Switzerland could well have the most peculiar naturalisation system in the world. Whereas in most countries citizenship attribution is regulated by the central state, each municipality of Switzerland has the right to decide who can become a national citizen. By transcending formal citizenship models, the Swiss case thus casts citizenship politics in an entirely new light. This book explores naturalisation processes from a comparative perspective, explaining why some Swiss municipalities pursue more restrictive citizenship policies than others. Through quantitative and qualitative data, this study shows how negotiation processes between political actors produce a large variety of local citizenship models. Integrating Bourdieu’s political sociology, the theoretical framework innovatively combines symbolic and material aspects of naturalisations and underlines the production processes of ethnicity.

**Marc Helbling** is a Lecturer in Comparative Politics at the University of Zurich. He has studied political science in Lausanne, Paris, Zurich and New York. His research fields include immigration and citizenship politics, nationalism, national political conflict and public policy analysis.

“This study takes research on citizenship onto a new level of analytical rigour and empirical precision. It shows that naturalisation practices are the result of a political negotiation process between actors that hold different conceptions of the nation and its boundaries.”

Andreas Wimmer, Professor of Sociology, University of California, Los Angeles

“By focusing on the small and poorly understood case of Switzerland, Marc Helbling provides a major contribution to the study of citizenship. His meticulous study is theoretically informed, empirically balanced and it reaches bold and convincing conclusions that should be of broad interest to this growing field.”

Marc Morjé Howard, Associate Professor of Government, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.
Practising Citizenship and Heterogeneous Nationhood
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Practising Citizenship and Heterogeneous Nationhood

Naturalisations in Swiss Municipalities

Marc Helbling

IMISCOE Dissertations

Amsterdam University Press
To Charlotte
and my parents
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Marc Helbling
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1 Politics of Citizenship

On 13 March 2000, the following headline appeared in The New York Times: ‘A Swiss Town Votes to Reject Dozens of Would-Be Citizens’. What followed in the article must have sounded very odd to the non-Swiss reader:

Provided with information about an applicant’s salary, tax status, background and hobbies, voters in an industrial suburb of Lucerne decided that only four families, all of Italian origin, were suitable to become Swiss – 8 individuals out of a total of 56. The rest, many from the former Yugoslavia, were voted down, most by considerable margins (Olson 2000).

Indeed, the way one gets a passport in Switzerland is very different from the procedures in other countries. To our knowledge, Switzerland is the only nation-state in the world where naturalisations happen at the local level. Every municipality, be it a town of 100,000 or a village of 400 inhabitants, is accorded the right to decide who can become a Swiss citizen. As the regulations on the national and cantonal (sub-national) levels are very sparse, each political local entity decides according to which formal procedure and criteria its alien residents are naturalised. ‘Popular votes’ are only one possible form of decision-making procedure – but the most controversial one, leading time and again to violent political debates and to a great deal of astonishment beyond Swiss borders. Given the high degree of autonomy possessed by municipalities in this policy field, the naturalisation procedures, the applied criteria and, consequently, the ratio of rejected candidates vary greatly from one municipality to another.

The main goal of this study is to explore these municipal naturalisation procedures and to demonstrate that local political struggles leading to specific national self-understandings explain why some municipalities pursue a more restrictive naturalisation policy than others. Before we lay out our arguments in more detail, however, this first chapter will present the peculiarities of municipal naturalisation procedures in Switzerland and raise the question of how the case of Switzerland’s local naturalisations enables us to make a more general contri-
bution to the study of citizenship and nationalism. The fact that different citizenship policies are pursued within a country suggests that these policies cannot simply be explained by national citizenship models. Rather, we must explore the practice of citizenship politics, i.e. how these models are applied and how this implementation depends on local political constellations. By adopting such an approach, we are in the position to go beyond existing explanation schemes and to account for the contentious and political nature of citizenship politics – showing how local politicians imagine their nation, how they struggle over their individual perceptions of Swiss citizenship and how a dominant understanding of citizenship emerges within a municipality.

1.1 What is to be explored?

A Swiss is not only a citizen of his or her country, but also of a canton (sub-national state) and of a municipality. Nowadays, due to increased mobility, most Swiss are no longer citizens of the municipalities where they live but of a municipality from which their families originate. It also happens (rather rarely) that Swiss citizens apply for local citizenship in their new home-municipality. The singularity of local citizenship is partly a relic of former times when each town and village was responsible for taking care of its poor and when only citizens (and not the inhabitants) of a municipality were allowed to participate in local politics. Already in 1551, the Diet of the Swiss Confederation required that every municipality nourish and lodge its poor (Simon-Muscheid 2002: 508-509). It was therefore in the interest of every municipality to control access to local citizenship and to send beggars and other people in need back to their home-municipalities (Kleger & D’Amato 1995: 260; Gruner 1968: 29-31).

The way political rights were attributed at the local level changed when the modern Swiss federal state was founded in 1848. The first constitution held that each Swiss who moves to a new canton is accorded full civic rights after two years of residence. From 1874 on, all Swiss obtained local and cantonal political rights after three months of residence in a new canton (Aargast 2004: 53, 2007: ch.4). Nowadays, a Swiss immediately profits from the political rights of his or her new home-municipality. In other words, the ‘municipality of citizens’ ceded political competencies and other responsibilities to the ‘municipality of inhabitants’. As for the question of poor relief, in most cantons the situation changed only in the second half of the 20th century. In the aftermath of the First World War, it was more and more common that local authorities also took care of Swiss who were living in, but were not citizens of, their municipalities. Only in 1975, however, did the
Swiss Confederation obligate municipalities to support all Swiss who are in need and live on their territories (Argast 2004: 54). Today, the federal constitution stipulates that the cantons are responsible in the domain of poor relief (Cattacin & Tattini 2002: 826). While some cantons are exclusively responsible in this policy field, many cantons delegate the financing and organisation of benefit payments and poor relief of local residents to their municipalities.

From the foundation of the modern Swiss state in 1848 until 1874, the federal state had no competences for establishing citizenship regulations. The federal constitution specified only that citizens of a canton who were at the same time citizens of a municipality were also citizens of the Swiss federal state (Steiner 2004a: 15-16). Since 1876, Swiss citizenship is regulated at the federal, cantonal and local levels. The Swiss Confederation regulates the granting of citizenship through descent, marriage, and adoption and enacts minimal regulations on naturalisations of foreigners that can be amended by the cantons and the municipalities. The cantons have the competences to regulate the naturalisation procedures at the local level, but, in fact, hardly interfere with local naturalisation politics. The ordinary naturalisation of alien residents is thus to a very large extent the responsibility of the municipalities.

What does the naturalisation procedure look like in Switzerland? The sequence of decision-making with regard to naturalisations between the three political levels differs from canton to canton. However, in each case the procedure on the local level constitutes the crucial part of the process. Whereas the decisions of the Confederation and the cantons constitute rather formal and administrative procedures on the basis of very few but clearly specified criteria that are checked either before or after decisions are taken at the local level, the municipalities make mainly political decisions. The federal law on citizenship merely stipulates that only those foreign residents can be naturalised who have lived in Switzerland for at least twelve years, respect the legal order, do not compromise the interior or exterior safety of the country and are integrated and familiar with the Swiss habits and customs. The first three criteria are quite clear, easy to verify and are always checked by the federal administration. As for the questions of integration and familiarity, not only do they constitute vague requirements, but they also are judged exclusively by local actors. Which local actors are involved in the decision-making processes? The local administration is in most cases in contact with the applicants during the entire naturalisation procedure. They inform them about the formal aspects of the process and check whether certain criteria for naturalisation are fulfilled. Often they also discuss with candidates whether they have any chance of getting a Swiss passport and make recommendations to political bodies.
involved in the process. In almost all municipalities a naturalisation commission composed of local politicians discusses in detail the dossiers and makes recommendations to those who make the final decisions. Sometimes dossiers are circulated several times between the various collective bodies involved in the decision-making processes. It might also happen that the local parliament or the executive body makes recommendations before the final decisions are made. Final decisions are made in some municipalities by the entire population, either by ballot or during a municipal assembly. In other municipalities, it is the local parliament or the executive body which decides who can become a Swiss citizen. It appears that various actors are involved in municipal naturalisations and that the evaluation of the candidates’ dossiers occurs at different stages. Naturalisations can therefore be compared to decision-making processes in other political fields where political actors have to come to an agreement as to which policy has to be pursued.

The candidates often have to pass a kind of exam or interrogation to verify that they are familiar enough with the Swiss political system, Swiss history and the language of the particular region. The local administration and decision makers decide whether and to what extent candidates have to pass such tests or interrogations. The criteria can therefore differ among municipalities even within the same canton. Formal regulations at the local level are rare and when they exist the criteria that have to be fulfilled are formulated in a very general way. Decisions depend therefore even more on the interpretations of municipal politicians or the opinions of the local population.

There exists a wide range of different naturalisation policies, from very generous to very restrictive. In some municipalities, a complete integration of the naturalisation candidates is presumed after twelve years of residence in Switzerland. In other municipalities, applicants have to prove their degree of integration by passing tests or by showing how well they are acquainted with the Swiss citizens of their municipality. However, it would be too simplistic to range the municipalities exclusively along such a scale, since naturalisation procedures also differ with regard to the issues that mould the respective debates. In some cases, the question of whether applicants can be naturalised who are benefiting from social security or disability insurance is at the centre of debates. In still other municipalities, language ability constitutes the crucial element of the contest. Switzerland has four national languages: German (spoken by 64 per cent of all Swiss), French (19 per cent), Italian (8 per cent) and Rumantsch Grischun (0.6 per cent). The language used by all Swiss Germans in their daily (and also professional) life is Swiss German, a strong dialect very different from the High German that is spoken in Germany and used in written German.
All Swiss-Germans, however, also speak High German. This particularity adds to the complexity of naturalisation, since in some municipalities it is a controversial issue whether candidates have to speak Swiss German or High German.

In the last few years, after discriminatory decisions were made, the Swiss system of naturalisation has aroused a great many political and judicial debates, especially when candidates from the former Yugoslavia have been refused Swiss citizenship in municipalities where the population has decided on applications by closed ballot. Opponents of this system criticise the arbitrariness of the municipal decision-making processes because they expose the candidates to the attitudes of the local population and politicians. They demand that procedures be standardised and decisions be made exclusively by the local administration or by the executive body and no longer by the population. In July 2003, the Swiss Federal Court rendered a verdict according to which popular votes by ballot on naturalisation requests violate the Swiss Constitution. In May 2004, it further declared that decisions during municipal assemblies have to be made by open ballot. Since the Swiss Federal Court regards naturalisations as purely administrative procedures, it has declared that justifications for the decisions, and possibilities for appeals against such decisions on this subject, must be made available. These two rights, according to the Swiss Federal Court, are not guaranteed by the system of votes by ballot.

Advocates of the existing system object that these verdicts violate the autonomy of the municipalities and the democratic rights of the Swiss citizens. They claim that the population of each municipality should have the right to decide according to which procedures and criteria foreigners are naturalised. Since the verdicts of the Federal Court, municipalities where the population had decided naturalisation status by closed ballot have abolished or suspended this procedure. It is, however, unclear whether popular votes remain prohibited or whether they will be reintroduced in the near future. In the canton of Schwyz, a popular referendum has been accepted in 2005 according to which the system of popular votes can be reintroduced. At the national level, popular and parliamentary initiatives demand that each municipality can decide according to which procedure alien citizens are naturalised.

A more general debate is also being carried on about whether it is too difficult and arduous to get a Swiss passport and about whether naturalisations should be facilitated. Proponents of a more liberal citizenship policy argue that the naturalisation procedures at three levels are too complicated and time-consuming and that requirements for naturalisation exceed those of other countries. Indeed, different studies have come to the conclusion that Switzerland, like Germany, constitutes an example of ethnic citizenship politics and pursues one of the
most restrictive naturalisation policies in Western Europe (Koopmans et al. 2005; Giugni & Passy 2006; Steiner & Wicker 2000). This might partially explain why Switzerland has a very low naturalisation rate. In the last ten years, on average, only 1.9 per cent of the foreign population has obtained the Swiss citizenship. In Germany, a similar percentage of foreigners have been naturalised, while in Italy, Portugal and Spain, the naturalisation rate has been even lower in the same time period. In most other European countries, however, between 3 per cent and 6 per cent of the alien residents have been naturalised. The average naturalisation rate amounts to 7.8 per cent in Sweden and 8.1 per cent in the Netherlands (SOPEMI 2006: 290).

One naturalisation criterion that stands out is the fact that one can apply for Swiss citizenship only after twelve years of residence in this country. Aside from Austria and Italy, where potential candidates have to wait for ten years, most Western European countries require only between three and seven years (Weil 2002: 7). Even in Germany, known for its restrictive citizenship policy, alien residents nowadays can get a German passport after only eight years. Opponents of the existing system make the further criticism that, besides Austria and Luxembourg, Switzerland is the only country in Western Europe where no facilitating dispositions for immigrants of the second generation exist (see Weil 2002: 6). Only some cantons facilitate the acquisition of the Swiss citizenship for young foreigners. Since 1980, three attempts to facilitate the naturalisation of the second and third generations at the national level have been rejected by the Swiss population. The main political actor who mobilises against facilitated naturalisation is the Swiss People’s Party (SVP), one of the major political forces in Switzerland. Members and supporters of this populist right-wing party fear mass-naturalisations, warn of the depreciation of the Swiss citizenship and argue that people who have grown up in this country are not necessarily assimilated enough to become Swiss.

These arguments are in line with the party’s more general demands for a limitation of both naturalisations and immigration. In particular, the growing immigration from the countries of the former Yugoslavia, which started in the 1980s, has time and again provoked violent debates about the capacity to integrate those people into Switzerland. Nowadays, alien residents who have emigrated from the countries of the former Yugoslavia make up over 25 per cent of all foreigners living in Switzerland and outnumber even Italian residents (20 per cent), who constituted the major immigration group in the 1950s and 1960s (BFS 2005: 16-17). This new pattern of emigration also has had an impact on the naturalisation rates: whereas until the first half of the 1990s most candidates for naturalisation came from EU countries, from the second half of the 1990s onwards more and more people
from the Balkans have applied for Swiss citizenship (see Piguet & Wanner 2000: 31). In 2004, for example, almost 40 per cent of all naturalised candidates emigrated from a country of the former Yugoslavia (BFS 2005: 41).

1.2 Why explore local naturalisation politics?

When comparing naturalisations in Switzerland with citizenship regulations in other countries, one quickly realises that a full understanding of the Swiss system can only be gained by taking a look at the local level, where the most important decisions are made. Only by going to the municipalities can we explore which are the relevant criteria for naturalisation and to what extent the practising of citizenship is commensurate with the general picture of a restrictive Swiss naturalisation policy.

While our study seeks to render the quite awkward naturalisation procedures more comprehensible, it also intends to make a more general contribution to current academic discussions. Switzerland and its highly decentralised citizenship politics constitute a unique case, but this does not suggest that inferences from the findings of this case are not possible. On the contrary, it should be considered as a unique research opportunity, allowing us to discuss citizenship and nationalism from new perspectives. Taking a closer look at naturalisation processes is revealing in that it enables us to go beyond formal regulations and citizenship laws and shows us how national citizenship models are interpreted and put into practice. Indeed, naturalisation is the crucial moment when it becomes clear how citizenship of a nation-state works, for it is at this moment that a nation-state decides whether a candidate might become a member of its community. Such a moment can show us a lot about the dominant national self-understanding and about which aspects of citizenship really matter. Going local also allows us to go beyond classic works on citizenship or nationalism, which often adopt macro-sociological and historical approaches. Investigating the application of citizenship laws in the clearly delimited field of Swiss municipalities and talking to local decision makers enables us to explore how ordinary citizens think about citizenship: how do they see the candidates for naturalisation, how do they conceive of their nation and which criteria do they consider as crucial for becoming a member of their community?

Studying naturalisations in Switzerland further permits us to abolish the idea of homogeneous nation-states and to demonstrate that citizenship can take different forms and meanings within a nation-state, not only over time but also over space. Diverging applications of citizen-
ship laws and understandings of nationhood are not found only in Switzerland. In fact, naturalisation politics in many nation-states, as is the case in many policy fields, are decentralised to a certain extent. In federal states such as Switzerland, its constitutive units often implement federal laws. As many studies have shown, such a situation leads to a variety of applications even if the federal state precisely stipulates how the law has to be executed (see Perret et al. 2007; Kissling-Naf & Wälti 1999).5

With regard to the implementation of naturalisation laws, the one case that probably comes closest to the Swiss system is Germany, where the citizenship law is regulated at the national level but executed by the Länder (sub-national states) (see Hagedorn 2001a,b; Ludvig 2004; Dornis 1999, 2001; Bultmann 1999). The Länder are accorded the competence to organise the naturalisation procedure and to decide who fulfils the criteria for being naturalised and who does not. A crucial difference between the two countries is, however, that in Germany an administrative body decides on applications. This does not foreclose the possibility that different standards may be applied: various studies have shown that naturalisation rates and citizenship politics differ significantly between the Länder (Hagedorn 2001a,b; Dornis 1999, 2001). A case in point is the granting of dual citizenship only as an exception. According to the federal law, naturalised Germans have to give up their old nationality. Exceptions can only be made when the former home country does not allow naturalisation of their citizens in another country. Nonetheless, the acceptance of dual citizenship varies a lot between the Länder – in 1995, for example, between 9 per cent and 80 per cent (Hagedorn 2001a: 109-110). This is just one example of how the federal citizenship laws are applied differently. Moreover, various studies have shown that the ethnic citizenship model that completely denies the possibility of identifying oneself with two nation-states is not the pre-conception of every regional decision maker.

The varying applications of federal citizenship laws in Germany are often explained by the political orientation of the regional governments and the attitudes of the authorities that are involved in the decision-making process. Hagedorn (2001a,b), for example, observed changes in naturalisation policies when the political majority of a Land switched from right to left or vice versa. More interestingly, she has shown that the number of naturalised foreigners depends on the attitudes of the representatives of the regional administrations (see also Bultmann 1999: 196-202). Thranhardt (1999) has even revealed that in one Land differences exist at the local level between different naturalisation offices, depending on the resources of the competent authorities and how they control the documents of the applicants. Dornis (2001: 76-85) explored how language tests and the verification of the candidates’
documents varies among the Länder and also discovered that individual officers regularly encourage applicants to withdraw their application if the officers have the impression that they have little chance of being naturalised. Hagedorn (2001a: 40) reports that it sometimes happens that the authorities protract the procedures on purpose when they consider the regulations too generous for certain candidates.

In other countries, divergent practices of citizenship can be observed, too. Cinar and Waldrauch (2006) present diverging implementation policies and integration requirements at the regional level in Austria. North (1985, 1987) examined the administrative structure of the American naturalisation programme and came to the conclusion that the formal procedures and the approaches of the examiners vary a great deal among district offices. There are differences with regard to how language tests are evaluated and how and when people are persuaded to withdraw their dossiers when they seem not to be qualified for naturalisation. He has demonstrated that rejection rates vary between zero and 11.5 per cent (North 1985: 38-39). Differing implementations of the naturalisation laws can even be observed in highly centralised states such as France. Weil (2004: 377-387) observed applications that clearly contradict the idea of a voluntaristic citizenship model with which France is often associated. In some regional offices, candidates are even manifestly dissuaded from applying for French citizenship. While Costa-Lascoux (1996: 149) reports that the assimilation of candidates is tested very differently from one regional office to the other, Hagedorn (2001a: 43-44) found that candidates are often refused for lack of assimilation. Since the degree of assimilation is exclusively judged by regional officers, arbitrary decisions cannot be excluded (see also Fulchiron 1996).

All of these studies partly explain differences in naturalisation politics by the different attitudes of the regional authorities towards the question of who has the right to become a citizen of their country. Variations in the national self-understanding can be observed not only in the context of naturalisations but also, more generally, when we analyse local integration politics and how municipalities manage ethnic diversity (e.g. Ireland 1994). It is often argued that cities have always been more confronted by problems related to migration than nation-states are, and thus constitute more interesting cases to analyse (Rogers & Tillie 2001; Rogers 2000; Penninx et al. 2004b; Favell 2001; Borkert & Caponio 2008). In those studies, it is argued that the local political structures shape the ways migrants are integrated. Although an influence of the national citizenship regime on local politics can sometimes be detected (e.g. Garbaye 2004), various empirical studies have demonstrated that forms of local integration and citizenship policies cannot be explained (at least not exclusively) by their embedment
in a national system. The essays collected in Penninx et al. (2004a) and Borkert and Caponio (2008) demonstrate that in various countries local politics towards immigrants varies a lot and that this heterogeneity is mainly attributable to differences between local political systems and prevailing citizenship paradigms. Ireland (1994), Koopmans (2004) and Bousetta (1997) demonstrate that local integration regimes and citizenship frameworks have an impact on the way, and on the degree to which, immigrants participate in political debates. Garbaye (2000) has explored how two cities in France and Great Britain manage ethnic diversity and identifies three elements that explain the different approaches: the relations between central and local governments, the organisation of political party systems and the organisation of local government. It is particularly interesting to observe that even in a country such as France, cities make differential use of their existing discretionary power to integrate foreigners (Moore 2001, 2004).

Revealing heterogeneous implementations of naturalisation laws and the variation of citizenship paradigms at the local level in other countries makes the case of Switzerland appear much less exceptional. Our project can therefore be incorporated into a wider study field of local citizenship and integration politics. In contrast to other studies that have concentrated their focus on large cities, mainly due to the fact that these political units are confronted with a relatively high percentage of immigrants or alien residents (see Alexander 2004: 60), our study explores relatively small local units. This is mainly due to the fact that the average number of inhabitants in a Swiss city is much lower than that in a city in the other countries. On average, a Swiss municipality has 2,100 inhabitants. Fifty per cent of the roughly 2,800 municipalities in Switzerland have fewer than 1,000 inhabitants and there are only five towns with more than 100,000 inhabitants. Despite their small size, Swiss municipalities constitute pertinent cases for the study of naturalisation processes, as they have a relatively high ratio of foreign residents. In this regard, too, Switzerland constitutes an exceptional case. Whereas in most European countries between 2 per cent and 9 per cent of the population are non-citizen residents, Switzerland counts a foreign population of almost 20 per cent. Such a high percentage of foreigners can also be observed in relatively small towns and villages.

Small municipalities not only have a high percentage of foreigners and thus have to deal like bigger towns with a lot of naturalisation requests, they also display a very distinct political system, making the study of local politics highly relevant. The distribution of competences with regard to naturalisations, for instance, reflects Swiss federalism, which attributes sovereignty to both the cantons and the municipalities (Kriesi 1998a: 50-89). The degree of local autonomy varies from canton
to canton, but is everywhere very high compared to other countries. Municipalities not only implement federal and cantonal laws, they also autonomously organise themselves, raise their own taxes and administer the municipal assets. Swiss municipalities enjoy a great many responsibilities and even enact laws in the following domains: primary education, culture, sports, environmental protection, poor relief, police, construction of roads, church and naturalisation (Ladner 1991: 40; Kriesi 1998a: 68). Each municipality has its own administration and executive body (local government), which is composed of elected local politicians and is, aside from the sovereign, the most powerful local political body. The mayor, as one member of the local government, has a particularly powerful position, as he or she is directly elected for this office. The mayor presides over the executive body and, in some cantons, holds specific responsibilities in certain policy areas (Geser 2002: 448-449). In small municipalities, the legislative body consists of all local Swiss citizens, while in larger municipalities, local parliaments are elected. Unsurprisingly, in a country with such a distinct system of direct democracy, decisions that are not made by the local parliament or during a local assembly are made by ballot by the local population. At the local level, commissions are also important political bodies, which are composed of local politicians or local citizens that are appointed in various policy domains to assume the functions of supervision and consultation. Naturalisation commissions, for example, discuss applications for Swiss citizenship and make recommendations to the political body that makes the final decisions.

Given the distinct political structures at the local level it is hardly astonishing that municipalities can also be distinguished by their party systems. Most municipalities have their own sections of cantonal and national parties. Parties or political associations also exist that are not politically integrated beyond the local boundaries. However, the four major political parties in Switzerland are also the most important political forces at the local level. Of all local sections, over 80 per cent belong to the Liberal Party (FDP), the Social Democrats (SP), the Christian Democrats (CVP) and the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) (Ladner 1991: 133). Of course, local sections are not as well organised as the cantonal or national parties. Particularly in small municipalities, however, their influence is rather strong, as they often are the only politically active, collective actors, and they also assume important social functions. Even very small local unities with fewer than 2,000 inhabitants have more than one political party (Geser 2002: 438). Given Switzerland’s distinct federalism, cantonal and municipal sections of a party are for the most part independently organised and sometimes differ in their political orientation (Ladner 1991: 120-121). As a consequence, local sections might pursue a citizenship policy that is not in
complete accordance with the positions of their national party or with those of other local sections.

1.3 Culture and power: how to explain local naturalisation politics

Given the large autonomy of municipalities, the distinct local political system and the relatively high ratio of foreigners, we can conclude that naturalisation politics can become a central political issue even in small municipalities. We have seen that naturalisations constitute a very timely topic in Switzerland and a unique research opportunity for studying the practice of citizenship, the way ordinary citizens conceive of citizenship and the variation of citizenship politics within a nation-state. Hence, it is all the more astonishing that this topic has been so inadequately studied. The political debates on legal norms have been accompanied by judicial studies treating the question of the constitutionality of local naturalisation procedures (Auer & Arx 2000; Thürrer & Frei 2004). At the same time, ethnographic studies have gone beyond the legal aspects of citizenship and demonstrated, among other things, the complexity of local citizenship politics by means of single case studies (Arend 1991; Centlivres 1990; Centlivres et al. 1991; Steiner & Wicker 2000, 2004; Achermann & Gass 2003). Especially the works collected in Steiner and Wicker (2004) and the case study of the town of Basel in Achermann and Gass (2003) deliver helpful insights into the various aspects and moments of municipal naturalisations. However, these studies do not provide, or only poorly develop, theoretical frameworks for a comparison of local procedures; they treat the question of why some municipalities pursue a more restrictive policy than others only at the margins, if at all. So far, Piguet and Wanner (2000: 66-74) and Bolliger (2003) provide the only, even if explorative, investigations that attempt to explain policy outcomes in citizenship politics.

Our study seeks to explore local naturalisation politics more systematically and takes the question of causality more seriously, in an effort to explain why in some municipalities more candidates for naturalisation are rejected than in others. We have seen that studies exploring divergent regional and local immigration, integration and naturalisation politics explain differences in policy outcomes with differing conceptions of citizenship. In a similar vein, we hold the conviction that the way alien residents are naturalised depends on the prevailing national self-understanding, which is, in turn, the outcome of political struggles. According to this view, it is ideologies and ideas about citizenship and nationality that shape how issues related to immigrants are resolved. Bru-
baker’s (1992) comparison of citizenship politics in Germany and France is probably the most prominent study adopting this approach. According to him, differences in citizenship politics and immigrants’ attitudes towards naturalisation are due to the fact that France represents a republican, expansive and assimilationist model of citizenship, while Germany defines citizenry as a community of descent that is very restrictive towards non-German immigrants. Similarly, Favell (1998) explains the divergent responses to ethnic and racial groups in France and Britain in terms of each nation’s public philosophy and political tradition. According to him, it is France’s republican tradition that favours a policy of integration rather than accommodation and consequently opposes separate Islamic institutions because this arrangement would violate the state’s ideological commitment to integrating individual outsiders into the French political culture. On the other hand, in Britain, more emphasis is placed on allowing separate groups to retain their distinctive identities. As a consequence, Islamic groups and the development of independent Muslim communities are recognised through public policy. Other scholars take the argument a step further and contend that institutionalised conceptions of citizenship even shape the collective action of immigrant groups trying to change public policy (Ireland 1994; Koopmans et al. 2005; Giugni & Passy 2006).

To distinguish different forms of national consciousness, the distinction most commonly made regarding nations is between ‘civic-territorial’ and ‘ethnic’ types of nationalism and citizenship, which are conceived, respectively, as free associations of human beings and as fixed and indelible organisms. While most researchers in this field nowadays agree that these two types constitute ideal types, we will further argue that they pose analytical problems, since they are normatively loaded and seem to be mutually exclusive, whereas every nationalism is shaped by both principles. Moreover, taking those categories too seriously risks the danger of a culturalist approach, which implies homogeneous and static citizenship politics. While ideological accounts have a high impact on how foreigners are naturalised, we must not forget that conceptions of citizenship take different forms within a nation-state and change over time. To account for these aspects we have to bring to mind the contentious and political nature of citizenship: the outcome of a specific naturalisation policy is the result of ongoing political struggles over the questions of who we are and who belongs to us. To understand those struggles, we first have to clarify what they are about. As we will demonstrate in Chapter 2, naturalisation is about the symbolic and emotional aspects of full membership in a nation-state. During the entire history of humankind, people have organised themselves in cultural groups and excluded those who were not considered to belong to them. In this age of nationalism, in which societies are orga-
nised in nation-states, this exclusion happens by means of national citizenship. National citizenship is tightly linked to the ideas of popular sovereignty, equality and self-determination. During naturalisation procedures, governmental actors struggle over the question of who belongs to the sovereign body, who profits from equal rights, who is allowed to participate in the democratic processes and, simply, who belongs to ’them’. This makes national citizenship a salient and contentious closure mechanism.

Chapter 3 elaborates on these ideas and provides instruments to analytically grasp struggles among municipal politicians in the context of local citizenship politics. Inspired by Berger and Luckmann’s (1967) social constructivism and Bourdieu’s (1977, 1990) idea of the ‘logic of practice’, we will propose an empirical research programme concentrating on interaction processes and accounting for both the individual perceptions and the larger social environment partially shaping the actors’ understandings of citizenship. We thereby follow Brubaker’s (2004) plea for a more thorough constructivist approach in the study of ethnicity and nationalism, seeking to circumvent both clichéd constructivism and hidden essentialism. While we are highly inspired by his cognitive approach, which proposes nationalist ways of thinking as forms of classification, we will try at the same time to avoid the pitfalls of methodological idealism. To understand nationalism and citizenship politics, we not only have to demonstrate how people think about these social phenomena, but also how a dominant view emerges within a group and how these processes depend on material aspects and are influenced by power structures. Such a theoretical extension is necessary, since constructions of a nation do not happen in a cultural vacuum and national traditions cannot be invented ad libitum. It is Bourdieu’s analytical tools of ‘habitus’, ‘capital’ and ‘field’ that will help us understand how individuals are both actors and agents producing and reproducing the social world in a socially and culturally constituted space. Our analytical framework will allow us to account for both structure and agency and how actors interact in a social environment.

To investigate struggles over the question of who belongs to a nation, Switzerland provides a unique ‘laboratory’, because in it the functioning of the contentious closure mechanism of national citizenship can be observed in clearly distinguishable local fields. How we go about analysing local citizenship politics in Swiss municipalities will be laid out in the last part of Chapter 3. It will become clear that given our theoretical framework and the complexity of local naturalisation politics, we have to approach the object of our study from various perspectives, at different analytical levels and by analysis of both quantitative and qualitative data. In a first step, Chapter 4 will analyse data from a large-N survey to get a more general view of what determines the out-
come of naturalisation politics, while Chapter 5 then compares prevailing understandings of citizenship and local power structures in fourteen municipalities, Chapter 6 will illustrate our arguments and discuss in detail four case studies. Finally, in Chapter 7 we will focus our attention on individual politicians and show to what extent their individual understandings of citizenship are shaped by local citizenship politics. We thereby investigate and apply Bourdieu’s logic of practice and his concepts of ‘habitus’, ‘capital’ and ‘field’ in two steps: first, by showing how political struggles among municipal politicians in local power fields influence the outcome of citizenship politics (Chapters 5 and 6) and, second, by demonstrating that the ‘habitus’ of the involved political actors is partly shaped by these ongoing struggles (Chapter 7).
2 From Citizenship to National Self-Understanding

2.1 What is citizenship?

To tackle this question let us directly start with Charles Tilly's definition addressing various important aspects of citizenship that will be specified in the course of this and the next chapter. Tilly (1999: 252-253) defines citizenship as referring to a relation between governmental agents and whole categories of persons identified uniquely by their connection with the government in question. The relation between government and its subject population can be considered as a contract involving transactions that cluster around mutual rights and obligations and drawing visible lines between insiders and outsiders. According to Tilly, such a contract is never completely specified. Rather, it might vary in range, depend on unstated assumptions about context, be modified by practice and be constrained by collective memory.

What immediately strikes us is that Tilly's view goes beyond many other definitions that address solely or mainly the legal and formal status of individuals (Brinkmann 1986) or the rights and obligations as related to such a status (Andrews 1991; Turner 1997). Moreover, it becomes clear that Tilly proposes a definition about what citizenship is and not about what it should be. By doing so, Tilly avoids the certainly interesting but, for an empirical research scarcely useful, normative arguments of who should be granted citizenship rights. Rather, it opens the way for an empirical investigation of how governmental agents decide which categories of people can be considered as part of the nation.

What further stands out in Tilly's definition is the contractual nature of citizenship, underscoring thereby that citizenship is not just about a mere aggregate of persons who happen to belong legally to a state. Nation-states are not simply territorial organisations but rather membership organisations or associations of citizenship in which all citizens are equal and have the same rights through their direct relations with the state (see Brubaker 1992: 22). Indeed, most citizens of a state are also residents of the state's territory. However, their relation to the state involves more than their passing or extended residence alone. Otherwise, one would automatically lose his or her citizenship by leaving the territory of the state. As will become clearer in the course of this chapter, in
the age of nationalism, citizenship is about the *symbolic* and *emotional* aspects of full membership, and it is about the questions of who belongs to the sovereign body, of who benefits from equal political rights and, simply, of who belongs to ‘us’. Conversely, the overlapping of different forms of peoplehood (mainly the sovereign body and the nation) makes national citizenship a particularly salient *closure mechanism*, excluding all those who do not belong to ‘us’.

Speaking of ‘full membership’ means that we are mainly interested in citizenship in a narrow sense: we will investigate the processes of becoming a full member of a nation-state and the procedures of the acquisition of individual citizenship rights. We will not discuss the procedures of entering the territory of a nation-state or collective rights and duties of migrants and permanent alien residents. To understand naturalisation processes, and mainly its variation in range, we will have to account less for formal rules but rather for governmental actors, how they practise citizenship politics and how such policies are influenced, respectively, by unstated assumptions about context and collective memory (as Tilly argues), or by national self-understandings (as we will put it). Ultimately, it is by looking at how a nation sees itself that helps us understand who is admitted. Ethnic and civic-territorial understandings of nationhood are two classic categories of classifying citizenship politics. While many authors have already pointed to the analytical ambiguities of these two concepts, hardly anybody has proposed alternatives to classify citizenship politics. We will plead for an approach that allows us to go beyond this dichotomy. Leading up to the next chapter, we will argue finally that such a new approach is demanded to account for the struggles between governmental actors that result in specific degrees of social closure and openness.

### 2.2 Becoming a new member: from local to national citizenship

Naturalisation is the very moment when an alien resident becomes a full member and when both parties – the government and the new citizens – sign a contract and agree to respect the others’ rights and declare to follow their obligations. Naturalisation is the transition from one citizenship status to another or the acquisition of a second one if dual citizenship is permitted. It has to be distinguished from ascription of citizenship by birth. Virtually everyone becomes citizen of a country at birth, either of the country of his or her parents or of the country where one is born. The admission procedure to a new citizenship status involves two crucial steps: first, an alien citizen has to decide for him-or-herself whether he or she wants to apply for a new citizenship and, second, the respective government has then to make a decision
whether it wants to accept him or her. The government is in the stronger position since it has the power of the last word. This is why we shall concentrate our empirical analysis on governmental actors. Authorities are free to decline an application after a candidate has made a first move showing his or her willingness to become citizen of that state – and even if the applicant fulfils all conditions (Bauböck 1994: 72). This makes decisions about naturalisation discretionary rather than strictly consensual. The acquisition of citizenship is not really optional, either. Foreign citizens of a country, it is true, have the choice of whether they want to apply for citizenship and are seldom forced to acquire a new nationality; however, individual candidates do not have the power to influence the naturalisation procedures, nor can they really choose between different nation-states. If migrants have any choice at all, it is in their decisions to migrate to a specific country based on considerations about territorial access or economic opportunities. They might emigrate to a third country if they do not encounter the positive economic or social conditions they expected to find in this first country to which they emigrated, but it is hardly imaginable that considerations about opportunities to become a full citizen will motivate such decisions.

Referring to citizenship politics, Bauböck (1994) proposes to imagine a world of voluntary associations with completely open boundaries of membership. These associations would take binding decisions for their present members and be open for all individuals who wished to join them. As individuals have different needs and preferences, not everybody would like to join all associations. On the other hand, nation-states would adapt their criteria for adhesion to attract more, or specific, naturalisation candidates. According to Bauböck, such a model, reminiscent of the liberal market regulated by offer and demand, would face the problems of collective action. Associations producing a lot of benefits for their members would be desired by non-members and overwhelmed by free riders; even more so, if a general right of exit would make it impossible to distribute burdens or duties necessary for the production of some collective benefit. In order to avoid such a self-destroying model and to deter any free riders, specific criteria have to be established that have to be fulfilled before one can be accepted.

The free rider problem and how it is solved by access regulations might be illustrated with the example of citizenship in medieval towns and their practice of poor relief. In his discussion of the evolution of citizenship in Germany and France, Brubaker (1992: 64-72) gives the example of German imperial legislation that in 1530 required every town and commune to nourish and lodge its poor. There was no doubt that each town was responsible for its municipal citizens. But did other inhabitants also belong to ‘its’ poor? In order to avoid a situation in
which too many migrant poor would populate a territory, each town had to define who ‘its’ poor citizens were and, obviously, had an incentive to define membership as restrictively as possible. While it had sufficed for a long time to live in a town to be considered as a member, from that time forward towns increasingly made membership contingent on formally approved domicile. The municipal closure against migrant poor was problematic insofar as an expulsion or a too restrictive definition of citizenship would displease other towns that would have to house these people. States began therefore to interfere in communal citizenship. Not only were membership policies more and more coordinated on the state level, but practices of poor relief also became the responsibility of states. This development lifted the problem of citizenship definition and exclusion of the poor from the municipal to the state level. As the towns had done before, the state now had to define who ‘its’ poor were. Also, as in the inter-communal disputes, states could no longer simply expel their poor without imposing costs on neighbouring states. Numerous treaties between states at the beginning of the 19th century articulated the principle that states could only expel into the territory of another state a member of that second state. Prak (1999: 22) illustrates similar social exclusion mechanisms in his discussion on the municipal citizenship in the Dutch town of Bois-le-Duc. Since there was no way to stop the influx of lower-class immigrants, in 1772, the local authorities stipulated that one could only be treated in the hospital – which was mainly an institution for the poor – after ten years of residence in town. To be eligible for municipal poor relief, one had to wait for fifteen years. While long-term residents profited from those social services, becoming a full citizen of Bois-le-Duc included significant additional advantages. Unlike ordinary inhabitants, native or purchased citizens could be admitted to the guilds and elected to the city’s more important offices. A further advantage was that they could be tried only by local courts. Such judicial differences between citizens and other inhabitants also came along with social inequalities. As Prak (1999: 21) notes, the distribution of wealth between natives and immigrants were quite equal. However, if one compares the naturalised immigrants with the mere inhabitants, it appears that the former were much better off than the latter. Whereas the citizens were over-represented among the upper middle class and the elite, the lower middle class and the poor were overrepresented by the inhabitants. Clearly, the attribution of citizenship seemed to be in favour of the wealthy. The various citizenship regulations not only prevented the municipal resources from being exhausted, but the political and economic exclusion mechanisms also aimed to protect the local citizens and deter possible free riders. Citizenship was an instrument of social
closure whose application reflected the material interests of the local citizens.

Like Germany, the Dutch Republic witnessed a transfer of citizenship regulations from the local to the national level at the end of the 18th century. However, this transfer was not only a shift of competence, but it also brought forth a new meaning of citizenship. Prak (1999) explicates that new ideas about citizenship began to emerge among radical opponents of the regime during the 1770s and 1780s. They developed a model of political participation by all the people against a hierarchical model of clientelism. Against a vertical conception of citizenship that was of a corporate nature and confined to certain localities, they put forward the idea of a horizontal, general and national conception of citizenship. This modern understanding of citizenship was inspired by thinkers of the Age of Enlightenment and reached a high point in the French Revolution. Citizenship was central to the theory and practice for the time after 1789 because the French Revolution sought the establishment of equality before the law and a general membership status for all permanent residents. These ideas began to dominate the debate in the Dutch Republic after the invasion of the French revolutionary armies. Citizenship status was no longer restricted to the urban elites but was thrown open to rural folk. More generally, citizenship became strongly politicised whereas before it had just been an economic and social institution. This might be illustrated by Prak’s (1999: 22-23) discussion on the treatment of Jews. Before the transfer of citizenship regulations, shopkeepers in Bois-le-Duc claimed that their business were undercut and disadvantaged by the illegal practices of Jews who came and went without paying any taxes. In 1777, the guild’s directors successfully requested that the admission of Jews be terminated. Whereas Bois-le-Duc considered Jews explicitly as outsiders, in the new conception of the national citizenship there was no reference to Jews. In 1796, the National Assembly decided that Jews could become equal citizens of the Batavian Republic, arguing that citizenship was an individual quality and that provincial and local bylaws concerning Jews must not interfere with national policy.

2.3 Two modes of social closure: immigration policy and national citizenship

The new form of citizenship that emerged all over Europe from the second half of the 18th century onward has not been a full break with the local citizenship models, in that it still functioned as an exclusion mechanism for poor and inferior social people from outside the nation-state’s territory. Like the towns before them, nation-states had to
decide who belonged to them and who could benefit from their institutions. However, the exclusion of economically undesirable people occurred more and more at the territorial boundaries of a nation-state. From this policy, though, it should not be deduced that access to the territory, on the other hand, equated with the acquisition of full membership. Rather, a system with two modes of social closure – once at the territorial border and once inside the territorial borders – has emerged. According to Mackert (2004: 258) and Brubaker (1992: ch.1) these internal and external exclusions have different meanings and reflect the dual nature of nation-states. When we dissect the nation-state we have got, on the one hand, the state that is – following Weber’s (1946: 78) definition – a territorial organisation, which exercises legitimate control over its own territory undisturbed by internal power competition or external intervention. On the other hand, we have got the nation that is a community of sentiment tending to produce a state of its own (Weber 1946: 176). When a state and a nation coincide territorially and demographically we then can speak of a nation-state.

The regulation of immigration into a territorial community has a decisive bearing on the life chances for migrants, since the access to a state includes such basic goods as security, public order and a promising labour market. The regulation of immigration is crucial not only insofar as it concerns the labour market, but also welfare state politics and nation-states have various material interests in facilitating and restricting immigration. This differentiates nation-states from medieval polities where rules were exercised over particular sets of persons and not over territories; mere presence did not include political, administrative, or legal inclusion. In modern times, jurisdiction has depended more and more on the spatial coordinates of the action and less on the personal status of the agent. Therefore, the territorial state has every interest in controlling the flow of persons across its boundaries. The refusal to let in migrants or to expel them is not unproblematic, since immigration policy of a particular state also concerns other, mainly neighbouring states. The various bilateral and multilateral treaties on immigration underscore to what extent different states have an interest in the degree of openness of a particular state’s borders. The European Union is probably the most illustrative example of a common immigration policy between various nation-states that have lost some sovereignty in this field.

While external closure serves vital and tangible nation-state interests, closure inside of a nation-state’s territory – what we henceforth call national citizenship – cannot be attributed to material interests. When one takes into consideration that nowadays in Western European nation-states permanent alien residents – ‘denizens’ as they often are called – have almost the same social rights as ordinary citizens, it becomes
clear that the attribution of citizenship must be influenced by other factors. Denizens, ordinarily, are allowed to remain indefinitely in a country and to participate in social and economic life on the same terms as ordinary citizens. It is political participation in particular that is not possible for alien residents. This does not mean that in individual cases pragmatic interests might not motivate an alien citizen to apply for citizenship. Having a Swiss passport, for example, might facilitate travelling and increase one’s chances on the job market. From the perspective of the nation-state, however, there are no differences in terms of material interests whether its permanent alien residents are naturalised or not.

Citizenship therefore cannot be considered in a purely functional context, that is, its contribution to the opportunities of immigrants or the exclusionary capacity of a state. Rather, it has to be analysed in a political-cultural context. Since hardly any material interests are at risk, symbolic stakes can be considered as crucial when it comes to naturalisation: future citizens are not selected (primarily) on their economic or kinship status but on the basis of cultural categories that are considered as a crucial part of the nation. Before we discuss in more detail the criteria that have to be fulfilled to become a new citizen, let us now explore to what extent this new closure mechanism relies on a different understanding of community than its local predecessor.

