attempts to use general functional models of meaning-making for all organisms, applying this to the description of human society. Hermann von Keyserling (1880–1946), who studied chemistry in Tartu, was an influential cultural philosopher of the early 20th century.


University of Tartu geography professor Johannes Gabriel Granö (1882–1956), who studied Estonian landscapes, and Walter Anderson (1885–1962), who was a
Valter Lang & Kalevi Kull

long-term folkloristics professor in Tartu, also exerted remarkable influence on our cultural studies.

Juri Lotman (1922–1993), a specialist in Russian literature and the history of culture, introduced the whole field of the semiotics of culture into the humanities. He organised a series of legendary summer schools on semiotics, or secondary modelling systems, in Kääriku (Estonia) from 1964 to 1986. These meetings enabled the establishment of the Tartu–Moscow School of semiotics. Almost all subsequent research in theory of culture benefits from the influence of this school.

Later, Linnart Mäll (1938–2010) studied the role of humanistic base texts in Eastern cultures. Cultural psychologist Peeter Tulviste (b. 1945) has studied cultural historical types of verbal thinking. Jaan Valsiner (b. 1954) has developed a semiotic approach in cultural psychology.

The work of the abovementioned scholars with their diverse backgrounds prepared the conditions for top-level research in the theory of culture in Estonia in the 21st century.

Centre of Excellence

The Centre of Excellence in Cultural Theory (CECT) was established in 2008. The Centre acts as an umbrella organisation for eight established research groups – archaeology, cultural communication studies, contemporary cultural studies, ethnology, folkloristics, landscape studies, religious studies, and semiotics. In order to advance the theoretical analysis of culture, the CECT focuses on ancient social and cultural systems, folklore and heritage, the evolution and translatability of sign systems, contemporary everyday practice, landscape and sociological processes, media and life story research, the theoretical problems of cultural semiotics, etc. Enhanced interdisciplinary communication and joint seminars have turned the Centre into an inspirational environment for further steps in the field of the humanities.

Since 2008, the Centre has organized a series of international annual conferences on culture theory:

- 2008 – *The Analysability of Culture* (Tartu, 21–22 November)
- 2009 – *Spatiality, Memory and Visualisation of Culture/Nature Relationships: Theoretical Aspects* (Tallinn, 22–24 October)
- 2010 – *Time in Culture: Mediation and Representation* (Tartu, 28–30 October)
- 2011 – *Things in Culture, Culture in Things* (Tartu, 20–22 October)
- 2012 – *In, Out and in Between: Dynamics of Cultural Borders* (Tallinn, 17–19 October)
Preface: Estonian approaches in culture theory

- 2013 – *Embodiment, Expressions, Exits: Transforming Experience and Cultural Identity* (Tartu, 30 October – 1 November)


**Current volume**

The aim of the current volume is to present a ‘contemporary anthology’ – a representative selection of research in the field of culture theory in Estonia. The articles have been selected from recently published works; some of them were translated from the original languages of publication into English and improved especially for this volume. As any other anthology, this one can hardly be an exhaustive selection, more something of a ‘best of Estonian cultural theory’, an overview of what some of our scholars are dealing with today. The authors represent all eight of the Centre’s research groups:

- Archaeology: Valter Lang
- Cultural Communication Studies: Halliki Harro-Loit
- Contemporary Cultural Studies: Aili Aarelaid-Tart
- Ethnology: Art Leete, Kristin Kuutma
- Folkloristics: Ülo Valk, Tiiu Jaago
- Landscape Studies: Hannes Palang, Rein Raud, Tõnu Viik
- Religious Studies: Anne Kull
- Semiotics: Mihhail Lotman, Peeter Torop, Kati Lindström, Kalevi Kull
  
In cooperation with the Centre: Martin Ehala, Raul Tiganik.

The first chapter of this collection is written by Mihhail Lotman. It draws attention to some paradoxes in Juri Lotman’s conception of structural semiotics, which did not find adequate expression in his publications. These paradoxical aspects of semiotics involve the separation of time from causality where result may precede cause in terms of information, and the relationship between sign and its meaning where meaning can be at the same time antecedent and subsequent, the cause and its result. Peeter Torop continues by analysing connections between culture and culture studies, particularly concentrating on the specificity
of translation – a concept that has been treated as central to discussion of the philosophy of culture. He elaborates the concept of the ‘thick translation’, which in parallel to C. Geertz’s ‘thick description’ is meant to signify translation that maximally opens up the cultural context. It follows that anthropology can be treated as culture translation and, therefore, translation can be examined not merely within the framework of translation studies but also within cultural anthropology. Tõnu Viik contributes by analysing Husserl’s account of the cultural uniqueness of Western civilization, focusing on cultural symbolic forms.

Martin Ehala turns to the theory of language ecology. He analyses the sustainability of language by distinguishing three main factors that influence it most: the external and internal environments, and the ethnonlinguistic vitality of the community. According to Ehala, changes in the external environment of a language community must be adapted to by developing the internal environment (social institutions) of that community as fully as possible, while the strength of the latter depends on ethnonlinguistic vitality, i.e. the ability of a community to behave in interethnic communication as a united collective factor. Kati Lindström, Kalevi Kull and Hannes Palang, in their chapter analyse semiotic treatments of landscape, where approaches to landscape as analogous to a text with its language and both writers and readers have turned to more naturalised approaches. This also includes understanding of landscape as chronotope and an ecosemiotic view of landscapes that goes beyond anthropocentric definitions. Valter Lang goes 3000 years back in time and tries to define prehistoric culture by using Juri Lotman’s treatment of semiosphere and cultural typology. He describes different sub-phenomena or models of cultural behaviour within eastern Baltic Bronze Age culture, which as a whole is distinguishable from neighbouring cultural regions.

Rein Raud dedicates his chapter to the analysis of identity, treating this concept as a cultural and linguistic phenomenon rather than a relationship between things and objective reality. Raul Tiganik and Anne Kull discuss the relationships between religion with its emphases on love, compassion, caring and peace from one side, and criminality and behavioural deviance from the other. Although the latter decreases the sense of security and increases the sense of danger both in the individual and in society, criminology has not been regarded as a partner for theology and religious anthropology as frequently as might be expected. Anthropological approaches to religion from the perspective of collective and individual characteristics are the subject of analysis presented by Art Leete. He compares characteristic research strategies, employed to explain Christian religious identities and processes in modern anthropological tradition, and applies them to his fieldwork data dealing with local traditions and vernacular expressions of faith among the Komi Republic in Russia. Ülo Valk discusses oral storytelling on the
basis of Estonian material, showing how dominant beliefs in the supernatural are connected with social changes and power relations in rural communities. He argues that in order to understand traditional legends, these legends should not be detached from the social world of the communities who tell them.

In her chapter Aili Aarelaid-Tart interprets human time as a cognitive construction of social reality that brings order to social interaction and communication. According to Aarelaid-Tart, the division of time into past, present and future is quite illusory and relative because in real life streams of events from the past and the representations of the future are subordinated to current needs. The next chapter, written by Halliki Harro-Loit, provides the concept of the diachronic change of journalistic conventions, which enables the author to highlight journalism as a specific phenomenon in cultural communication and reveal universal and unique processes in certain journalism cultures. Tiiu Jaago poses the question of how to apply today’s research methodology in the analysis of source material collected during earlier periods. For instance, how do the memories of the 1905 revolution in Estonia, written down by historians in the 1920s and 1930s for the purpose of studying history, suit folkloristic narrative research today? She analyses the contact points between historical and folkloristic narrative research from three angles: the genre of these texts, the specificity of oral and written texts, and the impact of the researcher and narrator’s cooperation on the archival text. The last chapter by Kristin Kuutma is concerned with the scarcity of theoretical discussions in Estonian folkloristics and proposes development of particular concepts through international disciplinary histories, and also contemplation of their interpretations and interpretative potentials.

As relevant to the diversity of our culture, this volume covers a great variety of topics related to the theory of culture. It is the first of its kind in scope and aim and is thus an important constituent of our larger project of advancing, integrating and institutionalizing studies in culture theory in Estonia.

The illustrations for the current volume represent Estonian art from the period 1967–1985. They are chosen from the collections of the Art Museum of Estonia.
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Tõnis Vint “Päikese tee” (“The Path of the Sun”) 1978.
Guoache, watercolor, paper. 42.8 x 43 cm.
The paradoxes of the semiosphere

Mihhail Lotman

Abstract. In the chapter Juri Lotman’s concept of semiosphere and paradoxes in it are analysed. The sources are not only Lotman’s scholarly publications, but also his correspondence and personal memoirs. The most important paradox is that the semiosphere as a whole rejects the principles of identity and causality on which, for example, all the physical systems are based. Semiotically, A=A is not necessarily valid when we are dealing with a sign and its object: a sign simultaneously is and is not identical with its object. When we discuss a sign and its meaning, we often find that meaning is at the same time antecedent and subsequent, the cause and its result.

In the present chapter I would like to draw attention to some aspects of Juri Lotman’s conception of structural semiotics, which did not find an adequate expression in his publications, although their importance to his conception is foundational. Situations like this are not rare in science, but the usual reason for such occurrences is that an author has not recognised his basic intuitions. But this is not one of those cases. I will speak about concepts of which the author was not only fully aware, but has even several times verbally expressed, and stated at least once in a scientific report. It seems that the reason lies elsewhere: in the paradoxicality of the given concepts. Generally, Juri Lotman was not afraid of paradoxes: he did not avoid them, and such expressions as

[...] paradoxically, the internal space of a semiosphere is at the same time unequal yet unified, asymmetrical yet uniform. Composed as it is of conflicting structures, it none the less is also marked by individuation (Lotman 1990, 131)

are not rare in his works. The paradoxicality of his most important theoretical positions was obvious to him as well as to his competent readers. For example, a mathematician, Vladimir Uspenskij, one of the founders of the Tartu–Moscow semiotic school (who, by the way, offered the term ‘secondary modelling systems’)
has written about it. In his article “What is a paradox?” he formulates Lotman’s paradox: “Sometimes life follows literature, imitating it” (Uspenskiy 1982, 159).

It should be mentioned that from the viewpoint of logic this argument itself is not a paradox because it does not include an inner controversion (as is emphasised by Uspenskiy as well, in this sense: “paradoxical is an argument which is an opposite to some orthodox opinion”). Paradoxicality lies elsewhere: what is usually regarded as cause is here declared to be the result and vice versa. Moreover, as we are yet to be convinced, in such and analogical cases we are dealing with the denial of some orthodox opinions.

In his publications Juri Lotman was not afraid of expressing paradoxical standpoints, which resulted from the logic of his constructions (as we saw in the example of literature and life – the result was paradoxical), but if initial theses were paradoxical, then his way of presentation became more cautious and even certain signs of mistrust of his own intuition appeared. From the viewpoint of scientific logic such a way of acting is completely acceptable. Above all, one has to examine critically the postulates of a theory, if these have been accepted, then all the results have to be accomplished without hesitation, thus, contemporary logic ‘tolerates’ paradoxes in conclusions, but not in axiomatics.

The ideas, which will be treated hereafter, are familiar to me at least from the first half of the 1970s, but probably had already started to evolve in the 1960s when the main works in the field of structural semiotics were created, i.e. we could assume that the conception of the semiosphere started to take form, although it was written down later. These ideas have been published only fragmentarily, with concessions and corrections which, in summary, resulted in distortion of the main formulations and conceptions. This applies also to Lotman’s semiotic work *Culture and Explosion* (2009 [1992]). This book was meant as a summary, and indeed it turned out this way in many aspects. The grounding for the conception of this book is the idea that in the field of culture simple models do not precede complicated ones, but vice versa, simple models are the result of the investigator’s abstraction or the result of reduction or degeneration of complicated systems. None the less, the structure of this book itself is built up in the opposite – traditional – way: from simple to complicated; on the one hand from simple biological systems to systems with consciousness and further on to culture as a system of such systems, and on the other hand from the elementary artificial monolingual system to the multilinguism of actual cultures. This idea is most consistently expressed in the article “On the semiosphere”, especially in its revised English version – “Semiotic space”. Cf, for example:
[...] a schema consisting of addresser, addressee and the channel linking them together is not yet a working system. For it to work it has to be ‘immersed’ in semiotic space. All participants in the act of communication must have some experience of communication, are familiar with semiosis. So, paradoxically, semiotic experience precedes the semiotic act (Lotman 1990, 123).

However, this work is also devoted to the description of the internal space of the semiosphere and includes neither discussion of the main paradox of the semiosphere, nor the discussion of the results that arise from this paradox. These ideas can be found in a more detailed form in the post scriptum of the letter to Boris Uspenskij (19 March 1982). The following quotation is rather important, as it marks the first stage of the development of the conception of semiosphere and has been published only in Russian. Juri Lotman writes:

I am reading Vernadsky\(^2\) with fascination, and I find that he has many ideas similar to mine (I am writing an article about semiotics). His writing is wonderful – wide and poetical. Only a geologist, who is used to thinking in segments of millions of years, is capable of writing like that. I haven’t read something like this for a long time.

NB. While reading Vernadsky, I was stunned by one of his statements. You know, that once, in our seminar in Moscow (in Andryushchenko’s cellar), I dared to express my opinion that a text can exist (i.e. is socially acknowledged as a text) if another text precedes it, and that any advanced culture must have been preceded by an advanced culture. And now I have discovered Vernadsky’s thought, deeply founded on experience of exploring cosmic geology, that life can originate only from the living, i.e. only if it is preceded by it. That is why he considers life and dead (inert, as he says) matter to be two initial cosmic substances, which appear in different forms, but are mutually separate eternally and making contact forever. But I am convinced that thought cannot be isolated from non-thought as well (another thing is that, most likely, we should not deprive animals of thought, and possibly, life itself is not possible without thought). Indeed, it is how all forms of life activities from anaerobic bacteria to more sophisticated forms belong to life, so does thought (semiosis) have simple and complex forms.

It is interesting that Vernadsky builds his reasoning up as an empiric-positivist, thoroughly fencing himself off from theological-mystical thought. He reasons: science can be founded only on observable or reconstructible facts. The moment of transformation of non-life to life is not observed or reconstructed anywhere in the Universe. Penetrating for millions of years,
The paradoxes of the semiosphere

we are still finding life forms of some kind (or its traces) and non-life. But all hypotheses about the origin of life are speculations, based on presumption that they should originate from each other. I believe as well that the assumption of similarly initial intellectual existence does not decide beforehand the necessity for theological or the opposite points of view. It just marks a simple fact: we cannot decide whether the radiation of stars is a semiotic signal or not, because there is no presumption of sensibility for us. Only the antecedence of the semiotic sphere makes message out of message. Only the existence of intellect explains the existence of intellect (Lotman 1997, 629–630).

Thus, life is principally always preceded by life, text by text, culture by culture. This approach is at the same time opposed to the materialistic idea of evolution from simple to complicated, as well as to the creationism of most religious systems from which he was always distantiated. I remember well one of our conversations, which took place in the middle of the 1980s. Juri Lotman expanded the idea that the cultural history of mankind would be a lot easier to write, if we assumed that the human being was originally a domestic animal, who lost for some reason his master and is trying to recreate his unintelligible, but safe world. To my replique, that this whole construction is just the next variation in the theme of lost paradise, he answered that to his mind it is rather vice versa: paradise lost, the golden era, Atlantis and the great stratum of mythology of most different nations are the reflections of a certain basic myth, which should not be called “the myth of the lost paradise”, but “the myth of the lost cattle-shed”.

Of course, it was half a joke, but in Lotman’s works we come across analogical lines of reasoning – although more carefully formulated – often enough to make an attempt to interpret them. The given standpoint can be interpreted in two ways. First, following the traditional causal-temporal world picture: in the beginning there was a higher culture, then it produced lower ones, etc. But in my opinion, another idea would be more productive, as well as more authentic: the constituents of the semiosphere are not necessarily time and causality, semiotic space can be formed not by mechanisms acquired from the physical world, but by mechanisms specific to sign systems. These are above all communication and interpretation.

The relationship between semiosphere and biosphere is the relationship between two possible worlds. They exist, so-to-say, in parallel: the biosphere is formed in accordance with the laws of science (physics, biology, etc.), i.e. this is the realm of time and causality; the semiosphere though is formed by means of semiotic mechanisms. However, we must remember that on the one hand there are many things in the physical world as well that lie beyond the dictate of
causality (I mean quantum mechanics, and especially Ilya Prigogine’s ideas and research in the field of chaos). On the other hand causality and time are, above all, signs, with which we interpret so-to-say reality; although, it is problematic as to what extent they are components of this reality itself. If Thomas Sebeok and other critics of the conception of semiosphere regarded semiosphere as part of biosphere, and consequently semiotics as belonging to the field of biology, then in my opinion the situation is completely the opposite: the biosphere itself is not natural, but a semiotic object. Here we should draw attention to the conception of Jakob von Uexküll, which differs from Vernadsky’s biosphere precisely by having a semiotic essence, not biological.

Hence, we are dealing here with the construction of the semiosphere using two possible logics. Let us regard them more thoroughly. On the one hand, we can conceive the world as the complex of objects. Description of the world means systemising and cataloguing objects. The ideal is a collection, museum or collection of descriptions, so-to-say a collection of metaobjects – a library. A collection has its own logic, which demands perfection and completeness. From the standpoint of this logic rare and unique objects are of most value (cf, for example, philately). However, here the mythology of collections evolves rumours and testimonies of objects which have not been preserved, and may never have even existed. Such phantom objects are the essential part of that kind of world picture (cf, for example, the part of Aristotle’s Poetics devoted to comedy in Umberto Eco’s novel The Name of the Rose).

Further, these objects exist in certain statuses that can change. Objects join into situations, the development of which has its own logic: one situation follows another (temporal sequence) and every situation has its causes and results. The natural metalanguage of this world is narrative. But the problem that Russian formalists called ‘the relationship between plot and story’ is connected with narrative. Let us start with plot, because it is said to be independent of both the narrator’s and author’s will and is connected with events themselves. One of the most important features of plot is that temporal sequence in it is always connected with causality: cause always precedes result. If some situation remains unknown to us, then that means that a gap occurs in the sequence of causality and subsequent situations result from unknown causes. One of the side products of narrative thinking is secrecy, although since we do not know everything anyway the world around us is swarming with secrets. In this kind of world the subject deals with continuous reconstruction and interpretation. An ideal character for a narrative is a detective. Peircean semiotics is the appropriate mechanism for describing such a semiosphere. This world picture is internally paradoxical, as questions arise constantly, for example which one was first, the chicken or the egg
The paradoxes of the semiosphere

(or biologically, life or DNA, or semiotically, a sign or its meaning, or linguistically, speech or its language, etc.). This paradoxicality is not usually perceived as a deficiency in the world, rather is it the inadequate perspective of the question.

This new idea, which was brought into the scientific field by Ilya Prigogine’s research and which was absolutely essential to the last period of Juri Lotman’s creation, is the separation of time from causality. There are two types of process: ‘normal’ and ‘explosive’. An explosion disrupts the sequence of causality, but not temporality. In other words, Prigogine demonstrates the physical asymmetry of time: there is no way back, not only in the chronological sense but in the physical sense as well: explosive processes are irreversible. Juri Lotman analysed explosive processes in culture and history. Not only is the concept of explosion important here, but a new treatment of causality as well. Causality and time now operate in the opposite direction: a situation can acquire the status of cause only after we know its result, i.e. chronologically, result precedes cause. Such concept signifies the transition to principally different treatment of semiotic space. This is a space without ‘before’ and ‘after’, without ‘cause’ and ‘result’. This space is not oriented towards objects and statuses, but towards information.

It would be interesting to point out that in language itself the field connected with treatment of information seems to be anomalous – in a very important sense for us. Specifically, there are such words whose meaning is so-to-say wrong: they do not distinguish process and result. I call such words homofinal. As an example such term is ‘comparison’, which is at the same time a process of comparing and the result of this process. Another example would be ‘dialogue’, which is again a process as well as the result of this process. The third example would be ‘interpretation’, which is at the same time a process of interpretation and the result of this process. Very important to us is also ‘translation’ – also a process and its result. We should not think that we are dealing here merely with an accidental peculiarity of some languages, for example of English: we come across analogous phenomena in very different languages. I would like to emphasize that such formulations as ‘process and result of interpretation’ are inadequate: language is wiser than its description, and we are not dealing here with the disability of language to distinguish things that need to be distinguished (due to the semiotic ambivalence of natural language), but with things that cannot be distinguished principally. Let us regard more thoroughly ‘dialogue’ and ‘translation’ in this connection.

However, before we start speaking of dialogue, we have to make a few remarks on communication in general. Communication from the standpoint of Tartu semiotics is not quite the same as, for example, that of Shannon, Jakobson or
Eco. Specifically, all the traditional treatments of communication regard it as a transmission or reception of already completed text.

From the viewpoint of Tartu semiotics we cannot speak of text beyond communication, i.e. a text does not precede an act of communication. Text and act of communication are relational notions, one does not exist without the other, there is no text beyond communication, there is no communication independent of text. The same applies to other participants in an act of communication: they become such only in the course of this act. The addressee is the one who appears in the function of addressee, the addresser is the one who appears in the function of addressee, and what is essential here is the sociosemiotic function, not, for example, the identity of the personality. So, Juri Lotman in his essay “Text and the structure of audience” (Lotman 1977) shows how a text creates its own addressee. Even more important is the notion of autocommunication, in which addresser and addressee appear as the same person. What distinguishes them is text. Autocommunication is a paradoxical phenomenon. If in a ‘normal’ act of communication an addresser sends a message to an addressee who is separated from him inside the space, then in the case of autocommunication a separating substance is time: an addresser writes to himself about tomorrow, as for example with an agenda relating to tomorrow, or to himself in the undetermined future, as for example with a diary or something like that. A man writes to himself as if he were someone else. He creates another person from himself with a text. Moreover, it could be shown that autocommunication is not a specific, almost curious class of communication. On the contrary, important features of any kind of communication become most clearly and vividly evident exactly here. Communication does not arise from prefixed unity, it creates unity, communia. Communication produces ’me’ in ’another’ and ’another’ in ’me’.

Not only the participants in an act of communication are a priori. Such is the act of transmitting information as well. The traditional approach to communication was monological. An addresser sends a text to an addressee, which is received by the latter, whereby the addresser remains addresser, and addressee remains addressee. In contrast to that, in Juri Lotman’s semiotics we can see the inner stratification of addresser, as well as that of addressee. Communication already takes place inside an addresser because the addresser’s inner dialogue precedes his transmitting of information, and so an addressee evolves within the addresser. In this respect Lotman’s treatment of dialogue differs from that of Mikhail Bakhtin. For Bakhtin, who follows Martin Buber here (Friedman 2001, 25), ’me’ and ’you’ appear as products of dialogue and dialogue turns out to be an existential notion: without ’you’, who is in dialogue with ’me’, there is no ’me’ either. Therefore, ’me’ and ’you’ are not constants, but variables, although for
Lotman the participants in a dialogue are also indivisible entireties. For Bakhtin it is not ‘me’ who splits, but the word. The word is bigger than dialogue and for Bakhtin the word is dialogical.

The traditional treatment of dialogue is roughly as follows. There is someone who has something to express. He expresses it. Another hears the replique, understands it and reacts to it verbally. The whole process can be described by means of temporal-causal logic as it is clear that the participants in a dialogue precede dialogue as a process, and dialogue as a process precedes dialogue as a result. At the same time dialogue is a result that is caused by the participants in the process. After Buber, Bakhtin and other philosopher-dialogists (here I would add also Heidegger’s name. He did not deal with dialogue directly, but his ideas are very important in this context) we must, above all, reinterpret the semiotic space connected with dialogue. The space of dialogue does not exist \textit{a priori}, it is being created in the course of dialogue.

The participants in a dialogue are not impartial personages – ‘they’, but ‘you’ and ‘me’, i.e. the only adequate view of a dialogue is from inside. As for such words as ‘you’ and ‘me’, their peculiarity is that they do not mean anything \textit{a priori}, they have no significance at all. ‘You’ are the one, whom ‘I’ call ‘you’ and ‘I’ am the one for whom ‘you’ are ‘you’. This situation cannot be interpreted in terms of temporal-causal logic, as we are dealing here with an obvious paradox: ‘you’ are the precondition of ‘my’ existence, i.e. ‘you’ must exist before ‘me’. At the same time ‘you’ fully depend on ‘me’. Hence Buber makes a conclusion of the existential essence of dialogue.

For Martin Buber dialogue is the grounds of existence, in dialogue theological perspectives interest him above all: the ideal form of all the dialogues is the dialogue between absolute Me and absolute You. Mikhail Bakhtin partially (but just partially) because of the pressure of censorship avoids theological problematics, on the other hand he adds a philological dimension to the philosophical problem. Lotman, who follows Bakhtin to a larger extent than is usually assumed, in his turn gives up the philosophical perspective of the problem and replaces it with the culturological one. Dialogue becomes one of the most central mechanisms of culture. For Lotman it is essential that text, consciousness and culture are principally homomorphous objects. It is, however, significant to mention certain differences. For example, on an individual level a normal form of communication is a dialogue with another, on the level of culture the autocommunication, i.e. the dialogue inside culture, dominates over the dialogue outside culture, and if we regard the semiosphere as a whole, then here the autocommunication has an absolute domination, although the problem itself allows, at least theoretically, other kinds of communication. Such a line of reasoning already appears in
Lotman’s works in the 1970s, when he had not yet invented the term semiosphere (cf Lotman 1970). Such a sequence of thoughts inevitably leads to it.

As has already been said, one of the most important features of the Tartu semiotic school is that simple semiotic systems are treated not as prime elements from which more complicated systems are formed, but, vice versa, elementary semiotic systems are abstractions; simplicity means here simplification. From the viewpoint of semiosis, the semiosphere as a whole is the initial unit, which is divided into simple subordinate systems. While originally the conception of secondary modelling systems (as the name itself reflects) at least potentially enabled the treatment of natural language as an initial system, Juri Lotman in his works of the 1980s treated verbal, so-called normal, communication as a polyfactorial multilingual activity.

Every act of communication includes an element of dialogue, translation and creativity, whereby dialogue already begins in the addressee, the speaking subject is not elementary from the communicative aspect. Human intellect consists of functionally asymmetrical hemispheres. As for semiotics, it is extremely important that these hemispheres are principally different. The dominant hemisphere is oriented towards conventional signs, the subdominant hemisphere – towards iconic signs. Thus, the inner dialogue of the addressee is already connected with translation, whereby this translation is principally nearly impossible. In any case, we are dealing here with the type of translation Jakobson calls intersemiotic. The subdominant and dominant hemispheres do not speak different languages in the sense that English and Italian are different, but in the sense that, for example, chemistry and ballet are different languages. Hence, this translation in principle cannot be mechanical, translation inside the brain comes close to an artistic translation.

Here some clarifying remarks have to be made. Specifically, my treatment of translation differs in some respects from the traditional one. Traditionally, a translation is treated as a transmission of the same message through the medium of another language, i.e. a text $T_1$ is given in some language $L_1$, and a language $L_2$ is given as well, into which $T_1$ has to be translated, but $T_2$ remains unknown.

Boris Uspenskij, on the other hand, offered a purely relativistic treatment. Specifically, text, meaning and translation are not constants, but variables. Hence, there is no such thing as just a text, there is a text which appears as a text with regard to the given meaning. The same is true of the meaning as well: there is no meaning beyond the text, but there is only the meaning of this text. This also applies to translation. Translation is a function of the given text and its meaning.

I would like to offer another treatment – quite close to Uspenskij’s, and yet different. For me there is still a central term – translation itself. Translation creates
the meaning, the meaning is what is being (or can be) translated. Translation creates the language; the language comes from what it is being translated, there is no translation from one dialect to another. If such translation takes place, they will become different languages (cf for example Serbian and Croatian; and on the other hand the German dialects. The linguistic distance between the latter is a lot greater, but there are no translations made from one dialect to another, hence they are not different languages). But often the translation is made from a language to the same language, for example by means of paraphrases, because paraphrases create sub-languages inside languages, for example the professional argot, etc. – in the culturological sense they function as different languages. Moreover, language itself is not a linguistic, but a cultural phenomenon.

Now the question arises, how are dialogue and translation connected with each other. Juri Lotman tended to think that dialogue is a semiotically elementary situation and the grounds for the semiosphere, but translation is based on it. I think that between these concepts bilateral hierarchies could be set forth, for example translation, as well, could be regarded as more elementary than dialogue and dialogue could be regarded as based on translation. Lotman continually emphasizes that a monolinguistic situation is an abstraction, but actually the foundation for each act of communication is translation, for example from the iconic code to the symbolic; cf for example the dialogue between hemispheres of brain, which is the translation preceding the dialogue between subjects.

Émile Benveniste (1971 [1958]) showed that such words as ‘me’, ‘you’, ‘here’ and ‘now’ differ from normal words which signify objects not because they are different words, but because they belong to a principally different system of signs. Benveniste tried to mark this differentiation by using such terms as semiotics and semiology and speech and language. Deictic words are the ideal form of the semiotics of speech, in contrast to the semiotics of language, which is oriented towards objects and situations. This is a very important differentiation, although in my opinion not quite adequate: deictic as well as symbolic signs belong to the field of speech. I think that Benveniste’s differentiation is very close to those two types of semiosphere of which we have spoken already. On the one hand there is a world a priori, which is expressed in speech, on the other hand there is a universe of speech. In the latter there is no ‘before’ or ‘after’, ‘I’ does not precede ‘you’, nor does it precede the word ‘me’, translation (the process) does not precede translation nor does dialogue precede dialogue.

The other approach somewhat resembles Jacques Derrida’s grammatology. In both cases the “transcendental meaning”, as Derrida calls it, has been given up. I do not want to involve philosophical problematics here and so I would prefer just to treat the meaning a priori and a posteriori. As I have said already, this kind of
differentiation has important semiotic consequences, but it is as much significant for linguistics and literary criticism. For example, in the field of rhetorics and poetics, which is traditionally built up following causal-temporal semantics \textit{a priori}, it would be more productive to proceed from the dialogical logic and \textit{a posteriori} semantics.

For example, homofinal words are especially significant from the viewpoint of general rhetorics as well as from the position of methodology of humanities (Lotman 1995). The operations that they describe are basic rhetorical operations. What does rhetorics do? It cuts out, relocates, compares and switches components of text. And it would be more logical and simple to describe all these operations not in terms of traditional rhetorics, which is based on causal and temporal connections, but in terms of homofinal processes.

References


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The paradoxes of the semiosphere

Notes


1 In English this conception is best expressed in the collection *Universe of the Mind* (Lotman 1990), which was prepared by Juri Lotman himself.

2 Vladimir Vernadsky (1863–1945) was a Ukrainian and Soviet mineralogist and geochemist who is considered one of the founders of geochemistry, biochemistry and radiogeology.
Unfortunately, this image is not available in open access version due to copyright restrictions.
Abstract. Translation is a cultural phenomenon and thus everything associated with translation is connected to culture. As such, translation studies cannot be treated apart from culture and the various sciences of culture. Accordingly, this chapter starts out by examining the connections between culture studies and culture, in order to bring out, later on, the substantial connections between the discussions concerned with the specificity of translation, and the specificity of culture as understood in different disciplines. The concept of translation has indeed been treated as central to discussions on the philosophy of culture, but also to interpret the various phenomena of national culture by using academic concepts, by translating them into academic language. On the other hand, there have been publications of cultural introductions to translation studies, and analyses of the impact of the so-called cultural turn. A separate domain is comprised of the metaphoric use of the concept of translation, or the discovery of the translational in different cultural phenomena. For example, a museum of ethnography is translational in the sense that each of its exhibits is accompanied by a written explanation, and this sort of a ‘rewriting of meanings’ is comparable to cultural translation. In parallel with Clifford Geertz’s concept of thick description, it ought to be feasible to use the concept of thick translation, signifying translation that maximally opens up the cultural context. Contacts between culture and the activity of translation make it possible to treat anthropology as translation, as well as to examine translation not merely within the framework of translation studies, but cultural anthropology as well.

Any analysis of translation and culture can only begin by providing definitions for both concepts. Presumably, both concepts can be intuitively grasped by most readers of this chapter. Nevertheless, providing unambiguous definitions for them is well-nigh impossible. In the humanities and social sciences, this situation is frequent: rigorous scientific study is often conducted without first providing clear

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Culture and translation

definitions for core concepts. This is in fact a general feature of the various methodologies of the disciplines. The language that disciplines use to mediate their results – metalanguage – develops alongside the disciplines and their research methods. Metalanguages can be treated as univocal only operationally, by tailoring them specifically for concrete research.

Translation and culture in unison form a conceptual pair that brings together different disciplines, mainly those of culture studies and philology. Contacts between these disciplines have an impact on how both translation and culture are defined. Disciplines associated with anthropology are essential for culture studies, and those connected to translation studies are important for philology, and the two are methodologically combined, balanced and generalised by cultural semiotics and its sub-discipline, the semiotics of translation (Appiah 2003; Asad 1986; Bachmann-Medick 2006; Bassnett 2007; Calame 2002; Carbonell Cortés 2006; Katan 1999; Ogawa 1995).

The proliferation of definitions of culture and their frequent disparity clearly indicate that the principles of defining culture are numerous and sometimes very different. Numerous indeed, as we still cannot speak of the science of culture as a single discipline. The second reason why we still lack a uniform discipline of the science of culture is the heterogeneity of culture itself. Culture, as the cause of all its definitions, is such a complex object of study that it is near impossible to list and rank all culture-related disciplines by their importance. Methodologist Paul Feyerabend (1993) uses the notion of epistemological anarchism to describe the randomness and lack of hierarchy in the choice of research methods, i.e. all disciplines and all methods are equally valid for the study of culture and we have no reason to regard one as better than the other. It is not even really possible, since even the strictest scientific analysis is but one approach to culture, which cannot in any case rule out the others. Thus, the study of one and the same culture gives rise to numerous and different views and snapshots of that culture, and the analysis of culture as a fragmented object of study becomes the analysis of cultures. Essentially, we can speak of two fundamental pluralities – the plurality of scientific research methods is complementary to the plurality of culture as a complex object of study.

However, the notions of culture that are born out of different disciplines and viewpoints can hamper the comprehensive understanding of culture, since the synthesis or complementary linking of those notions is nearly utopic, as it would be to be aware of all the qualities of culture:

Culture is the product of interacting human minds, and hence a science of culture will be a science of the most complex phenomenon on Earth. It will
also be a science that must be built on interdisciplinary foundations including genetics, neuroscience, individual development, ecology and evolutionary biology, psychology and anthropology. In other words, a complete explanation of culture, if such a thing is ever possible, is going to comprise a synthesis of all human science. Such a synthesis poses significant conceptual and methodological problems, but also difficulties of another kind for those contributing to this science. Scholars from different disciplines are going to have to be tolerant of one another, open to ideas from other areas of knowledge (Plotkin 2001, 91).

Thus, there are two discernible tendencies in culture-studying disciplines. On one hand, the scholars try to ascertain what exactly is being studied and how it is being studied when a particular approach is applied; and what can possibly be the proper field of study for a general science of culture. This implies that culture is not merely an existing object of study that is simply ‘out there’, but equally a created or constructed object of study. Thus, culture is an object of study that requires disciplinary adjustment for scientific analysis, i.e. the creation of analysability, and therefore culture is both a proto- and a metaobject at the same time; it is both immediate and mediated. On the other hand, scholars seek to establish the principles of metadiscipline or methodology of the science of culture, which would permit the description of the research results of various culture-studying disciplines on a uniform basis, and thus their so-called translation into a commonly understood language. In one case, the definition of culture is discipline-bound (culture is what one or the other discipline can analyse), in another, the disciplinary perceptions of culture are described as the parameters of culture that can be synthesised into a comprehensive understanding of culture (as a theoretical ideal). Even if we concretise this problem on a most basic level by moving from the level of general human culture through ethnic and social culture to the level of individual culture, the complexity of uniting those two tendencies will remain.

If we examine the analysability of culture from the 21st-century point of view, we can notice two distinct tendencies. On one hand, culture-studying disciplines interweave on the level of methods and the language of description, and the boundaries between cultural philosophy, cultural sociology, culture studies and their subdisciplines have become blurred. On the other hand, of course, it is also natural that such an intermingling produces new disciplinary identities. The inevitable consequence of interdisciplinarity is new disciplinarity, after all, sooner or later. These are natural tensions, inherent in the development of science, which can be observed in the effort to clarify the relationship between anthropology,
ethnography and ethnology and in the attempt to differentiate cultural anthropology from social anthropology, etc. In addition to differentiations and boundary redefinitions between those disciplines, we can also observe such differentiation that in fact brings disciplines closer together. The fact that reflexive anthropology and reflexive sociology exist side by side independently of each other is an example of this. Therefore a few notions have emerged (reflexivity, symbolism, interpretative, etc.) that draw various essentially different trends in science closer together via the language of description (i.e. metalanguage).

A qualitative change seems to be nascent in the development of the humanities and social sciences. It is related to changes in the emergence and establishment of disciplinary and interdisciplinary identities. On one hand, humanities and social sciences have already demonstrated metadisciplinarity for a long time, which means that certain disciplines serve as vehicles of innovation or as methodological generalisers. Among others, this metadisciplinary role has been played by linguistics and literature studies, and also by film studies. During the last few decades, this role has often been attributed to semiotics. Whereas linguistics enters the domain of other disciplines and supports methods based on language analogies (language of movies, language of theatre, language of literature, etc.), literature and film studies tend to accept more innovative impulses and are more synthesising in general. Psychoanalysis, colonial and gender studies have enriched those disciplines, but they have also given rise to hybrid knowledge forms and prestige languages. Thus, the heterogeneity of those disciplines has been increased.

On the other hand, we can see a lot of de-disciplinarity, which is the cornerstone of cultural studies. The story of cultural studies is a good example of how culture-oriented analytical activities have been able to make their existence a meaningful one. Since cultural practices often outrun the capabilities of theoretical interpretation, the analysts cannot always avoid transgressing discipline boundaries and using other methods and means. Such an analyst uses all available means to understand the culture and in principle operates on three levels – structuralist, culturalist and receptive. On the structuralist level, cultural processes can be observed and explained in terms of the structure of society, a hegemony of a social class or a dominant ideology. The culturalist level allows you to see the ubiquitous cultural uniqueness and interpret everything pertaining to society as culture – on this level, the in-depth analyses of texts employ the widest range of methods (semiotic, post-colonial, feminist, etc.). The receptive level interprets everything as cognitive processes, since the actual functioning of culture is determined by its receiver and, for example, the participation of a single work of art in culture depends on how it is received (audience analyses and
polls) on one hand and its scale of distribution (the number of copies printed, success at the box office, manner of presentation) on the other. As a result, we have a number of parameters that allow us to analyse various aspects of culture without the desire to elevate these analyses to the status of scientific discipline. In reality, dedisciplinarity does not oppose science, but supports flexible and transdisciplinary research.

Dedisciplinarity is an attempt to establish ad-hoc research as parameter-based and justify it with the need to understand the modern culture that immediately surrounds the researcher. Whereas metadisciplinarity combines different disciplines and creates a language of mediation between them, dedisciplinarity connects the different aspects of the object of study and permits the use of different research methods as means to identify the different parameters of the object. Since the primary object of study for cultural studies is modern culture, dedisciplinarity can be seen as the limitation of disciplinarity arising from the “diversity of the object of study” (Burgass 1999, 100). However, critical theory interprets the same phenomenon as the representation of cultural studies in different disciplines and in their methods, assuming that “[...] culture is based on discursive practices and that the subjectivities involved in making it are themselves socially constructed” (Rowe 1998, 3). The diversity of the object of study in this context is inseparable from the (inter)discursive representation of that diversity, i.e. the analyst is aware of the correlation between cultural diversity and the diversity of disciplinary or hybrid metalanguages that describe it.

As a result, we can interpret the same problems in terms of the diversity of disciplines and methods, aspects of the object of study, or the opinions of scholars. This multi-diversity has both its pros and cons. The pros are related to the notion of competence mastering, which denotes the emergence of the analysability of the symbiosis of different competence levels and types. The cons include the proliferation of half-competence or incompetence in education. Harold Bloom has alluded to this in relation to the modern training of philologists:

Precisely why students of literature have become amateur political scientists, uninformed sociologists, incompetent anthropologists, mediocre philosophers, and overdetermined cultural historians, while a puzzling matter, is not beyond all conjecture. They resent literature, or are ashamed of it, or are just not all that fond of reading it (Bloom 1994, 521).

One reason for amateurism and incompetence in university education is the discrepancy between disciplinary identities and explanation practices (see Woody 2003). Discrepancy between disciplinary identity as methodological homogeneity
and explanation practices as discursive or metalanguage heterogeneity is in its turn based on the interpretation of the disciplinary object of study and its dynamics, but first and foremost on the relationship between the terminology necessary for the description of the scientific model of the object of study and the actual terminology in use.

One solution to the discrepancy is to return to the disciplinary object of study and its clarification or reconceptualisation. The other possibility is the clarification of interdisciplinary relations and movement towards a complex approach. A possible example of the latter development can be the movement of metadisciplinarity and dedisciplinarity towards transdisciplinarity, and it is worth noting that one characteristic feature of ‘transdisciplinary identity’ is precisely the introduction of the “critical imperative” to the interdisciplinary field:

A different “transdisciplinary” identity appears in interdisciplinary fields that have a strong critical imperative. In the humanities, certain sectors of the social sciences and, in science, technology, and society studies, the term connotes not only wide scope and a new conceptual framework but also radical critique. Any transdisciplinary effort is implicitly a critique of the existing structure of knowledge, education or culture (Thompson Klein 2000, 51).

Transdisciplinarity can be perceived as an attempt to transcend the diversity (heterogeneity) of both the object of study and relevant disciplines and achieve a balance in the integration of knowledge products and in the integration of knowledge processes. Of course, this balance presupposes answers to the questions of which disciplines are to be integrated, why and how it is to be done, when it will be done, who will do it and where the integrated knowledge can be applied (Sage 2000, 248).

Whereas in the interdisciplinary field integrated knowledge is based on the shared part of the disciplines and thus also, at least partially, on interference, in the transdisciplinary field the disciplines preserve their identity and the integration process consists of the creation of a complementary synthesising framework. In general the synthesising framework depends on the aims of the research and consequently the role of disciplines may change in the integration process. In a most general manner this functional change is expressed in the difference between the descriptive perspective and prescriptive perspective of the problem solution. Thus, knowledge integration or transdisciplinarity is the most important component in modern knowledge management (Sage 2000, 249). Knowledge integration or transdisciplinarity becomes relevant in areas that have developed within disciplinary constraints up to a certain point, but have
then strayed into the interdisciplinary field and together with methodological and methodic enrichment have become heterogeneous and have abandoned their original relationship with their object of study. Consequently the discipline needs to be reconceptualised or at least made more coherent. At any rate, the problems related to the ontology of the object of study (the methodology of defining the object of study) and the epistemology of the object of study (the methodology of studying the object of study) of the given discipline will resurface.

With respect to transdisciplinarity, there is another important historical problem that Jürgen Mittelstrass highlights in his description of the characteristics of transdisciplinarity:

In other words, transdisciplinarity is first of all an integrating, although not a holistic, concept. It resolves isolation on a higher methodological plane, but it does not attempt to construct a “unified” interpretative or explanatory matrix. Second, transdisciplinarity removes impasses within the historical constitution of fields and disciplines, when and where the latter have either forgotten their historical memory, or lost their problem-solving power because of excessive speculation [emphasis added]. For just these reasons, transdisciplinarity cannot replace fields and disciplines. Third, transdisciplinarity is a principle of scientific work and organisation that reaches out beyond individual fields and disciplines for solutions, but it is no trans-scientific principle. The view of transdisciplinarity is a scientific view, and it is directed towards a world that, in being ever more a product of the scientific and technical imagination, has a scientific and technical essence. Last of all, transdisciplinarity is above all a research principle, when considered properly against the background I have outlined concerning the forms of research and representation in the sciences, and only secondarily, if at all, a theoretical principle, in the case that theories also follow transdisciplinary research forms (Mittelstrass 2001, 498).

Hence, the history of disciplines and their reconceptualisation should contribute to the definition of disciplinary and interdisciplinary identities. A new interpretation of historical sources also demonstrates that the disciplines defined today may have different sources or the justification of the innovativeness of a discipline is associated with the actualisation of new sources in history. The latter may mean the association of the same sources with different scientific branches.

Thus, Roland Posner links the historic development of cultural semiotics to Ernst Cassirer’s symbolic forms (as sign systems) in his comprehensive treatise of tasks of cultural semiotics:
Cultural semiotics is that subdiscipline of semiotics which has culture as its subject. According to Cassirer, it has two tasks:

(a) the study of sign systems in a culture (in the sense of Herder or Tylor) with respect to what they contribute to the culture,

(b) the study of cultures as sign systems with respect to the advantages and disadvantages which an individual experiences in belonging to a specific culture (Posner 2005, 308; original emphasis).

At the same time, John M. Krois, a leading expert on Cassirer, emphasises that the three-volume and 1162-page opus Philosophy of Symbolic Forms was envisioned by its author to be a treatise on philosophical anthropology: “Despite its size, it was, in Cassirer’s eyes, unfinished. He intended to publish a further, concluding volume that was supposed to include among other things a text on “The problem of the symbol as the basic problem of philosophical anthropology”” (Krois 2005, 560; cf also Vandenberghe 2001). From a narrower point of view, Guido Ipsen, relying on his attitude towards technology, regards Cassirer as an important source for new historical media semiotics. It is precisely Cassirer whom Ipsen relied on to reach the important conclusion “technology is always the articulation of something already existent in society” (Ipsen 2003, 48). Media development, inseparable from the context of cultural values and practical use, cannot be reduced to technological innovations. The historical interpretation of media thus becomes semiotic due to its very nature and according to Ipsen, we should speak of the complementarity of three branches:

The first is the semiotics of the media, which may be understood as the semiotics of individual media. This branch of semiotics looks into the sign processes that are characteristic for a specific medial form. Its subject matter includes any media, ranging from the computer to the stamp. The second important field is the semiotics of culture. Having been established some decades ago, its research has meanwhile covered any aspect of cultural life. The third branch of semiotics important for our project is the semiotics of history. Though none of the three approaches deals with the history of the media specifically, all of them have produced methods that are valuable for analyzing evolutionary medial concepts (Ipsen 2003, 49; original emphasis).

The synthesis of the semiotics of media, culture and history is essential for the semiotics of culture even outside historical media semiotics, since the dynamics of the cultural environment and the relationship between immediate and mediated study of culture are precisely linked to the historical development of media.
A valid insight into these problems is offered by evolutionary cultural semiotics. In 1989 Walter A. Koch wrote in the foreword to his series Bochum Publications in Evolutionary Cultural Semiotics, on the notion of culture, saying that it is

[...] a phenomenon whose true integrative potentialities have not yet been fully discovered or explored. For a semiotics thus conceived, structure and process are not different phases of reality and/or sciences but rather mere faces of a unitary field. In the view of this series, then, any fruitful attempt at semiotic analysis will be based on premises of macro-integration – or evolution – and of micro-integration – culture (Koch 1989, v; original emphasis).

Evolution and culture are joined in the global cultural environment, which evolves from word and picture media, at first, towards printed media and then telemedia. Today we are already surrounded by the environment of new media. In the most general sense, it is a movement from immediate communication towards the diversification of forms of mediated communication. The technological and historical evolution of communication forms has indeed strongly influenced the growth in the value of history.

On the other hand, the importance of history has been emphasised by the Tartu-Moscow school of cultural semiotics. Thus, in the foreword to Sign Systems Studies 25 (the last one to appear during his lifetime) Juri Lotman writes:

During the past decades semiotics has changed. One achievement along its difficult path was unification with history. The understanding of history became semiotic, but semiotic thinking obtained historic traits. [...] The semiotic approach tries to avoid the conditional stopping of the historical process (Lotman 1992, 3).

Building on the notion of semiosphere (developed by Lotman), Vyatcheslav Ivanov wrote programmatically in the epilogue to his treatise Outlines of Prehistory and History of Semiotics:

The task of semiotics is to describe the semiosphere without which the noosphere is inconceivable. Semiotics has to help us in orienting in history. The joint effort of all those who have been active in this science or the whole cycle of sciences must contribute to the ultimate future establishment of semiotics (Ivanov 1998, 792).
Lotman’s treatment of history also implicitly includes Claude Lévi-Strauss’s approach to structural anthropology. According to the latter, anthropology and history are very close disciplines, though psychologically different:

They share the same subject, which is social life; the same goal, which is a better understanding of man; and, in fact, the same method, in which only the proportion of research techniques varies. They differ, principally, in their choice of complementary perspectives: history organizes its data in relation to conscious expressions of social life, while anthropology proceeds by examining its unconscious foundations (Lévi-Strauss 1968, 18).

The concept of time logically becomes a focal point for clarifying the disciplinarity issue. In his view, ethnography, ethnology and anthropology do not constitute separate disciplines or lines of investigation: “They are in fact three stages, or three moments of time, in the same line of investigation, and preference for one or another of these only means that attention is concentrated on one type of research, which can never exclude the other two” (Lévi-Strauss 1968, 356).

Lévi-Strauss regarded anthropology as a key concept due to its central location in the interdisciplinary field. To illustrate his point, he provided a diagram (Figure 1). “In the above diagram, the horizontals mainly represent the view of cultural anthropology, the verticals that of social anthropology, and the obliques both” (Lévi-Strauss 1968, 359; see also the chapter “The place of anthropology” in Johnson 2003, 12–30). Juxtaposing geography, anthropology, psychology, sociology, linguistics and archaeology as culture-studying disciplines, Lévi-Strauss emphasised that their difference primarily lies in their perspectives, not in their objects of study, and therefore he also considered the attempt to unify their terminologies to be futile. Lévi-Strauss characterised the special status of anthropology in terms of three qualities: objectivity, totality and meaningfulness. Whereas
totality denotes the observation of social life as systematic, and systematicness in its turn the identification of a universal structure, the manifestations of which indeed constitute social life, the aspirations towards meaningfulness are primarily associated with the study of social life in oral tradition cultures (lacking written language) (cf controversy on written language and writing and the comparison of Lévi-Strauss and Derrida, Doja 2006). Objectivity aspirations differ from those in economics or demography, since social sciences employ the methods of natural sciences, but anthropology has closer ties with the humanities. Humanist and systematic interest towards hidden structures and meanings in culture is the reason why Lévi-Strauss predicts the transformation of anthropology into a semiotic discipline: “Anthropology aims to be a semiochemical science, and takes as a guiding principle that of ‘meaning’” (Lévi-Strauss 1968, 364).

The notion of semiotic anthropology has indeed surfaced now and its foundations include those disciplines in which, according to Lévi-Strauss, cultural and social anthropology meet, i.e. linguistics and archaeology: “Perhaps the most striking result of this movement toward the semiotic, in both linguistic and sociocultural anthropology, is the way it has helped to overcome an entrenched (and not particularly useful) division between idealist or symbolic approaches and more materialist forms of analysis” (Mertz 2007, 344). Thus, semiotic anthropology possesses a significant methodological value: “A further advantage of semiotic anthropology for today’s sociocultural anthropologists is that it supports more flexible and expansive approaches to defining where and how we can do our research” (op cit, 345). In archaeology we can also detect a similar methodological partnership with semiotics – belief that semiotics offers “a common language with which we can understand the structure of contrasting interpretative approaches and communicate across these boundaries while at the same time acknowledging the validity of our different theoretical commitments” (Preucel & Bauer 2001, 93).

Although semiotics is perceived as a possibly useful means to bring internal order and coherence to disciplines, to achieve holism and a methodology that understands a common language, at the same time, both humanities and social sciences nevertheless continue to be afraid of inordinate homogenisation and hierarchisation (cf Chakravarthy & Henderson 2007). Gustavo L. Ribeiro (2006, 365) postulates that “anthropology is a cosmopolitan political discourse about the importance of diversity for humankind”, and claims: “Monological anthropology needs to be replaced by heteroglossic anthropology” (op cit, 364). The ‘world anthropologies’ project is founded on the concept of heteroglossia (introduced by Mikhail Bakhtin):
The ‘world anthropologies’ project wants to contribute to the articulation of a diversified anthropology that is more aware of the social, epistemological, and political conditions of its own production. The network has three main goals: (a) to examine critically the international dissemination of anthropology – as a changing set of Western discourses and practices – within and across national power fields, and the processes through which this dissemination takes place; (b) to contribute to the development of a plural landscape of anthropologies that is both less shaped by metropolitan hegemonies and more open to the heteroglossic potential of globalization; (c) to foster conversations among anthropologists from various regions of the world in order to assess the diversity of relations between regional or national anthropologies and a contested, power-laden, disciplinary discourse. Such a project is part of a critical anthropology of anthropology, one that decenters, re-historicizes and pluralizes what has been taken as ‘anthropology’ so far. It questions not only the contents but also the terms and the conditions of anthropological conversations (Ribeiro 2006, 364).

Since anthropology’s object of study is in a state of constant change, another of Bakhtin’s concepts – chronotope – has been used to describe the diversity. For example, Terry Turner attributes pluralism to the change that has occurred in the transformation of the social space-time or chronotope from linear diachronic chronotope to the chronotope of synchronic pluralism (Turner 2006, 17) or decentralized synchronic pluralism (op cit, 22).

The same philosophy is expressed in the ‘systematically eclectic approach’ in sociology, which is also based on the realisation that “no one same theory may apply to all aspects of social life, all situations and all historical configurations” (Silber 2007, 226). The language that shapes and controls the theoretical thinking of a particular field is also systematically eclectic:

Both humanities and the social sciences […] have been deeply affected by the emergence and diffusion of new “master metaphors”, as I have termed it elsewhere, i.e. metaphors not simply used to adorn or enliven sociological writing, but actually playing a central role in the shaping and controlling of sociological theory and research (Silber 1995). I have in mind, for example, the impact of such potent literary metaphors as “culture as text” and related ideas (i.e. genres, scenarios, narratives), as well as a whole range of economic (e.g. “capital”, “market”, “goods”), spatial (e.g. social “space”, “fields”), and artistic (e.g. “repertoires”) metaphors, combining or competing with older metaphors such as “organism”, “system” or “code” (Silber 2007, 222).
Linguistic shift has also affected the principal concepts of culture and theory. The concept of culture has shifted towards both plurality and adjectivity – culture as cultures on one hand and culture as a collection of certain attributes or ‘cultural’ on the other:

Even in the plural, however, cultures were things that could in principle be isolated, analyzed, and ultimately compared – Balinese culture, Navajo culture, American culture, and so on. During the last quarter century, this concept of culture has been further softened and is now more comfortably expressed as an adjective. Questions that so exercised an earlier generation of anthropologists – what was ‘a culture’, how it could be defined, how coherent or disjunctive it was, how one culture intersected another – seem now anachronistic. But American anthropologists are still quite comfortable with culture as a modifier that denotes the symbolic or subjective dimension of life: ‘cultural this’, ‘cultural that’, ‘cultural anthropology’. To say that something is ‘cultural’ still carries theoretical meaning for many, but this meaning is diffuse and not definitive; it depends on the thing that is modified. In the process, ‘culture’ has become loosely evocative and theoretically fuzzy even as it is deeply sedimented in anthropological sensibility (Knauft 2006, 412).

The concept of anthropological theory has undergone the same transformation: “First ‘Theory’, then ‘theories’, now ‘theoretical’. Increasingly, theory in anthropology emerges not in itself but as a modifier of specific topics and issues to which theoretical articulations are applied, explored, and expressed” (Knauft 2006, 412).

Such dynamics are the result of the constant tension between the theoretical and applied, or theoretical and non-theoretical anthropology. The suggested solution to alleviate the tension between different approaches within one discipline, is the same that disciplines always resort to in difficult times, namely the dialogue within the discipline needs to be increased and, for the dialogue to work, its language must be simplified to the point that it will be generally understood by the parties involved. This process naturally takes place conjointly with methodological dialogue, i.e. striving for clarity of disciplinary thought:

In prosaic terms, it would help if anthropological writing were simpler and more direct. Much discourse by anthropologists, especially in books and monographs, is heavy with in-house terminology and overwritten evocations – long on innuendo but short on exposition. Clear and concise statements of purpose, implication, and relevance would create more rather than less space for ethnographic illustration through examples that are creative, carefully
chosen, and powerfully rendered. Structural and presentational clarity throws anthropological insights into bolder relief and fosters greater rigor as analysis is organized and orchestrated (Knauft 2006, 423).

At the same time, the internal heterogeneity of anthropology has also increased due to a significant shift within its object of study. Anthropology, which has so far studied alien or other cultures, now studies its own culture or the universal global culture. Such a situation raises questions:

How is a scientific discipline which was originally designed as a cognitive instrument for the understanding of ‘others’ (who, in the case of living societies, were always others with no chance of answering back) now transforming itself as a project in the degree to which groups within societies that are the traditional object of anthropological study start to use this cognitive instrument in order to gain anthropological knowledge both of their own sociocultural reality (in the immediate sense) and of global sociocultural reality as seen from their specific, local perspective? What are the distinctive characteristics of these Other Anthropologies when compared to the originals? How do their emergence and presence modify the whole of anthropology, that is, world anthropology? What would have to change within both dominant and emergent anthropologies to allow us to exploit better than we are currently doing their cognitive potential as single yet plural? How can we speed the renewal of a discipline distanced once and for all from monocentrism and unitarism? (Krotz 2006, 234).

To answer these questions requires significant metatheoretical activity within anthropology, i.e. the anthropology of anthropology (Krotz 2006, 236).

Since anthropology has close ties with cultural sociology, then it is only natural that cultural sociology is also willing to accept the role of so-called understanding methodology. Understanding of culture in cultural sociology has developed hand in hand with anthropology; the only significant difference is their language of self-description:

We take for granted here many of the changes in our understanding of culture which have been established in the work of the last twenty years, by contrast with (what have at least been retrospectively constructed as) more static, overgeneralized, functionalist understandings current in the mid-twentieth century. These developments include (a) reaffirmation of a shared understanding that cultural sociology is not limited to the study of specialized
cultural systems such as art, media, or science but rather that it is an analytic perspective on any social arena (b) a shift to analyzing specific meaning-making processes from earlier conceptualizations of culture as an integrated whole (c) increasing focus on cognitions, categories, and practices more than values and attitudes (d) an emphasis on the ways in which power relations – both dominance and resistance – are mediated through discourse (e) the analysis of three different elements of cultural process – practices, discourses, and institutionalized cultural production, and (f) a shared understanding that meaning-making processes should not be reduced to properties of individuals, as in the simple use of aggregated survey data, but rather should be investigated as trans-individual processes (Jacobs & Spillman 2005, 2).

And in the present situation, cultural sociology wants to be a uniting and balancing force: “Cultural sociology is the disciplinary crossroads where macro and micro, agency and structure, theory and data all meet; bounded by the institutionalized practices of the subdisciplines it gathers together, it is shaped by the very intellectual fields that it helps reshape in turn” (Jacobs & Spillman 2005, 13).

Mention should also be made of one more characteristic change in relation to cultural studies. The industrialising and ideologising interpretation of culture has become the culturifying interpretation of industry and power (culturification: see Lash 2007, 74). So, in order to avoid the ideological burden implicit in the notion of cultural studies, other notions such as cultural research (op cit) or culture studies (Bennett 2007b, 611) have been proposed. For the purpose of the present chapter it is also important to mention the attempt by Scott Lash to formulate the aspects of disciplinary ontology and epistemology:

I have spoken of a shift as we moved to the post-hegemonic power regime as hegemony from the symbolic to the real, from semiotics to intensive language, and most of all from epistemology to ontology. Here I have understood the symbolic, semiotics, representation, as basically epistemological and the real, intensive language, and the communication as basically ontological. Epistemology has to do with the understanding of the things we encounter, while ontology and the real have to do with the thing itself that is never encountered. The thing itself, and the real, is never encountered – it is a virtual, a generative force; it is metaphysical rather than physical (Lash 2007, 71).

Return to the original principles of the discipline and their redefinition under new circumstances is indispensable for the preservation and development of the disciplinary identity. Without constant clarification of ontological and
epistemological issues, communication on subdisciplinary levels will be hampered, since the hybridisation of theories and metalanguages will not result in a new synthesis or identity. In a hybrid stage, if we return to original principles and try to clarify them and adapt them to new circumstances, we will, on one hand, have the opportunity to typologically reorganise the discipline from within, irrespective of whether the typology is hierarchical or heterarchical. On the other hand, the history of the discipline, i.e. its self-reflection, will also re-evaluate itself.

The situation in various humanities and social sciences today can be understood with the help of science history, the logic of changes in the discipline's historical self-description and of different actualisations of its original sources. The contact of every culture-studying discipline with its object of study is historical and at every point in history this contact has been complicated by contacts with other disciplines studying the same object. And, if on one hand, these contacts fall under the categories of inter-, multi- or transdisciplinarity, then on the other hand, a historical approach, a “radical historisation” of science, is required to understand these contacts. Tony Bennett writes: “[...] our understandings of both culture and the social need to be radically historicized if we are to produce an adequate basis for understanding the specific contemporary forms of their interrelations” (Bennett 2007a, 43). We can say that the historical dimension is an essential component of analysability and the fact that the notion of globalisation has penetrated culture-studying disciplines indicates the need to consider new historical realities both empirically and theoretically (see, for example Bazin & Selim 2006).

Opposite to the trend of globalisation is the pull of localisation. As researchers, we have hardly reached the level of the universal, when we already need to consider the local. Whereas anthropology is indeed the history of cultural analysis, then, for example, the history of organisation theory was for a long time ‘culture-free’:

Traditional organization theories were culture-free because the researcher, the researched and the audience were largely US. Culture was considered to be similar to all and thus had little explanatory power to contribute, except when researching certain ethnic groups or minorities. Now, however, in a globally competitive context, culture is likely to have considerable power (both theoretical and statistical) to explain differences in perception, behavior and action. Its importance is now integral to any effort at theorizing or model building in the international context (Mukherji & Hurtado 2001, 110).
The eschewing of culture is also present in the history of psychology. In 1996, while presenting his future discipline of cultural psychology, Michael Cole pointed out that due to its difficult analysability, culture had been undervalued in psychology up to now and that the mission of the new discipline was precisely the study of the role of culture in the psychic life of humans (Cole 1996). Culture in an organisation and culture in human psyche are rather different matters in themselves, yet there are many similarities in the methodology of their analyses. In both cases the analysability of culture is an important issue. Another important aspect is the relationship with environment. In organisation theory it has been described by juxtaposing the high and low degree of analysability and the high and low degree of control (Figure 2).

In order to understand Figure 2 from the point of view of general cultural analysis we should tie the aspect of analysability with the position of an analyst and the aspect of control with the theoretical position used for analysis and the related terminology. It is difficult to analyse culture in motion, its dynamics. It is far easier to analyse culture statically, since you can rely on (at least operationally) clearly defined units. A high degree of control is linked to proper research that relies on an established theory or concept and to a supporting metalanguage. A low degree of control is linked to ad-hoc analyses which attempt to deduce the analysability of the object studied and the metalanguage for its description on the basis of the characteristics of the object itself.

The situation becomes more complicated if we consider that the notion of culture also encompasses its own self-description or cultural worldview, which expresses via oral or written communication its individual self-awareness, consensual ideology or cultural perception suggested by the cultural elite (Matsumoto...
A culture analyst’s description of culture should correlate with this self-description (culture as a system of self-descriptions). Ideally, this would mean dialogue or cooperation between the one who describes and the one described (Chun 2005, 53; cf also Strauss 2006). Reflexivity-based disciplines have enlisted a new member, autoethnography, which helps to transcend the crisis of subjective authorship in anthropology: “In autoethnography, the subject and object of research collapse into the body/thoughts/feelings of the (auto)ethnographer located in his or her particular space and time” (Gannon 2006, 475). Therefore, the relationship between the self-description and the description of others is an important problem in cultural analysis. Another important problem is the relationship between the describer and the described. That relationship can be either implicit or explicit. It is important for cultural semiotics that the position of the analyst is clearly evident, since the visibility of the observer’s position is indicative of the objectivity or the precision of the analysis.

