Since the Second World War, Asian nations have experienced some of the fastest economic growth in the world. Yet, paralleling the extraordinary growth, unequal development has generated economic and regional imbalances, particularly in the ultramodern metropolises and littoral zones. The development experience in the world over the last century has shown that economic growth cannot be sustained without taking into consideration the social and political development of vulnerable populations, including greater recognition of minority rights. Better minority socioeconomic and political accommodations have contributed to society’s overall well-being and the sustainability of economic growth. Integrating minorities as part of their development is a challenge of immense magnitude that Asian societies are facing. Within this context, the objective of Ethnic Minorities and Regional Development in Asia: Reality and Challenges is to support the interdisciplinary discussion that aims to join studies surrounding the development of minorities in Asia.
Ethnic Minorities and Regional Development in Asia
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Acknowledgements

As a guest editor, I would like to thank all the contributors for their kind collaboration and for giving me the opportunity to work with them to build this wonderful volume. I am sure the realization of this volume will greatly contribute to our understanding of minority regional development issues in Asia. We all hope that our research will influence policy designers, development practitioners, and other decision makers, in order to provide opportunities for minorities to improve their lives. I would also like to thank specifically Jing Feng, Ruibo Han, Julia Vedom and Matthew Skogstad-Stubbs from the University of Ottawa for their invaluable assistance in preparing the manuscript for publication.
1 Introduction

Huhua Cao
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1.1 Introduction

Since the Second World War, Asian nations have experienced some of the fastest economic growth in the world. Yet, paralleling the extraordinary growth, unequal development has generated economic and regional imbalances, particularly in the ultramodern metropolises and littoral zones. The development experience in the world over the last century has shown that economic growth cannot be sustained without taking into consideration the social and political development of vulnerable populations, including greater recognition of minority rights. Better minority socioeconomic and political accommodations have contributed to society's overall well being and the sustainability of economic growth. Integrating minorities as part of their development is a challenge of immense magnitude that Asian societies are facing.

Being a minority has different meanings and implications according to differing contexts and locations, and therefore the word ‘minority’ is problematic, fluid and difficult to define. In the interests of national unity and economic growth, governments often disregard and disparage minorities except when a distinctive culture offers tourism opportunities or attractive images for nationalist symbols. Nevertheless, the term minority is useful to describe populations that are disadvantaged numerically, socially or politically. The most obvious minorities are tribal, ethnic and religious groups. Yet, minorities can be created by physical and linguistic isolation, migration, gender imbalance, political exclusion, limited education, extreme poverty and a lack of civic rights. Some ethnic minorities are indigenous, others are not.

Owing to traditional lifestyles and historical competition with the majority, minority groups tend to occupy less advantageous geographic areas. This does not automatically deny minorities opportunities for improvement and economic development, although there are often more limitations. While underdevelopment occurs in all societies, it is more common in ethnic minority areas, and sometimes it is a result of state integration policies that lacked sensitivity to local needs and realities. This is an important reminder that development cannot be separated from political realities – either at the stage of concept, policy, implemen-
tation or outcome. For example, it has been noted that ‘politics’ are integral to the socio-economic disparities which hinder the establishment of a common good and produce communities often characterised by ‘sharp conflicts of interest’ (Gupta et al., 2004: 30). It is often disputes of this kind that prompt the eventual inclusion of marginalised groups in development policies and programmes. Yet many governments demonstrate inability or unwillingness to adequately address some of the underlying causes of conflicts.

Still, it is important to avoid categorising minorities as necessarily poverty-ridden societies, beset with social problems. Li’s study of upland communities demonstrates how overcoming the stereotype of ‘innocents, victims or villains’ helps to understand their agency, and contributes to awareness of minority aims and objectives (Li 1999: xv). Nonetheless, despite a heightened awareness of the issues faced by ethnic minority groups, economic and material poverty is still a major and persistent problem.

Disenchanted with the reliance upon market and state, many observers have come to view increased local power and autonomy as the favoured option to overcoming marginalisation (Rigg 2003; Rist 1997). For various reasons, decentralisation policies have been introduced in many developing countries in order to encourage growth that addresses local needs and contexts.

To be sustainable without dependence upon outside help, development must give communities the capacity to equitably negotiate the continuous and inevitable social and political transformations that occur. Within the context of viable human development, the objective of this book is to encourage interdisciplinary discussion and comparative analysis of some barriers to this development. Acknowledging the vastness of Asia, the book presents case studies by researchers from various backgrounds, all of whom have conducted extensive fieldwork amongst minorities’ regions. The book brings together twenty authors, from seven countries and fifteen different universities and institutes, in the fields of economics, development and area studies, geography, anthropology and sociology, to provide local narratives that shed light on some of the different needs, situations and approaches to problem solving. It thus proposes a multidisciplinary approach to the understanding of development challenges, and to finding solutions to the unfavourable treatment of minority communities. This approach gives a nuanced perspective to understanding social, economic and political inequalities, and the diverse ways in which people are constructing varied responses to the challenges of modernisation.
1.2 About this book

We examine two broad themes related to minorities and their development: minority region development and ethnic mobility and urbanisation. The first theme examines regional development among minorities and in minority regions. Anja Lahtinen examines the effects of the Chinese Western Region Development Strategy on provincial development in Qinghai, highlighting the need for increased opportunities in continuing and vocational education in order to provide work skills specifically targeted for the Tibetans of that province. Elisabetta Colla engages the reader in an interpretive study of the discourse used by a Florentine merchant to describe his encounters with the people of Southeast Asia during the 17th century. The narrative she lays out brings about a more nuanced cultural understanding of the indigenous peoples of Southeast Asian, as well as that of the Occidental traders. Shengquan Ma, Ruibo Han and Chengyi Zhang apply the concept of ‘fuzzy sets’ to an economic development analysis of Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region in Western China. They establish a methodology demonstrating the disparity of economic development levels among the counties of Ningxia. Julia Vedom and Huhua Cao concentrate on health care. Using the household survey data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS), changes in types of health care used and factors determining these choices are examined at the household level across socio-economic groups in nine provinces of China over the 1989-2004 period. Moreover, with particular attention, this research also highlights the differences between Han and minorities in the choice of health care facilities. By comparing three counties in southern Qinghai province, Peter Foggin, Marion Torrance and Marc Foggin analyse the accessibility of health care for pastoralists in the Tibetan Plateau region. The article by Reza Hasmath examines how the management of ethnic minorities is interpreted and implemented in both Chinese and Canadian contexts. He suggests that greater attention should be given to strategies of inclusion of minorities.

The second part of this book addresses issues related to ethnic mobility and urbanisation. Ai Deng, Anwaer Maimaitiming and Huhua Cao try to answer the following two questions in their study of the urbanisation processes in the ethnic groups in Western China: Why do some ethnic nationalities have high levels of urbanisation, while others do not – especially considering that all the ethnic nationalities inhabiting Western China live with a similar natural environment and socioeconomic conditions? What are the hidden factors that lead to this different pace of urbanisation among diverse ethnic nationalities? By comparing two communities in Anuradhapura District, Pinnawala Sangasuna discusses the issue of forced displacement due to the civil war in Sri
Lanka. He takes a Buddhist approach, as well as a psychological one in order to understand the suffering and the stories of success that emerge from the conflict. Niladri Ranjan Dash questions the impact on project affected people (PAP) of the widespread construction of dams in India. His conclusion is that resettlement has had some boons, though the substantial changes in daily social and economic life have been difficult. Stephen Robert Nagy compares the multicultural coexistence practices of two municipalities in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area (TMA) in order to illustrate how local governments are overcoming the challenges of accommodating growing numbers of foreigners living in their traditionally monocultural societies. Using the examples of Phongsaly and Luang Nam Tha of Laos, Yann Roche describes how development-oriented projects are implemented, as well as how they operate between state and foreign non-governmental organisations (NGOs). He explains how these projects attempt to improve the economy of provinces in order to help local populations protect their forests. Candice Cornet explores the identity and the development of ethnic tourism in the Dong village of Zhaoxing in Guizhou province in China, sharing her outlook on the role of ‘ethnic tourism’ in the construction of ethnic identity. With a similar research subject, Tânia Ganito demonstrates how the community of Luoshui village, on the border of Yunnan and Sichuan provinces in China, overwhelmingly comprised of Mosuo individuals, which are officially identified as a subgroup of the Naxi ethnic group, developed the mechanisms of resistance and self-protection vis-à-vis the ‘tourist gaze’ and the constant presence of tourists in the village.
PART I

MINORITY REGION DEVELOPMENT
In 1994, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report noted excessive disparities in levels of regional development in China. Consequently, in 2000, Chinese leaders launched the Western Region Development Strategy (XiBu Da Kaifa), to focus on the northwest and southwest. The strategy was initiated to accelerate growth in those regions, thereby facilitating social and political stability, and increasing national unity. The first stage, 2000-2010, is to be accomplished through massive infrastructure investments and environmental protection. This was supported by a series of preferential policies and investments in infrastructure projects. The grand strategy became an important component of national modernisation, and was integrated into the 10th Five Year Plan 2000-2005. The next stage has been subject to considerable debate. This has centred upon whether to turn the west into a magnet for investors or to reserve the region for sustainable development. There have also been concerns that the Western Strategy may be subsumed by the more recent Northeast Revitalisation Program. Eventually, at the Western Forum 2004 held in Nanjing, the central government announced that it will continue its national strategy to develop the western region.

There is no doubt that developing China’s west is challenging. Amongst the principal problems in this huge, geographically and culturally diverse area are ecological vulnerability and poverty linked to ethnicity. China’s ethnic minorities are mainly distributed in the western part of the country. In 2000, the western region accounted for only 28 per cent of the national population, but 72 per cent of the ethnic minority population. Many of these live in deepest poverty, and in mountainous areas they are the poorest of the poor.

China’s accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001 provides opportunities for the western regions to overcome the barrier of distance and to be integrated into development initiatives, if longstanding problems are solved in a sustainable manner. Some aspects of this reform process in a number of provinces have been extensively researched (for example Goodman 1997, 2003; Cheng 2003). In a poli-
tical economy discussion, various authors in Hendrischke and Feng (1999) focus on the concepts of competitive advantage and provincial identities, examining how individual provinces formulate strategies when facing inter-provincial competition. The interaction of social and economic spheres has received less attention. In this chapter, I examine the social and economic implications of China’s grand development strategy on the sparsely populated, multi-ethnic province of Qinghai. Although the modernisation initiated by the Xibu Da Kaifa has generated growth and infrastructure, benefits have been distributed unevenly. In fact, development may have increased unemployment and social exclusion among the ethnic groups, and particularly of the Tibetans, the largest ethnic group in Qinghai.

2.1 The fieldwork site

Qinghai Province is located in the northeastern part of the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau in western China, bordered by the Gansu and Sichuan Provinces, the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region and the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). Qinghai is a vast area, spanning over 721,200 sq. km, ranked fourth in size after Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia. The province is named after China’s largest inland salt lake, Qinghai Lake, which is located at the sources of the Yangtze River, the Yellow River and the Lancang River (which eventually becomes the Mekong). Because China’s three major rivers originate in Qinghai, environmental conditions in the province not only have serious implications for local people, but also have broader ecological implications. Environmental protection is therefore of utmost importance in Qinghai.

Most areas of the province are mountainous and at high elevations. The province is naturally divided into two parts by Riyue Mountain, with a pastoral area in the west and agricultural areas in the east. Farming in the west and southern areas is often nomadic, and is mainly based on livestock, specifically of sheep, yaks and horses. As well as animal husbandry, wild animal and plant resources, other exploitable natural resources include the Qaidam Basin which is a ‘treasure basin’ of natural gas and oil. The province is rich in hydropower, solar energy, salt lake resources, petroleum and natural gas, and non-ferrous metal.

Over half (54 per cent) of the total population of 5.29 million (2002), are of Han Chinese descent. This proportion is divided fairly equally between indigenous Han Chinese and more recent migrants. The chief minority nationalities are Tibetans (23 per cent), Hui (16 per cent), Tu (4 per cent), Salar (1.8 per cent) and the Mongols (1.8 per cent). The first Han Chinese people probably migrated into Qinghai during prehistoric times. Migration, however, has always been restricted because
of the high altitude and aridity, which made the region unsuitable for traditional Han agrarian communities. Yet during the Ming and Qing dynasties, some Han communities were established as military garrisons in Tibetan areas.8

Photo 2.1 Tibetan girls on a way to Tongren

Despite its size, Qinghai remains sparsely inhabited and has one of the lowest populations in China, larger only than that of Tibet. In 2000, the population density was 7.2 persons per square km. The urban population was 1.80 million and 3.38 million in the rural areas, accounting for 34.76 per cent and 65.24 per cent of the province’s population respectively.9

Major religions in Qinghai are Tibetan Buddhism (Lamaism) and Islam. Until 1928 when Qinghai became a province, it was politically a part of the Gansu Province under the direct rule of the Chinese state. Before then, Qinghai followed Tibetan culture (Amdo Tibet), including governance by local clans and monasteries. Today, administrative organisation is divided into eight prefectures, 43 counties and 429 townships. Xining is the capital, and also the largest city in that province.10 Although Qinghai has the third highest proportion of minority nationalities, it has not been appointed a minority autonomous region, because Han is the largest group in the province. Instead, some of the counties with large ethnic minority groups have been appointed autonomous counties, administered by local ethnic leadership.
2.2 The Tibetans of Qinghai

According to the 2000 Census, 5,146,000 Tibetans are resident in China, mainly in Tibet, Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan and Yunnan. As a result of the assimilation policies which were set in place before 1980, many Tibetans in Qinghai are nowadays more integrated into Chinese culture and do not speak their Tibetan national language. On the other hand there are also many Tibetans who do not speak the Chinese lingua franca. Tibetans in Qinghai regard themselves as socially and politically separate from Tibetans in Central Tibet. Those in Qinghai are the majority outside the northeast corner of the province, and as well, they constitute a quarter of the population in Xunhua County of Haidong province. Although the Tibetans of the interior are essentially nomadic, throughout Qinghai, some have also settled into agricultural practices. Animal husbandry is the main occupation. The Tibetan sheep, goat, yak and pien cattle are native to the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau, which has an elevation of about 4,000 metres above sea level. The yak is a major means of transport and a source of meat. The pien cattle are a crossbreed of bull and yak, and milk producer. In farming, the fast-ripening and drought-resistant qingke, a kind of highland barley, is the main crop. Other crops include wheat, peas, buckwheat and broad beans. In the warmer areas of the river valleys, amongst the various cultivated crops are canola, potatoes, turnips, apples and walnuts. The dense forests provide shelter for many animals, fungi and medicinal herbs.

Photo 2.2 Tibetan cattle at Qinghai Lake

Photo: Anja Lahtinen
2.3 Economic outlook

The economic performance of Qinghai province is one of the lowest in the nation. Table 2.1 demonstrates the income disparity between urban and rural households in China and Qinghai, and indicates that although each has experienced growth since 1980, the income disparity remains large.

In 1978 Qinghai was a middle-income province, with annual GDP per capita in excess of the national average (112.9 per cent), but by 1994 it had one of the lowest incomes, just 68.8 per cent of the national average. From 1978 to 1994 provincial growth rates varied from 5 per cent to 12.6 per cent. Qinghai was the slowest growing province, expanding by 5 per cent annually. In 2000 and 2001 the growth rates in Qinghai surpassed 10 per cent in both years, principally due to central subsidies and investments. For example, the level of subsidy rose from 20 per cent of GDP in 2000 to 27 per cent in 2001. In 2000, the gross domestic product of Qinghai was 26.312 billion yuan, and the per capita GDP was 5,068 yuan. Although according to the statistical yearbook, in 2002 the GDP was increased to 34.1 billion yuan, the GDP per capita of Qinghai was 6,426 yuan, while in Shanghai it was 33,933 yuan.
Economic development in China has largely been shaped by central government policies. As one illustration of this, investment policy favoured heavy industry from the 1950s. The resulting transfer of enterprises to Qinghai prompted massive in-migration attempts in the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s. Similarly, national security considerations in the 1950s and 1960s favoured investments in the interior province. This together with the ‘Third Front’ program laid the legacy of long-term economic problems in Qinghai.\(^{16}\) The pouring of investment funds into interior provinces took place at the expense of the coastal provinces. Furthermore, a military industrial base was constructed in the Third Front areas, mostly located in the western region (Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu, Shaanxi, Guizhou, Qinghai, Xinjiang). Also Hubei and Hunan, the home provinces of several top leaders, became favourite investment destinations. Between 1965 and 1972, the Third Front areas received more than half of China’s basic construction funds. However, one-third of the total investment was wasted. For example, the Second Automobile Company, which was built in the mountains of

### Table 2.1  Per capita annual income of urban and rural households (Yuan, RMB)

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### 2.4  Policies shaping the economy

Economic development in China has largely been shaped by central government policies. As one illustration of this, investment policy favoured heavy industry from the 1950s. The resulting transfer of enterprises to Qinghai prompted massive in-migration attempts in the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s. Similarly, national security considerations in the 1950s and 1960s favoured investments in the interior province. This together with the ‘Third Front’ program laid the legacy of long-term economic problems in Qinghai.\(^{16}\) The pouring of investment funds into interior provinces took place at the expense of the coastal provinces. Furthermore, a military industrial base was constructed in the Third Front areas, mostly located in the western region (Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu, Shaanxi, Guizhou, Qinghai, Xinjiang). Also Hubei and Hunan, the home provinces of several top leaders, became favourite investment destinations. Between 1965 and 1972, the Third Front areas received more than half of China’s basic construction funds. However, one-third of the total investment was wasted. For example, the Second Automobile Company, which was built in the mountains of
Hubei, experienced problems because the assembly plants were scattered throughout the region. Transportation between the plants and suppliers was difficult across vast distances and mountainous terrain, obstructing efficient production.17

The market-oriented reform period began in 1978 when the Chinese government decided to implement the ‘opening-up’ policy and to start economic restructuring. Deng Xiaoping formulated a strategy of ‘two overall situations’ in which the coastal areas were first to be given support. When they had reached a sufficient level of development, the interior areas in turn would receive such support. Hence, Deng decided to make the east coast accessible at the expense of the interior provinces. Further extension of the Open Door Policy to all of China followed Deng Xiaoping’s southern inspection trip in 1992.

Because of former central policies and planning, Qinghai’s existing resource-based industries, built in the 1950s, suffer from outdated processing equipment. This is especially evident in the mining and chemical industries. To improve the economic situation, provincial authorities have identified key industries to attract foreign investments. These are the development of hydroelectricity, salt lake resources, petroleum and natural gas, non-ferrous metal resources, animal husbandry, wild animal and plant resources and finally tourism.18

2.5 Meeting the challenges

Qinghai’s principal challenges are in environmental protection, investment, unemployment, education and poverty linked to ethnicity. Here, I briefly outline these issues and describe some local attempts to meet them.

To address ecological problems, forestation is a top priority for local planners. Part of the environmental protection strategy is to overcome desertification, to preserve the water resources of the Yangtze and Yellow Rivers, as well as to prevent flooding. The goal is to increase forestation to 13.86 million hectares, with 8.32 million hectares to be added in the coming five decades, so that the forest coverage rate will reach 14.1 per cent.19 Forestation means not just investing in growing trees, but also losing farmland to forests. This threatens traditional farming livelihoods. Agriculture is further expected to decline because of past over-cultivation, and because some arable land has returned to forest and grasslands. In addition, compensation for lost farmland is inadequate.20

Government measures seem insufficient for Tibetan farming families to overcome poverty. Consequently, new livelihood patterns are necessary, although during my fieldwork, some interviewees pointed out dif-
ferences of opinion over land usage and patterns of settlement. In Qin-
ghai, authorities have been debating how to settle nomadic herdsmen 
by 2011. As stated by one local government official, this is to ‘provide 
protection from natural disasters and better access to social services’. 
The official emphasised that many herdsmen households were happy 
with their relocation and the subsidies given by the government. This 
was not a shared view among the Tibetans I interviewed, although some 
confirmed that many improvements in living conditions have taken 
place recently. For example, travelling time to their home village has 
shortened to just a few hours, thanks to recently paved roads. As well, 
because of a new water piping system, women no longer need to carry 
heavy water containers. However, despite these improvements, no con-
crete programs have been established to create alternative, long-term li-
velihoods.

In order to accelerate growth, external investments are needed. In 
reality, all major projects in Qinghai involve significant capital and hu-
man resource investments, to enhance the old industry base and to 
build up new industries. The Xibu Da Kaifa has provided provincial lea-
ders with the opportunity to enhance managerial skills and to seek ex-
ternal assistance for planning. In short, provincial leaders are under 
pressure to develop Qinghai in a sustainable manner. Since 2000 the 
provincial government has sent cadres and other managers each year to 
be trained in the developed regions of China. Qinghai provincial autho-
rities have also established preferential programmes to attract talented 
people with overseas postgraduate qualifications. The provincial gov-
ernment has also requested help from the Academic Institute in Lanz-
hou to formulate the Province’s 11th Five Year Plan 2006-2010. Further-
more, the province participated in the International Investment and 
Trade Fair in Xiamen in September 2004, attempting to attract inves-
tors. Despite these moves, provincial authorities admitted in discus-
sions with me that they lack sufficient skills and knowledge to effec-
tively market the province to potential investors. They do not know 
whom to approach, or how to establish the new networks.

To compete against its neighbouring provinces, Qinghai offers inves-
tors lower land-lease prices. This is an unlikely solution, because the 
reasons and motivations of multinationals for investment are much 
more complex than cheap land alone. As Cypher and Dietz advised, for-
eign investors are seeking resources, efficiency, markets and strategic 
capability (Cypher & Dietz 2004: 408). Multinationals also require the 
global facilities of communications, transportation, information-proces-
sing technologies, new techniques and machinery. These conditions do 
not yet exist in Qinghai. Thus, in spite of positive initial signs, signifi-
cant challenges remain for provincial government in its attempts to at-
tract investments.
Unemployment is another significant challenge for Qinghai. In 2004, China’s official registered unemployment in urban areas was 4.2 per cent.22 Another source indicates that the average unemployment rate in urban China is 8.21 per cent, and that in the central region the urban unemployment rate is the highest at 9.93 per cent. Unemployment in the eastern region of China is the lowest (7.49 per cent), while the urban unemployment rate in the western region (7.73 per cent) is also lower than that of the national average rate.23 Unemployment in Qinghai actually decreased from 5.6 per cent in 1990 to 3.6 per cent in 2002, but in 2003 the rate again increased to 3.8 per cent, as shown in table 3.2. In 2000, 55.82 per cent of the labour force of 2.565 million

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Unemployment (10,000 persons)</th>
<th>Unemployment rate (%)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beijing</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tianjin</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>12.9</td>
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<td>Hebei</td>
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<td>Shanxi</td>
<td>5.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inner Mongolia</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>16.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Liaoning</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>75.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jilin</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heilongjiang</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>41.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shanghai</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>28.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jiangsu</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>42.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zhejiang</td>
<td>11.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anhui</td>
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<td>Fujian</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jiangxi</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>17.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shandong</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>39.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henan</td>
<td>25.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hubei</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>44.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hunan</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>30.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guangdong</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>36.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guangxi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hainan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chongqing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sichuan</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>33.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guizhou</td>
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<td>Yunnan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tibet</td>
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<td>Shaanxi</td>
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<td>Gansu</td>
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<tr>
<td>Qinghai</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ningxia</td>
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<td>Xinjiang</td>
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</table>

people were engaged in primary industries, 12.61 per cent were engaged in secondary industries, and 31.57 per cent in tertiary industries.24

As discussed earlier, Qinghai’s unemployment level is largely due to agricultural changes and restructuring of the old industry base. Yet unemployment is also caused by disparities between education and available employment. For example, a young Tibetan complained to me that he had not found employment since his graduation from the local university one year earlier. He stated that as a Tibetan, he did not have mandatory guanxi (connections or relationships to perform service or favour) to the local government. The government policy of guaranteeing employment ended in the Tibetan areas of Qinghai in 2001 for college and university graduates and in 2002 for high school graduates. However, apart from that reason, the young man’s unemployment may have resulted from a university programme which did not prepare him for potential work options. Many university areas of study are unrelated to vocational skills required in the region.

Current demands of economic growth outpace the limited skills of the local workforce. The migration of Han from outside the province, mainly from the east cost, fills the shortfall in local semi-skilled and skilled labour. Even in low-skill employment activities, job opportunities for Tibetans are limited unless they are literate and fluent in Chinese. Thus the local Tibetan labour force is disadvantaged by the influx of migrants from other parts of China who are attracted by the heavily subsidised economy.25

Vocational education and job skills training may help to create entrepreneurship and innovation to open up new businesses and jobs, and expand new livelihood opportunities. Ayres has argued that expanded educational opportunities are the best way to achieve economic and social progress:

[T]he most important factor in the economic life of any people is the educational level ... of the community. A technically sophisticated community can and will equip itself with the instrumentalities of an industrial economy. There is no instance of any such community having failed to do so (Ayres 1995: 94).26

Yet education in Qinghai is hindered, partly because many teachers have left to search for better-paid jobs in other provinces. In 2000, in Qinghai there were eight institutions of higher education, with 13,307 enrolled students and 2,107 teachers. Fifteen specialised secondary schools had 13,406 students and 1,365 teachers; 448 secondary schools had 224,660 students and 16,645 teachers; 3,429 primary schools had 504,800 students and 27,706 teachers. The school-age children enrol-
ment rate was 94.20 per cent, and the number of college students per 10,000 persons was 25.69.27

Despite China’s nine-year compulsory education programme, not all children attend school. In particular, ethnic minority families often simply cannot afford to send children to school. As well, ethnic groups usually live in remote areas, and parents feel that children are too young to attend boarding schools far away from home. Other concerns are also expressed, similar to those discussed in chapter 7 and chapter 8 in this volume. On the other hand, one of my interviewees said that all three children in his family were educated, including two girls. In his opinion, this was possible because his father was doing extra work to finance their studies.

A recent World Bank project appraisal document for the Poor Rural Communities Development Project (World Bank 2005) estimated that about 85 million rural people in China live in poverty, and that severe rural poverty is now concentrated particularly in the western provinces. The same paper indicates that ethnic minority groups make up less than 9 per cent of the total population, but are believed to account for about 40 per cent of the remaining absolute poor, and often they live in the deepest poverty.

A major challenge to be addressed is overcoming the linkage between ethnicity and poverty. The Qinghai provincial government claimed that the number of people living below the poverty line had been reduced from over a million in 1993 to less than half a million in 1999. Nevertheless, continuing poverty and limited opportunities amongst ethnic groups creates social exclusion, which leads to resentment and mistrust. Tensions between Han Chinese and minority nationalities were expressed to me by some Tibetans who complained that ‘Han Chinese look down on us’, that Han cadres ‘do not know or care about minorities, their language and culture’, and ‘Han immigrants take the best jobs’ and thus an unfair share of the wealth.

Historically, as Gladney has written, the Han have attempted to assimilate non-Han cultures (Gladney 1996: 319). Despite attempts at Sinicisation, pluralism is amongst the founding ideas of the Chinese state, and one of the main subjects of the 1980 reforms. Since 1978 China has officially pursued more multi-ethnic policies and increased equality for ethnic groups. Huber (2002) indicates that China has facilitated the construction of Tibetan identities by sponsoring Tibetan language media of all forms, as well as educational regimes, especially those in Amdo dialect. My own research suggests that those Tibetans who had integrated into society did not necessarily share that opinion. Instead, they claim their higher social status was acquired through education and job skills, and fluent Chinese language. Although Chinese relations with ethnic minorities are now more nuanced, these differing
perceptions demonstrate the complexities of instituting equitable development.

2.6 Conclusion: Looking into the future

Qinghai’s provincial government welcomed the central government development initiative and support to speed up infrastructure building. Now, after five years, the basic infrastructure work has been completed. New challenges have been recognised both at the central and provincial levels. These are to be carried during the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006-2010). Nevertheless, despite the importance of infrastructure development, there is a need to hasten social development.

Finally this has become apparent to the central government. On October 11 2005 at the Fifth Plenum of the 16th Communist Party, the Central Committee passed the party’s action guidelines for the 11th Five Year Plan (2006-2010). The aim is to seek human-oriented, balanced and sustainable dimension for the construction of a ‘harmonious society’ based on a ‘scientific outlook of development’. As this plan is implemented, the role of the provincial government will be crucial. Achieving effective change in rural development will be facilitated if the provincial government addresses the following strategies:

1. Integrate economic and social planning, especially amongst vulnerable groups such as the Tibetans,
2. Provide free education for the poor,
3. Increase cooperation between local governments and NGOs to jointly develop, implement and monitor poverty-alleviation programmes, and to find new ways to initiate self-support,
4. Organise vocational training to provide a pool of professional skills, for example in accounting, marketing, procurement, manufacturing, communication, and computer technology,
5. Organise training for entrepreneurship, especially for groups that are about to lose existing livelihoods,
6. Organise mixed public education about ethnicity and gender, to alleviate suspicion and mistrust,
7. Improve provincial marketing, for example by outsourcing necessary skills from marketing professionals in Hong Kong,
8. Focus on the specific features of local economies to create products and services in tune with market needs,
9. Develop local competitive strengths with regard to farming, pasturelands, grassland and biodiversity.

This integrated approach will expand sources of livelihood for ethnic minorities, enabling them to link into mainstream provincial development. Being competent actors in society will reduce the current sense of social exclusion and inequality.
Notes

1 Wang and Hu 1999: 11.
2 Launched by the Chinese government in 1999, the Western Region Development Strategy was made official in March 2000. See OECD-China Conference, Foreign Investment in China’s Regional Development: Prospects and Policy Challenges, 11-12 October 2001, Xi’an, China, p. 10. The western region consists of 12 provincial units; namely the northwest comprising Inner Mongolia, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang, and the southwest comprising Sichuan, Chongqing, Guizhou, Yunnan, Guangxi and Tibet. Together they account for 71.8% of China’s land area and 28.5% of its population (Yeung and Shen: 4).
5 My observations of China began in 1986 when I first visited the east coast. In 1999 I visited the western regions of Shaanxi, Sichuan, Yunnan, and Guangxi. This culminated in continuing research on the Qinghai Province from 2003. Data and observations used in this chapter were collected during fieldwork visits to Qinghai in February and November 2004, and to Qinghai and Gansu in October 2006.
6 Yeung and Shen 2004: 315.
7 The first central Han authority to colonize Qinghai was the Han dynasty, specifically the Former Han Dynasty (206 BC-25 AD) (Dede 2003: 324).
8 Huber 2002: xv.
14 Fischer 2005: 58-59
16 In the aftermath of the Great Leap Forward, the Sino-Soviet split, and rising international security threats, Mao decided in the autumn of 1964 that China should build its defence industries in the third-front areas to prepare for a defensive war. This top-secret programme, referred to as the Third Front strategy (san zhan), came in response to the understanding that China could no longer count on Soviet support in the event of war with the United States. The Third Front strategy started out as a programme for economic and social development of interior provinces, but was redesigned as a strategy for national defence. The immensely costly Third Front Programme was drastically cut down in 1971 with rapprochement with the United States. Apparently Mao and Zhou Enlai felt more secure with improved ties with the United States (Garver 2002: 300-301; Hutchings 2001: 157, 226).
17 Démurger, Sachs, Woo, Bao, Chang and Mellinger 2001: 16.
18 CIFIT Catalogue 2004: 11-12.
20 According to this programme, when a rural household abandons one mu of arable land, the state gives 100 kilos of grain per annum for an unlimited period of time. Young trees and grass seeds are given free of charge, agricultural taxes are waived, and twenty yuan per abandoned mu is provided as a living allowance. The grassland or forestland would be under the care of the household for 50 years.
CIA, World Factbook – China 2006. Data are subject to possible bias owing to statistical weaknesses. Thus the true level of unemployment remains uncertain, but likely the unemployment is higher than that shown. Nonetheless, regardless of accuracy, the official data are important tools in policy-making.


Fischer, 2005: 154-155, and personal discussions with NGOs in Qinghai.

Quoted in Cypher and Dietz, 2004: 173.

3 Southeast Asia ‘Ethnic Minorities’ in an Account by the Florentine Merchant Francesco Carletti: A 17th Century Manuscript

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3.1 Introduction

The word “ethnic” derives from the Greek expression ἔθνικος and from the Latin term ethnicus, both used to define “people” and “nation”. The former Christians applied the term to identify “pagans” or more extensively “people belonging to the nation of the non-believers”. In the 17th century, the term ‘ethnic minority’ did not exist; in manuscripts we rather find words such as ‘population’, ‘nation’ and ‘people’, without any specific reference to ‘ethnic minority’. The ethnic groups that the Florentine merchant Francesco Carletti met in Southeast Asia and described in his Codex 1331 were the Bisaya (or Visayan) people, the Chinese, the zinzin, population of Cochinchina (South Vietnam), the Pegu people (Bago in Myanmar) and the Canarini (Konkani speaking people in Goa).

Only in the mid-19th century the word “ethnic” was meaning of “they” and “others” in opposition against “us” reaching a high point of racialism. Beginning from the Age of Discoveries we have been witnessing the spread of an increasing number of writings related to the description of the “other” at a global scale. The Codex 1331 is one example of this kind of literature. The manuscript (T.3.22) preserved in the Angelica Library in Rome described the first known circumnavigation of the world on commercial ships by private means. This masterpiece written around 1619 is a copy of a 17th century manuscript known as the Ragionamenti del mio viaggio intorno al mondo. The original was lost. The Ragionamenti is divided into two parts and twelve chapters: six about the West Indies and six about the East Indies. This division, between the New World discovered by Columbus and India and the Far East, can be linked to the imaginary line drawn on the world map at the time that ran North to South through the mid-Atlantic. This division was made by Pope Alexander VI (1431-1503) on 4 May 1493 with the In-
ter Coetera bull, which began the process that led to the Treaty of Tordesillas (or Tordesilhas). The virtual division of this geographic space and all the political implications of this division, emerged very clearly in Carletti’s Discourses (ref. Primo Discorso dell’Indie Occidentali and Secondo Discorso delle Indie Orientali). For example when he wrote about the Philippine Islands: the

... farthest terminus of the conquest by the Crown of Castile, made in 1564 at the time of King Philip. And for that reason they were called after him, Philippines. They were subjugated and controlled by Castilian Spaniards who, navigating by way of the West Indies and proceeding constantly to the west, finally arrived at the outmost Orient from which, earlier, they had departed (Weinstock 1964: 81-82).

Francesco Carletti’s voyage was not the result of a plan, but rather the result of random wanderings that followed the commercial routes and markets opened by Spaniards and Portuguese during the Age of Discovery. During this little-known circumnavigation that took place between 1591 and 1606 Carletti left a very practical and detailed account of the places he visited during most of the time together with his father, the merchandise he bought and the people he met. The work was published only in 1701 and remained practically unknown until the beginning of the 20th century (Sgrilli 1905).

Carletti was not a famous navigator, but a young Florentine merchant. In the Renaissance, European travellers had already developed their perceptions of ethnic, political and religious diversity. Their individual narratives, drawn upon cross-cultural encounters had a specific flavour when they were focused on experiences in Asia. The chronicles written by Italian merchants about overseas discovery constituted an important group among written genres in late Renaissance historiography. These chronicles brought a shift of emphasis, outlining broad geographical perspectives and often displaying an extreme emphasis on observed detail. These writers were able to present their personal experiences as correctives to the rhetorical bias of the more educated writers of the period. Since they did not always respond to the pressures of the imperial doctrine that prevailed at court, these accounts generally had a certain grade of pureness.

Being a merchant-traveller-narrator, Carletti continued a certain tradition initiated by Marco Polo. He could be considered an anthropologist ante literam, who left behind a kind of relatively objective reportage, where the style was dry and did not include any apologetic elements, and in which there was no attempt to show the strength of intellectual exercise or to demonstrate any specific nationalism linked to the geo-
graphical space of the Iberian conquest. Being a Florentine he was considered a neutral actor in a world that, at that time and in the European perspective, was mainly divided between the Spanish and Portuguese crowns.

3.2 Francesco Carletti (1573?-1636)

Francesco Carletti was born around 1573 probably in Terranuova (Arezzo). He belonged to a traditional merchant family and left his country with the clear intention of buying Moorish slaves in Ethiopia to sell in the West Indies. Carletti left Seville with his father António in 1594 and sailed toward West Africa. Soon after they reached the West Indies (Panama, Peru and Mexico) and around 1596 continued their voyage toward the East Indies: the Philippine Islands, Japan, Macau, and finally Malacca and Goa.

Carletti was travelling aboard the galleon Santiago, which was attacked in Saint Helena, resulting in the loss of all his merchandise. In 1602 he reached Europe, but only in 1606 did he return to Florence, with nothing but his own experience, many adventures to tell and an Atlas. After such a long journey Francesco Carletti had lost everything with the exception of his travel memories. His chronicles were translated into English by Herbert Weinstock. His memories appeared to be much more valuable than silk, porcelain and spices especially because the Grand Duke of Tuscany had a plan, never fulfilled, to transform the port of Livorno (Leghorn) into an important depot of international trade. Carletti became Cosimo II (1521-1621) de’ Medici’s maestro (literally ‘master’, counselor at the court). He died in Florence and he left his goods to his only son Carlo Carletti. A funeral monument dedicated to him still exists in the Basilica of Santa Croce in Florence.

3.3 Philippines and the bisaios

The sixth chronicle of the Codex 1331 is about the voyage that Carletti made in 1596 from Mexico to the Philippine Islands by way of Acapulco. After 76 days of journey, he arrived in sight of the first outlying islands (about 950 miles from the Philippines) (Codex 1331, f. 53v; Weistock 1964: 71) known in Spanish as the Ladrones (‘The Thieves’, also known as ‘The Sails’). The name ‘ladrones’ seemed to be appropriate because local people were used to steal iron from European vessels. When Carletti first met the inhabitants of these islands, whom he referred to as ‘Indians’ (Chamorro people) they were crowded into small boats, coming out to meet his ship. They surrounded the vessel and ap-
proached with a quantity of thick green cane, fresh water, salted fish, rice and fruits of many sorts. In return they asked for iron (Codex 1331, ff. 53v.-54; Weinstock 1964: 72). Carletti described the kind of little sailboats the Chamorro used to get near the vessel: in each one there are four or five people completely naked and very robust, who

... were fat and of rosy colour, burned by the sun. They did not cover any of the parts that for us were believed to be shameful, but which perhaps were not considered to be so among them. They were, as I understand it, very simple and pure in that matter and holding everything in common, even with their women (Weinstock 1964: 73).9

After a funny episode that involved a Capuchin friar of St. Francisco, who fell into the sea when trying to convert these people, Carletti and his group already sailing in the area of the Philippine Archipelago, passing through Cabo Santo Spirito reached Luconia or Luzon Island10, finally arrived at the port of Cavite, not very far from Manila:

the farthest terminus of the conquests by the crown of Castile made in 1564 at the time of King Philip. And for that reason they are called after him Philippine (Weinstock 1964: 81).11

Cavite was populated by two kinds of ‘Indian’ people: one group whom the Spaniards called Moros (Moors), who preceded the arrival of the Europeans and were Muslims; the other group of inhabitants were known as Bisaios.12

This latter nation [Bisaios] differed greatly from the other both in customs and in bodily stature and gestures. The Moros were small and badly formed in face and body, of a very brown colour and of base and lazy spirit. On the contrary, those others had beautiful bodies, robust and virile, and were much whiter in complexion and more valorous in managing arms. They spend their time, arranging fights between cocks trained in that marvelous art, arming them with iron pierced through and cutting that part of the claws where the spur is located. It seemed like a real scimitar, and they wounded one another with it, often to death, by the blows that they gave with this instrument, sometimes they lacerated the crop, sometimes the breast, and often the stomach, disembowelling their opponents. When their wounds were not mortal, they were cured with balsams and precious oils and were patted and sprinkled with wine (Weinstock 1964: 83).13
Bisaios, ‘still preserved their ancient gentles and idolatry, as many still retained them because of a lack of ministers to teach them the truth of the Evangel’ (ibid).\(^{14}\)

The sexual habits of Bisays were also described:

The Bisaios men were very much given to the pleasures of Venus, and their women were no less ardent than beautiful, and they beguiled themselves with these women in strange and diabolic ways (ibid).\(^{15}\)

Carletti paid local people in order to perform the act

by an invention of the Devil and so as to give and receive diabolic pleasure with their women ... of making a hole in their membrum virile. And in that hole, which is made at a little more than half of its length, they put a leaden stud that passes through it from one side to the other. On top of the stud there was attached a star, also of lead; which revolved there and covered the whole member and projected a little beyond its edges. At the bottom of the stud there was a hole through which a wedge was passed so that it was firm and could not emerge from the member.

With their members thus armed, they laid to dally with their women, to whom they gave no less pain at first than pleasure later on, when they were well inflamed by the punctures that they were given by that little star, in such a way that for a time they lost all wish for what they desire most. This method of having lustful pleasure was, they said, devised by them for reasons of health – that was, to have fewer occasions to make use of venery and to have their women more sated. But I also heard that, on the contrary, this was a pure invention of Satan, done to impede those wretched people from generating children (Weinstock 1964: 84).\(^{16}\)

Marriage practices were characterised by giving a small amount of gold or silver to the bride’s parents. Normally men could marry as many women as they could pay for. If a woman wanted to leave a marriage, the dowry would have to be returned to the man. Scarification was used by the men to adorn their entire bodies with the aim of appearing more attractive to women. The cuts made to their skin were quickly treated with a special herbal juice that turned the scar blue. The women were clothed with the exception of their feet and legs, which they adorned with bracelets made by precious metals. Their necks and arms were adorned with metal stacking rings. Women normally painted their left hands with delicate and creative designs, and this created a competition among women to see who had the most attractive left
hand. Both men and women pierced their ears. Heavy gold earrings were worn, which normally deformed the hole, stretching them to such an extent that they reached the shoulder. The Bisayo also tinted their teeth with a sort of red varnish that gave them very polished appearance and apparently made them quite healthy. Some people also gilded their teeth.

The Bisayo lived in stilt dwellings, ‘six or eight arms above the earth’ (Weinstock 1964: 86). In the home people sat on woven rush mats, which they also transformed into beds according their needs. Under the houses, the Bisayo created fenced-in stables where they kept their fowl and swine. They could see the stables from inside of their houses and they usually throw down garbage to feed the animals.

The Bisayos’ diet was based on rice, which they cooked simply with water and salt. Rice was used to accompany fish and fruit. Salt was used, rubbed off of a big ‘stone’ and was put into food. The Bisayo also made a sort of mush with fish, macerated into salt and then shaped into round loaves. After being smoked these loaves were used in soups. Similarly they made a sort of bread, which Carletti reported that he liked, using the thick pith of palms, which they called sagri:

the pith was broken up and dried in smoke and then made into flour by being minced on a very large wooden mortars. Formed into paste, it was then cooked between two very hot flat pans, whereupon it took the flavour, colour, and shape of a chestnut cake, but without its excessive sweetness (Weinstock 1964: 87).

They kept different kind of animals both wild and domesticated. Carletti spent some time describing the carabao. Bisaios seldom ate meat except that of these buffalos, ‘which they often took raw when the animal had just died, with the blood still warm and with salt’ (Weinstock 1964: 87).

Carletti also reported that this population was used to chewing a kind of green leaf they called buyo and that very often they mixed it with a fruit they called bonga, to which they added a slaked lime prepared from marine shells, that turned them red and of good flavour. That mixture of leaf was said to be both helpful to the digestion and stimulating the ‘senses of Venus’, as well as giving one aromatic breath. The ‘Indians’ offered this mixture to friends during visits. In addition, the bisaios had other kind of drinks. Carletti described two made from different kinds of palms: nippa and the palm of ‘Indian nuts’. Both were used to produce a drink that Carletti called Sura, a word influenced by the Konkani sur, and in Spanish also known as tuba, from the Tagalog. Very pleasant to taste, this drink was distilled in an alembic and transformed into liquor like aqua vitae.
At the end of the sixth *Ragionamento*, Carletti described the *Parian*, which ‘consisted of houses and shops entirely built of wood a roofed the cane and the leaves of trees’ (Weinstock 1964: 89) where the Chinese and Japanese were confined with their shops and precious merchandise. *Parian* was built by Gonzalo Ronquillo (1580-1583), outside the city wall in order to concentrate all the Japanese and Chinese people, who supplied and traded with the Spanish, in one place. Whatever the islands lacked was imported. For example, wheat flour came from Japan, and was merchantized for Spaniards to make bread. The Chinese imported raw silk, that was made into velvet, satín, damask, or taffeta. The Chinese also sold cotton cloth, musk, sugar, and porcelain. *Parian* was mainly built to facilitate Spanish trade with Mexico. A clash of commercial and economical interests arose, owing to this sort of ghettoisation, which created problems that often resulted in fires, which damaged that crowded shopping area.

