Judging Q and saving Jesus

Llewellyn Howes

The monograph Judging Q and saving Jesus is ambitious in its scope and judicious in its conclusions. According to Llewellyn Howes, the macrogenre of the Sayings Source Q is sapiential with occasional insertions of apocalyptic microstructures and motifs. He hereby puts an end to the great ‘either-or’ of contemporary Jesus scholarship that the historical Jesus was ‘either eschatological or not’ – an alternative that dates back to Albert Schweitzer.

Chief Editor, A.G. van Aarde

Judging Q and saving Jesus is ambitious in its scope and judicious in its conclusions. The central problem investigated by Llewellyn Howes is exactly how ‘wisdom’ and ‘apocalyptic’ work together in Q, both compositionally and generically, and how they relate to the historical Jesus. Showing a mastery of the relevant primary and secondary literature, Howes – after introductory chapters on the history of Historical Jesus research and Q as a document of the first century – undertakes first of all a detailed examination of Son of Man and eschatological sayings in Q. Howes judges three Son of Man sayings (Q 7:35, 9:58, 12:10) to be authentic, two of which belong to the redactional layer of Q, and all three embedded in passages that display a sapiential form of argumentation. Howes also finds that generally, and even when used apocalyptically, the term Son of Man tends to support arguments best understood as sapiential in outlook. This is consistent with the sapiential genre of the document as a whole. This finding is supported by the close and careful exegesis of Q 6:37–38 (on not judging) … Howes reconstructs the original wording of the saying in Q and takes the reader deep into the relevant background literature, particularly on the idea of ‘weighing’ in judgment (psychostasia), determining in the end that the saying is entirely sapiential.

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Judging Q and Saving Jesus is a book that must be commended first of all for its ambition to tackle large, but also extremely crucial issues. The solutions that are provided … are very well argued and … open up significant methodological avenues to which other scholars would do well to pay attention … The textual analyses of single Q passages constitute another great strength of the book. In particular, the deep and convincing reading of Q 6:37–38 … ought to be taken as a model for future similar research on other passages in Q or in other early Christian writings. [T]he very balanced conclusion with respect to the impact of a study of the Q genre on historical Jesus research is another strong point of the book. Too much of the current writing on the subject is still hindered by the use of too abstract categorizations. Judging Q escapes such problems by attending at categorical distinctions first and foremost by way of the careful and critical reading of primary sources.

Giovanni B. Bazzana, Associate Professor of New Testament, Harvard Divinity School
Μὴ κρίνετε, ἵνα μὴ κριθῇ·
ἐν δὲ γὰρ κρίματι κρίνετε
κριθήσεσθε,
καὶ ἐν δὲ μέτρῳ μετρεῖτε
μετρηθῆσεται ὑμῖν.
Judging Q and saving Jesus
Q’s contribution to the
wisdom-apocalypticism debate
in historical Jesus studies

LLEWELLYN HOWES
Judging Q and saving Jesus – Q’s contribution to the wisdom-apocalypticism debate in historical Jesus studies

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Research Justification

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The monograph *Judging Q and saving Jesus* is characterised by careful textual analysis, showing a piercing critical eye in its impressive engagement with the secondary literature, and sharp and insightful critique. The target audience are specialists in the field of research on the Sayings Source Q (the hypothetical source of certain sayings of Jesus common to Matthew and Luke), historical Jesus, and early Christian theology.

The book takes the stance that the hypothetical document Q can be reconstructed with sufficient precision and that this enables biblical scholars to study with confidence its genre and its thematic and ideological profile. The genre issue is central to the book overall structure and the alternative proposals are discussed at length and with sophistication. The author’s inference is that Q’s macrogenre is sapiential with occasional insertions of apocalyptic microstructures and motifs. This finding embodies progress in Historical Jesus studies. An opposing trend has been to label Jesus an apocalypticist, so that the great ‘either-or’ of contemporary Jesus scholarship has been ‘either eschatological or not’, an alternative that dates back to Albert Schweitzer.

The author finds that generally, and even when used apocalyptically, the term Son of Man tends to support arguments best understood as sapiential in outlook. This is consistent with the sapiential genre of the document as a whole. This finding is supported by the close and careful exegesis of Q 6:37–38 (on not judging). He reconstructs the original wording of this saying ‘on not judging’ and explores the idea of ‘weighing’ in judgment (psychostasia), determining in the end that the saying is entirely sapiential.

Chief Editor, A.G. van Aarde

The publisher and Editorial Board certify that this work was evaluated in a two-step review process. An initial selection review process by a panel of domain experts; followed by in-depth double-blind peer reviews by three reviewers. They were selected by the Board being content experts in the field of early Christian literature.
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I dedicate this publication to my sister, Lurinda Maree, who remains my biggest fan. In addition, I would like to thank Yolandi Havemann, who supported me in so many ways. A final word of appreciation to my mother, Marianne Howes, who loves me despite my shortcomings.
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Introduction

The aim of this book is to contribute to the wisdom-apocalypticism debate in contemporary historical Jesus research by investigating the relationship between wisdom and (apocalyptic) eschatology in Q. The central question will be whether the Sayings Gospel\(^1\) Q portrays Jesus as apocalyptic, eschatological, prophetic, sapiential or some amalgam of these. In case of the latter, did any of these attributes enjoy preference, or were they equally important to the person and message of Q’s Jesus? Due to its geographical and chronological proximity to the historical Jesus, the Sayings Gospel Q is one of the most important sources for reconstructing an image of this elusive human being (Horsley 2012:103, 117, 154; Kloppenborg 2001:152, 171; Robinson 1991:192; 1993:9; 2001b:14; 2007:vii, viii; 2011:470; Vaage 2001:479; cf. Jacobson 1992:20). According to Theissen and Merz (1998:27, 29), Q is ‘certainly the most important source for reconstructing the teachings of Jesus.’ This is not to imply that Q’s Jesus and the historical Jesus are one and the same. While discussing the value of Q for historical Jesus research in particular, Kloppenborg (2001:155, 163) asserts:

Q should be used as a documentary source much in the same way that the three Synoptics have been used up to now, as a combination of traditional materials and redaction\(^2\) that requires careful analysis and sorting ... One cannot treat Q naively, as if it were an unmixed deposit of sayings of the historical Jesus. ... That Q is of potential relevance for the quest of the historical Jesus may be granted, but it ought to be clear that one should not confuse Q’s ‘Jesus’ with the historical Jesus any more than one would confuse Mark’s ‘Jesus’ with the historical Jesus. (p. 155)

More importantly for our purposes, out of all the sources used to reconstruct an image of the historical Jesus, Q is perhaps in the best position to specifically address the wisdom-apocalypticism debate in Jesus studies, primarily because sapiential and eschatological traditions are both integral to Q’s thematic content and linguistic structure (Carlston 1982:101, 112). On the one hand, the importance of Q in addressing the wisdom-apocalypticism debate can hardly be underestimated: ‘The question of Jesus’ apocalypticism is basically a question of the interpretation of Q’ (Robinson 1991:192). On the other hand, the importance of the wisdom-apocalypticism debate for our understanding of the historical Jesus is equally difficult to underestimate:

So the question of whether the historical Jesus was an apocalyptic prophet may well be the single most important one about him because it goes directly to the essential nature of his message and mission. (Miller 2001:1; cf. Miller 2005:111; Kloppenborg 2005:1)

\(^1\)My reasons for calling Q a ‘Sayings Gospel’ are explained below (see Chapter 2, ‘The genre of Q’).

\(^2\)In this context, Kloppenborg uses the word ‘redaction’ to refer to texts that were created ex nihilo by one of the Q redactors before being added to Q, and not to refer to the material of Q’s redactional stratum, or Q\(^2\) (see Chapter 2, ‘Kloppenborg’s stratification of Q’).
It should be clear from the preceding remarks that I regard it to be not only legitimate, but also desirable and necessary, to reach conclusions about the historical Jesus from our knowledge and exegesis of the Sayings Gospel Q (cf. Holmén 2001:513; Vaage 2001:479). A number of scholars criticise the use of Q in the first place as a possible source for reconstructing the historical Jesus. These scholars tend to attack the documentary status of Q, the possibility of constructing a Q community, and Kloppenborg’s stratification of Q (e.g. Wright 1996:81). The present study wants to approach the situation differently, and with a distinct line of enquiry. The central question is not whether the documentary status and stratification of Q are convincing, although these questions will also be addressed. The central question is rather the extent to which it is legitimate to construe a non-eschatological, purely sapiential silhouette of the historical Jesus on the basis of Q as a stratified document. In other words, if the documentary status of Q is accepted, and Kloppenborg’s stratification of Q is not just dismissed out of hand as an exercise in futility, does a purely sapiential, non-eschatological image of Jesus automatically follow? How legitimate is it to say that the documentary status and stratification of Q support the image of Jesus as a non-eschatological sage? This type of question has indeed been raised before. Koester (1992), for example, addressed the same subject more than twenty years ago:

It is questionable, however, whether this early stage of Q can really be defined as non-eschatological, even more doubtful whether one can draw from such observations the conclusion that the preaching of the historical Jesus had no relation to eschatology. (p. 7)

In a subsequent publication, Koester (1997:137–154) argued at greater length that even if a stratigraphic model like that of Kloppenborg is upheld, the earliest traditions in Q would remain intrinsically eschatological. As far as I can tell, however, no one has taken this specific concern further by examining the content of Q in a systematic and methodical manner. The latter is part of what the present study wants to achieve.

A high regard for Q, together with the propensity to regard Q as a stratified document, places the current study squarely within the camp of the Renewed Quest. However, there are two aspects of the current study that have affinities with the Third Quest as well.\(^3\) The first is the inclination to question the non-eschatological image of Jesus. Regarding Q, this inclination means that the current study will take the integrality of eschatology throughout Q seriously. The second is the synchronic manner in which the present study approaches Q. This study approaches Q in a manner that is not at all dissimilar to the way in which the Third Quest approaches the canonical Gospels in their search for the Jesus of history.

A final word on the methodology employed in the present study. Although the content of Q will not be unimportant in this study – not in the slightest – the focus will be on the formal, structural and rhetorical deployment of Q, and what these features can

\(^3\)For an explanation of this distinction between the Third and Renewed Quests, see Chapter 1, ‘The Third and Renewed Quests’. 
tell us about Q’s understanding of Jesus. The presumption is that Q’s understanding of Jesus is not only revealed by its content, but also by its formal, structural and rhetorical characteristics. As Kloppenborg (2001:158) explains, ‘the framing of the Jesus tradition in Q serves as a useful control on the exegetical imagination of those who wish to construct definitive portraits of the historical Jesus.’

The discussion will unfold in a systematic way. The first chapter provides a brief overview of historical Jesus research from its inception to the present, focusing specifically on the part played by wisdom and apocalypticism within that history of scholarship. The second chapter zooms in on the Sayings Gospel Q, considering it in its entirety. Preliminary considerations about the nature of Q need to be addressed in preparation for the subsequent chapters. These considerations include the documentary status, stratification, genre, eschatology and ethnicity of Q. Chapter 3 zooms in on two overlapping groups of sayings in Q: those that deal with eschatological judgment, and those that feature the Son of Man expression. During the exegetical examination of these logia, the focus will be on the interrelationship between wisdom and (apocalyptic) eschatology. Chapter 4 zooms in on one more time on a single Q saying, namely Q 6:37–38. The purpose is once again to determine the relationship between wisdom and (apocalyptic) eschatology. This logion appears in Kloppenborg’s first stratum, and has historically been viewed almost exclusively as a wisdom saying. Thus, whereas Chapter 3 focuses on eschatological sayings in Q (and their relationship to Q’s wisdom), Chapter 4 focuses on a sapiental saying in Q (and its relationship to Q’s eschatology). The final chapter considers the findings of the foregoing chapters, and their impact on our understanding of the historical Jesus. As is obvious from the overview just given, this book moves in a centripetal direction, from historical Jesus research in general (Chapter 1), to the Q document (Chapter 2), to a selection of Q logia (Chapter 3), to one specific Q logion (Chapter 4). Throughout this process, the focal point is the relationship between (apocalyptic) eschatology and wisdom. Unless stated otherwise, this study accepts the reconstruction and translation of Q put forward by the International Q Project in their Critical Edition of Q (Robinson, Hoffmann & Kloppenborg 2000; 2002).

At this preliminary stage, it is necessary to distinguish between the terms ‘eschatology’ and ‘apocalypticism’. The term ‘eschatology’ was coined in the 17th century, and derives from the Greek adjective ἔσχατος, which literally means ‘last’ or ‘final’ (Frey 2011:6; Sim 1985:68). In its broadest sense, ‘eschatology’ is therefore the teaching(s) about the last things (Patterson 1998a:164). However, the term has been applied variously by past and present scholars (see Borg 1994a:70–74; 1994b:19–20). Not only have systematic theologians and biblical scholars respectively interpreted and applied the term differently, but also within those fields the term has met with varying degrees of interpretation and application (Frey 2011:6–7; Miller 2001:5). In this book, the term ‘eschatology’ will refer to ‘a way of thinking’, common amongst ancient peoples, ‘that is centred on the end of the world’ (Miller 2001:5). If we therefore state
that the teachings of Jesus were eschatological, we say that they were motivated by and concentrated on the end times.

This definition needs immediate clarification. Although eschatology might imagine the end of the physical world, it could also imagine the end of the world ‘as we know it’ (Borg 1994a:8–9, 70–71; Patterson 1998a:164; cf. Kloppenborg 2011b:278–279). In other words, the term ‘eschatology’ does not always imply the end of history or the cessation of the material earth, but could also imply the termination of evil forces within the world, like injustice, disease or the Roman Empire. It could, therefore, denote a dramatic, this-worldly change in the history of Israel (Borg 1994b:19). Eschatology might be directed at the physical, social, religious, political or moral status quo, or even a combination of two or more of these aspects. Wright (1996:73) calls this latter type ‘horizontal eschatology’, and the type that believes in the cessation of the space-time continuum ‘vertical eschatology’. The phrase ‘imminent eschatology’ is an expression of the ancient view, held by many, that the world would come to an abrupt end in the very near future. It follows that the term ‘eschatology’ does not by its very nature imply imminence (pace Borg 1994a:9; Edwards 1976:39). Whenever imminence is seen as a feature of the eschatology under view, this will be made clear by the term ‘imminent eschatology’. Lastly, as we will see, Bultmann broadened the meaning of ‘eschatology’ by interpreting it existentially (see Edwards 1976:36–37). By contrast, when the word ‘eschatology’ appears in the current work, it will not refer to a drastic change in, or an end to, the subjective world of an individual, but rather to a drastic change in, or an end to, the history of Israel.

‘Apocalypticism’ is one form or type of eschatology (Crossan 1998:259; Miller 2001:6). Apocalypticism foresees the end of the world as something brought on by divine intervention (Crossan 1998:283). All people will witness and experience this cosmic happening, which will commence with an array of cataclysmic events (Crossan 1991:238; Van Aarde 2008:538 fn. 23, 543). Like eschatology, apocalypticism could also envisage this material world being replaced by either a this-worldly or an other-worldly future (Collins 1998:24, 54, 56, 58–59, 171, 176, 236, 280–281; cf. Allison 1999:129; Crossan 1998:283; 2001b:56–57; 2001c:138). In fact, 1st-century Jewish apocalypticism most probably did not envisage an end to the world in the form of a cessation of the space-time continuum (see Horsley 2012:38–52, esp. 42–43, 48, 52; Wright 1992:280–338; 1996, esp. 202–214; 1999:265). Instead, God was most commonly expected to destroy the world only so that he could then recreate and renew it (Allison 1999:129). Eschatology tends to have an ‘open’ and undetermined view of the future (see Wink 2002:158–159). People may still change the predicted future by adjusting their behaviour. Conversely, apocalypticism has a ‘closed’ and deterministic view of the future. The behaviour of people has no impact on the predicted future per se, only on their own fate during the Final Judgment. Generally, it could be said that whereas eschatology lacks any precise idea of how exactly the end will be effectuated,
apocalypticism entails a very precise description of how the end is imagined to take place (Frey 2011:20). Van Aarde (2011a) explains this distinction more precisely:

> All eschatologies, [including] 'apocalypticism', advocate that God's perfect world will be brought about by a termination of the created world which is domesticated by systemic evil. An apocalyptic perspective on the end of the world consists of a cosmic cataclysm and catastrophe expressed by symbolic language pertaining to earthquakes, fallen stars, darkness in daylight, empty tombs, holy wars, etc. (p. 40)

It follows that apocalypticism is not just a worldview, but also a genre. These writings surely had metaphorical and symbolic applications, but they were also seen as literal descriptions of exactly how the world would come to an end (see Allison 1999:130–134; Wright 1999:262–263; pace Horsley 2012:42). Many, but not all, ancient apocalyptic texts sought to describe the cataclysmic events that would accompany the end of the world (see Collins 1998). ‘Apocalypticism’ fundamentally includes some type of ‘cosmic catastrophe’ that will eradicate the circumstances and conditions of the world as they currently are (Allison 1999:129). Traditional definitions and usages of ‘apocalypticism’ viewed ‘imminence’ as a necessary and integral aspect thereof. Recent research of Jewish apocalyptic writings around the time of Jesus has revealed, however, that not all apocalyptic materials were by their very nature imminent (Collins 1998:58, 176, 215, 255, 260; cf. Borg 1994a:31; Frey 2011:22; see Horsley 2012:38–52, esp. 44–45, 49). Although many apocalyptic writings, including the book of Daniel, advocated that the end of the world would occur sporadically, they did not necessarily expect it to occur imminently (pace e.g. Allison 2001d:93; Crossan 1991; Miller 2001:6; Van Aarde 2008:543; Wink 2002:159). These writings could, and quite frequently did, describe the cataclysmic end without any reference to the time of its occurrence. Some apocalyptic writings of the time even contradicted and overtly denied imminence (Collins 1998:58, 176, 215, 255, 260). Earlier historical Jesus scholars did not make this distinction, but instead saw all apocalypticism (and eschatology) as imminent (see Borg 1994b:19–21). In the current work, apocalyptic eschatology will be clearly distinguished from imminent eschatology.

Also in the current work, the term ‘apocalyptic eschatology’ will refer to an eschatology that believes that the end of the world (as we know it) will be brought about by divine intervention, and will be accompanied by cataclysmic events, regardless of whether or not that end is thought to be imminent. If we define the ministry of Jesus as apocalyptic, we are therefore saying that Jesus believed and taught that God would intervene directly and visibly, thereby bringing an abrupt end to the world, only to replace it with either a this-worldly or an other-worldly reality (cf. Allison 1999:129; 2010:32; Kloppenborg 2011b:278–279). To summarise, ‘apocalyptic eschatology’ will denote something rather similar to Borg’s (1994a) definition of eschatology, when understood in the ‘narrow sense’ of the word:
(1) chronological futurity; (2) dramatic divine intervention in a public and objectively unmistakable way, resulting in (3) a radically new state of affairs, including the vindication of God’s people, whether on a renewed earth or in another world. (p. 73)

This definition leaves open whether or not the material earth will discontinue, and whether or not the history of mankind will cease, but closes off interpretations of apocalypticism as a mere event within history, like the destruction of the Temple in 70 CE. Although Jews saw God’s hand in such events, so that these events could on some level be described as ‘divine intervention’, they were not effected in a ‘public and objectively unmistakable way’, to the extent that Israel’s enemies would also have seen it as ‘divine intervention’. In other words, an event like the destruction of the Temple could be described as ‘eschatological’, but not as ‘apocalyptic’ (Allison 1999:135–136; Borg 1999:240–241; Witherington 1995:246; see Eddy 1999:43–49; pace e.g. Wright 1992:280–338; 1996:passim, esp. 202–214; 1999:265–266). This is unless, of course, the historical event in question is brought about via God’s unmistakable and observable involvement. So, for example, if the Temple were destroyed by a lightning bolt from heaven or something equally cataclysmic, and not by a historic event, like the Roman War, it would indeed have been an apocalyptic happening.

To conclude the introduction, a few words will suffice on my particular referencing style. Whenever a scholar is referenced without any abbreviation before her surname, it means that she is either being quoted directly or paraphrased. In other words, the comment she made was either exactly the same in both wording and concept or exactly the same in concept, but not in wording, to the statement in regard to which she is being referenced. If the abbreviation ‘cf.’ (Latin: confer; English: ‘compare’) appears before the surname of a referenced scholar, it means that the reader must compare the statement in the present work with the statement or discussion in the referenced source. The two would overlap conceptually to some extent; in most cases quite significantly, but not completely. On rare occasions, the two statements might be rather distinct. If other references precede the reference to the scholar with the ‘cf.’ before her surname, it means that the reader must compare the latter to both the statement in the present work and the preceding references. Although there will be some degree of conceptual overlap, there might also be distinguishing features. In all these cases, the implication is that one statement is comparable, but not identical, to another. However, when the views of a particular scholar, including myself, form part of an extended discussion, the abbreviation ‘cf.’ implies that the views being discussed overlap largely, or perhaps even completely, with those of the scholar being referenced. The intent behind my particular use of the abbreviation ‘cf.’ is to protect my references from misrepresentation.

The word ‘see’ is used to indicate that the statement in the current work is a summary of a larger discussion in the source. The larger discussion could comprise only two or three sentences, but it could also comprise a whole chapter or an entire publication. The Latin preposition pace (‘by leave of’) is used to express respectful disagreement with another scholar. In other words, the statement in the current work is very dissimilar or
exactly opposite to the statement or discussion being referenced. The abbreviation ‘e.g.’ ('*exempli gratia*') is used in one of two ways. Firstly, it is sometimes used in the usual sense to put forward one or two scholars as examples and representatives of a larger group of scholars. Hence, the statement in the present work is very similar or exactly the same as the referenced statement or discussion, to which a number of additional references by other scholars could have been added. Secondly, I use the abbreviation ‘e.g.’ much more frequently to indicate that the referenced scholar is an example of the statement in regard to which she is being referenced. Take the following illustration: ‘Scholars like to argue (Mustard 2000:18; e.g. Ketchup 2001 [fictitious sources]).’ In this case, Mustard made a comment to the same effect, likewise holding that scholars are generally fond of argumentation. Katchup, on the other hand, did not make the same observation about scholars in general, but is an example of a scholar who is particularly fond of argumentation, especially in her 2001 publication. For the most part, the reader will be able to tell from the context which usage applies in each particular case. Lastly, the abbreviation ‘esp.’ ('especially') functions to draw particular attention to either a certain scholar or a certain selection of material within a larger reference.
Chapter 1

A focused overview of the quest for Jesus

The Old Quest

It is well known that Hermann Samuel Reimarus started the quest for the historical Jesus when his private thoughts were published posthumously in 1778. Reimarus ([1778] 1970) thought of Jesus as an eschatological prophet. This is true even though Reimarus, influenced by the rationality of the Enlightenment period, attempted to strip the Gospels of their miraculous aggrandisements, including the Resurrection story. According to Reimarus, the disciples and evangelists invented these tales after Jesus’ death so that they could renovate the moral teachings of Jesus, and turn them into a supernatural religion. Jesus himself was not interested in offending or abolishing the Torah. It was the disciples of Jesus who had removed themselves from the Torah, and who had left early Judaism behind. Thus, both claims – that the historical Jesus should be seen as an eschatological figure, and that he was a teacher of simple moral truths – have been with us since the very beginning. In Reimarus’s opinion, Jesus pleaded with people to change their lives radically in light of the imminent eschatological event. One result of the work by Reimarus was that scholars subsequently felt obliged to choose between the historical Jesus and the dogmatic Christ.

In his Das Leben Jesu, David Friedrich Strauss ([1835–1836] 1972) addresses this situation by denying not only the notion that the portrayal of Jesus in the canonical Gospels is historically credible, but also the notion that it is absolutely necessary to choose between the Jesus of history and the Christ of theology. Strauss supports the application of historical criticism to biblical texts, and embarks on his own historical study of the Gospels, during which he finds that almost nothing in these portraits of Jesus is historically reliable. His explanation of this result is that the evangelists never intended the Gospels to be historical writings. Biblical authors were neither historians nor systematic theologians. They attempted to write neither history nor dogma, but
A focused overview of the quest for Jesus

myth. They inhabited a mythical and mystical world, presenting the story of Jesus in such language and imagery. The evangelists never intended to deceive anyone with falsehoods, but were merely attempting to give expression to universal truths through mythical language. Engrossed in Romanticism, Strauss believed that the natural sciences had no monopoly on the truth. Human emotions and ideas might also harbour some form of truth, even if not scientifically demonstrable or quantifiable. Eternally and universally valid ideas could be expressed in a variety of ways, which included myth. That the biblical ideas around the person of Jesus Christ are expressed in mythical language does not invalidate their inherent truthfulness. Strongly influenced by Hegelian philosophy, Strauss argued that the chief idea behind the Jesus myth is that God is incarnate in humanity. In this way, Strauss believed it possible to liberate some form of Christian faith from the historical research of biblical texts. Despite the discrepancies between the Gospel accounts, and the difficulties in reconstructing a chronological history of Jesus, it remained possible for Strauss to believe in the idea of the ‘eternal Christ’, who temporarily took shape as Jesus within human history, but exists eternally as the idea of God’s incarnation in humanity. Some of these ideas would later have a profound effect on both Kähler and Bultmann (Boyd 1995:28; Patterson 1998a:33).

Thanks to Heinrich Julius Holtzmann’s solution to the Synoptic problem, and the emergence of the Two Source Hypothesis in 1863, researchers increasingly felt that they had a sure footing when it came to the historical Jesus (see Den Heyer 2002:43–45). Attention could henceforth be directed at the most reliable source historically: Mark (Martin 1999:42; Theissen & Merz 1998:5). However, Holtzmann’s solution to the Synoptic problem was not universally accepted, and many scholars continued drawing on all four Gospels in their descriptions of the historical Jesus (Frey 2011:11). Q, the other source behind Matthew and Luke, was mostly overlooked and ignored during this time, sufficing only to supplement the Marcan sketch of the historical Jesus (Edwards 1976:3, 10–11, 14). For almost a century (1860s – 1950s), scholars agreed that Q was less important than Mark, primarily because it was seen as didache (teaching) and not kerygma (preaching), but also because it was generally believed that both Matthew and Luke valued Mark more than Q. According to scholars of this period, the didache could only ever be a supplement to the kerygma. Q also had less narrative material, rendering it less suitable for reconstructing the life of Jesus. This is not to say that scholars regarded Q as completely worthless during this time. If not in actual practice, at least in theory, scholars agreed from the outset that Q must have been a very primitive source (Jacobson 1992:20–21).

‘Rational’ interpretations of the Gospels, and Mark in particular, held that Jesus had experienced an intimate relationship with God, and that he gave expression to this

4. Although Christian Hermann Weisse should be credited as the first scholar to put the Two Source Hypothesis on the table in 1838 (Jacobson 1992:19).
familiarity with the term ‘son of God’. He did not attempt to establish a new religion, but proclaimed the speedy arrival of the kingdom of God. In order to make rational sense of this proclamation, ‘enlightened’ theologians of the second half of the 19th century had to do away with the eschatological language and imagery of the Gospels (Den Heyer 2002:45–46; see Patterson 1998a:27–29). According to these liberal theologians, ‘the Jesus behind the Gospels’ did not proclaim that God would intervene dramatically with fire and brimstone, but rather proclaimed that God’s kingdom would come within the confines of history. By means of a slow process of evolution, the kingdom of God was establishing itself on earth. No longer was the kingdom to be seen as a mythical and surreal utopia. Rather, the kingdom of God was an ideal to be attained through human progress and reason; an ideal that is slowly but surely cementing its place within the world. By stripping the Gospels of their supernatural elements, liberal theologians believed that they could discover the essence of Jesus: the ethical message enclosed in his teaching and preaching (Borg 1994a:4; Dunn 2005:187; Horsley 1999i:19; Koester 1992:3; Mack 1993:30–32; Martin 1999:36; Miller 2001:6; Tuckett 1996:45–46; Wright 1996:18; 2002:9; see Patterson 1998a:4, 27–32). Luke 17:21, which speaks about the kingdom of God being ‘within’ (ἐντός) us, was arguably the most important proof text for liberal theologians (Frey 2011:11). Likewise, the Johannine brand of realised eschatology was preferred over apocalyptic and futurist types of New Testament eschatology (Wink 2002:198).

Thus, the 'liberal' search for the historical Jesus progressively shifted away from Reimarus’s intuition that Jesus was a Jewish apocalyptic prophet, and towards his suspicion that Jesus was a teacher of morality. The moral teachings of Jesus were not only superior to Jewish obsession with the letter of the Law, but also timelessly and universally valid (see Theissen & Merz 1998:349–350; e.g. Baur 1847, esp. 585). Liberal theology reached its zenith at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century, with Adolf von Harnack arguably being its most prolific proponent (see Den Heyer 2002:63–69). Motivated by an apologetic attempt to defend the Christian faith, Harnack stripped the tradition of all its naïve fabrications, like the miracle stories and the Resurrection, in order to salvage its essence. That essence was Jesus’ ethical preaching and message about the kingdom of God. The core of Christianity was not, in Harnack’s view, the person of Jesus, but rather the Father-God proclaimed by Jesus. Like his ‘liberal’ partners, Harnack also believed that the kingdom of God was unfolding within history. Jesus was portrayed by him as a teacher of ethical ideals, a prophet of progress in the Western world, and an advocate for the establishment of God’s kingdom on earth and within history.

Albert Schweitzer

In an effort to reconstruct a biography of the historical Jesus behind the Gospels, especially Mark, liberal theology produced a sea of literature, and many different
pictures of Jesus. One of these pictures was put forward by Johannes Weiss (1892), who went against the stream by focusing only on the Synoptic Gospels, and proposing that Jesus was mainly an apocalyptic prophet who had expected the end of the world within his own lifetime. According to Weiss, Jesus spoke of the kingdom of God as an event that would be ushered in via the apocalyptic agency of the Son of Man figure, an emissary who would return on the heavenly clouds and bring about a period of unthinkable violence and misfortune, ultimately ending in the judgment of everyone on earth. The ethical demands of Jesus were the preparatory conditions not only for entering into God’s future kingdom, but also for sidestepping ultimate judgment. Since this view was so atypical for the time, and since there was so much literature out there, Weiss’s proposal was mostly overlooked.

In a classic study, Albert Schweitzer ([1906] 2005) pointed out the failings and shortcomings of liberal theology and the Old Quest. Schweitzer illustrated convincingly that each author had constructed, not the historical Jesus, but his or her own subjective projection of Jesus. Many pictures of Jesus had seen the light, but none of them were historically reliable. All these studies suffered from the same fundamental flaw: They thought of and described Jesus as if he were living in their own time. They failed to take the chronological, geographical and ethnic discontinuity between Jesus and themselves into account. This was true of every study except one: that of Johannes Weiss. Schweitzer revived the unpopular and unnoticed proposal of Weiss, judging it to be the best extant portrayal of the historical Jesus. According to Schweitzer, Jesus can and should not be modernised. Jesus is, and will always be, a stranger to both modernity and contemporary society. This estrangement pertains not only to his person, but to his ethics as well. Unlike the liberal theologians, Schweitzer believed that the ethics of Jesus were alien and irrelevant to contemporary society. Liberal theologians had watered down Jesus’ world-condemning imperatives to suit modern ethical ideals. Whoever ignores the strangeness of Jesus, constructs and projects an anachronistic Jesus. Only in embracing the discontinuity between Jesus and ourselves are we able to reconstruct a reliable picture of the historical Jesus.

In reaction to the host of images put forward by liberal theology, Schweitzer constructed his own image of Jesus; one that would have a lasting influence, reaching into the present. More than anything else, the Jesus proposed by Schweitzer (à la Weiss) was inspired and shaped by ‘consistent’ or ‘thoroughgoing eschatology’ (konsequente Eschatologie). Schweitzer used the word ‘consistent’ or ‘thoroughgoing’ (konsequente) to indicate that eschatology determined every aspect of the teachings, deeds and message of the historical Jesus. However, what Schweitzer understood as ‘eschatology’ would in modern taxonomy rather be classified as apocalypticism (Crossan 1998:274; Den Heyer 2002:54; Miller 2001:9). According to Schweitzer ([1906] 2005), historical Jesus research of the time had to solve three great alternatives, presented as either-or decisions:
He [Weiss] lays down the third great alternative which the study of the life of Jesus had to meet. The first was laid down by Strauss: *either* purely historical *or* purely supernatural. The second had been worked out by the Tübingen school and Holtzmann: *either* Synoptic *or* Johannine. Now came the third: *either* eschatological *or* non-eschatological! (p. 237)5

Schweitzer’s first alternative is somewhat misleading (see Robinson 1991:174–175). Strauss did not distinguish between ‘historical’ and ‘supernatural’. By arguing that the canonical Gospels should be understood as the result of mythmaking, Strauss synthesised both the historical and the supernatural elements of the canonical Gospels into one category: ‘myth’. In other words, Strauss did the exact opposite of distinguishing between ‘historical’ and ‘supernatural’; he transcended the distinction by fusing the two paradigms into one category. Schweitzer’s second alternative had at that stage already been decided in favour of the historicity of the Synoptic Gospels, especially Mark and Q, over the Gospel of John, and remains the majority position today. Finally, Schweitzer argued that Weiss and he had now solved the third great alternative in favour of an ‘eschatological’ understanding of the historical Jesus. One of Schweitzer’s legacies is that historical Jesus scholars still feel the pressure of his third ‘great alternative’, compelling them to choose between either an eschatological or a non-eschatological Jesus.

Opting for ‘thoroughgoing eschatology’, Schweitzer saw Jesus as a person who was completely controlled and consumed by his belief that the kingdom of God would appear very soon. This explains why he believed that Jesus’ ethics were irrelevant for modern society. In Schweitzer’s view, the ethical programme espoused by Jesus was an ‘interim ethics’, valid only until the imminent end of the world. It did not have, nor was it intended to have, any lasting significance. Rather than being timelessly valid, Jesus’ ethics were (in accordance with the view of Weiss) the conditions for becoming part of God’s kingdom. The ministry of Jesus, which included his ethical message, was principally determined by an imminent eschatology. This explained the strange extremism of some of his moral instructions.

As his ministry unfolded, Jesus became increasingly convinced that he had a fundamental role to play in the apocalyptic end that was unfolding. Matthew 10–11 (esp. 10:23) was a pivotal and historically reliable text for Schweitzer, who preferred Matthean source-critical priority over the Two Source Hypothesis. These two Matthean chapters describe how Jesus sent his disciples on a mission to proclaim the kingdom of God. According to Schweitzer, Jesus must have been severely disappointed when the kingdom failed to arrive after the return of his disciples; the first delay of the Parousia. From that moment on, Jesus was thoroughly convinced that he would have to sacrifice his own life in order to enforce the arrival of God’s kingdom. Jesus believed that, through his own suffering and death, he could compel and force the apocalyptic event to take place. Jesus was wrong; he failed, and history continued as per usual, as

5. Emphasis original, according to the 2005 translation.
if nothing had changed. Yet, in Schweitzer’s view, the ‘fact’ that Jesus was mistaken did not render his whole life meaningless. This strange man may still have meaning for us today. Paradoxically, the more we accept his strangeness and his separateness from modern society, the more meaningful his life becomes for today. Even though the kingdom had not arrived, Jesus lived as though it had, and allowed his expectation thereof to rule every aspect of his life. In this way, Jesus’ life and attitude takes on great significance for people of all times. Schweitzer is left unable to continue believing in the Christ of dogma, but finds it possible to be inspired by the man who lived and died as an apocalyptic prophet.

Initially, Schweitzer’s Jesus did not convince everyone (Frey 2011:13). Liberal portraits of Jesus continued to be published. Eventually, however, Schweitzer’s Jesus came out victorious, and remained the dominant paradigm for most of the 20th century (Horsley 2012:1, 15; Patterson 1998a:167–168, 171; cf. Chilton 2005:115; Dunn 2005:187; Martin 1999:41; Miller 2001:10). The reason for the latter was not only Schweitzer’s compelling case, but also the increasing evaporation of both evolutionary ideals and historical positivism in the face of two world wars. An apocalyptic Jesus seemed to fit this situation of devastation and pessimism much better than the moralistic Jesus of liberal theology (cf. Kloppenborg 2011b:249). However, Schweitzer’s Jesus did not just persist because it was historically and contextually convenient. The three traditions that were chronologically closest to Jesus, namely Mark’s Gospel, Paul’s letters and the recently discovered Q tradition, all portrayed him as being thoroughly immersed in and motivated by apocalypticism. After Schweitzer, an apocalyptic depiction of Jesus became synonymous with a historically reliable image of Jesus (Miller 2001:10).

Rudolf Bultmann and the ‘No Quest’ period

The search for the historical Jesus was dealt a critical blow when William Wrede (1901) discovered the theological motif of the messianic secret in the Gospel according to Mark. This discovery, amongst others, led to the inescapable realisation that even the Gospel of Mark was not historically reliable, and that it could not function as a solid foundation upon which a biography of Jesus could be reconstructed (Den Heyer 2002:74; cf. Bock 2002:144; Martin 1999:42; Theissen & Merz 1998:6). Wrede believed that not much could be said about Jesus, beyond that he was a teacher or prophet of some kind, who had lived a memorable life and was eventually executed. The views that the Gospels were historically unreliable and that a historically trustworthy picture of Jesus could not be achieved were already expressed in 1892 by Martin Kähler, who subsequently had a significant influence on Rudolf Bultmann. Kähler argued that the historical Jesus was insignificant to the church, but that the ‘historic Jesus’ remained

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6. Even if Schweitzer had himself denied the existence of Q.
significant for all time. With the word ‘historic’, Kähler meant the Christ of faith who had died and risen again. The Gospels intended to evoke faith in the death and Resurrection of Jesus. Their chief intention was not to be historical documents that relay the moral teachings of Jesus. Instead, the canonical Gospels present us with the historic Jesus, and it is all but impossible, in Kähler’s opinion, to separate this figure from the historical Jesus by means of the canonical evidence. Progressively over time, scholars started realising that the Gospels were all subjectively written after Easter, and that an objective reconstruction of the life of Jesus was perhaps an impossible task. On the other side of the scholarly coin, Holtzmann’s solution to the Synoptic problem was confirmed and elaborated in 1924 by Streeter. Holtzmann’s solution had been gaining more and more support over the years. Streeter’s contribution in 1924 ensured that just about all subsequent scholars would favour Mark and Q in their lives of the historical Jesus.

It was in this atmosphere that Rudolf Bultmann entered the scene in 1921 with his impressive Die Geschichte der synoptischen Tradition, which was primarily concerned with tracing the history of the Gospels’ genesis and evolution through form criticism. According to Bultmann ([1921] 1963:371–372), the overriding majority of material in the Gospels address the situation of the early church, which means that the Gospels have ‘no historical-biographical interest’, and have ‘nothing to say about Jesus’ human personality, his appearance and character, his origin, education and development’ (p. 372). The results of Bultmann’s form-critical approach also indicated that very little of the teachings of Jesus recounted in the Gospels actually go back to the Jesus of history. Despite these findings, the little that could be known about the teachings and message of Jesus prompted Bultmann to write a book on the historical Jesus in 1926 (simply entitled Jesus). In the introduction, Bultmann ([1926] 1958:14) reiterates his belief that almost nothing can be known about the ‘life and personality’ of Jesus, but continues to state that enough of his teachings are available to enable a relatively consistent picture of his message.

Bultmann’s work on the historical Jesus is interesting (to say the least), not only because he was undoubtedly the most prolific and influential New Testament scholar of the 20th century (Funk 2006:180; Stanton 2002:16; see Van Aarde 2011c:1–7), but also because he was influenced by, and adhered to, both the Schweitzerian and the liberal paradigms. Influenced by liberal theology, Bultmann ([1921] 1963) moved aside all metaphysical and ‘unscientific’ traditions about Jesus, including his pre-existence, Virgin Birth, miracles, Passion predictions, Resurrection and Ascension. These should, according to Bultmann, all be attributed to the early church. Like Schweitzer, on the other hand, Bultmann ([1926] 1958:27, 124) believed that Jesus acted as a messianic prophet, advocating the imminent coming of God’s future kingdom. However, Bultmann ([1926] 1958:39) refused to see Jesus as an ‘apocalypticist’ who was fundamentally concerned with speculation over the signs and specific nature of the end time. Bultmann attributed also these passages to the early church. When Jesus
spoke of the Son of Man, he always did so in the third person, implying that he was referring not to himself, but to someone else. Bultmann argued that Jesus’ expectation of the coming kingdom should not be described as ‘apocalyptic’, but as ‘eschatological’. In Bultmann’s opinion, Jesus emphasised the conduct and behaviour of people when proclaiming the coming kingdom. Jesus tried to persuade people to change their ways in light of the coming kingdom of God. In other words, the proclamation of the kingdom had essentially an ethical motivation and goal. Thus, Bultmann did not deny that Jesus preached imminent eschatology, and also largely agreed that, although Jesus preached an ethic of ‘radical obedience’ to the will of God, his message was based on imminent eschatology. Nevertheless, as we will see momentarily, this futurist eschatology had an existential meaning and application for the present: It called for a final decision in the here and now.

Bultmann also touched upon a separate, but related, aspect of Jesus studies: The annoying difficulty of the presence of sapiential traditions in authentic Jesus material. His form-critical approach had convinced Bultmann that many (if not most) of those Jesus traditions that espouse a certain morality were contained in sapiential genres. He proposed two solutions to this complexity. Both solutions reaffirmed eschatological priority, but tried to account for the presence of wisdom amongst eschatological material. The first solution was simply to place the two traditions side by side and claim that both called for ‘radical obedience’ (Bultmann [1926] 1958:89–92). The second solution was to afford eschatological sayings in the Synoptic tradition priority, and explain the presence of wisdom sayings as the result of secondary interpolations (Bultmann [1921] 1963:108). According to Bultmann, these traditions were introduced to construct an ethic for the time before the end of the world; something Schweitzer had already suggested. The inauthenticity of the wisdom material was substantiated by two arguments. Firstly, they could not be easily harmonised with an eschatological view of Jesus, which was historically most reliable. Secondly, Bultmann believed that the wisdom sayings stemmed from common and traditional folk wisdom, not from Jesus himself.

In 1935, C.H. Dodd proposed another solution to the (problematic) presence of wisdom material within the authentic Jesus tradition. As an eschatological prophet, Jesus had initiated a new age that was in continuity with his eschatological pronouncements. This new age simultaneously underscored the urgency of Jesus’ sapiential sayings. The proclaimed kingdom was an eschatological image, but then one that had been realised in the present by Jesus and his ministry. The ‘real’ message of Jesus was that all eschatological expectations had been, and were being, fulfilled through his person. Thus, the historical Jesus proclaimed a ‘realised eschatology’, and understood the kingdom of God as a present, not a future, reality that was being initiated by his person. The early church then corrupted this message by proclaiming an apocalyptic, futurist eschatology. Moreover, New Testament descriptions of the future coming of the kingdom referred neither to the ministry of Jesus, nor to a future event within history,
but to an otherworldly reality beyond space and time. By contrast, parables about the theme of judgment were not about the Final Judgment, but about the present crisis caused by the introduction of God’s rule. It followed for Dodd ([1935] 1958:109) that Jesus’ ethics were not interim ethics at all, but rather ‘a moral ideal for men who have accepted the Kingdom of God, and live their lives in the presence of his judgment and grace, now decisively revealed.’