Aleksandr Pjatigorski, one of the founders of the Moscow–Tartu school of semiotics, has emphasised that the definition of culture cannot be separated from the observer, since culture is a metaconcept, i.e. a concept of description and self-description (Pjatigorski 1996, 55). And understanding the observer is as important as understanding the observed, since “the language of world description cannot exist simply because there is no single natural language that can be used to describe the world as a single object of study” (Pjatigorski 2002, 9). Thus, when in anthropology the problem of the subjectivity of the describer primarily exists in autoethnography and that of the subjectivity of the described in its general theory (Luhrmann 2006; Strauss 2006; Ortner 2005), then in general methodology, description is associated with the use of general qualitative research methods and especially with the concept of participant observation. Participant observation consists of four strategies that may be realised through the direct contact of the observer with the observed, but also as a psychological attitude.

Complete participation may imply an attempt on the part of the observer to influence the processes either on the object-level or meta-level, by his or her behaviour or by publishing analytical writings. A participant as observer behaves in a more reserved manner and is more analytical than a complete participant, often less ideologically-minded. An observer as participant may possess only general behavioural experience and attempts to find theoretical support for it. For an observer as participant, the visibility of his/her theoretical position is already an important consideration. Complete observation is a theory-based process of relating with the analysed and presupposes the explicitness of the attitude towards the object of study and the study methods used. It is probably easier to operate
with different observation strategies in cultural semiotics than in anthropology, but the nuancing of observation is important in both disciplines.

It is easiest to observe the progress towards a general science of culture in the synergy of anthropology and semiotics. Here, the foundation has been laid by Bronisław Malinowski, who was among the first to emphasise (*A Scientific Theory of Culture*, 1941) that the flippant attitude on the part of scholars towards the scientificity of the study of culture is both despicable and immoral. According to Malinowski, history, sociology, economics and law studies must come together with other social sciences to combine into an intellectual force that would be able to withstand and balance the physical force of the natural sciences. The first step towards scientificity is the definition of the sphere of study. It was precisely the ability to identify the studied phenomena in the course of their observation or comparison that seemed to be lacking in the study of culture at that time. In his functional analysis of culture, Malinowski distinguished three dimensions of the cultural process – artefacts, organised groups or human social relations, and symbolism or symbolic acts. On these premises, Malinowski realised that in culture everything must be studied in context and in terms of the function of the object of study. Malinowski formulated the conceptuality of observation in the modern sense: “To observe means to select, to classify, to isolate on the basis of theory. To construct a theory is to sum up the relevancy of past observation and to anticipate empirical confirmation or rebuttal of theoretical problems posed” (Malinowski 1969, 12). Malinowski’s attitude towards the object of study is highly relevant today, the need to be constantly aware of the relationship between the discipline and its subject matter: “Our minimum definition implies that the first task of each science is to recognize its legitimate subject matter. It has to proceed to methods of true identification, or isolation of the relevant factors of its process” (op cit, 14).

Without attempting a systematic historical overview of the progress towards the science of culture, mention still should be made of two parallel events occurring at the same time. In 1973, *Interpretation of Cultures* by Clifford Geertz was published and in the same year cultural semiotics manifested itself as a discipline for the first time – more precisely, the cultural semiotics of the Moscow–Tartu school (Lotman et al 1973 [1973]). Geertz’s book was a clear sign of anthropology moving towards semiotics. The author claims that the aim of the semiotic approach to culture is to help us to gain access to that conceptual world where the studied people live and to start a dialogue with them. Geertz believes that the semiocity of his interpretation of culture lies in the desire to reach meanings. Therefore, he represents the interpreting science as meaning-oriented, apart from experimental science, which is law-oriented (Geertz 1973, 5). Geertz’s desire is to
Culture and translation

move from static description to dynamic interpretation, i.e. a thick description. In order to achieve that, culture must be seen as a text, which becomes an acted document in the analysis process, and not a universal structure (op cit, 9–10).

Looking at the membership and research topics of the Moscow–Tartu school, we can say that this particular cultural semiotics is a semiotic science engaging in cooperation with anthropology. The programmatic “Theses on the semiotic study of cultures” begin with the following passage:

In the study of culture the initial premise is that all human activity concerned with the processing, exchange, and storage of information possesses a certain unity. Individual sign systems, though they presuppose immanently organized structures, function only in unity, supported by one another. None of the sign systems possesses a mechanism which would enable it to function culturally in isolation. Hence it follows that, together with an approach which permits us to construct a series of relatively autonomous sciences of the semiotic cycle, we shall also admit another approach, according to which all of them examine particular aspects of semiotics of culture, of study of the functional correlation of different sign systems. From this point of view particular importance is attached to questions of the hierarchical structure of the languages of culture, of distribution of spheres among them, of cases in which these spheres intersect or merely border upon each other (Lotman et al 2013, 51).

According to the logic of the “Theses on the semiotic study of cultures”, the essence of culture is semiotic by its very nature, since its foundation is information and communication. On one hand, the study of culture would be possible via the semiotisation of culture-studying disciplines, which would bring them closer to the essence of culture. The birth of the notion of semiotic anthropology is an example of such a development, which, together with disciplinary analysis capability, would increase the level of analysability of culture. On the other hand, cultural semiotics offers a systematic approach to culture and creates a complementary methodology, which ensures the mutual understanding of different culture-studying disciplines. This is the development prospect of cultural semiotics.

Thus, the intersection of culture and culture-studying disciplines raises questions that the new century must attempt to answer, or reformulate. The first set of questions touches upon culture as a complicated object of study and relates to disciplinary possibilities in the culture-studying sciences. Will it be possible to transform culture as a complicated object of study into a single or multiple disciplinary
objects of study? Hence the issue of a single complex science. François Rastier has raised the question about universal transsemiotics and differentiates between two poles with respect to the study of culture: sciences of culture (sciences de la culture) is represented by Ernst Cassirer, and the semiotics of culture (sémiotique des cultures) by the Tartu school. Between these two poles lie the questions: one or many sciences?, culture or cultures? (Rastier 2001, 163). The second set of questions touches upon the relationship between the culture-studying disciplines. Is it possible to conceive of a hierarchy of culture-studying disciplines; could any of them, cultural semiotics for example, be assigned the role of methodological base discipline? This implies that the culture-studying disciplines themselves, their capability of dialogue with both the object of study and neighbouring disciplines should become separate subjects of analysis. Therefore, the question that needs to be answered is about the nature of relations between disciplinarity on one side and multi-, trans-, inter-, and de-disciplinarity on the other.

With respect to mutual understanding it is characteristic that a methodological and even ethical attitude towards translation, translating and translatability has emerged in different culture-studying disciplines. Malinowski used the notion of translation and that primarily in the sense of methodological translation (translatability). Translatability also implied observability for him, when he wrote about the transition from theory to empirics and claimed “that every theoretical principle must always be translatable into a method of observation, and again, that in observation we follow carefully the lines of our conceptual analysis” (Malinowski 1969, 14). The same principle was still relevant in 2006: “The challenge of cultural analysis is to develop translation and mediation tools for helping make visible the differences of interests, access, power, needs, desires, and philosophical perspective” (Fischer 2006, 363). Yet the notion of translation is also used on the object level:

Like a translation, culture is relational. Like a translation, culture links a source languaculture, LC2, to a target languaculture, LC1. Like a translation, it makes no sense to talk about the culture of X without saying the culture of X for Y. […] Culture is a construction, a translation between source and target, between LC1 and LC2. The amount of material that goes into that translation, that culture, will vary, depending on the boundary between the two (Agar 2006, 5–6; original emphasis).

From the point of view of methodology, the introduction of the notions of translation and translating into the context of cultural analysis is of crucial importance, since it demonstrates perhaps most eloquently the naturalness of the co-existence
of the static and the dynamic (see also Torop 2002b; 2007; Sütiste & Torop 2007). Translating a language-text from one language into another seems to be a most concrete activity that can partially even be subjected to formalised rules, if we recall machine translation. Yet translating the same text as a culture-text into another culture we face indefinability. The competences to evaluate translation into language and into culture differ, since in language the translation is a ready text, but in culture the same text is different for different readers and its ‘average evaluation’ is largely hypothetical due to the mentality of that text.

For each culture-studying discipline, the problem of culture’s analysability stems from disciplinary identity. One half of analysability consists of the culture’s attitude and the ability of the discipline’s methods of description and analysis to render the culture analysable. The other half of analysability is shaped by the discipline’s own adaptation to the characteristics of culture as the object of study and the development of a suitable descriptive language. The ontologisation and epistemologisation of culture as the subject of analysis is present in each culture-studying discipline or discipline complex. Disciplinary ontology and disciplinary epistemology constitute the methodological foundation of every discipline.

Cultural semiotics also has an important historical dimension. It is safe to say that cultural semiotics has developed from linguistic semiotics via text semiotics towards the semiotics of semiosphere (see also Portis-Winner 1999; 2002; Torop 1999; 2002a; 2003; 2005). In addition to historical logic, this process also follows theoretical logic. Cultural semiotics started from the realisation that in a semiotic sense culture is a multi-language system in which, in parallel to natural languages, there are secondary modelling systems (mythology, ideology, ethics, etc.) that are based on natural languages, or which employ natural languages for their description or explanation (music, ballet) or language analogisation (language of theatre, language of movies).

The next step is to introduce the concept of text as the principal concept of cultural semiotics. On one hand, text is the manifestation of language, using it in a certain manner. On the other hand, text is itself a mechanism that creates languages. From the methodological point of view, the concept of text was important for the definition of the subject of analysis, since it denoted both natural textual objects (a book, picture, symphony) and textualisable objects (culture as text, everyday behaviour or biography, an era, an event). Text and textualisation symbolise the definition of the object of study; the definition or framework allows in its turn the structuralisation of the object either into structural levels or units, and also the construction of a coherent whole or system of those levels and units. The development of the principles of immanent analysis in various cultural domains was one field of activity of cultural semiotics. Yet the analysis of
Peeter Torop

**Figure 3. Static and dynamic aspects in the concept of text** (Torop 2006, 310)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Static aspects of text</th>
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<tr>
<td>Text as textuality</td>
<td>Text as processuality</td>
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<tr>
<td>Metacommunication</td>
<td>Intercommunication</td>
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<tr>
<td>Proto- and metatexts</td>
<td>In- and intertexts</td>
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<tr>
<td>Complementarity</td>
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<td>Multimodal and multimodal texts</td>
<td>Mental texts</td>
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<td>Creole texts</td>
<td>Individual and collective mentality</td>
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<td>New prototexts</td>
<td>Intertextual, inter-discursive, intermedial, intersemiotic mentality</td>
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<td>Metacommunicative memory</td>
<td>Mental memory</td>
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<td>Memory of text</td>
<td>Memory of sign systems</td>
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A defined object is static, and the need to also take into account cultural dynamics led Juri Lotman to introduce the notion of semisphere. Although the attributes of semisphere resemble those of text (definability, structurality, coherence), it is an important shift from the point of view of culture’s analysability. Human culture constitutes the global semisphere, but that global system consists of intertwined semiospheres of different times (diachrony of semisphere) and different levels (synchrony of semisphere). Each semiosphere can be analysed as a single whole, yet we need to bear in mind that each analysed whole in culture is a part of a greater whole, which is an important methodological principle. At the same time, every whole consists of parts that are legitimate wholes on their own, which in turn consist of parts, etc. It is an infinite dialogue of whole and parts and the dynamics of the whole dimension.

Yet the text will remain the ‘middle’ concept for cultural semiotics, since as a term it can denote both a discrete artefact and an invisible abstract whole (a mental text in collective consciousness or subconsciousness). The textual aspect of text analysis means the operation with clearly defined sign systems, texts or combinations of texts; the processual aspect of text analysis presupposes definition, construction or reconstruction of a whole. Thus the analysis assembles the concrete and the abstract, the static and the dynamic in one concept – the text. These two interrelated aspects can be presented as shown in Figure 3.

Consequently, the aspects of the analysability of culture are inseparably related to the interpretation of methodological problems. From the ontological aspect of the methodology of cultural semiotics, the static and dynamic forces are defining factors on all three levels (Figure 4): on the level of language, the important distinction is between discrete (natural language) and continual (iconic-spatial)
languages (language of pictures, movies or theatre); on the level of text between textuality and processuality; and on the level of semiosphere between narrative (linearity) and performance (simultaneity). Every further clarification also implies the more precise definition of the object of study and the ontologisation of analysability, i.e. imagination of the object of study as analysable.

From the epistemological aspect of cultural semiotics, the static and dynamic serve as clarifying analysis strategies. On the level of language, on one hand we have the definition of the object of study (disciplinary/terminological) and its dialogisation (finding a flexible and emphatic language of description) on the other. On the level of text, on one hand we have analysis strategies that are based on the characteristics of the subject matter (structural) and the organisation of the subject matter (compositional). On the other hand, we can speak either of spatio-temporal (chronotope-based) or media-oriented (multimedia, etc.) analysis strategies, which do not depend directly on the composition of the text or the subject matter. On the level of semiosphere, the line runs between the levels of narrative and performance, the basis for linear and simultaneous analysis strategies. From the epistemological aspect, analysability is determined by the choice of study strategy.

Culture analysts are therefore scholars with double responsibilities. Their professionalism is measured on the basis of their analytical capability and the ability to construct (imagine, define) the object of study. The analytical capability and the ability to construct the object of study also determine the parameters of analysability. Culture as the object of analysis often dictates its own analysability, which is why ad-hoc theories, as theories based on their object of study, are in a prominent position in culture-analysing disciplines. Culture analysis and also its analysability begin with the understanding of the object of study,
the commencement of dialogue with the object of study, and finding a suitable
language (scientific or simply analytical) for that particular dialogue. Regarding
the thinking of an analyst, Lotman (2000, 143) has said that “the elementary
act of thinking is translation”. At the same time he has also added that “the el-
ementary mechanism of translating is dialogue” (Lotman 2000, 143). Dialogue
in itself does not mean the use of an existing common language, but the creation
of a language for communication that suits the purposes of the dialogue: “…the
need for dialogue, the dialogic situation, precedes both real dialogue and even
the existence of a language in which to conduct it” (Lotman 2000, 143–144).
Thus, be the analyst a specialist in translation studies or a culture semiotician,
the analysability of culture depends on how the analyst chooses to conduct the
dialogue between him/herself and his/her object of study.

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Notes

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Oil, canvas. 90 x 100 cm.
Husserl's account of the cultural uniqueness of Western civilization

Tõnu Viik

Abstract. Husserl sees the origin of Western civilization as stemming from Greek Antiquity, when spiritual objects (geistige Objekten) of a unique nature, i.e. infinite spiritual idealities, were discovered. Since then infinite spiritual objects have defined the basic aspirations of European civilization, most notably its scientific outlook, which is based on a purely theoretical attitude (rein theoretische Einstellung) that replaced the various religious-mythic attitudes of all previous cultures. In order to understand Husserl’s claims about the uniqueness of Europe, the chapter elaborates on his notions of the spiritual surrounding world (geistige Umwelt) and the spiritual objects that are the elements of this world. If Husserl sees the spiritual objects as intentional objects of a special type, then I will pay attention to their functioning as what Husserl calls the “grasping sense” (Auffassungssinn), by means of which an intentional object is constituted. This leads to re-examination and expansion of the notion of spiritual objects that are shared by members of a common spiritual surrounding world. They are not just ideal objects of possible acts of cognition, but elements of the symbolic structures of a culture – cultural symbolic forms that make certain objects meaningful in a way that is shared in a given society. If we apply this idea to Husserl’s own attempt to make sense of Western civilization, we discover that he uses the idea of infinite spiritual idealities in a double sense: first as a core of the idea of European uniqueness, and before that as a device that constitutes the unifying meaning of his narrative about European civilization. Hence, he arrives at the point where he argues for a European origin that functions both as the constituting device of his historical narrative and as the defining feature of the object constituted by this narrative.

Antiquity is not just a thing to be viewed in museums. Nor is it something that has remained behind us in the historical past. Antiquity is often regarded as an
Husserl’s account of the cultural uniqueness of Western civilization

important cultural source for the European Renaissance and modernity, and it still supports a specific way of thinking about Western (or European) civilization, about Western philosophy, literature, arts, economics, war-craft, etc. Antiquity can be seen as providing (and at the same time hiding) the specific nature of Western civilization – if viewed as its historical origin. An origin is not just a contingent starting point; it is the source of what comes from it, and as such determines the essence of what has become. At least this is how Husserl understands Antiquity in what later became known as the Vienna Lecture, which was actually held under the title The Crisis of European Humanity and Philosophy. The lecture took place in Vienna in May 1935, two years after Husserl was suspended from the University of Freiburg by decree of the Ministry of Culture of Baden Province.

In order to understand Husserl’s account of Greek Antiquity in this lecture we will have to come to terms with his notions of “spiritual surrounding world” (geistige Umwelt) and “spiritual objects” (geistige Objekte) which are the elements of this world. I will interpret these objects as cultural symbolic forms that play a role in meaning-formation processes. If Husserl sees the spiritual objects as intentional objects of a special type, then I propose to pay attention to their functioning as what Husserl calls the “grasping sense” (Auffassungssinn), by means of which an intentional object is constituted. This leads to re-examination and expansion of the notion of spiritual objects that is shared by members of a common spiritual Umwelt. They are not just ideal objects of a possible act of cognition, but elements of the symbolic structures of a culture – cultural symbolic forms that make certain objects meaningful in a particular way, a way that is shared in a given society. Thus the spiritual objects may function as meaning-formation devices for constituting the objects of experience. At the end of the essay I will apply this idea to Husserl’s own attempt to make sense of such a spiritual object as the essence of Western civilization. Husserl sees the uniqueness of European culture in being based on new types of cultural ideals that were discovered by Ancient Greek philosophers, and on a new type of attitude towards life that was formed on the basis of these ideals.

To be more specific, the uniqueness of Western civilization is to be found in the “spiritual shape” (geistige Gestalt) of European culture (V, 318–319; Ve, 272–273).¹ The notion of “spiritual shape” is, again, explained by the concept of the surrounding world. As discussed in the Vienna Lecture, Umwelt is not the “objective world”, nor the world of mathematical sciences and physics, but the world of “valid realities” (geltende Wirklichkeiten) for the subjects belonging to a particular historical-cultural community. Thus, for example, Husserl claims:
The historical Umwelt of the Greeks is not the objective world in our sense but rather their ’world-representation’, i.e. their own subjective validity with all the actualities which are valid for them within it, including, for example, gods, demons, etc. (V, 317; Ve, 272).

Further, he describes Umwelt as being spiritual (geistig) by its very nature:

The “surrounding world” is a concept that has its place exclusively in the spiritual sphere (geistige Sphäre). That we live in our particular surrounding world, which is the locus of all our cares and endeavors – this refers to a fact that occurs purely within the spiritual realm (in der Geistigkeit). Our surrounding world is a spiritual structure (geistige Gebilde) in us and in our historical life (V, 317; Ve, 272).

In other works the notion of Umwelt is not defined as being something purely ‘spiritual’, but is seen as consisting of both material and spiritual entities. Here, however, Husserl talks about a spiritual Umwelt that can be seen in my view as a layer within a wider notion of Umwelt. What does the word geistig mean in these contexts? The English translation of this adjective has usually been ‘spiritual’ in philosophical texts, and this is also David Carr’s choice here, although clearly Husserl is not talking about something ethereal or pertaining to religious otherworldly matters. Rather, Husserl is talking about a set of representations and typifications that are commonly held in a society. This explains best how our Umwelt is ’present in us’, i.e. in each individual belonging to a society. All social representations exist in no other way than in the minds of individuals, yet they are not private fantasies of individual subjects but exist as objectively valid in a given community, and as pre-given for the individuals born into this community. This is why Husserl can say that they form a “spiritual structure (geistige Gebilde) in us”. As Husserl claims, if social representations include acting gods and demons then there really are gods and demons in the Umwelt of a particular society. However, the Umwelt is geistig not because it includes collective representations of religious matters, it would be geistig even if its elements did not include any representations of religious deities. Thus the term geistig refers here to any type of collective idealities that are held as valid in a given society. Husserl also makes clear that these geistige phenomena have a historical existence, meaning that they are created by particular individuals at a particular point of time, after which they may become ’communalized’ and institutionalized in a given Umwelt, and after which they may spread to other cultural Umwelten as well. Thus the adjective
geistig also refers to this cultural and historical character of the collectively held idealities.

However, translating \textit{geistig} as ‘cultural’ is complicated in this text, because Husserl also uses the term \textit{Kultur}, and in some contexts (but not always), he differentiates between \textit{geistige} and \textit{kulturelle} phenomena: the terms cultural shape (\textit{Kulturgestalt}), cultural formation (\textit{Kulturgebilde}), and cultural form (\textit{Kulturform}) designate the ‘real’, materialized, and institutionalized social activities in which \textit{geistige} phenomena are brought to the level of praxis, whereas spiritual formations (\textit{geistige Gebilde}) and spiritual shapes (\textit{geistige Gestalte}) designate the collective representations themselves – commonly shared ideas, ideals, norms, and other elements forming the \textit{Umwelt}, and which have their place, as Husserl tells us, “exclusively in the spiritual sphere”. Thus, for example, Husserl distinguishes between philosophy as a spiritual, and philosophy as a cultural formation (Husserl uses \textit{Kulturgestalt}, \textit{Kulturgebilde}, \textit{Kulturform}). The first refers to the ideas and theories discovered by philosophers, the second to the real deeds of particular historical individuals who practiced philosophy in their real lives and discovered and developed these ideas in their particular “vocational communities” (V, 321, 333; Ve, 276, 286). Thus the first term refers to the idealities discovered by philosophers, and the second to the real historical forms of practicing philosophy, creating and communicating these idealities in real life. Similarly in the second volume of \textit{Ideas} Husserl discusses marriage, friendship, student union, and parish community (\textit{Gemeinde}) as cultural institutions within which we can distinguish between the level of everyday social praxis and the level of “spiritual essentialities” (I, 31; Ie, 210–211).

Perhaps the most well-known discussion of the nature of the ‘spiritual’ elements of cultural \textit{Umwelt} comes from “The origin of geometry”, in which they are named idealities (\textit{Idealitäten}) – as in the Vienna Lecture, but also spiritual products (\textit{geistige Erzeugnisse}), ideal products (\textit{ideale Erzeugnisse}), ideal objectivities (\textit{ideale Gegenständichtigkeiten}), and spiritual formations (\textit{geistige Gestalten}) (G, 368, 373; Ge, 356–357, 363). The use of words here suggests that \textit{geistig} is a synonym for ideal. But what kind of ideality is it, and what kind of ideal objects is Husserl talking about? To give a short answer, it is again the ideality specific to the intersubjectively valid social representations. For, as Husserl explains, they do not exist as contents of a single individual’s consciousness (G, 367; Ge, 356), but are valid, available and objectively given for everyone within a particular spiritual \textit{Umwelt}, yet their objectivity does not derive from their empirical existence (i.e. from the fact that they can be given to us in the form of empirically existent physical things). Rather, Husserl claims, they possess a specific
‘ideal’ objectivity (‘ideale’ Objektivität) proper to a whole class of spiritual products (geistige Erzeugnisse) of the cultural world (Kulturwelt), to which not only all scientific conceptions (Gebilde) and the sciences themselves belong, but also, for example, the constructions (Gebilde) of fine literature (G 368; Ge 356–357).

In the second volume of Ideas Husserl distinguishes between three types of objects: (1) ‘real’ objects, or the objects of nature, (2) purely ideal (ideale) or spiritual objects (Geistesobjekten), such as works of literature and music (I2, 74; I2e, 255), and (3) “spiritualized objects” (begeistete Objekte) that are both real and ideal (I2, 67; I2e, 248), such as a printed book that ‘contains’ a literary work or, if we want to use a modern example, a CD which ‘contains’ music. Thus there are two types of cultural objects according to Husserl apart from the natural or ‘real’ objects: first, pure idealities, or purely spiritual objects that can be united into purely ideal or spiritual formations (Gebilde), such as scientific concepts; and second, “spiritualized objects” and (institutionalized) acts of social praxis that deal with pure idealities.

This dichotomy between pure symbolic idealities and materialized social phenomena coincides with the main structuralist insight of the social theories of the twentieth century about the existence of symbolic networks or cultural structures that ‘format’ social life and all cultural artefacts. Starting from Durkheimian “forms of classification” (Durkheim & Mauss 2007 [1902]) social scientists have discussed the nature of cultural idealities, which provide forms to the empirically particular social life. Thus, social psychologists claim that our actions and thoughts, individual and collective self-identification, decision-making, and habitual lifestyles are all structured by nets of social representations, stereotypes, and interpretative schemes. Max Weber called social idealities simply ideas.³

Anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1973) prefers to call them cultural or symbolic forms that constitute the symbolic system of any given culture, and the description of which is the very task of interpretative anthropology. It is a distinguishing feature of homo sapiens, Geertz writes (1973, 48) that she learned to use “symbolically mediated programs for producing artifacts, organizing social life, or expressing emotions”. As a result, cultural symbolic forms are utilized in all particular artefacts, in states of consciousness of particular individuals, as well as in social institutions and in common social action. They are cultural constructions that have been created in the course of historical cultural praxis, but once created they structure understanding of the world and pattern social action in a given society. Geertz (1973, 93) defines them as models of reality in a given society.
Thus cultural or symbolic forms can be viewed as meaningful constructions that symbolically mediate our relationship to reality.

Karl Popper and John Eccles, in their book *The Self and Its Brain* (1993 [1977], 36–38) argue for an independent ontological status of “ideal objectivity” that is specific to the purely ideal objects of the cultural world. They draw a distinction between three different ontological domains: the world of physical entities (World 1), the world of mental states (World 2), and the world of the products of the human mind (World 3). The elements of World 3 bear a strong similarity to Husserl’s notion of ideal objects, for they also include scientific theories, the contents of works of art, etc. The point of making the objects of World 3 a separate ontological domain is to insist that World 3 cannot be reduced to Worlds 1 and 2, even though the elements of that world can obviously be ‘inserted’ into material bodies, as, for example, a scientific theory can be published in a book. And they can become the contents of the human mind, as when one contemplates the contents of this book, for example. However, Popper and Eccles suggest that the objects of World 3 have a peculiar objectivity of their own, i.e. their objective validity does not depend on circumstances and events in Worlds 1 and 2. Rather, World 3 objects may induce men to produce other World 3 objects and, thereby, to act upon World 1 (Popper & Eccles 1993, 39) and “they may have, objectively, consequences [in World 1] of which nobody so far has thought, and which may be discovered” (op cit, 40). Similarly, when the objects of World 3 become contents of World 2, they maintain their integrity, which cannot be changed by psychic events. I cannot make a valid conclusion invalid by wishing it, for example. Certain features of World 3 elements just cannot be subjected to manipulation by particular individuals.

It seems that Husserl, at least in “The origin of geometry”, is in agreement with these features of the objective idealities explicated by Popper. In addition to that, Husserl emphasizes a different specific feature of cultural idealities that he calls their “singular uniqueness”. Thus, for example, the Pythagorean Theorem does not come into existence anew each time it is uttered, expressed, used, or thought, but its existence is singular and precedes its particular expressions and applications (except perhaps when it was expressed for the first time). “It is”, Husserl argues, “identically the same in the ‘original language’ of Euclid and in all ‘translations’; and within each language it is again the same, no matter how many times it has been sensibly uttered.” (G, 368; Ge, 357) Husserl notices that in fact language is thoroughly constituted by such “ideal objects”. For example “the word ‘lion’ occurs only once in German language; it is identical throughout its innumerable utterances by any given persons.” (G, 368; Ge, 357) And when Husserl discusses the ideal nature of spiritual (geistige) phenomena in the manuscripts to
his lecture series on passive synthesis, he also mentions that language is made up of these ideal formations, which have the characteristic of singular uniqueness: “In a treatise, in a novel, every word, every sentence is singularly unique, and it cannot be duplicated by a repeated reading, be it aloud or to oneself.” (S, 358; Se, 10) This is because we distinguish between the treatise itself and the manifold of its uttered reproductions and written documentations. And it is because of this distinction, Husserl argues, that we are entitled to say that these particular editions and printed books are of one and the same work (S, 358; Se, 10–11; original emphasis). The same applies to non-lingual spiritual products of the cultural world, as for example to the Kreutzer sonata:

Even if the sonata itself consists of sounds, it is an ideal unity, and its sounds are no less an ideal unity; they are not for instance physicalistic sounds or even the sounds of external, acoustic perception; the sensuous, thing-like sounds, which are only really available precisely in an actual reproduction and intuition of them. Just as a sonata is reproduced over and over again in real reproductions, so too are the sounds reproduced over and over again with every single sound of the sonata in the corresponding sounds of the reproduction (S, 358–359; Se, 11).5

Thus we may conclude that when Husserl talks about spiritual or ideal formations of a common surrounding world, he means intersubjectively accepted and objectively valid idealities that are produced by human beings in the course of their communal life. They grow out from a particular psychic existence in some individual mind, yet once they are commonly accepted they have become independent from their particular subjective and objective manifestations. They are spiritual (geistig) in the sense that they constitute ideal contents of empirically sensible expressions and of the empirically sensible acts of social praxis. In this sense, spiritual means the same as ideal, but it has to be taken not as a standard of perfection, as in the expression “this is an ideal home”. Rather, spiritual is ideal as opposed to something materialized or embodied, and therefore multiplied.

The spiritual idealities are intersubjectively valid and pre-given from the point of view of an individual, and yet they are historical products that have their empirical origin – their first occurrence in someone’s individual mind, the event of which we are most often unable to track. The ideal elements constitute, as we saw above, the “spiritual sphere” of the surrounding world or, as put in the Vienna Lecture, the surrounding world itself. As we discussed above, in the Vienna Lecture Husserl claims that Umwelt is a wholly spiritual phenomenon, but in other texts the surrounding world is seen as the world that also includes objects
of World 1. In Ideas II and elsewhere Husserl claims that Umwelt also contains other subjects, as well as subjectivities of a higher order, – “social subjectivities” (soziale Subjektivitäten) or, which is the same, communities of subjects of different levels (I2, 26–30; I2e, 205–208). However, we are still entitled to talk about a specific “spiritual sphere” of Umwelt that is populated by spiritual idealities. Numerous thinkers before and after Husserl have suggested a concept for the repository of spiritual idealities, such as the “collective consciousness” of Émile Durkheim, the “collective memory” of Maurice Halbwachs, the “cultural memory” of Jan Assmann, the “collective unconscious” of Carl Jung, and, of course, their forerunners, the Volksgeist of Johann Gottfried Herder and “objective spirit” of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Therefore, it is no coincidence that Husserl talks about the spiritual Umwelt in connection with the cultures of nations. In the Vienna Lecture he also talks about the spiritual space (das geistige Raum) of a nation, which forms the spiritual Umwelt of a national society as a whole (V, 322; Ve, 277). A short discussion of the surrounding world of a nation can also be found in a Husserl’s manuscript from 1933 in which he talks about a “national surrounding world” (völkische Umwelt) and even mentions a “surrounding world of fatherland” (vaterländische Umwelt) which each nation possesses. The national surrounding world is defined here as generatively accumulated common validities constituting the whole sense of being (Seinssinn) that is valid for everyone among national fellows (Volksgenossen) (Husserl 2008, 345–349).

Summarizing the discussion so far we can say that the spiritual idealities that Husserl is talking about are to be understood as cultural symbolic forms that constitute cultural structures of a given society. These cultural structures are a part of the life-world of a society, but they may also be viewed as having a domain or a sphere of their own within it, in which case this domain has been called collective or cultural memory, or the ‘spirit’ of a nation. Elsewhere I have suggested a parallel between the concepts of the spiritual Umwelt of Husserl and the semiosphere of Juri Lotman (see Viik 2009), but perhaps most famously Geertz (1973, 89) uses the idea of spiritual idealities to define the concept of culture for interpretative anthropology: “it denotes a historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life.”

Now that we have gained some understanding of the nature of spiritual idealities and the spiritual Umwelt constituted by them, we can return to Husserl’s claims about the uniqueness of European civilization. As said above, this uniqueness is to be found in the “spiritual shape” (geistige Gestalt) that is specific to the Western world and which influences the whole cultural formation (Kulturgestalt).
of Europe. Needless to say, the “spiritual shape” of Europe cannot be defined geographically (V, 318; Ve, 273). Thus Husserl claims that the United States belongs to Europe, whereas some nations and cultures that are actually situated within the geographical domains of Europe, do not; he names Eskimos, Indians and Gypsies in this regard (V, 318–319; Ve, 273). European culture is transnational: each European nation may well have its own national Umwelt, but “the European nations nevertheless have a particular inner kinship of spirit (Verwandtschaft im Geiste) which runs through them all, transcending national differences”, and in this sense the European spiritual shape provides the feeling of the common homeland of all Europeans (V, 320; Ve, 274).

The uniqueness of European culture can be recognized by the representatives of other cultures, as well as being felt by Europeans themselves, according to Husserl, as a “spiritual telos of European humanity” (das geistige Telos des europäischen Menschenzustandes) (V, 320; Ve, 275). This does not mean, of course, that this telos occupies all Europeans all the time, or that it is the main goal of all activities of all European cultural institutions (V, 322; Ve, 276). It is just the essential ideal of European culture as a whole. According to Husserl the European telos was discovered and established by the Ancient Greeks in the sixth and seventh centuries BC in the course of activities that they called philosophy. From that time on this telos has created “a new sort of attitude of individuals toward their joint Umwelt” (V, 321; Ve, 276). Instituting this new attitude was according to Husserl a cultural revolution – a “transformation of the whole praxis of human existence” (V, 325, 333; Ve, 279, 287).

What happened there in Ancient Greece that can be seen as the creation and institution of a unique spiritual shape of European civilization? What kind of spiritual telos did the Greek philosophers discover? It was, as Husserl tells us, the discovery of spiritual idealities of a new type, namely infinite spiritual idealities:

The spiritual telos of European humanity [...] lies in the infinite (Unendliches), in an infinite idea (unendliche Idee) toward which, in concealment, the whole spiritual becoming (geistige Werden) aims, so to speak (V, 320–321; Ve, 275).

No other cultural formation (Kulturgestalt) on the historical horizon prior to [Ancient Greek] philosophy is in the same sense a culture of ideas (Ideenkultur) knowing infinite tasks, knowing such universes of idealities (Universa von Idealitäten) which [...] bear infinity within themselves (V, 324; Ve, 278–279).

Let us recall that each culture has a spiritual Umwelt that consists of cultural structures of all sorts, such as collective representations of deities, social norms,
Husserl’s account of the cultural uniqueness of Western civilization

even mythic cultures have, as Husserl says, certain “linguistically structured ‘knowledge’ of the mythical powers” that govern the world according to commonly held views in a particular spiritual *Umwelt* – the knowledge that, in mythic societies, is cultivated among the priesthood (V, 330; Ve, 284). What was specific about the idealities produced by Greek philosophers that made the European spiritual *Umwelt* different from all others was their infinite and otherworldly nature. Cultural symbolic forms of all cultures prior to Greeks, and of all other civilizations apart from European are finite in the sense that their cultural symbols are drawn from the particular life-world itself, where the “ends, activity, trade and traffic, the personal, social, national and mythical devotion – all this moves within the sphere of its finitely surveyable surrounding world” (V, 324; Ve, 279). Anything within a surrounding world of a traditional culture “[...] with its traditions, its gods, its demons, its mythical powers, [is taken] simply as the actual world”, Husserl explains (V, 332; Ve, 286). But the Greek philosophers, starting from the idealization of magnitudes, measures, numbers, figures, etc. (which was first applied to cosmology, and thus the first non-mythical accounts of it were created), discovered a whole sphere of infinite idealities that formed as if a parallel world that differs from the empirical world in the same way as Plato’s world of ideas differs from the world of shadows (V, 340; Ve, 292–293). The latter world is finite, yet non-persistent and constantly changing, while the former is unchanging, eternal, and universal. Based on these new spiritual idealities “the new question of truth arises: not tradition-bound, everyday truth, but an identical truth which is valid for all who are not blinded by traditions, a truth-in-itself” (V, 332; Ve, 286). Soon these otherworldly infinite idealities became applied to the other areas of life, including ethics and politics. Husserl argues:

Hence there are, for us Europeans, many infinite ideas [...] which lie outside the philosophical-scientific sphere (infinite tasks, goals, confirmations, truths, ‘true values’, ‘genuine goods’, ‘absolutely valid norms’), but they owe their analogous character of infinity to the transformation of mankind through philosophy and its idealities (V, 325; Ve, 279).7

Thus, according to Husserl the uniqueness of European culture consists of discovering a specific non-empirical universality and an attempt to yield all aspects of empirical life to it. It was the discovery of the theoretical gaze, a new “purely theoretical attitude” (*rein theoretische Einstellung*) that replaced the religious-mythic attitude of all previous cultures (V, 326–331; Ve, 280–285). The change of attitude was achieved due to the infinite nature of the new symbolic cultural forms. And it is precisely due to their infinite nature that they function as principles of the
whole life of European culture. Their embodiment and real achievement has be-
come the unattainable (in the sense of not being able to reach completion) telos
of all of the cultural life, including its ethical life and politics.

While today it is difficult to agree with Husserl about European culture being
the only one that attempts to ground its life on universal principles, we can admit
that European culture certainly attempts to embrace universality. Even when we
go to war we do it not just in order to accomplish some particular results – to
empower a regime and establish another one, for example. Rather – or at least
this is how we present it to ourselves – we go to war for universal ideals, such as
freedom or justice. And it is indeed commonly accepted and expected, regardless
of how paradoxically that sounds, that our wars should have universal grounds.
The wars that are not based on such grounds do not belong to the spiritual
Umwelt that defines ‘us’. Thus, Husserl is right that relating particular deeds and
thoughts to infinity has become a goal for Europeans – the Europeans who are
defined ‘spiritually’, i.e. in terms of their cultural symbolic forms.

It is important to notice Husserl’s suggestion that we attempt to cross the line
between infinity and mundane finiteness by means of cultural symbolic forms.
Being infinite in themselves, these forms are applicable to particularities that are
finite, but when applied, they make these particularities infinite on the level of
their social perception. It is on the level of intersubjectively validated perception
that we can say that these things are subjected to the higher goal of being univer-
sal. This is a cultural mechanism that can make a statue of a god, or a crucifix,
to be experienced as something beyond the given material and finite shape. The
same mechanism allows us to launch a war in the name of eternal peace. But we
are also capable of willing justice instead of retribution or punishment. And we
are capable of pursuing a truth that is not pragmatically convenient.

Today when we are used to being much more critical of such claims about the
exclusivity of Western civilization, we need to take notice of the fact that Hus-
serl cannot be accused of claiming that the European culture is already based on
universal cultural forms. Rather, he claims that it is a cultural ideal of Western
civilization to attempt to do so in all spheres of life. In real cultural life, he says,
it is an infinite task (V, 336; Ve, 289). Thus, in a way Husserl adheres to cultural
relativism – he sees Western civilization as having a culture-specific and histori-
cally contingent beginning that establishes infinite symbolic forms that come to
distinguish the European spiritual world from all others. At the same time, it is
true that he sees the West as the only civilization that attempts such universality
(and therefore he claims that what is called Indian or Chinese philosophy is es-
sentially different from Greek) (V, 325; Ve, 279–280) – a claim that can easily be
criticized. However, Husserl does not attach any axiological superiority to the idea of the uniqueness of Western culture.

Let us now turn to Husserl’s theory of meaning-formation in order to prepare ourselves for the phenomenological reflection on his claim about the uniqueness of European culture. We already know from Logical Investigations that the intentional object (intentionale Gegenstand) transcends the very act of experiencing it (Erlebnis), as well as the immanent contents (immanente Inhalte) of this act (L, V, §11, 387; Le, Vol. 2, 99). This is because of the following: what we intend, or the intentional object, is essentially different from the sensational content (Empfindungsinhalt) that is literally contained in the corresponding act of experience (L, V, §14, 395–397; Le, Vol. 2, 103–104). In other words, the process of appearance of the thing (Dingerscheinung) is not the thing which appears (erscheinende Ding). While things appear (erscheinen) to us, the appearing itself does not appear (erscheinen), but we live through (erleben) it, not being thematically conscious of it (L, V, § 2, 359–360; Le, Vol. 2, 83). Thus there is a basic phenomenological distinction between what appears and the processes within individual consciousness that provide for this appearance. These processes, however, constitute the intentional object that we are aware of.

Now, what is the nature of the processes that constitute intentional objects? As Husserl explains in the Cartesian Meditations, the ability of consciousness to be a consciousness of something, i.e. the ability to constitute intentional objects, is based on various kinds of synthesis that operate on the immanent contents of consciousness provided by senses (CM, §1–18, 41–48; CMe, 39–46). One of the most important effects produced by these syntheses is the constitution of the identity of an object, within which various visual, auditory, tactile, olfactory, gustatory, and other sensations, remembrances, future projections and expectations, and any other particular contents of consciousness, are brought together as being sensations, remembrances, and projections of one and the same intentional object. Thus, the function of synthesis is to unite different appearances in such a way that they will be experienced as appearances of one and the same thing.

If we look more closely into the nature of these synthetic processes we see that the meaning (Sinn) of a thing that appears, plays a decisive role in these processes, i.e. meaning is a decisive element in creating the synthetic unity of appearances and thereby constituting an intentional object. Thus Husserl writes in the Cartesian Meditations:

The “object” of consciousness, the object as having identity “with itself” during the flowing subjective process, does not come into the process from outside; on the contrary, it is included as a sense (Sinn) in it – and thus as an
“intentional effect” produced by the synthesis of consciousness (CM, §18, 44; CMe, 43; original emphasis, translation modified).

Here and elsewhere Husserl seems to suggest that the object’s identity, as well as its intentional objectivity, is produced by means of its meaning. This does not imply that the intentional object is reduced to its meaning, for we do not experience the meaning of an object, but the object itself (see L, I, §34, 108; Le, Vol. 1, 232). Rather, Husserl argues that meaning constitutes the identity and unity of the experienced object, because there is no way of being conscious of something other than being conscious of it as something. And the creation of this “as” is the function of meaning, as Husserl suggests.

Up to this point there seems to be a general agreement among commentators about Husserl’s theory of meaning, but we need to go a little further into the details. In the 5th Logical Investigation Husserl offers us an account of how exactly the consciousness of something by means of its meaning is achieved:

We concede that such a sense-complex (Empfindungskomplexion) is lived through (erlebt) in the act of appearing, but say that it is in a certain manner “interpreted” (“aufgefaßt”) or “apperceived”, and hold that it is in the phenomenological character of such an animating interpretation (beseelende Auffassung) of sensation that what we call the appearing of the object consists (L, V, §2, 360–361; Le, Vol. 2, 84; translation modified).

In the Logical Investigation Husserl calls the element of consciousness that performs the function of unification of appearances the interpreting sense (Auffassungssinn). Later, most notably in the Ideas, a similar function is taken over by the concept of noema. Husserl gives us several explanations of this concept, which has caused a lot of controversy among interpreters. Two sides have been taken on the nature of noema; one party of interpreters, the so-called East Coast position held by Gurwitsch, Drummond, Sokolowski, and others, sees noema as the intentional object itself, simply considered from the phenomenological point of view, i.e. as it is intended. The other party, the so-called West Coast interpretation held by Føllesdal, Dreyfus, Smith, and McIntyre, sees noema as an intermediary entity which mediates the act’s relationship to the intentional object.

The latter interpretation enables us to see a connection between noema in the Ideas and the Auffassungssinn in the Logical Investigations. Husserl introduces the notion of noema in the first volume of Ideas in connection with meaning-bestowal (Sinngebung) processes that produce the object that is “meant” (“gemeinte” Gegenstand) (I1, §88, 202; I1e, 213–214). In such contexts the term
meaning (Sinn) is often used to define it. In the case of perception, for example, noema is its perceptual meaning (Wahrnehmungssinn), and in other types of act, such as remembering, judging, or liking the “noematic correlate” of the act is, as Husserl claims, also its meaning (Sinn), but meaning in the extended sense of the word (I, §88, 203; I1e, 214). Husserl’s account of noema as meaning remains controversial about whether it is an abstract ideal meaning that designates universal species, or an individual meaning of a particular object that is a concrete instantiation of the species. What is more, Husserl draws inner levels (Schichten) into the concept of noema by distinguishing within the “full noema” its “noematic sense” (noematischer Sinn), regarding which the interpreters are similarly divided.

We cannot enter this debate here. Let it just be stated that I am taking the side of the West Coast interpretation and will define noema as the meaning of intentional objects. One of the West Coast interpreters, Dagfinn Føllesdal (1990), summarizes the function of noema as follows: (1) noema is a generalization of the notion of meaning; (2) it is that by virtue of which an act is directed towards an object, i.e. it is the objectifying device (the device constituting the objective validity) of an intentional object; and (3) noema is responsible for the self-identity of an object constituted in a complex act. Thus noema is not a part of the physical thing, nor a part of the intended object as intended, but that which ‘animates’ the intended object by forming its identity, and by the same move constituting that ‘as what’ the object is perceived. This conforms to Husserl’s claims in the Ideas I when he writes: “The noema in itself has a relation to objectivity (gegenständliche Beziehung), and this is achieved precisely through its ownmost ‘meaning’ (eigene ‘Sinn’)” (I1 §128, 296; I1e 308; translation modified). And again: “Each noema has a ‘content’ (‘Sinn’), that is to say, its ‘sense’, and is related through it to ‘its’ object” (I1, §129, 297; I1e, 309). Even though Husserl puts the term ‘meaning’ in citation marks, perhaps to indicate that he remains uncomfortable with the choice of the term, he seems to suggest that noema includes the medium by means of which intentional relationships are constituted.

Now I want to connect the West Coast understanding of the concept of noema as a medium with the Husserlian account of spiritual idealities that was discussed before. This connection is most evident in the case of an act of perception of cultural objects, or “spiritualized” material objects, as Husserl called them. Let us look once again at his own example of a spiritualized material object – a die. What are the phenomenologically observable synthetic processes behind the perception of such an object? Obviously all the timely and spatial, internal and external, as well as kinesthetic, syntheses of the sensuous contents that are given to me when looking at the different surfaces on my side of the object have to take place. In the course of these synthetic activities, Husserl claims, I constitute
a self-identical object including its horizontal potentialities that are not at the moment actualized in perception – the sides that are not visible, for example. But how do I know that the object before me is what we call a ‘die’? How do I know that such a word, and consequently such a concept is applicable to this thing here? For something like a die is a cultural object; and my knowledge of such a word and concept must also have a constitutive effect in recognizing this object as a die, and not just as a cube with black dots on it. We must distinguish, however, between the particular die as this object here – an object that is both spiritual and real (the “spiritualized object”, as Husserl says), and the die in a purely spiritual sense that functions as the grasping sense of this particular object as a die. It must be this purely spiritual die that forms the ‘spiritual sense’ which animates the sensuous appearances, fuses with them and unites them into this particular object – this particular die here (see I/2, §56, 69; I/2e, 250). Therefore, in order to complete the phenomenological analysis we need to make a step that Husserl himself did not make: we need to transcendentalize the notion of purely spiritual objects; and to view them as “grasping senses”, or, which is the same, the cultural symbolic forms that constitute the cultural structures of a given society.

Thus ‘die’ is both the abstract ideal meaning that designates a species of things, and an individual meaning of a particular object that is a concrete instantiation of this species. As a cultural symbolic form it is as a transcendental figure that belongs to the ‘spiritual sphere’ of ideal objects of a culture that form a ‘spiritual structure’ present in all of us. The ‘us’ here is defined as a cultural community of those who have the capability to recognize something as a die (and not just as a cube with black dots on it). For something can be a die only for the community of subjects for whom this word has an identifiable meaning – the subjects who share a common spiritual Umwelt.

With transcendentalizing the ideal objects of a spiritual Umwelt we make the phenomenological theory of meaning-formation accountable for culture-specific results of this process. Husserl himself was perhaps on the way towards revisions of his phenomenological project in this direction, as his manuscripts about generative phenomenology and intersubjectivity suggest, but there is no room here to discuss this trajectory of his thought here. While making meaning-formation dependent on culture certainly contradicts Husserl’s ambitions to create a foundationalist science, it would fruitfully relate his phenomenological method to the idea of cultural structures that were discovered during the twentieth century in various human sciences. It would in my view also fit with Husserl’s own idea of the variety of spiritual surrounding worlds.

To see this let us return to Husserl’s account of the uniqueness of Western civilization. What happens if we apply Husserl’s theory of meaning-formation
Husserl’s account of the cultural uniqueness of Western civilization

that we have made dependent on the cultural surrounding world to Husserl’s own history of Western civilization? A narrative as a whole always imposes a unifying meaning on its contents, be it historical events or the deeds of a protagonist. From the phenomenological point of view, however, we must distinguish between the constituted and the constituting meaning of a story, as we distinguished above between the abstract ideal meaning of die that designates a species of things, and an individual meaning of die as a particular object that is a concrete instantiation of the species. The meaning in the first sense is a cultural symbolic form available to everybody in a particular cultural Umwelt. The meaning in the second sense is the meaning of the particular object that is experienced by someone who has used this meaning as a constituting device to become conscious of a corresponding intentional object. In the case of a narrative the constituted meaning of a story is what one experiences when one finishes reading it – a meaning that applies to this particular story as a whole – as it is experienced after closing a book by this particular reader. This is the meaning that is constituted by the story. On the other side, the constituting meaning is a transcendental cultural device that allows one to experience a particular unifying meaning of the story. It is a meaning that makes it possible for this story as a whole to be about what it is. Thus the question about the constituting meaning of a story is the question about the grasping sense, or noema, of this story. It is the element of the reading that allows it to make sense for the one who experiences it. It is the element that constitutes the identity and meaning of the story as a whole.

As we saw, Husserl argued that the uniqueness of Europe is founded on a particular historical phenomenon – the discovery of a purely theoretical attitude by the Ancient Greek philosophers: “The theoretical attitude”, as he puts it, “has its historical origin in the Greeks” (V, 326; Ve, 280). A particular historical event, Husserl claims, has become the origin of the culture that was then – in the 1930s when Husserl presented his lecture – in crisis. What does it mean for something to have an origin? How does having an origin differ, if it does, from a simple starting point? Obviously having an origin particularizes and historicizes a phenomenon by giving it spatial and temporal coordinates. But a starting point could accomplish that as well. An origin seems to go further than that; it establishes a ground for a phenomenon, and sees it as grounded on it. Being grounded, however, does not just belong to the past. The ground is there as long as the phenomenon that is grounded by it. This means that the ground functions as a non-historical and timeless form of the phenomenon that is itself historical and particular.

By giving an account of the origin of European civilization – and this is what is accomplished in his lecture – Husserl gives us a glimpse of the constituting
sense of the phenomenon with which we are dealing. In fact Husserl used the idea of infinite spiritual idealities twice: once as a meaning that constitutes European uniqueness, and before this as a meaning device that constitutes the unifying meaning of the story of European civilization. Because the infinite nature of European cultural idealities functions both as the constituting and the constituted meaning of the story, finding the origin of Western culture establishes its atemporal essence.

It is, of course, arguable whether cultures and civilizations have origins and essences, or whether these can be discovered by means of philosophical reflection, but we know for sure that they can be created and experienced in the form of (world-) historical narratives. And if these narratives become widely accepted and obtain intersubjective validity, then these spiritual idealities will become symbolic cultural forms in a corresponding cultural surrounding world, even if only retroactively attributed to their real historical beginnings. But if it happens then they start to function as automated interpreting machines in the historical consciousness of the inhabitants of this spiritual Umwelt. They start to function as independent meaning-creating agencies, and as such, they determine not just the meaning of the story about this cultural world, but also the meaning of what is narrated about – the cultural world itself, as revealed according to this story. Thus inventing an origin of something means finding a cultural symbolic form that functions as a commonly accepted meaning-automaton of a corresponding historical narrative, the procedure of which is another typical ‘spiritual’ feature of European historical consciousness. For spiritual idealities are not simply what we think about, but they also function as constituting devices by means of which we make sense of what we think about.

The historical narrative, with its origin defined as Antiquity, has long ago acquired a normative status within the Western spiritual surrounding world. We will never reach any pure presentation of the transcendental function of this cultural form, however, because something like an origin can only be presented in terms of what is already originated. The originating activity itself will remain hidden. Applied to our case, this means that we can only approach the essence of European uniqueness from the perspective of its narrated consequences, and in this sense these narratives give the unique European “spiritual shape” its real birth. But what we can discover is the transcendental mechanism of this birth – which is not something the Greeks did, but something that Husserl and others have accomplished in their accounts of it.
Husserl’s account of the cultural uniqueness of Western civilization

References


Tõnu Viik


**Notes**


1 In all citations from Husserl first the German original, then the English translation (if one exists), is cited. Please see the abbreviations key in the References section of this chapter.

2 Sometimes Husserl does not hold to these distinctions and unites the terms Geist and Kultur into a single notion, such as Geisteskultur (translated as “spiritual culture”) or Kulturgeist (translated as “cultural spirit”) (V, 322, 325; Ve 277, 279).

3 See Weber’s famous discussion of the role of religious ideas in his *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (2012 [1905]).

4 See also the discussion of language in Husserl’s manuscripts on the analysis of passive synthesis: “The word itself [...] is [...] an ideal unity that is not duplicated with its thousand-fold reproductions.” (S, 359; Se, 12)

5 See also Husserl’s discussion of real and ideal objects (reale und ideale Gegenstände) in manuscript number 29 in the 39th volume of Husserliana, where he says that real objects each have their unique location in time and space (raumzeitliche Lokalität), and the ideal objects also have the spatial and timely manifestations, but they can manifest themselves in several time–spatial places at the same time, and yet remain identically the same” (Husserl 2008, 298).

6 See also Husserl 1973, 209.

7 See also the following statement from the Vienna Lecture: “If the general idea of truth-in-itself becomes the universal norm of all the relative truths that arise in human life, the actual and supposed situational truths, then this will also affect all traditional norms, those of right, of beauty, of usefulness, dominant personal values, values connected with personal characteristics, etc.” (V, 334; Ve, 287).

8 See also *Logical Investigations* (L, I, §13, 54–55; Le, Vol. 1, 198; and L, I, §15, 59; Le, Vol. 1, 201).
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Oil, canvas. 100 x 90 cm.
Principles of language sustainability

Martin Ehala

Abstract. The chapter aims to contribute to the development of the theory of language ecology. It is hypothesised that language communities can be understood as autopoietic systems aimed at their own reproduction, i.e. guaranteeing their own sustainability in time. A language is sustainable when, despite the changed circumstances and (social) environment, it still is used. Factors influencing the sustainability of a language community can be divided into three wide-ranging categories: (1) factors of the external environment, (2) factors of the internal environment, (3) the ethnolinguistic vitality of the community. Changes in the external environment can be considered the most important ones that contribute to language extinction. Like biological species that are unable to adapt to the changing environment, cultures and languages also become extinct when they are unable to function in the changed environment. To react to the changes in the external environment and to preserve their integrity, autopoietic systems attempt to develop their internal environment as fully as possible. The internal environment of a language community comprises its social institutions. The stronger and more fully developed are the social institutions the better are the possibilities of withstanding the impact of the changes in the external environment. The strength of the internal environment depends, crucially, on the third factor: ethnolinguistic vitality, the ability of a community to behave in interethnic communication as a united collective force. The chapter presents the main components of all three sustainability factors and characterises their interaction.

Language ecology

The concept of language ecology was first applied by Einar Haugen (1972). In sociolinguistics, this concept has usually been used metaphorically, although there are scholars who have attempted to develop the field of language ecology in greater depth (Mackey 2001; Haarmann 1986; Mühlhäusler 1996; 2000; Garner

The critics of the theory of language ecology (e.g. Edwards 1995; 2001), however, have stated that the theory has not contributed much to the research into language relations and language environments. This criticism has considerable truth in it, as very different research at different levels has been presented under the label of language ecology, and no common research area has been established.

The fact that language ecology has not been able to establish itself as a serious branch of research does not mean that the concept of language ecology would be untenable in itself. Ecology is a science about the connections of the organism with its environment, a science of how to preserve the natural diversity and balance in the conditions of sprawling civilization. Thus, language ecology would be a science on the interaction between the language and its environment, about how to preserve the linguistic diversity of the world. Such studies are practised within the framework of language policy, language maintenance as well as language sociology, language ideology and contact linguistics. For some reason, it has not become customary to call them jointly language ecology.

This chapter deliberately applies the ecological approach, attempting to outline the main relations in the interaction between language and environment, focussing on language sustainability, i.e. its ability to function as the main means of communication and identity marker of an ethnic group.

**Social functions of the language**

A language is sustainable when, despite the changed circumstances and (social) environment, it still is used. The most direct guarantee of sustainability is transmission of the language from a generation to another. Until the language is transmitted from one generation to another and used daily, at least at home, the language is sustainable. The intergenerational sustainability of a language depends on parents’ motivation to transmit the language to their children, i.e. to communicate with them in that language from their birth.

The motivation for the valuation of a language results from the social functionality of that language. In principle, a language always fulfils two functions in society – it enables the members of a society to exchange information, and to express their collective identity. Based on the functionality of language, Lambert (1963, 114) has distinguished between two types of motivation for language acquisition: instrumental and integrative motivation. Instrumental motivation derives from the benefits the command of a particular language gives someone in the area of information exchange – how it broadens the opportunities for information obtainment, study and career. Integrative motivation derives from the benefits
that the command of a particular language gives someone in the area of collective identity – whether it is prestigious to belong among the speakers of that language or not really. In principle, these two motivation factors also form the basis for intergenerational transmission of a language – until the command of a language is useful either in the instrumental or integrative sense, the language is transmitted from parents to children. The smaller these benefits are in the parents’ opinion, the lower is their motivation to transmit the language.

From here, an essential conclusion can be drawn: from the viewpoint of language ecology, the mutual dynamism between languages is based on their two main functions, instrumental and integrative. Obviously, not all languages can perform these functions equally well in all areas. Because of small human resources, it is more difficult for small languages to build up all the social institutions and simultaneously offer a desirable collective identity.

Still, it would be erroneous to think that small languages are totally unable to compete with larger ones. A good example is Faroese which has approximately 50,000 speakers on the Faroe Islands. For a long time, the language has felt great pressure from Danish, but nonetheless it has become the official language of the Faroe Islands, being the language of tuition at schools and three faculties of the islands’ only university, and the language of sermons in church. Notwithstanding this, the islanders are bilingual, as they have no resources for translating all the films, television programmes, comic strips, labels on goods, manuals of household appliances, etc., into Faroese (Benati 2009). The Estonian language community is approximately 20 times bigger and, therefore, the Estonian language has greater opportunities. Nonetheless, the Estonians have a rooted opinion that the Estonian language is small and uncompetitive.

Along with the instrumental function, the integrative function of the language is equally important. Although there are exceptions, for example the Jews (Myhill 2003), for many ethnic groups their language is one of the core values of their culture (Smolicz 1981), which distinguishes them from other ethnicities (Barth 1969). For such ethnic groups, their language is often the organizing axis of their identity, which maintains solidarity between the members of the group, and, if threatened, mobilises the community for action.

In the same way that languages do not perform the instrumental function equally, they do not equally perform the integrative function either. On the one hand, large nations always have more achievements on which to build up their positive collective identity. Their languages are also often spoken as second languages as the economic and cultural power attracts immigrants. They also have many native speakers who differ by their residence, social status or other features. As the speakership of the language is numerous and its limits fuzzy, acquisition
of the language as such is not of great integrative use for people. In the case of languages with a great number of speakers, the integrative function is rather performed by various regional and social varieties and ethnolects.

As it is difficult to find instrumental motivation for acquisition of small languages, they are not widely learnt as foreign languages or spoken as second languages. This, however, means that everyone who has a command of the language belongs to the inner circle and is treated as a compatriot. This usually creates a stronger feeling of togetherness in the speakership of a small language than among the speakers of a large language.

**Dialectics of the functions of the language**

The instrumental and integrative functions of a language are somewhat contradictory in their essence. Thus, from the instrumental point of view, the best state of affairs would be if there were only one universal language used by all. In such a case, information exchange between everyone would be possible with no expense or energy spent on translation; mutual understanding would improve, etc. Although the idea of one global language has fascinated humankind since Biblical times, all the attempts to create a universal language have failed. Likewise no language in the world has acquired a status that would have enabled it to oust all the other languages.

Such a situation will hardly ever come, as the integrative function of a language works against the disappearance of linguistic differences. Most sustainable ethnic groups value their languages as essential parts of their identities, and, as people generally do not want to change their identities, they do not want to change their language either. Until now, success has been achieved only in creation of national languages based on fragmented dialect communities. The process of nation building, which has a history of about a couple of centuries in Europe and has spread outside its borders, has managed to level the differences between dialects and to swallow smaller ethnic groups in the territories of nations, but, at the level of nations, the differences have increased rather than diminished.

Thus, it could be stated that the process of nation building is, to a certain extent, the achievement of a universal language ideal in a limited territory. In the ideal case, this has brought about a balance between the integrative and instrumental functions within one society because the language functions as a common language of communication for everyone and defines all of its speakers as one group. This balance, however, will remain only an ideal. In the mobile present-day world, larger or smaller immigrant communities have emerged within nation states. They value the language of their country of origin for integrative reasons
and use the language of their target country mostly for the instrumental function only. As human groups are attracted to more universal information exchange on the one hand, and to the preservation of their identity on the other, the full overlapping of the instrumental and integrative functions of the language cannot be foreseen. At that, some languages will inevitably disappear in the course of this process. Next, we will observe which factors influence the sustainability of languages.

The language community as an autopoietic system

An autopoietic system is a system that reproduces itself through its functioning. The concept of autopoietic systems was first applied in biology in order to describe living systems (Maturana & Varela 1973); later the concept was extended to society (Luhmann 1990; Capra 1997), language (Ehala 1996) and culture (Livingston 2006). In a sense, an autopoietic system has no other aim than the reproduction of itself, i.e. guaranteeing of its sustainability. As systems do not exist in a vacuum but in a constantly changing environment, which also includes other autopoietic systems, then guaranteeing sustainability is not monotonous vegetation but constant stressful interaction with the environment.

The language and cultural communities also constantly reproduce themselves as a result of their daily activities. Strictly speaking, they have no other aim than guaranteeing their sustainability (some such systems, like the Republic of Estonia, even have autopoiesis inscribed in their constitution); thus, language and cultural communities can be viewed as autopoietic systems. Although the aim of autopoietic systems is to guarantee their continuity across time, not all languages, language communities and ethnic groups are sustainable; the disappearance of ethnoses through language and identity change, sometimes even by physical destruction has become outright epidemic today.

As said at the beginning, a sustainable language is such a language that is in daily use and is transmitted from one generation to another; in other words a sustainable language has its community of users. Although we speak about the sustainability of a language, we actually speak about the continuation of the use of a certain language as a cultural practice. In a sense, the survival or decay of a language is comparable to the survival or decay of any other practice. The only difference is that a cultural custom may entirely fall into oblivion and not be replaced by anything else, but in the case of a language, the only possible solution is language shift, not complete abandonment of language. This also means that the maintenance or shift of a language can be viewed as part of the ability of a cultural community to preserve its cultural identity and continuity. There are
 Principles of language sustainability

Figure 1. Model of the language community (Harris Russell 2001)

LANGUAGE COMMUNITY

   Ideological system
   (ideas, beliefs, attitudes, worldview)
   Solidarity
   Members of the community
   Power
   Social system
   (government, church, economy, school, family)

numerous examples in which language communities with small cultural capital undergo identity shift simultaneously with language shift or immediately after it, so that the whole treasury of cultural practices falls into oblivion. This has happened, for example, to the Estonian language islands on the eastern shore of Lake Peipsi and also to small indigenous communities like the Livonians or Prussians.

As the language is only a part – although an essential part – of cultural identity, then language shift need not always mean assimilation of the cultural community. The community of American Finns with its long traditions still exists as a separate cultural community. In its practices, the Finnish elements (sauna, folk dancing, symbols) have an essential role, although command of the Finnish language has almost disappeared (Virtaranta et al 1993). Thus, it is entirely possible that, in distress, a community undergoes language shift, but still retains its identity, i.e. its sustainability as a cultural community. Here a good example is the Irish, although the Russian-speaking nationalism of Ugric and Samoyedic peoples has also been considered possible. Thus, when speaking about the sustainability of languages, the theme should be approached more broadly and one should rather concentrate on the sustainability of the communities speaking those languages.