### 3.4 From Japan to China toward India: Carletti’s encounter with zinzin, the people of Siam and Pegu

Carletti informed the Grand Duke of Tuscany that ‘after having been in Japan from the month of June until that of March of the year 1598’ he went to China but that the ship, the *Nau do Trato* (also known in Japanese language as, *kurofune* 黑船 – black ship) that year, did not go to the [...] island of Macao. (Codex 1331, fl. 141 v.; Weinstock 1964: 135).

In May 1597, Carletti and his father embarked on a Japanese boat called a *somme*. Both the so-called Japanese section and the Chinese section of the Chronicle were very long and detailed. The Chronicle written about Macau appeared to be more elaborate, probably because the author had absorbed background material from the writing of others that he had read. The Japanese *Ragionamento* seemed mainly to be based on personal observation, as was the case with all the other sections of the Chronicle.

Carletti was fascinated by Japanese life, remaining there from June 1597 until March 1598. His Chronicle provides us with one of the most beautiful and detailed descriptions of 16th century Japan.

Carletti’s father died in Macau on 12 July 1598 after suffering from kidney stones.

Carletti recorded information about the Chinese Empire in great detail. Much of this detail comes from an *Atlas* that he translated from Chinese into Italian with the help of a local translator.

In the kingdom of Cochinchina (*Annan* 安南), which is described in the abovementioned book, there were ‘four small provinces, regions in which were found the aloes wood, much gold and the animals called
rhinoceroses or *badà*, as well as elephants’ (Weinstock 1964: 159).31 There lived a certain sort of wild men who were hairy but of ordinary stature, and who had tails, and I was told that these men spoke a language of their own. The Chinese called these men *zinzin*32 because somehow they seemed like human beings. In order to capture them, one should go in the places where these *zinzin* often went and gave them many and varied things to eat, particularly wine, so that with it the *zinzin* became drunk. When this beings were drunk, the Chinese fall upon them from behind and took them without difficulty. The sole reason for capturing these men – or animals, if that was what they were – was to kill them and take their blood, which was used as ink, like kermes or purple, a colour highly valued by the Chinese and Cochin Chinese, and which never lost its beauty and was very expensive. When these *zinzin* were captured, it was necessary to caress them and give them more wine to drink, after which they became good companions and were glad to give their blood lovingly, each of them then being asked for it by one of those who earlier had wanted to kill them (Weinstock 1964: 167).33

While he was staying in Macao, Carletti also witnessed a big two-day typhoon, whose fury was so strong that in less than 24 hours swept through Macao uprooting trees, ruining houses, capsizing ships in all the harbours and all along the Chinese coast and causing many vessels to be shipwrecked. On 28 July 1599, Carletti related that he counted some twelve houses ruined (Codex 1331, f. 139; Weinstock 1964: 183).

He reported that the wind also brought a vessel from the Kingdom of Siam, which ‘was loaded with the wood commonly called red dyewood, which in their country they call *sapan*’.34 The Siamese sailors escaped from the ship with great difficulty, and with the women that they had brought with them when they set out on long voyages.35 During Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) a very strict tributary system was installed and in 14th century coastal people in China were forbidden to cross the seas. The Kingdom of Siam, together with Ryukyu Islands and Cambodia, were allowed into China with their *junks*, in order to carry their merchandise (mostly leather, red dyewood and rhinoceros horns36) to be sold to the Chinese. In turn, people from Siam purchased Chinese cotton cloths, silk, musk, porcelain earthenware of the heaviest sort and many other products that they brought back to their country.

According to Carletti, the King of Siam, who had many concubines, suddenly decided to fry them in oil in copper pots because they were discovered to be pleasuring themselves with certain fruits. The women
of that kingdom were accustomed while having intercourse to use many peculiar instruments, a custom that they inherited from the people of Pegú, a kingdom that was destroyed by the King of Siam (Codex 1331, ff. 139-140; Weinstock 1964: 181). According to Francesco Carletti’s account, the Queen of Pegu ordered that men cut an opening in their penis and insert two or three oval-shaped rattles as large as hazelnuts (the so called “Burmese bells” or mianling 缅铃). These penis inserts, which were quite known among Chinese traders, were made of gold and were constituted by iron pellets. Since they were like two shells fastened together without holes, when they moved, they gave off a dull sound. Because of their sound they were known as rattles (or bells, ling 铃). Once the rattles were put under the skin they enlarged the penis, bringing the sexual partner more pleasure. These rattles were sold by old women; they were made of gold, silver or gilded copper and were as small little nuts. The practice of placing these rattles in a man’s penis began when he reached marriageable age. The old women who sold the rattles also placed them in the man’s penis, choosing a different rattle according to the man’s age. Normally, according to Carletti’s account, the men who did not wear such a rattle were rejected by women. Because of this practice the Pegu’ women were therefore believed to be extremely concupiscent.37

3.5 Exotic Malacca and the Javanese

After observing a total eclipse in Macau, on 6th August 1599, Carletti departed in December by ship from China en route to Goa. After 20 days, he reached Malacca, passing through the kingdom of Cochinchina and those of Champa, Cambodia, Siam and Patani.

In Malacca Carletti ate new kind of fruits, such as the durione38, which had an unpleasant smell like onions but was very pleasant to the touch. According to Carletti the inner pulp was delightful. Malacca was described as a place full of colours, flavours and odours. Carletti left us one of the oldest records of pinnaples (piñas), mangosteen (mangostani) and rose apple (giambos), the latter described as a ‘freak of Nature’ that showed how a woman’s complexion ought to be according to European parameters imposed by 16th century fashion:

this fruit was of a pink colour mixed with milky white and it had a very lustrous skin, as delicate as could be desired. It was of a size like that of our eggplant and had an odour like that of a rose, so that if one ate it without peeling, its juice seemed to have been flavoured with rose water. It delighted the taste, being of a
bitter-sweetness that never sates or nauseates one even if one devoted an entire day to eating it (Weinstock 1964: 189).39

The sight of that fruit was so delightful that it was compared to a beautiful woman’s face and in eating it one could reach the pleasure of all senses, according to Carletti.

He described a big traffic in species and all sorts of dry groceries through the Molucca Islands, five of which were cloves suppliers: Ternate, Tidore, Morotai, Makian and Batjan. The nearby populations from Padang, Atjeh and Inderagiri (Sumatra) were especially involved in the pepper trade.40 They used merchant ships called caracoli, vessels with strange shapes (very similar to fantastic birds, as Carletti described them) beautifully carved and so light that they seemed to fly over the sea surface. The Portuguese captain-governor appointed by the Iberian Crown for three years, managed most of the spice trade in Malacca with the ‘Indians’, mostly people from the Island of Java that came from the port of Bandung with a huge number of boats. These boats were overcrowded in such a way that the Portuguese living in Malacca began to suspect that something wrong could happen. Portuguese, in order not to risk the life of the entire community did not allow the Javanese to enter the circuit of the small walled city and its fortress. Carletti described them

not only very numerous but also for the most part of the Mohammedan’s religion, as courageous and bellicose as whatsoever other Indian nation, and by nature treacherous and scornful of death, to which they pay small heed. For that reason, with great care and order, the Portuguese citizen of Malacca stand at the gates of the city, with vigilance making very sure that the aforesaid young men do not enter in, but only some of their chiefs to carry on the dealings for all the others, and they accompanied by a few others among them, but with no arms other than a small dagger that they call cris (Weinstock 1964: 193).41

These daggers came in various shapes. They normally had a wavy shape blade and they were carried in wooden sheaths with a fine texture and a fragrant smell. The sheaths were sometime covered with gilded silver, painted with attractive designs and carved with ivory and precious stones.

During the day the Javanese stayed outside the city in small wooden houses42 located among trees. At night they returned to their vessels where they did their trading of spices (clove, nutmeg, and mace) for which they took in exchange cotton clothes from India (Coromandel Coast), probably batik, which the Javanese used to wear. Particularly in-
teresting among the objects traded in this area, was the so called Bezoar-stone, found in the stomach of some ruminant: these stones were normally concreted in the bellies of the goats (Capra aegagrus hircus). These stones were black and dark brown in colour and sometimes white or dark-green. They did not have a standard shape or a standard colour and normally were composed by different layers or strata. Bezoar-stones were already known by Arabian traders and used in Asia to treat people for poisoning and as a cure for cholera.

The abovementioned stone was also good for the ailments of women’s wombs, and thus for malign fevers. For all these evils it was applied by being placed in ordinary water (Codex 1331, f. 150 v; Weinstock 1964: 195).

Those Indians used the bezoars without breaking them up or pulverizing them, but merely rubbing them on a stone moistened with a little water. Then they removed little pieces in the manner that, by order of Your Highness, I showed to your physicians and then ordered in that gallery that the abovementioned stone be broken up where the bezoars should be. Finally they drank that water, incorporated into which remains that with has been taken from the stone without ruiniing it (Codex 1331, f. 151; Weinstock 196).43

3.6 Conclusion

In “Ragionamenti del mio viaggio intorno al mondo” Francesco Carletti left us a chronicle of what he experienced and saw. He used a style in which the expression ‘if I had not seen myself, not wishing to be taken for a liar’, was used in contrast with ‘I had been told about’, a way to highlight a constant worry: telling the truth. Although his father’s goal was to make money through the slave trade, and Francesco himself tried to do the same, the result was quite different. It is likely that Carletti himself could not imagine the end of his own story: he lost most of the fortune that he had accumulated during his journey, however he was able to recall from memory every place he visited, he was able to describe the people from these other countries exactly as they lived, looked, ate, worked, made love, war and business in the late 16th century.

Beyond being a fundamental resource to reconstruct Francesco Carletti’s biography, this manuscript is above all an authentic source in which the 16th century world was described by a realistic and pragmatic observer. Thanks to the simple language used in this chronicle, the ver-
nacular Florentine, which is very close to today’s Italian language, the reader will have the pleasure and sensation of sitting beside Francesco Carletti and listening to his tales.

Notes

1 To date, we know that the original manuscript of the *Chronicle* has been lost. To the best of our knowledge, there is a corrupted printed version (1701) and 4 manuscript versions. The *Codex 1331* (T.3.22), preserved at the Biblioteca Angelica (Rome), is considered to be closer to the original version. I also believe that the *Codex 47*, preserved in the Biblioteca Moreniana (Florence) would be trustworthy because there is an introductory note by Borgherini, a son of Francesco Carletti’s cousin, to whom this manuscript belonged, wrongly supposed to be Antonio Carletti’s brother-in-law. Another manuscript is the so-called GINORI-VENTURI, a direct copy of the MORENIANO, which contains several transcription errors. The last manuscript is the MAGLIABECHIANO, which is a precise copy of the GINORI-VENTURI and corresponds to the Magalotti edition. Gemma Sgrilli assumed that Carletti’s original version of the *Chronicles* was probably written between 1609/10-1615 and one of the direct copies should be the *Codex 1331* (Sgrilli 1905: 232-258).

2 *Codex 1331*, f. 61 v. [Questo è l’ultimo termine della conquista della corona di Castiglia, fatta nell’anno 1564 al tempo del Re Filippo, et perciò si chiaman dal suo nome Filippine; soggiogate e comandate da Spagnoli Castiglioni, i quali navicando per via delle Indie occidentali sempre verso ponente sono finalmente arrivati in quell ultimo Oriente, in rispetto di dove sono partiti prima] Actually the entire *Codex 1331* was written in the present tense, but in order not to jump from the present tense to the past tense, I have decided to quote the manuscript using the past tense with reference to the Weinstock’s English translation.

3 António Carletti died in Macao in 1598.

4 Three or four Dutch vessels, captained by Gerardo de Roy from Zelanda vessel, shot against and defeated the Portuguese vessels. This happened when, after having sailed around the Cape of Good Hope, very close to Saint Helena Island, the Santiago vessel (the trade team’s main ship) directed by António di Melo de Castro (Portugal), was waiting for the other vessels in order to follow their route to Lisbon (Sgrilli 1905: 154; Barchiesi, 1978: 163-82).

5 *Atlas sinicus sive regni sinarum description geographica in ipso sinarum regno impressa charta et characterius sinicis* (Mgb. Cl. XIII, 1&2b) in two volumes. Probably the Atlas is a copy of the Zhu Siben’s 朱思本 guangyutu 廣東圖. This Atlas belongs to the Nacional Library o Florence. The Atlas was acquired by Francesco Carletti in Macao and served to Martino Martini, S.J. as a model for his *Atlas Sinensis*. There are other copies of this Atlas in Lenigrad, Real Sociedade Asiática, and in London.

6 In this chapter I have quoted the pages in Weinstock’s translation in brackets in the text, while the original folio is quoted in the footnotes.

7 Actually the Vela or Ladornes were also called the Marinas by Philip IV of Spain. The island of Guam’s first encounter with the new world was a historical, yet unsavoury event. Ferdinand Magellan sighted the Marianas on 6 March 1521 – halfway on the first circumnavigation of the world and almost 200 years before the Europeans explored Polynesia.

8 Chamorro people lived in Ladrones Islands discovered by Magellan in 1521 (Ladrones Era) and after 1668 the Islands was called Marianas (Marianas Era). The two phases correspond to: the phase of discovery and the phase of occupation respectively “Dur-
ing the 150 years between discovery of the Ladrones and their colonisation and subsequent conquest, a number of ships passed through the islands, mostly in convoys of vessels carrying several hundred people; there were three shipwrecks and ‘a substantial number of people are known to have remained for fairly lengthy stays among the Chamorros’ (Shell 2001: 227).

9 Codex 1331, f. 54v-55 [vi vanno quattro o cinque Indiani tutti nudi, e di persona molto robusta, e corpulente e d’un colore rosseggiante abbruciato dal sole; e senza coprirsi nessuna parte che sia appresso di noi vergognosa, che forse tra di loro non se ne tiene conto, essendo che io intesi essere questi uomini semplicissimi epurati in questo particolare, e di più che tenevano ogni cosa a comune, insino alle loro donne.]

10 Miguel López de Legaspi Martin de Goiti and Juan de Salcedo who arrived between 1570 and 1571 to claim the lands for Spain.

11 Codex 1331, f. 61 [questo l’ultimo termine della conquista della corona di Castiglia, fatta nell’anno 1564, al tempo del Re Filippo, et perciò si chiamano dal suo nome Filippine]

12 The Bisaya or Visayan people, recognised as the ancestors of the Philippine people. The Bisaya are also indigenous people of northwestern Borneo, Malaysia, concentrated around the Limbang River in northern Sarawak state. They primarily live in the Visayas and northeastern Mindanao but others have migrated elsewhere in the Philippines, including to Manila. Several linguistic groups in the Philippines are primarily of Bisaya descent. Bisaya or Visayan people. The Bisaya are a major ethnic group of the Philippines. Nearly the entire Philippine population consists of Malay peoples who are collectively called Filipinos. Their ancestors came from mainland Southeast Asia as well as from what is now Indonesia. A long history of contact between the Philippines and China has resulted in a group of people of mixed Filipino and Chinese descent. The indigenous people of the islands were a non-Malay people known as the Negritos. Today they make up only a small percentage of the population, living in the upland areas of Luzon, Mindanao, Panay and a few other islands.

13 Codex 1331 ff. 62-62v [è questa natione molto differente dall’altra così in costumi come nella statura e gesti del corpo, essendo che i Mori sono piccoli e malfatti di viso e di corpo, e di colore assai bruno, e d’animo vile e poltrone; per contra questi altri hanno bella persona robusta et virile, e molto più bianchi di carnatura e più valorosi nel maneggiar l’armi; nel quale exercitio si passano il tempo, con far combattere i galli avvezzi a questo con arte meravigliosa, armandoli di ferro che punge e taglia quella parte del piede dove è posto lo sporne, che pare propri una scimitarra con la quale si feriscono l’un l’altro e spesso a morte con l’urti che con essi si danno, sbranandosi quando il collo, e quando il gozzo, e quando il petto, e spesso il ventre sbudellandosi: le quali ferite, quando sono mortali, glie le curano con balsami et olii preziosi, accarezzandoli e sbuffandoli con vino e gli ristorano di cose buone da mangiare.]

14 Codex 1331 ff. 62-62v [e questi si stavano ancora nella loro antica gentilita e idolatria, si come di presente molti stanno per mancamento di ministrì che insegnino loro la verità del Evangelo].

15 Codex 1331 f. 63 [tutti deditissimi alli piaceri di Venere, e le loro donne non sono meno innamorate che belle, con le quali si trastullano in diverse e strane diaboliche maniere].

16 Codex 1331, ff. 63-63v. [Questi bisaios o la piú partesi loro, per invenzione del diavolo e per dare e avere diabolico piacere con la loro donne, usano ofrarsi il membro virile e in quello foro che fanno un poco piú che a mezzo di esso, vi mettono un pernetto di piombo che passa da una banda all’altra, in cima del quale vi è attaccata una stelletta pure di piombo, che vi si gira intorno e cuopre tutto il membro, avanzandone un poco dalle bande. Di sotto al pernetto vi è un buco, per il quale vi si attraversa unabettolina acciò stia saldo e non possa uscire fuori del membro: con il quale costi armato, si so-
gliano trastullare con le loro donne, alle quali non danno meno dolore al principio che piacere nel fine, quando sono bene riscaldate da quelle punture che ricevono da quella stelletta, di tal maniera che per un pezzo esce loro la voglia di quello che più desiderano. Questo modo di lussuriare dicono essere stato ritrovato da loro per sanità, cioè per avere manco occasione di usare Venere e tener piú satie le loro femmine; ma so dire anco per aggiunta che piú tosto sia una pura invenzione di satanasso, per impedire la generazione umana a questi sgraziati.

This instrument would be the palang. These sexual practices were already observed by Pigafetta: ‘The Bisayans, especially the women, are “very vicious and sensual”. To satisfy these women they young males insert a peg into their penis which is called the sagra. The Chinese and Spanish introduced islanders to sodomy’ (Pigafetta 1874: 240), as quoted by D. Lach the Pigafetta information was originally cited this practice as if originated in Burma (Lach 1965: 1504). Portuguese writers such as Barros, in his Decades, also describe this practice, which can be read also in the works of other authors such as Oviedo and Nicolò de Conti.

17 First they sharpen the teeth with a file in order to apply a small gold leaf.
18 Codex 1331, f. 65 [alte da terra sei o otto braccia]
19 Codex 1331, f. 66 [sagri, midollo delle quali, chéggiate e secco al fumo, si sfarina pestandolo in mortai di legno molto grandi; impastato poi si cuoce tra due teglie infocate, et ha sapore e colore e forma di castagnaci, ma non ha quell dolce cosí smaccato, nientedimeno è assai buono a mangiare.]
Sagrí means sagí: from the Malayan language sāgū, the name given to a thick palm.
20 Carabau, derived from the Malay Karabao, a species of water buffaló (Bubalus bubalis carabanesis) of that region.
21 Codex 1331, f. 66 [del quale mangiano spesso anche crudo, subito morto, con il sangue ancora caldo, e con del sale].
22 Bonga is the name that indicates the areca in the Philippines and the buyo is both the name given in that region to betel (also known as vettila) and a sort of mixture of leaves of the areca palm, leaves of betel and a form of calcium oxide.
23 Derived from the Malay word nippūh, the name of a palm very common in south Asia.
24 Sura: extracted spathe juice (Arum maculatum) of many types of palm trees, such as the coconut palm. In the former Portuguese ‘Estado da Índia’ (State of India), which covered a wide geographical area that went from Mozambique to East Timor, particularly in the Indian subcontinent and in Mozambique, the sura was used as a soft drink or, if not consumed, it was used as a substitute for vinegar or brandy. The word derives from the Konkani Sur, which in its turn comes from the Sanskrit Sura, juice prepared by the Sura people of the Ganges area. I thank Professor Joseph Abraham Levi, Institute for Portuguese and Lusophone World Studies, Rhode Island College, for his kind contribution to this note.
25 Parián, Dalia, probably derives from the Tamil language parēiyâh, which means drum holder, since this is one of the tasks of the pariás. Was built by Spaniards, who soon realised that the presence of so many Chinese in the city could have given some trouble to the Spanish business in that area. It was mainly a measure taken in order to prevent, or minimise, any disorder between natives and Japanese or Chinese people. Antonio de Morga describes also Parián (Morga 1868: 218). One century later the same area was described by another Italian from Naples, who also circumnavigated the world: Gemelli Careri, (Gemelli Careri 1699-1700: 20-22).
26 Codex 1331, f. 68 [sito fabbricato di case e botteghe tutte di legname e di canne tessute con foglie d’alberi]
27 He is talking about the ship that usually came to Nagasaki, the Nau do Trato (a merchant frigate) that among other journeys, made commercial voyages between Macau
and Japan, when Chinese officials banned direct trade with Japan in 1547. Carletti described the following: ‘Very good business is done between that country and other lands. But there is a very great lack of vessels ready to make long voyages, though the Japanese make them in every way, and at much risk, to diverse places. That is, they go to the Philippine Islands, to which they take wheat flour and other sorts of provisions and merchandise, at a profit of from sixty to one hundred per cent. [...]’ (Weinstock 1964: 129). Evidences proves that Portuguese trade along the China coast began shortly after the conquest of Malacca in 1511, only after 46 years, the Portuguese were actually able to acquire a permanent base in Macau. We know that during the pre-Macau period Portuguese trade was periodically interrupted. In the mid-1550s, after the foundation of Macau it became more regular and centred on the exchange of Chinese silk for Japanese/Spanish silver. Of all its trading partners, Canton and Nagasaki were the most important ones. (Boxer 1988).

28 The name “Macau” is thought to be derived from “Templo de A-Má” 媽閣廟 Chinese nameétaomén means “Inlet Gates”. (Jin 2007: 155-178)
29 First chronicle of the East Indies (in the manuscript is the seventh chronicle). In which is told the voyage from the Philippine Islands to those of Japan, and other notable things of that region (Weinstock 1964: 95-135).
30 The aloe wood, also known in modern botanical terms as *Aquilaria agallocha*, is native only to the countries around the Bay of Bengal and to Sumatra, even if early botanists also associate it with Annan. This wood was reserved as a royal export monopoly for sale to the Japanese who made fine wooden pillows from it and to the Indians for their funeral pyres (Lach 1965: 1259).
31 Codex 1331, f. 122 [Nel Regno di Coccincina, che si vede designato ne’ detti libri, chiamato ancora Anan, vi sono 14 provincie piccole: paese dove nasce il pregiato legno aloë, et dove si trova assai oro, e molti animali detti rinoceronti, o badà, et così ancora elefanti.]
32 The Xingxing 猩猩 were actually orangutans. This technique is still used to capture this animal, an animal that Carletti believed to be human. Also quoted by Marco Polo, and later by Matteo Ricci. This description can also be found in the Atlas.
33 Codex 1331, ff. 122-122v [certe sorte d’uomini salvatici, che sono pelosi, ma di statura ordinaria, et hanno coda; e dicono che parlano una loro propria lingua. Li quali uomini, se così si devono chiamare per averne l’effigie in qualche parte, li Cinesi domandano zinzin et dicono che per averli nelle mani apparecchiano ne’ luoghi dove questi tali zinzin sogliono stare molte et diverse cose da mangiare, et in particolare di molto vino, acciocché con quello si abbianchi, si come fanno, et all’ura gli giungono a dosso et pigliani senza alcuna difficoltà. Il volere questi uomini, o animali che si sieno, non è altro che per trarne il loro sangue uccidendoli; il quale serve di tinta, come lo che-mirsí o porpora, colore stimatissimo ancora fra cinesi et Cocincine et che mai non perde la sua bellezza et è in grande prezzo. Dicono che dopo aver preso questi zinzin, bisogna far loro carezze et dar loro di nuovo del vino a bere, acciò diventino buoni compagni et si contentino di dare il suo sangue amorevolmente, di che vengono pregati da quelli che li vogliono ammazzare; et che non facendolo loro queste piacevolezze non ne cavarebbono il detto sangue, ch’è quello che si cerca avere da tale bestia o altro che si sia, il quale per ordinario si pasce alla campagna di diverse frutte.]
34 Sapanwood, *Caesalpinia sappan*, also known as Brazilwood.
35 A practice that was very uncommon among Europeans, who normally did not bring women onto their vessels.
36 The rhinoceros nose was believed to have magic power, therefore they made a cup of it and they drank from it because they believed that it had the virtue of purifying or overcoming the force of the poison.
This story was already recorded by Nicolò Conti, in his report to Pope Eugeni IV about Ava Upper Burma, during the 15th century and in some Chinese fonts like the Yi Yuzhi of Zhou Zhizhong.

Durian, durio Zibethinus. The durian, is a stinky fruit, having a succulent and creamy filling. It normally grows in Southeast Asia.

Most of the pepper came from Djambi and Sunda.

Most of the houses inside the city wall were also made with wood.
4 Fuzzy Sets in Regional Development Analysis: A case study of Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, Western China

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4.1 Introduction

China has experienced astonishingly rapid economic growth over the past 30 years of reforms. This sustained and steady economic development has led to an exceptional increase in real living standards and to an extraordinary decline in poverty. However, the impact of the reforms has also included widespread income disparity, and a markedly smaller increase in income for rural residents as compared to urban residents. This disparity in rural-urban income has been the biggest contributor to the larger problem of equity in China, followed by inter-regional disparity. Of the 48 million people living under the official poverty line in China, the great majority are located in the western provinces, and the situation is even worse in rural, and in particular, ethnic minority areas (World Bank 2001). A number of scholars have been examining the economic disparities since the economic reforms launched in 1978. Lin and Chen (2004) pointed out that the economic disparities reveal a substantially lower standard of living and lower economic activity in the western regions of China. The causes of these disparities include a wide range of factors: geographical differences; government policies that address market distortions; preferential treatment that favours the eastern coastal areas; and an imbalance in China’s industrial structure. Tian (2004) tried to illustrate the difference between western and coastal regions by comparing regional gross domestic product (GDP), education levels and other indicators. Many researchers (Lin 2004; Tian 2004; Chen 2002) have used socio-economic indicators and quality of life to explain the widening disparities of regional development. However, most of the studies on regional disparities in China were focused on
the disparities between eastern and western; the interregional disparities within a province were not attached with much importance or given significant attention.

In recent years, along with Chinese and foreign economists’ systematic research on Chinese economic growth, academia and the public have gradually realised that this growth is highly unbalanced and is unceasingly leading to a disparity among local economic and residents’ income. Nevertheless, according to unbalanced growth theory, undeveloped areas often do not have access to capital and industrial growth within the entire region, so balanced growth is theoretically impossible for undeveloped regions (Huang 1991). Social economic development should follow the regional disparity rule in these regions: it should firstly appear in different intensities on certain growth spots or poles, then proliferate outside through different channels, and finally gain the ability to influence the entire economy. Hirschman (1991) remarked that any higher-income-level economy starts from one or several regional centres, and then some growth points or poles will emerge in the development process, which indicates that unbalanced growth among regions is an inevitable byproduct in the growth. Additionally, the polarization effect and the trickle-down effect (diffusion effect) also play a role in regional economic development (Xu 1995). In the early phase of economic development, the polarization effect is more remarkable than the trickle-down effect, which tends to increase the disparity. This imbalance indicates that if production factors were concentrated in certain points or regions, the economy could derive more benefits and development. In the later period of economic development, however, the diffusion effect becomes dominant, and the concentrated economy starts to proliferate to the periphery, which reduces the disparities of regional development (Hirschman 1991).

Fuzzy set theory, to treat fuzziness in data, was firstly formalised by Professor Lotfi A. Zadeh at the University of California in 1965 (Zadeh 1965). In fuzzy set theory the membership grade can be represented as a value intermediate between 0 and 1, although the membership grade can be taken only as 0 or 1 in the normal case of set theory. The function of the membership grade, which can be defined by the user in consideration of the fuzziness, is called its ‘membership function’.

Since its inception, the theory of fuzzy sets has advanced in a variety of ways and in many disciplines. Applications of fuzzy technology can be found in artificial intelligence, control engineering, decision theory, expert systems, as well as many other fields (Zimmermann 1996). Fuzzy set theory has also been extended to economic development analysis (Lee and Yao 1998; León et al. 2002). Shepherd and Shi (2006) developed a modeling strategy based on the application of fuzzy logic, which was shown to provide a powerful and efficient method for the estima-
tion of non-linear and linear economic relationships. Draeseke and Giles (2002) used fuzzy set theory and fuzzy logic to construct an annual time-series for the New Zealand underground economy over the period 1968-1994, in which two input variables were used to model the underground economy of New Zealand. Sharma et al. (2006) represented a fuzzy goal programming model for handling fuzzy goals such as production and income of farmers in rural development planning. The model was applied to assess employment opportunity in rural areas by way of minimising the operational costs and increasing the economic activities of the rural framers.

This article is intended to construct an assessment model suiting Ningxia’s economic structure and characteristics. An efficient synthesised assessment model has been built up for studies on underdeveloped regions, especially for economic development research in minority regions in Western China (Ma et al. 2004). This model has also been examined and applied successfully by Ma et al. (2006), who selected four main indicators to analyse in his research. However, if all the related indicators were included and processed, the data would be overwhelming to process; actually, the membership function given in the model can only be applied to a special kind of factors. In this article, the model is optimised and ameliorated: firstly, preprocess all the accessible related indicators following the method of information entropy and select out the primary indicators according to the information content; then, ameliorate the selection method of membership function and build membership functions separately based on whether the indicators are grouped into benefit or cost factors.

4.2 Fuzzy Modeling

4.2.1 Information entropy

The concept of information entropy in information theory is applied in this paper in order to compare and select indicators. Information entropy is occasionally called Shannon’s Entropy in honour of Claude E. Shannon, who introduced the idea of information entropy in his paper ‘A Mathematical Theory of Communication’ in 1948 (Shannon 1948). As a measurement of the average information content associated with a random outcome, information entropy defines the information content in a way that eliminates the amount of uncertainty about an event (Shannon and Weaver 1947; Wang 1994), and the concept has been more and more widely used to achieve this task (Cheng 1997; Deng et al. 2000).

Shannon defines entropy in terms of a discrete random variable $X$, with possible states (or outcomes) $x_1...x_n$ as:
In an evaluation system, suppose there are $m$ evaluation indicators and $n$ objects marked as $(m, n)$, $x_{ij}$ is the value of the $i^{th}$ indicator on the $j^{th}$ object, and $x_{ij} \in [0, 1]$ after normalisation quantitatively and qualitatively (Qiu 2002). Then, the entropy of the $i^{th}$ indicator is defined as:

$$H_i = -\frac{1}{\ln n} \sum_{j=1}^{n} f_{ij} \ln f_{ij}$$  \hspace{1cm} (2)$$

In the formula above,

$$f_{ij} = \frac{x_{ij}}{\sum_{j=1}^{n} x_{ij}}$$  \hspace{1cm} (3)$$

It is assumed that when $f_{ij} = 0, f_{ij} \ln f_{ij} = 0$.

From the definition above, we can deduce:

1. When the values of indicator $i$ about all the objects are equal, the entropy reaches the maximum 1, which means that the information provided by this indicator is 0, so this indicator is excluded.
2. When the values of indicator $i$ variate greatly, the entropy is small, which means this indicator offers important information. In that case, the objects show different properties on this issue and need to be highly considered.
3. From the angle of information amount, entropy represents the amount of useful information content in a certain issue.
4. According to the definition of entropy, the quantity and quality of the extracted information is one of the determining factors of evaluation precision (Hartley 1928; Srdjevic et al. 2004). Hence, in the indicator selection process, the more information one indicator contains, which has a smaller entropy, the more significance it has to the evaluation system, and vice versa. With respect to the ‘more information, more significance’ theory, indicators can now be selected out for the future evaluations.

### 4.2.2 Standardisation of Indicators

In a synthetic evaluation with multiple indicators, the indicators can be grouped into two categories: benefit factors and cost factors. Benefit factors refer to the indicators with values ‘the larger, the better’, while cost
factors refer to the indicators with values ‘the smaller, the better’. In terms of the indicators in this paper, benefit factors are applicable. The judgment of selected indicators is very vague, so membership function is applied to describe the quality of indicators, let \( U \) be the fuzzy sets, and the membership function are defined as follows:

\[
u(x_{ij}) = \frac{x_{ij} - \min\{x_j\}}{\max\{x_j\} - \min\{x_j\}} \quad (4)\]

where \( x_{ij} \) is the indicator \( j \)'s value of object \( i \), and \( u(x_{ij}) \in [0, 1] \).

For a certain evaluation issue, suppose there are \( m \) indicators and \( n \) objects, the evaluation matrix of the objects on multiple indicators is constructed according to the integration of quantitative and qualitative methods, after normalisation:

\[
X = (x_{ij})_{m \times n} \quad (5)
\]

where \( x_{ij} \) is the indicator \( j \)'s value of object \( i \) after standardisation, and \( x_{ij} \in [0, 1] \).

### 4.2.3 Construction of weight set

In order to construct the membership function reasonably and improve the division degree of the evaluation, the concept of ‘ideal’ is excerpted from the information method. In the ‘MCDM’ method (multiple criteria decision making), it is very difficult for every variable to reach the maximum value in this region. But, generally speaking, when a variable reaches a satisfying value, we can say it has achieved the ‘ideal condition’ (or satisfying condition), thus that value is called the ‘ideal’.

When a variable’s value gets to the point of \( S \), if the degree of satisfaction now for most people is 1.0, then \( S \) is regarded as the ideal. Regarding the average of the first \( N \) values of each variable in a region as the ‘ideal’ in this model, the ideal of this region can be calculated according to table 4.1.

Therefore, the weight set can be set as:

\[
W = (w_1, w_2, \ldots, w_n) = (S_1/A_1B, S_2/A_2B, \ldots, S_n/A_nB) \quad (6)
\]

Where \( w_n \in [0, 1] \), \( \sum_{n=1}^{n} w_n = 1 \)

### 4.2.4 Evaluation fuzzy model for regional economic development

The fuzzy mathematics information method is applied synthetically to construct the integrative fuzzy evaluation model:
\[
X_i = \sum_{j=1}^{n} w_j x_{ij}
\]  
(7)

where \(X_i\) is the evaluation score of the region \(i\), \(w_j\) is the weight of variable \(j\), \(x_{ij}\) is the evaluation result of the variable \(j\) in region \(i\).

Once the multi-variable weight \(W\) is obtained, we can calculate the result of the fuzzy comprehensive evaluation \(B\):

\[
B = W \circ R
\]

(8)

where \(R = R(r_{ij})_{m \times n}, W = (w_1, w_2, \ldots, w_n)\).

The fuzzy matrix can be formed as follows:

\[
B = (b_1, b_2, \ldots, b_n) = (w_1, w_2, \ldots, w_n) \odot \begin{bmatrix} r_{11} & \cdots & r_{1m} \\
         r_{21} & \cdots & r_{2m} \\
         \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\
         r_{n1} & \cdots & r_{nm} 
\end{bmatrix}
\]

(9)

where

\[
b_i = \sum_{j=1}^{m} w_j \odot r_{ij}
\]

(10)

\(b_i\) is the inner product of the fuzzy calculation, and different results may be generated depending on different fuzzy arithmetic operators. \(M(\cdot, \oplus)\) is used in this chapter, so the evaluation result is related to every variable’s value, in which way the limitation of neglecting the transition number can be excluded. Actually, based on the method of calculating variable weight and membership degree, \(\oplus\) can be degenerated to the operation of addition, thus, \(M(\cdot, \oplus)\) can be written as \(M(\cdot, +)\), and \(b_i = \sum_{j=1}^{m} w_j r_{ij}\) is then constructed.

In order to clearly describe the development of a sub-region, the development level is divided into 5 degrees, which are ‘developed, relatively developed, semi-developed, underdeveloped, undeveloped’, denoted as

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Ideal</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Dispersion</th>
<th>Information Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>(S_1)</td>
<td>(A_1)</td>
<td>(S_1/A_1)</td>
<td>(S_1/A_1B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>(S_2)</td>
<td>(A_1)</td>
<td>(S_2/A_2)</td>
<td>(S_2/A_2B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>…</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>…</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>(S_n)</td>
<td>(A_n)</td>
<td>(S_n/A_n)</td>
<td>(S_n/A_nB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>(B)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.1 Information content

SHENQUAN MA, RUIBO HAN & CHENGYI ZHANG
A, B, C, D and E respectively. Finally, we define an evaluation set $V$, which will be used as the possible evaluation rank set. Then:

$$V = \text{(developed, relatively developed, semi-developed, underdeveloped, undeveloped)} = (V_1, V_2, V_3, V_4, V_5) = (0.50, 0.40, 0.20, 0.10, 0)$$

$V$ is a fuzzy cut-set of $U$, and $V_j$ stands for the cut-set level. If the evaluation result $b_i \in (0.50, 1]$, this sub-region belongs to developed range; if $b_i \in [0, 0.10]$, this sub-region may be defined as undeveloped; and so forth.

### 4.3 Case analysis of Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region

#### 4.3.1 Research region

We have taken Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region as a case study area. Ningxia is located in northwestern China, adjoining three provinces: Inner Mongolia (Mongolian Minority Autonomous Region) in the north, Gansu in the southwest and Shanxi in the southeast. Ningxia is the smallest province in China and was established as Hui Minority Autonomous Region (province) by the Chinese government in 1958. The Hui minority group has a population of 1.86 million, which is 33.1 per cent of the total provincial population.

County will be used as the main geographical unit of analysis in the case study of Ningxia. County is the basic administration division of the province. There are seventeen counties in the province and three other cities (Shizuishan, Yinchuan and Wuzhong) (See figure 4.1).

Aside from its special location, the impoverished socioeconomic characteristics of Ningxia are quite unique. In 2000, the average gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in Ningxia was 4,839 yuan (US $590), which represented 68 percent of the national figure. In 2000 the average annual net urban income was 4,948 yuan (US $614), whereas the rural income was only 1,724 yuan (US $215).

#### 4.3.2 Indicator selection

The selection of variables was based on the theory of information entropy. The eight selected indicators with largest values of information entropy are: GDP, per capita GDP, per capita financial revenue, per capita fixed asset investment, per capita retail amount of social consumable, annual average wages of employee, per capita net income of farmer, and per capita consumption expenditure of farmer.
Figure 4.1 Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region and its counties

Although some academics are critical of a GDP-centered strategy of economic development, that does not mean that GDP is useless as an indicator; it is a process that only takes GDP amounts into consideration and fails to consider environmental and human factors that should be criticised. Even the GDP aggregate is not strictly comparable between areas with different populations; GDP is a good indicator to weigh the economic development level. In order to demonstrate the spatial distribution of economic aggregate and economic entity, the comparison of economic aggregates is still meaningful.
All the data used in this research comes from the Ningxia Statistical Yearbook 2003, 2004 and 2005. For proficiency and convenience, the data of 2003 is used as an example to demonstrate the process of calculation, while the final results for the 2002 and 2004 will be listed at the end.

4.3.3 Fuzzy judgment matrix in 2003

Based on the eight indicators and the membership functions mentioned above in section 4.2.2, we can construct the fuzzy judgment matrix as follows:

\[ R = (r_{ij})_{8 \times 17} \]

where the rows in the matrix stand for the seventeen counties (Yongning County, Helan County, Lingwu City, Pinluo County, Taole County, Huinong County, Litong District, Zhongwei County, Zhongning County, Yanchi county, Tongxin County, Yuanzhou District, Haiyuan County, Xiji County, Longde County, Jingyuan County, Pengyang County), and the columns stand for the eight indicators (GDP, per capita GDP, per capita financial revenue, per capita fixed asset investment, per capita retail amount of social consumable, annual average wages of employee, per capita net income of farmers and per capita consumption expenditure of farmers).

\[
R = \begin{bmatrix}
0.4354 & 0.5892 & 0.5194 & 0.3549 & 0.2978 & 0.0898 & 0.8237 & 0.8527 \\
0.3274 & 0.5210 & 0.5369 & 0.3298 & 0.2672 & 0.2986 & 0.8071 & 0.7298 \\
0.5428 & 0.6338 & 0.5348 & 0.8270 & 0.2871 & 0.1796 & 0.8387 & 1.0000 \\
0.4629 & 0.4491 & 0.5629 & 0.0475 & 0.4810 & 0.2769 & 0.8359 & 0.5949 \\
0.0000 & 0.4377 & 0.3297 & 0.7132 & 0.2856 & 0.6813 & 0.6855 & 0.8292 \\
0.1563 & 0.7028 & 1.0000 & 0.2604 & 0.6633 & 0.0000 & 0.8814 & 0.9927 \\
1.0000 & 0.8047 & 0.4020 & 1.0000 & 1.0000 & 0.1612 & 0.0000 & 0.8580 \\
0.6326 & 0.4647 & 0.4876 & 0.6845 & 0.4604 & 0.2382 & 0.8079 & 0.6857 \\
0.4456 & 0.4366 & 0.3895 & 0.4745 & 0.1419 & 0.0973 & 0.8172 & 0.9410 \\
0.5355 & 1.0000 & 0.3349 & 0.2983 & 0.1554 & 0.6694 & 0.1892 & 0.3464 \\
0.1830 & 0.0721 & 0.0931 & 0.0773 & 0.0366 & 0.5895 & 0.1021 & 0.1578 \\
0.3742 & 0.1280 & 0.0553 & 0.2050 & 0.2408 & 0.9357 & 0.0848 & 0.1803 \\
0.1404 & 0.0208 & 0.0002 & 0.0347 & 0.0000 & 1.0000 & 0.0028 & 0.0586 \\
0.1516 & 0.0000 & 0.0000 & 0.0000 & 0.0431 & 0.6866 & 0.0525 & 0.1062 \\
0.1073 & 0.0940 & 0.1565 & 0.2479 & 0.037 & 0.4828 & 0.0689 & 0.0499 \\
0.0061 & 0.0241 & 0.0360 & 0.0360 & 0.1744 & 0.5792 & 0.0000 & 0.0248 \\
0.0905 & 0.0427 & 0.0206 & 0.1529 & 0.1158 & 0.6945 & 0.0804 & 0.0000
\end{bmatrix}

\text{T}
4.3.4 Construction of weight set

Taking the average of the first five values of each indicator in all the counties as the ‘Ideal’ in this model, the ideal for each indicator in Ningxia in 2003 can be shown in table 4.2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Ideal</th>
<th>Provincial rank</th>
<th>Provincial satisfaction</th>
<th>Reference county</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>21134.82</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Litong District...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>per capita GDP</td>
<td>9015.4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Yanchi County...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>per capita financial revenue</td>
<td>339.68</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Huinong County...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>per capita fixed asset investment</td>
<td>1929.928</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Litong District...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>per capita retail amount of social consumable</td>
<td>1812.144</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Litong District...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>annual average wages of employee</td>
<td>1319.54</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Hangyuan County...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>per capita net income of farmers</td>
<td>3016.916</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Litong District...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>per capita consumption expenditure of farmers</td>
<td>2156.532</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Lingwu City...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Based on the Ideal and minimum value, the information contents of the indicators are:

Therefore, the weight set for the counties is:

\[ W = (w_1, w_2, \ldots, w_8) \]
\[ = (0.26, 0.14, 0.21, 0.14, 0.10, 0.03, 0.06, 0.05) \quad (12) \]

4.3.5 Results

Following the compound operation of fuzzy matrix \( b_i = \sum_{j=1}^{m} w_j \circ r_{ij} \), we can get

\[ b = W \circ R \]
\[ = (0.48, 0.44, 0.60, 0.45, 0.35, 0.56, 0.75, 0.57, 0.44, 0.46, 0.12, \]
\[ 0.22, 0.08, 0.07, 0.14, 0.06, 0.09) \]
\[ (13) \]

Through judgment set V, the results are shown in the table 4.4.
4.3.6 Spatial analysis

According to the results table, the level of economic development in Ningxia can be plotted out more accurately as figure 4.2 shows.