In 1941, Bultmann published *Offenbarung und Heilsgeschehen*, a study where he pleaded for the ‘demythologising’ of the New Testament. Bultmann was not the first to recognise the mythical character of the Bible, but he differed from most of his predecessors by not rendering these myths utterly useless and insignificant for modern man. He firmly believed that by removing the mythical skin from these biblical stories, one is time and again left with a message that is not time-bound, but remains surprisingly relevant. This applies also to apocalyptic passages in the New Testament. Despite the ‘obvious’ falsehood of apocalyptic language, viewed from the vantage point of modern science and reason, Bultmann claimed to be able to extract the *kerygma* of these passages by demythologising them. The apocalypticism and eschatology of the New Testament, when demythologised and ‘existentialised’, called for a (con)current decision that would bring about radical change in the here and now. The ‘existential eschatology’ of Bultmann denoted the following:

\[A\] dramatic internal change within an individual so that one may speak of the world (as the ground of identity and security) having come to an end for that individual. (Borg 1994a:71)

Notably missing from this understanding of eschatology are the concepts of change in the external world and futurity in general.

These findings were further applied to the historical Jesus, who was not an apocalypticist concerned with the future, but who preached an eschatological message in order to radically influence and alter people’s lives in the present. This authentic core of Jesus’ preaching could also be demythologised by means of an existentialist interpretation. Thus, the ethics of Jesus, although tainted by eschatology, could be demythologised, removed from their eschatological skins, and interpreted existentially. The existential interpretation of Jesus’ ethics took on a contextual flavour in Bultmann’s work. Accordingly, Bultmann spoke of the ‘eschatological ethics’ of Jesus, which is an ethical programme that calls for radical obedience to the laws of God, especially the love command, in the present moment, as demanded by the context of each situation, and not by the Torah. For Bultmann, Jesus’ emphasis on radical obedience in the moment formed part of his critique against the obsessive legalistic ritualism of traditional Judaism. Another attempt to preserve the eschatological essence of Jesus, but to still argue for the continued relevance of his ethics, was made by Amos Wilder (1950). According to Wilder, the imminent eschatology of Jesus functioned merely as ‘sanctions’ for his ethical prerogative. Yet, these sanctions were only ‘formal’ in nature. The ‘fundamental’ sanctions (meaning the *actual* sanctions) were Jesus’ message of
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God’s innate nature, his appeal to Jewish scripture, and his appeal to his own authority and example.

In 1945, Werner Georg Kümmel argued that the authentic Jesus material contained both present and future sayings about the kingdom of God. These sayings appeared side by side in the tradition, and any attempt to separate them, and to dismiss one group as inauthentic, would be subjective and unwarranted. Thus, the authentic Jesus material, as well as the inauthentic church traditions, simultaneously supported both reigning views of a ‘realised eschatology’ (à la Dodd) and a ‘consistent eschatology’ (à la Schweitzer). In Kümmel’s opinion, the person of Jesus merged the present with the future. The content of the future kingdom was already present in Jesus. This result became the consensus view amongst scholars from the middle of the previous century onwards (Borg 1994a:53; cf. Frey 2011:16; Theissen & Merz 1998:244). This consensus has been referred to as the ‘great synthesis’ of Jesus studies (Borg 1994a:53). To be sure, however, scholarly emphasis remained on the future aspect of the kingdom of God (Borg 1994a:53–54). The present aspect of the kingdom was typically added as an afterthought to discussions of its future aspect. The future dimension of God’s kingdom remained its fundamental and defining quality.

Despite putting his own image of the historical Jesus forward, Bultmann declared the search to be unimportant and trivial for Christian faith. As one of the main advocates of dialectic theology, Bultmann deliberately opted for the kerygmatic Christ, as he was proclaimed by the early church, over and against the historical Jesus. In this regard, the influence of Kähler is clear (Patterson 1998a:37). Yet, this choice was not meant to be an attack on, or a dismissal of, the relevance of historical Jesus research. His own work on form criticism and his book on the historical Jesus betray his commitment to the historical scrutiny of biblical texts (Kloppenborg et al. 1990:115). Bultmann’s point in opting for the kerygmatic Christ was that historical Jesus research is irrelevant, not as a means of historical enquiry or biblical exegesis, but when it comes to matters of kerygma and faith (see Van Aarde 2011c:1–7; 2012). In other words, historical Jesus research, and especially form criticism, was legitimate and relevant as an investigative tool for historians and biblical scholars, but could never substitute or validate ‘raw’ faith in the post-Easter Christ; nor could it ever serve as a foundation for the kerygma. Bultmann ([1960] 1965a:9) distinguished between the ‘that’ (daß) and the ‘what’ (was) of Jesus. Stories about Jesus – the ‘what’ of his life and ministry – were (and are) the result of faith in him, not the foundation of such faith. These stories were (and are) a way of asserting one’s faith and expressing the kerygma. The foundation for kerygma and faith, rather, is the belief that (daß) God somehow became human in a historic person named Jesus. This partly explains why Bultmann held that historical Jesus research, which deals exclusively with the ‘what’ of Jesus’ life and work, were exercises in futility when it came to faith and kerygma.

Conceivably, most scholars (and lay people) would agree with Bultmann on these matters, but unfortunately many from his own time (and thereafter) misunderstood
Bultmann to mean that historical Jesus research was wholly and utterly irrelevant. Bultmann’s focus on ‘demythologising’ and ‘existentialising’ the New Testament only ended in affirming these misconceptions. Ironically, though, these exegetical processes were thoroughly rooted in critical and historical research. Bultmann’s dialectic theology never disposes of historic (historisch) inquiry or research, but employs it in search of the existential (geschichtlich) relevance of both the mythological Bible and the historical Jesus (see Van Aarde 2011c:1–7; 2012). Additionally, Bultmann’s comments that nothing could be known of the ‘life and personality’ of the historical Jesus led many to misconstrue Bultmann as declaring that nothing at all could be known about him. As we saw, this was not Bultmann’s position. Instead, he held that rather much could be known about the teachings of Jesus; so much so that a relatively consistent picture could be drawn of his overall message (Kloppenborg et al. 1990:115).

While Schweitzer’s unassailable critique demolished and ended the First Quest, thereby inaugurating a period of No Quest, Bultmann’s perceived (!) pessimism over both the feasibility and relevance of Jesus studies affirmed and prolonged the No Quest period (Bock 2002:144; Martin 1999:41–42, 43; Telford 1994:33–34, 56; Witherington 1995:9–10; Wright 1996:21–22; 2002:14–15). It should be noted that neither Schweitzer nor Bultmann ever used the term ‘No Quest’, or intended to completely eradicate historical research of either the Bible or the person of Jesus (see Van Aarde 2011c:1–7). It is also important to note that the designation ‘No Quest’ is a misnomer, since historical Jesus research did not stall into a period of hiatus during this time (Bock 2002:144–145; Telford 1994:60; see Porter 2011:698). During this period, liberal theology and its ethical portraits of Jesus continued to exist alongside eschatological portraits of Jesus (Casey 2010:4, 12; cf. Allison 2001a:111–112; Wright 1996:23; 2002:16). Nonetheless, this period was marked by a general pessimism over the feasibility and relevance of a search for the Jesus of history (Borg 1994a:3–4; cf. Hedrick 2014:5; Martin 1999:42; Telford 1994:56). After the Second World War, the results of form criticism were confirmed by redaction criticism (Borg 1994a:4). Accordingly, not only the supernatural and mythical aspects of the Gospels, but also the ethical teachings of Jesus, had been manufactured by the early church. It was generally believed by New Testament scholarship that only a minimalist sketch of Jesus could be recovered behind the Gospels. For the most part, the only historically reliable tradition about Jesus was that he was an apocalyptic prophet who expected and preached the sporadic end of the world (Martin 1999:41).

The New Quest

A student of Bultmann, Ernst Käsemann, is generally thought to have initiated a new era of Jesus research, commonly known as the New Quest. With a lecture on the subject in 1953, published as an academic article in 1954 (and translated into English in 1964), Käsemann defended the opinion that Jesus studies could indeed be done
properly and lead to trustworthy results. Käsemann believed and argued that ignoring the historical Jesus would lead to a docetic disregard for the humanity of Jesus. He held that the historical Jesus could under no circumstances be made theologically irrelevant. Käsemann further argued that there are certain Gospel pericopes that are indisputably and undeniably authentic. The Gospels themselves built their theologies not only on the death and Resurrection of Jesus (à la Kähler), but also on the historical works and words of an authentic, historical person. Käsemann defended certain aspects of continuity between Jesus and the early church.

Regarding eschatology, Käsemann argued that the main difference between Jesus and John the Baptist was that the latter proclaimed an imminent and apocalyptic eschatology, while the former proclaimed the immanence of God and his kingdom in all aspects of life. Jesus had played down the apocalyptic element in John’s teaching, but the early church had resurrected John’s apocalyptic views, which then became paramount. A few of Bultmann’s other students, like Philipp Vielhauer and Hans Conzelmann, also advocated a (quasi) non-apocalyptic Jesus (Boyd 1995:55; Patterson 1998a:174–175; 2001b:70–71; see Robinson 1991:179–180). The continuing influence of Käsemann’s ‘discontinuity’ argument is evident in Robinson’s (1991:189–194) more recent proposal of a tradition-historical trajectory from an apocalyptic Baptist through a sapiential Jesus to a ‘re-apocalypticised’ Matthew. According to Robinson, Q represents the heart of the ‘re-apocalypticising’ process that took place in the period between Jesus and Matthew.

Käsemann’s main contribution was not his views on the eschatology of Jesus, though, but his optimistic introduction and convincing validation of the New Quest. Despite this new optimism, however, the New Quest continued in the footsteps of the No Quest period (Borg 1994a:4–5). Jesus was still largely believed to have preached an essentially eschatological message, which was then made relevant by interpreting it existentially (Borg 1994b:11–12). This was despite the views of many of Bultmann’s students that the message of Jesus was not essentially apocalyptic or eschatological. The essential difference between the No Quest and New Quest periods was not so much methodological, but theological (Borg 1994a:4–5; Patterson 1998a:39–40; Theissen & Merz 1998:7). Answers to historical questions remained largely the same. Instead, it was the theological relevance of these answers that changed. The New Quest was mainly concerned with validating the historical roots of the kerygma by determining the extent of continuity between the Jesus of history and the Jesus of the Gospels, as well as determining the significance of Jesus for both ancient and modern human existence (Borg 1994b:12–13; Koester 1992:5; Robinson 2011:450; cf. Pokorný 7).

7. Käsemann believed that his insistence on the theological relevance of the historical Jesus, as well as the continuity between this personage and the early church, was diametrically opposed to Bultmann’s preference for the kerygmatic Christ. Such a view of Käsemann’s relation to Bultmann can still be found amongst scholars today (e.g. Borg 1994b:12; Telford 1994:57). Yet, Käsemann’s original valuation of his relation to Bultmann might actually rest on a misunderstanding of the intricacies and nuances of Bultmann’s theology (see Bultmann 1965b:190–198; Schmithals 1968:262; [1926] 1988:149–158; Van Aarde 2011c:1–7).
As such, theological questions and concerns, as opposed to historical ones, largely governed the New Quest for Jesus (Charlesworth 1988:26). This is not to say that historical questions were completely moved aside, with a number of New Questers remaining principally interested in history (Kloppenborg 2011b:243).

In order to circumvent the mistakes made by earlier researchers, proponents of the New Quest focused their attention on historical-critical methods and various criteria of authenticity (see Den Heyer 2002:177–178; Patterson 1998a:40–41; cf. Bock 2002:146; Telford 1994:57; Witherington 1995:11). These criteria had already been suggested by earlier scholarship, but they received centre stage during this time (see Porter 2011:698–700, 706–708). The use of Aramaic to reconstruct the authentic words of Jesus was put forward by Joachim Jeremias as one criterion for the search (Bock 2002:147). Another important criterion was that of ‘multiple independent attestation’, according to which a tradition is more likely to be authentic if it is independently attested in more than one source. Yet another criterion, which had already been suggested by Bultmann, paid particular attention to the uniqueness of Jesus (see Van Aarde 2004:427). It held that something was historically reliable if it had not derived from the early church. Ironically, this ‘criterion of dissimilarity’ in a sense undermined the New Quest’s prerogative to discover aspects of continuity between the historical Jesus and the early church (cf. Kloppenborg 2011b:243). Another criterion, which had also been suggested previously by Bultmann and earlier scholarship, likewise focused on the supposed uniqueness of Jesus by being suspicious of any material that had close parallels in contemporary popular culture, especially the Jewish writings of antiquity. The belief was that the early church had probably attributed popular sayings and established wisdom to their hero, Jesus. The more unorthodox, intelligent and problematic sayings of Jesus were probably more authentic. This criterion also became known as the ‘criterion of dissimilarity’. Käsemann was the first scholar not only to explicitly identify and describe these criteria of dissimilarity, but also to suggest that they be used together when determining the authenticity of single traditions (Kloppenborg 2005:14). Together, these two criteria became known as the criterion of ‘double dissimilarity’, which authenticated Jesus traditions that were dissimilar from both popular (Jewish) culture and the early church (Blomberg 1999:21–22; Porter 2011:710; Theissen & Merz 1998:7; cf. Kloppenborg 2011b:266). Out of all the criteria, ‘double dissimilarity’ reigned supreme during the New Quest (Borg 1994b:15–16). The import of the ‘double-dissimilarity’ criterion, as well as the consensus that Jesus was an apocalyptic prophet, ensured that sapiential material continued to be viewed as inauthentic (Borg 1994b:19). Since the time of Bultmann, scholars simply accepted, on the one hand, that these sayings could not be harmonised with the reigning apocalyptic view, and, on the other, that they were little more than traditional folk wisdom attributed to Jesus by the early church.

The application of these criteria led to the inevitable realisation that only fragmentary glimpses of the historical Jesus could be reconstructed. What is more,
these reconstructions were just as subjective as those of the Old Quest, notwithstanding the rigorously of the methodological approach (Patterson 1998a:41–42). This realisation was disappointing, and only succeeded in confirming the scepticism of the No Quest period. Once again, the New Testament text became paramount, as is clearly demonstrated by the replacement of form criticism with redaction criticism, and the eventual replacement of both in some quarters with literary and narrative criticism. Even though a New Quest had started, pessimism over the relevance and feasibility of historical Jesus research was carried over from the No Quest period, and persisted (Koester 1992:5). For most New Testament scholars (as well as systematic theologians), the ‘thoroughgoing pessimism’ of Kähler remained (Borg 1994b:13). Historical Jesus research was mostly viewed as an academic cul-de-sac (Telford 1994:33). Even those who were initially optimistic and enthusiastic about the New Quest started doubting the viability of the search, finally abandoning such efforts completely in the early seventies (Witherington 1995:11).

The Third and Renewed Quests

The late 1970s and early 1980s saw a renewed interest and revival in historical-Jesus research (Borg 1994b:16–17; Kloppenborg 2001:149; cf. Boyd 1995:46; Charlesworth 1988:26; Martin 1999:45; Telford 1994:38, 47; Witherington 1995:12; Wright 1996:29; 2002:23). Up to and until the end of the New Quest, most historical Jesus research was concentrated in Germany (Borg 1994b:10–11). Scholars from other countries listened intently and sometimes even participated, but it was Germany that showed the way. English-speaking scholars, notably from the United States of America, should be credited with initiating and sustaining the revival of the search for the historical Jesus (Boyd 1995:50–51; Robinson 2011:450). In most European countries, pessimism increased over the reliability of our sources, particularly the Gospel accounts, for a reconstruction of the historical Jesus, and is still the most prevalent stance today. American and English scholars, however, became much more positive about both the viability and relevance of the search during the eighties (Charlesworth 1988:25; Martin 1999:45; Telford 1994:57; Witherington 1995:12–13; Wright 2002:38). This has led to a situation where the dominant voices in historical Jesus research no longer come from Germany, but from the United States and England (Borg 1994b:29).

A few features enabled this positive stance in the English-speaking world, and distinguished the revival in Jesus studies from earlier searches. The first was a brand new appreciation for the importance of non-theological disciplines, including specifically social sciences like cultural anthropology, social history and feminist studies, as well as archaeology, linguistics and history of religions (Borg 1994a:7, 19; cf. Boyd 1995:57–58; Charlesworth 1988:25; Telford 1994:52, 58; Theissen & Merz 1998:10; Witherington 1995:247; see Borg 1994b:21–24; Malina 2011:743–775). This appreciation has led to an interdisciplinary approach to Jesus studies, which has
allowed scholars to discover new truths about Jesus and his world (Martin 1999:45). One of the outcomes of such an interdisciplinary approach has been that the historical Jesus has increasingly been described in terms of his sociopolitical significance and contribution (see Borg 1994b:24–25). The second feature that enabled a renaissance of Jesus studies was a newfound appreciation for non-canonical sources from antiquity (Bock 2002:146–147; Boyd 1995:52; Charlesworth 1988:25; Theissen & Merz 1998:11; see Telford 1994:47–49). This appreciation was both fuelled and aided by archaeological discoveries, including especially the Dead Sea Scrolls and Nag Hammadi manuscripts (see Casey 2010:120–132; Charlesworth 1988:30–172; cf. Borg 1994a:10–11, 19; Witherington 1995:12). These findings enabled scholars to reconstruct the period and world in which Jesus lived much more accurately than ever before (Charlesworth 1988:9, 27).

The combination of an interdisciplinary focus and a consideration of extrabiblical sources enabled researchers to draw a fairly authentic picture of the world in which Jesus operated (Wright 2002:31–32). Such a picture has become essential for understanding Jesus himself (Boyd 1995:57; Telford 1994:49). As a result, scholarship has increasingly favoured approaches that place Jesus within his wider Jewish and/or Hellenistic contexts (Telford 1994:52, 58). In general, we could therefore say that the revival of Jesus research began an orientation that was (and still is) more directly interested in history than theology (Charlesworth 1988:9, 26–27; Telford 1994:57). Partly due to the revived interest in the Jewish world of Jesus, the belief slowly but surely gained support that research on the historical Jesus should take as its starting point the Jewish context and identity of Jesus (Bock 2002:141, 147; Fredriksen 2005:55; Kloppenborg 2005:2; Koester 1994:541; Telford 1994:49, 52; Wright 1996:5–6; 2002:31–32). This development should be seen as one of the most important features of the revived quest (Casey 2010:13; Theissen & Merz 1998:10–11).

The criteria developed during the New Quest were not totally abandoned, but were refined (Witherington 1995:12). In light of the attention paid to the 1st-century Jewish world of Jesus, the all-important criterion of double dissimilarity came under fire (Casey 2010:13; Pokorný 2011:338; see Borg 1994b:25–27; Den Heyer 2002:178–181). If this criterion is consistently applied, Jesus will as a matter of course be stripped of both his Jewishness and his impact on the early church (Casey 2010:104; Hedrick 2014:22; Kloppenborg 2005:16; 2011b:268; Pokorný 2011:338; Porter 2011:711; Telford 1994:58; Theissen & Merz 1998:8; Witherington 1995:46; see Meier 2011:316–317). Scholars now believe that to deny any continuity between Jesus and his Jewish world, on the one hand, or between Jesus and the early church, on the other, is anachronistic, unhistorical, unscientific, illogical and irresponsible (cf. Kloppenborg 2011b:269). Yet, the criterion of double dissimilarity did not disappear altogether (Wright 1996:86; 2002:33–34). Researchers agree that it still has a more limited application. More specifically, if utilised correctly, the criterion of double dissimilarity points to those aspects that made Jesus unique without stripping him of either his Jewishness or his
value for the early church (Pokorný 2011:338; Telford 1994:67; cf. Casey 2010:104; Funk 2006:162; Hedrick 2014:22; Meier 2011:317). At Jesus Seminar meetings, Funk referred to this new application of the older criterion as the criterion of ‘(double) distinctiveness’ (Miller 1999:75). Other criteria have also stood the test of time (see Telford 1994:67–68). Most important of these are arguably the criterion of multiple independent attestation and the criterion of embarrassment (see Casey 2010:13, 102–105). A brand new criterion was created, commonly referred to as the criterion of ‘historical plausibility’ (Theissen & Merz 1998:11; Van Aarde 2004:428; see Casey 2010:106–108). This criterion takes as its starting point not the uniqueness of Jesus, but his rootedness in Jewish culture of the time. It does this by asking two simple questions: Given his environment, is it historically plausible that Jesus did or said this or the other within his lifetime?, and: Is it possible to explain and clarify the rise of the early church from this tradition? In a sense, this criterion is the polar opposite of the criterion of double dissimilarity.

A schism in contemporary scholarship

New methodologies invariably lead to new results. The general consensus that Jesus was an eschatological prophet, which had governed historical Jesus studies since the time of Schweitzer, started to wane (Borg 1994a:7, 18–19, 69; 2001b:31; Horsley 2012:2; cf. Frey 2011:17; Miller 2001:10; see Patterson 1998a:164–184; 2001b:69–70). The belief that Jesus’ eschatology was not future-oriented began gaining a lot of ground. This idea was not new. As we saw, Dodd had already held such a view, expressed by the term ‘realised eschatology’ (see above, ‘Rudolf Bultmann and the “No Quest” period’). Also the idea that Jesus’ eschatology was not temporal at all was expressed long ago by a number of scholars, most notably by Hans Conzelmann (Patterson 1998a:174–175; 2001b:70; see Den Heyer 2002:100–102). These atemporal and non-futurist interpretations of Jesus’ eschatology started receiving a lot of support in the 1980s. The large-scale scholarly abandonment of the apocalyptic Jesus was the result of both negation and creation. Regarding the former, the material on which the apocalyptic Jesus was traditionally based came under fire. More precisely, the apocalyptic traditions in Q, Mark and Paul were increasingly being approached with suspicion (Patterson 1998a:172). Regarding the latter, a new picture of Jesus, one that could replace the apocalyptic picture, started to emerge (see Frey 2011:17–18; Miller 1999).8 The emerging picture of Jesus was that of a wisdom teacher (Horsley 2012:2; Stanton 2002:230; see Borg 1994b:17–19). The result was a broad consensus amongst like-minded scholars, accurately defined by Borg (1994a):

(1) wisdom is central to the Jesus tradition; and (2) this material suggest that, whatever else also needs to be said about Jesus, he was a teacher of subversive wisdom. (p. 82; see also Borg 1994b:17–19)

8. Crossan (1998:257–284) is an example of a scholar who, although firmly placed within the Renewed Quest, leaves enough room for (some form of) eschatology in the life and message of Jesus. He is certainly not alone.
Both the negation of the apocalyptic consensus and the creation of the sapiential consensus were the result of not only the methodological adjustments that characterised the revival of Jesus studies after the eighties, but also the scientific progress that typified mainly five separate, but interdependent, fields of New Testament research: (1) the Son of Man title; (2) the parables of Jesus; (3) the Gospel of Thomas; (4) the Jewishness of Jesus; and (5) the Sayings Gospel Q.

According to Borg (1994a:8), the older consensus of an apocalyptic Jesus was essentially based on four aspects: (1) the general atmosphere of crisis betrayed by the Gospels; (2) the Son of Man sayings, all of which were thought to predict the imminent coming of the Son of Man; (3) the sayings about the kingdom of God; and (4) the expectation by the early church that the eschatological end would occur within their lifetimes. Out of these, the logia about the Son of Man were, according to him, most central and foundational for an eschatological image of Jesus (Borg 1994a:52; cf. Van Aarde 2004:424; Wink 2002:164). Just before and especially during the Renewed Quest, it became increasingly accepted by American (and a few other) scholars that the futurist and apocalyptic Son of Man logia were not authentic, but were created by the early church after Easter in expectation of the second coming of Christ (Borg 1994a:8, 51, 52, 84–86; Horsley 2012:16; Patterson 2001b:70–71; Robinson 2003:26; cf. Theissen & Merz 1998:245; e.g. Burkett 1999:124; Crossan 1991:254–256; Hoffmann 1995:193 fn. 56; Van Aarde 2004:423–438). This development is clearly demonstrated by the fact that the coming and suffering Son of Man logia consistently received 80% grey or black votes at the 1988-spring meeting of the Jesus Seminar (Borg 1994a:15 fn. 13; Burkett 1999:80; 1994b:18; Miller 1999:24). Some scholars believe that the inauthenticity of the apocalyptic Son of Man logia is evidenced by their absence in the earliest layer of the Sayings Gospel Q (see Burkett 1999:79–80).

With the apocalyptic Son of Man logia and the futurist aspects of Jesus’ eschatology moved aside, the way was cleared for scholars to interpret the kingdom of God logia (Borg’s third item above) non-eschatologically, particularly because the respective terms ‘Son of Man’ and ‘kingdom of God’ do not appear together in the same sayings (cf. Borg 1994a:8, 53–57, 86–88; Horsley 2012:16; Kloppenborg 2011b:279; Patterson 2001b:70–71; see Wink 2002:161–163). Likewise, the early church’s expectation of an imminent end (Borg’s fourth item above) could now be explained as a consequence of the Easter event, as opposed to the preaching of Jesus (e.g. Borg 1994a:57–59, 78–79; 2001b:38). Lastly, the atmosphere of crisis in the Synoptic Gospels (Borg’s first item above) could now be attributed to the effect of the subversive wisdom of Jesus, as opposed to an expectation of an imminent end (e.g. Borg 1994a:59, 89). Thus, the four pillars on which the apocalyptic Jesus was formerly built started to collapse. Although Borg is no doubt correct about the impact of Son of Man research, he overemphasises the latter, and underappreciates other developments in New Testament studies that were no less significant in disrupting the apocalyptic consensus. Be that as it may, recent polls of American Jesus scholars indicate that a great number of them have
left behind the older consensus of an apocalyptic Jesus (see Patterson 1998a:170–171). Theissen and Merz (1998:245) claim that ‘[i]n most recent North American exegesis, future eschatology is denied.’ Likewise, Järvinen (2001) makes the following claim:

> The initial preference of the ‘Historical Jesus’ research for portraying an apocalyptic Jesus has lost much of its attraction whereas the ‘wise-man-Jesus’ is nowadays often more appealing. (p. 516)

As a result, current scholarship is divided between those who continue to advocate some form of Schweitzer’s apocalyptic Jesus and those who opt for a sapiential Jesus.

Wright should be credited as the first scholar to describe the contemporary schism in Jesus research accurately (Boyd 1995:46–47; Craffert 2003:339; Van Aarde 2002:425). Wright (1996:20–21, 28; 2002:12–13, 23) noticed that there was one group of scholars who favoured marching in the Wredebahn, while another group of scholars favoured the Schweitzerbahn. In other words, whereas some Jesus scholars followed in the footsteps of William Wrede and his ‘thoroughgoing scepticism’, other Jesus scholars followed in the footsteps of Albert Schweitzer and his ‘thoroughgoing eschatology’ (cf. Hedrick 2014:5). He labelled the former trend the Renewed Quest, and the latter trend the Third Quest (cf. Funk 1996:64). Wright (1996:28) immediately qualified his distinction by acknowledging that it is not ‘hard-and-fast’ (Craffert 2003:339). There are scholars who incorporate aspects of both stances (Wright 1996:78). Both sets of scholars also adhere to the broader developments outlined above, like the feasibility and viability of the search for Jesus, the centrality of Jesus’ 1st-century context, the concentration on his Jewishness, the focus on history rather than theology, and the appreciation for both non-canonical sources and non-theological sciences (Boyd 1995:57; Fredriksen 2005:55; Kloppenborg 2005:2). Yet, according to Wright (and myself), the distinction is clearly visible and worth making; if only as a heuristic aid (Craffert 2003:339).

Whereas the Renewed Quest (like Wrede) is more sceptical and cautious about the historical validity of information about Jesus in the Gospels, the Third Quest (like Schweitzer) is optimistic about the historical reliability of these canonical sources (Wright 1996:28; cf. Bock 2002:147, 150; Borg 1999:231; see Charlesworth 1988:19–21). Whereas the Renewed Quest (like Wrede) imagines a great gulf between the historical Jesus and the early church, the Third Quest (like Schweitzer) sees much continuity.
between Jesus and the early church (Bock 2002:148; Borg 1999:233; Charlesworth 1988:15). Whereas the Renewed Quest (like Wrede) tries to find the most reliable evidence by zooming in on particular traditions, the Third Quest (like Schweitzer) tries to synthesise all the canonical evidence in order to form a more holistic view of Jesus’ entire ministry and message (Blomberg 1999:21, 22–23, 31; Bock 2002:151–152; Telford 1994:50, 52; cf. Craffert 2003:342; Fredriksen 2005:65; e.g. Charlesworth 1988:17–18; Witherington 1995:247). Whereas the Renewed Quest (like Wrede) begins methodologically with the text, and works its way towards hypothesis, the Third Quest (like Schweitzer) begins with hypothesis, and works its way through the textual evidence in support of this hypothesis (see Wright 2002:36–37; cf. Borg 1999:231; Eddy 1999:42). Whereas the Renewed Quest (like Wrede) treats the Jesus tradition more or less diachronically, believing that the establishment of strata is of the utmost importance for a valid silhouette of Jesus, the Third Quest (like Schweitzer) treats the Jesus tradition more or less synchronically, with a fair bit of disregard for its layering (Craffert 2003:349; Telford 1994:69; see Borg 1999:231–233).

It follows that sources such as Q and the Gospel of Thomas are indispensable and central for the Renewed Quest, but dispensable and peripheral for the Third Quest (Bock 2002:150; Borg 1999:231; Craffert 2003:342; Wright 1996:35; see Arnal 2005a:41–48; Boyd 1995:52–55; Witherington 1995:48–50). Although both the Third Quest and the Renewed Quest are heavily invested in non-canonical (and quasi-canonical) sources, the difference is that the Renewed Quest values them not only because they assist in reconstructing Jesus’ world, but also because some of them may contain authentic traditions about Jesus (Boyd 1995:52; cf. Kloppenborg 2011b:255). The Third Quest, conversely, values non-canonical sources only as tools for reconstructing the world in which Jesus lived. It has been a trend in the Renewed Quest to broaden the criterion of multiple independent attestation to include a variety of non-canonical sources (Theissen & Merz 1998:11). This tendency reached an apex in the work of Crossan (1991), who often has a higher regard for certain non-canonical sources than the Synoptic Gospels (Boyd 1995:52; see Witherington 1995:77–79, 236). It also follows from the distinctions noted above that both the historical-critical methods and the various criteria of authenticity are central for Renewed Questers, but only slightly useful for Third Questers, who tend to put all their methodological eggs in the basket of historical plausibility (Blomberg 1999:21; Bock 2002:150; Eddy 1999:42; Telford 1994:49–50, 57–58; Witherington 1995:12, 247; Wright 1996:79, 87). When criteria of authenticity are applied by the Third Quest, they usually function not to determine the authenticity of individual traditions, but to validate a larger historical portrait (Blomberg 1999:22, 31; Telford 1994:52; Wright 2002:34). As one would expect, these different methodological foci also translate into different results. Whereas the Renewed Quest tends to emphasise the sapiential aspects of Jesus’ ministry and message, the Third Quest (like Schweitzer) tends to emphasise the eschatological aspects of Jesus’ ministry and message (Blomberg 1999:21; Wright 1996:81; cf. Stanton 2002:250; see Boyd 1995:55–56).
The schism between historical Jesus scholars is presently understood as two extreme points of view, with one promoting imminent and apocalyptic eschatology, and the other promoting wisdom (cf. Kloppenborg 2005:1; Telford 1994:72–73). We have seen that there were scholars in the past who had managed to retain both points of view. Werner Georg Kümmel (1945) should probably be credited as the first scholar to argue that the authentic Jesus material contains both present-oriented and future-oriented assertions about the kingdom of God. According to Theissen and Merz (1998:244), there is relative consensus today that both present and future kingdom sayings appear in the authentic Jesus material (cf. e.g. Wink 2002:165). This may be true formally, but it certainly does not seem to be the case in practice. Typically, scholars who prefer a sapiential Jesus tend to prefer present kingdom sayings, and discount future kingdom sayings as additions by the early church (e.g. Borg 1994a:27, 51, 53–57, 86–88; Crossan 1991:passim; Mack 1988:73; Patterson 2001b:76). In a similar fashion, scholars who prefer an apocalyptic Jesus tend to emphasise future kingdom sayings, and interpret present kingdom sayings as being enmeshed in (imminent) eschatology (Miller 2001:3; e.g.; Allison 2001b:24, on Q 10:9; 2001d:96–99). As a result, we tend to get images of Jesus that are either consistently eschatological or fundamentally sapiential (cf. Telford 1994:72–73). By and large, it remains possible to group historical Jesus researchers according to these two extreme points of view (Kloppenborg 2005:1; Miller 2001:1–2).

The cause of this division might be subconscious. It is possible that (post)modern scholars struggle to integrate the two worldviews that motivated ethics in the ancient Jewish world (Carlston 1982:116; see Horsley 2012:17–18). These were the sapiential and eschatological worldviews, which operated side by side in antiquity (see Meier 2011:321–322). It might be our modern, scholarly obsession with classification and taxonomy that lies at the root of the struggle to synthesise these two worldviews (see Allison 2001d:89–93, 110; 2010:88; cf. Jacobson 1992:35). The sapiential and eschatological frameworks are impossible for some modern scholars to reconcile, which explains the scholarlly need to choose between the two in their depictions of Jesus (e.g. Borg 1994a:82–83; Patterson 2001a:125–126; 2001b:71, 76). Carlston (1982) relates this problem to Q specifically:

If apocalyptic presupposes a world at its end and wisdom a continuing world; if apocalyptic thinks of God as active in bringing history to a dramatic close and wisdom thinks of human experience as the best guide to success and survival in an indefinitely extended history; if eschatology implies discontinuity and wisdom is based on thousands of continuities – how can a single document (and thus, to some degree, a single community) hold to both views at the same time? (p. 113)

This difficulty can not only be observed in the mentioned schism of the current quests, but is also apparent from the overview of historical Jesus research given above (cf. Horsley could also have been added as one of these examples, was it not for the fact that he describes Jesus, not as a sage, but as a social prophet. Nevertheless, Horsley (1987:170–172, 190–192, 207, 324–325) downplays the eschatological dimension of the term ‘kingdom of God’. Wink (2002:161–163) is another example of a scholar who views all the kingdom sayings as referring to the present, but does not necessarily advocate a sapiential Jesus.
Horsley 2012:2). In each phase of the history of historical Jesus research, one of these paradigms reigned supreme. In short, liberal theology preferred an ethical Jesus, the period after Schweitzer preferred an eschatological Jesus, and the current Renewed Quest prefers a sapiential, non-eschatological Jesus (Borg 1994a:48–51, 74; 2001b:31; Miller 1999:24; 2001:10). This brings us full circle. The pendulum of Jesus studies has returned to a position very similar to that of the Old Quest (Koester 1992:5). By portraying Jesus as a sage of some kind, the focus has turned away from his eschatological message, and back towards his practical message. Granted the differences between the Old and Renewed Quests, of which there are many, there are also some noticeable similarities (cf. Frey 2011:18). Another observation from the survey above also underscores the same point: There tended to be fervent reaction against the dominant position at different times, with the positive case against the reigning position typically being an argument for the opposite paradigm. Let me illustrate this with the two most obvious examples. Schweitzer reacted vehemently against the prevailing liberal image of Jesus, and proposed in its place an eschatological image. The Renewed Quest reacted no less vehemently against the century-old eschatological image of Jesus, and proposed in its place a sapiential image. After listing a number of English and German scholars who had historically been opposed to Schweitzer, Allison (2001a) makes the following statement:

My estimation is that the state of today's English-speaking academy is not far from what it has been for a hundred years, that is, pretty much evenly divided for and against Schweitzer. (p. 114)

Thus, both within the history of historical Jesus scholarship, and within the present stalemate, we can observe a tendency to separate the sapiential-ethical elements of his person and message from the eschatological-apocalyptic elements of his person and message. After separating the two, scholars tend to select only one and regard it as the all-encompassing paradigm for a complete understanding of the historical Jesus (cf. Miller 2001:1–2). This choice then tends to spill over into the way in which sources are approached, not only regarding the determination of authentic material, but also regarding the exegesis and interpretation of such authentic material (cf. Jacobson 1992:35). For example, scholars who prefer a sapiential Jesus would characteristically appeal to Kloppenborg’s stratification of Q, while those from the opposite camp would characteristically argue against Kloppenborg’s stratigraphy, and point to the eschatological and apocalyptic traditions in Q.

Ironically, the authentic Jesus material may underwrite either view of Jesus (apocalyptic or sapiential), depending on the methodologies, criteria and/or sources preferred. Theissen and Merz (1998:261–264) have argued, for example, that ethical (i.e. sapiential) and eschatological interpretations of the Lord’s Prayer may coexist side by side. In other words, if Theissen and Merz are correct, the content of the Lord’s Prayer justifies both reigning views of the historical Jesus. Witherington (1995:235) similarly holds that the symbolic ‘cleansing’ of the Temple could justifiably be construed as either a moral-sapiential act or a prophetic-apocalyptic act. Miller (2005:115–121)
lists a number of traditions, taken by most to be authentic, that could legitimately be read either as wisdom teachings or as apocalyptic pronouncements. Within this discussion, Miller (2005) explicitly states:

A number of Jesus’ words and deeds can be taken in either an apocalyptic or a non-apocalyptic sense … Both readings are legitimate and the differences in meaning come not from the material itself but from the larger context one uses to interpret it. (p. 118)

Such multivalence also applies to historical Jesus studies generally: ‘[W]ildly divergent representations of Jesus can be constructed from the same general fund of sayings and stories’ (Kloppenborg 2001:149–150). This pertains to the content of the Sayings Gospel Q as well (see Kloppenborg 2001:174–176; 2011b:260–261). On that note, let us take a closer look at the five developments in New Testament research mentioned earlier that are directly responsible for the birth of the Renewed Quest: (1) the Son of Man title; (2) the parables of Jesus; (3) the Gospel of Thomas; (4) the Jewishness of Jesus; and (5) the Sayings Gospel Q.

The Son of Man

Throughout the Patristic and Medieval periods, three interpretations of the term ‘Son of Man’ persisted largely unchallenged (Lukaszewski 2011:1; Wink 2002:19). Firstly, the term ‘Son of Man’ was a title that expressed Jesus’ human nature. The latter was contrasted with the term ‘Son of God’, which expressed Jesus’ divine nature. Secondly, the term implied that Jesus was the genealogical son of a historical figure, most commonly Adam and/or Mary. Regardless of his or her actual identity, the notion that the term implied a historical figure provided additional support to the idea that the human nature of Jesus was being conveyed. Thirdly, the term was derived from Daniel 7:13, which, it was believed, predicted the Parousia of Jesus and his role as apocalyptic judge. Thus, the term ‘Son of Man’ denoted the human nature of Christ, but also connoted his role as apocalyptic judge at the Parousia.

12. Although Miller argues that these traditions, particularly the parables, should preferably be read as sapiential teachings.

13. For an extremely thorough and detailed description of the history of Son of Man research and interpretation, see Müller (2008). For an excellent overview and evaluation of the same history, see Burkett (1999). Much of the content of the current section is indebted to these two publications.

14. A fourth interpretation could be added: Gnostics believed that the term portrayed Jesus as the divine son of the god Anthropos (Ἀνθρώπος) (Burkett 1999:6; see Müller 2008:32–52). This interpretation ceased to exist when Gnosticism died out, and was not fundamental to later interpretations.

15. For example, Tertullian, Against Praxeus 2; Irenaeus, Against Heresies 3.19.1.

16. For example, Gregory of Nyssa, Against Eunomius 3.1.91; Pseudo-Athanasius, On the Incarnation Against Apollinaris 1,8; Gregory of Nazianzus, Oration 30.21.

17. For example, Tertullian, Against Marcion 4.10.9, 12; Justin, Dialogue 31.1; 76.1; Hippolytus, Commentary on Daniel 4.10.2.

18. For example, Epistle to Rheginos 44:11–33; 46:14–18; see Vorster (1986:211–228, esp. 218).
Chapter 1

After the Reformation, some interpreters sought to uncover the Semitic phrase that lay ‘underneath’ the Greek ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, appealing mostly to Semitic idioms like ‘son of man’ (שְּנֵאָבֵר אלָש), ‘son of Adam’ (נְפִי אֵדֵם) and ‘that man’ (גֹּבֵר הָיוֹ אָדָם) (cf. Lukaszewski 2011:2). These interpreters soon realised that the Semitic expression ‘son of’ denoted membership of a group, and that whatever followed specified the group. The Semitic term ‘son of man’ therefore merely meant ‘man’. It followed that the term, as it appeared in the New Testament, did not refer back to a specific individual like Mary or Adam, but nonetheless expressed the humanity of Jesus. As an expression of Jesus’ humanity, most interpreters also saw an element of lowliness in the term, whether it be lowliness of social class or of human nature in general. Conversely, other scholars believed that the initial article in the term stressed the Son of Man’s superiority, uniqueness and/or idealness. In different ways, both of these views would go on to become a perfect fit for philosophers and liberal theologians of the Old Quest, who saw Jesus as the ideal example and perfect representative of history’s and humanity’s ultimate goal (see Burkett 1999:18–20; Müller 2008:130–152). Despite these linguistic efforts, some scholars continued the tradition that the term ‘Son of Man’ referenced Daniel 7:13. The main divergence from earlier interpretations was that ‘Son of Man’ now became a messianic title that Jesus had applied to himself. Although there was no shortage of novel interpretations after the Reformation, only three became widespread: (1) the term does not refer back to a particular individual, but still expresses the humanity of Jesus; (2) the term derives from Daniel 7:13 and functions as a messianic title for Jesus; and (3) the term is not a title for Jesus at all, and conveys a Semitic idiom by which someone could refer back to her or himself. A few less popular interpretations appealed to the use of the term ‘son of man’ in Ezekiel and the Psalms. The most popular view of the 16th and 17th centuries continued to be that the term ‘Son of Man’ expressed the humanity of Jesus.

During the 18th and 19th centuries, an ever-increasing number of scholars began supporting the theory that the term ‘Son of Man’ was a messianic title for Jesus, based on Daniel 7:13. By the end of the 19th century, this was the dominant view. A host of scholars were hard-pressed to relinquish the previous view that focussed on Jesus’ humanity. Some of these latter scholars simply combined the emerging consensus with the former view that concentrated on the humanity of Jesus (e.g. Harnack 1907). For some of them, ‘Messiah’ and ‘Son of Man’ were synonymous, both designating a human, earthly Messiah (e.g. Beyschlag 1891–1892). Like earlier, either the lowly or the superior connotations of the term could be emphasised, only now in specific reference to the Messiah (e.g. De Wette 1836).