When describing a cultural community as an autopoietic system, Harris Russell’s (2001, 142) model of the language community proves useful. According to this model, the language community has two essential dimensions: ideological (ideas, beliefs, attitudes, values, worldview, identity, etc.) and social (political
system, economy, church, family, etc.). The ideological system produces solidarity, the social system establishes power. Harris Russell’s model of the language community is depicted in Figure 1.

This model is robust, but not detailed enough to describe the functioning of an autopoietic social system. To build a more comprehensible model, four basic categories of ethnic group should be specified: structures, processes, beliefs and actions. All of them could be of the nature of the invisible hand (self-organising), i.e. hard to control and influence; or of the nature of the visible hand, i.e. the results of conscious decisions and societal design. So the four categories all have an invisible hand and a visible hand component. For example, the structures are divided by social institutions like church, school, defence, etc., that are organised and maintained by the governing structures, and the social network that is formed by individuals without government control. The social network is an invisible hand structure; it could not be redesigned in an easy way, using governmental or managerial tools.

Similarly, the processes are either norm based and regulated, such as institutional practices. Or they could be of the type of habitus which is not consciously controlled but emerges just as a consequence of people’s daily practices. The same holds for the beliefs. Ideology, law, customs, and religion is a consciously
designed set of beliefs that the elite in power establishes and disseminates through the mass media. Ethnolinguistic vitality is a belief system that is formed as a self-organising process of group members’ symbolic interactions and their perceptions of the social situation. It is an ‘invisible hand’ belief system that cannot be easily influenced by ideological manipulations. The model ends with two types of action, i.e. deliberate goal-directed activities. Top down actions are those that a government initiates and fulfills using its power structures, if necessary. Bottom up actions are those that group members collectively engage in because of their internal desires. Bottom up actions can be spontaneous; they can be consonant with the top down power wishes (social mobilisation in the case of threat or war), or against them (a revolution against the establishment).

From the viewpoint of language ecology, the object of research should be the language community in its full functioning as pictured on the Extended Model of speech community (see Figure 2). The aim of research should be to establish the main factors on which the sustainability of the research object depends, its ability to preserve its integrity and identity, and the factors that cause the disintegration of the community and the processes that lead to the formation of new language communities.

**Factors influencing the sustainability of a language community**

Factors influencing the sustainability of a language community can be divided into three wide-ranging categories: (1) factors of the external environment, (2) factors of the internal environment, (3) the ethnolinguistic vitality of the community. Let us take a closer look at these influencing factors.

Studies of endangered languages reveal that in most cases these languages have a very long history. This means that, for a long time, these language communities were sustainable, but not anymore. When we analyse the reasons for their endangered situation, we see that among the many influential factors, the clearest underlying causes are changes in the external environment. These changes can be both natural and social. Natural changes can worsen, for example, the economic conditions of the community. This can be accompanied by internal conflicts, migration or other social phenomena that destabilise the system. One of the best examples is the great famine in mid-19th century Ireland, which was destructive for the sustainability of the Irish language community – the starvation and collapse of the traditional economic system of the community forced people to join the English-speaking society (either in local cities, or through emigration to the USA). As both the instrumental and integrative values of the Irish language deteriorated considerably, the result was language shift.
More often, however, changes in the external environment have been social. What proved fatal for American Indians were the European immigrants with their technologically more advanced culture. Even today, establishment of contact with economically more advanced cultural communities is the main change in the external environment that disturbs the balance of previously sustainable language communities. For example, the traditional environment of small Siberian peoples has become industrialised and polluted, which is a great hazard for their sustainability. Such contacts need not always be a result of direct immigration. Often, the construction of an efficient network of roads in a previously isolated region is sufficient for the younger generation of the local population to leave their traditional habitats and abandon their indigenous language and cultural customs.

Like biological species that are unable to adapt to the changing environment, cultures and languages also become extinct when they are unable to function in the changed environment. Mufwene (2004) argues that if a language loses its sustainability because of changes in the environment, there is no other possibility for its revival than restoration of the environment in its earlier state, just as in the case of endangered animal species. As this is usually impossible, language and identity shift should be considered inevitable, he claims. Still, Mufwene does not take into consideration the fact that biological evolution and cultural evolution are not the same. While biological species can only adapt to the changing conditions, cultures and ethnic groups are able to influence the environment by their activity, thus actively contributing to their sustainability. The efficiency of such an influence also depends on the internal organisation of the community.

To react to the changes in the external environment and to preserve their integrity, autopoietic systems attempt to develop their internal environment as fully as possible. The internal environment of a language community comprises its social institutions. Traditionally, distinction has been made between five central social institutions that have existed and exist in all societies: economic, government and education systems, family and religion. As contemporary small language communities do not always form separate societies but function as parts of larger societies, they have not always developed all the five social institutions and use, at least partly, the institutions of the dominant ethnos. If, however, a small language community forms a separate society, it has all these institutions, although not in as sophisticated a form as in large societies.

According to the typical scenario of language and identity change, the disintegration of the endangered language community begins with the dominant ethnos taking over its social institutions. Usually, this begins with education and economy, but often the catalyst of the process has been religion. The last social
Principles of language sustainability

Institution of the endangered language community is usually the family. Thus, one can state that from the viewpoint of sustainability of languages, the existence and competitiveness of their genuine social institutions is most essential. Taking the Faroese language community as an example again, this small language community has developed all the essential social institutions. Through these institutions, the Faroese language community guarantees its instrumental function because efficient institutions enable society to react to environmental changes.

Even communities that have come into being as a result of migration, attempt to form their own social institutions in their target countries. A good example is provided by nearly all émigré Estonian communities, which, from their initial years, started to establish Estonian institutions, like the Estonian school, church and house, which functioned as parallel structures to the institutions of the receiving country. Their aim was to help the emerging language community guarantee its sustainability under the new conditions. Thus, one might state that, in order to resist changes in the external environment, the language community needs its own social institutions, but that these must be competitive with the parallel structures available to the members of the group. Thus, the institutions of the émigré Estonian communities have to offer at least partial competition to those of the target country. The history of émigré Estonians has shown that the sustainability of each community has depended on its ability to create and keep up social structures parallel to those of the receiving country. Naturally, success greatly depends on the size and dispersion of the community, although the size is certainly not the most essential factor.

In the world there are even language communities with several millions of members that are severely endangered. For example, there are approximately 8–12 million Quechua speakers in South America (mostly in Peru, Colombia and Ecuador). Only 1% of them are literate in their own language, while literacy in Spanish exceeds 60%. Although the Quechua language is taught as a subject in primary schools, parents residing in urban areas prefer their children to speak Spanish (Lewis et al 2013). From 1940 to 1982, the share of Quechua monolinguals dropped from 31% to 11%, while the share of bilinguals remained the same, although the proportion of those who have switched to Spanish grew from 50% to 72% (Hornberger & King 2001). Thus, the sustainability of the Quechua language is quite problematic, despite its sizeable number of speakers. Simultaneously, there are small language and cultural communities that are entirely sustainable. For example, the ethno-religious communities of the Amish in the USA, each of them smaller than 50,000 people (Kraybill 2000), are surrounded by one of the most powerful ethnolinguistic groups in the world – the Americans. The total number of the Amish is a few hundred thousand. Despite their small number,
they have been sustainable for more than 200 years, and in recent decades, their number has grown about 4% a year (Ericksen et al 1979). This makes them one of the most rapidly growing communities in the world.

In the same way that size does not always matter, neither does the weakly developed internal environment always determine the sustainability of the language community. The whole history of the Estonian nation is a good example of how the will of a group to behave as a collective actor has always been a few steps ahead of the available social institutions. Thus, the internal ecology of the system is essential for the sustainability of the system, but it is not an inevitable or sufficient factor. To sum it up briefly, this means that the sustainability of any community does not depend entirely and ultimately on the factors of its external and internal environment. The key question is rather the collective will of the community to exist as a language and cultural community.

The ability to “behave as a distinctive and active collective entity” is called ethnolinguistic vitality (Giles et al 1977, 307). This is a socio-psychological phenomenon that rests on the shared belief in the strength and sustainability of one’s group. Such shared beliefs are created more or less deliberately in public discourse, and leaders can raise the vitality of their community with enthralling rhetoric and vision. Nonetheless, the ethnolinguistic vitality of the community greatly depends on the external and internal environment of the group. It is quite clear that the ethnolinguistic vitality of a small language community with an undeveloped internal environment and in the sway of large and influential groups cannot be very high, as the perception of the weakness of one’s group does not increase people’s willingness to behave collectively. In such a situation, it is often difficult to find realistic aims that would mobilise the community. Notwithstanding this, the practice of language maintenance has shown that without ethnolinguistic vitality, external attempts to raise the sustainability of a community will fail. Thus, the only indispensable precondition for the sustainability of a language community is the ethnolinguistic vitality of the group – the ability to function as a unitary collective actor.

However, even high ethnolinguistic vitality does not guarantee the continuity of a community through time. The most telling example could be the destruction of the Melians by Athenians in the Peloponnesian War in 416 BCE. Unarguably, the small community on the island of Melos was ethnolinguistically vital when it decided to resist the overwhelming forces of the Athenians and not surrender. Unfortunately, the gods did not interfere with the siege. Finally, the Athenians conquered the town and killed all the men they could catch; women and children were taken into slavery, and 500 loyal colonists were settled on the island (Shelton
& Cengage 2005). Because of this genocide, the Melian community ceased to exist despite its high ethnolinguistic vitality.

A short summary of what has been said above would be that the sustainability of a language community depends similarly on all three factors, the influences of the external environment, the strength of the internal environment, and ethnolinguistic vitality. The core of sustainability is high ethnolinguistic vitality, but overwhelmingly unfavourable external environment factors can endanger even the most vital ethnic groups with a most developed internal environment. The correlation of all the three factors with sustainability could be expressed by the following formula:

\[
\text{sustainability} = (\text{strength of the internal environment} + \text{vitality}) - \text{threats from the external environment}.
\]

In other words, if vitality and the strength of the internal environment exceed the threats from the external environment, the group is sustainable; if, however, the threats from the external environment prove stronger, the community will cease to exist. Next, we will view these three factors separately.

**Factors relating to the external environment**

As said above, the external environment of a group consists of natural and social factors, three of which are of decisive significance for the group’s sustainability: its geographic location, access to resources, and neighbours.

As for the geographic location, a naturally isolated settlement area is a factor supporting sustainability. Johanna Nichols’ (1992) studies in language geography have shown that small language communities are most vital on islands and peninsulas (e.g. Icelandic, several variants of Gaelic, Welsh and Breton), in the mountains (e.g. the Caucasus is a region of notable linguistic diversity) and in other difficultly accessible places, such as tropical rain forests (where linguistic diversity is the greatest in New Guinea). The settlement area of the Estonian language is also relatively clearly defined geographically, being bounded by the sea on two sides, and a large lake and marshes on one side. Natural border elements are lacking only on the southern border of Estonia. A settlement area without geographically marked borders is generally the least favourable for sustainability, and the worst is the situation when a group entirely lacks a fixed territory.

Existence of resources is decisive for the sustainability of every community. Typical resources that influence sustainability are hunting and fishing grounds, arable land, water, forest, and minerals, the exploitation of which requires
corresponding technology. The geopolitical location can also be a resource if it is used, for example, for management of transit flows and earning a living from such flows. It is essential that the community would be able to exploit its available resources. For example, the settlement areas of the Khants and the Mansi are rich in oil and gas, but this has not increased their sustainability, as they have not had technology for oil and gas extraction.

The social environment, i.e. the existence of competing communities in a region, is equally important. Of that, the size, disposition and economic development of the neighbours are of utmost significance. The worst situation is to be surrounded by one large and hostile community, regardless of its economic situation. Somewhat better is to be near a large, neutral and wealthy nation, or being surrounded by it. The smaller the neighbours in their size and wealth in comparison with one’s own group, the more favourable the external environment is. Most favourable for sustainability is the lack of direct contact with neighbours (e.g. Iceland and other island ethnicities).

The concurrence of these three factors creates types of external environment with different influence on the sustainability of the community. It is possible to calculate the influence of each combination on the sustainability of a group by giving +1 to the most favourable situation, −1 to the least favourable situation and 0 to a neutral or average situation for each of the three environmental factors. The greater the summary index of sustainability, the more favourable is the environment; a negative value of the index refers to unfavourable environmental conditions (see Figure 3). Naturally, it should be kept in mind that all three factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sustainability index (SI)</th>
<th>Settlement area</th>
<th>Resources</th>
<th>Neighbours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>+1</td>
<td>Entirely isolated or hardly accessible settlement area.</td>
<td>Environment is rich in resources that can be processed using available technology and enable the growth of the community.</td>
<td>Neighbours are lacking or are numerically smaller and/or at lower level of technological development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>One’s own fixed settlement area.</td>
<td>Environment provides sufficient resources for the community.</td>
<td>Neighbours are equal to the community in their number and development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>−1</td>
<td>No settlement area of their own.</td>
<td>Few resources in the environment or a necessity to compete for them with other communities.</td>
<td>The community is surrounded by one big and hostile neighbour.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3. External factors influencing sustainability
are constantly changing, and are not clearly delimited categories. Therefore, the boundaries between types resulting from their different combinations are fuzzy.

**Factors relating to the internal environment**

As said above, the internal environment of an ethnic group comprises five central social institutions: economy, government, education, family and religion. For sustainability, each language and cultural community needs the whole system of social institutions if possible. The communities who are unable to create it have to integrate into the social institutions of other, larger or stronger groups. As the aim of institutions is to guarantee the sustainability of the groups who created them, integration into the internal environment of some other groups inevitably means weakening of one's own sustainability.

In the economic system, sustainability is most greatly influenced by the ability to produce values and the division of wealth between the group's members. The weakest economic systems are only able to provide subsistence; no economic surplus is created. The more surplus is produced, the better for the community, even if wealth is distributed very unevenly. In societies producing an economic surplus, so-called creative industries can emerge, which is essential for the formation of the collective identity and self-consciousness of the community. However, economic systems with an uneven distribution of wealth are worse for the sustainability of a community than systems with a more even distribution, as the former weaken in-group solidarity.

For the sustainability of government system, its centralization and sovereignty are essential. Governance at the level of the village community probably exists in all ethnic groups; the maximum level of centralization would be a government that unites the whole community. Sovereignty is also gradual. In the least favourable situation, there is no form of cultural self-government at all; ethnic autonomy is already an averagely favourable status, and the maximally favourable situation is independent statehood.

For education, the worst situation is the lack of a formal system of education; the best situation is an education system in one's own language and culture from the lowest to the highest level, including full-scale higher education and research.

For the family, the average number of children and the rate of exogamy, and also the size of the group, are essential. The greater the number of children who reach adulthood and the smaller the rate of exogamy, the better it is for the sustainability of the group. In very small communities where exogamy is biologically justified and balanced, the latter marker should be viewed conditionally.
The task of religion is to create social cohesion and a shared worldview between the members of the community. A strong original messianic religion, which presents a vision about the historic mission and chosenness of the community, is the best for the sustainability of the group. A distinctive national church based on a widespread religion is of average sustainability, even if it represents a cultural tradition rather than internal religiosity. Being a part of a church of another ethnic group is the worst variant, even worse than the lukewarm religiosity typical of Estonians.

**Ethnolinguistic vitality**

As said before, ethnolinguistic vitality is the ability of a community to behave in interethnic communication as a united collective force. For a community to behave collectively, two principal components are needed: readiness of group members to act collectively and existence of leaders who set aims to be collectively achieved. Both components are equally necessary, as a community without leaders is capable of spontaneous manifestations but not of organised action. Good leaders, however, are useless if an inert people will not follow them. Naturally, leaders can somewhat increase vitality with their rhetoric and personal bravery; it can also be expected that someone will always be ready to lead spontaneously agitated masses. Thus, ethnolinguistic vitality is very much formed in the rhetorical dialogue between the collective and its leaders.
Next, let us examine which components influence the readiness of a collective for joint action. Socio-psychological studies have shown that collective identity has three components – cognitive, evaluative and emotional –, although only the emotional aspect, fidelity to the group and its ideals, makes the group act in order to achieve its aims (Ellemers et al 1999, 386). Emotional connection with the group has several facets, one of the most essential of which is appreciation of traditional values and customs. Members who esteem the cultural customs and values are in tighter emotional connection with the group than members who do not care about them and prefer to behave out of utilitarian motives (profit, personal well-being, etc.).

Naturally, emotional connection with the group is not the only factor influencing vitality. It is also essential to realise the strength of one’s own group in comparison with neighbouring groups. This might be called ‘the winner effect’. If the group is small, weak and suppressed by others, the members’ readiness for collective action can easily decrease, as life has shown that nothing comes of it. Experience of earlier collective success, however, has a positive influence on vitality.

The propensity to collective action depends also on the feasibility of individual strategies to enhance one’s social status. Tajfel and Turner (1979) argue that group behaviour can be depicted on an axis, at one end of which is social mobility and at the other end social change. If people perceive that they have good chances for individual improvement of their lives and achievement of their aims, they opt for the strategy of social mobility – i.e. they attempt to build a career and climb the social hierarchy, which often brings about assimilation into the dominant group. If, however, the society inhibits social mobility by rigid barriers of class, caste, race, ethnicity or language, collective action is the only way for people to improve their living standards. In a situation of interethnic contact, this dilemma can be reduced to the question of whether it is more useful to change one’s identity, i.e. to assimilate into the group with a higher status, or to struggle collectively for the improvement of the status and living standards of one’s own group. In conclusion, the choice of individual or collective tactics depends on two factors: the distance and discord between the groups.

The distance between the groups consists of the sum of racial, ethnic, linguistic and cultural differences. The greater the differences between the two groups, the more difficult it is for them to apply the strategy of mobility to improve their living standards, as regardless of efforts, it would be impossible to hide one’s hereditary identity, which will inevitably hinder identity change. Thus, the greater the distance, the greater is the motivation for collective action. If the differences
Martin Ehala

**Figure 5. Vitality factors influencing sustainability**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SI</th>
<th>Utilitarianism</th>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Distance</th>
<th>Discord</th>
<th>Leaders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>+1</td>
<td>Very high emotional attachment to the group’s traditions and values.</td>
<td>The group is perceived as stronger than neighbouring groups; its status is high.</td>
<td>Very big racial, linguistic and cultural distance from the neighbouring groups.</td>
<td>Direct intergroup hostility and/or stigmatisation of the out-group.</td>
<td>One leader with indisputable authority.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Valuation of traditions and utilitarian motives are balanced.</td>
<td>The status of the group is perceived as equal with the neighbouring groups.</td>
<td>No racial distance; linguistic and cultural distance is noticeable.</td>
<td>Common feeling of superiority over the out-group without substantial hostility.</td>
<td>Existence of many good leaders, rivalry between them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-1</td>
<td>Behaviour influenced by the aim of pragmatic gain; no emotional attachment to traditions.</td>
<td>Strength and status of the group is perceived as weaker than that of the neighbouring groups.</td>
<td>Small linguistic, cultural and racial distance from the neighbouring groups.</td>
<td>No discord; friendly relations between the groups.</td>
<td>Lack of capable leaders.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

are small, then identity change is relatively easy or even unnoticeable, and people rather prefer the strategy of social mobility.

Even in the latter case, the strategy of mobility can prove difficult if the discord between the groups is great. Discord is usually caused by historical injustice, intergroup conflict or just banal xenophobia. In any case, great discord between groups can make the use of the strategy of social mobility impossible even if the cultural distance is small. For example, the discord between Serbs and Croatians is so big that changing group membership is impossible, even though the ethnic, linguistic and cultural differences between both groups are small. The impact of the vitality factors on sustainability is summarised in Figure 5.

**Conclusion**

Language sustainability is a multifaceted phenomenon dependent on the complicated interaction between natural, economic, social, cultural and socio-psychological factors. Some of these factors are outside the control of humans and the members of an ethnos; some of them can be influenced by the activity of the ethnos. Thus, it can be said that, although sustainability depends on factors outside a group’s control, no ethnos is entirely at the mercy of external factors. No
Principles of language sustainability

matter how complicated the conditions of the external or internal environment are, there is always the possibility to collectively improve the group’s situation. Making use of this possibility depends on the vitality of the ethnos and its ability to behave as a unified collective factor on the arena of history.

Therefore, ethnolinguistic vitality is the key factor in the sustainability of an ethnos. There is no doubt that the elites of successful ethnicities have guaranteed the sustainability of their ethnicities by deliberate or intuitive management of ethnolinguistic vitality. Systematic research of these processes also makes it possible to use this knowledge to secure the sustainability of endangered languages and cultures. This should in fact be the main aim of language ecology as a research area.

Internet sources


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Martin Ehala


Notes

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Landscape semiotics: contribution to culture theory

Kati Lindström, Kalevi Kull, Hannes Palang

Abstract. The chapter provides an overview of different approaches to the semiotic study of landscapes both in the field of semiotics proper and in landscape studies in general. We describe different approaches to the semiotic processes in landscapes from the semiological tradition in which landscape has been seen as analogous to a text with its language, to more naturalised and phenomenological approaches, including landscape as chronotope, as well as the ecosemiotic view of landscapes that goes beyond anthropocentric definitions. Special attention is paid to the potential of the Tartu–Moscow school’s cultural semiotics to analyse landscapes and the possibilities held by a dynamic, dialogic and holistic landscape definition for the development of ecosemiotics.

The aim of this chapter is at least threefold: (a) to contribute to the formation of the discipline called landscape semiotics, (b) to contribute to the development of an ecosemiotic concept of culture, (c) to demonstrate the fruitfulness of Tartu semiotics for both of these tasks. Denis Cosgrove (2003) has stated that there are two distinct discourses in landscape studies, the ecological and the semiotic.

A semiotic approach to landscape is sceptical of scientific claims to represent mimetically real processes shaping the world around us. It lays scholarly emphasis more on the context and processes through which cultural meanings are invested into and shape a world whose ‘nature’ is known only through human cognition and representation, and is thus always symbolically mediated (Cosgrove 2003, 15).

He explicitly calls for cooperation and mutual respect and understanding between these two discourses, maintaining that no ecologic interpretation or policy can ignore the effect of cultural meaning-making processes, while the fact “that

meaning is always rooted in the material processes of life” must also be recognised (Cosgrove 2003, 15).

The beginning of ‘landscape semiotics’ as such is very difficult to pinpoint, since there has been little explicit usage of semiotic terminology in landscape studies, although a wealth of inherent, albeit implicit, semiotic scholarship has been produced on topics such as landscape representations and preferences, the manifestations of power relations and the embodiment of social structures and memory in landscapes. There are many works that could potentially belong to landscape semiotics but which do not identify themselves as such. Mainly it is not yet a subject that enjoys an independent status in university curricula, apart from the Landscape Semiotics course taught in the University of Tartu since 2005. Most landscape scholars understand ‘semiotics’ much more narrowly than semiotics as a discipline sees itself, equalling it mainly to linguistics and Saussurean influenced semiology. Scholars of semiotics, on the other hand, tend to prefer the ‘social space’ as their concept of choice, with a special emphasis on urban semiotics (like Lagopoulos & Boklund-Lagopoulou 1992; Gottdiener 1995; Randviir 2008). In many cases, the terms ‘space’, ‘place’ and ‘landscape’ are used interchangeably, without much terminological rigour or distinction (that is not rare in human geography either, e.g. Wylie 2007; Cresswell 2004). Often the borders with neighbouring disciplines such as the semiotics of tourism or architecture are difficult to draw. Departing from natural sciences, Almo Farina (2010) has actively worked on the semiotic understanding of landscape ecology, but a more comprehensive synthesis between the ecological and cultural semiotic branches in landscape research, which Cosgrove called for, is yet to be developed. Between the semiological/structuralist and ecological currents we can see a growing body of work that seeks to embody and materialise the semiotic study of landscapes with the help of phenomenology, Peircean semiotics or the semiotics of culture, and that in future years could contribute to the new emerging synthesis.

In this chapter, after briefly defining the concept of landscape, we will give a review of existing work in the semiotics of landscape, according to different theoretical schools within semiotics, such as (but not limited to) the Saussurean, the Peircean and the Tartu–Moscow schools of cultural semiotics. In doing so, we concentrate mainly on the works that have explicitly chosen ‘landscape’ as their working concept (rather than the neighbouring concepts of ‘space’, ‘place’ or ‘environment’). In the final section we will briefly envision the potential of the concept of landscape for semiotic analysis.
**Terminological background: the concept of landscape**

‘Landscape’ is a fuzzy term with diverse usage both in common everyday language and in academia, with its multifarious definitions in different disciplines and different stages of its development ranging from a term referring to an areal category or human traces in the environment to a purely mental image of one’s environment. The popularisation of the concept across academic fields and within geography itself, and its entrance to the discourse of environmental protection policies has not reduced the ambiguity of the notion, but surprisingly enough, this has not impaired the concept’s functionality too much.

In the popular usage the word ‘landscape’ in the main Germanic and Romanic languages has undergone a change from the meaning ‘inhabitant of a restricted area’ or ‘land as a particular area of political unity’ to the meaning of ‘picture of a given area’ or an ‘aesthetically pleasing land within one’s field of vision’. The latter, presently most widespread usage of the word ‘landscape’ in these languages, is directly related to Flemish landscape painting.

The use of the term ‘landscape’ as a specialised academic research concept is not very straightforward either, ranging from a purely physical phenomenon to a visual or cultural image. This is partly inevitable as it is a term used in various disciplines from landscape ecology and geography to anthropology and art history. While art history sees landscape as a definite genre depicting vistas of natural surroundings from a certain distance, or more generally, as mediated land that “has been aesthetically processed” or “has been arranged by the artistic vision” (Andrews 1999) landscape ecology in its standard version sees landscape as an “area that is spatially heterogeneous in at least one factor of interest”, a spatial mosaic where ecosystemic relations unfold; the aim of landscape ecology is to uncover the relationships between spatial patterns and ecological processes (Turner et al 2001, 2–5).

The definition that holds most political currency at the moment and represents the widest possible consensus in European landscape research is probably the one featured in European Landscape Convention (ELC). Adopted by the Council of Europe in Florence in 2000 and presently ratified by 32 and signed without ratification by 6 countries, the convention defines landscape as follows: “[...] area as perceived by people, whose character is the result of action and interaction of natural and/or human factors” (ELC, Article 1) and “[...] an essential component of people’s surroundings, an expression of the diversity of their shared cultural and natural heritage, and a foundation of their identity” (ELC, Article 5a). This definition includes several assumptions that are today more or less recognised by the majority of European landscape researchers:
Landscape semiotics: contribution to culture theory

(1) Landscape is not limited to physical landforms, neither to a cultural image nor a way of seeing: it is a holistic notion that links both the physical expanse and the cultural ideas that a perceiving subject or a society has about it. It is a humane phenomenon.

(2) Diverse cultures (including subcultures and power groups) have diverse landscapes.

(3) Landscape is shaped in time and is necessarily a historical phenomenon. It preserves traces of what has been or is important (natural and cultural heritage). These traces can be interpreted and are used for identity building.

(4) Landscape is a collective phenomenon, but at the same time individual perception is extremely important in defining the qualities of a landscape. Collectivism and the importance of individual perception are not contradictory elements in the definition.

(5) Landscape has an areal aspect.

Not all approaches to landscape that are described in the present chapter depart from these assumptions, normally emphasising one aspect in this definition over others. Nevertheless, they are roughly the basis for our understanding and proposals for future semiotic analysis of landscapes.

Semiological approaches to landscape semiotics

For many scholars from a background other than semiotics, ‘semiotics’ is loosely equated with the analysis of meaning and signification in linguistics. ‘Semiotics’, ‘semiology’ and ‘linguistics’ often appear as near synonyms, whereas in several handbooks of geography a distinction is made, for example, between the iconography and semiotics of landscapes (Crang 1998), which are both seen as integral parts of semiotics by semioticians. Landscape semiotics grounded on the semiological and/or structuralist approaches and post-structuralist antithesis is by far the most common among the explicit attempts to develop landscape semiotics. Structuralism in all its different developments from Saussure and Barthes to Greimas, is also the most preferred approach in applied landscape semiotics (Monnai 1991; 2005; Son et al 2006; Monnai et al 1981–1990; Haiyama 1985; Lukken & Searle 1993) and is most popular among those scholars whose main field of research is outside semiotics, including geographers, architects and others (Imazato 2007; Knox & Marston 2001; Czepczyński 2008; Claval 2004; 2005; Møhl 1997; Lindsey et al 1988; Nash 1997).

The methodology of semiological analyses consists mainly of applying different linguistic concepts to the study of landscape elements. Landscapes are seen as
sign systems, that is, diverse landscape phenomena are thought to form a coherent systemic whole in which each of the elements is related to each other and where individual signs can be combined into sequences according to certain codes. The semiological approaches find their inspiration in the works of Saussure, Eco, Barthes and Greimas and tend to base their discussion on the following assumptions:

1) Landscapes are to a certain extent analogous to languages.
2) Landscapes, like languages, consist of signs, that is, independent identifiable meaningful units.
3) Landscape signs like language signs can be described by the Saussurean sign model that consists of the “signifier” and “signified”, the relationship between which is arbitrary and unmotivated by any observed features (the relationship between a horse-riding statue and the concept of power, for example, or a big porch and wealth, is as arbitrary as the connection between the word ‘horse’ and the big animal we refer to by this word).
4) The meanings of the arbitrary signs are understood through their similarity and difference to other signs in the sign systems.
5) Each single real-life landscape element (sign) is parole, that is, a local manifestation of some deeper language, the langue, or a deep structure (a notion borrowed from generative grammar).
6) Landscape elements/signs are combined into “utterances” according to some (social) codes. These utterances are normally analysed from the point of view of the receiver’s social codes.
7) Landscapes can be analysed with the same methodological devices as language, discourse or text.

**Landscape as text**

The work of a landscape analyst in ‘reading’ the landscape is therefore to identify signs and meanings in a landscape environment and deduce codes according to which these meanings have been grouped. Such an approach is shared by many geographers who do not explicitly align themselves with semiotics, but nevertheless speak of landscapes as ‘texts’ that need to be ‘read’ and which act as communicative systems. Duncan (1990, 20–22), for example, indicates a whole set of textual devices, such as tropes (synecdoche, metonymy and others) that allow landscapes to convey their messages and reproduce social order. This approach frequently emphasises the fact that these landscape signs are not as innocent as they look, being wittingly or unwittingly involved in the discourses of power, race, gender and nationalism (Duncan & Duncan 1988; 2004; 2009).
Lagopoulos and Boklund-Lagopoulou (1992, 209–217), for example, depart from Greimas and distinguish 32 different social codes according to which our conception of regional space can be structured, divided into subsets of economic, social, functional, ecological, topographical, personal codes and codes of built environment and history.

The notion of text itself has undergone several changes in the scientific history of the second half of the twentieth century, allowing for a larger plurality of voices in the text and giving more power to the interpreter and less power to the producer of the text. Nevertheless, the methodological approach remains similar: to identify individual signs, codes and messages among apparently neutral physical forms. In that, the emphasis is almost always on the side of the interpreter rather than the sender. Despite developments, the text-metaphor remains relatively rigid and hierarchic. It is characterised by very little fluidity, leaving very little space for creativity and spontaneous irregular processes, unlike the notion of ‘text’ which is used in the cultural semiotics of the Tartu–Moscow school, where text is considerably more dynamic, including both creativity (that is, non-regulated future possibilities and unpredictable processes) and memory (that is, individualized past) as opposed to crystallised universal codes.

The representational approach

From the 1970s, a new interest in the more subjective human landscape experience gained momentum with the works of phenomenologists such as Yi-Fu Tuan (1974; 2005 [1977]) and Edward Relph (1976), while the ‘cultural turn’ in geography brought a “heightened reflexivity toward the role of language, meaning, and representations in the constitution of ‘reality’ and knowledge of reality”, attention to economic and political aspects, identity and consumption, as well as to the impact of cultural constructions of race, gender and class on landscapes (Barnett 1998, 380). The peak of the confrontation with the quantitative physical landscape concept was probably reached in the completely ideational definitions, such as Daniels and Cosgrove’s famous observation that “landscape is a cultural image, a pictorial way of representing, structuring or symbolising surroundings” (Daniels & Cosgrove 2007 [1988], 1) that leaves the landscape idea with almost no physical reference to the external world. While this extreme definition was later modified by Daniels and Cosgrove themselves, the present mainstream definition of landscape is still very conscious of culture and its role in shaping the environment, including in its definition physical landforms, as well as its cultural image and representation and the influence of the foregoing on physical landscape processes. Developed through several hallmark publications such as Cosgrove (1984),
Cosgrove and Daniels (1988), Barnes and Duncan (1992), Duncan and Ley (1993), representation of landscape, its political and practical implications has become one of the most pervasive topics in humanistic landscape research. The criticism of the representational approach is directed against the naive conception that a representation can be entirely mimetic; landscape paintings in particular have been an on-going source of examples about the discrepancy between the semiotic and physical reality. The semiotic constructedness of photographs, literary texts, maps and other geographical methodologies has also been brought centre stage. This current is no doubt one of the most influential ones in late-20th century landscape studies and enjoys continuing popularity; therefore it is no wonder that Cosgrove's understanding of 'semiotic discourse' is in fact roughly equal to representation studies and their later developments.

Other semiological approaches

Semiotics in its narrowest sense of decoding written linguistic signs is prevalent in linguistically oriented notions of geosemiotics and linguascape. Scollon and Wong Scollon (2003) used the term ‘geosemiotics’ to describe “the study of the social meaning of the material placement of signs and discourses and of our action in the material world” (Scollon & Wong Scollon 2003, 2) and argued that there are three main systems in geosemiotics: the interaction order, visual semiotics, and ‘place’ semiotics. Geosemiotics, in their approach, is largely dedicated to the study of road signs, product logos, etc., in their relation to the spatial. Baker (1999), in a paper titled “Geosemiosis”, called on geologists to benefit “from a branch of philosophy called semiotics”. In his argument, “signs are not mere objects of thought or language, but rather are vital entities comprising a web of signification that is continuous from outcrops to reasoning about outcrops” (Baker 1999, 633). For Baker, geosemiotics is a study of signs as a part of a system of thought that is continuous with aspects of Earth’s so-called material world (Baker 2009). This is parallel to the sociolinguists’ concept of ‘linguascape’ or ‘the linguistic landscape’ (especially the works of Adam Jaworski) which deals with the narrowest and most material sense of the word ‘sign’ in the framework of a classical Marxist economic understanding of landscape as the locus of power struggles and consumption. For example, a recent book in sociolinguistics edited by Jaworski and Thurlow (2010) with the promising title *Semiotic Landscapes* is a very well-informed study on landscape studies in art and geography, although the ‘semiotic landscape’ here refers solely to linguistic landscapes and the role of texts (in a narrower sense of written linguistic representations) in landscapes and their creation.
Landscape semiotics: contribution to culture theory

From the side of semiotics, a call for developing the field of landscape semiotics can be found in the book *Existential Semiotics*, by Eero Tarasti, who envisions landscape semiotics as a “study [of] the landscape as a kind of sign language” (Tarasti 2000, 154). The departure point of Tarasti is landscape aesthetics, on the basis of which he then strives to develop a vision of Greimasian landscape semiotics. His book chapter is by no means a systematic development of landscape semiotics, but rather a conceptual paper envisioning possible approaches and his definition of landscape remains anthropocentric and culture-centred, heavily oriented towards the study of representations.

Massimo Leone (2009) is another semiotician who has made an explicit mention of semiotic landscapes, in proposing the notion of ‘semio-geography’, which is a neologism for “a sub-discipline that studies patterns and processes that shape human interaction with various environments, within the theoretical framework of semiotics” (Leone 2009, 217). In the course of his analysis, he adopts the term ‘semiotic landscapes’ to mean “a pattern of perceptible elements that individuals come across in public space” (op cit), aligning himself very clearly with the semiological tradition that seeks to identify individual units of meaning in landscapes.

Teruyuki Monnai and his colleagues (Monnai 1991; 2005; Monnai et al 1981–1990; Moriyama & Monnai 2010; Moriyama et al 2006–2012 among others) have developed a complex landscape semiotics for practical analysis and planning purposes in architecture. Unlike the textual research paradigm that is implicitly or explicitly semiological, the foundations of Monnai’s approach are Peircean. He uses a variety of Peircean notions, notably semiosis and Peirce’s triadic sign concept, but then combines it with several other rather binary notions like frames, and carries out a formalised analysis of buildings and the built environment which (probably due to the nature of building structures as a subject matter and the analysing software) is more reminiscent of structural linguistics and generative grammar. For example, in the first of his article series on Japanese traditional townscapes, he differentiates between the syntactic, semantic and pragmatic dimensions of semiosis, but then goes on to analyse only the first two in a constituent analysis that resembles Saussurean approaches (Monnai et al 1981–1990, 1). They also extensively use Saussurean ideas of similarity and difference between the signs as the clue to their meaning. Despite the methodological mixture, Monnai and his colleagues have unarguably managed to create a functional framework for a semiotic analysis of the built environment that serves not only for intellectual purposes but also for real-life planning. However, this landscape semiotics includes landscape only in its narrowest sense, that is, landscape as a built environment. There are other semiotic applications on architecture in Japan that are classically structuralist and analyse landscape structures...
according to binary features, mainly because it is the easiest way to quantify the
analysis (see, for example, Haiyama 1985).

Anne Spirn (1998) attempts to demonstrate that landscape is language. She
describes its grammar, meaningfulness and expressiveness, dialogues, contexts,
pragmatics and poetics. Without using explicitly semiotic theory, her analyses of
many examples provide efficacious description of semiotic features of landscapes.

**Semiotic approaches: toward materialisation and processualisation**

**Phenomenological landscapes**

Phenomenological approaches to landscape deal with a very fundamental aspect
of semiotics, that is, how meanings are generated in the phenomenal world and
in respect to the corporeality of the person who dwells in a landscape. This is in
stark contrast to the ‘arbitrary sign’ understanding of semiological interpreta-
tions in which landscape meanings were necessarily inscribed on them from
outside and had no experiential motivation to them other than that dictated
by external social codes (especially power structures). Ingold (2000, 153) has
stated that “the world continually comes into being around the inhabitant, and
its manifold constituents take on significance through their incorporation into
regular pattern of life activity”.

This stance has been expressed in the works of phenomenological authors
such as Relph (1976), Tuan (1974; 2005 [1977]), Tilley (1994), Ingold (2000) and
Abram (1996), to mention some outstanding works. Inspired by Merleau-Pon-
ty, Heidegger and Husserl, landscape is seen more as a holistic phenomenon
perceived with all senses and the whole body (hearing, smells, etc.). Perceptive
processes and intellectual mechanisms (that is mind and body) are not sepa-
rated; we are our body who lives the landscape, taking in its cues and being in
interaction with all its semiosic processes. Meaningful units in landscapes are
created through interaction with other entities (both organic and inorganic) in
the landscape and through one’s everyday bodily action, through routines and
practices (for example, ‘taskscape’ – see Ingold 2000, 189–208).

A collection of articles, *Symbolic Landscapes*, edited by Backhaus and Mu-
rungi (2009) seeks to overcome the Saussurean (structuralist) understanding
of symbol as something purely ideational and replenish the theory of symbolic
landscapes with Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, seeing symbol as something that
“arises between the lived-body and its milieu in gesture that freely enters virtual
space” (Backhaus & Murungi 2009, 26) and rejecting the division line between
perception and conception.
On the other hand, a radical step into understanding the participation of corporeality in meaning generation and the design of landscapes is represented by British non-representational and mobility studies (e.g. Thrift 2008; Merriman et al 2008; Cresswell 2006; Urry 2007). Animal geography, with its emphasis on other living beings and their meaningful landscapes, is a transfer zone between classical landscape studies, the phenomenological approach and an ecosemiotic understanding of landscapes as developed by Almo Farina and his colleagues (e.g. Philo & Wilbert 2000; Whatmore 2006; Wolch & Emel 1998).

**Peircean approaches**

Recent years have seen the influence of Peircean semiotics growing internationally and quite expectedly this semiotic paradigm has also started to appear in landscape semiotics. According to Michelle Metro-Roland, Peirce's understanding of sign processes (that is, semiosis) offers a good theoretical model about how mind and world, or thoughts and objects, relate to each other (Metro-Roland 2009; 2011), since Peircean sign relation consists not only of arbitrarily combined signifier and signified but includes a relation to non-semiotic (and semiotic) reality.

Another attempt to write Peircean landscape semiotics has been published by Tor Arnesen (1998; 2011). He concludes that landscape as a whole is a sign that stands in a triadic relationship with the object (physical land) and the interpretant (the community). Arnesen makes an attempt to apply a Peircean sign concept that is a triadic relationship between (1) ‘representamen’ or a ‘sign vehicle’, that is, “the concrete subject that represents” (CP 1.540); (2) ‘the object’ or “the thing for which it stands” (CP 1.564); and (3) ‘the interpretant’ or “the idea to which it [the sign vehicle] gives rise” (CP 1.339). However, Arnesen’s application is based on an in-principal deviation from the Peircean and post-Peircean definition of these terms. First, while Peirce notes that “the interpretant cannot be a definite individual object” (CP 1.542; original emphasis) and sees it as “[t]he mental effect, or thought” (CP 1.564), Arnesen defines interpretant as the person who interprets. Second, despite emphasising that the sign relationship cannot be reduced to any of the three components, he still does not make a distinction between the sign as a result of the sign relation and the ‘representamen’ or sign vehicle. In addition, his ‘object’ is necessarily the physical terrain, whereas Peirce himself understands objects much more widely, including also non-physical phenomena and facts. In fact, instead of the Peircean sign relation in which sign = the correlation of the sign vehicle, the object and the idea that the sign produces, Arnesen depicts a very different triangle that includes (1) physical lands as the object of reference,
(2) the people as the interpreters and (3) the sign or “the interpretations of an area by a sign user” (Arnesen 2011, 365).

In classical Peircean terms, Arnesen’s landscape would rather be an interpretant, with the important difference that for Peirce interpretant can also be pre-conscious and consist of some quality, while Arnesen sees it as mediated by language use (Arnesen 2011, 366). Thus, his ideas also remain on the border of Peircean and Saussurean paradigms.

However, Arnesen’s idiosyncratic interpretation of the main Peircean concepts does not curb the validity of his main argument, which surges from the Peircean definition of sign: “a sign is something, A, which denotes some fact or object, B, to some interpretant thought, C” (CP 1.346). In terms of landscapes this means that landscape as a whole is a landscape for someone with some specific meaning – with the evident and important consequence that for the same physical area there can be any related number of interpretative communities, and consequently landscapes. However, in contrast to the text- or discourse-based approaches to landscapes as a semiotic reality, the physical area is always included in Arnesen’s landscapes as one of the constituent factors. In short, the Peircean approach allows for an analysis of the interrelations between the constituent physical and mental elements in respect to the sign user and contextual information.

The Peircean sign model allows for a separation of mental (or symbolic) landscapes and material ones and permits one to follow separately the dynamic changes of a landscape as a symbolic resource and as a material resource. Both of these dimensions can change together, but they can also change separately and changes in material landscapes do not necessarily imply changes in the perceived landscapes that have been ‘processed’ through symbolic thinking. Depending on the community’s perceptions of these changes (“conceivable practical effect” – Arnesen 2011, 366; 1998, 42) we can speak of landscapes that are lost in battle (material change is the result of a dispute), faded out (material change remains unnoticed in the dominant symbolic discourse), and also gained (Abrahamsson 1999), since a new material landscape opens up new symbolic possibilities and will sooner or later be ‘appropriated’.

Similar concerns are reflected in the works of what has been called ‘material semiotics’ (Latour, Haraway – see Hinchliffe 2002, 217–218), which has attempted to restore materiality to the meaning, emphasising that landscapes are socio-material processes that, due to the action of both people and nature, continuously undergo morphological change (in the most material sense) and revision (in the sense that landscapes are viewed by people).
Landscape semiotics: contribution to culture theory

Landscapes are the contested networks of material-semiotic relationships, provisional alliances between people and things, and contested representations viewed from a necessarily situated perspective (Mercer 2002, 42).

Although several authors in this tradition resort to Greimasian rather than Peircean models, the important theoretical implication of the re-materialisation of the semiotic landscapes is the understanding that there are always several contesting semiotic realities relating to one physical area and that planning and management necessarily has to accommodate several different and often conflicting semiotic realities and visions of future and past.

Landscape as chronotope

Tim Ingold, describing a landscape painting, writes:

Not far off, nestled in a grove of trees near the top of the hill, is a stone church. [...] They have more in common, perhaps, than meets the eye. Both possess the attributes of what Bakhtin (1981, 84) calls a “chronotope” – that is, a place charged with temporality, one in which temporality takes on palpable form (Ingold 2000, 205).

Indeed, the spacetime, not in the physical sense, but in a semiotic sense, the chronotope, is the very core of landscape, if not identical to it. This concept, taken first from biologist Alexei Ukhtomsky and worked out by Mikhail Bakhtin, represents the temporalised place as it can be in a text, in language or in semiosphere. Bakhtin defines it as

intrinsic connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships [... where] spatial and temporal indicators are fused into one carefully thought-out, concrete whole. Time, as it were, thickens, takes on flesh [...] ; likewise, space becomes charged and responsive to the movements of time, plot, and history (Bakhtin 1981, 84).

The characteristics of chronotope as described by Bakhtin and his followers present well the semiotic features of landscape. A thorough analysis is provided by Alexandru Calcatinge (2012), who mentions: “For the study of cultural landscape the importance of the concept chronotope must be acknowledged through several approach directions” (Calcatinge 2012, 144). Mireya Folch-Serra, providing a review of the application of the chronotope concept in geography, remarks, among
other things that, “the main lesson to be taken from Bakhtin’s typology is that there is no single, timeless/master chronotope” (Folch-Serra 1990, 264). Importantly, Holloway and Kneale (2000, 84) add an emphasis to the dialogic aspect of chronotope: “This then is […] a methodological utilization of Bakhtin’s relational approach, wherein two modes of representation can be realized together without reduction of the loss of difference.”

Although Bakhtin’s original concept of chronotope emerged in the framework of his theory of novels, it is important to note that the notion is equally applicable to non-represented landscapes. Since landscape is termed as “area perceived by people”, it includes a semiotic interpretative element by definition. The interpretant that emerges when the “area” enters a sign relation, is necessarily characterised by a chronotope. In representing a landscape in some text (visual, textual, cartographic, behavioural, etc.) only “certain isolated aspects of the chronotope, available in given historical conditions, [are] worked out, […] only certain specific forms of an actual chronotope [are] reflected in art” (Bakhtin 1981, 85).

Tartu–Moscow semiotics of culture

The Tartu–Moscow school of semiotics, and especially the works of Juri Lotman, have provided a set of concepts that have a high potential for integrative landscape studies, ranging from the analysis of representation to a novel understanding of communication (especially autocommunication), text, semiotic space and models of change. Only some of these seminal ideas have been fully developed in respect to landscape studies (for example, St. Petersburg’s ‘text’ or autocommunication – see Lotman 1990) in their original context, while some have been developed later by younger colleagues in Tartu (Lindström 2010; 2011; 2012), and some still wait for their potential to be fully realised.

A model that might help in studying landscape change has been proposed by Lotman (2009) in his book Culture and Explosion. While most other semioticians focus on studying translation between (usually two) separate sign systems, Lotman pays attention to borders within one system and the translation possibilities that the border creates, that is, the continuity or persistence and the change of the system. One of the central aspects of landscape, from the semiotic point of view, is the existence of boundaries, communicative borders within the landscape which can be seen as the main factor and mechanism of the internal diversity of landscape and the main mechanism in generating new landscapes. Changes in any system are not always gradual and monotonous: Lotman distinguishes between gradual and explosive changes. During the former, the transition from
Landscape semiotics: contribution to culture theory

Periphery to centre and vice versa takes place in a gradual way and existing hegemonic structures are replaced in a slow transition. During epochs of explosive changes, all the existing semiotic structures are shattered and there follows an explosive growth of semiotic processes. Many competing new scenarios of development emerge at this point of disruption, only one of which finally consolidates and achieves the central position. In the same way, we can distinguish periods of gradual and explosive changes in landscapes, where in the epochs of explosive change a disruption with previous landscapes is produced. In such a way, the semiotic model of change allows a description of dynamic non-equilibrium change processes, the outcome of which is not always dependent on ecological necessity or practical needs, but can be a result of religious, irrational or aesthetic semiotic values that hard science models cannot normally take into account (see also Palang et al 2011). The difference between gradual and explosive change can also be very useful in describing processes of cultural memory and identity.

The ecosemiotic approach

The ecosemiotic approach is an academic approach that explicitly describes and analyses the role of sign processes in the modification of environment, of environmental design by organisms; it focuses on the semiotic mechanisms of relations in ecosystems. Since most relations established and kept by life are either themselves semiosic or are products of semiosis, a semiotic approach in their study is relevant.

The semiotic approach in ecology means a description or study that pays attention to:

1. **Distinctions** the organisms themselves make, the ways organisms themselves see the world, that is, the study of umwelt or organic categorisation.
2. **Intentionality** of organisms’ behaviour, the role and types of organic needs and the changes resulting from organisms’ search, individual learning, adaptation, habituation.
3. **Communication** and its role at all levels of living systems; the formation of organic forms as communicative structures.
4. Production of ecosystem as the result of multiple organic design by the organisms living in the ecosystem.
5. **Types of sign processes** as they differ and vary in the processes of production and reduction of diversity. (Kull 2008)
Thus, the points above specify the general statement of ecosemiotics about the importance of communication to the dynamics of ecosystems, including landscapes. This is beyond saying that the concepts are socially constructed – landscape itself is continuously designed by the communication processes of its inhabitants.4

An author who has contributed most significantly to the systematic study of landscape processes from an ecosemiotic perspective is Almo Farina (2006; 2010; Farina & Napoletano 2010). Taking a broader definition of ecosemiotics and a broader definition of landscape that goes beyond the anthropocentric approach of human geography and exceeds the narrow landscape ecological definition of landscape as a mosaic or organised space, Farina aspires to create a new framework that takes into account the multiplicity of agencies in a living environment and reduces the gap between human values and ecological processes. Relating landscape to Jakob von Uexküll’s notion of ‘umwelt’, he emphasises the fact that landscapes are individually perceived and subsequently puts forth the notion of a ‘private landscape’ (Farina & Napoletano 2010; ‘eco-field’ in Farina 2006): “the configuration of objects around an organism that are perceived in the context of space, time, and history (including memory, experience, culture, etc.)” (Farina & Napoletano 2010, 181). Thus, his semiotics of landscape is subject-centred, taking into account the species-specific lifeworld and the cognitive capacities of the species, as well as the experiential context (memory, and also history – if the species has a long-term memory) and even aesthetics. This approach also allows the inclusion of immaterial resources, but only when they are represented in some material artefacts. Although Farina’s theoretical framework can also hypothetically accommodate analysis of humans, his own applications pertain mainly to the fields of landscape ecology and biosemiotics; therefore, concrete ways to include human cultural systems in eco-field theory are not as thoroughly developed as the methodology for analysing the landscapes of other species.

Farina’s ‘private landscape’ is essentially a concept that belongs to the field of ecosemiotics, as defined by Winfried Nöth (1998, 333): “[...] ecosemiotics is the study of the semiotic interrelations between organisms and their environment.” According to this definition, any living organism (humans, animals, but also plants and so on) is the centre of a landscape and the semiosic processes unfolding in that landscape. From this it follows that landscape should be one of the central themes of eco-semiotics independently of whether we opt for a biological ecosemiotic definition or a cultural ecosemiotic definition (sensu Nöth 2001; Nöth & Kull 2001), a human-centred or simply an organism-centred landscape definition. Farina’s landscape semiotics and Nöth’s ‘biological’ definition of ecosemiotics undoubtedly compensate for excessive anthropocentrism in the
semiotic studies of landscapes, but still fall rather on the side of what Cosgrove called ‘ecological discourse’ in landscape studies. Integrative landscape semiotics should rather be born from the synthesis of ‘biological’ ecosemiotics with what has been called ‘cultural ecosemiotics’, which defines itself as “the semiotics of relationships between nature and culture. This includes research on the semiotic aspects of the place and the role of nature for humans, that is, what is and what has been the meaning of nature for us, humans, how and in what extent we communicate with nature” (Kull 1998, 350).

**Future perspectives**

No doubt studies of representation of and through landscapes and the issues of discourse and power connected to representations will be a source of continuous inspiration for landscape scholars for many years to come. Nevertheless, in the light of general tendencies of ‘re-materialisation’ and ‘corporealisation’ of human geography and semiotics, it is unlikely that these studies would remain confined to a Saussurean paradigm of arbitrary sign relations and ideational worlds of discourse. Instead, we will probably see more and more attempts to tackle the intricate mutuality of material and mental processes, both in signification, communication and interpretative bodily action, as well as their consequences for the material and life processes of other living organisms. As Metro-Roland (2009, 271) points out, the Peircean model is “more fruitful for the interpretation of signs outside of texts and language”, since his semiotics “treats explicitly the relation between the world and our understanding of it” by way of including in his sign relation the object, our understanding of it and the physical sign vehicle, and offering a thorough typology of their mutual interrelations, of which the Saussurean model covers only one, symbolic sign use.

The main advantages of the term ‘landscape’ for the semiotic study of landscapes are the following:

1. Landscape is a holistic phenomenon that does not make unnecessary divisions into culture/nature, human/non-human, individual/collective, perceived/physical and so on beforehand. Such divisions can be used as analytical tools in each particular case at hand but are not projected onto the ontological state of the material through terminological preconceptions. Therefore ‘landscape’ is a suitable term for overcoming rigid dualities predominant in modernist academic discourse.
2. Landscape is an inherently dialogical phenomenon and communication lies at the core of semiotic processes in landscapes. Thus, semiotics
can provide adequate tools for analysing processes of landscape formation, because they are always a result of multi-party communication and depend on the sign categorisation of the participants. The potential for the semiotic ideas of Mikhail Bakhtin (such as chronotope, dialogism and heteroglossia) and Juri Lotman (cultural translation, communication and auto-communication, models of change in a semiosphere made up of several semiotic subjects, among other seminal ideas) cannot be underestimated in this respect.

(3) Semiotic studies of landscape can be very useful for practical planning and management policies, as they help us to understand the dialogicity and generation of meaning in everyday landscapes, and comprehend how value is created in non-material terms. Peircean sign models also give a good methodological basis for discussing the different relations that the symbolic and material aspects of landscapes may have for different communities. Semiotics also provides a solid descriptive framework for understanding how different communities (and organisms of different umwelten) may live in different landscapes on the same physical grounds. The semiotics of culture, and especially the notions of ‘explosion’ and ‘future histories’, could prove very useful in mapping the dynamics of landscape change, understanding the becoming of past landscapes as a realisation of one of the many possible futures, and consequently in improving planning and management capacities.

**Internet sources**


**References**


Landscape semiotics: contribution to culture theory


Landscape semiotics: contribution to culture theory


Landscape semiotics: contribution to culture theory


Notes


1 See Holquist (2010) for the philosophical background and history of the chronotope concept in Bakhtin.

2 As semioticians, we must add, however, that most of this ‘area’ itself is a result of long-term semiotic interaction among human as well as non-human actors and therefore it is already loaded with semiotic structures prior to its interpretation by an individual. Different degrees of semiotic organisation can be discerned in landscapes, ranging from
untouched wilderness areas to domesticated landscapes of semi-natural pastures or agriculture, and further on to highly semioticised garden landscapes.


4 Cf: “The environment that we experience and affect is largely a product of how we have come to talk about the world. One woman’s ecological nightmare is another man’s wise use of resources only because we are symbol-using creatures” (Cantrill & Oravec 1996, 2).

5 On some additional aspects of the ecosemiotic approach to landscape, see, for example, Maran (2004), Siewers (2009; 2011).
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Where did the Asva culture go?  
Three models of cultural behaviour  
in the Bronze-Age eastern Baltics

Valter Lang

Abstract. The example of the Asva culture is used for critical discussion of the concept of archaeological culture by the cultural-historical school, and a proposal is made to abandon its use. Juri Lotman’s treatment of semiosphere and cultural typology serves as a basis for defining the prehistoric culture of a period or region as a comprehensive assemblage of non-genetic information, which, depending on the development level of society, economy, technology, and symbolised thinking, was expressed in material objects and their contexts. Because cultures are never homogeneous and cannot be explained by a single code of culture, one can differentiate sub-phenomena in archaeological cultures, models of so-called cultural behaviour. The present study focuses on three different cultural models of the Bronze and the Early Iron Age in the eastern Baltics.

Introduction

After an introductory lecture on the Estonian Bronze and the Early Iron Ages held at the University of Cracow in the spring of 2009, a local professor asked me why I had not mentioned any archaeological cultures in my overview. It is true that a scholar working in the archaeological tradition of Central and Eastern Europe could be surprised by the fact that one can discuss prehistory without archaeological cultures. With hindsight, one has to admit that when dealing with post-Stone-Age prehistory, we have not used the concept of archaeological culture for the systematisation of our material. With the exception of perhaps some occasional cases, such as the Rõuge culture and the long barrow or tarand-grave cultures, which are included in some treatments but not in others. The same is true of the Asva culture from the Late Bronze Age, which was presented by Richard Indreko half a century ago. This culture was covered by some studies

before the beginning of the 1980s; however, today this concept does not occur in research articles or general treatments, although it is included as a hangover from the past in some school textbooks.

The problem related to the Asva culture, which is discussed in the present chapter, has at least two aspects. First, did and to what extent did, the existing archaeological material support the creation of such a concept? The question is justified because it had gradually been abandoned even before Estonian archaeologists started to realise the other side of the issue – that is, a somewhat broader and more theoretical background, which includes use of archaeological culture as a concept in archaeology. A solution to the latter has implications not only for the Asva culture but also for the entire prehistory. The present chapter attempts to make a contribution to this end; initially it will discuss the Asva culture in the way it was adopted, followed by an analysis of the problems of archaeological culture as a theoretical conception. Finally, it will suggest a solution to the problem of how to study prehistoric culture.

On the concept of Asva culture

According to Richard Indreko (1961), who suggested the concept of the Asva culture, it was the culture of the inhabitants of fortified settlements in Estonia, northern Latvia, and south-western Finland in the Late Bronze Age and the Pre-Roman Iron Age, which after the example of then recently discovered Darsgärde settlement stretched as far as the coast of central Sweden and had belonged to ancestors of the Baltic Finns. The bearers of this culture lived by agriculture and animal husbandry and additionally by hunting, as well as fishing and seal hunting. It was thought that the Asva culture could have belonged to the same group as the Dyakovo and Gorodishche cultures in the Eastern European forest zone, although with considerable differences in both their material culture and external contacts. Indreko believed that the Asva culture could be traced back via the Kiukais culture and the Combed Ware cultures as far as the Kunda culture.

In the light of the new material that emerged at the end of the 1950s and in the 1960s, Vello Lõugas (1970a, 299–300; 1970b, 47; Jaanits et al 1982, 158) refined the definition of this culture. He suggested that it could be the coastal culture of the westernmost Finno-Ugric tribes, which emerged from the merging of tribes of the Corded Ware culture and the local Finno-Ugric tribes. He held the view that it was a culture of cattle raisers in which sea fishing played a major role; primitive agriculture and metalwork were known, too. The Asva culture had close ties with the neighbouring tribes, especially in the direction of Scandinavia and Central Europe (Lausitz). According to Lõugas, this culture could be dated more
narrowly, that is to the 9th–6th centuries BC\(^1\), whereas the so-called flourishing period was thought to have been in the first half of this period, in his view in the period IIa or the 9th–7th centuries BC (Lõugas 1970a, 299). In Estonia the distribution area of the Asva culture was seen first and foremost in Saaremaa and the coastal zone of continental Estonia. Some influences were reported to have reached central Estonia. However, it remained open whether this culture had reached Finland and the coast of central Sweden because of scarcity of material (Jaanits et al 1982, 159). A cultural group close to the Asva culture was also reported to have been common in northern Latvia and the lower reaches of the river Daugava, although those tribes revealed some peculiarities in economy and cultural ties (op cit).

Thereafter, following the publication of *Estonian Prehistory* (Jaanits et al 1982), the Asva culture disappeared from the work of Estonian archaeologists despite the fact that no funeral speeches had been made. It could well be that the author of the present chapter is partly responsible for this situation because his research results did not support the definition of the culture in question.\(^2\) Both Indreko and Lõugas held that fortified settlements with their rich and specific find material were typical sites of the Asva culture. They did not pose any questions with regard to the burial method of people representing this culture\(^3\) – possibly because no burial sites had been discovered in the immediate vicinity of fortified settlements. Moreover, Lõugas generally dated stone-cist graves as later – mainly to the Pre-Roman Iron Age with a few exceptions to the Late Bronze Age (Jaanits et al 1982, 149, 181–184).\(^4\) However, the research findings of the 1980s and the 1990s (for an overview see Lang 1996) clearly showed that (1) the majority of our stone-cist graves belong to the Late Bronze Age and the Early Pre-Roman Iron Age (i.e. they were built during the same period as the fortified settlements)\(^5\); (2) fortified settlements of the Asva type were an exception in Estonia in the Late Bronze Age, and at that time the main settlement units were, in fact, unfortified open settlements, that is, single households, and (3) the role of farming by making use of alvar soils of the coastal zone was much greater from the Late Bronze Age than had been previously thought. In the light of these research findings the so-called Asva culture could be regarded as an exceptional subculture for this region rather than the mainstream of the era. Moreover, while Indreko (1961) could suggest the settlement of Klaņģukalns on the lower reaches of the river Daugava as the only counterpart in the eastern Baltics outside Estonia (although more of them were known by then), the situation had changed dramatically by the 1990s. Four or five Estonian settlements\(^6\) constituted only a minor peripheral area in the distribution area and total number of fortified settlements in eastern Lithuania and the Daugava river basin\(^7\) (see Figure 1). Uwe Sperling’s recent
Three models of cultural behaviour in the Bronze-Age eastern Baltics

Three models of cultural behaviour in the Bronze-Age eastern Baltics

Figure 1. Fortified and hilltop settlements in the eastern Baltic region

Fortified and hilltop settlements in the eastern Baltic region

- Figure 1.

analysis of settlements of the so-called Asva group suggests a possibility that it could be a rather short phenomenon (of about 4 generations) in 800–700 BC (Sperling 2011, 301–306). 8

Thus, a conflict emerged between the findings of archaeological research and the definition of the Asva culture. Moreover, from the very beginning all the background information from the neighbouring areas had not been taken into account. One could also say that all that was perceived to be the main content of the Asva culture – that is, Estonian fortified settlements with their, in fact, very rich and diverse find material – constituted only a small part of the entire
archaeological material of the respective region and age. One has to admit that the attempt to differentiate the Asva culture failed from the very beginning, that is, it did not have enough substance even from the perspective of the cultural historical archaeology of the time.

**Culture and archaeological culture**

In connection with Richard Indreko’s other treatment of the ethnic origin of the Finno-Ugric peoples (1948), the author of the present chapter had some time ago a good reason to discuss at greater length the concept of archaeological culture (Lang 2001). Indreko – similarly to all other researchers of this period – worked and thought within the cultural historical paradigm of archaeology (as we call it today), which treated archaeological cultures as an assemblage of different sites and object types in time and space and saw behind them, either more clearly or indistinctly, various ethnic groups. However, this approach brought about a number of problems, which in the Western theoretical archaeological literature have been analysed for decades. In the present chapter there is no possibility – and evidently no clear need – for an in-depth analysis of the details of this discussion. From the perspective of the present chapter, the most important issue is that no such archaeological cultures, which have been defined in the previously described manner, have ever existed in reality; they are artificially created tools for the systematisation of the increasingly growing and diversifying information. However, scholars tended to forget about this fact when they enthusiastically constructed archaeological cultures and wrote surveys of the prehistory of peoples on their bases. This resulted in a motley collection of different and largely incompatible ‘ethnic histories’ because the same material enabled scholars to suggest a countless number of different development schemes. Indreko’s own understanding of the ethnogenesis of the Finno-Ugric peoples is a good example of such an interpretation because it turned out to be just the opposite of a theory worked out on Harri Moora’s initiative (EREA 1956). Naturally, the differences in interpretation were not confined to these two, but they increased considerably when Latvian, Lithuanian, Russian, and Finnish scholars were added. It was a dead end of archaeology as a creative pursuit based on empirical research.