It is very obvious that the northern part of Ningxia generally became more developed between 2002 and 2004. Six counties were recognised

### Table 4.3 Information content

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Ideal</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Dispersion</th>
<th>Information Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>211348.2</td>
<td>18571</td>
<td>1.3805</td>
<td>0.2575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>per capita GDP</td>
<td>9015.4</td>
<td>1420</td>
<td>6.3488</td>
<td>0.1436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>per capita financial revenue</td>
<td>339.68</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>9.3854</td>
<td>0.2123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>per capita fixed asset investment</td>
<td>1929.928</td>
<td>303.35</td>
<td>6.3620</td>
<td>0.1439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>per capita retail amount of social consumable</td>
<td>1812.144</td>
<td>400.33</td>
<td>4.5266</td>
<td>0.1024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>annual average wages of employee</td>
<td>13195.4</td>
<td>9316</td>
<td>1.4164</td>
<td>0.0320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>per capita net income of farmers</td>
<td>3016.916</td>
<td>1147.49</td>
<td>2.6291</td>
<td>0.0595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>per capita consumption expenditure of farmers</td>
<td>2156.532</td>
<td>1007.61</td>
<td>2.1402</td>
<td>0.0484</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Ningxia Statistics Yearbook 2004 (Ningxia Statistics Bureau 2005)

### Table 4.4 The economic development evaluation table for Ningxia, 2002-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Counties</th>
<th>2002 Value</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>2003 Value</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>2004 Value</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yongning County</td>
<td>0.5256</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>0.4819</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>0.558</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helan County</td>
<td>0.479</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>0.441</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>0.5622</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lingwu County</td>
<td>0.5711</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>0.5972</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>0.7976</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pingluo County</td>
<td>0.5071</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>0.4468</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>0.6498</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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as reaching a ‘developed’ economic level according to our fuzzy model in 2002, and four of them maintained this performance level in 2003. In 2004, all the counties in the north were ‘developed’ areas, and six (Pingluo, Helan, Yongning, Taole, Zhongning and Yanchi) were upgraded from the 2003.

**Figure 4.2 Economic development levels in Ningxia from 2002 to 2004**

The southern counties were relatively less developed during 2002 to 2004. In 2002, there was only one county with a normal development level and there were two (Jixi and Jingyuan) that were at the ‘undeveloped’ level. This situation for the Southern Province worsened in 2003: four counties (Jixi, Jingyuan, Haiyuan and Pengyang) were at the ‘undeveloped’ level. In 2004, Pengyang County upgraded to ‘underdeveloped’; however, the other three counties were still undeveloped.

In order to have a better view of all these changes, figure 4.3 presents the economic development in Ningxia province from 2002 to 2004. We can see from figure 4.3 that the developed regions in Ningxia are mainly concentrated in the Yinchuan-centered area in Northern Ningxia. The representative of this region is Wuzhong District, including Wuzhong City, Qingtongxia and Zhongwei County, which was marked as a developed region for all the three years. This region’s economy is developing steadily: Zhongwei County is developing at a rather faster speed, while Qingtongxia County’s economic development is also improving. Huinong County is also marked as one of the developed regions. Among all the economic regions, Yongning County is developing steadily while Helan County is developing relatively quickly. On the other hand, the underdeveloped regions are mainly in Southern Ningxia, especially the southern mountainous regions where the minorities reside. The factors contributing to the disparity between the north and south can be summarised as follows:
Natural Conditions

The difference in natural conditions is one of the reasons for the economic development disparities in Ningxia. The northern and middle parts of Ningxia enjoy superior natural conditions: Located in the catchment area of the Yellow River, their agriculture here is well developed due to these advantages. The southern part of Ningxia meanwhile is...
mainly mountainous with severe natural conditions: Located at the transition area of Loess Plateau to northern windy and sandy area, this area is mainly covered with loess hills with fragmented topography and numerous gullies. Ninety per cent of this area suffers from water loss and soil erosion with an arid climate, and the precipitation is 200-400 mm per year in most of the area. The frequent droughts, storms, frost, landslides, damage caused by rats as well as other severe natural conditions create great disadvantages for agriculture development in this area.

Location advantage
The northern and middle parts of Ningxia have better transportation links and infrastructure, and good accessibility to goods, materials, information, technology and skilled workforce, which help to promote regional economic development. While the southern area is surrounded by mountains and deserts, except for the south loess hill areas, which have some connections with the agricultural culture in China’s central plain. Additionally, the southern part of Ningxia is situated on the edge of the loess plateau, where transportation infrastructure and links are less developed. Combined these factors make the southern region, far from the political and economical center of China, a persistently marginal location to develop economically.

Resources
The increasing economic development in the central areas around Yinchuan and Wuzhong greatly benefited from the abundant water, tourism industry and mine resources, which are rare in the southern regions. Obviously, the distribution of natural resources largely influence the level of local development and Ningxia is typical in this sense.

Economic foundation and policy factors
With the economic reforms of the 1980s, the Chinese government’s unbalanced development policies have provided a great deal of support and benefit to the northern and central parts of Ningxia, which predominantly promoted local economic development. The southern parts of Ningxia have also obtained some support as a result of these reforms, however the effects were not so obvious due to natural conditions and historical factors.

4.4 Conclusion
The assessment of regional economical development is an important issue in regional economy studies, and the selection of a suitable model is a complicated process that involves multi-criteria and synthesised
analysis. This chapter’s model satisfies the reality requirements to some extent, however, whether it is a theoretically satisfactory model is still being researched. Nevertheless, this model has provided a rather new and feasible method; the determination of indicator weight and the concept of ‘ideal’ are of especially great importance. As a manner with which to distinguish indicators, information entropy provides a relatively objective method to select variables according to information content, not by literature or experiences, which are subjective and less pervasive. As a contrast to conventional assessment approaches based on crisp sets, the fuzzy logic method is an optimised method that can use fuzzy membership instead of sharp, unambiguous judgment.

From the operation of this model, we can conclude that dynamic analysis and forecast functions are of great value to the research of regions. According to our findings, further discussions on the ‘point-axis’ and economic zone patterns of the economic development in Ningxia are necessary and will be taken up in our following research work. The fuzzy logic method overcomes the limitation of crisp Boolean assessment by determining whether or not an area is developed based on the levels of certain indicators. However, different memberships for different variables might generate a more accurate consequence, which is also worthy of follow up in subsequent research.
Patterns of the Use and the Choice of Health Care Facilities among the Han and Minority Populations in China

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University of Ottawa, Canada

5.1 Introduction

The understanding of health care accessibility issues, such as the choice of a health care facility, is essential for informing public decision- and policy-making aimed at improving living conditions. Equity in social welfare has long played a major role in shaping China’s national policies (Liu et al. 2002); however, continued pursuit of the market-oriented reforms introduced in China in the 1970s has resulted in increasing urban-rural and intra- and inter-regional socio-economic disparities (Zhao 2006). This has raised multiple concerns about differences in the availability of health services in urban and rural areas and particularly about the equity of access to health care, which has been widely considered a key objective of health care policies (Liu et al. 2003). Empirical evidence suggests that urban-rural and regional as well as social (majority-minority) health status disparities continue to grow, which can be attributed to increasing income disparities, changes in health care financing and organisation, as well as the dramatic reduction of insurance coverage (Liu, Hsiao, and Eggleston 1999). From early 2000, the Chinese government has recognised this growing inequality and has shifted its development orientation from GDP-led to people-centred (Meng 2007). This implies that major changes in accessibility of health care should have followed such a radical change in the policy. Using the household survey data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS), changes in the types of health care used and the factors determining these choices are examined at the household level across socio-economic groups in nine provinces of China over the 1989-2004 period with particular attention attributed to differences between Han and minority populations. Although there are different minority populations in China, the study does not look at the difference between the different minority populations. Applying quantitative approaches, this research seeks to contribute to the understanding of health care access in China, sum-
marising and critically assessing existing English-language literature on
the subject, as well as analysing the CHNS data.

5.2 Regional, sectoral and social disparities of access

As a result of the preferential government policies following the eco-

nomic reforms of 1978 and fiscal reforms of 1994, three levels of dispa-

rities developed in China: regional (East-West), sectoral (urban-rural)

and social (Han-minorities). The disparities between coastal regions

and interior China are a result of the unequal distribution of the perfor-

mances of growth between geographical areas of China. Due to the stra-

tegic location of coastal areas, the historical links to other countries, ac-

cess to direct foreign investments (FDI), the presence of modern infra-

structure and the elevated level of human capital, China’s coastal

provinces tend to develop much faster than the interior provinces. The

per capita income is also substantially higher among the coastal pro-

vinces, for instance, there is a difference of 10 times in income between

the richest municipality (Shanghai), where in 2006 the average per ca-

pita income was recorded at 57,695 yuan, and the poorest western pro-

vince (Guizhou), where the average per capita income was only 5,787

yuan (China Statistical Yearbook 2007). Thus the concentration of

wealth in the coastal area of China contributes to the increase in regional

disparities within the country.

The sectoral disparities can be explained by the growing gap between

the standards of living of urban and rural residents, which can be attrib-

uted for the most part to per capita income differences. For instance,

the ratio of the urban-rural income passed from 2.570 in 1978 to 3.278

in 2006, i.e. an increase of almost 30 per cent in favour of the urban

population. The Gini coefficient constitutes another reliable disparity

indicator, providing an account of the enormous imbalance between ur-

ban and rural incomes. For the period from 1981 to 2004, the urban-

rural Gini coefficient increased dramatically from 0.29 to 0.44, illustrat-

ing not only the unequal nature of the Chinese distribution of income

but also the growing gap between the rich urban and poor rural popula-

tion (Yonghong 2006).

The third level of inequalities in China exists at the social level be-

tween the Han majority and the minorities. The majority-minority dif-

ferences in economic situation result mainly from the low level of edu-

cation among the minorities, as well as from their geographical concen-

tration in the remote inland areas. Minorities are mostly located in the

western region (figure 5.1). Indeed, Gustafsson and Shi (2003) found

that the gap in average revenue (per capita) between majority and ethnic

minorities has almost doubled between 1988 and 1995, reaching an
alarmingly high rate of 35.8 per cent. Similarly, the six provinces holding the highest ranking on the index of human development (IDH) (Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin, Zhejiang, Liaoning and Guangdong) comprise an extremely small proportion of minority ethnos groups, whereas the six provinces holding the lowest IDH (Tibet, Guizhou, Yunnan, Gansu, Qinghai and Ningxia) comprise an extremely high proportion of minority ethnic groups (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP] 2005). The privileged situation of the Han majority thus indisputably contributes to the increase in regional inequalities in China. As a result of these disparities there are differences in accessibility and use of health care. Consequently we expect the factors affecting Han and minority decision-making related to which health care facility to use to be different.

Figure 5.1  Distribution of minorities in China, 2001

5.3 Health care provision and administration

In China, in addition to the Ministry of Health, many other institutions have an indirect impact on health, such as the Central Family Planning Committee, the Ministry of Finance, the National Development Reform Council and the Food and Drug Administration (Li, Zhang and Tian 2006; Mao 2006). China’s public health system comprises delivery facilities at different administrative levels: provincial, city and county (See figure 5.2). High quality facilities with qualified personnel are scarce and are restricted to the provincial level. While the number of medical
institutions at the county level is quite high, they are generally very small and perform a very limited range of treatments (Hougaard, Osterdal and Yu 2008). In 2003, a study of 46 poor counties by Wang et al., found that 70 per cent of village doctors did not have any formal medical education and had received on average only 20 hours of training (Eggleston et al. 2008). During the egalitarian era, there was a well-functioning referral system between the different levels of institutions; village doctors would refer their patients to county, city or provincial facilities depending on the severity of the case. However, this was lost as a result of decentralisation and currently patients can choose whichever level of provider they can afford, preferring to turn directly to higher-level facilities. Consequently, higher-class facilities (provincial) are overutilised and are largely used by higher-income customers, while lower-class facilities (county and township level) are underutilised and mostly provide services to low-income patients (Eggleston et al. 2005). In such a fragmented system preventative, primary and tertiary services are all provided by different levels of facilities. Consequently, there is considerable overlap of services and resources among the different levels of facilities. In addition, there is little coordination among different levels of health care providers, and tests are often repeated when patients are referred to another facility (Yip and Hsiao, 2008). ‘Waste and inefficiency characterise many of China’s multiple systems of health services delivery’ (World Bank 2005: 2-3). The regulations regarding communication among these facilities and the responsibilities of these providers are inadequate. There is also a lack of enforcement mechanisms for existing regulations. The findings of Tang and Bloom (2000) suggest that the decentralisation resulting from health reforms has had a negative impact not only on overall quality of services but also on equity of access.

Figure 5.2  Health care administration in China

![Diagram of health care administration in China]

*run by the district governments

Source: adapted from Liu 2004: 534
Moreover, the health service delivery system is also run by a variety of public-private providers ranging from state-owned enterprises and military establishments to private investors and local cooperatives (Liu 2004). Currently hospitals are classified as either for-profit or not-for-profit, with a further distinction between state or privately owned (Eggleston et al. 2008). In cities, for instance, only 2 per cent of the hospitals are privately owned. In rural areas, however, most village clinics (73.6 per cent) belong to this category (Meng 2007). Also, since the 1980s there has been a tendency toward class conversions and by 2005, 15.9 per cent of hospitals were registered as for-profit. Evidence from the limited Chinese empirical studies on the effect of ownership and profit status suggests that for-profit providers are just as likely to over-prescribe medicines as public ones, but also are just as likely to provide preventative services if paid to do so (Eggleston et al. 2005).

While health care provision is still dominated by state owned facilities, the main revenue of health delivery systems comes from out-of-pocket fees based on a regulated fee schedule (60 per cent). The other two main sources are insurers (20 per cent) and government subsidies (20 per cent), although the latter accounts for a progressively decreasing share of providers’ revenues (Eggleston et al. 2008; Liu et al. 2006).

5.4 Health care use in China

Studies examining the use of health services found significant and apparently non-random reductions in health care use since the introduction of economic reforms (Bloom 2001; Bloom and Gu 1997; Bloom and Xingyuan 1997; Hesketh and Zhu 1997; Mao 2006; Wagstaff and Yu 2007). For example, between 1985 and 2000 the bed occupancy rate for town health centres has dropped from 46.0 per cent to 33.1 per cent and for county hospitals from 82.7 per cent to 60.8 per cent (Liu 2004). Mao (2006) found that from 1993 to 2003 outpatient visits and hospitalisation rates slightly decreased from 1.8 to 1.62 visits per capita and from 4.2 per cent to 3.6 per cent. In contrast, Henderson et al. (1994; 1998) concluded, using CHNS data, that between 1989 and 1993, health care was widely accessible and there was no evidence of declining use of services over this period. Possible explanations for this may be the earlier dates of the study or the self-reported nature of the data.

While, theoretically, increased doctor visits are not necessarily a positive outcome for health care reforms, there is evidence that demand for services in China coexists with under use by a sizeable portion of the population (Liu and Mills 1999). According to the findings of Liu et al. (2007) in 2003 only 43 per cent of respondents saw a doctor when they
were ill, while 32.2 per cent relied on self-treatment and 15.8 per cent had no treatment at all. For this reason increase in use of services is usually interpreted as an improvement of access to health care, regardless of actual changes in health outcomes (Wagstaff and Yu 2007). Not only has there been an overall decline in health care use, but the growing disparities between urban-rural health care utilisation rates have also been documented. Liu et al. (1999) have found that between 1985 and 1993 hospitalisation days have increased in urban areas by 12.8 per cent, whereas in rural areas they decreased by 10.3 per cent. Similarly, Liu et al. (2007) described the patterns in physician and hospital use among rural and urban populations in China using National Health Services Surveys (NHSS) 2003 data. They found that 53 per cent of respondents who relied on self-treatment and 90 per cent of those who had no treatment at all when they were sick were rural residents. Using Center for Health Statistics and Information (CHSI) 2003 data, Meng (2007) found that the non-utilisation rates of both outpatient and inpatient care were higher among rural residents by 5 per cent and 2.5 per cent as compared to urban residents primarily due to financial reasons.

A number of studies have also attempted to find the underlying causes of reported utilisation practices. A qualitative study assessing health care access barriers was conducted by Hong et al. (2006) concentrating on the urban areas of Beijing and Nanjing. Here it was concluded that the high cost of health care, a lack of insurance coverage and exacting work schedules often resulted in under use of formal health care, self-treatment and delayed treatment of illnesses. Liu (2004) found that on average, 45 per cent of discharges from inpatient care in rural areas were initiated against medical advice for financial reasons in almost 80 per cent of cases. Liu and Mills (1999; 2005) confirm Liu’s findings, demonstrating that user fees for preventative and curative care have been regarded as a significant barrier for utilisation of these services. In another qualitative study conducted by Wong, Tang and Lo (2007: 148) assessing people’s perceptions of the underlying principles of health care system reform, 86.1 per cent of respondents agreed to the statement ‘Current medical examination and treatment expenses exceed what the general public can afford’.

5.5 Methods

Data
The data used for this project comes primarily from the the University of North Carolina Population Centre CHNS and from the China Statistical Yearbook 2005. The CHNS is an ongoing international collaboration between the University of North Carolina, the National Institute of Nu-
tion and Food Safety of the United States, and the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention. This is a unique longitudinal publicly available dataset that covers nine provinces in China that vary considerably in terms of geography, economic development, infrastructure and health indicators (see figure 5.3). Since the first round of CHNS data in 1989, there have been six additional panels in 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, and 2006. The samples in the survey are drawn using a multi-stage weighted random cluster process. In each province four counties were selected randomly for the survey. In addition, whenever possible, the provincial capital and a lower income city were also chosen. The CHNS survey includes a health services section containing detailed information on insurance coverage, medical providers and health facilities that the household might use under selected circumstances. The impacts of health care and health behaviours are measured by changes in sets of household and individual economic, demographic and social factors.

The present analysis uses three years of data: 1989, the baseline year of the survey; 2004, the most recent complete year available; and 1997, the intermediate year. All data came from longitudinal datasets, except for the income data, which were only available in cross-sectional format. Since the data needed for this research were contained in multiple files they were first sorted based on the household ID and then merged based on the household ID and the respondent’s ID. Only the responses of heads of households living in the house were kept for the analysis for two reasons: because it is culturally accepted in China that the head of the household is the most informed member of the family and also for assurance of comparability of the answers. Household is thus the unit of analysis. After excluding all missing and incomplete cases, samples of 1,811 households in 1989, 3,071 households in 1997 and 2,904 households in 2004 were obtained.

This research examines the evolution of use of two types of facilities: clinics and hospitals. Clinics comprise village clinics, private clinics, work unit clinics, town family planning services and other types of clinics. Hospitals include town hospitals, county maternal and child hospitals, county hospitals, city maternal and child hospitals, city hospitals, workers’ hospitals and other types of hospitals. It is important to note that the Chinese health care system equally recognises Western medicine and traditional Chinese medicine. For this reason, health care facilities in China always have departments for both (Western and traditional medicine).

Statistical analysis and explanatory variables
The first phase of the analysis included the elements of central tendency statistics, which allowed describing the evolution of health care
use from 1989 to 2004, providing a general picture of changes that have occurred over the years. Multivariate logistic regression analysis was performed on the most recent data available (2004), as a second phase of the analysis, in order to examine the factors affecting the choice of health care facility used (clinics or hospitals) by Han and by minority people. The dependent variable (clinic=1/hospital=2) was regressed on the 17 predictor variables. The analytical framework presented in figure 5.4 was used for the analysis. The independent variables belonged to three categories: health delivery system characteristics (travel time, travel cost, waiting time, service charge, availability of drugs, qualified doctor and travel method), population characteristics (age, gender, marital status, education, health insurance, per capita income and ethnicity) and location characteristics (sector and region). The ethnicity variable is a dichotomous variable (Han=0, and minority=1).

A logistic multiple regression analysis was applied in order to study the relationship between several independent explanatory variables and the dependent choice variable, as well as to identify the individual effects that each of the predictors have on the dependent variable. Binomial logistic regression by default predicts the higher of the two categories of the dependent (hospital), using the lower (clinic) as the reference category. The independent predictor variables were entered in 1
model (block) using the ‘enter’ method. Three regressions were performed: one for Han, a second for minorities and a third for the total population with ethnicity as an independent variable. The availability of health care was defined by the number of health care facilities per capita in the province of residence of the household. All analysis was conducted using SPSS v.16.

5.6 Results and discussion

Use of health care facilities
From figure 5.5 we can see a clear change in the health care seeking behaviour of the Chinese population over the 15 years from 1989 to 2004, which is particularly pronounced in rural areas. While in 1989, 70 per cent of the population chose hospitals, only 42.5 per cent did so in 2004. This decrease in the use of hospitals was compensated by the increase in the use of clinics. Clinics became considerably more popular over the same period of time. In 1989, less than one third of the population used clinics in rural areas, in 2004 however, almost 60 per cent relied on their services. Similar tendencies can be observed in urban areas where hospital use decreased by almost 15 per cent, from 77.4 per cent to 65.1 per
cent, while the use of clinics saw an increase, although not as pronounced as in rural areas, from 22.6 per cent to 34.9 per cent.

**Figure 5.5** Use of health clinics and hospitals in urban-rural areas and by Han (H) and minorities (M)


Figure 5.5 also presents the patterns of health care use for Han and minorities. Although the tendencies in health-seeking behaviour are the same as for the total population, the change is much more pronounced among minorities. The use of hospitals declined by over 40 per cent among minorities, while for the Han it declined by 20 per cent. The use of clinics by minorities increased from 16.8 per cent to 59.8 per cent, while for the Han is increased once again only by 20 per cent. In 2004, hospitals and clinics were equally as popular for Han people, while for minorities clinics were preferred. There are substantial differences between the Han and minorities in the use of hospitals and clinics in different provinces (see figure 5.6). For instance, the rates of hospital use are much higher for Han people than for minorities in all provinces except Henan. The use of clinics, on the other hand is much higher among minorities and particularly high in Guizhou (western province) and in Henan.

Our descriptive findings confirm the decline in the use of hospitals between 1989 and 2004 compensated by an improved access to clinics. A previous study by Akin et al. (2005) reached the same conclusions, explaining this decline as being a result of the differences in policy and financing sources for these types of facilities. Due to a government-imposed price regulation system publicly owned hospitals have poor revenue-generating capacity unless they earn profits from the use of new drugs, tests and high-tech care, keeping hospital charges high. In rural areas, however, it is estimated that one third of drugs dispensed are counterfeit, which simultaneously keeps charges low and profits high (Mao 2006). What factors have influenced the choices of Han people and minorities switching from hospital to clinic care? Is it the demographic, financial or geographic factors that play the most important role in choosing a health care facility? In order to answer these ques-
tions we performed a logistic regression analysis to find out the main determinants of choice.

Factors affecting the choice of facilities

The results of the logistic regression are presented in table 5.1. The model including the ethnicity as a variable predicts the choice in 80.5 per cent of cases, which shows a fairly good predictability of a model. The pseudo R squares are also relatively high (Cox and Snell=.410 and Nagelkerke=.547). Cox and Snell’s $R^2$ is an attempt to imitate the interpretation of multiple R-Square, but its maximum can be (and usually is) less than 1.0, making it difficult to interpret. Nagelkerke’s $R^2$, on the other hand, is a modification of the Cox and Snell coefficient to assure that it can vary from 0 to 1. Therefore Nagelkerke’s $R^2$ is usually higher than the Cox and Snell measure.

We can see that the most important factor explaining the choice of health care facility is the method of travel. Those who take a taxi or a bus are 15.2 times and 11.5 times, respectively, more likely to go to hospitals than those who walk to get care. People who bike or drive to the facilities are also more likely to choose hospitals, but the odds ratio is not as strong (3.7 and 3.1). Patients relying on such expensive methods
of transportation as taxis are most likely in need of more urgent or specialised care that is not offered by clinics.

Availability of services is another important predictor of choosing hospitals. In provinces with denser infrastructure people are 4.6 times more likely to choose hospitals. Patients belonging to minority groups are less likely to choose hospitals (B(exp)=.571). This is not surprising, because minorities tend to live in rural and remote locations where hospitals are less accessible than clinics. Also, they tend to be poorer and less educated than Han people, which make them more prone to use

### Table 5.1 Logistic regression results for factors affecting the choice of facilities in 2004

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<td>.410</td>
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<td>.555</td>
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<td>1.813***</td>
<td>1.724**</td>
<td>2.505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical/vocational (4)</td>
<td>3.772***</td>
<td>3.071***</td>
<td>9.488**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College/university (5)</td>
<td>2.701***</td>
<td>2.155**</td>
<td>18.178***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Insurance</td>
<td>.660***</td>
<td>.730**</td>
<td>.189***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>.952</td>
<td>.876</td>
<td>1.459</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region (Western-ref)</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern (1)</td>
<td>.309***</td>
<td>.237***</td>
<td>1.209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central (2)</td>
<td>-.511***</td>
<td>-.421***</td>
<td>.609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel time</td>
<td>1.085***</td>
<td>1.094***</td>
<td>1.051**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel cost</td>
<td>.988</td>
<td>.987</td>
<td>1.409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waiting time</td>
<td>1.057***</td>
<td>1.048***</td>
<td>1.133***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service charges</td>
<td>1.015***</td>
<td>1.016***</td>
<td>1.015**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per capita income</td>
<td>1.000***</td>
<td>1.000***</td>
<td>1.000***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qualified doctor</td>
<td>2.086***</td>
<td>2.094***</td>
<td>1.671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Availability of drugs</td>
<td>2.864***</td>
<td>1.514***</td>
<td>3.088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel method (walk-ref)</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bike (1)</td>
<td>3.719***</td>
<td>3.848***</td>
<td>3.028**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bus (2)</td>
<td>11.477***</td>
<td>19.441***</td>
<td>3.505*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Car (3)</td>
<td>3.130***</td>
<td>3.492***</td>
<td>1.056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxi (4)</td>
<td>15.150***</td>
<td>12.547***</td>
<td>2.736E9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>4.610***</td>
<td>3.905***</td>
<td>3.692</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority</td>
<td>.571***</td>
<td>.571***</td>
<td>.571***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of cases predicted</td>
<td>80.5</td>
<td>80.8</td>
<td>83.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** Significant at p=0.01, **significant at p=0.05, * significant at p=0.1.
services that are less expensive without allocating much weight to the quality differences between the types of facilities.

Insured patients are less likely to go to the hospitals than uninsured \((B(\exp)=0.660)\). Availability of health insurance thus reduces the chances of a person preferring a hospital over clinic. On the other hand, the availability of drugs at the facility and the availability of a qualified doctor trained in Western medicine increases the chance of going to a hospital \((B(\exp)=2.860\) and 2.864 respectively). Clinics and hospitals in China vary greatly in terms of quality. The size of facilities and the services offered differs considerably between facilities, with clinics usually being very small and offering only a small variety of services. While urban hospitals have on average 128.5 beds and 170.4 employees, rural hospitals have only 16.1 beds and 24.8 staff members (China Statistical Yearbook 2005). In 2004, the urban-rural ratio in hospital beds per 10,000 of population was 2.2 and 2 in health care personnel employed (China Statistical Yearbook 2005). Not only are there two times fewer medical professionals in rural areas, but the quality of their training is also considerably lower in the under-developed poor areas (Eggleston et al. 2005; Meng 2007). In 2003 the majority of village doctors (70 per cent) did not have any formal medical education and had received about half a week of training (Eggleston et al. 2008). As a result, in under-developed areas, patients’ level of education is a critical predictor of the quality of health care services that patients receive, because those who are aware of quality differences ‘substitute the benefits of choice for the inconvenience of a longer journey’ (Haynes, Lovett and Suennenberg 2003: 1733). Consequently, in terms of education, we can see a clear pattern. Although not all of the categories are significantly related to the choice of a health care facility, the variable itself is significant. Patients with higher education are more likely to go to hospitals, particularly those with technical and vocational education. They are 3.7 times more likely to choose hospitals. With each additional level of education obtained by an individual, the probability of going to a hospital increases. Interestingly, the residents of the central and eastern regions are less likely to choose hospitals as compared to the residents of the west of China. This can be explained by the better quality of clinics in these regions due to a higher level of economic development. The quality gap between the hospitals and clinics is substantially smaller in the more developed provinces; for this reason people prefer to use clinics and avoid the higher charges in hospitals for the same types of services.

Marital status, location of residence (urban or rural) and travel cost were not significantly related to the dependent variable. Waiting time, service charges and per capita household income were significantly related but did not have any influence on the dependent variable since their odds ratios \((B(\exp))\) were very close to zero.
Overall, we found that travel method, greater availability of facilities, referral, very high education and female gender increased the probability of choosing hospitals over clinics. Lower education, availability of insurance, central and eastern region, availability of western doctor at the facility and availability of needed drugs as well as minority status reduced the chance of choosing hospitals.

**Han vs. minorities**

Both models for Han and for minority people show an important relation between the dependent and independent variables. The Han model predicts the facility of choice in 80.8 per cent of cases, while the minority model performs even better, predicting correctly in 83.1 per cent of the time. There are important differences in factors affecting the choice of a health care facility between the Han and minority population of China (see the results of the logistic regressions in table 5.1). First of all, demographic characteristics of minorities, such as being female or being married are significantly related to the choice of facility, favouring the choice of hospitals by approximately three to four times. For Han people, however, the demographic factors are not significant. It is also possible that in traditional rural settings, where minorities mostly reside, gender and marital status differences are still a lot more important than in modern egalitarian urban areas, where the Han mostly reside. Also, while minority men can avoid using costly hospital care for financial reasons, pregnant women or women with children have less of a choice. Clinics offer only a very limited range of services, so they have to go to hospitals.

Another very important difference between Han and minority people is the role of education in the decision-making process. We noted that education overall did not play a role in the choice of a facility for minorities, while in the case of Han people it is the second most important factor. Interestingly, minorities with education above the nine-year compulsory level are significantly more likely to choose hospitals that are higher-level facilities with a larger range of services offered as opposed to clinics. This is related to the fact that in general minorities tend to have considerably lower levels of education than those of the Han population. Cao (2008) has found that girls’ non-schooling rates in the government designated minority-poverty counties of Gansu province reached nearly 70 per cent, which is four times higher than in non-minority counties. Li, Luo and de Klerk (2008) found that literacy was a strong predictor of the use of antenatal examination, immunisations, hospital delivery and infant/child mortality rates. Differences in educational attainments between Han and minorities exacerbate existing social and economic divides, creating ‘inequality traps,’ where disadvantages in education among minorities result in lower earning power and
thus lower access to good quality social services such as hospitals. Some existing literature reveals health care accessibility issues among minorities (Li, Luo and de Klerk 2008), but this has not been well documented from a geographical perspective. Partly it is related to the geographic segregation of minorities, who occupy the predominantly western provinces and remote locations where they outnumber the Han population. The region of residence is very important for the Han, but not a significant predictor for minorities, most likely because they are located in particular counties of only a few provinces. In fact, the concentration of ethnic minorities in particular areas reflects not only their spatial segregation, but also their degree of socio-economic exclusion from the majority.

Another interesting difference is the importance of the travel method. It is one of the most significant factors affecting the decision making of the Han people and for the population in total, but somehow it is not important for minorities. In rural western areas where the majority of minorities reside there is simply no choice in terms of transportation methods. Patients mostly walk or bike to the health care facility, reducing the importance of this variable for minorities. Also, the availability of infrastructure is not a statistically significant predictor of facility choice. Minorities tend to live in rural and remote locations, where there might simply be no choice, which would explain the lack of significance for this variable.

**Income and choice of health care**

A number of studies (Eggleston 2008; Hougaard, Osterdal and Yu 2008) report substantial decreases in service use as a result of increases in service charges over the last few decades. Using the multivariate analysis, surprisingly, we found no significant influence of per capita income on the choice of health care facility either for Han or for minorities. We would expect higher income to have a positive relation to the choice of hospitals, since hospitals are generally more expensive but tend to provide better quality of service. However, we see no such trends. It is possible that relative income would be a better indicator of choice, since the same income may enable either higher or lower standards of living depending on the community in question (Hendryx et al. 2002).

Since regression results present the partial correlation coefficients it is possible that the role of per capita income, although undoubtedly important, is relatively less important compared to the role of the region where the income is earned. Unbalanced development and pronounced regional disparities are such a prominent phenomenon in China that everything becomes a function of a region and urban-rural sector of residence. For example, Han people living in the economically developed
eastern region are almost 4.5 times more likely to use hospitals than Han residents of the western region that lags behind economically. In the case of minorities, region does not play a role, because such eastern provinces as Jiangsu or Shandong have essentially no ethnic minority populations.

The link between price and demand for health care has been widely documented (Shengelia et al. 2005; Strombom, Buchmueller and Feldstein 2002). Generally, utilisation of medical care tends to decrease with an increase in price of services. Due to a rapid health care inflation triggered by the economic and health care reforms, the share of out-of-pocket expenses paid by the patients has been increasing steadily from 16 per cent of overall health care expenditures in 1980, to 38 per cent in 1988, and to 61 per cent in 2001 (Zhang and Kanbur 2005). Higher costs can be partially explained by general inflation and an aging population. However, the outcomes of hospital financial reforms, such as abusive usage of more expensive high-technology and over prescription of drugs and services, accounts for a progressively larger share of personal health care costs (Liu and Hsiao 1995; Wong, Tang, and Lo 2007). Almost all public hospitals in China require an initial cash deposit when seeking medical treatment, which poor minorities cannot afford thus creating an obstacle to getting medical treatment. Moreover, Liu (2004) found that on average, 45 per cent of discharges from inpatient care in rural areas are initiated against medical advice and in almost 80 per cent of cases for financial reasons. In fact, another study by Liu et al. (2007) reported that in 2003 physician visits were lower in poor less-developed regions (central and western China) and only 43 per cent of respondents saw a doctor when they were ill, while 32.2 per cent relied on self-treatment and 15.8 per cent had no treatment at all. Analysing the Chinese Ministry of Health 2003 data, Hougaard (2008) found that the ratio between people who reported illnesses but did not seek formal care for financial reasons increased from 36.4 per cent in 1993 to 48.9 per cent in 2003 and was particularly high in low-income rural areas (63.7 per cent in 1998 and 75.4 per cent in 2003). People rely on self-treatment or ignore health issues for as long as they can, in the hope of avoiding related medical expenses. Although the health-related charges are lower in less developed areas, such as in the west of the country, they nonetheless place a comparatively heavier burden on the shoulders of the western rural minority residents. Mao (2006) concluded that in 2003 the average hospital admission fee was equivalent to 27.9 per cent of the average per capita urban wage, while such a fee averaged 149.1 per cent of the average rural wage.

Health insurance is yet another finance-related factor that greatly affects the choice of type of facility used, not only for minorities but also for the majority Han population and for the total population. While
some studies found that the lack of health care coverage prevents people from getting needed medical care (Zhao 2006), others suggest that the availability of coverage encourages people to seek care when sick and to seek care from higher-level providers, in turn increasing the risk of high and catastrophic spending (Wagstaff and Lindelow 2008). Our results however show the opposite: insured patients are less likely to use hospitals. This might be explained by the fact that the majority of people in China who purchase insurance coverage are sick and are predisposed to having higher-than-average out-of-pocket payments. Since only part of total health expenses is covered by insurance, people might prefer to use less expensive facilities, thus lowering the overall expenditures. While health insurance is often cited in access literature as a policy instrument with a capacity to improve the use of health services rendering the access to health care more equitable (Ding and Zhu 2007), we should keep in mind that insurance schemes vary. Health insurance schemes in rural areas are largely (80 per cent) funded by personal contributions, while urban residents are required to contribute considerably smaller shares ranging from 0 to 25 per cent depending on the type of sector in which they are employed (Gao et al. 2002).

5.7 Conclusion

This study examined the use of health care facilities over a 15 year-period from 1989 to 2004 and evaluated the factors affecting the choice for a certain type of facility, with a particular emphasis on examining the differences in the patterns of use and the choice of facilities between the majority Han and minority populations. We found substantial differences not only in the patterns of use of clinics and hospitals by Han and minority people, but also in the factors determining the choice of the facility to use. Over the 15-year-period there was a pronounced decline in the use of hospitals between compensated by an improved access to clinics. The shift from hospitals to clinics is particularly noticeable among minorities that increased from 16.8 per cent to 59.8 per cent, while for Han is increased once again only by 20 per cent. The main factors affecting the choice of health care facility used for the general population are: the method of travel, the highest level of education completed, density of infrastructure, availability of needed medicines at the facility and of qualified doctor trained in western medicine. While for Han people these factors are the same, for minorities demographic factors such as gender and marital status play a considerably more influential role. It is important to underline that important majority-minority differences in the use of facilities exist. Minorities are doubly disadvantaged because they tend to live far from high quality hospitals.
addition they also have lower educational attainment and financial resources, which eliminates the option of choice of health care type, obliging them to rely on local lower-quality clinics. As a result of differences in access, life expectancy is considerably lower among minority groups as compared to the majority Han population. Infant and maternal mortality rates as well as the incidence of infectious diseases are much higher in minority areas. For instance, in 2000 the national maternal mortality rate was 53 per 100,000, while in the Tibet and Xinjiang Uigur Autonomous Regions it was 466.3 and 161.4 respectively (Human Rights China 2008). Life expectancy is also considerably lower in regions with high minority proportions. Future research should look more closely into factors affecting the choice of facility used by Han people and by minorities including a more exhaustive list of independent variables that were not included here for reasons of data limitations. In addition, policy must target minority areas, in order to eliminate or at least lower the disparities in choice of health care between the Han and ethnic minority populations, which coupled with differences in other social services and economic opportunities contribute to rising tensions.
6 Accessibility of Health Care for Pastoralists in the Tibetan Plateau Region: A Case Study from Southern Qinghai Province, China

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6.1 Introduction

According to China’s 2000 census, there are 5,416,021 Tibetan people in China, most of whom live in the Tibetan plateau region (which includes a large portion of Qinghai Province, the geographic focus of this chapter). The Tibetan plateau region covers 25 per cent of China’s total land area, i.e. around 2.5 million square kilometres. Approximately 45 per cent of the Tibetan population subsists on farming, while a further 40 per cent are nomadic or semi-nomadic (practicing animal husbandry). Only 15 per cent of the population reside in urban areas (Zhang and Zhu 2002). The harsh climate, an average altitude over 4,000 metres, rugged mountainous terrain and lack of infrastructure in vast parts of the plateau are all adverse factors that have contributed to the isolation of the region, as well as to the difficult socio-economic and physical living conditions that affect the majority of the population.

The organisation and development of health care provision in rural China has been going through a difficult period of transition since the early 1980s, particularly with the onset of major economic reforms and a parallel decline of the nation-wide Cooperative Medical System (CMS) (Foggin and Foggin 2006). Most notably, since the end of the communes, many minimally trained primary health care workers either disappeared due to lack of public funding (usually going back to their agricultural work) or re-established themselves as private doctors supported by the sale of medicines, often over-prescribed (for obvious financial reasons) (Wu 2001). With this economic transition came increasing inequities in health care (Gao et al. 2002). Recognising the emerging dilemmas of providing adequate health care for its rural populations, the central government recently established what has come to be known as the New Cooperative Medical Scheme (NCMS) for rural areas (World

However, notwithstanding these developments, health and health care on the Tibetan Plateau are among the poorest in China (table 6.1). In this vast and sparsely populated region there is a high incidence of diseases, in some areas resulting from malnutrition, and generally a significant lack of medical infrastructure and basic health education. International health organisations and the central government have often failed to report meaningfully on the statistical disparities in health that exist between the wealthier and more densely populated regions of eastern China and the remoter areas of western China, including the Tibetan Plateau region. However, the *China Development Report 2005* (UNDP 2005) is especially enlightening in this regard. In this document, human development indices (HDI) are reported for each province separately, and for urban versus rural areas within each province (see table 6.1). For example, life expectancy (one of the three criteria of the HDI) is greatly conditioned by infant mortality rates. It is in fact believed that Tibet may have amongst the highest newborn and infant mortality rates in the world. According to some reports, Tibetan women are three hundred times more likely to die than women in developed countries from various pregnancy- and delivery-related complications. Infant mortality rates are reported at close to 100 per 1,000 live births, and maternal mortality is in the range of 200 per 100,000, approximately three times higher than the average for all of China. Postpartum haemorrhage may be the leading cause of death. Furthermore, when a mother dies, her surviving children are three to ten times more likely to die within two years, and her surviving children are more likely to die young and less

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province / Region</th>
<th>HDI (rank, of 31 province-level entities)</th>
<th>Life expectancy (male, female)</th>
<th>Adult literacy rates</th>
<th>Per capita GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>0.943</td>
<td>82.0</td>
<td>99.0 %</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai</td>
<td>0.909 (1st)</td>
<td>79.0 (77.1, 81.0)</td>
<td>94.1 %</td>
<td>46,718 CNY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beijing</td>
<td>0.882 (2nd)</td>
<td>76.8 (75.1, 78.8)</td>
<td>95.4 %</td>
<td>32,061 CNY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>0.778</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>92.6 %</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China average</td>
<td>0.746</td>
<td>71.4 (69.6, 73.3)</td>
<td>89.0 %</td>
<td>9,101 CNY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>0.704</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>90.3 %</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qinghai</td>
<td>0.684 (27th)</td>
<td>68.8 (67.3, 70.4)</td>
<td>76.6 %</td>
<td>7,277 CNY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>0.602</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>61.0 %</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qinghai (rural)</td>
<td>0.599</td>
<td>65.8 (64.3, 67.4)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>3,712 CNY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tibet (A.R.)</td>
<td>0.586 (31st)</td>
<td>65.8 (64.2, 67.4)</td>
<td>45.1 %</td>
<td>6,871 CNY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>0.578</td>
<td>60.2</td>
<td>89.7 %</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>0.526</td>
<td>61.6</td>
<td>48.6 %</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from the *China Human Development Report*, UNDP 2005
likely to attend school or complete their education. No official data on morbidity and mortality exist for the Tibetan Plateau region as a whole.

Tibetan society is one of the few in the world where a tradition of trained birth attendants does not exist. Poor nutrition, lack of trained health personnel, long travel distances and limited access to emergency care place Tibetan women and infants at high risk of birth-related deaths. The vast majority of births take place at high altitude, in a cold environment and without access to electricity or health care. In spite of active campaigns by the government to encourage women to give birth in a medical facility, more than 95 per cent of Tibetan women still give birth at home. Most babies are delivered with the help only of the woman’s mother or mother-in-law whose assistance is primarily limited to cutting the umbilical cord. Many Tibetan women deliver their babies completely on their own (Dang et al. 2004).

In addition to diarrhoea, arthritis and pneumonia, which vary in prevalence throughout the geographic area, it is also reported that the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) has the highest rate of tuberculosis in China, and one of the highest incidences in the world of the rare Kashin-Beck (Big Bone) disease, which causes deformities and stunted growth. Beijing’s economic development strategy for the western regions of China, including the TAR and Qinghai province, tends to focus on large-scale infrastructure projects, such as roads, railways and power stations, while often neglecting ‘soft’ infrastructure such as the provision of health care and education. Adequate and affordable health care is still not available to the majority of Tibetans.

On a global scale, there are an estimated 600,000 pregnancy-related maternal deaths worldwide each year and 99 per cent of these occur in developing countries (Okonofua 2006). This translates to a worldwide mortality rate of slightly more than one mother dying every minute. Twenty-four percent of those deaths occur prior to labour, 15 per cent during labour, and the majority (61 per cent) happening in the first week after delivery. As Hackett has pointed out, the two most effective means of reducing maternal death in developing countries are (1) the presence of a skilled birth attendant at the delivery, and (2) timely access to emergency obstetrical care. Over half of maternal deaths are due to severe bleeding, infection or obstructed labour (Hackett 2004). Improving maternal and child health is therefore essential to helping to preserve the health of the Tibetan people.