After translations of 1 Enoch had become available in 1821, apocalyptic interpretations of the term ‘Son of Man’ started gaining ground. The Similitudes of Enoch, an ancient writing contained in 1 Enoch (Chapters 37–71), also featured the term ‘Son of Man’, and described this figure as a pre-existent, heavenly creature, whose main function was to act as judge at the apocalyptic event (see Hannah 2011:130–158). Since the writing was generally thought to predate Christianity, scholars believed that
such an idea of the Son of Man was prevalent in the Judaism of Jesus’ time, and that Jesus had adopted this idea, and applied it to himself. This belief is sometimes called the ‘Son of Man concept’ (Menschensohnbegriff), which Casey (2009:16) defines as the modern scholarly view that ‘Jews at the time of Jesus expected the coming of a glorious figure, the “Son of man”’. The Son of Man concept was primarily built on the Similitudes of Enoch, but once established, it was read into other works as well, especially 4 Ezra 13 and Daniel 7:13 (e.g. Beyschlag 1866:9–34). Thus, Daniel 7:13 was understood by many scholars of this period as one of the witnesses to an established Son of Man concept in Judaism (Collins 2010a:191). Some interpreters even went so far as to extract a long list of traits from various non-Jewish sources, and to then construct from these traits a supernatural, apocalyptic, composite Son of Man character underlying Daniel 7:13 (see Müller 2008:237–262, 276, 345–348, 351–354).

The inevitable effect of such developments was that the mortal Son of Man gave way to an apocalyptic Son of Man (Burkett 1999:4). The Son of Man was still primarily seen as the Messiah; only now this expected Messiah was an apocalyptic judge instead of a this-worldly saviour (Collins 2010a:193; Müller 2008:261–262, 418). Thus, the notion became established that Jesus had used the expression ‘Son of Man’ in order to associate himself with the heavenly Messiah of contemporary apocalyptic texts, who would visit earth at the Apocalypse, not only to judge humanity, but also to substitute the current world order with God’s transcendent kingdom (Burkett 1999:27, 70). This interpretation became increasingly popular from the 1850s onward, and established itself as the predominant view amongst scholars throughout the first 60 years of the 20th century. As Collins (2010a:192) points out, the Son of Man concept was still claimed by Perrin to be the prevailing stance in 1974. The influence of this line of interpretation on historical Jesus research is nowhere more obvious than in the fact that both Johannes Weiss (1892) and Albert Schweitzer ([1906] 2005) adopted it. It also became the assumption upon which Son of Man scholarship after Schweitzer was built (Burkett 1999:70; Müller 2008:262). During this time, it became customary to distinguish between apocalyptic and non-apocalyptic Son of Man logia.

Bultmann ([1921] 1963) followed earlier suggestions and argued that Jesus did not have himself in mind when he spoke of the Son of Man. He expected the coming of another figure, seeing as he always spoke of the Son of Man in the third person. Bultmann also followed previous proposals when he divided the Son of Man logia into three distinct groups: (1) those that speak of the Son of Man as ‘coming’; (2) those that speak of the Son of Man as suffering, dying and rising again; and (3) those that speak of the Son of Man as being at work in the present. From the first group of sayings, only those that differentiated between Jesus and the apocalyptic Son of Man were authentic. These sayings contained Jesus’ own apocalyptic predictions of the future coming of someone else, namely the Son of Man. In the early church, however, Jesus was identified with the coming Son of Man. This valuation of the first group of sayings betrays Bultmann’s approval of the Son of Man concept (cf. Casey 2009:27;
Müller 2008:249, 346–347; Smith 2006:135). According to Bultmann, the second group of sayings was entirely created by the early church, seeing as (1) they could be distinguished from the first group, (2) they were absent from Q, and (3) they only made sense as retrospective theological assertions. The third group of sayings might have been authentic, but operated in a non-titular sense. The early church later turned these idiomatic occurrences of the Semitic expression ‘Son of Man’ into a title for Jesus. In other words, even though the sayings in the third group might be authentic, their usage of the Son of Man expression as a title for the earthly Jesus was not. Ultimately, the only sayings that were deemed authentic in their titular usage of the expression ‘Son of Man’ were apocalyptic in nature.

After Bultmann’s 1921 proposal, most scholars agreed that only (some of) the apocalyptic sayings were authentic (e.g. Jeremias 1967:159–172; Tödt [1959] 1965). A few scholars accepted the apocalyptic consensus without discarding the present or suffering Son of Man logia. In other words, these scholars argued for the authenticity of all the Son of Man logia, but interpreted all of them apocalyptically. They achieved this by making one or more of the following suggestions: (1) the earthly Jesus used the phrase proleptically; (2) Jesus combined Daniel 7:13 with Isaiah 53, and revised the term to include both his earthly ministry and his suffering; (3) Jesus stayed true to Daniel 7:13, in which the Son of Man is both an apocalyptic and a suffering figure; (4) Jesus used all the Son of Man sayings with the same unifying theme in mind, like, for example, his authority.

From the middle of the 20th century onwards, many scholars started abandoning the apocalyptic consensus just described (Robinson 1991:178; 2003:26). This was the result of three developments. The first of these was the research done on the idiomatic usage of the term ‘Son of Man’ in Aramaic. As we have seen, the term’s Semitic usage had already received attention during the Reformation, leading some scholars to argue that it was not a title, but simply a generic or indefinite term that meant ‘man’ or ‘someone’. Other scholars of that period argued that the Semitic expression was reminiscent of the way in which Jesus spoke of himself in the third person. Thus, the term was plainly used as a circumlocution for ‘I’ or ‘myself’. Bolten (1792) was the first scholar to propose that the Syriac term ‘Son of Man’ could simultaneously be used in a generic sense, meaning ‘man’ or ‘humanity’, and in an indefinite sense, meaning ‘a man’ or ‘someone’. Other scholars of that period argued that the Semitic expression was reminiscent of the way in which Jesus spoke of himself in the third person. Thus, the term was plainly used as a circumlocution for ‘I’ or ‘myself’. Bolten (1792) was the first scholar to propose that the Syriac term ‘Son of Man’ could simultaneously be used in a generic sense, meaning ‘man’ or ‘humanity’, and in an indefinite sense, meaning ‘a man’ or ‘someone’. At the end of the 19th century, Eerdmans (1894:153–176) revived older views, but this time with more knowledge about the Aramaic term נְשָׁא בֵּר at his disposal. On linguistic grounds, he was able to argue, firstly, that the Aramaic term נְשָׁא בֵּר simply meant ‘man’, secondly, that Jesus used it as a circumlocution for ‘I’, and thirdly, that it could not have been a messianic title in either Daniel 7:13 or the teachings of the historical Jesus. In the same year,

19. Tödt’s acceptance of Bultmann’s position had a profound impact on subsequent Q scholarship. Tödt divided the Q Son of Man sayings into ‘coming’ and ‘present’ logia, and argued that the latter group was secondary.
Wellhausen (1894:312 fn. 1) made the very same argument independently of Eerdmans, pointing out that Jesus spoke Aramaic, and that the Aramaic term נַשְׁאָרֶב could not mean anything other than ‘der Mensch’, which Jesus used to reference himself in the third person.

Wellhausen and Eerdmans managed to win over a few scholars (e.g. Lietzmann 1896; Schmidt 1896), but the apocalyptic consensus still reigned supreme. Those who accepted the Aramaic explanation argued either for the generic-indefinite or the circumlocutional usage of the term by Jesus, although some scholars did combine the two (see Lukaszewski 2011:2–6). What almost all these scholars had in common were the views that the original term could not have meant ‘Messiah’, and that the early church had created the sayings that use the term ‘Son of Man’ in a titular, messianic-apocalyptic sense (Burkett 1999:45). These results were contested by Dalman (1898) and Fiebig (1901), who both argued from the original Aramaic that the term ‘Son of Man’ often referred to a single individual, and that it was used by Jesus as a self-designation in specific reference to Daniel 7:13. Most scholars of the time were convinced by the results of Dalman and Fiebig, possibly because it gave additional support to the reigning apocalyptic consensus (see Müller 2008:205–206). As a result, suggestions that the term ‘Son of Man’ originally operated in a circumlocutional, generic or indefinite sense disappeared almost entirely. For more than 60 years, the conclusions by Dalman and Fiebig prevailed as the mainstream philological solution to the Son of Man problem, contributing hugely to the proposals of both Weiss and Schweitzer.

This status quo was ‘rectified’ in 1967 with an article by Geza Vermes, which caused a watershed in Son of Man scholarship. He surveyed the utilisation of נַשְׁאָרֶב in a much broader range of ancient texts than anyone before him had done. This survey convinced him not only that the Aramaic term נַשְׁאָרֶב functioned as a circumlocution for the personal pronoun ‘I’, but also that it had no titular usage or significance before the emergence of Christianity. The most important result of Vermes’s study for our purposes was that it convinced a great number of scholars that the expression ‘Son of Man’ originated from a non-titular Aramaic term, and that it was not used by Jesus in an apocalyptic manner. Instead, these scholars agreed that all the Gospel texts that reference or allude to Daniel 7:13 were inauthentic. The ‘circumlocution theory’ was taken over, modified and presented anew by a number of prominent scholars in the field, including Müller (1984), Schwartz (1986) and Hare (1990). However, not all scholars were convinced by Vermes’s suggestion that נַשְׁאָרֶב simply meant ‘I’, instead preferring a generic and/or indefinite explanation (e.g. Colpe 1969:400–477).²⁰

²⁰Colpe (1969) extended the investigation of Vermes by expanding the base of ancient Aramaic texts even further, and surveying the entire Son of Man problem. This colossal investigation led Colpe (1969:406) to the following important conclusion: ‘A speaker could include himself in נַשְׁאָרֶב as well as (א)נַשְׁאָרֶב, whose generic sense was always apparent, or he could refer to himself and yet generalise at the same time.’ This is an almost identical proposal to the one made by Grotius in 1641. Unfortunately, Colpe bought into the Son of Man concept, and therefore failed to make much use of this important discovery in his attempts to explain the
Nonetheless, other aspects of Vermes’s investigation did indeed convince almost every scholar in the field, and are still accepted today (Borg 1994a:53; Lukaszewski 2011:8–9). Casey (2009:33–34), for example, agrees not only that most of Vermes’s examples are indeed working examples of the idiomatic use of the term מָהֵן אִישׁ, but also that the definite and indefinite forms of the expression are interchangeable. Also, many scholars still accept his understanding of the circumstances under which this idiom was most commonly used in Aramaic texts:

In most instances the sentence contains an allusion to humiliation, danger, or death, but there are also examples where references to the self in the third person is dictated by humility or modesty. (Vermes 1967:327)

Lindars (1980; 1981; 1983; 1985), Bauckham (1985), Casey (1987; 2009), Kearns (1988) and Crossan (1991) are amongst the scholars who took Vermes’s study further, but replaced his ‘circumlocution theory’ with explanations that focus on the generic and/or indefinite use(s) of the term. Thus, we still have this division today between scholars who prefer the ‘circumlocution theory’ and those who prefer the ‘generic and/or indefinite theory’. At the moment, the latter group seems to have the upper hand (cf. Burkett 1999:86–87; Müller 2008:322; Wink 2002:252). Despite this division, these scholars all tend to regard the future, apocalyptic Son of Man logia as inauthentic.

The second (concurrent) development that led to the rejection of the apocalyptic Son of Man consensus by numerous scholars was that the Son of Man concept started receiving severe criticism during the 1960s. Already in the 19th century, a number of scholars had criticised the Son of Man concept on mainly two fronts. Firstly, the term ‘Son of Man’ was not a fixed title in contemporary Judaism, and did not feature as such in Daniel, 1 Enoch or 4 Ezra 13. Rather, it only became a title with the emergence of Christianity. Secondly, the canonical Gospels consistently give the impression that the term ‘Son of Man’ was not a known title at the time of Jesus or shortly thereafter. At this early stage, however, the first objection was successfully refuted by contesting the non-titular interpretation of the Son of Man expression in 1 Enoch. The second objection was challenged by suggesting that the title was only known by a few limited circles in the early church.

The 1960s criticism against the Son of Man concept was more successful. The discovery of 1 Enoch in the Qumran caves had a huge impact on the dating of the Similitudes of Enoch. Eleven copies of 1 Enoch were found, some in Greek, others in Aramaic, but not one of these included the Similitudes of Enoch (Müller 2008:337; Robinson 1994:330). As such, the Similitudes had to be dated to a period no earlier than 70 CE (Burkett 1999:72; Stanton 2002:250–251). Supporting this later date was the fact

teachings of Jesus. Nonetheless, the realisation that the Aramaic term מָהֵן אִישׁ could, and usually did, simultaneously present both levels of meaning convinced a number of scholars, including Casey.

21. These works represent a major change of mind from his earlier views (see Lindars 1975–1976).
that not one Jewish or Christian work before the 5th century referenced or alluded to the Similitudes of Enoch, even though they do reference the rest of 1 Enoch with great regularity. Thus, the key text on which the Son of Man concept was constructed could no longer support it. A later dating of the Similitudes of Enoch meant that this text must have been dependent on Daniel 7:13. In turn, such dependence indicated that the Similitudes of Enoch did not provide independent attestation of a Son of Man concept alongside Daniel 7:13.

The Son of Man concept was further criticised in an article by Perrin (1966:17–28), which convincingly demonstrated that ‘Son of Man’ was not a title in any of the three key writings that were used to validate the Son of Man concept. Both the Similitudes of Enoch and 4 Ezra 13 were dependent on Daniel 7:13, and, like the latter, did not use the term in a titular sense. Rather, the apocalyptic imagery of Daniel 7, which included the symbolic Son of Man, was used creatively and unreservedly by subsequent authors. It followed for Perrin that even if the Similitudes of Enoch could be dated to a time before the rise of Christianity, it would still not provide any evidence for a widely-known, cohesive Son of Man concept at the time of Jesus or the evangelists. Rather, the apocalyptic material based on Daniel 7:13 all attest to a wide range of divergent ideas. In his 1968 article, entitled ‘Der apocalyptische Menschensohn ein theologisches Phantom’, Leivestad independently came to the same results as Perrin, thereby rejecting the Son of Man concept and affirming that the main texts utilised to develop this concept did not use the term ‘Son of Man’ as a title. The final nail in the coffin of the Son of Man concept was the indication by Geza Vermes (1967:310–328) that the wide range of Aramaic sources he had inspected never use the expression ‘Son of Man’ (בר נשׁא) as a title for some kind of apocalyptic or messianic figure. This usage first appears in the writings of the early church.

All these developments contributed to the abandonment of the Son of Man concept by most scholars of the time (e.g. Dodd 1966:475; Winter 1968:784). Lindars (1983:3) voiced the opinion of many when he called the Son of Man concept a ‘modern myth’. Yet, not all scholars discarded the idea, and a few continue to defend it even to this day. We will also see that even if the Son of Man concept is abandoned, as it should be, there remains reason to believe that 1st-century Jews held some ‘common assumptions’ about the specific identity of the ‘one like a son of man’ in Daniel 7:13 (see Chapter 3, ‘Casey criticised’). Moreover, the rejection of a Son of Man concept does not necessarily mean the rejection of an apocalyptic understanding and application of the term ‘Son of Man’ by Jesus. Some scholars argue that Jesus himself used the term in reference to Daniel 7:13, and created a title that refers either to himself or to another apocalyptic figure (see Müller 2008:369–372).

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22.The English translation of this article received a title that subsequently became just as well known as the initial German title: ‘Exit the apocalyptic Son of Man’ (see Leivestad 1971–1972).
The third development that led to the widespread rejection of the apocalyptic Son of Man was that a number of scholars started doubting the authenticity of the Son of Man sayings in toto. Some such voices had already appeared sporadically before the 1960s. Volkmar (1876:197–200), for example, noticed that the expression ‘Son of Man’ was entirely absent from Paul’s writings, and concluded that they were not authentic.23 Wrede (1904:359–360) argued that the peculiar usage of the third person in the Son of Man logia would make most sense if it were the early church that spoke about Jesus on his behalf. Case (1927a:16–19; 1927b:366–376) argued that it would make much more historical sense of the data if Jesus had not used the term at all, neither in reference to himself nor to someone else. In 1940, Grant argued that if Jesus had seen himself as the type of apocalyptic figure described by Enoch, he could not have been of sound mind. For the most part, however, these suggestions fell on deaf ears. As we saw, Käsemann argued for a discontinuity between the non-apocalyptic message of Jesus, on the one hand, and the respective apocalyptic messages of John the Baptist and the early church, on the other (see above, ‘The New Quest’). This view convinced Käsemann ([1954] 1964:15–47) that Jesus never proclaimed or awaited a figure like the Son of Man, amidst other apocalyptic images. In Käsemann’s opinion, the Son of Man sayings betrayed the Christological considerations of the early church after Easter, and infiltrated the Jesus tradition when Christian prophets starting speaking on Jesus’ behalf.

The first genuine threat to the authenticity of all the Son of Man sayings appeared in the works of Vielhauer (1957:51–79; 1963:133–177). He realised that the terms ‘kingdom of God’ and ‘Son of Man’ did not appear together in sayings that could realistically be considered authentic. According to Vielhauer, this was because these traditions did not originally or naturally belong together in contemporary Jewish thought. The Son of Man concept had to do with a future ideal that someone would come and save the day, while the kingdom sayings had to do with a present ideal that God should be the king of our daily lives. Since Vielhauer, like most, held that the kingdom of God was central to the preaching of the historical Jesus, he understandably approached the Son of Man tradition with suspicion. As a consequence, Vielhauer (1957:51–79) surgically removed all but one (Mt 24:37–39) of the Son of Man logia from the preaching of the historical Jesus in his tradition-historical analysis of the sources. Perrin (1966:17–28) agreed with Vielhauer that all the Son of Man sayings were inauthentic, and sought to illustrate how the early church created the term through midrashic exegesis of certain Jewish texts; an exegetical practice that was similar to the ‘pesher’ methodology of textual analysis employed at Qumran.

It was mentioned that Conzelmann argued for an a-temporal view of Jesus’ eschatology. This conviction compelled also Conzelmann (1957, esp. 281–288) to dispose of the ‘redundant’ Son of Man figure. We saw that Leivestad (1968:49–105)

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23. Although the pre-Pauline formula (τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ [ἐκ τῶν οὐρανῶν]) in 1 Thessalonians 1:10 might indeed be an allusion to the Son of Man.
came to the same conclusion as Perrin in rejecting the Son of Man concept. However, as a response to Vielhauer, Leivestad argued that at least some of the Son of Man sayings must be authentic, since they only feature in the Gospels as expressions made specifically by Jesus, and since they are absent from both Acts (bar 7:56) and the canonical epistles. Why would the term ‘Son of Man’ appear in such a large number of logia attributed to Jesus (and only Jesus) if it had almost no real significance as a title or designation of Jesus in the early church? Perrin (1967:164–206) took this as his cue and made a suggestion that would prove to be of lasting influence. He suggested that the coming and the suffering Son of Man sayings (i.e. Bultmann’s first two groups) were inauthentic, since they represented the conviction by the early church that the crucified and resurrected Jesus would come again to vindicate his followers and judge their opponents. Resultantly, only the logia that speak of the Son of Man as being at work in the present (i.e. Bultmann’s third group of sayings) should be regarded as authentic words of Jesus. The arguments of Vielhauer, Conzelmann, Leivestad and Perrin were subsequently adopted by many scholars of the Renewed Quest, and contributed hugely to the abandonment of not only the apocalyptic Son of Man, but also the apocalyptic Jesus of history (cf. Burkett 1999:56, 79, 124; see Patterson 2001b:70–71; Wink 2002:164–165; e.g. Borg 1994a:8, 52). At the same time, an idiomatic, non-titular, non-apocalyptic Son of Man suited the non-grandiose nature of ancient wisdom in general, as well as those logia deemed authentic by the Renewed Quest in particular. As far as Q is concerned, there has been a noticeable trend in Q scholarship after the 1980s to regard the present Son of Man logia in Q as part of the tradition it inherited, but to see the future Son of Man logia in Q as part of Q’s redaction, and therefore inauthentic (see Tuckett 2001:381–383).

The parables of Jesus

Research on the parables of Jesus also contributed to both the negation of the apocalyptic consensus and the creation of the Renewed Quest’s sapiential consensus (Stanton 2002:230; cf. Borg 1994b:19; Patterson 2001b:71; see Allison 2010:116–117). As early as the time when the Gospels were written, and probably even before then, the parables of Jesus were interpreted allegorically (Stanton 2002:224). Although some individuals, like Tertullian, Martin Luther and John Calvin, protested this hermeneutical practice, it continued unabated throughout the Patristic period, the Middle Ages and the Reformation (Stanton 2002:225; see Snodgrass 2005:248–250). The practice of interpreting the parables allegorically exposed them to a number of illegitimate interpretations. It is well known that Adolf Jülicher was the first scholar to present a systematic, well-argued case against the allegorical interpretation of the parables, with great success. Jülicher (1888; 1899) argued that Jesus did not make use of allegory at all; nor did his parables include any features that could be defined as allegorical. Rather, Jesus told stories with direct comparisons from everyday life that were easy to understand and self-evident. Whenever the Gospel parables contained allegorical features, the evangelists had, according to Jülicher, invented them. In his
view, each parable enunciated only one generally valid maxim; a pious moralism revealing some or other feature of God’s involvement in the world. It is noteworthy that this focus on the moral character of the parables appeared for the first time during the Old Quest.

C.H. Dodd ([1935] 1958) believed that the parables were essentially about a realised eschatology. Influenced by the work of Jülicher, Dodd argued that the evangelists had at times reoriented and reapplied the original parable message of a realised eschatology to a message centred on either futurist eschatology or ethical application. In order to recover their original meanings, it was necessary to determine the original *Sitz im Leben* of each individual parable. Dodd ([1935] 1958) also put forward a very handy definition of a parable:

At its simplest the parable is [1] a metaphor or simile [2] drawn from nature or common life, [3] arresting the hearer by its vividness or strangeness, and [4] leaving the mind in sufficient doubt about its precise application to tease it into active thought. (p. 16)

A number of subsequent scholars have found this definition useful in their individual discussions of the parable enigma (e.g. Funk 1966:133–162; Patterson 1998a:120–131; Stanton 2002:219). The tendency of parables to be ‘drawn from nature or common life’ convinced Dodd that the parables were not to be associated in any way with apocalyptic eschatology. According to Dodd, the one major premise that all the parables have in common is that the divine and human realms overlap. The kingdom of God exists in the mundane realities of natural and human existence. Whereas apocalyptic and futurist eschatology tend to denigrate and denounce the present order, the parables of Jesus discover God’s kingdom therein.

Joachim Jeremias ([1947] 1963) built on and expanded Dodd’s work by applying the same form-critical techniques with greater rigour. Through careful and methodical exegesis, Jeremias was able to identify accretions added to the parables by the early church. By identifying these anachronistic additions, Jeremias was able to illustrate how the parables grew in stages from the time of Jesus onwards. And by removing these accretions, he was able to expose the parables in their original forms, more or less as they were told by the historical Jesus. Like Dodd, he attempted to uncover the original *Sitz im Leben* of the respective parables. Unlike Dodd, he found that the parables were primarily used by Jesus in the true-life settings of individual clashes with actual opponents. In the context of historical Jesus research in general, Jeremias argued that the way forward was to uncover the Aramaic words of Jesus hidden beneath the Gospel accounts. He claimed to have found the original words of Jesus specifically in the parables, in the Marcan texts that speak about the sporadic coming of God’s kingdom (e.g. Mk 1:14–15), and in Jesus’ use of the words ‘abba’ and ‘amen’. Regarding the parables, the Aramaic *Urtexts* behind the Gospel accounts were reconstructed to reveal earlier versions that were, according to him, untainted by allegorical features or Christological reflection. Jeremias believed, like most scholars of the No Quest period,
that the parables were predominantly about the imminent coming of God’s kingdom. In other words, he replaced Dodd’s realised eschatology with an imminent futurist eschatology. In this regard, it is very illuminating to read Jeremias’s ([1947] 1963) critique of Jülicher:

We are told [by Jülicher] that the parables announce a genuine religious humanity; they are stripped of their eschatological import. Imperceptibly Jesus is transformed into an ‘apostle of progress’ (II, p. 483), a teacher of wisdom who inculcates moral precepts and a simplified theology by means of striking metaphors and stories. But nothing could be less like him. (p. 19)

Despite emphasising their eschatological nature, Jeremias also recognised that the parables had a purpose in the present. By means of his parables, Jesus had exposed the listeners to an imminent future crisis that demanded a decision in the present. The choice was between being either for or against the mercy of God, the nature of which was disclosed in the content of the parable itself. It is not at all difficult to observe the affinities of Jeremias’s parable research with Bultmann’s overall paradigm. The parables were mainly about the imminent coming of God’s future kingdom, but forced a decision for or against that kingdom at the moment of delivery. Many of the form-critical assumptions held by Dodd and Jeremias are no longer accepted today, like the belief that it is possible to uncover the original settings in which the parables were told by Jesus (Stanton 2002:225–226). The ability to reconstruct an Aramaic Vorlage for each of the individual parables is also less convincing than it was at the time of Jeremias. In fact, it has recently been suggested that the parables were from the outset composed in Greek (see Funk 2006:121–130). Although Jeremias’s interpretation of certain individual parables are still influential in some circles, his true legacy lies in his ability to isolate accretions and recover the parables more or less in their original forms. Also, his ability to link various elements in the parables to the general context of 1st-century Palestine continues to impress scholarship. These two aspects of his exegesis remain thoroughly convincing.

During the sixties of the previous century, parable scholars started finding the historical and/or eschatological method of interpretation by former academia insufficient (see Snodgrass 2005:254–256). These latter approaches were thought to have disregarded the attractiveness and force of the parables. To prevent such a tragedy, scholars diverted their attention to the parables’ aesthetic and rhetorical nature, applying interpretive tools from existentialism and linguistics. Together with the artistic beauty of the parables, these scholars highlighted their continuing relevance. This must be seen as a reaction against Jeremias’s tendency to focus exclusively on the message that the parables conveyed in their original delivery by the historical Jesus. According to these scholars, Jeremias’s purely historical focus undermined the natural ability of the parables to produce new interpretations in different historical contexts. By their very nature, the parables lend themselves to continuous legitimate reapplication. To be sure, Dodd had also highlighted both the aesthetic nature and the continuing validity of the parable tradition. Dodd thought of the parables as artworks,
and held that, as with other works of art, their significance outlasted their original conception. The reaction of subsequent scholars was mainly against the rigidity and single-mindedness of Jeremias's approach.

Amos Wilder (1964) highlighted the poetic traits of the parables, and emphasised their use of language. In his view, Jesus made use of parables to create a world that depicted his vision of reality so vividly that it could be enacted and experienced through imagination. These stories did not simply point towards another reality, but made that reality tangible through the use of vivid language that appealed to the imagination. Ernst Fuchs (1964) similarly saw parables as language events that had the power to effectuate the realities to which they pointed. By using parables, Jesus was able to apply God's love to sinners, make God's kingdom present, and open his audience up to God's reality. Dan Otto Via (1967) argued that Jeremias's obsession with the historical context of the parables rendered these literary works of art irrelevant for today. Instead, Via held that the narrative essence of the parables continues to impress hearers today. Via attempted to show how narrative conventions were skilfully and artistically applied in the parables. His specific focus was plot movements, distinguishing between comic and tragic plots. With comic parables, the characters progress on an upwards gradient towards overall well-being. With tragic parables, the characters regress on a downwards gradient towards calamity. This group of scholars was not principally important because of their analysis of any one parable. Rather, their significance and legacy linger not only in their aesthetic-linguistic approach to the parable tradition in toto, but also in their emphasis on the continuing relevance of the parables after the death of Jesus. Scholars continue to appreciate and revere the poetic skill with which the parables were composed.

All the parable research mentioned thus far laid the foundation for Funk’s work on the parables of Jesus (see Snodgrass 2005:256–258). In his seminal monograph on the use of language in the New Testament, Funk (1966) described parables as metaphors that only receive meaning when the audience is drawn into them. As a result, the parables of Jesus cannot be reduced to just one specific meaning, whether it be the pious moralisms of Jülicher or the eschatological pronouncements of Dodd and Jeremias. According to Funk, a parable can never be discarded once its meaning has been extracted. The parable itself is the message. Unlike deductive language, which functions merely to express existing meaning, the parable as metaphor creates the potential for utterly new meaning. Funk (1966:161) defined parables as ‘pieces of everydayness [that] have an unexpected “turn” in them which looks through the commonplace to a new view of reality.’ This ‘new view of reality’ is what Jesus understood as the kingdom of God. The parables undermine and subvert established reality by offering a glimpse of an alternative reality (cf. Funk 2006:63). It follows that the kingdom of God is not something that is expected in the near future, but is something that comes into being as the parable is being heard for the first time. In being exposed to an alternative reality, the hearer is called to respond appropriately.
In responding appropriately, the new reality is created in the here and now. In other words, this ‘new reality’ is not some far off utopia, but rather a different version of the existing reality, which comes into being when the familiar is rearranged. Whereas the establishment of the former would require a dramatic change in or end to the world (as we know it), the establishment of the latter merely requires the ability to imagine a different version of the world as it is. As metaphors, the parables live forever, opening themselves up to a never-ending chain of subsequent interpretations, as determined by each succeeding audience and situation. Despite their longevity, they continually address the present moment, not the eschatological future. Funk’s work was highly influential, leaving its mark on a number of parable scholars. Norman Perrin (1967), for example, interpreted the parables of Jesus as describing a non-temporal, symbolic kingdom of God. For the most part, today’s parable scholars continue to underwrite the intrinsically metaphorical nature of the parables.

What was needed at this stage was an approach that invested equal amounts of time and space to both the artistic essence and the historical context of the parables. Such an approach was pioneered by John Dominic Crossan. Crossan adopted many aspects of Funk’s understanding of the parables, but went beyond Funk in his painstaking interpretation of individual parables. In his first book-length publication on the parables, Crossan (1973) combined appreciative literary analysis with careful historical analysis to determine how the historical Jesus experienced God. According to Crossan (1973:31–35), Jesus told the parables to pronounce the presence of God’s kingdom as a startling advent that challenged and reversed the hearer’s world, summoning her to action. Taking his cue from the latter understanding, Crossan divided the parable corpus into parables of advent, parables of reversal and parables of action, with each respective category treated in a separate chapter of his book.

It should be obvious from this brief overview that Crossan’s emphasis was on the arrival of God’s kingdom in the present. In a clever effort to circumvent the question of eschatology, Crossan (1973:26) described the parables as harbouring a ‘permanent eschatology’, by which he meant that the parables proclaimed ‘the permanent presence of God as the one who challenges the world and shatters its complacency repeatedly.’ Yet, it needs to be emphasised that while the presence of God might be permanent, the challenge itself happens during the parable’s delivery. Despite the parables’ ability to repeatedly challenge and subvert the status quo in subsequent retellings, they address the present situation of their audience in each retelling. Crossan might be guilty here of using the category of ‘eschatology’ in Bultmann’s existential sense. As Crossan understood the parables, they did not point forward to the end of the external world (as we know it), but rather introduced the kingdom of God in the present. In the mouth of the historical Jesus, the parables were therefore not eschatological,24 but rather aimed at confronting the hearers with God’s kingdom in the present moment.

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24. As we have defined the word ‘eschatological’ in the introduction of this book.
Crossan expanded his insight into the parables in subsequent publications. In 1977, Crossan described a parable as a ‘polyvalent narration’, by which he meant that it was a ‘paradox formed into narrative’. As such, parables become metaphors for their own ‘hermeneutical multiplicity’. One can see the influence of Funk here, especially in Crossan’s insistence that parables are by their very nature polyvalent and paradoxical; so much so that any clear-cut summary of a parable’s supposed moral message would by definition miss the mark. The subversive and paradoxical nature of parables precludes the distillation of timeless truths from them. The parables are so subversive that they completely shatter reality, leaving almost no room for reconstruction. Since parables do not point to alternative realities with which to replace the one that has been shattered, the audience is left clueless and in the dark. Hearers are disoriented, without any promise of reorienting them again. Such reorientation is left up to the hearers themselves. Each parable that begins with the phrase ‘the kingdom of God is like’ ultimately fails in describing the kingdom, but succeeds in making people think for themselves.

In his 2012 monograph, Crossan brings many strands of earlier publications on the parables together. In this work, Crossan distinguishes between three types of parables: (1) ‘riddle parables’; (2) ‘example parables’; and (3) ‘challenge parables’. By his estimation, the historical Jesus told ‘challenge parables’. They are called thus because they challenge the status quo. According to Crossan (2012:63), ‘challenge parables humble our prejudicial absolutes, but without proposing counterabsolutes in their place. They are tiny pins dangerously close to big balloons.’ He continues: ‘They push or pull us into pondering whatever is taken totally for granted in our world – in its cultural customs, social relations, traditional politics, and religious traditions’ (p. 63). In their tendency to leave their audience hanging, challenge parables function as a ‘participatory pedagogy’, meaning that the audience actively participate in their own education (Crossan 2012:95). The purpose of Jesus ‘challenge parables’, Crossan (2012:134) reasons, was not only to subvert (for the sake of subverting), but ultimately also to shift paradigms and overturn fossilised views without the use of violence. Whereas the first part of his book is on the parables by Jesus, the second part of his book argues that the canonical Gospels are themselves ‘megaparables’ about Jesus (see Crossan 2012:6, 157–252, esp. 246). Over the years, Crossan’s work on the parables of Jesus has had an enormous impact, not only on our understanding of these literary forms, but also on our understanding of the historical Jesus (Laughery 1986:17).

The trajectory of parable interpretation traced thus far allowed scholars of the Renewed Quest not only to divorce the parables of Jesus from their eschatological and Christological contexts within the Gospels, but also to interpret them as stories about an alternate reality, called the kingdom of God (cf. Patterson 2001b:71). The historical Jesus made use of parables when he wanted to teach people about God’s realm. Parables could be seen as weapons in the arsenal of a wisdom teacher. Scott (1989), for example, attempted to reconstruct the original structures of Jesus’ parables in order to discover
how they challenge and subvert conventional wisdom. Moreover, the parables actually bring the kingdom of God into existence as they are being narrated; the kingdom cannot be more immediately present than that! The influence of these developments on the Renewed Quest for the historical Jesus are most visible in Funk’s 1996 monograph, *Honest to Jesus*, which is a direct result of his parable studies, and portrays Jesus as a Galilean sage. As Funk (2006:164) himself admits: ‘The quest of the so-called historical Jesus can only be a quest of the parabolic Jesus.’ Crossan’s reconstruction of the historical Jesus is also a direct result of his research on the parables of Jesus, amongst other considerations. The title of his first book on the parables of Jesus is a testament to the latter: *In parables: The challenge of the historical Jesus*.

It should be noted, albeit in passing, that there have also been interpretations to the opposite effect. According to Schmithals (1997a:3–32; 2008:353–375), for example, those parables that are most likely to go back to the historical Jesus make use of apocalyptic and imminent eschatology, as opposed to wisdom (see also Allison 2010:117–118). Conversely, one aspect that all the sapiential parable interpretations have in common is a high regard for the authenticity of (some of) the non-apocalyptic parables that feature in the Gospel of Thomas (see Meyer 2003:24–26); a writing to which we currently turn.

### The Gospel of Thomas

The third development that led directly to the negation of the apocalyptic consensus and the creation of a sapiential replacement was the discovery of the Gospel of Thomas (Horsley 2012:17; Koester 1992:7; Meyer 2003:7; Patterson 2001b:72; Telford 1994:73). In December of 1945, the Nag Hammadi manuscripts were discovered.25 Scholars of the time were in agreement that the Coptic manuscripts originated during the 4th century CE, and that they were Gnostic in nature. Besides broadening our knowledge of the world in which the New Testament came into being, these Gnostic texts had little value for uncovering the historical Jesus. There was one exception, though: the Gospel of Thomas, sections of which were only starting to be published from 1957 onwards (cf. Kloppenborg *et al.* 1990:82; Robinson 2011:455). The full text was finally published in 1959 (Hedrick 2010:3). Some of the sayings were remarkably similar to the Oxyrhynchus papyri discovered in the period between 1897 and 1905, also containing only sayings of Jesus (see DeConick 2008:14–15). Not much attention was paid to these papyri when first discovered, but their importance became paramount after the Gospel of Thomas had seen the light (cf. Kloppenborg *et al.* 1990:84–85). It was soon realised that a few of these Oxyrhynchus fragments were indeed portions of the Gospel of Thomas (Perkins 2007:68). From internal evidence, it was determined that these fragments should be dated to no later than 140 CE (see Turner 1962a:16–19;

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This indicated not only that the Coptic Gospel of Thomas had been translated from Greek (Hedrick 2010:3; Kloppenborg et al. 1990:81–82, 85), but also that its roots could be traced back to no later than the first half of the 2nd century CE, and perhaps even as early as the 1st century. This valuation was buttressed by the realisation that, long before the 4th century, certain church fathers knew of a Gospel supposedly written by the apostle Thomas (see Turner 1962a:14–16; cf. Hedrick 2010:1–2; Kloppenborg et al. 1990:78). Just over half of the sayings in the Gospel of Thomas had clear parallels in the Synoptic Gospels; the rest were completely different (Perkins 2007:69).

Before its publication, Quispel (1957:189–207) completed a source-critical investigation of the newly discovered Gospel. His findings would be very influential in subsequent research. He maintained that the Gospel of Thomas had no literary association with the canonical Gospels, but represented an independent tradition of Jesus’ early logia. He also looked at certain Apocrypha as possible sources. It did not take long for scholars to start doubting the results offered by Quispel (cf. DeConick 2008:16). In the early sixties, scholars became increasingly convinced that Quispel’s position was untenable. In its stead, they proposed that the Gospel, like most of the findings at Nag Hammadi, was thoroughly Gnostic. From this they concluded that the Gospel must be dated to a later time and that it must have been dependent on the canonical Gospels (e.g. Turner 1962a:11–39, esp. 31–39; 1962b:79–116, esp. 113–114). At around the same time, one or two individual studies indicated that some traditions in Thomas could actually have originated apart from the Synoptic Gospels. Montefiore (1962:40–78), for example, came to the following conclusion after comparing the Synoptic parables with those in the Gospel of Thomas:

Thomas’s divergencies from synoptic parallels can be most satisfactorily explained on the assumption that he was using a source distinct from the Synoptic Gospels. Occasionally this source seems superior [in terms of its proximity to the historical Jesus], especially inasmuch as it seems to be free from apocalyptic imagery, allegorical interpretation, and generalizing conclusions. The hypothesis that Thomas did not use the Synoptic Gospels as a source gains strength from a comparative study of the parables’ literary affinities together with an examination of the order of the sayings and parables in Thomas. (p. 78)

Also happening at around the same time, a number of scholars compared the content of the Gospel of Thomas to the beliefs of various ancient Gnostic communities known to scholars. Some scholars even argued for an identification of the community responsible for the Gospel of Thomas with individual Gnostic movements. Two of the most popular candidates were the Naassene Gnostics (e.g. Schoedel 1960) and the Valentinian Gnostics (e.g. Gärtner 1961). When it became apparent that the Gospel of Thomas did not derive from these Gnostic movements, scholars changed their approach and started asking whether the Gospel did not perhaps embody a generic

26. Although this is not a given (cf. Hedrick 2010:7).

27. Emphasis added.
type of Gnosticism (DeConick 2008:16–17). As they compared the Gospel of Thomas to other Gnostic texts, these scholars became increasingly aware of the ‘complication’ that a number of important Gnostic themes, like that of the Demiurge, were entirely missing from the document (Meyer 2003:4; Patterson 1998b:54; cf. Robinson 2011:460). It became all the more apparent, on the one hand, that the Gospel of Thomas, although undoubtedly Gnostic in nature, was ‘less Gnostic’ than the other Nag Hammadi texts, and, on the other, that the Gospel contained some sayings that were clearly not Gnostic at all, being influenced, rather, by other traditions.

Koester ([1968] 1971:158–204) addressed this difficulty by arguing that the Gospel of Thomas was only in the early stages of becoming a Gnostic text. The document could be seen as a type of ‘precursor’ to so-called ‘full-blown Gnosticism’. Additionally, the Gospel of Thomas represented a type of genre that antedated the narratives of the canonical Gospels, containing only the words of Jesus and lacking any reference whatsoever to his birth, life, crucifixion, Resurrection or death. In fact, there were no narratives about Jesus at all; only his words. The Gospel of Thomas had this in common with the Sayings Gospel Q. Almost as a side note, Koester ([1968] 1971:172) added that logia about God’s kingdom consistently highlighted its present significance for the audience instead of its future arrival. Koester further noticed that when certain individual sayings from the Gospel of Thomas were compared to their counterparts in the New Testament, many of them lacked those elements that had been suspected for some time to be secondary elaborations, most notably as a result of the efforts by Dodd and Jeremias. Astonishingly, the parables featured in the Gospel of Thomas showed remarkable agreement in wording and content with Jeremias’s Aramaic reconstructions of the ‘original’ Synoptic parables. In those cases where the traditions from Thomas showed similar signs of secondary elaboration, such development often happened independently if compared to the New Testament. These factors suggested that although some of the traditions in the Gospel of Thomas were dependent on the canonical Gospels, and clearly post-dated the 1st century, other traditions reached back to a time before the canonical Gospels were written. Many of these more primitive traditions were paralleled in Q. The conclusion seemed inescapable that both Thomas and Q derived from an even earlier sayings Gospel. Koester ([1968] 1971) explains:

The relation of this sayings Gospel, from which the Gospel of Thomas is derived, to the Synoptic Sayings source Q is an open question. Without doubt, most of its materials are Q-sayings. (p. 186)

What was glaringly missing from this earlier sayings Gospel were all the apocalyptic Son of Man logia. This led Koester to the conclusion that the apocalyptic material in Q were secondary additions. In other words, whereas Thomas had added Gnostic traditions and elaborations to some version of an earlier sayings Gospel, the author of Q had added apocalyptic traditions and elaborations to some version of the same

28 Italic original.
sayings Gospel. Hence, an earlier sayings Gospel stood behind both Thomas and Q, with each of the latter growing in a different direction; Q became more apocalyptic, and Thomas became more Gnostic. Koester ([1968] 1971) imagined Thomas and Q each making use of a different version of the postulated earlier sayings Gospel:

This would prove ... that the source 'Q,' used by Matthew and Luke, was a secondary version of such a 'Gospel,' into which the apocalyptic expectation of the Son of Man had been introduced to check the gnosticizing tendencies of this sayings Gospel; and that the Gospel of Thomas, stemming from a more primitive stage of such a 'Gospel,' attests its further growth into a gnostic theology. (pp. 186–187)30

In other words, Thomas and Q both made use of an earlier sayings Gospel, which had already been influenced to some extent by Gnosticism, but Q made use of a later version of this sayings Gospel than Thomas. This aspect of Koester's case is unnecessarily complex. If one applies Ockham's razor to Koester's case,31 the usage by both Thomas and Q of the exact same version of a non-Gnostic source would be preferable. Be that as it may, Koester managed to illustrate that both Thomas and Q relied on (different versions of) the same sapiential source.