Another problem was that human culture was reduced to material culture as if culture could exist only materially. Is materiality (including material culture) really something that stands alone objectively, to which mental meaning is attached from the outside, or is material existence from the beginning and by nature loaded with meaning? The author of the present chapter thinks that no artefact can be treated – although this has been done many times in the
past – separately from the thought that created it; only together do they form some element of culture. In fact, the greatest challenge to archaeology is how to understand the original thought behind the preserved objects, the meaning of things – or in other words, how to proceed in archaeology from a creative pursuit to scholarly interpretation.

According to Juri Lotman, culture could be generalised and summarised as the “totality of non-inherited information that is acquired, preserved, and mediated by different groups of human society” (Lotman 2002, 56). In prehistory, culture was, in fact, exactly the same. However, so-called material culture is only part of this ‘totality of information’, whereas archaeological material is in turn only a small part of the material culture that had once really existed. Lotman’s definition emphasises preservation of information, which has at least two important aspects from the perspective of (archaeological) culture: (1) one part of culture is preserved unintentionally, by itself, thanks to favourable conditions (for example the cultural layer of a settlement site that contains material left behind by everyday life); (2) another part has been materialised from the beginning with the purpose of preserving it longer than human life (so-called monuments). Thus, one part of the studied culture is transient and has an everyday character; the other part is eternal. It is in every respect logical to assume that some message, text, or symbolism is encoded in this kind of preserved heritage, and the task of archaeology is to reach it. Usually transient everyday material does not include such texts; however, its study is attractive because it enables us to learn about everyday things. It is important to emphasise that the moment from which people start to create monuments that are intended to last forever has a revolutionary significance in the development of symbolised thinking in this culture and could be compared to cultural explosion in Lotman’s (2001) sense.

As regards the concept of archaeological culture in the 2001 article, I thought it necessary to re-define its content proceeding from Lotman’s work on semiosphere. According to Lotman (1999, 9–35), semiosphere is a continuum that is filled with semiotic formations of various types and of different degrees of order. Similarly to biosphere, which is filled with living material around the planet and is not simply a sum of living organisms but much more an organic whole in which the existence of one part is unthinkable without others, the entire semiotic space could be regarded as a united mechanism or even an organism. What is primary here is not a single text or single structure but a whole that is always more than the sum of its components, the ‘big system’ or semiosphere the existence of which makes some semiotic (single) action a reality. The entire semiosphere is permeated by boundaries of different hierarchical levels (languages, texts), and the internal space of each such sub-semiosphere has its own semiotic ‘self’ by realising
itself as a relation in a certain megastructural space that describes them (Lotman 1996, 185). However, in the cultural historical school of thought the concept of archaeological culture meant – in contrast to the principle of semiosphere – a simple sum of ‘single texts’ (i.e. a small number of selected types of objects and sites). On the other hand, when reading material culture as a meaningful text (Hodder 1991), one can also interpret prehistoric culture – similarly to any other culture – in a similar way to semiosphere as something that is comprehensive and given in some space and without which any culturally meaningful single act is inconceivable. For example, the creation of the Pergamon Altar or Aphrodite of Milos would not have been possible outside the canons (cultural codes) of ancient culture; nor is it possible to understand them without knowing this culture. In addition, the making of Corded Ware pottery became possible only because – to put it archaeologically – of the existence of the so-called Corded Ware culture. In semiotic terms the shape and ornamentation had a specific meaning and function, which only in this time and space (and not for example in the Combed Ware culture) was significant for humans. At the same time one could regard Corded Ware ceramics separately as a sub-semiosphere in its own right, the so-called Corded Ware culture. However, if found in a grave, for example, where some symbolic meaning had been ascribed to it together with other grave goods, it belongs to another sub-semiosphere with a much more complicated structure, that is, a burial place.

When following archaeological literature, one can see that while the Stone-Age cultures are distinguished from each other mainly on the basis of single major object types (stone tools or clay pottery) more recent groupings are based on much more complex structures. Here single object types are insufficient, one examines also, for example, variation in the assemblage of grave goods, ornamentation of jewellery, and character of jewellery sets, location of sites on the landscape, etc. No doubt it is proof of cultural diversification and ‘progress’, to put it archaeologically.

However, from a semiotic perspective one can observe a shift from the individual meaning of objects to their contextual meaning. In the communicative process it was no longer sufficient to ascribe semiotic meaning to single objects or object types, such as stone axes or Combed Ware pottery. More and more often one had to use more complicated and complex methods to convey one’s message. Lotman (1999, 59–62) explained such a development path by increased complexity of personality structure and individualisation of intrinsic information-encoding mechanisms in the process of cultural development. Increased complexity of the encoding systems was accompanied by constantly increasing complexity of the semiotic structure of the message, which complicates
unambiguous translation. When comparing, for example, a simple underground inhumation or cremation burial without any grave goods with a burial with rich grave goods, which have been placed in a purpose-built monumental stone grave, then there is no doubt that the message these burials were intended to convey was different. They represent signs of either different cultural behaviour patterns (for example different religious beliefs or social statuses) or entwinement of many sub-semiospheres – where one is dealing with synchronic manifestations – or they are signs of increased complexity of the semiotic world over the course of time (in the case of diachronic manifestations). When observing the occurrence and variation of such more complicated burial complexes in space, one could in principle make similar conclusions about the local differences of semiosphere, as was possible in the case of earlier periods with regard to some isolated object types.

According to Lotman (1999, 12–18), the most important characteristics of the semiosphere are its delimitation and semiotic unevenness. There is a boundary between the semiosphere and the surrounding extra-semiotic or non-semiotic space. The boundary is as abstract as the semiosphere itself and could be defined as a sum of bilingual ‘translatable filters’, which translate so-to-say a text into another language that is situated outside the semiosphere in question. Similarly, archaeological cultural phenomena are separated from one another by boundaries, which are usually spatially rather fuzzy, vague, and, in the case of different elements, usually in different locations. On the other hand, here, too, boundaries have the same significance – they act as a buffer between different sign systems. Similarly to the semiosphere, here, too, the boundary limits the invasion of something that is external and foreign; it filters and adapts it into a language that is understandable. The spread of elements of foreign (material) culture across cultural borders may have two kinds of results. On the one hand, there have always been some objects that were imported across the (cultural) border but did not take root locally and remained single specimens. On the other hand, there are large numbers of types everywhere that are adopted across the border that start to be produced locally and further developed artistically. One could claim that unlike the former, the latter underwent semiotic adaptation; they acquired significance and a place in the sign system of the culture in question. Evidently, the adoption of such objects was accompanied by the adoption of their original or near-original significance – thus, the originally alien semiotic space has extended across its earlier boundary in some part.

Taking into account what was discussed previously, an archaeological culture can be re-defined as a totality of non-inherited information that had existed during some prehistoric period and in a delimited space, which in accordance with
development level of society, economy, technology, and symbolised thinking was expressed in material objects and their contexts. This definition emphasises the word ‘culture’ while the attribute ‘archaeological’ refers to the prehistoric past (which could be replaced by the name of the respective period) and to the fact that our data about this culture are mainly archaeological – that is, one-sidedly material. Archaeological culture in this wording is part of previous objective reality, which could be studied scientifically, rather than a device for the systematisation of find material – despite the fact that it could also be used for this purpose to create the ‘big picture’. On the other hand, it remains to be seen how close to former reality we could get with our research. However, this problem concerns archaeology as a whole and is not significant in this context.

In that case the Bronze-Age (archaeological) culture of Estonia (or the eastern Baltics and Scandinavia) could be regarded as a category that is similar, for example, to ancient culture, the medieval culture of Western Europe, or the culture of Kievan Rus’. None of the above-mentioned benchmark cultures was monoethnic despite the fact that Greeks and Romans dominated the first, Germanic and Romance peoples the second, and Slavic and eastern Finnic peoples the third. As in the case of these cultures it is difficult to draw precise temporal and spatial boundaries; in the case of the Bronze Age cultures of the eastern Baltics, too, it is impossible to show its precise boundaries – core areas are usually surrounded by peripheries and transitional zones and the principal periods by introductions and ripple effects. The situation is further complicated by the fact that different cultural phenomena spread differently, again both in time and space, which indicates different directions of external contacts.

The definition above shows that the study of archaeological cultures cannot be limited to the study of material objects; one has to reach the ‘totality of non-inherited information’, that is, former perceptions and beliefs, interpretations and meanings, and the entirety of cultural behaviour. An archaeological culture cannot be defined only on the basis of object types and sites, one has to focus on those specific cultural phenomena that are reflected by these objects and sites. One and the same cultural phenomenon can reveal different material outputs, as has often been the case, and as we will see below.

Because archaeology reveals one-sided information about culture, by means of material objects, different spheres of culture are revealed differently. Depending on the specifics of archaeological finds, the data about the culture of different eras can be of different kinds. For example, we know very little about settlements in the Early Iron Age, while there is abundant data about the burial method. As concerns the Viking Age, the situation is almost the opposite. Here it would be of course important to find an answer to the question of why this is so – is it
randomness in the preservation of the archaeological material or differences in the main and significant semiotic structures of different periods? One way or another, archaeology could provide ample information in the following spheres of culture, which have formed important components in the emergence of semiospheres with different content and volume.

- The economic mode is an extremely important domain because the way a people make their living largely determines their general cultural behaviour. It goes without saying that the cultures of hunters and fishermen were very different from that of sedentary farmers, especially with regard to differences in the economic mode. One can find many other nuances in the economic mode that cause cultural differences if one delves deeper in research.
- Settlement mode – the way in which many people live together – leaves a lasting imprint on culture, that is, whether they live dispersed as families in single farmsteads, more compactly in villages, or as larger groups in hillforts and towns.
- Burial mode – when describing each prehistoric culture, it is important to describe the attitude of this culture to the dead – whether and how people were buried. In fact, the first dividing line is whether the dead were buried at all in some specific way or not. The second important criterion is whether above-ground monumental graves were built, or the dead were buried in above-ground invisible graves. In the former case it is significant whether single or composite graves were built (specifics of sacral architecture). Cremation/non-cremation of the dead also constitutes an important cultural feature. Actually, there are many more nuances with regard to the burial mode than are mentioned here.
- Religion – a domain that is partly related both to the previous and the following domains; archaeology provides only indirect evidence about it. Because the prehistoric human was first and foremost a religious creature, religion is of key importance from the perspective of describing a culture.
- Art – artistic self-expression of people is also of key importance from the perspective of culture. Of course how much and what has been preserved to this day is a totally different matter. Considering the Bronze Age in Estonia, and more broadly in the eastern Baltics, one is dealing mostly with jewellery and applied art.

**Cultural behaviour models in the eastern Baltics in the Bronze Age**

Cultures are never unified, homogeneous and comprehensive entities, but may include many different trends, which will be treated below as models of cultural behaviour. Models may differ from one another by different emphases on methods of earning livelihood, settlement modes, religion, and burial modes. They
may also differ with regard to the organisation of social relations, mentality, codes of symbolised thinking, etc. However, the models that belong to one cultural complex must have a large and clearly recognisable shared part; if it is absent, then one is rather dealing with a phenomenon that belongs to a transitional or alien culture. As a modern example, one could cite here behavioural models that are characteristic of rural and city culture, which, in fact, differ considerably but nevertheless share well-recognisable commonalities within that culture. (How we would define these cultures today is naturally another matter.) In the eastern Baltics one can distinguish in the Bronze Age three models of cultural behaviour, of which one stems from earlier local so-called Epineolithic culturelessness; the other two, however, started to emerge as a result of influences from different directions and content from the third period of the Scandinavian Bronze Age. Because of an absence of better terms, these cultural models will be designated below according to their geographic location and cardinal points.

**Inland model.** The beginning of the Bronze Age is in the entire eastern Baltic region characterised by scarcity of known sites and poverty and one-sidedness of find material. In Estonia, in particular, this situation is conspicuous; the author of the present chapter has called it Epineolithic culturelessness – that is, the absence of more expressive ‘archaeological culture’ after the find-rich Neolithic (Lang 2007a, 36–38). This concept can to some extent be used with regard to Latvia and Lithuania, too, despite the fact that the abundantly adorned so-called Lubāna ceramic style is known from eastern Latvia (Loze 1979). Evidence of the large number of occasional finds (mostly stone axes) and the analysed pollen diagrams from different regions suggests that there is no way one can deny the existence of habitation. On the other hand, one is dealing with a sparse semi-sedentary habitation mode in which people practiced mixed economy (periodically rotating slash-and-burn agriculture, hunting, and fishing). The settlement units were small, possibly single households; the property relations with regard to land were probably communal accompanied by temporary individual rights to farming lands. As not a single grave of the Early Bronze Age is known from Estonia, this cultural model did not consider burial of the dead important. Some Latvian and Lithuanian evidence – as well as more recent evidence from Estonia – points to underground graves with inhumation and cremation burials (Lang 2007b, 31–32, 37). Due to scarcity of material with regard to the general religious picture of the era, scholars have thought that a slow shift from shamanism, which was characteristic of the previous period, to the ideology of soil tillers might have taken place (Jonuks 2009, 154–158). During this process people who were specifically involved in religion remained in the background and were replaced by people who had a leading social position. As devices of ritual practice, people could have
used stone and bronze axes (op cit), to which some (individual) significance had apparently been ascribed.

This model of cultural behaviour persisted in the eastern Baltics throughout the entire pre-Christian first millennium, although the area constantly decreased due to the pressure of cultural phenomena from the north, west, and south-east. The main reason for the viability of this model could be explained by its economic background because inland forests, rivers, and lakes provided favourable conditions for mixed economy. Moreover, such an extensive economic mode required large land reserves around the households – and at first there was enough free land to retain sparsity of settlement. The existing archaeological material suggests extreme simplicity of the semiotic structures of this cultural model.

**North/west model.** The north/west model of cultural behaviour describes those cultural phenomena that since the third period started to spread in former eastern Prussia, on the western coast of Lithuania and Latvia, and the lower reaches of the river Daugava; thereafter they spread to continental western Estonia and the islands, as well as to the coastal zone of northern Estonia beyond the Baltic glint and to northern Latvia (Figure 2). These regions witnessed the so-called cultural explosion during periods III–IV, the most important result of which was a revolution in symbolic thinking and behaviour – people started to build monuments, that is, monumental graves with above-ground structures (e.g. Engel 1935; Graudonis 1967, 31 ff.; Grigailavičienė 1979; Vasks 2000; Hoffmann 2001; Jaanits et al 1982, 149–151; Lang 2007a, 147–155; 2007b, 32–36, 57–63). On the one hand, this kind of development towards the creation of contextual sign systems reflects religious changes in which the fertility and ancestor cult and the idea of a collective spirit uniting all the dead – which is characteristic of early farmers – take centre stage (for a more detailed discussion see Jonuks 2009, 208–215). On the other hand, this process also implies manifestations of power and property relations (Lang 1996; 2007a). The latter became necessary during the settlement process, where in those areas that were more favourable for living and farming economy, settlement became denser to an extent that increased competition required more reliable fixation of land ownership. This resulted in the ownership of farming land by single households, which at least in the Estonian coastal zone was also expressed in the establishment of stationary field systems. The research at Saha-Loo showed that this process started there as early as in period III of the Bronze Age (Lang et al 2005), although it became predominant somewhat later. In addition to soil cultivation, people raised cattle (in the coastal zone of Estonia sheep/goat farming was predominant), but hunting and fishing had become less important.
Valter Lang

**Figure 2. Distribution of the north/west cultural model in the eastern Baltic region**

- Stone-cist graves
- Ship graves (distribution area and isolated sites)
- Barrows with stone constructions
- Barrows with stone circles
The ‘cultural explosion’ in the northern and western areas of the eastern Baltics occurred at least partly thanks to close overseas ties with Scandinavia, the western coast of the Baltic Sea, and the northern part of central Europe. Many cultural elements, including the grave shape, had been adopted from there; however, they were adapted to the local sign system with subsequent further development. One cannot rule out the possibility that these cultural loans were originally related to movements of certain groups of people (see Lang 2011a). Scandinavian influences are predominant to the north of the river Daugava and Courland, and influences of the cultural centre of the southern coast of the Baltic Sea are predominant to the south of this line. As noted, settlement was characterised by single farmsteads, but it was organised by smaller regions, which in the conditions of northern Estonia could be regarded as the system of one predominant farm (Lang 1996; 2007a). Although socially differentiated, societies representing the north/west model are characterised by a rather small power distance, which, on the one hand, was reflected in the large number of chiefs and, on the other, the smallness of their power base, scarcity of subordinates, and modesty of executed power. Naturally, one has to emphasize that this cultural model did not leave any identical traces in the preserved material culture. For example, stone-circle barrows in western Lithuania do not resemble stone-cist graves in northern Estonia very closely; however, both grave types reflect rather similar cultural behavioural norms and semiotic structures by comparison with inland underground graves or the absence of cemeteries.

**South-eastern model.** The Daugava river basin in southern and eastern Latvia and north-eastern Lithuania, which is rich in lakes and rivers (also connected to the Daugava river basin), witnessed the spread of the third major cultural model, which is best characterised by living together as larger communities in fortified settlements that were usually located along waterways (e.g. LA 5 1986; Graudonis 1989; Lang 2007b, 49–56). Such settlements can also be found beyond the noted area – in western and southern Lithuania, western and northern Latvia, and the Estonian coastal zone (see Indreko 1939; Vassar 1939; 1955; Lang 2007a, 57–58); however, they are sparse and in some places probably existed for a short period (Figure 1). It seems that the economic basis of the inhabitants of fortified settlements could have been animal husbandry (raising cattle dominated in the lower reaches of the Daugava and pig farming in north-eastern Lithuania); in addition, soil cultivation and metalwork were common. Concerning the burial tradition, it is true that large barrows with multi-layered stone constructions, which are characteristic of the north/west model, are known from the lower reaches of the Daugava, but, generally speaking, the culture in question is characterised either by an absence of graves or by underground graves with cremation
burials. Thus, the culture of the inhabitants of fortified settlements share several commonalities with the religion and the burial tradition of the inland eastern Baltics and apparently also more generally with the religion and the burial tradition of the inhabitants of eastern neighbouring areas; in this sense one can speak of some similarities in the semiotic structures of these models. However, this cultural model is unique with regard to bronze working because all the previous evidence of local bronze casting in the Late Bronze Age came from the fortified settlements. The fortifications of these settlements and their location on higher hilltops – in contrast with smaller open settlements in lower areas (Merkevičius 2007) – can be regarded as evidence of creation of some kind of a contextual sign system in the south-eastern model in the eastern Baltics, which made among other things use of specific features of the landscape to encode its message.

The first fortified settlements emerged in north-eastern Lithuania and the lower reaches of the Daugava during period III of the Bronze Age. Elsewhere they are of somewhat more recent origin; these places were often used as late as the Early Roman Iron Age. The building of fortifications, which are sometimes rather impressive in Latvia and Lithuania, as well as definitely the bronze trade and its manufacturing, required organisation of the work of larger communities. This resulted in the emergence of a societal and cultural model with a somewhat greater power distance than the north-west model. The find material of these settlements reveals many weapons (spear and arrowheads as well as bronze and stone axes); for this reason, one could speak of rather masculine and bellicose cultural behaviour (Lang 2008). The fortified settlements, being linked with waterways, formed an extensive network that reached much farther, especially into Central Europe (the Lausitz cultural groups) and the forest zone of eastern Europe (Dyakovo and Gorodishche settlement types); however, few examples can be found on the south-western coast of Finland and the eastern coast of central Sweden (for example Vanhalinna at Lieto and Darsgärde). The Estonian fortified settlements of the so-called Asva group (see Sperling 2011) differ from the Latvian and Lithuanian ones in that their fortifications are modest or absent and that they were used for a short time. On the other hand, they are interesting because of the manufacturing and use of meticulously finished drinking and eating vessels (so-called Asva-style fine ceramics), which in combination with bone-carved spoons shows that more attention was paid to ‘table manners’ and feasts or entertaining (Lang 2007a, 230–231). This kind of pottery cannot be found in Latvia and Lithuania; however, other material culture reveals a number of shared features.15

Thus, in the eastern Baltics (naturally with some neighbouring regions because it is impossible to draw any clear-cut boundaries) one can distinguish three models of cultural behaviour, which rather plausibly correlate with three or even
Three models of cultural behaviour in the Bronze-Age eastern Baltics

more different types of social organisation. At the same time one can identify only two main settlement modes – single-farmstead dispersed settlement and a network of fortified settlements, which in some places even existed side-by-side. In addition, in principle there are also two burial modes – above-ground barrows / stone graves and underground cemeteries (although one has to consider the possibility of the so-called non-burial of the dead, too; see more in Lang 2011b). The tradition of cremation burial was more common in the southern, and the custom of inhumation burial in the northern, part of the eastern Baltics. According to the rules of the old cultural historical school, these data would have suggested two archaeological cultures – the culture of above-ground monumental graves and the culture of fortified settlements; however, the inland dispersed settlement culture with mixed economy would have been ignored because of scarcity of evidence. Yet there is no doubt that this phenomenon did exist, stemming from the ‘Epineolithic culturelessness’ that characterised the second millennium BC.

Naturally, these models of cultural behaviour are not archaeological cultures in the traditional cultural historical sense, and it could have several explanations. First, they have no spatial completeness – all three models alternate on the landscape with others. One could probably suggest here some interplay between cultural behaviour and the peculiarity of the landscape. More compact core areas were formed by the fortified settlements in north-eastern Lithuania together with a neighbouring area from present-day Belarus, the stone-cist graves of northern Estonia, and barrows in western Lithuania. At the same time, the noted sites also occur as smaller and larger groups farther from the core areas, being separated from them by the ‘inland’ and its characteristic cultural behaviour. In the Estonian coastal zone and the lower reaches of the Daugava, the north/west and the south-eastern models are rather closely intertwined; elsewhere they are more distanced. I should emphasize once again that the south-eastern model of the eastern Baltics remains marginal in coastal Estonia, and apparently it could be a rather short-lived incompletely developed phenomenon, which did not significantly influence the further developments of the previously established north/west cultural model.

Second, the previously mentioned different cultural models have produced similar results in material culture, which makes it possible to treat them as belonging to a broader cultural world. For example, the pottery of Estonia and northern Latvia is rather similar in fortified settlements, stone graves, as well as in the few known inland settlements. On the other hand, the pottery of western Lithuanian barrows and north-eastern Lithuanian fortified settlements – as well as other find material – reveal remarkable differences. Third, there are some differences within the same cultural models that describe differences in the material
Valter Lang

culture; for example, the differences in the pottery and other material between the fortified settlements in Estonia and Lithuania. At the same time, their material culture also reveals many similarities, for example, among bone and horn objects (Luik & Maldre 2007; Luik 2012).

Thus, one cannot speak of three or two archaeological cultures in the Bronze Age eastern Baltics in the traditional sense of this concept. One is dealing with different models of cultural behaviour within the framework of a broader culture in the Bronze Age eastern Baltics, which was accompanied by different kinds of social organisation and peculiarities of mentality. The Bronze Age culture of the eastern Baltics (in this sense) emerged in the last quarter of the second millennium BC, somewhat earlier in the south and later in the north. It lasted at least up to the third quarter of the first millennium BC, that is, much longer than the ‘official’ boundary between the Bronze Age and the Pre-Roman Iron Age in about 500 BC (Lang & Kriiska 2001). In fact, it is difficult to determine the end of this one-thousand-year long cultural phenomenon because several of its characteristic features were still in existence during the second half of the Pre-Roman Iron Age (fortified settlements in Lithuania and Latvia) or even in the Roman Iron Age (for example monumental graves).

In the course of later developments, starting from the end of the Pre-Roman Iron Age, the inland cultural model declined gradually and mainly adopted the semiotic structures that are characteristic of the north/west model. In the archaeological material this process is manifested first and foremost in the spread of above-ground graves and the concurrent small number of hill forts – in the Roman Iron Age the tarand graves became common in the greater part of inland Estonia and northern Latvia. On the other hand, barrows with surrounding stone circles spread in northern Lithuania and southern Latvia, and graves with stone constructions became common in western Lithuania (for a more detailed discussion see Lang 2007b). This is how the cultural sphere of the middle zone of the so-called eastern Baltics emerged, the most characteristic and typical agricultural region in this part of the world (Moora & Moora 1960). Its material culture developed a remarkably uniform flavour from the former eastern Prussia up to the surroundings of the Gulf of Finland (see Lang 2005; Banytė-Rowell & Bitner-Wróblewska 2005). While earlier archaeology explained the spread of graves to areas where graves had previously been absent by population migrations (e.g. Jaanits et al 1982; Michelbertas 1986), the author of the present chapter thinks that it could be regarded as nothing other than the adoption of a new cultural model. Most fortified settlements in eastern Lithuania and the Daugava basin continued to be used until the 1st–2nd centuries. In Lithuania the 3rd–4th centuries saw the emergence of hillfort settlement complexes; during the following centuries
Three models of cultural behaviour in the Bronze-Age eastern Baltics

This tradition involved the entire central zone of the eastern Baltics by adding an important new dimension to this cultural model, which with its distant roots reaches the south-eastern model of Bronze Age culture.

Finally, I have to add that the distinction of models of cultural behaviour did not take us any closer to the solution of ethnic issues in the Bronze Age Baltics. However, this could not have been an aim because any such behavioural model is supra-ethnic and is caused by many factors, which might not include language or so-called anthropological type. According to Lotman (1999, 20), the sign systems that form the semiosphere develop at different speeds, whereas natural languages change much more slowly and for different reasons than, for example, mental and ideological structures. Naturally, this does not mean that linguistic affinity might not contribute to the emergence of some cultural behavioural model or that the spread of culture might not be accompanied by movement of people. In the Bronze Age eastern Baltics the Daugava formed a boundary that probably separated the tribes speaking the Finnic and the Baltic languages. On the other hand, strictly speaking, it is impossible to prove this claim by means of archaeological methods, and opinions may vary. One might suspect some ethnic differences in the eastern Baltics with regard to some ‘minor’ geographic coincidences, such as differences in the directions of external links, the general picture of religion and (material) culture in the northern and southern parts of the region, which indicate the existence of different social networks on the opposite banks of the river Daugava. At the same time some cultural phenomena are much more closely linked to their geographic environment than to other cultural structures, including language. Thus, for example, even today the settlement pattern of northern Latvia is much more similar to that of southern Estonia than to southern Latvia despite the fact that the language border shifted much farther northwards long ago.

Conclusions

Where then did the Asva culture go? One might claim that it was consigned to the wastebasket (or ‘recycle bin’) of archaeology (cf Lang 2009), and that this happened for two reasons. First, at the time of its creation the definition of this culture already failed to take into account all the existing archaeological information and therefore was inadequate even within the cultural historical paradigm. Second, the concept of archaeological culture, which is characteristic of the cultural historical school, is not suitable for the description of prehistoric reality. In fact, for this reason, all our previous archaeological cultures are consigned to the wastebasket of archaeology.
At the same time one cannot deny culture as an object of scholarly research in archaeology, which is a branch of (cultural) studies in the humanities. However, the crux of the matter is that for the purpose of studying prehistoric culture this concept once again has to be turned upside down. Prehistoric culture, too, should be approached as ‘totality of non-inherited information,’ and it should be described by means of cultural phenomena and not only according to the preserved material remains. The author of the present chapter claims that the continuum of cultural phenomena of different types and at various degrees of arrangement in some region and era could be regarded as a culture that can be scientifically studied. One such culture is the Bronze Age culture of the eastern Baltics, which was discussed in the present chapter.

By comparison with the Bronze Age culture of southern Scandinavia and northern Germany, the Bronze Age culture of the eastern Baltics was much more heterogeneous and included several subcultures or models of cultural behaviour. Nevertheless, it was highly original and clearly distinguishable from its overseas neighbour. When moving farther to the east and the south-east, the distinctions emerged much more slowly, especially considering the spread of the so-called inland and south-east model. To the north, south-western Finland constitutes as if a semiotic buffer zone, where one can find structures that are characteristic of both Scandinavia (monumental graves, metal objects) and the eastern Baltics (pottery, fortified settlements). As a rule, the cultural phenomena of the past were supra-ethnic – unlike the present-day archaeological research, which is often confined to ethnic borders, that is, the borders of a nation state. The latter circumstance has hindered the holistic understanding of past cultures because the present-day political frontiers have subconsciously made researchers search for and find similar boundaries in prehistory, too. Actually, it is not important within what kind of boundaries one analyses the Bronze Age culture – for example, whether one takes into account only Estonia or the entire eastern Baltics – because different phenomena were in one way or another known in different areas. The Bronze Age culture in Estonia was simply one part of a broader cultural complex on the eastern coast of the Baltic Sea, which was characterized by closeness of semiotic structures with regard to all the previously discussed models.

From the diachronic aspect the emergence of the north-west and the south-eastern models of the Bronze Age culture of the eastern Baltics could be interpreted as explosive complexity and contextualisation of the sign systems of local culture. In this respect they differed from the ‘inland model,’ which was doomed to decline from a historical perspective. The decline did not take place as a consequence of the extinction of people or migration but because the population of increasingly larger areas adopted the semiotic structures that are characteristic of
the north/west cultural model. The culture of the Roman Iron Age in the eastern Baltics developed directly from this north/west model, whereby it could be interpreted as a continuation of Bronze Age culture. Major cultural changes took place here as late as at the end of the Roman Iron Age and during the Migration Period.

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Valter Lang


Three models of cultural behaviour in the Bronze-Age eastern Baltics


Loze 1979 = Лозе, И. А. (1979) Поздний неолит и ранняя бронза Лубанской равнины. Рига.


1 According to the chronology by Vello Lõugas, it was the end of the Bronze Age and the beginning of the Iron Age, according to the present periodisation it is the Late Bronze Age.

2 In fact, the concept of the Asva culture is not common in the work of Lõugas either, with the exception of his thesis and the corresponding chapter in Estonian Prehistory, which was based on it. Thus, it seems that while Indreko suggested it – and it was used internationally in scholarly papers – no one doubted the existence of this culture. However, it did not inspire our archaeologists to carry out any in-depth research.

3 It is true that Indreko (1961, 420) mentioned in passing that stone-cist graves that are concurrent with Asva are known in Estonia, which, in his opinion, was additional proof that the Asva culture was different from the Dyakovo culture, where cemeteries were unknown. On the other hand, he did not suggest any possible link between stone-cist graves and fortified settlements.

4 I have to emphasise this difference – because Indreko had dated the Asva culture entirely to the first millennium BC, at least some concurrence of fortified settlements and stone-cist graves was evident (which he did not analyse). Lõugas dated fortified settlements more narrowly to an earlier period (which thrived in the 9th–7th centuries BC) and the majority of stone-cist graves to a later period from this boundary, that is, to the Pre-Roman Age. Thus, these two phenomena were separated with regard to time. Moreover, it was clear even then that dispersed settlement as reflected by stone-cist graves does not fit in with the world of fortified settlements.

5 This view is confirmed by recent AMS dates of human bones found in stone-cist graves (for a more detailed discussion, see Lang 2011a, 164–167 and the literature therein). I have to point out that the temporal span of stone-cist graves is much longer than that of fortified settlements.

6 Asva, Ridala, Iru, and Joaorg at Narva, whereas Kaali should be regarded as a cult location rather than a normal fortified settlement despite the fact that its find material and dating are not different from those of other fortified settlements (Lang 2007a, 75–77).

7 It could well be that not all sites that have been regarded previously as fortified settlements are similar by nature. Thus, among the Latvian and Estonian sites that were previously regarded as fortified settlements I have singled out several sites (so-called hilltop settlements), which should be treated separately due to their thin and find-poor cultural layer (Lang 2007b, 49, 88–92). One might suggest that such hilltop settlements could have belonged to prominent single families rather than larger groups of people.
It is true that the AMS date of carbonised organics of two clay vessels suggests that the fortified settlement of Narva is much older (12th–11th centuries BC; see Kriisika & Lavento 2006). In addition, some Asva finds allow earlier than 8th-century dates, while one cannot rule out their belonging to the century in question. However, only new AMS analyses could provide a more credible answer to the age of Asva settlement layers.

The reader is kindly referred to for example, Shennan 1989; Jones 1997; Brather 2004; Stark et al 2008; Hillerdal 2009.

It is important to emphasize from the perspective of relativity of the semiosphere and the possibility of multiple (sub-)semiospheres that these material objects and their contexts enable analyses on different levels starting from contextual interpretation of objects and ending with a general treatment of culture on the basis of archaeological evidence.

This is so despite the chronological framework negotiated by archaeologists and historians, which is precise in the interest of mutual understanding and success of scholarly research.

According to Lotman (2002, 58), each cultural text is an assemblage of many different and sometimes even opposite cultural codes (for example the behavioural norms of a monk and a knight in medieval culture), of which none alone can decode adequately the entire reality of a given moment. He distinguishes the so-called code of an era, which is not the only but the predominant system of a period, which decodes some base texts and organises the others in some way or other. Supplementary cultural codes may differ considerably from the predominant code; however, they must nevertheless be compatible with the former.

I have to emphasize, however, that only a small number of the community members who had adopted the north/west cultural model were buried in monumental graves, whereas the burial mode of other people resembled that of the inland cultural model. This feature, too, united this cultural behaviour with Scandinavian customs (cf, for example Herschend 2009).

Absence of graves and occasional underground graves with cremation burials (sometimes together with the so-called funerary houses) are also characteristic, for example, of the region of the Dyakovo group of fortified settlements in the first millennium BC (see for example Krenke 2011, 211–214).

An additional peculiarity of settlements of the Asva group in comparison with the fortified settlements of the Daugava river basin in Latvia and Lithuania is the method of obtaining livelihood – here tillage was apparently more common, sheep/goat farming prevailed in animal husbandry, and seal hunting played a major role. Thus, the economic mode of inhabitants of the Asva-type settlements was largely similar to that of those local communities that buried their dead in stone-cist graves; the main difference lay in bronze working.

It should be noted that social organisation could vary to some extent even within a single cultural model, for example, in the region of north-eastern Lithuania, the lower reaches of the Daugava, and the region of Estonian fortified settlements (for a more detailed discussion see Lang 2007b, 74–77).
It should be mentioned here that on the basis of Latvian and Estonian evidence J. Ozols (1969) made an attempt to combine these two kinds of sites into a single culture, which he called the culture of Baltic stone-cist graves. On the other hand, he ignored Lithuanian settlements and graves. Although his study was amateurish, even Ozols mentioned that the distribution areas of fortified settlements and stone-cist graves overlap only occasionally.

There are also some open settlements with less abundant find material that is characteristic of the inland cultural model (Merkevičius 2007). Unfortunately, there are no in-depth settlement-archaeological studies of this region that could enable us to assess the interplay between these two cultural models.

As regards Estonia, only the Iru fortified settlement was definitely located in the same settlement region with concurrent stone-cist graves while similar graves that could be dated back to the Late Bronze Age are absent in the immediate vicinity of Narva as well as Asva and Ridala. In addition, one can find some monumental graves with closely situated fortified and open settlements in the lower reaches of the Daugava; however, it is unlikely that they formed joint complexes.

I should mention, however, that there are some differences in style with regard to the pottery of, for example, the Estonian fortified settlements and stone-cist graves. Thus, coarse and fine ceramics of the Asva type can be found only in the previously mentioned settlements, and very few have been revealed in graves, while Lüganuse-style ceramics is more common in graves and settlements (Lang 2007a, 127–130). However, in the case of ceramic styles the boundaries are never clear-cut, and all of them can be found in inland settlements, too.

For example, J. Ozols (1969) claimed that northern Latvian stone-cist graves had belonged to the Balts.
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Identity, difference and cultural worlds

Rein Raud

Abstract. The primary concern of this chapter is to analyse several concepts of ‘identity’ influential in European philosophy, and to show that identity should be viewed as a cultural and linguistic phenomenon, not a relationship between things in objective reality. This is because any single ‘thing’ can be strictly identical even with itself only during an infinitely short span of time. The differences in cultural perceptions of identity can be compared to possible worlds discussed by analytical philosophers – different conceptual structures give rise to different cultural worlds, all of which arise as reflections of reality. All these worlds should be considered equally valid and only linguistically constructed models of reality, even though they are the only forms of reality the human mind can access. What defines a ‘thing’ in a cultural world, it is proposed, is the sum of properties which in that particular world are considered essential. The chapter also hopes to show that flexibility in defining what ‘things’ are considerably increases the openness of a particular cultural world and enables its carriers to understand the logic of other cultural worlds more clearly.

This chapter attempts to do two things. First, it is an investigation into the implications for the traditional notion of identity that are brought about by the move from a static worldview to a dynamic one, from a world of basically stable and self-identical things to the much more unstable environment contemporary philosophy regards reality to be. Secondly, since under the circumstances of inconstancy the entities we can speak about can be seen to be grounded in the languages in which we speak about them much more than an essentialist ontology would admit, I address the problematic of culturally constructed lifeworlds in which the rules for concept formation and definitions of ‘thingness’ itself may vary, as the tenets of non-European philosophical traditions make clear. I propose to compare such worlds to possible worlds.
Concepts and conceptual frames elaborated on the basis of this logic of possible worlds have already proved to be fruitful in various fields of humanities (cf. Allen 1989). My argument is based on the conviction that these concepts may also be put to good use in the theory/philosophy of culture, namely, that there exists an analogy between diverse systems of cultural representations and possible worlds. In other words, each comprehensive set of linguistic representations corresponds to a possible world, which is determined both by the circumstances they obtain in the actual world and by the capacities of the language to express them. The possible worlds of this kind are separated from each other by linguistic and cultural barriers which are, indeed, not only objects of cultural study but also very real factors of our daily life that sometimes cause major problems in the functioning of the actual world. Needless to say, the analogy between the possible worlds of logic and the cultural worlds is not strict and any conclusion drawn on either side has to be validated on the other before it can be developed further. An investigation of the ‘cultural worlds’ also necessarily entails the recognition of the contingency of our own linguistic representations of the actual world (but not the relativisation of the actual world itself) and should thus make us aware of the limitations of our theoretical constructions, especially when these take on ideological proportions. The language of such an analysis should therefore strive to accommodate all imaginable models of representation and, naturally, recognise their right to diversity.

Strong, weak and actual identity

One of the most fundamental laws of classical logic is the law of identity, which states that “everything is equal to itself”. In a popular textbook of logic, Wilfrid Hodges writes that it is “according to taste, either the supreme metaphysical truth or the utmost banality. Since it is true always and everywhere, we can’t deny it with consistency; any set of sentences which does deny it must be inconsistent” (Hodges, 1991 [1977], 164). But in reality, things are not at all so unproblematic as they seem. The same book states that “the word identical is normally used in English to express close similarity rather than identity. For example, identical twins are not the same twin, and two women who are wearing identical dresses are not wearing one and the same dress” (op cit). On the other hand, it is probable that two identical twins are at one moment of time more similar to each other than one of them to oneself at two times with any considerable interval. Does that mean that ‘identical’ things may in fact be less similar to themselves than ‘similar’ ones? The sentence “everything equals itself” thus makes tacit assumptions of what ‘everything’ or ‘every thing’ is, and maybe stronger ones than we should
necessarily admit at the outset. After all, classical logic was developed against
the background of Aristotelian-Newtonian views of the world, which do not
correspond to our ideas any more.

What a ‘thing’ is from the point of view of such logic can be derived from
the law of Leibniz, or the principle of the identity of indiscernibles. As it is well
known, this principle states that “if \( x \) and \( y \) are indiscernible, in the sense of all
properties \( x \)'s properties being the same as \( y \)'s properties and vice versa, then \( x \) is
identical with \( y \)” (Grayling 1998 [1982], 84–85). This formulation allows for two
interpretations. If \( x \) and \( y \) are indiscernible, it does not indicate any property
inherent to \( x \) and \( y \), but means that it is we who cannot discern between them.
‘All’ properties they have may indicate both all of these properties through the
analysis of which we try to discern between \( x \) and \( y \), or, alternatively, all proper-
ties that they might possibly have, even such ones which we cannot find out, say,
without a sufficiently powerful microscope or because appropriate technology
has even not yet been invented. Consequently, the principle may be taken in a
strong sense (to include all properties) and in a weak sense (to include only such
properties that we can discern). In the strong sense the law is reversible: if \( x \) and
\( y \) are identical, then all their properties coincide. In the weak sense this is not the
case: if \( x \) and \( y \) are identical, then only those of their properties coincide that we
are able to discern, and a scientific breakthrough, for instance, may change our
point of view in that respect. This can be illustrated by Hilary Putnam’s example.
He posits another, almost identical planet to Earth called Twin Earth, on which
there is a liquid called “water” that is identical to earth water in all respects except
its chemical composition, which is \( \text{XYZ} \) instead of \( \text{H}_2\text{O} \). This is something easily
found out, and therefore it is not correct to say that earth water and twin earth
water are identical. But, Putnam asks, what about the state of affairs obtaining in
1750 when the composition of water was unknown? At the time speakers on both
earths would have been unable to distinguish between their respective waters,
and yet they were not identical then either (Putnam 1993 [1973], 151–153). In the
present terms, however, ‘waters’ on both earths would have been weakly identical
in 1750, and not identical afterwards. Any other twin earth that might have water
which is identical in all respects to ours as we know it now is still only weakly
identical, because it is possible that an additional property will be discovered of
water in the future. This also means that any sentence of the type “\( x \) is identical
to \( y \)” is indexical to “today is Wednesday” – true at one moment, false at another.
Identity sentences are thus either doubly indexical along the pattern “at time \( t_1 \)
it is true that \( x \) is identical to \( y \) at time \( t_2 \)” or false. Times \( t_1 \) and \( t_2 \) may, of course,
coincide, and in most cases \( t_1 \) is a period, which contains \( t_2 \). But this is by no
means necessary.
It seems that the talk of logic about identities concerns only identity in the strong sense, so that when we discover a property of \( y \) that is not a property of \( x \), that means that they are not only no longer identical, but that they have not been identical all along, and it is only we who have held a false belief about their identity. From this point of view, all strong identity statements must be either tautological or definitions of terms. But weak identity statements necessarily have to allow for more vagueness than is usually acceptable in the analytical schools.

In debates about vagueness it is generally agreed that “Apart from representation, whether cognitive or mechanical, there can be no such thing as vagueness or precision; things are what they are, and there is an end of it” (Russell 1999 [1977], 62) and “the notion that things might actually be vague, as well as being vaguely described, is not properly intelligible” (Dummett 1999 [1997], 111). The counterargument for the existence of vague objects usually only claims that there are some exceptional objects with fuzzy boundaries, for example clouds, but normally ‘objects’ are not vague. It seems, however, that the opposite view is not difficult to defend after all. Elaborating on the work of the British scholar Lewis Richardson, who in the 1920s set out to measure the length of the coastline of Great Britain, Nakazawa Shin’ichi shows that the picture of the ‘real’ world is very much dependent on the ‘scale’ of the map we use. The coastline of a country appears to be of one clearly measurable length on a map of a large scale, whereas a more exact map that would also show all small bays, inlets and curves on the line would gradually make the coastline longer, until it approaches infinity (Nakazawa 1995 [1988], 79–80). It should be added that the coastline is also changing all the time as waves move. And what is even more important, this moving, self-identical but always different or ‘fuzzy’ coastline is the only one we can actually see, the unvague one on the map is a representation, a pure abstraction. The same applies to all borders and surfaces to some extent. Therefore, it could well be asserted that the vague object is the paradigmatic case. To treat objects as unvague means to subject our sense-data to certain corrections that enable us to use them in abstract thought-constructions, but as such they are already representations. Therefore it seems justified to say, as Michael Tye does in a slightly different context, that “the world is, in certain respects, intrinsically, robustly vague” (1999 [1997], 293).

But that affects any identity statement we might make. We are only able to assert the identity of any \( x \) and \( y \) in the weak sense (if we do not already know with certainty that \( x \) and \( y \) are the same thing), and strong identity with itself can be asserted of anything only for an infinitely brief moment of time, because a truly powerful microscope would probably disclose to us constantly on-going changes in the structure of the atoms of which the thing is composed, and show
that it no longer has all the same properties it had an instant ago. And however precisely we time the instant of validity of an actual strong identity statement, it is always possible that in the future time will be measured more precisely, which means that this statement will turn out to be weak after all. In other words, strong identity statements can be valid only at immeasurably short times, when nothing moves at all. Whether the state of the world at such times is the proper domain of logic is open to discussion, but it is at least certain that such a state of the world is not accessible to normal experience and common-sense assertions can therefore not be made about it. Consequently, a logic that operates exclusively with strong identity statements should not really appeal to common sense.

One well-known way to circumvent the problem is to hold that identity statements are made not about the world, but about linguistic representations of relations that obtain in the world. Logic is, after all, the study of arguments, not of the world, and we may as well accept that ostensive statements, which may refer to reality directly in its unstoppable ‘thatness’, lose their direct reference when they are integrated into propositions. This clause can make identity statements strong, but what is at most times conveniently forgotten is that it also makes them linguistically contingent (i.e. the rules of the language necessarily affect the way these sentences are constructed and function), unless we are prepared to accept that there is an unproblematic way of linguistic representation, an ideal metalanguage which is able to express everything that can be summarily expressed by all natural languages and at the same time translates into each idiolect without residue. This is certainly not the case with any metalanguage, which sets out to condense and transmit only the essential, discarding the noise, because the difference between the essential and the noise only exists in the representation, not in reality.

By translatability without residue I mean the situation in which everything that is expressed in the sentence of the source language is also expressed in the sentence of the target language, which means that they have to have corresponding grammatical categories. For instance, the French sentence “La professeur est vieille” does not translate without residue into the English “The professor is old”, because the English gives no indication of the gender of the professor, which in French is expressed. On the other hand, the insertion of a qualifying attribute such as ‘female’ into the English sentence would place a stress on the gender, which is not there in the original French. This sentence thus cannot be translated without residue because the source and target languages have different notions of what is essential factual information. In addition to such purely factual content, natural languages also express emotional states, modalities, speaker-recipient power relations, etc., although each of them prioritises some aspects of content
Identity, difference and cultural worlds

at the expense of others. This does not necessarily entail relativism, neither ontological nor cultural, because linguistic contingency asserts nothing about the way things are or about how they are perceived – nevertheless every linguistic system differs from some other by the structure of its categories and the semantic fields assigned to the words of which it is made. This does not evoke a strong version of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, which claims that each culture perceives the world differently, according to the rules of its language. However, as Gordon Lyon has noted (Lyon 1999, 508–509), in a weak sense the hypothesis is trivially true, because one cannot translate the sentence “the colour turned from yellow to orange” into a language that has a word for “yellow” but no word for “orange” without introducing supplementary elements into the sentence. A metalanguage that would satisfy all languages of the world does not exist, – should it exist, it would be too complicated to be of any use – and therefore we have to make do with linguistic contingency. This yields a version of what John R. Searle calls “careful external realism” and formulates as a belief in “that there is a way things are that is independent of all representations of how things are” (1996 [1995], 182).

In such a case, the sign ‘x’ refers to the ‘thing’ x, as ‘y’ does to y, and an identity statement ‘x’=‘y’ asserts the strong identity of the senses of the two signs, which in turn reflects the weak identity of the two ‘things’ referred to. The way out of the predicament consists in the fact that the sense of the sign can consist of a finite set of properties, and “all properties” in that case signifies “all properties included in the appropriate set”. Obviously a strong identity statement may in such a case be made only on the level of signs that uniquely determine a referent, i.e. proper nouns. In such a context it is also possible to avoid the instantaneous character of identity statements by defining the instant intralinguistically. This means that when the validity of identity statements is restricted to the domain of representation, then we can also deliberately set, in analogy with photography, the ‘angle’ and the ‘shutter speed’ of the pictures we take of reality in time. In each frame of the representation, nothing moves, although everything moves in reality. The only properties that count are those discernible in the picture. We might zoom in, as with a telescope, or obtain an extreme close up, as with a microscope. At very slow shutter speed, we might observe the movement of mountains from one frame to another to be as quick as the movement of rays of light would be at very fast shutter speed. In reality as it is, independent of our observation, there quite obviously is no such thing as a ‘natural’ or ‘neutral’ ‘angle’ or ‘shutter speed’. These are always observer-dependent. Unfortunately in discussions about logic in this post-Einsteinian framework it is not always clear whether logic should be one and always the same, valid at all angles and shutter speeds, or perhaps there are mutually exclusive logics. The latter alternative allows us to use different
definitions of, for instance, what an ‘object’ is as opposed to an ‘event’. In that case those who wish to do so would be able to retain the current definitions, but must acknowledge their limitation. At greater shutter speeds, however, all objects would turn into events. At the shutter speed of 70 years, a human life would pass as quickly as lightning in the direct sense of the word.

For the present purposes it seems prudent to restrict the validity of all sets of mutually coherent identity claims to a domain of representations that are all made from one angle, at one shutter speed, that is, under similar circumstances as the system of classical logic was constructed. This move enables us to assert a strong identity of ‘things’, if only intralinguistically, within the borders of a ‘cultural world’. But even that does not remove the problem altogether and it emerges again in the theory of possible worlds. As is well known, the assumption that each entity is identical with itself in the actual world and all possible worlds means that this identity must be weak: there have to be some (perhaps even discernible) properties that it has in one of these worlds and not in others, or else all the worlds would completely overlap. This means that all ‘things’ must have two kinds of property: essential ones that they necessarily possess in all worlds, and contingent ones that may vary from world to world. The question remains of how one can determine which properties are essential and which contingent. For example, is it possible that a certain property could be essential to \( x \) in one world and contingent in another? Is it perhaps also possible that the status of a property changes from essential to contingent, and perhaps even within the boundaries of one world? Another question that emerges in this context is again that of vagueness. It is well known that some properties things might have are vague. Is it possible that some of these vague properties might be essential to something? If so, could that mean that the identity, not only the borders, of that ‘thing’ could itself be vague?

One way to handle these problems is the so-called anti-descriptivist theory of naming. The debate between the adherents of this view (Saul Kripke, Ruth Barcan Marcus, Keith Donnellan) and the descriptivists may be reduced to the question of whether names refer to a ‘thing’ (which is available to us in representation) or its ‘thingness’, a certain unalterable nucleus within the ‘thing’ that constitutes its identity and remains unaffected by any alterations in its manifestation. This ‘thingness’ in that view is not a set of essential properties, it is nothing but itself, nevertheless necessary for the thing to be itself. The name Gödel, Kripke writes, which we know to refer to the man who proved the incompleteness of arithmetics, will always refer to the same man regardless of whether Gödel actually is the author of this proof or not; moreover, in other possible worlds Gödel will stay Gödel even if his description as “the man who proved the incompleteness of
arithmetic” refers to somebody else (Kripke 1981 [1972], 83–84). Hence we may infer that there is a certain ‘gödelness’ to which the name refers, and the name Gödel refers to whomever is in the possession of it. The ‘thingness’ of a thing is constituted by nothing other than the bestowing of the name in an act of “primal baptism” (Kripke 1981, 96). Thus Kripke advances a particular version of the law of identity: “everything is identical to itself” becomes “the designatum of a name [that] is identical to itself in all possible worlds” by virtue of its ‘thingness’ that makes it the designatum of the name in the first place. The views of other anti-descriptivists differ from Kripke in technical details.

However, if things have no essential properties apart from their unique ‘thingness’, then it should be possible that all their properties change in transworld migration except the ‘thingness’, but it is of little use to us to know that x is identical to y if they have absolutely no properties in common. This is a variant of the well-known paradox of the ‘ships of Theseus’, which has been advanced by André Gallois (1986) to contradict Kripke’s assertion of the necessity of identity.

Gallois presents the example of two ships, which are called Mary and Alice, and made of two distinct collections of planks $C_1$ and $C_2$. In one world $W_1$ Alice is produced out of Mary by replacing planks from $C_1$ with planks from $C_2$ one by one, and if we are reluctant to define the exact moment when Mary becomes Alice, we have to admit that they are the same ship. This way of treating the sorites paradox is obviously not at all unproblematic, but this issue is not of interest in the present context. In another world $W_2$, Mary and Alice are produced simultaneously, and therefore not identical. Accordingly, Gallois concludes: “Mary is contingently identical with Alice, and in the contingently true identity sentence “Mary is identical with Alice”, ‘Mary’ and ‘Alice’ function as rigid designators.” (Gallois 1986, 60). In his defence of this thesis, Gallois ends up in distinguishing the properties of ‘being identical’ and ‘being actually identical’, i.e. identical in the actual world, a property that Mary and Alice also have, although in their own world $W_1$ they are not identical (op cit, 74).

This view is grounded in the tacit assumption that the perspective of the actual world is somehow relevant in all the possible worlds, although it is difficult to see why the inhabitants of $W_1$ should care about the theory that the two distinct ships Mary, and Alice, are actually identical, because from their perspective their world is the actual one. It should be remembered that a ‘world’ is posited by a set of representations of reality and is not the same as ‘reality’ itself. The distinction between the actual and all possible worlds here is made from the point of view of an observer who claims to be in neither world, but endorses the perspective of the actual one. In other words, what is asserted is that statements about the actual world are themselves reality, not representations of it.
Actual identity and cultural worlds

This view has a widespread equivalent in the theory of cultures, which is, of course, not strictly concordant with this logical position. If possible worlds are all seen as deviations from the actual, i.e. the speaker’s own world, about which we can say how things ‘really’ are, then ‘cultural worlds’ would also be deviant systems of world representation that differ from the true (for example scientific) world representation to a greater or lesser degree. The possible worlds of Gallois are closer to or further from the actual world depending on how many things that are ‘actually identical’ are also identical in them, which presumes a hierarchy; similarly we can imagine a hierarchy of cultures depending on how much of the scientific worldview they share. It goes without saying that the latter view cannot be attributed to Gallois on the basis of his argument.

The main problem of this view is obvious: it enables one to classify cultures into ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ cultures and enables one to claim the superiority of one’s own culture over others. The adherents of such a view claim all their opponents to be ‘relativists’ who allegedly deny that things exist in one single way. Although such people may exist, their position does not follow from their rejection of a singular true cultural model. The analogy with the logical position of Gallois is extremely helpful to show the vacuity of such a claim.

Up to now I have used the notion of ‘cultural world’ analogously with ‘possible world’ without trying to specify exactly how these worlds come into being. The analogy is based on the view that a world is posited by a set of sentences about reality, the validity of which is determined both by circumstances that obtain in reality and by other sentences of the set. I prefer to speak about the validity, not truth-value of sentences in this context, because as long as we mean by ‘language’ only natural and metalanguages, we can assume that all their sentences are ‘true’ or ‘false’ in the same way, for instance, by assigning truth-values only to those utterances that are translatable from any existing language into any other without residue. This usage is not exceptional. As Ruth Ronen writes:

In any of its current formulations the concept of truth is thus in a way an altered logical standard in modern philosophy: from a metaphysical absolute principle responsible for establishing the relation between language and world, the standard of truth has changed into what one might interpret as a semiotic-oriented principle in terms of which one can describe the way a universe of discourse is constructed and is operated (Ronen 1994, 40).
This is perhaps not too much, but it is the best we can have. But if we mean, as we have to in the present context, all cultural languages, that is, also other systems of representation such as pictorial art, theatrical mimesis, ritual symbolism, etc., then we cannot speak about ‘true’ utterances any more, although we can speak of their ‘validity’, i.e. their acceptability in the culture as correct representations of reality. Thus utterances that are ‘valid’ in a cultural world correspond, in the present frame of reference, to ‘true’ sentences in a possible one.

The organisation of the set depends simultaneously on the rules that govern the workings of reality and the rules that define how to formulate new sentences that fit into the set. Such a set of sentences differs from a language by the token that the validity of sentences is determined only by its own rules. It is not important for a sentence of a language to be true for it to be grammatical, and ungrammatical sentences cannot be true or false at all. Not so in a world: a sentence has to fit two sets of constraints to be valid in it, those set by reality that is represented and those set by the language of representation, such as the availability of signs and rules for their appearance. The availability of signs and corresponding concepts is usually taken for granted, but it need not be so: in the proper languages of a chicken and a computer, sentences that contain numbers other than 1 and 0 cannot be formulated, but we can translate them into the language of the computer by using an interface, whereas they have to remain beyond the comprehension of the hen.

The world would be posited by a unique and definite set of representations if both of these rule-sets were rigid. As it happens, neither of them is. Events that happen in the world are more probably than not in greater part contingent, even if caused by previous events, since these may also have been contingent, and various languages offer broadly different devices for their representation. Both possible and cultural worlds are results of this non-rigidity. We know that in logic, ‘possible worlds’ are the corollaries of counterfactual arguments, the worlds that would have been if some contingent event had not happened. If Henry VIII had not been born, he would not have become the king of England. Thus there is a possible world in which somebody else ruled England at the time when he was the king in the actual one. Cultural worlds arise similarly as projections of the representational devices available in different languages, such as concepts and categories. This is not merely the problem of the linguistic form of abstract thought, which forces us to construe artificial equivalents for terms such as Aufhebung, svabhava or wuwei, which are easily intelligible to the speakers of the languages in question, but also of simple, daily matters – of whether something that ‘is’ in English should be ‘estar’ or ‘ser’ in Spanish. These two words actually denote two
different modes of being, as do shi, con, you and zai in Chinese, which in English equally actually do not make sense.

The word ‘actual’, it has been argued by David Lewis, functions indexically and points out the world from within which arguments are made, just as the word ‘present’ points out the moment when they are made; other possible worlds are not actual in the same way as past and future are not, but otherwise they are as real (Lewis 1973, 84–91). Now Henry VIII is not the king of England, and therefore now his being king is not actual. However, there could be possible worlds where all historical events take place in the same succession, but with certain intervals from their occurrence in our world – in one such world Henry VIII might now be the king. At the time of Henry VIII, this possible world in its present state was the actual one. In that world, our actual present would be distant future. If we do not wish to accept rigid predestination as Hugh Mellor does when he presents a similar case (1981, 29), we have to accept that our actual world is in that world itself only a possible one, because contingent events might happen that would alter the course of history. The same manoeuvre can also be executed for all possible worlds where some events did not happen and where things are therefore otherwise. If these things had ‘actually’ not happened, these possible worlds would have become the actual one. Therefore, for Lewis, all possible and mutually exclusive worlds are real.

This position is analogous to a strong version of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis: incommensurable valid statements about reality can be articulated for each cultural world, and things are ‘actually’ so in any such world. In his article “Languages and language” Lewis even provides an expression of this hypothesis in the terms of analytical philosophy when he claims to be able to “redefine relative to a population all those semantic concepts that we previously defined relative to a language” (1983, 169). However, this is precisely what opponents of the view that all languages are variants of the same basic urlanguage are accused of believing, and it is not surprising that critics of Lewis uphold the actualist view that in reality only the ‘actual’ world exists. However, it seems not so difficult to steer a middle course between the two extremes, through the ground that accommodates Nelson Goodman, Hilary Putnam and John R. Searle. Searle criticises Goodman for rejecting realism (Searle 1996, 163), although what Goodman rejects from his position of ‘irrealism’ is only strong ‘actualism’: “Irrealism does not hold that everything or even anything is irreal, but sees the world melting into versions and versions making worlds, finds ontology evanescent, and inquires into what makes a version right and a world well-built” (Goodman 1984, 29). Similarly, Hilary Putnam’s “internal realism” assumes that “the mind and the world jointly make up the mind and the world” (1987, 1). John R. Searle, who criticises both of them
from the standpoint of “careful external realism” is also anxious to show that his position is compatible with conceptual relativity, which, in his view, actually “presupposes a language-independent reality that can be carved up or divided up in different ways, by different vocabularies” (1996, 165), and therefore is not an argument against external realism. Regardless of whether we endorse any of these positions, we may accept Searle’s view that conceptual relativity does not entail external relativism, and if it were our aim to defend the latter, conceptual relativity would not be a sufficient argument. Since conceptual relativity within one cultural world does not differ from conceptual relativity between different cultural worlds, this argument is also the proof of a weak version of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, which holds that incommensurable statements about reality may be articulated for each cultural world, but the validity claims of these statements are only accepted in those worlds if at all, whereas none of these worlds is in exact correspondence with reality as it is. In other words, the assertion that “reality as it is available to us is a cultural construction” says nothing about reality itself.

**Linguistic construction of ‘thingness’**

There are two buildings in Japan that both pretend to the status of the oldest building of their kind. One of them is the Ise shrine of the Sun Goddess Amaterasu in Ise-shi, Mie prefecture, the other the Hōryūji Buddhist temple near Nara. A part of Hōryūji is in truth the oldest extant wooden building in the whole world, but the ‘oldness’ of the Ise shrine is of an absolutely different kind. After every 20 years, the buildings of the shrine are torn down and rebuilt exactly in the same manner. What remains the same is the design and the place, as well as the kind of building material that is used, what differs is the actual material it is built of. Nevertheless the shrine is perceived to be the same by the Japanese who visit it. In fact, many other Shinto shrines are continuously rebuilt in the same fashion. This practice is explained by the reason that the wood loses its purity with age and the shrine is no longer suitable for housing its god(s).

These two buildings present us with two different ways of defining their identity. To say that Hōryūji is self-identical means to assert that the sameness of the building material is what determines whether it is the identical building. In that sense, Hōryūji is identical with itself in the years 1000 and 2000, but the Ise shrine is not. On the other hand, a biological individual whose cells are gradually replaced would not be either, not to speak about the ships of Theseus and Gallois. Again, we could assert that it is an essential property of the Ise shrine to be built no more than 20 years ago. It is itself, not in spite of, but because of the fact that it
Rein Raud

is torn down after every 20 years, when the building material has lost its virginal purity and the building is no longer fit to fulfil its functions. The shrine, which exists at years 1000 and 2000, has this property at both times. Setting the ‘shutter speed’ for measuring an instant at 20 years and claiming that age is an essential property, we can assert that the Ise shrine is self-identical at each instant, whereas the Hōryū-ji temple is not: unlike the Ise shrine, it is one ‘instant’ older at each next ‘instant’. It would also not do to say that the way of defining the identity of the Ise shrine is wrong (that it is not self-identical) and the Japanese who think that it is the same shrine just do not know better. ‘The Ise shrine’ is a proper name just like ‘Hōryū-ji’ or ‘the Tower of London’ and it designates the one, concrete, self-identical shrine at each instant when it is used. In order to save the theory one could claim that ‘the Ise shrine’ is not a proper name. But ‘the Ise shrine’ is not referentially analogous to ‘the king of France’, because each particular individual who would answer to that description is not necessarily ‘the king of France’ and could be somebody else in some other possible world, whereas the Ise shrine can definitely never be anything other than itself. ‘The Ise shrine’ designates its referent rigidly at any given moment and since the Kripkean position allows for the gradual replacement of properties in possible worlds, there is no reason to deny it the status of a proper name in that theoretical frame.

The way out of this predicament that I would like to propose is a revision of the notion of ‘thingness’. If it is the essence of the ‘thing’ to which its proper name rigidly refers, it should not be conceived of as ‘empty’. It might as well contain the rule of defining the identity of that particular ‘thing’. In the case of the Ise shrine, its total rebuilding after every 20 years is its essential property, in the case of Hōryū-ji it is not. There might be buildings in the world for which the essential property is their building material, and others for which it is their layout. In each case the unrepeatable individuality of the entity in question – its ‘thingness’ – is constituted by nothing other than the definition of which of its properties are essential to it. The ‘thingness’ of a thing is not an essence as a separate entity, but a property of that thing, analogically as in the model of Ruth Barcan Marcus: “No metaphysical mysteries. Such essences are dispositional properties of a very special kind: if an object had such a property and ceased to have it, it would have ceased to exist or it would have changed into something else” (Marcus 1971, 202). This should also settle the question of how to determine the essential properties of things. We can imagine for each thing a theoretically endless list of numbered property variables we can discern of it. Each number is followed by a mark that shows whether the property is essential or contingent, and then the value of the variable for that particular thing. Kinds of various taxonomic levels are constituted by the overlap of lists until a certain specified
number, and things are themselves distinguished by the particular values of the variables. And the first item on this list is a set of numbers that specifies which of the listed properties are essential for this particular thing. The list has to be finite if we want the identity of the thing to be definite, it may remain open, if we are prepared to accept vague identities. It is our perception of reality that determines how to compose such lists, but the rules for marking properties as essential and contingent are cultural, thus there is no universally valid mechanism of bestowing rigidly designating names. But does that mean that the ‘thingness’ of a thing is defined intralinguistically, within a culture? And even there the mechanism might not necessarily be uniform – after all, the identities of the Ise shrine and the Hōryūji temple are defined differently in the same Japanese cultural world.