The present day organisation of health care in rural areas of Qinghai province, and much of western China, is hierarchical: county hospital – township health centres – local clinics – village doctors. This in some ways resembles the CMS as it existed in the early days of the ‘barefoot doctor’ medical system; the main difference of course being that previously there was a ‘safety net’ for all. Now each family must indepen-
dently assume most of the expenses for health care (more on recent attempts to introduce health insurance follows below). At the local level, village health centres (clinics) are served by village doctors (mostly men) who usually have between three to six months of training often after only several years of schooling, plus possibly two to three weeks of in-service training per year. Township clinics reportedly have approximately ten beds and are directed by a doctor who has had three years of training following secondary education. The doctor may share responsibility with other colleagues of the same level, as well as being assisted by village doctors (Tang and Bloom 2001). In some areas, at the township level one can find preventive health care programmes, centres for mother-and-child health (MCH), as well as family planning stations (Shu and Yao 1997). Township level provision may be much less than this in the more sparsely populated areas on the Tibetan Plateau. In county seats – there are 40 counties or districts in Qinghai, 71 in the TAR (Li 1987: 200, 205), out of a total of 2,182 for all of China – are small to mid-size hospitals, most with MCH programmes, as well as Centres for Disease Control and a variety of privately-operated clinics (Foggin and Foggin 2006). County hospitals have better trained doctors (with four to five years of formal training), assisted by support staff including nurses and technicians.

The goal of the 2002 reform with the creation of vast numbers of new cooperative medical centres (NCMS) was to make health care accessible to the entire rural population by the year 2008. Currently clinics are rapidly being built in many remote areas and these allow the administration of government health insurance schemes. There are therefore some steps being taken to improve the health care system in China, and while the goal has not been met entirely, still a significant proportion of herding communities in the project area now have a village-level clinic within reach (e.g., more than half of the villages in the western district of Zhiduo county now have local clinics, each staffed by at least one doctor, and sometimes also by one or two women’s health workers). It is against this regional backdrop, described above, that we now will focus attention on a specific area, a large administrative area near the centre of the Tibetan Plateau, Zhiduo County in Yushu Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Qinghai Province (see figures 6.1 and 6.2).

According to official sources the population of Zhiduo County in 2000 was 24,194 people, in 5,202 families (Ju 2002; Zhang and Zhu 2002; Zheng and Li 2004). Ninety-eight per cent of the people are Kham Tibetan, and around 90 per cent are pastoralists. Altogether there are over 475,800 head of livestock in the county, mostly sheep and yak (over 1 million ‘sheep-units’). Even when the western uninhabited region of the county is excluded (an extensive area of alpine desert steppe administered by the Forest Bureau as the Kekexili Nature
Reserve), the average population density still amounts to only 0.57 people/km². Throughout the Tibetan region, the traditional way of life – nomadic pastoralism, or livestock herding with seasonal mobility – has been developed over hundreds of years and Tibetan herders have acquired an intricate knowledge of their natural environment (Jones 1996; Khazanov 1984). A wide variety of livestock and rangeland management practices have enabled them to survive in the extremely harsh

**Figure 6.1 Location of Zhiduo county in People’s Republic of China**

![Map of Tibet showing Zhiduo County and surrounding regions.](source)

**Figure 6.2 Map of Zhiduo county**

![Detailed map of Zhiduo county with geographical features and legend.](source)
environment, including seasonal mobility of their livestock herds and a flexible, opportunistic approach (i.e., turning potential obstacles to their advantage) to many aspects of their pastoral livelihood (Foggin 2000). Today, however, the level of socio-economic development in most Tibetan areas of China remains exceptionally low. Among pastoralists in Qinghai Province, around 65 per cent of men and 95 per cent of women are functionally illiterate. Until recently few children had access to even basic education. With poor road conditions and limited access to vehicles, the sale of livestock products and hence opportunity for economic development also has long been restricted (Foggin 2006). Limited access to information – itself tied closely to education and literacy, and to health – equally means that what economic opportunities might be available to local herders are often missed, or that the herders are cheated by outside merchants because of their low level of literacy or numeracy. As stated above with regard to the Tibetan Plateau region as a whole, in Zhiduo County people’s health also remains cause for serious concern, with high levels of infant mortality and limited (but improving) access to health care services. As in many rural areas of western China, people may call on a village health worker who has limited formal training; there are no traditional midwives; nearly all health workers are men; and local women have virtually no monitoring in pregnancy. If serious problems arise, it may take several days for transport to be found to reach the county hospital, and many people still cannot afford the hospital care when they arrive (Foggin et al. 2006).

6.2 Proposed interventions

In 2003 the five-year Yangtze Headwaters Sustainable Development Project (2003-2008) was launched by Plateau Perspectives, an international non-profit organisation, in collaboration with the Zhiduo County Health Bureau and the grassroots NGO, Upper Yangtze Organization. In this specific local context, local communities and the county health bureau have sought Plateau Perspectives’ assistance in the following plan which has shown promising potential in the first few years of implementation (2004-2007). The same model is also being requested and applied now in other counties of the same prefecture.

**Village doctor training**

Given the trust in the local doctors in the context of at least parts of Yushu prefecture (Zhiduo in one of Yushu prefecture’s six counties), one clear way forward is to train the village doctors to diagnose and treat common conditions and to have a good understanding of medi-
cines (including their side effects) in order to improve health care and avoid inappropriate use of medication.

The training also includes:
- Methodologies to help enable communities to seek ways to improve their health;
- Disease prevention targeting the commonest illnesses, the most serious preventable diseases and the uptake of immunizations;
- Training in immunization, includes the development of a good understanding of their purpose, their administration and the cold chain;
- Woman and child health including the early detection and management of problems in pregnancy and delivery.

Given the large number of households who have recently contacted their village doctor (which indicates that some do have access to, and use, the services of the local doctor), the main starting point for training purposes needs to be these doctors whom they see on a regular basis. As many of these doctors do have experience assisting women in delivery and pregnancy, it is important that they receive further training to improve the quality of their care and allow them to detect difficulties early. However as they are men, in the framework of strict (limited) gender relations within the Tibetan nomad cultural context they tend only to be called upon if problems arise, and this almost always later on in the process. Women express a desire for female health care workers to assist in pregnancy.

Training of women's health workers
Furthermore, in response to a request from the county health bureau, young women were gathered from every village to come for training in women's health work (around 25 women in Zhiduo county and 15 women in Zaduo county). The training modules were given by two doctors and a midwife. The students enjoyed the course, participated well (e.g., writing health songs and engaging in role play) and made considerable progress in terms of knowledge and skills gained over the course of the two-week teaching workshops. Some of these women were invited to the village meetings (usually only attended by men) to give training in health and hygiene. Further training of these women's health workers has been requested and there is still a great need to train some women to a higher level of competence. However the women who have been trained will be the vanguard of a new kind of health worker in the county, perhaps more attuned to the needs of MCH, and particularly of women in general.
Establishment of village clinics and the introduction of a health insurance scheme

When the initial request came to assist in the construction of clinics, the first main question asked was how this would improve the health of the community or even the quality of health provision. However both the community leaders and the health bureau leaders put forward strong arguments:

1. The health bureau leader explained that for most people and for most conditions, the county hospital and township clinics were inaccessible. The most accessible level is that of the higher village level (dadui). Here local leaders appoint the best trained doctor from each area, and pay him a salary such that he could always be available. With the construction of a clinic building the health bureau would be able to administer a government health insurance scheme. They would also be able to store, administer and keep track of medicines. It should be noted that, currently, many local village doctors give out medicine from their own pocket, given the fact that the patients are either close friends or relatives and, consequently, it is difficult to ask for payment. A well-organised local clinic should enable them to overcome this problem.

2. The community leaders agreed with the above and added that the clinics would provide a centre for the community. They also offered that a village committee would organise the purchase and selling of medicine so that the doctor’s prescribing practices would be unaffected by this. The doctor would have no direct personal gain from the sale of medicine. The clinic could also provide beds for the more seriously ill who had travelled further from home.

3. In addition to this, the administration of immunizations has been made possible from these centres.

The health bureau and the village (dadui) communities have consistently appointed the best doctors from the training courses. They have continued to run these clinics in such a way as to leave the doctors free to see patients. Furthermore, some of the communities have set the women’s health workers up within these clinics such that they can go out to work from these health centres, while having back-up and support from the village doctors. These clinics have proved more successful than even Plateau Perspectives predicted. With such community support behind them and with the backing of the health bureau, the clinics are being run well. By adding a very small increase to the price of medicine (to pay for the transport of the medicine and the operating costs of the clinic) village leaders are running the clinics at no loss and utilisation rates are high. Many of the village doctors are highly motivated and
very invested in improving the health of the people who come from the community.

6.3 Conclusion

Based on the experiences described above we believe that the construction of clinics, after the training of the village doctors and women’s health workers to staff them, may indeed provide improved accessible health care provision for people in the remote areas. The success does however depend on the support, enthusiasm and participation of the communities as well as the health bureau and government to ensure that the village clinics are sustainable and of good quality. To improve the outlook for pregnant women, and reduce the rates of postpartum haemorrhage and maternal death as well as infant loss, the doctor and women’s health worker training courses also require specific instruction in the assistance of women in pregnancy through the postpartum period. This training needs to include discussion with the women and with local doctors about how best to reach the women, to listen to their needs, and to improve their understanding of their specific health care needs in pregnancy and for early infant care. Discussions with older and younger women, including those who have had children, are needed to guide in the development of the training programme. Ideally these same individuals should be involved in the hands-on teaching process. A system of ongoing medical update training also needs to be agreed upon to ensure that the standard of care can be maintained.

Such a plan can provide very accessible and inexpensive health care, without the use of new, large and ongoing financial inputs such as might have to be used in towns or cities for an equivalent level of service provision (Foggin 2008). Provided this type of training is maintained at a high level, and the candidates from the communities are well selected, conscientious and highly motivated, the quality of such health care delivery should and can be of the highest calibre.
7 Dealing with Urban Ethnic Differences: 
A Comparative Analysis of Chinese and Canadian Strategies

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7.1 Introduction

The management of urban ethnic differences has become a topical and passionate subject, with the Canadian and Chinese experiences being no exception. Since the inception of Canada’s multicultural policies in the early 1970s, there has been much written, domestically and abroad, about the nation’s changing social dynamics as a result of the growing ethnic minority population, and the practice of multiculturalism as social policy. In many respects, Canada has become a prominent leader in promoting multiculturalism in a programmatic manner, by designing specific, constitutionally protected policies to manage ethnic differences.

With almost half of its current 4,638,615 population (Statistics Canada 2005) coming from various ethnic minority groups, Toronto has become one of the most visible, multi-ethnic urban communities in Canada and the world. Spurned by vast post-Second World War immigration from Europe, the Caribbean, Latin America and Asia, the city now encompasses numerous distinct ethnic enclaves and economies, the Italian, Greek, Chinese and Portuguese being the most famous and largest. Toronto has attempted to promote ethnic differences through a variety of local social policies, which are supported and reinforced by federal and provincial efforts, as evident in the city’s Social Development Strategy (2001) and Economic Development Strategy (2000); financial support for annual festivals and cultural events such as Caribana or Turkish, Filipino and like-oriented, ethno-cultural summer festivals; and through its international and inter-provincial marketing efforts to promote the city’s ethnic diversity to lure tourists and potential migrants. It is thus not surprising that Toronto’s conduct in managing ethnic difference is often cited as exemplary and a model for other urban centres (UNDP 2004).

When it comes to ethnic difference in China the discussion is often directed towards the nation’s underdeveloped, bordering Western pro-
vinces, where three-quarters of the 106.43 million ethnic minority population resides (NBS/EAC 2003). Little has been written in either English or Chinese literature about China’s growing ethnic minority population in the relatively developed urban centres such as Beijing. Ethnic minority management in China is operated by a cocktail of Central government decrees, social policy protections and local attempts to promote ethnic minority culture such as festivals, food, sport or dance in the mainstream. In Beijing, a megalopolis with a population of nearly 13.57 million legal residents in 2000 (Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau 2005), local officials have stressed a loud confidence that the municipality promotes and respects the religious affairs, education, culture and sport of ethnic minority groups. In fact, officials from the Beijing Municipal Commission of Ethnic Affairs point to the Muslim population – comprised of approximately 300,000 people spanning 10 ethnic groups, including the Hui, Uyghur, Uzbek and Kazak – who practice their religion in the city’s 80-odd mosques, as a successful case study in managing ethnic difference (Hasmath 2007).

Given this rosy reality, discussion on the management of ethnic difference in the relatively developed urban spaces of China is not necessary according to the Central government. Yet, despite long-standing efforts to integrate ethnic minorities, Beijing has had a deep history of strained ethnic relations and tensions, rather than a Confucian-inspired, Socialist vision of harmony in ethnic interactions (Mittenthal 2002; Mackerras 1994). For example, the separatist activities during the 1990s in Tibet and Xinjiang trickled down to the streets of Beijing, where severe crackdowns on Tibetan and Uyghur activities occurred. During the period of former Deng Xiaoping’s State funeral (February 1997), bus bombings in Beijing signalled Uyghur contempt for the Chinese state (Rudelson and Jankowiak 2004; Mackerras 2001). In local government circles, ethnic minority community associations are often perceived as malicious and suspected of encouraging the drug trade or inciting “rebellious activities”. As recent as March 2008, there were “unauthorized” sit-ins by Tibetans at the Central University for Nationalities aimed to express their solidarity and support for improved “cultural freedoms” and development for Tibetans in the Tibet Autonomous Region and elsewhere in China – a call that has often fallen under deaf ears by the central government for decades (See Hasmath and Hsu 2007). While the integration of ethnic minorities into the urban milieu is a matter of great importance for Beijing’s development, suffice it to say, such integration is conducted against a background of often tense ethnic relations.

This chapter will examine the Canadian and Chinese strategies for managing urban ethnic differences, viz. its manifestation on the ground in Toronto and Beijing. First, it will detail exactly what is meant by eth-
nicity in the context of both nations, as the logic of ethnicity is fairly distinct in each jurisdiction. This will be followed by a discussion of ethnic minority development in Toronto and then in Beijing. Throughout this chapter it will become evident, due to contrasting historical, political and social experiences dealing with ethnic minority groups in Canada and China, strategies for managing ethnic differences in Toronto and Beijing have been construed differently.

7.2 Ethnicity: The Canadian and Chinese perspectives

Ethnicity describes the cultural, psychological and social characteristics of a population, as distinct from physical characteristics (Bolaffi et al. 2003: 94). Although innumerable theories of ethnicity have been developed (Thompson 1989), including primordialist theory (Geertz 1973: 260; Shils 1957); modernisation theory (Hettne 1996: 15); neo-Marxist or a class approach to ethnicity – including class segmentation (Reich et al. 1973); split-labour markets (Bonacich 1972); internal colonialism (Gonzales-Casanova 1965); and, world systems theory (Wallerstein 1979) – they all allow that ethnicity is a potent force under certain conditions. Moreover, all theories ultimately point to different mechanisms and accuse different social actors of using ethnic division to their advantage. In essence, they generally emphasise that ethnicity is a constructed relation, rather than an immutable force.

The idea of ethnic difference in Canada wonderfully reflects this concept of ethnicity as a constructed relation. In Canada, ethno-racial groups are presently categorised on the basis of how an individual defines their ancestry. In the 2001 national census, the relevant question about ethnicity asked: 'To what ethnic or cultural group do your ancestors belong?', and not the respondent’s present day ethnicity (see Statistics Canada 2005). The preamble to the census question states:

While most people in Canada view themselves as Canadians, information on their ancestral origins has been collected since the 1901 census to capture the changing composition of Canada’s diverse population. Therefore, this question refers to the origins of the person’s ancestors.

No pre-selected responses are supplied, simply four blank boxes for the respondent to complete. Multiple responses are thus encouraged by the four boxes provided on the census form, and explicitly so, by the accompanying instruction to specify as many groups as applicable.

The census data on ethnicity is thereafter processed into answers that are classified into categories that correspond to a nation (e.g. Portu-
guese), sub-national areas (e.g. Scottish), religious-oriented groups (e.g. Sikh) and racial categories (e.g. Black). Residual categories, such as ‘Other Southeast Asian’ are created to sort responses which are not common. In short, the group(s) that the respondent selected may not necessarily reflect the respondent themselves, as they may identify themselves differently than their ancestors. What the respondents are doing in effect is to make assumptions about whether to emphasise nationality over tribal grouping – will the Ethiopian assume that the question is about their country of origin or should they write their identification as a member of a tribal grouping of the nation? In a similar vein, census respondents may have to decide whether to emphasise religion over nationality or give both answers (e.g. Sikhs from the Punjab or Jews from Eastern Europe). Nevertheless, the results of the 2001 census found that there were 37 ethnic groups nationally with 100,000 people and a further 169 ethnic groups with under 100,000 people (Statistics Canada 2005).

In the People’s Republic of China, the concept of ethnicity is fairly straightforward, definitive and by some accounts rigid (Mackerras 1994), especially in comparison to Canada. The term ‘ethnic minorities’ refers to people officially identified as minority nationalities (shaoshu minzu), stemming from the controversial categorisation of ethnic minorities by the Communist Party of China (CPC) since 1949. When the CPC came into power they commissioned studies to categorise ethnic groups within the boundaries of the People’s Republic, who in 1953 numbered over 400 registered groups. Teams were sent into regions heavily populated with ethnic minorities to conduct research and field work, investigating minorities’ social history, economic life, language and religion. After detailed study, they found that there was a lot of overlap and a significant number of groups that claimed to be separate, actually belonged to existing groups (albeit with different names). As a result, 38 ethnic minority groups were officially recognised in 1954; and by 1964, another 15 were identified, with the Lhoba ethnic group added in 1965. The Jino were added in 1979, solidifying the official 55 ethnic minority groups of China.

In determining what constituted an ethnic minority group, a criterion in the Stalinist tradition was used to identify nationalities distinct from the majority Han. The official criterion was four-fold:

1. Distinct language – While there are virtually hundreds, perhaps thousands, of dialects spoken across China, a minority language is not simply a dialect. It is a language with distinct grammatical and phonological differences, such as Tibetan. Twenty-one ethnic minority groups have unique writing systems.

2. A recognised indigenous homeland, a common territory, within the boundaries of China.
3. Distinctive customs, ranging from dress and religion to foods.
4. A strong sense of identity – although at times, loosely interpreted.

Additionally, recognised nationalities were categorised according to five major modes of production: primitive, slave, feudal, capitalist and socialist. The Han people were ranked the highest on this scale, reinforcing the Han idea that minorities are ‘backward’ (Heberer 1989) and perpetuating Han superiority.

Although the categorisation of 55 ethnic minority groups was a step forward from Sun Yat-sen’s 1911 Nationalist Party denial of the existence of different ethnic groups in China; and from the derogatory names commonly used to refer to ethnic minority groups (officially abolished in 1951), criticism was rampant as it reduced the number of recognised ethnic groups by eightfold. In fact, the wei shibie minzu, literally the ‘undistinguished ethnic groups’, presently total more than 730,000 people (Mackerras 1994). Examples of these groups include the Gejia, Khmu, Kucong, Mang, Deng, Sherpas, Bajia, Yi and Youtai (Jewish). The number of undistinguished ethnic groups could even rise, as most commentators do not include groups that have been classified into existing groups, such as the Mosuo who were effectively assimilated into Naxi or the Chuanging who have been classified as Han.

Interestingly, the purpose of officially classifying ethnic minority groups in China rather than adopting a Canadian style of classification lies in the local logic that official ethnic minorities are guaranteed systematic and procedural ‘special rights’ and preferential treatment under China’s constitution and reaffirmed in various national (e.g. 1999 National Minorities Policy) and local (e.g. Beijing Minority Rights Protection Policies) policies. The ‘one-child’ policy typifies such preferential treatment. Since 1982, and reinforced by the Population and Family Planning Law in 2002, China’s population policy seeks to control the size of the population, calling for late marriages and fewer births. In effect, it strongly encourages couples to have one child. Special exemptions in the population policy have been afforded to ethnic minorities. The degree of special exemptions varies by province, autonomous region or even municipalities. In Beijing for example, couples who are ethnic minorities can have two children in most cases. In short, due to the ‘special rights’ and preferential treatments afforded to ethnic minorities in China, the status of an ethnic citizen cannot be altered at discretion.3

While the Canadian example is littered with policies of preferential treatments and social programs to improve ethno-development (e.g. employment equity), as we will see, the main reasoning for both nations’ divergent strategies in identifying and classifying ethnic groups lies in historical circumstances as evident by the cases of Toronto and Beijing.
7.3 Ethnic Minority Development in Toronto

The history of Toronto’s visible ethnic diversity is relatively new, being a product of post-Second World War immigration. Prior to this period, the majority of residents in the city were English, Irish, Scottish and French descendants. In the first major wave of immigration to Toronto, from 1946 to late-1960s, European ancestries were in the majority; the Italians, Portuguese and Greeks were the largest groups. Typically, the majority of immigrants during this period arrived in Canada with little formal education and economic capital. Moreover, due to their inability to speak English fluently and their relatively low educational levels, many first-wave immigrants, mostly men, filled positions as manual labourers, craftsmen, mechanics and miners.

In fact, Delovie (2000) has suggested that the manual labour skills these groups possessed are the predominant reason why the Canadian government and the City of Toronto welcomed them. The end of the Second World War brought an enthusiastic interest in revitalising, modernising and building Toronto through the construction of roads, railways and infrastructure. Taking advantage of the depressed economies and high unemployment rates in Western Europe, Canada encouraged immigration from these nations; interestingly, many Western European governments – especially Italian and Greek – even assisted in actively promoting temporary and permanent emigration to Canada which provided relief to their ravaged, domestic economies.

This first-wave immigration altered Toronto’s social and economic space tremendously. The city rapidly became a mosaic of ethnic neighbourhoods – a city of ‘homelands’. Most immigrants settled in the inner city where they built distinctive enclaves with their own ethnic economies, in which they attempted to reproduce many of the features and traditions of their countries of origin. A wonderful example typifying the experiences of the large ethnic groups migrating in the first wave involved the Italian community who concentrated in the St. Clair and Dufferin area, near a small, pre-Second World War Italian ethnic enclave in the Davenport and Dufferin area. Both areas, which now form Corso Italia, were very close to the junction of the Northern Railway and the Ontario and Quebec district line of the Canadian Pacific Railway, where many Italian labourers worked (Zucchi 1988: 41). Upon arrival, the Italians began to create their own enterprises to service the growing Italian community in the area according to cultural practices, such as pasta factories, bakeries, meat markets and grocery stores (Harney 1979: 224). As their small enterprises grew, their status and income varied greatly within the enclave. Similar to larger ethnic economies such as Greek Town or Little Portugal, small Italian businesses and
large enterprises within Corso Italia mainly employed members of their extended family, as well as people from the same ethnic background.

In 1966, a new immigration policy based on a point system involving many factors, including age and occupational qualification, replaced the older system that had been based on sponsorship. This sparked the second major wave of immigration to Toronto from the late 1960s to the late 1990s. Not coincidently, only a year prior to the changes in the immigration policy the Canadian government commissioned the Preliminary Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, which is commonly referred to as the first use of multiculturalism as a social policy for managing ethnic difference in Canada. The report ultimately led to the establishment of what is known as the Canadian Multiculturalism Documents that formulate Canada’s official policy on multiculturalism – the 1971 policy announcement; the 1982 Charter of Rights and Freedoms (constitutionally protected) and the 1988 Multiculturalism Act. The Multiculturalism Documents provided a statement of intent for managing ethnic difference by encouraging an environment in which ethnic minority groups are able to peacefully interact within a mixed community (Bibby 1990). The change in immigration policy and the introduction of the Multiculturalism Documents signaled Canada’s willingness to accept further immigrants – to address the problem of under-population – and to open its doors to those from non-European ethnic backgrounds.

The ripple effect was immediate in the visible ethnic demographics and settlement patterns of Toronto as Table 8.1 attests. The second wave of immigration brought a vast number of non-Europeans, from the Caribbean and Latin America (especially from the late 1960s to 1980s) and from South and East Asia (mainly in the 1990s), who form the bulk of the recognised ethnic minority populations. From 1971 to 2001, in a matter of 30 years, the non-European, ethnic minority population increased by 970 per cent, comprising 1,845,875 residents or 39.8 per cent of Toronto’s 2001 total population. Post-1960 immigrants largely bypassed traditional immigrant reception areas in the city centre and favoured immediate settlement in Toronto’s ‘older’ suburbs (e.g. Etobicoke, North York and York). For most non-European ethnic groups there were no pre-existing enclaves to assist their integration in Toronto. Thus, their residential geographies are more diffused and complex than the settlement patterns of European immigrant groups who arrived in Toronto before the 1960s.

The non-European ethnic groups that dominated second-wave immigration to Toronto largely differ from the first wave, as they were often more formally educated and experienced in skilled occupations. This was the result of a more stringent process in accepting immigrants based on a point system which rewarded skills and education. However,
upon arrival to Toronto many found they were not readily employable in the profession of their home country. Professional degrees such as medicine and engineering were not recognised by professional associations in the Province of Ontario. Hence, the end result is Toronto now has one of the most educated, low-wage workforces in the world.

The increased internationalisation of Toronto’s population is one of the major trends that have shaped the city’s economic and social life. Immigrants from all corners of the world, with varied experiences and human capital, strive to make positive contributions to the city’s economy. In this context, immigrants have become the new ‘job-makers’ through investment and business formation, and significantly, they participate in the entrepreneurial sector at a greater rate than those of French or British origin. Toronto’s diverse immigrant groups are thus a significant social and economic asset for the city, but whether these groups are utilised to their fullest extent is another question.

7.4 Ethnic minority development in Beijing

Ethnic diversity in the City of Toronto is the result of relatively new waves of immigration since 1946, in sharp contrast to Beijing where the city’s long history in dealing with ethnic minorities makes it an excellent case for comparison. For hundreds of years Beijing has been filled with diverse ethnic groups interacting with one another as a result of high internal migration and violent, regional conflict.

Over the last 600 years, Beijing has prospered in spite of repeated invasion by numerous empires – the Mongolian and Manchu invasions being the major ones. With every invasion, the pattern seems to have

| Table 7.1 Ethnic Composition of Total Population in Toronto, 1971-2001 |
|-------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Population | % | Population | % | Population | % | Population | % |
| European | 2,475,220 | 95.94 | 2,586,860 | 87.45 | 2,838,665 | 73.72 | 2,792,740 | 60.21 |
| Non-European | 104,830 | 4.06 | 371,255 | 12.55 | 1,012,030 | 26.28 | 1,845,875 | 39.79 |
| East Asian | 61,785 | 2.39 | 165,685 | 5.60 | 384,585 | 9.99 | 667,520 | 14.39 |
| Caribbean | 15,325 | 0.59 | 54,960 | 1.86 | 77,930 | 2.02 | 278,285 | 6.00 |
| African | 12,135 | 0.47 | 26,635 | 0.90 | 166,850 | 4.33 | 117,845 | 2.54 |
| South Asian | 5,650 | 0.22 | 71,490 | 2.42 | 212,420 | 5.52 | 484,480 | 10.44 |
| Middle Eastern and West Asian | 2,455 | 0.09 | 16,375 | 0.55 | 70,225 | 1.82 | 147,770 | 3.19 |
| South and Central American | 765 | 0.03 | 18,790 | 0.64 | 61,740 | 1.60 | 104,245 | 2.25 |
| Total Population | 2,580,050 | 100 | 2,958,115 | 100 | 3,850,695 | 100 | 4,638,615 | 100 |

Source: Statistics Canada (2005)
been that a small ethnic population of the invading group has stayed on, adapted and/or assimilated into Beijing life. The example of the Manchus who ruled during the Qing Dynasty from the mid-17th century to the early 20th century best illustrates this case. For political purposes, the early Manchurian emperors often inter-married with Mongols, so that their descendants would also be seen as legitimate heirs of the previous Mongolian-dominated, Yuan Dynasty. However, it was the interaction between Hans and Manchus throughout the Qing Dynasty that tested the resolve of Manchurian ethnic management in Beijing. On the one hand, the Manchu rulers sought to preserve a distinct Manchurian ethnic identity, however to keep power, they had to respect the existence of various ethnic groups, notably the Han, who were the majority population (Rawski 2001). One tactic the Manchus utilised was to maintain a system of dual appointments in which all major imperial offices in Beijing would have a Manchu and a Han member. In the late 19th century it became apparent that Manchus were beginning to largely assimilate with Hans, to the extent that they began adopting their customs and language. Spoken Manchu began to be rarely used in the Imperial Court or in the streets of Beijing. Scholars, such as Rawski, have pointed out that it is this shift in assimilation towards Han culture that played a major role in overthrowing Manchurian control of Beijing in 1912; and ultimately, to the creation of the Republic of China led by Sun Yat-sen. The legacy of Manchurian rule in Beijing can be seen today in the wider Han cultural context. The qi pao, a Manchurian dress, has been popularly adopted by Hans.

At present, Beijing’s Manchurian population is around 250,000. In fact, unknowingly to many, even some locals, Beijing’s demographics encompass all 55 ethnic minority groups, who total nearly 600,000 legal residents as elaborated further in Table 7.2. As one of China’s largest urban communities, Beijing is dominated by a Han population whereby many are descendants of Mongolians, Uyghurians, and Tibetans, but identify themselves as Han. For example, although 43 per cent of the ethnic minority population are officially Manchu, this number can be significantly higher as many with Manchurian ancestry choose to identify themselves as Han in order to protect themselves from the stigma of being seen as ‘outside colonisers’ (as Manchus were initially portrayed by Sun Yat-sen) or ‘imperialists’ (as portrayed by the CPC).

Other groups such as Tibetans and Uyghurs in Beijing harbour resentment against the majority Han due to the CPC’s treatment of their large populations in the western provinces. In contrast, certain groups such as the Zhuang and ethnic Koreans are well integrated into Beijing’s urban milieu. The ethnic Korean population in particular can be seen as one of the most successful minority groups in terms of economic capital and social integration. Their motivation for migrating to
the city was often due to famine and war in the Korean peninsula from the 1860s onwards. Most famously, the Japanese, who occupied Manchuria in the 1930s, organised a series of collective migration from southern Korea to parts of north-eastern China which eventually lead to thousands of ethnic Koreans settling in Beijing (Kim 2003). After the Sino-Japanese war and civil war between the Communists and Nationalists during 1945-1949, Koreans in China who allied with the Communists were granted formal citizenship and were encouraged to maintain their ethnic language, education and culture. However, during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), Koreans encountered setbacks as an ethnic minority group when the Communists sought to abolish bureaucracy and feudalistic elements of society. After having realised the vulnerability of being a minority group and the danger of nationalism, many ethnic Koreans in Beijing seemingly adopted a strategy of full accommodation to the authority of the Central and local Beijing government. They even obeyed the population control policy so enthusiastically that most ethnic Korean families in the capital city have opted to have just one child, even though they are allowed to have two children (Hasmath 2007). As a result, as Yu (2000) points out, their birth rates and population growth statistics are much lower than Han and all other ethnic minorities.

With widespread economic reforms in the 1980s and 1990s, South Korean firms began entering Beijing markets. Ethnic Koreans, who mostly retained their native language, were positioned to greatly benefit from the introduction of such firms who had preferences in hiring cheaper, domestic employees who were able to communicate in the Korean language and relate to its cultural values and practices. As a result,

Table 7.2  Ethnic Composition of Total Population in Beijing, 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Han</td>
<td>12,983,696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Minority Total</td>
<td>584,692</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchu</td>
<td>250,286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hui</td>
<td>235,837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongol</td>
<td>37,464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>20,369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuja</td>
<td>8,372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhuang</td>
<td>7,332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miao</td>
<td>5,291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uyghur</td>
<td>3,129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tibetan</td>
<td>2,920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>13,692</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Population</td>
<td>13,568,388</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Koreans in Beijing today are more highly represented in corporate and small-medium enterprise occupations than other ethnic minority groups. Commentators such as Kim and Yu further believe that the entrepreneurial class is likely to grow among ethnic Koreans because they are adopting capitalist values and high earning economic activities more rapidly than other ethnic groups. An observation that can be confirmed presently in the Wangjing neighbourhood of the business-oriented Chaoyang District and Wukaoku area in Haidian District, where ethnic Korean businesses such as electronic repair shops, information technology enterprises and restaurants are increasing in numbers to cater to South Korean firms and their employees, as well as an increasing expatriate community.

One noticeable difference in the neighbourhood characteristics of Beijing in comparison to Toronto is that the city lacks defined and distinct ethnic enclaves. Although there were small Tibetan enclaves near the Central University of Nationalities in Haidian District, pockets of Manchurian enclaves in the city’s outer districts, and very small Muslim-ethnic enclaves scattered throughout the city, today, due to Beijing’s unparalleled, rapid development and lack of physical space, virtually all ethnic enclaves have been absorbed to make room for high-rise residential and corporate buildings. Although there are several original Tibetan temples and Islamic mosques that still remain intact, they often do not reflect the ethnic demographics of the local area. This makes the Niujie area more remarkable as one of the last important historical and present-day ethnic enclaves in Beijing.

The Niujie area in Xuanwu District is centred around one of the oldest mosques in Beijing and China. Built in 966 during the Liao Dynasty and enlarged by the Qing Emperors, Niujie or Cow Street Mosque is the spiritual centre for 10,000 Muslims, mostly Hui, living in the area. Niujie is more than an average ethnic enclave. The Beijing Municipal Government has invested over RMB 10 million (US$ 1.2 million) in rebuilding this residential area mainly inhabited by Muslims. It has successfully revitalised Cow Street into a Muslim-style commercial street, home to numerous Muslim restaurants, a Hui Primary School, Islamic-Chinese styled buildings (from apartment blocks to the post office) and a street community centre, which in effect, serves the needs of the Hui community. In CPC fashion, there are signs that remind the locals about the recent historical achievements of the community and the role the municipal government has played in improving water, electricity and gas supplies to the area.

While an ethnic minority population has been entrenched in Beijing arguably since the existence of the capital city, the most significant recent additions to the ethnic population are the result of waves of internal migration by university students from minority regions. Students
often migrate to complete their studies in one of the numerous tertiary-level institutions in the city and are often granted legal residency status as they take up employment thereafter. It is expected that this trend will continue to hold true in the foreseeable future.

7.5 Conclusion

Examining the development of the ethnic minority populations in Toronto and Beijing demonstrates both communities have been shaped by vastly different historical experiences. Yet, both cities seemingly share a similar optimism when it comes to the management of their ethnic minorities. Toronto applauds itself as a true multicultural success story, whereby ethnic groups from all regions of the world are able to immigrate to the city and enjoy the equity that mass diversity brings. The sentiment in Beijing is similar: it is the present-day CPC’s stated goal to build a Xiaokang society, that is, to build a ‘well-off’, ‘equitable’ and ‘harmonious’ society. Both cities echo a similar goal – equity and access for all ethnic minorities.

With a projected increase in the urban ethnic minority population in Canada and China, the challenges cities such as Toronto and Beijing face in the future will be similar. It will be vital that multi-ethnic, urban communities in both nations develop effective strategies that not only promote ethnic minority development on the basis of social equity, but also in light of economic imperatives. There is a growing educated, urban ethnic minority population that is finding it difficult to access employment that reflects their education attainments. The challenge for multi-ethnic urban communities in Canada and China will be to develop effective strategies to ensure that ethnic minorities realise their potential in the labour market and that the economic losses that come with the under-utilisation of their human capital are minimised. The effective management of urban ethnic differences demands this.

Notes

1 The path multiculturalism has taken requires distinguishing the description of a nation as de facto multicultural encompassing ethnically diverse population segments (demographic usage); from a theoretical basis of public citizenship (theoretical-ideological usage); and, a formalized, specific, programmatic policy developed to respond to, and manage ethnic and cultural diversity (social policy usage). When referring to multiculturalism in this study, unless otherwise indicated, the intentions are to refer to the social policy usage.

2 This figure represents the legal population as defined domestically. According to Beijing’s Public Security Bureau, there are an estimated 2.5 to 3.5 million min gong (mi-
grant workers) living illegally in Beijing, that is, they do not have hukou (permanent residence) or temporary residence status in the capital districts. Among this group, an estimated 15-20 percent are ethnic minorities. Similar to Toronto, the legal population will be the basis of analysis throughout the chapter.

3 Save in the situation where a child is born by parents of different ethnic backgrounds. Here the ethnic status will be determined by the parents before the child reaches 18 years of age. However, when the child reaches 18, s/he can choose which parent’s ethnic status s/he chooses to adopt. By the age of 20 no alteration can be made. In practice, the large majority adopts the ethnicity of their father.

4 Although Italians have been immigrating to Toronto since 1880, the first major wave of Italian population movement was post-World War Two.
PART II

ETHNIC MOBILITY AND URBANISATION
8 Urbanisation Processes among Ethnic Groups in Western China

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Anwaer Maimaitiming
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Huhua Cao
University of Ottawa, Canada

8.1 Introduction

Since the end of the 1970s, the open door policy and economic reforms in China have revamped the country’s urban economy, which brought about considerable growth in urbanisation (Cao et al. 2000; Perkins 2002). At present, about 40 per cent of the population in China lives in urban areas, compared to only nine per cent at the beginning of the 1980s. Three decades of an accelerated urbanisation pace has profoundly transformed the social and economic context of China. Since the 1990s, a growing body of literature has attempted to describe and explain China’s urbanisation phenomenon from different angles (Goldstein 1990; Li and Li 1996; Jin 1999; Wang and Xia 1999; Chen and Chen 2002; Chung and Lam 2004). However, those studies are mostly based on geographical units, studying urbanisation at the level of a country, province or county – rarely from the perspective of social groups, especially ethnic nationality groups. In fact, the dynamics of the urbanisation process among ethnic nationalities can vary substantially (Cao et al. 2005). Taking the ethnic group as a basic research unit, the research reported in this chapter analyses the inequality of the urbanisation process among 51 ethnic groups in Western China; it also examines the factors that influence variations in their urbanisation level.

Urbanisation processes largely reflect the comprehensive development level of the society, economy and culture within one regional community. However, despite incredible economic growth, China has, since the 1990s, been facing not only a dramatic increase in the gap in development levels between different regions and provinces (inland-coastal and rural-urban), but also among multi-ethnic groups. Fifty-one ethnic
groups over 56 nationalities are mostly concentrated in western China. Western China consists of twelve provinces, but we have included only eleven provinces in this study (see figure 8.1).¹

Figure 8.1  China and its western provinces

China’s most recent national census data (2000) indicates that the urbanisation level of ethnic nationalities in western China varies greatly (see table 8.1). There are fifteen ethnic groups with an urbanisation rate of over 28 per cent, which was the western region’s average urbanisation level in 2000. Among these groups, seven have a higher urbanisation level than the national level of 36 per cent. Moreover, there are 29 ethnic groups with an urbanisation rate between 9-28 per cent, and seven groups with an urbanisation rate less than nine per cent, which was the national level before the economic reforms of 1978. It is noteworthy that the highest rate of urbanisation among the ethnic groups – held by the Russian nationality, whose population mostly inhabits Xinjiang – is 20 times higher than the lowest one, held by the Dongxiang nationality, which lives mostly in the Dongxiang Autonomous County in Gansu province. However, the inequality of the level of urbanisation among the 31 provinces of China, between the highest (Shanghai, Beijing) and the lowest (Tibet) is only a fourfold difference (see table 8.4). The level of urbanisation is indeed extremely varied among the different minority groups, even within one region or one province. For example, in Xin-
Table 8.1  The level of urbanisation of ethnic nationalities in western China in 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Serial Number</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Urbanization Level (%)</th>
<th>Serial Number</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Urbanization Level (%)</th>
<th>Serial Number</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Urbanization Level (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>80.93</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Naxi</td>
<td>21.85</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Qiang</td>
<td>12.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Uzbek</td>
<td>68.51</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Zhuang</td>
<td>20.65</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Yao</td>
<td>12.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Gaoshan</td>
<td>64.75</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Bai</td>
<td>20.53</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>Miao</td>
<td>12.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Oroqen</td>
<td>59.52</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Jingpo</td>
<td>20.29</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Tibetan</td>
<td>12.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Daur</td>
<td>57.29</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Miaoan</td>
<td>19.66</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>Shui</td>
<td>11.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Xibe</td>
<td>51.03</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Uygur</td>
<td>19.25</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Kirgiz</td>
<td>11.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Tatar</td>
<td>47.97</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Monba</td>
<td>18.17</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>Yi</td>
<td>10.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Jing</td>
<td>43.14</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Dong</td>
<td>17.66</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>Pumi</td>
<td>9.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Ewenki</td>
<td>44.75</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Jinuo</td>
<td>16.61</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>Va</td>
<td>9.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Mongolian</td>
<td>31.71</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Lhoba</td>
<td>16.55</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>Hani</td>
<td>9.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Han</td>
<td>31.52</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Gelao</td>
<td>16.49</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>Nu</td>
<td>8.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Hui</td>
<td>29.84</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Bouyei</td>
<td>16.32</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>Tajik</td>
<td>8.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Mulao</td>
<td>29.45</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Salar</td>
<td>15.56</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>Achang</td>
<td>7.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Dai</td>
<td>28.73</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>Kazak</td>
<td>15.18</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>Lahu</td>
<td>6.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Deang</td>
<td>28.47</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Tuja</td>
<td>14.51</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>Blang</td>
<td>5.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Yugur</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Baoan</td>
<td>14.19</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Lisu</td>
<td>5.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Tu</td>
<td>23.87</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>Dulong</td>
<td>13.95</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>Dongxiang</td>
<td>4.26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: Urbanisation level equals to the ratio of urban population to total population for each ethnic nationality in Western China.
jian, the minority Russian and Uzbek groups have a very high urbanisation rate close to 70 per cent (almost double the national rate and nearly three times higher than the western region average), while the rate for the Uygur, Kazak and Kirgiz groups is below 20 per cent, and the rate for the Tajik group is only eight per cent. From a socioeconomic perspective associated with the level of urbanisation, disparity among ethnic nationalities is much greater than it is among regions in China.

The questions raised at this point are the following: Why do some ethnic nationalities have high levels of urbanisation, while others do not – especially considering that all the ethnic nationalities inhabiting western China live with a similar natural environment and socioeconomic conditions? What are the hidden factors that lead to this different pace of urbanisation among the diverse ethnic nationalities?

In the next section, we present the proposed new Nationality Urbanisation Model and the data that was used for the regression analysis to examine the factors that potentially influence the variation of the level of urbanisation among ethnic groups. Next, we present and discuss the regression results and validate the proposed model. The last section of this chapter offers a brief conclusion summarising the main findings and indicating what work remains to be done.

8.2 Building a new Ethnic Nationality Urbanisation Model

Existing urbanisation economic and sociological theory models and empirical studies have provided a foundation for our case study. However, since our research is based on nationality as a research unit instead of region or country, it is essential to revise the existing theories and develop a new ethnic nationality urbanisation model to apply to our study. Taking into consideration the socioeconomic characteristics of ethnic groups in western China and the availability of statistical data, a linear logarithm equation model is proposed to analyse the functional relationship between the urbanisation level of the different ethnic nationalities and the factors that influence variation within this urbanisation level:

\[
U_i = C + \alpha \ln E_i + \beta \ln H_i + \gamma \ln D_i + \delta \ln S_i + \varepsilon \ln R_i + \theta \ln C_i + u
\] (1)

Dependent variable:

\[
U_i = \frac{\text{urban population of } i \text{ Nationality}}{\text{total population of } i \text{ nationality}}
\] (2)

Where

- the dependent variable U represents the urbanization level of each ethnic nationality, which is the proportion of the urban population relative to the total population for each nationality in Western China
1. E represents the non-agricultural employment rate of the nationality, which is measured as the proportion of non-agricultural employment in relation to total employment. This variable indicates the state of an ethnic nationality’s migration from traditional agriculture and stock-breeding sectors to modern economic sectors. The non-agricultural employment rate could stand for the condition of a national population’s employment and participation in urban economic and industrial sectors, which can reflect the expected revenue and employment rate in Todaro’s Model (1969). E is expected to have a positive impact on the rate of a nationality’s urbanisation, so its regression coefficient ‘α’ should be positive.