It is important to note at this stage that Koester did not picture this earlier sapiential source to be non-eschatological, but non-apocalyptic. In other words, the source that was shared by Thomas and Q was not only already Gnostic to some extent, but also inherently eschatological. In this regard, Koester seems to have been under the spell of the eschatological consensus. In true Bultmanian fashion, he tended to approach sapiential traditions with suspicion (cf. esp. Koester [1968] 1971:184). When reading his article closely, it becomes evident that the eschatological roots of the tradition were more important for Koester than the sapiential roots. The following quotation should suffice as evidence of the latter: 'Thomas presupposes a stage and form of the tradition of eschatological sayings which did not yet contain an apocalyptic expectation of the Son of Man' (Koester [1968] 1971:171).32 Like Bultmann, Koester preferred to view the historical Jesus as thoroughly eschatological, but refused to view him as an apocalypticist (see above, 'Rudolf Bultmann and the “No Quest” period'). Nevertheless, Koester's unearthing of a wisdom-based sayings source common to both Thomas and Q laid the foundation for subsequent scholars.

The careful work done by Koester managed to win over a number of scholars, especially in North America, some of whom were students of his; and of James M. Robinson (DeConick 2008:17; Kloppenborg et al. 1990:85; Miller 1999:16). Scholars

29. The academic article in which Koester makes these arguments was published in the same journal as Robinson's (1971) influential article on Q, entitled ΛΟΓΟΙ ΣΟΦΩΝ.

30. Italics original.

31. For a short explanation of Ockham's razor, see Chapter 2, 'The documentary status of Q'.

32. The word 'Thomas' was originally written in italics, but the words 'eschatological' and 'apocalyptic' were emphasised by me.
increasingly started speaking of the different layers in the Gospel of Thomas. In 1990, it was seemingly acceptable to claim that Koester’s hypothesis represented the majority opinion of contemporary scholarship (cf. Kloppenborg et al. 1990:103; cf. Horsley 1991:201). A number of these scholars were, and still are, convinced that the earliest layer of Thomas was not at all dependent on the canonical Gospels, and that its formation took place either before or during the writing of the canonical Gospels, thereby bringing us closer to the historical Jesus (e.g. Hedrick 2010:16–17; Kloppenborg et al. 1990:85–90; Meyer 2003:5–7, 18, 33; Patterson 1992:45–97; 1993a:9–110; 1998a:173; 1998b:41–45, 66–75; 2001b:72; Robinson 1990:viii–ix). If so, the significance of the historical Jesus was initially, according to these scholars, not to be found in his miracles, apocalyptic outlook, crucifixion, death or Resurrection, but in his words, and only his words (see McDonald 2013:65–66; e.g. Hedrick 2010:13; Kloppenborg et al. 1990:105; Meyer 2003:5, 22; Patterson 1998b:56, 74). According to this branch of scholarship, these words, as they are presented by the Gospel of Thomas, are undeniably sapiential and lack any hint of a reference to apocalypticism or eschatology (e.g. Davies 1983; Meyer 2003:21–22, 32; Patterson 1998a:173; 1998b:49–51, 74–75; 2001b:72). Significantly, these scholars all judge the parables of the historical Jesus to have been non-eschatological in nature (e.g. Meyer 2003:24–26). They also point out that Christological and other titles of Jesus are missing from the Gospel of Thomas, and that Jesus nowhere in Thomas acts as a prophet of the coming kingdom of God (e.g. Meyer 2003:21, 24–26; Patterson 1998b:56). Rather, Jesus is consistently depicted as a teacher of wisdom, concerned exclusively with the present (e.g. Meyer 2003:19–22). The kingdom of God is not, according to their reading of the apocryphal Gospel, to be found in some futurist expectation, but can rather be experienced and witnessed in the here and now. Increased appreciation for the Gospel of Thomas amongst New Testament scholars can indeed be noted as one of the developments of the Renewed Quest (Kloppenborg et al. 1990:78). Participants of the Renewed Quest have been eager to latch onto the research done by Koester and his disciples (see e.g. Robinson 2011:455–461).

Yet, as with the other developments traced thus far, not all scholars have been so eager to simply accept these conclusions (Kloppenborg et al. 1990:85–86). Dunn (1977:286), for example, argues that many of the Thomas sayings were ‘de-eschatologised’. With the latter term, Dunn means that, by virtue of his own observation, it seems as though many of the non-eschatological traditions in the Gospel of Thomas were originally eschatological, but were subsequently reinterpreted and rewritten in a way that was more this-worldly. In Dunn’s estimation, the Gospel of Thomas betrays signs of stripping the original sayings of their eschatological moulds. Instead of going back to earlier traditions, the lack of eschatology in the Gospel of Thomas is a later development. In Dunn’s (1977:286) opinion, Q (and its eschatological character) is ‘almost certainly’ closer to the historical Jesus. Other scholars have agreed with Dunn, seeing no reason why the trajectory should necessarily be from wisdom to eschatology (DeConick
2008:19). These scholars point to textual evidence indicating, in their view, that a trajectory from eschatology to wisdom is just as plausible (e.g. Allison 2010:127–134; DeConick 2005a). Moreover, ‘proto-Gnostic’ is not accepted by everyone as a realistic characterisation of the Gospel of Thomas. A number of scholars have even denied the idea that the Gospel of Thomas has Gnostic tendencies at all (e.g. Davies 1983). Even some of Koester’s students, like Meyer (2003:4), have grown wary of calling Thomas a ‘proto-Gnostic’ or ‘gnosticising’ Gospel. Meyer (2003:19, 32–33), nevertheless, holds firm to the idea that early Jesus traditions can be extracted from later ‘gnosticising elements’. An increasing number of scholars cemented in the Renewed Quest have started questioning the presumption that the Gospel of Thomas is Gnostic at all (e.g. Robinson 2011:460–461). Even so, most Renewed Questers judge the developments discussed in this paragraph to be mainly reactionary (e.g. Meyer 2003:7). There is one recent study, however, that cannot be ignored.

Of late, the best counter to Koester’s disciples has been the one put forward by DeConick. By applying research on the anthropological phenomenon of ‘communal memory’ to the Gospel of Thomas, DeConick (2005a:3–63; 2005b:207–211) concludes that the document is a ‘rolling corpus’. By this term she means that the document, as it stands, contains traditions from every phase in its tradition history. DeConick (2005a:64–110) then proceeds to demarcate the sayings that she deems to be kernel sayings, and to separate them from later developments. After having completed this procedure, DeConick (2005a:111–155) ends up with five ‘kernel speeches’, all of which (1) resemble Q to some extent, (2) fit the situation in Jerusalem before 50 CE, (3) present Jesus as God’s truth-speaking prophet, and (4) proclaim an imminent-apocalyptic eschatology. In the remainder of her book, DeConick (2005a:157–249; cf. DeConick 2005b:211–215) argues that the people responsible for Thomas were severely disappointed when the Apocalypse failed to arrive, and were subsequently forced to adapt their imminent-apocalyptic worldview to an imminent-mystic belief system. In 2010, exactly 20 years after the claim was made that the great majority of scholars follow in Koester’s footsteps (see above in this section), Hedrick (2010:14–15) holds that scholarship has reached an impasse on whether or not the Gospel of Thomas was literarily dependent on the canonical Gospels. He maintains that current scholarship can basically be divided into two opposing camps: Those who defend and those who deny the possibility that the Gospel of Thomas was from the very beginning dependent on the canonical Gospels. Meyer (2003:6) divides contemporary scholarship into three separate camps, adding a third category for more complex solutions to this vexing problem of intertextual relationships (cf. Patterson 1998b:68 fn. 37). Whatever one’s position, it is no longer justified, in view of the current state of research on the Gospel of Thomas, to make sweeping generalisations about the nature, date or (in)dependence of this document (Kloppenborg 2001:153; 2011b:255; cf. Howes 2014e:225–226; see Robinson 2011:455–457). Conclusions should rather be based on the examination of individual sayings and speeches.
The Jewishness of Jesus

The fourth development within New Testament studies that brought about the replacement of an apocalyptic Jesus with a sapiential one was the rediscovery of his Jewish roots. Traditional Christian caricatures, particularly by Protestants, of ancient Torah-based Jewish ethics, included the following (Theissen & Merz 1998:348–349; cf. Casey 2010:3): (1) the Torah was ‘absolutised’ after the Babylonian exile by making it a constitutive component of the covenant, rather than maintaining it as a regulative feature within the covenant; (2) the Torah was exclusively construed and practiced in a casuistic manner; (3) Torah obedience was motivated by recompense and concentrated on superfluous merits; (4) the Torah was obeyed only formally, because it was commanded, and the moral essence of the Torah was resultantly overlooked; (5) Jews saw the Torah as a burden and suffered under the redundant, impossible demands of the scribes. It naturally followed from such an anachronistic, Christian understanding of early-Judaic ethics that Jesus was the one who had liberated his people from absolutised, casuistic, superfluous, formal and burdensome Torah ethics. Despite Schweitzer’s plea not to conjure up depictions of Jesus that are mirror images of oneself, scholars of the time continued to ignore or relativise the Jewish ethnicity of Jesus (Casey 2010:3; see Den Heyer 2002:111–118). This tendency reached its pinnacle just before and during the Second World War. Academic works by Jewish scholars, highlighting the Jewishness of Jesus, were ignored, and belittled as perfidious. In hindsight, one might say that this trend is inexcusable – and it certainly is! – but it is also explicable. Moxnes (2011) has argued persuasively that the different portraits of the historical Jesus that have been put forward by researchers have all been mirror images, not just of the individual scholars, but also of the political, cultural and social agendas of their native countries. With Germany, for the most part, dominating the Old and New Quests, it should come as no surprise that German anti-Semitic ideologies also dominated these quests (see Moxnes 2011:95–120).

The end of the Second World War also brought an end to this anti-Semitic hermeneutic. The Jewishness of Jesus was no longer denied, and neither were the findings of Jewish scholars. Classic studies by Jewish scholars of a generation gone by were revived. These included the important study by Klausner ([1907] 1925), who saw Jesus as the representative of a remarkable Jewish ethic. There was also the monumental two-volume study by Montefiore (1909a; 1909b), who described Jesus as a prophet opposing the Jerusalem cult and externalised rites. Another classic Jewish scholar worthy of mention is Eisler, who thought of Jesus as a political rebel that wanted to found a this-worldly kingdom (cf. Theissen & Merz 1998:9). What these latter classic studies had in common was a disregard for the apocalyptic and imminent-eschatological features of Jesus’ message and person. They also chipped away at the traditional Christian images of ancient Torah ethics. Montefiore (1909a; 1909b), for example, argued that it was anachronistic and unhistorical to separate Jesus’ ‘ethic of grace’ from the rabbinical ‘ethic of works’. A few years later, Kittel (1924:555–594)
compared the Sermon on the Mount with rabbinic literature, and found that all the individual demands in the former had analogies in the latter. Hence, all Jesus’ moral stipulations were in theory also conceivable in *mainstream* Judaism of the time. In 1957, Braun discovered that, despite some important differences, the *radical* ethics of Jesus were comparable to the ethical demands of the communities responsible for the Dead Sea Scrolls. In the period after the Second World War, Jewish scholars like Flusser (1968) paid particular attention to the scantly Gospel portraits of Jesus’ upbringing, from which they concluded that Jesus was brought up in accordance with Jewish practice, which left him accustomed to, and knowledgeable about, both the Torah and Jewish tradition. For these scholars, the conclusion seemed inescapable: ‘Zij [Jezus] leefden serieus, verdiepten zich in de studie van Schrift en traditie, en trachtten de geboden van de Torah in het dagelijks bestaan in praktijk te brengen’ (Den Heyer 2002:117). This conclusion went against the traditional (Protestant) image of Jesus (Theissen & Merz 1998:347). Jesus’ newfound familiarity with and rootedness in the Torah eventually contributed to the trend of imagining him as a *teacher* of Torah morality.

Despite these broad strokes, Jewish scholars were not in agreement about every aspect of the life and person of Jesus. The canonical Gospels describe Jesus as someone who held a range of differing opinions and attitudes towards the Torah (Theissen & Merz 1998:347–348, 361). Jesus’ tendency to relativise Torah norms appears alongside his other tendency to accentuate them. In other words, the Jesus tradition reveals *both* a liberal relaxation and a rigorist intensification of the Torah.\(^{33}\) Jewish (and other) scholars are not always in agreement about how to explain this tension.\(^{34}\) Be that as it may, Jewish scholars tended to emphasise the embeddedness of Jesus in Torah morality. Geza Vermes (1973), for example, believed that the eschatological dimension of Jesus’ message and conduct was invented by the early church, most notably Paul and John. At the time, Vermes went against the tide of Christian scholarship when he described Jesus not as an apocalyptic prophet, but as a charismatic travelling Hassid. In Rabbinic literature, a Hassid is someone who transcends the Torah and its requirements for ethical and ritual observance in daily life. The word Hassid derives from the Hebrew noun נְצָד, which literally means ‘kindness’ or ‘love’, and connotes the *act* of showing or expressing love for God and for one’s neighbour. It follows that Vermes saw Jesus

33. According to Theissen and Merz (1998:348), Jesus’ freedom towards the Torah is more characteristic of the sapiential manner of developing ethics, while his strictness towards the Torah is more typical of the eschatological manner of developing ethics. Such a deterministic division is not supported by comparative evidence, however. Although it is true that Jewish eschatological models and movements of the 1st century (like the communities behind the Dead Sea Scrolls and the movement begun by John the Baptist) would highlight the intensification of Torah obedience in order to bring about the coming age, sapiential traditions are more diversified in their treatment of the Torah. Traditional wisdom tends to emphasise strict Torah obedience (cf. Proverbs), while dissident wisdom tends to relativise Torah obedience (cf. Qohelet). Thus, Jesus’ attitude towards the Torah should actually not be taken as an indicator of whether his person or message was eschatological or sapiential.

34. Theissen and Merz (1998:361–372) are probably correct in their explanation that Jesus *radicalised* ethical norms (in the more narrow sense), particularly the dual love command, and *relativised* ritual and cultic norms, particularly purity laws, without abandoning them entirely (cf. esp. Q 11:42 for evidence of both).
as a travelling charismatic who practiced an ethical lifestyle aimed at applying and preaching the love command under every and all circumstances.

Whether or not they saw Jesus as an apocalyptic prophet, all Jewish scholars had one thing in common: They all held that Jesus lived and preached an ethic of Torah observance, inalienable from Jewish tradition. These types of views about Jesus seemed to address a certain discrepancy and answer a question that had plagued researchers for some time: If Jesus did not intend to start a new religion outside, or sect within, contemporary Judaism, why did he call and entertain an inner circle of followers, including a core group of disciples? This historically reliable aspect of Jesus’ life did not correspond to an eschatological image of Jesus: If Jesus were so obsessed with the imminent coming of the kingdom, why would he waste any time gathering disciples? The answer to these questions became increasingly clear to some scholars: Jesus acted as a teacher. In many Gospel accounts, some of which are very likely to be authentic, Jesus is referred to as ‘rabbi’, meaning ‘teacher’.35 Some researchers started portraying Jesus as a scribe or lawyer, or even a Pharisee.

Even a cursory glance at these Jewish studies betrays a cultural and ethnic reaction against the discrimination, bigotry, violence and brutality experienced during the Second World War. By depicting Jesus as a mortal human being and a ‘thoroughbred’ Jew, these scholars could take back what was rightfully theirs: The memory of a Jewish teacher who became an icon for the world. Even if this laudable reaction does not technically qualify as an example of a ‘nationalistic’ reaction, it still represents an example of the same tendency Moxnes (2011) describes in his book (see above in this section). At any rate, Jewish scholars like Vermes and Flusser have become formidable supporters, representatives and promoters of the Renewed Quest.

It is worth noting at this juncture that most of the Third Questers, including, for example, Witherington (1995:247–248), Wright (1996:43, 58–59, 71, 79, 85–86), Meier (2001:3–4) and Sanders (2002:34), criticise Renewed Questers for harbouring and advocating a non-Jewish Jesus. Some of these critics have even claimed or implied that scholars of the Renewed Quest are somehow anti-Jewish or anti-Semitic (Miller 2005:113). In addition, some of them have gone as far as to distinguish between the Third and Renewed Quests on the basis that the former ‘works more seriously with Jewish backgrounds’ (Bock 2002:147). This line of critique should be discounted (see Arnal 2005a:24–54; 2005b). Those involved with the Renewed Quest have overtly and repeatedly denied these accusations (Arnal 2005a:26 fn. 6). Virtually all contemporary Jesus scholars, of both the Third and the Renewed Quests, not only affirm the Jewishness of Jesus, but also portray Jesus in all his Jewishness (Arnal 2005a:24–25, 34; 2005b:5; Kloppenborg 2005:2; 2011b:269). For those who criticise the Renewed Quest

35. This epithet is a powerful argument in favour of a sapiential Jesus. In this regard, Pokorný’s (2011:350) reasoning is troublesome: ‘Jesus was called “teacher” (rabbi, didaskalos), and according to Mark 14:14, he spoke of himself as teacher. However, his self-understanding was a prophetic one.’
in this way, being a 1st-century Jew is synonymous with being apocalyptically minded, and/or being wholly isolated from Hellenistic influences (Miller 2005:113). Likewise, for these critics, 'being Jewish' means to be orthodox, traditional and non-subversive (Kloppenborg 2005:2–3; see Arnal 2005a:34–41). In many cases, the various Jesuses proffered by the Renewed Quest may not be coloured by eschatology, and may be fairly unorthodox and/or Hellenised, but they are nonetheless thoroughly Jewish (Arnal 2005a:28, 34; cf. Kloppenborg 2011b:289). In fact, as the current overview has indicated, both the increased emphasis on the Jewishness of Jesus and the contributions by Jewish scholars have in many respects bolstered the case of the Renewed Quest. Conversely, Third Questers might themselves at times be guilty of separating Jesus from his Jewish roots with their apocalyptic and eschatological portraits of Jesus (see Kloppenborg 2011b:280–281, 289).

### The Sayings Gospel Q

The fifth development that resulted in the replacement of the former apocalyptic Jesus with a sapiential Jesus was the increased attention being paid to the Sayings Gospel Q from the 1960s onwards (Allison 2010:118; Borg 1994b:17; Horsley 2012:17; Koester 1992:7; Patterson 2001b:71–72; Telford 1994:73). Many of the modern conclusions about Q were foreshadowed by Paul Wernle (1899). He suggested that Matthew and Luke made common use of a Greek source, not an Aramaic one. Observing a number of tensions in the Q text, he further suggested that the collection of material grew in stages. Wernle also argued that Matthew preserves the text of Q more faithfully than Luke, but that Luke preserves the sequence of Q more faithfully than Matthew. Finally, Wernle claimed that Q represented the most primitive theology of the early church. These findings are extremely impressive if one considers the fact that they not only went against the tide of popular opinions at the time, but also anticipated the findings of much more sophisticated studies on Q in later periods. Unfortunately, it was the less impressive proposals by Wernle that initially influenced scholarly opinion. The first of these was that Q functioned as a catechetical guide for new members in the early church. The second was that Q presupposed the content and theology of Mark. Hence, Q did not represent a separate community with a distinct theology, Christology or soteriology. Rather, Q was a piece of paraenesis that contained the *didache* (i.e. the teachings of Jesus), to instruct those who had already accepted the *kerygma* (i.e. the preaching about the death and Resurrection of Jesus). The devaluation of Q's theological significance by scholars of the time resulted in the notion that it was only useful as a supplement to Mark’s portrait of Jesus.

Julius Wellhausen (1905) was the next important scholar on Q, although he only treated Q indirectly through his commentary on the Synoptic Gospels. Within historical Jesus research generally, he held that Jesus was a Jew, not a Christian. As with the Synoptic Gospels, Wellhausen maintained that Q bears witness to the
process whereby Jesus was ‘Christianised’. This process entailed the creation of eschatological traditions around the person of Jesus. Firmly grounded in the Old Quest, Wellhausen believed that the historical Jesus was not in any way messianic or apocalyptic. Messianic, apocalyptic and eschatological elaboration is illustrated not only by the contents of the Synoptic Gospels, but also by the contents of Q.

Harnack (1907) was the first scholar not only to comprehensively discuss Q, but also to offer a reconstruction of the Q text. Like Wernle before him, Harnack believed that Q was used in the early church as a compilation of Jesus’ logia with a catechetical function and intent. Q did, nonetheless, bring the researcher closer than the canonical Gospels to the message and intent of the historical Jesus. Although some scholars had taken it for granted, Harnack was the first to argue persuasively and comprehensively that Q was more primitive than Mark. Like Wellhausen, Harnack was firmly rooted in the Old Quest. For this liberal theologian, the eschatological elements in Q were subordinate to its ethical character, which was its essential feature. Harnack’s leading refutation against scholars who tried to subordinate Jesus’ ethics to his eschatology was an appeal to Q. For more than a generation, this remained the prevailing interpretation of Q (Edwards 1976:3).

Although previous scholars had observed Q’s tendency to develop in an eschatological direction, it was Benjamin Wisner Bacon who first directed attention to Q’s sapiential roots through a series of articles and dictionary contributions published between 1915 and 1927 (see Jacobson 1992:25–27). According to Bacon, Q properly belonged to the sapiential tradition, both formally and conceptually. One of the most important sapiential motifs in Q was its presentation of Jesus as an emissary of Sophia. Unfortunately, Bacon went a few steps further in his argumentation, equating the wisdom of Q to the soteriology of suffering and degradation that the apostle Paul took over from Isaiah. In the process, the wisdom of Q was merged with the kerygma of the early church, notably that of Paul. The upside of this fusion between Q’s wisdom and Paul’s soteriology was that Q could be viewed by Bacon as a true Gospel, and not just a source of the other Gospels. In fact, Bacon was the first scholar to propose that Q be seen as a proper Gospel, albeit for misguided reasons.

Schweitzer did not pay much attention to Q, and it was Bultmann who first noticed and acknowledged the centrality of Q’s eschatological dimension. According to Bultmann, Q saw Jesus not only as a teacher of wisdom and Torah ethics, but also as a preacher of eschatological repentance and salvation. This realisation offered proponents of the dominant Schweitzerian view an opportunity to gain additional support for their arguments by appealing to the eschatological dimension of Q. Streeter (1924), for example, argued that Q was most comparable to the prophetic books of the Old Testament, notably Jeremiah. Streeter also argued that Q represented a divergent stream within early Christianity. Whereas some early Christians, like Paul, focused on the death and Resurrection of Christ as the centre of their faith and theology, other
early Christians were embarrassed by Jesus’ inglorious death, preferring rather to focus on his Parousia. Yet, Q was still seen as a supplement to the passion *kerygma*, and did not represent a distinct community alongside mainstream Christianity. By comparing Q to prophetic literature, and by highlighting the importance of the Parousia, Streeter underlined the eschatological character of Q over and above anything else. During the No Quest and New Quest periods, when the Schweitzerian paradigm predominated, research on Q continued in the same vein. Manson (1949), for example, held that Q represented a separate stream within early Christianity, and that eschatology was its most prominent feature. Manson’s chief contribution was highlighting two eschatological themes in Q, arguing that the eschatological kingdom of God would appear historically in the person of Jesus, and that eschatological judgment was imminent.

Q studies experienced a revival in the 1960s (Neiryenck 1982:32). The instigation of this revival is attributable to Günther Bornkamm, a student of Bultmann (Robinson 1991:182; cf. Kloppenborg 2001:150). The influence of Bornkamm is visible in the work of his students, including especially Heinz Eduard Tödt, Odil Hannes Steck and Dieter Lührmann. The most influential scholar on Q during the New Quest period was undoubtedly Tödt, whose prime interest was the Son of Man logia, both in general and in Q. Tödt ([1959] 1965) investigated the role and significance of the title ‘Son of Man’ in Q, which led him to the all-important (and brand new) discovery that Q was not a supplement to the passion *kerygma*, but a literary representative of a completely different branch of early Christianity, to be separated from Pauline Christianity. Accordingly, Q represented an independent and alternative *kerygma*, as opposed to a paraenetic supplement to the mainstream *kerygma* of the early church. Whereas Streeter (and other scholars) differentiated between divergent *streams within* early Christianity, Tödt differentiated between opposing *branches of* early Christianity. Not only was the *kerygma* of Q distinctive; it was also more primitive than the more developed Pauline *kerygma*. The idea that Q has a unique *kerygma* is arguably Tödt’s most important legacy, observable in the tendency of today’s Q scholars to identify a distinct Q community or movement behind the double tradition (Kloppenborg 1990:71; cf. McDonald 2013:65).

Regarding the content of Q, Tödt argued that the reason behind its collection and existence is revealed by the mission discourse in Q 10:2–15, which commissioned the disciples to proclaim the nearness of God’s eschatological kingdom. This eschatological message is in continuity with the historical Jesus’ original message. The Q people did not assume that the eschatological message about God’s kingdom had lost its relevance after the Easter experience. The Easter event was not supposed to be the content of the proclamation, but rather its enabler. According to Tödt, the Q people’s Christology was centred around the eschatological Son of Man figure. He followed Bultmann in his belief that the historical Jesus did not identify himself with the eschatological Son of Man. Yet, in Tödt’s view, the early church *did* make such an
identification, and Q expressed as much by creating the so-called ‘present’ Son of Man logia. Thus, he attributed to Q the innovation of identifying Jesus with the future Son of Man. Tödt ([1959] 1965:254) referred to it as the ‘Christological cognition’ when the followers of Jesus realised for the first time that the eschatological Son of Man proclaimed by Jesus was actually Jesus himself. For the Q people, Jesus could now, in hindsight after Easter, be identified with the Son of Man figure, not only at the eschatological event, but also during his earthly career. Despite this association, Q had no concept of a present or realised eschatology. Rather, it supported and professed an utterly futurist and imminent eschatology. Despite its futurist nature, Q’s eschatology was also not apocalyptic. Although Q’s Jesus was already the Son of Man during his earthly ministry, the eschaton would only commence once the Son of Man had arrived in the near future. By attaching themselves to the Son of Man figure, the Q people had assured their own salvation at the Final Judgment. The sayings of Jesus were accumulated and preserved in Q to guide and instruct people in preparation for Jesus’ eschatological return as the Son of Man. As a result of the realisation that Jesus was the Son of Man, Jesus’ sayings could now be recognised by his followers as being not only instructions for the present, but also criteria that would apply at the future judgment. In Tödt’s view, the ‘Christological cognition’ witnessed by Q represents the earliest roots of Christological development in the early church.

For scholars of the New Quest period, the work of Tödt provided a firm foundation for arguments highlighting the dominance of eschatology in Q. Davies (1964), for example, argued that a futurist and imminent eschatology was the dominating feature in all of the Q material (see also Hoffmann 1972). In his view, the Q material was collected in order to continue the eschatological crisis initiated by Jesus. The ethical elements of Q provided only the requirements of the crisis. Thus, the ethics of Q were eschatological ethics, very similar to Schweitzer’s interim ethics.

Tödt also influenced Lührmann (1969), and his redaction-critical investigation of Q. Lührmann argued compellingly that Q was much more than a mere collection of disinterested and ‘neutral’ logia. Instead, Q was the result of a process of deliberate redaction and compilation, betraying the theological and historical perspective of the redactor. In many respects, Lührmann is more important for his method than his results, introducing a number of methodological techniques that would greatly influence subsequent redaction-critical studies of Q, including that of Kloppenborg. Form-critical analyses of the larger compositions of logia that comprise Q allowed him to isolate individual sayings. Once the constitutive sayings of larger compositions were isolated, it was possible to determine the sequence in which these logia were

36. The following quotation from Edwards (1976:43) is also telling, and representative of this period of Q studies: ‘The community which used the Q material was definitely anticipating the arrival of Jesus as Son of Man in the near future. This eschatological orientation is the one most distinguishing feature of their theology. It overshadows and influences everything that they say and do’ (italics are original).
connected to one another to create those larger compositions. Thus, form criticism became a direct and invaluable aid for Lührmann’s redaction-critical analysis of Q. Unfortunately, Lührmann incorporated a history-of-traditions approach into his form-critical analysis, rendering it far less objectively reliable. Despite this drawback, Lührmann’s ability to illustrate that Q underwent a definite process of redactional development determined the direction of many subsequent Q studies. Even if his methodological approach ended up being more influential than his actual findings, the impact of the latter should not be underestimated.

Accommodating the novel proposal by Steck (1967) that the Deuteronomistic tradition and material in Q are redactional, Lührmann argued that Q’s redaction needs to be associated with those traditions that pronounce the eschatological condemnation of greater Israel (or ‘this generation’), who had rejected the Q people and their message. The Q people downplayed the historical Jesus’ message of a realised eschatology in favour of a futurist eschatology. They took over Jesus’ eschatological message of God’s coming kingdom, but emphasised, unlike Jesus, the expectation of eschatological judgment. Since Q conflated the Deuteronomistic worldview of the Old Testament with the Sophia tradition of sapiential texts, Lührmann argued that not only the Sophia texts in particular, but also Q’s sapiential material in general, were attributable to Q’s redaction. In fact, sapiential motifs were to some extent responsible for the new focus on eschatological judgment in Q’s redaction. Against Tödt, Lührmann argued that the identification of Jesus with the Son of Man happened during Q’s prehistory, and was not an identifiable feature of Q’s redaction. Nonetheless, Lührmann held that the apocalyptic Son of Man logia were very important to the redactors of Q, regardless of whether or not they went back to the historical Jesus. Although Lührmann agreed with Tödt that Q primarily advocated a futurist eschatology, he was the first scholar to notice within the content of Q a concern for the Parousia’s delay. According to Lührmann, this delay forced the Q people to defer the point in time when the Parousia would occur. The imminence of the Q people’s eschatological message was therefore undermined. Ultimately, Lührmann’s redactional layer lacked a clear profile, being comprised of a mixed bag of different types of logia.

Research on Q has at the very least been a contributing factor to the revival of Jesus studies during the Third and Renewed Quests (Järvinen 2001:515). Although two related studies had presented similar results a year prior (i.e. Christ 1970; Suggs 1970), the Renewed Quest’s interest in Q is generally thought to have started with an article by James M. Robinson (1971), entitled ΛΟΓΟΙ ΣΟΦΩΝ, or ‘Sayings of the Wise’ (cf. e.g. Koester 1997:137). Unlike most Q studies of the time, Robinson was not primarily interested in the redaction of Q, but in its genre. It was interesting to him that Q’s theology was so strongly influenced by wisdom. In his view, the identification of Jesus

37. As well as Koester.
with Sophia suggested that the Q people harboured, not a Son of Man Christology, but a wisdom Christology. Within the larger context of his preoccupation with the recently-discovered diversity of the early church, Robinson found it significant that one of the primary witnesses to that diversity fostered what could best be described as a sapiential theology. It was further noteworthy to Robinson that this sapiential theology was formally expressed by means of a compilation of logia, which is precisely what one would expect from a wisdom-type theology. Inspired by the correspondence between Q’s sapiential content and form, Robinson set out to determine the genre of Q more closely. He compared Q to Jewish wisdom texts, and found that the genre of Q could best be explained as ‘sayings of the wise’. Whereas Davies was the first scholar to argue that all the Q material should be interpreted eschatologically (see above in this section), Robinson was the first scholar to argue that all the Q material should be understood in terms of its wisdom.

These results were very influential, and gave rise to a spate of studies on the wisdom in Q (Sim 1985:46; Tuckett 1996:326). Amongst these, the investigation by Dieter Zeller (1977) was one of the most methodical, convincing and influential. Zeller argued that it was possible to isolate six lengthy complexes of logia that predate the Sayings Gospel Q. According to Zeller, all six of these elaborated complexes were structured around sapiential admonitions. The complexes included the following: (1) behaviour towards enemies (Q 6:20–49); (2) behaviour of missionaries (Q 10:2–12, 16); (3) prayer (Q 11:2–13); (4) behaviour under persecution (Q [?] 11:33–36; 12:2–10); (5) attitude towards material things (12:22–31, 33–34); and (6) preparedness (Q 12:35–37, 39–40, 42–46). It is remarkable that the traditions isolated by Zeller overlap extensively with Kloppenborg’s formative stratum. More than ten years after Zeller’s study, Ronald A. Piper (1989) also isolated six sapiential clusters that predate Q, but went a step further by indicating that these clusters had a similar internal structure if compared to one another. These clusters of sapiential logia included the following: Q 6:37–42; Q 6:43–45; Q 11:9–13; Q 12:2–9 and Q 12:22–31. Piper’s six clusters all appear in the six complexes of sapiential logia identified by Zeller.

The new trend to identify an earlier sapiential core in the Sayings Gospel Q seemed to be corroborated by other developments in New Testament studies, especially on the Gospel of Thomas. Koester ([1968] 1971) saw enough justification in the traditions common to Q and the Gospel of Thomas to postulate a sapiential sayings source shared by both. Since the Gospel of Thomas features no futurist Son of Man logia, Koester argued that neither did the original layer of the Sayings Gospel Q (see above, ‘The Gospel of Thomas’). Subsequent scholars went beyond Koester in arguing that the sapiential source shared by Thomas and Q is both non-apocalyptic and non-eschatological (cf. Horsley 1991:196). Patterson (1993b), for example, argued that both the eschatology in Q and the Gnosticism in Thomas were secondary developments, while the sapiential core to both should be regarded as primary. Yet, the distinguishing feature between Q and other wisdom material seemed to be the integrality of eschatological and judgment
themes to the document (Carlston 1982:101, 112). Ever since Robinson, scholars who have preferred an exclusively sapiential Q have, in one way or another, struggled with the annoying presence of eschatological themes throughout Q.

According to Mack (1993:36–37), Kloppenborg ‘solved’ the problem of the integrality of eschatological material in Q by distinguishing two main compositional layers within the document: An earlier sapiential layer and a later apocalyptic layer. Yet, Kloppenborg (1987a:244–245; 2000:150–151, cf. Kloppenborg 2001:159) has redactional activity in mind when referring to the one layer as being ‘earlier’ and the other as being ‘later’ (cf. Crossan 2001a:119; Dunn 2013:81; Tuckett 1996:68; 2001:383, 388; Vaage 1995:75; see Freyne 2000:227–228). Redactional activity does not necessarily correspond to the chronology of the Jesus tradition in such a direct way that the earlier layer in Q comes closer to the historical Jesus than the subsequent layer (Koester 1994:540–541; see Allison 2010:120–125). Be that as it may, the stratification of Q into an ‘earlier wisdom layer’ and a ‘later apocalyptic layer’ seemed to confirm the idea prevalent amongst Renewed Questers that eschatological material was added to the more authentic Jesus tradition after Easter (cf. Allison 2010:118; Boyd 1995:55; see Koester 1997:137–141, esp. fn. 4). For most of these scholars, the pre-eminence of wisdom was further corroborated by the sapiential nature of Thomas’s earliest stratum. Mack’s direct application of Kloppenborg’s stratification of Q to the historical Jesus is typical of scholars rooted in the Renewed Quest (Allison 2010:118–119; Wright 1996:36–37, 41; cf. Kloppenborg 2001:159). Borg (1994a) represents another example of this tendency:

\[\text{7} \text{he earliest stratum of Q is non-apocalyptic, with apocalyptic elements appearing only in the latest stratum, suggesting that the teaching of Jesus was ‘apocalypticised’ by some in the early church. (p.15 fn. 13)}\]

Similar views are also expressed by Patterson (1998a:171–172): ‘it has become increasingly clear that Q was not originally an apocalyptic document at all, but – to take the widely accepted view of Kloppenborg – a collection of wisdom speeches.’ He (Paterson 1998a) continues to assert:

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38. For a short period of time, including the year 2000, John S. Kloppenborg’s surname features as ‘Kloppenborg Verbin’ in his publications. In earlier and later publications, his surname only features as ‘Kloppenborg’. To avoid confusion, I will feature his surname throughout this book as ‘Kloppenborg’, but add the ‘Verbin’ between brackets where applicable in the biography at the end.

39. Later on in his book, Borg (1994a:94 fn. 46; cf. Borg 1999:231) tries to clarify his view by voicing his own reservations about the layering of both the Gospel of Thomas and Q. But he then goes on to express the same result, as if he does indeed accept the layering of Thomas and Q: ‘However, regardless of how one views the “layering” of Q and Thomas, it is clear even from their present form that the Gospel tradition from a very early stage contained a large component of wisdom material.’ This quotation actually says nothing. No one would dispute that there are sapiential traditions in the ‘more authentic’ Jesus material. The real issue is that there are prophetic, apocalyptic and eschatological traditions in this material as well (Carlston 1982:101). The central question is how to account for the presence of both in the same authentic material, especially Q. Kloppenborg’s (2001:160–161) statement that Borg has arrived at a non-eschatological Jesus without accepting the stratification of Q is therefore not entirely correct.
The Q apocalypse (Luke 17:22–37//Mat 24:23–28, 37–42), as well as the sayings of judgment against ‘this generation’ scattered throughout the document, affixed like barnacles to this earlier stratum of wisdom speeches, belong to a later edition of Q. (p. 172; cf. Patterson 2001b:72, 73)

Robinson (2001a) is yet another example, declaring that the earliest layer of Q ‘is generally agreed to provide the oldest surviving layer of material brought together by Jesus’ disciples’ (p. 27), so that it ‘does in fact reflect what [the historical] Jesus had to say’ (p. 47). 40

Although most studies on Q since the 1970s have highlighted the sapiential nature of Q, a number of scholars have continued focusing their investigations on its eschatological nature (e.g. Sato 1988; Schulz 1972). Despite Lührmann’s discovery of a delayed Parousia in Q, the prevailing view, by far, amongst these latter scholars is the one put forward by Tödt, namely that Q held and professed an imminent, futurist eschatology. Schmithals (1997b), for example, argues that Q’s sapiential, this-worldly sayings are secondary, since they are incompatible with the interim ethics of the historical Jesus, who was apocalyptic.

The aftermath

In North American scholarship, all these developments in New Testament research progressively led to the abandonment of the former apocalyptic consensus by quite a number of scholars (see Borg 1994b:17–19; cf. Borg 1994a:9; Frey 2011:17; Koester 1992:7; Patterson 2001b:69–70; Wink 2002:165; e.g. Patterson 1998a:177). Scholars of the Renewed Quest have been impressed by these developments, and have readily adopted an understanding of Jesus that has nothing to do with eschatology, mostly replacing the ‘outdated’ eschatological Jesus with some type of teacher or sage. We have already seen that Funk’s image of Jesus is directly derived from his understanding of the parables of Jesus. Likewise, Stephen J. Patterson’s (1998a) depiction of Jesus as a teacher of countercultural wisdom is a direct consequence of his research on the Gospel of Thomas. Similarly, Crossan’s (1991) influential portrayal of Jesus as a Jewish-Cynic-peasant sage is a direct result of his own research on the parables of Jesus, as well as his high regard not only for Thomas and Q, but also for the criterion of multiple independent attestation. Mack’s (1988; 1993) portrayal of Jesus as a Cynic sage flows unswervingly from his high regard for both the parables of Jesus and Kloppenborg’s stratification of Q. The Jesus Seminar’s (Funk & Hoover 1993) selection of authentic Jesus material promotes a subversive, sapiential, fairly Hellenised, non-eschatological Jesus, and is based on all of these developments, especially the ‘discovery’ of the earliest layers of both Q and the Gospel of Thomas (Boyd 1995:62; Wright 1996:39, 41, 81; cf. Borg 1994b:18; see Miller 1999:16–17, 24, 69–74; 2001:10). In the Jesus Seminar’s publication of their results about the sayings of Jesus, significantly called The five Gospels,

40. Theoretically at least, Robinson (1995:260; 2011:471) does allow for a modicum of dissimilarity between Q’s redaction and tradition histories (see Chapter 5, ‘Wisdom’).
none of his apocalyptic sayings appear in red (Patterson 1998a:170). Conversely, there are more red sayings in the sapiential Gospel of Thomas than in the canonical Gospel of Mark (Casey 2010:21).

There is perhaps no stronger defender and promoter of a non-eschatological Jesus than Marcus J. Borg (Kloppenborg 2001:174). Borg’s (1984; 1987) fourfold description of Jesus as healer, sage, social prophet and movement founder depends greatly on his acceptance of recent parable research, and his denial of the authenticity of the apocalyptic Son of Man logia. By the term ‘non-eschatological’, Borg (1994a:9) means a Jesus who did not proclaim ‘the imminent coming of the kingdom of God and the Son of Man, understood as involving the last judgment and the end of human history as we know it.’

Not all proponents of a sapiential Jesus reject all the eschatological elements of Jesus’ message (Van Aarde 2004:424), but most of them deny the imminent and/or apocalyptic aspects of his eschatology (e.g. Borg 1994a:82–84; 88–90; 1994b:21; 2001b:34, 42). They also deny that an eschatological expectation dictated every aspect of his message and conduct (e.g. Borg 2001a:115–116; 2001b:43–48; cf. Pokorný 2011:350). Crossan (1998) is an excellent example of the latter:

From the very beginning of my own research, I have insisted that the historical Jesus was eschatological but not apocalyptic, although it has always been difficult for me to put a more positive name on that nonapocalyptic eschatology. (p. 257)

For Crossan (1998:259–260), the most definitive aspect and attribute of eschatology is that it is world-negating. Eschatology is born out of a resounding dissatisfaction with the status quo in the world ‘around us’. Hence, it is a communal defence mechanism against the perceived wickedness in the world. The specific form in which such a defence mechanism finds expression varies from group to group. Some might physically, symbolically or mystically withdraw from the physical world, while others might come to expect the destruction of the world (as they know it). According to Crossan, two ancient examples of this are the Gospels of Q and Thomas. Crossan (1998:260–271) argues that the Gospel of Q is an example of ‘apocalyptic eschatology’, while the Gospel of Thomas is an example of ‘ascetical eschatology’ (cf. Patterson 1998b:55). Regarding Q, Crossan (1998:264) differentiates between ‘primary’ and ‘secondary apocalyptic eschatology’. The former results in a development of certain directives because the end is coming (soon), while the latter coerces, threatens, sanctions or motivates certain directives that were in place already and would have been expected in any case. In other words, in the former, eschatology is primary and foundational, while in the latter, morality is primary and foundational. In the former, eschatology determines morality. In the latter, eschatology is in the service of morality. Crossan (1998:264) sees Q as an example of ‘secondary apocalyptic eschatology’.

As Crossan (1998:264) acknowledges, this view of Q’s eschatology was foreshadowed by Kloppenborg’s ‘symbolic eschatology’. Even though Kloppenborg (1987b:291–292) makes use of different terminology and prefers not to use the label ‘apocalyptic’ in reference to Q, his understanding of Q’s eschatology is very similar to that of Crossan. Kloppenborg (1987b) notices and explains that:

Q uses threats of judgment and unsettling apocalyptic metaphors, not because it speaks from an ‘apocalyptic situation’ of anomie but because the symbolic character of apocalyptic language could be turned to Q’s particular aims. (p. 304)

Thus, Q makes use of apocalyptic images and language to support, sanction, buttress and motivate that which it holds most dear, namely a particular moral programme communicated via a specific brand of wisdom. These descriptions of Q’s eschatology are very similar to, if not exactly the same as, Bultmann’s understanding of the ‘eschatological ethics’ of the historical Jesus (see above, ‘Rudolf Bultmann and the “No Quest” period’).