Indeed, this position would have us assume that identities are world-bound, because the ‘thingness’ of the same ‘thing’ could be constructed differently in another cultural world, which means that even if the Japanese think that the Ise shrine is self-identical through time, this does not automatically entail that it is self-identical for Westerners also. But this is not necessarily a difficulty as long as it is remembered that identity statements can only be made about representations, not about things themselves, since in any case the external reality stays self-identical only for an indivisible instant. What should concern us is not the transworld validity, but the translatability of such statements. A proper name is, in this view, a rigid designator of the ‘thingness’ if it is translatable without residue from one language to another. For most proper names, this is not a problem. But there are problematic cases for which it is. For instance, during approximately one fifth of its existence the city now, as well as initially, called St. Petersburg was called ‘Leningrad’. There might have been any number of individuals who were born and died in Leningrad, though this is not an essential property of this city. However, there was the blockade of Leningrad, whereas the blockade of St. Petersburg never happened. In the Soviet Communist cultural world, the happening of this blockade is an essential property of this city, and there are still people with political views that make them continue to call St. Petersburg ‘Leningrad’. This example shows, among other things, that translatability without residue is not a property solely of utterances, but is also determined at least in part by the structural features of the languages between which we translate. Some define more, some less essential properties of the things in question, therefore some can adapt to changes more easily, while for others change presents problems. Similarly, we can imagine possible worlds in which some historical events are not contingent while others are, as well as worlds governed by rigid predestination, in which other possible worlds are not possible. Evidently, the flexibility of
Rein Raud

world-defining rule-sets is a property of the worlds in which they obtain, not of
the reality they build upon.

Conclusion

I have tried to show that identity in a strong sense of the term can be asserted
only of something with itself during an indivisible instant and is therefore not
available to us in experience, which is why all identity statements with which we
can meaningfully operate pertain to the linguistic representations of things, not
to things themselves. This makes them linguistically contingent. In this view,
the problem of the identity of things in linguistically constructed domains of
representations is not unlike the problem of the identity of things in different poss-
able worlds. The analogy discloses the similarity of the positions of ontological
relativism versus actualism and cultural relativism versus linguistic universality.
In my view, by distinguishing clearly between what is asserted of the external
reality and of its representations it is possible to avoid the unwanted corollaries of
either extreme. Neither do we have to admit that an infinite multitude of possible
worlds really exists and people who speak different languages are fundamentally
unable to understand each other precisely, nor that there is only one correct way
of seeing the world and only one correct culture.

References

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**Notes**

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Human beings, religion and deviance: does religiosity create a secure environment for living?

Raul Tiganik, Anne Kull

Abstract. All of the world’s great religions, to varying degrees and with different emphases, both teach and assume the priority of love, compassion, caring, peace and altruistic behaviour. Unfortunately, the dark side of human behaviour must also be included – namely, criminality and behavioural deviance. Deviant behaviour can, but need not, be a crime, but a crime is certainly deviancy. Both are characterised by the fact that they decrease the sense of security and increase the sense of danger both in the individual and in society as a whole.

Criminology has not been as frequent a conversation partner for theology and religious anthropology as might be expected. Different empirical studies have reached conflicting findings on the effects of religion on deviant behaviour. Much more research is needed to establish a correlation, especially as societies and forms of religiosity are changing rapidly, and what is valid in one region at one moment of time, may not be the case later.

Introduction

Human activity is highly diverse. All of the world’s great religions, to varying degrees and with different emphases, both teach and assume the priority of love, compassion, caring, peace and altruistic behaviour. All religions have also recognised that in human existence there is a gap between the created or desired state and the real situation; the present state is characterised using terms like estrangement, sin, evil, suffering, transgression, the fall, stupidity, etc. Unfortunately, the dark side of human behaviour must also be included – namely, criminality and behavioural deviance. Historically, the family, schools, churches, and temples have been considered a safety or a sanctuary zone from violence – these institutions were sanctioned by society to be conveyors of messages of restraint, respect for individual freedom and beliefs, the value of life, and the unconditional love of
Does religiosity create a secure environment for living?

others. Yet a glance at the media news conveys a different picture: school killings, killings in the family and in (or near) churches and mosques are occurring with frightening regularity. These sociopathic acts are beyond the scope of this chapter, but we do need to ask whether they have become more frequent because these social institutions are no longer capable of providing the context and patterns for peaceful and secure coexistence.

Criminology has not been as frequent a conversation partner for theology and religious anthropology as might be expected. In criminology itself, religion seems to be one of the most controversial factors. There may well be an ideological bias against the relevance of religious factors in criminology as well as in some other social sciences. The ideological debate concerning the *raison d’être* of the justice system for violent offenders has continued for more than a century. The magnitude of the problem – the increasing rates of violent crimes and the cost of medical care for victims of violence, lost wages, not to speak of mental afflictions – does not allow us to discount any factor that may influence violence.

Relatively little is known from the psychological perspective about the empirical relationship between religious identification and aggression. That religion has been used to justify aggressive and transgressive behaviour over the course of history, is widely known. Many theorists have also believed that religious practice may reduce aggression and other destructive behaviour. A laboratory-based study by Leach et al (2008, 311–319) indicates that is not the case: religious practices (in their study, reading the Bible and meditating) had no significant influence on aggression. Self-reported religious motivation for pro-social behaviour turned out to be inconsistent with observed and measured aggressive behaviour in the laboratory.

Neuroscientists add another perspective: certain parts of the brain are activated by moral issues (parts of the frontal lobe and the left temporal lobe), the same areas that play an important role in controlling negative emotions such as fear and rage (Newberg & Waldman 2006, 132–167). When the neural circuits involved in moral assessment are injured, one’s ability to interact morally with others can be severely impaired. Moral beliefs play an essential role in suppressing destructive impulses, but there is also a gap between moral beliefs and behaviour. For instance, most people do not believe in lying or cheating, but many easily suspend this belief when selfish concerns arise. Moral beliefs, in turn, are strengthened in people’s minds when an ethical ideal becomes law.

One cannot draw conclusions too quickly here from these empirical studies, as religious and spiritual ideologies are multifaceted and extremely complex phenomena. However, the studies do make it clear that our understanding of the relationship between religious ideology and aggression and other forms of
behavioural deviancy is in its infancy and that more interdisciplinary research is needed to delineate the role of religious motivation.

The obvious question is: what is the function of religion? Social scientific theories tend to locate the origin and function of religion in the non-religious sphere. Religion helps to fulfil one’s needs (for food, health, prosperity, etc.), or it functions as an explanation, fulfilling the need for meaning. Religious studies scholars tend to affirm that human beings need contact with god/the sacred; that is, the function of religion is to fulfil the human need for god/the sacred. An encounter with god/the sacred may yield peace of mind, a healthy and wholesome lifestyle, or other benefits (for example Eliade, van der Leeuw and others). But does religiosity influence deviance? And if it does, is the influence positive or negative? Intuitively, many people feel that religious people must be law-abiding and good citizens, and if they are violent or deviant, their religion is inauthentic or corrupted. There have also been others who assert that “there are fewer criminals where atheists abound” (Lombroso, 139). Schur claims that “organized religion may be held partly responsible for the magnitude of the American crime problem through its frequent support for translating standards of private morality into criminal laws” (Schur, 85–86).

Émile Durkheim’s (1965 [1915]) social control theory is based on the foundational assumption that religion is a basic integrative mechanism for maintaining social order and fostering common beliefs and values among individuals. Max Weber has written that “Social action, which includes both failure to act and passive acceptance, may be oriented to the past, present, or expected future behavior of others” (Weber BCS). Thus it may be motivated by revenge for a past attack, defence against present, or measures of defence against future aggression. The ‘others’ may be known individuals, or may constitute unknown individuals (Weber, 22). Criminality has always been an inevitable companion to humanity. The question of human nature and practical issues, concerning the understanding of criminal behaviour, are of great importance for social and political order. Yet criminologists complain that they do not control their own research object, that the definition of crime is decided by political-legal acts rather than by scientific procedures, and thus usually crime is defined as “behavior in violation of law” (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 3).

The purpose of the present study is to examine answers to the questions: (a) Is religiosity related to deviance? (b) Does religiosity reduce deviance and create a secure environment for living? and (c) When it does, we can ask – how?

In one of the most widely cited articles, “Hellfire and delinquency” (1969) on the effects of religion in criminology, Hirschi and Stark concluded that religiosity does not influence adolescent delinquent behaviour. This conclusion was
based on their findings that church attendance and belief in supernatural sanctions were unrelated to delinquency. Seemingly due to the strengths of aspects of their study method, their findings became the accepted conclusion to a long debate in the literature on the relevance of religiosity to delinquency for many researchers (for example Tittle, Sloane, Brownfield, Burkett and Cochran). For other researchers, however, those findings and conclusions became a catalyst for a resurgence of investigations into potential relationships between religiosity and various forms of delinquency (Brownfield, Newcomb, Burkett, Chadwick, Free, Benda) (Evans et al 1995).

This resurgence of research arose from and has inspired questions regarding conditions under which any relationship between religiosity and deviance are observed: (a) Are there differential effects of religion on various forms of unlawful behaviour? (b) Are the effects of religiosity on unlawful acts mediated by those of more important factors? and (c) Does religion insulate youth from unlawful deeds only among those who are regularly exposed to religious doctrine? A major generalisation found in the literature is that religion is relevant only to minor offenses such as underage alcohol consumption or use of tobacco for which there are clear religious proscriptions, whereas societal norms and sanctions are inconsistent or ambiguous. Finally, it is generally agreed that religion deters unlawful actions only among people who are regularly inculcated with religious doctrine.

The present study is based on the assumption that these generalisations in the literature regarding the effects of religion on unlawful activity are largely, if not entirely, the result of using single-item measures of religion such as church attendance and ratings of the importance of religion in one's life. Church attendance is often a product of social control; it is a result of expectations or pressure and a desire to avoid eternal damnation, and ratings of religion are too prone to 'socially acceptable' responses. It is assumed that church attendance is closely analogous to classroom attendance in its relationship with personal conviction or motivation to learn and practice what is taught; however, attendance in either setting is a superficial indicator of performance, albeit attendance is necessary for many people for performance. However, other dimensions of religiosity also have to be taken into account, especially the level of internalisation of religious prescriptions and self-reflexivity, the efficacy of religious formation, the structure of 'moral community', attachment and bonding, co-operation and mutual aid, conflict resolution, and awareness of and responsiveness to group rules or norms. As with college courses, attendance is an aspect of the experience; however, the effects of attendance pale in comparison to application of the principles taught, such as regular prayer, Bible study, and efforts to convert others, in the case of religion.
Deviance or crime

Deviance is a much more common phenomenon in human society than one may suspect. Noticing and acknowledging deviance depends on how we define deviance. Following narrow definitions of deviance, the hypothetical observer will find very little deviance in society, and small deviant behaviours will hardly cause any trauma or affliction. If this observer extends the scope of the term and perceives as deviance any kind of deviation from the norm, established by a given community, then we can assume that the hypothetical observer finds him/herself in the situation where s/he is surrounded only by the deviants and his/her sense of safety is lost or at least endangered. Defining deviance in such a wide sense, the definition may turn very hazy and subjective; therefore we need criteria to keep the term as unequivocal as possible. Erich Goode claims that in speaking of deviance we have to ascertain the presence of four elements; if these elements are missing, we have to find some other term instead of deviance to describe a person’s action. These elements are:

1. the presence of a rule or a norm which is violated;
2. the presence of a person who violates (or intends to violate) this rule or norm;
3. the presence of a public who evaluates the violation of the norm; and
4. the presence of a public who expresses disapproval (Goode, 2005, 24).

Crime is a different matter in the important sense that it is more clearly defined than deviance, and both can be united under a general theory of behaviour. Still, one has to recall that the term ‘criminality’ can be used in practical terms only for those human societies in which a certain level of organisation and development has been achieved. An act is defined as a crime only by law, following the principle nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege.

We apply a legalistic definition of crime – crime is an act which, according to a valid criminal or other code, is defined as a punishable act. For a natural person the main punishment is a monetary fine or imprisonment. Law can be secular or religious in its origin. Archaeology has been successful in providing knowledge about ancient societies. The laws are upheld by the king as part of his duty of governance. The Bible portrays Solomon as the ideal monarch and judge. There were also local judiciaries (village elders, town councils). And there were specially appointed judges who presumably took their authority from the king or from the central government. Yet, in ancient Israel priests appear to play a larger role than judges. The ultimate authority of the laws was seen as coming from God. Sometimes lex talionis (a law of retaliation) by which the guilty party suffers the same harm as that experienced by the injured party is seen as a summary of biblical law. In biblical as in modern law the primary example of retaliation is capital
punishment for a judgment of murder. The classical formulation of retaliation in biblical law is “life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burning for burning, wound for wound, stripe for stripe” (Exod. 21:23–25). This text is popularly quoted as “an eye for an eye (and a tooth for a tooth)”, following Matt. 5:38. Compensation or fine is also a very early concept. In biblical law there are also important principles: only the guilty person can be punished (no vicarious retaliation) – “everyone will be put to death for his own sin” (Deut. 24:16) and “there should be one law for you; as for the alien, so for the native, for I am the Lord your God” (Lev. 24:22). Driver and Miles wrote that “the whole system of punishments among the Semites was based on talion, which is itself nothing but a legalised limitation of the vengeance of the blood-feud” (Driver & Miles 1952, 60), although more recent studies claim that blood-feud is hardly the background of biblical or the Ancient Near Eastern law (Huffmon 1992, 321–322).

Thus, deviant behaviour can but need not be a crime, but a crime is certainly deviancy. Both are characterised by the fact that they decrease the sense of security and increase the sense of danger both in the individual and in society as a whole.

How are these two terms related to religion? At first sight the relationship may not be obvious, but it does exist and may even be strong. We can divide this relationship into two sub-themes: “religion and the deviancy”, and “religion as a deviancy” In one case religion and deviancy are set against each other, in the other case religion itself requires deviancy from the norms and accepted behaviours in society. The last situation is more common in a society that is highly secular, relatively closed and in which its members consider religion and followers of a religion something alien. In this case a strange situation arises in which according to Goode’s elements the three last elements are certainly present although it is difficult to establish the first. Specifically, objectively there is no rule or norm which has been violated, that is, there is no legally binding norm, for in most contemporary states at least officially freedom of various religions is accepted. The fact that there is no legal norm does not automatically guarantee that an act or behaviour could not be perceived as deviant. We have to look for the norm elsewhere: we have to look for informal rules and establish the informal rules that are followed in a given society, community, or group. Thus it is useful before going for a trip to a foreign country to make oneself familiar with the information accessible from the homepage of the destination’s foreign ministry, and it is also useful to find additional information either from the newspapers, friends, or the Internet to avoid unexpected conflicts when an innocent tourist finds him/herself in the territory between the two codes. Which code to follow depends of the situation, because both choices (pro formal or pro informal code) can bring
about the perception that the tourist is behaving deviantly and sanctions should be meted out. Sometimes even being well informed does not help, for a contingency may take one into an environment where s/he will be considered deviant or different from the norm and such situations can end tragically, as happened in 2007 with a British college girl who was beaten to death for dressing differently in the opinion of a youth gang (Ashford 2011). The young victim was aware that her dressing style did not follow ‘mainstream’ fashion but the awareness did not help her because it is impossible to foresee all informal rules of all possible small groups and the chance of meeting an aggressive group.

In some societies a religious person may be considered a deviant just because she or he is a follower of a religion (for example the Jehovah’s Witnesses in many countries) or behaves or dresses in accordance with requirements of the chosen religion. If there are many such so-called deviants (and if they do not form the majority), the community may begin to feel endangered, their sense of security decreases or disappears, and it may start behaving as Weber predicted: the social activity of the community will be oriented towards the presumed future behaviour of the deviants. The community will attempt to reduce the risk to their security, to fend off the presumed danger to the community and to its formal and informal norms. Security measures may vary, from ignoring the strangers to ridicule or physical assault. In a secular country like Estonia, at the beginning of the 21st century (and particularly in the spring-summer of 2003) discussion over religious education in schools did not end in physical violence but certainly a lot of labelling and ridiculing accompanied this discussion (Valk 2011).

**Religion and deviance**

Several studies have been conducted in recent decades to find out whether religion inhibits or promotes criminality (or perhaps it does not have any effect on deviant behaviour) and if there is an effect, what that effect is.

When we talk about religion, what exactly are we talking about? This raises the issue of definition and also of methodology: how do we measure religiosity? While there are hundreds of definitions of religion, perhaps the most commonly quoted is offered by Clifford Geertz. According to Geertz, religion is

(1) a system of symbols which act to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that (5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic (Geertz 1973, 90).
Does religiosity create a secure environment for living?

What unifies religion with other social acts and organisations are the physical/ritualistic and verbal behaviour, the concerns with good or correct action, the desire to achieve certain goals or effects, and the establishment and perpetuation of communities. What distinguishes religion is the object or focus of these actions, namely, typically supernatural beings or forces with which humans are understood to be in relation. Religion fills the individual’s psychological or emotional needs, and it offers explanations and solutions. For the present purpose, religions are significant sources of rules and norms. Religion can also be a means of social control. A large part of religion is about what we should do, how we should live. Kinship and political and social institutions (family structures, peer groups, professional groups, police, etc.) provide a measure of social control. However, the limitation of this kind of social control is obvious: human agents of social control cannot be everywhere and cannot see everything, and the rewards and punishments they can mete out are finite, e.g. they cannot continue to reward or punish you after you die (Eller 2007, 9–11).

Since Durkheim, religiosity has often been identified with social control theory. For Durkheim, when the group celebrates or worships its spirits or gods, it is really representing or symbolising its society to itself (Durkheim 1965, 257). The central premise of control theory is that bonding to others promotes social and personal control over natural aggressive impulses (Kornhauser, Nettler). The initial or primary element in which bonding forms is attachment to caregivers, which fosters acceptance of the caregivers’ supervision, normative beliefs, and religion. Secure attachment to caregivers also enhances a sense of self-worth (Rosenberg, Benda). Attachment, supervision, normative beliefs, religiosity, and self-esteem are theorised to be elements of bonding that induce control over natural impulses to release feelings of aggression. In contrast, the experience of maltreatment in childhood or adolescence weakens the formation of close attachment to others (Sampson, Laub) and thereby lessens the inhibitory affect of attachment in violence (Brezina, Benda) (in Benda & Toombs 2000, 483–496).

However, social religion is not only about control or celebration. It is also creative: it creates social integration and cohesion; it establishes a moral community with common norms, values, and morals, with shared identity and shared interests.

Designing studies with sufficient numbers and adequate controls can be problematic both for research in criminology and in religious studies. It is difficult to recruit and randomise subjects; both prayer and crime are often private, silent, or disguised as social interactions, or some other kind of rational activity. Moreover, there are many possible measures of religiousness. Subjects who score highly in one dimension may not necessarily score highly in others, for example an individual may feel s/he is very religious (subjective measure) but s/he may score
poorly in other or more objective measures (for example low participation in formal church, synagogue, mosque activities). Thus organisational religiosity can be measured by noting the frequency of church attendance, or reading religious scriptures and prayer over a period of time. In the case of subjective religiosity it is much more risky to try to establish a true cause-and-effect relationship, and even the direction of causality is not always clear.

Religions are affected by the local environment. Different religions hold different social statuses in different countries at different times. Religions often influence behaviour and lifestyle: while religions can account for both stress and anxiety, they can also account for peace of mind and forgiveness – on the one hand, one may expect a rise in deviancy, while on the other, a lowering of the rates of retaliation, violent acts, etc. Because religious precepts often also regulate consumption of alcohol and drugs, lower incidence of deviant acts is expected and deaths caused by alcohol and drug use should be less than in the general population. Religion can play a role in preventing risky sexual behaviour (Lee & Newberg 2005).

We can agree with the arguments that religiosity and deviance are not yet studied thoroughly and the reason for this may be in the origins of modern criminology: a positivistic discipline could not take into account the religious factor. At the same time, over the recent decades there has been an increasing number of studies on many different levels. One can cite, for instance, a meta-study by Byron Johnson, Spencer De Li, David Larson and Michael McCullough who found 40 articles, published between January 1985 and December 1997 in different scientific journals. Of these 40 studies, only one found that religion fosters crime, 75% demonstrated that religion inhibits crime, and 25% demonstrated inconclusive results including five studies, or 12.5%, which said that there is no effect at all on crime (Johnson et al 2000, 42).

An interesting question has also been which kind of deviant behaviour does religion impact the most? Does religion deter delinquency or not? Paul Higgins and Gary Albrecht found a moderate negative relationship between church attendance and delinquent behaviour. They differentiated between 17 types of delinquent behaviour (see Figure 1, created by Raul Tiganik, using the data collected by Higgins and Albrecht, and published by them in 1977; the acts are in simplified, descriptive language, not in legal terms). Church attendance had the strongest negative impact on use of narcotic substances and thefts, and the weakest impact on running away from home and fights.

Although many studies have tried to demonstrate that religiosity may decrease deviant behaviour, it is not unambiguously clear. Taking just as an example the statistics of Great Britain in June 2008, we see that of 83,200 imprisoned
Does religiosity create a secure environment for living?

Figure 1. Relationship between church attendance and delinquent behaviour

Values range from -1 (100% negative association, or perfect inversion) to +1 (100% positive association, or perfect agreement). A value of zero would indicate the absence of association. The correlation index between the frequency of church attendance and various delinquent behaviours showed a modest to moderately strong negative relationship.

Figure 1 shows the relationship between church attendance and delinquent behaviour, with values ranging from -1 (perfect negative association) to +1 (perfect positive association). A value of zero indicates no association.

-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0
-0.51 Used narcotics
-0.49 Stole things over $10
-0.49 Drank alcoholic beverage
-0.46 Bought alcoholic beverage
-0.44 Sold narcotics
-0.38 Skipped school
-0.31 Destroyed property worth over $10
-0.31 Car theft
-0.31 Reckless or fast driving
-0.29 Came home later than midnight
-0.29 Used force to get money from someone
-0.26 Driving car without a license
-0.25 Hard to handle at home
-0.24 Sniffed glue
-0.23 Carried a knife, razor, etc.
-0.22 Fight
-0.21 Ran away from home

people only 33% were not adherents of a religion; 28% were Anglicans, 17% Roman Catholics, 12% Muslims (OMCS 2008). The prisons are full of people whose religious commitments have not kept them out of deviant behaviour. Data from the year 2001 showed that 31% were non-religious, 37% were Anglicans, 17% were Roman Catholics, and Muslims were 8% of total number of confined persons (OMCS 2008). The ratio of religious to non-religious people is almost constant, 67–69% of prisoners are adherents of a religion. As mentioned before, some researchers do find that religion decreases behavioural deviancy, but the question still remains why the number of deviant (and in this case, criminal) people among the religious is so big. There is no single answer to this question. We refer to some studies that have attempted to explain this phenomenon.

First, Travis Hirschi and Rodney Stark summarise their conclusions with hard words in their article “Hellfire and delinquency”:

[Further text would be added here about the studies and conclusions mentioned.]
The church is irrelevant to delinquency because it fails to instill in its members love for their neighbors and because belief in the possibility of pleasure and pain in another world cannot now, and perhaps never could, compete with the pleasures and pains of everyday life (Hirschi & Stark 1969).

In a simplified manner, then, as long as people cannot touch the evidence nor develop absolute faith in paradise or hell, we cannot count on the positive effect of religion to prevent deviant behaviour. These conclusions challenged common sense and disturbed social scientists, and several new studies were designed. Some of these confirmed fully or partly Hirschi’s and Stark’s findings, others found strong support for the conventional hypothesis. Nobody was happy with the seemingly ambiguous result: sometimes religion inhibits crime and sometimes not. In 1996 Stark presented an updated hypothesis: “Religious individuals will be less likely than those who are not religious to commit delinquent acts, but only in communities where the majority of people are actively religious” (Stark 1996, 165). Sociologically, religiousness is a property of a group, not of an individual, and thus one has to consider data ecologically or sociologically. Geography matters: relatively unchurched areas do not find expression for the ‘hellfire effect’, while studies carried out in other regions do.

Secondly, Charles Tittle and Michael Welch discovered in their study “Religiosity and deviance: toward a contingency theory of constraining effects” that religiosity has the strongest effect on an individual’s normative behaviour if four conditions are fulfilled in their society: (1) general normative ambiguity, (2) low social integration, (3) generalised perceptions of low peer conformity and (4) a relatively high proportion of people who are not religious. These four characteristics are present in the disorganisation of a secular society. The non-religious section of society usually does not form a distinct localised community, so it is also difficult to investigate. But the question arises as to why religion is more influential in the secular and unorganised society. Tittle and Welch think that religion’s ability to encourage obedience has an important and strong impact on the behaviour of an individual, but religion is not the only factor – obedience can be achieved by other means. Tittle and Welch thus claim that religiosity influences behaviour only in large societies that lack the usual mechanisms to restrict criminal behaviour (Tittle & Welch 1983, 674). That is, a non-religious state with a strong control mechanism can achieve significant results in the regulation of deviant behaviour, although it is doubtful that the members of such a society would like to live there because of the total control exercised over their social life.

Thirdly, while Tittle and Welch state that religion has a strong influence on an individual’s behaviour, they do not identify the exact mechanism of this effect.
Does religiosity create a secure environment for living?

Harold Grasmick, Robert Bursik, and John Cochran found in their study\(^9\) that the effect of religion can be elucidated through psychological phenomena which are found in feelings of ‘shame’ and ‘embarrassment’ (Grasmick et al 1991). In brief, shame is self-imposed and embarrassment is socially imposed. They elaborated that both terms have to be kept apart, as shame originates from the person’s inner world of feelings, while embarrassment originates from the person’s social relations and activities. Consistent with expectations and their hypothesis, attending church services correlates with the feeling of embarrassment, and the level/depth of religiosity and religion’s importance in a person’s life influences the emergence of the sense of shame. At the same time Grasmick et al concluded that through the inward sense of shame, religion will influence the person in a positive (non-deviant) direction and increase obedience to the legal norms. The sense of embarrassment has a somewhat smaller impact on deviancy (op cit, 261). It was also found that age inversely correlates with the risk of behaving in a reprehensible way, for with age feelings of shame and embarrassment grow (op cit, 262).

In short, Grasmick et al found that religiosity may deter violations of law, and their findings support the claim that importance of religion (intrinsic religion, depth of religiosity) and church attendance (extrinsic religious orientation) must be discussed on different levels, for these are specific dimensions of religiosity, although both are also influential separately, i.e. shame and embarrassment influence a person’s inclination to transgress. The inner or intrinsic religiosity or importance of religion produces a bigger effect than the extrinsic religiosity (or attending worship services or other religious events) in reduction of illegal behaviour. Shame is more effective in reducing crime than embarrassment – the inner aspect is more important than the extrinsic (Grasmick et al 1991, 263).

Fourth, Travis Hirschi suggests in his monograph *Causes of Delinquency* that belief is one factor that decreases delinquency (Hirschi 2004, 26). In his discussion at this point, belief is not just a religious belief but belief in a wider sense. If a person believes in the validity of the norms and legal system, no doubt it is less probable that the person will violate the rules s/he believes in. Hirschi uses here the term ‘belief’ rather in the sense that it is used in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Article 9 – Freedom of thought, conscience and religion,\(^{10}\) where the term ‘belief’ is used in a wide sense, referring to any kind of belief, be it religious, moral, scientific, or other kinds of beliefs. The term ‘belief’ is distinguished from the term ‘religion’: it includes individual convictions which may or may not be religious. It must be emphasised that the court considers the difference important (Kokk 2003, 211). While the term is interpreted differently in the religious and human rights context, the difference does not reduce the importance of religion in the formation
and development of a person’s ethical convictions. This is also in agreement with Hirschi’s discussion of the importance of the values in which a person could believe and, in turn, the fact that belief in these values will lead to a decrease in the commission of deviant acts.

Thus we can say that although it is not exactly clear how religiosity reduces deviant behaviour, religion is perceived as a factor that makes people conform with socially appropriate behaviour; religion also offers some mechanisms that influence a person to behave in conformity with laws. However, sometimes religiosity may be perceived as deviant or it may actually become deviant itself.

**Religion as deviance**

Religion as such can become deviant in two main ways: it is proclaimed deviant by public authority (formal social control) or it contradicts the informal norms in the given society. Both things can happen simultaneously, and in this case we see cults or sects that practice destructive mind control.

Destructive mind control can be recognised with the help of Robert Lifton’s eight criteria:

1. Controlled environment (no contacts with former friends or relatives, nor access to media);
2. Manipulation using mysticism;
3. The demand for purity, i.e. especially difficult rules of behaviour, transgression of which is understood as sin;
4. Overemphasising confession, i.e. all thoughts, emotions, etc., belong to the community and must be shared with fellow believers;
5. Sacred science, i.e. doctrines or teachings of the sect express the supreme morality and are absolutely scientific, leaving no space for doubt;
6. Careful selections of words, i.e. use of expressions which should be understandable only to the adept; skilful rhetoric;
7. The principle that doctrine is superior to the human being;
8. Belief that members of the group or sect have the right to live, while others (critics, dissidents, etc.) do not.

Lifton adds that although some of these characteristics are typical to many groups, the groups that exhibit all eight characteristics are involved in destructive mind control (Lifton 1961 in Hassan 2003, 76–77). James Patten specifies that authoritative people use combined control over individuals or groups, that is, they possess and combine normative power in their status as priests with charismatic personal power. Such charismatic people can be founders of successful religious organisations (Patten 1978, 107).
Does religiosity create a secure environment for living?

Rodney Stark and William Bainbridge mention the options that have been used in certain societies: religion as the cause of mental illness or religion as mental illness, and thus as deviance. This so-called mental illness needs to be treated by professional health care providers, for example various therapies were tried in mental asylums in the former Soviet Union. In the end, Stark and Bainbridge claim that “there is no evidence at all that religion produces madness, and the diagnosis of religious insanity seems more an expression of prejudices of psychiatric infidels than it is a scientific judgement” (Stark & Bainbridge, 1996, 154–155). Both sociology and psychiatry draw conclusions that do not define religiosity as illness, although people still use the label ‘religious maniac/fanatic/lunatic’ to describe people who publicly profess their beliefs. Use of these labels could indicate that in the informal system of norms religiosity can still be considered deviancy, despite the fact that a religious individual is not officially defined as ‘mad’.

Does religion and deviance data cause problems?

Quantitative research requires exact and well-defined measures. Especially in the older research, religiosity was defined in a general manner, as a term that includes spirituality, forgiveness, and commitment to religious acts. Most often only frequency of church attendance was taken into account.

Johnson and others enquired as to what measures of religiousness have been used most frequently in different studies. The most popular dimensions were “salience” with 85%, then the previously mentioned “attendance” with 65%, “prayer” with 35%, “religious activities” with 27.5%, and “Bible study” and “denomination” both with 22.5% (Johnson et al, 2000, 43).

Although there has been valid criticism of this choice of measures (for example that the choice reflects the researchers’ Protestant bias), the following six dimensions of religiosity are considered most often in various studies: (1) attendance at religious activities, (2) salience or importance of God to one’s self, (3) denomination, (4) frequency of prayer, (5) Bible studies, (6) religious activities outside of church (Butts et al, 2003).

Some sceptics say that it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to measure religiosity and that these six criteria are reductionist. There is another breed of sceptic, those who say that it is impossible to study religion’s impact on deviance because real believers do not commit crimes and those who do violate the laws are not real believers. They do not recognise that a religious person him/herself can appear deviant (either according to formal or informal norms).

Measures of religiosity can be difficult to establish. However, problems also arise with defining infringement of the law, especially when transgressions are
listed in a laconic form on questionnaires. Many studies expect respondents
to answer questions about breaking the law sincerely, i.e. frank confessions are
expected. Yet we would be justified in doubting the respondents’ sincerity if the
responses were to cause feelings of shame or force respondents to recall events
they perhaps did not want to admit to, even to themselves. For instance, thefts,
drug use and much other behaviour may require quite a lot of courage to confess,
even anonymously. The anonymity of questionnaires might be a sufficient incentive (although it is not a guarantee of sincere responses).

For years it has been noted that different empirical studies reach conflicting
findings on the effects of religion on deviant behaviour. Paul Higgins and Gary
Albrecht suggested three possibilities that might explain the different results.
These are: (1) differently defined terms, (2) measurements of delinquent behav-
ior, (3) context or regions where data are collected. Simply put, if in one area
there is no relationship between attending church and delinquent behaviour,
then it does not mean that in another area, even in the same state, the findings
will be the same (Higgins & Albrecht 1977, 957). We, the authors of this chapter,
would also like to add the time factor. Societies are constantly changing and it is
important to pay attention to the date of the research. Behaviours and beliefs that
were attractive in the 1980s, may not be emotionally or intellectually interesting
at the beginning of the 21st century. Thus one and the same question can receive
a different response at different moments.

We can observe that determination and collection of data are of crucial im-
portance in quantitative studies, and research on religion and deviancy is no
exception.

Conclusion

Bridging the divide between criminological and religious research can be chal-
lenging. There is some evidence that religion may provide benefits for crime
prevention and social order. Religion may bring social and emotional support,
motivation, and may promote a healthy lifestyle. However, religion can also be a
source of stress and strain, although establishing cause-and-effect relationships is
still difficult and much more research needs to be conducted. The problem is also
partly due to the disciplinary divide: criminologists are not familiar with religious
studies, theologies, the psychology of religion, etc., and vice versa. Religions
may be global (as are all the major world religions), but they take their specific
form locally. Different religions hold different statuses in different places. The
acquisition of ‘moods and motivations’ for non-deviant behavior entails learn-
ing the appropriate attitudes and feelings in a given society. In a secular society
Does religiosity create a secure environment for living?

where people’s minds, bodies, habits, and sentiments are not trained and attuned to religious dimensions of reality, we cannot count on religious affiliation to be a strong weapon in the battle against crime or to create a safe environment for living. In the modern secular world, especially in Estonia, it is not possible to count on religion when we talk about the struggle against crime. However, the responsibility for rehabilitation and the work to guide change have been partly placed on the shoulders of religious communities both in the USA and Europe (including Estonia). While there are numerous studies on the neurophysiological effects of various religious (and non-religious) practices, a lot more research is needed to establish how religion influences the human mind. Religion and criminology have good reasons for serious dialogue as both are concerned with the human being and societal wellbeing. Thomas O’Connor, Jeff Duncan and Frank Quillard suggested that,

Authentic faith development can make a significant contribution to humanizing prisons, and the process of desistence from crime for some people, but only in so far as that faith development supports and aligns with the evidence-based or “what works” principles of effective correctional programs (O’Connor et al 2006).

As for Estonia, we do not have relevant statistics, for our Ministry of Justice and penal system do not collect data about the religious affiliation of the inmates. We note with regret that one interesting period to study the relationship between religion and crime in Estonia is lost. That period extended from the 1980s to the early 1990s. At the end of that period Estonia emerged from a totalitarian and actively antireligious system, which had guaranteed social order without the contributions of religion. Our society stepped into the new epoch where we lost firm order, and religion initially gained a lot of new supporters even at the state level. However, the status of a believer had changed in the society, and soon a believer in some traditional religion became again a synonym for fanatic or madman, or perhaps a person who had suffered some misfortune. In this respect, Soviet antireligious propaganda was successful. Penal systems and religious organisations, however, are working together today in the form of prison chaplaincy, and thus we need to think about the goals and gifts of both systems. Criminology may be a secular field but as human beings, criminologists are interested in understanding another human being from the psychological perspective, as well as in behaviour. Religious communities can offer their insights, as well as remind policy makers of values such as compassion, love, hope, goodness, and truth. Policy makers, in turn, can always insist that religious chaplains, while adhering to their own
goals and values, respect also the methods and goals of the penal system. In the end, both sides are interested in living in a safe environment where the fullness of what it means to be human can be discussed.

**Internet sources**


**References**


Does religiosity create a secure environment for living?


Notes


1 One can think of numerous studies by Brent B. Benda, Nancy J. Toombs, David T. Evans et al from the 1990s onwards.

2 The following could be seen as an example of a too wide definition: “We define deviant behavior as behavior which violates institutionalized expectations – that is, expectations which are shared and recognized as legitimate within a social system” (Cohen 1959, 462).

3 This has been the purpose of Gottfredson's and Hirschi's (1990) book.

4 No crime or punishment without legislation (trans. from Latin).

5 The major law collections of the Ancient Near East are the Codes of Urnamma, Lipit-Ishtar, Hammurapi, the Laws of Eshnunna, the Middle Assyrian Laws, the Hittite Laws, plus numerous fragments of laws and other legal compositions. The Bible preserves several significant collections of laws: the Decalogue, the Covenant Code, the Holiness Code, and the Deuteronomic laws. These collections have been identified as literary units by modern scholars (the ancient writers did not label these).

6 The same division is also used by Stark and Bainbridge (1996).

7 Whether such a society is conducive to a sense of security or not is another question. In this chapter we do not discuss this problem and do not evaluate such societies.

8 Criminology is the scientific study of the nature, extent, causes, and control of criminal behaviour in both the individual and in society. It is an interdisciplinary field, drawing especially upon the research of sociologists and psychologists, as well as on writings in law.

9 Their sample included 12.8% non-believers, 8.2% Catholics and 79% Protestants.

10 “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, and to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. [...] Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others” (ECHR, Article 9).

11 We noted the importance of the feelings of shame and embarrassment in human psyche earlier in this chapter.

12 For example as discussed by James W. Fowler (1981) (note by the authors).
Unfortunately, this image is not available in open access version due to copyright restrictions.

Jüri Palm “Must ja hõbe” (“Black and Silver”) 1967.
Lithography, embossing, paper. 62 x 49 cm.
The collective powers of religion: scholarly interpretations and vernacular dialogue

Art Leete

Abstract. In this chapter I aim to analyse comparatively anthropological approaches to religion from the perspective of collective and individual characteristics. I also attempt to explore scholarly and vernacular discourses concerning several important aspects of Pentecostal and Charismatic (P&C) Christianity, such as morals, mission and narrative strategies. In my research I compare characteristic research strategies, applied to explain Christian religious identities and processes during different decades of the modern anthropological tradition. I demonstrate how these approaches can be applied to my fieldwork data from the Komi Republic, Russia. I studied how global features of P&C Christianity are adapted in local communities and how local traditions resist internationally shared Christian ideas and morals. Finally, I discuss the ways in which anthropological scholarly writings on Christianity can be put into a dialogue with relevant vernacular understanding. My study reveals that relationship between anthropological research on religion and vernacular expressions of faith is ambivalent. Scholars become more skilled in observation and discover multiple locally distinctive features in P&C Christian communities worldwide. At the same time, collective and global qualities of Christian faith are normally emphasised by the believers. From my research I can reveal that scholarly investigations and vernacular ideologies develop at a different pace but stay in conditional dialogue. Anthropological studies develop rather quickly and new conceptual frames and focus points replace earlier ones in a dynamic way. People recognise their religiosity as much more stable if compared to changing understandings presented by scholars. These two cognitive communities are not blocked from each other as a result of this development. There is still ground for negotiation on the understanding of Christian morals, mission and language use between scholars and P&C believers.
Introduction

A hundred years ago, Émile Durkheim determined collective powers of religion through the notions of ideal moral life and perfect society. Later scholarly discourse has employed further ideas concerning the collective dimension in connection to spiritual ambitions. However, this kind of approach concentrates mainly on ecclesial believers. It does not have the same heuristic value for analysis of behavioural strategies of people whose religious commitment is vaguer.

Studying the collective aspects of religious identity is in accord with self-identification of the dominant majority of Evangelical believers. Although believers stress a personal relationship with God, religious commitment is mainly of a communal character. Furthermore, individual conversion narratives and religious experiences are often shared through negotiations inside a congregation and designed through collectively adopted narrative strategies, thus becoming significantly similar to each other. One can easily notice that collective aspects of Evangelical faith are reasonably important but, at the same time, their interplay with individual features of religious experience is rather complicated.

In the course of anthropological studies, earlier texts seem to have a hidden authority over later research; one must admit that the latter avoids overgeneralisations more effectively. Research will always perpetuate shadows of the initial meta-thoughts, even if a particular approach is directed to the analysis of details.

The anthropology of religion has been consolidated to a coherent sub-discipline only recently, during the last couple of decades (see Robbins 2004; 2007; Cannell 2006; Hann & Goltz 2010). Earlier anthropological research on Christianity was fragmentary and mainly related to specific questions without distinguishing the domain as a particular field for anthropological investigations. Only in the 1990s did Christianity become one of the central topics in anthropology (see, for example Comaroff & Comaroff 1991). The shift of focus to Christianity in anthropology is inspired by general strategic concentration on more individual aspects of culture and the search for potentially heuristic aspects of culture in phenomena that had been ignored or underemphasised by earlier researchers. The interplay of the collective and individual aspects of religion (and Evangelical Christianity in particular) are worth further exploration.

In this chapter I attempt to demonstrate how elements of earlier research on religion can be found in reflections of the later dynamics of scientific and vernacular discourse. These transformed reappearances of initial discourses are embodied in the strategic modelling of textual practices of more recent scholars. A strategic shift from research emphasis on collective aspects of religious life to individual features involves the appearance of a multi-layered analytic approach.
while the former dominants of research have not disappeared but rather continue to provide ground for cognitive dialogue. I concentrate my approach on the collective values of religion by analysing the degree of coherence between Émile Durkheim’s concept of religion as a powerful force that determines social integrity, and some examples of later research on the Pentecostal and Charismatic (P&C) Protestants. I also provide some insights into my ethnographic fieldwork data concerning P&C Protestant groups in the Republic of Komi, Russia. Finally, I attempt to analyse comparatively approaches to monolithic aspects of Christianity (Harvey Whitehouse (2006) uses the term ‘monolithic’ in order to characterise systematic, authoritative, and context-free knowledge as well as moral imperative applied in Christian missionary conduct and vernacular discourse of faith) as they appear in my fieldwork experience.

**Émile Durkheim’s legacy**

Durkheim defines religion through “collective powers” that promote the moral life of a presumably perfect society and establish ideal standards for people. This perfect society is nurtured by religion but cannot be found in real life.

The powers they bring into play are, above all, spiritual, and their primary function is to act upon moral life. In this way, we understand that what was done in the name of religion cannot have been done in vain, for it is necessarily the society of men, it is humanity, that has reaped the fruits.

It may be asked, exactly what society is it that in this way becomes the substrate of religious life? Is it the real society, such as it exists and functions before our eyes, with the moral and juridical organization that it has toiled to fashion for itself over the course of history? But that society is full of flaws and imperfections. In that society, good rubs shoulders with evil, injustice is ever on the throne, and truth is continually darkened by error. How could a being so crudely made inspire the feelings of love, ardent enthusiasm, and willing self-sacrifice that all the religions demand of their faithful? Those perfect beings that are the gods cannot have taken their traits from such a mediocre, sometimes even base, reality.

Would it not be instead the perfect society, in which justice and truth reigned, and from which evil in all its forms was uprooted? No one disputes that this perfect society has a close relationship to religious sentiment, for religions are said to aim at realizing it. However, this society is not an empirical fact, well defined and observable; it is a fancy, a dream with which men have lulled their miseries but have never experienced in reality. It is a mere idea...
that expresses in consciousness our more or less obscure aspirations toward
the good, the beautiful, and the ideal. These aspirations have their roots in
us; since they come from the very depths of our being, nothing outside us
can account for them. Furthermore, in and of themselves, they are already
religious; hence, far from being able to explain religion, the ideal society
presupposes it (Durkheim 1995 [1912], 422–423).

Thus, according to Durkheim, spiritual powers possess a number of principal
qualities that are mainly ideal. These powers shape people’s moral lives and serve
as a foundation for a perfect society. Durkheim argues that the important meth-
odological issue is that by its holistic intentions religion serves as a powerful
integrative force for a society. In Durkheim’s view, the total collective powers of
religion are actually never realised. Those serve as a motivational standard but
stay in the background or constitute a semi-hidden establishment, a somehow
indistinct conceptual framework of actual social practices. Religious issues can
be discussed but never applied in practice in the same general way that they are
positioned in discourse.

Religion continuously adds some value to a society; it covers a real society
with a carpet of perfect dreams. These idealist conceptual discourses are real in
the way in which religion will be manifested in believers. The P&C Christians
try to apply these ideal principles of religion in real life, and one may argue how
complete is the detachment of the perfect moral life from the real one.

Durkheim is one of the foundational sociologists/anthropologists whose
views have influenced later research to a remarkable degree. In particular, the
overall tendency of how to treat religious topics was settled by this early research
(see Pyysiäinen 2003, 74; Cannell 2006, 2–3, 8; Hann 2007, 396–397; Hann &
Goltz 2010, 5–6). The tendency to approach the Christian religion as globally
oriented is derived naturally from the overall Christian message itself and the fact
that early research on Christianity emphasises this feature is most predictable.
But how is this overall collective tendency reflected in later research?

Two views on the principles of
the P&C Christians’ social-religious program

Pentecostals are today the most rapidly growing Protestant denomination in the
world. One of the issues of their social success is related to their claim to enforce
collective powers of religion to step from the ideal, to the real, life.

I have chosen here two approaches for discussion. First, I shall look at an
earlier study by Elaine Lawless (1983). Lawless’ paper was published before the
anthropology of Christianity became an established branch of scholarly enterprise. Thus her approach is not influenced by conventions that tend to be evoked when a large number of scholars focus on a scientific problem simultaneously.

Another study I bring into play is Joel Robbins’ article about the globalisation of Pentecostal and Charismatic Christianity (Robbins 2004). Robbins is a major figure in the field of the anthropological study of Christianity who faces the issue that really a lot is written about P&C Christianity. In order to make new sense of the field, Robbins provides a critical analysis of scholarly discourse that takes several prominent ideas about the P&C Christians for granted (see Robbins 2010).

Lawless concentrates on analysis of the ways in which the collective spiritual powers of Pentecostalism appear in the behavioural strategies and material culture of believers. Particularly, Lawless points out that dressing style has distinctive purposes for the Pentecostals. This may not be valid from a more global perspective, but we must take into account the fact that everything she describes is related to the period before the latest wave of globalisation of Pentecostalism, which started in the 1990s (see Robbins 2004; Cannell 2006). In Lawless’ view, the Pentecostals’ self-understanding is very much embodied in their overall appearance:

Pentecostals are associated with poor people everywhere who wear old clothes out of necessity and who do not sport fashionable hair-styles because of a lack of opportunity or sophistication. But for the adherents of Pentecostalism, dress embodies an entire complex of notions about “holiness” and what a Pentecostal man or woman represents to the rest of the world and to fellow Pentecostals (Lawless 1983, 87).

Lawless emphasises that Pentecostal dress serves as a statement to other Pentecostals that “the believer is willing to sacrifice all notions of fashion for notions of holiness.” According to the Pentecostals, this “sacrifice is the most admirable by the Lord” (Lawless 1983, 88). In addition, rejection of dressing fashions and other issues of American everyday amusement are integrated into the Pentecostals’ missionary agenda.

The life of a “Saint” (a Pentecostal believer) is a model and a witness to all who might observe that life. Saints have a duty to act like saints at all times. They must be prepared to go out into the world, but they must never join the world or participate in it under penalty of hell and rejection by Jesus. Being a model begins very early for the Pentecostal believer (Lawless 1983, 90).
Lawless also emphasises the Pentecostal attraction to ecstatic ritual behaviour. It serves as the most powerful tool in the religious practice of the Pentecostals. As Lawless writes:

The New Testament basis for tongue-speaking as possession of the Holy Ghost makes a lot of Christians nervous – what if the Pentecostals are right? This accounts for the surging interest in charismatic seeking of “tongues” by many closeted groups within main-line denomination churches. These groups cannot be openly condoned by the hierarchy of the churches, but many non-Pentecostal parishioners and pastors are convinced of the “reality” of the tongue-speaking experience (Lawless 1983, 93).

Thus, Lawless emphasises in her approach that the Pentecostals’ collective power relies on absolute rejection of evil and building up one’s holiness by using all available spiritual and material means. Lawless also depicts the holistic missionary strategy of the Pentecostals. Everything that exists in the world can and must be used for the purposes of evangelisation.

Robbins, in his turn, concentrates on the problem of how the P&C project manages to meet global challenges in a more ambivalent way. Robbins reflects the common agreement among scholars who treat P&C Christianity as one of the main homogenising forces of the contemporary world.

Many scholars argue that P&C is markedly successful in replicating itself in canonical form everywhere it spreads, whereas others stress its ability to adapt itself to the cultures into which it is introduced. Authors thus use P&C to support both theories that construe globalization as a process of Westernizing homogenization and those that understand it as a process of indigenizing differentiation (Robbins 2004, 117).

Robbins admits that there are principal differences in the ways of interpreting the character of the P&C global mission. Some scholars tend to “stress processes of Western cultural domination and homogenization” while others “emphasize the transformative power of indigenous appropriation and differentiation” (Robbins 2004, 118).

Robbins proposes an approach that integrates both dominants. P&C’s own cultural logic of world-breaking does not deny the possibility of preserving an authentic sense of people’s traditional cultures (Robbins 2004, 119). P&C Christians “find their assurance in ecstatic experience” (Robbins 2004, 123), instead of a fundamentalist Christian way of seeking salvation by living according to a
strict ethical code. That does not necessarily contradict the indigenous approach of the character of a ritual life.

Robbins argues that in the 1960s and 1970s the early classics in P&C history and ethnography deployed the arguments of marginalised lower-class deprivation, egalitarianism, ascetic morals and ecstatic escape. “These arguments have become so much the common sense of the P&C literature that most works draw on them at least implicitly” (Robbins 2004, 123–124). He reveals in his analysis that there can be detected certain overexploitation of generalisations concerning P&C Christianity (Robbins 2004, 126).

Robbins also notices that the Pentecostals have proved their ability to indigenise and to adapt themselves to the societies and local communities where they are introduced (Robbins 2004, 129; 2010, 634). But the indigenisation is always combined with certain homogenising attempt in the context of globalisation drive:

The resulting cultural formation is a particular kind of hybrid in which the parts of the mixture are kept distinct despite the relations that exist between them. The nature of this hybrid accounts for why global and local features appear with equal intensity within P&C cultures (Robbins 2004, 129–130).

Thus, Robbins raises the issues of world breaking and world making, rejecting and adopting the local in relation to Pentecostal and Charismatic Christianity’s globalising effort. Robbins argues in favour of meaningfully nuanced analysis instead of meta-theoretical generalisations of ideal and total features of P&C global agenda. Robbins admits that intentions of P&C Christianity are in a way global but the logic of application is often local.

The examples of Lawless’ and Robbins’ articles demonstrate different ways of treating the holistic tendency of religion. Lawless depicts how the attempt to achieve spiritual totality can be detected in an example of a particular religious denomination. Pentecostals may be seen as one of the most suitable examples for illustrating Durkheim’s general idea about totality of faith. It is also obvious that in many other cases this ambition or strategy is not so explicit.

Durkheim’s approach presupposes that religion is empowered predominantly by a certain total collectively shared inner feeling. Pentecostals themselves, as described by Lawless, can express their religiosity quite freely in their original social settings. Through encountering a variety of different cultures with their multiplicity of original worldviews this explicitness of total change evades. At least for tactical reasons, P&C Christians adapt to some extent to local spiritual conditions, as Robbins demonstrates.
The collective powers and P&C Christians of the Komi Republic

Pentecostal & Charismatic churches are the main force of the contemporary process of the globalisation of Christianity (Hann 2007, 391; Coleman 2010, 800; Meyer 2010a, 741) or even its future form (Meyer 2010b, 119). Apart from recognising Protestant missions as signs of globalisation, they can also be examined as responses to it (Coleman 2010, 799). Robbins summarises the debate concerning the global and local features of Pentecostalism with the notion that “approaches to P&C globalization need to recognize that P&C possesses cultural features that allow it, in most cases, to work in both ways at once” (Robbins 2004, 117; see also Robbins 2003, 196; 2007, 10; Hann 2007, 395).

The same tendency of Pentecostalism becoming the most extensive Protestant denomination can also be traced in post-Soviet Russia. The Pentecostals are the third largest religious denomination after Russian Orthodoxy and Islam. Spreading P&C in the Komi Republic follows the overall pattern of Russia quite adequately. In the Komi Republic, P&C communities are the most numerous after Russian Orthodox believers (Filatov 2009, 15; Religions in Russia 2009, 101; Religious Organisations 2010, 50).

Roman Lunkin argues that the spread of Protestantism in Russia is an especially remarkable issue among different ethnic communities in Russia:

Native peoples in Russia are turning to Christianity as part of the process of their reorientation to new values. [...] For new believers their new faith frequently means a lot more to them than does the faith of traditionally Christian nations, where the majority are nominal believers only (Lunkin 2000, 133).

Actually, the growth of P&C Christianity in Komi stopped after the 1990s. During the first post-Soviet decade, Protestants were publicly active in Komi, especially in the capital Syktyvkar. Baptists managed to build a huge church (actually it has remained unfinished) in the centre of Syktyvkar, the Pentecostals held regular open-air evangelising concerts (which have been banned since 2000). At the same time, in rural areas several P&C communities have been established during the 2000s. In fact, there is no relevant statistics available concerning the Protestants in Komi Republic. P&C groups are often unregistered or act as branches of some central religious institutions and do not appear in official regional records. The general impression from fieldwork experience confirms this tendency – during the last decade the growth of Protestantism in the Komi Republic has not been very impressive.
I provide a few examples from interviews made with Charismatic Protestants in the Komi Republic in order to demonstrate possible connections between scholarly approaches and the believers’ concepts. Members of different Komi P&C groups have touched multiple times upon the issue of ‘world-breaking and -making’ during our conversations. Surprisingly, the only Pentecostal missionary I have interviewed did not stress this aspect. He saw his conversion and acting upon surrounding worldly society through distinct oppositions in smoother terms. Yet, this topic remains quite prominent. Using a few examples, I illustrate the need of the believers to follow the faith holistically, in every act of their everyday lives and in a consistent way of life.

[The orthodox believers] understand it in the way that it is enough to be a church-goer. But you need to be believer every day and in all your actions. Your thinking must be different. You must deal with different things and your life must be changed. It must be separated from worldly life. [Everyday practices] are connected to God. Your life, thinking and deeds must meet God’s will (F 71, FM 2010).

Statements such as this characterise the core of the behavioural code of P&C Christians. This assertion is both personally and socially prescribed. If believers talk about their general approach to the relationship between faith and everyday behaviour, in many cases statements like this can be heard. However, this does not mean that in this discourse we observe just automatic reproduction of a certain code. Obviously, people really mean what they say and they have adopted this attitude as being simultaneously personal and common with their social surroundings.

Another widely shared attitude of P&C Christians is related to the fact that the formality of tradition-based faith is denied. Komi Protestants have expressed their mind-set in a similar manner:

Everything is meaningless if your life does not change. You visit a church just to comfort the people. They go and you go, too, just for the sake of some traditions (F 42, FM 2008).

Quite obviously, this critique is targeted predominantly against people who have started to attend Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) services without studying the teaching enough, but are encouraged by public promotion and restoration of ROC traditions all over Russia, and particularly in Komi. Protestants are ready to approve Russian Orthodox church-goers’ choices, if they are ‘true believers’.
The collective powers of religion: scholarly interpretations and vernacular dialogue

This, however, may mean different things for Protestants and Orthodox people. Protestants assume that being a believer means studying the Scripture regularly. For the Orthodox believers this may not be so imperative, although one must indicate some religious activism outside church also. In the Orthodox case, this means primarily the reading of home prayers. However, attending church services is the most important way of acting as an Orthodox person. So, it is not just about visiting church “for the sake of some traditions”.

A person’s behaviour is closely linked to his/her belief. Another Protestant believer stressed quite characteristically the issue that one’s deeds must indicate faith:

> It is written in the Bible that you are supposed to demonstrate faith by your deeds. Supposedly, there are deeds that are the fruit of the Holy Spirit. Saint Paul wrote that faith without deeds is dead¹. If you only talk about your faith and there are no deeds, then your faith is dead. But if the deeds are applied in practice, one needs to explain nothing (F 37, FM 2009).

Logically, one of the most significant actions a real believer must be involved in is evangelisation work. In the Komi Republic, the number of believers or regular church-goers is not significant. In this situation, believers see a need and many possibilities to carry out mission work. The Komi Protestants evaluate their evangelisation effort highly:

> Naturally, I try to talk to people. This is God’s commandment. He ordered us to teach all the nations, to make them confess their sins and to enable salvation.² It’s called the great commandment. You must intervene if you see that somebody is fraught with doom (F 42, FM 2008).

The issue of language is relevant to all Komi Protestant groups. As a minimum, the New Testament in the Komi language is promoted and religious hymns are sung in the Komi language. But language has also more intimate qualities in the context of evangelisation work and people’s faith in general. This discourse concerns the specific role of the Komi language in spiritual revelation and is quite well elaborated. Different people have stressed the idea that ‘God speaks in my language’, just as in the following example:

> I saw that God is so close, God speaks in my mother tongue. I saw that people’s attitude towards our nation and language is different. I said to myself that I wanted this life. God changed my values, He turned me around: “You see
how beautiful your language is! You see, I love all nations, I love the Komi!” (F 45, FM 2010).

As local P&C Christians suppose, the Komi language has a special influence on people. It is believed that through the Komi language, God delivers a particular message to the Komi people and there is a particular divine plan behind it.

Many people ask: “Why do we need to have sermons in the Komi language? Everybody understands Russian.” Certainly, everybody can understand Russian. But there is something amazing, some specific influence if somebody perceives information in their mother tongue. It is tricky to comprehend. I don't know, something happens subconsciously... It’s a different kind of understanding of ideas and meanings (M 39, FM 2010).

Initiation of this specific language ideology is related to spiritual developments in the Komi Evangelical Church (Komi Church in everyday conversation) whose leaders have promoted Komi language as an evangelisation tool since the 1950s. Today, all prominent religious organisations, even the local diocese of ROC, admit the role of the Komi language in the spiritual sphere. Many Protestant communities explain the importance of language in evangelisation, using ideas and expressions borrowed from Komi Church religious discourse. The special role assigned to the Komi language by local Protestants is a distinctive peculiarity in the development of Christianity in the region. The Bible is translated into many languages but not every ethnic group takes the initiative in this translation and application process. The Komi Christians see in their language a distinctive quality that enables promotion of their faith as domesticated in Komi, although Protestantism has a history of less than a hundred years in the area.

It is obvious that the arguments of the Protestant believers are rooted in strong feelings of collective values. The language issue links the faith specifically with the Komi people. At the same time, evangelisation is supposed to be related to the exemplary everyday lives of the believers. True believers can influence their surrounding community just by their general demeanour, a particular mood that can be felt by non-believers. So the understanding of evangelisation is total and includes all aspects of believers’ existence.

Actually, not everything that the Komi Protestants have said fits in with the concept of total evangelisation equated with the ideal life. People may attend meetings just to drink tea and communicate local news. For some church-goers it is a matter of opportunity – there are no other churches available in surrounding villages and they just take the chance. Actually, in villages church-goers may
even not have a precise idea about the differences between the Protestant and Orthodox churches.

More devoted ecclesial believers have ideas about the necessity to read the Bible and to design one’s life according to divine standards in order to reach salvation and to impress non-believers spiritually. Thus, the intensity of commitment may vary considerably among Komi Protestants.

Some church-attendants may still behave traditionally, according to the ideas that they have embraced in the course of their lives and while visiting a local Russian Orthodox church. Once I observed a situation in which a few Komi grannies decided to visit the local Protestant church to celebrate the Transfiguration (which is a Russian Orthodox festivity normally not celebrated by local Protestants) and brought apples for the celebration (according to the folk Orthodox custom). On another occasion, an old lady who had attended a local Protestant church for three years, accepted baptism in a nearby Russian Orthodox monastery. Afterwards she continued to attend Protestant ceremonies exclusively. This intermezzo with baptism remained basically her only contact with the ROC. Protestant missionaries accepted all this without much protest. Sometimes, Protestant churches are less tolerant concerning earlier traditional customs (see, for example, Cannell 2006, 26). In complicated social settings (as in the Komi Republic, where the ROC very clearly dominates overall spiritual discourse), ambivalent attitudes may be detected.

The global qualities of P&C Christianity, although communicated to everybody in the church, have not touched all the people with the same intensity and the dynamics of different kinds of approach are not so easy to predict or even document. The ability to adapt to local conditions and to get involved in the development of syncretised religious forms has been described in relation to many Christian missions around the world. The capability to become locally appropriated is a condition for the flourishing of Christianity in particular social environments (see Whitehouse 2006, 306).

**Conclusion**

Early research in religious studies and anthropology tends to define the basis for further understanding. Durkheim defines the collective power of religion through its ideal and overall tendencies. Later research on P&C Christianity defines more particular discourse, although scholars have always kept in mind issues of the ideal and the total. The three examples chosen here represent different ways to treat the collective totality of religion. Durkheim treats the issue in an abstract way, discussing religion as such without particular examples.
However, he certainly had in mind particular Western prototypes for modelling the fundamental impact of belief. Lawless describes a particular case in which this totality of religion can be observed quite explicitly in real social settings. Robbins treats this completely collective tendency through a dialogue of other different aspects of people's spirituality. In his approach, this is not the only or dominant way to interpret the influence of religion on people. In this way we see that in a broad sense, approaches to religion have become gradually more ambivalent in real practice.

In case studies, the connection between general and particular is complicated. Generalisation does not necessarily need details and may ignore controversy between overall theoretical drive and discovered local features. Apart from this, these local features do not necessarily abolish the adequacy of the monolithic totality of the initial theory. P&C Christians seem to carry out all the moral demands of belief; religion is not an abstraction of the ideal world or a principal conviction. And this totality somehow survives through local adaptations.

The monolithic totality of Christianity is not simply an abstract thought or narrative. It is also important that we can detect a certain bridge between theory and empirical evidence. We need to consider data relating to believers’ self-expression in order to reveal the possible connection between theoretical approaches and the way in which people's minds work in real life.

Whitehouse conceptualises Christianity as a “monolithic entity” that, despite its actual diversity, has in missionary form certain parameters making it systematically different from pre-contact indigenous religions. The first of these features is related to the distribution of authoritative religious knowledge, which is disseminated as a moral imperative (2006, 299–300). However, Fenella Cannell claims that Whitehouse develops an extreme interpretation of the universal Christian transformative effect. Actually, Christianity as a radical new form of religion does not “simply displace and replace preexistent forms” but older cognition of the world continues to exist alongside the new forms (Cannell 2006, 34). Cannell argues that “when a locality encounters Christianity, it is never obvious in advance what that 'Christianity' is” (op cit, 43). Particularly, questions about the essence of Christianity are complicated for anthropologists as they tend to put emphasis on “native’ appropriations of Christianity in everyday practice rather than on doctrinal nuances” (Hann 2007, 386).

Although Christianity can be treated as “a context-independent monolith”, at the level of empirical facts, it is “a vast array of fragments, uniquely shaped by local discourse and politics” (Whitehouse 2006, 295). As can be revealed from data collected by this author during ethnographic fieldwork, active believers are quite ready to admit the style of thoughts Durkheim proposes as explanation
The collective powers of religion: scholarly interpretations and vernacular dialogue

for the collective qualities of religious life. They really see the whole process of believing as a collective effort that aims to reach a kind of a perfect and holistic condition. However, the durkheimian concept of collective powers does not leave any key for interpreting a variety of alternative attitudes and behaviour that can also be mapped among the P&C Christians. These alternatives may be rooted in long-term vernacular spiritual strategies that are hard to grasp because of their vague appearance on the social scene.

There is the possibility that particular modes of belief are difficult to understand because vernacular narration strategies prescribe to people (at least, the Komi people) a certain ambivalent behaviour. A traditional vernacular narrative is considered to be true if an audience is not able to recognise for sure to what extent the storyteller actually believes he or she is presenting real facts (see Leete & Lipin 2012). This attitude makes it complicated to estimate with certainty how enthusiastically some people actually follow the Christian calling, despite their quite affirmative but somehow formalised statements (cf Vallikivi 2009; Leete & Koosa 2012; Koosa 2013). The level of commitment varies among the Komi P&C Christians considerably, although, at least in principle, they are ready to admit monolithic claims for their faith.