2. H represents the average per capita’s education level or the human capital supply of each ethnic nationality. H is measured by the average years of education received by each person older than 15. In fact, the level of education is an important factor in influencing the decision of the rural population to migrate to an urban area (de Haan 2005). This measurement reflects the popularisation status of modern education. H has positively correlated to expected revenue when people migrate to urban regions. Thus, H and urbanisation level U have a positive relationship, and its regression coefficient ‘β’ should be a positive number.

3. D represents the concentration degree of an ethnic group in the western region. D is therefore measured by the proportion of an ethnic nationality in the western region relative to its total population in China. The aim of introducing this factor is to measure the level of influence of the concentration degree of an ethnic nationality on its urbanisation pace. Wang (2005: 65) concludes that the pattern of spatial distribution of nationalities in western China, in particular minority groups, is ‘mixed inhabitation generally, but gathered inhibition locally’. Of all the nationalities, the Hui group is relatively evenly spread across the western provinces, while the rest are fairly concentrated. Furthermore, within a province, most of the minority population is generally concentrated in several minority autonomous prefectures or counties (Zhang and Zeng, 2005). D reflects the pattern (concentration or no-concentration) of distribution of the ethnic population.

There is no empirical research into whether the high concentration
of a nationality contributes positively or negatively to the pace of urbanisation. Kindle (1977) believed that similar background, common language and culture lead to a lower cost of acquaintance and communication, which is an important reason for the concentration of minority populations. However, certain rules and traditions might hinder the development of these concentrated minority regions. In this case, if a minority is highly concentrated in a region (mostly a rural area), the psychological and social-cultural cost will be augmented when a portion of the population wants to move to the city. This situation will impede the process of urbanisation. Whether this view can be applied in western China remains to be examined. If the higher concentration degree of the ethnic group is unfavourable to urbanisation, then the regression coefficient ‘γ’ should be negative; otherwise ‘γ’ will be positive. If the concentration degree and urbanisation process are unrelated, the regression coefficient ‘γ’ should be zero.

4. S represents the population scale of each ethnic nationality, which is measured by the total number of people of an ethnic group. The objective of this measurement is to determine how the population scale influences the urbanisation pace for each nationality. In fact, the population scales in western China vary considerably. Based on the fifth national census of 2000, the Han population accounts for approximately 76 per cent (240 million) of the total western population, whereas the Gaoshan minority only has 1,200 people, which represents 0.04 per cent of the western population. In western China, there are 16 nationalities within a population over 1 million. Three nationalities have a population between 500,000 and 1 million, eleven with a population between 100,000 and 500,000, fifteen with a population between 10,000 and 100,000, and six with a population below 10,000. Do the nationalities with a higher population therefore have a higher rate of urbanisation? If so, there should be a positive relation between the population scale and urbanisation level, and the regression coefficient ‘δ’ should be positive.

5. R represents the regional urbanisation rate, which is measured by the sum of each nationality’s urbanisation rate multiplied by its population proportion. It is shown as the equation below:

\[ R_i = \sum (R_j \times W_{ji}) \]  

(3)

Where \( R_j \) represents the urbanisation level of i nationality in j province, and \( W_{ji} \) represents the weight or percentage of i nationality population in j province. The purpose of introducing this variable is to measure the difference between the urbanisation levels in each province and the urbanisation rate of each nationality. Generally, if other conditions are the same, the larger the proportion of a nation-
ality in a province, the higher its overall urbanisation rate will be. So, R is expected to have a positive impact on the level of urbanisation, and its regression coefficient “ε” should be positive.

6. C represents the regional nationality composition, which is measured by the sum of the proportion of all nationality populations multiplied by a nationality population’s proportion in the corresponding province. It is represented by the equation below:

\[ C_i = \sum (C_j \times W_{ji}) \]  

Where \( C_i \) represents the population proportions of all nationalities in \( j \) province; then \( 1-C \) equals the population proportion represented by the Han nationality. This variable will allow us to measure whether the relative proportion of minorities vs. Han influences the minority urbanisation pace. If there is an influence, it means the larger the proportion of a minority, the higher its urbanisation rate will be. The assumption to be proven is the following: the coefficient ‘\( \theta \)’ of ‘C’ is obviously positive.

It is important to highlight that the model has adopted a logarithm equation form, so each variable’s coefficient has an elastic meaning, which reflects the influence of a coefficient’s change, while other coefficients remain unchanged. So, in a situation where the estimated result is valid, the coefficient’s symbol and value reflect the nature and magnitude of a variable’s influence on the urbanisation.

8.3 Data and variables

All original data comes from the *Tabulation on Nationalities of 2000 Population Census of China* based on the data from China’s fifth national census (2000), published by the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS) and the State Ethnic Affairs Commission of China (SEAC) in 2003. The reasons for choosing the data from the fifth census are (1) this is the most recent national census data available, reflecting the current socioeconomic situation of various ethnic nationalities in China; (2) compared with other statistical sources, the national census is the largest and most exhaustive investigation in China, providing complete and dependable data. The 51 ethnic nationalities (including the Han majority and another 50 minorities) were chosen for this study because at least 20% of the total population of each of these communities lives in western China. Based on this criteria the She, Man, Li, Hezhe and Korean nationalities were therefore excluded.

The following variables are presented as percentages (per cent): the urbanisation rate of each ethnic nationality (U), the employment struc-
ture—non-agricultural employment proportion (E), the concentration degree of the nationality population (D), the regional urbanisation rate (R), and the regional nationality composition (C). The national population scale (S) is expressed in ten thousand people (10,000 people), and the per capita average education level (H) is expressed in the years of education received.

8.4 Results and discussion

In order to examine the effect of each factor influencing variations in the urbanisation level of ethnic nationalities, a series of multiple-linear regression analyses were carried out. Multiple-linear regression is the standard tool for assessing the contribution of each independent variable to the ‘explanation’ of the dependent variable. Table 8.3 lists the main results of three regression analyses, which have been rectified using the residual and DW value of first OLS in WLS and general difference equation methods. Regression (1) is an analysis using all six explained variables; Regression (2) is the result acquired after taking off the weakest variable Ci (regional ethnic nationalities composition); Regression (3) is the result acquired after taking off the next weakest variable Ri (region urbanisation rate).

Considering the three regression results, whether adding or deleting the variables, the equation’s overall F tests are significant at a level above 1 per cent, and the coefficient of determination $R^2$ is above 0.9. This means that the equation has results that fit well, and that a very strong corresponding relation exists between the explanation variables and nationality urbanisation levels in western China. The total results are therefore very satisfying. Our new ‘Nationality Urbanisation Model’, constructed in the previous section, can well explain the urbanisation variance among 51 ethnic nationalities in the western region.

Table 8.2  The descriptive statistics of urbanisation level and other variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>Variance</th>
<th>$Vs$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>4.26</td>
<td>80.93</td>
<td>23.64</td>
<td>18.03</td>
<td>325.14</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>5.13</td>
<td>80.13</td>
<td>23.13</td>
<td>18.23</td>
<td>332.45</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>10.44</td>
<td>6.67</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>3.78</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>23914.25</td>
<td>613.06</td>
<td>3340.55</td>
<td>11159267.55</td>
<td>5.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>20.63</td>
<td>99.89</td>
<td>87.13</td>
<td>21.97</td>
<td>482.64</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>19.64</td>
<td>42.58</td>
<td>27.87</td>
<td>5.85</td>
<td>34.25</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>5.29</td>
<td>92.10</td>
<td>37.49</td>
<td>16.88</td>
<td>284.77</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The meanings and enumerative criterion of variables as stated above. $Vs$ is the coefficient of the standard deviation.
8.4.1 Employment structure

As expected, the coefficient of employment structure (non-agricultural employment rate) $\ln E_i$ is positive with a significance above a 1 per cent level. The coefficient values for all three regressions are above 0.5 or around 0.5, which is greater than the coefficient values of the other factors. This indicates that there is a strong positive relationship between employment structure and the nationality urbanisation level in the western region. Employment structure is the primary factor influencing the level of urbanisation. In other words, the urbanisation level of a nationality is very sensitive to changes in employment structure. Suppose other variables are constant, then if the employment proportion of the non-agricultural industry increases by 1 per cent, its urbanisation level will rise by about 0.5 per cent. For the nine ethnic nationalities with urbanisation levels higher than the national level (36 per cent), all have a non-agricultural employment proportion of 30 per cent and higher; for the ten nationalities whose urbanisation levels are lower than 10 per cent, their non-agricultural employment proportions are all less than 12 per cent, except for the Tajik nationality (tables 8.3 and 8.4). Figure 8.2 shows the relationship between urbanisation level and non-agricultural employment of ethnic nationality populations in western China.

### Table 8.3 Regression results of the nationality urbanisation model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Regression (1)</th>
<th>Regression (2)</th>
<th>Regression (3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C (constant)</td>
<td>0.984*</td>
<td>1.014**</td>
<td>1.265***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.112)</td>
<td>(2.084)</td>
<td>(4.364)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\ln E_i$ (non-agricultural employment rate)</td>
<td>0.501***</td>
<td>0.515***</td>
<td>0.491***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(9.788)</td>
<td>(10.255)</td>
<td>(11.341)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\ln H_i$ (average education level)</td>
<td>0.227**</td>
<td>0.381***</td>
<td>0.443***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.073)</td>
<td>(4.457)</td>
<td>(10.218)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\ln D_i$ (concentration degree of the nationality population)</td>
<td>-0.237***</td>
<td>-0.205***</td>
<td>-0.254***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-3.985)</td>
<td>(-3.447)</td>
<td>(-3.788)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\ln S_i$ (national population scale)</td>
<td>-0.046***</td>
<td>-0.039***</td>
<td>-0.030***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-6.307)</td>
<td>(-5.346)</td>
<td>(-4.681)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\ln R_i$ (regional urbanization rate)</td>
<td>0.215</td>
<td>0.121</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.427)</td>
<td>(0.774)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\ln C_i$ (regional nationality composition)</td>
<td>0.050</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.273)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.901</td>
<td>0.917</td>
<td>0.956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$F$</td>
<td>65.456***</td>
<td>96.956***</td>
<td>244.099***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DW</td>
<td>1.543</td>
<td>1.730</td>
<td>1.726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In bracket is the t value. *, **, *** represent the level of significance greater than or equal to 0.10; 0.05; 0.01 respectively. N shows the number of samples.
Consequently, the ethnic nationality urbanisation rate and non-agricultural industry employment proportion have a strong positive relationship. This result confirms Lewis’ Dual Economy Model and Tudor’s Rural-Urban Population Migration Model. Urbanisation is the process whereby a traditional rural economy becomes industrialised and modernised. In this process, the surplus rural labour forces progressively move from the traditional, low-productivity agricultural sector, to the modern, high-productivity industrial sector, which causes migration from countryside to city. This result matches the research findings of Zhang (2001), who determined a negative correlation between the agricultural employment rate and the level of urbanisation in 31 Chinese provinces. Nationality variances in non-agricultural employment reflect the extensive degree to which members of the nationality enter the modern economic sector; they also reflect the dependence of various nationalities on traditional economic activities, and the disparities of expected non-agricultural employment opportunities in rural-urban migration.
Table 8.4  Urbanisation rate among China’s provinces in 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provinces</th>
<th>Urbanization rate (%)</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Provinces</th>
<th>Urbanization rate (%)</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Provinces</th>
<th>Urbanization rate (%)</th>
<th>Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>Sichuan</td>
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<tr>
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<td>55.00</td>
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<td>Hebei</td>
<td>26.08</td>
<td>26</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Qinghai</td>
<td>34.76</td>
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<td>Gansu</td>
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<td>23.87</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>Yunnan</td>
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<td>Zhejiang</td>
<td>48.87</td>
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<td>Inner Mong.</td>
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<td>Tibet</td>
<td>18.93</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 2001
8.4.2 Education level

Educational level is an important factor affecting the urbanisation level of nationalities. In regression (2) and regression (3), the average education level coefficient is significant above a 1 per cent level, with values above 0.4. There is a relatively strong positive correlation between an ethnic nationality’s average education level and its urbanisation level, as shown in figure 8.3.

**Figure 8.3** Relationship between urbanisation level and education level of ethnic nationalities in Western China, 2000

![Graph showing the relationship between urbanisation level and education level](image)

\[
y = 2.829e^{0.281x}, \\
R^2 = 0.613
\]

For the nine nationalities with urbanisation levels higher than 36 per cent (national level), all average adult education levels are eight years or more. Russia has the highest urbanisation level, with adults averaging 10.4 years of education. On the contrary, for the eleven nationalities with urbanisation levels lower than 10 per cent, the average adult education level is less than six years. Dongxiang has the lowest urbanisation level, with people over fifteen receiving an average of 2.5 years of education (figure 8.2). The average years of education reflects the polarization of basic education among the different ethnic groups in the western region, and the differences in government investment in education and human capital between the different ethnic groups. There is a positive correlation between a nationality’s average education level and its urbanisation level. The result is consistent with the hypothesis that the level
of education has a negative correlation with the cost of rural-to-urban migration, and has a positive correlation with prospective earnings. Overall, the more a nationality invests in education, the higher the average education level they will attain, and the easier it will be for them to adapt to and participate in urbanisation and modernisation processes.

8.4.3 Concentration degree of the nationality population

The results of the analysis indicate that the degree of population concentration is one of the major factors influencing the urbanisation level of nationalities. The ‘T’ test for the coefficient InMi has negative significance above the 1 per cent level. The absolute values of the coefficient are quite large, and in regression (3), the value of the coefficient approaches -0.25, which means that if other conditions are the same, a nationality’s urbanisation level will rise by about 0.5 per cent once its population density is reduced by 2 per cent. This indicates that population concentration degree has the exact opposite reaction of urbanisation level. Nationality populations with a lower urbanisation level inhabit mostly the rural and pasturing areas in western China, where traditional cultural and social life dominates, where marketisation and modernisation rates in the economy are fairly low, and where the regional and industrial mobility of labour is quite poor.

For the nine high urbanised nationalities, some have densities of above 90 per cent (Russians, Uzbekistan clan, Tartar, Jing), while others have relatively low densities. However, for the ten nationalities with an urbanisation level less than 10 per cent, their densities are more than 97 per cent, without exception (tables 8.3 and 8.5).

8.4.4 Population scale

The coefficient of population scale is negatively significant above a 1 per cent level. This indicates that there is a negative correlation between a nationality’s population scale and its urbanisation level. This result is different from what was expected: the prediction that population scale should have a positive correlation with urbanisation. Generally speaking, if other conditions are the same, a nationality with a higher population proportion should have a higher urbanisation rate, because it has advantages with respect to regional economic, social and cultural development. If the advantages did not exist, the urbanisation rate would have nothing to do with the population scale.

However, taking into account the policies towards ethnic nationalities with respect to ethnic affairs and the regional autonomy system, the result, that a negative correlation exists between a minority’s population scale and urbanisation level, is totally reasonable and sensible. Accord-
### Table 8.5  The employment, education and other factors of the fifteen ethnic nationalities, whose urbanisation levels are higher than 28 per cent (2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Serial number</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Non-agricultural Employment rate (%)</th>
<th>Average level Of education (Years)</th>
<th>Population scale (10,000 people)</th>
<th>National concentration degree (%)</th>
<th>Regional urbanization level (%)</th>
<th>Regional nationality composition (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Russian</td>
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<td>1.42</td>
<td>91.20</td>
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<td>Gaoshan</td>
<td>60.09</td>
<td>9.42</td>
<td>0.12</td>
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<td>0.37</td>
<td>44.58</td>
<td>42.39</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Daur</td>
<td>47.81</td>
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<td>8.34</td>
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<td>Xibe</td>
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<td>1.79</td>
<td>99.57</td>
<td>23.40</td>
<td>33.42</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


Note: “Regional nationality composition” means all proportion of population of ethnic minority in the total population in this area. “Serial number” is arranged in an order for the urbanisation level.
According to ethnic policies and the national regional autonomy law, all majority regions should implement the national regional autonomy policy, regardless of nationality size or population number. This system guarantees that nationalities with a lower population will have political, economic and societal rights, and opportunities equal to higher-population nationalities. Furthermore, the government has offered more preferential policies to lower-population nationalities, such as priority enrolment in government, state-owned enterprises and universities. In this way, if other conditions are the same, the urbanisation levels of lower-population nationalities should be a little higher. The analysis result that population scale and urbanisation level are negatively correlated, proves that Chinese ethnic policies and regional autonomy systems are very effective in guaranteeing equal development rights and opportunities to minority nationalities.

Meanwhile, though the population scale and urbanisation level are notably negatively correlated, the coefficient value of $\ln S_i$ is very small; therefore, population size is not the decisive factor in a nationality’s urbanisation.

8.4.5 Regional urbanisation rate

The coefficient for the regional urbanisation rate is positive, meaning if most of a nationality’s population resides in a certain region, that region will have a higher urbanisation rate and the nationality will have higher overall urbanisation. In other words, the more developed the regions is, the more developed the nationalities residing in this region are. However, the corresponding relation between regional urbanisation level and nationality urbanisation level is not statistically remarkable. The $t$-test value of $\ln R_i$ in regression (2) has no significance, even under the 40 per cent significance levels. In regression (3), after removing the insignificant variable $\ln R_i$, however, the significance of other variables was not reduced, and $R^2$ even increased a little. This evidence indicates that there is no obvious corresponding relation between the urbanisation level of each western province and the urbanisation level of its nationalities, and that the regional urbanisation level impacts weakly on the nationality’s urbanisation.

8.4.6 Regional nationality composition

As with the regional urbanisation level, regional nationality composition (the population proportion assumed by ethnic minority populations) has an unremarkable effect on the nationality urbanisation level, although the coefficient symbol is the same as expected. In regression (1), the coefficient symbol of the proportion of minority population is
Table 8.6  The employment, education and other factors of the 36 ethnic nationalities, whose urbanisation levels are lower than 28 per cent (2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Serial number</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Non-agricultural employment rate (%)</th>
<th>Average level of education (Years)</th>
<th>Population scale (10,000 people)</th>
<th>National concentration degree (%)</th>
<th>Regional urbanization level (%)</th>
<th>Regional nationality composition (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>30.99</td>
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<td>Blang</td>
<td>6.26</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>9.09</td>
<td>98.96</td>
<td>23.42</td>
<td>33.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>Lisu</td>
<td>5.13</td>
<td>4.47</td>
<td>62.92</td>
<td>99.10</td>
<td>23.50</td>
<td>32.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>Dongxiang</td>
<td>6.04</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>51.31</td>
<td>99.87</td>
<td>25.11</td>
<td>14.62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: “Serial number” is arranged in an order for the urbanisation level.
positive, but the coefficient value is very small, and the significance of \( \text{InCi} \) is the worst among all the variables, even after being different-variance or array-correlated rectified. After taking off \( \text{InCi} \), Regression (2)'s \( R^2 \) is the same as regression (1)'s, meaning that the overall significant or fitness of the equation was not influenced after removing the factor. So, the assumption that coefficient \( \theta \) of ‘S’ is positive is rejected. Therefore, a nationality’s urbanisation level has no direct relation with its population’s proportion in the total population. The view that the population proportions of the Han nationality in a minority area will influence the socio-economic development of local ethnic minorities is unable to be verified.

8.4.7 Equation of the nationality urbanisation model

To sum up, in the six independent variables that were included in our ‘nationality urbanisation model’, only four variables (employment structure, education level, concentration degree and population scale) can pass significance inspection, and all their symbols and coefficient values have rational socioeconomic meaning. Although the symbols of regional urbanisation rate and regional nationality composition conform to the expectation, they are not significant.

Within the three regression analysis results in table 8.3, regression (3), which has only four significant variables, has better overall F value, fitness and T-tests than the other two regression results. Consequently, the reliability, accuracy and validity of the estimated result for regression (3) are relatively higher. Therefore, our ‘Nationality Urbanisation Model’ has been adjusted as follows:

\[
DnU_i = C + \alpha \text{InE}_i + \beta \text{InH}_i - \gamma \text{InD}_i - \delta \text{InS}_i + u
\]  

(5)

Based on our analysis, the equation of the nationality urbanization model is:

\[
DnU_i = 1.86 + 0.49 \text{InE}_i + 0.44 \text{InH}_i - 0.25 \text{InD}_i - 0.03 \text{InS}_i
\]  

(6)

Where \( R^2=0.956 \), \( F=243.49 \), \( \text{DW}=1.726 \)

Equation (6) shows that the nationality urbanisation level of western China and urbanisation level disparity are mainly decided by four factors (listed in order of importance according to their absolute coefficient values): non-agricultural employment rate, education level, concentration degree and population scale. Among these four factors, the first two factors correlate positively with urbanisation level and the last two factors correlate negatively.
8.5 Conclusion

This chapter proposes a new ‘Nationality Urbanisation Model’ based on common urbanisation theory models and relevant research. Applying this model and using data from China’s most recent national census, conducted in 2000, this research analysed the inequality of the urbanisation process among 51 ethnic groups in western China; it also examined the factors that influence the variation in urbanisation levels. The main conclusions are summarised in the following paragraphs:

First, the urbanisation levels of various ethnic nationalities in the western region have obvious disparities. The maximum rate of urbanisation is 20 times greater than the minimum, and this disparity is five times the rate between the maximum and the minimum in 31 provinces of China. Empirical analysis indicates that the inequality of each nationality’s urbanisation rate is the result of the synthesised influence of economic, cultural, national and ethnic policies and certain other factors.

Second, the non-agricultural employment rate and education level have notable positive correlation with urbanisation levels, and they are the two most important factors. Urbanisation level disparities are mostly attributed to the employment structures and education levels among more than 50 nationalities in western China.

Third, the nationality’s population density and scale have a notable negative correlation with urbanisation levels. The former factor indicates that traditional ethnic culture factors have negative effects on the urbanisation and modernisation process. The latter indicates that national ethnic policies and the regional autonomous system have positive effects on the social-economic development of minorities, especially lower-population minorities.

Fourth, the results of empirical analysis show that there is no significant correlation between regional urbanisation level and the urbanisation level of various ethnic nationalities of eleven provinces in western China. This indicates that the provincial urbanisation process does not proceed at the same pace as the urbanisation process of various ethnic nationalities in these provinces, and that the urbanisation level of various ethnic nationalities may be lower or higher than the overall urbanisation level of the province. It is, therefore, doubtful whether the economic development of each province is the equivalent of the economic development of various ethnic nationalities of the western region.

Finally, the empirical analysis also shows that there is no significant correlation between the Han nationality’s population proportions (or the proportion of minority population) and the urbanisation level of ethnic nationalities. It can be argued, from a certain perspective, that the proportions of the Han nationality inhabiting the minority regions of western China will influence the socio-economic development of local eth-
nic minorities. This study is unable to provide convincing evidence to support this view through its analysis of 2000 census data and national population urbanisation models; on the contrary, this research found that the population proportion of the Han nationality or other minorities in each province in western region has no influence on the urbanisation and modernisation development of these nationalities in the province.

It is important to highlight that it would be, at present, difficult to generalise the value of our new Nationality Urbanisation Model, because the data materials in this study are limited, and we were able to do a cross-section analysis for only one particular year (2000) and one specific region (western China). It would certainly be helpful to conduct a deep and thorough analysis, using accurate and reliable historical data to do a time-series analysis. It is also necessary to continue exploring this new model in, for example, other Chinese provinces inhabited by multiple ethnic groups or even in other parts of the world. Future studies will help us understand more thoroughly and more systematically the inequality of the urbanisation process among different ethnic groups, and will help us perfect and complete our new Nationality Urbanisation Model.

Notes

1 The only province not included in this research was Shaanxi because the number and proportion of its minority population are very low compared with those of other provinces in western China.
2 Urban population is the sum of ‘city population’ and ‘town population’.
3 For instance,
   – 99 percent of Tibetans in Western China live mainly in 5 west provinces (Tibet, Qinghai, Sichuan, Gansu and Yunnan)
   – Uygur, Kazak, Uzbek, Kirgiz, Tajik and Tatar minorities live mostly in the Xijiang autonomous region
   – over 75 percent of the Mongolian nationality lives in 4 provinces (Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, Qinghai and Gansu)
   – 95 percent of the Zhuang and Dai minorities live in the provinces of Guangxi, Yunnan and Guizhou
   – 99 percent of the Li and Qiang nationalities live in Sichuan province.
9 Conflict and Displacement: A Leading Social Problem in Sri Lanka
A Study of Two Communities in Anuradhapura District

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9.1 Introduction

The root causes of displacement and their impact on a society may vary from place to place and community to community according to their socio-economic, political, cultural and environmental identity. But generally, as a result of, or in order to avoid the effect of one or more of these causes, such as political conflicts, natural or human-made disasters and development projects, people have been forced to leave their habitual residence and preferred life, as well as their customs and norms. People who are subjected to displacement experience physical dislocation, separation from habitual environments, social disruption and material dispossession. When this occurs within the border of a country, it is called ‘internal displacement’ and the people who experience this are referred to as ‘internally displaced persons’ (IDPs). They retain IDP status until they are resettled which can be in one of three locations, namely a) in the place of origin; b) at an authority determined destination; or c) at a place which they have chosen by themselves and if they could re-enter into the social, economic, cultural and political fabric of their original community or the new community where they are resettled (IDMC 2005). Conflict and displacement not only disrupt the lives of the individuals and families concerned, but their entire communities and societies. Both the areas they leave behind and the areas to which the displaced are relocated often suffer from extensive damage. In many cases, socioeconomic systems and community structures break down, impeding reconstruction and social development for decades. Therefore conflict-induced internal displacement has come to the fore as one of the most pressing social problems facing the global community.

Sri Lanka is experiencing different types of population displacements due to three main reasons: armed conflict, natural disasters and development projects. Conflict-induced displacement has become prominent among the other displacements in the country during the last few dec-
The 25 year long armed conflict in Sri Lanka is, essentially, a story of bitter struggle between two factions; one, a group of Tamil separatists called the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (commonly known as Tigers) are demanding an independent state in Sri Lanka fighting for a separate state in the north and east, and the other, the Government of Sri Lanka. On the one hand, Tamil tigers have been undertaking the frequent human right violations such as arbitrary arrests, detention, torture, forced expulsion, ethnic cleansing, forced recruitment of women and children, claymore attacks to the public transports, bomb explosion in public places and suicide bomb attacks, on the other hand, Government is confronting this situation in fighting against them with sever operations, artillery firing, aerial bombing, establishing high security zones so on and so forth. Altogether this situation has cased mass movement of people from their places of origin as well as human suffering and damage in almost all spheres of life. The conflict gained greater momentum since the 1983 escalating violent confrontations between the state military and the Tamil tigers. It has killed around 70,000 of people and displaced around two million people, belonging to all three ethnic communities – Tamils, Sinhalese and Muslims. Most of them have been languishing in IDP camps for several years anticipating a return to their original villages. A large number of people have lost their habitual residence either due to being directly victimised by the armed conflict or as a result of fear of attacks. In addition, there are many conflict-affected people in war-torn and border areas who have not been physically displaced but have rather been socially displaced, which makes them no longer able to maintain existing social structures and networks due to different vulnerabilities. The degree of militarisation of rural society has been accompanied by a disruption to the social network. As the community’s interaction with the outside world has been restricted, the behavioural space of people living in such areas continues to diminish. Those villages make relations with the areas where social relationships can be maintained under relatively safe conditions. The displaced people in Sri Lanka are sometimes called by non-displaced as anathayo which means destitute or helpless people. This includes people who are powerless and marginalised and who cannot subsist on their own. It seems that the problem of internal displacement has become a disaster enveloping the whole of Sri Lankan society, having caused a huge disturbance and social conflicts.
9.2 Methodology

9.2.1 Method

In this study, the internal displacement process is considered a social phenomenon that focuses how internal displacement in Sri Lanka has become a social problem under the theme of mental trauma, victim socialisation and block socialisation of conflict-affected children. Since the study attempts to use the interpretative approach to understand the conflict-affected communities and their social and cultural context, a qualitative approach which is not one completely devoid of quantitative analysis has been used in the study. In order to collect the qualitative data, the method of event recording, which is still rarely used in social research, was very successful in obtaining correct information in respect to both the situation and the time. In addition, in-depth interviews, recording of life histories and direct observations were also used to collect information. In addition to the above methods, a short questionnaire was also used in the study. It was a very important part of the research method recording lived experiences of IDPs and other conflict-affected non-displaced people and presenting them as short stories. The selected focus group of the study was comprised of conflict-affected communities and IDPs of Sinhala origin in North Central Sri Lanka because most of the studies to date had dealt with IDPs of Tamil origin in the Northern and Eastern Provinces.

9.2.2 Research sites

This study was conducted with the objective of examining internal displacement as a social problem in Sri Lanka with particular reference to Anuradhapura district in the North Central Province (NCP) which borders the Northern and the Eastern provinces (NEP) that have been seriously affected by the armed conflict. The district hosts IDPs from both within and outside its borders. In addition, there are a large number of conflict-affected people in border villages in the district. Two villages were selected as the research sites to depict two stages of internal displacement process: Dutuwewa and Morakewa located in the Divisional Secretarial Division (DSD) of Horowpothana belonging to the Anuradhapura district. In the first village the people were vulnerable because of their location on the border of the conflict area in the Eastern Province. The village has faced several brutal attacks by the LTTE since 1989. Another village that could be identified as one of the survival destinations of Sinhala IDPs from the Trincomalee District was selected for the study as well (figure 9.1).
9.2.3 Problems and limitations

Though the displacement process can be viewed from different perspectives, the present study was focused within a limited theoretical and conceptual framework. Hence, in this study the focus is only on the so-
cial context of internal displacement from a problem-oriented aspect. Due to the expansive nature of the study, even definitional delimitations had to be adapted. People gain various types of experience at the individual and community level in the process of displacement. In inquiring about sensitive information the researcher as well as the respondent found themselves on uneasy ground and on such occasions the researcher had to make judgmental decisions. The main problem that occurred in event recording was the verification of events or incidents reported by the respondents. Since the study was in part conducted during the harvesting season, there were difficulties in spending time with some respondents to the extent desirable. At the initial stage it became a problem to access respondents not only as an outsider, but also as a Buddhist monk. As a Buddhist monk has a revered position in Sri Lankan culture, at the beginning, the respondents were not ready to accept someone who occupies such a position in the role of researcher. The IDPs were somewhat ashamed to explain certain experiences that they had had because they held the monk reverence in which a monk is held. They also found it uncomfortable as they thought it is against the culture to discuss such matters, while sitting face to face with a Buddhist monk. But in time the researcher was able to win over their confidence and obtain more information with 100% certainty because of the advantages the monk offered to the respondents in terms of confidentiality, leadership, ability to offer mental and spiritual consolation and impartiality. As a result within a short time the respondents opened their heart and soul to the researcher. However, the parents and elders did not allow the IDP children to be interviewed because they (the parents) feared that they would be too outspoken. In addition, another problem was how to correctly estimate the time involved in carrying out the research according to the chosen methodology. The needed time had been underestimated and it was not possible to stick to the original schedule.

9.3 Defining social problems

Straying away from accepted social norms and ideals can be defined as a social problem that causes disruption of the social order by either neglecting or transgressing the existing social standards (Rathnapala 1986). In other words it is the emergence of a system of activities that is not accepted by society. In return, this emerging system of activities affects social activities negatively because the behaviour is not socially accepted. Thus social problems are only one side of the coin of anti-social behaviour, which can be seen in a disorganised society. But a social problem does not arise every time that there is opposition to the accepted social system. Hence, when one or two people engage in an anti-
social activity in isolation, it does not directly affect the overall activities of the society. Therefore a social problem is one that is felt by the society itself. According to one point of view, a social problem is a sequence of dynamic events that badly affect the entire society and is recognised as such by the majority of people who have a desire to change such events for the better (Donnell 1985). In this definition, several characteristic features of a social problem are made evident. These include the social problems affecting not only a single person but the society as a whole, emergence of social problems through social forces, unfavourable consequences of social problems on society, collective awareness of the majority of people in the society of social problems and a need on the part of the majority of people in the society to solve the social problem. According to the functionalists social problems originate because of the destruction of essential values that had been formed with social approval (Amarasekara 1990). The break-up of essential values may be caused by social, economic, cultural or psychological factors.

Scarpitti (1977) distinguishes three approaches to the identification and definition of social problems. Firstly, linking social problems directly to individual opinions concerning what represents a problematic social condition. This is not a very successful approach because collective awareness is one of the key components characterising a social problem. Secondly, correctable conditions define social problems as conditions that decision makers view as undesirable and that they think can be ameliorated by social action. Conditions that are believed to resist corrective measures are therefore not identified as social problems. When compared to the previous approach, this perspective also largely ignores the fact that some opinions have greater weight than others: i.e. power relations. Actually it is the more influential opinions that determine whether an ameliorative social action is feasible. A more useful approach for identifying social problems would therefore be independent of the opinions and actions of powerful social interests. Finally, social problems with a negative impact have an adverse impact on individual and collective social well being. In this approach, the conflicting opinions and beliefs regarding social problems form a topic for investigation. Buddhism analyses social problems by considering them as basic human problems. According to Buddhism social problems are caused by basic human nature supported by social opportunities rather than on the social environment alone (Gnanathilake 1992). Many psychological concepts such as depression, aversion and perversion that are obsessed in the human mind are found in the Buddhist teachings as Asawa (mental stress). In the discourse of Sabbasawa sutta, Asawa is described as destructive and consuming. Buddhism that teaches seven ways to get rid of Asawa shows meditation as one of them (Gnanarama
As many social problems are a result of mental conditions, Buddhism shows the way to avoid these by means of psychological analysis and very methodically and correctly providing answers to these basic human abnormalities.

9.4 The mental trauma

The armed conflict in Sri Lanka, has caused destruction and widespread damage to local communities in the rural areas. The social structure is shattered and a strong feeling of fear grips the inhabitants of these areas. They suffer from a terrible fear after seeing with their own eyes, the terrible and pitiful fate faced by their parents, children, grandchildren and other relatives. This unusual fear, which affects them psychologically, disturbs their daily activities by shattering the tranquility of their minds from time to time. On 11 February 1989, Dutuwewa village was destroyed by a LTTE attack. This became the main cause of the physical and social displacement of the village’s inhabitants. The manner in which a middle-aged woman carried pieces of the dead bodies of 12 members of her family who were burned to death in this attack in a basin is still remembered as symbolising the destruction of the rural social structure. Appendix 1 (‘Flames’) represents the physical and psychological stress of a woman in the aftermath of the LTTE attack. The fact that after the attack, not only the villagers but also the army and the police officers who had to come to the village to provide security was the cause of terrible psychological pressure that the victims had to undergo. It shows the intensity of pressures of the post-traumatic stage of the displacement process.

Being subject to hallucinations is another dimension of fear psychosis (appendix 2: ‘Hallucination’). Dreams have been found to be more perceptual than conceptual. Sigmund Freud (1980) suggested that a mental process when awake is quite different to that which is found in the dreaming mind. He described this primary process as characterised by more primitive mechanisms, by rapid shifts in energy and emotions and by a good deal of sexual and aggressive content derived from childhood.

As shown in appendix 2 the personal experiences as well as the mental imagining experienced during thoughts can also be considered to be a form of dreaming. According to Freud such dreams can be experienced because of fear or anxiety. Appendix 2 shows that fuelled dreams is strongly active even in the case of military personnel who are normally conditioned to face such harrowing situations. A problem faced by conflict-affected displaced people is having nightmares and waking up in a state of shock. This is caused by intolerable weakness or anxiety.
as a result of fear, worry and shock. The thoughts of a person in the midst of such mental stress are irrational. His memory is very weak. He cannot focus attention on anything. Doctors say that even some physical illnesses are the results of such anxiety. These anxieties are reflected in sleepless nights or managing sleep only by fits and starts.

Lack of interest in sexual activities can be stated as another mental problem experienced by conflict-affected displaced people. Many of them have experienced fear of death (or fear for their own lives) while some of them have seen their parents or children massacred in front of their own eyes. In some cases they had the experience of being forced to stay in hiding for several days with dead bodies strewn around them. The strong shock resulting from such experiences apparently made some people impotent. A young man whom the researcher met in the field spoke about this with disappointment:

‘Only I survived among my family members after the tigers (LTTE) attack. I saw how they hacked my parents and two sisters to death. I had to bury them myself. It was done about 40 miles away from the village. By that time I was married and my wife lived in a ‘safe’ village. For about one year I could not sleep without having a light switched on nearby. In addition to that my mind did not allow me to be near my wife. Later I took courage and tried to engage in sexual activities but I could not. As a result of all these now I spend time alone in this IDP camp’. (Widower, age 37)

Even though IDPs who faced terrifying situations were provided with assistance, protection and welfare services, they did not find satisfaction in them. It was because they were not facing a crisis requiring a rational answer but a problem related to existentialism woven around humanity. The questions faced included ‘What is humanity? What is the meaning of living? Why was I born?’ The conflict affected IDPs think that because of their fate or because of past crimes that they may have committed they have been subjected to these disasters. ‘A sin committed in the past’ they think ‘is causing this suffering’. So they consider themselves to be sinners. They suffer from a guilty conscience as well as from self disappointment. They display physical weakness, lethargy and mutual abhorrence.

It is possible that a considerable number of displaced people commit suicide out of sheer desperation, however statistics are not available. The shock and anxiety caused by displacement could sometimes end in suicide. Among the families that took part in the study, in 22 per cent of the families, at least one person had committed suicide or had attempted to commit suicide. Some of these people lost their possessions
such as houses, lands, animals and also family members. They also had to put up with an unfamiliar living environment following these traumas. Living in IDP camps has proven to be a big challenge. Due to the disorganisation of the society at the local or national level, social cohesion at the local and family level has suffered. Hopes about the future slowly disappear. The resulting frustration strongly affects the decision to commit suicide.

9.5 Challenges to the socialisation process

UNHCR (2004) reports that lack of socialisation of children in displaced families has become the greatest challenge to the IDPs in Sri Lanka. Indeed it has emerged as a social problem of its own. Socialisation simply stated is the process by which the young learn acceptable norms of behaviour for a given environment or the process involved in young children of becoming aware of society and learning how they are expected to behave (Durkheim 1956). Sociologists who have conducted empirical studies on socialisation have formulated four basic rules: (1) the person should have learned the rules of the collective, (2) he/she should follow the accepted norms of the collective, (3) get an education on crafts essential for the culture and (4) he/she must clearly identify the role he/she has to play. The earliest stage of socialisation is childhood. A small child is tempted to gradually learn about everything from his family and the surrounding society. The family acts as the main agent in the process of socialisation while schools, institutions and peer groups help in secondary socialisation. According to Freud the experience gathered during infancy and childhood directly influences personality development. Therefore, the socialisation of children is an essential and a very important social requirement for any given society.

The challenge to socialisation that is faced in internally displaced communities can be further analysed with reference to two important concepts (Parsell 1990). The first one is called re-socialisation. It means getting accustomed to a new environment by completely discarding the old environment where one had previously lived. This is one of the problems faced by displaced people. When people leave their usual environment and settle down in one that they are unaccustomed to, say in a destitute community, the socialisation process of their children is deeply affected. The local community (host community) may discriminate against them and this may have a lasting impact on young people. The ‘victim socialisation’ is another issue arising from such a background of discrimination. This concept concerns socialisation not being properly carried out. Because of ‘negative’ socialisation conflict-affected displaced people entertain pessimistic thoughts such as ‘we are anathayo (dis-
placed persons)’ and ‘nobody helps us’. In contrast to the local community, the displaced community has to face the challenges of re-socialisation and as a result of this challenge they are subject to victim socialisation. Since they self-identify as victims, a specific dimension of the social problem that is associated with the socialisation process of the displaced can be identified.

9.6 Victim socialisation

In Sri Lankan society parents and elder siblings of the family as well as relatives and religious leaders play a vital role for the socialisation of children. The confusion ensues from the undermining of social foundations is instrumental in disrupting the process of socialisation. The children of displaced families whose basic needs are not satisfied and who are living in temporary shelters without adequate assistance have become used to comparing their fate with the children of non-displaced families. In a considerable number of IDP families studied the father or the mother had died in attacks, had disappeared or had abandoned the families and fled. In the IDP camps, relatives care much less about children than would usually be the case in a traditional village. Displacement has changed the collective rationality that existed in the traditional society to one of individual rationality.

Where the family is dominant in socialisation, there are five pre-conditions that need to be fulfilled in the personality development of the child (Maslow 1967). In the IDP camps the fulfilment of the prerequisites of socialisation such as physiological needs, safety, recognition and love, esteem and self actualisation is only a dream, because these preconditions cannot be met in the displaced families. The IDP children do not know the exact situation that led to their displacement. The children come to know about their position from their parents. Children of a similar age group who did not belong to IDP families have labelled these displaced children as Anathayo. This makes these children think of themselves as being destitute and displaced. The family atmosphere is another factor that increases this feeling in IDP children. When the elders regularly speak and act with the feeling that they have become victims of internal displacement, the children also tend to develop the very same attitudes. When visitors come to the camp, children regularly follow them and open their arms for begging something and when they asked some questions about anything, they immediately claim to be destitute rather than giving a precise answer.

As sports play an important role in the socialisation of children, some equipment is distributed to IDP camps by the government institutions and by NGOs. But it can be seen in selected camps that this equipment
is not being properly utilised. In one of the IDP camps at Horowpothana three carom boards were being used in the production of bricks while two chess boards were placed on the roof. This atmosphere mars the development of a child’s self confidence and expectations. In terms of psychology it can be explained as ‘learned helplessness’ (Zanden 1987). The children who feel destitute or helpless show lapses in their personality. This causes abnormal personality development in children. It may lead to lethargy and criminal disposition in the future. Displaced children have become used to staying away from school, bathing places and other public places. Various incidents (food being offered by children from non-displaced families at school) impose a sense of destitution in the minds of IDP children.

The child, who enters the society through the family, has to maintain relationships with various institutions, services and people in order to learn about relationships and the manner and form of greetings that are prevalent in the society. The school, religious school (Dhaham pasa-la) and peer groups can be named as the agents that provide secondary socialisation in the context that was studied. Between the two worlds of family and society, the school fits in well as an intermediate centre. The school contributes towards socialisation by providing scientific as well as social knowledge. The religious school is long fed by Sri Lanka culture and acts as an agent to significantly help to develop the personalities of children.

During the research it was noted that displaced children who are deprived of primary socialisation (because of broken families) are in addition not benefitting from the secondary socialisation provided social institutions such as schools. Even though displacement affects schooling by preventing children from going to school, dropping-out or not considering schooling as a must, one can clearly recognise the direct effects of the family environment that created an obstacle to IDP children who are missing the benefits of secondary socialisation.

There are clear irregularities in the personality development between the children of families in the Morakewa camp and the IDP children who live away from the camp in self determined locations. All children under the age of fifteen from thirteen families, who live away from the camp, go to school. They have also successfully taken part in oratorical contests, drawing contests, etc., winning many prizes in the process. They have certainly developed their creative skills. Two daughters of a displaced family that lives outside the IDP camp got through the Grade Five scholarship examination which proceeds to secondary education with financial assistance of the government. This was the first time such a thing had happened in the history of the Morakewa village. The son of same family, who was selected for university education after he got through the Advanced Level Examination is the only child belonging
to a displaced family in Morakewa who reached such a high standard of educational accomplishment. In addition he was well recognised and respected in the village that hosted them. It is thus proven that IDP children who are living outside camp are better socialised than those who live in the camp.

Persons who live within IDP camps as members of displaced families have access to various benefits from governmental and non-governmental institutions and also from the general public. Answering the question ‘why they had left the camp despite all those benefits’, the parents replied, ‘if we continue living in the camp, we will not be able to bring up our children well’. This answer shows that in the environment of the camp, child socialisation has become a big challenge. In the Morakewa camp 38 percent of the population consists of children under the age of fifteen. The field data show that only 2.38 percent of pre-school age children (4-5 years old) in the Morakewa camp had completed their pre-school education. This means that out of all the children in the camp only one had completed pre-school education. The total of both regular school-attendants and irregular school-attendants at primary level is as low as 47.6 per cent. According to the local educational authority, even regular school attendance means going to school for only two or three days per week. Out of the fourteen children at the Morakewa camp who left school prematurely, nine had done so already in grade four or earlier. These statistics show that the school dropout of IDP children in the camp at the early stage has significantly kept them away from the secondary socialization. It is clear from appendix 3 (‘Schooling under pressure’) that the importance of school as an agent for facilitating secondary socialisation is very great. Apart from the development of creative minds it is unfortunate that not even the school manages to provide a proper environment for protecting the lives of children.