But Crossan (1998:282–283) goes even further. He argues that the so-called ‘Common Sayings Tradition’ behind Q and the Gospel of Thomas promoted an ‘ethical eschatology’, which should be separated from the specific eschatologies put forward by either of the individual sayings Gospels. Crossan (1998:284) defines this ‘ethical eschatology’ as an eschatology that negates the epistemic evils in the world, neither by projecting apocalyptic judgment upon her, nor by withdrawing from her, but by ‘actively protesting’ and ‘nonviolently resisting’ her. ‘Ethical eschatology’ zooms in on the structural and systemic injustice in the world, and addresses it by both pointing it out and boycotting the process. In Crossan’s view, this is the type of ‘eschatology’ that comes closest to the historical Jesus. Unlike the presumptions of apocalyptic eschatology, God is not violent, and he is not the one who acts (cf. Patterson 1998b:56). It is not difficult to notice that, in both Kloppenborg’s and Crossan’s respective understandings of eschatology, wisdom and morality reign supreme. Eschatology is either made subservient to wisdom, or it is redefined in such a way that it almost, if not completely, ceases to be apocalyptic eschatology.

Not all scholars have been as accepting of the developments described so far, explaining the current schism in Jesus scholarship. As we have seen, scholars of the Third Quest hold firm to a Schweitzerian understanding of Jesus, at times defending it with some vigour (Horsley 2012:2, 26; McKnight 2005:271; Patterson 2001b:70; Stanton 2002:250; see above, ‘A schism in contemporary scholarship’). They are sceptical of the research that gave birth to a sapiential Jesus, possibly with a fair degree of justification. All the developments described above can indeed be undermined. As these sceptics point out, the Gospel of Thomas could in its entirety have been directly dependent upon the Synoptic Gospels, and should perhaps be dated to the 2nd century CE, in which case it would not even go back to the historical Jesus at all (Arnal 2005a:41–42; Blomberg 1999:21; e.g. Stanton 2002:230; Witherington 1995:48–50). Even if its
early dating is accepted, it is not a given that the first draft of Thomas contained only wisdom, or that the Thomas tradition developed from wisdom to eschatology (see Allison 2010:125–134). Secondly, these scholars point out that the parables, as they appear in the canonical Gospels, are notoriously multivalent, and can be construed as advocating both a present and a future eschatology (Allison 1998:128). Only if they are surgically removed from their Gospel contexts do they appear to advocate some sort of wisdom or morality (cf. Horsley 2012:3). As a side note, it is interesting to observe that the parables of Jesus do not feature prominently (or at all) in the reconstructions of Jesus offered by scholars of the Third Quest (Miller 2005:121). Thirdly, this branch of scholarship argues that rediscovering Jesus’ Jewish roots does not necessarily place him squarely within a wisdom tradition. Judaism of the time was complex, and included rich prophetic and apocalyptic traditions. Apocalypticism was particularly popular and widespread in 1st-century Judaism (Allison 2001d:88). Maurice Casey (2010), for example, appealed primarily to Jesus’ Jewish roots (including his lingua franca, Aramaic) when he defended the notion that Jesus was primarily a prophet who preached both the present and the imminently-coming kingdom of God. In this context, it is perhaps ironic that the Jesus Seminar has been criticised by some for stripping Jesus of his Jewishness (cf. Miller 1999:75). Fourthly, most of these scholars simply reject the documentary status and Kloppenborg’s stratification of Q (Blomberg 1999:21; e.g. Allison 2001d:95). In addition, they tend to reject the mere possibility of reconstructing a Q community from the material available (e.g. Wright 1996:81). Fifthly, there are still a fairly significant number of scholars who give precedence to the ‘coming’ Son of Man logia, and who regard the apocalyptic references to Daniel 7:13 to be authentic. A few scholars even continue to defend the notion that there existed a unified Son of Man concept at the time of Jesus (see Burkett 1999:76–78, 97, 109–114). Furthermore, scholars who defend an apocalyptic Jesus typically point to how little we know of the Son of Man sayings, and how precarious it remains to make any kind of judgment call on their authenticity (e.g. Allison 1998:128; 2001d:95). It should perhaps be noted that these scholars do not deny that there are elements of wisdom in the authentic Jesus material, or that Jesus might also have been a sage, in addition to being an apocalyptic prophet (e.g. Allison 2001d:91). Rather, they prefer to see eschatology as the all-encompassing framework from which to interpret all the Jesus material, including his sapiential teachings.

The best contemporary case for an eschatological understanding of Jesus is arguably that of Dale Allison (Borg 2001b:31; Casey 2010:21; Miller 2001:11; Patterson 2001b:70; cf. Horsley 2012:26–27; Verheyden 2001:702). His views are presented most comprehensively in his 1998 book Jesus of Nazareth: Millenarian prophet. Allison believes that all research is pre-determined by the paradigm of the researcher. In true Third Quest fashion, he explicitly voices his paradigm before even directing any attention to the literary evidence. The paradigm with which he approaches the Jesus tradition is that of a Jesus concerned primarily with the imminent end of the physical world,
described by Allison as a ‘millenarian prophet’. Allison defends this paradigm with five arguments. Firstly, both John the Baptist and the early church believed in the imminent and apocalyptic nature of the future kingdom of God. If Jesus was a disciple of John, and if the early church came into being as a result of Jesus’ teachings, then Jesus must also have proclaimed an apocalyptic eschatology. To deny this is to deny any continuity between John and Jesus, on the one hand, and between Jesus and the early church, on the other. This view was already expressed by E.P. Sanders (1985:91–95) more than a decade before Allison’s *Jesus of Nazareth*. It remains for both authors, together with a number of other scholars, the most important and compelling piece of evidence of an eschatological Jesus (e.g. Sanders 1985:152; Wright 1996:160–162; cf. Borg 2001a:117; Crossan 2001a:122; Patterson 2001a:126; Wink 2002:164). Secondly, the widespread and deep-seated conviction by the early church that Jesus rose from the dead does not make sense unless these early followers of Jesus were already expecting, because of Jesus’ message, some sort of eschatological event to take place soon. Thirdly, the early Christian belief that the eschaton had commenced directly after the death of Jesus, as well as the early Christian description of his death through apocalyptic imagery, can only be explained by the likelihood that Jesus himself proclaimed an imminent and apocalyptic end. Fourthly, eschatological perspectives and movements, together with the apocalyptic literature that represents them, flourished in the time of Jesus. Not only was the whole Roman Empire infected by this craze, but the Jewish people of Palestine were also contaminated by it. Fifthly, in a few canonical texts Jesus is explicitly compared to other apocalyptic figures, like John the Baptist, Theudas and Judas the Galilean. With his paradigm defended, Allison then proceeds to interpret the Jesus tradition from a perspective of apocalyptic eschatology. Sanders (1985) follows a similar methodology in his depiction of Jesus as an eschatological prophet. He extracts from the Jesus tradition eight seemingly undeniable ‘facts’ about the historical Jesus, interprets these facts from an eschatological framework, and then concludes that Jesus must have been eschatological.

The current intention is neither to dissect the views of Allison or Sanders, nor to enter into a discussion with their respective endeavours. All their arguments have counter-arguments (see Borg 1994a:74–84; 2001b:31–48; Crossan 2001b:48–69; Horsley 2012:26–37; Patterson 2001b:69–82; Pokorny 2011:345–346; Robinson 1991:189–194). The current intent is simply to hold these works up as examples of contemporary attempts to defend and re-establish the view that Jesus held and taught

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42. ‘Millenarianism’ could be defined as ‘the social expression of apocalyptic convictions’ (Miller 2001:11). The difference between ‘apocalypticism’ and ‘millenarianism’ is that the former represents certain beliefs, while the latter represents a social group for whom these beliefs are foundational.

43. A few years ago, Allison (2010:45–86) added four additional arguments to these five.

44. Horsley (2012) argues vehemently against this position.
an apocalyptic and imminent eschatology. A final word in closing on the following claim by Horsley (2012):

In recent debates over whether Jesus was apocalyptic, both sides agree on and work with the standard older view of Jewish apocalyptic eschatology more or less as articulated a century ago by Schweitzer and summarized a generation later by Rudolf Bultmann. (p. 53)

I have not found this to be the case. Although a few contemporary scholars do at times operate with archaic definitions of eschatology and apocalypticism, they seem for the most part to have moved beyond the simplistic definitions of previous scholars.
The documentary status of Q

According to Kloppenborg (1987a:89–95; 2000:66–72; 2001:151–152), the existence and nature of the double tradition can be best accounted for and explained by the positing of only one source, as opposed to two or more. In the first place, Q features a number of common themes, together with a unique style and form, when compared to the rest of the New Testament (cf. Catchpole 1993:5, 59). Despite the varied application of formal characteristics and rhetorical method, Q undoubtedly displays a distinctive profile when compared to Mark. Moreover, Q deliberately attempts to unify the material by relating disparate elements scattered across the double tradition.\(^{45}\) In the second place, the relative correspondence in the sequence of Q's material as it is found in Matthew and Luke respectively is not only an argument for its written status, but also for its unity (cf. Catchpole 1993:5). In addition to the relative agreement in overall sequence, the respective sequences of independent sayings and clusters also tend to correlate, even though they might be huddled together in one Gospel and spread out in the other. Disagreements in sequential order, both on the macro and microstructural levels, can more often than not be explained on account of the redactional tendencies of the two evangelists. According to Kloppenborg, these two features (commonality in content and agreement in relative sequence) compel the scholar to regard Q as a single document. As a controlling principle, Kloppenborg further applies Ockham's razor, otherwise known as the principle of parsimony, to the Q hypothesis. In this regard, Ockham's razor requires persuasive and undeniable evidence for the positing of two

\(^{45}\)Take, for example, the mention of the 'Coming One' in Q 3:16; Q 7:18–23; Q 10:13–15 and Q 13:34–35; the motif of judgment throughout Q; the relationship between Jesus and the Baptist in Q 3:7–9, 16–17; Q 6:27–42; Q 7:24–26, 31–35 and Q 17:3–4; and the relationship between Jesus and his followers in Q 6:39–40; Q 10:16 and Q 22:28–30.
or more sources behind the double tradition. The lack of such evidence obliges the positing of one source only.

The question of whether Q comprised one cohesive source or many distinct sources goes hand in hand with the question of whether Q was handed down in written or oral form. On the one hand, if Matthew and Luke made use of oral tradition, they probably drew upon more than one source, although this would not necessarily have been the case. On the other hand, if the two evangelists made use of written tradition, they probably used only one source, although this would likewise not necessarily have been the case. It needs to be emphasised that the question of whether Q was a written or oral source relates to Q as it was used by Matthew and Luke, not to the prehistory of Q. There is no denying that the material in Q has its roots in oral tradition. Kloppenborg (2000) supplies three reasons for preferring the probability that Matthew and Luke made use of a written Q:

(1) the near-verbatim agreement between Matthew and Luke in certain double tradition pericopae; (2) the significant amount of sequential agreement between Matthew and Luke in some portions of the double tradition; and (3) the use by Matthew and Luke of some unusual phrases or words. (p. 56)

In the last decade or so, the proposal that Q subsisted in oral form at the time of adoption by Matthew and Luke has been revived with some energy by a number of scholars, especially from the Third Quest (e.g. Dunn 2013:80–108; Mournet 2005:42–45). These scholars typically question the confidence with which Q is deduced to be a single written document:

Unfortunately, the positive conclusion reached over the existence of a common source has contributed to the over-confident attribution of much, if not all, of the shared double tradition to the now posited written source text (i.e., Q). (Mournet 2005:43)

Against such confidence, these scholars usually offer the following arguments in support of the idea that Q comprised oral traditions when picked up by Matthew and Luke (McDonald 2013:63): (1) as one would expect from oral tradition, there is significant variance in wording between Matthew and Luke’s respective versions of Q; and (2) the agreement in sequence is not as strong as some scholars would have us believe.

The typical response to these arguments are as follows (McDonald 2013:63): (1) notwithstanding the differences, Matthew and Luke retain significant agreement as far as Q’s word order and word choice is concerned; (2) significant commonalities between Matthew and Luke’s respective versions of Q speak against their origination as diffused oral traditions; (3) Matthew and Luke have preserved the Q material in the same relative sequence, as opposed to the exact same sequence; and (4) the doublets in Matthew and Luke underwrite the theory of a written Q. On both sides of the

46. Or a combination of oral and written form, but with emphasis still on the former.

47. Emphasis original.
scholarly divide, statistical analyses are sometimes applied in an effort to measure the agreement in sequence between Matthew and Luke's preservation of Q (see Mournet 2005:45–51; e.g. Tripp 2013:123–148). For the most part, the results of these statistical analyses seem to be dependent on the data selected for analysis. In turn, the data is determined by choices such as the boundaries of individual pericopes, the extent of Q and the inclusion of triple tradition material.

Very few scholars today would deny the Semitic character of Q under the Greek surface. However, despite the presence of Semitic features at the level of syntax, style and idiom (see Bussby 1954:272–275), the near verbatim agreement between Matthew and Luke in some pericopes demands a Greek Q, especially if Q is to be considered a single document (see Kloppenborg 1987a:51–64; Tuckett 1996:83–92; cf. Koester 1997:138 fn. 5). Several quotations derive unmistakably from the Septuagint. The temptation narrative quotes three texts from the Septuagint (Dt 6:16; 8:3; Ps 91:11), and Q 13:35 cites the Septuagint’s translation of Psalm 117:26 word for word (Allison 1997:47). The Septuagint’s version of Genesis 7:7 might also be reflected in Q 17:27. There seems to be relative agreement today, especially amongst Q specialists and scholars of the Renewed Quest, that the version of Q used by Matthew and Luke was a single Greek document (McDonald 2013:63; Vaage 1994:8; see Kloppenborg 2000:72–80).

The arguments presented so far are seen by most, Q scholars and critics alike, as the most important arguments for Q's documentary status. They have presently been recounted in only very summarised form, both because these arguments have been hulled over extensively in other studies, and because the present author does not regard them as all-important. There is another factor, mostly overlooked in disputes about the documentary status of Q, that is much more persuasive. When Q was ‘discovered’, it was seen as remarkable and very telling that it consisted almost exclusively of sayings, to the exclusion of other types of tradition. This smidgen of awe all but disappeared as scholars got used to the idea of a Q source in subsequent years. To the present writer, it remains ‘awe-fully’ telling that the double tradition agrees almost exclusively about the sayings of Jesus, and not much else. The morsels of narrative in Q all function to set the stage and paint the background for the sayings and speeches that then follow. This amazing ‘coincidence’ is explained most effortlessly by the probability that both evangelists made use of the same written source. If Q consisted of oral tradition or a number of isolated written sources by the time Matthew and Luke used it, one would have expected the double tradition to contain more than only the sayings of Jesus. One would at least have expected the double tradition to also contain lengthy descriptions of Jesus’ deeds, as well as some examples of extended narratives.

48.Cf. Q 3:7a; 4:1–3a, 4a, 5a, 10a, 12a, 5–6a, 8a, 13; 6:20a; 7:1, 3, 6–8, 9a, 18, 24a; 9:57, 59; 11:14–15, 16; 17:20a.

49.Or at least a very similar written source.
Mainly two factors prevented some traditional scholars from seeing Q as a single document. The first was the temptation story, which differs from the rest of Q in that it is essentially a narrative that contains one or two sayings, not a saying or speech introduced by a short narrative. This oddity has in recent years been clarified as a normal and expected feature of these types of literature, which are prone to being introduced by short narrative sections (see Chapter 2, ‘Q as wisdom’). Thus, the presence of the temptation narrative is not an argument against the documentary status of Q, but entirely explicable as an expected feature of a writing that otherwise contains logia only. In any case, the temptation story is predominantly made up of individual logia. The second factor that historically prevented certain individual scholars from seeing Q as a single document was the fact that there were no other documents of this sort extant in antiquity. This situation changed when the Gospel of Thomas was discovered, providing comparative proof of a single document containing only the sayings of Jesus (Boyd 1995:53; Perkins 2007:68; cf. Jacobson 1992:31). Some scholars had long believed that Q was a single document containing almost entirely the sayings of Jesus (Perkins 2007:68). That this hypothesis was subsequently corroborated by another physical document is no less telling or astounding than the fact that the double tradition is almost exclusively made up of Jesus’ sayings (cf. Robinson 2011:457–458; see Kloppenborg et al. 1990:82–84). Both elements point in the same direction: Q was a single document. A great deal of imagination is required if one attempts to explain these two astonishing factors by appealing to multiple written sources or oral tradition.

To the astonishing feat of discovering an actual sayings document could be added the ‘discovery’ of other sayings documents in the early church, including the parables and sayings collection behind Mark 4, the sayings tradition behind the epistle of James, the logia collection mentioned by Papias (Hist. Eccl. 3.39.16), the sayings of Jesus in the first six chapters of the Didache, and the sayings in the apocryphal agrapha (cf. Kloppenborg et al. 1990:93; Meyer 2003:20). Whether or not ‘sayings of the wise’ (λόγοι σοφῶν) is an acceptable genre designation for Q (see below, ‘The genre of Q’), it is certainly significant that pupils of all ancient cultures collected the sapiential sayings of noteworthy sages, not excluding Jewish, Persian, Egyptian and other Mediterranean cultures (see Patterson 1998b:36–37). Examples of such collections are embedded in Jewish works, such as Proverbs, the Wisdom of Solomon and Sirach.

Kloppenborg’s stratification of Q

Whether or not you agree with the practice of stratifying Q, and notwithstanding all the contributions made up to the present day, Q scholarship can be divided into the time before and the time after John S. Kloppenborg. Even some of his most notable opponents cannot help but sing his praises and appreciate the quality of his work (e.g. Allison 1997:3; Horsley 1995b:41; Sato 1995:140; Tuckett 1996:69, 73). To be sure, Kloppenborg built on scholarship that predated him, but his 1987 monograph, The
formation of Q, significantly changed the face of Q scholarship (cf. Dunn 2013:80; Kirk 1998:35; Tuckett 1996:69). The impact of his hypothesis has been extensive and far-reaching. For the first time since the ‘discovery’ of Q, one theory of its composition and genre gained wide acceptance, frequently forming the point of departure for other studies (Freyne 2000:227; Horsley 1999a:62; Tuckett 1996:69, 70; e.g. Arnal 2001:5; Cotter 1995a:117; Vaage 1994:7, 107). A consequence of The formation of Q was to divide Q scholarship more clearly into two groups: those for and those against the stratification of Q; each with its own arguments within the current debate.

Furthermore, Kloppenborg laid to rest Kleinliteratur conceptions of Q (Kirk 1998:35). These conceptions had enabled past scholars to postulate an array of tradition-historical and redactional models of Q without any attempt to control their own methodologies (Kirk 1998:64). Such a lack of literary-critical controls made it possible for scholars to apply just about any analytical model to Q in support of their tradition and redaction histories (Kirk 1998:65). Kloppenborg’s The formation of Q also marked the end of the undervaluation of Q’s redactor (Kirk 1998:35). The refutation of Kleinliteratur conceptions enabled Kloppenborg to do away with the idea that Q was created sui generis, which, in turn, enabled him to compare Q with other ancient literature (Kirk 1998:35–36, 64). Such comparative studies have, since then, become a programmatic hallmark of Q research. Former disregard for the structural features of Q, as well as the literary contexts of individual sayings, was nipped in the bud by Kloppenborg’s study. Contemporary Q research affords primary importance to the literary, compositional and rhetoric features within the framework structure of Q (Kloppenborg 1995a:2).

Kloppenborg’s analysis of Q is influenced in particular by the methodologies and contributions of Robinson, Lührmann, Koester, Jacobson and Zeller. He applies three redaction-critical tools to unearth the redactional history of Q (see Kloppenborg 1987a:98–101). The first tool is to determine ‘the compositional principles which guide the juxtaposition of originally independent sayings and groups of sayings’ (Kloppenborg 1987a:98). This is achieved in two steps: (1) the isolation of formerly independent units through form-critical analysis; and (2) the determination of not only the order in which these formerly independent units were added to one another, but also the reason(s) for each juxtaposition, including catchword connection, thematic association, formal correlation and/or syntactical linkage. The second tool is the identification of secondary additions that were attached to literary units. Such additions might be totally new creations, or they might stem from formerly independent sayings (Kommentarworte). In either case, each insertion was made to explicate or modify the literary unit to which it was affixed. Only those additions that occurred at the level of redaction are relevant, as opposed to additions and associations that took place during the prehistory of the literary unit in question.50 The third tool is a comparison of

50.In my view, this is an unavoidable weakness in the second step of Kloppenborg’s methodology. Distinguishing between
literary units in Q with their appearance in other streams of tradition, like the Gospels of Mark, Thomas and John. This tool is mainly applied to corroborate the results of the previous two tools.\footnote{In my view, this methodological priority might be a weakness in Kloppenborg’s analysis, since the third tool is undoubtedly the most objective of the three. Nevertheless, this weakness is wholly overshadowed and accommodated by the scrupulous nature of Kloppenborg’s analysis. In any case, the third tool usually does succeed in corroborating the results of the first two.}

As a result of this redaction-critical analysis, Kloppenborg (1987a:166–170, 238–262) is able to show that Q mainly consists of two separate complexes of literary units, each respectively unified by the same redactional concerns and interests. The one complex is primarily concerned with the preaching of judgment, and has the following features in common: (1) the same audience: although the actual audience is the Q people, the ‘projected’ or ‘implied’ audience comprises those who oppose the Q people and reject their message; (2) the same literary forms: mainly *chreiai* consisting of prophetic and apocalyptic logia; (3) the same motifs: centred around apocalyptic judgment. The other complex may be dubbed ‘wisdom speeches’, and has the following features in common: (1) the same audience: the Q people, who constitute both the actual and the projected audience; (2) the same literary forms: wisdom sayings; (3) the same motifs: centred around the radical wisdom of God’s kingdom. The two strata are further distinguishable in terms of their rhetoric. The ‘wisdom speeches’ use a hortatory rhetoric of persuasion, while the ‘judgment’ layer features a defensive rhetorical strategy of prophetic pronouncement and declamation (cf. Cromhout 2007:263; Kloppenborg 1995a:12). The ‘wisdom speeches’ also follow a fairly set structure, being introduced by programmatic sayings, followed by second-person imperatives, and concluded by a saying emphasising the importance of the instruction (cf. Kloppenborg 2000:145). The internal similarities of each respective complex, as well as the antithesis between the two complexes if compared to each other, invite the conclusion that they constitute two separate redactional strata (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:166, 238).

In the ‘wisdom speeches’, some of the individual sayings and clusters stand out as anomalous, harbouring those features that are characteristic of the ‘judgment’ layer (i.e. Q 6:23c; 10:12–15, 21–24; 12:8–10; 13:26–30, 34–35; 14:16–24). As such, it is possible to identify these isolated sayings and clusters as interpolations that were added by the same hand that compiled the ‘judgment’ layer. The identification of these interpolations reveals that the three features of each separate stratum are not only the result of Kloppenborg’s redaction-critical analysis, but also criteria used by him to
separate the two strata, and determine the placement of specific literary units within a particular stratum. In other words, by illustrating that a literary unit harbours the features of a particular stratum, one is able to argue that the unit in question belongs to the stratum in question. These features-turned-criteria are helpful not only in identifying interpolations, but also in assigning to one of the two strata those sayings that do not lend themselves naturally to redaction-critical analysis, like Q 15:4–7; Q 16:13 and Q 17:1–6 (Kloppenborg 1987a:100). Moreover, it is on account of the common features identified during the redaction-critical analysis that the separation of the two strata is possible in the first place, which means that it is entirely legitimate to refer to these features as ‘criteria’ for distinguishing between the two layers.

After separating the two layers on account of redactional concerns and common features, Kloppenborg (1987a:244–245) argues convincingly that the ‘wisdom speeches’ initially existed on their own, to which the ‘judgment’ layer was subsequently added as part of a redactional process. He therefore dubs the ‘wisdom speeches’ the ‘formative stratum’ or ‘Q¹’, and the ‘judgment’ layer the ‘main redaction’ or ‘Q²’. Yet, Kloppenborg is cautious not to draw tradition-historical conclusions from his redactional model (cf. Crossan 2001a:119; Dunn 2013:81; Tuckett 1996:68; 2001:383, 388; Vaage 1995:75; see Allison 2010:120–125; Freyne 2000:227–228). In fact, Kloppenborg (1987a:99, 244–245; 2000:150–151) warns against equating the redactional development of Q directly with the tradition history of Jesus material, or with the historical prominence of the traditions that make up these strata.52 His main reason for identifying Q² as redaction is its position within the Sayings Gospel (Kloppenborg 2000:143). Firstly, the main redaction appears at the beginning and end of Q. Secondly, Q² seems to function as the organising principle in four, perhaps five, blocks of material. Thirdly, as we saw, interpolations harbouring the same features as the main redaction interrupt the flow of Q¹ speeches. Mack (1993:108) adds a fourth argument by pointing out that Q² betrays knowledge of Q¹, whereas Q¹ betrays absolutely no knowledge of Q². These observations point to a compositional direction from Q¹ to Q². The characteristic motifs of Q² may therefore be taken as redactional in nature. These motifs include judgment, polemic against ‘this generation’ (ἡ γενεὰ αὕτη), a Deuteronomistic concept of history, and – a motif that was only identified later (see Kloppenborg 2000:118–121, 143) – allusions to the story of Lot. The remaining material seems to be untouched or minimally influenced by such themes. Instead, these traditions display concerns that are internally similar, having to do mainly with legitimising ‘a somewhat adventuresome social practice – including debt forgiveness, the eschewing of vengeance, and the embracing of an exposed marginal lifestyle’ (Kloppenborg 2000:144). Mack (1993) goes

52. According to Tuckett (2001:388 fn. 70), Kloppenborg is guilty of transgressing beyond his own boundaries between redaction history and tradition history. As proof, Tuckett points to Kloppenborg’s position that Q 22:28, 30 has so much in common with Q’s redactional programme that the onus of proof shifts to those wanting to prove its authenticity (cf. Verheyden 2001:717). This might, however, be due to Kloppenborg’s distinction between Q’s ‘redactional elements’ and Q’s ‘redactional layer’ (see further below in this section), with Q 22:28, 30 being an example of both. If so, Tuckett’s critique does not apply.
Chapter 2

beyond Kloppenborg when he applies these findings to the Q people, and postulates a sequential tradition history of the Q group (cf. Kloppenborg 2001:159).

After distinguishing between the two main strata in Q, Kloppenborg (1987a:246–262) identifies another redactional stratum, consisting only of the temptation narrative in Q 4:1–13 and two interpolations at Q 11:42c and Q 16:17. This stratum is separated from the two main strata for nine reasons (see Kloppenborg 1987a:247–248; 2000:152–153). Firstly, the narrative genre of the temptation story contrasts with the genres of the other two layers. Secondly, the form of the temptation story, having a three-part debate and mythic motif, is unparalleled in Q. Thirdly, the presence of explicit biblical quotations introduced by a citation formula (γέγραπται) is unique to the temptation story, with the only parallel occurring at Q 7:27. Fourthly, the title ‘Son of God’ appears nowhere else in Q (cf. Mack 1993:173). Fifthly, the theme of ‘miracle’ is applied differently in the rest of Q. Sixthly, the ‘devil’ is here called ὁ διάβολος, and not βεελζεβούλ as in the rest of Q. Seventhly, Jesus is here challenged directly by the devil, and not by ‘this generation’, as in the rest of Q. Eighthly, the temptation narrative’s positive view of Jerusalem and the Temple differs from Q’s otherwise negative valuations of Jerusalem (cf. Mack 1993:173). Lastly, the assumption that the Torah is an appropriate basis for rhetorical appeal is, according to Kloppenborg, unmatched in the rest of Q, apart from Q 11:42c and Q 16:17. Mainly because of the centrality of the Torah and nomistic piety in the latter two texts, they are both seen as interpolations that, together with the temptation story, constitute a separate redactional layer (cf. Cromhout 2007:264; Mack 1993:173).54 Kloppenborg (1987a:325–327) holds that this third layer was added to the rest of Q at a third stage of redactional activity, which is why he calls it the ‘final recension’ or ‘Q3’.

At this juncture, it is perhaps helpful to clear up a potential misunderstanding. Kloppenborg might be misconstrued as contradicting himself when discussing the relation between Q and the historical Jesus. Kloppenborg sometimes appeals to redactional development when considering the authenticity of individual Q texts. For example, while discussing traditions of an imminent eschatology in Q, Kloppenborg (2001:165–169) repeatedly states that the traditions in question are of no value to our understanding of the historical Jesus, seeing as they belong to Q’s redaction.55 In

53.But these one had to do without giving up those’ (ταῦτα δὲ ἔδει ποιῆσαι κἀκεῖνα μὴ ἀφιέναι).


55.Consider the following quotations: ‘The impression of imminence is a function of Q redaction, not the antecedent tradition from which Q was constructed’ (p. 167); ‘But not only is the Sophia oracle an editorial insertion into a string of older woes; Q 11,51b – the part of the oracle that most clearly expresses temporal imminence – is also usually considered to be Q redaction’ (pp. 167–168); ‘A few other Q sayings of Jesus, like the Baptist oracle, Q 10,12, and Q 11,51b, also imply an imminent end; but none is likely to be authentic tradition’ (p. 168); ‘Q indeed implies an imminent judgment and an imminent intervention by God. But these impressions are conveyed mainly by redactional elements ... and elements [that] seem to have played a part in the framing of the collections a whole. ... It would be most unwise to base a conclusion that Jesus embraced an imminent catastrophic judgment on elements in Q that are either non-dominical or redactional’ (p. 169; emphasis original).
a different context, Kloppenborg (2001:155) claims more generally that only ‘those portions which are not obviously the product of redaction’ should be considered when attempting to uncover the historical Jesus. On the surface, this might seem to contradict his case against equating the redactional development of Q directly with tradition history (see above in this section). This is not the case, however. One needs to distinguish between Q’s ‘main redaction’, which is a literary layer made up of both authentic and inauthentic traditions, on the one hand, and ‘redactional elements’ in Q, which are those elements that are deemed by scholars to have been created ex nihilo by the main redactor, and are therefore inauthentic, on the other hand. Kloppenborg is referring to the latter ‘redactional elements’ when claiming that reconstructions of the historical Jesus should only consider ‘those portions which are not obviously the product of redaction’ (p. 155). In the same discussion on imminent eschatology referred to just above, Kloppenborg (2001:168–169) treats Q 13:28–29, which belongs to his main redaction, as a ‘traditional saying’ that has a legitimate claim to authenticity. The latter, amongst other discussions that could have been added, prove that Kloppenborg himself distinguishes clearly between redaction history and tradition history when using Q to unearth the historical Jesus. The other sayings discussed in the context of imminent eschatology are not considered helpful in recovering the historical Jesus, not because they belong to the main redaction, but because they are generally considered to be redactional creations ex nihilo. These ‘redactional elements’ are also referred to as being a function or part of ‘Q’s framing’. By this phrase, Kloppenborg conveys the impression that the main redactor created the text in question ex nihilo in order to explicate or modify the literary unit to which it was affixed, and/or to improve the general continuity and flow of the document as a whole.

Let us look at an example of the misunderstanding described above. Tuckett’s (2001:385) argument that Q 17:23–24 is ‘pre-redactional’ forms part of his larger case that some of the coming Son of Man sayings in Q do not belong to Kloppenborg’s Q². In conclusion to the narrower argument, he states:

It seems easier to explain the data if vv. 23–24 comprise a traditional element, taken up by the Q-editor/redactor and pressed into service of a slightly different aim [if compared to vv. 26–30]. Thus vv. 23–24 seem to be pre-redactional, rather than characteristic of the final redaction of Q [referring to Kloppenborg’s Q²]. (Tuckett 2001:385)

The comment that Q 17:23–24 is pre-redactional is indeed correct, but the follow-up comment that this text does therefore not belong in the main redaction exposes the misunderstanding. In Kloppenborg’s analysis, both options are simultaneously possible; because of the distinction between Q’s ‘redactional stratum’ and Q’s ‘redactional elements’, a saying can predate Q and at the same time be part of the main redaction. In other words, it is the phrase ‘rather than’ in the preceding quotation that reveals the miscomprehension. Kloppenborg (1987a:154–166) treats all the sayings that make up Q 17 as ‘originally independent sayings’ (p. 159), and acknowledges the possibility that they might be ‘dominical’ (p. 160). In other
words, Kloppenborg recognises (with Tuckett) that these sayings are in all likelihood ‘pre-redactional’ in the sense that they existed independently before being added to Q. The same is true of many sayings in the main redaction. This explains why not everything in the main redaction is automatically inauthentic. Q 17:23–24 is attributed to the main redaction because the ‘compositional principles governing the juxtaposition’ (p. 166) of this text with the rest of Q 17 reveal the hand of Q’s main redactor. If the ‘characteristic forms’, ‘characteristic themes’ and ‘implied audience’ of Q 17:23–24 are considered, one would find that this text has most in common with the rest of Q². By attributing Q 17:23–24 to Q’s ‘redactional layer’, Kloppenborg is not suggesting that it is a ‘redactional element’ within Q, as Tuckett presumes.

The same comments apply to Tuckett’s (2001:385) treatment of Q 12:8–10 (cf. De Jonge 1997:116–117). Verse 10 could indeed have been added secondarily to verses 8–9 without it indicating that the latter saying belongs to the formative stratum. Like Tuckett, Kloppenborg (1987a:212, 216) also identifies a seam between the two logia, but concludes that the main redactor was responsible for combining them, and then adding them to their current context in Q (cf. Gregg 2006:176, 178). Identifying Q 12:10 as a clarifying redactional addition to Q 12:8–9 is not necessarily relevant to the stratigraphy of Q. Before relevance can be assessed, one needs to determine when the traditions were joined. In other words, Tuckett’s proposal⁵⁶ that Q 12:10 is a ‘redactional element’ in Q does not automatically lead to the conclusion that it belongs to Q’s ‘redactional layer’, and that Q 12:8–9 therefore belongs to the formative stratum. To some extent, Tuckett (2001:385 fn. 61) betrays awareness of his misunderstanding when he states that his conclusion about Q 12:8–10 ‘does of course depend on how one defines “redactional”’.

After identifying the three redactional strata that make up the Sayings Gospel Q, Kloppenborg (1987a:263–328) embarks on determining the genre of each Q stratum. He compares the identified strata with literary material from antiquity, arriving at the conclusion that Q¹ displays most similarities to the ancient sapiential genre of ‘instruction’, while Q² is most similar to ancient chreia collections, and Q³ is most comparable to the narrative-biographical introductions of ancient sayings collections. Customarily, the label ‘instruction’ is applied to both individual instructions and documents that compile individual instructions. In this book, I will distinguish between the two by referring to the former as ‘instructions’ and the latter as ‘instruction collections’. Kloppenborg’s identification of Q¹ as an ‘instruction collection’ is encouraged by the naming of the sage, the abundance of imperatives (especially when considering where these appear within the structure of each wisdom speech), the careful concern with which the sayings are organised and structured, and the projected Sitz im Leben of the Q people as a community of believers. The reasons behind the identifications of Q² as a chreia collection and Q³ as a narrative introduction are obvious.

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⁵⁶I disagree with this proposal. Q 12:10 rather seems like a traditional saying, which is how Kloppenborg also treats it.
Ultimately, Kloppenborg manages to separate three layers in Q, based on considerations of its overall structure, implied audience, characteristic literary forms, characteristic motifs and rhetorical strategies, as well as the structural concerns of individual pericopes (cf. McLean 1995:333–334). The same considerations enable him to determine the genre of each stratum. Kloppenborg is also able to determine the redaction history of Q. Mack (1993:131–132) fully assimilates Kloppenborg’s proposal, and sees a definite shift from the *aphoristic* style of Q₁, featuring imperatives, exhortations and indirect address, to the more developed style (literarily) of Q₂, featuring dialogues, narratives, controversy stories, warnings, descriptive parables, apocalyptic pronouncements, warnings and historic examples. Kloppenborg’s analysis begins with the final form of Q, and works its way ‘downwards’ or ‘backwards’ in order to determine its compositional layers (Kloppenborg 2000:143; McLean 1995:333–334). Observations of the continuity of the final Q text (in terms of theme, audience and form), as well as observations of its discontinuity (in terms of redactional seams or disruptions of literary ‘flow’), form the basis of Kloppenborg’s analysis. The strengths of such an analysis are that it frees the interpreter from unqualified assumptions about Q’s origins and genre, and that it takes seriously the literary context of each individual saying within the structure and rhetoric of Q (McLean 1995:334, 340).

### Assumptions

In what follows, I will discuss the validity of Kloppenborg’s stratigraphy of Q by addressing each of the arguments against it, starting with the *assumptions* he is said to have held when stratifying Q. To begin with, Kloppenborg has been accused of assuming that the individual sayings and small sayings-clusters in Q were originally independent, only to be combined later (see e.g. Horsley 1999a:62–63, 65). Kloppenborg does indeed hold such a view, not least of all because of the influence on him of previous Q scholarship, and their preoccupation with form criticism. Kloppenborg (1987a:98) states in no uncertain terms that he presupposes, adopts and builds upon the results of form-critical analyses that predate him, including the works of Lührmann, Zeller and Jacobson. However, Kloppenborg does not simply and uncritically *assume* such a compositional history for Q. Rather, he is compelled by internal evidence to accept this perception of Q’s formation. Not only are many of the sayings in Q juxtaposed arbitrarily, but they are also joined through a number of quite varied methods: By using catchwords, by thematically joining sayings with common structures or formal elements, by syntactical devices, by rhetorical composition and by including disparate sayings within the same communicative event (see Kloppenborg 2000:124–128). No wonder a previous generation of scholarship believed that these sayings were haphazardly combined, harbouring no apparent order whatsoever. Furthermore, Kloppenborg’s analysis of Q does not *start* with form criticism, and neither does it end there. Instead, he works from the final form ‘downwards’ to single clusters, and only then to individual sayings. Form criticism is not the only weapon in his arsenal.
Kloppenborg applies redactional, compositional and rhetorical analyses to Q. To the extent that he does this, he goes beyond previous form-critical analyses of Q. In the end, Kloppenborg’s ‘assumption’ is warranted by the evidence, and his method is not controlled, dictated, restrained or inhibited by this assumption. In any case, the original independence of certain Q logia and sayings-clusters is indicated by the nature of their appropriation by the Gospels of Mark and Thomas, where they tend to appear either autonomously or in different literary contexts.

According to Horsley (1999a:63), Kloppenborg takes for granted that ‘there must have been different strata in Q.’ Yet, without such types of methodological assumptions, no study or analysis would be possible at all. A redaction-critical study of Mark also presupposes that redaction took place. With Kloppenborg’s analysis, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. Regardless of what he assumes, proving his assumption(s) to be accurate is another story altogether. What makes Kloppenborg’s stratigraphy so compelling is not that he puts forward a comfortable hypothesis, but that he corroborates his proposals with in-depth analysis of the text. If his assumption that Q must have had different layers could not be corroborated by the Q text itself, then it would simply have been an assumption. Yet, Kloppenborg argues the validity of his proposal through meticulous literary examination of the text; something that critics of stratigraphical approaches to Q typically fail to do (Järvinen 2001:516 fn. 6; see McLean 1995:333–334; Piper 1995b:3–4; cf. Kloppenborg 2001:164; Tuckett 1996:73, 345).

One could perhaps point to Kirk’s (1998) synchronic analysis of Q as an exception to the latter (Järvinen 2001:516 fn. 6; see also Fleddermann 2005). Unfortunately, Kirk does not confront the individual exegetical arguments that make up Kloppenborg’s diachronic exegesis, but rather attempts to illustrate that the various scholarly attempts at a diachronic analysis of Q contradict one another, and that a synchronic analysis of Q is entirely able to satisfactorily explain Q’s formal, structural and thematic content, without the need for diachronic explanations (cf. Neirynck 1982:74–75). Against Kirk, I would argue that synchronic analyses of Q also contradict one another, particularly as they relate to the macro structure and overall composition of the document. Compare, for example, Kirk’s (1998) synchronic analysis with that of Fleddermann (2005). Both synchronic and diachronic analyses of a text are subject to a degree of subjectivity, but the greater the appeal to literary-critical controls, the greater the degree of objectivity and persuasiveness. Both Kirk and Kloppenborg should be commended for their extensive and comprehensive appeal to literary-critical controls. For the most part,

57.A similar critique of specifically Kloppenborg’s diachronic analysis appears in Wright (1992:41), who points out that a similar diachronic analysis of Q by Schulz (1972) came to conclusions that differ from those of Kloppenborg. Firstly, one has to acknowledge that the analysis by Schulz is outmoded, mainly because it still assumes the archaic distinction between pure Judaism and Hellenistic Judaism; even if the study still has a lot of technical and exegetical value. Secondly, despite some differences, Kloppenborg’s analysis has a lot in common with that of Schulz, especially on the technical and exegetical level. In fact, Robinson (1995:261 fn. 5) finds it ‘remarkable’ how much overlap there is between Kloppenborg and Schulz if their respective layers of Q are compared, and views this as just another reason why ‘Kloppenborg’s analysis has much to commend it.’
critics of Kloppenborg’s stratigraphy fail to consider the nuts and bolts of his exegetical analysis (cf. Kloppenborg 2001:164).

A host of scholars have accused Kloppenborg of assuming that sapiential and apocalyptic materials are incompatible, and of using this presupposition to separate Q¹ from Q² (e.g. Allison 1997:4; Casey 2002a:29–30; Horsley 1999i:25–26, 77; Tuckett 1996:327–328). The objection is, in other words, that Kloppenborg treats Q as if apocalyptic and sapiential traditions are incompatible. Hence, he feels the need to separate the two traditions by manufacturing two layers. Horsley (1999i:19) claims that Kloppenborg stratified Q in order to separate prophetic from non-prophetic material (cf. Järvinen 2001:516). Kloppenborg (2000:145–146 fn. 61, 150–151 fn. 71) denies that he regards wisdom to be incompatible with apocalyptic or prophetic materials, and confirms that there are ancient writings with the propensity to inextricably combine these types of materials (cf. Arnal 2001:5). Kloppenborg does occasionally use the presence of eschatological and apocalyptic themes in individual Q¹ pericopes as evidence for redaction. Yet, he only does this after initially determining and identifying the two primary strata within Q. In any case, if Kloppenborg were mainly interested in separating the sapiential and apocalyptic materials in Q, he would probably have done a better job of it. As it stands, the main redaction contains a number of sapiential logia; something Kloppenborg (1987a:169, 239) himself points out (see Howes 2015b:96–114, esp. 97–98). Kirk (1998:41) is correct in asserting that such criticism will not be entirely successful unless these scholars start engaging in the literary-analytical aspect of Kloppenborg’s hypothesis, which they do not (cf. Järvinen 2001:516 fn. 6; Kloppenborg 2001:164). Ultimately, Kloppenborg’s stratigraphy is based on literary considerations, not the presence or absence of wisdom, eschatology, apocalypticism or prophecy in respective traditions. In a strong and seemingly frustrated response to such unjustified critique, Kloppenborg (2000:151) states: ‘To imagine that stratigraphical analysis is driven by a priori judgments about “wisdom” and “apocalyptic” is simply nonsense.’