Different approaches are required when one tries to look at groups through abstractions of collective morals, or if individual understandings are really mapped and discussion tries to follow certain logical multiplicities that usually appear in life. By taking both into account dialogically, one can get closer to an adequate interpretational model for a way of thinking and believing.

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The collective powers of religion: scholarly interpretations and vernacular dialogue

Notes

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1 Discussion concerning the relationship between faith and deeds can be found in the Letters of Paul (Romans 3:28, 4:3; Colossians 3:23 and 2 Corinthians 5:10; see also Genesis 15:3–6). The topic is more elaborated in the Letter of James (2:14–26). Jesus also said (Matthew 7:26–27): “Faith without deeds is no different than building a house on sand, which is quickly washed away.”

2 Matthew 28:18–20; Mark 16:15–18.
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Oil, canvas. 100.2 x 90.2 cm.
Abstract. The chapter discusses oral storytelling in Estonia during the period of the national movement and the spread of education in the second half of the 19th century. The dominant beliefs in the supernatural are discussed in connection with social changes and power relations in rural communities. Focus is on legend as a genre about encounters with the supernatural, which have usually been studied through diachronic perspective as survivals of declining folk belief. The chapter argues that in order to understand traditional Estonian legends these legends should not be detached from the social world of the rural communities who tell them. Legends are not only forms of symbolic expressions of social conflicts and tensions, they also participate in reinforcing, directing or restraining social processes. Thus, social reality is not outside folklore but actively constructed through its dominant genres.

Legends are a folklore genre that expresses, validates and questions belief. They also extend belief as ideas, mental images and attitudes that are shaped into narratives, the plots of which are attached to the physical and social environments that the storytellers inhabit. However, legends are not confined to the discussion of religious matters and supernatural belief. As a genre with an orientation towards daily life, legends also express mundane opinions and shape worldly attitudes. The chapter that follows argues that in order to be fully understood, legends should not be detached from the social world of the village community that tells them. Social reality does not exist outside legends but is actively constructed through the medium of language and daily communication in its public and private forms, and oral, written and printed genres.

The national movement and the Estonianisation of folklore

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Estonian language was mainly spoken by the rural people. The landlords, who formed the noble elite of the society and represented high culture, spoke Baltic German. The population was thus divided by a clear social and ethnic borderline, which was almost impossible to cross from either side. The nobility and the Estonian folk were nonetheless not completely isolated from each other. They belonged to the same Lutheran church and had daily contact in the manors. The first peasant schools had been founded in the late seventeenth century, and by the early nineteenth century literacy was widespread.

In political and administrative terms, Estonia was a province of the Russian Empire, but the domination of the German language tied it culturally and mentally with Western Europe. These ties were strengthened in 1802, when the University of Dorpat (Tartu) was re-established, something that opened the country to more intellectual influences from the West, such as the ideologies of the Enlightenment and Romanticism. These new movements started reaching Estonia via the intellectual circles of the Baltic Germans, who were joined by several ethnic Estonians in the first decades of the nineteenth century. People of peasant origin gained better access to university education when serfdom was abolished in 1816 in the province of Estland in the north and in 1819 in the province of Liefland in the south. It was around this time that the Enlightenment thinker, Garlieb Merkel (1769–1850) introduced into his writings the principle that all nations have the right to live and should be seen as equal, something which paved the way for the birth of Estonian literature (Annist 2005, 394). Early writers such as Friedrich Robert Faehlmann (1798–1850) nonetheless composed their works in German in order to prove the artistic quality of the folklore of the suppressed Estonian folk. Faehlmann's mythical narratives (Estnische Sagen) about the doings of pre-Christian deities and harmonic life in ancient Estonia closely followed the literary models of the Ancient Greek, Roman and Germanic myths which had appeared in eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century writings. Following on from this, in 1857–1861, Friedrich Reinhold Kreutzwald (1803–1882) published the Estonian epic Kalevipoeg (The Son of [the mythical hero] Kalev), a work that became the cornerstone of Estonian professional literature and national culture. Although academic circles expected a scholarly work that would represent authentic Estonian folklore, Kreutzwald approached his material as a creative writer, composing a mythical biography of the ancient king Kalevipoeg from the fabric of folklore and his own poetry. Nonetheless, the national mythology composed by Faehlmann, Kreutzwald and a few other writers provided the Estonian people with a precious heritage which linked the emerging national
Ülo Valk

aspirations with the imagined golden age of ancient independence that existed before the German conquest of the thirteenth century. The last lines of Kreutzwald’s epic predict the return of the mythical hero Kalevipoeg who will create a new life in the future Estonia.

Alongside these developments in literature, new agrarian laws passed in the middle of the nineteenth century prepared for changes to take place in rural communities. Rent in the form of money started to replace labour carried out for the manor, and the number of peasants who had become owners through buying land grew rapidly (Raun 1991, 49–50). This reinforced the levels of stratification in Estonian villages, as farmers, tenants, farm-hands and other landless workers started to become part of distinctive social groups. The Baltic German landlords nonetheless remained the political rulers of the country. They also remained ethnic and social ‘others’ in contrast to the independent Estonian farmers, those Estonians who had a university education and those other ethnic Estonians who had started the national movement.

Meanwhile, the ideas of being Estonian, of speaking the vernacular language with pride, and of celebrating Estonianness as a special quality were spreading rapidly through society by means of the printed and spoken word, and in both the private and the public spheres. Nation building was also supported by various societies, schools, and even the church, where some pastors came to be leaders of this movement. Newspapers, works of fiction, schoolbooks and the whole Estonian print-language played a central role in changing the ethnic consciousness of the people. For example, it was due to the distribution of newspapers that Jakob Hurt’s (1839–1907) public appeal of 1888 for the recording of old songs, tales and other forms of vanavara (ancient treasures) reached those people who were later to become his most devoted helpers in accumulating folklore collections. Popular books of folklore with the word Eesti (Estonian) or rahvas (people, folk) in their title started appearing, following on from the epic Kalevipoeg, which was referred to as Üks ennemuistne Eesti jutt (An Ancient Estonian Tale), and Kreutzwald’s collection of fairy tales, which were described as Eesti rahva ennemuistsed jutud (1866) (Ancient Tales of the Estonian Folk). Such publications gave Estonian readers the feeling that they could identify themselves as owners of this new ‘national’ heritage. Estonia is an example of countries where “language became an important medium for national cohesion and belonging […]” and “the nationalization of culture was very much linked to the creation of a public sphere by the rising bourgeoisie, who created new arenas and media of debate and information” (Löfgren 1989, 16).

Writers went on to compose historical narratives about the romantic and heroic adventures of ancient Estonians who had fought for the freedom of their
Constructing social reality in Estonian legends

country, such as *Tasuja* (The Avenger, 1878) and *Villu võitlused* (Villu’s Battles, 1890) by Eduard Bornhöhe (1862–1923); and *Vambola* (1889), *Aita* (1891) and *Leili* (1892–1893) by Andres Saal (1861–1931), the titles of the latter trilogy referring to central characters who lived during the Ancient Fight for Freedom in the thirteenth century. Others, such as Eduard Vilde (1865–1933), published realistic and critical works of fiction discussing social problems in contemporary Estonia, as in Vilde’s novel *Külmale maale* (To the Cold Land, 1896). The last two writers played a central role in establishing the novel as a genre in Estonian literature during the last decades of the nineteenth century.

Benedict Anderson has noted the parallel spread of newspapers and novels in many societies and the role that both play in constructing nations as imagined communities. While superficially different, both share a similar format, if not a similar train of thought. As Anderson notes: “Reading a newspaper is like reading a novel whose author has abandoned any thought of a coherent plot” (Anderson 1991, 33). Both newspapers and novels nonetheless manifest social orientation, permit the expression of different, even opposing points of view within the pages of the same publication, and also take part in ideological discussion.

Within the same context, Mikhail Bakhtin studied the historical emergence of literary genres in Europe, and the movement from monologic, myth-making epics to novels that manifest the new qualities of “pluralism of independent and unblended voices and consciousnesses” and pervasive dialogism that encompasses all elements of the work (Bakhtin 2002, 10, 51). The author’s dialogic position with regard to the literary characters means that they are independent of the author, who regards them as subjects (op cit, 74). The appearance of novelistic qualities, or novelisation, is a historical process that bears on many genres. Bakhtin notes that novelised genres:

- become more free, flexible, their language renews itself by incorporating extraliterary heteroglossia and “novelistic” layers of literary language, they become dialogized, permeated with laughter, irony, humor, elements of self-parody and finally – this is the most important thing – the novel inserts into these other genres an indeterminacy, a certain semantic openendedness, a living contact with unfinished, still evolving contemporary reality (the openended present) (Bakhtin 1981, 7).

Bakhtin’s theory of genres was open, encompassing literature, folklore, oral and written forms of expression. His concept of novelisation was also broad and can be applied to society as a whole and all public uses of the word in its oral, written and printed forms.
In nineteenth-century Estonia, one can note several traits of novelisation, including the appearance of new literary genres and the development of a system of generic classification in the emerging discipline of folkloristics. We can also note the parallel, dialogic functioning of several discourses as “practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak” (Foucault 2001, 49), such as pietistic, enlightening, scientific, agricultural, capitalistic and national discourse – all based on certain public institutions and all aiming at making changes in social life and in people’s mentality. Folklore cannot be called “discourse” in the Foucauldian sense, because it lacks systematic coherence and the purposeful dissemination of a certain worldview and the support of official institutions. However, the emerging discipline of folkloristics can be viewed as a discursive practice, generated by the national project, but over the course of time acquiring autonomy from the original national pursuits.

The conceptualising of folklore as ancestral heritage spread widely as it was popularised by Estonian newspapers. One can note parallel developments in the mass media and the public awareness of Estonian folklore as a national resource. Both folklore and the mass media share common traits, such as the blending of several genres, the construction of social reality as a verbal practice, the shaping of social attitudes, and the enabling of different points of view and dialogue. Romantic poetry, the epic, choral singing, patriotic speech, Lutheran hymns and sermons all manifest monologic voicing. According to Bakhtin, monologism is characterised by the author’s omniscient position, which opens up the world from a truthful, correct perspective that excludes other points of view as erroneous, deceitful visions (Bakhtin 2002, 90–93). In contrast to these monologic artistic forms, several genres of journalism and folklore manifest novelistic qualities, such as internal dialogism. Bakhtin also writes about the novelistic prevalence of the “double-voiced word” (dvugolosoye slovo) that mediates the utterances of others (op cit, 207). The “double-voiced word” refers to reported speech – something that has already been said or heard by others, but when reverbalised acquires a new colouring and tone. As examples of the double-voiced word, Bakhtin mentions stylisation, parody, dialogue and colloquial narration in everyday life (skaz) (op cit, 207).

The concept of the double-voiced word linked to tradition and intertextuality helps us to deepen our understanding of folklore and explain how it was transformed into national heritage, that is, Estonianised. Valuable folklore manuscripts were born out of a dialogue between collectors and informants whose words were not only recorded, but also modified and co-produced by the collectors, something that made these texts truly double-voiced. As the verbatim recording of narratives was near impossible, archival manuscripts were usually based on the
Constructing social reality in Estonian legends

collector’s memory, in which several performances merged (Hiiemäe 1999, 3–4). In addition to the voices of the collector and the informant, we can often ‘hear’ the echo of former performances in folklore. This polyphony of voices that are involved in narrating the same story was conceptualised by Walter Anderson as the “self-correction” of tradition; it directs each new performance, both in oral and written form. Many storytellers and folklore collectors made use of different sources, simultaneously following earlier models and trying to imitate the ideal ‘folk style’ formulated by the chapbooks that were so widely spread in late-nineteenth-century Estonia. Although many folk tales and legends are seemingly coarse or even primitive, their textual tissue is thicker than that in most works of fiction written by individual authors. The collectors combined oral and literary traditions and interpreted their work as a national project, something that is evident from the titles they added to their recordings. Titles such as Eesti Rahvanali (Estonian Folk Jokes), Vana Eesti nalju (Jokes of Old Estonia), Eesti rahva vana usu kombed ja nõiduse vigurid (Ancient Customs, Belief, and Witchcraft Tricks of the Estonian Folk), Eesti ennemus’tete jutu (Ancient Estonian Tales), Eesti rahva vana-vara (The Ancient Heritage of the Estonian People) are typical in the manuscript folklore collection of Jakob Hurt from the late nineteenth century (Peebo & Peegel 1989, 22, 94, 138, 206, 224). Jakob Hurt himself valued folklore collecting highly as a form of mental labour, calling it “proof of a lively and healthy patriotic spirit in people’s hearts, and burning love for one’s homeland and nation” (Hurt 1989, 81). The collection of folklore and the publication of manuscripts for a wide Estonian readership can be understood as the utilisation of folklore as part of the Estonianisation and nationalisation of culture and society (see Bauman 1999): a project with an orientation towards the future but a firm foundation in history.

Jakob Hurt saw oral tradition as a resource of historical memory, a chronicle of the Estonian people, a great narrative about the lives of the ancestors and events in the old days. In Hurt’s time, it was an innovative, recently discovered truth that folklore had the quality of being able to preserve ancient ideas and knowledge. As Estonians were a people who lacked ancient manuscripts and historical writings in their native language, the folklore recordings seemed a suitable substitute. The association of folklore with ancient times before the German conquest of the country was, of course, a value attribution. In nineteenth-century Estonia, the epithet vana (old) was used to define most genres and conceptual fields of folklore: old songs, old stories, old proverbs, old beliefs and so on were all worth recording for future generations. They were valued differently to new songs and new stories.
Ülo Valk

On the teleology of Estonian legends

The oral and printed legends of nineteenth-century Estonia should not be isolated from the public discourse encountered in newspapers and other publications. The legend is a genre of everyday communication that frequently discusses social matters, such as relationships between neighbours, or conflicts and tensions in the village. In his monograph on the Danish legends of the late nineteenth century, Timothy Tangherlini has noted that:

social, economic, geographic, political and psychological forces at work in a given society are important influencing features which should be included in any consideration of tradition (Tangherlini 1994, 31).

As a belief-related genre, the legend shapes collective mental attitudes and supports the local identities of village communities. Legends express the points of view of those who could be called the rural ‘folk’: the Estonian peasants who were involved in daily communication in face-to-face situations, constantly negotiating relationships between themselves and with others in rural communities where social stratification grew rapidly.

The Estonian legends recorded in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries belong to a lively oral tradition. The dominant topics in the legends of this time were the devil, the restless dead, witchcraft, and demons (kratt, puuk) who fetch property for their masters by stealing it from local neighbours. Forest and water spirits, ‘underground’ folk, angels and other supernatural creatures also appear in many legends, but these still seem to be more in the background, compared with the above-noted sets of beliefs.

The drawing of social borders within the Estonian countryside, and the separation of village communities from the supernatural others are processes that are strongly related. Although, as noted above, serfdom had been abolished and the number of independent Estonian farmers was growing, the Baltic German landlords maintained their powerful position in society. They were the most prominent ethnic ‘others’ in Estonian folklore, and were surrounded by an aura of suspicion, mistrust, fear, hatred and envy. The Germanisation of the Devil in Estonian folklore probably started in the Middle Ages but was still very evident as late as the end of the nineteenth century. It is also noteworthy that one of the favourite guises of the Devil in Estonian legends is that of a landlord, a gentleman or a German nobleman, as can be seen in the following example:
Constructing social reality in Estonian legends

Once the threshers of the estate were talking about hanging. One of them said it was like this, another like that until they decided to try it to see what it’s really like. Then, for a joke, they tied a rope to a beam and decided to try hanging, one in turn. One of them had just got the rope around his neck and hung there when the landlord himself appeared in the barn and shouted at them: “What! You’re idling here! Get back to work at once!” No one had time to take down the man who was hanging on the rope – everyone tried to escape. The Old Bad Boy (vanapagan) changed himself into the landlord, and got one more soul for himself that way (H II 37, 303 [3] < Jõhvi – N. Otto [1892] in Valk 2001, 75).

In this international migratory legend (TMI 456, Hanging Oneself in Jest; MI N334.2), the Devil usually appears as a hare (in Finnish, German, English and Hungarian folklore: see Valk 2001, 124) and the boys rush to catch him, forgetting about their friend who unintentionally dies by hanging. The replacement of a hare with the landlord in the Estonian example above does not seem unusual.
if we consider other Estonian legends, where, as noted above, the German appearance of the Devil is common.

Landlords still had a central role in nineteenth-century Estonian society, and their image in the folklore of the time is complex and many-sided. Some songs and recordings of oral history actually praise benevolent landlords who treated their peasants with justice and kindness, for example, by arranging Christmas celebrations for the village folk and providing gifts for them. There are also legends about eccentric or mad landlords who gained attention because of their unusual behaviour and bizarre habits. However, the stereotype of evil landlords noted above was dominant in folklore. Indeed, several manors were reported to have special cellars with instruments of torture that were used to punish disobedient village folk. Descriptions of the sadistic beating of the peasants and sexual violence towards women were also common (Remmel 2004, 28). In the following legend, the landlord is described as being involved in superstitious practices designed to give him magical control over his workers:

In the old days when folk slaved for the manor, the landlord believed that if a new serf came to the manor, the overseer had to cut his fingernails in secret at night. It had to happen during the first week: at least the nails of the first two fingers. These fingernails were put into a crack in the wall of the granary. Then the new serf would do an excellent job and would be loyal to the landlord. If the overseer failed to cut the fingernails during the first week, the serf did not become a good worker and left soon. The serfs did not want the overseer to cut their fingernails, and tried to hide their hands while sleeping, so that they would wake up if the overseer tried to cut the fingernails (ERA II 57, 713/4 [10] < Mārjamaa < Rapla – E. Poom [1932] in Loorits 1990, 12).

Evil landlords often went on to become members of the restless dead in Estonian folklore, and their graves and burial chambers were feared. These places were admittedly sometimes plundered by people in the hope of finding gold and other valuables, something that contributed further towards the demonisation of the landlords whose anger seemed more menacing when it emanated from the other world. Landlords were also often depicted as suffering in hell, a common motif in Estonian folklore showing how the Devil comes to claim the soul of an evil landlord on his deathbed.

It is said that if evil people die, there are frightening great storms at night which destroy houses. When the landlord of Loopre manor died, there was a storm like this. People say this landlord was very cruel to the working people,
and used to beat them with a stick. When he felt that death was near, he asked others to bring a black rooster and a dog with four eyes. But when he was dying, there was a great noise next to his deathbed three times as if firewood was being thrown on floor. Then the old man shivered and died. Many people say that a coach was sent from Hell to take him away (H II 74, 359 < Pilistvere, Kõo v. – J. Keller [1905]).

A black rooster and a dog with four eyes (that is, with dark patches above the eyes) were supposedly able to detect the Devil and keep him away, according to folk belief. The attribution of such beliefs to the landlord, such as the alleged magic concerning the use of fingernails in the previous example, shows that the stereotype of the landlord had been integrated into the popular belief systems of Estonian folklore. Such belief attribution served as a means of underlining the social borders that existed between the village folk and the nobility. This ethnic borderline between the Estonian peasants and the Baltic German landlords came
Ülo Valk

to be essential for the self-determination of the new nation. In the middle of the nineteenth century, Germanisation actually seemed a positive future scenario for those Estonians who strove for a better position in society. The mastery of the German language was an inseparable part of the quest for proper education, worthy jobs and participation in high society. Even Kreutzwald had predicted such a future for Estonians when he composed the epic Kalevipoeg as a monument to their disappearing ethnic culture. However, in spite of such predictions, the Estonians maintained their language and managed to construct an ethnic identity that was different from that of the Baltic Germans. The demonisation of the landlords and the Germanisation of the Devil thus supported the formation of the Estonian nation. Indeed, the borderlines between Estonians and Germans were so strongly underlined in the legendary tradition that crossing them en masse became near impossible.

However, the ‘folk’ of the Estonian legends were naturally much more complex than any homogeneous class of peasants, unanimous in their hostility towards the upper class. While some legends reinforce social borders, others blur them. As noted at the start, the second half of the nineteenth century was a time of growing social stratification within the Estonian village. The buying of

Figure 3. A peasant woman from Saaremaa with a cow wagon.
farmhouses and land had now become possible, as had social mobility both upwards and down. For some people, the new conditions meant economic success. For others, increasing poverty seemed more miserable when viewed in the context of the increasing wealth of neighbours. At the same time, we see an explosion in the spread of those Estonian legends concerning demonic assistant spirits or familiars (kratt, puuk) who steal money, grain and milk products and bring it back to their owners. In order to have a demonic assistant of this kind, you had to undertake a blood contract with the Devil, or buy a kratt from the market. The price for such crooked and criminal enrichment entailed the offering of one’s soul to the Devil.¹

The aforementioned legends seem to have a direct connection to the increasing social stratification in the Estonian village. As frequently repeated stories, they conveyed important messages (cf Tangherlini 1994, 41). Explaining some- body’s economic success in terms of their having made a contract with the Devil and owning a kratt probably represents the point of view of those who were less successful, that is landless labourers, farmhands, maids and others who had failed to become independent farmers. The legends, of course, also reflect other tensions within the village, such as conflicts between neighbours competing with each other for rapid enrichment and the gaining of a higher position within the village community. Similar ideas probably lie behind the following legend:

There were two farmers in the next village. They had fields of equal size and were both competent, but one of the farmers was rich and the other was poor. The poor farmer pondered on the reason why his neighbour was rich and he was poor. He worked equally hard. Finally he came to the conclusion that the other farmer might have a puuk who stole grain from his house. He went to the forest, picked spruce needles and dried them and added them to his grain, which was drying in his barn. When the grain was dry, he threshed it and started to winnow it. Suddenly a powerful whirlwind appeared in the yard, entered the barn and flew over the heap of grain. The man thought that this was a puuk and went to the neighbouring farmer to check what kind of grain he had in his drying barn. He went there and saw that the other farmer was winnowing too, but curiously enough, he also had spruce needles in his grain. Now he realised that the other farmer indeed had a puuk who had carried away his grain. He told the other farmer: “If you don’t stop these tricks, I will ask some wizard to bewitch you.” From that time onwards, the puuk did not come to him again, and he became as rich as the other farmer (H II 27, 933/4 [2] < Kodavere – V. Kirik [1889] in Peebo & Peegel 1989, 175).
The most common motifs in Estonian legends concerning the puuk or kratt are the following: the earlier-noted blood contract with the Devil, which is necessary in order to gain such a demonic assistant; the idea of somebody’s kratt being seen flying at night as a stream of fire; the idea that a kratt is working restlessly for his owner as a faithful slave; the legends concerning an impossible task which is given to the kratt as the only way to get rid of it and save one’s soul; and finally the accounts of an angry kratt burning down the house of its master. According to many legends, this assistant demon is an artificial figure made from different components, which is revived with the help of the Devil, who is summoned on a Thursday night at a crossroads. In other legends, we find the motif of somebody’s spirit leaving their body in order to steal or do harm to their fellow men. Many legends about the kratt tell the story from the point of view of a poor farmhand, who is opposed to the rich but cruel master:

There was a farmer who got very rich. Nobody knew whence his property came. He never went to the town to buy herring or shoes but there was always fresh herring on the table and his whole family had new footwear.

One Thursday evening the child was asked to bring herring from the storehouse. The child came back with a plate full of herring and shouted: “Mother, mother, there was a black one in the store house who vomited herring.”

Mother scolded: “Don’t babble, the black cat ate fish.”

“No, no, the black cat vomited herring,” the child disagreed.

Then the maids and farmhands realised who was this cat and refused to eat herring. One evening a farmhand heard that the master said to the mistress: “Never ask the child to go to the storehouse on Thursday evenings. The stupid child cannot keep quiet about what he sees.”

It became clear to the farmhand that it was on Thursday evenings, when stuff was brought to the farmer. The farmhand took a stick from rowan tree, cut three crosses into it and went secretly to the storehouse. After some time a black cat came and vomited grain into the bin. The farmhand beat the cat with his stick. The cat never came back but the farmer soon became poor. Finally he became so poor that he lost his farm (H II 33, 966/7 [32] < Jüri, Rae – J. Pihlakas [1889] in Hiiemäe 1988, 34).

While the legends about the Germanised Devil and the demonised landlords underlined existing social borders and separated ethnic groups, the legends about the kratt illustrate contemporary social change. As noted above, it was now possible to become a landowner and a farmer in Estonia, and many peasants were reaching for this status. However, explaining somebody’s new economic success
Constructing social reality in Estonian legends

in terms of them having a *kratt* added mystery to upwards social movement and demonised some of those who had been successful. Thus, the apparent owners of *kratt* also became ‘others’, people who had sold their souls to the Devil and excluded themselves from the community of fellow Christians. Simultaneously, these legends confirmed the possibility of fast enrichment and of ascent through the social hierarchies. Whereas the great careers of the poor heroes of Estonian tales of magic remained fictional, the deeds of the legendary characters were projected into the real world. Shepherds could not become kings but they had fair chances of becoming masters and farm owners in their homeland. We can thus talk of the teleological orientation of legends which reinforce, direct or restrain social processes. Through their construction of social reality, legends also shape the future of those people who share them.
Final remarks

This chapter has focused on two popular groups of legends in nineteenth-century Estonian folklore, one of them supporting the existent social order, while the other illustrates and comments on the changes that were taking place within rural communities, but both affirm “the group identity of the tradition participants” (Tangherlini 2007, 8). There were, of course, also other beliefs that were widely discussed in the nineteenth-century legends of Estonia, such as those concerning revenants who return to their former homes and bother the living. Perhaps these moving restless dead are another symbol of the unstable, restless society of change in which many people felt insecure. The obsession with enrichment in Estonian folklore is thus not a reflection of the remote Middle Ages or of the Early Modern period, but rather a typical feature reflecting the time of rising capitalism in Estonia at the end of the nineteenth century. The legend is a complex genre which is not restricted to supernatural dimensions. It includes material and inspiration drawn from the poetic and the fantastic, the historical and the social space. It is also a genre of symbolic expression, which manifests a specific worldview. As a belief-related genre, the legend can also express the anxieties and insecurities caused by a rapidly changing society, fears of the unknown, aspirations towards economic stability and other important matters of social psychology. As an emotionally charged genre, the legend also draws social borders between in-groups and out-groups. Legends thus not only shaped village communities, which were in face-to-face contact, they also supported the formation of the ‘imagined community’ that was the Estonian nation. The latter function was then reinforced by the numerous popular books of legends that were addressed to Estonian readers. In the nineteenth century, these legends reflecting the forces at work within local communities went on to play a crucial role in the textual production of the Estonian nation. Hence it is completely justified that we call them Estonian legends (in many senses of the word).

Archival sources

ERA = Collection of the Estonian Folklore Archives (Eesti Rahvaluule Arhiiv).
H = Collection of Jakob Hurt, Estonian Folklore Archives.

References


Sources of Illustrations

Figure 1 – Photographer unknown, around 1900. The photo collection of Estonian National Museum, ERM Fk 887:103.

Figure 2 – Photographer unknown, the beginning of the 20th century. The photo collection of Estonian National Museum, ERM Fk 887:601.
Notes

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1 Similar legends about witches’ familiars were widespread in the Nordic countries, and also in Ireland. Parallels can also be found in the nisse/tomte figures in Nordic legends, which steal hay or corn.
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Mixed media, paper. 55.7 x 48.9 cm.
Avoiding uncertainty by making the past usable

Aili Aarelaid-Tart

Abstract. Time can be interpreted as a cognitive construction of social reality that brings order to social interaction and communication, in all its variability from one culture to another. People would like to control and regulate the uncertain and unreliable circumstances in their lives using a variety of (culturally distinct) reckoning systems. Human time is characterised by the dichotomy of inner and outer realms which highlight the continuity of self-awareness against the discontinuity of external events. The division of the arrow of time into past, present and future is quite illusory and relative, just as in real life streams of events from the past and the future are subordinate to current needs. In everyday practice there are many strategies (forgetting, sacralisation, banalisation, etc.) for making use of the past to further a sustainable development of the lives of individuals/collectives as social subjects.

Introduction

I am interested in the specifics of the human cognitive capacity to reflect upon and rationalise past experiences and memories, to match them with present and foreseeable future circumstances via a strategy for making the past usable (MPU). Individuals, communities, and generations – they all need to find ways of dealing with uncertainty in their lives and thus need to continuously use their past practices and memories to prepare for the unknown future. In the following, I develop an interdisciplinary argument for this process through three successive analyses, moving from the abstract to the concrete.

In the first section I revisit the old philosophical problem of whether time represents an aspect of nature that exists independently of human beings, or whether it is merely a notion rooted in human consciousness. The question of MPU has an important place in this relationship between subjectivity and objectivity in time, because it is precisely by raising such a question that we admit that throughout the long progress of humankind human cognition of time has grown more and

Avoiding uncertainty by making the past usable

more synthetic, continuously using previous experiences to deliberately recreate a framework of perception to make connection with environmental reality more definite. According to Norbert Elias, the problem of objective and subjective time is still relevant, as people have had more success studying ‘natural’ time from astronomical to quantum levels than learning about the psychological and social aspects of time (Elias 1994).

In the second section I examine the same problem of subjectivity/objectivity from a socio-psychological point of view as a relationship of inner and outer times. Inner time is defined as an accumulation of biographical self-awareness, which constantly but creatively meets the regulations, restrictions and demands of the outer structure of time. MPU is interpreted as an enduring but changing balance between self-reflection and the influence of cultural mechanisms. I argue that in biographical case studies, MPU is relatively easy to determine by using turning points in individual life stories, and that it is harder but more beneficial to analyse it in strategies for coping with cultural trauma.

In the third section I investigate the same problem of objective and subjective human time at the socio-historical level. Now I ask whether past events, as experienced by individuals, communities or states, can be later recalled in an objective manner. I answer with the words of Peter Burke that “neither memories nor histories seem objective any longer” (Burke 1989, 98) after a serious exploration of the social framework of memory (starting with the work of Maurice Halbwachs in the 1920s). Reinterpretation of the past by certain social groups for the purposes of the present is key to the past’s usability.

The essence of human time

Human time is paradoxical: growth and decay, durability and transience, certainty and uncertainty are genuinely interlinked. On the one hand, the *homo sapiens* of any period would like to control surrounding events and forecast the future and in doing so to build up a reliable living environment. Yet, on the other hand, humans constantly remake their understanding of the temporal structure of the universe – in both a very local and a very global sense – preferring to hide from the finality of human ontology. Time is a very sensible feature: people are afraid of discovering the essence of time because they do not know what they might uncover. Time could be an order or a chaos, a mystical deity like Chronos or a practical commodity like money, an a priori intuition or a stable social structure. “The problems of ‘time’, too, are often treated like a secret, protective cloak in which to hide” (Elias 1994, 83–84). Humans behave both like a creator god who
Aili Aarelaid-Tart
gives rise to the temporal order of the world they live in, and a trickster god who disrupts the order of that same world and then remakes it in the oddest manner.

Human time is a fundamental property of human reality, defined by Pertti Alasuutari as “the entire reality that we face and experience as human beings” (Alasuutari 2004, 2). Human time is a simultaneously durable and fluid cognitive system of co-ordinates for fixing mental as well as environmental realities, which frames every individual and collective form of existence. “Humans differ from other species precisely in their ability to exceed the physical and mental limits of individuals” (op cit, 5) and create a social order of signs and meanings. The human ability to successfully adapt to the environment is closely tied to their skills and capacities for storing gathered experiences and information in an interpersonal way. Claude Lévi-Strauss has smartly postulated that the sign-based creation of meaning in interpersonal communication was a revolutionary achievement of the Neolithic. Dating and measuring time is based on the human capability of mental synthesis, “of seeing together what does not happen together but successively” (Elias 1994, 8). Anthony Giddens assumed that it is “people not only living in the time, but having an awareness of the passing time which is incorporated in the nature of their social institutions” (Giddens 1991, 36).

The difficulty in conceptualising the essence of time is hidden in the abstract cognitive level of human perception and related memory activities. A human being not only reflects on the processes of internal and external worlds, but also invests them with semiotic significance and bases on them the overarching temporal frameworks of his or her life. Human time is even more difficult to understand because as a bio-social creature, homo sapiens participates in very different processes from individual metabolism to astro-geo-biophysical rhythms, from gradual personal aging to rapid changes in social routines, etc. Reflecting on the abstract interconnection of all these processes is often ambivalent and limited in scope. Thus, the line between subjective and objective in human perception and cognition of the dimension of time is fine and subtle. Paraphrasing the above quote from Anthony Giddens, we could say that people primarily live in time and only afterwards make it socially meaningful, thereby making the objective and subjective aspects inseparable.

Human time is determined by such a multitude of natural and cultural, genetic and non-genetic factors that its structural composition is extraordinarily complicated. In contemplating human time it is possible to evoke very many different levels, aspects and reckoning systems, all of which are relevant to each other. In the following I only list some of the more significant properties of the temporal fabric of human reality:
Avoiding uncertainty by making the past usable

• adaptation to the natural rhythm, pace, sequence and other astro-geo-biological variations through cognitive procedures used to create socially institutionalised timeframes for human activities;
• reflective monitoring of past events to establish some kind of sensory and mental order called memory (both individual and collective);
• rationalisation of the continuity and innovations in the progression of natural and social events, aimed at regulation and control;
• interpersonal negotiation of the use of many kinds of time-reckoning systems and memory-assistance devices, including symbols, notions, values, norms as well as mechanical and electronic artefacts, etc.

Temporality is an integral aspect of social interaction and the construction of meaning (Adam 2004, 66). A (yet mythical) concept of time was introduced by the ancient Greeks and further developed through three thousand years of different civilizations, by “long chains of human generations” (Elias 1994, 37) towards a more and more general notion. The more complex human society becomes, the greater is the importance of temporal ordering and the more weight is accorded to the institutional reckoning systems of social interaction. “In other words, the more societies grow in complexity, the more temporal concepts tend to the abstract, to a higher degree of conceptual synthesis” (Leccardi 2008, 121).

MPU reflects the fundamental features of the temporalisation of human reality, both on the ontological and the phenomenological level. Human reality and its temporality are in a permanent process of becoming and reshaping. Novel experiences of organic (body) or cognitive (mind) qualities of time imply reflectivity, and part of this reflectivity involves the past. “That is, unanticipated experiences make people reconstruct the past symbolically – make them look back upon the past from a new perspective” (Baert 1992, 319). The process of making the past usable proceeds by an adaptive remaking of practices and memories to match and be beneficial for the present, enhancing the mechanisms of recording and recalling social as well as individual experiences.

**Inner and outer time – durée and temps**

“The personal reason why the discovery of that which is eternal and permanent behind all changes has a high value for people is, I suggest, their fear of their own transience – the fear of death” (Elias 1994, 129). To lessen this fear, a person delegates the establishment of the more permanent structures of his/her existence to collective regulations and institutions. From a phenomenological point of view I interpret this division and co-existence between inner and outer time
Aili Aarelaid-Tart

as a great interplay between the two fundamental arenas of human reality – the personal and the interpersonal.

The dichotomy of internal and external sides as the constitutive structures of human time was designed by the French social scientist Henri Bergson at the end of the 19th century. Durée as our intuitive, subjective insight into inner, personal durations manifests as a continuous emergence of the Self. Temps belongs to the practical, material world; it is more objective, reversible, quantitative and divisible into spatial units, measured by the mechanical clock, used for everyday purposes (Bergson 1988 [1889]). This division into inner and outer time is useful, because a human being differentiates between the continuity of a personal Self and the perpetual contrasting of this Self with external events and outer personalities (Others).

Nearly a century later, the English sociologist Anthony Giddens also interpreted this inner time as an introspective experience, directed towards a continuous reflection of the current situation and development of the Self, as an internal referential process. Yet the goal of this continuous self-reflective inner time is to make “active attempts to re-embed the lifespan within a local milieu” (Giddens 1991, 147) or outer time. I will describe the dichotomy between inner and outer time by distinguishing between two closely interconnected modes of human time: cultural and personal time.

**Cultural** time as a temps structure emphasises the continuity of human time and sets its goal to arresting and controlling the duration of time through interpersonal measures (Adam 2004; Gell 1992; Fabian 1983; Zerubavel 2003). Humans live within their umwelt (a term introduced by J. von Uexküll, see Sebeok 1989, 194), a specific mental environment of signs and meanings, trying to reduce external uncertainty by creating and shaping order, which has both spatial and temporal dimensions. Although the mental creation of order is species-specific, its implementation is still confined to a locally and historically determined population (a clan, an ethnos, a nation), which we can treat as a culture. The specific set of timing-measuring devices is like the frame of a collective ‘window’ into the surrounding world. Pertti Alasuutari noted that “a culture is a home, an order people try to maintain in the anarchy and disorder of human reality” (Alasuutari 2004, 15). The culturally ordered form of the human being is opposed to the other side of the same coin – to the ‘trinity’ of uncertainty, vulnerability and insecurity.

Cultural time is closely connected with social representations and collective memory and identity (as investigated by Émile Durkheim, Maurice Halbwachs et al). The patterns of behaviour are created through repetition, sequence, rhythm, etc., within a particular collective experience, diminishing the role of uncertainty and chaos in social reality. Security, trust and identity within a community are
Avoiding uncertainty by making the past usable

based on the institutionalisation and maintenance of certain value-normative constellations in collective memory and the corresponding stereotyping of everyday behaviour. “Human values are seen to join the perennial attempts of our species to oppose the passage of time” (Russell 2005, 122). Culture creates such existential value-normative frameworks for concrete human populations that are capable of actively specifying future trends by revisiting and utilising their past experiences. Cultural time could be interpreted as a consensus between living generations and the generations of the dead (Misztal 2003, 95).

Thus, culture is a self-regulating interpersonal system that tries to face transience and chaos by increasing order and lessening the unfamiliar influences from external transcendence. It may be conjectured that the progress of cultural time along its diachronic (continuous) and synchronic (discrete) axes is complementary. On the one hand, every culture possesses the desire to routinize and ritualize activity, to achieve its stereotypes in thought and action through re-representation. This could be viewed as the creation of the flexible but fixed invariant of behavioural and mental patterns with the general aim of increasing trust and stability. On the other hand, every culture has to deal with never-ending waves of uncertainty (invasions from other cultures, abrupt changes in the environment, etc.) influencing its semiosphere (a term coined by Juri Lotman in 1992) as its realm of active meanings. The discontinuity axis of cultural time accepts mutual changes, but still tries to create the material and intellectual resources the society needs to adapt to the inevitable variability and divergences from the assumed invariance. Against slowly progressing changes, institutionally well-structured cultures can usually come up with adaptive mechanisms, like stockpiling food and other vital supplies, introducing rituals for softening the socio-psychological impact of poor climate or seasonal variation, defence mechanisms for managing a moderate ‘alien’ invasion, etc. Fast and fundamental changes at discrete axes cause cultural trauma, which I will consider in more detail below.

Anthony Giddens pointed out that all cultures have “possessed modes of time-reckoning of one form or another” (Giddens 1991, 16). The reckoning of cultural time proceeds through: (a) keeping the traditions inherited from the ancestors; (b) routinization of everyday behaviour and common sense; (c) passing on certain institutionalised systems (ownership, power or family structures, etc.) from one generation to another.

The process of making the past usable becomes evident in cases when rapidly progressing human conflicts (interventions, wars, revolutions, etc.) or non-human forces like natural catastrophes (hurricanes, earthquakes, etc.) cause rapid and unpredictable changes in cultural reality. Forceful implementation of new traditions, unavoidable directives from the new authorities, unexpected
modifications to everyday customs – all these adjust the temporal structure of a culture and in doing so deeply transform how people understand the past.

**Individual life course** as a basis for *durée* is given by an organism’s internal regularities (for example ageing), life-long personality traits, psychological processes (perception, cognition, memorisation, etc.) and a socially realised self-identity. An individual life course is the most real reification of the order of time within human reality; according to Jean-Paul Sartre it could be interpreted as a “universal singular” (Denzin 1989, 9). The backbone of self-awareness has also been described as a “different unique” (McAdams & Olson 2010), including self-authorising by intertwining two dimensions: the inner and outer time or personal reality and the reality of the Otherness.

An individual life course has a very clear biological starting point – the time of birth. This is a formative act – uncertainty becomes some kind of certainty. An individual being is genetically programmed to go through predetermined states of growth and ageing, which will culminate in death. This sequence forms the main continuity axis of an individual life. Its duration corresponds to the continuous flow of consciousness one may call self-awareness. Carmen Leccardi maintains that “Husserl’s [...] reflections on *durée* as temporal consciousness remain fundamental” (Leccardi 2009, 1).

A human life is an unfinished project and uncertainty is an inevitable property of every life course. To diminish this existential uncertainty and anxiety, “a person attempts to organise those projects around his or her identity or personal biography” (Denzin 1989, 29). The construction and narration of a particular life story make the corresponding life course fit into a socially acceptable discourse and lessen the weight of past randomness and uncertainty by viewing the subject’s life as an ordered process with a definite goal. The perpetual internal retelling of a biography as a process of self-authorship “involves fashioning the raw material of a life-in-culture into a suitable narrative form” (McAdams & Olson 2010, 527). According to Giddens, “each of us not only ‘has’, but *lives* a biography reflexively organized in terms of flows of social and psychological information about possible ways of life” (Giddens 1991, 14; original emphasis).

The creation of every individual life story must simultaneously pass along two intertwined paths: socio-culturally standardized life courses (Corsten 1999, 250) and the unique individual self-realization. Pierre Bourdieu compares a single life to a subway line “where the stops have no meanings by themselves, only as parts of a larger structure” (Bourdieu 2000, 301). One could develop this metaphor further and say that in the progress of a life course its principal seeks the names of the stops on the way and the meaning of the structures behind these names. This may be seen as embracing outer time, a personal recognition of the
Avoiding uncertainty by making the past usable

ways of reckoning time that were created and recorded in social memory before this life began. A person seeks his/her place in the succession of generations, trying to make the spirit of the time (Zeitgeist in Weberian sense) practically comprehensible, to take a position on the current political or economic order, etc. Over the course of this process of embracing, “the self forms a trajectory of development from the past to the anticipated future” (Giddens 1991, 75), which could be viewed as a construction of inner time. “The trajectory of the self has a coherence that derives from a cognitive awareness of the various phases of the lifespan” (op cit, 75). An (auto)biography is a form of self-presentation as well as self-identification, in which one attempts to link the sequence of personal experiences with the ‘objective truth’ of social reality. According to Pierre Bourdieu, this dialectic of inner and outer time “leads to constructing the notion of trajectory as a series of successively occupied positions by the same agent in a space which itself is constantly evolving and which is subject to incessant transformations” (Bourdieu 2000, 302).

Reckoning the time of individual life in a self-narrative proceeds through: (a) recognizing some (officially) fixed day of birth as ‘my birthday’; (b) becoming aware of the cohort disposition, common life-expectancy and the process of ageing in a particular cultural environment; (c) consciously accepting the culture’s measure of external durations (calendars, time units, historical periods); (d) developing short- or long-term plans for the future; (e) discerning the turning points in one’s life, which (usually) correspond to ‘life-changing’ events.

These turning points are extraordinarily important for describing the mechanism of making the past usable in a life-long self-authorship. At every turning point in one’s life, the Self emerges as the balancing of previous experiences and mental standards with a new set of cultural patterns. Adoption of these patterns is often obligatory and enforced, because an individual inevitably challenges and explores new norms, be it age- and health-related statuses, new requirements for building a career or receiving an education, changed ideologies and institutions, etc. “How do people think about and cope with the conflicts and challenges they face” (McAdams & Olson 2010, 524) is a very important question for understanding the essence of human time. Pasupathi and Mansour found that the use of the concept of turning points in one’s life as an autobiographical tool increases with age up to midlife (in McAdams & Olson 2010, 529), when an individual has lived long enough to estimate his/her life in a more complex manner.

There are two basic turning points in every individual life course: birth and death. Martin Heidegger interpreted the bridging between these two turning points as Dasein (being-in-the-world), implying the dualism of origin and destiny, thought and action, being and becoming, which interweave the Self with
the life-flow of its predecessors and successors (Heidegger 1962). These turning points mark an individual’s passage from the non-personal realm of the *temps* into the *durée*’s sphere of personal becoming and the final converse exit from the self-awareness of the *durée* back into the domain of the *temps*. After the last breath is taken, every life and its corresponding story could (not can!) be socially measured and thus becomes a vulnerable and insecure object of public discussion without any further possibility of taking responsibility for that lived life. The complete life stories of national heroes, important political figures, great artists, etc., become inspirations and archetypes for the following generations. The preservation of nationally significant life stories serves the purpose of diminishing the uncertainties of the past and guaranteeing the transmission of memory between generations. The conservation of past relics – old manuscripts, photographs, pieces of art, personal belongings or tools of great writers, composers, artists, etc. – is a time-honoured practice of every larger community of memory. But every political turnover can fundamentally alter the interpretation of those lived lives: the heroes of yesterday may be re-labelled ‘enemies of the nation’ and, contrariwise, former adversaries may suddenly turn into allies. Demolishing the statues and monuments of important politicians and military commanders, renaming streets named after them, closing down personal museums, etc., are all common practices after a political turnover to make the past usable.

**Generational time** can be taken as continuous as much as life itself is, reflecting both biological and social chains of reproduction. Individual finiteness and generational succession demonstrate the connection between inner and outer time – *durée* and *temps* – in an especially prominent way. At the same time the historical change of generations is not reducible “to the biological law of the limited life-span of man and the overlap of new and old generations” (Mannheim 2003, 24). Generational activity (Corsten 1999, 250) happens in two directions: participation in certain historical processes and bonding with one’s contemporaries into a community of memory. Such interconnection actuates the transmission of cultural patterns, i.e. “traditional ways of life, feelings, and attitudes” (Mannheim 2003, 43). Generational time operates as a ‘transmission belt’ for values and norms, functioning as the perpetual carrier of the temporal structure of a particular society. But many authors (Adam 2004; Nowotny 1994; Giddens 1991; Leccardi 2009) see vast differences between traditional and contemporary societies: post-modern time-based inter-generational ties are considered fragile, the process of “remembering together” (Leccardi 2009) is deemed to have become heavily obstructed due to the time compression of social life, and the instantaneousness and simultaneity of many communicative acts. Today, several generations live ‘in the same cage of time’ and, for the most part, each of them would like
Avoiding uncertainty by making the past usable

to be heard in its own understanding of time and thus annex the positions of co-existing generations. Vera King mentions that “the recognition of one’s own limitedness, as well as steadfastness and the gift of time, to the generational others who follow, as well, hold greater vitality” (King 2010, 67).

Generational time is also discrete as it occupies a very concrete historical and geographical niche and covers the biographical developments of a limited number of individuals. Every succeeding generation passes through its circle of life in a more or less different manner than its predecessors, thus expressing its members’ creativity, plasticity, flexibility and capacity for making the past usable in their specific circumstances. Bryan Turner defines a generation as “an age cohort that comes to have social significance by virtue of constituting itself as cultural identity” (Turner 2002, 15–16), i.e. as a subject that takes positions towards the myriad of events that accompanies their appearance on the stage of history. An individual’s generation is a resource-rich structure of opportunity for its members experiencing historical processes during a certain unique biographical period.

So within human time, a cohort is an age-homogeneous group with similar life cycles, it is the basis for a specific pattern of mental differentiation and stratification within a particular “social and intellectual current” (Mannheim 2003, 46). While they go through genetically predetermined life cycles against the backdrop of certain historical events, every generation has some freedom to “articulate temporally the interpretative forces of its new ideas” (Corsten 1999, 251), i.e. to make the past usable. Generational time is a “cluster of opportunities or life chances” (Edmunds & Turner 2002, 5) within given historical conditions, which the cohort can transform to a certain degree. Generational time cannot exist “without its members having concrete knowledge of each other, and which ceases to exist as a mental and spiritual unit as soon as physical proximity is destroyed” (Mannheim 2003, 33).

Here, I must point out Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of habitus as a durable generative principle that produces and reproduces the cognitive schemes and is formed of practices within certain (class-based) social groups (Bourdieu 1977). Habitus could be interpreted as a temporally organized set of means by which specific historical social groups succeed (or do not succeed) in imposing ways of seeing reality favourable to their own interests and goals. Habitus is an involuntary inter-generational transmission girdle, which passes from one genetically (family, kinship) or socially (class) linked group to the next one through structured dispositions, highly visible even in bodies, and recognizable in value-orientations and everyday behavioural patterns. Bridging lived lives with living those lives, habitus is a trusty anchor that in a limited way allows new forms of action, but is far from allowing the creation of unpredictable novelty.
Generational time expresses the polyphonic temporal connections of an inter-generational relationship on the one hand, and the time schemes of distinctive collective awareness, the thriving, ageing and decay of a unique generation on the other hand. Generational time progresses through a dialectic interaction between conflict (generation gap) and reciprocity (inter-generational dialogue).

**Remembering as a process of remaking the past**

The past is commonly viewed as an interval of a line, succeeded by a point called the “present”, existing objectively and independently from our current experience. This kind of distinction is very illusory and simplified, like talking of a ‘true’ or ‘false’ past. The myriad of past human lives and events do not necessarily have any direct importance to present human lives, but some of them could be crucial because we construe them in this way. The past of human reality could be interpreted only as a multitude of events, which we investigate in order to understand our current lives. The point is that we do not have access to the past without a scheme of our own culture, or as Durkheim would say, without a subjective set of our “collective representations”. The temporal structure we call the “past” from the ‘present’ point of view is only a “selectively exploited” (Zerubavel 1995, 5 in Halas 2008, 107) compendium of events from this endless multitude. “There is no past independent of the present, as there is no present independent of the past. Memory can never rescue the past through reflexivity, since there is no past in itself to be rescued” (dos Santos 2001, 170).

Even more, there is no memory of a society as a whole, just the opposite, there are “[…] numerous, often varied experiences of the past and different oral histories” (Halas 2008, 105), officially recognized written histories and versions of counter-histories. Distinctive groups and individuals can recall shared or similar life experiences in quite disparate ways, “so the memory of the same fact can be placed within many frameworks” (Halbwachs 1992, 52). During different historical periods and under various political systems, the interpretations of a society’s past can diverge greatly. There is an excellent exposition by American researcher James Wertsch on the differences in how the 20th century school textbooks before and after the collapse of the Soviet power represented past events (Wertsch 2002). Carmen Leccardi highlights a concept of the British scholar Paul Connerton (from 1989), who has carefully analysed the notion of “incorporated memory”, identifying it as a strategically important dimension for understanding the processes through which social groups conserve and transmit memories (Leccardi 2009, 7). The Polish-American researcher Iwonna Irwin-Zarecka uses the expression “communities of memory” (a derivative of Halbwachs’ “group
Avoiding uncertainty by making the past usable

that remembers”), which are formed of individuals with not only common experience but a shared sense of its meaning and relevance. “A great deal of our daily interactions take place within various communities of memory allowing us the comfort of feeling at home with people we are with” (Irwin-Zarecka 1994, 54). Cohorts and other social groups involve people in the genuine processes of building up certain modes of remembrance and connecting those with present circumstances, thus creating policies for making the past usable.

Therefore dealing with the past is not feasible without a special toolkit of appropriate ways of remembering, a set of narrative templates. And even then it is a very uncertain, vulnerable and susceptible procedure, so a person has to choose between different possible versions without any guarantee of a comfortable solution. When an individual life is moving through the present, it is nearly impossible to know whether some fact from the past will exert negative influence on it. Only a few examples: an individual could be suddenly attacked by previously undiagnosed genetic disease; one’s grandparents’ ‘wrong’ social position or former membership of a currently outlawed organization could distort the chances for descendants, etc. Thus the uncertainty of the past is a huge risk that may easily blemish single life courses. Everybody would like to have a brilliant life trajectory, but in practice we have to face its limits and manoeuvre between personal ideals, taken-for-granted cultural patterns and real-world conditions. To make the past more usable and minimize the impact of prior negative events, people reinterpret the past, legitimize their previous memories and experiences, and fit them into the present.

Collective as well individual memories become legitimate first and foremost when they are approved by the current authorities and public opinion. While self-awareness and auto-biographing work within the durée, they are not independent of the framing forces of the temps. The legitimacy of narratives as well as identities is not derived from the past, but it comes from a present act of narration (dos Santos 2001, 183). An astute comment of Peter Burke’s is that at all times “it is important to ask the question, who wants whom to remember what, and why?” (Burke 1989, 107).

There are outside pressures for including many of the past events in a narration and an individual has to be very careful to only choose useable memories from the mixture. Continuous self-awareness (durée) introduces one more aspect to making the past usable: responsibility. An individual can choose to remember (or not remember) various historical events and therefore makes the decision of what he/she is ready to be responsible for. In contrast with official duty (the above-mentioned legitimate narration templates), “responsibility in fact emerges as an option of a decidedly individual nature, the outcome of the elaboration of
its own irreducible difference. In this sense one can affirm that personal identity is constructed and confirmed through the exercise of responsibility” (Leccardi 2009, 4).

Claiming to take responsibility for some combinations of historical events is again very closely connected with the desire to diminish uncertainty and increase trust. Here the subject selects an aggregate subset from among all the practices and mental patterns that he/she has ever used, declares that it matches his/her personal identity and that he/she is ready to be responsible for it. Carmen Leccardi posits that taking responsibility, “conceived as the possibility for the agent to decide between different alternatives” (Leccardi 2009, 6), allows him/her to take charge of the consequences of his/her own actions.

To live a human life includes mastering two opposing scales of time: the auspicious and prosperous days versus the inopportune and traumatic days. Both the individual as well as the collective can experience fundamental negative changes, i.e. traumas, which directly cause personal or social instability, risk and uncertainty. Human beings have basic psychological needs (a concept put forth by Maslow in 1954) for trust, security, order, love, approval, belonging, self-actualization. When something happens that sharply undermines the fulfilment of those needs, people feel traumatized (Alexander et al 2004, 3) and betrayed, and become distrusting. The traumatizing event may partly or fully shatter identity and disrupt the continuity of awareness. Since traumas are not rare in human reality, every (individual or cultural) subject possesses a mechanism for recovering from such wounds in the fabric of its temporal structure.

On the interpersonal level this process is called coping with cultural trauma (Aarelaid-Tart 2006; Alexander et al 2004; Sztompka 2000). There is no culture that has not encountered a natural catastrophe or a man-made disaster. Correspondingly, throughout all history people have experimented with different strategies for coping with difficult periods and have saved these multi-faceted experiences in the memory systems of cultures. Apart from glorious victories and eras of prosperity, collective memories include recollections of embarrassing defeats, economic recessions and natural disasters. Very often it is not only human bodies, but the value-normative systems of a given collective that suffer at these turning points. Cultural trauma is not the result of a group or a nation experiencing physical pain, but the collective feeling of anxiety, helplessness, and uncertainty. “It is the result of this acute discomfort entering into the core of the collectivity’s sense of its own identity” (Alexander 2004, 10). Thus, cultural trauma could be interpreted as a moment in which the continuity of cultural patterns is strained or broken and former identities crumble. “By collective trauma I mean a blow to the basic tissues of social life that damages the bonds attaching
people together and impairs the prevailing sense of communality” (Erikson 1976, 153). Coping with trauma entails a series of narrations and discussions encouraging the resurgence of collective memory for rebuilding an appropriate identity and a usable past. The renewal of collective as well as individual identity mostly lies in becoming aware of a new, unusual way of bridging the gap between the present and the past, a special positive mode of discussion about events too uncomfortable to remember.

Coping with cultural trauma begins when the changing (mostly political) reality makes it necessary to give meaning to the rapid changes in the value constellations of a particular culture. Then the freshly launched discourse on traumatic events itself is interpreted as an innovative social practice, the goal of which is to overthrow the atrocities and create a fresh version of history, i.e. to make the past usable instead of distressing to the people. Such a discourse introduces novel words, signs, leitmotifs, etc., interpretations that influence the conceptions and behaviour of the active actors when communicating with the past. Discourses on trauma, as a result, bring into being analytical ‘toolkits’ for dealing with an uncomfortable past. These may not relate to actual events very well, but they shape the innovative layer of “instrumental (semantic) collective memory” (Wertsch 2002, 57) and produce narrative templates for individual biographies. The memories that a society chooses to actively recall become distinguished among all those it actually possesses. Collective memory is not a neutral storehouse of events, but it “emerges in response to the need to create a usable past” (Wertsch 2002, 44). This opens up the dualism of remembering according to two different scales of human time. On the one hand there is the reference to a concrete historical event, yet on the other hand it proceeds through particular narratives as ‘cultural toolkits’, placing the memories of the past into fixed and socially acceptable frameworks. There are things that people do not want to remember about the unpleasant and traumatic events, and other things that are constantly recalled and focused on. There are no wrong or right memories, there are master commemorative narratives (Halas 2008, 108), which legitimize general notions that refer to the past and allow them to be shared as appropriate templates for interpreting present life.

There are several strategies for coping with an unpleasant past. A well-known one is forgetting: members of a memory community cease to discuss some objectionable topics (for example membership of and collaboration with the former Communist parties of Eastern European countries). This ‘work of memory’ is mostly subordinate to selecting the matters that have to be remembered in order to reproduce power (Leccardi 2009, 10). There is also the complementary strategy of sacralization of a period or event with the goal of producing a dominant
narrative toolkit for the power-holders. For example, in the early 1990s the inter-war independence period (1918–1940) was practically held sacred in Estonia, and this was reflected in the legislation of that time, especially in the Ownership Reform. Another opposite yet parallel strategy is that of banalization, which presents some social group, prominent person or movement from the past as hostile, awkward or dangerous (e.g. the brutal punishment of well-to-do farmers, re-branded as kulaks, after the October Revolution in Russia in 1917).

**Concluding remarks**

Time is both a vanishing moment and a lasting bio-social invariant in organizing human activity and perception. The ultimate goal of this organization is to lessen the uncertainty and randomness that individuals, social groups, nation states and cultures constantly encounter as results of both natural and human action. It is important to distinguish between individual existential uncertainty (when and how will I die?) and social uncertainty (what kind of natural or social risks could restrict the succession of a specific socio-cultural environment?). Although uncertainty is a dimension of the future, human beings still hope to reduce risks through the past dimension, interpreting what has already happened to expeditently match that which is yet to come.

In the article I treated MPU as an important principle in the analysis of human perception of time, reflecting the dialectics of objectivity and subjectivity with regard to individual, generational as well as social order. MPU as a principle is important in the execution of many social-psychological and sociological studies. First I would stress this in biographical studies, where the researcher constantly faces the problem of how truthfully the respondent is telling his/her tale, which episodes or even longer periods are left untouched, and why. Lived lives and told lives may correspond to each other, but not necessarily very well, since respondents use narration templates to construct their stories as ‘true’ according to the currently dominant interpretation of history. MPU is also important in studies of recent history, where different mnemonic communities represent even only decades-old events within frameworks that are presently beneficial to them. In such a case MPU becomes a source-critical point of view, aimed at finding greater relevance between historical events and their interpretations. MPU is also important in generational studies (youth or ageing studies, cohort studies like the baby-boomers or Komsomol elites of the 1970s in the USSR, etc.). The representatives of a generation usually overestimate their role in maintaining the continuity of the society and underestimate the contribution of either their predecessors or progeny, but converse cases also exist in which people want to
see their contemporaries as losers, a group representing historical interruption (Kõresaar 2004). MPU is also significant in the analysis of great historical cataclysms or cultural traumas, where it is important to find out how people create those social representations of the past that are aimed at reducing the aftereffects of negative events during a period of identity reformation.

**Internet sources**


**References**

Aili Aarelaid-Tart


Avoiding uncertainty by making the past usable

Notes


1 The Principles of the Ownership Reform Act, passed in 1991, enacted that unlawfully expropriated property shall be returned to the owners or compensated for. See in detail: Ownership Reform 1991.
Unfortunately, this image is not available in open access version due to copyright restrictions.

Etching, paper. 44.5 x 49.2 cm.
The diachronic approach to journalism culture

Halliki Harro-Loit

Abstract. This chapter is an extract and adaptation (to the contemporary context concerning research on journalism) of a doctoral dissertation defended at the University of Oslo: Changing Journalistic Conventions in the Press: Empirical Studies on Daily Newspapers under Different Political Conditions in 20th Century Estonia (Harro 2001).

The chapter provides the concept of the diachronic change of journalistic conventions that on the one hand enables the author to highlight journalism as a specific phenomenon in cultural communication. On the other hand the concept of journalistic conventions enables researchers to reveal universal and unique processes in certain journalism cultures. This study provides some examples of empirical findings on how analysis could reveal the changes in journalistic discourse, and how genres and information processing methods are diffused and adopted. The bridge between theoretical concept and empirical finding is important as discourse analysis reveals changes that take place over years and decades. Because news journalism is by nature ubiquitous it has become little more than cultural wallpaper; journalism conventions therefore are usually not consciously perceived, but rather culturally inherited, copied and, to some extent, acquired by training and learning.

Introduction: journalism as a phenomenon in cultural communication

Culture circulates through communication, although communication in the mass media also influences how culture is depicted and perceived. Journalism, at least since the 15th century, has been developing into a specific pattern or phenomenon of mediated communication. In comparison to literature, art, music or science the daily news flow is perceived more like wallpaper and, as Barbie Zelizer notes, not easily appreciated at the moment of its creation (Zelizer 2004, 1). Notwithstanding this, absorbing and producing different types of texts and discourses

The diachronic approach to journalism culture
day-to-day, journalistic content simultaneously represents and constructs the
complexity of cultural practice, identity, collective memory and self-perception
of a society – to name just a few of the functions. Therefore, journalism is like-
wise an influential phenomenon in cultural communication as wallpaper is in
house decoration. Concurrently, the performance of journalism itself depends
on culture. Journalism culture has been defined from different points of view
depending on disciplinary lenses and theoretical approaches.

The aim of this chapter is to study the diachronic dimension of journalism
culture by using the approach of media discourse. While Zelizer points out five
dimensions that prevail in the scholarly literature on journalism – profession,
institution, text, people and set of practices (Zelizer 2004, 32–43) – this chapter
aims to identify to what extent and how journalistic conventions in all five dimen-
sions are preserved in various (archived) texts.

The concept of journalistic conventions in this chapter is defined differently
from journalism culture. The latter was theoretically conceptualized by Thomas
Hanitzsch in 2007 and the following empirical studies on journalism culture have
focused mainly on the comparative cross-cultural and global perspective (e.g.
Hanitzsch et al 2010; Hanitzsch et al 2011; Hanitzsch 2011; Obijiofor & Hanusch
2011; Mellado et al 2012; Reich & Hanitzsch 2013). While in the studies on jour-
nalism culture a key question is how journalists in different countries interpret
their role and the functions of journalism, the concept of journalistic conven-
tions in this chapter refers to various practices and norms that partly are easily
recognizable, and partly might be not perceived knowingly by the professional
community. Journalistic conventions can be revealed from content produced
daily, media-related laws and court cases, journalism curricula, research, text-
books on journalism, etc. For instance, genres and formats can be an outcome of
professional training but could be also copied. In addition, information process-
ing methods (e.g. selection, interpretation, evaluation, etc.), intertextuality, con-
tent production (often dependent on technology) and its cycles, in conjunction
with a variety of other elements that influence journalism phenomena, are not
habitually knowingly perceived by journalists. Neither can the public perceive
all the filters, conduits or moulds journalism uses when mediating the daily
news and related discourses (e.g. analysis, images, advertising, etc.). Journalistic
conventions change obliviously and constantly. Therefore, diachronic analysis
that stretches over social, economic, technological and political change enables
researchers to capture journalistic conventions.

The perpetual daily production of journalistic content – that has been ar-
ched – has created an enormous reservoir that enables researchers to recon-
struct the development of journalistic discourse and conventions. Those texts that
have survived constitute the most comprehensive source material available, material that is enhanced by a variety of records and research, as well as the memoirs and life-stories of journalists. Therefore, in order to answer the question how to capture empirically journalistic conventions, I suggest using close reading, text linguistics and discourse analysis, with the intention of reconstructing how these surviving texts were composed, what rules governed journalistic information processing, and what power relations may be reflected in the texts.

The chapter basically proceeds from constructionism (this perspective was introduced in the sociology of news production between the 1970s and 1980s), although as Raymond W. K. Lau (2012) points out, it is important to distinguish the construction of reality through news and by news. Hence, the concept of journalistic convention could help us understand how culture is communicated through journalistic discourse and how journalism is instantly affected by culture.