In the Morakewa camp both the children who were attending school and those who had prematurely stopped schooling are instead forced to work for money by their parents and older siblings. For instance, 93 percent of the IDPs in the Morakewa camp make bricks in their own compound and only the children who are younger than four do not work. The work done by children includes drawing water, carrying firewood, trampling the clay and arranging and piling bricks. Children who are in the ten- to fifteen-year age group earn 50 cents for making a raw brick. After baking, the bricks are priced at three rupees and fifty cents. If parents employ their own children, no payments are being made to them. But children who work at other places may earn the above-mentioned rates.

As in many other places the camp leader at Morakewa (a woman) employs a child labourer for brick making in a very inhuman way. For this purpose she uses her influence and authority based on family rela-
tionships and on the opportunity to dispense aid received from outside sources. However, challenges have arisen from within the IDP community itself against the use of child labour. The following is a statement made by Rosy, a sixteen-year-old girl, a representative story of the crisis which faces children in the IDP camps.

‘I am staying at the place of my grandmother who serves as the leader of the camp. My parents died from a LTTE attack when I was only eight. They killed my father while he was cuddling me in bed. He died, but I survived. Now I think that it would have been much better if I had also died with him at that time. Now I realise that my grandmother is not trying to protect us, but that she is actually exploiting us as cheap labour to earn money. Soon it will be time for me to sit for the Ordinary Level examination. But I am allowed to go to school for only two or three days per week. I have to make bricks for my grandmother on all the other days. Otherwise I have to go to pick green chillies. Even though the government package of dry ration is available also for me I have never seen any of it because everything is collected by the grandmother. She says that if I want to eat her food, I must earn money for her. She does not allow us to speak, when donors come into the camp. She chases us away claiming that as girls we should not speak with strangers. When I am away she talks to the donors about my pathetic state to get their sympathy. During those conversations she says that she helps my schooling thanks to the dry rations that she gets, but now it is very difficult to do so. Using this approach she knows that the donors will help her. But I do not get any of that. Even when she gets writing books she gives me only one or two and sells the rest to shops. During the last three months I did not go to school but made about 3000 bricks instead. She did not give me a single cent.

9.7 Block socialisation of children

Studying the displaced community in Morakewa reveals the children have been deprived of the necessary requirements to develop their minds and themselves more generally as people. Theoretically this deprivation is termed ‘block socialisation’. Under such circumstances children get used to deviant ways of behaviour and transgress accepted social norms. From a criminology perspective these children are considered to belong to broken families. As shown in appendix 4 (‘The Mechanical Child’) the family environment has caused the desperate be-
havioural pattern in the child. A situation similar to the analysis given by Watson (1986) about the characteristics of a broken family becomes evident. Among the characteristics he noted are:
- family members who become violators of the law, have low moral conduct and become alcoholic;
- the child lives with only a single parent or is separated from both, due to divorce or abandonment;
- shortcomings in parental control due to physical disability of parent, domination of one parent and excessive rudeness.

The father of a young man shown in appendix 4 who manifested such abnormal behaviour had deserted his family and become a womaniser.

Spencer (1980) had categorised deviant families from type A to I. He emphasises a tendency towards block socialisation in these families. The category G explains families where the mother does not have the money necessary to protect the family or to feed the children. It is evident that the mother has to assume extra responsibility when the family is displaced because older males are often at great risk. Internally displaced women are therefore facing intense physical and mental pressure. Jayawathie, the mother mentioned in appendix 4, was not only subject to physical and mental stress because her husband had left but also because she had lost one of her hands when LTTE attacked the village. To take care of the children she does various tasks such as pounding rice, chopping wood and producing bricks for a fee. It is no wonder that the proper socialisation of children became an unachievable goal in her family.

This situation also perfectly fits the category H of Spencer’s categorisation, which includes parents who neglect their children. One reason here is that parents are too busy. When faced with the challenge of living in a new environment the IDPs have to find livelihoods for sustenance, at times engaging in activities like brick making even at night.

A ‘mechanical child’ is defined by sociologists as a product of a broken family. The mechanical child born through the process of block socialisation has certain inherent features (including breaking rules or regulations, regularly running away from school, associating with ‘bad’ people, non-acceptance of advice, disobeying parents, laziness, hurting ones own self or others and threatening others, keeping away from home without providing reasons, disorderly conduct in public, habitually speaking indecently, visiting brothel houses, visiting gambling dens, loitering as a habit, engaging in illegal money-making activities and smoking excessively). The case of C presented in appendix 4, demonstrated all of the above features.
9.8 Increasing abnormal behaviour as a defence mechanism

As shown in figure 9.2 various factors interlink with the abnormal behaviour of conflict-affected children in the process of internal displacement. The defence mechanism mechanisms used by IDP children originating due to the internal displacement takes the form of two flows. Various conditions associated with this process directly influence abnormal behaviour. Because the children of displaced families have not been properly socialised, different personality disorders have arisen.

Figure 9.2 Integrated root causes determining abnormal behaviour

These disorders or abnormalities can be identified by recognising the defence mechanism hidden in the personalities of IDP children. These have been named by Freud as projection, suppression, displacement, rationalisation and sublimation. Freud was of the opinion that these conditions arise due to the clashes between the id, the ego and the super ego. Displacement is the attempt to prevent the flow of ideas that one does not like into one’s mind. In suppression, stubbornness becomes evident. Rationalisation is justifying a thing that one wants to do. The best example of this is appendix 4 where the child himself gives reasons for his stubbornness. Sublimation is displaying natural aggressiveness in an indirect manner. This condition is demonstrated by the ‘mechanical child’ in the form of throwing away household goods and trying to choke one’s own neck.
9.9 Conclusion

The social dimensions of the internal displacement process can be examined through the experiences of those who have completed the displacement cycle. Within this cycle various communities face different problems when they are leaving their places of origin; when they are searching for a new destination; and when they are returning to their places of origin or are resettled at another place. These problems may vary depending on the displaced person’s ethnicity, language, religion, cast and other social factors. Even though issues faced by conflict-affected communities are different in terms of their ethnic and regional background, the mental traumas and socialisation problems are common to all of the conflict-affected children.

According to the Buddhist perspective, every social problem is the effect of different mental conditions that are lodged in the human mind and of our individual attempts to establish a personal identity for ourselves internally and to project that identity outwardly for others to recognise and accept. It is appropriate to consider the sophisticated Buddhist teachings when it comes to understanding the mental conditions of most IDPs. Hence, it is very important to identify and analyse internal displacement as a social process. It is clear that the mental trauma suffered by conflict-affected people is very severe and leads to many other issues – such as feelings of helplessness, desolation, anxiety, learned helplessness and suicide – that can arise during any phase of the internal displacement process.

When studying conflict induced internal displacement it is very important to analyse the socialisation process of the younger generation of different IDP communities. This chapter has focused on how internal displacement is an important factor in the block socialisation and abnormal behaviour of displaced children. This research found that the family unit, school and other institutions as well as the host community are strongly interrelated with regard to this issue.

The problem of internal displacement can be singled out as one of the foremost social problems that causes the breakdown of family units, to the creation of mechanical children, to the use of defense mechanisms, and to the block socialisation of children. In addition this study suggests how disorders and abnormalities can be identified by situational analysis of the conflict-affected communities.

Recognising that the problem of internal displacement affects a social context – i.e. physical and mental stress, changes of life path and lifestyles, loss of basic necessities and the breakdown of the family unit – it is more than evident that the displacement of people has become an acute social problem in Sri Lanka, where there are about 500,000 in-
ternally displaced people, that is almost 2.5 percent of the total population.

A proper strategy for providing a rational explanation of the social problem of internal displacement should focus upon different communities who are in various phases of the process and employ a qualitative rather than a quantitative approach. Only in that way is it possible to deeply examine the traits of individuals, and to focus on the specific stories of real people. At issue is the collective memory of a population which has been subjected to the trauma of displacement. It should be stressed that all the collected information was discussed with and agreed upon by the respondents. The technique of recording stories and events revealed quite a lot of information about the impact of the armed conflict from the time of its early beginnings up to the stage of displacement. The overall purpose of the research was to reach a better understanding of how individuals respond to the traumatic situation created by the armed conflict.

Appendix 1 Flames

Although several attacks had took place at nearby villages, Dutuwewa villagers did not think that the LTTE would cross the Yan oya River and attack their village. One night, after a heavy days work, they went to bed. Facing no resistance from the sleeping villagers, it was easy for the LTTE to rampage through Dutuwewa, setting the village afire. They burned down the houses and massacred the people at midnight. Soma, a 29-year-old widow had an eighteen month-old baby boy and a six-year-old daughter. Her husband had been abducted by the LTTE one year before. At the time of the attack she was asleep with the children. Awakened by the sound of shooting, she knew immediately that it was an LTTE attack. Waking up her daughter, she told her to run to the scrub behind the house for safety. She cuddled her sleeping infant son and ran into the dark jungle leaving the door locked behind her.

Tamil Tigers shot at the house and set fire to it. Soma was keeping silent behind the bush with the infant. After a few minutes she heard the cry of her daughter from the house. She was helpless. The young innocent girl had apparently once again fallen asleep in complete ignorance of what was happening outside. In the morning when the flames were out Soma was anxious to see the result. Then she thought of her son who was unusually silent. Only then did she discover that she had fled her house not with her little son but with a pillow. Both sister and brother were burnt to death in the fire. Though she is still alive, she recalls the event a hundred times a day with the utmost pain and helplessness.
Appendix 2  Hallucination

The brutality of the LTTE attack on Dutuwewa, which shocked the whole area, was witnessed by the neighbouring villagers as well as by the Dutuwewa residents themselves. Everyone saw how people brought the bones of burnt bodies in various containers to the village school. Even after a few days had passed no action was taken to provide security to the village. As a result of the villagers’ demands for security, an army camp was set up in a corner of the village and the partially burned building of the temple was housed to the soldiers. Even the soldiers in the camp were deeply shocked after hearing about the tragedy that befell Dutuwewa.

One day a young soldier who was stationed at the guard room near a boulder, saw a dark shadow coming from the jungle and trying to reach the village. The figure that was approaching gradually appeared to grow to a height of some twelve metres tall. Seeing this apparition in black the soldier continuously shot at it. But it had no effect on the approaching figure. The soldier saw that the figure ran and entered into the ruined building of the burnt temple and disappeared.

On another day two soldiers who were sleeping in the same building woke up, both reporting that they had had the same dream at a different time. One soldier had narrated his dream to another soldier. After going to sleep this soldier had the very same dream and screamed in his sleep. They said that the monk of that temple, who had been killed by LTTE, had pulled them by their legs and had warned them saying ‘Tigers have come’. Thus the young soldiers in the army camp were gradually affected by hallucinations, apparently caused by the mental stress of being in the village. As a result of such incidents some soldiers suffered from fever and sometimes had to be hospitalised. In order to rectify these fearful mental experiences in and around the premises and as a psychiatric therapy for the persons who had experienced the hallucinations, eventually a Pirith Chanting Ceremony was conducted. According to the villagers seven days after the ceremony had begun everything had become normal.

Appendix 3  Schooling under pressure

After the Tamil Tiger attack all the activities in the Dutuwewa village were reduced to a very low level for a long period of time. The only school in the village that the local children had was abandoned. The charred bodies of the 34 people that died in the attack were piled up in the school building until their burial. Few months later arrangements were made to reopen the school. Very few children came to the school
on the first day. Many children had refrained from going to school because they had witnessed how corpses had been piled up in the classrooms and they were afraid to enter those classrooms. The children suffered unbearably when they remembered their classmates who had died in the attack. The teachers were equally affected by this situation as well. One day I visited the school just before it was due to begin. I saw the teachers coming to school carrying fire arms in a state of alert to meet any possible Tamil Tiger attack.

The school bell rang. It seemed that the children who were lined up for religious prayers still did not feel safe. The teachers observed Panchaseela (the five precepts of Buddhism) with the loaded firearms leaning against their bodies. When can these children find an atmosphere conducive to education? The teachers come to classrooms armed with weapons like hunters. The teacher who writes on the black board with a firearm in readiness at arms length has his attention focused not on the children but on the surroundings. On some occasions distant gun shots shatter the silence. Will the children have a free mind conducive to education in such a context?

Appendix 4 The Mechanical Child

In her twenties Jayawathie faced a brutal attack of Tamil Tigers when she was collecting firewood in the Jungle with her parents. As a result not only was her left hand disabled but she also lost her parents. Now she is 38 years old and the mother of two sons and a daughter, and is among the displaced people in the Morakewa IDP camp who fled from a threatened village of Trincomalee district. Two days before she left her original village, her husband had fled to an IDP camp in Trincomalee with another woman. Jayawathie, eight months pregnant at that time, decided to come to Alapathwewa because she thought she might get help from her parents who were living there at the time. After a few months, she married a bachelor of a displaced family called Siril living in the same place. Within six months an IDP camp was set up by the main road close to Morakewa junction to accommodate the displaced families being housed in the Alapathwewa community hall. The donor groups who came in search of displaced people distributed clothes, dry food and medicine to these people.

Jayawathie had two sons when Siril had started to have an affair with another displaced widow. Even though Siril couldn’t get married to her legally, after a few months he left the camp with that woman and her children and settled down in a village close by. Since it was very difficult to maintain the family only with dry rations, Jayawathie, with one hand disabled, found an opportunity to work for a farm as a temporary wage
labourer. A few months later, an IDP male widow called Dias and his children living in the same camp moved in with her. At this time the local authority decided to shift the IDP camp from the Morakewa junction and put all IDPs on a plot of land at the edge of the Morakewa village close to the jungle. A small shelter built on that land housed Jayawathie and her family. It was not a good time for Jayawathie because while her elder son was addicted to alcohol. Dias started his usual life with gambling, alcoholism, loitering and stealing. Both Jayawathie’s husband and the elder son started to quarrel with other siblings of the family when they had taken too much liquor. The tragic drama of Jayawathie’s life again started with Dias leaving with his children for another woman one year later because one day he was thrashed by Jayawathie’s elder son. Jayawathie again had to face life alone. Her two sons have inherited the ruined lives of their parents such as insecurity, loss and abandonment as well as alcoholism and gambling. Her elder son became a notorious thief who has been in police custody several times.

None of Jayawathie’s children received even a primary school education. Upon further investigation I saw that when visiting the IDP camp and passing Jayawathie’s hut, the broken legs of plastic chairs came flying into the yard. The cooking utensils in her hut were crushed and sleeping mats were torn. I made the terrifying discovery that Jayawathie’s younger son (aged 15) was trying to strangle himself with a rope around his neck. Jayawathie was crying in a corner and was using her hand to try to stop the rush of blood from a head wound. Jayawathie and her younger son had had an argument over a very simple issue and he had assaulted her with a mamoty (a large-bladed garden hoe). Before that he had hit and chased away his elder brother too. The female leader of the camp had come and offered to mediate but she too was threatened. At the request of the camp leader the camp bully entered the scene and physically punished the boy and brought him under control.
10 Sardar Sarovar Dam: A Case Study of Oustees in Gujarat, India

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10.1 Introduction

The issue of water is expected to acquire vital significance in the years to come. With the increasing pressure of population growth, water is becoming a scarce commodity. Environmentalists warn that future conflicts between regions are going to be based on water. Management and distribution of water resources are becoming matters of great concern for governments. This has led several governments to undertake massive river valley projects that aim to properly distribute water between water deficient and surplus regions. India, although endowed with an enormous quantity of water resources, suffers from both spatial and temporal disparities in water availability. Even during the normal monsoon season some regions of the country face drought conditions at times. Certain regions are naturally water deficient. There are areas where a huge quantity of water simply flows into the sea during the rainy season, while other areas find it difficult to quench their thirst. Such disparity has led the Indian government to undertake large ‘check dam’ projects to balance out water distribution between different regions. However, despite their noble intentions such projects have raised several contentious issues involving governments, environmentalists and the ‘project-affected people’ (PAP). Among all, the issue of resettlement and rehabilitation of the population that is ousted in the context of a dam project has attracted the attention of an even wider circle of actors. Government policies in regard to the displaced and affected people due to dam projects are yet to be judiciously formulated. These policies are not only devoid of a proper perspective but also their implementation process has been utterly slow, creating economic and socio-psychological stress among the affected population. These are common features associated with large river valley projects, including the Sardar Sarovar Project (SSP) on the Narmada River.

The Sardar Sarovar Project was conceptualised in 1949 to harvest Narmada river water for the purposes of generating electricity and supplying irrigation and drinking water. After long deliberations lasting for
several years between three Indian states – Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Gujarat – a consensus was reached that paved the way for the SSP. All three states made an agreement for distribution of water, electricity and resettlement and rehabilitation of the oustees.

The study on resettlement and rehabilitation of oustees has gained importance in India as a result of aggravation of disputes between the oustees and governments regarding the implementation of resettlement and rehabilitation policy of SSP. The responsibility to resettle and rehabilitate the oustees, including those from Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra, is solely vested with Gujarat vide award of project by Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal (NWDT). The challenge posed by the project due to large scale resettlement and rehabilitation of the oustees to the policymakers of governments had never been experienced in any developing country till late 1960s. The NWDT set up in October 1969 to prepare policy directives related to all the contentious issues, provided guidelines that were changed by the Gujarat state in due course as per the recommendations of study groups (Centre for Social Studies, South Gujarat University, Surat) constituted by Government of Gujarat (by a Government Resolution No. NPG-1084: 758/1k dated 15-04-84), to conduct socio-economic survey of PAPs.

Of those contentious issues surrounding the SSP, those specifically related to the rehabilitation of oustees have been widely debated and researched. Amidst the din created on the sufficiency of the rehabilitation policy and the efficacy of the project, the perception of PAPs towards the project also changed. The people were resettled irrespective of on-going debate pertaining to economic versus socio-psychological rehabilitation. Instead, the government remained more concerned with whether to raise the height of the dam or to blow it off to please the environmental and social activists.

The issue of how developmental projects like large river valley projects affect the socio-psychological and cultural milieu of the displaced as well as project affected population and not just their economy is discussed in this chapter. Specifically this chapter focuses on the impact of resettlement and rehabilitation policy, based on primary research of the resettled population at selected sites.

10.2 Submergence of villages due to SSP

By 1985 interstate disputes were resolved by NWDT and the World Bank agreed to grant financial aid for the completion of the project. However, the construction work on dam could begin in 1987 till the World Bank withdrew from the project in 1992 after the state failed to comply with the World Banks resettlement and rehabilitation norms. In
addition the project attracted the attention of environmentalists, social activists and social scientists. Each of them analysed SSP in their respective contexts and deliberated on the issues related to submergence, resettlement and rehabilitation. Even a writ petition was filed in March 1994 by NBA (Narmada Bachao Andolan) contending the resettlement and rehabilitation policy of the project.

The submergence of land by the SSP is estimated to be 7,112; 9,599 and 20,822 hectares of land in Gujarat, Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh, respectively, amounting to a total of around 37,533 hectares. As per the revised schedule of the dam issued in December 1989 and approved by the Sardar Sarovar Construction Advisory Committee (SSCAC), a total of 245 villages have been affected in the three states. Table 10.1 furnishes the data on state wise break-up of affected villages and number of affected families.

Of the families to be rehabilitated i.e. the oustees were to be provided with a house, farmland and other compensation, all of those in Gujarat, 999 of those in Maharashtra and 14,000 of those in Madhya Pradesh, have opted to settle in Gujarat. Out of these, 96.56 per cent or 4,442 families from Gujarat, 67 per cent or 679 families from Maharashtra and 20.71 per cent or 2,899 families from Madhya Pradesh have been completely rehabilitated.

10.3 Resettlement and rehabilitation policy – main features

1. An oustee in any one criterion, such as, (a) a co-sharer of original joint holding, (b) a landless agricultural labourer, (c) an encroacher on land owned by the government or the Forest Department, and (d) a major son of a family, would be provided two hectares (five acres) of land.

Table 10.1 Selected Villages – Social Composition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paniya (Host)</th>
<th>: Padiyar (SC), Vasava (ST), Solanki (SC) and Baria (ST)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paniya (RS)</td>
<td>: Bhil (ST)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simaliya (Host)</td>
<td>: Patel, Mansuri (Muslim), Jaiswal (SC), Rohit (SC), Prajapati (SC), Tadvi, Rathore, Vankar (SC), Patanwadia, Dhodiaya (ST)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simaliya (RS)</td>
<td>: Tadvi (ST)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golagamdi (Host)</td>
<td>: Patel, Tadvi (ST)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golagamdi (RS-Gujarat)</td>
<td>: Tadvi (ST)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golagamdi (RS-MP)</td>
<td>: Rathwa (ST)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Primary Survey, 2004
Note: RS = Resettlement Site; SC = Scheduled Caste; ST – Scheduled Tribe
2. Every family would be given Rs. 45,000 for the construction of a core house in addition to a plot for the house measuring 60 x 90 feet = 5,600 sq. feet.
3. Subsistence allowance of Rs. 4,500 would be given to each family.
4. House electrification at the rate of 1.5 point per house would be given free of cost.
5. Insurance for house, death, personal accident and assets acquired through rehabilitation package would be taken in the name of a beneficiary.
6. Irrespective of the number of families, each resettlement site would have a school, children’s park and a dispensary.

Indeed, the above provisions made in NWDT’s final report were more advanced than provisions for any other water resources project made earlier in India. In addition to the provisions outlined by the NWDT, the Gujarat government made further recommendations. While the NWDT stipulated that each displaced family would be offered a minimum of two hectares of land in the command area of the project, the Gujarat government further extended the package to encroachers and landless labourers. While the NWDT provided 500 m² of residential land upon which to build a house, the Gujarat government went beyond that and provided a grant-in-aid of up to Rs. 7,000 to an oustee to purchase productive assets. As per the latest provision, a house of approximately 45 m² at the cost of Rs. 45,000 would be given to an oustee in lieu of a finished plinth and roof tiles.

It is remarkable to note that under the provision of the rehabilitation scheme of the Gujarat government, displaced families were resettled in colonies with all civic amenities including approach road, primary school, dispensary, children’s park, tree plantations, drinking water, electricity, issuance of ration card, accessibility to cooperative society and arrangements for vocational training such as modern farming techniques.

The ‘liberalised’ rehabilitation policy of the Gujarat government, however, at no instance considered including the socio-psychological and cultural parameters of the impact of displacement within its framework.

10.4 Study area

This study is aimed at documenting impact of displacement on resettled people in the present economic, socio-psychological and political context. The study was undertaken in three villages in the Vadodara district of Gujarat with resettlement sites namely Simaliya of Dabhoi Taluka and two villages namely, Paniya and Golagamdi of Sankhed Taluka.
The Bhil, Tadvi and Rathwa communities belonging to the Scheduled Tribe (ST) category from submerged areas in Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh have been rehabilitated in the three village sites. The *vasahat* or resettlement sites (RS) are located on the outskirts of the host/original village in complete segregation. The layout of the resettlement sites are well planned, with houses identical in size and equally spaced. Each family member above age 18 is supposed to have been allotted a house as well as two hectares (five acres) of cultivable land.

### 10.5 Methodology

The study was conducted through a primary survey of sample households and discussions with the community elders, school teachers and representatives of local administrators such as the *Sarpanch* (village headman) and *Talati* (the village accountant). Among the three studied villages, the RS at Simaliya village with around 300 resettled families is the oldest. Paniya RS is relatively new and has around 50 families of which some 36 have already occupied the allotted houses and land. The Golagamdi RS has two segments, one for the Gujarat and the other for the Madhya Pradesh PAPs. Both sites have around 70 families each who have taken possession of the allotted land and houses. Of these households about 25 households from each of the four RSs were chosen for detailed investigation. The result of the primary investigation was analysed on the basis of demographic, economic, social and political parameters.

### 10.6 Social composition

The selected villages are heterogeneous in their social composition. Simaliya particularly, has representation of almost all castes and religions. The caste composition of the three villages is as below.

It was observed during the field survey that the average age of the host population is greater than the resettled population implying thereby, migration of only the younger generation from the submerged village sites. The number of literates in the under 18 age group for males and females being resettled is greater than their counterparts in the 18 plus age group, indicating an added emphasis on education in the new generation (table 10.2).
The households surveyed in the rehabilitated sites of the villages were classified by size of land holdings as depicted in table 10.3. During the field investigation it was observed that the size of land holding varied immensely among the host population – a common characteristic feature of non-tribal rural India. The resettled population, which was supposed to be allotted five acres of cultivable land per every adult member, however, shows relatively less variation. By and large the resettled population possessed 3-5 acres of cultivable land per adult and only two households in Paniya RS were found to be landless. It is interesting to note that the number of landless households was much larger among the host population.

### Table 10.1a State-Wise Break-up of the Affected Villages and Number of Affected Families

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States</th>
<th>Villages Affected</th>
<th>Families to be Rehabilitated Including Major Sons/Daughters</th>
<th>Population Affected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fully</td>
<td>Partially</td>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madhya Pradesh</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maharashtra</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gujarat</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 10.2 Demography: Resettled Persons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Paniya</th>
<th>Simaliya</th>
<th>Golagamdi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gujarat</td>
<td>MP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Average Age of HH</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Male Population</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Female Population</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) Total Population</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f) Literate Male &lt; 18</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g) Literate Female &lt; 18</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h) Literate Total &lt; 18</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j) Literate Male + 18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k) Literate Female + 18</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>l) Literate Total + 18</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample Households</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MP= Madhya Pradesh

Source: Primary Survey, 2004

### 10.8 Economic base

The households surveyed in the rehabilitated sites of the villages were classified by size of land holdings as depicted in table 10.3. During the field investigation it was observed that the size of land holding varied immensely among the host population – a common characteristic feature of non-tribal rural India. The resettled population, which was supposed to be allotted five acres of cultivable land per every adult member, however, shows relatively less variation. By and large the resettled population possessed 3-5 acres of cultivable land per adult and only two households in Paniya RS were found to be landless. It is interesting to note that the number of landless households was much larger among the host population.
10.9 Occupation

The study revealed that irrespective of the caste (community) background, the host population was basically engaged in agricultural activities with varying sizes of land holding in their possession. The tribes resettled in the villages belonged to forest ecological setup and operated a forest-based economy with partial dependence on agriculture. An attempt was made to understand their patterns of occupation in the present location.

It is evident from the information presented in table 10.4 that agriculture remains the major occupation of the resettled population. In Paniya 21 households (more than 80 per cent of the households) among the resettled population work in the agricultural labour market. The situation in the other two villages is relatively different, wherein some of the households have found opportunity outside agriculture. The situa-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 10.3 Land Holding: Number of Households</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Landless</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) 1-2 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) 3-5 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) 6-10 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) 11-15 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f) 16+ acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample Households</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Primary Survey, 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 10.4 Occupation: Number of Households</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Agriculture (Main)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Agriculture (Subsidiary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Agri.Labour (Main)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Agri.Labour (Subsidiary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) Service (Govt./Semi-Govt.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f) Casual Lab (Main)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g) Casual Lab (Subsidiary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h) Business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i) Pvt. Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j) Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample Households</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Primary Survey, 2004
tion in Paniya can perhaps be related to the quality of agricultural land allotted to the resettled families. The five acres of land allotted to the resettled families in this village is by and large uncultivable. This could be one of the reasons why not all of the families allotted land and houses in Paniya have moved in. However, the position of the households resettled in Simaliya seems to be much better in comparison to the other two villages.

10.10 Earlier and present status of oustees

An attempt was also made to assess the resettlement status of the oustees in comparison to their status in their previous location, specifically with reference to land holding, size of family, house type, income, crops grown, inputs used, livestock and material possessions. Some of the information gathered is presented in table 10.5 (a).

Information on the resettlement status of the oustees indicates that the size of land holdings amongst all the resettled households was much greater than were their current land holdings in their resettlement sites. The size of their land holdings was reduced from seven to ten acres at the original sites to around five acres at the new sites. The difference in the earlier and present size of holding is much greater in the case of Paniya and Golagamdi (MP) resettlement households. By and large, all the households are now in possession of cement houses. The decrease in the average size of family in almost all cases is indicative of the fact that the families have been disrupted by scattered resettlement of the family members during the process of resettlement and rehabilitation. The policy related to allotment of land, in the initial stage, was biased against the oustees from Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh, as they were not allotted the five acres of land per every adult member of a displaced family. Rather, only the head of the households

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEMS</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Paniya</th>
<th>Simaliya</th>
<th>Golagamdi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gujarat</td>
<td>MP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Landholding (acres)</td>
<td>Present</td>
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<td>5.16</td>
<td>4.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Earlier</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>7.74</td>
<td>7.87</td>
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<td>House (cement)</td>
<td>Present</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Earlier</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Family Size</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>6.12</td>
<td>5.44</td>
<td>5.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Earlier</td>
<td>11.64</td>
<td>9.36</td>
<td>7.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of HHs With More Income</td>
<td>Present</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Earlier</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Primary Survey, 2004*
were considered eligible to receive the specified size of land. Such a policy created a disadvantageous situation for them and as a result many of the elderly members of their family preferred to remain in their original communities. Today, many of those households that did not remain in the same families as a result of the resettlement process feel the pain of being separated from their kith and kin.

In contrast to the assumption that the new sites have increased the income of the displaced persons, the majority of the households' income decreased. However, the Golagamdi (Gujarat) resettlement households, which experienced an increase in income, are an exception.

10.11 Agriculture

The study of the resettlement sites in comparison to the previous homes of the resettled people was undertaken to understand the effect of rehabilitation on the agricultural practice of the resettled population. It is interesting to note that the tribes cultivated a variety of crops in their home villages before they were submerged, whereas at the resettlement sites the variety of crops is rather limited. However, the resettlement process seems to have introduced the tribes to modern agricultural inputs, which perhaps they had not been previously exposed to. The oustees from both Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh used to grow similar type of crops such as bulrush millet, maize and red gram as major food crops, while at the new sites they were found to be cultivating only wheat – table 10.5 (b).

10.12 Forest, livestock and material possessions

The livelihood of the tribal communities in their previous sites/locations was primarily dependent on forest resources and livestock. The primitive activities including crop cultivation at the previous sites were not intense. The abundance of land and access to forest resources at the earlier sites might have discouraged dependency on agriculture. The land has now become the centre of economic activity for the majority of households at the new sites. The inhabitants did not have a monetary economy at the previous sites, instead trading was done mostly through barter system. The exposure of the tribal community to the market economy in the resettlement sites compelled them to earn their livelihood in the competing environ of a developed non-tribal community. Their managerial capabilities related to money matters are poor and hence they are prone to have low levels of savings and investments. In the new site, the access to (a) money in cash, (b) amenities like
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>Crops &amp; Inputs</th>
<th>Paniya</th>
<th>Simaliya</th>
<th>Golagamdi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gujarat</td>
<td>MP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earlier Average Crop Area (Acres)</td>
<td>Red Gram</td>
<td>3.93</td>
<td>2.26</td>
<td>3.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>3.66</td>
<td>1.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bulrush Millet</td>
<td>4.07</td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>4.42</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.48</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Other Pulses</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Caster</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>4</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present Average Crop Area (Acres)</td>
<td>Red Gram</td>
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<td>1.57</td>
<td>1.63</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maize</td>
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<td>1.55</td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Bulrush Millet</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>1.42</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Cotton</td>
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<td>1.75</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wheat</td>
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<td>2.75</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Caster</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>1.68</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrigation Practiced (No. of HH)</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inputs (Earlier) (No. of HH)</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fertilizers</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pesticides</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Org. Manure</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HY-SEED</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TR-SEED</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Plough (W)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Plough (I)</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tractor</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pump</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hired Labour</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inputs (Present) (No of HH)</td>
<td>Fertilizers</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pesticides</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Org. Manure</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>27</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HYV Seeds</td>
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<td>25</td>
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<tr>
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<td>TRD Seeds</td>
<td>18</td>
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<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Plough (W)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Plough (I)</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tractor</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pump</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hired Labour</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Primary Survey, 2004
drinking water sources other than river, lake or pond, (c) revenue land and ownership, and (d) other community infrastructure has changed their socio-cultural characteristics. This can be better understood by studying their present access to land, forest and material possessions.

In addition to agricultural practices, the study also investigated the status of the resettled population with respect to their use of forest resources, possession of livestock and material assets (see table 10.5c).

The tribes in their original location had access to forest resources in the vicinity, such resources are completely absent in the resettlement sites. Bereft of the alternative resource base, i.e. forest, the tribes in the present location derive sustenance by selling their labour. There seems to be a drastic negative change between the earlier and present sites in terms of the possession of livestock among the resettled households. As was observed during the field investigation, lack of grazing land/forest around the resettled sites has compelled the households to leave their li-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 10.5 (c)</th>
<th>Resettlement Status: Forest, Livestock and Material Possession</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Item</td>
<td>Paniya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gujarat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest Resource Use (No. of HHs)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earlier</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earlier Average No. of Livestock</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milch Cattle</td>
<td>20.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bullock</td>
<td>6.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>45.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present Average No. of Livestock</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milch Cattle</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bullock</td>
<td>2.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>8.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material Possession (Earlier)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Bicycle</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bullock Cart</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two Wheeler</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron Chest</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fan</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Material Possession (Present)</td>
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<td>Bicycle</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bullock Cart</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two Wheeler</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron Chest</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fan</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Primary Survey, 2004
vestock behind in their original villages with their relatives. A lower level of livestock possession would definitely have a negative economic impact on the resettled households. However, the resettled population today has a much wider range of material possessions at its disposal in comparison to the range of possessions they had at their earlier locations. The ownership of items such as electric fans, televisions, bicycles, and iron chests has increased at the resettlement sites. The increased use of bullock carts at the resettlement sites implies that the communities were now more inclined to be involved in agricultural occupations.

10.13 Problems at the resettlement sites

Finally, to understand the problems of the resettled population at the new sites in terms of economic, socio-psychological and political spheres of life, issues pertaining to unemployment, financial difficulty, food shortages, disruption of family and social isolation, children’s education, political and social relationships with the host population, time spent in finally settling down at the new site and compensation received for displacement were investigated (see table 10.5d).

Table 10.5d indicates that the resettled populations studied have universally faced problems relating to economic as well as social life. The majority of the households are experiencing financial difficulty, debt burden, unemployment and food shortage. The allotment of land and houses to every adult member of the project-affected families has created a situation of social isolation and separation among the family members. Most of the respondents revealed to the investigator that the older generation instead preferred to withdraw further inside the forest along with their livestock and other possessions rather than be resettled in another area. The socially heterogeneous village Simaliya seems to have socio-political conflict between the host and the resettled population. Drinking water remains a problem for the resettled population of two villages, namely Paniya and Simaliya, where the tube wells provided for the purpose yield hard water.

10.14 Overall perception

The resettled tribal people have increased access to an improved variety of seeds, irrigation facility, fertilizers and pesticides. The proximity of the present sites to urban centres and access to a better transport system has enhanced the mobility prospects of the resettled population. However, the resettled population finds it very difficult to adjust to the
alien market-centred economy. The land ownership pattern among the resettled families has changed and has resulted in the breakdown of the joint family system of property ownership. The level of social insecurity among the surveyed resettled tribal population seems to have increased. Though the agricultural extension officers from government and non-government organisations have also provided help, the resettled people told researchers that they still miss their forest resources and vast grazing land for their cattle.

Access to basic infrastructure such as a dispensary, education, a market and drinking water has increased for most of the oustees, so also their aspirations and demands. The constant exposure to media that they previously had no experience of and access to markets has raised their awareness and led them to demand access to more of such facilities. Initially the resettled populations were satisfied with the relief and rehabilitation that they received but as about a decade has passed since the study was undertaken by the author in year 2004, they have realised

Table 10.5 (d) Problems at the Resettlement Sites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>Problem Type</th>
<th>Paniya</th>
<th>Simaliya</th>
<th>Golagamdi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rehabilitation Problems (No. of HHs)</td>
<td>Financial Difficulty</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td>Debt Burden</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Shortage</td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Isolation</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Disturbed</td>
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<td>16</td>
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<td>Distance From Family</td>
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<td>19</td>
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<tr>
<td>Children’s Education</td>
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<td>Hostile Host Population</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>Local Power Structure</td>
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<td>No Market</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
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<td>Drinking Water</td>
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<td>Others</td>
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<td>3</td>
</tr>
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<td>Time Lapse (No. of HHs)</td>
<td>&lt; 1 Year</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1-2 Years</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>2-3 Years</td>
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<td>12</td>
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<td></td>
<td>&gt; 3 Years</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compensation Spent On (No. of HHs)</td>
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<tr>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Primary Survey, 2004
the shortcomings of the package they were given and some have even alleged that the government has duped them.

The displacement of the tribes has decreased their access to common property resources in most cases. However, with the passage of time, the younger generation (rather than the older generation) seems to be much more satisfied with the improved common social and economic facilities. The resettled populations now have easy access to the political, social and economic network of the state, which the tribes were missing in their earlier locations. Their vulnerability of being exploited in monetary, social and cultural terms by various interest groups seems to have increased. Internal groupings have started to emerge within the community as a result of different stands taken against particular issues that were negligible or absent under the earlier traditional tribal social set-ups. The interaction and integration with the host community howsoever cordial would be difficult for the tribes to maintain in the absence of a strong leadership among the resettled community. Traditionally each tribe in India displays different social identities and ethos. Resettlement of different tribal communities at one site has not only resulted in differential patterns of interaction and integration between the tribes but also between them and the host populations. At the socio-psychological level the search for individual tribal identity would take a direction in further research that needs to be observed and analysed regarding resettlement sites. The pattern would certainly vary from Rathwa to Vasa and from Bhil to Tadvi tribes. In some cases it may be possible to maintain a separate identity and develop a specific pattern of interaction with the host and other communities. But the initial acceptance of the hosts, which is a reflection of the kind of compensation and persuasion exercised by government officials, might decline over a period of time and result in the alienation from or conflict with the resettlers.

10.15 Findings

Rehabilitation of the oustees was done based on the basic guidelines adopted at the recommendation of the NWDT and under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Law. Though under the pressure of certain non-governmental organisations the rehabilitation authorities increased the compensation that was distributed, much remains to be accomplished in terms of the complete rehabilitation of these displaced populations. As is evident from the present study the rehabilitated population suffers from economic, socio-psychological and at times political difficulties. Broadly speaking:

- Despite the fact that the approach taken to rehabilitation in this case was based purely on economic considerations, the new settlers have
suffered from economic disadvantages owing to decreased size of landholding and livestock population, reduction in family income and compulsive single reliance on agricultural pursuits.

- The policy of allocating land and houses to every individual adult member of a family has, in fact, rendered much harm to the social ethos and security of the rehabilitated tribal population.
- Under the present setup, the displaced segment of the tribal population finds itself in the midst of a completely alien society with which it may take generations to adjust, assimilate and absorb.
- On certain occasions the resettled population has no place in the power structure/decision-making body of the host village.

10.16 Conclusion

The issue of rehabilitation is not a linear phenomenon rather it is a dialectical process involving views of both proponents as well as opponents. The resettlement sites in the study area present the outcome of the constricted approach adopted by the project authorities, which seems by and large unconcerned with the socio-psychological aspects of rehabilitation. The policy interventions cannot be based merely on economic considerations of the displaced persons but should also incorporate socio-psychological parameters. The word ‘rehabilitation’ itself connotes restating the original status of the displaced. It is clear that although satisfaction has been partially achieved in economic terms, there has been a failure in providing socio-psychological satisfaction to the displaced families.

It is of utmost importance that Indian rehabilitation policies for displaced people take into consideration not only economic parameters but also the socio-psychological aspects of the affected populations. Those concerned with rehabilitation of tribes displaced due to construction of large-scale projects must pay sufficient attention to these aspects of the life and culture of the oustees.

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11.1  Introduction

In March 2006, a symposium was jointly held by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the International Organization for Migration on ‘How should Japan respond to the issue of foreigners?’ (*Gaikokujin mondai ni do taisho subeki ka?*). At the symposium, the Senior Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Shiozaki Yasuhisa, stressed that the continued march of globalisation, in concert with Japan’s greying population, low birth rates and the continued influx of both illegal and legal foreigners has compelled Japan to seriously consider the manner in which they deal with foreign residents. His statements reified that as of 2005, Japan’s population began to decline owing to low birth rates, a reality that will affect the country’s future economic vitality.

Like other nations, Japan is using foreign workers to compensate for this depopulation trend. As a result, Japan has once revised its immigration policy to accommodate its labour shortage. According to the Immigration Control Bureau of Japan, the number of foreigners living, working and studying in Japan reached 2,152,973 in 2007 representing 1.69 per cent of the total population (Figure 11.1). This number represented a 46 per cent increase in the number of registered foreigners compared with 1994. This figure does not include the number of known illegal foreign residents, which according to the Ministry of Justice has climbed to 207,299. Moreover, the number of foreign residents could be much higher if we consider those children that come from international marriages called *daburu* in Japan as well as the large number of naturalised foreign residents.
Local governments are responding to increasing numbers of foreigners in their communities by planning and implementing Tabunka Kyosei (multicultural coexistence initiatives). These practices centre on inclusionism and pluralism, principles that enable foreign residents to realise their rights and fulfill their obligations as municipal residents. Multicultural coexistence practices also aim to diffuse intercultural friction through cultural awareness, language and exchange programs. The end result of these practices is the facilitation of the integration of a growing foreigner minority population.

This chapter compares the multicultural coexistence practices of two municipalities in the Tokyo Metropolis (TM) to illustrate how local governments are overcoming the challenges of growing numbers of foreigners living in their traditional monoculture society. Specifically, the objective of this chapter is to identify differences and similarities between the local government multicultural coexistence practices. Shinjuku Ward and Adachi Ward have been chosen as case studies because they possess a multicultural coexistence plan, they have a large and diverse number of foreign residents and the author is familiar with both municipalities owing to his four years work experience at a local government in the TM.
11.2 Multicultural coexistence in Shinjuku and Adachi Wards

Japan is usually associated with xenophobia and discrimination against foreign residents. Notwithstanding this reputation for intolerance, multicultural coexistence initiatives, that is practices that are to varying degrees inclusive and pluralistic in nature, have been in existence in Japan since the 1960s. In 2006, three local governments in the TM released official multicultural coexistence plans and at the national level, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication released an official report on the promotion of multicultural coexistence in March 2006. Shinjuku and Adachi Wards are examples of local governments that have promulgated Tabunka Kyosei plans as of 2006. Each has a particular focus and orientation that meets their municipality's needs and direction and will be the focus of the second section in this paper.
11.2.1 Shinjuku Ward

Shinjuku Ward has a foreign population representing almost 10 per cent (9.72 per cent) of Shinjuku’s total population. This population is expected to increase to 30 per cent in the coming years. According to the 2007 statistics, Shinjuku’s total population was around 300,000, with nearly 30,000 being registered foreigners. Moreover, compared with 1995, Shinjuku Ward’s registered foreign population increased 50.3 per cent, from 18,815 in 1995 to 28,272 in 2005 (See table 11.1).

Contrasted with other wards in the TM, Shinjuku has by far the largest concentration and population of foreigners in addition to a relatively more diverse foreign resident population surpassing its nearest rival Adachi Ward by almost 7,000 foreign residents.

Shinjuku’s initial steps towards integrating their large and diverse foreign resident population was manifested as a concept (not policy) that strives to promote exchange between foreign and Japanese residents and to promote mutual understanding of culture and history in order to live together harmoniously. Key initiatives connected with this concept are: (1) creating a municipality that is easy to live in, (2) deepening the understanding of local foreign residents of Japanese residents and (3) creating a municipality in which foreign residents can live easily alongside their Japanese counterparts.