2.4 A new form of political community: popular sovereignty, equality and self-determination

National citizenship is very closely related to the age of nationalism. To understand the role and meaning of national citizenship, we therefore have to make clear what we understand by nationalism. There are almost as many definitions of it as scholars in this field (for an overview see Jafferlot 1997; Smith 1998; Spencer & Wollman 2002). Most researchers are preoccupied with uncovering its origins and explaining its emergence. Some see it as a result of enduring ethnic identities (Geertz 1963; Smith 1986; Hutcheson 1994, Armstrong 1982) whereas others link it to the needs of generating a ‘high culture’ for modernisation and industrial development (Gellner 1983). Still others argue that nationalism derives from the rational workings of the world economy or consider it as separatists’ responses to unequal economic development (Hechter 1975; Nairn 1977). Tilly (1975, 1990), Mann (1993, 1995), Giddens (1985) and Breuilly (1993) explore the relationship between nationalism and sources of power such as war, elites and modern states. Greenfeld (1992) puts forward the argument of the status anxiety and ressentiment of new elites claiming distinction from older
elites by legitimating themselves as representatives of the new nations, and Hobsbawm (1990) explains it as a result of the invention of an ideology to legitimate states within capitalist economic relations. A last group of scholars includes Kedourie (1960) and Juergensmeyer (1993), who consider nationalism as a belief system and a form of religious surrogate or secular religion.

All of these approaches contribute in one way or the other to a better understanding of the creation of nationalist movements and the emergence of nation-states, but none of them explains them entirely. They help us understand the various dimensions and contents of those social phenomena but they do not explain the form itself that would enable us to better understand the role of national citizenship (see Calhoun 1997: ch.1). While ‘form’ stands for the undifferentiated primal element of nationalism, contents or dimensions are the particular shapes that are assumed. Under ‘dimensions’ of nationalism we might categorise such diverse phenomena as inter-state wars, separatist movements, singing national anthems at soccer games, or the hissing at national flags on national holidays. The ‘content’ of nationalism consists of the meanings that are associated with the different dimensions. Crucial in the course of the next chapters will be the ‘content’ of the closure mechanism of citizenship (another dimension of nationalism), for example, the question of whether a rather restrictive or a rather generous understanding of citizenship prevails in Swiss municipalities.

While questions of content and dimension will preoccupy us extensively below, they are inadequate for grasping the more general character of nationalism, namely that it is a modern version of ethnicity. Following Jenkins (1997), we define ethnicity as a first-order dimension of human experience and a principle of groups living together: it is a form of cultural understanding, social organisation and political contestation. This definition draws heavily on Weber’s (1978: 385-398) and Barth’s (1969) understanding of ethnicity as social organisation of cultural difference and group claims based on the belief in shared culture and common ancestry.

Throughout history, human beings have organised themselves in groups with cultural or symbolic meanings. By underscoring this basic principle of nationalism, we do not speak out on the stability and fluidity of groups or the mechanism producing them, nor do we claim that there is a specific content for a cultural group in general or a nation in particular. Our argument is simply that human beings have always been culturally organised – mostly in ethnic groups and nations. There are similarities between these two versions of ethnicity: the search for historic origins and the socio-cultural organisation to mobilise part of the masses have been part of both versions of ethnicity (Smith 1984, 1986: ch.6). However, the differences between them are crucial: na-
tions are distinguished by action oriented towards political autonomy, and this aspect makes nationalism entirely modern. Emphasising the political and modern character of nations also enables us to separate them from other categories of collective identification such as class for example.

‘Modern’ does not imply that drawing on older communities or traditions is irrelevant for nations. A reproduction of traditions and mobilisation of a (suitable) cultural and heroic past and a certain way of resorting to an ethnic community to legitimate their existence can be observed in every nation-state. Nor does ‘modern’ mean that nationalism is necessarily and exclusively the outcome of other modern developments such as industrialisation (Gellner 1983), print-capitalism (Anderson 1991[1983]), or new communicative facilities (Deutsch 1966). Rather, following Wimmer (2002) and Calhoun (1997, see also 1993), it can be argued (1) that nationalist principles structure modernity, i.e. the idea of nation and claims to national identity are the basis for modern politics and culture and (2) that nationalism is the result of the overlapping and fusion of other modern notions of peoplehood. The first argument draws on Gellner’s (1983: 1) seminal definition of nationalism, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent.12 This does not simply mean that nations tend to produce states of their own and that modern societies are organised within nation-states. Following Wimmer (2002: 4-5), it rather can be argued that nationalism is modern because it ties institutions of inclusion such as citizenship, democracy and welfare to national forms of exclusion. Calhoun (1997) adopts an even broader understanding of nationalism as a modern phenomenon and argues that ‘national’ ways of thinking or the ‘discourse’ of nationalism structure not only political life but also everyday experiences (see also Billig 1995). The emergence of national citizenship and its exclusion mechanism is indeed a corollary of state formation. However, its deeper functioning, and this is our second argument, can fully be understood only when we see nationalism in combination with other notions of peoplehood: the people as a sovereign entity, the people as citizens of a state holding equal rights, and the people as a community held together by common political destiny and shared cultural features (Calhoun 1997; Wimmer 2002). In other terms, nationalism as a modern version of ethnicity is tightly linked to the ideas of popular sovereignty, equality and self-determination this – and this makes national citizenship a highly salient closure mechanism.

By defining nationalism as a modern form of ethnicity, we make no particular claims about the period of its emergence, although it can certainly be agreed that most nationalisms did fully develop only in the wake of the French Revolution.13 For some scholars, nationalism made
its appearance earlier. Seton-Watson (1977) and Johnson (1993), for example, demonstrate that national feelings had already emerged in England and France in the 17th century. For Greenfeld (1992), the British rebellion against monarchy in the 17th century constitutes the beginning of nationalism. Anderson (1991 [1983]) situates its origins a century later in the struggles of creole pioneers against Iberian colonialism. Hastings (1997) even argues that such phenomena and the term ‘nation’ (as it is used in the modern sense) could be discerned at least from the 11th century onwards.

Tracing the development of the meaning of the notion of nation provides a first opportunity to apprehend the modernity of nationalism. The term ‘nation’ has existed for a long time but has had various meanings and has referred to different groups of people (Greenfeld 1992: 4-9; Habermas 1991: 8-9). The initial use was derogatory and reserved for groups of foreigners in Rome coming from the same geographical region. The idea of common geographical origins was also part of a later use of the word ‘nation’: communities of students coming to several universities from the same region. In a further change, this concept partially lost its geographical connotation and began to stand for a political, cultural and social elite, namely, the representatives of secular and religious potentates at the Church Council. In England in the early 16th century, the word ‘nation’ and its counciliar meaning of an ‘elite’ was applied to the people of the country and subsequently made synonymous with the word, ‘people’. As Greenfeld (2002: 6) points out, prior to its nationalisation, the term ‘people’ referred to the lower classes of a region. The elevation of the people to a nation made it the bearer of sovereignty and the basis of political solidarity. The people – formerly stratified along status – were now perceived as essentially homogeneous. In other words, the emergence of nation-states was closely coupled with the emerging idea that the legitimacy of the state ‘ascended’ no longer from God but from the people. Since the label ‘nation’ was attached to a specific people of a certain territory, the concept of nation referred not only to the sovereignty of a people but also to its uniqueness. The differentiation between these two meanings is quite crucial, for a ‘nation’ can be considered as both a general organising principle and a specific form of cultural community. Indeed, ‘nations’ are always associated with existing populations or countries. This does not mean, however, that certain elements determine what a nation is. It is rather the organising principle, which makes these elements into a unity and gives them a certain meaning. Similarly, nationalism involves more than the construction of a particular national identity. It includes the general principle that the people organise their own cultural community.
At first sight, this Janus-faced meaning of nationalism (or nation) – universalism and particularism – might appear paradoxical but, in fact, it allows us to fully grasp its modern character: while nationalism goes hand in hand with the universalistic doctrines of sovereignty, equality and democracy, these principles apply only to the people who belong to a particular nation. In other words, only those persons who are part of the nation belong to the sovereign body, profit from equal rights and are allowed to participate in the democratic processes. According to Anderson’s (1991 [1983]: 6) seminal definition, a nation is a community imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. Anderson (1991 [1983]: 7) explains the relation between sovereignty and nationalism by the fact that both concepts were born in the age of Enlightenment: nationalism grew partly out of popular challenges to the authority and legitimacy of the elite of modern states. From another perspective, one observes that the extension of the power of states through a standing army, bureaucracy and the collection of taxes was only conceivable if politics was legitimatised by the population. To call up a popular army and collect taxes is only possible if the people consider themselves as a part of the nation and if they also consider themselves as the sovereign body. Nationalism plays a crucial role in the modern discourse of political legitimacy, for that state is legitimate which fits with and serves the interest of the people: ‘To “fit with” the people meant both that the boundaries of the state matched those of the nation – an important aspect of the movement towards compact and contiguous territories – and that the purposes of the state matched the interests of its citizens – conceived not only as individuals but also as a singular nation or confederation of such nations’ (Calhoun 1997: 69-70; see also Schöneberg 1987: 49). To conceive of the citizens as a singular nation is commensurate with Anderson’s (1991 [1983]: 7) idea that a nation has to be imagined as ‘limited’. For even the largest nation has finite, if elastic, boundaries and would never imagine itself coterminous with mankind. The idea that each nation constitutes a particularly imagined community has to be seen in the light of liberalism and the idea of individualism, which were entwined with nationalism at least from the time of either the English or French Revolutions up until 1848 (Spencer & Wollmann 2002: 6-8). A lot of liberals made a connection between individual and national freedom and saw nations as ‘individuals’ with particular talents that had the right to unfold themselves in freedom. Nations were seen both as communities of individuals and as themselves being individuals – ‘both in the literal sense of being indivisible, and metaphorically as singular beings that move through history as ordinary people move through their biographical life courses’ (Calhoun 1997: 44). As for individual persons, it was suggested that a healthy development of nations was only possible in freedom, that is, when na-
tional communities are conceded self-determination and sovereignty. According to Spencer and Wollman (2002: 6), the foundations of the rapprochement of liberalism and nationalism were laid by Kant, who insisted on the idea of individual autonomy and will and thus opened the way for others to think about nations along the same lines. Calhoun (1997: 45) sees the links between individualism and nationalism most clearly in the works of Gottlieb Fichte and his notion of self-recognition. For Fichte, nations are individuals with particular talents. To succeed and become an extraordinary community, nations had to achieve a distinctive character in a process of individuation. Even if some later nationalisms were connected more with collectivistic and authoritarian ideologies, rather than with the concepts of individual liberty and rational cosmopolitanism, the idea of constituting a self-determined nation remained (Kohn 1967; Greenfeld 1992).

The ideology of individualism forged not only the conception of the nation but also the relationship between nations and between each nation's constituent parts. Individuals are directly members of their nations, this relationship not being mediated through other social structures. Nationality is understood as an attribute of the individual, and because this attribute is the same for everyone, nationality makes all individuals potentially equal and consequently seems to erase structural inequalities. The new nation-states integrated all major exclusionary modes previously organised on different social levels and fostered internal integration and homogenisation. Thus, the emerging national citizenship was no longer confined to the members of certain families or persons of high social status but extended to the lower classes (Bendix & Rokkan 1971; Bendix 1977). Nairn (1977: 41) formulates this idea as follows: 'The arrival of nationalism in a distinctively modern sense was tied to the political baptism of the lower classes [...] Although sometimes hostile to democracy, nationalist movements have been invariably populist in outlook and sought to induct lower classes into political life.' Demands for equality did not result uniquely from an economic dissatisfaction, as is put forward by Marxist theory, which concentrates on one of the major movements in the 19th century – socialism – but completely ignores the second one, namely that of nationalism. As Bendix (1977) argues, the distribution and redistribution of rights and duties were rather the result of a political alienation of the working class and a rising awareness of not having a recognised position in the national community. Such distributive processes might be influenced by the structure of society – as the Marxian argument runs – but they are also affected 'by conceptions of what the proper distribution in the national community ought to be, and by the give and take of the political struggle' (Bendix 1977: 88). Thus, it is in the course of political struggles about the definition of who constitutes the nation that the
boundaries are drawn and certain parts of the population are included, while others are excluded.

While at first citizenship excluded socially and economically dependent persons and for a long time women too, in the course of the 19th and 20th century such restrictions were gradually reduced, until eventually all adults had been classified as citizens. According to Marshall's (1950) famous trichotomy, citizenship rights successively included civic, political and social rights. Whether this sequence over three centuries could be observed only in his study of England or could be observed in other countries as well might be subject to debates (see Mann 2000). Moreover, it is certainly true that his trichotomy should be extended with economic and cultural rights as mechanisms to include or exclude specific groups (Mackert 1999; Kymlicka 1995: 179-181). Nonetheless, Marshall's (1950) theory enables us to dissect the various aspects of citizenship rights and, more importantly, to apprehend their integrative function in nation-states in which capitalist development led to class inequalities: citizenship rights foster a sense of community based on loyalty to a nation that is a common possession.

The evolutionary ascription of the same rights to all members of a nation-state is part of what Bendix (1977) and others call the ‘age of democratic revolution’. Since citizenship no longer referred to membership in corporate institutions, henceforth and especially with regard to political rights, an active participation in the affairs of the national community was required. Whether the basic ideas of democracy and nationalism are compatible is subject to academic debate (Spencer & Wollman 2002: ch.5). At first, the logics that are commonly attributed to these two concepts – democracy as an inclusive and nationalism as an exclusive doctrine – seem to be contradictory. In the context of the French Revolution, however, both democratic and nationalist struggles pursued the same aims: to abolish authoritarian rule and to establish self-determination of the people. We can thus agree with Greenfeld (1992: 10) and hold that ‘nationalism was the form in which democracy appeared in the world, contained in the idea of the nation as a butterfly in a cocoon.’ Moreover, it can be argued that nation-states provide the necessary framework within which democratic rights have been most effectively demanded, accorded and sustained.

Yet, given the fact that nationalism and democracy emerged in a specific spatio-temporal context indicates that the relation between these two principles might vary according to historical circumstances and the nature of the political process (Wimmer 2002: 2; Greenfeld 1992: 10-11; Spencer & Wollman 2002: ch. 5). In fact, democracy has not the same significance in all nation-states and, of course, there can be nationalism without democracy. France and Germany are often brought up as two examples where democracy played a different role in the pro-
cess of nation-state formation. In France, both ideas seem to be closely related because this country was the setting for both a democratic and a nationalist revolution. Consequently, nationalism there has been almost unthinkable without democracy; but only ‘almost’, for it has also undergone its anti-democratic periods. In Germany, on the other hand, democratic and nationalist movements have evolved separately. At certain times, nationalism even took a radically anti-democratic turn – especially in the context of the destruction of the Weimar republic and Hitler’s rise to power. Such variations of the relation between these two principles, however, do not belie the fact that nationalism is an essential component of democracy (Nodia 1994). While the latter concept stands for the idea that the people decide what they want, the former defines who the people are who make those decisions. Miller (1995, 2000) goes even a step further in his argumentation. For him, the role of nations is not limited to telling us who is allowed to participate in the democratic process. Defending the idea of republican citizenship, he argues that a good democracy is one whose citizens are actively engaged in politics and that such an engagement necessitates a shared national identity among the participants to motivate them to work together (see also Calhoun 2007). For a common national identity is the basis of mutual trust that is, in turn, a necessary condition to make a state work. From this it does not follow that democracy entails nationalism. Rather, democracies are structured within nation-states. As a general rule, only those people are accorded political rights who are part of the nation – and this is true in France as well as in Germany. Of course, the exclusion of people from democratic processes can be strongly contested when long-term residents of a state get no voting rights. To which atrocities the confusion of the demos (the mass of the population) and the ethnos (the ethnic group) can lead has been demonstrated by Mann (2005) in his book on ethnic cleansing in the age of democracy.

To summarise the foregoing discussion, it can be stated that nationalism claims rights of self-determination and legitimate rule by reference to the sovereign people of a country. In modern times, state power is derived from and exercised for a nation; or formulated differently, a nation-state claims to be the state ‘of’ and ‘for’ a particular, distinctive and bounded nation. The closure mechanism of national citizenship can only be understood by the idea of this interconnectedness. For to qualify to be or to become a full member, potential candidates have to be a member of the nation or to fulfil the membership criteria. As we have illustrated with Prak’s example of citizenship politics in Bois-le-Duc, historic forerunners of nation-states were based on organisational forms, which conceived of a hierarchical order of unequal status as normal (see also Mackert & Müller 2000: 14). As we have seen,
citizenship was mainly an economic regulatory mechanism open for the wealthy urban elite and closed for the poor and socially disadvantaged. Nation-states, on the other hand, are always conceived as ‘a deep, horizontal comradeship’ (Anderson 1991 [1983]: 7) – regardless of actual social or economic inequalities. They are organised primarily as categories of equal individual members identified on the basis of various cultural attributes and exclude all those who do not belong to the nation (Calhoun 1997: 42-48; see also Gellner 1983: 57). Vertical boundaries dividing rulers and ruled were replaced by horizontal boundaries separating nationals from foreigners. This new distinction has become particularly salient given the overlapping of various forms of peoplehood; the definition of who belongs to those who can be considered as equal members became of crucial political importance.

### 2.5 Citizenship and national self-understanding: analytical ambiguities

Claiming that human beings have a natural tendency to organise themselves in groups and that in modern times nation-states exclude undesirable people through citizenship mechanisms does not help us understand who exactly is excluded. It only implies that even the most generous politicians demand applicants to fulfil at least some minimal criteria. Or as Wimmer (2006a: 341) has put it: ‘However widely the boundaries of the national community are imagined […] it remains a bounded community, with the large majority of the world’s population on the outside.’ It is hardly imaginable that a person with no Swiss passport, with no historical or emotional connection to Switzerland, and speaking no Swiss national language could immigrate to Switzerland and have any expectation of acceptance when requesting Swiss nationality. Closure mechanisms are always at work when somebody seeks to cross cultural boundaries. Consequently, we have to ask the following questions: how is a nation-state imagined? Who belongs to the people that enjoy equal rights? In whose name does a state rule? And hence, who can be admitted to full membership? By looking for answers to these questions, we turn to the various contents of nationalism and to the particular understandings of citizenship.

The most commonly used categories of nationalism or citizenship are ‘civic-territorial’ and ‘ethnic’. Kohn (1967 [1944]), probably the most influential source of this opposition, speaks of Western and Eastern versions of nationalism and makes a distinction between a ‘voluntarist’ type, which regards the nation as a free association of rational human beings entered into voluntarily and on an individual basis, and an ‘organic’ type, which views the nation as an organism of fixed and indel-
ible character that was stamped on its members at birth. The two countries that are most often put forward as examples of these types are France and Germany. While France represents a republican, expansive and assimilationist model of citizenship, Germany defines citizenship as a community of descent that is very restrictive towards non-German immigrants. What consequences such different understandings of nationhood can have on citizenship politics has been illustrated by, among others, Brubaker (1992). He starts his study with the observation that, although both countries recruited foreign workers in large numbers in the 1960s and 1970s, subsequently witnessed a growth of the migrant population and consequently pursued an equally restrictive immigration policy, they differ in their sharply different citizenship policies. While Germany requires from potential applicants for naturalisation ten years of residence and the renouncement of the original nationality, in France candidates have to live in the country for five years before they can apply and are allowed to keep their old passport. Germany lacks a political support for naturalisation and explicitly considers itself as not a country of immigration. In France, on the other hand, naturalisation is considered as a normal and desirable outcome of permanent settlement. Consequently, immigrants’ attitudes towards naturalisation differ in Germany and France. In 1985, only 6 per cent of German migrant workers intended to naturalise, while they were about 25 per cent in France. Looking at the naturalisation rates in the 1980s reveals that they are four to five times higher in France than in Germany. Brubaker (1992) explains this difference by different national self-understandings in these countries, which are, in turn, rooted in distinctive French and German paths to nation-statehood.

Both concepts – the civic-territorial and ethnic models of citizenship – have become so habitual in the meantime that it is often forgotten that they are invented (Calhoun 2004a: ix). They seem to be natural, whereas in fact they are based on political discourses. Therefore, they should not be treated as normative categories but as different styles in which nations are imagined (see Anderson 1991: 6). Brubaker (1992) has demonstrated how particular ways of thinking and talking about nationhood were reinforced and activated in specific historical and institutional settings. A similar position is taken by Greenfeld (1992, 1995), for whom the inventors of nationalism were psychologically insecure or socially subordinated parts of a specific society: the English protestant squires, the French nobility, the newly literate German classes or the English Puritans in America. Insecurities arose in specific historical circumstances in which consisting identities or social orders disaccorded with the beliefs of those groups. The resulting resentments were relieved by using the idea of nationalism to invent new nations, and these new definitions of what constitutes a particular so-
ciety mainly served to legitimise the interests of the emerging elite. Whether nations were defined in civic-territorial or in rather ethnic terms depended on the perception of a nation’s status relative to other nations. Ethnic nationalism emerged in societies that believed themselves – at the time of emerging national identity – to be inferior to existing nations. Civic nationalisms, on the other hand, emerged when achievements provided a society with sufficient reasons for national pride. According to Greenfeld (1992), German ethnic nationalism was triggered in the aftermath of the defeats against Napoleon’s revolutionary troops and during a period of French hegemony. In such precarious circumstances, claims to a particularly restrictive German identity, clearly delineating oneself in contrast to others, seemed to answer a great need. France, on the other hand, being at the time of emerging nationalism in a period of superiority, was too self-conscious to fear cultural or political hegemony and took the liberty to define its nationhood rather generously, allowing the access to all those who were ready to share their political convictions. Thus, references to common blood or to political ideas are less inherent characteristics of German or French culture respectively, but rather the outcome of particular historical and political situations.

Kohn’s geographical application (dividing the European countries at the Rhine) has become, in the meantime, a more overall account of nationalism and, alternately, is replaced by other typologies, such as cultural/political, illiberal/liberal, emotional/rational or bad/good nationalisms. The last distinction suggests to what extent those dichotomies are ideologically and politically laden and have even passed into caricature. Eastern nationalism is often considered as too exclusionary, too collectivist and too particularistic compared to the inclusionary, individualistic and universal Western nationalism. Civic nationalism is commonly located in the Enlightenment and connected with the concepts of individual liberty and the liberal revolt against absolutism, whereas ethnic nationalism is considered as opposed to these core values.

Instead of distinguishing between inclusionary and exclusionary nationalisms that pose normative ambiguities, it is analytically more useful to discern the bases or criteria of inclusion and exclusion. While the distinctions of ethnic and civic nationalism do grasp important aspects of reality, it is suggested here that these supposedly fundamental differences are better understood as differences of degree and emphasis than principle. Each form of nationalism has its inclusionary and exclusionary aspects and each nation-state defines who its people are and, thus, specifies who is excluded. Smith (1995: 101) even suggests that civic nationalism can be as severe and uncompromising as ethnic nationalism. As the example of France shows, civic nationalism might also require assimilation of ethnic minorities within the borders of the
nation-state through acculturation to the dominant culture. As Kuzio (2002) and Kaufmann (2000) underscore, so-called open citizenship models such as the Canadian and the US-American, excluded various groups such as blacks, Catholic conservatives or communists at various moments in their history. Moreover, in all nation-states with a supposedly civic form of citizenship, distinctions are made between foreigners from European or North American countries and those from other regions.

Even if we consider these two forms of nationalism as two ideal-types or end points of a continuum, the terms ‘ethnic’ and ‘civic’ are ambiguous and their definitive meanings are elusive. For Brubaker (1999: 59-63), the notion of ethnic nationalism can be interpreted narrowly or broadly. In the narrow interpretation, it refers to descent and biology; in the broad interpretation, it is used as a synonym for ‘cultural’. Given the fact that very few nations invoke a common ancestor and that for many nationalists ‘common descent’ is only one among many claims (and often a minor one), the group of ethnic nationalisms defined this way would be severely under-populated; the group of civic nationalisms, on the other hand, would become too heterogeneous, since it would include any number of nationalisms emphasising common culture. Applying the broader definition of ethnic nationalism leads to the problem that, in this case, virtually all nationalisms would fall in this category. Almost every nationalist movement invokes cultural characteristics that separate their people from other peoples. Moreover, cultural differentiations have been relevant throughout human history. Thus, a ‘cultural definition’ would include communities that existed before the age of nationalism and others that do not consider themselves as nations. Furthermore, it first would have to be decided which cultural characteristics divide such communities and how much homogeneity is required for a community to be considered a nation (Gellner 1983: 54). On the other hand, interpreting ‘civic nationalism’ in a very narrow sense involving an acultural, voluntarist and rationalist understanding of citizenship would define the phenomenon out of existence, too, since even classical cases of civic nationhood such as France or the United States involve cultural components (Brubaker 1999: 59-63). From another perspective, if we define nations as groups that will themselves, we end up with too many observations, since such a definition also applies to groups such as conspiracies, gangs, teams, or religious communities. Thus, even if will were the basis of nations, it is also the basis of much else (Gellner 1983: 54).

Dividing nation-states into ‘ethnic’ and ‘civic’ groups of nationalism seems to imply that ‘culture’ and ‘will’ are mutually exclusive and misleads us into dividing citizenship models into clearly defined groups. For Gellner (1983: 53f) and Smith (1986: ch.6), neither one of them is
remotely adequate for fully grasping the complexity of nationalism. Rather, it should be recognised that each form of nationalism consists of a combination of these two principles; and this combination can change over time. There are very few examples that come close to the extreme – the complete exclusion of those who do not belong to their ethnic community from the possibility of naturalisation. On the other hand, every civic nation-state attributes citizenship on the basis of at least some minimal cultural requirements. Smith (1986: 144-152) argues that what distinguishes nations from ethnies are ‘Western’ features and qualities of nationalism such as territoriality and political culture. Even ‘original Western nations’, however, have reconsidered their ethnic bases and reasserted their cultural and historic unity against minorities and subversive ideologies. Ernest Renan – the advocate of subjective self-understanding in constituting nationhood (through a daily plebiscite) – underscores that cultural elements play a crucial role in modern nation-states. According to him, a nation is both a soul and a principle. The first one belongs to the past and represents the common possession of a rich legacy of remembrances, and the second one is in the present and stands for the desire and will to honour this legacy. He even seems to switch to the other side when he argues that man does not improvise but that the nation is the end product of a long period of work, sacrifice and devotion (reprinted in Hutchinson & Smith 1994: 17).19

2.6 Citizenship as a contested instrument of social closure

Given the fact that the concepts of ‘ethnic’ and ‘civic’ citizenship as well as political and cultural nationalism are analytically ambiguous and ideologically laden, we suggest a return to Weber’s idea of open and closed relationships in our study of the functioning of the closure mechanism in national citizenship (Weber 1978; see also Brubaker 1992: 23). Weber defines a social relationship as ‘open’ to outsiders if participation in the mutually oriented social action relevant to its meaning-content is not denied to anyone who wishes to participate and who is actually in a position to do so. On the other hand, a relationship will be called ‘closed’ for outsiders if participation of certain persons is excluded, limited, or subjected to conditions.

Weber himself did not develop these concepts any further and mainly applied them in the context of economic closure mechanisms. Nonetheless, his arguments are very helpful in our discussion for three reasons: first, he provides neutral notions for the functioning of closure mechanisms. Second, speaking of open and closed relations implies that closure mechanism can be more or less open and closed. Accord-
ingly, there can be more or less restrictive understandings of citizenship (cf. Howard 2006). Third, Weber accounts for actors who use those instruments of social closure according to their interests. This brings us back to the beginning of this chapter where we discussed to what extent citizenship can be considered as an instrument of social closure being operated by governmental agents. Those operations, as Weber would put it, are governed by both material and ideal interests; these in turn have been created by ‘world images’ – or what we call in this context national self-understanding – that have determined, like switchmen, the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest (Weber 1946: 280). This becomes most clear when Weber presents closure mechanisms in monasteries and religious sects, which have passed from a stage of religious proselytising to one of restriction in the interest of the maintenance of an ethical standard or for the protection of material interests.

Introducing human action or agency in the study of nationalism and citizenship is indispensable for the following reason: underscoring the continuity of closure mechanisms between total closure and total openness and its propensity of change over time contains the danger of fluidity and vagueness. Indeed, we sought to put in perspective seemingly fixed categories such as ethnic and civic-territorial understandings of citizenship. This does not mean, however, that we cannot observe enduring citizenship politics. As will become clearer in the next chapter, fluidity and persistence can be reconciled by accounting for how actors struggle over the meaning of citizenship. National self-understandings persist as long as they appear to be legitimate and change when they are successfully challenged. This stands in blatant contrast to Gellner’s (1983) proposition of how to overcome the dichotomy of will and culture. He completely blinds out the role of actors, adopts a functionalist perspective and argues that nations are indispensable for industrial societies requiring patterned homogeneity, individual mobility, and cultural standardisation. Smith’s seminal contribution to this discussion in The Ethnic Origins of Nations (1986) seems to prioritise culture over agency (or will). However, he also speaks in detail of the malleability of particular ethnics and nations (1986: 210-211). He emphasises the role of intellectuals (calling them the modern priesthood), rediscovering and transmitting to future generations the myths and symbols of modern nations that are far more politicised than ethnies. But he is quick in cautioning us – and rightly so – against an instrumentalist perspective: ‘Ethnies and nations are not fixed and immutable entities ‘out there’ [...]; but neither are they completely malleable and fluid processes and attitudes, at the mercy of every outside force.’

Brubaker’s (1999: 67-69) alternative to civic and ethnic nationalism does not account for agency but points to a further aspect that will be-
come more relevant in the next chapter – political struggle. Brubaker prefers to apply the concepts of state-framed and counter-state forms of nationalism. In the former, ‘nation’ is conceived as congruent with the state and as institutionally and territorially framed by it. There is not necessarily anything ‘civic’ about state-framed nationalism; different linguistic, cultural and ethnic aspects may be shaped by the state. ‘Counter-state’ nationalism imagines ‘nations’ in opposition to existing ‘state-framed’ nationalisms. Similarly, counter-state definitions of nations may be drawn from various ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ aspects of nationhood. Brubaker does not elaborate very much on this dichotomy but by giving various examples insinuates that counter-state nationalisms seek regional autonomy or secession from existing nation-states. By generalising his arguments, we could understand by ‘counter-state’ nationalism a movement questioning the way in which individual aspects of nationhood are framed by the state. We then might assume that there are various actors (within a nation-state) challenging the dominant definition of a nation-state, and that such conflicts occur at different points in time. Such movements do not assert their claims to specific parts of a nation-state but to its very essence.

2.7 Conclusion

This chapter started out to explore the idea of citizenship and its functioning in modern nation-states. On the basis of Tilly’s definition, we first underscored the contractual nature of citizenship between governmental agents and categories of persons. Dissecting the two steps of naturalisation – decision-making by both potential candidates and the authorities – revealed that the latter have the last word and regulate the access to citizenship according to specified criteria. Contrary to medieval local citizenship politics, national citizenship is no longer about an economic free-rider problem. Rather, considering nation-states as membership organisations where cultural and symbolic aspects are at stake, it is the national self-understanding – i.e. the way a nation is perceived – that guides citizenship politics. To better understand the logic that follows the functioning of national citizenship, we explored the concept of nationalism as a modern form of the principle of groups living together. We argued that modernity is structured by nationalist principles and that nationalism is the fusion of other notions of peoplehood. Accordingly, naturalisation has become a highly political issue because it is about the questions of who belongs to us, who is an equal citizen, who is allowed to participate in the democratic processes and who belongs to the sovereign body legitimatising the state.
Citizenship models provide answers to these questions, as they represent different ways that community is imagined. The dichotomy of ethnic and civic-territorial models has emerged as the main theoretical framework to study contents of nationalism and citizenship. While these two models do grasp reality in a certain way, they pose various analytical problems: they are normatively loaded; they represent ideal-types and not clearly distinguishable empirical cases; they seem to be mutually exclusive whereas in fact every nationalism is composed of both principles; and, finally, they suggest differences of principle whereas it would be more useful to consider them as differences of degree and emphasis. To overcome these problems, Weber’s concepts of open and closed social relations were introduced: Weber provides neutral terms and enables us to account for both agency and for different degrees of social closure. The aspect of agency is crucial for understanding why citizenship models emerge and change over time: for citizenship politics is led by the ‘unstated assumptions and collective memory’ (Tilly) of the governmental agents regulating the access to the national community, and they might be challenged by various other actors with different national self-understandings. This argument comes close to Beissinger’s (2002: 19) approach of grounding ‘nationalism in an ongoing interaction between a national order and those who seek to overturn or alter that order through the production of disruptive events.’

A contentious approach to nationalism allows us to better apprehend how definitions are imposed and contested and enables us to reconcile cultural fluidity and cultural persistence. Moreover, it becomes clear that the categories of ethnic and civic-territorial understandings of citizenship are not inherent characteristics of particular nation-states but rather politically framed ideologies. Speaking of ‘political struggles’ does not necessarily imply violent conflicts between national or ethnic groups. As we have argued above, nationalism also structures our everyday life and politics – citizenship politics! How to grasp analytically these struggles over who might be granted full membership in a national community will be dealt with in the next chapter.
3 Nation as a Political Field

3.1 From the practice of citizenship to the logic of practice

This chapter seeks to provide a theoretical framework for the ways the closure mechanism of national citizenship is manipulated, how its manipulation depends on the prevailing national self-understandings and, finally, how a specific use might be contested by other actors possessing another understanding of what it means to be member of the nation. All this brings us back to Tilly’s (1999: 252-253) definition of citizenship, which we have outlined at the beginning of the previous chapter. While so far we have discussed a great deal the contractual nature of citizenship and its role in modern societies, we have only slightly touched on Tilly’s addendum that such contracts are never completely specified but rather modified by practice. This specification opens a window to follow a research strategy that has hardly been adopted so far in the study fields of citizenship and nationalism.

To put the ‘practice’ of citizenship in perspective has both theoretical and empirical implications. As for the latter, it simply means that we have to concentrate on what people do and to adopt a research programme based on close observation and ethnographic studies. To concentrate on the activities of individuals might seem trivial, since, almost per definition, the social sciences deal with what people do, especially when we analyse social interaction, everyday life, or social behaviour. However, in the fields of nationalism and citizenship the situation is quite different in this regard. Most studies follow a mere structuralist perspective, situate themselves on a purely macro-sociological level of argumentation and concentrate mainly on the origins and developments of nations. As a consequence, a majority of studies adopt an historical perspective and analyse large evolutions, completely disregarding micro-sociological aspects. Several authors in this field have recognised that research merely relying on macro-sociological data does not allow a full understanding of the functioning and evolution of nationalism and citizenship, since it is only by accounting for agency that processes and variations of nationalism can properly be understood.
For Hobsbawm (1990: 10), nations constitute ‘dual phenomena, constructed essentially from above, but which cannot be understood unless also analysed from below, that is in terms of the assumptions, hopes, needs, longings and interests of ordinary people.’ Criticising Gellner’s perspective of modernisation, he argues that official ideologies of states and movements are not necessarily guides to what is in the minds of the even loyal citizens or supporters (1990: 11). He further states that national identity is not always a major part of the set of identifications that constitute the social being; national identification can change and shift in time. Anderson (1991[1983]) also believes that taking into consideration the attitudes of individuals is crucial for the understanding of nations and nationalism. Since ‘communities’ are ‘imagined’ and individuals have a great capacity for invention, they do not simply reflect the macro-social forces. After all, nations exist only through the minds of its citizens, or as Seton-Watson (1977: 5) puts it ‘[a] nation exists when a significant number of people in a community consider themselves to form a nation, or behave as if they formed one.’

Following the citizenship-as-practice idea does not mean to disregard the pitfalls of individualistic or psychologistic approaches. Tilly (1999: 253) seems to be quite clear on that point when he reminds us that the practice of citizenship is constrained by collective memory and depends on unstated assumptions. This implies that we should not take what people do in their daily lives for granted but also account for the wider patterns of social life, for what people do is located in a social space and shaped by social relations. This is what Bourdieu understands by the ‘logic of practice’ (Bourdieu 1977; 1990; Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992). It is here that we are turning to the theoretical implications of the citizenship-as-practice idea. The ‘logic of practice’ refers to the interdependence of mental structures and institutional requirements by recognising that the emergence and conditionality of social structures must be relocated on the level of social actors (see also DiMaggio 1997: 277). In other words, Bourdieu proposes to go beyond the dichotomy of objectivist and voluntaristic approaches according to which ethnically motivated actions are either determined by their cultural environment or the result of individual rationalised decisions. According to Bourdieu’s famous words, one can escape the alternative between objectivism and subjectivism by accounting for how in ongoing processes dominant interpretations emerge out of different representations of the social world. To study such processes Bourdieu’s analytical tools of ‘habitus’, ‘capital’ and ‘field’ will help us understand how human beings both internalise external structures and produce and reproduce them by externalising internal structures within the confines of a socially and culturally constituted space. These concepts will enable us to cap-
ture the dynamic nature of nation and to combine micro- and macro-
sociological elements in the study of nationalism.

Elaborating on Bourdieu’s logic of practice, this chapter aims at pro-
viding a theoretical framework that enables us to closely look at the
very moments when citizenship laws are applied and when it is
decided to whom national membership status is given. For this pur-
pose, we will first address the question of social constructivism. By re-
viewing some of the current debates, we will plead for a more thorough
and coherent constructivist theory that closely follows Berger and Luck-
mann’s (1967) model and which accounts for interaction processes be-
tween human beings that produce social reality. Their approach will
enable us both to overcome essentialist arguments and to avoid the pit-
falls of instrumentalism and post-modernism. Their model will be
complemented with the notion of power, in order to go beyond classic
discourse analysis that is unlikely to explain why a certain interpreta-
tion of a social phenomenon prevails. Without abolishing the notion of
nation altogether, Berger and Luckmann’s approach to social constructi-

vism enables us to follow Brubaker’s (2004: ch.1, 1994) advice to treat
nations not as bounded groups but as variables that may be moulded
across and within putative groups. The main arguments of this chapter
will then be presented in two parts. First, we will emphasise that a cog-
nitive approach to nationalism and citizenship crucially enables us to
better understand citizenship politics. We will discuss concepts such as
‘scheme’, ‘categorisation’ and ‘stereotypes’ to apprehend the actors’
point of view. Departing from the idea that individuals are both socia-
lised and improvising human beings, we will then demonstrate that
definitions of cultural boundaries are produced and reproduced in on-
going political struggles leading to temporarily stable cultural compro-
mises.

3.2 Rethinking the social construction of nations

For a long time now, the research fields of ethnicity and nationalism
have been the settings of violent struggles between essentialists/prim-
ordialists and constructivists on the questions of whether or not na-
tions can be considered as bounded and fixed groups or whether or not
they constitute historically deep-rooted entities. An essentialist ap-
proach perilously implies homogeneous and static entities and does
not allow us to account for variation over both time and space. Essenti-
alist definitions of nations are often contestable because they are based
on qualities that putative nations share with other groups or on quali-
ties that are not clearly shared among all recognised members of the
nation (Calhoun 1993: 216). Considering ethnic groups or nations as
fixed and bounded may lead to a risk of over-ethnicised interpretations of conflicts and violence between ethnic and national groups, thereby obscuring either other possible explanatory factors such as material interests at stake or dynamics involved that could be better explained, for example, by warlordship or opportunistic looting (Bowen 1996). Disregarding framing dynamics or instrumentalisation processes may lead us to mistake groupist rhetoric of political leaders for real groupness and putative groups of ethnopolitical rhetoric for substantial things in the world (Brubaker 2004: 9-10). It also lets us falsely assume that the ascribed characteristics or features of such entities are an essential part of individual identities. Finally, it does not permit us to understand why ethnic or national identities arise and wane at different moments in time and never have the same salience for all the constituent parts of a group.

Today, constructivists clearly dominate the field, arguing that groups are contingent and fluctuating, as they need human practices to sustain their existence. In other words, individuals participate in the creation of their perceived reality of groups, dominant views on what constitutes a group being maintained or challenged by social interaction. Essentialist arguments are no longer represented – at least not in the forefront of the theoretically more sophisticated debate. It has even been convincingly demonstrated in the meantime that Shils (1957) and Geertz (1963), who have often been accused of primordialism, were not saying that the world is constituted by an objective primordial reality, but were actually emphasising the ‘participants primordialism’, that is, the idea that primordial attachments are felt towards co-ethnics (Gil-White 1999: 802-804; Smith 1998: 151-159). Ordinary people incessantly naturalise and essentialise their social environment. Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992: 228) have called this ‘our primary inclination to think the social world in a substantialist manner.’ As we have pointed out above in defining the concept of nationalism, human beings have a natural tendency to organise themselves in groups and tag them with cultural or symbolic meanings. We may agree that primordialist thinking is an inherent and necessary functional aspect of the organisation of society that gives human beings a sense of belonging and hence of security. However, while such entities may appear as fixed to individuals, social researchers must take care not to run the risk of adopting such common sense concepts as analytical instruments or, in Bourdieu’s terminology, to take care to maintain a clear distinction between categories of practice and categories of analysis.

For Brubaker (2004: 8-9), essentialist ideas still covertly inform ‘much ostensibly constructivist academic writing.’ He observes a tendency to speak, for example, of Serbs, Muslims, Jews, Turks, etc. ‘as if they were internally homogeneous, externally bounded groups, even
unitary collective actors with common purposes.’ According to him, it
often happens, especially in debates on multiculturalism and group
rights (be it by political actors or researchers), that groups are essentia-
"lised and legitimacy is lent to political discourses (Brubaker 1998: 294-
295; see also May et al. 2004: 10-11). As Brubaker (2004: 10) rightly
points out, one cannot criticise politicians talking about group rights
and the existence of groups, as this is precisely what their business is
(and what scholars are to analyse). As for researchers, it is, indeed, a
more delicate question. Brubaker explains the perseverance of (some-
times unconscious) essentialist thinking with the fact that talking
about nations itself easily misleads social scientists into adopting com-
mon sense views of a world partitioned into deeply constituted and
quasi-natural entities. Brubaker (2003: 557) seeks to solve this problem
not simply by expunging the misuses of these terms but – in a very
Bourdieuian tradition – by ‘constructing an analytical language that
can do justice to the complexity of social affinities and affiliations,
without falling back on the easily accessible yet impoverished social
ontologies – individualist or groupist – on which moral and political
theories too often rest.’ Brubaker introduces the concept of ’nation-
ness’, which stands for a variable that may be moulded across and
within putative groups and thus provides us with a very useful analyti-
cal tool to apprehend the complexity of the social phenomena of na-
tionalism.

However, even if we agree that nations are not bounded primordial
groups, this does not imply that this notion has no analytical value for
constructivists. In fact, we still need it to describe the reality we ob-
serve. When a certain number of individuals consider themselves as
part of a nation, agree to share certain cultural characteristics and to
build a community of sentiment (Weber 1946: 78) – and this happens
nowadays quite often – which other term than ‘nation’ could social re-
searchers use to describe this social phenomena? ‘Nationness’ does not
do the job. Rather, it shows us how to think and talk about nations. It
rightly forces us to ‘treat nation not as substance but as institutiona-
lised form; not as collectivity but as practical category; not as entity but
as contingent event’ (Brubaker 1996: 16, our emphasis). ‘Nationness’
is a conceptual tool to guide the work of researchers, but does not re-
place the concept of ‘nation’. Moreover, what Sewell (1992: 3) said in
his critique and reformulation of the concept of ‘structure’ is also true
for ‘nation’, namely that it is such a rhetorically powerful and pervasive
term that any attempt to abolish it would be futile. Instead, we should
try to overcome its weaknesses and redefine it in a way that allows us
to better grasp social reality.

Such a redefinition should prevent us from assuming essentialist
convictions exist behind every scholarly use of the term ‘nation’.

NATION AS A POLITICAL FIELD

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Smutny (2004: 83-88), for example, very much inspired by Brubaker’s new terminology, argues that some scholars adopt what he calls a ‘light essentialist’ approach. They try to distance themselves from substantalist thoughts by deducing ‘nations’ from other categories such as ‘people’, ‘communities’, or ‘ethnic groups’, thereby simply moving the essentialist bias to another level. For Smutny (2004: 85-86), Smith’s (1986) argument on the ethnic continuity of nations, for example, runs the risk of ‘essentialising’ ethnic groups or what he calls ethnic cores. Indeed, Smith (1991: 39) asserts that a state’s ethnic core often shapes the character and the boundaries of the nation. In his defence, it has to be pointed out, however, that he clearly says that ethnic cores do not automatically lead to the emergence of nations. Rather, modern nationalism resorts to ethnic myths (Smith 1991: 39, 1986: 148, more generally ch.6 and ch.7), and the search for historic origins and the sociocultural organisation needed to mobilise part of the masses has been part of both ethnic groups and nations (Smith 1986: ch.6). Smutny further accuses Alter (1994), among others, of ‘light essentialism,’ only because he asserts that ‘the nation is a politically mobilised people’ or that a nation ‘is constituted by the social group’s (the people’s) consciousness of being a nation, or their wanting to be one […]’ (Smutny 2004: 86). For Smutny, this is evidence enough that Alter deduces nations one-to-one from the people thereby reifying social groups. Did he overlook that Alter speaks of politically mobilised people and of social groups that gained consciousness and that he understands by ‘people’ simply a set of people of a certain category?