**Journalistic discourse**

In the context of this study, the term ‘journalistic discourse’ is used to refer to the specific information processing and consumption of factual and non-fictional phenomena in the form of mediated messages. Although journalistic discourse has inherited or taken over and adapted most of its formats from discourses like everyday conversation, telegrams, literature, etc., the discursive practices of journalism are quite distinct from other literary and everyday rhetorical practices. This implies that information published in a newspaper has usually gone through what we may term ‘journalistic processing’. Sifted through this filter, speeches may be turned into small news items and one-sentence declarations may be processed into long stories. Just how tight this ‘processing filter’ is depends on the autonomy and professionalism of the press institution. A certain tension between the other discourses and journalism is therefore natural. Some events fit in more easily with the demands of journalism genre than others. Usually, single-incident stories are more easily written in the inverted pyramid format. A fire and a medical congress are very different subjects to process into a news story, not only because the extent of the information to be reported is different. The discourse of responding to a fire naturally corresponds better to the news report format than the discourse of a medical congress.

The discourse analysis of old newspapers displays the step-by-step evolution of professional information processing methods, a change of genres, changes in the status of journalists and several other factors of professional culture that were implicitly recorded in texts and visual symbols.
The diachronic approach to journalism culture

For example, summarisation and focusing are very common contemporary journalistic techniques used internationally. By focusing on a certain fragment, an event or allegation is given news value. By refocusing, through which information is deleted or reordered, a story might become non-congruent in comparison to the “original input copy” (Bell 1991, 228). The focusing method gives media organisations and journalists the power to interpret and highlight the events.

Estonian newspapers started to adopt the technique of focusing during World War I; later the lead technique\(^2\) was introduced in accordance with the gradual development of headlines. In the 1920s headlines were sometimes the only purely journalistic element in an article belonging to the category of non-journalistic discourse. By the 1930s the lead was more or less adopted. Hence, the discourse analysis enables revelation of the gradual change in journalistic information processing methods that directly influence epistemologies of journalism.

It can be also said that for a critical discourse analyst a set of historical newspaper texts contains more information about the circumstances these texts were created under than any other historical document. (Unlike in archaeology, enquiry does not transform the source.) In some studies, the media as an object of research turns into a screen on which the performance of different social forces becomes visible and is studied. For example Jan Ekecrantz (1997) reports on how Swedish society has been represented by newspapers in three periods of the 20th century between 1925 and 1987.

In order to use these archived texts as a reservoir of cultural communication the understanding of the journalism conventions of the past would be helpful. Concurrently, the diachronic analysis of journalistic discourse influenced by contemporary contexts extends the horizon of understanding of the substance of journalism culture.

**Diffusion and adaptation of journalistic conventions**

As journalism is particularly responsive to social and technological change from the historical and geographical perspectives, there is no agreement yet on what exactly constitutes journalism at any one point in time (Zelizer 2004, 23–24). It seems therefore reasonable to use the concept of contemporary journalism culture with the intention of recognising the scale of change of conventions over time in one particular country, and then return to the universal nature of journalistic conventions.

Journalistic conventions include habits and social agreements connected to the collection of information and the production of content. They depend on the range of professional methods and skills with which the professional community
is acquainted. Michael Schudson depicts a decisive role of genre conventions: “[…] it is the conventions of the genre, not the competence of the reporter, that determine what can or cannot become a story, what angle will or will not make sense” (Schudson 1995, 14). Schudson also maintains that a mechanism of ‘sourcing’ or selecting appropriate information sources is at work through those conventions: not everyone is a legitimate speaker in the news. Journalistic conventions are also influenced by and exert influence upon the political, cultural, economic and technological configurations in a given society. Conventions in a democratic society differ from those that are accepted by an authoritarian or totalitarian regime.

The dynamics of journalistic convention is connected with the temporal diffusion of journalistic information processing methods, formats and practices globally. For example, the diffusion of the news paradigm happened in different countries in different periods of time. Although it was developed during the last two decades of the 19th century and in the early part of the 20th century, it took several decades to spread across Europe. The news paradigm came to Denmark in 1905, to Sweden in 1908 (Marzolf 1982, 132–147), and was adopted in France only in the 1930s (Chalaby 1996, 303–326). Unlike technical inventions, cultural innovations tend to be adapted to local conditions. Even though the television and magazine formats today travel globally (content is offered under the same brand names, companies share knowledge in marketing and managerial processes, journalists share best practices), there is no demand for anything that could be called a pure global media. Rather, the content very often encounters cultural barriers and needs to be generated locally in order to be a success with audience (Rohn 2010, 368; Rohn 2011).

From an international chronology it becomes evident that the speed and the extent of the adaptation of new journalistic methods depends on the cultural-economic-political contexts of the adopting countries. Historically, we can assume that a more intensive diffusion of journalistic innovation into Western cultures started towards the end of the 19th century when most European countries abolished censorship. It should be noted that journalistic discourse sometimes requires special training, hence the diffusion of innovations might be connected to the patterns of education.

While Thomas Hanitzsch (2007) proposes epistemologies as one of the constituents of journalism culture – objectivism versus subjectivism and empiricism (truth should be substantiated by proper reporting) versus analytical (opinion) journalism – the adaptation of the modern news paradigm is one precondition for apparent ‘objectivism’.
Interventionism – the dimension that reflects the extent to which journalists are either ‘neutral disseminators’ or ‘advocates’ – is partly linked to the development of journalistic methods and genres that give a more decisive role to journalists. For example, according to Michael Schudson (1994), the interview genre was invented when journalists started to publish questions and answers in the form in which they were recorded. This happened in America in the 1860s and in Estonia at the end of the 1920s. Before this, reporters talked with public officials but they did not refer to these conversations in their news stories. Direct quotation (interview genre) helps journalists to demonstrate the interviewees’ reaction, competence (or non-competence) or emotions to the public only if conducted professionally. For example, through the use of the journalistic interview as a genre, a public person can potentially be placed under public surveillance. This also depends on the chosen techniques and conventions of questioning, which allow or restrict direct and aggressive modes of enquiry or ‘interrogation’.

The question of interventionism is also linked to the complicated question of by-lining in journalism culture. While Roland Barthes (1977) claims that the author is a modern figure discovered together with the prestige of the individual towards the end of the Middle Ages, and that in ‘ethnographic societies’ the responsibility for a narrative is never assumed by a person but by a mediator, one can ask the same about the journalist. The development of journalistic conventions determines when a journalist or any individual acting as journalist is biased towards the role of a transmitter of existing discourse, and when he or she becomes (or is presented as) a reconstructor of a ‘reality’ as an author.

Authorship in newspaper discourse is also dependent on the character of the text. Basically, newspaper discourse can be divided into informative and interpretative texts. In interpretative texts the author assumes an active role, while in informative texts the relationship between author content and transmitter content generally remains unclear. Schudson links the increase of by-lining in the American press in the 1920s with changes in journalistic practice. He suggests that the stories in the 1920s became more interpretative (Schudson 1995, 63). According to Manka Koshir (1988, 357–358), the ‘function’ of a text depends on the absence or presence of the journalist or author in the text. The main point here is that some journalistic texts – especially news – try to avoid the presence of an author because an author always entails subjectivity. In opinion articles, on the contrary, the presence of an author (occasionally using the first person, ‘I’) is important. Editorials are sometimes intentionally not by-lined to emphasise collective opinion.

My claim is that the character of a text cannot be determined solely on the basis of the presence or absence of an author, since newspaper texts may be
interpretative and still lack an author and his/her individual voice. The author’s presence in the text may be fairly sophisticated as he or she may let others tell the story and thus be seemingly absent. According to the definitions given in the introduction, the author’s activity may still be very high, because he or she has highlighted someone’s speech. In Estonia the journalist as an author became visible from the end of the 1920s, but only since the 1970s did the journalist become an author with a full name and exist as fully identifiable and visible. In Northern Europe press ‘voicing’ developed in the first quarter of the 20th century.

Power distance – the question of whether journalism and journalists openly challenge powers (adversarial journalism) or whether journalism is rather given a propagandist role – becomes a dynamic factor when applied to different periods of time. Discourse analysis shows (Harro 2001) that once an autonomous journalistic discourse is established – one that is specific to the professional community involved in journalistic text processes and products – it may sometimes withstand authoritarian, or non-totalitarian, censorship. In contrast, poorly developed journalistic discourse, together with weakly established conventions, a low level of professionalism and an under-developed professional ideology, may make the press vulnerable to manipulations by those in power, be they democratic or otherwise.

If handled professionally, journalistic discourse (especially genres and methods) may have the ability to withstand authoritarian censorship. To illustrate this claim I draw on an example of the creation of sub-text using opportunities that are available through the journalistic genre. When an authoritarian political regime was established in the Republic of Estonia in 1933–1934, following a period of parliamentary democracy, journalists were left with few possibilities for the expression of critical opinions about the government. Nevertheless, in a straightforward reportage from a meeting in the village council of Mõisaküla, forbidden information was disclosed simply by publishing a conversation between ordinary people that would usually not have been reported. Significantly, using the reportage form kept the reporter in the shadow and, through an ironic twist, as can be seen below, criticism was presented, and arguably amplified.

The background is that in 1935 a group closely linked with the government launched a new daily, Uus Eesti. In circular letters from the State Propaganda Office any criticism of the newspaper was forbidden. Such letters did not have the status of regular laws, but still needed to be adhered to. In 1937 the biggest Estonian daily Päevaleht in effect defied these orders by publishing the following story.
The diachronic approach to journalism culture

Päevaleht 1 April 1937, 4  
Headline: STORY ABOUT THE “SECRET” REGULATION

The following conversation took place at a council meeting of the borough Mõisaküla, with the local authorities and an audience, in total 20 people:

Deputy M. Kull: “According to the financial report, what kind of literature does the local council read?”

The head of the borough J. Paalits: “That would be the government’s newspaper Uus Eesti.”

Deputy M. Kass: “But the official publication of our government is Riigi Teataja [a bulletin of state laws and acts – HHL], and not a political newspaper.”

The head of the borough: “Last year we received a secret regulation where it was made obligatory for the local council to subscribe to Uus Eesti.”

Deputy M. Kass: “We cannot accept any authority that makes it obligatory to raise public expenses by secret regulations. According to the current laws, the local council decides on local expenses, and thus we cannot believe that there is such a regulation at all.”

Secretary: “It exists.”

Deputy M. Kass: “We would like to see it.”

Secretary: “It is impossible, it is secret!”

This story thus contains the implied meaning that Uus Eesti is not an independent newspaper. It breaks the fair competition rules and yet the government supports it. The government is also breaking the law by issuing secret regulations. This type of message could not have been published in the format of a conventional news story, editorial or commentary.

I argue that the conventions, genres and the competence of the reporter may have strongly determined what could be said. The power of a generic convention was exploited by competent reporters to publish forbidden messages while keeping the text within the given limits of censorship. In Estonia, this technique was later reinvented and also used during the Brezhnev period of Soviet rule (1964–1982). However, as mentioned above, the power relations might be quite the opposite if journalistic discourse is poorly developed and the professional ideology of journalists does not support the autonomy of journalism.

However, it is important to note here that, under the strict totalitarian system characterised by Stalin’s aggressive exercise of state control (1940–1953), autonomous journalistic discourse could not exist in Estonia at even the lowest level. Publishing a message with implied meanings, such as the example given above from 1935, was severely punished. Epp Lauk (1999, 28) provides an example that when the Soviet Union’s fourth Five-Year Plan was launched in 1946, the local newspaper Valgamaalane published an article with a utopian vision of the town of Valga in five years, i.e. in 1950:
Halliki Harro-Loit

Valgamaalane 27 March 1946

Headline: WHAT SHOULD OUR HOMETOWN BE LIKE IN 1950
By L. Tamm

The food coupons and shortage of goods will be forgotten. There will be an abundance of all kinds of goods in the shops. The rows of ‘trade women’, trying to sell second-hand stuff in the marketplaces, will have vanished. The quality of bread will have improved, and the people will speak jokingly about the year 1946, when one could often find pieces of straw, rats and rat-tails in the bread. [...] The brewery in Valga will have enough bottles and every consumer will be able to get refreshment at any time. [...] The fourth Five-Year Plan will lead us closer to our happy future, to Communism.

This particular article passed pre-censorship. However, in a report of the controllers from Moscow, the case was later mentioned as a severe political mistake, and it was one of the reasons for the dismissal of the then chief of the Estonian censorship agency, GLAVLIT.

If we compare this article with the above-mentioned village meeting at Möisaküla, the difference between the relative freedom of the 1930s and Stalin’s totalitarianism becomes quite obvious. Under Stalin, the use of different techniques of writing and the adoption of genres to mark and convey both information and the restrictions on journalistic publication was almost impossible. This occurred across the Soviet Union, and was by no means applied only to Estonia.

In the 1960s and especially since the end of the 1970s, with news as a genre still blocked by the authoritarian system, journalists started to use the feature genre again to report about reality. Different types of participatory reportage became popular in the Estonian press. Journalists took jobs as farm workers, worked in pubs, etc., and wrote serial stories about the daily routine of the professions they experienced for a while. Less time-consuming and therefore more often used was a style of reportage in which journalist visited a person (or organization) and later reported the experience of the visit. These features included pieces of social criticism and revealed information that would have been complicated to publish in the form of a news story. For example, the following extract gives hints about the pollution of Lake Võrtsjärv, the wasting of resources, etc.

Noorte Hääl 9 October 1981, 2

Headline: POSTMAN
By Ivo Pilv

[...] Kusti and I seated ourselves on a bench behind the sauna and talked about Lake Võrtsjärv.

“...When I settled down here in 1946, the beach was bare. Now it is full of...”
The diachronic approach to journalism culture

reeds. The last 10 years have increased its growth.”

“?”

“Most probably it is the Tänassilma river, which brings fertilisers to the bay and feeds the reeds. Pity, that there’s some useless fertiliser in the fields and elsewhere flowing into the river. Fish like it least of all. Most of them have said farewell to the bay. In old times, you could fish close to the coast. Now it would be senseless.”

“So, now you cannot go to the lake at all, let the fish be wherever.”

“Yes you can, if you buy a ticket. I had it once for 2.5 months, 10 roubles. The last one expired in August and it wasn’t renewed. They said that there would be no ticket before winter ice. If not, then let it be,” Kusti is forbearing.

[...]  

“But anyway, why do they consider or call you a Postman? Did you often deliver the wire messages this way?”

“Of course. When I had just completed the delivery route, I had to turn my horse or moped back for the second lap, regardless of cold or rain.”

“But nowadays the wire messages addressed to village may reach the addressee later than the sender himself by bus. Despite general progress, the delivering speed of wire messages has developed in the opposite direction.”

“That’s true. I don’t know why. [...] Besides they have created such a stupid law that allows a postman to put the wire message into the mailbox. It doesn’t climb up to the apartment itself!”

[...]

All of the given examples illustrate how genre conventions (for example different norms concerning news stories and features during the Soviet time) and voicing strategies (in the 1930s common people could talk more freely about reality than journalists) were used to ‘write between the lines’. When censorship became stricter (for example at the beginning of the 1970s) the feature genre receded for a while. Hence interventionism – here with the focus on journalist’s role as a transmitter, interpreter or more or less hidden constructor of reality – as one factor in journalism culture came to light via discourse analysis. Diachronic changes in journalistic discourse therefore also reveal the dynamic changes dependant on socio-political context.

As was stated before, the diffusion of journalistic conventions occurs via professional communicative discourse: daily practice (for example testing the limits of censorship, communication of best practices, feedback from the audience, etc.), education and textbooks – all the elements that construct and constitute journalistic discourse. However, a textbook without training is inefficient, as indicated by the analysis of the development of Estonian journalism culture (Harro 2001), outlined below. The first definition of journalistic genres in the Estonian language was published in 1924, when the Estonian magazine Vikerkaar published a series of articles about the basic skills needed to become a correspondent.
Halliki Harro-Loit

(Mändmets 1924). The first textbook on journalistic genres and techniques in Estonian was published in 1932 (the title was *Reporter: Technique for Newspaper Writing*, Wellner 1932). It was a synthesis of different Anglo-American textbooks and covered issues like gathering news and news value categories, news sources, focusing, the lead, etc. One can find very little of these reporting techniques in Estonian newspapers of that time. In 1954 journalistic education was established at the University of Tartu and the second textbook on journalism *Newspaper* was published in 1968 (Peegel 1968). The third textbook was published in 1997 and this was again strongly influenced by the tradition of American journalism training (Pullerits 1997). By that time a purely news reporting practical training course had been included in the journalism curriculum. The analysis of these textbooks compared to journalistic content provides a future possibility to study how universal journalistic methods are disseminated and then adopted according to the local cultural baggage and temporal context. While discourse analysis provides evidence of changes in journalism culture, textbooks, empirical data about education, conferences, discussions on ethics, etc., provide the interpretative context.

The diachronic approach in cross-cultural research on journalism: comparing processes

In addition to discourse analysis of archived journalistic content and professional communicative discourse on journalism, several other sources are available when asking how journalistic culture has been developed in a particular cultural context: scholarship on journalism history, life narratives and various case studies on ethical and legal conflicts (lawsuits) that illustrate the normative thinking about journalistic performance in a particular social context – to name a few examples.

It is important to distinguish between the two types of approach to journalism and media history: conventional, descriptive histories, and studies that specifically examine the diachronic development of these conventions, which we recognise today as constituent parts of journalistic conventions. The next step is to compare these processes cross-nationally.

Most conventional work in journalism history falls into four genres: firstly biographies (focusing on a journalist or news organization) produce neat bodies of primary documents; secondly comprehensive journalism histories that are almost always nation-centred and offer progressive narratives, showing the advancing autonomy and respectability of the occupation, while more recent comprehensive histories have proposed more critical narratives; thirdly event-focused histories cover major events from the perspective of journalism practice, for example World War II; and fourthly image-focused histories attempt to
The diachronic approach to journalism culture

examine larger collectives, such as women or ethnic minorities (Barnhurst & Nerone 2009, 24–25).

The early deviation from the traditional historical (biographical and comprehensive) approach towards historical mass communication research focused on the development of communication and media technologies. The theoretical groundwork for this development and extension of media history was initiated by Harold Innis in *Empire and Communications* (1950) and elaborated by Marshall McLuhan in *Understanding Media* (1964). This approach deals with qualitative changes in human communication that were initiated by the invention of writing, paper, printing, recording, film, etc. Wilbur Schramm’s *The Story of Human Communication: Cave Painting to Microchip* (1988) is a good example of this type of communication history, which also covers media history. Another contemporary example of the approach is the monographic research by Brian Winston entitled *Media Technology and Society – A History: From the Telegraph to the Internet* (1998).

There is, of course, a notable difference between communication and media histories. As Hans Dahl (1994, 556–557) has pointed out:

To focus on media [...] you have to direct your attention towards an institutional level, concentrating on the modes of repetition of indefinite series of communicative acts within certain structures of social economics, cultural or textual kind, applying such categories as routines, habits, genres and the like.

Another non-conventional media historic approach that is based on the sociological rather than historical research tradition is the branch that focuses on the history of media texts and the journalistic profession. Here I shall call it the journalism-centred media historic approach. One of the best-known landmarks of the journalism-centred media historic approach is *Discovering the News* (1978) by Michael Schudson. This book is based on his PhD research, which was published in 1967, and is remarkable in several respects. First, by following the development of news as a social construction and invention he writes a social history of American newspapers. Secondly, it is the first study of press history to be based on criteria that are central to contemporary media research, namely the news paradigm and its social meaning, objectivity and objective reporting, journalism as a vocation, etc. Schudson looks at the criteria from a historic perspective and thus provides the material with which to examine journalistic phenomena in the process of constant change. However, Schudson has not carried out a systematic textual analysis based on a defined body of texts. In 1997–1998 John Nonseid and Svennik Høyer carried out such an investigation, focusing on the telegram news
published by Norwegian newspapers from 1918–1930 (Nonseid & Høyer 1998). The main finding of their research was that conventionalisation of the ‘inverted pyramid’ structure was slower and more casual than expected. In conclusion I would argue that the new focus and elegant approach Schudson introduced might be more valuable in a conceptual sense than his deductions about the development and conventionalisation of the structure of the news story.

In 1994 Schudson published an article about the history of the news interview, based on American journalism (Schudson 1994). The focus on journalistic methods and genre was new in media history. In another piece of research, titled “The politics of narrative form”, Schudson looks for the changes that have taken place in the way print journalism has treated the American presidency from the early days of the Republic (Schudson 1995, 53–71). In this study he relies both on factual and textual analysis. The study can be classified as a qualitative case study. To give other examples of studies that theoretically rely on journalism studies, Jean Chalaby (1996) compares the adaptation of modern American reporting methods in Britain and France. Marion Marzolf (1982) shows that the modernisation of journalistic methods and genres of the Northern European press started during the last quarter of the 19th century.

A notable dimension relevant to the analysis of temporal change in journalism culture focuses on the history of professional ideology and takes in the position and role of the press institution over time. The earliest study on this topic was published by George Boyce in 1978 and was titled “The fourth estate: the reappraisal of a concept”. Where Boyce has based his research on British media history, Timothy Gleason carried out an American-oriented study in 1990. Both of these studies followed the development of the ideological relations of journalistic institutions and society especially concerning the concept of the watchdog role of the press. Gleason, in particular, approached this by examining court practice in relation to the press in 19th century America.

A further strand of professional ideology is that of the emergence of journalistic standards that emphasise the development of rules governing journalistic practice. In Journalistic Standards in Nineteenth-Century America, published in 1989, Hazel Dicken-Garcia emphasised the nature and content of past discussions of press behaviour and press criticism. This discussion included what journalists have viewed over time as ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ practices, their views on appropriate and inappropriate conduct, and the role of ethics in their work. For Dicken-Garcia (1989, 10) the term ‘standard’ is used to mean:

[...] the criteria or rules of procedure governing and of an occupational end - those “rules” for example that define how information is to be collected,
 incorporated into a report and presented in published form. [...] Standards are part of the journalist's routine [...] and they are apt to change over time.

One of her research questions is: how do concepts of journalistic standards change in the course of a century and how do earlier models relate to present-day concepts at the broadest theoretical level? (Dicken-Garcia 1989, 6).

It is useful to compare the two approaches of Dicken-Garcia and Schudson. Dicken-Garcia centred on press behaviour and standards. Schudson (1994) demonstrated that the development of standards and journalistic methods influence each other directly. Dicken-Garcia did not examine actual journalistic practices and discussions of how practice should be carried out, whereas Schudson built a bridge between changes in methods and genres. His selection of the news interview allowed him to examine both the journalistic method and genre at the same time.

The development of journalistic standards is close to studies carried out about the development of the journalistic profession. Høyer and Lauk (2003) have studied the professionalisation of journalism in Norway and Estonia and also draw on theories of professionalisation. In another study of the historical development of professionalisation, Patricia Dooley (1997) focused on the development of the journalistic occupation in America during the 19th century. Before presenting the historical study in depth, Dooley provides a theoretical frame for defining journalistic work as such and the elements that influence this work. Her study draws partly on texts that reflect a range of professional communication, for example court speeches. Her approach may be classified as partly discursive-historical.

In 2005 Svennik Høyer and Horst Pöttker edited a collection of articles on the diffusion of the news paradigm in different countries over one-and-a-half centuries. As Høyer points out:

The diffusion of cultural ideas is an underlying theme of this book. Long before “globalisation” became a catchword, ideas, styles and fashions etc. originating from abroad were imported and domesticated by ‘adopting cultures’ under the false impression of being local inventions. [...] Ideas are rarely identical in different environments and adoption is rarely a passive reception, but rather an interchange, which results in a hybrid of new and old ideas, or between international trends and national customs. Understanding more of the autonomy of an ‘adopting’ culture, it will be easier to explain the entwined trajectories between original idea and adopting cultures (Høyer 2005, 14).
Hence, while the cross-cultural research on journalism culture would broaden the idea of ‘culturally appropriate’ journalism models that are dominantly constructed in the Anglo-American and Western European traditions, pinpointing these analyses to a specific period of time does not permit researchers to analyse the patterns of journalism culture over time.

My claim is that while the main conceptualisations of current research problems arise from the existent theories of journalism, one can go beyond the reconstruction of the past for its own sake. I would therefore discern the diachronic from the historical approach to journalism culture. For example, the concept of genre is controversial for a historical study: it is not suitable for comparative historical analysis through different epochs because genre patterns are dynamic. A genre is the final result of the changes of conceptions of accepted behaviour, professional methods, functions and communicative goals. One possible solution to this problem is to use the matrix of contemporary press genres – structure, function, and the methods certain genres demand – and compare the history with the contemporary understanding of journalistic genres.

As so much research is already available on the development of different aspects of journalism culture, a meta-analysis of long-term journalism-cultural processes would be a potential that could be realized in future research.

**Conclusion**

The concept of journalistic conventions enables researchers to capture the variety of empirical evidence concerning temporal changes in epistemologies of journalism culture, its institutional roles, ethical ideologies (Hanitzsch 2007, 371), journalistic discourse and practices. Research on media history shows that some universal innovations that influence journalistic conventions have been adopted in different periods of time in different countries. Concurrently, this diffusion is not usually mechanical, but rather, cultural adoption of these practices creates different journalism cultures. The concept of journalistic conventions is therefore a kind of tool that enables researchers to build a bridge between the theory of journalism cultures, empirical journalism studies and media histories.

The bridge between theoretical understanding of journalism as a phenomenon in cultural communication and empirical research is important. Specifically, various researchers have stated that cultural factors play the most important role in daily media performance. Epp Lauk (2008, 209), for example, states that national, historical and cultural traditions, as well as unique features of the progress of local journalism cultures may have a stronger impact on the development of post-communist journalism than has ever been admitted, yet she does
not specify these “cultural implications”. Peter Gross (2013), in his review of the book *Central and Eastern European Media in Comparative Perspective: Politics, Economy and Culture* (Downey, J. & Mihelj, S. (eds), Burlington, Ashgate, 2012) critically points out that although Colin Sparks gets everything right about the relationship between media and elites, between the varied elites, the very political and economic context that enfolds them, the explanatory essence of the cultural context is not sufficient. Gross is also critical of Karol Jakubowicz’s brief touch on cultural issues in the same book. Gross argues:

Missing, however, in this well-documented and reasoned chapter are the significant details addressed by the questions, which cultural values and related behaviour patterns are we talking about? What are the origins and nature of these values and related behaviours? (Gross 2013, 402-403).

These critical ideas indicate that in order to understand the phenomenon of journalism and its influence on cultural communication we need a concept that enables us to empirically capture and reveal certain factors which on the one hand influence the journalistic practices at a certain time and in a certain society, and, on the other hand influence cultural factors that determine journalistic performance.

**References**

Halliki Harro-Loit


The diachronic approach to journalism culture


Notes

1. An important part of the news discourse is how journalist tells the story. By the use of the so-called inverted pyramid formula, news of the latest and most newsworthy events is put first, followed by details on historical context and comments. The natural chronology is ruined, the focus is narrowed down.

2. The lead today usually summarizes the most newsworthy facts or provides a narrative that is like a teaser for the following story. 'Lead technique' here means that news journalists learned incrementally to write attractive stories.
Unfortunately, this image is not available in open access version due to copyright restrictions.

Illimar Paul “Taevas” (“Sky”) 1985. Silkscreen printing, paper. 50 x 50 cm.
Genre creation within memory collection

Tiiu Jaago

Abstract. The chapter poses a question as to what needs to be considered, in scientific research, when applying today’s research methodology in the analysis of source material collected during earlier periods. The problem emerges due to the fact that the quondam aims of collecting and recording source material do not overlap with modern research questions and approaches. A closer look is taken at the collection of materials created by historians during the 1920s and 1930s – these are memories and recollections of the 1905 revolutionary movement in Estonia. How do these memories, collected for the purpose of studying history, suit folkloristic narrative research? Historians were primarily interested in the reconstruction of the events of 1905, whereas folklorists proceed from narration as reality: how and why are the events of the time recollected and memorised in such a manner. The contact points between historical and folkloristic narrative research are analysed from three angles: the genre of these texts, the specificity of oral and written texts, and the impact of the researcher and narrator’s cooperation on the archival text.

Recollections of historical events have been researched in Estonia by historians, ethnologists, sociologists and also scholars of literature.1 The following chapter focuses on the folkloristic analysis of memories; the main theme therein is how to interpret the texts, collected earlier and stored in the archives, proceeding from the research goals of today. These earlier materials were indeed collected with a particular aim, which might not be directly associated with contemporary research problems, yet the purpose for collecting the material does have an impact on the information recorded in these texts. I will take a closer look at the archival texts dating from the 1920s and 1930s. These are the materials preserved in Tartu, in the Cultural History Archives (EKLA) of the Estonian Literary Museum. EKLA f 172 is the Year 1905 Society’s collection (1905. aasta Selts); EKLA f 199 (1922–1938) and 200 (1923–1933) comprise the Historical Tradition collection (Ajaloolist traditsiooni) from Estonian parishes, written as fieldwork reports by

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scholars from the Academic History Society and the Estonian Literary Society’s working group on history. The Year 1905 Society operated between 1929 and 1940, yet the Society’s collection also contains retrospective materials from 1903 onwards. In the context of this chapter, these memories are thematically connected with the 1905 revolutionary movement in Estonia. What should be known about the aims and principles of creating these texts when the emphasis is shifted from the event in history, to researching the text as a narrative about the past? The various strands of this question converge in a genre-based problematic: how to define the genre of archival texts.

In the first part of the chapter, I present the theoretical background, sources and concepts, and discuss the folkloristic research domain that studies memories as narratives of history. I observe how understandings of material collection methods have taken shape and how this has influenced the texts in the archives. This does not mean that archival texts are merely a written recording of an existing genre; quite the contrary, it often happens that the outcome of the collection process is a new independent genre. The second part of the chapter is an analysis of these issues, relying on specific examples. I will point out the factors that cannot be omitted when providing a new interpretation of earlier archival texts.

**Background of the analysis**

In Estonian folkloristics the study of memories as narrations of history is referred to as *pärimuslik ajalugu*, ‘popular narrated history’ (Jaago 2006). This domain is comparable to *muistitieto* research in Finnish folkloristics, and internationally, hooking up mainly with the study of oral history within the frameworks of history and the social sciences, and has existed as an inter-disciplinary subject area since the 1990s (Peltonen 2006; Thomson 2007). When researching popular narrated history, relevance is given to the narrativity of the particular text: the important question is how is it narrated, rather than what is being told or what happened in the past. The focus on narration and text creation renders significance to the genre of these texts. When discussing the genre, I observe how the narrators and researchers have referred to or defined these texts. I proceed from Dan Ben-Amos’s classification of genres which describes these as categories of analytical and cultural discourse. In the first case, the focus is on the comparative observation of text features. In the second case, it is of relevance as to how texts occur in a cultural context, where “the universals are not the genres themselves but the division of speech into different forms” (Ben-Amos 1997, 413). An important change occurring in folkloristics after World War II was that when speaking about genres, consideration is given to social aspects, for example what kind
of expectations does the author have with regard to the text, and what are the expectations of the audience; how are these expectations associated with communication and presentation situations in which these texts are being used, etc. (Abrahams 2005, 55). Such a genre definition is of later origin than the creation of the texts observed in the chapter, and therefore highlights the question about the factors influencing the new interpretations of these texts.

In Estonia, recollections for research purposes have mainly been gathered using two methods: in fieldwork, when questioning and interviewing people, and by way of public collection campaigns. In the latter case, volunteer correspondents compile their contribution for the archives, relying on the guideline worded by the researcher or pursuant to a separate printed publication issued in the media. The collected materials are preserved in the central archives of Estonia, mainly in two institutions, the Estonian Literary Museum and the Estonian National Museum. These methods of collecting material have been systematically and effectively applied since the 1870s (see, in detail, for example Jaago 2005, 58–61; Tael 2006, 7–30; Tamm 2002). Thus, it is not at all surprising that researchers also use texts that have been collected in earlier periods and are preserved in archives, in addition to narratives recorded today. This provides an opportunity to mutually compare different periods, although by using today’s research methodology during the analysis this in turn gives rise to current questions about rethinking archival material, including the issue as to what influences these interpretations (cf Andrews 2008, 90–92). Concurrently with the more widespread use of research methods that attempt to interpret cultural documents, more attention is also paid to the reciprocal connection regarding the generation of archival texts and the data existent in these texts. “One of the ways to understand archival documents is to pose questions regarding the persons who produced them,” argues Janika Oras (2010, 22). Yet, it is not only the narrator’s person, but also the retrieval cue (Tulving 1990, 352) that has an impact on the nature of what one or other archival text becomes. What are the research questions for which the retrieval cue is of relevance, and when does it not have any significance? For instance, what should be the point of departure when attempting to interpret the text creation situation in the 1920s and 1930s as a retrieval cue, and when should questions about the creation of the text be totally discarded? The retrieval cue is undoubtedly of significance in a situation where texts are created for the purpose of research in cooperation between the researcher and the narrator. Indeed, it is particularly this practice that has made researchers pay more attention to the creation process and the genre specifics of the archival texts (cf, e.g. Apo 1995, 173–174; Portelli 1997, 4; Bela-Krümina 2002, 205; Pöysä 2006, 223–228; Tuisk 2010, 64).
many references to the inter-subjectivity and dialogicality of the fieldwork and interview methods, both with regard to the research on oral history (Grele 2007, 13) and folkloristics (Knuuttila 2010, 29).

**Sources**

The collection of the observed archival materials, created in the 1920s and 1930s, was at the time organised by historians, yet today, these texts are of interest for folklorists, with the aim of studying popular ways of narrating history. Thus, these texts also represent the contact points between folklore and historical research, i.e. the process divided by Peter Burke into three different periods (Burke 2004). The time of generating the material discussed in the current chapter falls into the second period according to Burke, which he refers to as “The Age of Suspicion” (1920s–1970s). Irrespective of the fact that folklore, and the research thereof, was recognised as being of relevance from the viewpoint of historical research, it is actually characteristic of this period that the branches of science diverged (Burke 2004, 135). And although in Estonia, folkloristics was institutionally independent and a significant branch of research in the scientific context, differently from the Western European scientific research region referred to by Burke, his argument is also actually quite characteristic of the situation in Estonia. Mutual understanding between historians and folklorists was partially based on their earlier cooperation, and, to some extent, on the search for collaboration opportunities, yet the two branches developed in parallel.

The materials of the observed collections – The Year 1905 Society (1905. aasta Selts), and Historical Tradition (Ajaloolist traditsiooni) proceed from the researcher’s questions and are thus not spontaneous stories, created upon the narrator’s initiative. These archival texts are in written form, yet this is achieved by way of different methods. In one case, the narrator has submitted his/her written recollections to the researcher, while in another, the researcher has interviewed the narrators and rewritten what she/he heard in the oral conversation, following the narrator’s text to a greater or lesser extent.

**Points of contact in the research of history and narration about the past**

Why did historians, at the end of the 1920s, begin to collect the memories of the 1905 Movement? The historical research of the 1920s interpreted the 1905 Movement as one of the most important socio-political revolutionary periods in Estonian society, despite there being insufficient research material about this
period (EKLA f 172, m 1: 9, 1). The collection of historical tradition, launched in 1922, indeed also brought about the written recollections about the year 1905, yet merely as a brief episode in the sequence of the events of two centuries. This material was not sufficiently detailed as could have been presumed from the thorough research into the 1905 Movement (EKLA f 172, m 5, 4). The collected memoirs were expected to be abundant in facts, relying on the narrator’s own immediate experience:

In the compilation of the mentioned memoirs, it would be necessary that, relying on the general course of events, you would attempt to shed light on your personal role in the 1905 Movement, and the period before and after this, and that you would present everything you saw and heard that was of greater or lesser historical value (EKLA f 172, m 1: 9, 7).

The utilisation of recollections in historical research relied on Jakob Hurt’s\textsuperscript{5} works, of the 1870s on folk memories, which evolved into Estonian folkloristics and national history-writing (Jaago 2005; Kruus 2005 [1930]). “Folk memories” is actually the concept used by Jakob Hurt to denote ‘folklore’, in which he sees an opportunity to write Estonian history: “folk memories are [...] a large and vibrant chronicle, teaching us to learn about the old times” (Hurt 1989 [1871], 11). The same tradition continued, in the 1970s and 1980s, in the work of historian Hillar Palamets. The scarcity of historical documents relating to the enforcement of Soviet power and the post-World War II period, associated with the organisation of work at the University of Tartu, prompted Hillar Palamets to interview people who had lived during these events.\textsuperscript{6}

As one of driving forces for the emergence of oral history research of 1940s and 1950s America, Ronald J. Grele points to the need to collect a new type of information that had so far been left out of the interest field of historians. He describes the changes that had taken place in American society in the documentation of everyday life. In connection with the emergence of new communication patterns, such as the mobile phone era, the pace of life, etc., the role of previous writing habits (diaries, letters) reduced significantly, and oral history interviews began to compensate for this (Grele 2007, 11–12). In comparison with Estonia, however, it turns out that during the Jakob Hurt era in the last quarter of the 19th century, and also during the 1920s and 1930s, and 1970s and 1980s (and also today), the driving force for collecting material about the past is the noticing of changes in the socio-political life of society, rather than at the everyday level. And although the changes also took place in the sphere of daily life, these were not
perceived as critical but as naturally concurrent with the changes on the more general level, overshadowed by political developments.

The above-given evidences the fact that historians primarily need data about events. As historians are interested in the truth of an event, the viewpoint of the narrator may turn out to be a disturbing factor. Thus, for example, Merilin Kotta writes: “The drawback of recollections, as a source of history, is their subjectivity (facts are selected, forgotten or mixed up; the motive for writing, sympathies, emotions and fantasy) [...]” (Kotta 2009, 40). And Hiljar Tammela argues: “But such a collective memory is not the best source of history as the experience of the time becomes forgotten in the course of years, it can become vague and get mixed up with other memories” (Tammela 2009, 145). However, folklorists who study oral history primarily proceed from the question of whose viewpoint the observed story represents, and how this is revealed in the narration.

Accordingly, Annikki Kaivola-Bregenhøj writes: “A folklorist would not look for the one and only truth in personal stories, but instead, would try to ascertain the importance of memory for the narrator, and what the narrator is attempting to convey with his/her story” (Kaivola-Bregenhøj 2000, 45). Thus, while historians focus on the event, folklorists concentrate on the reciprocal connections between the event and the narrator. When narrating about real life, the storyteller unavoidably assumes a certain role which (contrary to the expectations of a historian-interviewer) need not be merely that of an eyewitness; rather the narrator attempts to influence the listener, being at the same time influenced by the listener. The layers of influence within a text have also been studied by Ene Kõresaar, whose focus was on the role of the public in life story narratives (Kõresaar 2005, 20–25), and Jyrki Pöysä, who referred to the differences in texts created either in writing or orally, proceeding from narration situations (Pöysä 2006).

Relying on the standpoints of Gadi Benezer, Anne Heimo indicates that a folklorist who researches the past does not need to proceed from the historian’s endeavour to “mediate the truth” as this truth has different parameters: historical, psychological, social, narrative (Heimo 2010, 58). Despite using the same sources, the research outcomes obtained are different with regard to reality and truth. In connection with this, Jorma Kalela uses the fertility image of the original source, when assessing the truthfulness of recollections: memory as a source can neither be good nor bad, rather they can be eloquent when the right questions are asked of them (Kalela 2006).

When shifting the research focus, from the truth-value of the source, to the mode of narration (under what circumstances were texts created, and how has a specific story-telling situation influenced the text and the way in which it can now be found in the archives?), the role of the researcher (collector) also becomes
much more conspicuous in text creation. Therefore, the revealing of a narrative-truth is actually associated with the creation of texts and also with the interpretations (by the researcher).

Genres: ‘life story’, ‘memories’, ‘thematic narrative’

In folkloristic oral history research, classification of texts is not a separate issue when the research focus is on the themes of the past and on defining the mutual relationships between the events, the experiences and the presentation. In general, these texts are considered narratives (sing. lugu) based on real life, and the types of texts are referred to relatively freely in these research papers. For instance, the more general concepts, such as ‘memories’ (mälestused), ‘real-life stories’ (töieloolood), ‘life stories’ (eloolood), ‘narratives’ (lood), and more specific terms, such as ‘contributions to collection contests’ (kogumisvõistluste kaastööd) are used together with folkloristic notions such as ‘thematic writing’ (teemakirjutamine) and ‘personal experience stories’ (Jaago, 2008, 102–104). Bearing in mind the material observed in the current chapter, it would, on one hand, be appropriate to use the definition ‘memories’, yet on the other hand, these materials can also be associated with ‘life stories’, a term used widely today. More specifically, at the present time the subject matter for similar research on narrating about history could be the collection of Estonian Life Stories in the Estonian Literary Museum (EKLA, 2008, 102–104). Rutt Hinrikus, one of the organisers of the collection, actually makes a distinction between ‘memories’ and ‘life story’, pursuant to the reciprocal connection between the narrator and the events: in memories, the narrator positions him/herself in the outskirts of the events, but in a life-story, at the centre of the narrated events (Hinrikus, 2008, 172–173). True, in the case of a life story it is presupposed that the narrator would encompass all the phases of her/his life. And although this can also be the same in the case of memories, the recollection of the 1905 events is merely one stage in a person’s life story.

The term ‘memories’ has been used in the case of the materials of the Year 1905 Society, this being probably more appropriate for the historians than ‘life-story’.
Genre creation within memory collection

Evidently, it was also more intrinsic of the then scientific language. The life-story concept, denoting autobiographical narration of a life-story, emerges in the Estonian interdisciplinary scientific vocabulary at the end of the 1980s, partially due to the impact of the social sciences (J. P. Roos), and partially by way of literary studies (see Hinrikus 2003, 178–181). Although these text genres are similar to each other (narrating about history while relying on one’s own experience), today, the understanding of the role of an individual in society has shifted in favour of the individual, in comparison with the 1920s and 1930s, hence the life story is the more ‘preferred’ text genre.

The genre-wise definitions of memories and life stories, presented by Rutt Hinrikus, proceed from written texts. In an oral life story, however, recollections can also be understood as the knowledge underpinning the life story, or, as folklorist Annikki Kaivola-Bregenhøj argues: ‘memories’ are worded in the ‘life story’ (Kaivola-Bregenhøj 2000, 43–46). The contributing narrators of the Year 1905 Society associate their texts with ‘memories’ and also with the writing down of these memories (i.e. narratives based on memories). For instance, the title of a written contribution sent to the Society is “My memories of the events of 1905 in Koeru parish”, yet the foreword to the same story notes: “I would hereby send the description of my memories, with an attempt to truly shed light on the events in Koeru parish [...]” (EKLA f 172, m 14: 5; emphasis added). The fact that the term ‘memories’ (memoirs) was used in the written contributions sent to the Society may be due to the points raised in the questionnaire, or the text of the appeal to the public to take part in the collection contest, and the printed publication of the Society (Kruus 1932), in which these concepts were used as such. The fact that ‘memories’ serve as a basis for oral communication and narratives which, when written down, are again ‘memories’, can also be noticed when discussing, for example, the collection of historical tradition (Schmidt 1984, 28). In this context, ‘memories’ are not a genre of a text, but a type of source from which to study history and which can be expressed in different textual genres, yet with a common denominator – the reliance on memory.

What becomes evident from the comparison of folkloristic, literary and source-related treatments is noteworthy, i.e. that ‘memoirs’ are rather a genre of written texts and not applied to oral narration as in oral narration people rely on memories. This, in itself, raises the question of oral and written narratives, and I will come back to this later in the chapter. At this point, I will discuss another aspect that links to the genre-theme – cooperation between the researcher and the narrator.

The observed texts, which are based on recollections (and possibly also on earlier narrations), were written down not upon the narrator’s initiative but that
of the researcher (whereas the recorder who wrote them down could only be the researcher, not the narrator). How does this affect the genre of the text? Oral history interviews of today are referred to as a separate genre: this is an oral narrative about the past, created within the dialogue between the interviewer and the interviewee (Portelli 1997, 3). The dialogical nature of the oral history interview determines that the text combines both the narrator’s (interviewee’s) and the interviewer’s understanding of history: while the interviewer relies on academic research and provides structures to the text through her/his questions, the narrator, on the other hand, proceeds from her/his experience and organises the text by way of narrating events (Grele 2000, 44–45; 2007, 13). Indeed, the above-quoted and other authors highlight the need to contextualise the interview, particularly when analysing interview texts that are based on real life/a life story, whereas by context, the researchers bear in mind the narrating and recording situations and the role of the interviewer (or the person who initiates the narration) in the creation of the text (see, for example, Palmenfelt 2006; Halbmayr 2008).

When comparing the Year 1905 Society collection and the materials of the Historical Tradition, it turns out that the questions to the narrator have been generally asked in the same way (in the “how do you remember these events” style), yet the overall context highlights different emphases. Specifically, the collection of the Society solely discusses the events of 1905, whereas among the narratives of the Historical Tradition, the events of 1905 are positioned in the general sequence of memorised events which took place over the course of a couple of centuries. This also moulds the overall plan of the information: the year 1905 events are unfolded in one case, and in the other, the emphasis is on the aftereffects of this period in later history. A significant difference in the texts in these two collections is that in the Society’s material, the popular understanding withdraws to give way to the academic viewpoints of historians, as the collection process of this material was specifically directed by way of asking questions. The questions asked were in the style: “we have contrary data with regard to this or that aspect of the chain of events, what is your knowledge of this?” This helps to highlight the personal memories of those participating in the events, and the individual aspects of these recollections (which are closer to a life story). The questions asked when collecting Historical Tradition merely indicate the subject matter: “what do you know about the events of 1905?” What comes to the fore in this case is the experience of the community (‘what people say’, or folk tradition). Thus, if at first glance these collections seem to be similar (in both cases recollections are gathered with the help of interviews), it is obvious that the data in these two collections are different, particularly due to different goals and methodologies of interview. Notwithstanding this, at the same time it is necessary to mention
that despite particular emphasis on certain themes, and the difference in the positioning of the narrator’s self, these texts actually represent the same view of the past (Jaago 2011).

The research on popular narrated history, which evolved from folkloristics (as, for example the Finnish folkloristic muistitietotutkimus), is much more narrator- and narration-focused than (oral) history research: clues (themes, keywords, suggestions to tell one’s own story) only are given during the collection, and, as a result, the research and creation process of these texts can be separated (i.e. the studied texts are not created for any specific research project). Quite the contrary, the normal work practice for the popular narrated history researcher is to go to the text stored in the archives and ask questions relating to the text without having had the chance to be involved in text creation (cf, for example, the research on Finnish family lore in Latvala 2005, 33–36; the texts of a collection campaign in Pöysä 2006).

In addition to the recordings of oral conversations or interviews, writing has also been a method for the collection of folkloristic sources. In Estonia, the relevant example would be Jakob Hurt’s work with voluntary correspondents/contributors (see Laugaste 1989). As a rule, these contributions were the written recordings of oral renditions (of tradition). However, in parallel with this collection method, there are also texts that have been created in writing to begin with. On one hand, these are the written genres of folklore (for example verses written in albums, chain letters). Yet in the given case, they are also associated with such written genres as diaries, private letters, etc., which are not the normal field of interest for folklorists. Nevertheless, folklorists, ethnologists and researchers into cultural history have combined the genre of private writing and the method of collecting the material into what can be referred to as thematic writing (Satu Apo’s concept, Apo 1995, 173–174). Thematic writing as a text genre was born in cooperation between the narrator and the researcher. The researcher presents a written questionnaire, and the narrator outlines her/his story proceeding from this. However, the narrator is not forced to answer the questions but instead is inspired to freely build up a narrative. The result is a thematically determined text that combines several genres of oral and written narration.

Thus, this genre is on one hand associated with characteristics that can be described by way of the activities within the narrative, and the ways of presenting the characters (the narrator’s positioning, themes, the formula of expression, connection with real life as the basis for the story, other structural aspects), and on the other hand is also associated with the characteristics concurrent with narrating as an activity. This includes, for example, the involvement of a partner in text creation, even though it might not be explicitly included in the text:
conversations, dialogic basis, the fact that writing proceeds from the questionnaire or from thematic appeals, etc., and even ways of presenting things (genres of oral and written text) and the involvement of the presumed or imagined audience (for example bearing in mind that the story told for an archive or to a researcher is much more public than the tales told within the family or close community). However, in the genre definitions of classical folkloristics, the emphasis is more on the aspects related to the specific features of the text, for example as in the widely common genre-based classification of folk tales, used since the times of the Brothers Grimm (Ben-Amos 1997, 410). The deeper the understanding of oral folk tradition as a certain type of communication, the more narration is referred to as a social engagement (see Ben-Amos 1993; Abrahams 2005, 52–69; cf, for example, in sociology Fairclough 2003).

From the viewpoint of folklorists’ research on popular narrated history, it is possible to classify the memories of the events, collected during the 1920s and 1930s and observed in this chapter, as thematic narratives about events (derived from Satu Apo’s concept of thematic writing). The researchers/interviewers directed these narratives thematically. According to the expectations of the collectors, these stories should primarily be memories recollecting, as precisely as possible, what has been seen or heard – positioning the narrators as witnesses to the events. However, when comparing the texts it becomes evident that the narrator is not always a neutral mediator of (or witness to) the events, but instead she/he creates self-images through interpretation of the aftermaths of the events. Such a style, as apparent from the above reference to Rutt Hinrikus’s argument, is rather more intrinsic of a life story. Thus, the narrators, although guided by the researchers’ questions, still rely on their recollections; and the more the narrators highlight their own involvement in the events, the more autobiographical these texts are.

**From an oral conversation to a written archival text**

Is there any difference between narrating one’s life story orally or by writing it down? Current research shows that the principal difference is not in the presentation of the subject matter, but in the aspects proceeding from the process of creating the text: in the difference of the self-image in oral or written narrative, in the intimacy of writing versus the oral communication situation, and, correspondingly, either in the self-directedness of the text or immediate dependence on the conversation partner (Pöysä 2006, 228–231). But what happens to these texts in the situation in which the collectors have written down oral texts
for archival purposes? The following digression is based on the materials of the Year 1905 Society.

Two methods were used to record the materials of the Society: first, those who had taken part in the 1905 Movement were asked to send written contributions, and secondly, one researcher was seconded to fieldwork. The first collection method was utilised at the beginning, during the first (1929) and second (1932) phases of collection, with the aim of ascertaining the general themes of the 1905 Movement, and thereafter commencing a more precise thematic collection. For instance, if a ground-breaking event was unveiled from among the general themes, as for example with what was referred to as the Volta meeting, it was possible to compile and present a detailed questionnaire relating to this particular event. In both stages, immediate and self-centred recollections were expected from the contributors, not a free flow of narration. The narrators were supposed to rely on the questions asked by the researchers and connect their answers to the particular number of the question in the questionnaire. The third phase of collection work encompassed the fieldwork by Voldemar Juhanson (Juhandi) in 1932. Juhanson’s supervisor Hans Kruus justified the fieldwork with the need to “check the narrator’s memory”, to draw attention to contradictions in the data presented by the narrator, and to supplement and specify what has been said: “It was a relatively bothersome and costly method, but still viable and effective” (Kruus 1932, 6). Research phases were aimed at obtaining ever more detailed historical data. Yet, with regard to narrating, it is necessary to underline the fact that the written contributions sent to the researchers, and the archival texts written down during fieldwork, were fundamentally different, but in what regard?

The material collected during fieldwork does not have such a sound questionnaire-based structure as the contributions sent by correspondents because fieldwork writings allow greater relevance to be attributed to unforeseeable subject matter, which can probably be revealed during the conversation, and also because of the ‘people’, who emerge as narrators/witnesses. Thus, it is possible to find, in the fieldwork texts, Voldemar Juhanson’s personal observations and comments about the things he came across during his fieldwork, for example written recordings of what people thought about the murder of Arthur von Baranoff, the lord of Peningi manor, and what Juhanson himself thinks of the rumours: “There are stories about provocation going on around people. This can be regarded as quite likely” (EKLA f 172, m 6, 31).

Juhanson elaborated the material written down in the course of oral conversations during fieldwork into a written narrative suitable for the archive. What he did can be observed in Voldemar Juhanson’s own explanations, added to the edited archival texts (EKLA f 172, m 5, 4). In general, he followed two principles:
Tiiu Jaago

he maintained the narrator’s first-person position and wording yet altered the presented sequence of events and the narrator’s personal deliberations that depended on the particular moment of recollection.

Who is the narrating character in Juhanson’s written recordings? According to the expectations of collectors, the prevailing characters are witnesses: the narrator outlines the chain of events of the time based on first-hand knowledge, but not only this. On a number of occasions the narrator changes her/his self-positioning. These are the situations in which the active first-person narrator becomes a bystander: she/he sees everything, but does not place her/himself in these situations and considers her/himself a person in the crowd. For instance, in the situation of singing the anthem when describing punishment:

[After being beaten, the people were forced to sing the anthem.] Being terrified, people began to sing: one at a high pitch, the other at low pitch, one started before, and the other afterwards. It sounded as if there were many cats fighting. I opened my mouth from time to time then closed it again. It was funny, but you were not allowed to laugh (EKLA f 172, m 6, 62).

On page 48 of the same collection there is a peasant’s story in which he presents everything in the third person: “I” is the eyewitness, not the participant involved. Likewise, there are descriptions in which the story begins with the first person narrator, but once the events become critical, the narrator seems to lock up: the use of “I” and the impersonal mood in the same episode show a change in the narrator’s viewpoint:

Then an order came one day to gather in Paeküla manor. The order usually came from the neighbouring farm, people just passed it on to others [...] I also received the order and began to go towards Paeküla [manor]. [...] Having got to the manor, there were many people there, and there were still more and more coming. All the village inhabitants had come together, masters and farmhands without any difference. There were probably no strangers there. At first, when the arsonists had come to Haimre and Kasti manors, there had also been townsmen among them. Afterwards, when ours [people of Paeküla manor] were already in full swing, they had disappeared. [...] How did the smashing start all of a sudden, can’t remember. The piano was smashed by the way. Having had enough of breaking and smashing, the manor was set on fire. (EKLA f 172, m 6, 116–117).
The changes in the narrator’s viewpoint, evident in the text excerpts above, are not only conditioned by alteration of the narration schemes, but also by situations prior to the narration (for example the moment of memorising, the emotional effect of living through the event). Harald Welzer, a social psychologist, argues, when analysing the three levels of a life story – memory-psychological, communicative and narrative-theoretical – that people usually talk about the different aspects of real-life events consciously, although this is not the case in traumatic experiences. Emotions either support or hinder memorising, and by way of this, emotions have an impact on how the event and the relevant experiences are presented in the narrative (Welzer 2000, 55–56).

It is indeed characteristic that although the narrator who writes down the memories is one and the same person, these texts contain a specific abundance of detail intrinsic to the particular narrator: each described situation (shooting, escape under guardianship of the people, etc.) is exactly the situation it is and not inter-changeable with what happened to the neighbours. So, in this regard, we can believe that Juhanson did not change the narrators’ style. But what did he change, of what he had heard in the course of editing? At what level does editing have a say when contributing to text creation, and how does this influence the possible interpretations of the text?

The creation of a written archival text from oral conversation first encompassed the chronological sequencing of events. Secondly, Juhanson consolidated all the data that was linked to the same event yet highlighted through different associations during recollecting. Thirdly, he got rid of the contradictions in a given narrator’s story. At the same time he did not broaden the requirement not to have any contradictions or differences of opinion to the stories of all the narrators, although if this was the case he would point out to the user of these materials that they should be critical with regard to the relevant data.

After initial editing, Juhanson returned the accounts to some of the narrators and asked additional questions. In the majority of cases, this was due to certain data discrepancies in the presented narratives, which Juhanson wanted to eliminate. He inserted the narrators’ additions to the edited version. Juhanson also sequenced the archival documents thematically, rather than following the course of the fieldwork, considering it more reader-friendly to first present the narratives that provided a general picture, and thereafter the more detailed descriptions of the events.

An analogous method of editing oral into written texts was used by Hillar Palamets in the 1980s: initially he made recordings of oral interviews with the help of an employee in the sound studio of the university, then he used the tapes
Tiitiu Jaago

to make written transcriptions and asked the narrators to make manual corrections therein. Hillar Palamets specifies:

The writings made from tapes actually follow the structuring of the material into thematic chunks and a chronological sequence that can be very unsettled, particularly in the case of material recorded as a dialogue (TÜR f 141, n 1, s 80, I).14

Thus, he has the same misgivings about interviews that Juhanson had half a century earlier.

According to Juhanson, it was expedient to edit and process the texts for archival purposes, although the course of the conversation was also fully documented. He argues that fieldwork notes embody the “traces of the process of unveiling recollections” (EKLA f 172, m 5, 4–5). Juhanson notes that the written notes made during the course of narration actually impede the coherence of the narrative, as they contain repeated returns which either supplement what has already been said, present it in a more diluted manner, or in the worst case, create contradictions in what was said in the earlier and later phase. Text editing does indeed facilitate reading, yet it is necessary to bear in mind that while analysing these texts, it is thereby not possible to study the natural flow of narrating and that of the narrative, nor the sequence of the narrative events. Likewise, this would diminish – even more profoundly so if adjustments are made on the factual level – the possibility to study the issues related to the process of recollecting. At the same time, editing does not directly alter the narrative itself (this has also become evident in the comparison of oral and written narrations): the knowledge or the image of the events, and the way of presenting them, is maintained.

Additional information relating to the methods of editing archival texts is given by Jyrki Pöysä, who also refers to reader-friendliness: “very fragmented and literately weak descriptions are usually not published in anthologies, although, from the point of view of research, these could be of even greater value than smoothly written texts”, instead, what is created during the editing process is “a new genre of discourse which fits in better with the conventions of literature” (Pöysä 2006, 235). Hence, a written (legible) text presupposes a different structure and wording from an oral one, and this is due to the fact that the expectations of the audience are different with regard to oral and written narratives. Thus, the problem is not so much in narrating per se, but in the receiver – the listener or reader, and in the fact that oral and written presentations can be followed in a different manner.
The preferences of the collectors clearly reveal the historians’ interest to reconstruct the truth about the historical events with the help of these materials. The collection techniques and also the editing of the collected material are all subjected to this aim. From the viewpoint of folkloristic research on popular narrated history, however, memory is associated with giving meaning to quondam events, and therefore it is not even possible in this context to talk about ‘checking the memory’ (in contrast to Kruus’s statement), as the emphasis is put on the process of recollecting (the reciprocal semantic connectedness of the present and the past is observed through the concept of memory).

Conclusion

The archival texts observed in the chapter were created during the 1920s and 1930s, inspired by the historians’ aim to reconstruct historical events with the help of memories. The narrators are directed to near-event recollection by way of appeals and questionnaires, and also in fieldwork situations. Questionnaire-based written contributions are easier to structure for research purposes than the oral texts recorded during fieldwork. Text analysis allows us to make it possible to follow the ‘written dialogue’ in the archival texts created in cooperation with the researcher and the narrator: we see what is being asked in appeals and questionnaires, and how these questions are answered. However, when studying the written recordings of oral texts, it would be expedient to presume that the interviewers could not keep to their questions so strictly and that they took part in the relatively spontaneous conversation, although they did not note this down for the archive. At the same time, the observations made by the researcher in the course of the conversation, are also sporadically existent in the text created during fieldwork (for instance, what people thought in general, did it have any solid basis, and why the researcher presumed so).

In the first place, the genre of the text depends on whether it is oral or written, and secondly, on the specificity of the cooperation between the researcher and the narrator in creating an archival text. It turned out that ‘memories’ are a written text genre. ‘Life stories’ (elulood) can be oral and also written, yet as a popular narrated genre a ‘life story’ is a type of narrative induced upon the initiative of the researcher. Only when narrated spontaneously it is possible to talk about biographic/autobiographic texts. Likewise, it should be noted that as a text genre, the term ‘memories’ was preferred in research studies during the 1920s and 1930s, when the focus was on the reconstruction of the event. ‘Life story’ is a more salient text type today, when the researchers’ interest is on experience, individuality, the narrator’s viewpoint. Thus, in addition to referring to
the preferences in research methods and questions, research terminology also points to the timeframe in which a particular term is more in the forefront. As a term used in folkloristic research of popular narrated history, ‘thematic narrative’ is an appropriate word to use in order to combine ‘memories’ and ‘life stories’. In a similar way to the involvement of the researcher in text creation, the oral-ity or writtenness of a text would in this case withdraw to the context of source criticism. Nevertheless, it is interesting to observe the genre flexibility associated with archival texts: from an oral narrative or notice, from answering a researcher’s questions, including written questions (which is also a separate genre), to the creation of a written text.

The reasoning as to why the oral text has been altered, one or the other way, in the process of creating a written archival text can be reduced to the principle of comprehension, i.e. to the question how to better understand the text. For instance, when publishing in print, the aesthetic aspect prevailed (Pöysä), but editing pursuant to history-related interests guaranteed chronological sequence and directedness, and no contradictions in a story from the same narrator (Kruus, Juhanson, Palamets). Thus, the genre of the text again seems to be dependent on whether the text is oral or written, although now this is connected with the reception, rather than the creation, of the text.

In contrast to the folklorists-researchers, the collectors-researchers of event facts attempt to avoid the aspects emanating from the specificity of recollection and the technique of narrating. Those proceeding from this platform alter the scheme of the narrative (i.e. how the narrator orients the events with the help of and through her/his own recollection), yet they maintain the narrator’s wording style and interpretation of events. Research materials created using this methodology make it possible for the researcher of folkloristic oral history to again proceed from these texts as thematic narratives in which the focus is on subject matter that describes the past. However, when asking questions about recollecting and narrating, it is necessary to bear in mind the impact of the text creation situation on the studied text.

Archival sources


Genre creation within memory collection

TÜR f 141, n 1. Hillar Palamets, personal archive, University of Tartu Library.

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Notes

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Examples of inter-disciplinary research on the narratives about recent history: for example the collections of articles of the life stories of Estonian women (Kirss et al 2004) and the war experience of Estonian men in World War II (Köresaar 2011).

Historians differentiate three directions in the 1905 Movement: at first the peasant movement, demanding better tax, rent and salary conditions, with the Estonian peasantry and the Baltic-German manor-owners as the opposing parties; secondly, the movement of workers in towns, protesting not only against low salaries but also against the political authorities in the Russian Empire; thirdly, the democratic movement of the middle classes (literati, the petty and middle bourgeoisie) in the course of which the political parties began to take shape (Rosenberg 2006, 33). Civil disorder (demonstrations and suppression thereof, meetings, submitting of demands) peaked with the burning down of manors and punitive actions by the representatives of power. Historians have been more interested in the sequence of events during the entire process, whereas in popular narrated history, the focus is more on the punishment and the consequences of this movement (Jaago 2011).

Both the contributions and the guidelines (for example questionnaires) can actually be considered as separate genres (cf Pöysä 2006, 232).
4 EKLA f 172 and EKLA f 199, f 200. These two are the collections generated by Estonian scholarly societies. With regard to the operation of learned societies in the period 1920–1940, including that of the Academic History Society, and the Estonian Literary Society's working group on history, see, in detail, Kivimäe & Rosenberg 1985; Rosenberg 2009; Taal 2010. Terje Schmidt wrote a thorough research manuscript in 1984 about the process of collecting historical tradition and the relevant outcomes (Schmidt 1984). In the context of collecting historical tradition, and with regard to the collection of memories organised by the Year 1905 Society, it is important to point out that the same group of researchers was involved in these endeavours; one of the main people in charge of the operations was Hans Kruus, who compiled the questionnaire for the collection of historical tradition from Estonian parishes and also put together the guidelines for collecting the memoirs of the 1905 Movement.

5 Jakob Hurt (1839–1907) was a notable Estonian folklorist, theologian, and linguist.

6 As an outcome and further elaboration of this work, there is now a Hillar Palamets manuscript archive at the University of Tartu Library, comprising, among other materials, the memories of the employees of the University of Tartu from 1940 until the beginning of the 1950s (e.g. TÜR f 141, f 1, s 79 and 80, 85–87).

7 Cf the given issue with, for example, Ulf Palmenfelt’s treatment of the circumstances of covering or not covering the events in a life story interview (Palmenfelt 2006), or Anu Korb’s discussion based on folkloristic fieldwork of how the cooperation between the collector and members of the lore group influence the recorded texts (Korb 2005, 73–109).