Methodology

We now turn to arguments against Kloppenborg’s method. Some scholars question the plausibility and feasibility of stratification in the first place. In typical fashion, Meier (1994:179) argues that by attempting to determine the location, redaction and theology of Q, ‘exegetes are trying to know the unknowable.’ (But is this not the goal of scientific enquiry, to know the unknowable?) These objections usually start with the observation that Q is the result of a hypothesis (e.g. Perkins 2007:89). As such, attempts to discern Q’s documentary status, written language, sequential order, theology, audience and compositional history are all built on the Two Source Hypothesis (see Horsley 1999a:61–62; Tuckett 1996:1–2). It is thus a case of building one hypothesis

58. Regarding the general compatibility of sapiential and apocalyptic material in ancient Judaism, see my discussion on ‘The genre of Q.’
on top of another (cf. Stanton 2002:230). However, these scholars are simply wrong about at least three of these endeavours. The very same arguments underlying the Two Source Hypothesis apply equally to Q’s documentary status, language of composition and sequential order (Kloppenborg 2000:111). In other words, arguments that support conclusions about Q’s documentary status, compositional language and sequential order are not based on the Two Source Hypothesis as such, but are determined by direct appeal to the patterns of agreement and disagreement between Matthew and Luke in the double tradition.

What concerns us, however, is Kloppenborg’s stratification of Q, which is indeed based on an acceptance of the hypothesis that Q was the written document used as a source by both Matthew and Luke. First off, if the hypothesis of Q is widely accepted, then attempting to discern its compositional history is warranted (see Arnal 2001:2–3). Should we think it legitimate and acceptable to posit the Q document as a solution to source-critical issues, but illegitimate and unacceptable to investigate the very same document for its compositional and/or socio-historical value? The Two Source Hypothesis is accepted by an overwhelming majority of New Testament scholars, and has withstood numerous challenges over the years, mainly because it is corroborated time and again by the data (cf. Kloppenborg 2001:151; Robinson 2011:447). In any case, building hypotheses on top of one another is standard practice in other fields of New Testament studies, not to mention other disciplines and sciences. How many theories have not been built on the hypothesis that the Third Evangelist wrote the Acts of the Apostles, or the theory that Gnostic believers made up a significant portion of the Johannine church? In my view, it is not only legitimate to survey the evidence in search of Q’s compositional history, but also necessary and even compulsory to do so; that is, if New Testament scholarship is indeed interested in gaining and generating knowledge, which is supposed to be the chief goal of any academic undertaking.

Critics of stratification, whether it be the theory posited by Kloppenborg or not, tend not to engage these theories at all, but rather to dismiss them from the outset (Arnal 2001:4; Kloppenborg 2001:164). A closer look often reveals the veiled reasons behind such condemnations. More often than not, these reasons have nothing to do with research methodology or scientific approach. Instead, they seem to be motivated by an unwillingness and/or inability to abandon former conclusions (Arnal 2001:4, 7; cf. Kloppenborg 2001:161). The primary unease with Kloppenborg’s stratification of Q is that it at times underlies reconstructions that call former conclusions about the historical Jesus and the genesis of Christianity into question; not to even mention the historical reliability of the Bible and the canonical portraits of Jesus.59

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59.Similar reasons are probably at the heart of the occasional scholarly denial of the Two Source Hypothesis and the existence of Q (see Robinson 1993:14–15; 2001a:33). In the context of our larger discussion, it can also not be denied that the apocalyptic and eschatological portraits of the historical Jesus by Third Questers are often comfortably congenial to Christian interests, particularly in relation to Christology (cf. Kloppenborg 2011b:280–283).
Casey (2002a; 2010:78–86), amongst many others, prefers a ‘chaotic Q’, by which he means that Q was not a single Greek document when it was used by Matthew and Luke, but rather represented a number of loose traditions that circulated on their own (cf. Dunn 2013:80–108, esp. 94). Kloppenborg’s stratification of Q is only possible or legitimate if it is accepted that Q was a single document at the stage when Matthew and Luke appropriated it. In other words, this objection by Casey is similar to (but not the same as) the previous objection, since it questions one of the theories on which Kloppenborg’s stratification is built. Casey (2002a; 2010:81–83) agrees that there are passages with strong verbal agreement, and that these passages must have reached Matthew and Luke in Greek, but he argues that the passages with little verbal agreement represent separate translations from one or more distinct Aramaic sources. If this could be shown conclusively, then a more chaotic understanding of Q would surely be preferable. Indeed, in his 2002 monograph, Casey devotes most of his space to reconstructing Aramaic sources for those sections in the double tradition that have little verbal overlap. His knowledge of the Aramaic language is impressive, and his reconstructions elucidate much of the interpretation of these individual passages in their original social contexts.

However, Casey (2002a:189; 2010:82) concludes his painstaking efforts by putting forward only one passage that might have reached both Matthew and Luke in Aramaic, namely the woes against the Pharisees and scribes (Q 11:39, 41–44, 46–48, 52). He admits that all the other passages considered by him reached Matthew and Luke in Greek, but posits that they all originally had Aramaic substrata. One would think that an argument mostly based on demonstrating that parts of Q were Aramaic when they reached Matthew and Luke would have had more evidence to substantiate this claim. One would also expect such an argument to put forward the best pieces of evidence. If, then, the best and only piece of evidence for the claim that some of Q reached Matthew and Luke in Aramaic is the single passage in Q 11:39, 41–44, 46–48, 52, the suggestion of a chaotic understanding of Q rests on a frail foundation indeed. Moreover, the verbal disagreements between the two Gospel versions of this pericope can plausibly be explained as the editorial activities of the two evangelists. Thus, Casey’s main argument against Kloppenborg, and in favour of a chaotic Q, rests on a singular passage that can also be explicated in other ways. The cumulative weight of the arguments for a single Greek Q by far outweighs Casey’s most important argument for a chaotic Q. In any case, it is not sure that both evangelists could speak Aramaic, let alone translate an Aramaic source into Greek. What we do know with absolute certainty is that much of Q reached the two evangelists in Greek. This cannot be denied. For this reason, it is highly likely that those passages with little verbal agreement also existed in Greek when Matthew and Luke got hold of them. Since both Gospel authors were undoubtedly fluent in Greek, and since it is undeniable that at least some of Q was transmitted in Greek, the burden of proof falls on opposite arguments, including the argument that the two evangelists received some Q material in Aramaic.
Casey (2002a:25; 2010:83–84) also attacks the argument of common order, claiming
both that Kloppenborg’s compilation of such material is highly selective, and that he
constantly has to supply reasons why some individual pericopes are not in common
order. First off, Kloppenborg is indeed selective in compiling individual pericopes that
betray a common sequence internally, but his main argument is not concerned with
the internal sequence of individual pericopes. Instead, his main argument has to do
with the rather substantial degree of correspondence between Matthew and Luke in
the sequencing of the double tradition as a whole. Only after indicating the latter does
Kloppenborg move on to the internal sequencing of selected individual pericopes as
supporting evidence. It is only to be expected, given the editorial techniques employed by
both evangelists, that some pericopes would not be in common order, both internally
and with regard to their placement in the double tradition as a whole. These individual
cases require explanation; something attempted by Kloppenborg. These explanations
are, for the most part, rather convincing.

Unable to convincingly refute the relative common order of the double tradition as a whole, Casey (2010:84–85) puts forward an alternative explanation for this occurrence. He argues that the relative agreement between Matthew and Luke in the sequencing of the double tradition is explicable even if they did not both have access to a similar Greek document:

If they both [Matthew and Luke] inherited the ‘Q’ material in pieces, written on wax tablets or single
sheets of papyrus, it would be entirely natural that they should insert some pieces in the appropriate
places of Mark’s narrative. Moreover, some places are so obviously appropriate that they would
occur naturally to two authors who were independent of each other. (Casey 2010:84)

He cites the Baptist’s judgment sayings in Q 3:7–9 as an example. That both evangelists
would attach these sayings to the story of Jesus’ baptism is obvious, which explains
why both evangelists would feature this complex of sayings early on in their respective
Gospels. This is a very convenient example, however, and one of the few cases where
Casey’s argument holds true. For the most part, the literary placement of individual
sayings and pericopes in the double tradition is not ‘obviously appropriate’. In fact,
many of the individual sayings and pericopes in the double tradition are not placed in
the same Marcan positions by Matthew and Luke respectively, but in spite thereof still
follow the same relative sequence. The best way to explain this happenstance is to put
forward a single source for both evangelists.

Implied audience

According to some, Kloppenborg’s distinction between Q¹ and Q² on the grounds of implied audience is perhaps not as thoroughgoing as he claims. Horsley (1991:197;
1995b:40; 1999a:64) identifies only one cluster in Q² (Q 11:14–26, 29–32, 39–52) directed
at the out-group, with the remainder of Q² directed at the Q people (cf. Tuckett 1996:72).
Although Horsley makes use of the terms ‘projected audience’ and ‘implied audience’, he
seems to be missing the point that much of the Q² material is directed at the opponents of Q indirectly, as part of Q’s polemic against them. Naturally, the actual audience of Q² are the Q people. Nonetheless, the projected audience constitutes outsiders opposed to the Q people (Kloppenborg 1987a:167). The mentioned audience or recipients of Jesus’ words do not necessarily represent the projected audience. The latter sometimes needs to be inferred, not extrapolated. One should not conclude from the terms ‘implied audience’ and ‘projected audience’ that Q² was developed so that these outsiders could actually hear or read these texts. Instead, Q² was developed so that the Q people could hear or read it with the out-group in the back of their minds. In other words, the main redaction does not address the out-group in the sense that they are imagined actually participating in the communication process, but rather addresses the out-group in their absence so that the in-group would hear it and know what to think about these outsiders and themselves. By addressing outsiders, the main redaction gives a voice to the conflict between the Q people and their opponents, which ‘serves a positive and constructive purpose as a means to define more clearly group boundaries, to enhance internal cohesion and to reinforce group identity’ (Kloppenborg 1987a:167–168).

Horsley lists the following Q² clusters that are, according to him, directed at the in-group: Q 7:18–23, 24–28; Q 12:39–46, 51–53, 57–59 and Q 17:23–35. Unfortunately, Horsley fails to analyse these texts in support of his claim. At face value, Q 7:18–23 speaks to John’s disciples. It is not at all clear that the group constituting John’s disciples and the group constituting Jesus’ disciples overlap completely, if at all, so that it would be wrong to simply assume that John’s disciples form part of Q’s in-group. The text further lists the miracles of Jesus and his benefit to the poor in order to legitimise his public career and authority. This need to legitimise the career and authority of Jesus arises in the context of the Q people’s polemic against outsiders. In other words, Q 7:18–23 functions to legitimate Jesus in the face of claims from outsiders directed against him. The latter is evidenced by verse 23, where those not ‘offended’ (σκανδαλίζω) by Jesus are seen as being blessed. The projected audience, therefore, comprises those who are indeed offended by Jesus.

The named audience in Q 7:24–28 is the ‘crowds’ (ἄχλους). Although these crowds came to listen to Jesus, it is once again not clear that they necessarily represent the Q people. Just like Jesus was legitimitated in the previous text, John is legitimised in the current text. If John were understood by the Q people as being the messenger who prepared the path for Jesus (verse 27), then John’s legitimacy is inseparably connected with that of Jesus. Whether or not the historical John actually foretold Jesus’ appearance and ministry is not important currently. What is important is that the Q people believed this to have been John’s purpose. If John’s prophecy about Jesus was illegitimate for any reason, doubt would fall on the authenticity of Jesus himself. Q 7:24–28 is therefore an attempt to legitimate John in order to indirectly legitimate Jesus. As such, this text forms part of Q’s polemic against outsiders, who must have had their suspicions about the legitimacy of both John and Jesus.
Let us turn to Q 12:39–46. It is not impossible that portions of this text originally stood in the formative stratum, before being appropriated by the main redaction (see Howes 2014c; 2015a; see Chapter 3, ‘The robber and the Son of Man’). The most likely candidates are verses 39, 42–44. As it stands, however, the apocalyptic and prophetic nature of Q 12:39–46 cannot be denied. The unifying theme of this passage is preparedness in expectation of the Son of Man’s apocalyptic arrival. It is important to note that the ‘coming of the Son of Man’ does not necessarily refer to the Parousia of Jesus (see Horsley 1999a:70–71). The actual audience is not mentioned, but one can presume that it constituted either the crowds or the disciples of Jesus. It is only natural to equate outsiders with those imagined not to be ready for the Son of Man. Their fate is declared with horrific imagery in verse 46, and compared to the fortuitous fate of the Q people in verse 44.

Q 12:49, 51, 53 is obviously directed at the Q people themselves, but speaks to the consequences of their choice in becoming members of the in-group. As such, it puts the opposition they experience into perspective. The text clearly draws a line between insiders and outsiders; a line of distinction that runs through patriarchal families. Apart from its obvious apocalyptic overtones, the image of ‘fire’ bespeaks the situation of conflict and opposition that characterises the relationship between the Q people and greater Israel. The image of ‘a sword’, which also bears apocalyptic overtones, is particularly apt as a symbol of division and separation. This text clearly addresses the theme of boundary demarcation, which is of great concern to the main redaction. The comment in verse 51 that Jesus intended from the outset to bring about division and conflict instead of peace was in all likelihood a polemic response to outsider accusations that Jesus’ ministry ultimately only succeeded in creating tension and division within Israel (cf. Jacobson 2000:193). Q 12:49, 51, 53 certainly has the out-group in mind as those on the other side of the divide.

Horsley is probably correct about Q 12:58–59, which speaks directly to the Q people on the importance of being reconciled to one’s ‘opponent’ (ἀντίδικος) before going to trial. If this ‘opponent’ is a reference to the out-group, the saying would contradict the preceding pericope by advocating reconciliation with outsiders. Likewise, if the fate of the person in verse 59 is symbolic of the fate of outsiders, it is not clear why Q’s Jesus would address this hypothetical person directly in the preceding verse, attempting to direct behaviour. In the remainder of Q, such instructions are reserved for the in-group. More than anything, Kloppenborg’s (1987a:152–153) allocation of this text to the main redaction is motivated by the prophetic nature of verse 59 specifically. He does not appeal to the criterion of ‘implied audience’ at all. If Piper (1989:106–107) is correct in arguing that the Matthean placement of this logion between Q 16:17 and Q 16:18 should be preferred, a purely sapiential reading thereof would be much more likely. In this case, the saying would belong in the formative stratum rather than the main redaction (see Howes 2015b:107–110).
Q 17:23–35 is obviously apocalyptic in nature. Outsiders are clearly meant by the third person plural suffix of the verb ‘say’ (εἴπωσιν) in verse 23. The same is true of the third person plural suffixes of the verbs ‘nibble’ (τρώγοντες), ‘drink’ (πίνοντες), ‘marry’ (γαμοῦντες) and ‘give away [in marriage]’ (γαμίζοντες) in verse 27, as well as the implied referent of the noun ‘all of them’ (ἅπαντας) in the same verse. Q 17:34–35 clearly distinguishes between those who will be taken, meaning insiders, and those who will be left behind, meaning outsiders. Thus, although Q 17:23–35 (at face value) warns the in-group about the coming Son of Man, it serves a similar function as Q 12:39–46 above. The outsiders’ fate is polemically described as being fatal (cf. verses 24, 27, 34–35, 37). The passage is thus indirectly aimed at outsiders, describing their imminent demise in the face of apocalyptic judgment. The purpose of such condemnation is to reassure the in-group that they are on the right side of the divide.

Seven out of the eight texts identified by Horsley (1991:197; 1995b:40; 1999a:64) as addressing only the in-group, including Q 7:18–23; Q 7:24–28; Q 12:39–46; Q 12:49, 51, 53; Q 17:23–24; Q 17:26–27, 30 and Q 17:34–35, do indeed address the out-group indirectly in the polemical sense proposed by Kloppenborg (1987a:167–168). That leaves Q 12:58–59, which does indeed seem to be directed only at the in-group. One text is hardly conclusive evidence against the validity of the criterion of ‘implied audience’. In any case, if we are correct in attributing Q 12:58–59 to the formative stratum, its nature as an instruction that addresses only the in-group becomes intelligible.

### Characteristic forms

Some scholars maintain that Kloppenborg’s distinction between Q¹ and Q² on the grounds of characteristic forms is perhaps not as thoroughgoing as he claims. Regarding Kloppenborg’s second common feature (i.e. that of form), Horsley (1999a:65) counts only one (Q 11:29, 31–32) of the chreiai listed where ‘this generation’ is (expressly) criticised for not responding to the kingdom message. Horsley here confuses content with form. Kloppenborg has literary reasons for identifying Q² with comparative chreiai. This objection should rather be made against the motifs Kloppenborg identifies within the main redaction. At any rate, whether directly or indirectly, Q² polemically and apologetically targets outsiders. It is not certain that these outsiders and outsider groups should all be included under the term ‘this generation’ (Howes 2014b:7), but that the main redaction programatically targets and condemns outsiders, some of whom are identified by the derogatory term ‘this generation’, should not be doubted. Thus, the term ‘this generation’ names at least some of the outsiders identified in the foregoing discussion as the projected audience.

Horsley (1999a:65; cf. Horsley 1991:197) only identifies one saying (Q 17:23–24) that could form-critically be classified as ‘apocalyptic’. Even if this were true, many sayings in Q² should rightfully be called ‘apocalyptic’ on account of their content, regardless
of whether they are formally presented as apocalyptic small forms (e.g. Q 12:39–40, 42–46, 49, 51, 53, [54–56]; 17:34–35, 37). The principal aim of the main redaction is to voice its polemic against outsiders, including ‘this generation’. The authors of Q² do this by using all the tools at their disposal, at times using prophetic forms and themes, and at other times utilising apocalyptic forms and motifs. Regardless of whether we call these sayings apocalyptic or not, they are still concerned with polemic against outsiders. Horsley (1999a:67; cf. Horsley 1991:197) further asserts: ‘[i]n fact, much of the material in both strata would be described as prophetic according to traditional form-critical criteria of form and function.’ Unfortunately, he does not continue to substantiate this claim. Kirk (1998:152–403) has conclusively demonstrated that the prophetic forms in Q act as incentives for the framework genre’s wisdom imperatives (see below, ‘Q as wisdom’). These prophetic forms are even delivered in sapiential idiom (cf. Kirk 1998:270). Kloppenborg (1987a:168–169) has shown that chreiai predominate in Q², with much of the prophetic sayings being imbedded in and presented as chreiai. Kloppenborg (1987a:170) never denies the presence of prophetic sayings in Q². The existence of these prophetic forms makes all the more sense if the aphoristic and subversive nature of Q’s wisdom is fully comprehended (see Kirk 1998:306, 333–336).


A case could also be made for identifying wisdom forms in Q² that would perhaps be more at home in Q¹. Against this, one could point to the haphazard style of chreia collections, and the way in which they tended to absorb other sayings into their overall structures (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:323). Casey (2002a:31) objects by arguing that it is possible to reconstruct some of Kloppenborg’s identified chreiai, like Q 9:57–58, in their original Aramaic forms. Casey might be correct, not only in his Aramaic reconstruction of this and other Q passages, but also in claiming that these Q sayings ‘were originally
Jewish and transmitted in Aramaic, and ... were not originally examples of Greek chreiae.’ Nevertheless, the prehistory of Q is irrelevant for the conclusion that the second layer was made up of *chreiai by the time the document reached the two evangelists*. Once again, the tendency of *chreia* collections to absorb other sayings into their overall structures accommodate both Casey’s theory that some of them were originally not *chreiai* and Kloppenborg’s theory that Q² consisted mostly of *chreiai* when Q received its final redaction.

Tuckett (1996) seems to be in agreement with Kloppenborg when it comes to form, although he is reluctant to admit this:

[...] it would seem that any sapiential elements in the tradition have been overlaid by a powerful eschatological / prophetic element ... In one sense this might support Kloppenborg’s thesis of a prophetic Q² succeeding a sapiential Q¹. (p. 353)

Unfortunately, he downplays the wisdom element, seeing it as both undervalued by Q and subordinate to the prophetic element (see also Boring 1991:232–233). Nonetheless, Tuckett supports Kloppenborg’s compositional theory in as far as it estimates that pre-existing polemic and prophetic traditions were incorporated into a more wisdom-type document.

### Characteristic motifs

According to some, Kloppenborg’s distinction between Q¹ and Q² on the grounds of *characteristic motifs* is perhaps not as thoroughgoing as he claims. This objection must be distinguished from the objection discussed earlier that Kloppenborg assumes wisdom and apocalyptic material to be incompatible. The two objections are similar, but the former attacks his *assumption* of incompatibility, whereas the current objection tries to invalidate his *method*. The two objections contradict and nullify each other. If sapiential and apocalyptic traditions are generally compatible, then the presence of apocalyptic motifs in Q’s ‘sapiential’ layer, or sapiential motifs in Q’s ‘apocalyptic’ layer, do not undermine Kloppenborg’s stratigraphy. The opponents of Kloppenborg betray their own inability to acknowledge the compatibility of wisdom and apocalypticism by pointing out the presence of apocalyptic motifs in Q¹ or the presence of sapiential motifs in Q². Within the current objection, we must distinguish further between arguments pertaining to the content of Q¹ and arguments concerned with the content of Q². I will start with the former.

One of the points of critique against Kloppenborg’s hypothesis relates to the presence of judgment and eschatological motifs in the proposed sapiential layer (e.g. Horsley 1999a:67, 81; Sato 1995:140; see Hoffmann 1995:187–188; Tuckett 1996:160–163). This situation apparently undermines his whole hypothesis. Jacobson (1989:152) discovers some possibly prophetic sayings in Q¹ (e.g. Q 6:23; 9:57–62; 12:11–12). However, if these sayings are truly prophetic in the first place, they are subordinate to the sapiential framework genre of the formative layer.
We have already seen Allison’s argument that both strata allude to Isaiah 61. Allison (1997:7) concludes from the latter that the relevant texts should be assigned ‘to the same redactional stage.’ But why? Allusions to the same text, even if they contain Christological implications, simply indicate continuity between Q¹ and Q², and say nothing about redaction (cf. Arnal 2001:5). To use the possibility of allusions to the same Old Testament text as evidence for redaction is far-fetched. Allison (1997:4–5) is further concerned about the fact that Kloppenborg feels the need to view all Deuteronomistic themes in Q¹ as interpolations.60 Horsley (1991:198; 1999a:66) has a similar concern about Kloppenborg’s need to regard prophetic and outsider-directed passages in the sapiential stratum as interpolations (cf. Casey 2002a:29). These critics seem to overlook that these interpolations are identified by Kloppenborg (1987a:240, 242–244) on literary grounds, and only thereafter added to Q² because of their strong affinities with the forms, themes and projected audience(s) of the redactional layer. Allison (1997:7) also argues that a Deuteronomistic theology can be found in other ‘authentic’ Q¹ texts, especially the idea of ‘rejection’.61 These observations are curious in light of Allison’s (1997:27–30) discussion on Q 12:35–Q 17:37, where he states that ‘the section remains transparently practical wisdom with a strong eschatological component’ (p. 28; see also Allison 1997:42). Why would Allison see the need to undermine Kloppenborg’s thesis in light of the presence of certain themes in both layers if he himself admits that such thematic overlap is indeed possible?

Tuckett (1996:160–161) argues that a futurist eschatology appears not only in Q², but in Q¹ as well, listing as examples the beginning and end of the inaugural sermon (Q 6:20–23, 47–49), the mission discourse (Q 10:2–15), and the teaching on cares and prayer (Q 12:22–31). As before, this argument betrays Tuckett’s own inability to make peace with the fact that sapiential and eschatological material often appeared together in ancient literature. In any case, Kloppenborg did not separate the two strata on thematic grounds only, but also on literary and rhetorical grounds. If anything, Kloppenborg (cf. 1987a:100; 2000:151) affords priority to formal features during his analysis. At any rate, wisdom literature of the Hellenistic age tended to be more eschatological and future-oriented in its approach (cf. Kirk 1998:52). Furthermore, the aphoristic nature of Q¹ explains to some extent why it would potentially appropriate prophetic and/or apocalyptic materials. Finally, that any one of the texts isolated by Tuckett feature a futurist eschatology in the first place is debatable (see below, ‘Futurist eschatology in Q’; cf. Robinson 2011:472).

A similar but different objection is that some of the topics discussed in the formative stratum, such as mission (Q 10:2–11, 16), discipleship (Q 14:26–27; 17:33) and the Holy Spirit (Q 12:11–12), are anomalous if compared to the logia that make up the rest of Q¹ (Horsley 1991:198, 203; 1999a:66, 88–89; cf. Tuckett 1996:72).

Kloppenborg (1987a:240) also noticed the unusual content of these examples during his initial analysis, but argued that they should nonetheless be accepted as part of the formative stratum, mainly because they ‘cohere with the radical ethic and lifestyle articulated in the admonitions and beatitudes.’ Kloppenborg (1987a:240) adds that they ‘build on the already-existing promises of God’s providential care for his envoys.’ Despite not being a thoroughgoing theme, it is easy to see how the ‘person’ and theme of the Holy Spirit would have some significance in the new wisdom of Q’s Jesus. Likewise, if wisdom is concerned with the right behaviour before God, then discipleship is a proper sapiential topic in that it regards a lifestyle that follows the example of Jesus as the correct conduct before God. In the same vein, missionary work, as Q understands it, might be little more than the act of informing others of Jesus’ new wisdom (cf. Q 12:2–3). The mission discourse uses wisdom forms to deal with sapiential themes, such as equipping, provisioning, table manners, hospitality, labouring and the responsibilities of messengers (see Kirk 1998:346–350, 358–359). What is more, verses 2 and 3 introduce the mission discourse with small forms that are most at home with the ancient genre of instructional wisdom (Kirk 1998:346).

The reference to ‘harvest’ (θερισμός) in verse 2 does not in and of itself presuppose apocalyptic judgment (cf. Carlston 1982:112). There are a number of intertextual examples where the ‘harvest’ metaphor is actually applied to wisdom itself (cf. Valantasis 2005:95). It is also possible that the ‘workers’ (ἐργάται) and ‘harvest’ (θερισμός) of verse 2 are not intended as metaphors at all. A literal reading of this verse as a proverb would rather suggest that agricultural labour and labourers are straightforwardly intended (cf. Carlston 1982:112; Koester 1997:152; Piper 1989:133). A literal understanding of the word ‘harvest’ not only appears in wisdom material of the time, but in contemporary apocalyptic literature as well. If the ‘harvest’ in Q 10:2 is indeed a metaphor of something, it is, in this Q context, a metaphor of the mission itself, not apocalyptic judgment (Davies & Allison 1991:148–149; cf. Allison 1997:14; Horsley 2012:35; Piper 1989:134; pace Catchpole 1993:164; Edwards 1976:102; Funk & Hoover 1993:166, 318). In my view, however, it seems much more likely that the Q1 form of the mission discourse (i.e. Q 10:2–11, 16) was not meant to be interpreted metaphorically, but rather as a literal piece of sapiential advice for freeborn agricultural workers, especially

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62.Cf. Joel 4:9–17; Isaiah 9:2–3; 27:12; Jeremiah 51:33; Hosea 6:11; Revelation 14:15–20; 4 Ezra 4:26–37. The following comment by Luz (2001:65) gives the impression that judgment is the only possible association that the word ‘harvest’ carried in Jewish tradition (cf. e.g. Marshall 1978:416): ‘In the Old Testament and Judaism the image of harvest is definitely associated with judgment.’

63.For example, Sirach 6:18–22; 24:25–26.

64.Cf. Proverbs 6:8; 10:5; 20:4; 26:1; Job 5:5; Sibylline Oracle 3:244–245; 2 Baruch 10:9; Pseudo-Phocylides 163–170.

65.For example, Jeremiah 5:17; 4Q285 1–2:4–8; the Treatise of Shem.

day labourers (see Howes 2014a; cf. Horsley 1991:206; cf. Gos. Thom. 73). Horsley (2012:10) proposes that it is due to the legacy of Schweitzer that the harvest imagery in this text continues to be viewed by default as a metaphor for apocalyptic judgment. Instead, a literal reading would facilitate a much closer association between the mission discourse and the rest of Q¹ (cf. Robinson 2001b:15–17). Be that as it may, apart from the announcement of judgment in Q 10:12–15, which belongs to the main redaction, no part of the mission discourse resembles prophetic material (cf. Jacobson 1982:421; Koester 1997:143–144, 152).

Horsley (1999a:67) claims that the motifs in Q¹ are not consistent throughout. For example, the beatitudes in the inaugural sermon apparently betray little sapiential content or formulation (cf. Allison 1997:5; Hoffmann 1995:188). Kloppenborg (1987a:172–173) agrees that the beatitudes are concerned with eschatological reversal and reward, which just goes to show that eschatological and apocalyptic motifs do not dictate his stratigraphy (see Van Aarde 1994:151–179, esp. 170, 174–175). The latter also illustrates that Kloppenborg is wholly comfortable with the presence of eschatological themes in Q¹'s formative layer (cf. Koester 1997:139 fn. 8, 140). Horsley's claim that the beatitudes betray little sapiential content is based on the erroneous assumption that wisdom cannot feature eschatological themes. He simply fails to take note of the tendency in contemporary wisdom literature to incorporate eschatological themes (cf. Kirk 1998:52). Given this tendency, eschatological themes are not always good indicators of genre. The beatitudes are wisdom forms that might be considered by some to betray and develop eschatological themes (cf. Patterson 2001b:77). As a side note, I am personally unconvinced that the beatitudes in Q 6:20–23 are in any way eschatological (see below, 'Futurist eschatology in Q²').

I now turn to arguments based on the content of Q². Horsley (1991:197–198; 1995b:40; 1999a:65) counts only two short passages (Q 11:29–32 & Q 11:39–52) that enclose all three features common to the various traditions in the main redaction. As we have seen, his reasons for discounting some of the other discourses are arbitrary. Regarding the feature of common motifs, Horsley (1999a:65) argues that the tendency to regard Gentiles positively while condemning greater Israel is not a thoroughgoing thematic feature of Q². From this, he concludes:

It seems unwarranted, therefore, to believe that a whole redactional layer of Q was directed against Israel and to proceed with a redactional judgmental stratum as a working hypothesis about Q.

(Horsley 1995b:40)

Starting with Q 7:1, 3, 6–9, Horsley (1995b:40) argues that the purpose of this pericope is to 'challenge Israel to fuller response', and 'not to exemplify a mission to Gentiles.'

67 I hope to defend this proposal in an upcoming publication.

68 Koester (1997:150–151) also underlines the alleged eschatological content of the beatitudes, but he does so not to argue against Kloppenborg's stratification, but rather to argue that some of the more primitive traditions in Q are identifiable as 'eschatological'.
Although the Gentile mission is an important theme when it comes to Kloppenborg’s (1987a:117–120) interpretation of this pericope and contributes to its allocation to the main redaction, this theme is not the most important reason why the passage receives a place in Q\(^2\). Kloppenborg (1987a:119) even admits: ‘It may be that 7:1–10 by itself does not evidence the involvement of the Q community in the Gentile mission.’ The deciding factor for the allocation of this passage to Q\(^2\) is its juxtaposition with the subsequent material, especially Q 7:31–35, where ‘this generation’ is criticised for its ‘lack of response to John and Jesus’ (Kloppenborg 1987a:119). Whether the intention of such criticism is to challenge ‘this generation’ to fuller response, or simply to condemn them, is subject to interpretation. Either way, the purpose of the passage in Q ‘is to be seen in the context of Q’s polemic against Israel’s lack of recognition of the authority of Jesus and his message’ (Kloppenborg 1987a:120; cf. Kloppenborg 2011b:265). As a theme, the Gentile mission adds to the latter as a way of contrasting the faith of Gentiles positively with the faith of Israel (cf. Smith 2006:148). Other Q\(^2\) passages apply the same rhetorical strategy as part of its polemic against certain Jewish groups, including ‘this generation’ (i.e. Q 10:13–15; 11:31–32). Even if the comparative illustrations in Q 11:31–32 ‘are hardly gentile responses to Jesus, providing no basis for the notion of “gentile faith”’ (Horsley 1995b:40), it is still noteworthy that this text places Gentiles, and not Jews, in the judge’s seat at the Final Judgment (Bock 1996:1098, 1099; Luz 2001:220). By focusing on the Gentile mission, Horsley diverts attention away from the actual reasons for assigning Q 7:1, 3, 6–9 to the main redaction.

Horsley’s (1991:197; 1995b:40) comment that the term ‘this generation’ does not necessarily refer to Israel, ‘as opposed to Gentiles’, is curious, especially in light of the fact that Horsley (1992:191; 1995b:49; 1999g:299) himself argues that the term has the Jewish elite, especially the Pharisees and scribes, specifically in mind. Granted, the precise designation of the term is debatable, and Kloppenborg is perhaps too quick to view greater Israel in toto as its necessary referent (cf. Verheyden 2001:710–711), but that this term references some group within greater Israel, if not in fact greater Israel as a whole, should not be doubted. In any case, the precise determination of the term’s referent is not crucial to Kloppenborg’s diachronic analysis or resultant stratigraphy. The main redaction is still concerned with judgment against a number of groups within greater Israel, including certain Galilean towns, Pharisees and scribes, the Jerusalem elite and so on. Whether the term ‘this generation’ references one of these groups or functions as an umbrella term for all of them is somewhat irrelevant to Kloppenborg’s case. By concentrating on the precise designation of the term ‘this generation’, Horsley once again diverts attention away from the actual reasons for distinguishing Q’s two main layers.

Horsley (1995b:40) argues that a number of Q\(^2\) passages, including John’s preaching of the baptism by spirit and fire (Q 3:16), are ‘double-edged, positive-salvific as well as negative-judgmental.’ It should certainly be accepted that the judgment of which Q speaks has both a positive and a negative side to it (see Howes 2014b:1–11).
Nonetheless, that the judgment of Q² is a double-edged sword does not take away from the conclusion that the main redaction is concerned with the theme of judgment, whether eschatological or not. In this regard, Horsley’s phrase ‘negative-judgmental’ is imprecise. The Sayings Gospel Q understands the concept of ‘judgment’ in its ‘neutral’ sense (see Howes 2014b:1–11). The judgment that Q foresees will include both condemnation, on the negative side, and liberation, on the positive side. It is the outcome of the verdict at the moment of Final Judgment that is either negative or positive, not the judgment itself (Howes 2014b:10 of 11).

In all events, that Q² is concerned with the condemnation of certain groups within greater Israel, including ‘this generation’, whatever the precise designation of this term might be, is undeniable. As a theme, ‘judgment’ is certainly an integral feature of the main redaction, as is the relationship of such ‘judgment’ to greater Israel, regardless of whether or not it entails only condemnation or both condemnation and liberation. Moreover, one cannot deny that the main redaction is particularly interested in the negative side of (eschatological) judgment, and more specifically how such negative judgment relates to (certain groups within) greater Israel. Such interest is an integral aspect of the polemic of the main redaction. Horsley (1995b:40) admits that John’s sermon is polemic in nature when he states that it is ‘a vindication of Jesus and John vis-à-vis outside critics.’ That these ‘outside critics’ came from within greater Israel is highly likely. Sato (1995:140) struggles to see how one redactional layer could discuss both salvation and disaster. Sato’s concern is interesting considering Horsley’s (1995b:38–40) identification of both a positive and a negative side to the isolated instance of John’s preaching, not to mention Q as a whole. Ironic is the fact that Horsley appeals to the harmony between condemnation and liberation in his argument against Kloppenborg, while Sato appeals to the incompatibility of condemnation and liberation in his argument against Kloppenborg.

That Jesus is associated with Sophia in the second ‘prophetic’ and ‘apocalyptic’ stratum, and not in the first ‘sapiential’ stratum, as one would supposedly expect, has led some to doubt Kloppenborg’s stratigraphy (e.g. Allison 1997:4; Horsley 1999a:67; Jacobson 1989:152; Tuckett 1996:351–352). Once again, some of these opponents betray their own discomfort with the ancient compatibility of sapiential and eschatological themes. That Jesus is only at the redactional stage linked to Sophia confirms that there was a degree of continuity between the two layers (cf. Mack 1993:147, 151). The Sophia theme is mainly introduced at the redactional stage for polemical reasons, functioning in combination with the Deuteronomistic theme to charge ‘this generation’ with killing the prophets (cf. Smith 2006:102; see Hartin 1995:158–159; Robinson 2001a:36–38).

It seems that Jesus is not at all equated with Sophia in Q, but that he is only portrayed as the last and most important emissary of Sophia (Horsley 1999d:3; see Piper 1989:165–170; Tuckett 1996:218–221; cf. Hartin 1995:159; Jacobson 1995:376; cf. Q 7:35; 11:31, 49–51). It is perhaps only later, in the Gospel according to Matthew, that Jesus is identified with divine Sophia (Hartin 1995:159). It is also possible that Q represents traditions that depict Jesus as being both a messenger of Sophia (cf. Q 7:35) and Sophia herself (cf. Q 10:22) (Schottroff 1995:356). Whatever the case, both views indicate continuity between Q¹ and Q².
True enough, the Deuteronomistic theme would have been sufficient in and of itself to serve this polemical purpose, without having to be conflated with the Sophia theme. If Jesus was the last in a long line of prophets murdered by ‘this generation’, then the accusation is complete. It could simply have been God (and not Sophia) who sent the prophets. When compared to contemporary and earlier Jewish texts, Q is unique in adding Sophia to the Deuteronomistic theme (cf. Robinson 2001a:36–37; Smith 2006:102; see Crossan 1983:138–139; Horsley 1999e:117–118). As such, the introduction of the Sophia figure probably had its conception in something authentic, like the sapiential nature of Jesus’ teachings.

The association between Jesus and Sophia probably functioned to legitimise and authorise the teachings of Jesus, who was thereby made privy to divine wisdom (Kloppenborg 1987a:324; Mack 1993:152; cf. Smith 2006:102). Since Christology is mainly, if not exclusively, a feature of Q₂, one should not be surprised to find a Sophia Christology in the main redaction (see Robinson 1991:188–189). In the early church, wisdom traditions generally tended to develop in a Christological direction (Schottroff 1995:356). The early beginnings of such a development can already be seen in Q¹ (cf. Q 10:16). Although Jesus was already seen as a teacher of wisdom in Q¹, he was only associated with Sophia by the time of redaction. A similar development probably occurred in Proverbs 1–9, with the teachings on practical wisdom preceding the personification of Wisdom in Proverbs 9:4 (Hartin 1995:152). In the term ‘Sophia Christology’, the word ‘Sophia’ betrays both the sapiential roots of this tradition and its continuity with the formative stratum, while the word ‘Christology’ represents both the expansion of this tradition and its discontinuity with the formative stratum.

Allison (1997:5) has a similar concern for the presence of wisdom in the main redaction when he points to the fact that Jesus is compared to both a prophet (Jonah) and a sage (Solomon) in Q 11:31–32. As with the Sophia motif, the presence of both prophetic and sapiential themes within one layer is not an argument against Kloppenborg. On the one hand, the reference to a traditional sage indicates the thematic continuity of the main redaction with the formative stratum, as can be expected from a document composed by the same group. On the other hand, the reference to a traditional prophet indicates the distinctiveness of the main redaction from the formative stratum as a separate compositional layer. In fact, in Q 11:49, Sophia herself sends both sages and prophets to Israel (Carlston 1982:104; Robinson 2003:25–26; Smith 2006:102). This indicates not only that the main redaction fused prophetic and sapiential themes into one whole, but also that divine wisdom (represented here by Sophia) remained theoretically and theologically superior to human sages and prophets (see below, ‘Q as wisdom’). As far as all of the previous is concerned, arguments based solely on the motifs in each layer do not substitute, and are never superior to, thoroughgoing literary analysis (cf. Järvinen 2001:516 fn. 6; Kirk 1998:55).

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70 I am not saying ‘identification’.
The final recension

The distinction between Q² and Q³ has occasionally been called into question. Tuckett (1996:73–74) holds that a nomistic outlook is more widespread in Q than allowed for by Kloppenborg. In fact, Allison (2000:25–73; 2001c:395–428) has convincingly shown that the Moses image, and allusions to a new exodus, are indeed thematically evident throughout Q (cf. Cromhout 2007:310–311; Horsley 2012:105–107). Since Kloppenborg appeals to references to the Torah as a reason for delineating Q³, the need for a Q³ is questioned. According to Cromhout (2007:283), ‘the material assigned to Q³ fits very well with the rhetorical character of the material found in the main redaction.’ He mentions, as example, the importance of the temptation story in Q’s overall Christology. He further notices degrees of continuity between the polemic and apologetic strategies of Q² and Q³. Tuckett (1996:419–421) offers an array of textual examples to indicate that, thematically, the temptation narrative is closely connected to the rest of Q. He does this to argue that the temptation narrative should not be seen as a subsequent or final stage of redaction. However, what Tuckett (and Cromhout) accomplishes to ‘prove’ is that there is thematic continuity between the temptation story and the rest of Q, which is to be expected in any case (cf. Arnal 2001:5).

Tuckett (1996:421–422) acknowledges that there are formal discontinuities between the temptation narrative and the rest of Q, but dismisses them as being explicable on the grounds that the temptation story is an introduction or prologue to the rest of the document. He holds up the prologues in the Gospels of John and Mark as examples. These are not legitimate comparisons, however. The canonical Gospels are complete narratives, and their prologues are formally similar to the remainder of their writings. The Sayings Gospel, on the other hand, is a compilation of sayings, and its narrative prologue is formally at odds with the remainder of this document. Lastly, Tuckett (1996:423) attempts to disprove Kloppenborg’s case that the temptation story was added later by pointing out that this narrative is not alone in referencing scripture. He provides a few examples of other Q texts that likewise refer to scripture, albeit implicitly. Yet, Kloppenborg’s argument is not that Q fails to reference scripture at all, but that the temptation story is unique in quoting scripture directly, and even using a citation formula (γέγραπται) to introduce the quotation.

I agree with Allison, Tuckett and Cromhout that Kloppenborg underestimates the integral presence and import of nomistic themes throughout Q. However, I disagree with them that it requires doing away with a third compositional layer, particularly when it comes to the temptation story. As we have seen, references to the Torah are not Kloppenborg’s only reason for identifying the temptation story as a third stratum (see above, ‘Kloppenborg’s stratification of Q’). Appeal is also made to the temptation story’s genre, form, vocabulary, content, Christology and positive regard for the Temple and Jerusalem. Besides, Kloppenborg (1987a:247) was not the first to notice the anomalous character of the temptation story, with some scholars seeing it as a
Fremdkörper, others excluding it from Q altogether (Kloppenborg 2000:152; Robinson 1992:378), and yet others going as far as to change their initial theories because of it (cf. Tuckett 1996:43).

Nonetheless, Kloppenborg’s suggested interpolations (Q 11:42c & Q 16:17) do not, in my view, necessarily belong with the third stratum. Tuckett (1996:73) also objects to removing these texts from their current contexts in Q, but for reasons that differ from mine. He maintains that passages should not be excised from a text simply because they fail to reflect the same concerns as other parts of that text. I agree with this general statement, and I am guessing so would Kloppenborg. Tuckett, however, misunderstands Kloppenborg’s reasons for adding these sayings to Q³. These sayings are identified as redactional additions on literary grounds, since they fit poorly with their immediate literary contexts, and function to correct possible misreadings of the sayings that precede them directly (see Kloppenborg 2000:152–153). I agree with Kloppenborg’s finding that these sayings are redactional additions, but I disagree that they should therefore be associated with the third redactional stage, and added to Q³. To my mind, the issue is not whether these clauses are redactional additions or not. They clearly are. The issue is whether or not their identification as interpolations justifies their addition to Q³.