Interestingly, Smutny (2004: 83n278) defends the authors he criticises by acknowledging that they are all researchers who definitely distance themselves from essentialist arguments. Smutny then explicates that his accusation concerns mainly their ‘essentialist rhetoric’. It thus seems that he merely criticises their use of notions such as ‘nation’ or ‘ethnic group’. Speaking of nations (especially when scholars do it nowadays), however, does not automatically imply representing a ‘social and cultural world in terms reminiscent of a Modigliani painting as a multichrome mosaic of monochrome ethnic or cultural blocs,’ as Brubaker asserts (1998: 293). Pointing to the dangers of reification, i.e. ‘the apprehension of human phenomena as if they were things, that is, in non-human or possibly supra-human terms’ (Berger & Luckmann 1967: 89), does not mean that groups are not real or that there are no cultural differences. It is rather the case that they cannot be considered as clear and fixed unities but as both fluid and manipulable. On this point most researchers in this field certainly agree.

Why then worry about essentialism when the large majority seems to agree that nations are socially constructed? In our opinion, concerns are still largely justified. The ongoing campaign against essentialism –
even if it often resembles straw man bashing – is itself a sign of discomfort towards current theoretical approaches in the field of ethnicity and nationalism. The unease with the current analytical frameworks is due not so much to some dissenters of the dominant view, but rather, can be explained by the fact that it is getting ever more difficult to understand what the idea of ‘constructivism’ really represents. Too often taken for granted, its meaning is seldom explained, i.e. what it really means to say that communities are imagined, contingent and fluctuating. This, in turn, has led to a certain naivety or over-simplification of argument, or as Brubaker (2004: 3) puts it, ‘by virtue of its very success, the constructivist idiom has grown “weary, stale, flat, and unprofitable.”’ Constructed phenomena of any kind then get blurred and may hardly be analytically or intellectually grasped. Nations appear as illusory communities and nationalism as a case of false consciousness or a mistaken identity. Such a situation is then mainly grist for the mills of those who criticise an apparently everything-goes constructivism and for whom traditions seem to be invented out of the blue.

To counter such criticism we first and foremost have to delimit social from radical constructivism. The latter has mainly been developed by Glasersfeld and Foerster (1999, see also Glasersfeld 1996). Similar to postmodernists, radical constructivists argue that we cannot know the reality of the human world. Objective knowledge is not possible because all our knowledge is constructed by cognitive processes of the human brain. Although there is an objective world out there, all we can do is offer representations of it. For Berger and Luckmann (1967) – probably the most important representatives of social constructivism – reality is also produced by people acting on their interpretation and their knowledge of it. However, Berger and Luckmann claim that knowledge about the social world is possible by revealing the ways in which actors contribute to the creation of their perceived reality. Such a method involves looking at the ongoing and dynamic processes in which social phenomena are created and institutionalised by humans. Berger and Luckmann argue that all knowledge, including the most basic – the taken-for-granted common sense knowledge of everyday life – is derived from and maintained by social interactions. When people interact, they do so with the understanding that their respective perceptions of reality are related and, as they act upon this understanding, their common knowledge of reality becomes reinforced. Since this common sense knowledge is negotiated by people, human significations and institutions come to be presented as part of an objective reality.

Translated into our more specific research field, this model of how society works implies that we have to account for what we have earlier called the principle of nationalism, i.e. the social organisation of cultural difference and, more specifically, for how people imagine citizenship
and nationalism and how the more general perceptions of these phenomena are the results of ongoing social interactions. Following our discussion on nationalism and national citizenship in the foregoing chapter, we can state more precisely that these confrontations constitute ongoing political processes in which claims are made about the categories that are included in the nation. Such an approach clearly refutes instrumentalist accounts with which constructivism is often related. Ethnic and national groups are not rational associations of self-interested actors or the artefacts of cultural engineers (Brass 1979, 1991; Nairn 1977; Hechter 1975). It also questions post-modernist and cosmopolitanist arguments, which, indeed, reject substantialism but completely deny the existence of any cultural groups by considering ethnicity and nationalism as a matter of free-floating, ubiquitous and undetermined construction (see Calhoun 2003, 2004b). At the same time, Berger and Luckmann’s approach helps us describe groups of people considering themselves as a nation without automatically implying that a nation constitutes a bounded group. On the contrary, demonstrating interaction processes within a nation (in our case even within Swiss municipalities) challenges the idea of homogeneous cultural entities (cf. DiMaggio 1997: 267-268).

There is one remaining problem: when we assert that common sense knowledge of everyday life is derived and maintained by social interactions, how can we explain that a specific perception or opinion prevails? Berger and Luckmann’s model of society is problematic insofar as it concentrates on the symbolic aspects of the social worlds, thereby almost completely neglecting the material practices in which symbolisation is embodied. Indeed, they discuss at length the question of legitimation. However, as Jenkins (1997: 137-139) rightly criticises, power should be more prominent in their model. Accounting for power means going beyond a classic discursive approach that relies solely on the meanings and attitudes that are mobilised and evoked. Discourse analysis has indeed deconstructed the idea of cultural homogeneity and replaced it by notions of multiplicity and heterogeneity by demonstrating how multiple discourses exist in a certain place, dissolve and reappear (Bhabha 1990; Chatterjee 1993). However, as Wimmer (2002: 24-26) rightly points out, it does not provide analytical tools to explain why a specific construction dominates. The social construction of the world is intimately linked to the capacity to impose one’s definition onto others: ‘In this sense, nationalism is not simply about imagined communities; it is much more fundamentally about a struggle for control over defining communities and, in particular, for control over the imagination about community’ (Beissinger 2002: 18).

To combine discursive elements and power structures we will refer below to Bourdieu’s ‘field-approach’, which accounts for both the sym-
bolic and material aspects of interactions (cf. Swartz 1997). A nation is such a field in which people confront, in a socially constituted space, their opinions on what constitutes the cultural boundaries (cf. Spillman & Faeges 2005: 435). Such a definition does not predefine which categories lie at the basis of a nation; it even leaves open which actors participate in the processes of labelling the nation and which arguments are mobilised. It merely expounds that people incessantly struggle in political processes over the question of who they are and whom they exclude and that the arguments of the more influential actors prevail. The claim that a nation is socially constructed thus invokes a specific process by which a national self-understanding is produced and reproduced in interaction processes (cf. Fearon & Latin 2000: 850). The precise mechanisms of these processes will be delineated in the remaining parts of this chapter.

3.3 The actors’ perceptions and categorisations

A social constructivist approach involves recognising the importance that has to be accorded to the actors’ point of view (Borofsky 1994; DiMaggio 1997). When we investigate how the closure mechanism of citizenship is used and postulate that its application depends on national self-understanding, we first have to account for how social actors perceive citizenship politics and which categories are mobilised to regroup candidates for naturalisation. Accounting for the ways cultural categories are applied is all the more crucial in the age of nationalism, in which social structures are no longer defined by kinship networks and citizenship has ceased to be an economic regulatory mechanism.

One of the first researchers in the field of ethnicity and nationalism who emphasised the actors’ perceptions was Barth (1969). Best known is his prioritisation of ethnic boundaries over groups. What is relevant is not the ‘stuff’ of a group, i.e. common language, culture, territory or history, but how certain characteristics become salient boundary markers between groups: ‘We can assume no simple one-to-one relationship between ethnic units and cultural similarities and differences. The features that are taken into account are not the sum of ‘objective’ differences, but only those which actors themselves regard as significant [...] some cultural features are used by the actors as signals and emblems of differences, others are ignored, and in some relationships radical differences are played down and denied’ (Barth 1969: 14).

The selection and use of cultural features happens through categorisations and by means of schemes (Lakoff 1987; DiMaggio 1997: 268-272). Jenkins (2004: ch.8) distinguishes categorisation from group identification. While the former stands for external definition, the latter
points to internal processes of self-definition. Of course, both are closely connected, for how we define the others depends on how we see ourselves. Cultural boundary demarcation is thus not only a means to exclude those who do not belong to us; simultaneously it informs us about the identity that has been adopted by a group. More generally, categorisations are the processes through which we make sense of the complex social world. All our thoughts, perceptions and actions are structured through meditative filters, or what others call schemes and frames (Strauss & Quinn 1994, 1997; Goffman 1974). This fact becomes relevant, for example, when we meet strangers: ‘The ability to identify unfamiliar individuals with reference to known categories allows us at least the illusion that we know what to expect of them’ (Jenkins 2004: 82).

Such categorisations of individuals are akin to what others call stereotypical thinking (Hamilton & Sherman 1994). Stereotyping is the partial or incomplete labelling of others, thereby simplifying and generalising the view of others based on a restricted amount of information (e.g. external characteristics such as clothes, skin colour, gender or behaviour), clichés and prejudices. Indeed, stereotyping might result in discrimination, false assumptions and dramatising simplifications. However, today stereotypes are no longer considered as cognitive deficiencies but as normal and ubiquitous mechanisms of the mind generating inferences and expectations (Hamilton & Sherman 1994: 2-3). They need not necessarily be hostile. Like schemes, they are mental structures or templates that help us to interpret the world and render it more predictable. Since we are incessantly led in ambiguous and uncertain situations we all need instruments to explain and anticipate the behaviour of others (Jenkins 2004: 128). Stereotyping is only one aspect of cognition and identification, but a highly crucial one in the context of citizenship politics.

Nonetheless, we have to keep in mind that not only individuals get classified but also utterances, situations, events, actions and state of affairs. Analysing such categorisations not only helps us understand how people or things get classified, but also, more generally, it provides answers to the question of how people see the world (Brubaker 2004: 77). In the empirical chapters below, we will not only demonstrate how foreigners are categorised. We also will discuss in detail how membership criteria are established and which are the opinions on the recent decisions of the Swiss Federal Court, in order to understand how citizenship is perceived, how local politicians see their own community and how such understandings lead to different naturalisation policies.

Where do schemes, stereotypes and attitudes come from? Why do people categorise strangers in a specific way? For Strauss and Quinn (1994: 284-285) schemes are the generic versions of past experiences
and the internalisation of collective representations. Thereby, they emphasise that a cognitive approach is not identical with individualistic analytical models. Rather, schemes, stereotypes and attitudes are ‘socially shared knowledge of social objects’ (Brubaker 2004: 86). A common perception of the nation, for example, can be imposed through explicit teaching (see Gellner 1983: 140; Smith 1991: 118-119). Following this idea, Eugene Weber (1976) demonstrated how the compulsory education system in France led to the incorporation of the great majority of the population into the French nation-state.5

However, most of our expectations about the world are learned in social interactions without explicit rules being taught us (Strauss & Quinn 1994: 286-287). Perspectives on others might be imposed by the state through what we have referred to earlier as constructions from above, i.e. categorisation practices of authoritative institutions. The modern state has not only the monopoly of violence, but also seeks to legitimate symbolic force and control ethnic categorisations (Bourdieu et al. 1994: 8-12). By means of censuses or specifications in formal identity documents, for example, individuals can be obliged to choose a specific ethnic identity (cf. Anderson 1991[1983]: 164-170; Jenkins 1997: 69; Caplan & Torpey 2001).

The way state institutions promote national identity, mobilisations by nationalist entrepreneurs, or more generally, discourses by the political elite concerning foreigners and immigration, might also shape individual schemes. However, the connection between official categories and popular self-understandings is seldom demonstrated in detail. Barth (1969) argued that a definition of identity cannot simply be imposed on a group, but has to be accepted by significant others before an identity can be said to be taken on.6 Ethnographic studies have shown that categories used by ordinary people in everyday life can differ substantially from official classifications.7 Sökefeld (1999) demonstrated the plurality of contradictory identities in northern Pakistan. Different ways of grouping ethnic categories have been investigated by Sanjek (1981) in urban Ghana. Gorenburg (2000) revealed that support for nationalism within an ethnic group is neither constant nor random. To what extent caste classification depends on context has been reported by Levine (1987) and Berreman (1972). Brubaker et al. (2006) show in their study of an ethnically mixed town in Transylvania that despite elite-level nationalist discourses against the ethnic minority, ordinary people of both the majority and minority do not seem to be preoccupied very much by questions of ethnic differences. As we will see below, such variation does not mean that the range of popular self-understandings is unlimited.

Another way to explain the formation of shared knowledge constitutes the exploration of the interplay between self-identification and exter-
nal categorisation (Barth 1969). Such interactions, though, do not happen only between groups of people considering themselves as different from each other but also in various ways within a group (Tilly 2005: 7-8). As Jenkins (1997: 63-70) points out, the production of identity and ethnic categorisation happens in a variety of contexts, or more generally through primary and secondary socialisations (see also Berger & Luckmann 1967: 129-146). The former designates the first socialisation an individual undergoes in childhood when patterns for our receptiveness to being categorised are set. The latter stands for subsequent socialisations in the various sub-worlds an individual encounters. Every individual is born in a socially structured world and takes over to a certain extent the world in which others already live. However, once internalised structures do not remain unchanged forever. Each individual is incessantly confronted by new attitudes and has to find his or her way in new situations. Such confrontations happen at various levels and in different contexts. Social categorisation can take place in routine public interactions, communal and associational life, or market relationships (Jenkins 1997: 66-67). For our study, the influence of the social environment of local settings on the attitude towards naturalisation candidates will be of primordial importance.

By distinguishing all different contexts in which individuals internalise schemes and stereotypes, one runs the risk of ending up with individuals completely determined by their social environment. However, each human being is also an actor contributing to the production of the social world. Only by conceiving human beings as both agents and socialised and improvising individuals are we able to capture the dynamic nature of nations. Relying solely on socialisation would not allow us to comprehend the ongoing negotiation processes on cultural boundaries or the variety of attitudes within a group. People are not just imbibing culture; the culture in which they are socialised leaves much opportunity for choice and variation (DiMaggio 1997: 264-268).

To capture the duality of internalisation and externalisation, Bourdieu has elaborated the concept of ‘habitus’ that stands for a principle of generation and structuration. It is a system of dispositions that is adopted by an individual actor throughout his or her life and through the interiorisation of his or her social environment. It can be considered as a general perception or action-scheme that structures an individual's reactions to new situations. Emphasis is placed on structuration: our habitus does not determine our actions, but structures them by providing a limited set of possible solutions or, in Swidler’s (1986) terminology, a toolkit of habits, skills and styles, which are applied in everyday thinking and activities. This ‘elbowroom’ – limited by the actors’ socialisation and the constitution of the field in which they act –
accords them the competence to assess pros and cons in a given situation and to develop strategies on the basis of their own interests. To be completely clear on this point: This does not mean that human beings are sometimes free and sometimes they enact learned structures; rather, their activities are always constrained by learned dispositions. Habitual responses do not represent hard-and-fast rules, but are acquired from everyday practices that are not highly precise.

By the means of their habitus, actors tend to reproduce their own conditioning: Confronted with familiar situations, human beings act according to their past experiences and apply those schemes that were useful for solving previous, similarly shaped problems. Such a reproduction may be observed in traditional societies in which individuals do not very often need to improvise. This leads some to criticise Bourdieu for reintroducing structural determinism in his theoretical framework (Sewell 1992: 13-19; Jenkins 1992: ch.4; Wimmer 2002: 27; Bidet & Bailey 1979; King 2000). However, Bourdieu clearly goes a step further by arguing that we are all constantly confronted with new problems for which we have no ready-made solutions at hand. When we find ourselves in unfamiliar situations, all we can do is to choose among our schemes and transpose them to the new situations (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992: 129-135; Bourdieu 1989: 406; see also Sewell 1992: 17-18 and Swartz 1997: 211-214). By doing so, human beings produce structures and give social life a certain dynamic. This incessantly happens in modern and complex societies. However, even in very traditional societies improvisations occur. In his ethnological studies of the Kabyles in Algeria in the 1970s, Bourdieu (1972) observed that individuals exercised some degree of freedom even in seemingly highly regulated domains as, for example, marriage.

The idea of habitus can best be illustrated by Bourdieu’s own metaphor of sport games in which intense competition and engagement in a struggle with others is going on (see Calhoun 2000). Bourdieu suggests that social life is like such a game, except that the stakes are bigger. To understand a game, we first have to look at the individual players and their abilities that make the game dynamic and interesting. A successful player not only masters particular techniques, he or she also has a sense of the game that is, for example, a constant awareness of and responsiveness to the play of one’s opponents. This sense of the game is the result of years of experience and practice and allows him or her to react quickly, almost automatically, to the actions of other players; deliberate decisions would be mostly too late. Indeed, a game in which players solely and strictly reacted according to practised strategies would be quite boring. Moreover, it is hardly imaginable that any training or coaching could completely determine the players’ game. Since no game is like another one, improvisation is constantly re-
quired. The unpredictable reactions of the players confronted with the constantly changing situations on the field make a game, like life, captivating and dynamic.

Individuals are capable of exerting (consciously or unconsciously) some degree of social control over the social relations they are part of (Sewell 1992: 20-21). Since hardly any two human beings have undergone exactly the same socialisation, when confronted with the same unresolved problems they react differently, due to their own mechanisms of social perspectivity (Hannerz 1993: ch.3). This explains the variable, conflictive and processual character of nations or culture more generally. As the examples above illustrate, the connection between official categories and popular self-understandings vary in range between individuals and groups due to different perceptions and interpretations of the same cultural phenomena. Such a heterogeneity or inconsistency of schemes may also lead to conflicts between groups or individual actors: dominant views may be questioned and new ones imposed. However, as we will see in the next sections, not any view can be conceived and/or imposed.

3.4 Limited contestations

To make it clear right from the outset, emphasising the processual character of nations (Tilly 2005: 23-44; Brubaker 1994) does not mean adopting a developmentalist perspective of modernist exponents such as Gellner (1983), Anderson (1991[1983]) and Hobsbawm (1990), thereby running the risk of falling into the teleological trap. Such a danger also exists when agency is accounted for. Greenfeld’s (1992) agent-centred accounts in the comparison of the emergence of nationalism in five countries, for example, pays indeed a lot of attention across time and place to the way ideas of the nation are originally conceived. However, by emphasising that the character of every national identity is defined in the early phase of the emergence of nationalism, once-established nations in her accounts seem impervious to subsequent events. It is rather the opposite case: struggles about nation incessantly change directions, wane and reappear (see Tilly 1975, 2005).

Brubaker (1996: 63) introduces, among other concepts, that of ‘nationalising states’ to allow a better analysis of the situation of emerging nations in Eastern Europe in the last two decades. He prefers this concept to the one of ‘nation-state’ because the latter stands for an achieved or completed condition, while the former implies that this completed condition has then not yet been achieved in most Eastern European states. This differentiation is certainly of crucial importance and highly useful. At the same time, it implicitly reveals an often mis-
guided view that considers nation-states as an achievement of a certain evolution. Nation-states continue, even when established and legitimated, to nationalise their territory. Therefore, it would be more appropriate to speak of ‘nationalising nation-states’. But not only do nation-states incessantly nationalise their territory, the nationalisation process itself is subject to debates between various actors over its definition and meaning.

This has already been recognised by Brubaker (1992) in his earlier work on citizenship models in France and Germany. Indeed, his citizenship models seem to be enduring but not immutable. Interestingly, Brubaker reveals that they have been fluid and internally contested at different points in time. He convincingly demonstrates how particular ‘cultural idioms’ and ways of thinking and talking about nationhood were reinforced and activated in specific historical and institutional settings. Speaking of ‘cultural idioms’ allows him to avoid the culturalist trap and provides a finer theoretical grasp of contention and variability in the field of citizenship politics (Spillman & Faeges 2005: 431). Accordingly, citizenship models are not culturally determined but the outcome of political struggles and power relations between actors defending opposite ideas. The concept of ethnic citizenship was raised by some actors at certain moments in France as much as defenders of a republican model regularly appeared in Germany.

Yet, at the same time, Brubaker’s cultural idioms can be persistent over time and limit the discursive field within which debates are conducted. As we have already mentioned in the previous chapter, nationalism and ethnicity are about the social organisation of cultural difference and similarity. However, too crude a dichotomy between the social and the cultural should not be made, since the “cultural stuff” [...] and ethnic boundary mutually modify and support one another. The former establishes and legitimises the contrast of the boundary; while the latter, often in response to external conditions, modifies or alters the relevance to the boundary of aspects of the former’ (Handelman 1977: 200 quoted in Jenkins 1997: 20).

Although the ‘cultural stuff’ does not automatically lead to group-identity, it is not irrelevant, either. Not all categories can be instrumentalised and mobilised, nor are ‘invented traditions’ fabricated or created, ex nihilo. Hobsbawm (1983) would certainly agree with Smith (1998: 129-131) that such ‘inventions’ occur in a historically constituted field, and that the selecting and reworking of old traditions by modern elites and intellectuals must take place ‘on the wavelength to which the public is ready to tune in’. Struggles over cultural boundaries happen in a culturally and socially pre-constituted field. In such a field, certain ethnic distinctions may be particularly salient, reinforce cultural differences and develop effects of path dependency (Wimmer 2006b). Those
could be considered the rules of Bourdieu’s sport games we have used as illustration above. To understand such a game, we have to account not only for the players but also for the rules that position the players and that set the limits for the individual actions. On a more general level, this means that we not only have to look at the various meanings that are given to a certain social phenomenon, we also have to account for the fact that this processes do not happen in a cultural and social vacuum. This argument is akin to what others call the influence of discursive frameworks or cultural idioms on the interests and actions of, and the relations between, individuals and groups (Skocpol 1985; Emirbayer & Goodwin 1994; Koopmans et al. 2005).

However, not only is the scope for imposing new perceptions limited, the habitus of each individual allows only for a restricted use of new strategies. Since individuals have been socialised not in the same, but a similar, social environment, the variation over cultural schemes is not infinite. The example of Leach’s (1965 [1954]) study on the political systems of highland Burma is a case in point. Against the idea of cultural homogeneity, Leach successfully demonstrated that the Kachin culture varies a great deal between local places. In particular, he investigated political organisations between lineages. Whereas in most groups they were hierarchical, in some local settings an egalitarian view was asserted. Leach (1965 [1954]) explains this uneven implementation of political forms with the distribution of local resources and local conflicts. In spite of these different political claims, however, the range of political alternatives is limited. A comparison shows that a feudal hierarchy like that of the neighbouring Shan society was not possible in Kachin society. Leach argues that attempts to institutionalise feudal hierarchies in Kachin groups always failed because they would have gone against certain persistent presuppositions of the Kachin groups on how society should be organised.10

3.5 The political field and cultural compromise

To understand the structuration of the field of nation we first have to remind ourselves that today’s social organisation of cultural groups is happening in the age of nationalism and by the exclusion of undesirable strangers through the mechanism of national citizenship. Most of us certainly agree with Brubaker (2004) that nationalism (and ethnicity) can exist without groups. It might be part of the discourses of nationalist entrepreneurs and political elites. Also, it might appear and disappear at various moments and have various meanings for different people. However, when groups of people are culturally organised, they are most often called nations nowadays. This has not always been the
case and might very well change in the future, for ‘[n]ationalism is a
historical phenomenon. It appeared in one age and it can disappear in
another’ (Greenfeld 1992: 491). Whether or not and when nationalism
will disappear is subject of debate and shall not occupy us here (see
Smith 1995). But if it does, Greenfeld (1992: 491) continues:

the world in which we live will be no more, and another world
will replace it. This post-national world will be truly post-mod-
ern, for nationality is the constitutive principle of modernity. It
will be a new form of social being and it will change the way we
see society; to understand it, we shall have to begin anew.

Above, we have demonstrated how politically salient nationalism is. Na-
tionalism not only structures modernity (Wimmer 2002), but also our
everyday life (Calhoun 1997; Billig 1995). Being in the age of national-
ism thus already limits the scope of the thinkable. It is almost incon-
ceivable to organise society within other forms than nations. From this
it does not follow that any specific nationalism comes to the fore: ‘Na-
tionalism as such is fated to prevail, but not any one particular na-
tionalism. We know that reasonably homogeneous cultures, each of them
with its own political roof, its own political servicing, are becoming the
norm, widely implemented but for few exceptions; but we cannot pre-
dict just which cultures, with which political roofs, will be blessed by
success’ (Gellner 1983: 47). Any particular content of nationalism
might be challenged much easier than the form itself. This comes
close to Spillman’s (1995: 144) argument of the limits that may be
reached in questioning profound categories such as, for example, gen-
der: ‘it is much more possible to challenge meanings and values asso-
ciated with gender than to constitute for oneself a genderless identity’.

To understand which ‘culture will be blessed by success’ or why cer-
tain categories become more salient than others, power structures
within fields of nation have to be accounted for. They help us under-
stand why a specific construction of the world permeates a group and
why frames are being changed, disappear and reappear in diverse con-
texts. In such ongoing processes, power structures are not more sub-
stantial than any community or group. For the power of a group or an
individual defending a certain idea is not an inherent characteristic of
them but depends to a large extent on their position in these spaces of
struggle. The ongoing interactions in a social space point to the rela-
tional nature of power and ideas and underline that the production of
a frame heavily depends on the relations between the different units
(see Emirbayer 1997; Emirbayer & Goodwin 1994; Tilly 1994, 2005;
Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992: 15-19). Correspondingly, the emerging
and waning of any specific frame can be explained by changing rela-
tions between the involved actors and thus by the formation and deformation of specific power structures.

The relational character of power can best be captured by Bourdieu's notions of capital and political field. Following our earlier discussions and definitions of the concepts of nation and nationalism, we can consider the nation as a part of what Bourdieu (1996) calls the political field. As all the other fields such as, for example, those of art, education, or media that have been explored by Bourdieu, the political field refers to a relatively autonomous sector of social activities with its specific rules. However, a distinctive feature of the political field is that confrontations of different ideas and interpretations of the social world can be observed more directly than in other fields. Much more explicitly than elsewhere, actors in the political field struggle for the legitimate manipulation of the comprehensive view of the social world (e.g. Kauppi 2003). Next to journalists and scientists, politicians perform the function of making visible their perception or action schemes, their visions of the divisions of the social world and they work to transform them into categories applicable for all (Fritsch 2001: 21).

Political struggles are not simply debates of convictions but rather confrontations of ‘power-ideas’ (idée-fores) between progressives and conservatives or challengers and incumbents (Bourdieu 1996; see also Kauppi 2003). These power struggles are motivated by an internal asymmetry between established and newcomers. Ultimately, it is the political power of an idea that is crucial for the continuity of an old and the emergence of a new interpretation. In other words, the dominant world-view prevails not because it is truer than others but because it appears more legitimate or convincing than others. A new comprehensive view of the social world can only be proved to be wrong with another power-idea. The power or the political capital of agents or groups that hold those convictions depends on their social and symbolic capital that, in turn, results from their position in the political field. Social capital stands for the relationships or the social network of agents and the resources that depend on specific social affiliations. The symbolic capital can be considered as the perceived and legitimised form of any capital, i.e. prestige and legitimacy. Political capital is mostly symbolic capital, since only legitimated and respected politicians can convince others of their interpretations of the social world. However, it is also social capital insofar as the power of actors depends on their positions and relationships with other political actors. It becomes clear that political capital constitutes a relational form of power. Far from being an attribute or a property of actors, power is thus unthinkable outside structures of force relations. Bourdieu proposes the differentiation between accumulated and delegated political capital. Whereas the former is the result of slow accumulation of symbolic, so-
cial and cultural capital, the latter is acquired by delegation and investiture. In this way, political capital becomes institutionalised in the form of posts and positions (e.g. Kauppi 2003).

The powerful are those people who succeed in convincing the others of their interpretation of the world and thus influence the others’ choices against their original wills. Those have a lot of political capital who are perceived by the others as the legitimate holders of power. Accordingly, we will operationalise the influence of local politicians by their reputation. Speaking of ‘legitimation’ implies that struggles about cultural boundaries is less about elimination and suppression of minority positions than about conviction. Since people are related to one another in a space of social relations and communication, such struggles can be considered as negotiation processes leading to cultural compromise. Wimmer (2002: 29) defines a cultural compromise ‘as consensus over the validity of norms, classifications and patterns of interpretation that lasts beyond the open process of its production.’ Put differently, a cultural compromise emerges when actors agree that certain modes of classifying the world makes sense to them. It can be conceived of as a temporal consensus abiding until new, more convincing arguments are put forward. Wimmer partially draws on Habermas’ theory of communicative action that stands for the idea that norms and values can be substantiated through a process of argumentative negotiation and thus in principle can be questioned. Contrary to Habermas, however, Wimmer (2002: 31) argues that norms can be questioned not by referring to universal standards of rationality, but simply by relying on norms and modes of validation respectively habitualised as schemes of cultural givens. All this brings us back to our earlier argument that human beings are socialised and incessantly internalise their social environment. In the meantime, however, we understand why specific schemes and perceptions are adopted.

3.6 Empirical implications: the design of the study

Nowadays, most scholars in the field of nationalism and citizenship agree that we are all constructivists. Thus, the question that needs to be asked is no longer whether, but how, nations are socially constructed. Indeed, the axiom of constructivism has reached a dominant position in this field even though some argue that essentialist arguments still exist in seemingly constructivist approaches. But in any case, we have to specify what it means that nations are socially constructed, for ‘constructivism’ would lose its analytical power if it degenerated to a simple buzzword. Following this idea, this second theoretical chapter helped us understand the mechanisms of the social construction of a national
self-understanding and how a specific naturalisation policy is the outcome of political struggles. In this sense, we not only look at how citizenship is conceptualised and a nation is perceived. We propose to study the actual politics of citizenship, i.e. the ways in which ideas about the question of who might be admitted are pitted against each other in local naturalisation fields. To do this, we have to account for both the ideologies of municipal politicians and the local power structures. We thereby closely follow Bourdieu’s and Berger and Luckmann’s propositions of how to study the social world. Berger and Luckmann remind us that scholarly knowledge about the social world is possible when we analyse how knowledge is produced in interaction processes between human beings. In accounting for power structures, Bourdieu similarly argues that we have to put in perspective political struggles between the different visions of the division of the social world.

How do we go about analysing such struggles? First, we have to remind ourselves what kind of struggles we are analysing. Above, we pleaded for studying citizenship politics at the micro-sociological level. However, the basic ideas of our theoretical framework can be applied at various levels and in different circumstances. Struggles about national cultural boundaries can be observed in the early phase of the formation of a nation, but also after the achievement of a clearly definable nation-state, when the national elite continues to nationalise its territory and when opposing powers try to question the ways a nation is defined. A successful opposition can lead to a reformulation of the national self-understanding, the attribution of more autonomy to, or even the secession of a part of, the national territory. But citizenship and nationalism are not only about tumultuous events. Citizenship and nationalism can be much more banal and very close to everyday lives (see Billig 1995). In our case, we are probably somewhere between everyday nationalism, that might be so familiar to everyone that it is easily overlooked, and violent contestations of nationalist politics. Naturalisations are part of daily politics and constitute decision-making processes during which politicians have to come to an agreement on which criteria have be fulfilled to get a passport. Such processes can be observed at various levels in both federal and centralised states. As for Switzerland, we have seen in the introductory chapter that the large autonomy of municipalities, the distinct local political system and the relatively high ratio of foreigners make naturalisations a central political issue even in small municipalities. Switzerland thus provides a useful ‘laboratory’ to study decision-making processes, struggles over national boundaries and the practice of citizenship in clearly delimited fields. To be sure, Swiss municipalities are no nations. Yet, given the large competencies of Swiss municipalities in naturalisation politics, we can apply analyti-
cal instruments at the local level we would use in other countries at the national level.

Given the fact that local decision-making structures are not very much formalised, one has to look very closely at what happens in these municipalities. Detailed case studies and ethnographic work are therefore indispensable. However, too close a look carries the danger of not seeing the wood for the trees, especially when we do not know a lot about local naturalisations. Hence, it is necessary to approach our object of study from different perspectives to better grasp the complexity of local citizenship politics and to test our hypotheses with different data. We therefore decided to present naturalisation politics in four steps: first, by discussing data of a large-N analysis; second, by comparing quantitative data collected in fourteen case studies; third, by illustrating our arguments with qualitative data of four case studies; and fourth, by analysing individual data of local politicians. Combining quantitative and qualitative comparisons helps us frame qualitative data within a quantitative profile and put some qualitative flesh on quantitative bones (Tarrow 2004). Both our large-N analysis and our case studies aim at reconstructing the local naturalisation fields and at distinguishing the ideas of local actors and power-structures within municipalities. When we study the local naturalisation fields we will adopt a relational approach and resort to social network analysis in order to study the distribution of both symbolic and material resources in the social space of local citizenship politics. Concentrating our attention on both the systemic level, i.e. the local naturalisation fields, and the individual actors enables us to conceive of local politicians as both improvising and socialised individual beings. On the one hand, they contribute to the production and reproduction of the practice of citizenship and, on the other hand, their own understanding of citizenship is influenced by the prevailing naturalisation policy.

In what follows, we give a short overview of how we collected data to analyse our theoretical constructs. In order not to confound the reader, the detailed operationalisations will be discussed in the individual empirical chapters at the places where the respective data are used. In Chapter 4, we start out to set the stage by analysing data from a large-N survey in more than 150 municipalities. The aim of this first survey was twofold: on the one hand, it enabled us to collect important data that has not been available so far; on the other hand, data from this survey will help us specify the factors influencing naturalisations before we can fully apply our theoretical framework. Contrary to other studies (Piguet & Wanner 2000; Bolliger 2004), and because we are only interested in the attitudes of local politicians towards applicants for naturalisation (and not why they apply for citizenship), we preferred not to analyse the naturalisation rates but the rejection rates,
which depend exclusively on the way local politicians handle the applications for naturalisation. For each municipality we collected data on the number of rejected applications between 1990 and 2002. To obtain these data and further information on the formal aspects of local citizenship politics, the administrations of 207 municipalities have been contacted in the summer of 2003 to fill in a questionnaire. Despite the fact that citizenship politics constitutes a highly politicised issue, we did not face any major difficulties in obtaining the requested information: 78 per cent (N=162) of all 207 municipalities have responded and 74 per cent (N=154) provided us with their average rejection rates for the period between 1990 and 2002.

For the selection of the municipalities, we resorted to a dataset comprising data of three national surveys in all Swiss municipalities in 1988, 1994 and 1998 executed by Ladner and his colleagues (see, among others, Ladner 1991). This dataset provides important information on the socio-economic and political structures of nearly 80 per cent of all Swiss municipalities, which we used for our analyses. Since we have had almost no systematic information on local citizenship politics at our disposal, our only selection criterion was the size of the municipalities. We assumed that the ways according to which decisions are taken and opinions are formed are different in urban and rural areas. Accordingly, we first selected all municipalities in the dataset with more than 10,000 inhabitants (N=107). In addition, we randomly selected 100 municipalities among the remaining communities with less than 10,000 residents that are documented in the Ladner file.

As we will show below in detail, cultural and political factors are good predictors of the naturalisation policy that is pursued in a municipality, and socio-economic and socio-structural factors have no explanatory power. On the basis of these results, we have selected fourteen municipalities, in which we have executed detailed case studies (see Chapters 5 and 6). For this second phase of our study, we have selected the municipalities in a way to guarantee a large variety among the cases and to make sure that they are representative for the entire population of cases (King et al. 1994: 139-146; Collier et al. 2004: 94-95). For a small-N analysis, random selection is unwise, as we would run the risk of missing typical cases and/or end up with few or no variation on our dependent variable. We therefore selected the cases on both the dependent and the explanatory variables. Such a procedure bears some dangers, since it is easy to bias the results inadvertently. As King et al. (1994: 142) note, the most egregious error would be to select cases in which dependent and independent variables vary together in ways that are consistent with the hypotheses to be tested. To avoid this danger, we applied a ‘mixed-selection procedure’, according to which cases are selected in two steps (King et al. 1994: 143-144).
First, we have selected municipalities on the basis of the variation of the three variables that had a significant impact on the rejection rate in our large-N analysis. As we will demonstrate, a restrictive understanding of citizenship, high influence of the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) and popular votes lead to more rejections. As it appears in Table 3.1, we distinguished whether in the municipalities of our sample a restrictive or a generous understanding of citizenship prevails, whether or not the SVP is influential in local politics, and whether decisions are taken by the population by ballot, during a municipal assembly, or by elected politicians (a parliament or an executive body). We then regrouped all cases of our sample according to these three characteristics (see Table 3.1). For some groups, we disposed of none or only one case. In a second step, from each one of these groups, one municipality with a relatively high rejection rate and one with a relatively low rejection rate were selected. In view of the more detailed case studies in Chapter 6, the pairs of municipalities within each group were selected in a way to make sure that they are in the same canton and similar with regard to socio-structural factors. We thus end up with municipalities in which decisions are taken by the population at ballot (four cases), or during a municipal assembly (four cases), or by their representatives in the local parliament or the executive body (six cases). In seven cases, a restrictive understanding of citizenship prevails and, in seven cases, the attitudes towards foreigners is rather generous. In nine municipalities, the local section of the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) is powerful and, in five municipalities, it plays a rather minor role. Since we promised our interviewees complete anonymity and because we are not interested in naturalisation politics of specific municipalities, but seek instead to make some general statements about local citizenship politics, we decided to rename the municipalities. The first part of the new name refers to the canton of the municipality, while the second part in-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Understanding of citizenship</th>
<th>Influence of SVP</th>
<th>Formal decision-making procedure (rejection rates)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Popular votes</td>
<td>Municipal assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restrictive</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Schwyz (47%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Luzern (24%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generous</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>St. Gallen (11%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Aargau (13%)</td>
</tr>
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Table 3.1 Selected municipalities
icates whether the rejection rates in these municipalities are relatively high or low.

To get a clearer picture of naturalisation politics in our fourteen municipalities, we first analysed documents such as voting bulletins and regulations, the ‘grey literature’ from the local authorities and the local press. At the same time, we conducted expert interviews with representatives of the local administration to get to know better the local naturalisation processes and especially the role, influence and attitudes of the local actors. We also conducted expert interviews with representatives of the cantonal administration in the cantons in which our case studies are situated. This information allowed us to gain a more general view of the naturalisation politics in a certain region and to find out whether there are regional patterns of citizenship politics and whether there might be any external influences on the municipalities we were investigating.

Once we gained an overview of the respective local naturalisation policies between September 2004 and February 2005, interviews have been conducted with all actors that are involved in the decision-making processes. Depending on the size of the municipalities ten to twenty interviews have been carried out, mostly with the members of the local executive body, several members of the municipal parliament and the naturalisation commission, representatives of the local administration and representatives of political parties.

With the selected actors face-to-face, we carried out interviews by means of standardised questionnaires. 16 The interviews lasted between 45 and 90 minutes. To operationalise the individual understandings of citizenship, in the first part of the interview we asked questions concerning their personal attitudes towards the naturalisation politics of their municipalities and about different criteria that may or may not be relevant for naturalisation (open and closed questions). In the second part of the interview, they were asked to indicate which actors they were regularly in contact with and whether they share the same opinions with these actors. Moreover, we asked all interviewees to tell us which actors they judged to have some influence in the local naturalisation politics. These questions help us reconstruct the local power structures. In the third part of the interviews, we asked additional questions concerning their attitudes towards other policy domains or parts of social life that are related to questions of naturalisations. In the fourteen municipalities, we conducted 180 interviews. Only ten persons refused to participate.

The data collected in our fourteen municipalities are analysed in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. In Chapter 5, we will investigate naturalisations in a comparative perspective and present the construction of two crucial indicators, which will be of relevance throughout of the remaining
chapters: the individual understanding of citizenship (UC) and the relative power within a municipality an individual actors has. The understanding of citizenship will be measured by accounting for the attitudes towards eleven naturalisation criteria. While it will be revealing how large the variety of naturalisation policies can be, and how differently naturalisation criteria are applied, we also have to find out which are the majority positions and which attitudes play a minor role. By accounting for the contact structure between politicians and the relative degree of influence of each actor, i.e. the reputation a person enjoys in a political field, we will get a much clearer picture of the various policy fields and a more pertinent indicator to predict rejection rates.

Keeping a comparative perspective, Chapter 6 will allow us to look even closer at the individual decision-making procedures and at the different prevailing attitudes within four of our case studies. Using qualitative data, we will demonstrate how people think about the importance of various naturalisation criteria. Moreover, opinions on candidates from Muslim countries and the recent decisions of the Swiss Federal Court will help us understand to what extent local citizenship politics is discriminatory, how people with another cultural background are perceived, and whether local politicians consider naturalisation procedures as political rather than administrative procedures.

While Chapters 5 and 6 account for the entire local social structure and demonstrate to what extent individual actors contribute to the reproduction and production of the municipal naturalisation fields, Chapter 7 will concentrate on the individual level and investigate how the politicians’ attitudes are influenced by their social environment, i.e. how their habitus are shaped in the context of citizenship politics. Drawing on theories in social psychology and social network analysis, we will demonstrate that within a group of local politicians a cultural compromise might emerge on the question of who can become a Swiss citizen. Contacts with other actors during the decision-making processes are crucial when politicians exchange their views, try to convince others and alter their attitudes in the light of convincing arguments.
4 Explaining Rejection Rates

4.1 A first glimpse at rejected applications

Following the theoretical discussions in the two previous chapters two groups of arguments and approaches in the field of nationalism and citizenship studies will be challenged in the empirical part. First, our constructivist approach will be pitted against both essentialists’ and relativists’ reasoning throughout the following chapters. Second, this chapter more particularly contrasts our theoretical framework to perspectives that explain tensions and conflicts between ethnic and national groups as directly related to socio-economic and socio-structural conditions. Exponents of such approaches argue that situations of crisis for example caused by a high unemployment rate or that feelings of threat triggered for instance by a high ratio of immigrants or alien residents spark negative attitudes and movements against foreigners. By analysing data from our survey in 154 municipalities, those hypotheses will be tested against our argument that you can explain the outcome of naturalisation processes by political and cultural factors. More generally, this first empirical part helps us set the stage for the ensuing analyses and get a rough idea which direction we have to take in the next chapters to unveil the causal mechanisms with which we can explain citizenship politics. Looking at such a large group of municipalities does not enable us to study local citizenship politics in detail, but it permits us to sort out variables that have no explanatory power and to specify what has to be explained.

As we have already argued in the introductory chapters, data on local naturalisation politics in Switzerland – with the exception of our study – are virtually inexistent and limited to some few case studies describing the formal naturalisation procedures. To get a first impression of what is going on in these municipalities when it comes to decide whether a foreign resident might become a member of their community or not we have to resort to media reports. Since 1985, the Endowment against Racism and Anti-Semitism (Stiftung gegen Rassismus und Antisemitismus) in Switzerland has gathered, among other things, information on rejected naturalisation applications and racist statements in the context of citizenship politics reported by newspapers.
The national coverage of this collection of reports constitutes an ideal complement to our own survey, which for the sake of feasibility had to be limited to 154 municipalities and for which we were not able to collect data on individual rejections.

The presentations of these media reports are mostly very short but nonetheless allow us to get a glimpse of how and why naturalisation requests are rejected. Most articles report time and again similar incidences. The following fictive report could be a very typical article of this electronic archive on rejected naturalisation applications:

On 12 September 1999, the Swiss citizens of the municipality of X rejected almost all naturalisation requests of persons from the former Yugoslavia. Only the application of a young Muslim woman from Bosnia-Herzegovina has been accepted. All candidates from Italy, Portugal and Germany have been approved. A member of the local Swiss People’s Party (SVP) told the newspaper that the refused candidates were not integrated enough, did not take part in the communal life and often did not greet when you met them in the streets.