8 For example the full-length texts of the responses given by correspondents of the Estonian National Museum.


10 Personal experience stories: these stories are based on the events and occasions which have taken place in the life of the narrator, for example, a funny situation from childhood, an event from school, an unfortunate thing that has become humorous in the course of time, contacts with supernatural phenomena, etc. The elements of traditional storytelling are used when narrating these episodes (Stahl 1986).

11 Similar written contributions are not always titled memories, for example “1905. aasta mässupalavik ja selle arstimine Soosaares Viljandimaal” (The 1905 upheaval fever and its treatment in Soosaare, Viljandi county) (EKLA f 172, m 14: 4) figuratively refers to the events without defining the genre or the way of narrating.

12 See, for example, EKLA 172, m 5.

13 The mid-December meeting in Tallinn, held in the Volta factory by delegates dispatched from Estonian rural municipalities, and local workers, was considered to be the key event by the members of the Year 1905 Society in burning down the manor houses and of the 1905 Movement in general (EKLA f 175, m 1: 9, 10–26). With regard to analysis of what took place in the Volta factory, relying on the material discussed here, see, for example, Jaanson 2005.

14 Palamets provides a detailed overview of his working methods in the article “Mälestused helilindil” (Memories on tape) (Palamets 1989).
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Oil, canvas. 100 x 90 cm.
From the construction of concepts to knowledge production: the interdisciplinarity of folkloristics

Kristin Kuutma

Abstract. Folkloristics evolved into an independent scholarship in the context of the nation-building process and the ideas of National Romanticism, which implicitly continue to prevail in many countries. While the experience, expressive culture and environment studied by folklorists today appears dynamic and varied, also the discipline has undergone conceptual change. However, theoretical discussions have remained relatively scarce, particularly in Estonian. Folklorists tend to use many concepts that are inter- or transdisciplinary in essence, as if these were neutral, objective or extemporal formulations and epistemological givens, instead of recognising their constructed nature and dependence on social, political or historical contingencies. This contribution proposes to elaborate on the development of particular concepts (culture, representation, tradition, memory, and cultural heritage) through international disciplinary histories, and to contemplate their interpretations as well as their interpretative potentials.

There are dynamic changes observable in folkloristics that correspond to the processes occurring in the humanities in general. In Estonian folkloristics these changes have taken place through the past two decades, whereas on the international scale their trajectory extends to a somewhat earlier period, starting from the seventies and eighties of the twentieth century. Folklorists of today position themselves in the sphere of the studies of everyday culture and social experience, which was clearly demonstrated, for example, by the call issued by the Estonian Folklore Archives in April of 2010: a published request to send in personal experiences of, or stories told about, being stranded by the ash cloud.\footnote{Lang, V. & Kull, K. (eds) (2014) Estonian Approaches to Culture Theory. Approaches to Culture Theory 4, 308–328. University of Tartu Press, Tartu.} Both the times and circumstances have obviously changed as well as the research environment or tools of the trade, while the connecting disciplinary axis remains in general the same by focusing on the study of verbal communication. But the ones that have changed in time are not only methods for collecting source material. When
the surroundings and conditions alter and shift the analytical gaze accordingly, then the need to re-consider the disciplinary effort in general also emerges. This inference appears to be supported by initiatives like that of Tiiu Jaago to edit an electronic dictionary of everyday culture Argikultuuri e-sõnastik (Jaago 2005) in Estonia, or of Burt Feintuch to publish the compendium Eight Words for the Study of Expressive Culture in the USA (Feintuch 2003a), which both reflect upon the concepts and perceptions prevailing in modern folkloristics. The current chapter concurs with this trend in my attempt to simultaneously analyse and expand the disciplinary field while contemplating the usage or meaning of particular concepts and addressing neighbouring disciplines to seek overlap or common grounds.

Before starting to think about the possibilities or contingencies of conceptualisation in a research field, one should first pose the question of whether there is altogether any independently distinct folklore theory outside of the trans- or interdisciplinary theoretisation. Although it has been a noticeable endeavour in the last century², it would probably no longer work as an exclusive principle due to current research trends. As already stated, apart from the aesthetic expression practiced in everyday life contemporary folkloristics is also interested in the social aspect, the research into which demands tools that assist understanding of its structure and mechanisms. Contemporary folkloristics is a scholarly field that describes culture and creates a presumably reflexive representation. A research text produced by a folklorist is an ethnography that documents a cultural expression and simultaneously creates a meaning in the description made. A folklorist is not simply interested in a ‘product’ or ‘piece’ but studies the whole process and elaborates on the everyday situation and communication.³ Folkloristics that acknowledges its interdisciplinary and social interrelation proposes to focus on the creativity of interpersonal communication while being interested in how an individual aesthetic or symbolic act is embedded in a particular culture (Feintuch 2003b, 3). This targeted interest on creativity proceeds from the disciplinary foundation of folkloristics and recognises the unavoidable interdisciplinarity of today’s research context. When surveying and generalising the concepts and positions that guide modern folkloristics, the tendencies prevailing in the humanities in general become apparent: blurring of disciplinary boundaries, concepts travelling across disciplines, while their choice and application are determined more on the basis of the research question and object than on authoritative or established theories.

The historical development of folkloristics into a separate field took place in the context of and in support of burgeoning nationalism, and even today a connection to National Romanticism implicitly forms its bigger or smaller
characteristic baggage, particularly in countries where the nation-building process concurred with procuring extensive collections of verbal lore. The collected folklore represents in these countries the past repertoires and practices, mainly celebrating pre-industrial peasant lifestyles, and concurrently the respective scholarly field is still largely considered to represent and explain this particular image. Such a perception presumes that the centre is in the past; one would also find there its aesthetic and ideological value, and consider the prevailing criterion of authenticity to be rural and defined by village surroundings. However, the human experience, (verbal) creativity and environment studied by contemporary academic folkloristics are incommensurably more dynamic, varied and vigorous. On the other hand, this discrepancy does not appear simply between the common image and the scholarly trends, because it is also observable inside the field of academic folkloristics. The latter reflects the conceptual shifts that have occurred in the academic discipline. Precisely these contradictory tenets gave me the original impetus to undertake writing about these issues in Estonian to begin with (see Kuutma 2010) – although academics have accepted the alterations in the research field itself, the discussion relating to the theoretic field has remained modest, particularly in Estonia. At the same time the expanding research field has opened up folklorists writing to a plethora of concepts that are interdisciplinary in essence, whereas their users seem to perceive those concepts to be neutral and objective when using them in an extemporal and self-evident manner. Scholarly formulations, nonetheless, are analytical theories or methodologies that are not merely applied in the process of scientific knowledge production but are directly related to a particular experience and worldview, defined by the surrounding social, political and historical situation.

The current chapter proposes a brief elaboration on how concepts change over time, how they are interpreted, and how interpretative they happen to be. This approach is grounded in disciplinary history and expanded to the study of knowledge production. I position such an inquisitive angle both inside and outside of folkloristics when taking into account the transdisciplinary nature of the concepts at hand, while nevertheless observing meanings that are inherently important for folkloristics. On the other hand, I intentionally refrain from focusing on Estonia, in order to problematise the tacitly prevailing national engagement in Estonian folkloristics, and have the aspiration to stress the fact that the tendencies under scrutiny do not correspond to geographic regional boundaries but derive rather from disciplinary contingencies. With the help of widely quoted authors, the following will discuss the concepts of culture, representation, tradition and cultural heritage, which frequent modern folkloristics. By choosing an international perspective and by acknowledging the inevitable interdisciplinarity
The interdisciplinarity of folkloristics

that transcends disciplinary and geographic borders, I would like to enquire to what extent the concepts that modern folkloristics operates with are epistemological ‘givens’ – i.e. whether they are scientifically established and finite, or not. Such enquiry has been sparked by the observation that some scholars (or the general public) perceive folklore to be an ontological given instead of a form of communication or expression, considering it an organic cultural matter that carries the label of the past. While taking into account the persistence of such a problematic footing, I consider it necessary to debate whether we are dealing with a representation from the past or from the present, and what it means to rely on tradition or memory, or to argue for cultural heritage. My aim is to draw folklorists’ attention to conceptual constructedness and to call for a critical re-examination by stressing particular nuances, with the hope of providing the wider public with an insight into the conceptual field of modern folkloristics from an interdisciplinary perspective.

From systematisation of subject matter to social meaning

Theories, methodologies or concepts do not emerge in a vacuum but reflect various developments surrounding them. One characteristic trait of the end of the last century was to investigate disciplinary history in order to ask questions about the process of knowledge production and its subject matter. Among the seminal works taking this stance in folkloristics the study of authenticity by Regina Bendix (Bendix 1997) might be mentioned, alongside articles by other authors (e.g. Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1998a; Abrahams 1993, etc.). These works have studied the production of authoritative knowledge, the evolvement of disciplinary canons, and the institutionalisation process of the discipline in order to elaborate on its position both in the academic world and in society in general. Historical-political circumstances have determined observable differences and variation, therefore I will mention here only the most prominent tendencies that would take us eventually to the international impacts that started spreading more widely in the last decades of the twentieth century.

The collection of and research into folklore evolved into a separate discipline in the course of the socio-cultural modernisation at the turn of the twentieth century. Being originally research fields that explored the nation or more distant cultures, folkloristics, ethnology and anthropology have always been directly linked to political developments, either to those of nationalism or colonialism. The so-called classical folkloristics has been defined by the collection and documentation of oral expressions pertaining to the folk that were deemed preindustrial, while highlighting aesthetic and ideological traits with a celebrating goal
to preserve for posterity a disappearing repertoire and expressive richness that would be stored in archives or printed in books. As an academic field folkloristics has practiced the collection of lore in the largest possible and representative quantity, while trying to cover national territory and creative variability in its entire expanse. At the same time the choice of material to be recorded has been determined by its poetic expressiveness and characteristic nature pertaining to a particular cultural space and carrying features of the pre-industrial ‘untainted’ past, providing thus a solid ground to claim its distinct differentiation from so-called high culture (sophisticated artistic (written)) creation.

While the nuances of classification and the linguistic characteristics of folkloric expression had to be highlighted in the process of making a scholarly canon and in establishing the positivistic parameters of scientific criteria, over the course of time the concept and perception of folkloristics moved closer to the creative performer. The dethroning of the investigation of structure or analytic construction has in turn brought to the centre of study the performer, her/his repertoire, and the social experience. Modern means of communication, the social and spatial mobility of people, the complex nature of communal relationship, the context of the information and consumer societies presented a challenge to further extend and modify the research paradigm. In addition to typologies and formulation studies that derived mostly from the poetically defined subject matter. Western scholars paid increasing attention to social context and meaning; fieldwork was no longer focused on providing collections of texts or on reconstructing imagined pasts but started to study small, face-to-face communities or social groups. This trend was set with the collection of articles edited by Américo Paredes and Richard Bauman *Toward New Perspectives in Folklore* (Paredes & Bauman 2000 [1972]). This publication was understandably embedded in the situation and emerging interdisciplinarity characteristic to the United States, as illustrated by the book ignoring the question of the origin, genre or type of a folklore piece, stressing instead the present moment by focusing on the act of creation. This approach found an innovative analytical basis in the performance theory that claims social life to be created via, and during, communication, which embraces both the lore and the process of its production simultaneously and to the same extent (Bauman 1986).

Folklorists have gradually grown more interested in the events and moments when folkloric expression intersects with social being. They study the everyday, analyse communication and communicators, events and experience (cf Abrahams 1992). They observe the modern urban society and the media culture in it, with transnational cultural processes and globalisation in the background (cf Hannerz 1996). In this environment they focus not only on a group as a distinct
entity but investigate the multi-layered relationships of a social network and the strategies applied in it (cf Hannerz 1992; Noyes 2003). Text and textuality are related to the social aspect, which also provides an analysis of linguistic parameters with a different angle (cf Briggs & Bauman 1992). The topic of genre becomes somewhat problematic if applied outside the paradigm of typology, whereas the delimiting category of genre is counter-balanced by hybridity, which crosses borders, taking into account primarily the social potential embedded in such an approach (cf Kapchan 1993). Hybridity is a seminal feature in modern communication, identities, expressive forms, and subcultures. The study of disciplinary history has demonstrated, in turn, the validity of the concept of hybridity not only for the exploration of the modern situation but also its instrumentality in studying past research or lore, as it provides a fresh glance that discards the constraints of searching for ‘pure’ forms, expressions or experiences (cf Bauman & Briggs 2003).

The acknowledgment of the process of transcending the previously established boundaries has inevitably led to re-thinking of folkloristics that recognises the need for incorporating elements of social theory. The following is limited only to a few concepts, but I have chosen the ones that are highly productive and in extensive use. The practice of pointing out keywords7 derives from the analytical principles of the twentieth century flagship of cultural studies, the Birmingham School, where the critical thinking concerning the meaning and use of concepts was grounded in social principles and their transdisciplinary potential. In the book edited by Burt Feintuch (2003a) the research object for folkloristics is creative expression in concrete social contexts that are analysed via the following “eight words”: group, art, text, genre, performance, context, tradition, identity. Expressive culture is socially based, it has artistic nature, and with the help of these words authors elaborate on their categories and temporal relations. These studies do not propose concrete or exhaustive definitions to scientific terms but intend to provide a survey of words that we need when speaking about the expressive parameters of culture, like form, process, emotions or ideas that are essentially a result of social communication (Feintuch 2003b). The contributing authors8 to that volume are well-known academics in Anglophone folkloristics who contend that it would be impossible to fix the analysed concepts to one discipline or definition. The meaning, usage and perception of these words depend on the moment and place of use; it is impossible to fix them because they tend to be slippery. Thus the authors resort to introducing relevant philosophical background, sphere of usage, their problematic nature or the opposite potential in order to alleviate tension. It has appeared to be most suitable to ground their analysis in a unifying conceptual space from where the analysis may depart, but
Kristin Kuutma

this cannot be considered ‘the end point’. In the process of interpreting a social act (including folkloric expression) and its investigation it is important to notice the problematic of objectivity considered self-evident in the process of recording and representing. Potential pitfalls and turbulence can be revealed with the assistance of reflexive analysis, which acknowledges the participation and activities of the researcher in the process of interpretation. When turning one’s attention to how folkloristics creates its own object, one accepts that neither the research matter nor the act of research are essential or universally ‘given’ entities but are instead social constructions (Anttonen 2005 [1993]). A similar constructedness is in the inherent nature of concepts, which points to the necessity of recognising their ambivalence when approaching them from an inquisitive angle.

**Construction of concepts: culture and representation**

In the last decade of the twentieth century when international folkoristics became influenced by the deconstruction of the historical development of discursive formations, it began to question the practice of identifying its research object on the basis of binary oppositions like oral/written, folk/elite, collective/individual, whereas an earlier approach had celebrated particularly the first part of the pair. These problematic modernist dichotomies prevailed throughout the whole history of the discipline; among them, the most infamous was the opposition between the authentic and the non-authentic. But once the supportive framework of the categories of truth and integrity falls, their constructedness and rhetoric shift to the foreground.

Let us have a closer look at the predicaments of conceptualising culture⁹ – we are dealing here with a concept that appears on the surface to be perfectly neutral, but it is exactly this productive transparency that should be problematic. Even if folklorists focus first and foremost on cultural continuity, the term culture manifests itself in principle as reference to a synchronic state. The concept of culture seems to lack reference to temporal dynamics, as if it rejects time – it is a modern term of categorisation that may be systematised and structured. On the conceptual plane there is a temporal limbo, although this is nevertheless descriptively used as a signifier of temporal fixation. On the other hand, a singular treatment of culture as a signifier is gradually seen as delimiting, whereas culture is now perceived to be plural in essence, particularly from the social perspective. In his reference to overcoming the historical identification of Culture (being cultured) with Civilisation (being civilised), the historian of anthropology James Clifford has claimed that the word ‘culture’ is now lower-case with a plural grammatical ending (Clifford 1988, 234). On the other hand, the practice of talking about
cultures while shunning the construction of hierarchies has fostered a relativist approach over the judgemental. Globalisation and the connectedness of worlds brings forth the principle of syncretism, in which Clifford sees an analogy to the ‘heteroglossia’ defined by Mikhail Bakhtin – when the scope of communication widens and the mutual impact of cultures increases it enhances a plurality of idioms in the process of interpreting oneself and others. In a world of multiple voices and blurred boundaries the primary dimension and object of study can no longer be that of a distinct culture with clearly defined borders.

The use of ‘culture’ as a signifier has also been criticised for the totalising effect of a priori collectiveness, which may become delimiting and prescriptive and leave no space for individual choice. We are dealing here once more with the aspect of given-ness or self-realisation – the same can be noticed in the analytical and reflexive treatment of the concept of identity. I would also like to refer to the introductory idea chosen in Feintuch’s volume, namely creativity, and in particular the aspect of creativity that becomes manifest in the act of communication between people, including the act of creating the self. The more direct call to write “against culture” has been uttered by cultural anthropologist Lila Abu-Lughod (cf Abu-Lughod 1991; 1993). Culture as a generalisation creates a rigid and oppressive impression of homogeneity, coherence and timelessness, which can be avoided if we delve into the particular, i.e. concentrate on individuals and their dynamic relationships. Social anthropologist Ulf Hannerz (1996) has studied the urbanised and mediatised society under the condition of transnationalisation and globalisation to find another way of distancing himself from a levelling approach. His perspective of “the cultural ecumene” puts the individual into the central position where s/he transcends and becomes a cultural subject based on particular emotional entanglements and experiences – these relate ‘her/his culture’ partly to that of everybody else: it overlaps partly with that of only a few, and partly with nobody else. Here is the place for creating meaning in the ecumene of Hannerz: at its centre stands the individual, while the ecumene forms the source of signs, images, ideas, expressions and practices from which to extract cultural meanings. The ecumene is characterised by the existence of ties and accessibility, interpersonal communication and connected developments. Cultural sociologist Tony Bennett (2007) questions likewise the perception of ‘culture’ as an always-already-there sphere of human life. Rather, it is evoked by certain interest groups who use it to impact and execute social order. A purposeful identification of ‘a culture’ does not mean a disinterested recognition of something that already exists because that very act of definition at the same time creates the entity. And once ‘a culture’ has been thus created, the relevant idea and representation may be used to govern both people and things related to it in various ways.
In order to turn to representation, let me first point out that a folkloristic, anthropological or cultural exploration appears to us largely in a textual format, most often as a written text. Through the course of times the practise of folkloristics has denoted documentation of oral verbal lore and publishing it for an interested readership in written or printed format. On the one hand this process entails written study by the researcher, but a similarly important phase encompasses the act of writing down what has been heard or observed. The changes in the self-image of folkloristics have instead given rise to a deepening interest in the procedure of how an oral performance appears to be transformed into a written text. The postmodern interpretation of the interpretation of cultural phenomena has also caused the critical eye to notice the previously self-evident epistemological and ontological perceptions. Scientific formulations are socially and politically conditioned constructions, which at the same time participate in the cementation or shaping of the existing positions of power. Based on the discourse analysis of Michel Foucault, anthropologist and folklorist Charles Briggs (1993) has investigated the process of establishing a textual authority as a metadiscursive practice. In addition to texts, their status in time, space and society, a discourse denotes here the strategies, models of conduct, institutional formations, etc., that define the shaping or development of power positions and the establishment of “regimes of truth”. Metadiscursive practices in turn locate, differentiate and interpret between discourses with the goal of applying power to various related discourses. Briggs has analysed the metadiscursive practices at play in the process of textualisation, the process in which (oral) communication becomes first a recorded text, which becomes afterwards fixed in the act of translation or editing. He has thus shed light on how folklorists and anthropologists identify their object of study, how they draw borders and extract their study objects in order to differentiate them from their surroundings, and how they eventually prepare a publication out of something that has been fixated. In conclusion, they create interpretations, which are representations.

Representation refers to the act of standing for or taking the place of an entity that either is not present or is unable to stand for itself. Whereas an image created from a real being or thing, event or phenomenon, mediates only partly what it seeks to represent. Representations are in essence productions of meaning and the act of codification; they are constructed out of existing cultural codes (cf Hall 1997). But representations carry no natural reference or immediate access to external reality, as representations both present and construct their object – the object presented. The concept of representation and its usage are inherently politically loaded, involving issues of aesthetics, language and politics, whereas an image or a verbal description mediate only partly what it seeks to represent,
and presupposes a recipient. In social context a representation of someone in general refers to the act of speaking for someone, while in the act of representation the one representing becomes as if transparent. But if orality is transformed into writing it does not denote an innocent process, because the text is created by the hand of a writer. In the process of textualising cultural phenomena the fundamentally important (anthropological) observation cannot be separated from the experience and the description of that experience – an ethnographer of culture at the same time `writes’ that particular culture. In a paradoxical way a shift occurs, a transformation in which an experience (audiovisual and emotional) becomes converted into a material representation. An ethnography, i.e. a written study that is the result of ethnographic fieldwork creates a representation that is based on close study and empirical material. Even though the process of an ethnographic study assumes participation and an experience of `being there’, its capacity to document reality and its aspiration to present non-mediated reflection has been seriously questioned by critical reflexive anthropology. According to James Clifford (1986a) an ethnographic representation can present only “partial truths” in which the relationship of the written to the experienced reality, or lived life, remains ambivalent. He considers the allegorical nature of ethnography to be essential both in content and form – both what is said about (strange) cultures and their histories as well as the manner of textualisation are eventually allegories (Clifford 1986b). According to Clifford an allegory is a self interpreting representation, whereas the created realist portraits are metaphoric, always having additional meanings. Any kind of cultural ethnography does not simply represent and symbolise what is described but rather presents a morally loaded narrative (op cit). A similar understanding of allegory also extends to the author of an ethnography. In the textualisation of ‘an ethnographic pastorale’ the researcher is unavoidably influenced by a variety of impacts and the surrounding socio-cultural discourse. The researcher who makes a documentation proposes to be a saviour of a traditional, disappearing world, the textual reconstructor of a value that has slipped into oblivion, ‘the textual redeemer’ of a vanishing community. And at the same time the presented ethnography is more an imagination of the author who organises a particular narrative into a coherent whole, provides the framework, determines the angle and chooses what to include and what to exclude.

A critical scrutiny of the process of turning orality into literacy has caused the questioning of the writer’s ability to represent: who represents whom and how, what is the role of the folklorist as a mediator between everyday life and the academic world, who has the right to speak for others, what does it mean in general to speak for someone else, and is this at all possible? A representation mediated
by language and in language acquires a particular measure in the analysis of the relationship of the text and power, this relationship brings forth the problematic positions of subjectivity and agency, the act of mediating interlocutors. The latter in turn is related to social representation, the establishment of authority and the topic of the muted or voiceless minority. In principle, folklorists tend to investigate positions of marginality, at least this appears to be an essential characteristic in the studied themes (an interpretation of the past in a different present and context). And yet, determining someone to be a member of a marginal group puts the performer of folklore in a position where individuality has to give way to the discourse of similarities (as happens in the process of creating a national narrative). Thus, representation acts like a force of homogenisation that hones down differences, which in fact carry essential significance for individuals.

**Predicaments in conceptualising tradition**

In the rest of this chapter I will trace theoretical trajectories to reflect upon a ‘cluster of conceptualisations’ that is quite influential in folkloristics due to its wider socio-political potential, both for its ideological and motivating weight. The elements of this cluster, the three distinct categories of tradition, memory and heritage are not quite discrete but intertwine in a synonymic relationship. In many contexts one might replace the other, if we hold recourse to the past as focal. This cluster has been critically inscribed with constructedness, both in creating tradition, mediating memory, and in the evolvement of cultural heritage. The notion of time is essential, though in an inverted state, for the whole conceptualisation that draws upon the implication of temporal collapse in relation to the past, the present, and the future. The basic understanding of time in these settings contends that time is a historical construct, while there is no linear, progressive temporality. Tradition involves repetition; the concepts together could be elaborated upon as a representation of the experience of time. To the discussion of experience I add in this context the notion of mediation, which also depends on narrative mode and qualities. The current approach conceptualises history as a knowledge institution and my argumentation here does not so much deal with tradition as an organisational concept, but rather as a social act, a space where narratives of tradition and narratives of heritage form representations. Those representations serve under particular circumstances as instrumental tools in the construction of new knowledge. The study of folklore or culture depends on, but also configures, the process of knowledge dissemination. From this perspective the institutions of acquisition and dissemination of knowledge obtain particular significance, determining the ways knowledge institutions contemplate tradition
or represent heritage not only in academia but also in society in general. This has been described as the “flow of knowledge” (Strathern 2004), in which academic formulations transcend to the public sphere and become part of common perceptions and argumentation.

Tradition is a temporal construction that does not yield to systematisation. The concept of tradition expresses in essence temporal continuity, to mark a phenomenon or a hereditary custom that is transmitted from generation to generation. The category of time and an ambivalent relationship with temporality cuts through both the concept and the research process: when a folklorist carries out fieldwork (which is directly related to anthropology) s/he acts in the category of the present when collecting source material, but with frequent glances to the past (memory); the material recorded during fieldwork will usually be deposited as archival material, and thus, when a folklorist works with archival material, s/he acts in the category of past; at the same time s/he creates (created) in the archive a representation of the past, to which one may pose questions from the moment of the present.13

In the study of folklore, ethnology or anthropology the transdisciplinary concept of ‘tradition’ – widely appropriated in the humanities and social sciences – is central for identifying and describing one’s object of research, while often extended to denote even the whole field. However, methodological and epistemological scrutiny of the concept is rather recent, whereas enquiry into its social meaning and dimension has been principally argued in other disciplines. The more conservative discussion of folk culture relies on its signification of essential continuity between the past and the present, when underscoring oral transmission, and the genuine taken-for-granted organic integrity of cultural expressions and practices in the past; it has been perceived as a conglomerate to passively “store” cultural substance (cf Honko 1999). Yet if we take a broader analytical perspective, tradition should be considered a social phenomenon, particularly if we proceed from an understanding that it has no formal existence outside human interpretation, where it is in essence a symbolic construction – not a given or defined organic entity, but an interpretation of the past in the present. While common sense still covets the organic essence of continuity and disseminates the perception of tradition as the handing down of an eternally fixed core of phenomena, beliefs, or practices, the current analysis of culture considers it to be a symbolic representation of elements from the past, re-created or invented in the present. Folklorist Pertti Anttonen has defined tradition to be a modernist construct that signifies cultural continuity and the repetitive qualities of historical patterns (Anttonen 2005). The construction of tradition, or its invention (in reference to the seminal collection of articles edited by Eric Hobsbawm and Terence

319
Ranger, *The Invention of Tradition* (1983)) is essentially a process of formalisation and ritualisation – it is generally a reaction to an alteration of circumstance, which often takes place in a situation when a swift social transition weakens or destroys previously established social patterns (Hobsbawm & Ranger 1983).

Tradition as a symbolic representation is constructed on an interpretation of the past in the present moment, to further particular social and ideological concerns; a tradition acquires salient significance as an interpretation of the past that is intended to render meaning to the present (cf Handler & Linnekin 1984). In the same vein, another concept delineated by the temporal category is that of authenticity (which is often stressed in connection with tradition); the moment of authenticity is likewise defined in the present. The distinction of traditions as either genuine or spurious, authentic or inauthentic does not appear to be valid, as this essential feature of tradition, the fact that it endorses authenticity, is created and determined in the present and confined by the space from where the past is interpreted. In her elaborate study of the history of folkloristics, Regina Bendix suggests that we should not question the category of authenticity, but rather endeavour to analyse who needs this authenticity, why they need it, and how they implement it (Bendix 1997, 22–23). The definition and function are created in the present.

Under the pressure of dynamic modernisation and globalisation, the role and significance of traditional cultural expressions acquire particular poignancy. People turn to their cultural heritage to find means of expression that carry the values of tradition and reflect current concerns, both social and political. Tradition comes to serve as a reservoir to which one resorts in search of artistic elements and aesthetic features that address the cultural and ethnic identities in question. Here the opposition of tradition and innovation (or modernisation) is geared towards creating a unified cultural expression, with the eventual goal of establishing representative cultural symbols. Periods of turbulent and unsettling social change usually create in a community a need for unifying (e.g. national) symbols that might boost the sense of connectedness with the overall aim of establishing a friction between ‘us’ and ‘them.’ The created common cultural framework and its expressive language are based on the representation of cultural heritage as a common national symbol.

**From memory to cultural heritage**

When a folklorist seeks re-presentations of the past in the act of folklore collecting, s/he addresses human memory. The way people perceive the interconnectedness of tradition and time in representation, and the way one makes an effort
to contemplate it, holds largely also in the scrutiny of memory and its narrative representation. Experience, reality, time, narrative, and language are inherent notions entangled in the act of remembering, but also in the process of recalling. Memories are presented to us in a narrative structure, while narrative is the central means whereby humans come to understand temporality – we learn to organise time through the experience of narratives, both fictional and historical, as claimed by Paul Ricoeur (1980). The foundational premise rests on the mediation of memory by narratives in intricate involvement with temporality. And yet, the ‘memory work’ involves a temporal collapse in the act of recalling and that of shaping a narrative. When in folkloristics memory is applied as an object of study through the recollections of the heard, the experienced, and the occurred in order to re-present them, then the act of interpretation of what actually happened involves a collapse of the past and the present into a combination of memory and imagination, which interpret the significance of the past. An intentional discord between temporal or spatial order in narrative expression reflects the uniqueness of individual experiences and the relative truth in remembering past events. The discrepancy between the order of events in a story or in their presentation makes it possible to ‘travel in time’, and also reverse the position of truth, the moment of authenticity (Knuuttila 2008).

Although remembering is an individual mental process, theorists studying the ontological or epistemological background of memory claim that memories representing lived experience implicate a complex relation to ‘actuality’ because the act of representation implies the absence of immediate access to external reality (cf Radstone 2000). Memories are actively produced as representations that are “open to struggle and dispute” (op cit, 7). Therefore they are an eternal battleground, which is particularly fused by the tension between the individual and collective, the public and private. They are based on selection, while memory is always and necessarily an interaction of the two contrasting animators: disappearance (i.e. forgetting) and preservation, where one should inquire who has the right to control the choice of elements retained according to Tzvetan Todorov (2001). There are tensions between public representation of history and lived experience because they form different ‘audiences’ of memory, whose contradictions reflect deviance in the production and consumption (or reception) of memory, in the configurations of public or private reminiscing. The public or national representations of memories may correlate with, creatively transform or contradict personal experience; memories of an individual may concur or contest the established or collective narratives.

Although memory has transformed into a meta-level concept where the individual or collective practices of remembering continue to create confusion, this
abstract concept has certainly found significant materialisation in the so-called memory institutions. Museal institutions contain a representation of the past that mediates a narrative of national memory. Archives and museums are deemed depositories of memory; they are considered institutions of memory that define and preserve prescribed knowledge. Social anthropologist Paul Connerton (1989) claims that material culture is a way by which societies deliberately choose to encode memory, and this lends rationale to the proliferation of museums based on the intricate relation of ‘the past in the present’. Museums have been assigned the task of presenting a packaged form of memory and history that are predisposed by the internal tensions of modernity or identity politics. Memory institutions acquire particular significance when standing in reference to national memory where they become institutional sites of memory. They entail the potential of temporal collapse in the presented narrative where the intentional inversion of time and place are implemented with a political purpose of creating a celebrative, coherent ‘narrative’ as a foundational premise for teleological national memory.

The making of archives and museums, the establishment of depositories for past repertoires, and for records of past cultural practices and artefacts has inherently served the purpose of creating a national cultural heritage. The elements of cultural expression perceived as representative symbols of the past serve to signify the continuity of ancient cultural traditions, being explicitly a modern cultural production where phenomena manifested to be archaic are publicly displayed. This exposition to mediate the past transforms a particular object into cultural heritage, whereas the process of heritage construction unavoidably makes the object perceived as heritage more ideal than historical reality could ever have been: the sloppiness of experienced reality is turned into something perfect in form and shape, making it representational (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1998b, 7–8). The mapping and identification of ‘heritage’ as the formational premise of cultural politics concerning locally grounded groups, the awareness of cultural heritage and its significance in identity construction has concurred with the modern process of documenting and promoting past repertoires and practices. Objects and elements of previous cultural experience are transformed into heritage as fragments that are decontextualised, in order to recontextualise them in a novel situation of representation that transforms them into national or ethnic symbols. (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1998c) An abstraction takes place that brings forth new representative entities. The public presentation of heritage creates and implements knowledge that becomes incorporated into modern social imaginaries. I refer here to the modern moral order and the concept of social imaginary by philosopher Charles Taylor (2004): common practices and a shared sense of legitimacy are generated by a social imaginary of common understanding.
The concept of cultural heritage derives from the late-modern European apprehension of cultural phenomena. It is a project of ideology involving an ambivalent implementation of the category of time, where the alluded preservation and celebration of past elements of reified culture are implemented by cultural politics to address the concerns of the present, with a particular perspective to the future. Due to its engagement and programmatic nature, the employment of the claim for ‘cultural heritage’ comprises tacitly a capacity to overshadow the complexities of history and politics (cf Bendix 2000). Cultural heritage is a term manifesting a position of power; it builds on choices emanating from the power play of inclusions and exclusions, of rootedness and rights for possession. The concept of heritage is a resonant and politically implicated tool in any scholarly exchange, which has easily transcended from the academic scene to the general public. Considering the present state of affairs when the concept of cultural heritage gains new ground as a symbolic and material, social and political capital, it seems important to elaborate on how the knowledge on which heritage production rests has been produced.

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The current elaboration of concepts was embedded in the discourse of knowledge production, the analysis of the process of creating and grounding knowledge. The object of study, the subject matter and research activities have been defined by scholars at different times and by applying changing terminology. Consequently, an analysis referring to itself, i.e. a reflexive inquiry into cultural and academic processes, has to take into account its own position and construction as a cultural artefact. This implies a recognition of epistemological and political forces that condition our research as well as shape (or have shaped) the discipline. This recognition supposes an illumination of the constraints and contingencies of truths postulated and of positions taken for granted, both on the level of concepts or of institutions. To sum up the trajectory of passage undertaken, I return here to the topic of knowledge production. Knowledge is formulated by collected data and their systematisation, while folkloristic or anthropological knowledge is mediated by an ethnographic description. But it appears impossible to avoid in this context the paradox of objectivity and subjectivity, when we want to depart from the principal epistemological questions like the origin of knowledge, the role of experience, the feasibility of truth or error. Let us contend with Richard Rorty (1991) that there exists no transcendent theory of knowledge and knowing that might rest on representative concepts, because we would always be dealing
Kristin Kuutma

with another form of discourse as part of communication that takes place in the network of language users.

Despite the previous criticism on the non-reflexive use of concepts, one cannot avoid these words on the level of generalisation where they continue to be used and misused. On the other hand, it is worthwhile keeping in mind the fact that the creation, the performance, and the constantly renewed content of interpersonal communication do not happen outside of the social. Therefore, modern folkloristics should address with more vigour various social problems and their consequences, in order to contribute to the wider academic discussion while drawing on invaluable disciplinary experience. Today’s folklorists have trained eyes and ears and the interest to investigate how individuals or groups perceive or reflect their surroundings in (verbal) expression. However, particularly for this reason one could shift the research focus more purposefully into the present and onto the problems that may brush our contemporary society against the grain. Instead of the idealisation or reconstruction of the past by the researcher, instead of the celebration of the ‘evanescent’, I would like to welcome studies that pose informed questions and interpret creative expressions that spring from the problems and conditions of the present.

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The interdisciplinarity of folkloristics


References

Kristin Kuutma


326
The interdisciplinarity of folkloristics

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Notes

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1 Due to the volcano eruption in Iceland in the middle of April 2010, airtraffic was halted for weeks all over Europe. Reference to the call issued in the folklorists’ mailing list.
2 In order to provide examples from different periods, let me mention here the historical-geographic method that derived from the positivist conception of a scientific field, the theories for systematisation that were prompted by massive collections of texts, or the oral formulaic theory that has been connected to mnemotechnical processes.
3 What first catches the inquisitive attention continues to be the exceptional in the heard, in the seen, or in the person who performs.
4 For the changes that have occurred in Estonia in the use and perception of the fundamental concepts of rahvaluule (folklore) or rahvakultuur (folk culture), see Jaago 2005, Kannike 2005b, or Kannike 2005a.
6 Social relationships were studied, of course, in the course of the twentieth century, but then it meant predominantly a presentation of collective experience projected onto the past instead of an individual experience. From a historical point of view an additional issue might be the manipulation of folklore and folkloristics as an academic field by totalitarian regimes, but such a complex topic remains outside the limits of the current chapter.
7 The original inspiration deriving from the volume edited by Raymond Williams Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society (1976).

I have discussed the concept of identity and its usage in cultural research more thoroughly in Kuutma 2008a.

Visual or other documentation remains outside the scope of the current treatise.

Cf Kuutma 2008b.

The contingencies of the category of time have been criticised by Johannes Fabian who has demonstrated how the studied material and people have been placed without further reflexion in a so-called timeless time that excludes change and dynamics, which are nevertheless perceived to be self-evident in the life and surroundings of the researcher (cf Fabian 1983; 1991).

In reference to *lieux de mémoire*, the famous concept by Pierre Nora.

I have analysed the concepts of cultural heritage and ownership in more depth in Kuutma 2009. Cf also Kuutma 2007.

For example, in modern Estonian folkloristics one would hardly find any documentations or interpretations of the everyday experience of the Russian-speaking minority.
Index of names
Page numbers featuring illustrations marked in italic

Aarelaid-Tart, A. 9, 17, 19, 242, 254, 257, 259
Abrahams, R. D. 286, 294, 301, 311–312, 325, 328
Abrahamsson, K. V. 120, 126
Abram, D. 118, 126
Abu-Lughod, L. 315, 325
Adam, B. 245–246, 250, 257
Agar, M. 56, 60
Agnew, J. 126
Aitken, S. 128
Alasuutari, P. 244, 246, 257
Albrecht, G. L. 190, 196, 199
Alexander, J. C. 254, 257
Allen, D. E. 4, 12
Allen, S. 165, 178
Amaterasu 175
Ammerlaan, T. 106
Anderson, A. 218
Anderson, B. 225, 227, 236
Anderson, K. 128
Anderson, W. 15
Andrews, M. 112, 126, 286, 301
Anikina, M. 278
Annist, A. 223, 237
Antrop, M. 127
Anttonen, P. J. 314, 319, 325
Apo, S. 286, 293–294, 301, 305
Appiah, K. A. 37, 60
Aristotle 26
Arnese, T. 119–120, 126
Asad, T. 37, 60
Ashford, B. 188, 198
Assmann, J. 73
Austin, W. G. 106
Bachmann-Medick, D. 37, 60
Backhaus, G. 118, 126
Baert, P. 245, 257
Bainbridge, W. S. 195, 199–200
Baker, V. R. 116, 126–127
Banytè-Rowell, R. 152, 155
Barker, E. 2
Barthes, R. 113–114, 267, 277
Barth, F. 90, 105
Bassnett, S. 37, 60
Bauer, A. A. 46, 62
Bauman, R. 227, 237, 312–313, 325, 327
Bazin, L. 51, 60
Bela-Krūmiņa, B. 286, 301
Bell, A. 265, 277
Bemong, N. 128
Ben-Amos, D. 285, 294, 301
Benati, C. 90, 105
Benda, B. B. 185, 189, 198, 200
Bendix, R. 2, 311, 320, 323, 325
Benezer, G. 289
Benjamin, W. 257
Bennett, T. 50–51, 60, 315, 325
Benveniste, É. 31–32
Berganza, R. 278
Berger, P. L. 237–238
Bergson, H. 246, 257
Bergunder, M. 218
Berman, M. E. 199
Bersu, G. 155
Bitner-Wróblewska, A. 152, 155
Bloom, H. 40, 60
Boklund-Lagopoulou, K. 111, 115, 128
Borghini, P. 248–249, 251, 257
Bourhis, R. Y. 105
Bowman, M. 218
Bowser, B. J. 157
Boyce, G. 274, 277
Branch, M. 326
Brather, S. 155, 159
Brezhnev, L. 269
Breznina, T. 189
Briggs, C. L. 313, 316, 325
Broekman, J. M. 128
Broom, L. 198
Brownfield, D. 185
Buber, M. 28–29, 32
Buchan, R. 128
Bulla, C. O. 238
Burgess, C. 40, 60
Burke, P. 243, 253, 257, 287, 301
Burkett, S. R. 185
Burks, A. W. 127
Bursik Jr, R. J. 193, 199
Burton, V. S. 198
Butler, T. 257
Butts, C. O. 195, 198

329
Index of names

Calame, C. 37, 60
Calcatinge, A. 121, 127
Cangoz, I. 278
Canell, F. 205, 207–208, 215–218
Cantrill, J. G. 127, 132
Capra, F. 92, 105
Carbonell Cortés, O. 37, 60
Carr, D. 68
Cassirer, E. 42–43, 56, 61, 63
Caune, A. 157
Cengage, G. 99, 105
Chadwick, B. A. 185
Chakravarty, B. 46, 60
Chalaby, J. K. 266, 274, 277
Chronos 243
Chun, A. 53, 61
Claval, P. 113, 126–127
Clifford, J. 60, 314–315, 317, 325–326, 328
Cobley, P. 10
Cochran, J. K. 185, 193, 199
Cohen, A. K. 198, 200
Cole, M. 52, 61
Coleman, S. 211, 217
Coman, M. 278
Comaroff, Jean 205, 217
Comaroff, John 205, 217
Connerton, P. 252, 322, 326
Corsten, M. 248, 250–251, 257
Cosgrove, D. 110–111, 115–116, 125, 127
Cottrell Jr, L. S. 198
Crang, M. 113, 127–128
Cresswell, T. 111, 119, 127, 129
Cullen, F. T. 198
Curran, J. 277
Czepczyński, M. 113, 127
Dahl, H. F. 273, 277
Daniels, S. 115–116, 127
de Courtenay, J. B. 15
De Dobbeleer, M. 128
Deely, J. 62
De Li, S. 190, 199
DeLyser, D. 128
DeMoen, K. 128
Denzin, N. K. 248, 257
Derrida, J. 31, 46, 257
de Saussure, F. 113, 114
de Soucanton, J. K. G. 231
De Temmerman, K. 128
Dicken-García, H. 274–275, 277
Dil, A. S. 106
Doja, A. 46, 61
Domosh, M. 128
Donnellan, K. 170
Dooley, P. L. 275, 277
Dorson, R. M. 303
dos Santos, M. S. 252–253, 257
Downey, J. 277
Dreyfus, H. L. 78
Driver, G. R. 187, 198
Droogers, A. F. 218
Drummond, J. J. 78
du Gay, P. 257
Dummett, M. 167, 178
Dunaway, R. G. 198
Duncan, J. 197, 199
Duncan, J. S. 114, 116, 127–128
Duncan, N. 114, 127–128
Durkheim, É. 70, 73, 83, 184, 189, 198, 205–207, 210, 215–217, 246, 252
Eccles, J. 71, 84
Eco, U. 26, 28, 114
Edmunds, J. 251, 257–258
Edwards, J. 89, 105
Eelma, M. 4
Egorov, B. 32
Ehala, M. 9, 17–18, 88, 92, 105
Ekecrantz, J. 265, 278
Eliade, M. 184
Elias, N. 243–245, 257
Ellemers, N. 103, 105
Eller, J. D. 189, 198
Emel, J. 119, 131
Emmeche, C. 9
Engel, C. 147, 155
Ericksen, E. P. 105
Ericksen, J. A. 98, 105
Erikson, K. T. 255, 257
Eubanks, L. 199
Euclid 71
Evans, J. 257
Evans, T. D. 185, 198, 200
Eyerman, R. 257
Fabian, J. 246, 258, 326, 328
Fadeyeva, I. 219
Faehlmann, F. R. 223
Fairclough, N. 294, 301
Farina, A. 111, 119, 124, 128
Fath, B. D. 128
Feintuch, B. 309, 313, 315, 326–327
Fennig, C. D. 106
Feyerabend, P. 37, 61
Filatov, S. 211, 217–218
Fill, A. 106
Fingerroos, O. 302–303
Fischer, M. M. J. 56, 61
Fishman, J. A. 106
Folch-Serra, M. 121–122, 128
Föllesdal, D. 78–79, 83
Foucault, M. 226, 237, 316
Fowler, J. W. 198, 200
Fox, R. 325
Freedman, D. N. 199
Free, M. D. 185, 198–199
Fricchione, G. L. 198
Friedman, M. 28, 32
Fry, G. 127
Gallois, A. 171–172, 175, 178
Gannon, S. 53, 61
Gardner, R. H. 131
Garner, M. 88, 106
Index of names

Geertz, C. 18, 36, 54, 61, 70, 73, 83, 188, 198
Gell, A. 246, 258
Giddens, A. 244, 246–250, 258
Giesen, B. 257
Giles, H. 98, 105
Glassie, H. 328
Gleason, T. 274, 278
Gödel, K. F. 170–171
Goltz, H. 205, 207, 218
Goode, E. 186–187, 198
Goodman, N. 174, 178
Gottdiener, M. 11, 128
Gottfredson, M. R. 184, 198, 200
Granö, J. G. 15
Grasmick, H. G. 193, 199
Graudonis, J. 147, 149, 155
Grayling, A. C. 166, 178
Green, T. A. 301
Greimas, A. J. 113–115, 129
Grele, J. R. 287–288, 292, 301
Grigelavičienė, E. 147, 155
Grimm, brothers 294
Gross, P. 277–278
Grusec, J. E. 304
Gunnell, T. 238
Gurwitsch, A. 78
Haanpää, R. 302–303
Haarmann, H. 88, 105
Hagd, P. 303
Haiyama, A. 113, 118, 128
Halas, E. 252, 255, 258
Halbmayr, B. 292, 301
Halbwachs, M. 73, 243, 246, 252, 258
Hallin, D. C. 278
Hall, S. 316, 326
Hamada, B. 278
Hammurapi 200
Handler, R. 320, 326
Handoo, J. 237
Hanitzsch, T. 263, 266, 276–279
Hann, C. 205, 207, 211, 216, 218
Hannerz, U. 312–313, 315, 326
Hanusch, F. 263, 278–279
Hara, H. 130
Haraway, D. J. 120
Hardy, M. A. 258
Harris-Lopez, T. 328
Harris Russell, S. A. 93–94, 106
Harro-Loit, H. (= Harro, H.) 9, 17, 19, 262, 268, 271, 278
Hartshorne, C. 127
Hassan, S. A. 194, 199
Haugen, E. 88, 106
Heath, S. 277
Hegel, G. W. F. 73
Hehn, V. 14–15
Heidegger, M. 29, 118, 249–250, 258
Heimo, A. 289, 301–303
Help, H.-L. 156
Henderson, J. 46, 60
Henry VIII 173–174
Herbert, S. 128
Herder, J. G. 43, 73
Hermans, T. 60, 62
Hernandez, M. E. 278–279
Herschend, F. 155, 159
Herzfeld, M. 128
Higgins, P. C. 190, 196, 199
Hiiemäe, M. 227, 234, 237, 303, 304
Hillerdal, C. 155, 159
Hinchliffe, S. 120, 128
Hinrikus, R. 290–291, 294, 301
Hirschi, T. 184, 191–194, 198–200
Hobsbawm, E. 319–320, 326
Hodder, I. 142, 155
Hodges, W. 165, 178
Hoffmann, M. 147, 155
Höfdre, A. 241
Holloway, J. 122, 128
Holquist, M. 128, 131
Honko, L. 319, 325–326
Hornberger, N. H. 97, 106
Horne, L. 157
Hostetler, J. A. 105
Howard, P. 131
Høyer, S. 273–275, 278–279
Huffmon, H. B. 187, 199
Hufford, M. 328
Hulsen, M. 106
Huntington, G. E. 105
Hurtado, P. 51–52, 62
Hurt, J. 224, 227, 236–237, 288, 293, 301–303, 305
Husserl, E. 18, 66–84, 118, 248
Ikegami, Y. 129
Imazato, S. 113, 128
Indreko, R. 136–138, 140, 149, 155, 157–158
Ingold, T. 118, 121, 128
Innis, H. A. 273, 278
Ipsen, G. 43, 61
Irwin-Zarecka, I. 252–253, 258
Issakov, S. 32
Ivanov, V. 44, 61
Ivask, M. 156
Jaago, T. 9, 17, 19, 284–286, 288, 290, 293, 301–302, 304, 309, 324–325, 327
Jaanits, L. 137–138, 147, 152, 155, 157
Jaanson, K. 302, 305
Jacobs, M. D. 50, 61
Jakobson, R. 27, 30
Jakobson, S. 156
Jakubowicz, K. 277–278
Järvieluoma, H. 302
Jäschke, G. B. 14
Index of names

Jauhiainen, M. 237
Jaworski, A. 116, 128
Jesus 208, 219
Jochmann, C. G. 15
Johannessen, K. I. 199
Johanson, K. 157–158
Johnson, B. R. 190, 195, 199
Johnson, C. 45, 61
Jones, S. 155, 159
Jönsson-Korhola, H. 106
Jonuks, T. 146–147, 155
Jørgensen, S. E. 128
Juhansön, V. (= Juhandi, V.) 295–298, 300
Jung, C. G. 73
Kainulainen, M. 106
Kailovu-Bręgnoj, A. 289, 291, 302–303
Kaldre, H. 156
Kalela, J. 289, 302
Kalmre, E. 304
Kangro, B. 238
Kannike, A. 4, 12, 324, 327
Kant, I. 15
Kapchan, D. 313, 326, 328
Karadjov, C. D. 278
Kariya, T. 130
Karjahärm, T. 302
Kärnsna, K. 301
Kass, M. 269
Katan, D. 37, 61
Keefe, R. 178–179
Kee Wang Yuen, E. 278
Keller, J. 231
Keunen, B. 128
King, K. A. 97, 106
King, V. 251, 258
Kirik, V. 233
Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, B. 311, 322, 326
Kirss, T. 302, 304
Kivimäe, J. 302, 305
Klein, B. 303
Knauff, B. M. 48–49, 61
Kneale, J. 122, 128
Knox, P. L. 113, 128
Knuuttila, S. 287, 302, 321, 326
Koch, W. A. 44, 61
Köiva, M. 301, 326
Kojima, K. 130
Kokk, M. 193, 199
Köll, A.-M. 2
Koort, A. 15
Koosa, P. 217–218
Korb, A. 302, 305
Köresaar, E. 257–258, 289, 302–304
Kornhauser, W. 189
Kortekaas, P. 105
Kosirn, M. 267, 278
Kotta, M. 289, 302
Kraybill, D. B. 97, 106
Krenke, N. 156, 159
Kreutzer, R. 72
Kreuzwald, F. R. 223–224, 232
Kriska, A. 152, 156, 159
Kriikmann, A. 301
Kripke, S. 170–171, 178
Krois, J. M. 43, 61
Kronberg, J. 326
Kroo, K. 11
Krotz, E. 49, 61
Kruus, H. 288, 291, 295, 299–300, 302, 305
Kuhiwczak, P. 60
Kull, A. 9, 17–18, 182, 200
Kull, K. 2–3, 9–10, 14, 17–18, 36, 61, 110, 123–125, 128, 130–131
Kull, M. 269
Kulmar, T. 200
Kuper, A. 326
Kurvits, R. 4
Kuutma, K. 10, 17, 19, 302, 308, 310, 324–328
Kvideland, R. 325
Labor, K. 326
Lagopoulos, A. P. 111, 115, 128
Lagos, C. 279
Laidla, J. 303
Lambert, W. E. 89, 106
Laneman, M. 156
Lapin, L. 4, 307
 Larson, D. B. 190, 199
Lash, S. 50, 61
Latour, B. 120
Latvala, P. 293, 303
Laub, J. 189
Laugaste, E. 293, 303
Lauk, E. 269, 275–276, 278
Laul, S. 155
Lauristin, M. 302
Lau, R. W. K. 264, 278
Lavento, M. 156, 159
Lawless, E. J. 207–210, 216, 218
Leach, M. M. 183, 199
Leccardi, C. 245, 248, 250, 252, 254–255, 258
Lee, B. Y. 190, 199
Leete, A. 10, 17–18, 204, 217–219
Leibiniz, G. W. 166
Leman, M. 304
Leon, M. 117, 128
Lévi-Strauss, C. 45–46, 61, 244
Lewis, D. 167, 174, 178
Lewis, M. P. 97, 106
Ley, D. 116, 128
Lifton, R. J. 194
Lindsey, S. 113, 128
Lindström, K. 10, 17–18, 110, 122, 129, 131
Linnekin, J. 320, 326
Lipin, V. 217–218
Lipit-Ishtar 200
Index of names

Littau, K. 60
Livingston, I. 92, 106
Lockhart, R. S. 304
Löfgren, O. 224, 237
Lombroso, C. 184, 199
Loorits, O. 15, 230, 237
Lorimer, H. 129
Lotman, M. 10, 17, 22, 32–33, 179
Löugas, V. 137–138, 155, 157–158
Loze, I. 146, 157
Luckmann, T. 237–238
Luhmann, N. 92, 106
Luhrmann, T. M. 53, 61
Luik, H. 152, 157
Luukkan, G. 113, 129
Lunkin, R. 211, 218
Lyon, G. 169, 178
Mackey, W. F. 88, 106
Magnusson, L. 325
Maim, N. 15
Malashenko, A. 218
Maldre, L. 152, 157
Malinowski, B. 54, 56, 61
Mäll, L. 16
Mancini, P. 278
Mändmets, J. 272, 278
Mannheim, K. 250–251, 258
Mansour, E. 249
Maran, T. 129, 132
Marchitello, H. 327
Marcus, G. E. 60, 325
Marcus, R. B. 170, 176, 178
Marston, S. A. 113, 128
Martin, M. 106
Marzolf, M. 266, 274, 279
Masing, U. 15
Maslow, A. 254
Mathisen, S. R. 325
Matless, D. 129
Matsumoto, D. 52, 62
Maturana, H. 92, 106
Mauss, M. 70, 83
McAdams, D. P. 248–249, 258
McCullough, M. 190, 199
McDowell, L. 128
McIntyre, R. 78
McLuhan, M. 273, 279
Melazzo, L. 128
Mellado, C. 263, 278–279
Mellor, H. 174, 179
Mercer, D. 121, 129
Merkel, G. 223
Merkevičius, A. 150, 157, 160
Merleau-Ponty, M. 118
Merriman, P. 119, 129
Merton, R. K. 198
Mertz, E. 46, 62
Metro-Roland, M. 119, 125, 129
Meyer, B. 211, 218
Michelbertas, M. 152, 157
Mihelj, S. 277
Miles, J. C. 187, 198
Misztal, B. A. 247, 258
Mittelstrass, J. 42, 62
Mühl, P. 113, 129
Monnai, T. 113, 117, 129–131
Moora, A. 152, 157
Moora, H. 140, 152, 155, 157
Moore, A. W. 179
Moreira, S. V. 278–279
Moring, T. 2
Moriyama, M. 117, 130–131
Mufwene, S. S. 96, 106
Mugurévičs, É. 157
Mühlhäusler, P. 88, 106
Mukherji, A. 51–52, 62
Murungi, J. 118, 126
Mwesige, P. G. 278
Myhill, J. E. 90, 106
Nakazawa, S. 167, 179
Napoletano, B. 124, 128
Nash, G. 113, 130
Nerone, J. 273, 277
Nettl, G. 189
Newberg, A. 183, 190, 199
Newcomb, M. D. 185
Nicholls, J. 99, 106
Noguchi, H. 130
Nömmla, M. 325, 327
Nonseid, J. 273–274, 279
Noor, D. V. 278
Nora, P. 328
Nöth, W. 124, 130
Nowotny, H. 250, 258
Noyes, D. 313, 327–328
Obijiofor, L. 263, 279
O’Connor, T. P. 197, 199
Ogawa, T. 37, 62
Oikawa, K. 130
Olesk, S. 301
Olson, B. D. 248–249, 258
O’Neill, R. V. 131
Oras, J. 286, 303
Oravec, C. L. 127, 132
Ortner, S. B. 53, 62
Ose, I. 157
Ota, T. 130–131
Otto, N. 229
Ouwerkerk, J. W. 105
Ozols, J. 157, 160
Paalits, J. 269
Paalits, K. 4
Palamets, H. 288, 297–298, 300–301, 303, 305
Palang, H. 11, 17–18, 110, 123, 127, 130–132
Palménfelt, U. 292, 303, 305
Palm, J. 203
Palm, T. 13
Paras, Ü. 304
Paredes, A. 312, 327
Pasupathi, M. 249

333
Index of names

Patten, J. V. 194, 199
Paul, I. 283
Paul, the apostle 213, 218
Peebo, K. 227, 233, 237
Peegel, J. 227, 233, 237, 272, 279
Peil, T. 2
Peirce, C. S. 26, 117, 119–120, 127
Pelkmans, M. 218
Peltonen, U.-M. 285, 302–303
Perks, R. 301
Pertot, S. 105
Philo, C. 119, 130
Pihlakas, J. 234
Pile, S. 128
Pilv, I. 270, 279
Pjatigorski, A. 53, 61–62
Plaisance, P. L. 278
Plato 75
Ploomipuu, U. 109, 181
Plotkin, H. 38, 62
Pocius, G. 328
Poom, E. 230
Popper, K. 71, 84
Portelli, A. 286, 292, 303
Portis-Winner, I. 57, 62
Posner, R. 2, 42–43, 62
Pöttker, H. 275, 278
Pöysä, J. 286, 289, 293–294, 298, 300, 302–304
Preucel, R. W. 46, 62
Priestly, T. M. S. 105
Prigogine, I. 26–27
Printsmann, A. 132
Pullerits, P. 272, 279
Putnam, H. 166, 174, 179
Pyysäinäinen, I. 207, 218
Quillard, F. 197, 199
Radstone, S. 321, 327
Randviir, A. 111, 130
Ranger, T. 320, 326
Rapport, D. J. 62–63
Rastier, F. 56, 62
Raud, R. 11, 17–18, 164, 179
Raun, T. U. 224, 237
Rebo, Ü. 156
Redman, P. 257
Reich, Z. 263, 278–279
Relph, E. 115, 118, 130
Remmel, M.-A. 230, 237
Revill, G. 129
Ribeiro, G. L. 46–47, 62
Richardson, L. 167
Ricoeur, P. 321, 327
Rimantienë, R. 156
Robbins, J. 205, 208–211, 216, 218
Roca, Z. 126
Rohn, U. 266, 279
Ronen, R. 172, 179
Roos, J. P. 291
Rorty, R. 323, 327
Rose, G. 129
Rosenberg, M. 189
Rosenberg, T. 302–305
Roucek, J. S. 199
Rowe, J. C. 40, 62
Runge, S. 65, 87, 221
Runnel, H. 302
Russell, B. 167, 179
Russell, C. 247, 258
Saal, A. 225
Sage, A. 41, 62
Sakiyama, S. 130
Salamon, E. 198
Salupere, S. 61
Sampson, R. J. 189
Sapir, E. 169, 174–175
Sartre, J.-P. 248
Sbrocchi, L. 62
Schmidt, T. 291, 303, 305
Schmidt, V. 218
Schmitt, R. 200
Schoolcraft, H. R. 237
Schramm, W. 273, 279
Schudson, M. 266–267, 273–275, 279
Schur, E. M. 184, 199
Scollon, R. 116, 130
Searle, J. R. 169, 174–175, 179
Searle, M. 113, 129
Sebeok, T. A. 26, 246, 258
Seethaler, J. 278
Selim, M. 51, 60
Seppel, M. 303
Setten, G. 127
Shannon, C. E. 27
Shelton, D. L. 98, 105
Shennan, S. 157, 159
Siewers, A. K. 131–132
Siikala, A.-L. 237, 325
Silber, I. F. 47, 62
Simons, G. S. 106
Skewes, A. A. 278
Sloane, D. M. 185
Smelser, N. J. 257
Smith, D. W. 78
Smith, P. 178–179
Smolicz, J. J. 90, 106
Snē, A. 156
Sokolowski, R. 78
Solomon 186
Sommerville, M. A. 62–63
Son, K. 113, 130–131
Sooväli, H. 127
Sparks, C. 277
Spek, T. 130
Sperling, U. 138–139, 150, 157
Spillman, L. 50, 61
Spirt, A. W. 118, 131
Squire, C. 301
Stahl, S. K. D. 303, 305
Stalin, J. 269–270
Stark, M. T. 157, 159
Stark, R. 184, 191–192, 195, 199–200
Stefano, G. B. 198
Stenseke, M. 130
Strathern, M. 319, 327
Strating, H. 106
Strauss, C. 53, 62
Index of names

Sturje, K. 62
Sükösd, M. 278
Sulimov, V. 219
Süntiste, E. 57, 62
Sztompka, P. 254, 257–258
Taal, K. 303, 305
Tael, T. 286, 303
Tajfel, H. 103, 106
Takano, H. 130
Tamboukou, M. 301
Tammela, H. 289, 304
Tamm, K. 286, 304
Tamm, L. 270, 279
Tamm, M. 2, 12
Tangherlini, T. 228, 233, 236–237
Tarasti, E. 117, 131
Tasa, M. 4, 12
Tautavičius, A. 156
Taylor, C. 322, 327
Taylor, D. M. 105
Teichmüller, G. 15
Tennmann, E. 15
Theseus, 171, 175
Thompson, I. 131
Thompson Klein, J. 41, 63
Thompson, S. 237
Thomson, A. 285, 301, 304
Thrift, N. 119, 128, 131
Thurlow, C. 116, 128
Tiganik, R. 11, 17–18, 182, 190, 200
Tilley, C. Y. 118, 131
Titon, J. T. 328
Tittle, A. R. 185, 192, 199
Todorov, T. 321, 327
Tönisson, E. 155
Toombs, N. J. 189, 198, 200
Toporov, V. 61
Torop, P. 2, 11, 17, 36, 57–58, 61–63, 158
Törv, M. 157–158
Tuan, Y.-F. 115, 118, 131
Tuisk, A. 286, 304
Tulving, E. 286, 304
Tulviste, P. 16
Turner, B. S. 251, 257–258
Turner, J. C. 103, 106
Turner, M. G. 112, 131
Turner, T. 47, 63
Tye, M. 167, 179
Tylor, E. B. 43
Ukhtomsky, A. 121
Urnamma 200
Urry, J. 119, 131
Uspenskij, B. 61
Uspenskij, V. 22–24, 30, 32
Vakimo, S. 302
Valk, P. 188, 199
Valk, Ü. 11, 17–18, 218, 222, 229, 237–238
Vallikivi, L. 217–218
Valsiner, J. 16
Vandenbergh, F. 43, 63
van der Laan, C. 218
van der Leeuw, G. 184
Varela, F. 92, 106
Varlamova, G. 156
Vasiljeva, O. 218
Vask, A. 147, 156–157
Vassar, A. 149, 157
Västrik, E.-H. 303
Venuti, L. 60
Vernadsky, V. 24, 26, 33
Vilki, T. 11, 17–18, 32, 66, 73, 84
Vilde, E. 225
Vilmans, R. 156
Vinn, V. 261
Vint, T. 21, 35, 135, 163
Virtaranta, P. 93, 106
Volkaitė-Kulikauskienė, R. 156
von Baer, K. E. 15
von Baranoff, A. 295
von Harnack, A. 15
von Keyserling, H. 14–15
von Schroeder, L. 14–15
von Staël-Holstein, A. 15
von Uexküll, J. 9, 15, 26, 124, 246
von Ungern-Sternberg, E. A. 302
Võõbus, A. 15
Wagner, A. 128
Wahl-Jorgensen, K. 277
Waldman, M. R. 183, 199
Walters, G. C. 304
Waterton, E. 131
Weber, M. 70, 84, 184, 188, 198–199
Weiss, P. 127
Welch, M. R. 192, 199
Wellner, H. 272, 279
Welzer, H. 297, 304
Wertsch, J. 252, 255, 258
Whatmore, S. 119, 131
Whorf, B. L. 169, 174–175
Wilbert, C. 119, 130
Williams, C. H. 105
Williamson, R. 62
Williams, R. 327
Wingate, P. 277
Winston, B. 273, 279
Wolch, J. 119, 131
Wong Scollon, S. 116, 130
Woody, A. I. 40, 63
Worchel, S. 106
Wylie, J. 111, 129, 131
Yagmur, K. 106
Zarina, A. 132
Zelizer, B. 262–263, 265, 279
Zerubavel, E. 246, 252, 258