Each of the above initiatives includes several sub-initiatives. For example, in the case of ‘Creating a municipality which is easy to live in’ the sub-initiatives include: (1) the provision of easy to understand and accessible information, (2) placing information that is easy to understand on bulletin boards throughout the community, (3) establishment of advisory bureaus where foreign residents can receive counsel and (4) enrichment of opportunities for foreigners to learn Japanese. These sub-initiatives revolve around access and quality of information. Previously, most information on everything from education to vaccinations was only available in Japanese, inadvertently creating an insurmountable hurdle for foreign residents without Japanese language proficiency.

Table 11.1 Percent increase/population of Registered Foreigners in Shinjuku Ward, the Tokyo Metropolitan Area and Japan in 1995, 2000 and 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Registered Foreign Population in 1995</th>
<th>Registered Foreign Population in 2000</th>
<th>Registered Foreign Population in 2005</th>
<th>Percent increase from 1995 through 2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1,354,011</td>
<td>1,556,113</td>
<td>1,973,747</td>
<td>45.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td>265,359</td>
<td>286,648</td>
<td>353,826</td>
<td>33.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shinjuku</td>
<td>18,815</td>
<td>21,780</td>
<td>28,272</td>
<td>50.30%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: This material was obtained at the February 2006 International Exchange Forum Conference in Tokyo, Japan in which a representative from Shinjuku Ward gave a lecture on the multicultural coexistence policies in Shinjuku Ward.
Information-centred, these particular initiatives aim to increase the flow of information, access to that information and increase the independence of minority foreign resident groups living in the Shinjuku in order to maximise the ability of non-Japanese residents to fully realise their rights but also fulfill their obligations as Shinjuku residents.

The second initiative of ‘deepening the understanding of local foreign residents of Japanese residents’ includes two sub-initiatives: (1) holding of exchange events to learn about each other’s culture and customs and (2) programmes to encourage Japanese and foreign residents to respect each other as individuals rather than as juxtaposed groups. Here, the focus of measures clearly is centred on breaking down cultural stereotypes that might manifest as intercultural friction or, worse, ethnic violence as in the banlieu of Paris in 2005. Knowledge about cultures and customs of residents living in Shinjuku helps to cross the boundary between the known and the unknown, that is Japanese and the other with the intention of forging a shared identity based on familiarity with differences.

The third measure of ‘creating a municipality in which foreign residents can live easily alongside their Japanese counterparts’ also consists of two sub-initiatives: (1) creation of publications that build mutual awareness and (2) creation of opportunities to introduce one’s mother tongue and culture. In this third case, sub-measures support and reinforce the collectiveness of the Shinjuku community as well as respect for one’s ethnic background. At least in theory, no longer do minorities have to hide their backgrounds, mother tongues and cultures as seen in the past, now communities can practice pluralism openly and proactively.

Part and parcel of realising these measures, Shinjuku established the Shinjuku Multicultural Coexistence Plaza, a centre for information exchange, advisory services, Japanese and foreign language instruction and cultural exchange events. Through the vehicle of the Shinjuku Foundation for Culture and International Exchange, Shinjuku’s quasi-governmental foundation has budgeted for international understanding projects, international exchange programmes, multicultural coexistence projects as well as other projects.

The activities and projects that Shinjuku is pursing in its overall multicultural coexistence objectives demonstrate Shinjuku’s commitment to ensuring that the minority resident community do not become a burden to the municipal government and the Japanese residents of Shinjuku. Japanese language classes and cultural classes provide participating residents with the rudimentary skills they need to manoeuvre through the complexities of life in Japan as a foreign resident. Multilingual advisory services and publications also complement the aforementioned
projects by ensuring that all resident foreigners are aware of their rights and responsibilities as residents of Shinjuku.

The rationale behind these kinds of information, publications and advisory services is that if minorities are kept abreast of their rights and responsibilities, and if they have language and cultural skills they will not cause intercultural friction or be a burden on the Shinjuku local government and community. This strategy includes contributing to and receiving when necessary social welfare, pensions, national health care, education subsidies and child subsidies among others benefits. Providing language and culture training as well as multilingual services is meant to decrease the chances that minority workers are exploited and increases their ability and desire to seek medical, legal and other kinds of services when the need arises. In short, these initiatives ensure that minorities can and are fulfilling and realising their obligations as residents.

Shinjuku recognises that the proportion of minorities living in Shinjuku will increase in coming years, and that without the necessary infrastructure these new residents will find integration into Shinjuku, either for the short term or long term, challenging. Multicultural coexistence activities such as those mentioned above temper the severity of this challenge, attenuating cultural friction that may occur and limiting the potentially negative impact that poorly integrated foreign residents may have.

In terms of a fully inclusive municipality, Shinjuku remains aloof to the idea of voting rights for all residents and voting rights for long-term residents. According to the managing director of international exchange at Shinjuku’s Shinjuku Foundation for Culture and International Exchange:

Multicultural coexistence practices are not about creating a municipality that minorities want to come to, rather is about maintaining the integrity of the Japanese community, ensuring that the foreigners that do settle temporarily or for the long term do not disrupt the traditional patterns of Japanese life. Multicultural coexistence programmes provide foreign residents with knowledge about Japanese customs and manners so they can avoid causing problems with Japanese residents. Moreover, multicultural coexistence practices are not about voting rights for foreigners (interviewed 21 September 2006).

The investment in Japanese language programmes for foreigners is also an illustrative example of Shinjuku’s limited inclusionistic multicultural coexistence practices. Similar to other wards in the TMA, Shinjuku organises, liaises and provides support in the form of facilities and net-
working. In terms of budgetary prioritisation, Japanese language classes for foreigners are deemed important enough to devote nearly 4.5 million yen. The rationale behind this investment is that with cultural familiarity and Japanese skills, foreigners will be less of a disruption as they will be more independent.

It should be mentioned that the Japanese language classes offered by Shinjuku and most of the other municipalities in the TM are not the equivalent to English as a Second Language (ESL) instruction or in Japan’s case, Japanese as a Second Language (JSL). Rather, they are introductory, beginner and intermediate Japanese conversation courses that aim to facilitate the lives of foreigners while living in Japan. Classes are conducted by volunteer teachers who receive training from Shinjuku-sponsored Japanese language teaching programmes. They are not professional or certificate programmes, rather seminars in which volunteers instruct participants on how to teach Japanese at an elementary level. This quasi-commitment to language training leaves questions as to the degree to which foreign residents can fully access the Shinjuku community with only rudimentary Japanese language conversational, reading and writing skills.

Despite this shortcoming, Shinjuku’s multicultural coexistence strategy and practices include multilingual publications to ensure that important information is conveyed to all residents. The most recent focus has been on multicultural disaster training.

Multicultural disaster training, one of the pillars of today’s multicultural coexistence practices was conceived following the Hanshin Earthquake in 1995, which highlighted that the most vulnerable residents in disaster situations are the old, the sick, the disabled and foreign residents who often are handicapped by limited linguistic skills and lack of cultural savvy for full community integration. To pre-empt a similar tragedy from occurring in Shinjuku, the ward has provided nearly a million yen for multicultural disaster training and nearly 15 million yen for multilingual publications that provide information on what to do in the case of a disaster. Notwithstanding the quality and volume of information that has been produced for foreign residents, the managing director of International Exchange stated that Shinjuku still faces challenges in getting this information out to foreign residents, getting foreign residents to participate in training exercises and raising their awareness of community facilities and preparations in case of emergencies.

What is more, the managing director asserted that obstacles to distribution of this information and obstacles to participation barrier were compounded by pre-existing minority communities. For example, Filipinos that settled in Shinjuku had contact with other Filipinos through church communities where they received information on Shinjuku, the TM and Japan in general. Similarly, those of Korean heritage networked
with already established Korean communities in Shinjuku. In a similar manner, Chinese newcomers networked with pre-existing Chinese communities in the ward for work, information and camaraderie. Despite these challenges to conveying important information about living in Shinjuku such as health care enrolment, vaccination schedules, the filing of taxes etc., disaster training for foreign residents takes place at least once a year in Japanese, Chinese, English and Korean.

A plethora of explanations exist for the low levels of participation of foreign and Japanese residents in Shinjuku’s multicultural coexistence activities. First, as previously mentioned foreigners who settle in Shinjuku gravitate to ethnic centres where they can get information in their own languages, find employment and communicate with those who share the same culture and mother tongue. Consequently, these foreigners unintentionally isolate themselves from Shinjuku society at large. The end result is detachment from the needs of the Shinjuku community.

Second, another important factor in the lack of involvement of foreign residents in Shinjuku could be related to visa status and forced repatriation. These concerns have manifested themselves in many kinds of services, information and programmes that contribute to overcoming language, cultural obstacles and importantly worries related to infringement of visa status at events targeted at foreign residents such as the Tokyo Relay (a rotating, legal counselling services offered free to foreign residents).

Third and lastly, apathy and resignation are often cited as reasons why foreign residents do not become more involved in the local community. In interviews conducted in 2003 in Shinjuku as part of the Shinjuku municipal government’s efforts to find a direction for their multicultural coexistence policies, many foreign residents voiced the opinion that they wanted to participate in Shinjuku society but felt that it was difficult owing to cultural differences with the Japanese, that they lacked opportunities to participate, and that existing possibilities for participation were not attractive as they were cast in the role of guest (vs. host) and were not viewed as co-residents of Shinjuku.

On the cultural side, Shinjuku’s municipal government is implementing its initiative to create a society in which all cultures are respected and can be openly expressed through cultural exchange events, international festivals and foreign language classes. Still, activities tend to juxtapose Japanese culture against foreign cultures, diminishing the sense of togetherness or multicultural coexistence as a community, as illustrated by the events such as the Korean Correspondent Fashion Show and Japanese speech contest for foreigners. This juxtaposition of cultures and treatment of foreigners as Nobue Suzuki’s ‘undifferentiated mass’ leaves questions as to whether or not multicultural coexis-
The Shinjuku municipal government broaches its multicultural coexistence practices collectively and comprehensively. Specifically, no less than 21 departments, sections, foundations or municipal facilities are involved in multicultural coexistence policy and practice. Each administrative bureau puts forth its own multicultural coexistence activity. For example, the Taxation Department publishes material on how to pay residential income tax, the Health Department provides information on AIDS prevention in multiple languages, and the Department of Education provides supplementary Japanese language instruction and has produced a multilingual CD guide on ‘Japanese school lifestyle’. Most innovatively, Shinjuku’s attempts to ensure that all foreigners are educated about how to manage and succeed in their lives in Shinjuku have manifested themselves into the production of a multilingual video.

Although each section maximises opportunities for foreign residents to fully integrate themselves into mainstream Japanese life through inclusionary lifestyle assistance programs, there is the noteworthy absence of the Electoral Department in this process, again reifying Shinjuku’s commitment to limited inclusionism by not granting or at least considering some form of political participation for foreign residents and more significantly long-term permanent residents.

Examining Shinjuku’s multicultural practices we see that they do promote a degree of inclusionism and pluralism. Foreign residents are now able to access all administrative services, no longer or at least less handicapped by linguistic barriers. Moreover, both their human rights and to a certain degree their civic rights have been protected, with access to all social welfare programmes, education and other local government services. However, even long-term residents have not been given the right to vote, or be represented.

In terms of pluralism, Shinjuku is making attempts to ensure that all cultures present in Shinjuku can be expressed openly through cultural exchange programmes, the establishment of the Shinjuku Multicultural Centre and by holding foreign language classes. Still, the penchant to juxtapose Japanese culture and Japanese residents as opposed to foreign residents sets up a dichotomy, a guest-host paradigm that places the two groups in opposition to each other. In this sense, Shinjuku’s multicultural coexistence policies and practices are embodiments of both limited inclusionism and pluralism.

11.2.2 Adachi Ward

Adachi bases the relevance of its multicultural coexistence practices on two facts. First and foremost, Adachi demonstrates quantifiably that
multicultural coexistence policy has become a necessity as the population of registered foreign residents in the ward has increased to 21,405 as of 1 January 2006. This is a nearly threefold increase in the number of resident foreigners since 1980.

To elaborate, in 1980, 95.6 per cent of the foreign population was composed of ethnic Koreans. However, beginning in the 1980s, newcomers, primarily from China and the Philippines began to settle in Adachi because of its relatively inexpensive cost of living. Currently, the demographic distribution has altered dramatically since the 1980s with ethnic Koreans also known as oldcomers only representing 41.7 per cent of the foreign resident population. The next two largest groups of foreigners are Chinese, at 28.5 per cent, and Philippinos at 17 per cent. Other significant numbers include Thais (1.8 per cent), Brazilians (1.5 per cent), Pakistanis (0.9 per cent), Americans (0.8 per cent) and Vietnamese (0.8 per cent). By 2025, Adachi’s foreign population is predicted to rise to 40,000 or 6.7 per cent of the total municipal population. Surprisingly, by 2050 the foreign population of Adachi is predicted to rise to 70,000 (approximately 14.7 per cent of the municipal population). This figure is higher than even some countries with a history of immigration (see table 11.2). With this expected rise in foreign population and in particular the prediction that the newcomers will be predominantly of Asian origin, Adachi is predicting that problems associated with national health care, education and housing will occur as seen in the past.

Indeed, Adachi has been transformed since the 1980s from a predo-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country, Region or Ward</th>
<th>Foreign Population (Estimated)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>4.6% (1999)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>5.5% (1999)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>9.7% (2002)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>12.1% (2005)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>21.8% (2001)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1.6% (2004)◎</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TMA</td>
<td>2.8%(2004)◎</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shinjuku</td>
<td>9.72% (2004)▲</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adachi</td>
<td>6.7% (2005)○</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* ILO website and the Center for Immigration Studies website US Census Bureau
minately Japanese municipality to one that hosts a large and diverse popula-

tion of foreign residents. This increased presence of minority groups in the ward has been felt by Japanese residents. According to the August 2005 survey ‘The 34 Annual Household Census’ which included a section on multicultural coexistence, 14.1 per cent of Japanese residents in Adachi hope for ‘the number of foreigners to increase in the future’, 61.4 per cent ‘don’t care either way’ and 22.3 per cent ‘hope that the number of foreigners does not change’.

Those who were positive about the number of foreigners increasing in Adachi cited increased chances for cultural exchange including language exchanges as their rationale for their answer. Those who replied negatively cited worries related to increased crime, differences related to cultural and lifestyle, differences with regards to thinking and, finally, increased social costs.

In the aforementioned survey, enquiries were made related to the manner in which the municipal government should carry out its internationalisation. Adachi registered Japanese were asked about the initiatives found in Table 11.3.

Responses are indicative of Japanese residents’ awareness of foreign residents living in Adachi. Moreover, these responses highlight what Japanese residents feel should be prioritized vis-à-vis the integration of foreigners into Adachi emphasising language training, Japanese culture and rule awareness and advisory services being at the top of the agenda. As a result of this survey, the citizen responses to the aforementioned 2005 survey have been incorporated to some extent into multicultural coexistence practice.

In response to a questionnaire and interview conducted with the coordinating manager of Adachi’s Multicultural Coexistence Management Section, Adachi’s municipal government has prioritised promoting world peace, mutual understanding, ‘internationalisation’ of the local community, facilitating the lives of foreigners, promoting more interaction between the foreign and Japanese residents of Adachi Ward and creating a multicultural coexistent society. Moreover, when asked about the direction of evolution of Adachi’s vehicle of internationalisation and its relationship to the Multicultural Coexistence Management Section, the coordinating manager agreed that the overall direction of policy has changed from an emphasis on cultural programs to supporting local foreign residents. However, despite this transition, Adachi’s internationalisation organ still emphasises international understanding and cultural programmes and, according to the managing director, would like to expand these kinds of programmes at the elementary school level.

The structure of Adachi’s overall multicultural coexistence plan is based on the fundamental principle of ‘richness in difference’. Supported by four additional basic initiatives, the municipal government’s
Creating multicultural coexistence in Adachi with the cooperation of people with different mother tongues, culture and customs. The basic initiatives are:

1. communication assistance;
2. lifestyle assistance;
3. the creation of a multicultural coexistent municipality; and
4. the setting up of multicultural coexistence measures.

Under the rubric of communication assistance, Adachi has put forward three concrete initiatives including: (1) providing lifestyle information, (2) instructions for information bulletins and (3) enrichment of Japanese language volunteer classrooms. This information is distributed to all municipal facilities including police stations. The enrichment of Japanese language volunteer classes takes the form of creating a network

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**Table 11.3** Adachi resident responses to future direction of Internationalization in Adachi Ward and what area the municipal government should prioritize its resources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Questions related to the future direction of Internationalization in Adachi Ward and what area the municipal government should prioritize its resources.</th>
<th>Those who responded positively to the following question</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Increase foreigner advisory services at the city hall reception windows</td>
<td>96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Strengthen the Japanese language programs for those foreigners who cannot speak Japanese</td>
<td>70.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Hold seminars/courses on lifestyle rules in Japan</td>
<td>64.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Increase the amount of information available in foreign languages at municipal facilities</td>
<td>64.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Expand the cultural exchange activities at Adachi’s International Festival</td>
<td>39.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Expand assistance to foreigners starting companies or interested in working</td>
<td>37.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Enrich education related to foreign cultures and languages at local schools and in the local municipality</td>
<td>37.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Promote citizen based international exchange, cultivate an international exchange group</td>
<td>32.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Increase chances for foreign residents to share their views and participate politically</td>
<td>23.60%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Table extrapolated from information found in the Adachi Ward Multicultural Coexistence Promotion Plan

stresses ‘Creating multicultural coexistence in Adachi with the cooperation of people with different mother tongues, culture and customs’. The basic initiatives are:

1. communication assistance;
2. lifestyle assistance;
3. the creation of a multicultural coexistent municipality; and
4. the setting up of multicultural coexistence measures.
between Japanese language volunteer groups, establishing Japanese language classrooms targeted at children and including cultural elements into Japanese language classrooms.

As in Shinjuku, these initiatives aim to include all foreign residents in the ‘information loop’ that exists within Adachi by providing multilingual information at a host of locations. Importantly, they tap into localities and facilities that foreign residents would make use of in their daily life such as libraries, cultural facilities, train stations and local bulletin boards. Unfortunately, according to the coordinating manager of the Multicultural Coexistence Unit, this distribution system is somewhat incomplete because at present there are no connections with local grassroots organisations that are frequented by foreign residents, for example churches where ethnic Filipinos often gather. In fact, when quizzed about the current obstacles to more effective multicultural coexistence, the manager echoed the comments raised by the local government public servant in Shinjuku Ward, who strongly believed that despite the need, lack of interest from Japanese and foreign residents has made it difficult to ensure that information is conveyed to all residents.

This problem is magnified by the absence of ‘orientation’ programmes that raise awareness among foreign residents of the resources available to them in Adachi, including where to find information in their own language. Also, Foreigner Registration Sections, the first and immediate entry point to local government for foreigners settling in Tokyo’s wards are almost always located in a different facility than the International Exchange Sections and Multicultural Sections, which are the sources for lifestyle information for foreigners. This often results in these sections being entirely missed by newcomers. Location considerations and staff who are often less than adept at communicating with foreigners in foreign languages compounds the transfer of information to newcomers.

Under the initiative of lifestyle assistance there are five specific measures including (1) educational assistance, (2) child-rearing assistance, (3) promotion of crisis and disaster management, (4) establishment of a management and labour office and (5) setting up a volunteer dispatch system. Where the number of communication assistance initiatives provide informational support for foreign residents, these initiatives are more structural in that they concentrate on education access and success, skill, knowledge and facility awareness in the case of a natural disaster, the provision of venues, opportunities and assistance for foreign residents to receive business ‘start-up’ assistance, liaising with Adachi economic groups, information exchange and networking opportu-
nities with Adachi businesses and assistance for economic activities.

All these initiatives embody inclusionism to some degree. Promotion and support for business activities by foreign residents, collaboration and exchanges with local Japanese business leaders and perhaps most importantly the recognition and implementation of these basic measures demonstrate Adachi’s vision of a ward in which all residents are contributors with potential to cooperate and succeed together.

Similarly, initiatives to establish nursery school facilities for foreign resident children, enhanced training for nursery school staff, educational advisory services, disaster training, aid for foreigners interested in starting their own companies and the creation of a group of volunteers that could be dispatched to help foreign residents when they encounter difficulties with educational, administrative or other living difficulties emphasise Adachi’s structural approach to multicultural coexistence. Structures are being established for foreign residents to not only be linguistically integrated in Adachi, but more significantly to weave themselves into the Adachi tapestry.

The third basic measure in Adachi’s multicultural coexistence is the creation of a multicultural coexistent municipality. This measure includes the creation of networks, the expansion of opportunities to participate in ward administration and planning, the creation of multicultural coexistence awareness, invitations to schools to conduct and participate in international cultural exchange awareness activities.

Adachi means to achieve these objectives by expanding exchanges with the Association for Overseas Technical Training, a network with overseas youth groups, by increasing the number of exchanges, application and publication of human resource information, by increasing opportunities for foreign residents to participate in local administration (such as through the yet-to-be established Multicultural Promotion Assembly) and by expanding opportunities for foreign residents to visit schools.

Taking a similar approach as in Shinjuku, in order to achieve these objectives Adachi has recruited the aid of a diverse group of administrative units including the Citizens Section, the Board of Education, the Youth Centre and the Cultural Promotion Section. Each has a particular role in helping realise Adachi’s multicultural coexistence policy and in this case the objective of creating a multicultural coexistent municipality.

For instance, the Board of Education is coordinating the clarification of ‘multicultural coexistence awareness’, while the Citizens Section is involved in planning and implementing events that represent this vision of multicultural coexistence. The Section of the Promotion of Sports
and the Cultural Promotion Section complements this collaboration by targeting youth and organising events for young people.

In contrast to Shinjuku, Adachi’s measures to create a multicultural coexistent community importantly include initiatives to establish a Foreign Resident Advisory Board to enable foreign residents to have a voice in ward administration. The establishment of this advisory board and efforts to include foreign residents in ward administration demonstrate Adachi’s commitment to political inclusionism.

In addition to the establishment of a Foreigner Advisory Board, Adachi is also currently investigating how to incorporate Teijusha Gaikokujin (Special permanent residents), sometimes called ‘permanently settled foreign residents’ into local referendums. Further, Adachi is also presently conducting research on adopting new legislation that would permit permanent residents voting privileges in local elections demonstrating its commitment to at least some level of inclusionism for foreign residents in terms of civic rights.

Finally, where the first three measures put forth by Adachi to achieve its multicultural coexistence vision revolve around participatory assistance, structural reform and legal reform, the establishment of a Multicultural Coexistence Promotion System institutionalises the vision of multicultural coexistence. This institutionalisation of the multicultural coexistence system includes the creation of formal municipal ordinances for the promotion of multicultural coexistence, and strengthening the networking with other municipalities, the Tokyo Metropolitan Government and other associations by broadening current multicultural coexistence policy information.

The establishment of a formal multicultural coexistence promotion system emphasises strengthening networks with other organisations that provide aid to foreign residents; collaboration in research, publishing and evaluation of programmes, although it does not specifically mention strengthening networks; and forming networks with local institutions and private groups in which foreign residents routinely participate including churches and ethnic associations. According to the coordinating manager of the Adachi Multicultural Coexistence Section, this has proved difficult in the past because foreign resident associations generally avoid formal associations with local governments or other levels of government. Moreover, the manager also emphasised that historically, the oldcomers/Zainichi Koreans generally faced little difficulty with language or culture, where their challenges were more in the realisation of basic human and civic rights and once those were fulfilled they no longer needed to be as vocal.

Adachi’s comprehensive strategy is very much related to the aforementioned prediction that the foreign population of Adachi will rise to represent 14.6 per cent of the total ward population by 2050. Moreover,
according to the ‘34th Annual Household Census’, not only is the number of foreigners predicted to increase, but so are the number of problems associated with absorbing a large number of non-Japanese speaking foreigners, for example problems related to education, employment and payment for and receiving of social welfare, as many other previous studies in Japan have shown.

On the basis of these predictions, Adachi has put forth a multicultural coexistence plan that aim to stem some if not all of the problems first identified in the Kanagawa 1984 Survey on the Living Conditions of Chinese and Korean Residents. Adachi’s planning has also taken into consideration the future impact of free trade agreements that are currently under negotiation with fifteen neighbouring Asian countries and their potential to increase the movement of people into Japan and into Adachi Ward. The plan has also taken into account the growing economic ties in the East Asian area and the shift in the centre of economic power to East Asia, which would result in a Japan and Adachi with increased numbers of foreign residents.

In short, Adachi’s multicultural coexistence practices take the form of participatory assistance in the form of language and cultural assistance, structural modification to promote participation in Adachi social welfare programmes, legal reform and the establishment of an advisory board to explore a degree of civic inclusionism and lastly, local government legal reform to institutionalise multicultural coexistence policy and practice.

In contrast to Shinjuku, Adachi’s multicultural coexistence practices are aiming to be more inclusive. Specifically, Adachi has made or is in the process of making structural reforms in its administrative services to allow for real participation rather than just language supplementation as seen in the Shinjuku case. The establishment of liaisons between foreign residents and Japanese people at the business level, cultural level and legislative level is allowing foreign residents to participate at all levels of Adachi society. Nevertheless, long-term foreign residents in Adachi, as in Shinjuku still do not have complete civic rights since they still are not legally eligible to vote.

Another noteworthy difference between Shinjuku and Adachi is the employment of a fulltime foreign resident employee to act as liaison/interpreter/translator for foreign residents. Full-time foreign staff complements the multicultural coexistence awareness measures, not only by acting as non-professional interpreters for foreign residents when special request are made, but by being involved in policy development, amendment and implementation.

In terms of promoting pluralism in the Adachi community, similarly with other wards in the TMA, Adachi sponsors culture exchange events, international cultural days and opportunities for Japanese residents to
learn about fellow residents and their native cultures. Multicultural coexistence awareness programs such as ‘guest teacher programmes’ introduce non-Japanese cultures to students in Adachi schools. Research is currently being carried on multinational curriculum for Adachi nursery schools. Culture events and international events on the other hand promote pride and awareness of the diversity that exists in Adachi.

In addition to initiatives to build multicultural coexistence awareness and fostering pluralism at nursery schools, the Board of Education in Adachi is conducting research into the manner in which it can incorporate multicultural coexistence into lifelong learning as part of its Adachi Ward Education Plan.

Whether or not the Adachi Board of Education can implement multicultural coexistence awareness into the classroom remains to be seen but to be sure it will have to find a way to incorporate this new emphasis into the mandatory curricula stipulated by Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT). In short, if Adachi’s Board of Education would like to add multicultural coexistence awareness to the mainstream education system in Adachi it will have to reach a compromise with the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology.

Despite these interesting and innovative programmes, a lingering trend remains that juxtaposes foreign cultures and foreign residents with Japanese culture and Japanese residents, as illustrated in the ‘guest teacher’ programme; the Children’s Assembly, which allows Japanese and foreign children in Adachi to exchange opinions; and the proposed Foreigners Assembly Advisory Board.

11.3 Conclusion

The differences between multicultural coexistence practices in Shinjuku and Adachi are a result of different demographic changes in their respective wards. Multicultural coexistence practices fomented inclusion and pluralism through structural changes, legal reform, institutional changes and participatory assistance initiatives that enable foreign residents to access and participate in their respective municipality. Specifically, both Shinjuku’s and Adachi’s participatory assistance included multilingual guides, signage and multilingual advisory services in an effort to remove linguistic and cultural barriers. Significantly, only Adachi engaged in structural changes and administrative changes such as hiring foreign staff and the planning and sponsoring of foreigner advisory assembly boards to encourage participation in Adachi social welfare programmes. Moreover, legal changes were exemplified by Adachi Ward with its initiatives to include foreign residents in local referenda. Both
municipalities engaged in institutional changes such as the institutionalisation of the multicultural coexistence system with the objective of the creation of formal municipal ordinances for the promotion of multicultural coexistence.

In both municipalities the same multicultural coexistence practices that leverage the realisation of inclusionism and pluralism are by design flawed. First, although they encourage cultural exchange and mutual understanding, they consistently reinforce differences rather than similarities and as a consequence strengthen ethnic and cultural identity rather than shared identity. This trend was further exacerbated by holding activities that are designed just for foreigners or Japanese, as opposed to residents of Shinjuku and Adachi.

In terms of inclusion at the local government level, current multicultural coexistence practice, in particular the provision of multilingual guides, signage and multilingual advisory services liberate foreign residents from linguistic obstacles to realising their limited civic rights and obligations. Paradoxically, by providing multilingual guides, signage and multilingual advisory services, local governments are removing the need for foreign residents to learn Japanese and thus fully integrate into Japanese society. It is difficult to imagine a fully inclusive society in which a segment of the population does not speak, read or write the dominant language at native or advanced levels.

Lastly, despite the weaknesses in the current multicultural coexistence practices oriented toward minority groups in Adachi and Shinjuku, these practices represent a step forward towards facilitating minority populations which can navigate through daily Japanese life, flourish in the areas of community involvement, provide access to services and avoid intercultural friction. By initially securing limited inclusionism and pluralism, local governments are laying the foundation for a Japanese society that recognises and celebrates pluralism while at the same time allows for minorities to better realise and fulfill their civic rights and obligations.
While the effects of the 1997 economic crisis wore down all of Asia, most countries on the continent are once again experiencing economic growth. This growth does not come without a cost, however, especially an environmental cost, which is the subject of numerous studies. There is also a huge social cost, which has caused many imbalances, particularly an increase in poverty. Even in a country like the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, where economic development has been much less spectacular than in neighbouring Vietnam or Thailand (Laos ranked 130th on the Human Development Index in 2005 (HDR 2007/2008)), unbalanced development remains an important issue. While urban areas, such as the capital city, Vientiane, Luang Prabang (included on UNESCO’s World Heritage Cities list), and Pakse and Savannakhet in the South, show obvious signs of economic growth, remote and rural areas, especially the mountainous provinces inhabited by minority groups, are still characterised by very harsh conditions. The gap seems to be widening between these two Laos. The following chapter focuses on development-oriented projects in the country’s mountainous areas, especially in the province of Luang Namtha, with a particular emphasis on the role of minority populations and on how the projects help protect the forests.

12.1 The official Lao classification of minorities

As is the case in many countries in Asia, the issue of minority groups in Laos is a sensitive one. The Lao represents the largest group among more than 47 officially recognised ethnic groups. Since the 1970s, the government has come forward with an original classification system based on the traditional natural environment in which each group usually lives, as opposed to a system based on linguistic differences (Hahn 1999). This classification includes three categories:

- The *Lao Loum* (Lowland Lao), live primarily in urban areas, such as the lowlands and along the Mekong River. They make up approximately 68 per cent of the total population. They are essentially ethnic
Lao; other groups whose cultures closely resemble the Lao Loum are included in this category.

- The *Lao Theung* (Upland Lao) populate the lower mountainous slopes. They are much less numerous, representing only about 22 per cent of the population.
- The *Lao Soung* (Highland Lao), the Lao equivalent of the highlanders or Montagnards, usually live at altitudes above 1,000 meters. Essentially, they inhabit remote areas. This group is the smallest; they make up about ten per cent of the total population.

While there is a significant social imbalance between urban (accessible) areas and rural (remote) provinces, uneven development in Laos also has an ethnic dimension. The poorest provinces are essentially inhabited by Lao Soung and Lao Theung. For historical, ideological and cultural reasons, the sustainable development of mountainous areas is not a priority for the state. This is partly explained by the role some of the Lao Soung played during the colonial era; they often took sides with the French. Furthermore, many Lao Soung have cultural customs considered primitive by the Lao majority, including slash-and-burn practices, which are still considered a major cause of deforestation in Southeast Asia by most governments and by certain researchers.

The government has shown some interest in the provinces inhabited by the Lao Soung. According to Evrard, the land policy implemented in the 1990s, land allocation procedures target primarily the ethnic minorities living in the mountainous areas, which account for more than 40 per cent of the total population, as these are the people that rely mostly on slash-and-burn activities (Evrard 2004). As many recent studies have shown, land allocation unfortunately has either weak positive impacts or negative effects on rural livelihoods, degradation being more frequent than improvement, especially in the North. Furthermore, the way the policy has been implemented in the mountains shows what little consideration the government has for the traditional practices and knowledge of the highlanders.

There is a vital need to address the critical economic, social and environmental problems in the mountainous and remote areas of Laos. Despite the limited accessibility of these regions, many development projects have been implemented there, often with the input of foreign NGOs and businesses in the private sector. Through the example of the province of Luang Namtha, this chapter intends to explain the specific challenges these development-oriented projects face in these areas. We will focus on how these projects operate between the public and private sector, and how they try to improve the economy of these provinces. Ultimately, the purpose of this research is to establish how successful de-
Development-oriented projects are at both protecting forests, often one of their principal goals, and reducing poverty.

12.2 Luang Namtha: Development based on natural and cultural resources

The province of Luang Namtha is located on the northwest tip of the country; it borders China and Burma (figure 12.1). The proximity of China has a huge impact, especially on foreign investments and infrastructure development. An important communication axis, Route 3, connecting Thailand to China, runs through the heart of the province and cuts directly through the Nam Ha National Protected Area (NPA). This highway has recently been upgraded (Marris et al. 2002), and is now one of the best roads in Northern Laos. Still, the province is not easily accessi-

Figure 12.1  Luang Namtha Province, including Nam Ha National Protected Area
ble from Vientiane, especially because Route 13B, which connects the capital city through Oudomxay and Luang Phrabang, is in very bad shape. Moreover, Luang Namtha airport is under construction, and has been throughout 2007.

Forty-seven per cent of the land in Laos is covered with forest. Remote and sparsely-populated Luang Namtha is one of the most forested provinces in the country. Most of its forest cover is located on steep slopes and in the 222,400 hectares of the Nam Ha National Protected Area (30 per cent of the province; see figure 12.2), established by Prime Minister’s Decree 164 in 1993 (GoL 2003). Despite concerns about the importance of a human presence in and around Nam Ha NPA and about the impacts of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) corridor around Route 3 (Marris et al. 2002), natural forest is still a strong asset for the province.

Luang Namtha is the province showing the highest number of different ethnic groups in Laos, each district having a specific and distinct ethnic composition. Despite the hilly topography, most villages are located in valleys or very close to the roads, which is uncharacteristic of minorities described as ‘Hill tribes’. Evrard indicates that the relation-
ship between Montagnards (Lao Soung) and the Thai ethnic group, which traditionally would be an issue, is complementary because of the specific context of the region (Evrard 2001).

**Figure 12.2 Path of Route 3 across Nam Ha National Protected Area**

Since the country opened its frontiers to international tourists, Luang Namtha has been a leader in ecotourism in Laos. From 1998 to 2005, the number of tourists visiting the province each year has increased from 18,600 to over 49,000 (LNTA 2005a). These numbers represent five to seven per cent of the country’s annual tourist market. The rise in tourism in Luang has been built upon two of the province’s major assets: its cultural diversity and the Nam Ha National Protected Area.

**12.3 Development through ecotourism: The Nam Ha UNESCO project**

Since the country opened its frontiers to international tourists, Luang Namtha has been a leader in ecotourism in Laos. From 1998 to 2005, the number of tourists visiting the province each year has increased from 18,600 to over 49,000 (LNTA 2005a). These numbers represent five to seven per cent of the country’s annual tourist market. The rise in tourism in Luang has been built upon two of the province’s major assets: its cultural diversity and the Nam Ha National Protected Area.
With these two features, Luang can potentially follow in the footsteps of Chiang Mai in Thailand and Lao Cai in Vietnam and become a cultural tourism destination. What distinguishes Luang Namtha, however, is the fact that its ecotourism industry simultaneously takes advantage of both the cultural and ecological aspects of this destination (photo 12.2).

As well as being officially managed by the Provincial Tourist Office (PTO) the reason the province has become a leader in ecotourism is because since the late 1990s, its activities geared towards an increase in tourism have been efficiently structured and organised, especially through input from projects such as the Nam Ha Ecotourism Project. This project was implemented by the Lao National Tourism Authority (LNTA) in 1999, under the leadership of UNESCO, with funding from the Government of New Zealand and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) of Japan (Lyttleton & Allcock 2002).

**Photo 12.2** Akha villagers near Muang Sing, Luang Namtha Province. Ethnic diversity is a major asset for ecotourism in the province

Its goals were the social and economic development of ethnic villagers living in and around Nam Ha NPA, having limited access to market commodities or social support services. The project assumed that tourists would help reduce poverty by bringing money directly into largely subsistence communities by paying for food and lodging. The project also gave the Provincial Tourist Authority the means to manage a separate fund, generated from tourist trekking fees, specifically designated
to assist in livelihood improvement. Another project goal has been to use tourism as a tool for forest biodiversity conservation (photo 12.3). By giving villagers a larger economic base, ecotourism intends to reduce their reliance on forest resources. This is particularly relevant around the Nam Ha NPA, where many villages can be found in and around the protected area (109 villages border the NPA; sixteen villages are located inside the protected area (Marris et al. 2002)).

Lyttleton and Allcock confirm that the Nam Ha Ecotourism Project has been a tremendous success. It provides an ideal model of how tourism might be used as a tool for development in rural subsistence villages, as well as a mechanism for promoting forest conservation (Lyttleton & Allcock 2002). The project has received several international awards and has become a national model (Schipani 2007). It has particular relevance to Laos because this country has a large number of Protected Biodiversity Areas (according UNEP’s designation), many of which have the potential of becoming ideal sites for the development of ecotourism activities.

Photo 12.3  Ecotourism: a tool for forest biodiversity conservation

The Nam Ha Ecotourism Project (1999-2002) has been so successful that a second phase was implemented in 2005, working closely with other projects and organisations such as the Asian Development Bank’s
(ADB) Mekong Tourism Development Project, the German NGO GTZ and the EU (UNESCO 2006). By involving various tour operators (four provincial operators and two national companies with foreign private sector participation, see table 12.1), ecotourism has established itself in Luang Namtha as a major foreign exchange earner, with an estimated US$ 3.15 million generated in 2005. It has also become a major local employer; 138 people (table 12.1), including ethnic minority people (Schipani 2007) were hired in 2005.

Schipani further indicates that beyond these figures, ecotourism in Luang Namtha meets a large number of the criteria outlined by the Lao National Ecotourism Strategy and Action Plan (LNTA 2005b). According to Schipani, the ecotourism sector: ‘(i) employs and generates financial benefits for local people; (ii) provides appropriate small-group settings for cultural exchange; (iii) minimises adverse cultural and environmental impacts; (iv) has a strong educational component; and (v) generates public funds for environmental and cultural protection’ (2007, p. 8).

The province seems to have established itself as a leader in ecotourism, involving local minority populations, generating money in a sustainable way and capitalising on its natural and cultural assets, arguably, all the while satisfactorily preserving its forest.

Table 12.1 Tours operators in Luang Namtha in 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator name</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Number of Active Employees/Guides</th>
<th>Tour Types /Number of tours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Luang Nam Tha Guide Service</td>
<td>Namtha (est. 2000)*</td>
<td>59 male</td>
<td>Trekking (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15 female</td>
<td>River Tour (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(34) ethnic minority</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Luang Nam Tha Bike Tours</td>
<td>Namtha (est. 2003)</td>
<td>3 male</td>
<td>Mountain bike tours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 female</td>
<td>in the province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(4) ethnic minority</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Muang Sing Guide Service</td>
<td>Sing (est. 2001)</td>
<td>24 male</td>
<td>Trekking (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3 female</td>
<td>Eco/cultural tours (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(23) ethnic minority</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3 female</td>
<td>Cave tour (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(16) ethnic minority</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Green Discovery Namtha (est. 2000)</td>
<td></td>
<td>10 male</td>
<td>Trekking (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0 female</td>
<td>River rafting (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2) ethnic minority</td>
<td>Mountain Biking (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Camping (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Vientiane Travel &amp; Tour/ Exotissimo Sing (est. 2004)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 male</td>
<td>Trekking (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0 female</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0) ethnic minority</td>
<td>tours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>138 (79) ethnic minority</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*est. = established
Source: Schipani 2007
12.4 The threat of rubber?

The recent ‘success story’ focus in Luang Namtha province, however, has been on the growing rubber industry (*Hevea brasiliensis*). Rubber plantations started on a small number of plots in 1994. One of the arguments in favour of their development was that they generally started in areas of degraded forest and fallow swidden fields. By 2005, over 4,580 ha of rubber had been planted in small to intermediate rubber plantations. The plantations are close to a number of trekking routes in Muang Sing and Namtha district (Alton et al. 2005). Thus far, clearance has mainly been limited to corridors along roads, but is now beginning to progress along the Nam Ha and the Nam Tha rivers. The trend is clearly in favour of the development of rubber industry, as shown in a recent article in the *Vientiane Times* (Pongkhao 2007):

Investment in rubber plantations is booming in Luang Namtha province, with most owned by Chinese investors, according to local authorities. Authorities approved three rubber plantation projects over 5,000 hectares this month, with an investment value of US$ 900,000. The Deputy Governor of Luang Namtha province, Mr Phanthong Phithoumma, said yesterday the rubber industry is a priority of the province in striving to alleviate poverty for local people. ‘Soil in Luang Namtha is particularly good for rubber,’ he said. ‘We are trying to ensure all plantation projects benefit poor people by encouraging each family to grow at least one hectare of rubber.’ *(Pongkhao Somsack Vientiane Times, 29 June 2007)*

Beyond the environmental costs of the rubber plantations, which only started to produce latex in very small quantities in 2002 (the bulk of the production coming in the following years) the question is now how this obviously powerful trend will threaten the efforts and successes of ecotourism in Luang Namtha. Schipani acknowledges the potentially positive aspects of rubber plantations in the provinces of Laos but he strongly advises that the development of this industry be carefully planned in areas that are not located near ecotourism (especially trekking) sites. According to Schipani, ‘both activities can be conducted viably, but not in the same immediate areas’ (2007, p. 15), and the next photo (photo 12.4) illustrates quite well how harmful certain kinds of land uses can be to an industry that relies so much on the quality of the natural environment and the pristine quality of the landscape.
12.5 Conclusion

The example of Luang Namtha shows that in Laos, despite the encouraging results that have been observed, exogenous forces can put promising developments based on tourism at risk, despite the involvement of foreign NGOs, private sector businesses and government agencies in these tourism efforts. Substantial foreign investments and obvious political choices are altering the fragile balance that had been so hard to reach, and that had been leading to positive results, especially those results that were improving minority populations’ standard of living and efficiently supporting forest protection in the province. The magnitude of the changes at work in the North, especially the development of the rubber plantations will certainly alter the results of the previous efforts to develop ecotourism.
13 Ethnic Tourism Development: Preliminary Data for the Dong Village of Zhaoxing, China

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13.1 Introduction

Only later did I realise the symbolic enactment I was watching through the basketball game. It was a game between the local government and the tourism company newly established in the village. The government team was obviously at a disadvantage against the company’s team of young athletic players. Government officials played courageously, running after every ball yet never scoring a point. This friendly game, taking place in a primary school playground, could be seen as a representation of the position of power the company had taken up in the village. Their presence and role in the local development of tourism was negotiated with higher-level government officials. Elected by the villagers, the local government officials meanwhile had protested against this decision to give control of village tourism to the company, afraid of the control this gave the company over village inhabitants and the future of the village. As in this basketball game, one could clearly see that the local government was losing this battle of control; a battle in which much more was at stake than the final score.

This game took place in 2006 in Zhaoxing (肇兴), a small village tucked away on the southeastern border of Guizhou, next to Guangxi province, some 60 kilometres south of the county town of Liping. In the past four years, the village has become an important tourist destination, both for international and domestic tourists. Ninety-five per cent of the village’s 4,000 inhabitants are of the Dong ethnic minority, who are promoted on the tourist market for their nasal singing, their drum towers and their wind and rain bridges.

Using this village as a case study, this chapter examines one of the many forms of tourism development in minority regions in rural China. In this chapter some of the forces at play in the process of socioeconomic change and the struggles of the villagers to maintain control over the shaping of their own modernity are described. Questions are raised about these issues but I do not purport to provide all the answers. Mainly, as an anthropological endeavour, this chapter aims to present
villagers’ voices, which otherwise tend to remain mostly unheard in the context of China’s fast-paced economic development.