While persons from countries of the European Union normally are naturalised without any dissenting votes, candidates from the former Yugoslavia or from Muslim countries often face a lot of difficulties to be accepted. Religion seems to be a crucial factor since Catholics from Croatia, for example, are sometimes naturalised with less opposition. Girls and young women who were born in Muslim countries but have grown up in Switzerland have more chances to get a Swiss passport than their brothers and mothers. Young women are considered more integrated and more decent persons. Young men are sometimes rejected on the grounds that they are aggressive and speed around with their cars. Muslim women, who immigrated to Switzerland as adults, often speak the regional language very badly. When they wear the Muslim headscarf in public they arouse suspicion among the local population. It sometimes happens that they are refused citizenship while their husbands, who are better integrated as a consequence of their contacts to Swiss citizens at their workplaces, are naturalised. If any actors speaking against certain applicants are identified in the newspaper articles, they are members of the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) – a major populist right-wing party – or minor right-wing movements. It is rarely reported that representatives of left-wing parties speak in favour of such applicants. To justify their negative attitude towards candidates from Muslim countries, the SVP politicians often argue that those persons are very different from Swiss citizens and are not accustomed to the Swiss mentality, customs and traditions. If any justifications for re-
fusals are put forward at all, they are mostly kept very short and refer almost exclusively to the cultural and religious characteristics of the candidates. A last typical communality of the reported incidences is that candidates for naturalisation are exclusively rejected at popular votes at ballot or during a municipal assembly. No incidents are reported from municipalities where elected politicians decide on naturalisation requests.

Although these reports are kept very short, they allow us to dissect some crucial elements that we have to investigate in more detail in the following chapters: who are the actors influencing the naturalisation policy? Which are their attitudes towards citizenship in general and naturalisation candidates in particular? How do the formal procedures have an impact on the outcome of the decision-making processes? The dominant understanding of citizenship, i.e. the idea what makes a difference to be or to become a Swiss citizen, is certainly a crucial factor when it comes to establish criteria for naturalisation. A restrictive understanding of citizenship will be translated into higher barriers and entails a higher rejection rate. Given the political character of naturalisations in Swiss municipalities, we also have to account for the attitudes of the political actors who influence the decisions. Of particular interest is the role of local SVP representatives. The Swiss People’s Party is a crucial actor in naturalisation politics in Switzerland and the only major political force seeking to limit naturalisations and immigration. The formal decision-making structures are of importance insofar as they provide different opportunity structures facilitating or inhibiting mobilisations against naturalisation or the activation of discriminatory attitudes. In the last years, the political and judicial debates in the context of local naturalisation have mainly focused on those procedures in which the population makes the final decision on naturalisation requests by ballot or during a municipal assembly. It is argued that such procedures enable discriminatory decision because people do not have to render an account for their decisions.

Finally, we will also take a particular look at how candidates from Muslim countries are treated. An accumulation of negative reactions against persons from Muslim countries began in the mid 1990s when people from the former Yugoslavia gradually became the biggest group of naturalisation candidates. The examination of the newspaper articles shows that there were hardly any incidents of negative decisions reported before 1996. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s Switzerland witnessed an increase of immigration from the countries of the former Yugoslavia and from Turkey. Akin to the immigrants from Italy in the 1950s and 1960s, those migrants have met a lot of resistance among the Swiss population. Can we consider such incidents in the context of naturalisations as local clashes of civilisation? We will analyse below...
whether the ratio of applicants from those countries influences the naturalisation policy. If our hypotheses are correct such candidates do meet with more resistance not in those municipalities where a lot of persons from Muslim countries try to get a Swiss passport, but rather in those places where local politicians perceive them as a cultural threat; and conceptualisations of such a threat are expected to be very different from one municipality to another.

In the next part we will present competing approaches explaining tensions and conflicts between national and ethnic groups. We will argue that socio-economic and socio-structural factors have no direct impact but might be mobilised by political actors to legitimate their claims. In a second part we will discuss in detail the operationalisation of our dependent variable, i.e. the outcome of naturalisation processes. It will be argued that the rejection rate, i.e. the ratio between the submitted and rejected applications, constitutes a valid indicator since it only depends on the supply side, contrary to the naturalisation rate which is heavily influenced by the demand side. After a discussion of the variance of the rejection rates and the operationalisation of the independent variables, we will test the various hypotheses presented in the course of this chapter. It will be demonstrated that the rejection rate can to a large extent be explained by three variables: the local dominant understanding of citizenship, the strength of the local Swiss People’s Party and the formal decision-making procedures. No significant values could be obtained for the perception of the unemployment rate, the ratio of local alien residents and the ratio of candidates from Muslim countries. It will further be shown that our explanatory model explains even better the rejection rate of candidates from Muslim countries. In the concluding part we will address the question of whether there are regional clusters of municipalities with similar naturalisation policies.

### 4.2 Competing explanations

In the above-presented example of rejected naturalisations the representative of the local Swiss People’s Party (SVP) was reported to justify the rejection of most candidates from the former Yugoslavia with cultural and religious differences between Swiss citizens and foreign residents emigrated from Muslim countries. He held the opinion that such persons do not fit in their community. This statement is in line with our main hypothesis according to which the outcome of naturalisation processes can be explained by how the cultural frontiers are drawn within a municipality. This explanation stands in contrast to a whole group of grievance theories that stress the objective economic or socio-
structural conditions triggering xenophobic and discriminatory attitudes towards foreigners. The self-interest theory states that individuals develop negative affects toward others with whom they are in competition and conflict (for an overview see Horowitz (2000 [1985]: 105-135). Economic success of foreigners, firms seeking to replace highly-paid workers by cheaper ones or challenges to the dominant group’s exclusive claim to privileges may result in frustration, relative deprivation and prejudices (Blumer 1958; Bonacich 1972). The realistic group theory (Bobo 1983) argues that subordinate groups may be a threat to real resources and accepted practices of the dominant group. Prejudice is a response to collective threats against the real interests of the dominant group. However, it is often emphasised that individuals whose interests are not directly threatened may also express racial prejudice (Sears & Funk 1991) and that dominant groups may require immigration restrictions although they profit from the lower production costs (Quilllian 1995: 588). Therefore, Blumer (1958) and Quilllian (1995) argue that prejudice is not necessarily linked to the individual interests of group members but is rather the result of a feeling that their prerogatives are threatened by the subordinate group. This feeling of threat is largely influenced, according to Quilllian (1995), by both the relative size of the subordinate group and the economic circumstances of the dominant group (see also Blalock 1956, 1967).

In a similar vein, theories of internal colonialism and cultural division of labour explain antipathy against foreigners or ethnic groups by the combination of unequal industrialisation and cultural differences (Hechter 1975). According to these theories, economic disparities or neglect of certain regions by the dominant group lead to mobilisation and conflict, if the neglected group is segregated along ethnic lines. Horowitz (2000 [1985]) makes a distinction between ranked and unranked ethnic groups. The distinction is based on the coincidence of social class with ethnic origin. In ranked systems the two coincide and are therefore less stable and concerned with power and domination. Connor (1984) and Montlibert (1981) criticise the supporters of economical interpretations of nationalism and ethnic movements. They state that nationalist movements can emerge independently from any economic discrimination. There are enough examples of ethnic groups, for example the Catalans, requiring more autonomy although they are highly privileged regions. Often, secessionist movements originate in regions which would hardly be capable of survival or which even profit economically from the hitherto common state – as the Slovak part of the former Czechoslovakia demonstrates (Wimmer 2002: 99). On the other hand, not all economically or culturally neglected groups are the source of ethnic conflicts (Horowitz 2000 [1985]: 194). Hechter’s (1975) segregation theory is also refuted by the competition theories
(Bonacich 1972; Olzak 1982, 1992). According to this approach, not the segregation of ethnic groups, but confrontation and competition are causes of conflict. Bonacich (1972) argues that employers maintaining low labour costs by employing cheaper workforces encourage violence against other ethnic groups. Olzak (1992) expands on this subject, arguing that economic competition between ethnic groups leads to conflict. Competition for its part is the result of socio-structural changes undermining traditional local identities and opening the opportunity for ethnic identities. She enumerates four processes that influence competition and ethnic conflicts: large number of immigrations, economic crisis, augmenting resources of the ethnic groups and organisational structures (political parties and social movements). But, conflicts over jobs or housing frequently disappear as rapidly as they arise. Wimmer (2002: 99-100) argues that so-called socio-structural struggles are often less concerned with individual economic goods than with the political, legal and moral goods of the modern nation-state.

From our point of view, tensions or conflicts between ethnic and national groups are never the logical or direct consequence of socio-economic or socio-structural conditions. This does not mean, though, that such elements are completely irrelevant. Perception of threat and economic crisis might be two fundamental elements for the understanding of hostilities between ethnic groups, but their relation can only be explained by the framing processes conditioning the presence of perceptions of threat and conceptualising social causations. Stereotyping and discrimination are relatively open to manipulation and can be constructed by political entrepreneurs, if the latter manage to link them to specific issues. Watts (1997) sketches a model of xenophobia that easily visualises this argument. He distinguishes political xenophobia from potential xenophobia. By the former he understands a desire to discriminate, exclude, legislate against or persecute an out-group, whereas the latter could more generally be named affect or prejudice. Watts (1997: 76-77) elaborates on that second concept ‘that any form of affect (emotional response) such as prejudice or, in this case, xenophobia, exists in the individual and in the political culture as a response disposition – a potential for emotional reaction to social stimuli that can be called up or evoked by relevant social processes. It is not ever-present and it is not automatic; it is only a potential source of emotional and behavioural energy and requires activation before it becomes actual’. Such activation happens, for example, when a group of people is being convinced that foreign residents are responsible for their economic deprivation.

Of course, such activation cannot occur just by pushing the right button. One has to ask how and why people differ in their propensity to adopt negative out-group stereotypes, and why some are consequently
mobilised by political actors. First, it seems plausible that it is easier to mobilise people in regions with economical problems. Second and more important, the larger social context has to be accounted for. To that end, Watts (1997: 82-87) expands his model with what he calls the ‘environmental gradient’, which stands for the contextual factors that augment or dampen aggression or discriminating behaviour. Watts argues that the degree of political xenophobia is related to social inhibition forces, i.e. official mechanisms of repression and punishment of racist behaviour. In other words, xenophobic expression depends directly on the degree of social legitimisation of such discourses. In a similar vein, Koopmans et al. (2005) demonstrate that the success of right-wing parties mobilising against immigration can be explained to a large extent by discursive opportunity structures and dominant national understandings of nationhood. In their study right-wing parties appeared to be stronger and more radical in countries with an assimilationist citizenship policy and less legitimate in countries with a multiculturalist tradition. Similarly, pro-migrant and anti-racist mobilisation seems to be strongest not where the positions of the migrants are weakest but where citizenship models stand for an open and accessible nation.

All this reminds us that ‘threat’ cannot only be framed in economic but also in cultural terms. This becomes particularly relevant in the context of citizenship politics since naturalisation in modern nation-states is less related to economic interests than led by questions concerning national identity. Thus, it can be expected that mobilisation against naturalisation of foreign residents is more likely to be successful in municipalities where the attitude prevails among the Swiss population that they constitute a culturally homogeneous community. In other municipalities where the local cohesion is less pronounced or where a multiculturalist and/or egalitarian understanding of citizenship prevail, foreigners might not be considered a cultural threat. To understand how many and which applicants are naturalised, we need to account for the local discursive opportunity structures or what we call the prevailing local understanding of citizenship. Moreover, we have to find out whether there are particular influential political actors who defend a restrictive naturalisation policy and succeed in convincing the population or other politicians.

4.3 What is to be explained: the rejection rate

Before we can test the different hypotheses and measure the influence of the various explanatory factors on the local naturalisation policy, we have to specify what we are going to explain respectively how we opera-
tionalise our dependent variable, i.e. the outcome of naturalisation politics. At a first glance, the naturalisation rate, i.e. the ratio between the yearly number of naturalisations and the averaged foreign residents, appears to provide a useful indicator. These data have already been used in other studies on local naturalisation politics (Piguet & Wanner 2000; Bolliger 2004) and are easily accessible since they are provided by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office. However, the application of this indicator poses a problem as it depends on both the demand and the supply side. A low naturalisation rate might be explained by a restrictive naturalisation policy and/or because the demand on the part of the foreign population is low. Moreover, since the ratio is measured within the overall foreign-resident population, changes of the naturalisation rate might tell us more about the immigration flows (the denominator in the calculation) than about the desire of foreign residents to become naturalised (Ludwig 2004: 509-510; see also Bultmann 1999: 206-212). For the following analysis, however, we need an indicator that depends on the supply side only, for we are not so much interested in why somebody applies for the Swiss citizenship. We would rather like to know why in some municipalities the naturalisation policy is more restrictive than in others. Therefore, we propose to analyse the local naturalisation policy by means of the rejection rate that is the ratio between the rejected and the submitted applications. Once the applications are handed in, naturalisation candidates have no longer control over them; whether they are rejected or not depends entirely on the supply side that is the local citizenship policy.

Although the validity of this indicator is much better for what we seek to explain, it is not fully unproblematic for two reasons. First, it does not consider that certain candidates interrupt their applications during the procedure. It may happen that applicants are recommended to withdraw their dossier when it appears that they do not fulfil all criteria for naturalisation (often because of insufficient command of language). Unfortunately, we do not dispose of such information. In the interviews with the responsible officials at the local administrations it appeared that most municipalities do not exactly know how many dossiers are not passed through to the final decision. However, most of them told us that withdrawn applications are normally resubmitted some years later, for example, after candidates have improved their linguistic proficiency. As we analyse a relatively long period of twelve years, such applications should not strongly affect the validity of our indicator. Second, our indicator does not consider either that some alien residents might not apply because they do not expect to be naturalised in municipalities with a restrictive naturalisation policy. Such a deterrence effect is difficult to measure and could only be analysed by interviewing potential candidates who did not apply for the Swiss citizen-
ship. Such data has not been collected systematically so far, since studies analysing the reasons to acquire the citizenship of one’s host country have either left out this question or concentrated on freshly naturalised candidates.

Yang (1994) provides one of the most elaborate studies to explain the likelihood of citizenship acquisition in the United States. He incorporates in his analytical framework not only the immigrants’ individual characteristics, but also accounts for the larger social contexts in both the countries of origin and destination. In particular, he investigates whether the size of the immigrant community in the host country and the political, social and economic situation in the home countries influence the individual desires to apply for citizenship. Considering the individual factors, he demonstrates that higher education (however, only to a certain degree), higher social status, home-ownership, having children, being married and having served in the U.S. Armed Forces increase the likelihood for an application. Moreover, he confirms the urban concentration hypothesis predicting a positive association between the size of the immigration community and the likelihood of its members’ naturalisation (see also Bultmann 1999: 208-209). In such groups assimilation into a new culture is facilitated and members are provided with better information concerning the benefits, procedures and experience of naturalisation. As to the country-of-origin characteristics, the results suggest that unfavourable conditions in the home country have a strong influence on immigrants’ naturalisation decisions. Interesting as these results are, we do not learn whether the formal naturalisation procedure influences in any way one’s propensity to apply for citizenship.

In Switzerland, ethnographic studies not only investigated the motivations of potential candidates to apply for the Swiss citizenship, they were also interested in the factors leading candidates from the idea for applying to the actual application (Centlivres et al. 1991: 157-160; Achermann & Gass 2003: 173-179). Interestingly, they reveal that such decisions are not always consciously taken and cannot be explained by clearly distinguishable factors. Rather, they often seem to be accidental and the result of a combination of causal factors and specific circumstances. It was found that foreign residents often apply only after they accidentally acquired necessary information about the formal procedure or after friends or relatives have drawn their attention to the opportunity to naturalise themselves. These studies also discuss the discomfort naturalisation candidates have with some aspects of the procedure and reveal that some applicants experience the naturalisation procedure as exhausting, complicated and even humiliating to a certain extent. Although such information reveals attitudes of candidates towards the naturalisation procedure, those are the statements of persons
who were not deterred from submitting their application. They do not necessarily help us know whether or not and how many potential candidates did decide not to submit an application. On the other hand, however, these studies show that potential candidates seem to know the naturalisation procedures and how difficult it is to get naturalised because they are often in contact with persons who have already been naturalised. Therefore, one can assume that some people are deterred from submitting an application in municipalities with a restrictive citizenship policy. But it is unlikely that such a deterrence effect lowers the rejection rate since it cannot be assumed that the local decision makers would accept more applicants if such persons submitted a naturalisation request. On the contrary, it is likely that even more candidates would be rejected in municipalities with a restrictive understanding of citizenship, assuming that such deterred persons would constitute borderline cases. In this case, the rejection rate would be even higher in such municipalities and the difference between local settings with a generous and restrictive naturalisation policy even more pronounced.

Let us now take a closer look at the rejection rates of the municipalities in our sample. To make valid explanations, we have to be sure that there is enough variance in the dependent variable and that the differences of rejection rates are significant. This refers to a central aspect of this study, namely that we can observe different practices of citizenship within a nation-state. Not even the most orthodox essentialist or culturalist would assert that all citizens of a nation-state have exactly the same understanding of citizenship. To counter their arguments, it has to be demonstrated that the differences are significant. To that end, we have to ensure that high rates are caused by a relatively high number of rejected applications. Keep in mind that 50 per cent of the roughly 2,800 municipalities in Switzerland have less than 1,000 inhabitants. Consequently, the number of naturalisation applicants is very low in these municipalities. The rejection of one or two candidates would already have a high impact on the rejection rate. For example, in one municipality of our sample only four dossiers were submitted between 1990 and 2002, and one of them was rejected. Without looking in detail at this particular case, it would be too risky to conclude that this municipality pursues a restrictive citizenship policy by rejecting 25 per cent of the submitted applications.

Surprisingly, we found that in almost all municipalities where only up to ten applications were submitted between 1990 and 2002, none of them were rejected (Helbling & Kriesi 2004: 46-48; see also Piguet & Wanner 2000: 56-58). Does this mean that small communities pursue a more generous citizenship policy? Given the very small number of candidates, it is hard to tell, since the acceptation rate depends on very few individual cases. Of course, it might be that in such municipi-
lities foreigners are better integrated, as it might be assumed that they have more contact with the local population and get faster accustomed to local customs and traditions. Therefore, they meet with less resistance of the local population when they seek to become a full member of their municipality. However, an opposing argument is also quite conceivable. It might be that in such places of mostly rural character the municipal citizens are less willing to accept new members because they are less used to be in contact with foreigners and much sooner consider their municipality as a homogeneous community than citizens of larger towns do. Considering the small size of these communities, negative decisions are anticipated more easily and potential candidates deterred from submitting their dossiers.

To be sure that there are significant differences among the various rejection rates, we decided to sort out those cases in which less than ten applications have been submitted in the period under investigation from 1990 to 2002. These cases correspond roughly to the group of municipalities in our sample with less than 1,000 inhabitants. From the 154 municipalities that provided data on submitted and rejected applications, 48 cases are not considered for the following analyses. In the remaining 106 cases an average number of 336 applications was submitted, the standard deviation being 391. The rejection rate varies between 0 and 50 per cent, has a mean rate of 9.6 and a standard deviation of 10.6. We thus can be sure that the rejection rate varies a lot and that the variation is caused by a considerable number of rejected applications. Excluding cases with few applications for naturalisation entails of course that we cannot make any statements about citizenship politics in very small municipalities.

4.4 Operationalisation of the independent variables

Asserting that cultural and political factors explain the rejection rates and that the outcome of local citizenship politics is the result of ongoing struggles over the cultural boundaries of these communities implies that we take a closer look at the prevailing understandings of citizenship, the political actors implied in the naturalisation politics and the formal decision-making structures. To control for socio-economic and socio-structural factors, we will consider the perception of the unemployment rate, the per cent of local foreign residents in the local population and the share of naturalisation candidates from Muslim countries compared to all naturalisation candidates between 1990 and 2002.

The local understanding of citizenship is measured by means of municipal results of national referenda on aliens’ acts, immigration and
facilitated naturalisation between 1982 and 2002. These referenda provide information on the attitudes of the respective municipal Swiss population towards alien residents and on the significance of their national identity. If in a municipality laws on facilitated naturalisation are rejected and laws limiting immigration are approved, this indicates that the majority of Swiss citizens have a restrictive understanding of citizenship. We carried out a factor analysis with the yes-percentages of votes. The second resulting factor matched fairly well our conceptualisation of the understanding of citizenship and was therefore retained for the following regression analysis.

The nominal variable of the formal procedures has been transformed in dummy-variables. Remember that decisions are taken either by the entire population (at ballot or during municipal assemblies) or by elected politicians (by the local parliament or the executive body). In our analysis below we retained the variables for ‘popular votes by ballot’ and ‘municipal assemblies’ in order to test whether or not more candidates are rejected when the population takes the decision. As for the local political actors, we have only data at hand that provide us with information on the power of the local parties in municipal politics in general (and not for the domain of naturalisations in particular). This is a rather crude indicator, since the power structure within a municipality runs only partly along the party lines, as we will see in our case studies. However, it is the most valid indicator that we have at disposal for a large-N analysis. This indicator relies on the perception of the strength of the respective parties. The municipal secretaries have been asked for each political party to indicate how important they are. Laderner (1991: 237-238) has shown that the evaluations of the municipal secretaries are congruent with the real power distribution. Such an operationalisation is better than accounting for the seats of the different parties in the local parliament or the executive body insofar as the number of received votes does not necessarily reflect the power of these parties. Particularly in small towns and villages the position of individual actors is often more important than the size of the party. As for the unemployment rate, the secretaries of the local administrations have been asked to what extent their municipalities have been affected. Contrary to the effective unemployment rate, this operationalisation allows us to better measure the perception of the local economic situation that might also be influenced by the situation at the regional level. For the share of foreigners, we simply resorted to the percentage of the population living in a municipality that is of foreign origin. To account for the impact of the number of candidates from Muslim countries we resorted to the ratio between applications from immigrants from the former Yugoslavia and Turkey and all submitted applications.
4.5 Results

In the following paragraphs we will test the various arguments presented in the chapters above. Particularly, we would like to show whether the local rejection rates can be explained by cultural and political or socio-economic and socio-structural factors. Since we lack data for the relative power of political parties for a considerable number of cases, we retained only the variable for the influence of the Swiss People’s Party for the regression analysis in Table 4.1. More detailed analyses have shown that other political parties have no significant influence at all on the rejection rate. As we dispose of information of the strength of the SVP only for a restricted number of municipalities, we had to make sure that both the full and the restricted samples are part of the same population. Thus, we ran the regression analysis for both samples (see Models 1 and 2). Since it might be assumed that the power of the SVP has an influence on the local understanding of citizenship and formal decision-making procedures, the respective variable has been included separately in Model 3. The individual coefficients change only slightly between the three models. Therefore, it can be presumed that both groups are from the same population and that the indicator of the strength of the SVP has no significant impact on other variables.

So far, the results in Table 4.1 confirm our hypotheses and disconfirm competing explanation models: it appears that the perception of the employment rate, the ratio of foreigners living in a municipality and the ratio of applicants from Muslim countries have no direct influ-

Table 4.1 Rejection rates of all applications: Non-standardised regression coefficients, standard error in brackets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Popular votes at ballot</td>
<td>23.3*** (3.7)</td>
<td>26.2*** (4.3)</td>
<td>28.4*** (4.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal assembly</td>
<td>3.5 (2.3)</td>
<td>2.7 (2.7)</td>
<td>2.5 (2.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding of citizenship</td>
<td>3.3*** (1.1)</td>
<td>4.7*** (1.3)</td>
<td>4.6*** (1.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence of the SVP</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>5.4** (1.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate</td>
<td>0.0 (1.8)</td>
<td>0.2 (2.2)</td>
<td>0.0 (2.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio of foreign residents</td>
<td>0.0 (0.1)</td>
<td>0.0 (0.1)</td>
<td>0.0 (0.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio of Muslim candidates</td>
<td>4.3 (3.7)</td>
<td>2.2 (4.2)</td>
<td>0.0 (4.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.8 (3.2)</td>
<td>3.7 (3.6)</td>
<td>0.3 (3.6)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R² (adj.) 0.43 0.50 0.55
N 103 74 74

Notes: Level of significance: ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Only municipalities have been retained in which at least ten applications were submitted between 1990 and 2002. We lost three cases in Model 1 because data for one or several independent variables were missing (listwise deletion).
ence on the naturalisation policy. Rather, political and cultural ele-
ments help us predict the outcome of naturalisation policies: in muni-
cipalities with a restrictive understanding of citizenship among the po-
pulation more applications are rejected. Moreover, it is demonstrated
that we have to account for the dominant actors and their attitudes:
municipalities in which the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) is an influential
force in local politics refuse more persons the Swiss citizenship.

The rejection rate increases immensely when the entire population
takes decisions by ballot, which confirms the commonly held opinion
that direct democratic decisions lead to a more restrictive naturalisation
policy. However, we observed no significant increase of rejected candi-
dates in municipalities in which the population decides in municipal
assemblies. This can be explained by the fact that in municipalities
with votes by ballot the individual decisions are taken in complete
anonymity, whereas in municipal assemblies one’s show of hands is ex-
posed to other citizens. But what about those assemblies at which deci-
sions are taken by closed ballot? With the data from this survey we are
unfortunately unable to distinguish such cases and to systematically in-
vestigate this aspect. But anticipating our case studies of the next chap-
ters allows us to shed some light on this question. In our sample of
case studies we have four municipalities where decisions are taken dur-
ing local assemblies: in two of them always by open ballot and in the
two others always or sometimes by closed ballot. In the former two
hardly any candidates were rejected during our period of investigation,
whereas the latter two constitute cases with a relatively high rejection
rate. Table 4.2 lists the fourteen case studies in descending order of the
rejection rates and for the sake of comparison juxtaposes them with
the formal procedures. Having more detailed information about the de-
cision-making processes at hand, we can distinguish the municipalities
in which decisions in municipal assemblies are taken by closed or
open ballot. We immediately see that in municipalities in which deci-
sions are taken by popular votes or during municipal assemblies by
closed ballot feature higher rejection rates than the other cases. A bi-
variate analysis of the variables ‘rejection rate’ and ‘decisions by closed
ballot’ reveals a relatively high correlation ($r=0.7, p<0.006$).\textsuperscript{11}

The fact that anonymous decisions can have an impact is illustrated by
one municipality in which decisions are often but not always taken by
closed ballot. In this municipality it has happened in recent years that
individual citizens requested the decisions be made by closed ballot.
Each time the request was accepted, all applications of citizens from
Muslim countries that were up for decision were rejected. During other
assemblies, when the population voted by open ballot, almost no candi-
dates were refused. A representative of the administration of this mu-
nicipality told us that the persons who demanded a vote by closed ballot were known as quite xenophobic and normally did not attend the local assemblies. The exceptional appearance of such ‘extreme voices’ at these two particular assemblies provided an opportunity for a majority of the population to reject applicants from Muslim countries. It seems that in this municipality during the municipal assemblies – with the exception of the two votes by closed ballot – the social control avoided not only discriminatory decisions but also requests for votes by closed ballot.12

Another case provides a similarly revealing example. In this town, the municipal parliament decided on naturalisation applications until 1999, when the majority of the population voted in favour of a referendum, launched by a right-wing party, which required that henceforth decisions should be made by closed ballot. This change of procedure generated a lot of media attention and public debates in Switzerland, since after the change the population of this particular town regularly took discriminatory decisions refusing most or all candidates from Muslim countries. Decisions by closed ballot can also be an issue in local parliaments. In one of our case studies, the local SVP successfully instituted a requirement in 1998 that decisions of the parliament were no longer to be taken by open ballot. They argued that some deputies preferred not to expose their views to colleagues and the media. Unfortunately, our data does not allow us to verify if this change of procedure had an effect on the rejection rate.

Although our data clearly reveal that decisions by closed ballot have a high impact, we consider the formal procedure as an opportunity structure and not as a factor that automatically leads to very high rejec-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rejection rate (%)</th>
<th>Formal procedure</th>
<th>Decisions by closed ballot</th>
<th>Degree of dissatisfaction with decisions of Federal Court</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 47</td>
<td>Popular vote</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 29</td>
<td>Municipal assembly</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 26</td>
<td>Popular vote</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 24</td>
<td>Popular vote</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 22</td>
<td>Parliament</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 15</td>
<td>Executive body</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 13</td>
<td>Municipal assembly</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 11</td>
<td>Popular vote</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 11</td>
<td>Parliament</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 5</td>
<td>Executive body</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 2</td>
<td>Parliament</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 1</td>
<td>Municipal assembly</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 1</td>
<td>Municipal assembly</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 0</td>
<td>Parliament</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
tion rates (see Helbling 2008). Generally, it can be argued that decisions by closed ballot enable more restrictive and even discriminatory decisions because they do not have to be justified. However, it depends after all on the attitudes of the local population whether restrictive and discriminators decisions are taken or not. To have an effect, an opportunity not only has to be provided, it also has to be grasped by xenophobic actors. As one of our case studies shows, where most decisions are taken during municipal assemblies by open ballot, decisions by closed ballot do not necessarily lead to a higher rejection rate. In the past it happened several times in this municipality that representatives of the SVP required that decisions be made by closed ballot. While their requests were accepted each time no candidates were rejected during these assemblies.

Interestingly, in municipalities in which all or most decisions are taken by closed ballot another understanding prevails of what it means to become Swiss. While the various understandings of citizenship will be addressed in more detail in the next chapters, we would like to emphasise one particular aspect, which is directly related to the formal procedure. In contrast to cases where decisions are taken by the local parliament, the municipal executive body or, during assemblies, by open ballot, the influential actors in the other municipalities defend the positions that, first and foremost, naturalised Swiss citizens become members of their local community. Therefore, they prefer the entire population taking decisions by closed ballot. This explains why a majority of politicians in these municipalities did not welcome the verdicts of the Swiss Federal Court, which in July 2003 and May 2004 decided that popular votes and decisions by closed ballot during municipal assemblies violate the Swiss constitutions. Table 4.2 reveals that in all municipalities in which decisions are taken by closed ballot, half or more of the local actors are unsatisfied with these decisions. The correlation between these two variables is very high ($r=0.83$, $p<0.000$). In the other municipalities only a minority is against the principles required by the Federal Court. As we will see in more detail in Chapter 6, politicians opposing the decisions of the Federal Court argue that the local population should decide according to which procedure and criteria alien residents should be naturalised. They clearly consider naturalisations as political decision-making procedures the outcomes of which do not have to be accountable to others. It thus seems that diverging attitudes are hidden behind the formal procedures applied in the various municipalities.

We have seen above that many incidents and controversies in the context of local naturalisations refer to a particular group of people, namely the increasing number of immigrants from the countries of
the former Yugoslavia and Turkey. A look at the data from our survey shows that 36 per cent of all applications in Swiss municipalities between 1990 and 2002 were submitted by people from those countries. When it comes to the number of rejected dossiers, the ratio of these people rises to 56 per cent. This makes clear that the majority of rejections concerns candidates from Muslim countries. Thus, it should be tested whether or not the models in Table 4.1 mainly explain the rejection rates of applications of candidates from Muslim countries.

The results of this test are presented in Table 4.3. It immediately becomes clear that our explanatory model predicts the number of rejected applications of candidates from Muslim countries even better than the general rejection rate. The explained variance rises to 66 per cent in Model 3. Looking at the individual coefficients it appears that the value of the indicator for popular votes at ballot increases strongly, although it is already relatively high in Table 4.1. The coefficients of the other explanatory factors – the understanding of citizenship and the influence of the SVP – do not change a lot. This reveals that candidates from Muslim countries face a particularly hostile naturalisation procedure in municipalities where the entire population decides on such requests. Popular votes not only entail a restrictive naturalisation policy but are also the cause of discriminatory decisions against candidates from the former Yugoslavia and Turkey. We have also tested our hypotheses for all rejected applications without those of candidates from Muslim countries (results not shown here). As we expected, the individual coefficients and the explained variance are very low. Concerning the level of significance of the coefficients, however, we observed the same pat-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Popular votes at ballot</td>
<td>44.5***</td>
<td>51.3***</td>
<td>53.2***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5.0)</td>
<td>(5.3)</td>
<td>(5.3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal assembly</td>
<td>3.9 (3.0)</td>
<td>1.4 (3.3)</td>
<td>1.3 (3.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding of citizenship</td>
<td>2.0 (1.4)</td>
<td>4.1* (1.5)</td>
<td>4.0** (1.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence of the SVP</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>4.5* (2.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate</td>
<td>0.4 (2.5)</td>
<td>1.1 (2.7)</td>
<td>0.9 (2.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio of foreign residents</td>
<td>0.0 (0.1)</td>
<td>0.0 (0.1)</td>
<td>0.0 (0.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio of Muslim candidates</td>
<td>9.0 (4.9)</td>
<td>6.1 (5.2)</td>
<td>4.3 (5.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.5 (4.2)</td>
<td>3.7 (4.5)</td>
<td>0.8 (4.7)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R² (adj.)                           | 0.52        | 0.64        | 0.66        |
N                                   | 103         | 74          | 74          |

Notes: Level of significance: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Only municipalities have been retained in which at least ten applications have been submitted between 1990 and 2002. We lost three cases in Model 1 because data for one or several independent variables were missing (listwise deletion).
tern as in Tables 4.1 and 4.3. It can be concluded that the proposed explanatory model explains the rejection rates for different groups of naturalisation candidates and is a particularly good predictor for the number of rejected candidates from Muslim countries.

4.6 External influences I

One important aim of this chapter has been to get a first idea in which direction we can find causal mechanisms explaining citizenship politics in Swiss municipalities. It helped us to set the stage for more detailed discussions in the following chapters. We were able to demonstrate that the outcome of naturalisation policies is influenced by cultural and political factors. Thus, it appeared that we mainly have to look into how people think about citizenship and in which way political actors influence the decision-making processes. This is in line with our hypotheses according to which we have to account for conceptualisations of nationhood and political struggles over cultural boundaries in order to understand how many and which foreigners are accepted in a nation. Although we speak of ‘cultural factors’, we clearly delineate our theoretical framework from culturalist approaches by relating those ‘cultural factors’ to political processes. Indeed, the results in Table 4.3 point to particularly high tensions between Swiss citizens and foreigners from Muslim countries. Rejection rates increase exceedingly when the population takes the decisions. This confirms other studies that revealed that the accommodation of migrants from Muslim countries poses particular problems to European nation-states (Koopmans et al. 2005: ch. 4). But this has nothing to do with a clash of civilisations. The study by Koopmans et al. (2005) has shown that first, groups demands by migrants are much lower as is often preached by culturalists and, second, that the intensity of group demands by Muslim immigrants varies a lot between different countries and depends on the respective citizenship models. The idea of a homogeneous Swiss culture defending itself can also be rejected when we take a closer look at our case studies. As we will see in the next chapters, migrants from Muslim countries are perceived very differently from one municipality to another.

In the meantime, we would like to deal with a further important question. We demonstrated above that municipalities indeed autonomously decide according to which criteria and procedures foreigners can acquire the Swiss citizenship. Only very few cantonal and national regulations interfere with the local naturalisation policy. Therefore, a high variation of local citizenship politics can be expected. Though, this does not necessarily exclude any regional clusters. This question is of
crucial importance since we have to know whether local naturalisation processes are isolated events or are influenced from the outside. It is often put forward that the population of the French speaking part of Switzerland has another relationship with its nation and with its foreigners than the population of the German speaking part, both being inspired by the German and French understandings of nationhood, respectively. The often evoked trench between these two language regions, when it comes to questions about the political opening towards Europe, could also be relevant in citizenship politics. Consequently, it may be argued that municipalities in the French part of Switzerland are inspired by the French republican citizenship model and thus pursue a more generous naturalisation policy than Swiss German municipalities being influenced by the German ius-sanguinis principle.

Model 1 in Table 4.4 reveals, however, that the chances of becoming a Swiss citizen do not significantly change between these two language regions. More detailed analyses have also shown that there is no significant difference between the Italian and German speaking municipali-

**Table 4.4  External influences: Non-standardised regression coefficients, standard error in brackets**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
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<tr>
<td>Language region</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.2)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(3.0)</td>
<td>(3.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural municipality</td>
<td>6.8*</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.1)</td>
<td>(2.6)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of inhabitants</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0)</td>
<td>(0.0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular votes at ballot</td>
<td>28.3***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.4)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Municipal assembly</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.6)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding of citizenship</td>
<td>4.7***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence of the SVP</td>
<td>5.9**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.1)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio of foreign residents</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio Muslim candidates</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.4)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.0)</td>
<td>(1.4)</td>
<td>(1.4)</td>
<td>(5.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$ (adj.)</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Level of significance: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Data for ‘Rural Municipality’ are drawn for Andreas Ladner’s dataset (see Ladner 1991).
ties. In Table 4.4 the influence of the degree of urbanity and the size of the municipalities is also tested. The number of inhabitants has no impact at all on the local citizenship policy (Model 3). While it appears in the bivariate analysis that rural municipalities reject significantly more applicants than towns (Model 2), this influence completely disappears when we control for the factors discussed above (Model 4).

Although there seem to be no regional clusters, it is not improbable that local actors copy practices from neighbouring municipalities or that contacts to other actors in the same region influence peoples’ attitudes. We will come back to this question at the end of the next chapter, which presents naturalisation politics in fourteen municipalities in more detail.
5 Comparing Local Citizenship Models

5.1 Introduction

Having confirmed in the preceding chapter that naturalisation politics can be explained with political and cultural variables and that socio-economic and socio-structural factors have no explanatory impact, in the following chapters we will analyse in more detail the local struggles over the definition of cultural boundaries. Relying on data collected in fourteen case studies, we are now going to study the national self-understandings of local politicians in relation to the criteria they establish to select candidates for naturalisation. Besides the symbolic and cultural aspects of citizenship within our municipalities, we will also account for the local influence structures, which will enable us to distinguish dominant discourses from minority discourses. By describing in this chapter the variety of citizenship policies and the prevailing conceptions between municipalities, the relevance of this study once again will be underscored and some more flesh will be added to the bare-bones analytical arguments sketched out above.

More generally, this chapter aims at disaggregating the concepts of citizenship and nationalism in order to show that they can have various meanings in different situations and in different places. Going beneath the national level enables us to rectify the results of various empirical studies which have shown that despite its linguistic and religious diversity, Switzerland, in general, demands a relatively high assimilation from naturalisation candidates (Koopmans et al. 2005: 35-41; Giugni & Passy 2006: 60-63). This chapter and those that follow will illustrate that all kinds of citizenship politics can be observed in Switzerland, and that it oversimplifies the facts to put Switzerland in one specific category. By going to the municipalities and speaking to local politicians, we followed Eric Hobsbawm's (1990: 10) advice that nationhood cannot be understood when we study the official regulations by themselves but only when we account for the ideas and interests of ordinary citizens. By analysing local decision-making processes, we will also come closer to the idea that naturalisation policies in these local settings constitute political fields, as conceptualised by Bourdieu, in
which struggles over the cultural boundaries of these communities are going on.

This chapter also lays out the basis for the next two by presenting indicators for the understanding of citizenship and the degree of influence of each local actor. By means of the ‘reputational approach’ borrowed from the community power studies, we will detect the political capital of each local politician. By means of social network analysis and more specifically block-modelling, we will be able to trace the structures of the policy fields of naturalisation politics in our fourteen municipalities. After the construction of the two main indicators – understanding of citizenship and influence – we will then test whether it makes a difference or not to account for power structures when we measure the influence of the understanding of citizenship by the ratio of rejected applications. In line with our theoretical arguments, it will be shown that it does not suffice to solely retain the attitudes of the local decision makers.

In the concluding part of this chapter, we will then come back to the question of external influences. Although we gained the impression during the collection of our data that hardly any exchange exists between municipalities with regard to citizenship politics and that discourses at the local level are sometimes little influenced by the debates led at the national level, one element could be detected that is common to all our case studies, which points to the fact that all fourteen municipalities belong to the same nation-state: when it comes to the question of what local politicians are most proud of about Switzerland, a majority of each municipality mentioned Swiss direct democracy and the high degree of liberty which people in this country enjoy.

5.2 Understandings of citizenship

To use municipal results of national referenda on aliens’ acts, immigration and facilitated naturalisation for the operationalisation of the local national self-understanding, as we have done in the previous chapter, is, admittedly, a rather crude proceeding; however, it is the best that could have been done with the data we had at our disposal for such a large-N analysis. Having spoken to 180 local politicians, we are now in position for a more pertinent operationalisation. As we already know, each municipality establishes naturalisation criteria independently. The federal law on citizenship merely stipulates that only those foreign residents can be naturalised who have lived in Switzerland for at least twelve years, respect the legal order, do not compromise the interior and exterior safety of the country and are integrated and familiar with the Swiss habits and customs. The first three constitute quite clear cri-
teria that are easy to verify and are always controlled by the federal administration.

As for the questions of integration and familiarity, not only do they constitute vague requirements, they are judged exclusively by local politicians and the municipal administration. Given the fact that virtually no formal or written regulations exist at the local level and, in line with our earlier plea for a cognitive approach, we rely exclusively on the attitudes of local decision makers towards naturalisation criteria to establish an indicator that informs us about the prevailing understandings of citizenship. Since we are only interested in the processes of becoming a full member, this operationalisation of the understanding of citizenship does not take into consideration cultural group rights or the legal status of foreign residents as other studies have done (see Tilly 1995; Koopmans et al. 2005).

Which criteria are applied? How do local politicians evaluate applications? In the example of rejected applications presented above, we have come to know that the representative of the local Swiss People’s Party (SVP) justified the refusal of almost all candidates from the former Yugoslavia by their lack of integration, their unwillingness to take part in the municipal life and their bad manners in everyday life. Several aspects are addressed here, which are often relevant when it comes to naturalising foreigners: when is a person integrated enough to become a new member of a nation? Does integration mean being familiar with the basic social rules or does it require an active participation in the new society? Is a naturalised person primarily a citizen of Switzerland or of his or her municipality? The general position of the SVP (at the national level and in most municipalities) is very well illustrated by this example. How do other local politicians think about naturalisation, and which are the prevailing positions in our case studies? To find answers to these questions we confronted local politicians with a range of naturalisation criteria. The revealed attitudes show how cultural boundaries are drawn in relation to how high the barriers are set for accepting new members.

Unfortunately, there exists no pertinent theoretical framework for selecting and classifying naturalisation criteria. Howard (2006: 446-447) classifies citizenship policies according to three criteria: (1) whether or not jus soli is granted, i.e. whether children of non-citizens who are born in a country’s territory can acquire the country’s citizenship; (2) the minimum length of residency requirement for naturalisation; and (3) whether or not naturalised immigrants are allowed to hold dual citizenship. For Howard (2006: 446-447), these three criteria constitute the most general elements of a country’s citizenship policy: They capture the two main modes of citizenship acquisition (by birth and by naturalisation), as well as the primary deterrent that can potentially dis-
courage immigrants to naturalise even if they are eligible (dual citizenship). While these three elements can certainly be considered as crucial aspects of naturalisation regulations, there are more relevant criteria. Without giving any specific justifications, Koopmans et al. (2005: 35-41, 52-54) further retained three criteria for their classification of naturalisation policies: (1) welfare and social security dependence as an obstacle to naturalisation, (2) privileged access to nationality for co-ethnics and (3) knowledge of the national (or regional) language. Contrary to Howard (2006: 446-447, 452n22), who classifies countries along a restrictive-liberal range according to the number of criteria that have to be fulfilled, Koopmans et al. (2005) make a qualitative distinction and use their criteria to find out whether a country pursues an ethnic or rather a civic-territorial citizenship policy – whether it is committed to respectively, cultural monism or cultural pluralism. We have already discussed the analytical ambiguities of these concepts in Chapter 2. Treating concrete naturalisation criteria makes this distinction even more problematic. Take, for example, ‘knowledge of the national or regional language’. For some, this is clearly a cultural requirement, which accepts only those belonging to an ethnic group who speak the native language of the group. However, one might also argue that it constitutes a criterion for structural integration in countries with a civic-territorial citizenship model, since the command of the national or regional language is crucial for participating in economic and social life. As for the ‘welfare and social security dependence’, it is even less clear how the application of this criterion tells us anything about whether a country defends an ethnic or rather a civic-territorial citizenship policy. In line with our theoretical arguments and akin to Howard (2006), we prefer to argue for a difference of degree in regard to the effect of different criteria: the more criteria have to be fulfilled, the more restrictive is a naturalisation policy and the more closed is the social closure mechanism of citizenship. Since we had no analytical framework at hand, we have simply chosen criteria, which often come up in debates about naturalisation in Switzerland to generate an indicator for the understanding of citizenship. Attitudes towards the following eleven criteria were collected:

1. Required degree of integration or assimilation;
2. Required language knowledge;
3. Required knowledge of Swiss history and the Swiss political system;
4. The right for Muslim women to wear a headscarf in public;
5. Allowance of dual citizenship;
6. Required membership in local associations;
7. Unemployment as an obstacle to naturalisation;
8. Social security dependence as an obstacle to naturalisation;
9. Disability insurance as an obstacle to naturalisation;
10. Facilitated naturalisation for the second generation;
11. Facilitated naturalisation for the third generation.