Kloppenborg’s (2000:153) primary reason for assigning these logia a place in the third layer is that they share with the temptation story a ‘common perspective on the centrality of the Torah’, which is not, according to him, a feature of either the formative stratum or the main redaction. As we have argued, however, nomistic themes and allusions feature in both Q¹ and Q². Even though Q 11:42c and Q 16:17 were probably added by a redactional hand, there is not enough evidence to show that it was a Q³ hand that did so. These interpolations could just as easily have been added during Q’s ‘complex prehistory’ (Tuckett 1996:71), particularly if nomistic motifs are inherent to the Sayings Gospel Q. The fact that these redactional clauses only modify individual sayings, and do not seem interested in the overall structure or redactional activity of Q, probably points to their inclusion at an earlier stage (Tuckett 1996:418–419). In summary then, I agree with Kloppenborg that the temptation story was added to an existing Q document at a third and final stage, but I disagree that Q 11:42c and Q 16:17 represent the same compositional activity or stage.

**Compositional activity**

A number of scholars would plainly prefer a simpler compositional activity. Hoffmann (1995:187) mentions the possibility that the same author might actually have brought disparate material together, simply because he found them already in such multiplicity in the Jesus tradition. Tuckett (1996:71–73) agrees and gives three reasons for preferring a unitary compositional happening (cf. Horsley 1999a:67). Firstly, Q² has a more complex prehistory than simply being viewed as the redactional material added to
Q¹. Secondly, Tuckett questions whether the six⁷¹ blocks of Q¹ material ever belonged together in a literary whole before being redacted by Q². According to him, evidence rather points to the fragmentary and multi-faceted nature of Q¹. Dunn (2003:156–157; 2013:106–107) agrees, and maintains that Kloppenborg fails to illustrate that Q¹ 'ever functioned as a single document or stratum' (Dunn 2003:156). He also prefers a single compositional act. Thirdly, it is not necessary for Tuckett to divorce the temptation narrative from the rest of Q as a separate redactional layer. Tuckett’s (1996) concerns are valid, and may be summarised by recounting the following quotation:

If, as I have tried to argue, it is unnecessary to postulate a Q³ subsequent to Q², and if the pre-Q² material is perhaps rather more disparate, and the alleged 'Q¹' stratum not necessarily capable of being shown to have existed as a literary unity in its own right before Q², then we may have a rather simpler model, viz. a Q-editor taking up and using (possibly a variety of) earlier materials. (pp. 73–74)

Despite these objections, Q¹ betrays internal evidence of sophisticated composition (cf. Kirk 1998:38). Apart from similarities in audience, forms and motifs, certain structural and rhetorical features also seem to indicate that the wisdom blocks were probably redacted together (see Kirk 1998:61–62, 269; Kloppenborg 1987a:242–243; Piper 1989:35–36, 61–63, 72–73, 139). The structuring techniques, genre patterns and stylistic devices featured in the formative stratum are quite conventional when compared to instruction collections of the time, like Sirach and Pseudo-Phocylides (Kirk 1998:269). The methods by which Q² texts are inserted into Q¹ complexes indicate that the wisdom blocks were in all likelihood available in written form when the Q² redactor got hold of them (Kloppenborg 1987a:244). Such evidence strongly suggests not only that two different redactors were responsible for Q¹ and Q² respectively, but also that a single redactor stands behind all the Q¹ material. That Q² has a complex prehistory, and that the sayings in Q¹ are rather loosely connected, do not invalidate the compositional activity argued by Kloppenborg. As far as the disparity of Q¹ is concerned, Tuckett seems not to take the very nature of wisdom collections into account. Unrelated and dissimilar sayings often appear side by side in many wisdom texts known to have existed as a unity. The book of Proverbs is a good example. On the surface, sayings might appear unorganised and disparate, but careful composition is betrayed when analysing stylistic, rhetorical and thematic commonalities within the corpus (see Loader 2006:1177–1199, esp. 1197; cf. Allison 2010:90). Disparity is therefore not a good indicator of composition, particularly in wisdom texts. Identifying a prehistory for Q² does not take away from the hypothesis that this layer was added at a secondary stage, and that it should therefore be regarded as the main redaction, mainly because of its positioning within the document, its function in organising the text, and its proclivity to disrupt the flow of Q¹. In fact, unravelling and describing the

prehistory of individual clusters in all three strata of the Sayings Gospel is a crucial and indispensable part of Kloppenborg’s analytic method.

### Summary

Most objections to Kloppenborg’s proposed stratification focus on aspects thereof that Kloppenborg pointed out when he initially argued his case. Scholars are unable to prove that Kloppenborg held many of the assumptions he is said to have held. The assumptions that Kloppenborg did indeed hold are of the type that all scholars hold to some degree, and it cannot be shown that Kloppenborg’s assumptions had any effect on either his analysis or his ultimate results.

Objections to Kloppenborg’s method are equally unconvincing. Arguments against his criterion of ‘implied audience’ seem to be based on (deliberate?) misunderstanding. Arguments against his criteria of ‘characteristic forms’ and ‘characteristic motifs’ basically revolve around two similar objections: (1) the presence of eschatological, apocalyptic and/or prophetic forms and themes in Q$^1$; and (2) the presence of sapiential forms and themes in Q$^2$. The legitimacy of the first objection is essentially problematic. It is not certain that the Q$^1$ texts put forward as evidence qualify as prophetic and/or apocalyptic texts in the first place. At the least, classifying these texts as prophetic and/or apocalyptic depends on their interpretation. At the most, such classification is ultimately incorrect. Unlike the first objection, the second does not rest on potentially erroneous assumptions. Sapiential forms and themes do indeed occur in the main redaction. Nevertheless, it is questionable that this observation qualifies as evidence against Kloppenborg’s stratification. Formal and thematic continuity between the formative stratum and the main redaction should be expected as a matter of principle. At any rate, both of these objections only succeed in reiterating aspects of the text already identified by Kloppenborg in his initial analysis, and do not invalidate his diachronic analysis.

Critics of Kloppenborg appear to be nitpicking. They tend to draw on certain isolated examples when building their cases against him. More specifically, they tend to merely list a number of proof texts to corroborate their sweeping statements about the alleged issues with Kloppenborg’s stratigraphy. With the exceptions of Kirk (see above, ‘Assumptions’) and Sato (see below, ‘Q as prophecy’), they all fail to carry out rigorous form-critical, redaction-critical and literary-critical examinations of the text (cf. Järvinen 2001:516 fn. 6). The traditions, forms and themes they focus on are often peripheral to Kloppenborg’s diachronic exegesis, having very little impact on his exegetical observations and arguments.

Tuckett’s case for a simpler compositional activity fails to convince, simply because he does not engage the text in a comprehensive and literary-critical manner. Evidence of the formative stratum’s synchronic disparity and the main redaction’s diachronic prehistory do not refute Kloppenborg’s proposed compositional history. Arnal (2001:5) is thus correct when he says that no one has been able to successfully refute
Kloppenborg’s theory of stratification, arguably because none of them have addressed Kloppenborg’s detailed literary arguments.

The genre of Q

According to Kirk (1998:69), ‘[g]enres are patterns for structuring communication acts.’ As such, genres create templates for the implementation of communicative and rhetorical strategies. Yet, genre not only pertains to the form of a communication event, but also to the meaning and interpretation of its content (McLean 1995:342). Most literary theorists agree that the determination of genre is invaluable and indispensable for the interpretation and understanding of any text (see Tuckett 1996:103–104; cf. Van Aarde 1994:151). Genre does not only serve the heuristic purpose of textual classification, but also the hermeneutic purpose of textual interpretation (Kloppenborg 1987a:2; 1990:84; Vorster 1981:28). Stanton (2002:13), for example, claims: ‘In reading or interpreting any writing, whether ancient or modern, the first step must always be to determine what kind or genre of writing it is.’ Modern literary critics speak of ‘genre conception’ when emphasising the importance of genre to the understanding of a text (e.g. Hirsch 1967:78). Genre conception enables one to understand both the text as a whole and each of its constituent parts in relation to the whole (Hirsch 1967:86; Kirk 1998:70, 71). Genre conventions determine and direct the mode and content of communication, while also guiding interpretation and understanding of said communication (see Kirk 1998:69–70). While text producers integrate genre conventions into a text to facilitate and procure the intended reading of that text, thereby attempting to thwart misunderstanding, recipients engage inculcated genre knowledge when they decipher texts (Kirk 1998:71). This process is not only guided by genre conception, but also restricted by it. Certain understandings of a text are summarily prohibited by the genre conception of that text. When these prescriptive conventions are ignored, misunderstanding is bound to take place. Hence, the determination of Q’s genre is indispensable for interpreting the meaning of both the document as a whole and all constituent parts thereof. Although genre is not entirely determinative in the production, reception and presentation of a text, it still plays such an irreplaceable role that any study of Q which disregards or undervalues inquiries of genre is at risk of generating untrustworthy results (Kirk 1998:72).

In 1971, Robinson suggested ‘sayings of the wise’ (λόγοι σοφῶν) as a possible designation of Q’s genre, referring to the Mediterranean wisdom collections customarily collected under that title. Describing Q as a collection of ‘sayings’ seems legitimate, not only because it is predominantly made up of individual and extended logia, but also because the document describes its own content with the epithet ‘sayings’ (λόγωι) in Q 6:47 (Robinson 1992:371). Perhaps because of the differences between Q and these collections, Robinson’s proposed title did not catch on. Subsequent scholars, including Robinson himself, have preferred either ‘Sayings Source’ or ‘Sayings Gospel’ as a proper
title for Q. Both designations communicate the correct idea that Q constitutes a single written document and not a number of loose-standing oral traditions. Unfortunately, the title ‘Sayings Source’ describes Q only in relation to something else, conveying the faulty notion that Q is only valuable as the ‘source’ of Matthew and Luke, and not as a freestanding document (cf. Robinson 1990:viii; 1992:371; 2001a:27; see Robinson 1997). On the other hand, the designation ‘Sayings Gospel’ conveys the correct idea that Q is a document in its own right, which existed as such before the canonical Gospels came into being.

In my view, it is not at all inappropriate to refer to Q as a ‘Gospel’. The evangelists did not refer to their own literary works as ‘Gospels’ (Vorster 1981:7–8). Mark does indeed begin his Gospel with the opening phrase: ‘The beginning of the gospel (τοῦ εὐαγγελίου) of Jesus Christ’, but the word ‘gospel’ (εὐαγγέλιον) is not used (anachronistically) here as a reference to his literary work, or as an indication of genre (Robinson 1992:371). ‘Gospel’ was not yet seen as a genre at that time (Perkins 2007:88–89). Instead, Mark simply meant that the opening sentence of his Gospel marks the beginning of the ‘good news’ of Jesus Christ, which, as we all know, is what the word εὐαγγέλιον literally means (Newman 1993, s.v. εὐαγγέλιον; Perkins 2007:88–89; Robinson 1990:vii). The latter is evidenced by the fact that neither Matthew nor Luke took over from Mark the word ‘gospel’ to describe their literary creations; whether it be as a description of its genre, its theme, its style or something else. Matthew introduces his Gospel with the term ‘genealogical book’ (βίβλος γενέσεως), which probably refers only to the first 17 verses, and not the whole Gospel. Luke (1:1) calls his Gospel a ‘narrative account’ (διήγησις), and (like Q) entirely lacks the noun ‘gospel’ (Robinson 1992:371). It was only much later that the church fathers started using the word ‘gospel’ as a way of identifying the genre of the canonical Gospels (Vorster 1981:8). Still, not all the church fathers used the word ‘gospel’ as a designation for (the genre of) the canonicals Gospels. Justin (Apo. 66.3), for example, referred to the canonical Gospels as ‘memories’ or ‘memoirs’ (ἀπομνημονεύματα) of the apostles (Stanton 2002:14; see Alexander 2006:21–22). The unique content, structure and composition of each canonical Gospel has even convinced some scholars that each of these texts should be seen as a different genre. Schulz (1964:138, 141, 143), for example, holds that Mark should be seen as a Gospel, Matthew as a homology, Luke as a ‘biography’ (vita) or ‘history’ (historia), and John as a composition of revelatory speeches and miracle stories (σημεῖα).

In view of all this, it is perhaps not even justified to speak of the canonical Gospels as ‘Gospels’ (cf. Vorster 1981:26). However, seeing as we are stuck with this designation, we might as well continue using it; as long as we do not then claim that the literary works of the evangelists have ‘sole custody’ of, and exclusive entitlement to, this designation. The happenstance that a certain text is conveyed in a narrative structure or form is not supportive evidence in favour of its determination as a Gospel (pace Alexander 2006:16). Conversely, the lack of a narrative framework or structure does not invalidate the classification of that text as a Gospel (cf. Jacobson 1992:31;
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Meyer 2003:39; pace Perkins 2007:89). As far as our earliest sources, including the canonical Gospels, were concerned, a ‘Gospel’ (εὐαγγέλιον) was any text, written or oral, narrative or not, that purported to be telling people about the ‘good news’ of Jesus and/or his message of the kingdom (Perkins 2007:88–89). The precise content of the good news differs from one text to the next. Some may tell about the ‘good news’ of Jesus’ sacrificial death and/or Resurrection, while others may tell about the ‘good news’ of his miracles. Still others may proclaim the content of Jesus’ teachings and message as ‘good news’. Jesus himself is often described as preaching the ‘gospel’, usually not about himself, but about the kingdom of God.

Crossan (1998:31–40) distinguishes between four ‘types’ of Gospels, of which ‘sayings Gospels’ like Q and Thomas represent one, and ‘biography Gospels’ like the canonical Gospels represent another (cf. Meyer 2003:39; Van Aarde & Dreyer 2010:4 fn. 14). That Q purports and desires to preach (or rather, teach) the ‘good news’ is without much doubt. Q 7:22 claims that Jesus ‘brought the good news’ (εὐαγγελίζονται) to the poor (Meyer 2003:40; Perkins 2007:86; Robinson 1990:vii; 2001b:14). This task was taken over by the Q document. The evangelists also seem to realise that the content of Q is appropriately described as ‘good news’. The Sermon on the Mount, which essentially derives from Q’s inaugural sermon plus quite a bit of other Q material, is described by Matthew (4:23; 9:35) as ‘the good news of the kingdom’ (τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τῆς βασιλείας) (Meyer 2003:40; Robinson 1990:vii; 1992:370). That ancients could see a document containing only the sayings of Jesus as a ‘Gospel’ is specifically evinced by the Coptic version of the Gospel of Thomas, which opens with the (appended) heading ‘The Gospel according to Thomas’ (Jacobson 1992:31; Kloppenborg et al. 1990:90; Perkins 2007:68, 86; Robinson 1992:372). It is not entirely unlikely that sayings Gospels like Q and Thomas were responsible for the tradition that ultimately led to the identification of the canonical Gospels as ‘Gospels’ (Robinson 1992:371). For all these reasons, an ever-increasing number of scholars, especially in North America, are now, as a matter of course, referring to Q as the ‘Sayings Gospel’ (cf. Robinson 2011:458; see Neirynck 1995:421–430; cf. Neirynck 2001:57 fn. 14).

Sapiental, prophetic or apocalyptic?

Much more important than the semantic question of how to label the Q document is the literary question of which ancient genre Q best resembles. Q is arguably one of the most difficult texts in the Jesus tradition (and beyond) to assign to a particular genre. Ever since Q’s ‘discovery’, scholars have been struggling to determine its genre, not least


73.For example, Matthew 4:23; 9:35; 24:14; Mark 1:14.

of all because it contains small forms of more than one type of genre (Järvinen 2001:520 fn. 20). As with the larger historical Jesus debate, the main rift has been between those who advocate an (imminent) eschatological understanding of Q, on the one hand, and those who advocate an ethical and/or sapiential understanding of Q, on the other. In the meantime, scholarship has realised that the themes of apocalyptic, prophetic and sapiential literature were not antithetical, mutually exclusive or incompatible for the authors of antiquity (Carlston 1982:103, esp. fn. 15; Horsley 1999a:77; Järvinen 2001:520 fn. 20; Tuckett 1996:334; cf. Edwards 1976:46; Frey 2011:22; Piper 1989:159). On the contrary, some obvious examples of ancient texts that mix apocalyptic and wisdom material include Proverbs 8, 1 Isaiah, Matthew, the Didache, Hermas, the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, 4 Ezra, Tobit, the Similitudes of Enoch and the Wisdom of Solomon (Allison 1997:4; Carlston 1982:114; cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:37; see Horsley 2012:60–61; Theissen & Merz 1998:372–374). At times, ancient writers even attributed some individual sayings to both genres (Kloppenborg 1987a:37). Such imprecision accords well with the tremendous diversity of early Christian texts, views and movements (cf. Tuckett 1996:66).

In general, ancient genres were not as restrictive as modern genres, and ancient writings often enough mixed genres freely (Allison 1997:41; pace Oakman 2008:3). This phenomenon occurred in both directions. Prophetic or apocalyptic material would employ sapiential forms, and vice versa (Kloppenborg 2000:380; see Edwards 1976:71–73; Horsley 2012:60–61; Piper 1989:137–155; Sato 1995:141–142). Yet, this tendency neither turned prophetic and apocalyptic genres into wisdom, nor turned wisdom material into prophetic or apocalyptic books (Carlston 1982:113–114; Kloppenborg 1987a:37; 2000:181; see Edwards 1976:44–46). The ancient rationale behind the incorporation of apocalyptic themes and forms into sapiential writings is explained concisely and effectively by the pseudepigraphical Jewish writing 4 Maccabees (1:16): ‘Wisdom, I submit, is knowledge of things divine and human, and of their causes.’ First-century Judaism represents the heyday of both apocalypticism and wisdom (Theissen & Merz 1998:373). Both traditions were seen as a way to bypass the Jerusalem cult and the Torah in gaining direct access to God (cf. Horsley 2012:60–61).75 Apocalypticism did this by claiming to have glimpsed the next world, while wisdom did this by claiming to have direct access to the mind of God (or Sophia) (cf. Carlston 1982:104). Both traditions produced a never-before-seen wealth of Jewish literature.

Even though ancient sapiential, apocalyptic and prophetic materials were not incompatible, the question remains: Should Q mainly be seen as representative of the prophetic, apocalyptic or sapiential genre? In other words, is Q a wisdom collection that contains some, albeit important, apocalyptic and prophetic themes, or is Q an apocalyptic and/or prophetic book that contains some, albeit important, sapiential material? When it comes specifically to the question of genre, most scholars agree that

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75 However, Torah obedience was always reinforced by apocalypticism, and only sometimes reinforced by wisdom.
the eschatological and apocalyptic elements in Q are in the service of, and therefore subsidiary to, its wisdom and/or prophetic elements (Horsley 1999a:72, 74; see Kloppenborg 1987b:292–303). Based on the evidence, most scholars have abandoned the outdated belief that apocalypticism constitutes the genre of Q, even though the document undoubtedly contains apocalyptic small forms. Instead, the current debate is between prophecy and wisdom as an appropriate category for Q’s genre. This does not imply that the apocalyptic nature of Q is abandoned. To the contrary! Identifying Q as a prophetic genre could support the construct of the historical Jesus as an apocalyptic prophet, especially if apocalyptic themes predominate (cf. Theissen & Merz 1998:249).

In ancient literature, including especially Jewish writings of the Second Temple period, the prophetic genre was often employed to convey apocalyptic content. There have historically been proponents on both sides of the debate, supporting either sapiential or prophetic prevalence for the genre of Q (see Tuckett 1996:327–329). There have also been those in the middle who refuse to choose between the two genres, claiming that the two are not mutual rivals (see Tuckett 1996:328–329).

Most scholars opting for a prophetic classification do so because there is by their calculations more prophetic than sapiential material in Q, not least of which includes the overwhelming presence of the ‘judgment’ theme (Tuckett 1996:342; e.g. Edwards 1976:50–54). Boring (1991:231) takes this criterion to its logical extreme by calculating the percentage of prophetic material in Q. This approach rests on the erroneous assumption that statistical information is useful in determining the genre of a piece of writing. The number of prophetic or sapiential small forms in Q say nothing about its framework genre (see Kirk 1998:46–47). At any rate, it is not at all obvious that Q contains more prophetic than sapiential small forms (see Carlston 1982:107–112). Tuckett (1996:346–354) claims that a lot of Q¹ material is blatantly ‘un-sapiential’ and determined more by futurist eschatology than wisdom as such. Boring (1991:323) makes a similar point, claiming that the immediacy of revelation characteristic of Q coheres more with the prophetic genre than the wisdom genre, which is timeless (cf. Horsley 1999a:66; see Sato 1995:141–142, 150). On this matter, Boring is plainly mistaken. Ancient wisdom can also be typified by the characteristics of immediacy and divine revelation, with a number of ancient texts appropriately defined as revelatory wisdom (see Kirk 1998:45–46).

Tuckett’s ‘evidence’ for calling some of the texts in Q¹ ‘un-sapiential’ is that their teachings are incompatible with conventional wisdom (cf. Horsley 1999a:88–89; Koester 1997:151). In other words, although the structure and form of Q¹ mostly correspond

76. Although such debates are still alive and well as far as the whole of the Jesus tradition is concerned (Oakman 2008:103).
77. For the same approach to a defence of Q’s intrinsic sapiential nature, see Carlston (1982:107–112).
79. For example, Sirach 24; Wisdom of Solomon 7–9; Pseudo-Phocylides 1–2; Golden Verses 46–48; Hesiod, Works and Days.
to the conventions of instruction collections, the content does not. Unfortunately, the latter cannot be used as evidence against the classification of a text as wisdom. Instead, such evidence only suffices in indicating that a text comprises subversive wisdom (cf. Kirk 1998:306; Kloppenborg 1987a:320). Otherwise, it would have been possible to apply the same kind of ‘evidence’ against the taxonomy of Qohelet, seeing as it likewise challenges traditional wisdom (cf. Kirk 1998:46). No serious scholar today would earnestly entertain the possibility that Qohelet constitutes anything other than wisdom. In Q 10:21, the Sayings Gospel declares in no uncertain terms that its wisdom differs from that of traditional sages, being based on the unconventional teachings of Jesus (cf. Carlston 1982:104; Horsley 1999e:118). Although some of the literary forms of ancient wisdom were remarkably stable for more than a millennium, the content of sapiential literature was much less stagnant, being forced to adapt to new insights, situations, contexts and paradigms (Kirk 1998:93; Kloppenborg 2000:382, 385; see Mack 1993:45–46).

Tuckett’s definition of wisdom is far too narrow. He sees wisdom as an attempt to ‘explain’ the world, and make ‘general observations about life in general’ (Tuckett 1996:334, 342; cf. Sato 1995:141). The wisdom genre, however, fosters and encloses very broad applications and references (Vorster 1999:312). In addition to ethical behaviour and lifestyle choices, wisdom is also concerned with matters such as intelligence, practical skills, craftsmanship and governance. Tuckett (1996:333–337) reasons that a definition of wisdom should not include aspects of apocalypticism or prophecy, for this would stretch the category so much that ‘wisdom’ would become useless as a classification of genre, accommodating almost anything under its umbrella. This line of reasoning is unconvincing, not least of all because Tuckett (1996:335, 349–354) goes on to argue that a lot of Q’s content should indeed be seen as wisdom; but then wisdom shaped by prophetic themes and eschatological concerns (cf. Edwards 1976:42). If the category of ‘wisdom’ loses its heuristic appeal when it is shown to contain elements of prophecy and apocalypticism, then, by the same token, the category of ‘prophecy’ should lose its heuristic appeal if it is shown to contain elements of wisdom. One cannot help but wonder why ‘prophecy’ is not also in danger of heuristic futility if sapiential elements feature therein. As a genre, wisdom has historically been much more inclusive of other genres than has been the case with prophecy (Crenshaw 1976:953).

80. Tuckett (1996:332–334) does make mention of these internal shifts in wisdom literature, and even refers to Qohelet, but still goes on to argue that traditional wisdom should be seen as the only proper definition of what wisdom really is. This narrow understanding of ‘wisdom’ permeates his whole argument against the sapiential nature of Q.

81. It is interesting that, according to Tuckett (1996:161–163), Kloppenborg’s definition of ‘apocalypticism’ is too narrow and restrictive. Tuckett does, however, agree with Kloppenborg’s overall analysis of the nature of Q’s apocalypticism: ‘Q’s “apocalyptic” language is at times unusual in relation to other contemporary uses of such language in being somewhat negative, and also being generated within a rather more world-affirming ethos than some other apocalyptic language.’ What we have here is a case of Tuckett and Kloppenborg agreeing not only that Q contains both wisdom and apocalypticism, but also that the content and nature of those two elements of Q differ from that of contemporary sapiential and apocalyptic texts.
Kloppenborg (1987a:263–328) has argued convincingly that Q¹ should be seen as an instruction collection, and Q² as a chreia collection. There seems to be some scholarly confusion when it comes to Kloppenborg’s understanding of Q’s genre. Scholars are indeed correct about the fact that Kloppenborg sees the formative stratum as a wisdom layer, but many seem to be unclear about the literary and rhetorical reasons why Kloppenborg identifies Q¹ as an instruction collection. This is true even though Kloppenborg (2000) explains his reasons quite clearly:

To argue that Q¹ conforms to the genre of an ‘instruction’ is to assert a ‘family resemblance’ between Q and other documents typically designated ‘instructions.’ This is asserted in the first place on the basis of Q¹’s dominant grammatical forms, then the nature of argumentation (its warrants and methods), then the nature of the authorial ‘voice,’ and finally, its typical idioms and tropes. The designation ‘instruction’ does not rest on a subjective judgment about its theological orientation – that is, that it is ‘sapiential’ rather than ‘prophetic’ or ‘apocalyptic.’ (p. 159)

Kloppenborg (2000:197–198) continues to explain that Q¹ reflects on the instructional process itself, contemplating master-student relationships, the importance of good guidance, the value of good speech, the need for exemplary behaviour, and the process of (re)searching what is hidden but knowable. Jesus and God are regularly put forward as mimetic ideals.

Confusion increases when it comes to the main redaction. As far as its genre is concerned, the main redaction was not identified by Kloppenborg as a prophetic or apocalyptic corpus, but as a chreia collection. Like instructions, chreiai were collected, serialised and attributed to sages, who were experts in wisdom (see Kloppenborg 2000:160–161; cf. Alexander 2006:24). In other words, both the formative stratum and the main redaction were classified as wisdom during Kloppenborg’s investigation. The essentially sapiential nature of the main redaction is what most opponents of Kloppenborg fail to acknowledge or comprehend. Whether or not Q² was chronologically second is inconsequential in view of the fact that it displays literary features characteristic of wisdom, and, inasmuch, shows continuity with Q¹. Despite the thematic content of the main redaction, and regardless of their respective shorthand designations as ‘sapiential’ and ‘apocalyptic’, both layers qualify formally as wisdom (Kloppenborg 1990:85; cf. Catchpole 1993:60; Kirk 1998:78).

If the main redaction qualifies as wisdom, what is one to make of all the prophetic and apocalyptic motifs and small forms in this layer? The innovation and flexibility that ancient producers of individual texts had at their disposal included the mixing of genres (Kirk 1998:77). This partly explains why ancients did not regard sapiential and prophetic or apocalyptic materials to be mutually exclusive. When genres are mixed, it

is critical to determine a document’s framework genre, since it is the framework genre (Makrogattung) that organises constituent small forms or micro genres (Mikrogattungen) into a coherent whole (Catchpole 1993:60; Horsley 1999a:84; Kirk 1998:77; Vorster 1981:25–26). By placing selected small forms in important literary positions and other small forms in subordinate positions, the compiler creates a framework genre that structures the text according to a hierarchy of sorts (see Kirk 1998:77–78). Whereas superior micro genres determine the rhetorical intent of the text as a whole, subordinate micro genres strengthen the overall argument by buttressing superior micro genres.

Most of the prophetic and apocalyptic sayings in Q are presented as reactions to specific situations, meaning that they are structured as chreiai (see Kloppenborg 1987a:168–169). Although Q² features prophetic and apocalyptic small forms, it presents these micro genres in a sapiental mould or framework genre (cf. Kloppenborg 2000:381). Q’s main redaction contains deliberate structuring devices and pragmatic unities that conform to the conventions of other chreia collections (Kloppenborg 2000:209). In fact, when compared to other chreia collections from antiquity, the main redaction represents one of the more sophisticated examples of the genre (Kloppenborg 1987a:323–324; 2000:209). Form criticism might be able to isolate prophetic and apocalyptic small forms in Q, but it will also be obliged not to ignore the existence of sapiental small forms in Q. It is genre criticism, redaction criticism and composition criticism that identify Q as a wisdom book, by taking seriously the literary features, rhetorical strategies, structuring tendencies and compositional modus operandi of the macro structure. In this regard, scholars fail or refuse to understand the literary and rhetorical reasons why Kloppenborg (2000) classifies Q² as a chreia collection:

Whereas at the formative stratum the dominant grammatical form was the hortatory imperative buttressed with a variety of programmatic statements, motive clauses, and concluding warnings, the main redaction contains woes, warnings of judgment, and prophetic correlatives. It also includes chriae occasioned by a healing (7:1–10), a question from John the Baptist (7:18–23, 24–28, 31–35), and two challenges to Jesus (11:14–23, 29–32). The presence of prophetic sayings does not, however, turn Q into chresmologoi – an oracle collection. For although prophetic forms are present and the examples of prophets are invoked (6:22–23; 7:26; 10:23–24; 11:32, 49–51; 13:34–35), and while an Elijah-like figure is described in 3:16–17; 7:22, most of the sayings of Q² are framed as chriae rather than as direct oracles. Q employs the technique of extending or elaborating an initial chria by appending additional chriae, or by attaching further sayings to the initial chria. (p. 202)

That the main redaction presents its material, including its eschatological, apocalyptic and prophetic themes and micro genres, in a sapiental format and structure is

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84. For example, Q 3:7–9, 16–17; 11:14–26, 16, 29–32, 33–36.

85. According to Sato (1995:140), the genre of chreia collections is ‘too formal and abstract’ to say anything about the content of Q. He maintains that many prophetic books could also be classified as chreia collections, being introduced as they are by introductory remarks. However, Sato overlooks the literary and rhetorical reasons for this genre identification, failing to appreciate the specificity of chreia collections over against other genres with introductory remarks. Chreia collections typically feature a wisdom saying or tradition within a short narrative context to highlight the innovation and originality of the sage. The purpose is to show that the sage practices what he preaches, not simply to provide some kind of abstract background.
certainly telling. On the one hand, it indicates continuity with the formative stratum. Hence, as far as its genre is concerned, Q’s main redactional stratum betrays literary and rhetorical continuity with its formative stratum. The continuity between Q¹ and Q² is also indicated by the way in which various passages are connected. As was the case with both instruction collections and chreia collections in antiquity, the responsible parties made use of catchword and thematic connections when redacting and compiling Q (see Kloppenborg 1987a:322–323; 1990:85). Despite Q¹ and Q² being two separate layers, one must remember that the main redactor added his material to Q¹ in order to create a unified text. In the process, the combined Q¹–Q² text was turned into a chreia collection (see Kloppenborg 1987a:322–325). In many ways, a chreia collection still qualifies as an ‘instructional composition’ (see Kirk 1998:109–120). In particular, the Sayings Gospel Q retains its instructional feel through the preservation of Q¹’s instructional material, as well as the inclusion of many instructional logia in Q². As such, the sapiential nature of Q is not only indicated by the individual framework genres of Q¹ and Q² respectively, but also by the developmental continuity between these two strata. It was customary in antiquity to provide true life settings for instructions, thereby turning them into anecdotal chreiai. The development in the Sayings Gospel Q from an instruction collection to a chreia collection is therefore typical of ancient wisdom and unique to this genre.

On the other hand, structuring Q² in a sapiential frame indicates a strong desire to present both the main redaction and the combined Q¹–Q² text as wisdom. It is not a far cry to suggest that wisdom was an important aspect of the self-definition and ‘faith’ of these individuals. If considering the expansion of the Q document, it would seem that the wisdom of Q’s Jesus was central to the ‘faith’ of the Q people, even if they became increasingly consumed by apology and boundary-marking at the level of the main redaction (cf. Mack 1993:164). That those responsible for the main redaction retained the formative stratum at all is in itself significant, indicating that these individuals valued the sapiential content and structure of Q¹. That they left the content and structure of Q¹ more or less intact, points in the same direction.

Sophia herself also features in the main redaction, and forms an integral part of the eschatological and prophetic themes encountered in Q² (see Robinson 2001a:36–38). The prophetic themes and the Sophia theme are inseparably conflated, and equally important for the theology of the main redaction. Tuckett (1996:351) claims that Q uses the Sophia image to emphasise the prophetic material in Q. This remains to be shown, however. Carlston (1982:104) is probably closer to the truth: ‘The motif of the rejection of the prophets (and, probably, σοφούς) is good wisdom thought, whether or not we include σοφούς in the most primitive form of the saying.’ If anything, the image and figure of Sophia should be identified with wisdom. One could even argue that the Sophia figure is afforded primary importance on a semantic level. She is the agent who sends the prophets and sages, and announces judgment on their persecutors (Q 11:49–51). Sophia is thus superior to the prophets and sages in that she sends them
to deliver her message to Israel. Jesus is seen as the final messenger of Sophia (Smith 2006:102; see Tuckett 1996:220–221, 281–282). In a way then, Sophia is even superior to Jesus, being the agent who sends him (cf. Robinson 2001a:52; 2007:xi); that is, if Jesus is not to be wholly identified with Sophia (cf. Smith 2006:102).

If both Q¹ and Q² (as well as Q³–Q⁴ combined) qualify formally as wisdom literature, is the same also true of Q³? You will recall that Q’s final recension (Q³) consists in my view only of the temptation narrative in Q 4:1–13. Considered in isolation, the temptation story qualifies as a short narrative (Kloppenborg 1987a:246). It is nonetheless noteworthy how little of its content actually functions to relate the narrative. Proportionally, most of its content is made up of logia. Be that as it may, this narrative introduction functions within the context of Q to legitimate the person and message of Jesus, the hero of the story (Kloppenborg 1987a:261, 326–327). The temptation story intends to explain and confirm Jesus’ career in advance. By placing the words of Jesus in a mythical narrative context, the temptation story legitimises Jesus’ teachings before they are even taught. The particular ethic that Jesus espouses is illustrated paradigmatically by the temptation story, and further developed and justified by his subsequent teachings (Kloppenborg 1987a:327). The hearers are assured that their attention to what follows will not be in vain. The temptation story is not dissimilar to the ordeal stories found at the beginning of Greco-Roman biographies (Kloppenborg 1987a:261). The ‘testing’, ‘temptation’ or ‘ordeal’ of the sage is a prominent theme at the beginning of many instruction collections in the ancient world, including Jewish instruction collections (see Kloppenborg 1987a:260, 278–279, 326–327).86 Chreia collections are also preoccupied with the biographies of their sages (Alexander 2006:24; Kirk 1998:400). If the formative and redactional strata of Q should be seen as wisdom, then the narrative prologue of Q should be seen as an attempt to legitimise that wisdom. The narrative introduction serves to legitimise not only the sage, but his Q teachings as well. Although the temptation story is a step in the narrative direction, it is in service of the sapiential macro genre.

Yet, the temptation story should be classified as wisdom not only by virtue of its relation to the macro genre, but also in its own right, due to its sapiential content:

Unless we reject the inclusion of Job in the wisdom-category altogether, we have here [in Q 4:1–13], as in Job, a ‘mythological’ wisdom framework: a dispute with the devil, an extensive dialogue about right conduct and the worship of God, and the vindication of the righteous one by God. (Carlston 1982:106)

In addition, the strong link in Q 4:1–13 between the righteousness of Jesus and his knowledge of the Torah also reminds one of instructional wisdom (Carlston 1982:106). The narrative form of Q 4:1–13 does not take away from its intrinsically sapiential disposition. As such, the temptation story directly participates in the deployment of

86. For example, Amenemhat I; Aesop; Ahikar; Ankhsheshong; Sentences of Secundus; Demonax; Proverbs 1:10–11; Sirach 2:1, 4–5; Wisdom of Solomon 1:16–2:20.
wisdom in Q. In antiquity, attaching a legitimising prologue to the beginning of a sayings collection was simply an option available to the authors and editors of such writings. It is certainly not insignificant that the version of the Sayings Gospel that featured both Q1 and Q2 was augmented by a narrative prologue customarily found at the beginning of ancient wisdom collections. The addition of a sapiential-type prologue indicates that the responsible party understood the pre-Q3 version of the Sayings Gospel, featuring both of its main strata, as wisdom. Once again, the sapiential nature of Q is not only indicated by the individual sapiential genres of the three respective layers, but also by the developmental continuity between the three layers. The attachment of a legitimising prologue to the beginning of Q is typical of ancient wisdom. The redactional development from an instruction collection to a *chreia* collection to a corpus with a narrative prologue is distinctively sapiential. To summarise, Kloppenborg did not divide Q into an earlier sapiential layer, a later prophetic-apocalyptic layer, and a final narrative layer, but into three sapiential layers that have to varying degrees assimilated prophetic, apocalyptic and eschatological motifs and small forms into their overall structures.

If all three of Q’s layers qualify formally as wisdom, is it legitimate to view the final composition of Q as a sapiential document? In his synchronic genre criticism of Q, Kirk (1998, esp. 88, 152–403) manages to demonstrate conclusively that wisdom comprises the framework genre of Q’s final form, with prophetic micro genres employed to support the framework rhetoric. By contrast, Sato’s (1995:157) best explanation for the presence of sapiential blocks in Q is that they ‘can rightly co-exist with the prophetic sayings.’ According to Kirk (1998:399), Q is an instructional composition comparable to other instructional compositions of the time, including Sirach, Wisdom of Solomon, Pseudo-Phocylides and the Pythagorean Golden Verses. Hence, the final form of the Sayings Gospel Q qualifies as wisdom, regardless of whether or not Kloppenborg’s stratification is upheld.

After analysing a number of ancient instruction collections, Kirk (1998:149) shows that one of the recurrent features of the genre is an ‘implicit or explicit threat of divine sanction.’ To discover a ‘threat of divine sanction’ as a recurring feature of wisdom literature might seem surprising at first, but this feature coheres with the essential deed-consequence reasoning of much sapiential rhetoric, which situates human behaviour in a divinely-sanctioned cosmic order. With this schema in mind, it is easy to understand why instruction collections would feature prophetic forms to support their framework genres, including especially prophetic woes and pronouncements of judgment. The assimilation of prophetic, eschatological and apocalyptic materials makes even more sense for aphoristic wisdom, which attempts to subvert the current social structure in exchange for a different one (see Kirk 1998:335–336). It follows that a futurist eschatology is not evidence for the determination of Q’s framework genre, whether used to argue in favour of prophecy or against wisdom (cf. Kloppenborg 2000:385). Although

87. Emphasis original.
older wisdom collections tended to focus on the present, wisdom literature of the Second Temple period, like the sapiential Dead Sea Scrolls and the Wisdom of Solomon, entertained hopes and expectations for the future (Kirk 1998:52; see Kloppenborg 2000:385–386).

In his third chapter, Hirsch (1967), a literary theorist, distinguishes between levels of genre. The first level is the broadest. Each level thereafter becomes more and more specific. It is at the lowest level that texts show their individuality. At the highest level, Q should be seen as a wisdom text. At the lower levels, prophetic, apocalyptic and eschatological themes start to become important. It is at these lower levels that one can see Q as a specific kind of wisdom collection: One that includes a lot of eschatological, apocalyptic and prophetic themes and small forms. These types of themes were indeed characteristic of wisdom literature composed during the Hellenistic period (Kirk 1998:52).

An important critique against the case that Q is framed as a sapiential writing is that it opens and closes with traditions that may justifiably be labelled as prophetic and/or apocalyptic (e.g. Horsley 1991:203, 208). The document begins in Q 3:7–9, 16–17 with John the Baptist in his role as an apocalyptic prophet who threatens his listeners with ultimate condemnation, and ends in Q 22:28, 30 with Jesus promising his followers that they will act as judges over Israel at the eschatological judgment. According to Mack (1993:153–159), the framers of Q introduced John the Baptist into the narrative in order to align Jesus’ former role as wisdom teacher with his subsequently added role as apocalyptic prophet, but seeing as ancients did not view these two identifications as incongruent, this is unlikely. John’s presence in Q is perhaps better explained as being necessitated by its reliability as a tradition that stems from Q’s prehistory (cf. Tuckett 1996:109). Narratively, John’s introduction also functions to prepare the audience for what is to come (Edwards 1976:55; see Cotter 1995b). Like in other ancient literature, John’s anticipatory sermon programmatically introduces themes for the rest of Q (see Kirk 1998:395–396). These themes are undoubtedly prophetic and apocalyptic in nature. Even so, the prophetic-apocalyptic content of Q 3:7–9, 16–17 is formally presented in the mould of an elaborated chreia (see Kloppenborg 1987a:168–169). Besides being presented as an elaborated chreia, Q 3:7–9 is steeped in sapiential small forms. Kirk (1998) unpacks the constitutive small forms well:

Q scholarship has typically characterized 3:7–9 as prophetic speech and polemic, and indeed John appears very prophet-like and prophetic intensity and motifs animate his speech. However, from a form-critical perspective the speech is actually paraenetic: chreia; scolding word (Scheltwort); double admonition followed by two motive clauses invoking a conditional threat of judgment. The admonition against complacent reliance upon election is grounded with an aphoristic motive clause (3:8c). ‘Offspring of vipers’ (3:7b) anticipates the puncturing of confidence in Abrahamic descent (3:8bc). The composition is concluded by a maxim (3:9b) which with its references to both judgment and fruit forms a cumulative inclusio. (pp. 367–368)
I will argue below that Q 22:28, 30 features at the end of Q as the hermeneutical application of the preceding parable (Q 19:12–13, 15–24, 26), and inasmuch functions to support and explicate the wisdom of Q (see Chapter 3, 'Enthroned followers'). Hence, the Sayings Gospel Q opens and closes with sapiential passages that discuss eschatological, apocalyptic and prophetic motifs.

Throughout this discussion, much has been made of the formal features of Q's content. One might argue that, in addition to form, thematic content is also important for genre determination (see Kirk 1998:75–76). Thematic content is certainly important, but form deserves theoretical and methodological priority when it comes to determining a document's genre. On the one hand, the form of a tradition is naturally determined by technical features, fostering a fairly high degree of objectivity. On the other hand, the content of a tradition naturally lends itself to interpretation, fostering a fairly high degree of subjectivity. When it comes to the specific question of Q's genre, the ambiguity of Q's thematic content urges Kloppenborg (1987a:38) to prefer framing devices and formulas over content. What is more, the formal features of a document reveal the intent of the author or compiler to present the writing as a specific type of genre. Conversely, the motifs that feature in a document are not in all cases relevant to the document's overall genre. On a rudimentary level, a document's genre is the sum total of its formal features. As corroboration, at least some of its constituent themes should comply with the document's genre designation.