This chapter represents a first step toward understanding the local reality of this village. It does not claim to be an in-depth analysis of the situation but rather hopes to open new perspectives from which to make sense of the collected data. It is also an overview of a moment in time, a period of economic development that may serve as comparison with future changes and may lead to future research on more specific issues.

Analysis of this case study is based on periodical visits to the village between 2000 and 2007 including one year of extensive fieldwork, which ended in July 2007. More than 30 official semi-structured interviews, as well as some 50 unofficial, unstructured interviews with villagers, government officials, tourist guides and tourists were undertaken during these years. Observation and participation in the village’s activities have also contributed to the analysis and understanding of the village’s local reality. In addition, cooperation with scholars from the Guizhou University Southwest Minority Language and Culture Research Institute greatly contributed to the research.

13.2 Zhaoxing

13.2.1 Zhaoxing’s location

Zhaoxing is situated in the Duliu basin of the Qiandongnan Miao and Dong Autonomous Prefecture. In the county of Liping it serves as an administrative seat (xiang: 乡) to 22 administrative villages (political division called cun: 村) and 52 natural villages (geographical division called zhaizi: 寨子). Sitting in the bottom of a valley, the village of Zhaoxing proper is surrounded on three sides by mountains rising to almost one thousand metres, giving it a sense of remoteness and ‘an enclosed and hidden quality’ (Oakes 1997: 62). It can be best described in Chinese as 洞天盆地 (dong tian pen di: hole sky basin land): ‘... when one looks up, one can see only the mountainsides and the sky, as though the mountains formed the sides of a land basin’ (Geary 2003: 44). Cultivated terraces and forests, where China firs are predominant among bamboos and fruit trees, sculpt the mountains. A river runs through the village (Zhaoxing River) from east to west.

Zhaoxing proper includes three natural villages (upper Zhaoxing 上寨, middle Zhaoxing 中寨 and Zhaoxing 下寨). It has a population of 3,485 inhabitants living in some 800 households. Key to its tourism development, the village has five drum towers, five wind and rain bridges, five opera stages and three village entrances. Although all of the village’s original drum towers were destroyed in the Cultural Revolution, all were rebuilt between 1982 and 1983 and were later given
county-level protected status. The bridges were spared destruction, though one was washed away by a flood and later rebuilt. Of the five opera stages three are in poor condition and two have been renovated in recent years. Two village entrances were recently built and one was reconstructed in 2005. All houses are Ganlan (干栏) style wooden houses with two or three floors, with animals typically living on the first (ground) floor.

The village is relatively difficult to access. It used to take an average of two days to reach Zhaoxing from the large cities of Guilin or Guiyang. However, the county town of Liping has recently opened an airport (late 2006) with flights to and from Guiyang and, since April 2007, to and from Guilin, greatly reducing the time required to reach Zhaoxing. Most foreign tourists still prefer the longer bus routes, which offer spectacular scenery and visits to other minority villages. The difficulty in reaching the village gives it a sense of remoteness, which plays an important role in its marketability as an authentic, untouched Dong village.

13.2.2 **Zhaoxing’s Dong population**

The Dong minority was categorised through the minzu shibie (ethnic identification project) launched in the 1950s by the newly appointed Chinese Communist Party. This project involved the classification of China’s ethnic minorities according to evolutionary criteria set by Lewis Henry Morgan and Joseph Stalin. The Dong are one of the 55 official national minorities that obtained minority status and now have a population of almost 3 million in China, spread mostly across the three provinces of Guizhou (55 per cent), Hunan (28 per cent) and Guangxi (10 per cent). They are mostly subsistence farmers. Although categorised as one group and sharing many characteristics, many regional differences exist such as two distinct dialects in north and south, different festivals, diverse songs, clothing and architecture.

The Dong minority belongs linguistically to the Kam-Shui family, itself a branch of Kam-Tai, a subgroup of the Sino-Tibetan language group. The Dong language contains nine tones and is mainly made up of monosyllabic words (Geary 2003: 31). In the 1950s, the Dong language was divided into two main dialects (southern and northern) with each in turn subdivided into three sub-dialects. Accordingly, the Dong spoken in Zhaoxing belongs to the second subgroup of the southern dialect (ibid: 35). Although it is not a written language in Zhaoxing, it remains the main language spoken in the village and acts as a strong binding force among villagers. Outsiders, newcomers and business people from outside the village are not fully integrated and accepted into village life unless they master the local language.
In southeast Guizhou, the Dong minority and the Miao minority make up the majority of the population. The Miao reside mostly in the northern part of the region while the Dong settled in the south, along the Duliu River. Living along the river, the Dong populations had much more commercial contact with the Han and were subjected to fewer repressive measures. Compared to the Miao, who are mountain dwellers and are perceived as rebellious, the Dong minority is often portrayed as peaceful, harmonious and tranquil.

In Zhaoxing, we see an example of contact with the Han majority in the names given to the five drum towers. These are named after the five Confucian virtues: (仁, 礼, 义, 智, 信: Ren, Li, Yi, Zhi, Xin; benevolence, courtesy, justice, wisdom and trust). According to an elder in the village, it was clan leaders who had been educated in the Chinese educational system before the revolution that gave these names. He furthermore stated: ‘in the old times we [the villagers] followed Confucianism and the Five Regulations’.

Theme parks throughout China are playing a great role in (re)presenting national minorities to the rest of China’s population and to the world (Oakes 1997; Sofield and Li 1998; Nyíri 2006). Located in the main cities, these parks present a selection of minority groups mainly based on the visual beauty of their architectural skills. Hence, of the 55 official ethnic groups, only about twenty are usually represented. The Dong minority, with its known carpentry skills, is generally among the minorities featured. The space dedicated to them includes all the architecture that characterises the minority. When performances are held, the Dong present their ‘Dong Choral Songs’ (dongzu dage, 侗族大歌). Although there is great diversity in these performances and architectural styles throughout the many Dong villages of China, only one standardised version is featured, limiting the representation of the ethnic group to a set of clearly defined characteristics.

Tourism pamphlets promoting the village of Zhaoxing reflect these standardised attributes, showing drum towers, wind and rain bridges and people singing and working the fields. They aim to attract tourists by representing Zhaoxing and the Dong (and often other minorities of the southwest) as exotic relics of the past. As a pamphlet on the Dong of Liping county states: ‘Nowadays, while industrial civilisation is developing rapidly, people here still live in a plain and romantic style, devoutly guarding their beautiful tranquil homeland’.

13.3 Guizhou’s tourism development

Guizhou, being the poorest province in China and lacking proper infrastructure to attract industrial investments, has vigorously turned to tour-
ism as a means of economic development (Tan Chee-Beng 2001: 16). In a speech in 2000, Yang Shengming, the director of Guizhou Provincial Tourism Administration, advocated the slogan ‘promoting an opening up, the elimination of poverty and the increase of prosperity by tourism development’. Tourism is to become one of the ‘pillar industries’ of Guizhou province by the year 2010 (Oakes 2000: 680). The Tourism Administration director in Guizhou also noted that tourism is the solution to many of the province’s problems: ‘It can improve the ecological environment, help the poor mountainous areas shake off poverty and become better off, improve the poor people’s living quality and intellectual level. In a word, it has become the key to solving the problems relating to agriculture, the countryside, and the farmers.’

Specific villages in Guizhou have been designated to represent particular minorities and have been given funds to develop tourism and serve as examples for other villages of the province. Zhaoxing is one such village.

13.3.1 Zhaoxing’s tourism development

According to Tim Oakes, a geographer who did fieldwork in the village of Zhaoxing between 1993 and 1994, the National Tourism Administration (NTA) emphasised that Zhaoxing was a ‘comprehensive site of Dong ethnic tourism’ (1998: 211). Because the village has many drum towers and wind and rain bridges, Zhaoxing’s carpenters have been recruited to build replicas in the theme parks of Beijing, Shenzhen and Guilin. In addition, Dong performance troupes from Guangxi and elsewhere were often sent to Zhaoxing to learn the ‘authentic’ songs and dances of the Dong (ibid).

Historically, Zhaoxing’s tourism development can be divided, for analytical purposes, into three phases. The first phase was from 1982 until 2001, when the local government started to develop tourism in the village. Then between 2001 to the end of 2003, villagers got involved in the development of tourism. Finally, the third phase, from 2003 until 2007 has been characterised by the arrival of a Guiyang tourism company in the village and the increased direct involvement of the Guizhou government (county and provincial) in Zhaoxing’s tourism development.

During the first phase, tourists came mainly from Guangxi. The leader of Sanjiang county in Guangxi province, bordering Liping county where Zhaoxing is located, had made tremendous efforts to have his county recognised as the seat of true Dong culture. Tourists, however, would often be taken across the border to see Zhaoxing. Indeed, Zhaoxing, with its many drum towers, its beautiful setting and being so close to Guangxi was often included in tourists’ travel plans to the Dong region.
In the 1980s the government’s Provincial Foreign Affairs Office was responsible for tourists. In 1982 the local government’s Cultural Department opened the first hotel in Zhaoxing. By the 1990s, a second guesthouse had opened (called minzu zhaodaisuo and now closed), followed by the Post Office Hotel (youdian bingguan), which opened in 2001. At the time, a co-project between the Norwegian and Chinese governments established four ecological village museums in Guizhou, one of which is the neighbouring village of Tang’an.

By the year 2001, some villagers, noticing the increasing amount of visitors coming to their village, decided to build their own guesthouses. The first folk guesthouse opened near the largest drum tower. The owner convinced members of his drum tower group as well as his clan leader to get involved in tourism development:

In 2001, my family was the only one to open a folk hotel; later, I asked the officials in our clan to join the business and then they asked all the farmers in our clan to build this pedestrian path. Our clan was the first to build pedestrian paths. I often say we owe the path to our clan’s farmers. They helped to build it voluntarily. Before the paths in Zhaoxing were very poor and full of mud. Once we built it, the county level, the district level and the provincial level officials all came together to visit us. They attached great importance to this and felt embarrassed because even we farmers could think of it before they did. Then they invested money and asked people from all over Zhaoxing to build roads like the ones we had built.

These initiatives also led the government to invest in the village’s infrastructure, burying electrical, telephone and television wires, developing the sewage system, paving roads, building the river bed, etc. In addition, a lot of effort was placed into the prevention of fires, since a fire would diminish Zhaoxing’s potential as a tourist site (see the case of Gaozeng discussed in Oakes 1997: 58).

During the last phase of Zhaoxing’s development, the pace of change increased tremendously. The total number of guesthouses in the village increased from three to fifteen with the addition of three hotels built by the newly arrived tourism company. There are now, in 2007, more than twenty souvenir shops and restaurants in the village, two bars catering to foreign tourists, a karaoke and a disco bar.

In 2003 a company from Guiyang, together with a tourism investment company from Liping, signed a 50-year contract with the county and the local government, gaining a relative monopoly on the development of tourism in the village. At the local level, the three villages of Zhaoxing (Zhaoxing, upper Zhaoxing and middle Zhaoxing) were asked
One of the villages refused to sign it and asked for changes to be made in the distribution of benefits. Small changes were then granted and villagers reluctantly signed.

The contract called: ‘Agreement on Developing and Operating Zhaoxing Scenic Area’, stipulates, amongst other clauses, that the company has priority access to the village’s drum towers, wind and rain bridges and opera stages, unless villagers use these spaces for a wedding or a funeral. It also states that local people should be prioritised for employment. However, no provision for ongoing local input into decision-making processes involved in tourism operations is included in the document.

In terms of economic clauses, the contract also specifies the varying percentages of the benefits (between ten and thirty percent according to profit) the company must give villagers. The company, in return, is to invest a minimum of 35,000,000RMB (6,000,000 of which must be invested before the opening of Liping airport in late 2006) for the development of tourism in the village. Accordingly, it has, in the past years, built a three-star hotel, a two-star hotel, a guesthouse as well as two major parking lots on the outskirts of the village. It has also contributed to the improvement of Zhaoxing’s infrastructure; it has built village gates as well as installed Chinese red lanterns around the village.

Many villagers have however, through interviews, expressed discontent with the company’s presence in the village. Some believe they can and should develop tourism by themselves and in doing so, keep all the economic benefits in the village. Some believe the company is not respecting the contract and has not invested in the village as much as they had promised. But most importantly, many villagers fear they are losing control over their own future and their village’s development.

Since the arrival of the company, the number of tourists visiting Zhaoxing has increased every year and has more than doubled in the past two years (see table 13.1). Zhaoxing is gaining in popularity and expectations are high on the part of villagers, the tourism company and the Chinese government at different levels.

In October 2005, Zhaoxing was recognised as one of the six most beautiful ancient towns in China by the National Geography of China journal. The book, showcasing the scenic splendour of China, was first published in Chinese and later translated into English in 2006. It includes, amongst other natural beauties, the most beautiful mountains, landscapes, lakes, deserts, forests, gorges, coastlines, waterfalls, as well as China’s six most beautiful country towns and villages. Furthermore, adding to Zhaoxing’s popularity on the tourism market, the famous National Geographic magazine, in its Traveler edition, cites this Dong village as one of the Most Attractive Places in 2007 (最具诱惑力的目的地 zui juyou huoli mudidi).
In 2004, the road between Liping and Zhaoxing was paved. Prior to this, the village was very difficult to access with only muddy roads linking it to major towns and frequent road slides isolating the village for days. All the villagers we interviewed consider this recent change the biggest. It has increased the flow of vehicles travelling past the village, brought more tourists and allowed an increased mobility for villagers (now some go to Liping for the day, the trip having been reduced from more than four hours to a mere two and a half hours). In addition there are, in 2007, plans for two major highways to pass through the area, which may result in even greater accessibility to the village.

To villagers, the second biggest change brought about by the advent of tourism, is the improvement in the general cleanliness of the village. Garbage cans have been placed alongside the main road, dogs are no longer allowed to wander around and the company hires villagers to sweep the village’s paths and road. This, according to the leader of the local hospital, has also had a direct impact on villagers’ health.

The village’s outlook has also changed as houses were renovated (from tree bark to tile roofs) and made higher (from two- to three-story houses). This, as many other aspects of ethnic tourism, brings about a certain paradox as a clan leader noted:

... people’s houses are relatively better; before houses were very simple and broken, now there are lots of new houses. But the problem is that outsiders do not like new houses, this is a contradiction between the ideas of local people and visitors’ expectations. Now, we have an argument with the government who claims our village is one of the six ancient towns in China and it wants to keep its appearance like this (primitive), but people think this way there is no development and we cannot advance. If we build new houses it will destroy the primitive appearance. Actually, we know ourselves that if we build new houses it will destroy the scenery. If we do this, who will come to visit? There will no longer be anything interesting.

### Table 13.1  Zhaoxing: approximate number of tourists per year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total visitors per year</th>
<th>International visitors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>13,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>42,000</td>
<td>17,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>17,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This data is official data given to us by the new leader of the village (interviewed the 27th of April 2007)
Indeed, villagers are not allowed to build new houses in the village and when they wish to renovate their own homes, the Ganlan style must be respected. In order to accommodate the villagers’ desire to improve their living conditions, they are now allowed to use modern materials inside the house yet the outside must remain wooden. In addition, there is presently a plan at the local government to build a ‘New Zhaoxing’ five kilometres away, in order to keep the old Zhaoxing as a ‘primitive ecological cultural village’. The implications of such a project are immense both in terms of the cohesion of the village and in relation to Zhaoxing’s Dong culture.

Culturally, the development of tourism has brought a renewed interest in the villagers’ own culture. During an interview, a village elder stated:

Tourism helped the development of the ethnic culture. For example, our ethnic musical instruments: my father’s generation was very familiar with them, but in our generation, we had some education and left those things behind; in the ‘80s and ‘90s we were still not very fond of those Dong songs and dramas; but with the development of tourism, we started to learn Dong songs and dramas again.

The development of tourism has however led to a ‘grand ideal’ of Dong culture in which the Dong minority is represented as one homogeneous group while local variations are ignored. Indeed, the performance troupe of the tourism company in the village has integrated, in its performances to tourists, elements from other Dong villages. In addition, for tourism’s sake, performances are done by young and attractive villagers, excluding the elderly who used to take part in these performances. This homogenising tendency is also followed and reinforced by theme parks where ‘inhabitants’ of the ethnic villages are all aged ‘...18-25 years, and may be described as vibrant and beautiful’ (Sofield and Li 1998: 383).

Finally, in recent years the general economic situation has improved for the majority of villagers, especially those involved directly in tourism development (see table 13.2). According to a clan leader, almost 70 per cent of the villagers have an income above 10,000 RMB per year, which is significantly higher than in other Dong areas. For example, in Zaima District, Rongjiang County, also a Dong area, in 2005, the average income was under 1000RMB per year (figures of 6 out of 12 villages). Accordingly, villagers of Zhaoxing have a higher monthly income than the average yearly income of other Dong areas.

This has had two main impacts on villagers’ lives. First, we begin to see in Zhaoxing a slow reduction in the number of people going to work (dagong: 打工) in factories in Guangdong and other major cities; a
phenomenon which has greatly affected minority villages’ population in the past ten years. For example, Tang’An, a small village located above Zhaoxing and under its administration, is visited by much fewer tourists and has lost half of its population, which has left to work in factories (the population decreasing from approximately 800 to now 400 villagers). In addition, the segment of the population leaving for Guangdong is usually between 17 to 40 years old, leaving the children and the elderly to take care of the land.

In Zhaoxing, in addition to people opening souvenir shops, guesthouses and restaurants, almost 100 local villagers work for the tourism company and although the salary is relatively low (<600 RMB/month), it allows some young people to remain in the village. Nevertheless, on average, every household still has one member of the family working outside the village. This exodus of Zhaoxing youth to Guangzhou (principally) has had a tremendous impact on village life. For example, villagers believe it has led young people to stop wearing traditional Dong clothes. In addition, although most villagers still marry within the vicinity of the village, some have started to marry people outside of the Dong minority.

Secondly, tourism brought inflation, increasing the price of everyday goods. This means better benefits for farmers with more land and those raising pigs, chickens and cows. For example, according to the vice-leader of Jilun village, a farming community located on the mountain above Zhaoxing, villagers from Jilun can now make more than 10,000 RMB per year by selling their vegetables in Zhaoxing. The vice-leader added that presently, in Zhaoxing, six pigs and two cows from Jilun are sold everyday. These are indirect benefits brought about by tourism development in Zhaoxing proper. However, as noted by a farmer we interviewed, this has become an economic burden for the lowest income families who have seen their everyday expenses increase.

Table 13.2  Zhaoxing: estimated villagers’ revenue per month

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Revenue (RMB) per month</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>300-400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>1400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*These are average wages estimated by one of the clan leaders and have been adjusted allowing for others’ estimates. Salaries of persons interviewed varied between 550 to more than 3000 RMB/month (that is in 2006-2007)
13.5 Conclusion

This chapter briefly discussed the situation of the Dong village of Zhaoxing, focusing on its tourism development and the changes such development has engendered in recent years. As Wood states, ‘tourism always enters a dynamic process of historical change involving many actors. Tourism both introduces new actors and provides pre-existing actors with a range of new opportunities and constraints’ (Picard and Wood 1997: 20). Accordingly, we have tried to present Zhaoxing’s new actors as well as the opportunities and constraints faced by villagers.

Ethnic tourism, which commercialises traditions, is based on a paradox. It is through tourism that minorities can modernise, however in order to attract tourists, they must remain traditional. As the pamphlet on the Dong of Liping advertises, minority villages stand as the antithesis to the fast-paced industrialisation and modernisation of China. Yet the villagers of Zhaoxing are neither outside this Chinese quest for modernity nor in any simple process of being assimilated by it.

The process by which Zhaoxing’s villagers are developing economically and modernising involves an ongoing dialogue in which power relations and forms of resistance are revealed. Tourism development in Zhaoxing is no longer primarily in the hands of the local government and its villagers; its direction now involves powerful non-local actors. This has generated, and will continue to generate, divergence between villagers’ motivations for a better life and the restraints ethnic tourism imposes on their development. Villagers will continue to attempt to gain greater control over their lives and their future. They will, as they already have through writing petitions to different levels of the government, come together to object to changes they do not agree with.

As they stand at the bottom of a highly hierarchic society, whether their voices will be listened to (or even heard) is questionable. However, the increasing visibility tourism provides them with in the public sphere within China and internationally could become a tremendous source of power.

Note

1 The research was financially supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the Fonds de Recherche sur la Société et la Culture of Quebec, Canada.
14 Between Performance and Intimacy: 
Back Spaces and Private Moments in the Tourist Village of Luoshui, China

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14.1 Introduction

The growth of tourism, especially ethnic and cultural tourism, which has provided strong contact between local communities and tourists, has come to impart on the hosts – particularly those belonging to the communities inhabiting remote or peripheral areas – a much stronger awareness of self-consciousness, thus raising their confidence in relation to their immediate surroundings and the world beyond.

On the other hand, however, the development of tourism has caused culture to be evaluated mainly in terms of its exchange value, in a commercial context, therefore transforming it into a commodity. The leisure, domestic and religious spaces have in part become those inevitable interaction spaces that are thus subject to a process of constant change, revitalisation, invention and performance, in order to meet the expectations and longings of tourists. Such a fabricated cultural performance or staged authenticity (MacCannell 1973), or, as Boorstin has it, such a panoply of simulations or pseudo-events (Boorstin 1987) happen in spaces that are then transformed into non-places. They are, after all, fabricated and imagined places to which temporary identities are associated with and in which actors interact based on a contractual relationship which comes to an end once the tourist visit is over (Augé 2005). Yet, these performances are part of a much more complex process of negotiation that in itself includes various mechanisms for preserving the balance of the community and of the very relationship between the native and the tourist.

Thus, in order to maintain the boundaries of intimacy and preserve their balance, local communities engender invisible balloons (Hall 1986: 148) inside of which they move along everyday life absorbed by the presence of outsiders. These hidden dimensions are defined not only in terms of space, but in terms of time as well.
I will draw upon Goffman’s dichotomy of front and back regions – the first related to ‘spaces where performance is represented’ (1959: 130) and the latter to spaces where the staging comes to a halt and individuals abandon the characters they play before the other. I will also rely on MacCannell’s adaptation of Goffman’s theory to the touristic context. MacCannell does not analyse such stages in an independent way, seeing them rather as scenes that make part of a continuous process through which different stages can be discerned (MacCannell 1999: 101-102). This chapter aims to demonstrate how the community of Luoshui village developed precisely such mechanisms of resistance and self-protection vis-à-vis the tourist gaze and the constant presence of tourists. This community is mainly inhabited by the Mosuo people, which is officially identified as a subgroup of the Naxi ethnic group.

14.2 Context

Like in other countries, ethnic tourism in China places a strong emphasis on the exoticism that characterises national minorities. A strong fascination has been attached not just to the beauty of Lugu Lake – where Luoshui village is located – but also to Mosuo people and their culture, particularly some markers of ethnic difference, such as its matrilinearity-based organisation or the modality of sexual life known as the visiting marriage (zouhun). These same markers have served as a drive for the engendering of a strategy that enabled the improvement of living standards in this community and, consequently, of other adjacent ones, as the touristic activity has intensified the contacts between the local population and other communities. Furthermore, an increasingly large number of people from other Mosuo villages and from other ethnic groups, have moved to Luoshui to engage in temporary work or simply to sell their locally produced goods.

Tourism has, however, been developing in some Mosuo villages since the early 1990s and it is today an important and powerful source of income. Since then, the local community, along with the local cadres and the official departments responsible for regional tourism development, has been striving to improve the village conditions in terms of means of communication, housing and even forms of entertainment for tourists who visit the region on a daily basis. As a result of these combined efforts, many Mosuo families have been able to enlarge their homes or, alternatively, build new homes in other areas of the village and receive daily visitors from all over the country.

According to 2002 data provided in 2004 by the head of Luoshui, this village of 489 residents is inhabited by people of three distinct groups: 214 of Mosuo origin, 183 belonging to the Pumi ethnic group
and 92 Han. According to the village head, Luoshui annually receives thousands of tourists. The tourists, mainly Han Chinese, come from various Chinese cities and usually in groups, accompanied by a guide who is usually familiar with the tourism activities offered by the local residents. These activities include dancing and singing, canoe tours to the tiny islets of Lugu Lake, riding tours, rental of traditional dresses and accessories, photographic sessions and visits to the Ethnographic Museum.

Out of the 84 Mosuo households living in Luoshui in 2003, 73 were actively taking part in these tourism activities, organising themselves according to a rotation system. At least one member of each family has to participate, both in the daytime canoe trips and the dancing and singing shows that take place every evening inside the enclosures of the Ethnographic Museum. Other members of the family, usually women, are expected to take care of horseback riding activities and guiding tourists through the village, around the lake or on mountains trails.

However, following MacCannell’s proposal, the tourism activities listed above belong, I believe, to different scenarios of representation. Some of these moments qualify as the scenarios corresponding to the front region defined by Goffman, as is the case with horseback riding and canoe trips. Yet some other moments, particularly the singing and dance performances where Mosuo boys and girls dress in traditional costumes and dance and sing around a large bonfire to the sound of the flute played by a male musician, do qualify as the second scenario as it is defined by MacCannell. This is, in fact, a front region which contains, however, a certain transposed ‘atmosphere’ (MacCannell 1999: 101) of the most intimate sphere of community life.

The Ethnographic Museum is a positive match for MacCannell’s third scenario, since it is in part organised so as to be similar to a back region. The wooden museum aspires on the one hand to reproduce authentic representations of the various sections that form Luoshui’s traditional Mosuo dwelling, such as the matriarch’s house, the praying room, the women’s bedrooms, the space for the animals, farm implements and other tools.

On the other hand, through the simulation of religious ceremonies – carried out by a daba (animist priest) from a neighbouring village – and the staging of the first moments of a visiting marriage carried out by museum employees, the museum satisfies the curiosity and motivations of the tourists. It brings to the dominion of touristic representation elements of a much more intimate sphere, a move that will ultimately reflect on the real privacy of the community.

Some buildings for hosting tourists, including a replica of the matriarch’s house, also fit into this third scenario. This replica serves to keep the matriarch’s real house out of the reach of tourists.
Several areas are difficult to classify, such as the inner courtyard of the Mosuo houses. Sometimes, as was the case with the house where I stayed during my first two fieldwork visits, the inner courtyard is in fact the space where the village residents remove their masks and free themselves of the characters they play in their performances for the tourists. In effect, the inner courtyard is the place where the staging of these performances begins and ends, the place where, the staging having finished, the villagers get rid of their traditional costumes revealing, in the case of women, modern pants, socks and T-shirts that had been hidden under long skirts and colourful short gowns. As Goffman has said, ‘this is where the stage accessories and the elements of personal front regions can be stored in a kind of a concentrated repository full of action and characters’ (1993: 136). Interestingly this area is the same area tourists go through before reaching their rooms, usually rented for just a night.

The same is true with respect to hualou, the building where, except for the matriarch, several members of the family sleep, where the women receive their companions (azhu) and which sometimes is used to house tourists. Or even with regard to the many village paths, which are open to the passage of tourists but which, at the same time, constitute intimate spaces of social interaction and of religious practice. These paths are walked by elders who, alone or in small groups, and carrying prayer wheels and Buddhist rosaries, move towards the various manitui – combinations of stones placed in conical or pyramidal shape – to worship the gods and ancestors.

I believe that the scenarios above mentioned can be plausibly explained by Goffman’s statement that ‘individuals can transform into backstage each and every region’, since, notwithstanding it being a space accessible to tourists, the elders appropriate for themselves part of this front region. Therefore they act in informal ways, ‘isolating it symbolically from the rest of the front region’ (Goffman 1993: 145). However, in this case, the coexistence of front and back regions emphasizes another point mentioned by Smith in her study on the impact of tourism among Eskimos communities, ‘especially mass tourism, which changes the local scene and can lead to the segmentation of the population according to their participation’ (Smith 1989: 68). Put differently, it is important to note that the elders usually do not participate directly in the activities prepared for tourists, due not only to their advanced age, but also to their generally poor knowledge of Mandarin, which makes communication much more difficult. Therefore, it would, to a certain extent, be much easier to transpose particular attitudes and social situations that in fact belong within the sphere of their intimacy to spaces that are shared by the self and the other.
14.3 Back spaces

There are certain spaces and rituals in Luoshui that normally constitute spatial and temporal dimensions of social interaction, leisure or devotion, and that are reserved only for members of the community. On some exceptional occasions outsiders or guests may visit these spaces or witness these rituals. These are spaces and rituals that match the sixth scenario proposed by MacCannell and are discussed in the following section.

14.3.1 The Upper Village (shangcun)

Although the process of assimilation of the Mosuo culture in this region can be quite visible, the Pumi people of Luoshui continue to identify themselves as Pumi, and the Mosuo, for their part, continue to recognise them as such. In order perhaps to stress the boundary which, after all, never ceased to exist, the Mosuo occupy the bottom of the Luoshui village, near Lake Lugu, also called Lower Village (xiacun), whereas the Pumi inhabit the Upper Village (shangcun), near the mountain. Separating them is the main road that connects Ninglang Autonomous County to Yongning area. The tour buses park near the spot where Mosuo men and women are concentrated, chatting and playing cards, waiting for the tourists that come to take canoe trips around the lake and to some of the islets. Women and children from different villages, most of them belonging to the Yi ethnic group, also come to this spot every day to sell fruits, basketwork and other items. The Upper Village, with its ill-maintained houses and narrow trails, as well as its lack of available land for the construction of tourist accommodations, makes it a silent area. As a result it is excluded from the tourist routes and brochures, and consequently less exposed to the tourists gaze.

14.3.2 Mosuo dwellings

Although the Mosuo houses at the Lower Village have been partially converted into souvenirs shops, small restaurants and tourist hostels\(^1\), efforts have been made to preserve and regulate contact with visitors by controlling and either partially or fully restricting their access to certain areas. These restricted spaces are areas where informal activity related to the domestic sphere, familial intimacy and worship of the gods and ancestors is carried out. This demonstrates how the dwellings are organised into front regions, where guests and visitors are received, and back regions (see, for example, Gulick 1964; Maretzki and Maretzki 1966; Errington 1978 and Pellow 2003).
The *zumufang* (matriarch's house), is one of those spaces where family intimacy, as well as interaction with other elements of the community, is cultivated. The matriarch, who is the oldest female member of the family unit, is much respected by all other relatives. She distinguishes herself from other women through markers such as her clothing, for example skirts and jackets in deep and dark colours. Given her advanced age, the management of material goods is not necessarily in her hands, such a task being usually carried out by one of the daughters. Her role, however, is of great importance in that she is in charge of maintaining the family’s spiritual balance, being also the main link between the family’s ancestors and its new generations.

The special role of the matriarch explains why a separate space in the dwelling is granted to her, while the other members of the family sleep in another building, called the *hualou*. The matriach’s house is considered the central location of the Mosuo dwelling and serves as the centre of family life. This is the space where family members gather together, cook, eat, pray to the gods and ancestors and where guests are received. This is also the space where one is born and eventually dies. It is also here that the puberty ritual is held. The interior of the *zumufang*, darkened by smoke and the smell of burning wood over many years, confers upon it a strong sense of mysticism, which is made all the more salient by the lively presence of the flame of *ranbala* and *huotang*.

Built to pay homage to the ancestors and the gods, the *ranbala* consists of a bas-relief of Tibetan influence upon which several Buddhist symbolic motives are engraved or painted. On the top, the sun is on the left, representing the male principle, and the moon is on the right, representing the female principle, thus symbolising the harmony of the opposites. The God of Fire is represented at the centre by six flames symbolising family prosperity. The bottom of the *ranbala* is decorated with shells, a stylised version of the vibrations of *dharma*.

In front of the *ranbala* is the *huotang*, a hole dug on the house floor where a fireplace should remain always lit in honour to the ancestors. Above this fire an iron tripod is placed for use in boiling water and cooking food. Between these two spaces there would be a stone building erected in memory of the ancestors, as well as a small clay-made platform upon which a small portion of food and drink offered to the ancestors and gods is placed before the start of each meal.

It is around the *huotang* that members of the family gather to eat, take decisions, talk or simply warm up on colder days. The order according to which they sit is not random. Each person’s place is determined by gender and age. Taking the wall facing the mountain as a reference point the seating is as follows: women sit on the right and men on the left, both on the same wooden platform; the two eldest members of each sex occupy the two places near the wall upon which the God of
Fire is represented, which are considered to be the two warmest places and therefore the most comfortable ones. This symbolic occupation of the space is also present in the architectural structure itself, revealing the guiding principles of the cultural construction of gender among the Mosuo.

The zumufang stands on two pillars, which are kept upright by two beams. Placed in the centre of the house, such pillars represent the men and women of each family, and precisely for this reason they must be trunks of the same tree, reinforcing the principle of sharing the same substance and the sense of belonging to the same family (Weng 1993: 52). According to Weng, the trunk that symbolises the female gender should come from the wood that is the closest to the tree root, because the two pillars represent not only the relationship between all the female and male individuals of the same generation, but also symbolise the relationship between the mother and her descendants (Weng 1993: 52-53).

The position of the pillars determines the division between male and female spaces, thus defining the order by which women and men, from eldest to youngest sit around the fireplace. We can therefore say that the social construction of space, age and gender are closely related. As Pellow asserts, cultural codes are embedded in spatial arrangements, which ‘not only embody social life; they themselves exemplify social life’ (2003: 178).

As mentioned above, the main rituals of the individual’s lifecycle are celebrated, as well as the very rituals of death itself. When someone dies of natural causes, such as old age or due to illness, the body is kept in a small chamber until the respective spirit is ready to be sent to the land of the ancestors. According to one of the informants, after death, and far from the eyes of strangers, the body is washed and wrapped in a flax cloth, and placed in a foetal position, with both arms crossed over the chest inside the small division located inside the matriarch’s house, until the lama monks determine the date upon which the body will be cremated. Although it is women who ‘feed’ the dead three times a day, as is the case with the ancestors, the aforementioned tasks related to attending the body are carried out by a man.

In addition to this area, which is considered the most important of the Mosuo dwelling, two more sections deserve attention: the praying room (jingtang otherwise called lamashi) and the rooms of the Mosuo girls, both of which are kept out of a tourist’s gaze.

The praying room is on the second floor of the building nearest the mountain. It is a place dedicated to prayer, ornamented with paintings, motives, objects and images. The images allude to the Gelugpa school of Tibetan Buddhism, the religion to which the Luoshui villagers converted at the end of the Yuan dynasty. The maintenance of this sacred
space is carried out by elders who, on a daily basis, burn incense, light oil lamps and make fruit and tea offerings to Tsongkhapa – the founder of the Gelugpa school – and his two disciples, Gyaltsab and Khedrup. Among the more peculiar religious ornaments that can be found in this space are the torma – usually made of zanba and decorated with circular ornaments, made from a butter and wax mixture that, after being moulded, are offered to the gods symbolising food offerings – and decorative butter works.

During the three field visits I made to Luoshui, I only once entered the praying room, located in a dwelling near the Upper Village. This happened moments before the start of the cremation ritual of an old woman. To the profoundest regret of the matriarch of the family with whom I lived during my stay in Luoshui, the praying room was demolished and in its place was being built a hostel for tourists. However, the matriarch’s family members promised that, after the completion of the hostel construction, they would seek to rebuild the praying room, albeit in a much smaller space.

Another of the domestic spaces to which tourists do not have access are the rooms of the Mosuo women. In the home of the family with whom I lived, male and female family members slept in the same building (hualou) although boys slept on the second floor and the only girl on the third floor. Her azhu and, later, her newly born daughter, were the only ones who used to enter her room. The mother of the girl and the mother’s sister lived under the same roof with their male partners, a rare yet necessary phenomenon when there are not enough family members of a particular gender.

The friends who came to visit the young Mosuo woman would gather with her in the zumufang, where they drank tea, ate sunflower seeds or watched television. But, generally, it was outside the domestic space and after the end of the dancing and singing performances that they used to get together. In barbecue places (shaokao), tea houses or in tiny restaurants where hotpot (huoguo) is served, I often had the chance to observe groups of women, not always of the same age, who turned these public spaces, also used by tourists, into a sort of backstage space where moments of intimacy were lived, obviously using the local language as a means of expression. However, these are also the areas where we encounter what Boissevain termed ‘covert resistance’ (1996: 14-16). Since the community depends on the tourist’s presence and money, they will avoid any direct confrontations when something goes wrong. But among themselves, they express what they think, thus sharing some complaints regarding the attitudes revealed by some of the tourists, who sometimes comment with irony on the natives’ appearance and behaviour.
14.4 Private moments

The Luoshui village receives hundreds of tourists everyday and, consequently, residents are always exposed to tourists’ attention and to their curiosity, a phenomenon that can became a little too suffocating.

As a result, the local community tries to hide the celebration of certain rituals, festivals and other feasts or leisure moments from the tourist gaze. These moments of intimacy, tremendously important to the well-being of the community, can be defined as ‘insider celebrations’ (Bossevain 1996: 16). According to Bossevain, these celebrations are carried out by members of the nuclear community – its permanent residents. The author excludes from the definition of ‘insiders’ the returning migrants, the visitors from nearby communities and the tourists (1996: 22). However, I believe, based on data gathered during fieldwork in Luoshui, that the concept of ‘insider’ should also include all those who for some reason share the intimacy of the local community.

14.4.1 The raohuli

I had the opportunity to attend a ritual called raohuli, in which Mosuo people from different villages in the Yunnan and Sichuan provinces walk around Lugu Lake as a way of paying homage to the gods and to Mosuo ancestors. This ritual usually takes place on the fifth, fifteenth or twenty-fifth day of every lunar month. I participated in the ritual in 2004, on the fifteenth day of the seventh lunar month (corresponding to 31 July). At the invitation of a young woman from Luoshui village, I accompanied a group of eight women – including a Mosuo student at Yunnan University who came home to be with the family during the summer holidays and another Han woman who now lives in Luoshui, for her boyfriend is a Mosuo man from this village.

Mosuo women engage in this ceremony of worshipping – which involves praying and food offerings like water and grain, placing Buddhist flags and lighting small fires and incense to seek protection, health, fertility and harmony for them and their families. This ritual is, however, also a gendered ritual, since women meet with the purpose of socialising and sharing information on various subjects that can only be spoken about and dealt with among members of the same gender.

The ritual of walking around Lugu Lake usually takes about three days. However, at that specific time, the heavy rain forced the young women to accept lifts from passers-by and to pay small amounts of money to truck, small van and even canoe drivers that took the group from village to village. By the end of the second day, after visiting several Mosuo villages such as Lige, Nizi, Xiao Luoshui, Dazui, Luguhuchen and Caohai, and having met other groups of women who were
also travelling around the lake for the same reason, we were back in Luoshui. I realised that the celebration of the raohuli was also a way of running away from the daily routine, of taking a rest from the everyday performances that can became tiring and disturbing. The group of young women felt free and joyful for having the chance to simply be themselves. They prayed, they shared secrets, played with each other, met old friends from other villages and bought new accessories to wear before getting back ‘on the stage’.

14.4.2 The Festival of the Goddess Ganmu

According to the festival calendar, ten days later, on the twenty-fifth day of the seventh lunar month, the Mosuo from all the villages meet to celebrate their most important feast, held in honour of Ganmu, the Goddess of the Mountain. Throughout history they have always shown enormous respect for the elements and forces of nature, on which their survival depended and, at least in part, still depends. The Mosuo developed the cult of nature as a means of invoking and giving thanks for the favourable conditions and good harvests, choosing the most beautiful and powerful mountain as the main symbol of worship. On this day Mosuo communities from Yunnan and Sichuan provinces get together to pray around the Ganmu Goddess Temple, and through worshipping, dancing, singing and sharing food and drinks they enjoy themselves in an intimate atmosphere.

When I went back to Lugu Lake in August 2005 I finally had the chance to attend this festival. Apart from hundreds of Mosuo villagers I also noticed the strong presence of religious authorities – the lamas – and governmental authorities – the local cadres. Besides myself, I’ve just noticed the presence of another foreigner, a young man that had been invited by Yang Erche Namu, a famous Mosuo woman well known both in China and abroad. That year, during the monsoon season, the rainfall was very heavy and the bad weather damaged the road, which caused some of Luoshui families to remain in the village. Others decided to celebrate the feast, although far from the Goddess temple. Nevertheless this day was celebrated in private, far away from a tourist’s gaze, and some of the families left the village in search of a quiet place near the lake, somewhere between Luoshui village and Lige village.

There is one last celebration to consider, in which the tourist’s gaze is circumscribed, where villagers get together to share cultural and community values and where, at the same time, they also get the chance to restore a sense of intimacy and community: the cremation ceremony.
14.4.3 The cremation ceremony

As mentioned above, the Mosuo people believe that when someone dies, the soul goes through a period of constant transformation before returning to the original human form. When it reaches that stage, the spirit is ready to meet the ancestors and the lama sets the date of the body’s cremation. At the dawn of the appointed day, when tourists are still sleeping, the relatives, friends and neighbours of the deceased gather at the courtyard to participate in this sacred ceremony.

Before being taken out of the main house, the body of the dead person is moved to a coffin that looks like a small house and which is covered with a multicolour rug and long white pieces of silk. The moment the coffin is taken out of the matriarch’s house all the relatives standing at the courtyard grab little pieces of white cloth, a symbol of mourning, and kneel before the coffin. Soon after, several men carry the coffin towards the mountain, accompanied by the sound of firecrackers strategically positioned along the way. The women follow them, weeping and calling out with the purpose of encouraging the soul to go in search of the ancestors. When they arrive at the cremation site, the body is placed on a pyre that has been prepared in advance. The women do not go up the slope but stay at the foot of the mountain. Then the lama carry out the ritual of freeing the soul, and the cremation starts. By the time the pyre and the coffin are engulfed in flames, women, at first, and then all the men leave the site, only the oldest lama stays until the end of this religious ceremony, reading the sacred scriptures and praying for the soul to have an auspicious journey.

14.5 Conclusions

As a reaction to the demands of the tourism industry the Mosuo ethnic identity has become intertwined with a mixture of cultural traits, some of which are authentic while others become constructed images and myths that comfort and stimulate the tourist idea of nostalgia. The strong impact created by the daily interactions between villagers and tourists has led, however, to the construction of spatial and temporal boundaries by the host community. Nowadays, Luoshui can be perceived as a place of multi-locality and multi-vocality (Rodman 1992), since we can find several settings in which staged and authentic narratives are shared, side by side, in front as well as in back regions.

Nevertheless, I believe that the local host community reinvented new ways of thinking of space and time in order to reinforce family and community ties, to preserve cultural values and practices and, at the same time, as a way of demonstrating an increasing self-consciousness.
Therefore, the places and rituals mentioned above can be viewed not just as an instrument used to mitigate the impact of external forces but also as a mechanism to reassert indigenous values and identity (Ewins cited in Bossevain 2006: 18).

Finally, it is important to recognise that although the tourism-induced performance of Mosuoness and commodification of local culture in Luoshui village is taking place, it did not lead to the complete loss of meaning of social and ritual events or to a feeble sense of social solidarity (Greenwood 1979). On the contrary, this process has allowed the Mosuo people to protect the intimate parts of their lives and has led to the ‘persistence and, indeed, expansion, of another locally autonomous sphere of cultural activity’ (Bossevain cited in Selwyn 1996: 15).

Notes

1 The ground-floor spaces of these houses were previously used to house cattle, store cereals, vegetables and farm tools, and to develop activities such as spinning and weaving.
2 Although some of their native religious practices are still maintained.
Biography of Contributors

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Huhua Cao, professor at the University of Ottawa’s Department of Geography, is a specialist in the application of the geostatistical approach to urban and regional minority development. He has been involved in extensive research projects in Canada, Asia, Eastern Europe and Africa. His research related to the socioeconomic development of minorities within the urbanisation process in Canada and China has been funded several times by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and by the Canadian International Development Agency. Along with his research experience, Cao has written numerous articles related to the urban and regional development of minorities while collaborating with academics throughout the world. Cao is also co-editor of two books Inclusion and Harmony: Improving Mutual Understanding of Development in Minority Regions (The Ethnic Publishing House- 民族出版社, 2008) and Regional Minorities and Development in Asia (Routledge, 2009).

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