The criterion of residency is not considered for our analysis as it is regulated at the national level and thus constitutes a constant for all our cases.\(^4\) The same is true for the allowance of dual and facilitated naturalisation (the latter being regulated at the cantonal level). As these criteria are regularly and violently discussed at the local level, the attitudes towards these criteria are nonetheless revealing for capturing the local understandings of citizenship. As Switzerland has no provisions for the naturalisation of co-ethnics (neither at the federal nor at the regional and local levels), this indicator is not being considered, either.

Table 5.1 lists the aggregated values of each indicator for each municipality as well as a summary index for each municipality (UC) in the last column. All indicators and the summary index constitute the arithmetic means of the individual attitudes and the individual indicators, respectively. Taking the arithmetic mean has the advantage that the composite measure has the same scale as the individual indicators and can therefore be interpreted in the same manner (see Roller 2005: 71-72). The cases are listed in ascending order of the prevailing understanding of citizenship (UC) in the last column and the individual indicators, in ascending order of their means. The eleven indicators have been standardised so that each one varies between ‘0’ (generous) and ‘1’ (restrictive). To make it clear from the outset, the range of variation between generous and restrictive understandings of citizenship help us compare the prevailing attitudes in our fourteen municipalities. However, we will not be able to judge the various positions in relation to any absolute standard. For example, when a municipality scores 0.2 on the summary index, one can say that its citizenship policy is half as restrictive as the one of another municipality scoring 0.4. But we do not know whether the first municipality can be considered by some abstract theoretical or normative standard to be very generous in naturalisation politics.

When aggregating individual indicators into a composite measure, one has to decide whether they should be weighted equally or differently. In the latter case, the weighting needs to be justified either theoretically or empirically. As we simply chose the eleven indicators on grounds of naturalisation criteria, which seem to be regularly applied, we propose no theoretical framework by which to judge which indicators should be considered more important than others. What about empirical weighting? This is typically done by factor analysis, which is a value-neutral technique. Choosing this alternative, we are, however, confronted with the questions of what these weights mean and
Table 5.1 Attitudes towards naturalisation criteria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipalities</th>
<th>Integration/assimilation</th>
<th>Naturalisation 2nd gen.</th>
<th>Naturalisation 3rd gen.</th>
<th>Muslim head-scarf</th>
<th>Dual citizenship</th>
<th>Disability insurance</th>
<th>Local association</th>
<th>Unemployment</th>
<th>History and pol. system</th>
<th>Social security</th>
<th>Language knowledge</th>
<th>UC (Summary Index)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bernlow</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.17</td>
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<td>.67</td>
<td>.50</td>
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<td>.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
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<td>.22</td>
<td>.33</td>
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<td>.22</td>
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<td>.78</td>
<td>.78</td>
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<td>.19</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.31</td>
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<td>.31</td>
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<td>.29</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.21</td>
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<td>.06</td>
<td>.41</td>
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<td>.25</td>
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<td>.51</td>
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</table>

| Range                | 0-.40                    | 0-.40                   | 0-.50                   | 0-.80             | 0-.66 - .73      | 0-.80 - .80        | 0-.14 - .75     | 0-.14 - .80 | 0-.21 - .80          | 0-.20 - .51     | 0-.20 - .51        |
| Mean                 | .08                      | .17                     | .19                     | .32               | .35             | .35                 | .36              | .45         | .49                  | .59             | .80                | .38               |
| Std. Dev.            | .11                      | .12                     | .14                     | .21               | .22             | .15                 | .18              | .17         | .22                  | .18             | .19                | .10               |

Notes: All indicators vary between ‘0’ (generous) and ‘1’ (restrictive). The cases are listed in ascending order of the prevailing understanding of citizenship (UC) in the last column. The individual indicators are listed in ascending order of their means.
whether the individual politicians ascribe them the same importance (Carley 1981: 80). A further problem is that the resulting factor loadings can only be interpreted if we make use of a social model or expert opinions. Although we gained the impression during the interviews that certain criteria are ascribed more importance than others by certain individuals, it is obvious that different criteria seem to be crucial for the various actors in the fourteen municipalities. As we make use of no theoretical or analytical framework to regroup the individual criteria, they are equally weighted.

Now let us have a brief look at the individual criteria. We will not only discuss the meaning of each indicator, but also show how strongly they vary from one municipality to the other (standard deviation and range) and in which municipalities they vary at either a rather restrictive or generous level, taking the mean of the summary index of the understanding of citizenship (UC) as a dividing line (0.38; see Table 5.1).

1. Integration/assimilation: As our interviews have revealed, even the most generous politicians require a minimal degree of integration. This is hardly surprising in the light of our earlier argument according to which people incessantly organise themselves in cultural groups. The question of course remains how integrated a foreigner has to be or whether one has even to assimilate him-or-herself to the culture of his or her new home-country. ‘Integration’ and ‘assimilation’ have become delicate concepts and are defined differently in the academic literature. We prefer to make a difference of degree rather than of principle. While ‘integration’ means that a person finds his or her way in the most important social domains of the new country without giving up his or her own culture, ‘assimilation’ stands for a complete absorption by the new cultural environment. As Table 5.1 shows, for all but one municipality integration is for the most part enough. The indicator varies not very strongly at a relatively low level, both its mean and its standard deviation being relatively low and small. This may be explained by a certain shift in the use of these two notions. In Switzerland today, hardly anybody speaks of ‘assimilation’ when it comes to naturalisation. The same is true for the official use of these notions. In 1991, the national law on citizenship replaced the notion of ‘assimilation’ by ‘integration’. ‘Assimilation’ is seen even by a lot of right-wing politicians as too extreme. They argue that nobody can completely discard his or her former culture. Whether this change of usage of the two expressions also means a change in attitude is doubtful. Politicians from left-wing and right-wing political parties will hardly mean the same when they speak of ‘integration’. Nonetheless, it is
still surprising that only fourteen out of 180 local politicians in our sample prefer that candidates be assimilated.

2. *Language knowledge*: Basic knowledge of the national language is a minimum requirement for naturalisation in every country. The same holds true for Switzerland: almost all interviewees agreed that some minimal knowledge of at least one of the three national languages is necessary to manage the most important situations in everyday life. This also appears in Table 5.1: the indicator for language knowledge varies at a very high level. For the large majority of municipalities in our sample, this indicator scores the highest among all criteria. This confirms that even for persons with a rather generous understanding of citizenship, basic knowledge of language is important. It is thus rather interesting to look at requirements that go beyond basic language knowledge. While some argue that it suffices that candidates speak one of the three national languages in Switzerland (since nobody would require from a Swiss citizen to learn another language when he or she moves to another language region), some politicians in the German part of Switzerland require that candidates speak Swiss German without which foreigners could not pretend to be really integrated.

3. *History and political system*: While opinions on ‘integration’/‘assimilation’ and language vary either on a very low or a relatively high level, attitudes toward knowledge about Swiss history and the Swiss political system vary even more, ranging from a relatively low to a relatively high level, and thus appearing to be more controversial. In most municipalities, candidates have to pass a more or less formalised test on Swiss history and the Swiss political system. During the interviews, applicants are often asked questions about the most important events in Swiss history, the principles of a democracy, or the names of the seven ministers in the Swiss government. Sometimes candidates have to prove their knowledge about history of the canton where they live or the political structure of their municipality. While for some this is a crucial criterion, others argue that even Swiss citizens would often fail such tests. Critics often hold the position that such tests make the Swiss naturalisation procedures particularly difficult to pass. Interestingly, in Switzerland knowledge about the political system is considered as much more important than knowledge about history. For many left-wing and right-wing politicians, it is for example crucial that future citizens understand the democratic principles in this country. To a certain extent, this reflects the often expressed idea that for Swiss, their national identity is mainly a political one (Kriesi 1998a: 5-23).
4. **Muslim headscarf:** The increase of immigration from the countries of the former Yugoslavia and Turkey throughout the 1980s and 1990s have led to violent debates about the integration of people from Muslim countries. Discussions often focus on elderly Muslim women who are in general less integrated than their husbands or their children due to a certain lack of contacts with Swiss citizens. Moreover, they are much more quickly stigmatised than other Muslims, as they often wear the Islamic headscarf in public and thus clearly demonstrate their religious affiliation. The headscarf is not such an important issue in Switzerland as it is in France and Germany (see, however, Ossipow 1998; Gianni 2005a: 357-363). Nevertheless, some politicians are bothered by the public ostentation of religious symbols. If they emphasise the importance of the liberty of religion, at the same time they defend the position that in public foreigners have to adopt Swiss ways. Once, a local right-wing politician told us that he actually would like to ask each candidate from a Muslim country if he or she would commit him-or-herself to the Bible or the Koran in a ‘case of doubt’. He then could not tell us what he understood by a ‘case of doubt’. However, he added that of course he could not ask such a question since religious freedom was an important individual right in Switzerland. Attitudes towards the ‘Islamic headscarf’ indicate whether persons practising another religion can become member of one’s own community. As Table 5.1 reveals, attitudes vary a lot between municipalities with a generous and those with a restrictive national self-understanding. Opinions regarding this matter are less restrictive than requirements with regard to knowledge about Swiss history and the Swiss political system.

5. **Dual citizenship:** Right-wing politicians often argue that people who belong to a religious group other than Christian are not familiar enough with Swiss norms and culture and thus do not identify themselves enough with this country. If that is so, how about people who prefer to keep their old nationality when they become Swiss? Is it possible that individuals feel at home in two countries? Politicians with a restrictive understanding of citizenship cannot imagine having two nationalities since, according to them, every person can identify only with one nation-state. In Germany, for example, it is still (at least officially) impossible to have two passports. In Switzerland, dual citizenship has been allowed since 1992. Although local politicians have no right to reject applicants who want to keep their old passports, in some municipalities candidates are regularly asked whether they would abandon their old nationality if they were naturalised and, if not, for what reason they preferred to have two
passports. For some, such questions allow the authorities to verify whether candidates really identify with Switzerland. In municipalities where decisions are made during local assemblies by the entire population, it may happen that individual citizens ask the members of the naturalisation commission whether certain candidates are ready to abandon their old nationality. In other municipalities, such information about the individual candidates is specified in booklets, which are sent to all households in the run-up to a municipal assembly. In six of our case studies, the majority of local politicians would prefer that candidates give up their old nationality, the mean of this indicator being above 0.38. In the remaining municipalities dual citizenship seems to be widely accepted.

6. **Membership in local associations**: As we have already seen, some politicians require a strong identification not only with the Swiss nation but also with the municipality where candidates live. Some of our interviewees see their municipalities as a community where all citizens should participate in social life. Candidates are often asked during the interviews with the naturalisation commission or representatives of the municipal authorities whether they are members of a local association in which Swiss also participate. At the beginning of a naturalisation procedure, it may sometimes happen that candidates are advised to join a local association in order to increase their chances of becoming Swiss citizens. While some see such a membership as an important step towards integration, others argue that even many Swiss are not members of any local association. In our sample, the majority of politicians in five municipalities prefer that applicants join local associations.

7. **Unemployment, social security and disability insurance**: For a lot of politicians it is not irrelevant whether applicants benefit from social security, from disability insurance or are unemployed. During our interviews some actors sometimes referred to cantonal or municipal regulations requiring that candidates have to financially keep themselves or their families. If most politicians agree on this principle, the interpretations of what this really means diverge. For some, candidates benefiting from social security or from being unemployed are considered unable to financially support themselves and their families. Others argue that financial problems or the loss of a job can happen to anybody, and that such persons are very capable – with the help of the state – of supporting themselves. As a matter of fact, foreign residents who have worked in Switzerland have the same social rights as Swiss citizens whether they are naturalised or not (see, however, Howard 2006: 445). Nonetheless, some right-
wing politicians argue that ‘real’ Swiss can do without the help of the state and that those people only immigrated to Switzerland to profit from the social security system. According to these politicians, such freeloaders should not be rewarded by granting them Swiss citizenship. A comparison between these three criteria — social security, disability insurance and unemployment — shows that different importance is attributed to them. In twelve municipalities of our sample, being unemployed and/or benefiting from social security is considered a problem for naturalisation. In regard to disability insurance, we get a different picture. In ten municipalities, the majority of politicians are rather generous with such people. In the course of our case studies, we received the impression that many local politicians think that losing a job or not having the money to support his or her family is self-inflicted. On the other hand, we were often told that to be involved in an accident that limits one’s working abilities could happen to anybody.

8. **Facilitated naturalisation for the second and third generations:** The nine criteria we have presented so far can be applied each time a decision is made about an application. It may be that considerations about certain criteria are not explicitly made. As we have seen, for example, candidates must not be refused for the simple reason that they prefer to keep their old nationality, as this right is guaranteed by the Swiss citizenship law. Nonetheless, this aspect is sometimes taken into consideration when decisions are made. As for the last two criteria, the situation is slightly different: laws on simplified naturalisation exist only at the cantonal level. Local decision makers are hardly ever confronted with the question of whether young applicants who have been born or have attended part of their school years in Switzerland should profit from a facilitated naturalisation procedure. Nonetheless, opinions on these questions allow us to verify whether or not local decision makers think that young adults who have lived and gone to school in Switzerland can be considered integrated enough for naturalisation. Opinions are very diverse on this subject. For some, applicants who have spent most of their life in this country can be considered Swiss citizens. It is often argued that these adolescents have almost no relation any more with the former home country of their parents. Some, in fact, find it discriminatory to assert that people strongly identifying themselves with their Swiss environment have no political rights. In some few Swiss municipalities, all applicants that have lived for at least twelve years in this country are automatically considered integrated enough: applicants no longer have to prove their degree of integration; rather, opponents to an individual naturalisation have to show that candi-
dates do not fulfil this criterion. For other politicians, having lived in Switzerland for a certain time does not tell them anything about how familiar these persons are with Swiss culture. They argue that even adolescents who have been born in Switzerland may be socialised mainly in the cultural environment of their families. The average positions towards these two questions score in most municipalities below our 0.38 benchmark, and the standard deviations are relatively low compared with the other indicators. It thus seems that the majority of politicians in all our case studies are in favour of facilitated naturalisation. This is rather surprising, as during our project two national referenda on these two issues have been rejected by a majority of the Swiss population.

The attitudes towards these eleven naturalisation criteria enable us to generate an indicator for each actor on how generous or restrictive his or her understanding of citizenship is. This indicator will be used extensively in Chapters 6 and 7. In this chapter, we are more interested in the aggregated indicator of both local subgroups and the entire municipalities, i.e. the summary index in the last column in Table 5.1. Interestingly, this new indicator for measuring the overall understanding of citizenship of all local politicians correlates relatively highly with our first indicator, which has been generated for the large-N analysis on the basis of results of national referenda (r=0.69, p=0.006). The positions of the local politicians thus appear to be in line with the attitudes of the people they represent. Moreover, we can be sure now that the first measurement of the understanding of citizenship is a rather good operationalisation even though it does not directly account for individual attitudes.

As Table 5.1 displays, a whole range of understandings of citizenship can be observed. For the sake of illustration let us briefly look at the two extreme cases. In Bernlow, the municipality with the most generous understanding of citizenship, hardly anybody requires that candidates be assimilated, give up their old nationalities, or become members of a local association. For the large majority, it does not pose a problem when women wearing the Muslim headscarf apply for Swiss citizenship or that young foreign citizens profit from facilitated naturalisation. When a candidate is unemployed, benefits from disability insurance, or is not very familiar with the political system in Switzerland, only a minority opposes his or her application. On the other hand, when someone does not speak the regional language very well or benefits from social security, it becomes difficult for him or her to become a Swiss citizen. At the other end of the scale of our fourteen municipalities, the situation looks much different. While the majority of the decision makers in Aargau high finds that integration is enough for natur-
alisation and sees no problems in facilitating the procedure for young candidates who have been born or went to school in Switzerland, all other criteria feature relatively high values.

5.3 Structure and influence

Needless to say, various attitudes on naturalisation politics can be found in each municipality. How do we know then which ones prevail when it comes to making decisions on naturalisation applications? Could it be that the average values in Table 5.1 are distorted by extreme attitudes of politicians who are not very influential? To get a clearer picture of the prevailing attitudes, we have to find out who the actors are who influence the decision-making processes. In other words, the importance of a specific discourse can only be detected if we know who uttered it, in which situation and which position the bearer of an opinion has within an influence network. According to Hajer (2005), there are two steps to measure the influence of a discourse: first, we have to look at whether it is used by a given social unit to conceptualise the social world. Second, we have to verify whether a specific discourse solidifies into institutions and organisational practices. Since we deal with municipalities where few practices are institutionalised, it will be almost impossible to detect dominant discourses simply by looking at the formal procedures and regulations; nor is it very promising to take into consideration only the functions of the communicators of certain discourses. Instruments borrowed from social network analysis and community power studies constitute better and more useful means to reveal the influential actors and therefore the dominant understandings of citizenship.

In the study of power relations and social influence in local settings, two main theoretical traditions can be distinguished: community power studies and social network analysis (Helbling, Egli & Matter 2005). In the community power studies that have emerged in the 1950s and 1960s in the U.S., three classic approaches for data collection and analysis have been developed that are still applied in contemporary studies. The positional approach states that power is attributed through hierarchies and formal positions held by individuals in a political, bureaucratic, or economic system (Mills 1956). According to the decision-making approach, one might identify the elite by detecting the actors intervening in particular decision-making processes (Dahl 1961). Influential actors either are able to implement their own problem-solving strategies or they may successfully block the propositions of others. The reputational approach enables researchers to determine the local elite based on an assessment of the political, economic and social actors by
local insiders (Hunter 1953). The subjective perceptions of these insiders constitute the main source of information. A strength of this approach is the consideration that power bases can translate into direct interpersonal influence only if they are perceived as influential. The disadvantage of this approach is, however, that the evaluation relies on subjective assessments. Real influence is not measured and there are no criteria for the selection and the number of ‘insiders’ to be interviewed.

More recent studies began to combine these three approaches (Lauermann & Knoke 1987; Knoke et al. 1996). By means of the positional and decision-making approaches, the important actors are identified. The reputational approach, on the other hand, enables researchers to further reveal who the more informally powerful actors are, as well as to elicit who the most influential among the involved actors are. Once all the involved actors are identified, everyone is asked whom he or she considers as the most influential actor. The most often mentioned persons are then regarded as the most powerful ones. In a similar vein, we first identified the involved actors by the positional and decision-making approaches and then located the degree of influence of each local politician by means of the reputational approach; this approach comes closest to our definition of powerful actors in terms of Bourdieu’s concept of political capital. Accordingly, those individuals are influential who succeed in convincing others of their interpretation of the world and who are perceived by others as the legitimate holders of power. The construction of the indicator of political capital is based on data collected in our face-to-face interviews. We asked all interviewees to indicate all actors from the list they thought to have some influence in the naturalisation politics of the respective municipalities.8 Then they were asked to indicate the three most important actors and out of these three the one they considered to be the most influential. For the index, we summed up the number of times an actor was mentioned as being influential. Persons among the three most influential actors received an additional point and those who were mentioned as the most important actors, two additional points. This indicator was then standardised so that the most important actor in the respective municipalities received the value ‘100’.

Interesting as it is to look at the actors individually, it is even more interesting – and more revealing – to look at the entire structure of a municipality, by defining the actors’ relative positions in the contact network and by revealing groups of actors with similar positions. In social network analysis, the perspective that power is mainly a relational construct has gained in importance in the last decades (see Knoke 1990). In order to discern the important actors, the conviction prevails that it has to be observed how the actors bring each other into account,
and it is argued that the influence of an actor depends on his or her contacts with others and his or her position in the network (Bourdieu's social capital). By accounting for all ties between actors, we can go beyond their party affiliations and formal functions in political bodies and get a clearer picture of the entire political field. In this way, we will be in a better position to situate the various discourses and controversies.

As a complement to classic community power studies, several research projects in the 1970s began to study local power structures in Germany and the U.S. by means of instruments borrowed from social network analyses (Laumann, Marsden & Galaskiewicz 1977; Laumann & Pappi 1973). Other studies analysed the influential actors within a specific national or local policy domain (Laumann & Knoke 1987; Knoke, Broadbent & Tsujinaka 1996). In such issue networks (Heclo 1978) or policy networks (Van Warden 1992), different actors collaborate in a thematically delimited field. The network approach allows for widening the mere state-centred perspective of politics by including actors and organisations that are not formally involved or institutionalised. In a similar vein, the organisational state approach (Laumann & Knoke 1987; Knoke et al. 1996) assumes that modern states cannot be considered any more as autonomously negotiating actors but rather as conglomerate of interacting public and private actors, (e.g. Sciarini 1996; Serdu¨lt 2002). Such a perspective is helpful especially for studies in local settings, since it can be assumed that there are a lot of informal contacts and that a large range of different actors may exert influence (e.g. Ladner 1991: 236-258).

Social network analysis not only allows us to account for relationships between actors, it also provides different instruments for regrouping individual actors and for defining their relative position in a group. A useful instrument that will be applied for the analysis of our case studies is block-modelling (Wasserman & Faust 1994: 394-424). A block is a group within an adjacency matrix that displays structurally equivalent actors. Recall that by structural equivalence we mean that actors are substitutable. In our case, such actors have the same patterns of relationships with third persons. This does not mean, however, that structurally equivalent actors have any direct ties to one another. In this sense, block-modelling has to be distinguished from the analysis of cliques, by which we can identify groups whose actors are all connected. The disadvantage of analysing cliques is that it is based only on first-order relations and does not allow us to find out where those groups or their constituent parts are situated in the structure of the network. A clique may consist of both rather isolated and very well-connected actors. On the other hand, by identifying structurally equivalent actors, all the contacts of all the actors and hence their relative positions in the network are accounted for. Given the fact that these ac-
tors are connected to exactly the same nodes, they are identical with respect to all structural variables and indicators of centrality (Borgatti & Everett 1992: 7). This implies a certain cohesion or proximity between structurally equivalent actors, as they are in the same part of the network (Borgatti & Everett 1992: 9). Moreover, structurally equivalent persons tend to have similar attitudes because they interact with the same kind of persons (Burt 1978: 199). Whether the obtained blocks really can be considered as issue networks, i.e. groups of actors that pursue a similar policy, can be decided by looking at the characteristics of the constituent actors. As a matter of fact, we observed that the various blocks of our municipalities are relatively similar in their understanding of citizenship. Party members with differing attitudes are re-grouped in different blocks. We can therefore conclude that, on the one hand, our structurally equivalent blocks are groups of actors who discuss matters of local naturalisation politics with the same people and thus dispose of similar information and are exposed to the same attitudes of third persons. Information on ties between actors has been collected in our face-to-face interviews. Each interviewee had to indicate with whom he or she had been in regular contact to discuss matters of local naturalisation politics.  

Table 5.2 lists the blocks of all fourteen municipalities of our sample and thus enables us to get a clearer picture of the municipal power structures. By means of the CONCOR method, we have divided the actors of each municipality into four blocks. In three cases less than four blocks result from the calculations because groups of actors that are structurally completely equivalent, for obvious reasons, cannot be divided. In St. Gallenhigh (case 8 in Table 5.2), for example, all actors are connected to each other; no subgroups can therefore be found. For each block, we have listed the party affiliation of their members and calculated the indicators for the degree of influence and the understanding of citizenship by averaging the values of the individual actors of the respective blocks. The municipalities are listed in descending order of their rejection rates (indicated in brackets) and the blocks within each municipality, in descending order of their degree of influence. As for the party composition of the individual blocks, it appears that in many cases the two most influential blocks are composed of politicians from both left and right wing parties. An exception is Bernlow (case 14 in Table 5.2), where the powerful blocks 1 and 2 are composed of either Social Democrats or Liberals. On the other hand, in no municipality are all politicians of the same party part of the same block. These two observations confirm our earlier caveat according to which local power structures cannot be strictly traced along party lines (cf. Ladner 1991: 252-256). As it turns out, resorting to social network analysis and community power studies is highly useful for finding influential actors, as
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Block models</th>
<th>Blocks</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Political parties</th>
<th>Influence</th>
<th>UC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Schwyzhigh (47%)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>SP, SVP</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>SVP, CVP, FDP, Admin.</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>SP, Grüne</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>SVP, CVP</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. Dev.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Bernhightwo (29%)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>SP, SVP, Admin.</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>SP, SVP</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. Dev.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Schwyzlow (26%)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>SP</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3 CVP, SP</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2 CVP, FDP, SP</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3 SVP</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. Dev.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Luzernhigh (24%)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3 SVP, Grüne, FDP</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2 FDP, CVP</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2 FDP, 2SP, SVP, CVP</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.31</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>SVP, SD, FDP</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. Dev.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Bernhigh (22%)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3 FDP, 2 SVP, SP, 2 Admin.</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3 SP, Grüne</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2 FDP</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>EVP, SVP</td>
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<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. Dev.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Neuchâtelhigh (15%)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>SP, PL</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2 SP</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>0.09</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>SP, SVP, PL, FDP, Grüne</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. Dev.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>39</td>
<td>0.09</td>
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Table 5.2 Blockmodels (continued)

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<th>Blocks</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Political parties</th>
<th>Influence</th>
<th>UC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7. Aargauhigh (13%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>FDP, SVP, EVP, SP, Admin.</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
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<td>2 SVP, PA</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>SP</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>SP, Grüne</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. Dev.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 8. St. Gallenhigh (11%) |   |                                    |           |     |
| 1           | 8 | 3 FDP, 2 CVP, SP, 2 Admin.        | –         | 0.39|
| Std. Dev.   |   |                                    |           |     |

| 9. Zurichhigh (11%) |   |                                    |           |     |
| 1           | 7 | 2 SVP, FDP, SP, CVP, 2 Admin.    | 57        | 0.47|
| 2           | 6 | 2 SVP, 2 FDP, EVP, Grüne         | 33        | 0.32|
| 3           | 2 | SP, Grüne                        | 33        | 0.27|
| 4           | 2 | 2 SVP                            | 19        | 0.48|
| Std. Dev.   |   |                                    |           | 0.11|

| 10. Neuchâtel (5%) |   |                                    |           |     |
| 1           | 3 | POP, SP, PL                        | 50        | 0.12|
| 2           | 3 | POP, SP, Grüne                     | 25        | 0.27|
| 3           | 1 | SP                                | 25        | 0.18|
| 4           | 5 | SP, Grüne, SVP, PL, FDP           | 18        | 0.27|
| Std. Dev.   |   |                                    |           | 0.07|

| 11. Zurichlow (2%) |   |                                    |           |     |
| 1           | 5 | SVP, EVP, CVP, SP, Admin.         | 27        | 0.42|
| 2           | 6 | 3 SVP, 2 FDP, SP                 | 22        | 0.50|
| 3           | 7 | 3 SP, 2 CVP, FDP, SVP            | 13        | 0.28|
| 4           | 2 | 2 SVP                            | 12        | 0.82|
| Std. Dev.   |   |                                    |           |     |

| 12. Aargaulow (1%) |   |                                    |           |     |
| 1           | 9 | 3 SP, AF, CVP, SVP, FDP, Admin.  | 73        | 0.37|
| 2           | 2 | CVP, SP                          | 33        | 0.25|
| 3           | 2 | Admin.                           | 33        | 0.58|
| 4           | 1 | SP                               | 20        | 0.18|
| Std. Dev.   |   |                                    |           | 0.18|
we thereby do not start from any prior assumptions about the distribution of power.

If our hypotheses are correct, the influential blocks in municipalities with a high rejection rate should feature high values for the understanding of citizenship. Inversely, municipalities in the lower half of Table 5.2 should be dominated by groups with a rather generous understanding of what it means to become Swiss. Moreover, actors with opinions strongly diverging from the general naturalisation policy should be part of third and fourth blocks, which normally have little influence. In this regard, block 4 in Zurichlow (case 11) and Aargaulowtwo (case 13), as well as block 3 in Aargaulow (case 12) are very good examples: they are composed of actors with little influence who have a very restrictive understanding of citizenship in municipalities that hardly reject any applicants.

Skimming over Table 5.2 does not immediately confirm the assumption that the average attitudes of the most influential blocks predict the rejection rates. There are even cases which seem to clearly contradict our hypothesis: in the first and third cases in Table 5.2 — in Schwyz-high and Schwyzlow — the first blocks feature very low values, which are caused by two Social Democrats, who have a very generous under-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Blocks</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Political parties</th>
<th>Influence</th>
<th>UC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13. Aargaulowtwo (1%)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>SP, FDP, SVP, EVP, 2 Admin.</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2 FDP, SP, SVP</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2 SP, FDP, Grüne</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>SVP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. Dev.</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 14. Bernlow (0%) | 3 | 2 SP, Admin. | 51 | 0.16 |
| 2 | 5 | 4 FDP, Admin. | 45 | 0.22 |
| 3 | 3 | EVP, SVP, FDP | 7 | 0.32 |
| 4 | 1 | SVP | 0 | 0.19 |
| Std. Dev. | 26 | 0.07 |

Abbreviations: Understanding of citizenship (UC), Liberal Party (FDP) and (PL), Christian Democrats (CVP), Social Democrats (SP), Swiss People’s Party (SVP), Green Party (Grüne), Evangelical People’s Party (EVP), Politarena (PA) (local right-wing association close to the SVP), Agenda Femina (AF) (local left-wing association), person in charge of naturalisations at the local administration (Admin.). Scales of indicators: ‘Influence’ varies between ‘0’ (no influence) and ‘100’ (very influential). ‘Understanding of citizenship’ varies between ‘0’ (generous) and ‘1’ (restrictive).
standing of citizenship and who have been declared as the most influential actors by the other politicians of their municipalities. This is rather surprising, as these two municipalities clearly pursue a very restrictive naturalisation policy. One might of course argue that the rejection rate would be even higher if these Social Democrats did not intervene in local naturalisation policies. As a matter of fact, these two politicians are politically very active – however, rather from the outside and through their political functions at the cantonal level, since they are not formally involved in local politics. It appeared that they are not very well connected to other local politicians and that they do not directly participate in local naturalisation politics. It is thus doubtful whether they exert any real influence. It seems that these two persons were chosen as very influential by their colleagues because of their regular public appearance, rather than due to any real influence they have on the outcome of local decision-making processes. This reveals a problem we sometimes encountered while doing our face-to-face interviews: for some interviewees, very active colleagues were considered as dominant actors, even though they have never substantially influenced the local naturalisation policy (cf. Windisch 1976: ch.2).

Having briefly presented and discussed for our fourteen case studies the two central indicators for the analysis of local citizenship struggles and naturalisation fields – the understanding of citizenship and the power structure – we are now in a position to systematically study their impact on the outcome of decision-making processes in the context of naturalisations. Recall that in the large-N analysis in the previous chapter, we operationalised these two concepts by the understanding of citizenship of the entire population and the degree of influence of political parties in local politics. For our fourteen municipalities, we have data at hand for a more pertinent operationalisation, enabling us to distinguish ‘power ideas’ (Bourdieu): for each decision maker who is involved in local citizenship politics we know how he or she thinks about citizenship and how influential he or she is in this policy domain (political capital).

There are two strategies to test whether the distribution of power ideas has an impact on the outcome of policy processes: We account either for the degree of polarisation or simply for the most influential actors (cf. Van Waarden 1992: 36; Rhodes & Marsh 1992: 198-199; Kriesi et al. 2006). Let us start with the first strategy. In the theoretical part, we argued that the struggles over applications for naturalisation lead to cultural compromises, i.e. a consensus on which criteria have to be fulfilled. This consensus might of course be more or less strong. If it is very strong, one might expect a naturalisation policy that is very restrictive, very generous, or somewhere between these two extremes, depending on the prevailing attitudes. When the consensus is low, we
additionally have to account for whether the political structure is very polarised or not (whether there is equal distribution of power between adversary groups or not). When one group monopolises the power, we can expect that the rejection rate will be in line with the convictions of the most influential group. When we have two or more powerful groups with opposing understandings of citizenship, we should expect rejection rates at the medium level, as the groups have to compromise. To measure the degree of consensus (related to understanding of citizenship) and the degree of polarisation (related to influence) we resorted to the standard deviations listed in Table 5.2. While we cannot expect any specific rejection rates in municipalities in which either a high consensus or no polarisation exists, we expect modest values in highly polarised municipalities. As Table 5.3 reveals, however, we cannot confirm this hypothesis. In every group – and especially in group 2 – rejection rates vary from very low to very high.

Following our second strategy for analysing the impact of the power structures, we simply account for the attitudes of the elite. We hypothesise that the average understanding of citizenship of the very influential actors helps us predict the rejection rates better than the average attitudes of all actors involved in the decision-making processes. By means of regression analyses, we compare the impacts of the average values of the most powerful groups (see most influential blocks in Table 5.2) and the average attitudes of all actors (see Table 5.1).13

Having few cases does not present a statistical problem as far as the basic assumptions of the classical normal linear regression model are concerned (see Gujarati 2003: ch.10; Goldberger 1991: 248-250). It is decidedly important that the number of observations is greater than the number of regressors and that there is sufficient variability in the

### Table 5.3  Polarisation and concentration of power structures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Std. dev. UC</th>
<th>Std. dev. influence</th>
<th>Expected rejection rate</th>
<th>Groups</th>
<th>Municipalities (rejection rates)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very low</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Neuchâtellow (5%), Bernlow (0%), Bernhightwo (29%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium 2</td>
<td>Zurichlow (2%), Aargauhigh (13%), Aargaulowtwo (1%), Schwyzlow (26%), Schwyzhigh (47%), Luzernhigh (24%), Zürichhigh (11%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>– 3</td>
<td>Aargaulow (1%), Bernhigh (22%), Neuchâtelhigh (15%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: St. Gallenhigh is not listed, as we found only one block of actors in this municipality. The mean of the standard deviations of the understanding of citizenship is 0.13. Cases with a standard deviation below 0.09 are considered being highly consensual (group 1). As for the distribution of power (std. dev. influence) cases are divided at its mean value of 17.
values taken by the regressors. Further potential problems lurk in the facts that small-N regression analyses lead to big standard errors and that individual cases can easily distort general results. Since the effects of the independent variables are highly uncertain when we have only a limited number of cases, a large standard error ensures that we do not jump to conclusions, since we need much more data to reap significant results (Goldberger 1991: 248-250). Thus, if the t-values are low, we might too quickly accept the null hypothesis. Conversely, if the number of observations is small and we still obtain statistically significant results (even if they are significant at a low level), we can be sure that we have confirmed our hypotheses. The impact of individual cases is a more serious problem. As we have shown, however, we have carefully selected a representative sample of cases (see Table 2.1). Moreover, we are in the position to compare our results with alternative analyses. As we shall see, the results from the fourteen case studies confirm to a large extent the findings of our large-N in Chapter 4. Thus, we can be sure that the results presented below are not distorted by individual cases.

In Table 5.4, the impacts of the unweighted (all actors) and weighted local understandings of citizenship (very influential actors only) can be compared (see Models 1 and 2). One immediately sees that accounting for the powerful actors predicts much better the outcomes of citizenship policies: whereas the coefficient of the second indicator is highly significant, the first one is significant only at a relatively low level. Moreover, the weighted UC explains the variance of rejection rates much better. When in Models 4 and 5 we control for the perception of the employment rate, the ratio of foreigners living in a municipality and the ratio of applicants from Muslim countries – operationalised as in Chapter 4 – the influence of the unweighted understanding of citizenship decreases and is no longer significant. On the other hand, the coefficient of the weighted indicator remains stable and is still significant. Comparing Models 4 and 5 reveals again that more variance is explained when information about the influence structure is included. These findings demonstrate that accounting for the power structures gives a much clearer picture of which criteria are relevant and which citizenship policy is pursued. We further observe that the unemployment rate and the number of Muslim candidates have no significant impact on the rejection rates. As for the ratio of foreign residents living in a municipality, the results are ambiguous. Contrary to the results we have got from our large-N analysis, the negative sign seems to indicate that fewer candidates are rejected in municipalities with a large foreign population. In Model 6, the coefficient is significant at the 0.1 level.

As we have seen in Chapter 4, the formal decision-making structure also has an enormous impact on the rejection rate. Our large-N ana-
The analyses in Tables 4.1 and 4.3 have shown that municipalities in which the entire population makes decisions in naturalisation matters by ballot reject many more applications than others (see also Helbling 2008). Taking into account only the fourteen case studies, a bivariate analysis revealed that not only decisions that are made by popular votes but also those made by closed ballot during municipal assemblies lead to much higher rejection rates (see Table 4.2). The impact of this modified variable (accounting for both popular votes and decisions by closed ballot during municipal assemblies) is also tested in Model 3 of Table 5.4: in municipalities in which decisions are made anonymously, almost 20 per cent more applicants are rejected. The impact of this indicator is highly significant and explains much more than the weighted understanding of citizenship (Model 2). However, when we control in Model 6 for other variables, it is no longer significant; its coefficient strongly decreases and the degree of explained variance becomes smaller than when we include the indicator for the weighted understanding of citizenship (Model 5). Unfortunately, the two variables ‘weighted understanding of citizenship’ and ‘decisions by closed ballot’ cannot be included in the same model as they are highly correlated ($r=0.67$, $p=0.009$). This is probably due to the fact that the variable ‘decisions by closed ballot’ not only informs us about the formal structures but also contains information about the attitudes of local politicians. As we have already seen in Table 4.2, local politicians in municipalities in

Table 5.4  Rejection rates of all applicants in fourteen municipalities: Non-standardised regression coefficients, standard error in brackets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unweighted understanding of citizenship</td>
<td>0.71° (0.35)</td>
<td>0.51 (0.42)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weighted understanding of citizenship</td>
<td>0.61** (0.26)</td>
<td>0.60* (0.29)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decisions by closed ballot</td>
<td>19.81** (6.02)</td>
<td>13.51 (8.51)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate</td>
<td>0.08 (0.13)</td>
<td>0.12 (0.11)</td>
<td>0.03 (0.11)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio of foreign residents</td>
<td>-0.84 (0.52)</td>
<td>-1.06* (0.48)</td>
<td>-0.41 (0.52)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio Muslim candidates</td>
<td>0.23 (0.20)</td>
<td>0.21 (0.17)</td>
<td>0.18 (0.19)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-11.17 (13.69)</td>
<td>-8.65 (10.82)</td>
<td>7.03* (3.94)</td>
<td>5.40 (19.86)</td>
<td>4.57 (14.70)</td>
<td>11.85 (14.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$ (adj.)</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Level of significance: ° $p<0.1$, * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$. 
which decisions are made anonymously disapproved the verdicts of the Swiss Federal Court, declaring such procedures to violate the Swiss constitution. In such municipalities, the opinion prevails that their population constitutes a homogeneous group, which should have the competence to decide who becomes member of their community. Accordingly, both indicators in Models 2 and 3 include information on the attitudes of local politicians.

In the previous chapter, we have demonstrated that our explanatory model explains the rejection rate of candidates from Muslim countries much better than the general ratio. We have got similar findings for the comparison of the fourteen case studies in Table 5.5. When we replace the dependent variable, all coefficients of the explanatory variables strongly increase. As for the ‘understanding of citizenship’ we observe the same patterns as in Table 5.4: The coefficient for the unweighted understanding of citizenship decreases and is no longer significant when we include control variables. On the other hand, the coefficient of the weighted understanding of citizenship does not change and remains significant at the 0.1 level (Model 5). In line with the results from the large-N analysis, the impact of the formal decision-making structure is much higher when explaining the number of rejected applications of candidates from Muslim countries than when predicting the general rejection rates.

**Table 5.5** Rejection rates of candidates from Muslim countries in fourteen municipalities: Non-standardised regression coefficients, standard error in brackets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unweighted understanding of citizenship</td>
<td>1.16° (0.58)</td>
<td>0.79 (0.72)</td>
<td>0.79 (0.72)</td>
<td>1.03* (0.48)</td>
<td>1.03° (0.48)</td>
<td>1.03° (0.48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weighted understanding of citizenship</td>
<td>1.06** (0.41)</td>
<td>1.03* (0.48)</td>
<td>1.03° (0.48)</td>
<td>1.03° (0.48)</td>
<td>1.03° (0.48)</td>
<td>1.03° (0.48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate</td>
<td>0.10 (0.21)</td>
<td>0.18 (0.19)</td>
<td>0.18 (0.19)</td>
<td>0.18 (0.19)</td>
<td>0.18 (0.19)</td>
<td>0.18 (0.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio of foreign residents</td>
<td>-1.13 (0.90)</td>
<td>-1.52* (0.81)</td>
<td>-1.52* (0.81)</td>
<td>-1.52* (0.81)</td>
<td>-1.52* (0.81)</td>
<td>-1.52* (0.81)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio Muslim candidates</td>
<td>0.38 (0.34)</td>
<td>0.34 (0.29)</td>
<td>0.34 (0.29)</td>
<td>0.34 (0.29)</td>
<td>0.34 (0.29)</td>
<td>0.34 (0.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-22.16 (22.50)</td>
<td>-20.66 (17.21)</td>
<td>6.32 (5.91)</td>
<td>1.27 (34.01)</td>
<td>-3.15 (24.64)</td>
<td>4.57 (22.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R² (adj.)</td>
<td>0.19 0.30 0.52 0.23 0.42 0.43</td>
<td>0.19 0.30 0.52 0.23 0.42 0.43</td>
<td>0.19 0.30 0.52 0.23 0.42 0.43</td>
<td>0.19 0.30 0.52 0.23 0.42 0.43</td>
<td>0.19 0.30 0.52 0.23 0.42 0.43</td>
<td>0.19 0.30 0.52 0.23 0.42 0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>14 14 14 14 14 14</td>
<td>14 14 14 14 14 14</td>
<td>14 14 14 14 14 14</td>
<td>14 14 14 14 14 14</td>
<td>14 14 14 14 14 14</td>
<td>14 14 14 14 14 14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Level of significance: * p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
5.4 External influences II

This chapter set out to operationalise naturalisation fields and citizenship struggles as we conceptualised them in Chapter 3. We generated pertinent indicators for the understanding of citizenship and the degree of influence of each local actor and tested whether it makes a difference or not to account for power structures when we measure the influence of the understanding of citizenship on the ratio of rejected applications. As our findings have shown, it makes a difference whether or not we account for the local power structures in predicting the outcomes of naturalisation policies. Similar to the findings of the previous chapter, we further demonstrated that our model and especially the indicator for the formal decision-making structures work particularly well in predicting the number of rejected applications of candidates from Muslim countries. More generally, we have also revealed that in Swiss municipalities the implementation of citizenship politics and the application of naturalisation criteria diverge a great deal. This confirms our earlier observation that Swiss municipalities can be considered to a certain extent as independent political units when it comes to naturalising foreigners. The question remains, however, whether the attitudes of local politicians are solely the result of local struggles (which we will discuss in more detail in Chapter 7), or whether their opinions are also influenced by external factors. We have already seen in the previous chapter that there are no regional clusters of citizenship politics (see Table 4.4). In our interviews we learned that some actors knew and observed how other municipalities in their region dealt with naturalisation applications. It may even happen that somebody proposes to introduce a procedure that was successful elsewhere. However, such occurrences seem to be very rare. It appeared that hardly anybody regularly discusses matters concerning naturalisations with colleagues from other municipalities. We can therefore conclude that there are no significant influences from one municipality to another within a certain region that lead to clusters of local settings with similar naturalisation policies. As we will see in the next chapter, one can observe very different approaches in citizenship politics even among neighbouring municipalities.

Might there be influences coming from the national level? As we already know, there are very few regulations at the national and cantonal levels and hardly any direct exchanges between actors at the different levels. When it comes to the discourses of the individual actors, we noticed in our interviews with local politicians that they sometimes adopted arguments from representatives of their parties at the national level. However, whether such influences exist or not is irrelevant, since they constitute a constant factor for all municipalities. What is more in-
teresting is the fact that such discourses are adopted in varying degrees. We observed, for example, that some local representatives of the Swiss People’s Party, defending a very restrictive naturalisation policy, used similar arguments as their colleagues at the national level. In municipalities with a generous understanding of citizenship and a less active SVP, however, such arguments were absent. This points again to the salience of the local context.

Although we highlighted, time and again, the importance of the local political and social context and could hardly trace any external influences, we should not treat our case studies as completely isolated fields. After all, they are part of the same nation-state and it might be assumed that they share some cultural and political characteristics. Leach’s (1965 [1954]) study illustrates that the variation of political systems on the local level in highland Burma appears to be limited when compared to other societies where political systems existed that were not conceivable in highland Burma (see Chapter 3). In a similar vein, studies comparing local integration politics in different countries have emphasised the influence of national citizenship models that limit the range of conceivable politics at the local level within a nation-state (Rogers & Tillie 2001; Koopmans 2004; Penninx et al. 2004a). Unfortunately, there is no comparable data about local understandings of citizenship in other European countries. Such information would allow us to evaluate whether, on average, conceptions of citizenship are more restrictive or generous in other nation-states.

Instead of comparing local citizenship models in different countries, another strategy is to look for commonalities of Swiss municipalities and to evaluate whether local politicians in different places share some cultural and political values despite diverging citizenship politics. This can be done by studying how local decision makers think about Switzerland and what they feel proud about in this country. In each of our municipalities, at least 56 per cent of our interviewees, and an average of 77 per cent, are very or rather proud of Switzerland.16 This might not be so surprising given the fact that we talked to local politicians. It gets much more interesting when we look at what these people are proud of. As is shown in Table 5.6, in each municipality by far the most often mentioned characteristics were the direct democratic system and the high degree of liberty prevailing in this country. Both aspects were conceived as existent together, since by ‘liberty’ most people understood rights and opportunities to express one’s opinion and to participate in the political processes. Of all eighteen characteristics that came up in this open-ended question, these two traits of the country were mentioned by 59 per cent of all interviewees. Indeed, in the individual communities, how many politicians are proud of direct democratic institutions varies a great deal. In virtually all cases, however, it
is by far the most often mentioned characteristic of Switzerland. Even in the municipality in which ‘direct democracy’ and ‘liberty’ have been indicated as points of pride the fewest times, 40 per cent of the local actors still have mentioned it. Only in three municipalities have other characteristics been mentioned more often than 40 per cent. The second most often mentioned characteristic, ‘cultural diversity’, scores (on average) only 23 per cent and the remaining ones, 19 per cent or less. By ‘cultural diversity’, most understand the four national linguistic groups. A few left-wing politicians also included the cultural diversity of immigrants in this category. In some individual municipalities, people are also proud of the peaceful cohabitation of different (indigenous) cultures, the social wealth of this country, its politics of neutrality and the prevailing law and order.

Table 5.6  Pride of Swiss local politicians

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Municipalities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Overall %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Direct dem./liberty</td>
<td>59 50 71 56 67 64 64 60 40 43 88 60 63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Cultural diversity</td>
<td>23 20 18 9 19 50 18 22 0 7 43 35 20 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Social wealth</td>
<td>19 25 6 8 36 19 0 9 33 20 27 7 29 0 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Peaceful cohabitat</td>
<td>18 30 12 32 27 25 33 27 11 0 13 7 6 10 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Law and order</td>
<td>15 15 18 8 6 0 36 0 20 27 14 12 0 38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Neutrality</td>
<td>13 10 25 9 13 0 18 0 20 7 14 12 20 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Nature</td>
<td>11 20 6 17 3 8 18 11 0 13 21 18 20 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Constitutional state</td>
<td>10 20 12 8 0 31 8 9 0 0 20 14 6 0 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Welfare state</td>
<td>7 5 0 0 0 6 0 9 0 20 13 14 18 0 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Tolerance/generosity</td>
<td>7 5 6 17 9 6 8 0 11 0 13 14 0 0 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Level of education</td>
<td>6 5 6 0 6 0 0 22 20 0 14 6 10 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Assiduity</td>
<td>5 15 0 0 0 0 17 9 0 0 13 14 0 0 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Only those characteristics are listed that were mentioned by at least 5 per cent of all interviewees. In total, eighteen characteristics came up in the interviews. Characteristics mentioned by less than 5 per cent are ‘self-assuredness’, ‘federalism’, ‘consociationalism’, ‘Christian values’ and ‘Switzerland as a financial centre’. Some were also proud of the fact that most politicians at the national level are not professionals (militia-system).
Similar patterns can be observed when we compare how proud the representatives of different local political parties are. With the exception of the members of the Green Party, of which only 25 per cent are very or rather proud of Switzerland, in all other groups only a minority is not proud of Switzerland. Needless to say, differences can be observed between the Social-Democrats (SP) and the Swiss People’s Party (SVP), of which 64 per cent and 97 per cent, respectively, are proud of this country. As for ‘direct democracy’ and the ‘high degree of liberty’, those are again by far the most crucial characteristics of Switzerland for a majority of the representatives of all political parties (results not shown here).

More detailed analyses have shown that there is no correlation between the most often mentioned characteristics and the rejection rates (results not shown here). This shows that local politicians in Swiss municipalities have some common ideas about the Swiss nation-state, even though they pursue different naturalisation policies and have different ideas about who can become a member of this nation-state. The fact that a large majority is proud of this country’s direct democratic institutions confirms the commonly held view that political institutions constitute a crucial part of Swiss citizens’ national identity (Kriesi 1998: 5-12; Chollet 2006: 86-124). Of the three fundamental political institutions in Switzerland – neutrality, federalism and direct democracy – the last one is considered as the most important one since it heavily determines political life in this country (Kriesi 1998: 90). Some even speak of Switzerland as the oldest democracy, referring to the union of the first three cantons in the 13th century. Given the cultural heterogeneity of this country, it is possible to contend that political institutions constitute a crucial denominator for all groups. Accordingly, Switzerland is often considered as a nation by action of the will rather than a nation based on cultural homogeneity (Kohn 1967 [1944]; Deutsch 1976; Theiler 2004).

It can be concluded from this short excursus on what Swiss local politicians are proud of Switzerland that they share some common ideas about this country despite diverging understandings of citizenship. While we discussed in this chapter our hypotheses by comparing aggregated data of fourteen case studies, in the next chapter we will illustrate in more detail the decision-making processes and the various understandings of citizenship by looking more closely at the politics of citizenship in four municipalities.
6 Four Naturalisation Fields

6.1 Introduction

Having compared the prevailing ideas of citizenship and the local influence structures among our fourteen case studies, we are now taking a closer look at two pairs of municipalities by investigating in detail their decision-making structures and the attitudes of their politicians. This chapter mainly serves to confirm our hypotheses with more qualitative data and to illustrate in more detail the conclusions of the previous two chapters. Besides the meaningful generalisations we seek in our study, we will highlight that each municipality has interesting and important stories to tell us. For the sake of feasibility and not to bore the reader with endless accounts of local naturalisation politics, only four cases will be discussed in more detail.

Two ideas guided the selection of the four cases: first, we wanted to guarantee a certain variety among the cases covering the range of citizenship politics, which we encountered in the previous chapter. Second, we made sure that the two cases of each pair are as similar as possible in order to control for a range of intervening variables. Out of the fourteen case studies we first selected the two municipalities with the most generous and the most restrictive understandings of citizenship (see Table 5.1). As we selected most of the fourteen municipalities in pairs (see Table 3.1), we then simply retained the two cases that belonged to the first two cases; these two are situated somewhere in the middle between the two extreme ends of the scale of understandings of citizenship. One case of each pair has a high and the other one a low rejection rate. Looking at Table 6.1, where some key features of the four cases are listed, we notice that the number of inhabitants, the ratio of foreigners living in these municipalities and the local unemployment rate are relatively similar for each pair and that there seems to be hardly any relation between these variables and the rejection rate. Although there are very few regulations at the cantonal level that could interfere with local naturalisation policy, we selected municipalities of the same canton. This allows us to show that even within the same region naturalisation politics and understandings of citizenship can vary a lot. Moreover, the selected pairs of municipalities have the same for-
mal decision-making procedure. In Bernhigh and Bernlow, the final decisions regarding naturalisation applications are taken by the local parliament, whereas in Aargauhigh and Aargaulow the population decides during municipal assemblies whether the applicants can acquire the Swiss citizenship. Although similar with regard to a range of characteristics, the averaged rejection rates between 1990 and 2002 do display differences upon critical inspection. While Bernhigh and Aargauhigh refused 22 per cent and 13 per cent of the applications respectively, Bernlow and Aargaulow accepted almost all candidates.

As we will see in the course of this chapter, the idea of citizenship is problematised in a completely different manner in the municipalities with restrictive naturalisation policies and those with generous naturalisation policies. The detailed description of these four case studies – first of Bernhigh and Bernlow, then of Aargauhigh and Aargaulow – therefore mainly concentrates on the attitudes of the local decision makers in order to show that it is to a certain extent their conceptions that help us understand whether a candidate is naturalised or not. In contrast to the previous chapter, we will not content ourselves with quantitative indicators; we will present in more detail the discourses of local politicians. By doing so, we will not lose track of the power-and-influence structures within each municipality that facilitate or constrain certain ideas.

On the basis of documents and expert interviews with representatives of the local administration, we will for each case first present the respective formal naturalisation procedure and concentrate especially on the question which actors are involved in which function and at

### Table 6.1 Key features of the four case studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bernhigh</th>
<th>Bernlow</th>
<th>Aargauhigh</th>
<th>Aargaulow</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rejection rate</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding of citizenship</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal decision-making procedure</td>
<td>Parliament</td>
<td>Parliament</td>
<td>Assembly</td>
<td>Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kind of municipality</td>
<td>Small industrial town</td>
<td>Small industrial town</td>
<td>Rural commuter municipality</td>
<td>Small town</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canton</td>
<td>Bern</td>
<td>Bern</td>
<td>Aargau</td>
<td>Aargau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residents in 2002</td>
<td>14,284</td>
<td>10,803</td>
<td>8,421</td>
<td>10,776</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign nationals in 2002</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate in 2002</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The understanding of citizenship (UC) varies between ‘0’ (generous) and ‘1’ (restrictive) and has been generated according to the procedure discussed in Chapter 5. The information for ‘kind of municipality’ has been extracted from Andreas Ladner’s dataset that is based on three surveys in all Swiss municipalities (cf. Ladner 1991).
what moment of the process. This will allow us to find out whether certain individuals or groups of persons through their formal positions have an influence on the decision-making processes. More generally, the brief presentation will show in detail how municipal naturalisations proceed, that even in relatively small political units many different actors are involved in the decision-making processes and that the evaluation of the candidates’ dossiers happens at various stages. This once more reveals the contentious nature of local naturalisation processes and that both recommendations and final decisions depend a lot on the attitudes of individual actors. Finally, looking at how the dossiers are treated, in which way information about candidates are gathered, how recommendations are made and how the broader population is informed, already tells us a lot about how restrictive the local naturalisation policy is.

The power structures within the local political fields of naturalisation will be sketched by resorting to the indicators that we generated in the previous chapter. Again, we will be able to show the positions of individual persons within each municipality. These preliminary analyses mainly serve to better situate the importance of the discourses of individual actors and political parties. Thus, we will be able to distinguish dominant and minority discourses, conflict situations and the degree of heterogeneity of ideas within each municipality.

The discourses of local politicians will then be presented and compared in relation to three relevant questions which we have already dealt with in the previous two chapters: (1) first and foremost, we will present attitudes towards naturalisation criteria for which we have so far used an aggregated indicator. In contrast to the previous discussion on the eleven naturalisation criteria, only the attitudes towards aspects that are judged by the local actors as being crucial have been retained for the following analysis. (2) We repeatedly noticed that our explanatory model works particularly well to predict the ratio of rejected applications from Muslim countries. We will therefore present in more detail the attitudes towards this group of candidates. It will be revealing as to whether people from Muslim countries are seen as very different from Swiss citizens or not with regard to their culture and more specifically their attitude towards the state. More generally, we will demonstrate how those people are categorised and whether or not and to what extent stereotypical thinking is present in the heads of local politicians. Interestingly, it will appear that problems of integrating oneself into a new social and cultural environment are explained very differently: for those with a rather restrictive understanding of citizenship it is the different cultural background of the applicants that is crucial, whereas those with a rather generous understanding of citizenship emphasise individual characteristics such as education or social class as relevant
for a successful integration. Moreover, politicians requiring a lot of criteria to be fulfilled also use a more xenophobic vocabulary than those with a more generous understanding of citizenship. Using terms like ‘tribes’, ‘niggers’, ‘potential criminals’ and ‘profiteers’ when talking about naturalisation candidates, not only shows how high the barriers are set by such actors, but also what image they have of certain foreign residents. (3) Finally, we are also interested in views of the verdicts of the Swiss Federal Court that were taken one year before we started our case studies. Attitudes towards these decisions will be an indicator of whether the interviewees see naturalisations as political rather than administrative procedures. As our interviews have revealed, those people regard naturalisations as political procedures who think the local population should have the last word to say in naturalisation matters. They have a restrictive understanding of citizenship and most often hold the opinion that a naturalised citizen becomes primarily a member of a local community and not of the Swiss nation-state.

6.2 Bernhigh and Bernlow

Formal procedures and power structures

In both municipalities, Bernhigh and Bernlow, the formal naturalisation procedures and the kind of actors involved are more or less the same. However, some minor aspects already point to a more restrictive naturalisation policy in Bernhigh. In Bernhigh, after candidates have submitted their applications at the local administration, the sufficiency of the documents and the formal requirements (mainly the years of residence) are verified. In contrast to procedures in many other municipalities, applicants are then invited for more or less formal interviews with representatives of the local administration (in most municipalities candidates only meet the naturalisation commission). These interviews mainly serve to let the authorities to get to know the candidates – to find out their reasons for naturalisation and to verify their knowledge of language and degree of integration. In some cases, possible criminal records or outstanding tax debts in the past are addressed. In Bernhigh, it regularly happens that information is gathered from employers, schoolteachers and housekeepers. In Bernlow, it appears to be rather exceptional for schoolteachers and employers to be contacted. In contrast to Bernhigh, in Bernlow representatives of the executive body (local government) are always present during these interviews. On the basis of the interviews and recommendations from third persons, the local administrations of both towns make an application for acceptance or rejection.
The dossiers are then handed over to the naturalisation commission consisting of representatives of the local parliament. Each candidate’s application is discussed by the members of the commission who often adopt the recommendations of the administration. In Bernlow, it rarely happens that the commission invites candidates for a second interview. In Bernhigh, this may occur in some borderline cases when candidates seem to have violated a traffic rule. Since the commission does not dispose of any written documents in such a case, candidates are invited to clarify the incident. After having discussed each dossier, the commission also makes an application for acceptance or rejection. If a candidate is not recommended for naturalisation, he or she is given the opportunity to withdraw his or her application. In Bernhigh, about 25 per cent of the applications are withdrawn each year and submitted again one or two years later. In Bernlow, very few dossiers are recommended for rejection. This means that the difference in the rejection rates between both municipalities would be even higher if all submitted dossiers in Bernhigh were passed through the process to the final decision in the local parliament.

The members of the commission are in direct contact with the parliamentary groups and inform them about the individual dossiers. As a consequence, the attitudes of the deputies are taken into account by the commission and its recommendations are often followed after the dossiers have been handed over to the legislative body. In both municipalities, the executive body also discusses the dossiers but virtually never challenges a recommendation of the administration or the commission. Since representatives of the executive body in Bernlow interview the candidates together with the person in charge at the local administration, the opinions of its members already flow into the very first recommendation. Interestingly, in Bernhigh freshly naturalised candidates are invited for a more or less formal ceremony during which the documents are handed over. In Bernlow, however, such ceremonies were abolished some years ago since hardly anybody attended to them.

Looking at the formal procedures, we can see that in Bernhigh the candidates appear to be screened more systematically, more information is gathered from third persons, and it is recommended to more persons that they withdraw their applications. It seems that more criteria are verified and a higher level of integration is required. All this constitutes an initial explanation for the different rejection rates and points to local politicians with more restrictive attitudes towards naturalisation candidates in Bernhigh. The existence or non-existence of a naturalisation ceremony might also be considered an indicator for the importance that is attributed to the citizenship acquisition. To elaborate on these impressions, we now have to specify who the actors are who
decisively influence the decision-making processes. In both communities, the local administration seems to be an important actor, since their representatives are among the few persons that encounter the candidates. Actually, only in Bernlow do some other actors – members of the executive body – regularly meet the applicants. The recommendations of the administration are therefore crucial for the decisions of both the naturalisation commission and the local parliament. In Bernhigh, the naturalisation commission itself is certainly another important actor. Its members verify the dossiers a second time and work out recommendations for the parliament. During the decision-making processes, they are constantly in contact with other members of the local parliament and inform them about their decisions. In Bernlow, the executive body can be considered the second most important collective actor, since it is involved already at the very beginning of the naturalisation procedure.

These impressions are confirmed in Table 6.2, which lists the relative influence of each interviewee in comparison to the most powerful actor in the political field of naturalisations of each municipality. The two persons in charge of naturalisations at the local administration and the members of the commission are among the most influential indivi-

Table 6.2  Relative influence and understanding of citizenship of local actors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bernhigh</th>
<th>Bernlow</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Actor</td>
<td>Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>FDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>FDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>SP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>SP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>SP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>SVP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>SVP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>FDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>FDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Grüne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>FDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>SVP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>SP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>EVP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Abbreviations: Influence (Infl.), Understanding of citizenship (UC), Liberal Party (FDP), Social Democrats (SP), Swiss People’s Party (SVP), Green Party (Grüne), Evangelical People’s Party (EVP).

Scales of indicators: ‘Influence’ indicates the relative influence of actors in comparison to the most powerful actor (100). ‘Understanding of citizenship’ varies between ‘0’ (generous) and ‘1’ (restrictive).
dual actors in Bernhigh. The executive body in Bernhigh has no influence except for one person who is also a member of the naturalisation commission. In Bernlow, in addition to the two persons in charge of naturalisations at the local administration, three members of the executive body and one representative of the local parliament constitute the most important persons. The naturalisation commission seems to be fairly unimportant.

Table 6.2 also lists the individual understandings of citizenship (UC). A brief look at the table reveals that, except for one representative of the local administration, the important actors in Bernhigh have a more restrictive attitude than their counterparts in Bernlow. Interestingly, the party affiliation of the influential members seems not to be a very good predictor of the individual understandings of citizenship. In both municipalities, members from the Liberal Party (FDP) and the Social Democrats (SP) constitute the most influential actors, while representatives of the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) are rather unimportant. Nonetheless, the naturalisation policy in Bernhigh is much more restrictive than that in Bernlow.

**Attitudes towards naturalisation criteria**

Now that we have a clearer picture of the structures of the local naturalisation fields and know who the dominant actors are, we would like to explore and compare in more detail the various discourses on citizenship and particularly the criteria that have to be fulfilled for naturalisation (for a summary of this analysis see Table 6.3 below). Without knowing who the influential actors are, we would not be able to distinguish influential attitudes from less relevant opinions. In the following discussion we will therefore always specify whether certain positions are taken by powerful politicians or not.

As we have seen in Table 5.1 above, knowledge of the regional language is an important criterion in most of our case studies. The obvious difficulty for examiners is how to evaluate whether the language ability of a candidate is good enough for naturalisation. In most municipalities, local politicians verify the language abilities of examinees during an interview in an informal way. For candidates who are judged to have an insufficient command of the required language, it is often recommended that they attend a language course before continuing the naturalisation procedure. Quite exceptionally, Bernhigh in 2003 introduced a standardised language test that should enable the local decision makers to evaluate the individual candidates according to a standardised European language folio. Different actors in Bernhigh argued that it was now easier to prepare for these language tests because the expected level was better specified.
While such language tests avoid discriminatory decisions, they may lead to other problems. The most influential actor in Bernlow, the person mainly responsible for naturalisations at the local administration, opposed such language tests because they discriminated against illiterates, candidates from regions with other alphabets, persons with a low education and elderly people. According to her, it sufficed to evaluate their language knowledge during the regular interviews. Anyway, she continued, the interviewers in Bernlow did not consider the command of German very important. It was only when they had the impression that candidates really did not understand anything at all that they would suggest to them that they attend a language course before the application process was carried further. Compared to Bernhigh, the different attitudes towards the criterion of language knowledge became most apparent when she told us that even if candidates did not improve their German during such a language course, they were naturalised simply because they showed some willingness to integrate themselves.

When asked about the most important criteria a naturalisation candidate had to fulfil, most actors in Bernlow either did not mention language knowledge at all or attributed to it less importance than their colleagues in other municipalities. An influential member of the SP argued that she expected that young candidates would have a minimal command of German, but those persons who immigrated to Switzerland as adults would not be expected to speak German. Another actor of the same party held the attitude that it was important that applicants were able to communicate in school or at their workplace. It had to be taken into consideration, however, whether these persons had any opportunity at all to learn German. A representative of the administration observed that nobody felt bothered when a French-speaking Swiss moved to Bernlow and did not speak German even after twenty years; if an Italian did not speak German after having lived in Switzerland for many years, why should it pose a problem, he rhetorically asked. On the other hand, most actors of the slightly less important right-wing group required either broken German or another national language. Two politicians even brought up the question of whether English should be acceptable. Language knowledge was an important criterion for only one influential right-wing politician. According to him, candidates had to be able to speak and read but not write German. However, under certain circumstances and because of Bernlow’s proximity to the French-speaking part of Switzerland, he could also accept somebody who only spoke French.

In Bernhigh, most actors seemed to agree that the command of a language was a very important criterion to prove a certain degree of integration. Surprisingly, for some influential actors it seemed to suffice to
speak a national language, although they all supported the new language test by which only knowledge of German is verified. A left-wing member of the executive body told us that if a person spoke one national language, this already showed that he or she wanted Swiss citizenship for other than purely self-serving reasons. Not all representatives of the left-wing parties, though, seemed to have the same opinion concerning this matter. Indeed, the two members of the naturalisation commission believed that it was only by learning the regional language and thus through linguistic integration, that one could become a Swiss citizen. One of them told us that otherwise contact with Swiss citizens and the accomplishment of everyday tasks would be impossible. She gave us the example of her foreign cleaning lady who damaged her furniture because she did not understand her instructions and used the wrong cleaning agent. The much-less-influential representatives of the left-wing parties defended other positions. One of them argued that an insufficient command of German did, indeed, complicate a successful integration, but that this was no reason to prevent someone from becoming a Swiss citizen. The representative of the Green Party presented an argument similar to that of some actors in Bernlow, namely, that it sufficed if candidates tried to learn the language; this effort already proved that they were willing to integrate themselves.

Notice two observations: (1) despite the fact that in Bernlow the criterion of ‘knowledge of language’ is attributed much less importance than in other municipalities, it is still much more relevant than other criteria in this municipality (cf. Table 5.1). (2) In Bernhigh, this criterion is much more relevant than in Bernlow. However, nobody required it for cultural integration. Rather, it was argued that speaking the regional language facilitates everyday life in a new home country. As we have already argued in Chapter 5, it appears that the application of this criterion does not necessarily tell us whether naturalisation policy is led by an ethnic conception of citizenship or a civic-territorial one. On the one hand, it constitutes an important criterion even in municipalities with a rather generous understanding of citizenship. On the other hand, in municipalities where it is rather difficult to get the Swiss passport, language knowledge might be required for a structural rather than a cultural integration.

In some municipalities, controversies are ignited when candidates for naturalisation benefit from social security or disability insurance or are unemployed (cf. Table 5.1). Some right-wing politicians are opposed to the idea that the Swiss state has to financially support such persons. Others are rather concerned about naturalising persons that, in their opinion, unjustifiably profit from the Swiss social security system. They want to be sure that candidates have serious reasons for benefiting from social security and disability insurance. Such debates are all
the more interesting in light of the fact that foreigners eligible for naturalisation already have the same social rights as Swiss citizens. Therefore, granting the Swiss citizenship never implies any additional costs for the municipalities or the Swiss state. As will become clearer in the next few paragraphs, opposing the naturalisation of such candidates does not reflect any economic interests, but rather expresses the attitude that ‘good’ Swiss citizens do not depend on the state.

The very influential person in charge of naturalisation at the local administration in Bernhigh first explained to us that, in principle, there was no obstacle for naturalisation of such persons. However, with regard to unemployment, he then made a distinction between persons that were unemployed though they had made an effort to find a job and those that were just too lazy to work. According to him, in Bernhigh it often happened that applications of young persons were reset because the naturalisation commission had the impression that the young people were not motivated enough to find a job. He concluded that such persons lacked a certain ambition and did not share the Swiss mentality in terms of diligence. After all, negative decisions were even some kind of ‘development aid’ for such persons because they forced them to find a job. Interestingly, in Bernhigh representatives from both left-wing and right-wing parties preferred to verify why applicants were unemployed. An influential member of the Social Democrats told us that it posed a problem for her if a person had no job only because he or she was too lazy to find one. Another person in charge at the local administration required that concrete and clear reasons had to be presented before such a person could be naturalised.

It also seems, as just asserted by the representative of the administration, that cases of candidates benefiting from social security and disability insurance are more controversial. For a right-wing politician and influential member of the naturalisation commission, it did not suffice if candidates benefiting from disability insurance could provide medical attestations since some doctors handed them out even to persons that had no disability or illness at all. Surprisingly, a representative of the Swiss People’s Party, who is politically rather isolated in Bernhigh, confided to us that he is no longer against naturalisations of persons who have debts, are sick or disabled, for it was incredible how many applicants benefited from social security or disability insurance nowadays, and it was simply impossible to reject them all. After all, he told us, they also got the money without naturalisation. How important it is for some politicians in Bernhigh that candidates do not financially depend on the state provides a final example: a representative of the Swiss People’s Party explained to us that a command of German was one of the most important criterion for naturalisation. However, his party allowed some exceptions. Recently, the SVP had been in favour
of a naturalisation of an elderly couple that had been living in Bern-high for twenty years but only spoke German badly. But, according to the representatives of the SVP, they had worked their whole lives and had never made any financial demands on the state, which in large measure justified accepting them for naturalisation.

In Bernlow, the person in charge of naturalisations at the local administration told us that the social status of a candidate was no obstacle for the acquisition of the Swiss citizenship. For most influential actors, ‘social security’, ‘disability insurance’, or ‘unemployment’ were not issues that should influence decisions on naturalisation. An important representative of the SP argued that these persons had every right to benefit from these services since they had paid taxes in Switzerland for many years. Only for one person was it important to verify such cases because, according to her, it sometimes happened that asylum seekers refused to work and thus unjustly benefited from social security. For her, it posed a problem if such persons applied for citizenship later on. Some right-wing politicians, indeed, preferred to verify in detail the dossiers of persons with financial difficulties. However, they were not opposed to applicants who benefit in one way or another from the state. They saw it rather as a problem if candidates had debts or did not pay their taxes.

While national criteria are vague regarding most aspects of naturalisation, they are quite clear on the requirement that alien citizens have to respect the legal order and must not compromise the interior and exterior safety of the country if they want to acquire Swiss citizenship. Criminal records are verified by cantonal and national authorities and can make naturalisation impossible. Therefore, it is even more surprising that local politicians in Bernhigh worried about possible criminal records of candidates. In contrast to actors in Bernlow, some in Bern-high when asked about the most important naturalisation criteria, explicitly required that applicants have no criminal records. Agreeing with the attitudes in other rather restrictive municipalities, some actors in Bernhigh argued that breaking traffic rules was not always registered, or was deleted, after several years. Merely looking at criminal records therefore did not suffice to verify if a candidate had violated any law in the past. As we have already seen, when the naturalisation commission is suspicious of a candidate, he or she is invited for an additional interview. For a right-wing politician of the naturalisation commission, even ‘youth sins’ have to date back quite a few years before the person could be naturalised. For a left-wing representative of the commission, candidates should not have committed any ‘gross’ crimes. A colleague of his told us that applicants should not be criminals, although small acts of thievery and youthful escapades should not be an obstacle. Only one member of little influence in the Social Demo-
crat Party defended the position that even criminals should have the right to acquire the Swiss citizenship. In Bernlow, the matter of ‘criminal records’ was only mentioned by some uninfluential right-wing politicians.

**Attitudes towards candidates from Muslim countries**

Besides the attitudes on criteria that have to be fulfilled for naturalisation, perceptions of candidates, especially with regard to their nationality and their ability to integrate themselves in Switzerland, constitute another helpful indicator for the identification of different conceptions of citizenship. In Bernhigh, we were told by two representatives of the local administration that for the local decision makers, the country of origin and especially the religious affiliation played an important role when it came to judging the different applications. A lot of actors, they continued, were quite critical towards Muslims and persons from the countries of the former Yugoslavia, since such people were often associated with crimes reported by the media. After all, the statistics showed that in most violent crimes people from countries of the former Yugoslavia were involved, and personal experiences and incidents such as brawls during the weekly evening sales in Bernhigh simply confirmed this. They held the opinion that the Muslim headscarf was often interpreted as a sign of extremism and that a lot of inhabitants were scared by international events such as the terrorist attacks in New York, the wars in the former Yugoslavia or the conflict in Palestine.

These remarks are confirmed to a large extent by the opinions of the local decision makers. Almost all right-wing politicians agreed that persons from Muslim countries, in contrast to people from Western Europe, experienced many difficulties integrating themselves in Switzerland because of their very different cultural and religious background. Some mentioned also Africans as a group of persons having such difficulties. On the other hand, Tamils and Vietnamese were considered as adaptive and friendly persons. Often we heard that Muslims had another image of the role of women. A lot of local actors felt uneasy with the headscarf because they see it as a sign of oppression of women. Some stated that persons from Muslim countries placed religion over the state and democratic institutions. A person in charge of naturalisations at the local administration distilled these opinions with the assertion that Muslims had a ‘special’ relationship with the state. A very influential Social Democrat and member of the naturalisation commission told us that certain ‘tribes’ such as the Roma or the Kosovars had another way of thinking and followed different laws. She gave us the example of a Roma who had killed another Roma and then had paid his victim’s family money as an act of reconciliation. This man had not
understood, according to her, why he was put in prison by the Swiss state and therefore in his eyes punished twice.

Some related the allegedly violent attitudes of people from the former Yugoslavia toward the wars of the last decade in their region. A right-wing politician and member of the naturalisation commission told us that these violent attitudes might be explained by the violent and criminal past of these regions. According to her, it would take many years before these people were no longer violent. And then she added that, after all, persons from the former Yugoslavia also had a brutal physiognomy. A colleague of hers explained the Muslims’ lack of integration mainly by the fact that – unlike Italians and Spaniards – what he called ‘pride people’ always stuck together and avoided the contact with the Swiss. Sometimes a link between immigration from Muslim countries and the Swiss welfare system was established. A member of the influential naturalisation commission asserted that certain persons came to Switzerland with excessive expectations (he referred to the image of Cockaigne). According to him, when they realised that they did not get what they wanted, they just took it. The representatives of much lesser importance in the left-wing parties in Bernhigh also held the opinion that persons from Muslim backgrounds had more difficulty adapting to West European culture. They underscored, however, that the capacity for integration mainly depended on the individual persons and their education and less on their cultural background.

Different perceptions could be observed in Bernlow. The person in charge of naturalisations in Bernlow told us that in her municipality, in the last years Muslim women wearing a headscarf were naturalised without any problems. She assumed that most politicians did not even notice that women with a headscarf had acquired Swiss citizenship and that in contrast to other municipalities female applicants were not asked to take off their headscarves during the interviews with local decision makers. The dominant left-wing politicians in Bernlow agreed that there were no differences at all between candidates from different countries concerning their ability for integration. For one of them it depended a lot on how the different cultural groups collided with Swiss society. Tamils, for example, were better accepted because they were much quieter and remained within their own groups. Swiss people therefore hardly noticed them. Albanians, on the other hand, were much more communicative and attracted more attention. She concluded therefore that it was mainly a matter of how the Swiss perceived the different groups that facilitated or complicated the integration of foreign residents.

Contrary to the opinions of many local politicians in Bernhigh, a colleague of hers was convinced that persons from countries of the former
Yugoslavia were very much liked at their working places because they were assiduous and learnt German quickly. She stated that the high crime rate among immigrants could be explained by the fact that the Swiss society did not want to integrate such persons. Therefore, it hardly surprised her that they behaved differently. She concluded that integration depended on each individual and on his or her character. The representative of the local administration who is in regular contact with left-wing politicians, held a slightly different position. He asserted that people from the former Yugoslavia had more difficulties integrating themselves and were more violent than persons from West European countries. He argued that this had nothing to do with their particular culture but could rather be explained by the fact that these people often were refugees who had undergone very hard experiences.

Even most right-wing politicians in Bernlow argued that the ability for integration of candidates of the former Yugoslavia could be explained mainly by the particular situation in their home countries. Often they linked difficulties in integrating to individual characteristics or the willingness to undertake the necessary efforts. One representative of the Liberal Party deplored the fact that Swiss society did not communicate clearly enough what is expected from foreign residents. As for the Muslim headscarf, he saw no problem for naturalisation, as long as it was not worn at school. He defended the French position that the wearing of headscarves in schools should be forbidden in public, asserting that such a manifestation of religious affiliation might provoke unnecessary aggression. Moreover, Swiss pupils would then demand to wear caps in school with the argument that this was their religion.

**Attitudes towards the decisions of the Swiss Federal Court**

The narratives presented so far give a clear picture of the various attitudes of the influential local decision makers. We get some important impressions of how naturalisation candidates are perceived and how citizenship is conceptualised. In Bernhigh, more criteria have to be fulfilled, a higher integration or assimilation is required and candidates from Muslim countries are perceived much more mistrustfully. In Bernlow, the attitudes towards the acquisition of the citizenship are quite different. They could be summarised by a statement of the very influential person in charge of naturalisations at the local administration that their municipality does not consider naturalisations an act of state. Whereas in Bernhigh the influential right-wing politicians especially wanted to make sure that applicants identified with the Swiss nation, in Bernlow the attitude prevails that Swiss citizenship should be granted even if foreigners apply for it for purely practical reasons; for example, because it makes travelling much easier.
This difference of attitude leads us to the more general issue of whether naturalisations should be considered administrative or political procedures. This issue is not only a matter of competence but more generally concerns the question of whether municipalities can be considered communities that should have the right to decide according to which procedure and criteria foreigners become a member of their society, or whether naturalisations constitute clearly regulated procedures similar to those for issuing a driving license. Concerning this matter, attitudes towards the verdicts of the Swiss Federal Court from July 2003 are good indicators. It may be argued that this indicator is less relevant for understanding the current naturalisation politics since it does not directly concern the question of who might become a Swiss citizen. However, those attitudes give us a more general picture of how citizenship is perceived and might indicate whether subjective discriminatory decisions are in general accepted or not.

In Bernlow, virtually all actors welcomed the decisions of the Federal Court. They all agreed that decisions taken by the whole population at ballot were nonsense, since such a system favoured discriminatory decisions. Most actors agreed that candidates must not be rejected solely because they are coming from a certain country. Some saw it as an advantage for better integration that, henceforth, negative decisions had to be justified. In such cases, candidates knew exactly what they had to improve before they applied a second time. Only one isolated representative of the SVP was completely against the decisions. In Bernhigh, many of the important politicians were also in favour of the ban on popular votes and of the right of candidates to appeal negative decisions. Some of the important right-wing politicians, however, expressed their ambivalence with parts of the decisions. Others were against the right of appeal because they thought that this amounted to a right for naturalisation and therefore diminished the position of the municipality. All but one of the SVP politicians were against popular votes. Two persons of the naturalisation commission were against the obligation to justify decisions. They argued that some foreigners simply did not fit into their community and that it happened sometimes that they just did not like an applicant and that, in such cases, decisions simply could not be justified.

In contrast to the attitudes towards the other issues presented above, the positions of the influential politicians in Bernhigh and Bernlow with regard to the decisions of the Swiss Federal Court are less disparate. This can be explained mainly by the fact that the crucial part of the verdicts – the ban of popular decisions at ballot – did not concern the current practices in Bernhigh and Bernlow. In most municipalities where decisions had been taken until recently by the population through a closed ballot, a large majority of local politicians completely
disapproved of the verdicts (see Table 4.2). Table 6.3 summarises the qualitative analysis of the various attitudes of the local decision makers that decisively influence the respective naturalisation processes. The findings show that the politicians in Bernhigh not only defend a restrictive naturalisation policy with a high level of requirements, but are also quite hostile towards candidates from Muslim countries. In Bernlow, on the other hand, discriminatory attitudes hardly exist and there are only few criteria that are required for naturalisation.

6.3 Aargauhigh and Aargaulow

Aargauhigh and Aargaulow are not directly affected by the ban on popular votes by ballot because decisions are taken in these two neighbouring municipalities during the municipal assemblies. They are, however, confronted with the problem of justifying negative decisions. For it is almost impossible to know why a majority of citizens who are in attendance are not in favour of a particular naturalisation application. Given the fact that their naturalisation procedure also relies on popular decisions, it may be assumed that local politicians are opposed to the verdicts because they fear an interference with municipal political autonomy and local democracy. However, and in line with our hypothesis, only the influential local politicians in Aargauhigh criticised the verdicts, whereas the decision makers in Aargaulow were mostly in favour of them. These findings are commensurate with the different attitudes towards candidates from Muslim countries and correspond, though less clearly, to the different levels of requirements in both municipalities (see Table 6.5 below).

Given the fact that in Aargauhigh and Aargaulow the population has the final word in naturalisation matters, it might be objected that we did not talk to the people who actually take the decisions. It could easily be argued that the attitudes of the politicians involved in the naturalisation processes in Aargauhigh and Aargaulow do not help us predict how many applicants are refused Swiss citizenship, since the population takes the final decisions during the municipal assemblies. There are, however, two reasons why our data very readily constitute valid indicators of the respective prevailing conceptions of citizenship.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitudes towards...</th>
<th>Bernhigh</th>
<th>Bernlow</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Naturalisation criteria</td>
<td>Restrictive</td>
<td>Generous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidates from Muslim countries</td>
<td>Hostile</td>
<td>Open</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
First, the interviewed politicians are also citizens of these municipalities. They can be considered as a representative group of the respective populations insofar as most of them are elected politicians. Given the small size of the municipalities and the low degree of institutionalised politics, the distance between the population and the political elite is very narrow, in contrast to the situation at the national level.

Second, the actors directly involved in the naturalisation processes know the candidates and their dossiers, on the basis of which they issue recommendations for the citizens attending the local assemblies. It can be assumed that these recommendations have an effect on the decisions of the individual citizens. Finally, we have already shown above that attitudes of the populations in our fourteen case studies strongly correlate with the positions of their local representatives ($r=0.69$, $p=0.006$). It thus seems that our data on local politicians’ attitudes is quite pertinent to predict the rejection rates. Let us now turn to the formal procedures and power structures of these two municipalities to get a clearer picture of what is going on in Aargauhigh and Aargaulow.

**Formal procedures and power structures**

In both municipalities of Aargauhigh and Aargaulow, foreign citizens who seek to acquire the Swiss citizenship submit the required documents at the local administration. The persons in charge at the municipal administration verify the formal requirements and contact the cantonal police, the employers and the teachers of the candidates. In Aargauhigh, candidates are given booklets that inform them about the municipality and the political rights in Switzerland. They receive another booklet about the political structure of Switzerland after they have filled in the forms. When the person responsible for naturalisations in Aargauhigh has the impression that prospective candidates have an insufficient command of German, he advises them to refrain from applying right away when they ask him for the forms. If such persons still apply, he discusses the matter with the mayor.

For a short time, the local administration has offered the possibility of inviting applicants for a language test. During the test, candidates are required to copy a text and to write a short curriculum vitae. If someone fails the language test, he or she has to attend a language course before his or her command of German is verified again and the procedure is carried on. After the person has passed the exam, the dossiers are handed over to the naturalisation commission, which consists of the mayor, the secretary of the municipal administration and four representatives of the local parties. The commission has existed since 2000 and was constituted after the startling rejection of two young Muslim women (see below), with the aim of reinforcing recommenda-
tions among the population. Before, only the mayor and a person in charge of naturalisations at the local administration interviewed the applicants.

The commission invites the candidates for a second interview and for a test about the Swiss political system. Each member of the commission separately interrogates individual applicants or couples and discusses with them the results of the test. After the individual interviews, the commission meets without the candidates for a discussion of all dossiers. Recommendations for acceptance or rejection are handed over to the executive body, which almost always follows the decisions of the commission. Finally, the population of Aargauhigh votes on the individual applications during a municipal assembly. In the run-up to the municipal assembly, all citizens receive a booklet with information about the candidates. Each applicant is presented with a photo and specifications such as their nationality, profession, employer, etc. Before the local assemblies, the president of the executive body informs the presidents of the local parties about the dossiers. For ten years votes have been taken by closed ballot. Such a procedure has been chosen because the impression emerged that some people otherwise do not dare to express their real opinion. After the assembly, candidates are informed in written form about the decisions.

In Aargaulow, the administration does not interview the candidates, and the completed dossiers are directly handed over to the naturalisation commission, which is composed of six members: the president of the executive body, the secretary of the administration and four inhabitants of Aargaulow. In contrast to Aargauhigh, the members of the commission are not necessarily representatives of the local parties but often persons who work in organisations that deal with foreigners. In the past, the commission tested the knowledge of the Swiss political system of each candidate. After they had noticed that applicants learned the answers by heart, the commission abandoned the tests and, henceforth, has verified the integration of the applicants during the interviews in a more informal manner. The applicants are asked if they know some Swiss citizens personally, if they are members of an association, how well they know the municipality of Aargaulow and how they pass their spare time. Families are also interrogated about the education of their children. Then a recommendation for acceptance or rejection is made by the commission that is handed over to the executive body, which normally follows up on these decisions. Negative decisions are discussed with the applicants, and it is recommended that they withdraw their application. In a pattern similar to that in Aargauhigh, around 10 to 15 per cent of all applications are withdrawn, mostly because candidates do not speak German well enough. The population of Aargaulow is informed about the applications in the run-up
to a local assembly. So far, no pictures of the candidates have appeared in the information leaflets; however, some members of the commission suggested following the example of their neighbour municipality of Aargauhigh. The executive body refused this idea, arguing that such pictures would favour subjective judgments. Decisions at the local assembly are taken by open ballot. In both municipalities no celebration is held for the freshly naturalised candidates.

In contrast to Bernhigh and Bernlow, one notices that in Aargauhigh and Aargaulow the involvement of the local citizens in the decision-making processes alters the formal decision-making processes. Not only does the municipal population take the final decisions, they are also informed by the local administration and the naturalisation commission. The information-booklets that are sent to each household and especially their contents have let, time and again, to violent debates in Switzerland. It is debated whether such leaflets are derogatory for candidates or whether they violate their privacy. While many prefer to abandon such ‘information-campaigns’ or to limit the information appearing in these booklets, others wonder whether it is possible at all for local citizen to get an idea of the applicants on the basis of such leaflets, which for the large majority constitutes the only information about them. Many hold the opinion that it is particularly questionable whether pictures of candidates contain any relevant information that should be taken into account for the final decisions. To augment the chances to get the Swiss passports, applicants often have their pictures taken by professional photographers. In this respect, it is particularly noteworthy that no pictures of the candidates appear in the information leaflets in Aargaulow. While many politicians in Aargauhigh hold the opinion that such pictures show their citizens how friendly an alien resident might be, in Aargauhigh a majority of the local actors argue that such pictures contain no relevant information about the candidates.

Despite the direct democratic decision-making procedure in Aargauhigh and Aargaulow, the local administration and the municipal politicians are still strongly involved in the naturalisation processes. As in most of our case studies, the persons in charge of naturalisations at the local administrations play a crucial role during the naturalisation procedures. In Aargauhigh, the responsible person at the local administration seems to be a particularly influential actor, since together with the mayor he verifies the German knowledge of all candidates and receives them for a first interview, before the naturalisation commission talks to them. In Aargaulow, representatives of the administration do not meet the candidates and make no recommendations. Moreover, the composition of the naturalisation commission further distinguishes the two procedures: in Aargaulow only few politicians are members of
the commission. This might point to the fact that in this municipality naturalisations are considered an administrative rather than a political issue.

Table 6.4 confirms that, compared to other actors in their municipalities, the representative of the local administration in Aargau high is much more important than his colleague in Aargau low. Very influential actors are the mayors of both municipalities, since they are involved at different points during the naturalisation processes. The party affiliation seems to be a better predictor in these two municipalities than in Bern high and Bern low: in Aargau high the president of the SVP and another person who has a lot of affinities with the Politarena – a political right-wing association – are judged more important than the members of the naturalisation commission. In Aargau low, with one exception, the influential actors are members of the centre or left-wing parties. Beside the respective mayors, the other members of the executive bodies are seen as rather unimportant.

**Attitudes towards naturalisation criteria**

With regard to the command of the German language, knowledge of the Swiss political system and candidates benefiting from social secur-

**Table 6.4 Relative influence and understanding of citizenship of local actors**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Infl.</th>
<th>UC</th>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Infl.</th>
<th>UC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>Mayor</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CVP</td>
<td>Nat. commission</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>Party president</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>Mayor</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>SVP</td>
<td>Party president</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>AF</td>
<td>Nat. commission</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>SVP</td>
<td>Nat. commission</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>SVP</td>
<td>Nat. commission</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Nat. commission</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>SP</td>
<td>Nat. commission</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Grüne</td>
<td>Nat. commission</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>SP</td>
<td>Nat. commission</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>SP</td>
<td>Nat. commission</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>EVP</td>
<td>Nat. commission</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>SP</td>
<td>Executive</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>SP</td>
<td>Party president</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>SVP</td>
<td>Executive</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Grüne</td>
<td>Party member</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Executive</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>CVP</td>
<td>Executive</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>SP</td>
<td>Party president</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>SP</td>
<td>Party president</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>SP</td>
<td>Nat. commission</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Abbreviations: Influence (Infl.), Understanding of citizenship (UC), Liberal Party (FDP), Christian Democrats (CVP), Social Democrats (SP), Swiss People’s Party (SVP), Green Party (Grüne), Evangelical People’s Party (EVP), Politarena (PA) (local right-wing association close to the SVP), Agenda Femina (AF) (local left-wing association).

Scales of indicators: ‘Influence’ indicates the relative influence of actors in comparison to the most powerful actor (100). ‘Understanding of citizenship’ varies between ‘0’ (generous) and ‘1’ (restrictive).
ity or disability insurances, the dominant actors in Aargau high and Aargaulow defend different positions. However, the differences are not as much pronounced as between Bern high and Bern low. Strongly diverging attitudes between the two municipalities of the canton of Aargau can, however, be observed, when it comes to deciding whether or not naturalised Swiss should be allowed to keep their old nationality. By virtue of a motion that has been accepted by the municipal assembly in Aargau high some years ago, all applicants have to indicate whether they would give up their old citizenship in the case of naturalisation. Different actors in Aargau high confided to us that, although dual citizenship had been permitted in Switzerland since 1992, they wanted to have this information in order to know whether candidates were really serious about their application. During the municipal assemblies, it regularly happens that individual citizens ask the naturalisation commission whether the candidates preferred to keep their old nationality or not. The person in charge of naturalisation at the local administration told us that alien citizens who declared that they would give up their old nationality had a much better chance of being accepted. This very influential actor seemed to be very attracted to the idea that candidates should sign a notice of abandonment to make sure that they turned in their old passport after a successful naturalisation. He recognised, however, that such a procedure was legally impossible. An influential member of the naturalisation commission and representative of the SVP argued that naturalised citizens should abandon their first citizenship because otherwise they could easily escape Switzerland when they had committed a crime. In Aargaulow, on the other hand, dual citizenship seems not to be of an issue at all. A lot of important actors argued that freshly naturalised Swiss should keep their culture and therefore also their old citizenship. Only one representative of very little influence in the local administration held the opinion that candidates from Western Europe could keep their old nationality, whereas naturalised Swiss from the countries of the former Yugoslavia must not have two passports.

**Attitudes towards candidates from Muslim countries**

Quite a large gap between Aargau high and Aargaulow can also be observed concerning the different attitudes towards candidates from Muslim countries. The three most influential actors in Aargau high took the view that persons from Muslim countries had considerable difficulty integrating themselves into Switzerland. The mayor, as one of them, argued that they had, for example, diverging perspectives on marriage. It was often problematic when Muslim men married non-Muslim women. In such situations, he argued, kidnapping of children by one of
the parents had already occurred. He then went on to tell us that people from the former Yugoslavia had more difficulty to live in Western European countries because they had had to survive for many centuries under Tito’s dictatorship and were therefore not used to living in a democratic country. The second most important actor in Aargauhigh who has a lot of affinities with the right-wing association Politarena expressed the opinion that not only people from the Balkans and Turkey but also Blacks (he used the term ‘nigger’) were persons who integrated themselves with more difficulty. Such people had another culture, often dealt with drugs and knew quite well how to sell themselves. He was also convinced that they lived in clans and were always ready to kill other people to protect themselves. He concluded that such people did not like to work, just took the money where they could and pitilessly drew on the Swiss social security system. Everybody in Aargauhigh does not share such extreme positions. However, most right-wing politicians agreed with the basic arguments that have just been presented. Even the left-wing actors who had little influence did not seem to completely disagree with such stances. The SP representative in the executive body supported the opinion that people from the Balkans were not used to living in a democratic system and the president of the SP in Aargauhigh argued that the behaviour of foreigners in their daily life and their readiness to integrate themselves depended a lot on their ‘race’.

The perceptions of citizens coming from Muslim countries were different in Aargaulow. Only the very influential mayor’s attitude resembled those of the restrictive positions in Aargauhigh. For example, it posed a problem for him when Muslim women wore a headscarf. He argued that they did this only to affront the social environment of their host country and held the opinion that people from the Balkans interacted with each other in a very ruthless manner and had misguided attitudes toward governmental institutions. They simply thought that the state was responsible for everything outside their domiciles. Some other influential actors in Aargaulow agreed that foreigners from Muslim countries had more difficulty integrating themselves in Switzerland than people from Western European countries. However, they did not seem to be that much preoccupied with this question or had no real explanation for this phenomenon. One influential member of the naturalisation commission argued that people from African or Asian countries had such difficulties simply because of the cold temperatures in Switzerland. The president of the Social Democrats, who had relatively little influence, explained the difficulties persons from Muslim countries had by the fact that Islam was 700 years younger than Christianity. For him, such countries were in another ‘historical phase’ than, for example, Switzerland. She then added that the social class of a can-
Candidate explained a lot more than other factors about one’s ability to adapt to another culture. In general, a lot of actors in Aargaulow agreed that the individual characteristics of a person were much more decisive for a successful integration than their cultural background.

*Attitudes towards the decisions of the Swiss Federal Court*

Since both municipalities of Aargauhigh and Aargaulow were affected by the decisions of the Federal Court, it is even more surprising that the reactions were so different. One of the most important politicians in Aargauhigh told us that it was an unbounded cheek that the Federal Court tried to take the responsibility for naturalisations away from the people. For him, decisions by ballot should still be possible and they should not have to be justified. The influential mayor had a rather ambivalent attitude towards the verdicts. On the one hand, he was against an arbitrary naturalisation policy. On the other hand, he preferred that the decisions be taken by the population; and since the citizens decided at closed ballot in Aargauhigh, he concluded that it was impossible to know why they refused a particular candidate. Anyway, he did not see the reason why Swiss citizens should justify their decisions about naturalisation, for nobody asked them – so his comparison ran – to justify why they voted, for example, for a particular candidate during an election. Altogether, he preferred decisions by closed ballot, because in this case people did not have to expose their personal attitudes. Moreover, there were legitimate reasons to fear reprisals from foreign citizens if everybody could see how they voted. This seems to be an issue that concerns politicians in Aargauhigh here and there. A member of the naturalisation commission confided to us that in the commission they had already discussed several times whether its members exposed themselves to any danger when they rejected applications.

In contrast to Aargauhigh, the opinions in Aargaulow were very much in favour of the verdicts. Only two actors were opposed to parts of the decisions. The mayor and a member of the naturalisation commission held the opinion that the verdicts had mainly caused confusion and uncertainty. Both agreed that the Federal Court decided about a political matter it had not been competent to decide on. They, however, disagreed about whether popular votes by ballot should be possible and whether decisions should be justified. The other members of the naturalisation commission agreed that decisions have to be justified and that candidates should be given the opportunity to appeal naturalisation decisions. After all, so their arguments ran, the right to appeal had to be part of every democratic decision. One actor expressed a certain doubt as to whether applicants would really make use of this
right. Another person argued that justifying a negative decision also would help the candidates to better prepare for a second application.

Table 6.5 summarises the various attitudes in Aargauhigh and Aargaulow. The influential decision makers in Aargauhigh require a lot of criteria to be fulfilled by applicants, are very hostile towards candidates from Muslim countries and, in contrast to Bernhigh, completely oppose the decisions of the Swiss Federal Court. In Aargaulow the local politicians support the decisions of the Federal Court and have no discriminatory attitudes towards candidates from Muslim countries. As for the positions towards naturalisation criteria: they point to a less restrictive naturalisation policy that, however, does not seem to be as generous as in Bernlow.

### 6.4 Controversies and occurrences

This chapter allowed us to illustrate the results of the foregoing chapters with more qualitative data and to discuss the various discourses of local politicians in more detail. The comparison of two pairs of case studies enabled us to make appear different citizenship politics in municipalities with similar socio-economic characteristics, situated in the same regions of Switzerland. While in this study we mainly concentrate on the number of criteria that have to be fulfilled for naturalisation, a more detailed discussion of attitudes towards candidates from Muslim countries and the recent decisions of the Swiss Federal Court opened additional ways to analytically grasp the local understandings of citizenship. At the same time we have got a clearer picture of the formal decision-making processes and to what extent they reflect the prevailing understandings of citizenship. The involvement of different actors at various stages of the decision-making processes clearly shows that naturalisations are not administrative procedures in which only representatives of the local authorities take a share. Rather, both political and administrative actors struggle over the question of who might become a Swiss citizen.

However, naturalisation politics is not always controversial and has not the same political salience in all municipalities. Interestingly, when

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitudes towards...</th>
<th>Aargauhigh</th>
<th>Aargaulow</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Naturalisation criteria</td>
<td>Restrictive</td>
<td>Rather generous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidates from Muslim countries</td>
<td>Hostile</td>
<td>Open</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decisions of the Swiss Federal Court</td>
<td>Opposed</td>
<td>In favour</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
comparing cases with high and low rejection rates, we noticed that naturalisation politics is rather more controversial in municipalities where a lot of candidates are rejected. The four case studies discussed in this chapter are particularly good examples in this regard. In Bernlow and Aargaulow 87 per cent and 100 per cent of all actors respectively had no objections to the current naturalisation policy. On the other hand, in the two municipalities of Bernhigh and Aargauhigh 31 per cent and 41 per cent of the involved actors from various parties told us that they were opposed to several aspects of the citizenship politics of their municipalities. It regularly happens in both municipalities that actors with a restrictive understanding of citizenship demand a tightening up of the naturalisation procedures. Moreover, we have observed fiercer debates, highlighted by particular incidents in recent years, which indicate how controversial naturalisation politics in these municipalities is.

As we have already alluded to above, in 1995 and 1996 the municipal assembly in Aargauhigh twice rejected two young Muslim women who were said to have refused to shake hands with the mayor when they met for an interview. These rejections were widely echoed in the regional newspapers and discussed among the population and local politicians. The two women told the mayor that their religion would not allow them to touch a man who is not a member of their family. For many local politicians such an attitude was a clear indication of lack of integration. The mayor, who was in charge of all applications at this time, recommended that the municipal assembly not accept these two candidates for naturalisation.

Quite exceptionally, in Bernhigh some years ago the different parties involved did not come to an agreement as to whether to recommend a particular candidate for naturalisation. The administration was somewhat, but reluctantly, in favour of the candidate because he more or less fulfilled all the criteria. However, the commission preferred not to recommend that candidate. They justified their decision simply by the assertion that he was not a friendly person. After the executive body had backed the decision of the commission, the candidate in question appealed the recommendation. The cantonal authority in charge of naturalisations rejected the decision and remanded the dossier to Bernhigh. During our interviews, most actors in Bernhigh referred to this incident to criticise either the decisions of the naturalisation commission and the local naturalisation policy in general or the interference of cantonal and judicial authorities in local politics.

Such incidents might be exceptional even in municipalities with a restrictive naturalisation policy, and we do not claim that they are always a result of their respective politics or that they tell us everything about the attitudes of local politicians. But they indicate that naturalisations constitute a controversial issue in these municipalities and mobi-
lise political actors. On the other hand, the absence of such incidents and the high degree of satisfaction with the local procedures, as we have observed in Aargaulow and Bernlow, point to the fact that local actors are not that much preoccupied by the question of who should become a Swiss citizen.

It is of course quite difficult to quantify such local occurrences and to judge whether they have clouded local discussions on naturalisations for a longer period or only at the time of our data collection. Nonetheless, we have tried to find out for each of our municipalities whether incidents such as the ones described in the foregoing paragraphs have occurred. We have only retained incidents that were mentioned by various local actors and/or were discussed in regional newspapers. Table 6.6 clearly reveals that they can indeed be observed mainly in municipalities with high rejection rates ($r=0.79$, $p=0.001$). Table 6.6 also lists the degree of dissatisfaction with local naturalisation policy expressed by local actors. The relation between this indicator and the pursued naturalisation policy (rejection rate) is, however, rather ambiguous ($r=0.44$, $p=0.12$). As the example of Bernhightwo shows, even in municipalities with a high rejection rate can a large majority of local politicians be happy with the current naturalisation policy (when there are no left-wing politicians questioning the way alien residents are naturalised). On the other hand, it might very well be that a rather generous citizenship policy is criticised by right-wing politicians as the example of Zurichlow demonstrates.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>Rejection rate (%)</th>
<th>Controversial occurrences</th>
<th>Degree of dissatisfaction with local naturalisation policy</th>
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7 Local Social Influence Networks

7.1 Introduction

This last empirical chapter seeks to analyse naturalisation processes from a further perspective that so far has been treated only at the margins. After a large-N analysis, a comparison of local citizenship models and a detailed discussion of four naturalisation fields, we now concentrate our attention on the individual decision makers and on the factors influencing their individual understandings of citizenship.

In the introduction to Chapter 4, we have presented a newspaper report in which a representative of a local Swiss People's Party (SVP) justified the rejection of several candidates from Muslim countries. He thereby exposed the fact that he personally requires from candidates a high degree of integration into the local community. Why does he have such a restrictive understanding of citizenship? Might it be due to bad experiences he had with foreign residents from Muslim countries? Is he looking for a job and fears that naturalised foreigners might be preferred to him? Does he fear that Switzerland loses its cultural characteristics by allowing too many alien residents to become Swiss? Or did his parents teach him to be wary of foreigners? All these aspects might have an impact on his attitude towards naturalisation candidates. According to our theoretical model presented in Chapter 3, there is a further explanatory variable that we will discuss in more detail in this chapter: the influence of the local social environment.

So far, we have mainly demonstrated how local politicians struggle over the definition of their nation and thereby how they contribute to the production and reproduction of social reality. As we argued above, such groups of local politicians are not rational associations of self-interested actors. Rather, their attitudes towards naturalisation candidates and their perception of citizenship are shaped by, among other factors, interactions in the context of decision-making processes. By emphasising such socialisation processes, we argue that struggles about cultural boundaries are more about conviction than suppression of minority positions: those arguments prevail or become accepted that appear to be more legitimate than others. Or as Wimmer (2002) would put it: such struggles can be considered as negotiation processes leading to cultural
compromises or agreements inhabiting a common arena about basic principles, meanings, moral and social categories that structure, for example, naturalisation politics. While cultural compromises are the results of established and internalised modes of meaning-making, they in turn influence the direction in which further struggles develop by limiting the horizon of possibilities within which individual actors interpret and experience social reality (Wimmer 2002: 35). In other words, local interactions can be considered as secondary socialisation processes (Berger & Luckmann 1967: 129-146), which decisively influence the actor's habitus (Bourdieu 1977, 1990), constraining his or her attitudes towards foreign residents applying for Swiss citizenship.

As we have repeatedly seen above, in the context of naturalisations interactions happen exclusively within municipalities, external influences being virtually inexistent. Cultural compromises thus emerge in relatively isolated local policy fields. It thus can be assumed that the prevailing naturalisation policy and the attitudes of the dominant actors influence the opinions of other politicians and that the range of attitudes is limited in each municipality. To test these hypotheses and to explain more systematically how interactions with other local politicians shape one's attitudes towards candidates for naturalisation, we propose an analytical framework that draws on theories in social psychology and social influence networks.

7.2 How to explain individual understandings of citizenship: classic approaches

To be clear from the outset, by investigating the influence of the local social environment on the understanding of citizenship of municipal politicians, we do not claim that contacts with other politicians during decision-making processes are the unique explanatory factor for individual attitudes. Each human being has been socialised in various contexts during his or her life. Attitudes towards foreigners and the way people think about their nation are influenced to various degrees by their education, personal relationships to alien residents, experiences at work, etc. We merely seek to demonstrate here that the local social environment constitutes a further important variable that should not be neglected.

Before we present our main theoretical framework, let us briefly discuss some alternative explanations by resorting to theories on xenophobia. Xenophobia – commonly defined as the fear of the ‘other’ or the ‘stranger’ – is closely linked to nationalism and our concept of understanding of citizenship. The attitude toward foreigners and their desire to become members of one’s community depend largely on one’s na-
tional identity, its definition, and especially its openness toward citizens living outside one's community: 'Racism' and nationalism are both ideologies. They are bodies of knowledge (a word that denotes in this context neither validity nor reliability), which make claims about the way the social world is and, crucially, about the way it ought to be. This knowledge is mobilised in the definition of criteria of group membership and principles of exclusion' (Jenkins 1997: 84; see also Hall 2000: 7-8).

Whenever people have organised themselves in groups throughout human history, they have excluded others. As Taifel (1981, 1982) has shown in his experiments, such processes occur not only among individuals that possess similar convictions or feature cultural characteristics. Even arbitrarily arranged groups begin to form their own group identities and to mark themselves off from other groups through categorisation and over-accentuation of common characteristics within a group and differences in relation to other groups. In the age of nationalism, this disposition to exclude others from a nation can be called xenophobia (Wimmer 2002: 5; Schönberg 1987: 44). In other words, understanding of citizenship and xenophobia/racism are the two sides of the same coin: the way we perceive ourselves heavily influences the way we exclude others; a person with a very restrictive understanding of citizenship can also be considered as very xenophobic. Accordingly, theories explaining xenophobic behaviour can also be resorted to in order to explain the degree of understanding of citizenship of individual citizens.

Arguing that in modern nation-states xenophobia constitutes a potential disposition to exclude others is far from a socio-biological approach elaborated by such researchers as Van den Berghe (1978, 1981). By claiming that somebody always is excluded and that xenophobia and racial differentiation are specific dimensions of nationalism, we make no statement about the content of xenophobia or about who is excluded. Just as there are many different contents of nationalism, so there are also various forms and degrees of racism and xenophobia. Thus, the crucial question is not whether or not somebody is excluded but who and how many are denied Swiss citizenship.

Contrary to our theoretical model claiming that specific contents of nationalism, ethnicity or xenophobia are the outcome of political struggles, Van den Berghe (1978, 1981) argues that ethnicity tends to be ascriptive, defined by common descent, generally hereditary and often endogamous. For him, ethnic groups and nations are extensions of primordial kinship networks. That is why for him such powerful sentiments as nationalism or xenophobia can easily be mobilised even in modern societies. He acknowledges that common ancestry is always partially fictive as a result of migration and conquest and partially in-
strumentalised. However, he is convinced that ethnicity is primordial and that myths ‘will only be believed if members of an ethnic group [or a nation] are sufficiently alike in physical appearance and culture and have lived together and intermarried for a sufficient period (at a minimum three or four generations) […]’ (Van den Berghe 1995: 360). According to this view, fear and aggression toward others that look or behave differently are natural and very old protective mechanisms (see Jäger 1995: 28-29). For exponents of the socio-biological approach, xenophobia is the consequence of incompatible cultures: a country’s population rejects immigrants because of their inability to integrate into the structure and culture of the new home country.

Although Van den Berghe relativises his socio-biological explanation by considering social and cultural aspects, his emphases on physical aspects and ethnic durability cannot account for the considerable variability, wide range and frequent absorptions and dissolutions of instances of ethnic affiliation and exclusion. Smith (1998: 149) criticises Van den Berghe for forgetting that, for example, the Romans and English emphasised in their myths of common ancestry their varied origins, and that the contents of these myths changed considerably over time. Against the argument of cultural homogeneity, one could also put forward the example of Switzerland, where the idea of cultural heterogeneity and its four linguistic groups is often successfully mobilised to construct a national identity (Chollet 2006). As Smith (1998: 150) rightly comments, socio-biological approaches fail to discriminate between various forms of exclusion over time and space and do not account for how exclusion is socially and politically organised. As for the rejection of immigrants, Wimmer (2002: 205-208) offers an explication that asserts that so-called ‘objective cultural distances’ and ‘racial distinctiveness’ are mainly the results of framing processes. In most countries, it can be observed how the perception of a certain group of foreigners can change from a view of complete distinctiveness to wide acceptance. A case in point are Italians who immigrated to Switzerland in the 1950s and 1960s. Their culture was first widely regarded as incompatible with Swiss culture. Today, they constitute one of the best-integrated foreign groups in Switzerland, whereas recently arrived migrants from the countries of the former Yugoslavia and Turkey are often seen as too different from Swiss citizens (Stolz 2001: 60; Niederberger 2004).

Besides the socio-biological approach, nowadays completely out-dated, there are various other theories seeking to explain xenophobic attitudes. Approaches can be divided into two groups, one emphasising the dimensions of structural elements, the other, the dimensions of individual characteristics (Jäger 1995: 27-50; Heitmeyer 2002: 28). Approaches explaining tensions between ethnic and national groups with
socio-economic and socio-structural factors have already been discussed in Chapter 4. We thus concentrate the following brief discussion on the second dimension. Following Heitmeyer (2002: 27-30), we will first distinguish four explanatory variables on the micro-sociological level: social class of individuals, contacts with foreigners, authoritarianism (including unbounded flexibility) and social disintegration (including relative deprivation). We will also discuss whether education has an influence on xenophobic attitudes. In the following paragraphs, we will briefly present the different theories and how we operationalised the respective indicators. The hypotheses will then be tested below in Table 7.1.

1. Social Class: Related to theories emphasising structural changes are those approaches explaining xenophobic attitudes by social class. It is argued that globalisation and the opening of national markets mainly pose problems for people from lower social classes (Bornschier & Helbling 2005: 32-36). It has been shown that such people more readily vote for radical-right and populist parties (Mughan et al. 2003; Kitschelt & McGann 1995). These so-called losers in the globalisation processes might perceive immigrants as competitors on the job market. More generally, their precarious situation might lead to feelings of anomie and relative deprivation. We operationalised social class with the job of the interviewees. Accounting for the rise of the new middle class in Western European countries, Kriesi (1998b) has developed a useful class structure with eight categories that goes beyond the traditional class divide of the working class and the old middle class and that discriminates between more and less privileged groups. People of the middle class are divided in three groups: those who fulfil administrative or commercial tasks (office workers, managers, etc.), technical specialists (engineers and those working in a natural-science domain) and socio-cultural specialists (teachers, nurses, etc.). A further distinction is made between qualified and unqualified workers. The last three categories consist of farmers and self-employed persons exercising traditional jobs (craftsmen, salesmen, etc.) and other self-employed persons. There were no unskilled workers, socio-cultural specialists, or other self-employed persons among our interviewees. As there are only four farmers in the dataset, this category has been put together with those exercising traditional jobs. In Table 7.1, the four remaining categories are retained as dummy-variables, the category of office workers and managers serving as a reference category.

2. Education: Various studies have empirically demonstrated that a rising level of education reduces negative attitudes toward foreigners
It is often argued that education influences our cognitive faculties, social competences, value orientation and social status (Heyer 2002: 78). Education has thus not only an impact on our attitudes towards foreigners but is also closely related to the social class of a person and influences one’s social integration (cf. Heyder & Schmidt 2000). It is disputed why and how education reduces xenophobia. Some argue that individuals with a low level of education have limited cognitive capacities for differentiated perceptions and information processing and are therefore inclined to stereotypical thinking and much more susceptible to interpersonal influence (Case et al. 1989; Hyman et al. 1990; Maykovich 1975; Stouffer 1955). As the reference to ‘susceptibility’ makes clear, people with limited education are not automatically xenophobic; a social environment is still needed to trigger negative attitudes towards foreign residents. Political mobilisation processes conditioning the presence of perceptions of threat and conceptualising social causations are still a necessary condition to produce a restrictive understanding of citizenship. Others argue that educated people are better integrated and thus consider immigrants not as competitors. Still others hold the opinion that better-educated people mix in a social environment where xenophobic attitudes are considered as socially not desirable (see Kühnel & Schmidt 2002: 85). To measure the impact of education, we use a dichotomised indicator differentiating whether or not a respondent has a general qualification for university entrance (A-level).

3. The contact hypothesis: It is often observed that persons who are particularly xenophobic have very few contacts with foreigners. For example, it has been demonstrated that among different ethnic groups in Germany, Sinti and Roma are especially disliked although very few Germans have any contacts with members of these groups (Wagner et al. 2002: 98). A common argument, which has been empirically proved, therefore asserts that personal contacts with foreigners in the neighbourhood or at the workplace reduce negative attitudes towards those people (Wagner et al. 2002: 99-101). It has been argued that knowing people from other ethnic groups helps relativise one’s own cultural and ethno-centrist standards (Pettigrew 1997; Thomas 1996). Such relationships help people to learn and accept that different cultural backgrounds might lead to different behaviours. Of course, it also has to be taken into account whether contacts to foreigners are positive or negative. Unsurprisingly, Wagner et al. (2002: 100-101) have shown that people are less xenophobic when in the recent past they had been helped by foreigners.
or when they have had the opportunity to conduct an interesting conversation with such persons. The problem of causality concerning xenophobia is, however, not yet completely solved. Against the contact hypothesis it might be argued that people with negative attitudes try to avoid contacts with foreigners. In assessing our local politicians we were in a particular situation, as most of them were in contact with foreign residents in the context of naturalisation processes. However, we still wanted to know how often they met foreign residents privately or at their working places and whether these contacts were positive or negative. Astonishingly, no less than 96 per cent told us that their relationships to foreigners were rather or very positive. Even among those people with a very restrictive understanding of citizenship, who had no reason to give socially desirable answers, only a very few of them reported negative experiences. Eighty-six per cent were regularly or very often in contact with foreigners. Only two persons indicated that they hardly knew any alien residents or immigrants. Given the very small variance in the frequency of contacts, it is unclear whether this variable has any impact at all.

4. Authoritarianism: A large range of studies concentrate on individual psychological characteristics to explain xenophobia. The work of Adorno et al. (1950) on the authoritarian personality, seeking to predict one’s potential for fascist and antidemocratic behaviour, stands at the beginning of this research tradition (see Altemeyer 1996; Heitmeyer & Heyder 2002; Heyder & Schmidt 2000). It is argued that an authoritarian character is developed during childhood and the result of a specific socialisation. An authoritarian character needs to maintain control and prove superiority over his or her social environment and is rooted in a worldview populated by enemies and empty of equality and empathy. Such persons are therefore particularly xenophobic. Authoritarianism is often related to the following characteristics: group dependency, ethnocentric orientation, coercion to conformity and hierarchical and dogmatic thinking (Jäger 1995: 31). Those characteristics result in mental and social rigidity and immaturity (Roghmann 1966: 76). Therefore, authoritarianism comes close to the concepts of anomie and social disintegration. For the operationalisation of an authoritarian character, we asked our interviewees whether they think that we need leaders who tell us what to do, whether they agree that children should follow their parent’s convictions, whether school should mainly teach discipline and performance and whether criminality should be combated more aggressively. For each question, respondents had to indicate on a scale from 1 to 6 to what extent they agree with
those statements. A summary indicator (Authoritarianism) has been generated by averaging the attitudes towards those statements.

5. **Social disintegration and relative deprivation**: According to the social disintegration hypothesis, those people are xenophobic who have little or no access to parts of their society (e.g., labour market), who do not have the resources to participate in public life, who have a feeling of political powerlessness or, more generally, who are not socially integrated (Endrikat et al. 2002). According to Heitmeyer (2002: 29), closely related to this hypothesis is the concept of relative deprivation emphasising the subjectively felt degree of disadvantage in comparison with people of the same group (individual relative deprivation) or compared with other groups (collective relative deprivation) (Runciman 1967). As Endrikat et al. (2002: 37-39) argue, modern societies indeed offer differentiated structures, pluralistic values, individual lifestyles and thus many opportunities for self-realisation. On the other hand, however, increasing structural inequalities, rapid social changes, experiences of senselessness and the dissolution of social relations present precarious situations for individuals. People, especially when they have the feeling that what they are doing is not appreciated, or when they do not succeed in life, develop negative attitudes towards foreigners (Kronauer 2002; Honneth 1992). In the light of the social-disintegration hypothesis, local politicians constitute a particular group, as they are presumably rather well-integrated socially through their public functions. This does of course not foreclose the possibility that they may feel excluded in other domains. To measure relative deprivation and social disintegration, we rely on two indicators that inform us about whether people think that the increasing ratio of foreigners aggravates the labour market (Economic threat), and whether they no longer feel at home where they live due to an increasing number of alien residents (Alienation). For each question, respondents had to indicate on a scale from 1 to 6 to what extent they agree with those statements. The above-presented variable for social class might partially also be considered for the operationalisation of relative deprivation, as people with a low social status may perceive foreigners as an economic threat.

7.3 **Social influence and norm formation**

Some of the approaches to xenophobia, presented in the foregoing paragraphs, emphasise socialisation and interaction processes as explanatory factors for negative attitudes towards foreigners. It is widely
agreed that the social environment constitutes a crucial element for forming attitudes and norms. For our local politicians, the environment of local citizenship politics provides a sub-world different from all other contexts in which they have been socialised, as it is common to all actors of a specific municipality. While municipal politicians might have grown up in different regions, educated by different parents and teachers and work at different places, they all have experienced citizenship politics in the same municipality. None of our interviewees has ever been active in local politics of another municipality. On average, all interviewed politicians have been involved in local naturalisation politics for ten years and only 16 per cent for less than four years – four years being one term of office for those who are elected. As for the time of residence, on average they have lived for 29 years in the municipality where they are currently politically active – 28 per cent less than twenty years and only 11 per cent less than ten years. Their municipality and its political system thus become an important environment, in which their attitudes towards naturalisation have been shaped. This becomes all the more relevant when we look at how strongly those politicians identify with their municipality: not very surprisingly for local politicians, 96 per cent of them identify rather or very strongly with the town or village where they live. We can therefore conclude that for the large majority of the interviewed persons their municipalities constitute an important political environment for forming ideas about citizenship. They present their opinions about naturalisation along with those of other local politicians, confronting those other opinions, trying to impose their own or modifying them when convinced and influenced by other arguments. To understand how such influence mechanisms work, we resort to theories in social psychology.

In social psychology, the concept of ‘social influence’ refers to ways in which the attitudes of individuals have an impact on each other and conformity or norms are created. If it is hard to imagine attitudes that are not in some way exposed to those of others, social influence varies along a continuum according to the degree of pressure exerted on the individual. Homans (1961) argues that idiosyncratic norms may indeed exist when a person perceives that a feeling, thought or action is appropriate and correct for one or more persons in particular circumstances. However, it is difficult to maintain one’s perception in the presence of disagreement among significant others. Therefore, for Homans, most norms are shared norms by virtue of the process that links the development of normative content to the recognition that it is a shared norm. If a person adapts his or her opinion to the attitudes of his or her social environment, a distinction has to be made whether such an adaptation happens because the respective individual has been convinced by
new arguments (informative social influence) or because he or she changes his or her personal point of view for reasons of social desirability (normative social influence) (Van Avermaet 1996). As for politicians, the second mechanism might often apply. Since politicians are also strategists, it is certainly possible that they change their openly declared opinions in order to represent the attitude of a majority or to avoid antagonising their electorate. In our interviews, however, all actors were explicitly asked in face-to-face interviews to tell us their personal opinions and not that of a particular party or organisation of which they are a member. Indeed, they often told us that their personal opinion did not correspond to the official position of their party, or they confided to us thoughts they would not express in public. We are thus convinced that the responses we have gotten from our interviews reflect the personal opinions of these actors and are the result of informative social influence processes.

Sherif’s (1935) seminal study on norm formation still belongs among the classical works in this research field. He demonstrated that people’s judgments about the characteristics of an ambiguous phenomenon tend to converge when their disagreements are made visible, and that such emergent agreements shape people’s judgments about the same phenomenon when they experience it at a later point in time. Sherif’s experiments showed how the judgments of different actors converged when the addressed question could be answered objectively. Hardy (1957) conducted analyses to see if similar results could be obtained when persons were asked to comment on rather normative questions. His experiments with small groups debating issues such as divorce led to the insight that the majority influences the judgments of both the public and private attitudes of individuals of the minority group.

The question remains why local politicians adapt their personal judgments, for we are dealing with actors who are involved in a political decision-making process and are supposed to defend their personal convictions. In this regard, the insights of Asch’s (1960) experiments are highly relevant. He discovered that changes of judgments occurred even when the test persons were clearly convinced of their judgments at the beginning of the experiment. Festinger (1954) and more generally social comparison theory (Erickson 1988: 101-102) explain that such adaptations occur because human beings tend to evaluate their opinions and skills by comparing them with other persons through interpersonal communication. People feel uncomfortable when they are not sure whether their attitudes are correct. Especially in situations in which normative considerations influence the decision-making and when no objective standards are at hand, advantages and disadvantages of alternative arguments are deliberated and measured. According to
Festinger (1954), such a comparison is sought in circumstances when important decisions have to be made and personal opinions or skills become highly relevant. Attitudes tend to be unstable in the absence of interpersonal agreements, since actors are not confident that their attitudes are correct when there are no influential others who agree with them. Decisions in the context of naturalisations and the evaluation of naturalisation applications clearly demand normative judgments. The judgment whether a foreigner may become a new citizen depends on the understanding of citizenship, which constitutes a highly subjective question.

Arguing that local actors are influenced by the opinions of the actors surrounding them in their individual opinion-making processes, we have to tackle the problem of causal relation, since similar attitudes among interacting individuals at a specific point in time could result either from selection or socialisation (Kandel 1978: 427-429; Baron & Tindall 1993: 269-270). It could easily be argued that actors mainly maintain relationships with those persons who share the same opinions or that they deal with people of the same political party (Erickson 1988: 101). This problem mainly applies in situations in which individuals are free to choose their contact persons. The opinion-making before general elections or referendums, when voters compare their opinions or preferences with those persons surrounding them could be such an example: are people influenced by the opinions of their friends and colleagues at work or did they choose people as friends defending similar values? It seems quite plausible that someone will compare and come to agree with close colleagues or friends rather than with political enemies (Erickson 1988: 102). However, there are many situations in which the choice of others is not free and where relationships are constrained by impersonally determined opportunities to interact (Feld 1981). Many policy fields, including our own, constitute such examples. Eighty-two per cent of our actors are formally involved in the decision-making process. They are members of a naturalisation commission, the local parliament, the executive body, or the municipal administration. They were delegated by their party and/or elected by the local population and thus confronted with other politicians they did not choose to deal with.

Even if we are sure that each local actor talks to different colleagues during decision-making processes, however, we cannot attribute the same relevance to all relationships. Although most politicians incessantly try to convince others of their opinions, not all are equally successful. Those who enjoy a great reputation or those who are in contact with many others have particular success in imposing their convictions. The more frequently people interact, the more opportunities they have to interpret each other’s attitudes accurately. We thus not only
have to look at the relationships between actors but, again, also at the
degree of influence of individual actors and at the frequency of contacts
between actors (e.g. Baron & Tindall 1993; Erickson 1988: 102-105).

7.4 Explanatory model and results

Our explanatory model is heavily influenced by social influence net-
According to Friedkin (2001: 171), social influence network theory in-
cludes French's (1956) formal theory of social power and DeGroot's
(1974) consensus formation model, and 'describes an influence process
in a group of N persons in which the members' attitudes and opinions
on an issue change as they revise their positions by taking weighted
averages of the influential positions [of] other members' (Friedkin's em-
phasis). In line with our theoretical arguments and Bourdieu's 'field-
theory', social influence network theory accounts for both symbolic (at-
titudes) and material (structure and power) aspects of influence pro-
cesses. Arguing that individuals form their opinions in a complex inter-
personal environment in which powerful opinions are in disagreement
and liable to change, Friedkin (1999) has probably developed the most
elaborate account of how social influence networks affect attitudes and
opinions. His theoretical model takes into account how actors modify
their opinions by taking into consideration their own circumstances
and the influences of others and how the configuration and strength of
interpersonal influences in particular populations depend on the social
structure.

All the aforementioned studies have compared attitudes before and
after the experiments to reveal influence mechanisms. Since we were
not in an experimental setting and resources as well as practical con-
siderations did not allow it, data for our analyses were collected for one
period only. As we argued above, initial opinions can be assumed to
change at the moment they are actively voiced in local naturalisation
politics, since it is a situation in which political actors with a priori dif-
f erent attitudes, none of whom chose to deal with each other, confront
each other. For the index measuring the individual understanding of ci-
tizenship, we resort to the indicator we have generated in Chapter 5.
The social environment of an actor has been operationalised by aver-
aging the attitudes of all persons with whom an actor is in contact dur-
ing the decision-making processes.

How can we measure the degree of influence of particular actors? In
Friedkin's (1999) experiments the participants were asked to record
their opinions at the beginning and at the end of the experiment. To
solicit information on relative interpersonal influences, the participants
had to estimate the extent to which each group member influenced their final opinion. As Friedkin (1999: 17) admits himself, there are obvious difficulties with such a measurement: actors may over- or under-estimate the importance of others or their own susceptibility to be influenced by others. Especially in a political field, actors may present themselves as resistant to other opinions. In our study, we have measured two constructs in order to weight the opinions surrounding an individual actor: the first weight concerns the intensity of contact. Each respondent was given the possibility of indicating a maximum of three persons with whom he or she was more often in contact than with the other indicated actors. Each interviewee then also indicated which one of these three was the most intensive contact. Values of colleagues with whom a politician had intensive or very intensive contacts have been doubled and tripled respectively.

The second weight is the relative power of each actor, as presented in Chapter 5. While the interviewees indicated with whom they discussed naturalisation politics most often, they were not asked who influenced their personal opinion but which actors were influential during the decision-making processes in general. The strength of such a measurement is that we do not rely on subjective judgments for measuring particular interpersonal influences. At the same time, it is an advantage that we measure the subjective judgments of the general influence of other actors, for power bases can only translate into direct influence if they are perceived as such.

As we have already argued above, our politicians are in contact with colleagues from different parties with whom they did not choose to deal. However, they are free to decide with whom they discuss matters in naturalisation politics more often. It might be that intensive contacts exist mainly between persons defending similar ideas. It can thus be assumed that the averaged attitudes of the social environment weighted with the intensity of contacts correlates relatively highly with the individual attitudes. On the other hand, the relative influence of actors does not depend on individual decisions and is therefore the more ‘objective’ weight.

Rather surprisingly, our analyses revealed that only 41 per cent of those contacts indicated by our interviewees as intensive relationships are contacts between actors with similar attitudes. If we consider only the most intensive contacts of our interviewees, 48 per cent of them happen between politicians with similar attitudes. It appears that local politicians discuss naturalisation matters not exclusively with colleagues defending the same positions. On the contrary, a lot of intensive exchange happens between politicians with different understandings of citizenship. In other words, due to structural constraints and their formal involvement in various political bodies, local politicians are regu-
larly confronted with opposing ideas in naturalisation politics. Nonetheless, we expect a higher impact of our indicator of social environment when we weight it with the intensity of contacts than when we weight it with the actor’s relative influence. After all, almost half of the weighted interactions happen between actors with similar attitudes.

The construction of our main independent variable and our explanatory model can be summarised as follows:

\[ E_1 = \frac{1}{n} \left( w_1 y_1 + w_2 y_2 + \ldots + w_N y_N \right) \]  

(1)

\[ SE_2 = \frac{1}{n} \left( w_1 y_1 + w_2 y_2 + \ldots + w_N y_N \right) \]  

(2)

Table 7.1  Individual understandings of citizenship: Non-standardised regression coefficients, standard error in brackets

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<tr>
<td>Social class: technocrats</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.07</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social class: skilled workers</td>
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<td>-0.03</td>
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<td>(0.03)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
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<td>-0.07*</td>
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<td>(0.00)</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>(0.02)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Authoritarianism</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic threat</td>
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<td>0.05**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alienation</td>
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<td>0.03**</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
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<tr>
<td>( R^2 ) (adj.)</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.36</td>
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<tr>
<td>( N )</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Level of significance: * \( p < 0.05 \), ** \( p < 0.01 \), *** \( p < 0.001 \). ‘Social environment 1’ is weighted by the frequency of contacts and ‘Social environment 2’, by the actors’ relative power.
Equations 1 and 2 describe how we constructed our main independent variable, the social environment (SE) of each local politician. The actors with whom an individual is in contact during the decision-making processes are. The individual attitudes of the actors with whom an individual politician is in contact are weighted either by the intensity of contact () (Eq.1) or by their relative influence () (Eq.2). The individual values have been summed up and divided by the number of contact persons. By doing so, we got an indicator for the social environment measuring the averaged and weighted attitudes of the political environment that influences the opinions of the individual actors. Equations 3 and 4 display the model we test in Table 7.1 below. Besides our differently weighted main variable (SE1 and SE2), the two equations include indicators generated on the basis of more classic approaches to xenophobia we discussed above: the social class of the respondents, the degree of their education, the degree of their contacts with foreigners, whether or not they have an authoritarian character, whether or not they perceive foreigners as an economic threat and whether or not they feel alienated due to an increasing number of alien residents.

In Table 7.1 we first compare the two differently weighted indicators for the social environment (SE1 and SE2) without controlling for other factors. As predicted, the indicator in Model 1 has a higher impact than the second indicator in Model 2, as a large part of the intensive (41 percent) and most intensive contacts (48 percent) occur between actors with similar attitudes. However, the impact of the second indicator also remains statistically highly significant for predicting one’s attitude towards naturalisation candidates: local politicians have a more restrictive understanding of citizenship when they are in contact with powerful actors who require a limitation of naturalisations. However, this indicator explains only 5 percent of the variance.

As Models 3 and 4 reveal, the coefficients of the two indicators decrease but remain significant when we control for alternative hypotheses. Of course, other elements also influence one’s attitudes since every person has been socialised in different social environments. While the social class seems to have no impact – at least for those
groups for which we have respondents – the perception of foreigners as an economic threat, a feeling of alienation and an authoritarian character leads to a more restrictive understanding of citizenship. Given the fact that both politicians with restrictive and those with a generous understanding of citizenship are often in contact with foreigners, the contact variable does not vary a lot and thus has almost no impact. Nonetheless, the negative sign seems to indicate that people who are regularly in contact with foreigners are less xenophobic. It is further demonstrated that better educated actors are less susceptible to the influence of xenophobic ideas.

7.6 Conclusion

As we have argued in Chapter 3, to understand the dynamic nature of nations, the contentious nature of citizenship politics and more generally the ongoing processes of cultural boundary drawing, we have to conceive of individuals as both improvising and socialised human beings. Naturalisation politics can be considered as political fields in which different understandings of citizenship are pitted against each other. At the same time, those controversies can be seen as social negotiation processes, in which individuals adapt their attitudes when they are confronted with more convincing arguments. While we have seen in Chapters 5 and 6 to what extent powerful actors within a naturalisation field influence the outcomes of naturalisation processes, in this chapter we discussed how the local social environment shapes individual attitudes towards candidates for naturalisation. We have revealed that the attitudes of those colleagues with whom an individual politician is in contact influence his or her understanding of citizenship. This is all the more astonishing when we recall that many intensive contacts occur between individuals who do not share the same convictions in citizenship politics. Although the indicators for the individual social environments remain significant when we include other influence factors in our models, our main variables explain relatively little of the variance in the understanding of citizenship (see Models 1 and 2 in Table 7.1). Nonetheless, we are able to demonstrate that the negotiating processes in the context of citizenship politics have an impact on personal convictions.
8  Contingent Citizenship Politics

8.1  Local struggles over cultural boundaries

Having arrived at the end of our study, we hope to have achieved two aims: on the one hand, our intention was to shed some light on what is going on when alien residents are naturalised in Switzerland, and to better understand why some municipalities pursue a more restrictive citizenship policy than others. On the other hand, we sought to make a more general contribution to the study of citizenship and nationalism and more specifically to the debate about the social construction of nations. Today, most researchers in this field agree that nations and ethnic groups are not fixed and bounded entities, but rather contingent and fluent. Despite this wide consent, the scholarly debate is far from resolved. Do constructivists believe that there are no such things as national and ethnic groups? Are cultural group characteristics and identities completely open to free choice? Our theoretical arguments and empirical results should have made it clear that the answer to the second question is clearly ‘no’. As for the first question, we have argued that nations and ethnic groups are neither a matter of essential commonality nor a matter of free-flowing constructions. What are nations and ethnic groups then? In this concluding chapter we will summarise our main results and discuss to what extent our project on local citizenship politics in Switzerland has helped us find an answer to this question.

When it comes to naturalisations, Swiss municipalities are accorded many rights that normally belong to the competencies of nation-states. Within the framework of vaguely defined criteria at the national level, municipal politicians or the entire local population decide according to which formal procedure candidates are naturalised and which are the criteria applicants have to fulfil to get a Swiss passport. The political systems and the social structures of Swiss municipalities make the study of municipal citizenship politics highly relevant: not only do they enjoy much more autonomy in various policy fields than municipalities in other countries, even small municipalities dispose of a distinct party system and have a relatively high ratio of foreigners. As a consequence, we have observed a large variety of citizenship politics and distinctive ways of regulating the access to the Swiss nationality. The dif-
ferences in citizenship policy might not be as big as those between nation-states. As we have seen, our local political units clearly have some cultural traits in common. When it comes to the question of what local politicians are proud of about Switzerland, a majority in all our case studies agreed that the direct democratic system and the political liberty people enjoy in this country are crucial characteristics of Switzerland. This confirms the commonly held view that political institutions constitute a crucial part of Swiss citizens’ national identity. But the key question still remains to be answered: why do some municipalities pursue a more restrictive naturalisation policy than others?

Data from a large-N analysis allowed us to pave the way for a more thorough investigation (see Chapter 4). We were able to demonstrate that socio-economic and socio-structural factors have no influence on which naturalisation policy is pursued in a municipality. A high unemployment rate, a large ratio of foreigners or a growing number of applicants from Muslim countries seem not to preoccupy the people who decide how many and which alien residents become Swiss citizens. Rather, cultural and political factors are decisive: the rejection rates increase when the local population has a restrictive understanding of citizenship, when the Swiss People’s Party (SVP), a populist right-wing party, is influential in local politics and/or when decisions are taken at open ballot. It thus clearly appears that it is how people think about citizenship, in which way political actors influence the naturalisation procedures and how decisions are made, which tells us which policy is pursued. This points to the contentious and political nature of citizenship and is a first confirmation of our main hypothesis according to which the outcome of a specific naturalisation policy is the result of ongoing political struggles over the questions of who we are and who belongs to us.

Citizenship politics were then analysed in more detail in fourteen case studies (see Chapter 5). By generating an indicator for the individual understanding of citizenship of local actors, we were able to distinguish diverging ideas on how cultural boundaries are drawn and how foreign residents who apply for Swiss citizenship are perceived. As we made clear from the outset, solely accounting for the way local politicians think about their nation leaves us in a somewhat unsatisfied situation. How do we know which attitudes are relevant when it comes to the final decision? To distinguish majority and minority positions and to explain why a specific construction prevails, we proposed to include the local power structures in our study. In order to trace the ways in which influence is exerted, we resorted to community power studies and social network analysis. As it turned out, accounting for both the symbolic and material aspects of naturalisation politics enabled us to
explain rejection rates and to distinguish various local citizenship models.

While Chapter 5 provided a quantitative comparison of fourteen citizenship models, Chapter 6 illustrated our hypotheses by means of qualitative data collected in four municipalities. A detailed discussion of the naturalisation procedures, the attitudes of the municipal politicians involved in the decision-making processes and the local influence structures once more revealed the highly political nature of naturalisations: at different stages various actors confront each other with their convictions of who should become a member of their community. Each municipality has an interesting story to tell us about how foreigners become citizens of Switzerland. This becomes most clear when diverging attitudes are presented toward topics that have been moulding naturalisation politics in Switzerland in recent years. In municipalities pursuing a restrictive naturalisation policy, not only do local political actors screen the candidates more systematically and gather more information about them, but as we have already seen in Chapter 5, in such municipalities more criteria have to be fulfilled to get a Swiss passport. It is often requested that the candidates speak the local dialects, that they know a lot about the political systems of Switzerland, their canton and their municipality, that they are members of local associations, are willing to give up their old nationality and/or that they have a job and do not benefit from social security or disability insurance.

Local debates on the decisions that have recently been taken by the Swiss Federal Court have revealed whether citizenship politics constitutes a political or rather an administrative issue for municipal politicians. Some hold the opinion that naturalised citizens become first and foremost citizens of a local community, and therefore local politicians or the entire population should be accorded the right to decide on each application individually. Opponents of the existing system criticise the arbitrariness of this system and demand that procedures be standardised. We were also interested in the opinions on candidates from Muslim countries. In recent years, the increasing immigration of people from the countries of the former Yugoslavia and from Turkey has led to violent debates on the question of how they can be integrated in Switzerland. It is thus all the more interesting to observe that opinions on whether they can and should be naturalised diverge a lot. While some defend the position that the cultural background of those immigrants is incompatible with Swiss traditions, others relate difficulties of integration to individual characteristics such as class or education.

Emphasising that naturalisation policies are the outcome of political struggles and that not only the ideas of local actors but also the local power structures are relevant to understand them reveals that understandings of citizenship are constructed in socially and culturally
shaped fields which, in turn, influence the attitudes of individual politicians. This aspect has been investigated more thoroughly in Chapter 7. By drawing on theories in social psychology and social influence networks, we have demonstrated how the individual habitus of local politicians are influenced by their contacts to other politicians in the course of decision-making procedures. We were thus able to demonstrate that local politicians involved in naturalisation processes are both actors and agents or improvising and socialised human beings. Not only do they contribute to the production and reproduction of citizenship politics, their opinions are structured during the decision-making processes.

One might easily criticise that inference from the Swiss case of naturalisation procedures is not possible as the heterogeneity of citizenship politics is simply due to its highly decentralised system. Of course, we can observe so many different naturalisation policies because municipalities take the decisions autonomously. But when we look at other countries, we observe that variations in regional practice of naturalisations are strong in both federal and unitary states. Moreover, studies analysing integration politics in European cities also revealed diverging citizenship paradigms as a major explanatory factor for policy outcomes. It thus appears that the Swiss case is not as exceptional as one might first think. Rather, it constitutes a unique opportunity to approach citizenship politics from new directions and forces us to reflect on existing analytical instruments. Our object of study not only enabled us to demonstrate that citizenship can take different forms and meanings within a nation-state. It also allowed us to go beyond formal citizenship regulations and to look closely at the moments when naturalisation laws are applied and interpreted. By talking to local politicians and observing how they come to an agreement on which criteria are relevant to become a Swiss citizen, we were in the comfortable position to study the ways ordinary citizens conceptualise citizenship and how a specific naturalisation policy emerges in a local setting.

8.2 Towards a sociology of citizenship and nationalism

Our results clearly refute the arguments of essentialists who would expect a much more homogeneous naturalisation politics both among and within our municipalities and much less variation of the individual understandings of citizenship. The close look we have taken at local naturalisation politics has revealed that it becomes highly problematic to speak of the Swiss citizenship policy or of a clearly defined Swiss national identity. Our analysis also disproves Van Evera’s (2001) argu-
ments who is one of the very few scholars still openly defending a primordialist position. Van Evera (2001: 20) recognises that ethnic identities are not stamped on our genes at birth, but holds the opinion that they can become fixed after having been adopted through socialisation. According to him, identities especially harden when mass literacy is achieved (because literacy allows to store identity and to purvey it to a mass audience), in situations of violent conflicts with others (due to an emotional impact of recorded national memories that is enhanced) and among non-immigrant ethnic groups (because they did not have to assimilate to another culture). In our study we focused on a highly educated society where ethnic conflicts are absent and on local politicians who have spent most of their life in Switzerland – and even in the same village or town. Nonetheless, cultural boundaries are drawn differently from one municipality to the other.

Our findings are also opposed to the arguments of instrumentalists and adherents of rational choice theories who see groups as artefacts of cultural engineers and/or as being mobilised on the basis of economic interests. We have demonstrated that socio-economic and socio-structural factors have no direct impact on the outcome of naturalisation policies. This is in line with one of our main arguments according to which citizenship is about the symbolic aspects of national membership. Noteworthy in this regard are the attitudes of local politicians towards candidates who are unemployed and/or depend on social security or disability insurance. Our qualitative analysis has shown that when politicians refuse to naturalise such candidates, they do this, not because they are not willing to financially support them but because according to them, ‘good’ Swiss citizens do not depend on the state. Against extreme instrumentalists – hardly represented in the theoretically more sophisticated debates – we argue that culture is not infinitely malleable: elites are not free to choose aspects of culture, and the masses do not always follow the elite. The role of elites – be they politicians or intellectuals – and their attempts to mobilise the masses are certainly crucial to understand the formation of nations and national identities, but these processes do not happen in a cultural vacuum. Elites must select from a range of symbols that are traditionally embedded in a group and mobilisations must take place on the wavelength to which the public is ready to tune in. As we have seen, elites are also a product of their social environment and they have to negotiate on citizenship politics with other actors defending opposing positions.

In our study we have put forward an approach that helps us bridge the rigid divide between these two research traditions. Following many others, we have first pleaded for a cognitive approach. We fully agree with Brubaker (2004) that we have to conceive ethnicity and nation-
hood in terms of practical categories, cognitive schemes and discursive frames. However, solely taking into account how people perceive their social environment does not allow us to grasp the dynamics of nationalism and citizenship politics. As Calhoun (2003) rightly fears, claiming that ethnicity, race and nationhood are not things in the world, but perspectives on the world might easily lead one to underestimate the importance of the social. Pure cognitivism also bears the danger of being a-historical as it neglects broader social structures and events. Brubaker (2004: 86) rightly reminds us that ‘there is nothing intrinsically individualistic about the study of cognition’ and that schemes of perception is always ‘socially shared knowledge of social objects.’ Our aim was to elaborate on this aspect in order to better understand why specific perceptions on the world appear and disappear.

To avoid an individualistic approach and methodological idealism, we have to be aware that no human being lives outside of particularistic solidarities. People have always organised themselves in cultural groups. In the age of nationalism they do this in nation-states, which give human beings a sense of belonging, offer rescue from alienation, solitude and anonymity and assure individuals that they enjoy equal status (cf. Tamir 1995: 433-435; Greenfeld 1992: 487-488; Calhoun 2003: 546-550). How individuals depend on their social environment became most obvious in our discussion on social influence and norm formation (see Chapter 7). We came to the conclusion that the way we conceive a social phenomenon is partially shaped by the attitudes of individuals whom we are in contact with. Especially when we have to take normative judgments and no objective standards are at hand, and when in processes of interpersonal communication convincing arguments are brought up, alternative arguments are deliberated and measured.

Emphasising that nations and, more generally, groups are both a social reality and a social necessity does not mean that they are in any way bounded and clearly defined. When human beings begin to (re-)organise themselves in cultural groups, neither we as researchers nor the members of the emerging groups do know which culture will be blessed by success. A contrasting argument would imply that forms of culture exist prior to the formation of groups or that any cultural traits automatically lead to group-consciousness. Culture might indeed be the basis of political action, but it is also the result of political efforts. Any form of social closure – and in the light of our study especially national citizenship – is intrinsically political. Consequently, we argued that a specific naturalisation policy is the outcome of struggles, and that it is in the course of such processes that nations are constructed. Accordingly, claiming that nations are socially constructed does not simply mean that people imagine their nation, but rather that they con-
front different ideas about how to draw the cultural boundaries and come to a temporarily stable agreement. Those processes make nations real without ascribing them any fixed cultural boundaries.

To analytically grasp such struggles, we proposed to study citizenship politics by means of Bourdieu’s analytical instruments. Bourdieu has never specifically written on nations and nationalism, but he studied neighbouring themes such as regionalism and identity (Bourdieu 1980) and the genesis of groups (Bourdieu 1984). The political sociology that he has elaborated in these works and elsewhere provides challenging analytical tools to bridge the rigid division between essentialists/culturalists/objectivists and instrumentalists/cosmopolitanists/subjectivists, namely by accounting for how in ongoing processes dominant interpretations emerge out of different representations of the social world.

Resorting to his analytical instruments enabled us to conceive of nations as ‘political fields’ in which, according to Bourdieu, actors struggle over the legitimate manipulation of the comprehensive view of the social world. In those fields ‘power-ideas’ between those defending a prevailing perception of the world and those challenging it can be observed. It is the political capital of the involved actors that helps us trace the power structures and predict which ideas have more chances to become dominant. According to Bourdieu, ‘political capital’ includes the prestige and legitimacy a person enjoys and his or her relationships to others. Correspondingly, powerful are those people who succeed in convincing others of their interpretation of the social world. To understand these dynamic processes, Bourdieu’s concept of ‘habitus’ was of great importance. ‘Habitus’ can be considered as a general perception or action-scheme that structures an individual’s reactions to new situations. It helps us understand that people’s identity is shaped by their social environment, but that they also exercise choice and thus may claim or reject common cultural values.

With Calhoun (2003: 549) we can conclude that groupness and its related aspects of identity and social closure are ‘neither simply a matter of inheritance and essential commonality nor a matter of free-flowing ubiquitous and undetermined construction. [They are] socially produced, shaped by material factors, culturally organised and yet also open to human action.’ Such social production processes cannot only be observed in Swiss municipalities. They are the engine of every nation-state and help us explain why nationalism and citizenship politics change their forms over time and space. We therefore think that the theoretical framework discussed in this study might lay the basis for a more coherent theory of nationalism and citizenship politics.
8.3 Contingent naturalisation politics: arbitrary decisions

Having come to a conclusion why certain municipalities pursue a more restrictive citizenship policy and reject more applicants for naturalisation than others, we are already confronted with the next question: why does a more restrictive understanding of citizenship emerge in some municipalities more than in others? We have demonstrated that there are no regional clusters of citizenship policies. The language region, the number of inhabitants and the degree of urbanisation have no impact. This finding underlines that explanatory factors have to be found at the local level and lends force to our argument according to which the outcome of a specific naturalisation policy is the result of ongoing political struggles. But how can we predict which direction such struggles take, and why are local politicians with more xenophobic attitudes more successful in certain local settings than in others?

To completely understand the ways people confront each other with their ideas about citizenship, we would have to observe such processes over a longer period of time. A longitudinal analysis would be necessary to fully apply our theoretical framework and to grasp the interaction processes between individual and systemic levels. For comprehensible reasons we have neither had the financial resources nor the time to undertake such an ambitious project. As written documents about local politics hardly exist, such a research programme would require observing local struggles over a period of at least ten years. We would then probably see how certain politicians get powerful, how they convince others of their ideas, how certain constellations of actors favour specific solutions and pave the way for further developments, etc. Thereby we would trace the actual sequence of the actor’s moves and reactions to the others’ moves and reconstruct the particular strategies and struggles. We would be able to demonstrate that particular ways of thinking and talking about nationhood are reinforced and activated at specific moments and in particular institutional settings and produce effects of path dependency. When convincing arguments were brought up against an established naturalisation policy, we would then observe that a path is abandoned again and that changes become possible.

It appears that interactions between actors, to which extent actors adapt themselves to negotiated and established politics and how opponents try to challenge these politics constitute the crucial aspects we would have to investigate. Emphasising these aspects of life in general and citizenship politics in particular brings us back to Bourdieu’s metaphor of sports games. To understand, a soccer game for example we have to know the rules and the abilities of the two teams. If we followed games in the past and know how the teams and the individual players have recently performed, we might dare to make a bet which
team will win. But as the rules do not regulate every tiny aspect of the
game and any training and coaching does not determine the player’s
performances, our knowledge at the beginning of the game does not
help us foresee the reactions of the players of one team to the other
team’s changing constellations they are faced with in the course of the
game. Similarly, any social processes involve complex and open-ended
series of interactions among numerous actors and groups. This makes
it difficult to predict with certainty who will win respectively which po-
titical decisions will be taken.

This does not mean that on the field where the soccer game takes
place or in political fields of nations a complete chaos prevails. Nor
does it mean that the reactions of the players to an attack of the other
team or decisions of local politicians in the context of naturalisation
politics are unreasonable, only because they take unforeseeable turns.
Both players and politicians pursue specific strategies, and both soccer
games and decision-making procedures can always be retrospectively
reconstructed to a certain degree. But even if you can explain why a for-
eign resident has been denied Swiss citizenship, the decision might ap-
ppear arbitrary when we compare decision-making processes and come
to the conclusion that between municipalities or even for different ap-
plicants within a municipality different criteria were applied. How can
it be that within a nation-state the chance to become a full member de-

dpends on the location where you (by accident) are living at the moment
of application? Those defending the current system argue that you first
and foremost have to please the people who live in the same village or
town because you have to deal with them in everyday life. Opponents
require that criteria be standardised and be the same for all municipali-
ties and that the local administrations or the executive body take the fi-
nal decisions as these organs are better capable or more willing to ap-
ply clearly defined criteria. As it seems, this issue will continue to pre-
occupy Switzerland in the years to come. Interestingly, these struggles
not only turn around the questions of how to define the Swiss nation
and how high to set the barriers to become a full member of it. They
also include a debate on whether you are primarily a citizen of a muni-
cipality or of a nation-state.
Notes

Chapter 1

1 The Diet was a regular meeting of representatives of the cantons of the Swiss Confederation. It had only limited governmental capacities and operated essentially as a meeting place for strictly instructed ambassadors of the sovereign cantons.

2 See articles 37 and 38 of the Swiss Constitution from 1999 and articles 14 and 15 of the Federal Law on the Acquisition and Loss of the Swiss Citizenship (141.0) from 1952.

3 A big exception is the canton of Geneva, where municipalities are not involved in the decision-making procedures and naturalisations are centralised at the cantonal level.

4 More detailed descriptions of the local decision-making processes in the context of naturalisations can be found in Chapter 6, which discusses citizenship politics in four municipalities. Various local naturalisation procedures are presented in Steiner and Wicker (2000, 2004) and Achermann and Gass (2003). For an overview of the formal aspects of the procedures in all 26 cantons, see Boner (2000), Schaffhauser (2001) and Schweizerischer Gemeindeverband (1998).

5 Strictly speaking, in Switzerland naturalisation politics does not constitute a classic case of executive federalism, as the federal state does not explicitly delegate this task to the cantons and municipalities. On the contrary, local citizenship regulations existed long before regulations on national citizenship came into being.

6 For this reason, Bauböck (2003) suggests strengthening municipal autonomy in immigration and foreign policy. Among other suggestions, he proposes formalising local citizenship, which would be based on residence and disconnected from nationality.

7 Compared with other European countries, only France has more small municipalities with an average number of 1,500 inhabitants, while in Austria and Germany on average 3,300 and 7,300 people live in a municipality, and Swedish municipalities have on average 29,800 inhabitants. The number rises to 123,000 in Britain (Ladner 1991: 47).

8 Part of this high ratio might be explained by the fact that Switzerland is a small, rich country in the middle of Europe that attracts a lot of foreign workers, whose numbers therefore grow faster as a percentage of the population than they do in bigger countries. It can also be explained by the low Swiss naturalisation rate.

9 For example, the fourteen case studies we will present below have on average 15,000 inhabitants and a ratio of foreigners that varies between 9 per cent and 39 per cent (25 per cent on average).

10 For an overview of the competences of Swiss municipalities, see also Linder (2005: 160-163), Geser (2002: 427-432) and Meylan et al. (1972).

11 Further legal aspects of laws about naturalisation were reviewed by Burckhardt (1914), Ilg (1922), Ruth (1937), Benz (1986), Fasel (1989), Grendelmeier (1969), Burger (1971) and Hottelier (1991). The development of the norms of naturalisation dur-
Chapter 2

1 Tilly (1999: 252) differentiates between government and state, designating the former as any organisation that controls the coercive means within some substantial territory and reserving the latter for those governments that do not fall under the jurisdiction of any other government. Thus, Switzerland qualifies as a state, whereas Swiss municipalities can be considered as governments. Such a differentiation highlights the fact that citizenship is not necessarily and exclusively related to a state. Similarly, Mackert and Müller (2000: 12) make a distinction between the concept of citizenship (they use the English notion) and the widely used German translation of ‘Staatsbürgerschaft’ (literally translated: ‘States-Citizenship’) that is often used as a synonym. While the latter clearly designates citizenship in a state, the former can be understood as a membership status of various territorial and/or social entities (cities, European Union, etc.). Similar discussions turn around the question of whether citizenship should and could be disentangled from the idea of nationality (Habermas 1992, 2001; Wiener 1999; see also Calhoun 2004b; Soysal 1994).


3 A distinction has to be made between discretionary and as-of-right systems. In the former, candidates can be rejected even if certain conditions are fulfilled. In the latter, mostly concerning candidates of the second generation, individuals have a right to citizenship when they meet certain conditions; negative decisions must be justified and can be appealed. Ordinary naturalisations (first generation) happen in many countries, including Switzerland, according to a discretionary system (Weil 2002; Brubaker 1989: 108-109).

4 This does not mean, however, that migrant movements and their claims have no impact on citizenship politics over a longer period (Joppke 1998, 1999; Kastoryano 2002).

5 In our project, we have even received the impression that it is rather exceptional that potential candidates move to another municipality where the chances to obtain Swiss citizenship appear to be higher.

6 The actual legal reality was much more complex, since there was not only the status of citizens and non-citizens but also those of privileged inhabitants and others. For details, see Brubaker (1992: 201143).


8 There are, however, a considerable number of nation-states where all or part of the permanent residents get electoral rights on the local and regional and more seldom
on the national level (Bauböck 2005). In Switzerland, denizens have political rights at the local and regional levels in some cantons.

By this we mean that no costs arise for the state when permanent residents are naturalised. On the contrary, in some (rather exceptional) circumstances the state might even profit from naturalisations when the candidates have to pay to get a passport. Until recently, naturalisations in some few Swiss municipalities were quite costly. For some municipalities, naturalisations were an important source of income (see Steiner 2004b). Since 2006, and according to the Federal Law on the Acquisition and Loss of the Swiss Citizenship (141.0; art. 38), only taxes covering the costs of the proceedings are allowed to be collected at the federal, cantonal and municipal levels. Fees can be waived for impecunious persons at the federal level.

Smith (1998: 223) concludes his overview on the various approaches of nationalism with the rather pessimistic observation that ‘the field [of nationalism] is so riven by basic disagreements and so divided by rival approaches, each of which addresses only one or other aspect of this vast field, that a unified approach must seem quite unrealistic and any general theory merely utopian.’

Our argument is thus far away from any socio-biological arguments. Claiming that human beings have a natural tendency to organise themselves in groups does not entail that there is any natural characteristic automatically unifying a group of people. As we will argue in the course of this and the next chapters, the definition of what constitutes a nation (or any other group) is not a given but the result of political struggles over cultural boundaries (see also our arguments on xenophobia in Chapter 7).


Or as Best’s (1982: 29) often quoted argument goes: ‘Historians of nationalism agree to differ in their estimates of how much of it [nationalism] (and what sorts of it) already existed in the Atlantic world of 1785. They are at one in recognising that the world by 1815 was full of it, and that although each national variety had of course its strong characteristics, those varieties had enough in common for it to constitute the most momentous phenomenon of modern history’.

For a very thorough critique of modernist theories of nationalism, see Gorski (2000).

Exceptions to this rule are nation-states in which all or certain groups of foreigners are allowed to participate in the democratic processes after some years of residence on the national, regional and/or local level (Bauböck 2005).

Schöneberg (1987: 49) argues that the principle of democratic majority leads to oppression and exclusion of minorities. See also Montagu (1997[1942]).

Most widely cited is Brubaker (1992). Comparisons of citizenship models in France, Germany and other countries such as Britain, the United States, the Netherlands and Switzerland can be found in Koopmans et al. (2005), Giugni and Passy (2006), Greenfeld (1992), Joppke (1999), Kastoryano (2002) and Schiffauer (1993).

For that reason, some introduce a second dimension in the citizenship typology and distinguish to what extent Western nation-states require cultural assimilation (Tilly 1995; Koopmans & Kriesi 1997; Koopmans et al. 2005). Those models provide, indeed, a more detailed analytical framework for the study of citizenship politics as they account for both how discriminatory the individual access to citizenship is and to what extent cultural group rights are granted. This second dimension has not been retained for our analysis, however, since we are only interested in the process of becoming a full member of a nation-state.

Some argue that Renan’s arguments were developed in the highly political context of the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany (Weil 1996; Silverman 1992). Thus,
Renan’s lecture can also be seen as a political intervention intended to counter German claims to this territory.

Chapter 3

1 See also Tilly’s (2005: 3-6) criticism on what he calls dispositional accounts in Greenfelds (1992, 2003) approach to nationalism.
2 Elias (1977: 111-112) even points out that essentialist thinking closely corresponds to grammatical patterns of Western languages.
3 Or as Tamir (1995: 433-435) has put it, membership in a nation promises individuals redemption from personal oblivion, offers rescue from alienation, solitude and anonymity, and assures individuals that they enjoy equal status. See also Greenfeld (1992: 487-488) on national identity as a matter of dignity.
4 Lacking the space to discuss in detail the contributions of those researchers, it should be added that they pursue a rather moderate political instrumentalist approach.
5 Weber further highlights the roles of the conscript army and the centralised communication networks linking all the French provinces.
6 For explanations on how elites can convince their followers to adopt false beliefs, see Fearon and Latin (2000).
7 A case in which most individuals seem to share the same attitudes towards other ethnic groups is discussed by Gil-White (1999).
8 Nonetheless, some researchers in the field of citizenship studies (Koopmans et al. 2005: ch.1; Hagedorn 2001) criticise Brubaker’s model and his argument of the citizenship’s historical rootedness for being too rigid and not allowing for variation over time. This interpretation might be explained by the fact that Brubaker does not allot the variability of citizenship models a very important place in his book.
9 Different studies demonstrated that citizenship models in France, Germany and other countries have varied a lot within the last two decades (Weil 2001; Koopmans et al. 2005; Ludwig 2004).
10 A similar example on limited variation over schemes is provided by Wimmer (1995) demonstrating different stories on the foundation of an Indian village in Mexico.
11 Systematically collected data are provided by Boner (1999), Schaffauser (2001) and the Association of Swiss municipalities (Schweizerischer Gemeindeverband 1998). However, they list only very general information on the naturalisation procedures at the local level.
12 To attain a high rate of return we proceeded according to Dillman’s (1978: 160-199) total design method, which describes the step-by-step details of how to conduct successful mail surveys.
13 As it turned out, however, no such difference exists (see Chapter 4).
14 In one group we only disposed of municipalities from different cantons: Bernhightwo and Aargaulowtwo are, however, in the same region.
15 Decisions are taken either by the local parliament or the executive body.
16 For the detailed questionnaire, see Annex.

Chapter 4

1 Remember that 162 municipalities (78 per cent) have responded to our survey and 154 municipalities (74 per cent) have provided data on their rejection rates.
We analysed all 174 incidents reported between 1992 and 2005, which are accessible online on the following webpage: www.gra.ch (see also Stutz 2001). This time period corresponds more or less with the period for which we have collected our data (1990-2002).

As for the submitted applications only those have been considered that entered the naturalisation procedure. The persons in charge at the local administrations who filled in the questionnaires were asked not to include applicants who submitted incomplete dossiers or did not fulfil the criteria pertaining to the number of years of residence.

For an overview of the few and mainly descriptive and impressionistic studies on the reasons for naturalisation in the United States, see DeScipio (1987). Wunderlich (2005) provides a detailed study on the subjective dimensions of naturalisation procedures in Germany.


The variables on the perception of the strength of political parties and of the unemployment rate have been taken from a dataset provided by Andreas Ladner and his collaborators at the University of Berne who carried out three national surveys in all Swiss municipalities in 1988, 1994 and 1998 (see Ladner 1991).

The municipal secretaries have been asked how important, according to their opinion, party X is in the political life of their municipality – whether they are ‘very important’, ‘important’, ‘rather unimportant’ or ‘unimportant’. For the regression analysis the party variables have been dichotomised (important/unimportant).

The municipal secretaries have been asked whether their municipalities have been affected ‘very much’, ‘partly’ or ‘not at all’ by increasing unemployment. This variable has been dichotomised (not affected/partly or very much affected).

Unfortunately, we had no variable at hand that measures the perception of the presence of alien residents.

We are conscious of the fact that all candidates emigrated from the countries of the former Yugoslavia are not Muslims, nor are we sure whether all Muslim applicants from the former Yugoslavia or Turkey are religious. It is estimated that around 10 to 15 per cent of all Muslims in Switzerland practise their religion (Gianni 2005b: 10). As a matter of fact, Muslims from Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina constitute by far the largest immigrant group from the former Yugoslavia (see CFR 2006: 7-8; Gianni 2005b: 13-17). Moreover, we are mainly interested in how applicants are perceived. We observed that even local politicians consider candidates for naturalisation from the countries of the former Yugoslavia and Turkey as a homogeneous group. Stolz (2005: 558-560) has shown that Swiss do not make a big difference between Muslims in general and those from specific countries and regions.

For a multivariate analysis see Chapter 5, Tables 5.4 and 5.5.

For a detailed discussion of the effect of the formal decision-making procedures, see Helbling (2008).
Chapter 5

1 Examples for this indicator are, for example, regulations in Germany facilitating naturalisations of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe and the Balkans whose ancestors have left Germany (Aussiedler). Another example is Israel’s ‘law of return’, which gives Jews all over the world the right to Israeli citizenship. In some countries, residents of Overseas Territories and former colonies profit from facilitated naturalisation.

2 They also retained the actual naturalisation rates as an indicator for nationality acquisition. As this indicator constitutes no naturalisation criterion (but rather is close to our dependent variable), we did not consider it for our analyses.

3 For the exact wording of the questions, see Annex (questions 4 to 12). For an overview of naturalisation criteria in European and other countries, see Weil (2002).

4 However, some cantons and municipalities require that a part of the twelve years required at the national level have been spent on their territory.

5 For a discussion of these concepts, see Hoffmann-Nowotny (1973), Esser (2001), Gordon (1964), Brubaker (2001) and Matter (2005).

6 This definition was given to all our interview-partners. See Annex (question 4).

7 For the diverging application of this principle, see Hagedorn (2001: 109-110).

8 See Annex (questions 16 to 19).


10 For further problems connected with analysing cliques, see Erickson (1988: 107-108).

11 See Annex (questions 16 to 19).

12 The CONCOR approach (CONvergence of iterated CORrelation) was applied for the analysis of the local networks and the structural equivalence of the individual actors (Wasserman & Faust 1994: 376-381). Similar to hierarchical cluster analysis, this analytical instrument permits us to regroup actors with similar characteristics and to analyse the structure of the naturalisation field. CONCOR begins by correlating each pair of actors. Each row of this actor-by-actor correlation matrix is then extracted and correlated with each other row. Through repeated correlations, groups of actors are divided into two subgroups consisting of actors that are as similar as possible. This operation can be repeated, whereby the regrouped actors are again divided into two groups. We have divided each municipality into four blocks for practical reasons. Regrouping all actors into two groups only would not have allowed us a very differentiated analysis. Running the regrouping three times, we would have ended up with eight blocks, most of them consisting of one or two actors only. For the analysis of the network data, we used the programme Ucinet 6.59 (Borgatti, Everett & Freeman 1999).

13 One actor in groups 1 and 3 is not a member of a political party.

14 Since the first blocks in Schwyzhigh and Schwyzlow are outliers, we retained the second most influential blocks for these two cases.

15 Regarding the problem of large standard errors: it appears that, at a theoretical level, few observations and multicollinearity are essentially the same problems (Achen 1982: 80-82; Gujarati 2003: ch.10; Goldberger 1991: 248-250).

16 In a Klein test we got the following results: $R^2$ (adj.) = 0.69, VIF = 3.18.

17 For the wording of these questions, see Annex (questions 25 to 27).
Chapter 6

1 See Annex (open questions 2, 3 and 13 and closed questions 4 to 12).
2 The construction of this indicator is based on data collected in our face-to-face interviews. Each interviewee had to indicate which actors exert a certain influence on the respective local naturalisation procedures (reputational approach). For a theoretical elaboration of this indicator, see Chapter 5. For the exact wording of the questions, see Annex (questions 20 to 23).
3 Remember that Switzerland has four national languages. All municipalities discussed in this chapter are located in the German-speaking part of Switzerland.
4 The rather exceptional introduction of such a language test in Bernhigh may be due to the fact that the responsible person at the local administration who proposed to introduce this test is a linguist. In recent years, formal language tests have also been introduced in other municipalities. Each time, violent debates could be observed in Switzerland on whether such tests are an appropriate instrument to evaluate if the language knowledge of candidates is good enough for naturalisation.
5 These arguments also have to be seen in connection with national statistics that were published at the time of our data collection and showed that young men from the countries of the former Yugoslavia were more often involved in car accidents than young Swiss. A fierce debate started after a car insurance company announced its intention to increase the insurance premium for such persons.
6 We first asked all our interviewees in open questions whether it was more challenging for some foreigners to integrate themselves than for others, and if yes, for whom and for what reasons it was more difficult. We then more specifically wanted to know whether it posed a problem when a Muslim woman wearing a headscarf in public applied for Swiss citizenship. See Annex (questions 7 and 13).

Chapter 7

1 Jenkins uses the term ‘racism’ in the same way we use the term ‘xenophobia’.
2 How closely related the concepts of xenophobia and understanding of citizenship are can also be demonstrated empirically by comparing attitudes towards naturalisation criteria with a more classic operationalisation of xenophobia. Our indicator for xenophobia includes questions on whether foreign residents constitute a cultural enrichment, whether the ratio of foreigners should be reduced, whether one-day immigrants from Turkey living in Switzerland will be completely integrated, and whether due to the rising ratio of foreigners Swiss no longer feel at home. Unsurprisingly, both variables correlate relatively highly (r=0.63, p<0.000) compared with Heitmeyer’s comparison of xenophobia and racism correlating at 0.69 (Heitmeyer 2002: 31-32n4). For the exact wording of the questions, see Annex (questions 28a, b, c and d).
3 Heitmeyer (2002: 29) also lists anomie as a further independent variable explaining xenophobia with processes of disorientation and alienation in a faster-growing social world (see also Künnel & Schmidt 2002). This concept has not been retained for our analysis due to a lack of data for its operationalisation and because it comes close to the concept of social disintegration.
4 For the exact wording of the questions, see Annex (questions 28 to 32).
5 In the rare cases in which the respondents were not the main wage earners, we retained the job of the respondent’s partner.
6 The remaining 18 per cent are informally involved in the decision-making processes mostly through their membership in a local political party.
Chapter 8

1 For the exact wording of the questions, see Annex (questions 16 to 19).
2 For each relationship that was indicated by an actor as one of his or her intensive (or most intensive) contacts, we verified whether the attitudes of the indicated actors were within a range of ten points of the respondent’s attitude. For example, if a particular actor had an understanding of citizenship of 0.38, a contact with another politician with an understanding of citizenship of 0.28 or 0.48 would be considered as a relationship between actors with similar attitudes.
3 W1 takes the values ‘1’ for non-intensive, ‘2’ for intensive and ‘3’ for the most intensive contacts. W2 varies between ‘0’ and ‘1’.

Annex

1 Because school systems vary a lot between countries, we did not translate the different categories, but rather only provided approximate translations in brackets.
Annex

Questionnaire for Interviews with Local Politicians

This questionnaire was used for the face-to-face interviews that we conducted with 180 local politicians in the framework of our fourteen case studies. Only those questions are listed that were used for our empirical analyses. The entire and original questionnaires in German and French can be obtained from the author. The questionnaire is divided into four parts:

1. **Personal attitudes.** These questions were used for measuring the understanding of citizenship.

2. **Influence and contacts.** These questions were used to trace the contact networks and power structures.

3. **Swiss identity and foreigners.** These questions were used for measuring the various indicators for xenophobia and for getting to know what local politicians are proud of about Switzerland.

4. **General questions.**

---

1. **Personal attitudes**

   1. What is your opinion about the current naturalisation policy in your municipality and its evolution in recent years? Are you happy with the current naturalisation policy or is there anything that should be changed, and if yes, why?

   2. In July 2003 the Swiss Federal Court decided that decisions on naturalisations taken at ballot are unconstitutional and that justifications for the decisions and possibilities for appeals against such decisions on this subject must be made available. What is your opinion about these verdicts?
3. In your opinion, which criteria have to be fulfilled by a candidate for naturalisation to become naturalised. For this question we are interested in your personal opinion that may not be commensurate with the current naturalisation policy of your municipality.

4. In the context of naturalisations one often distinguishes integration from assimilation. By assimilation we understand that one disrobes one’s former culture and completely adapts to the new culture. On the other hand, integration means that one finds his or her way in the most important social domains of the new country without giving up one’s own culture. In your opinion, should candidates for naturalisation rather be integrated or rather be assimilated, or does this not constitute a criterion for naturalisation?

- Rather be integrated
- Rather be assimilated
- No criterion
- Don’t know

5. Do you prefer that a naturalised Swiss abandons his or her old citizenship or should it be possible to have two nationalities?

- Is possible
- Is not possible
- Don’t know

6. Should a naturalisation candidate absolutely, if possible or not necessarily be a member of a local association in which also Swiss participate; or does this not constitute a criterion for naturalisation?

- Absolutely
- If possible
- Not necessarily
- No criterion
- Don’t know
7. A Muslim woman wearing a headscarf in public, does this constitute a problem for naturalisation or not?

- Rather a problem
- No problem
- Don't know

8. A naturalisation candidate should he or she has good or broken knowledge of the German/French language? Does it suffice if he or she speaks a national language or if a member of the family speaks German/French?

- Good knowledge of German/French
- Broken German/French
- A national language is sufficient
- It suffices if a family member speaks German/French
- Don't know

9. It might happen that a candidate for naturalisation benefits from disability insurance, social security or is unemployed. Could you please indicate for each possibility whether this constitutes a big problem, rather a problem, rather not a problem or not a problem at all?

9a. Disability

- Big problem
- Rather a problem
- Rather not a problem
- Not a problem at all
- Don't know

9b. Social security

- Big problem
- Rather a problem
- Rather not a problem
- Not a problem at all
- Don't know
9c. Unemployment

- Big problem
- Rather a problem
- Rather not a problem
- Not a problem at all
- Don't know

10. A naturalisation candidate who attended his or her entire school years in Switzerland, should he or she benefit from a simplified naturalisation?

- Yes
- No
- Don't know

11. A naturalisation candidate who was born in Switzerland, should he or she benefit from a simplified naturalisation?

- Yes
- No
- Don't know

12. A naturalisation candidate should he or she has a very good, good or minimal knowledge of Swiss history and the Swiss political system or does this not constitute a criterion for naturalisation?

- Very good knowledge is necessary
- Good knowledge is necessary
- Minimal knowledge is necessary
- No criterion
- Don't know

13. Candidates for naturalisation have emigrated from different countries to Switzerland. Many people think that for some applicants it is more difficult to integrate or assimilate themselves in Switzerland. Do you agree that there are such differences?

- Yes
- No
- Don't know
13.a. [IF YES] In your opinion, which nationalities, religious or other groups have more difficulties and which ones have less difficulty?

13.b. Could you briefly give reasons for your answer?

2 Influence and contacts

14. Could you please indicate whether you are formally involved in the naturalisation processes of your municipality? Are you...

- a member of the local parliament and decide on or deliberate about applications?
- a member of the executive body and decide on or deliberate about applications?
- working at the local administration and responsible for naturalisations?
- a member of a commission and decide on or deliberate about applications?
- a member of another political body that is involved in the naturalisation procedures?

15. Since when have you been involved in local naturalisation politics?

16. We have compiled a list of actors who are somehow or other involved in naturalisation politics of your municipality. Could you please indicate which are the actors with whom you discuss naturalisation matters once in a while? Could you please also indicate whether or not you share similar attitudes about naturalisation politics with those persons?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Contact</th>
<th>Similar attitudes</th>
<th>Different attitudes</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
16. Are there any other actors – at the local or cantonal levels – with whom you discuss naturalisation matters once in a while with regard to naturalisation politics in your municipality?

☐ Yes
☐ No

17.a. [IF YES] Could you please name them and indicate whether or not you share similar attitudes about naturalisation politics with those persons?

18. The contacts with the persons you have indicated have probably not been equally intensive. Which are the three actors of those you have indicated with whom you have had the most intensive contact concerning citizenship politics in your municipality?

1. 
2. 
3. 

19. Please indicate which one of these three contacts has been the most intensive?

20. In the following list could you please indicate all those who, according to your personal opinion, have had some power in naturalisation politics of your municipality in recent years? You can also indicate yourself. For this question we are not simply interested in actors who have been involved in naturalisation politics, but in those who have exerted some influence. Influential persons can be directly involved and force their point or they indirectly shape the attitudes of the involved politicians.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. ☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. ☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. ☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... ☐</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
21. Are there any other actors – at the local or cantonal levels – who have been influential in citizenship politics of your municipality?

☐ Yes  
☐ No

21.a. [IF YES] Could you please indicate them?

22. Of all actors you have indicated as influential, which are the three persons who are, according to your personal opinion, the most powerful in naturalisation politics of your municipality?

1. 
2. 
3. 

23. And which of these three actors do you consider as the most influential person?

3 Swiss identity and foreigners

24. In this table, please tick how strongly you identify yourself with Europe, Switzerland, your canton, your region and your municipality.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very strongly</th>
<th>Rather strongly</th>
<th>Rather little</th>
<th>Very little</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Europe</td>
<td>❑</td>
<td>❑</td>
<td>❑</td>
<td>❑</td>
<td>❑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Switzerland</td>
<td>❑</td>
<td>❑</td>
<td>❑</td>
<td>❑</td>
<td>❑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Canton</td>
<td>❑</td>
<td>❑</td>
<td>❑</td>
<td>❑</td>
<td>❑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Region</td>
<td>❑</td>
<td>❑</td>
<td>❑</td>
<td>❑</td>
<td>❑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Municipality</td>
<td>❑</td>
<td>❑</td>
<td>❑</td>
<td>❑</td>
<td>❑</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
25. In general, are you ...
   - very proud,
   - rather proud,
   - not so proud or
   - not proud at all
   ... of Switzerland?
   - Don't know

26. What are you particularly proud of about Switzerland?

27. What are you not at all proud of about Switzerland?

28. In the following table we have compiled a list of statements that are related in the broadest sense with questions of foreigners and naturalisations. Those are statements that often have been made by different people. Could you please indicate for each statement to what extent you agree. ‘1’ stands for complete disagreement and ‘6’ for complete agreement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statements about foreigners who live in Switzerland:</th>
<th>Do not agree at all</th>
<th>Do completely agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Foreigners who live in Switzerland are a cultural enrichment for this country.</td>
<td>❑</td>
<td>❑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Due to a growing number of foreigners in my neighbourhood I do no longer feel at home where I live.</td>
<td>❑</td>
<td>❑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. In general, the ratio of foreigners in Switzerland is too high and should be limited.</td>
<td>❑</td>
<td>❑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. One day, immigrants from Turkey will be completely integrated in Switzerland.</td>
<td>❑</td>
<td>❑</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In a political system, in which the citizens are strongly involved, as it is the case in Switzerland, one has to ask whether or not the citizens have the capacity to form their own opinion, and what is the role of the elite and education for the formation of an opinion. To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Do not agree at all</th>
<th>Do completely agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

e. We should be grateful to have leaders who tell us exactly what to do and how to do it.  

f. For their future, it is in general useful for children to follow their parents' convictions.

g. School should mainly teach discipline and performance.

Debates about foreigners are often related to the problem of growing criminality in Switzerland. What is your position towards the control of criminality in Switzerland? To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Do not agree at all</th>
<th>Do completely agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

h. The police should combat criminality more aggressively.

i. For severe crimes the death penalty should be reintroduced in Switzerland.

29. How often are you in contact with foreigners?

- Very often
- Rather often
- Rather rarely
- Very rarely
- Don't know
30. Are your contacts to foreigners very positive, rather positive, rather negative or very negative?

- Very positive
- Rather positive
- Rather negative
- Very negative
- Don’t know

31. Some people assert that important characteristics of Switzerland are about to disappear and that this is related to the growing number of foreigners. With this statement, do you ...

- Completely agree
- Partially agree
- Partially disagree
- Completely disagree
- Don’t know

32. Some people assert that the growing number of foreigners leads to an aggravated situation on the labour market. With this statement, do you ...

- Completely agree
- Partially agree
- Partially disagree
- Completely disagree
- Don’t know

4 General questions

33. How long have you been living in this municipality?

34. What is your highest education?¹

- Keine Schulbildung (No education)
- Primarschule (Primary school)
- Sekundarschule (Secondary school)
- Anlehre (Basic apprenticeship)
- Berufsslehre (Apprenticeship)
- Diplommittelschule oder allgemeinbildende Schule
- Handelsschule, Handelsdiplom (Commercial school)
Berufsmatura (A-levels for those who have accomplished an apprenticeship)
Matura, Seminar (A-Levels, general qualification for university entrance)
Höhere Fachschule (Krankenpflegeschule, Schule für Sozialarbeit, Medizin-technische AssistentIn) (Schools for nurses, social workers etc.)
Höhere Berufsausbildung mit Meisterdiplom, Eidg. Fachausweis oder gleichwert (Continuing school for those who have accomplished an apprenticeship)
Fachhochschule, Technikerschule (Technical schools)
Universität, ETH (University)

35. Are you member of a political party?

- Yes
- No

35.a. [IF YES] Of which political party are you a member?

- SP (Social Democrats)
- CVP (Christian Democrats)
- FDP (Liberal Party)
- SVP (Swiss People’s Party)
- Grüne (Green Party)
- EDU (Federal Democratic Union)
- EVP (Evangelical Party)
- Others:

35.b. [IF NO] Which party would you elect if national elections were held next Sunday?

- SP (Social Democrats)
- CVP (Christian Democrats)
- FDP (Liberal Party)
- SVP (Swiss People’s Party)
- Grüne (Green Party)
- EDU (Federal Democratic Union)
- EVP (Evangelical Party)
- Others:
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