Overall, the Sayings Gospel Q exhibits minor peculiarities when compared to other instructional compositions. Firstly, the author of Q does not speak in the voice of the parent, as was typical of ancient instruction collections (Horsley 1991:199; 1999a:81). However, the unconventional ethic promoted by Q, especially its contemptuous disregard for the traditional patriarchal family, explains its apprehension to accommodate the convention of parental instruction (Kloppenborg 1987a:318–319; 2000:159; cf. Q 9:59–60; 14:26). By relativising the conventional import of family bonds, Q forms part of a larger development in ancient wisdom literature generally (Kloppenborg 1987a:319; 2000:159). For the most part, chreia collections lacked any references to parental instruction (see Kloppenborg 1987a:313–314). Secondly (and subsequently), unlike most instruction collections, Q1 does not feature conventional wisdom, but subversive wisdom (Horsley 1991:199; see Horsley 1999a:81–82). The truisms, principles and proverbs most commonly associated with instruction collections make way for imperatives, injunctions, aphorisms, extreme examples and evocative imagery (Mack 1993:45). Unfortunately, these observations are not indicative of a framework genre shift, from wisdom to prophecy, for example, but could at the most indicate an internal genre shift, from one type of wisdom to another. Even the latter option is unlikely, though, since ancient instruction collections were not monolithic in the sense described above, but often contained aphoristic material. Thirdly, according to Tuckett (1996:342), the mentioning of Jesus and John the Baptist is atypical for ancient wisdom, which tended to be anonymous. This may be true of older wisdom
collections, but certainly not of later developments. It was customary for both
instruction collections and chreia collections to attribute certain sayings to particular
sages (Alexander 2006:24; Kloppenborg 1987a:265, 277, 306, 317). In any case, the
authority afforded Jesus by the Q people more than validates his name appearing in
their principal faith document. Lastly, the regular use of the second person plural
in Q is incongruous with the more usual use of the second person singular in other
wisdom collections (Tuckett 1996:343). The high probability that Q is addressed to a
specific faith community of sorts, and not just to people in general, justifies its use of
the second person plural. In other words, unlike most other instruction collections and
chreia collections, Q is not just wisdom for wisdom’s sake, with general applicability.
Rather, it should be seen as a piece of wisdom with a very particular message for a very
specific group of people. What is more, the second person singular was traditionally
used because instructions were presented as if they were pieces of advice for individual
sons by their fathers. Since Q has abandoned the conventions of traditional parental
instruction collections, its usage of the second person plural makes absolute sense.

In the end, these ‘peculiarities’ are explicable if the distinctiveness and specificity of
Q are taken into account, compared to other wisdom traditions. In the ancient world
in general, genre was not stagnant, but fluctuated, being adapted and transformed
to address particular and changing circumstances within particular and changing
communities. Producers of literary texts had tremendous freedom when applying genre
conventions to their compositions. Genre conventions supplied the raw parameters
within which a great degree of creativity and innovation was possible (Kirk 1998:70,
77). It follows from such fluidity that none of the ‘discrepancies’ listed above invalidate
Q’s genre determination as an instructional composition. Regardless of whether or
not Q exhibits every single characteristic traditionally associated with instructional
compositions, Q is still most comparable to this ancient genre (see Kloppenborg
2000:382–383). Although there have been objections to these results (to be considered
shortly), no one to my knowledge has argued as methodically, comprehensively and
convincingly as Kloppenborg and Kirk, by means of a literary and rhetorical
exposition of the text, for an alternative taxonomy of Q (cf. Tuckett 1996:73, 345; see McLean

Q as prophecy

As far as I can tell, Migaku Sato (1988) is the only exception to the claim that ended the
previous section. Like Kloppenborg, he gives literary considerations precedence, and
works from the final macro-text ‘downwards’ to its constituent sayings and clusters. His
redaction-critical analysis leads to the identification of three distinct redactional layers:
(1) Redaction A (Q 3:2–Q 7:28); (2) Redaction B (Q 9:57–Q 10:24); and (3) Redaction
developed independently from each other, but were combined when Redaction C was
added to both. Redactor C was further responsible for adding Q 10:12–15 to Redaction B, from which it was formerly absent. A number of interpolations were added at some indeterminable time during the evolution of the various traditions (Q 4:2–13; 6:43–45, 39, 40; 7:27; 10:22; 17:23–37). Redaction C represents a concerted effort to turn the whole compilation into a prophetic book. According to Sato, the redactional history of Q reveals its Sitz im Leben to be the daily activities of both wandering prophets and settled ‘sympathisers’.

I raise only three points of critique at this juncture. Firstly, if Redaction C represents an attempt to turn Q into a prophetic book, it stands to reason that the earliest Q traditions had utterly non-prophetic roots (cf. Jacobson 1992:59). This would support a sapiential origin for Q rather than a prophetic one. Secondly, the itinerant hypothesis upon which Sato builds his case has been widely criticised (e.g. Arnal 2001:1–2, 50, 69, 93–94, 173–174; Horsley 1996:180–181; 1999c:60). Even the mission discourse does not necessarily support the itinerant hypothesis (see Howes 2014a; see above, ‘Characteristic motifs’). Even if it did, there is not enough evidence to support Sato’s leap from wandering radicals to wandering prophets, notwithstanding the standard itinerancy of many traditional prophets. Thirdly, Sato’s redaction-critical analysis has one serious methodological flaw: He determines the composition of Q before analysing its content (cf. Jacobson 1992:59).

Sato compares Q to prophetic books, distinguishing three formal and structural features that are typical of prophetic literature: (1) Q’s propensity to claim that sayings have a divine origin (e.g. Q 10:16, 22; 11:49, 51b); (2) Q’s tendency to name the human tradent of divine sayings; (3) evidence of an oral prehistory; and (4) the appearance of prophetic micro genres, including call narratives, doom oracles, visions, woes, prophetic correlative, admonitions, macarisms and proclamations of salvation and condemnation. When treating the individual micro genres, Sato is deliberate about mentioning each time the micro genre under discussion is scarce in apocalyptic literature, which is quite often the case.

The first three features are not really idiosyncratic of prophecy, since wisdom traditions typically also claim divine origination, name human tradents and reveal oral roots (see Kloppenborg 1987a:263–316). Regarding the first feature, it is worth noting that Q shares with other Jewish instruction collections of the period the feature of associating wisdom with divine Sophia (Carlston 1982:116–117; Kirk 1998:51; e.g. Pr 1–9; Sir). Sato is mistaken if he believes that ancient wisdom lacked revelatory material (Kirk 1998:51). Regarding the second feature, revealing the identity of the speaker became increasingly important in the development of wisdom. Since aphoristic wisdom, by definition, calls traditional wisdom into question, it is crucial for the former to be associated with the personality of a specific sage (Kirk 1998:46). In particular, individual chreiai are predicated upon the significance of the sage (Alexander 2006:24; Kirk 1998:46). What is more, it is
unprecedented for prophetic books to mention two prophets operating alongside each other. Sato’s claim that the Baptist has no independent relevance for Q, and that Jesus is the actual prophet, does not convince. Out of the various sapiential traditions in the ancient world, instruction collections and chreia collections were particularly inclined to attribute their wisdom to one or more sages, with chreia collections occasionally even naming the collector (Kloppenborg 1987a:306). As far as the third feature is concerned, most of the traditions in both the Old and New Testaments reveal some history of oral delivery. This is perhaps more true of wisdom than any other genre, including prophecy, with much of it not only deriving from the mouths of the people as common wisdom, but also lacking any narrative features.

The fourth prophetic feature of Q that Sato isolates is the presence of prophetic micro genres in Q. As for the first of these micro genres identified by Sato, it is doubtful that the baptism of Jesus should be seen as a prophetic call story, even if it is accepted as part of Q (cf. Jacobson 1992:54). Likewise, Sato’s classification of some individual traditions and sayings as prophetic micro genres is highly suspect, although it has to be admitted that Sato does not overstate his case, even disregarding the prophetic nature of certain individual micro genres occasionally taken by other scholars to be prophetic. It is not essential for our present purpose to examine each individual micro genre claimed to be prophetic. That Q does indeed contain prophetic small forms is beyond doubt. Yet, even if Sato is correct about each of the traditions he identifies as prophetic, it would still say nothing about the framework genre of Q (cf. Kirk 1998:51). Individual units of a literary document should always be interpreted by appealing to their larger literary contexts (Horsley 1999a:84; 2012:3).

In addition to the four prophetic features of Q listed above, Sato also points out that Q lacks important elements that are typically also absent in prophetic traditions, including parables, miracle stories (for their own sake) and an account of the prophet’s death. The Sayings Gospel Q, as reconstructed by the International Q Project (Robinson et al. 2000; 2002), does indeed contain both parables and miracle stories. It certainly counts against his case that Sato has to divorce Luke 14–19 from Q in order to eliminate any semblance of parabolic material from the document. Regarding Q’s silence about the death of Jesus, wisdom books often fail to disclose any information about the death of its sage (see Kirk 1998:50–51). Sato’s arguments ad silencium are intrinsically unpersuasive. There are two arguments ad silencium, however, that are essential to the question of Q’s prophetic nature, and inherently convincing.

More essential than any of the foregoing arguments against Sato is his failure to appropriately explain the fact that Q lacks the two most important and distinctive features of the prophetic genre: (1) the literary formula ‘thus says the Lord’ (τάδε λέγει ὁ κύριος) in particular; and (2) divine speech in general (Jacobson 1992:54; Kirk 1998:51, 88; Kloppenborg 1987a:321; 2000:142). Edwards’s (1976:48–49) attempt to redefine
Q's much-loved introductory formula ‘(truly,) I say to you’ ([ἀμὴν/ἀληθῶς] λέγω ὑμῖν) as a version of the prophetic formula ‘thus says the Lord’ is unconvincing. Essentially, these two formulas are not the same. Whereas the former functions merely to highlight the content of a statement, the latter invokes divine authority. One could argue that the formula ‘(truly,) I say to you’ appeals to the authority of Q's Jesus, but would that entail his authority as a sage or a prophet? Whatever the case, it is certainly not his authority as God. Q betrays absolutely no knowledge of the identification of Jesus with the second person in the Trinity. Such Christological development postdates Q (Robinson 1993:9 of 18). While discussing Q 12:22–23, Edwards (1976:124) makes the following statement: ‘Although it opens with the prophetic introduction (Therefore I tell you), the saying itself is a wisdom admonition.’ Should this supposed exception not suffice as evidence that the so-called ‘prophetic introduction’ was never intended of the by Q as a prophetic formula? Instead, this saying supports the more likely circumstance that Q makes use phrase in question to authorise its wisdom. Just as noticeable as the absence of the prophetic formula par excellence is the fact that God never speaks directly in Q. The document contains none of the usual visions, oracles or framing formulas one would normally associate with the prophetic genre. When we first meet Jesus in Q 6:20, the lack of prophetic formulas and character descriptions is immediately noticeable.

Overall, Q's rhetoric, like that of other wisdom material, appeals to nature and ordinary human transactions (Kloppenborg 1987a:321). Most notably lacking from Q are thoroughgoing rhetorical appeals to God's authority, an integral feature of all prophetic literature. In other words, despite the occasional appeal to divine sanction, Q's rhetoric tries to convince in a manner more at home with wisdom than prophecy. Kloppenborg (2000:141) agrees with Sato that Q contains portions of prophetic speech patterns, and that not every single tradition in Q should be seen as sapiential. Nonetheless, Sato's compositional analysis is flawed in that it requires him not only to expel large chunks of material from Q, but also to identify significant blocks of material as ‘unmotivated’ additions. Ultimately, Sato's compositional analysis fails to prove the most important argument for its case: that Q is framed as a prophetic book (Kloppenborg 2000:142). Sato (1988:4) does attempt to show that the inaugural sermon is framed by prophetic material: Q 6:20–23 and Q 6:47–49 (cf. Hoffmann 1995:188). Yet, he expressly states that Q 6:20–23 is a wisdom text, which only infiltrated prophetic books secondarily. The possible ‘eschatologisation’ of the beatitudes in Q 6:20–23 is not evidence of them having been transformed into prophetic material per se (see Kirk 1998:51–52; cf. Patterson 2001b:77). Sato (1988:208) acknowledges that Hellenistic wisdom had certain eschatological tendencies and features. Regarding Q 6:47–49, it is not at all clear that this passage qualifies as prophecy.

Sato (1988:79–85, 94–95) further acknowledges that there are certain crucial discrepancies between the Sayings Gospel Q and other prophetic literature, including the themes of discipleship and mission, the way in which Q juxtaposes John and Jesus, and the predominance of blessings. The difference between these peculiarities and those regarding Kloppenborg’s genre determination is that the former transgress beyond the parameters of prophetic genre conventions, whereas the latter represent innovation within the boundaries of wisdom literature. As Kloppenborg (1990:85) explains, the addition of *chreiai* to the formative stratum ‘did not remove Q from the orbit of wisdom collections as a whole, but it did propel Q beyond the generic boundaries of the instruction.’ In any case, Sato (1995) seems to have readjusted his earlier views to align somewhat substantially with those of Kloppenborg.

Shortly after Sato’s redaction-critical analysis of Q, Richard A. Horsley (1991) wrote an article entitled *Logoi Prophētōn*, or ‘sayings of the prophets’, explicitly meant as an alternative to Robinson’s ‘sayings of the wise’ (cf. Horsley 1991:202; see above, ‘The genre of Q’). The article addresses two ideas prevalent amongst scholars: (1) that Q’s genre is best understood under the category of wisdom; and (2) that the sayings source common to both Thomas and Q was a purely sapiential source. Horsley proposes that both the genre of Q and the genre of the source it shares with Thomas should rather be classified as prophecy, or at least be seen as a combination of sapiential and prophetic material. Horsley (1991:196–200) begins his discussion by arguing against Kloppenborg’s stratigraphy, raising many of the concerns I have attempted to refute on the foregoing pages. Horsley (1991:200–209) then turns his attention to determining the best designation for Q, first of all considering its relation to the Gospel of Thomas. He points out that Thomas contains a mixture of sapiential, prophetic and apocalyptic material. According to him, prophetic traditions predominate, constituting nearly half of the logia, many of which also appear in Q. From these observations, Horsley raises two points. The first is that if prophetic traditions predominate both in the Gospel of Thomas and in the material it shares with Q, then it is perhaps more appropriate to classify both as prophecy. If this were true, it would follow that the most primitive traditions in Q are (predominantly) prophetic in nature, not sapiential. Q could then be viewed as developing in a sapiential and apocalyptic direction from a largely prophetic base. A similar type of conclusion is indeed drawn by Koester (1997:142 fn. 23), referring specifically to Horsley’s article currently under discussion: ‘That the earlier stage of Q includes quite a few sayings that should be classified as prophetic rather than sapiential has been demonstrated by Richard Horsley.’

To my mind, nothing of the sort has been demonstrated, at least not in a form-critical or genre-critical sense. Regrettably, Horsley fails to list the specific sayings that qualify as prophetic, but he does mention that they include “‘kingdom” sayings

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90. Sequentially, this is actually the second point made by Horsley. I have reversed the order to facilitate the logic of my own discussion.
and parables’ (Horsley 1991:200). Since parables are typically sapiential small forms (Edwards 1976:74; see Kirk 1998:234, 246–248), and since the kingdom of God is mostly in Q featured in the midst of sapiential discussions, I suspect that many of the logia classified by Horsley as prophetic would rather qualify as sapiential on form-critical and rhetorical grounds, which are, by the way, the most objective means of determining the micro genre of a logion. From a form-critical perspective, it is noteworthy, and perhaps determinative, that none of these logia contain the prophetic formula ‘thus says the Lord’. Although the thematic content of some of the material in Q could to some extent be labelled ‘prophetic’ (e.g. Q 6:20–23), none of the material in Q qualifies as such from a form-critical or rhetorical perspective.

The second point Horsley (1991) raises from his observation that both Q and Thomas contain apocalyptic material is the following:91

Thus the difference between (the tradition of sayings leading to and/or reflected in) Gos. Thom. and (the final version of) Q cannot depend on the absence or presence of apocalyptic sayings or motifs generally. (p. 201)92

Sadly, this conclusion does not follow from the observation that both Q and Thomas contain apocalyptic material. The question should rather be whether or not the two documents in question share specific apocalyptic traditions. If they do not, it stands to reason that both documents developed from a common non-apocalyptic base in separate apocalyptic directions. Considering the specific traditions that are shared by Thomas and Q, this would be my assessment. I suspect that a proleptic anticipation of the latter assessment lies behind Horsley’s use of a vague description such as ‘the tradition of sayings leading to and/or reflected in’, as well as his use of the word ‘generally’, in the passage quoted above. The truth is that the difference between the specific logia shared by Thomas and Q, on the one hand, and the specific logia not shared by them, on the other, can and should inform the scope of the source they had in common. Horsley may be correct in the quotation above that ‘the absence or presence of apocalyptic sayings or motifs generally’ is not a distinguishing feature between Thomas and Q, but the difference between Thomas’s specific apocalyptic logia and Q’s specific apocalyptic logia is indeed a distinguishing feature, relevant from a source-critical and stratigraphical perspective.

Horsley (1991) continues with the following claim:

But that [i.e. the presence of apocalyptic material in both Thomas and Q] appears to eliminate the basis on which Kloppenborg and others posited a stage of a sayings genre antecedent to the final form of Q that was basically sapiential and distinguishable from a redactional layer in the final form of Q. (p. 201)

91. With Thomas supposedly housing more apocalyptic material than Q. Once again, Horsley fails to list the logia in Thomas he regards to be apocalyptic.

92. Italics original.
Horsley here assumes that Kloppenborg used the distinction between wisdom and apocalypticism to differentiate the two principle layers of Q. He also assumes that the main redaction is identified by Kloppenborg as an apocalyptic genre. As we saw, neither of these assumptions is true (see above, ‘Assumptions’; ‘Q as wisdom’). Regarding the former, Kloppenborg’s stratigraphy is based on literary considerations, not the desire to separate sapiential and apocalyptic materials from each other. Regarding the latter, the whole document qualifies as sapiential, not just the first stratum. What is more, Kloppenborg correctly treats the material that Q and Thomas have in common on a case-by-case basis, refraining from blanket statements about the genre of this corpus of shared material.

Next, Horsley turns his attention to the Q document itself. After observing that, unlike Thomas, the sayings in Q are clustered together into larger complexes, Horsley (1991:202) infers that ‘the composition, character, and function of those complexes may be the key to understanding Q as a whole.’ He proceeds with a synchronic analysis of Q, arguing that the content of the document as a whole is arranged as a ring composition around the central theme of God’s kingdom. He lists only a few individual traditions93 as being ‘strongly sapiential’, discounting other traditions94 because they are not ‘conventional forms of wisdom’ (Horsley 1991:205). The words ‘strongly’ and ‘conventional’ in the previous quotations reveal that a definition of ‘wisdom’ that transcends a mere corpus of traditional proverbs would include the removed traditions as well, along with most of the remaining material in Q. Horsley finds prophetic traditions in the following material: Q 11:29–32, 39, 41–44, 46–52; sections of Q 12; Q 13:34–35 and Q 17:23–37. Interestingly, these traditions all belong to Kloppenborg’s main redaction. Horsley (1991:206) even admits that most of this material is absent from the Gospel of Thomas, which would indicate that it does not form part of a common sayings source. Horsley (1991:203, 208) also mentions that the traditions that begin and end Q are prophetic in nature.95 As it relates to the genre of Q as a whole, this might be considered a fairly strong argument (if its premise is true, that is), but as it relates to the source shared by Thomas and Q, the traditions appear precisely where one would expect secondary additions to feature. At any rate, we have argued that the opening and closing passages of Q qualify formally as wisdom, even if they happen to discuss prophetic motifs (see above, ‘Q as wisdom’).

Horsley (1991:207, 208–209) ends his synchronic analysis with the conclusion that Q differs from the Gospel of Thomas in that it promotes ‘a new or renewed social order’, as opposed to ‘a “radical mode of existence” for individuals’ (Horsley 1991:207). This is certainly true, but it does not follow that the Sayings Gospel Q is for that

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94. These are Q 10:2–16 and Q 11:2–4, 9–13.
95. These are Q 3:16–17 and Q 22:28, 30.
reason less sapiential. Not all ancient wisdom was aimed at individual enlightenment, especially during the Second Temple period. In fact, the most important and obvious aspect that prophets and sages had in common was an interest in the prevailing social order. More precisely, subversive wisdom shared with prophetic traditions the goal of renovating an unacceptable existing social order. It is because of thematic and conceptual overlaps like these that determining the genre or disposition of a logion or complex of logia without form-critical and literary-critical controls is highly subjective and suspect. Horsley (1991:209) maintains that one should give preference to the composition of Q over the forms of its constituent logia when determining its genre or disposition. As we saw, Kirk (1998) has subjected the Sayings Gospel Q to a meticulous compositional analysis,96 rightly considering both the forms of its constituent sayings and the composition of the document in toto, and finding rather conclusively that the document as a whole should be understood as a sapiential writing (see above, ‘Q as wisdom’). To counter this finding, one would have to argue the ascendancy of prophecy as a framework genre for Q by means of an equally methodical compositional analysis of the Sayings Gospel.

Finally, Horsley (1991:207–209) compares Q to the Didache in an attempt to determine what makes the former distinctive, concluding that Q is more prophetic than either Thomas or the Didache. On the one hand, this result indicates that Q and the Didache share a common sapiential basis, which, in turn, strongly suggests that Q developed in a prophetic direction from a largely exclusive sapiential foundation. On the other hand, this result indicates that Q contains prophetic traditions in addition to many sapiential traditions; a feature of Q that no one is denying. At most, Horsley’s results indicate that the wisdom of Q has a prophetic inclination. I would suggest that the prophetic nature of Q’s wisdom is to be located in its subversive aim to address the prevailing social order and the future of Israel. In terms of its genre, this aim does not turn the wisdom of Q into prophecy. The comparison with the Didache is significant, since this document indicates that wisdom could also be directed at more than only the individual, being as it is a ‘manual for community order’ (Horsley 1991:209). The difference between the Didache and Q is that the former is most comparable with conventional wisdom in its attempt to retain order, whereas the latter is more comparable with subversive wisdom in its attempt to question the status quo.

A clear watershed

Much of the scholarly confusion regarding both the stratigraphy and genre of Q is related to misrepresentations of Kloppenborg’s The formation of Q (1987a), particularly in descriptions and summaries of his proposal. Järvinen might be held up as an

96. Much more impressive in analytical thoroughness than Horsley’s five pages (203–207).
example. In specific reference to Kloppenborg’s stratigraphy, Järvinen (2001) offers the following description:

A big part of the discussion about Q has centered around questions of tradition history: which traditions might be more ancient than the others. Although it may be too simplifying to say, a clear watershed has been drawn between two major genres that are distinct and characteristic of Q: the wisdom tradition and the apocalyptic tradition. Both are more or less separated from each other, existing in individual thematic blocks. (p. 516)

In this summary, Järvinen fails to differentiate a number of issues, leaving the impression that they are the same. Firstly, he confuses tradition history and redaction history. Kloppenborg’s *The formation of Q* is interested in the redaction history of Q, not its tradition history. Kloppenborg only starts treating the question of Q’s relation to the historical development of the Jesus tradition at a later stage in his professional career. The perceived (!) separation of wisdom and apocalypticism in Kloppenborg’s study is not the result of a tradition-historical investigation of Q. Instead, Kloppenborg’s stratigraphy is the result of a redaction-critical examination of Q. Secondly, he confuses the results of Kloppenborg’s study with the results of historical Jesus scholars who often draw upon his work. Kloppenborg’s study does not result in ‘a clear watershed’ between wisdom and apocalypticism. As we saw, sapiential traditions appear in the so-called ‘apocalyptic layer’, while prophetic and apocalyptic traditions appear in the so-called ‘wisdom layer’ (see above, ‘Characteristic forms’; ‘Characteristic motifs’; ‘Q as wisdom’). Thirdly, he confuses Kloppenborg’s initial redaction-critical analysis with his subsequent genre-critical analysis. Kloppenborg’s stratigraphy is not based on the ‘two major genres’ of Q, but on form-critical and redaction-critical considerations. The allocation of different genres to the respective layers in Q was only attempted after the document’s layers had already been separated on other grounds. Fourthly, he confuses the genres that Kloppenborg isolated for Q with the genres that are important to the historical Jesus debate. Kloppenborg identified an instruction collection, a *chreia* collection and a narrative prologue in Q, not a wisdom genre and an apocalyptic genre. With phrases like ‘it may be too simplifying to say’ and ‘more or less’, Järvinen acknowledges that his summation is not entirely accurate. The current discussion is not intended as a criticism of Järvinen, but rather as a word of caution to colleagues. Rather than relying exclusively on the views and reviews of others – critics and supporters of Kloppenborg alike – it is recommended that scholars engage Kloppenborg’s proposal directly, as it is presented in *The formation of Q*.

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97. As his footnote 6 makes clear, specifically mentioning both Kloppenborg and his monograph, *The formation of Q*.

98. Cf. also his ‘rectifying’ footnote 20 (p. 520): ‘Terms “wisdom” and “apocalyptic” function here not as characterizations of the criteria for recent stratifying theories of Q but as rather innocent and simple categories to describe the “mood” of easily identifiable portions of Q.’
The eschatology of Q

Futurist eschatology in Q

Very few scholars would deny that Q 3:7–9, 16–17 references an apocalyptic, futurist eschatology, and likely also an imminent eschatology (e.g. Robinson 1991:190; 2003:28). It is crucial to recognise, however, that these texts expound the Baptist’s eschatology, and not that of Jesus (Robinson 2003:27, 28; Sim 1985:181, 213–214; see Kloppenborg 2001:166–167). In fact, if one compares Q 3:16–17 with not only Q 7:18–19, but also the characterisation of Jesus in the rest of Q, it would appear that Q’s Jesus deliberately modified the Baptist’s particular eschatology to suit his own perception of God’s kingdom (Kloppenborg 2001:166, 188–189; see Pokorný 2011:345–346, 347). Since we are mainly interested in the eschatology of Q’s Jesus, these texts will not presently be considered. The following Q texts indisputably portray Jesus as proclaiming a futurist eschatology: Q 10:12–15; Q 11:19b; Q 11:29–32; Q 11:50–51; Q 12:8–9; Q 12:10; Q 13:28–29; Q 17:23–24; Q 17:26–27, [28–29], 30 and Q 22:28, 30 (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:169; 2001:165). In all of these texts, the future tense features repeatedly in reference to the eschaton.100 Out of these, the following texts are clearly apocalyptic, featuring familiar apocalyptic imagery: Q 10:12–15; Q 11:29–32; Q 12:8–9; Q 17:23–24 and Q 17:26–27, [28–29], 30.101 In addition, the prophetic-eschatological small form identified by Edwards (1969:9–20; 1976:41, 142) and Schmidt (1977:517–522), correctly called the ‘prophetic correlative’, appears at Q 11:30; Q 17:24 and Q 17:26–27, [28–29], 30 (Kloppenborg 1987a:169; Robinson 1991:192; Kloppenborg 1987a:169; 2001:165).

Futurist eschatology in Q

99. For apocalyptic imagery, consider ‘impending rage’ (ἡ μελλούσῃ ὀργής), ‘repentance’ (μετανοία), ‘the axe lies at the root of the trees’ (ἡ ἀξίνη πρὸς τὴν ῥίζαν τῶν δένδρων κεῖται), ‘chopped down’ (ἐκκόπτεται) and ‘the pitchfork’ (συνάγωσιτος), ‘clean out’ (ἀποθήκη), ‘wheat’ (διακαθαίρω), ‘granary’ (κατακαίω), ‘chaff’ (ἄχυρον), ‘burn’ (πῦρ) and ‘inextinguishable fire’ (πῦρ ἀσβέστῳ), ‘sweep away’ (ἀείρω) in Q 17:26–30. Since they are predisposed to both apocalyptic and sapiential interpretations, the following terms have deliberately been left out of the lists that make up this footnote, even though they feature in the selected texts: ‘Son of Man’ (ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου), the verb ‘judge’ (κρίνω) and the noun ‘judge’ (κρίτης). Even when the latter two words refer in each individual case to eschatological judgment (as opposed to divine sapiential judgment), they do not necessarily connote apocalypticism.
see Robinson 1994:334–335; see Chapter 4, ‘Micro genre’). In view of the apocalyptic imagery in these latter texts, it is justified to describe them not only as ‘eschatological’, but also as ‘apocalyptic’. All the eschatological texts listed above speak straightforwardly and unequivocally about a future event. More importantly, it is impossible to interpret any of these texts exclusively as wisdom texts, to the exclusion of eschatology and/or apocalypticism. In other words, these texts are futurist and eschatological by their very nature, and any attempt to explain them as non-eschatological would be unwarranted and unjustified.

What is blatantly missing in all of these texts is any reference whatsoever to the imminence of the predicted Apocalypse (cf. Horsley 2012:35; Robinson 2001a:39; see Borg 2001b:42–43; Sim 1985:206–223; pace e.g. Catchpole 1993:passim, esp. 251). Rather, we get the impression from these texts that the apocalyptic event will occur at an undetermined time in the future. The references to Noah, Jonah, Tyre and Sodom suggest that the apocalyptic event will be devastating, and that it will take place unexpectedly (Catchpole 1993:251; Sim 1985:233; Smith 2006:128; Tuckett 2001:385; see Casey 2009:226–228). The time cannot be predicted, only the fact of its happening (Kloppenborg 2001:166). Q 17:27, in particular, contrasts the everydayness of life, where people eat, drink, get married and go about their daily business, with the suddenness, devastation and unexpectedness of the primeval flood (Allison 2010:35; Catchpole 1993:250; Davies & Allison 1997:380; Fleddermann 2005:835, 836; Kirk 1998:261; Kloppenborg 1987a:157; 2001:166; Luz 2005:214; Tuckett 2001:385; Valantasis 2005:217). Suddenness and unexpectedness should not be confused with imminence (see Allison 2010:40–41)!

Another feature of these texts is that the eschatological event is not described in terms of the phrase ‘kingdom of God’ (cf. Horsley 2012:35). The latter term is absent from all but one of these texts. Although the term ‘kingdom of God’ occurs in Q 13:28, which is clearly an eschatological and futurist passage (see Kirk 1998:251–252), the term ‘kingdom of God’ is not utilised there as a description or sign of the eschaton (pace Kirk 1998:253; Meier 1994:309–317; Sim 1985:204). Rather, the text takes for granted that the kingdom of God will already be in existence by the time the future event takes place. It does not specify when the kingdom comes into being, only that it is already there when the fortunate recline with Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. Notably absent from Q 13:28 is any reference to the kingdom ‘coming’ or ‘happening’ or ‘being brought into existence’. The eschatological event that Q 13:28–29 envisions is the ingathering of dispersed peoples, who will subsequently be fortunate enough to recline in the already-existing kingdom of God. In this text, the kingdom of God is neither a sign nor a result of the event described (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:236).

102. And perhaps Lot, if Q 17:28–29 is judged to be part of Q (cf. Catchpole 1993:248).

103. The question of their ethnicity is not important at the moment, but will be addressed in due course (see below, ‘Ethnicity and Q’).
In addition to the list of texts featured above, there are a number of Q texts that are more difficult to determine precisely, opening themselves up to interpretations that are (1) exclusively sapiential, (2) exclusively eschatological, (3) mainly sapiential with eschatological references, or (4) mainly eschatological with sapiential references. These include the following: Q 6:20–23; Q 6:37–38; Q 6:47–49; Q 11:2b; [Q 11:21–22]; Q 12:5; Q 12:31; Q 12:33–34; Q 12:39–40; Q 12:42–46; Q 12:49, 51, 53; [Q 12:54–56]; Q 12:58–59; Q 13:24–27; [Q 13:30]; Q 13:35; [Q 14:11]; Q 14:16–18, 21, 23; Q 17:34–35; Q 17:37 and Q 19:12–13, 15–24, 26 (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:169).

I have argued elsewhere that Q 12:39 and Q 12:42–44 featured as purely sapiential (that is, non-eschatological) texts in the formative stratum, but that Q 12:40 and Q 12:45–46 were added during the redactional phase to turn these texts into eschatological passages in the main redaction (see Howes 2014c; 2015a; cf. Tuckett 2001:384–385). A similar process might underlie Q 13:24–27; Q 14:16–18, 21, 23 and Q 19:12–13, 15–24, 26 (see Chapter 3, ‘Rejection’; ‘Enthroned followers’). That is not to minimise the import of eschatology in any of these texts. As we saw, redactional additions are not necessarily inauthentic from a tradition-historical perspective (see above, ‘Kloppenborg’s stratification of Q’). Moreover, the eschatological nature of these passages is not denied, especially in their final form in the main redaction.

I agree with Piper (1989:106–107) against the International Q Project that the Matthean placement of Q 12:58–59 should be preferred, in which case this saying would almost certainly be purely sapiential (see Howes 2015b). It further seems unlikely to me that the references to ‘hell’ or ‘Gehenna’ (γέεννα) in Q 12:5 and ‘heaven’ (οὐρανός) in Q 12:33–34 either denote or connote eschatology. The former text seems to rather have the post-mortem destination of certain individuals and groups in mind (see Chapter 3, ‘Confessing Jesus in public’). The latter text seems to have God’s transcendental abode primarily in mind, while also intending the post-mortem destination of certain individuals and groups by implication. Q 6:47–49 lends itself to either a purely sapiential or a purely eschatological interpretation. Given its place and function in the inaugural sermon, a purely sapiential reading is certainly preferable (Carlston 1982:106). At face value, Q 12:49, 51, 53 immediately strikes one as eschatological, but the uncertainty of verse 49’s inclusion in Q opens the door for a purely sapiential reading of verses 51 and 53 (cf. Ps.-Phoc. 42–47; pace Kloppenborg 1987a:151–152). If so, the text probably deals with the public ministry of Jesus, which resulted in family division and inter-familial feuds (see below, ‘Family feuds’). Horsley (1991:197; 2012:34) proposes a non-eschatological, non-apocalyptic reading of this text even with verse 49 included, arguing that the imagery in verse 49 refers to the family division of verses 51 and 53, not apocalyptic destruction (cf. Jacobson 2000:193). A purely eschatological reading of Q 13:35 and Q 17:34–35 seems preferable, although a purely sapiential reading should not in either case be summarily discounted. A precise interpretation and determination of Q 17:37 eludes us. Its position between Q 17:23–24 and Q 17:26–27, 30 (as in Matthew) or between Q 17:34–35 and Q 19:12–13, 15–24, 26 (as in Luke) renders an
eschatological reading more likely. For a number of the individual logia listed above, including Q 11:21–22; Q 12:54–56; Q 13:30 and Q 14:11, it is disputed whether or not they actually belong in the Sayings Gospel Q. Interestingly, these borderline texts all share the same feature: Considered in isolation, it is possible to read them as purely sapiential texts, but in their present Q contexts, a purely eschatological reading seems more likely. Q 6:37–38 will receive detailed consideration in Chapter 4 below, but it can be mentioned at this juncture that this logion is undeniably sapiential in nature, while nevertheless possibly featuring eschatological references.

That only leaves Q 6:20–23; Q 11:2b and Q 12:31. As with Q 12:33–34, the reference to 'heaven' (οὐρανός) in Q 6:23 is unlikely to either denote or connote eschatology (cf. Piper 2000:254, 258; pace Davies & Allison 1988:463; Smith 2006:131, 132). Q 6:22–23 neither puts forward a single apocalyptic image, nor does it feature a single verb in the future tense (cf. Horsley 2012:14). It seems much more likely that the reference to 'heaven' is not in the first instance concerned with temporality, instead pointing mainly to the location where the reward is being kept at the moment (see Betz 1995:119). Valantasis (2005:56) argues that heaven and earth do not constitute two separate realms in Q 6:22–23. Yet, the whole point of claiming that one’s reward is ‘in heaven’ is to explain why it cannot be found on earth at the present moment, indicating that the saying does indeed distinguish between two separate realms. Valantasis is no doubt correct in claiming that God’s kingdom encompasses both spheres, and that the two spheres influence each other directly, but these observations do not illustrate the absence of a conceptual and practical distinction between the two very different domains. At any rate, the reference to ‘heaven’ is mainly spatial, even if the saying itself focuses on the present. Not only is the reward already in existence, but it has also already been assigned to its rightful recipients (Betz 1995:152; cf. Piper 2000:258). This is not to say that some form of futurity is not implied. Yet, to jump from the suggestion of futurity beneath the surface of the text to certainty about an eschatological or apocalyptic intent is hermeneutically unsound. Even if the reward is only retrievable at some future date, the text does not elucidate whether the individuals in question would end up in heaven after passing away or after the Apocalypse. Given the lack of clear apocalyptic imagery, the post-mortem option seems more likely. The reference to the persecution of former prophets in the second part of verse 23 also supports the post-mortem interpretation. It is assumed in verse 23 that the prophets had already received their reward; otherwise Q 6:23b would not make sense as a coherent substantiation of Q 6:23a (Betz 1995:153). The logic of the argument demands that if the prophets had received their reward before the apocalyptic end, so will the followers of Jesus.

In any case, the text seems unconcerned with the details of heaven’s temporal aspect, even if it is implied. The focus is on the present moment, during which knowledge of a heavenly reward, theoretically already belonging to the recipients, is cause for jubilation (Betz 1995:152; cf. Bock 1994:570; Piper 2000:254). According to Bock (1994:581), ‘the reference is to a promise of present, heavenly vindication.’ As much as a purely
non-futurist interpretation would support my case, the latter seems unlikely. It is logically impossible for someone to receive a reward, be it vindication or something else, if the recipient and the reward are spatially removed at the moment of reception. Even so, Bock’s interpretation serves to remind the exegete that a future orientation is not explicit in the text, and that even the post-mortem understanding is only implied. Nolland (2005:209) seems to understand the reference here to ‘heaven’ correctly: ‘The imagery is of a (cumulating) reward kept with God (i.e., in heaven) to be received at some appropriate future date.’ Unfortunately, he then takes an unjustified leap of faith to futurist eschatology: ‘No doubt the reward is to be received at the coming of the kingdom of heaven’ (p. 209). It is precisely in this regard that there is indeed enough doubt to question a conclusion that goes beyond the text itself. If anything, the text seems to imply that the reward will be received post-mortem.

Although Q 6:21 features the future tense verbs ‘will be filled’ (χορτασθήσεσθε) and ‘will be consoled’ (παρακληθήσεσθε), these verbs denote the immediate future of daily existence for which corporeal survival and personal happiness are important (cf. Horsley 2012:28; pace Betz 1995:124, 132; Bock 1994:575–577; Davies & Allison 1988:448–449, 453; Fleddermann 2005:324). The latter is supported by a number of considerations (see Kloppenborg 2001:181–185). The first is the syntagmatic literary context of Q 6:20–23: The inaugural sermon deals specifically with the implementation of a new social praxis in everyday life (Kloppenborg 2011b:261). The second is the paradigmatic literary context of Q 6:20–23: A number of texts in Q also deal with the topic of physical survival through daily sustenance (e.g. Q 11:2–3, 9–13; 12:22–31). Out of these, Q 12:22–31 similarly features a verb in the future tense (προστεθήσεται) to denote the immediate future of a person’s earthly existence (see further below in this section; cf. Horsley 2012:127; Kloppenborg 1990:75–76). The third consideration is the intertextual context of Q 6:20–23: A non-eschatological rendering of these beatitudes is also a feature of other early documents, including the Gospel of Thomas (54, 68, 69) and James (2:5) (Kloppenborg 2011b:261). Some scholars read Q 6:20–23 as an eschatological text because of its possible allusion to Isaiah 61 (e.g. Allison 2010:42; Catchpole 1993:86). In Isaiah 61:1, the prophet claims to have been anointed by God ‘to preach good news to the poor.’ Although these beatitudes almost certainly do allude to Isaiah 61 (Nolland 2005:201; see Davies & Allison 1988:436–439, 443; Robinson 1992:363–370; 1994:317), they differ from that text in their temporal orientation. Whereas the content of Isaiah’s good news is that the unfortunate can look forward to deliverance in the future, the content of Jesus’ good news is that the poor are already blessed in the present.

In Q 6:20, the announcement happens in the present, and the content of that announcement also refers to the present, as is demonstrated by the present tense of

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104 Bock (1994:581) seems to trespass his own logical boundaries when he uses a future tense verb in the following statement: ‘In effect, Jesus says [in Q 6:22–23] that commitment will be vindicated and rewarded’ (emphasis added).
the verb ‘is’ (ἐστίν) (Bock 1994:572; Wink 2002:161–162). Some interpreters have argued that the latter verb should be read as a futurist present (e.g. Catchpole 1993:86; Davies & Allison 1988:445, 446). For a number of reasons, such an interpretation is highly unlikely (Fleddermann 2005:324; see Sim 1985:183–184). Firstly, whenever the present tense refers to a past or future action in the New Testament, this is usually made obvious by the syntactical context. In other words, the sentence in which the verb occurs will characteristically indicate in some way or another that the present tense actually refers to a past or future action, usually with an additional future tense verb or a temporal clause. In Q 6:20, there is no such indication. Secondly, it is much more probable that ἐστίν here fulfils the function of a gnomic present. Whereas the beatitudes in Q 6:21 motivate their respective main clauses with a future event in their respective subordinate clauses, the beatitudes in Q 6:20 and Q 6:22–23a motivate their respective main clauses with gnomic, timelessly-valid maxims in their subordinate clauses.

Thirdly, there are no other examples of futurist present verbs in Q, indicating that their utilisation is plainly not a feature of the Sayings Gospel. Q prefers to make use of the future tense when denoting a future action, and does so readily and repeatedly throughout the document. If this Q logion had a future action in mind, it would very likely have used a future tense verb. This is particularly applicable in the current case, where the saying is followed by two beatitudes with future verbs in their subordinate clauses. Ultimately, the beatitudes profess that the poor, hungry, mournful and persecuted are blessed in the present moment (cf. Betz 1995:151), mainly because they subsist in the kingdom of God, where people are not only fed and consoled, but also manage to accumulate heavenly treasures. It is interesting to note in this regard that the word ‘blessed’ (μακάριος) basically means ‘free from daily cares and worries’ (Davies & Allison 1988:431; cf. Marshall 1978:248). Given the foregoing considerations, it is extremely unlikely that Q 6:20–23 presumes a futurist eschatology (cf. Horsley 2012:14; Robinson 2003:30–31; pace e.g. Koester 1997:150; Luz 2007:187–188; Meier 1994:317–336).

The same is true of Q 11:2b, to which we now turn (cf. Borg 2001b:42). Particular textual indicators have led some scholars to read this text in futurist terms (e.g. Allison 2010:36–38; Catchpole 1993:185). The verbs ‘be kept holy’ (ἁγιασθήτω) and ‘let come’ (ἐλθέτω) both appear in the aorist imperative, which usually means that the action is simply mentioned as a once-off event, and not as a continuing or repetitive event. As with all imperatives, the action is commanded in the present, and can resultantly only be fulfilled sometime in the future (cf. Sim 1985:204). Moreover, the fact that the realisation of the actions denoted by the two verbs need to be prayed for indicates that these actions have not yet occurred. Thus, Q 11:2b does seem to refer to the future (cf. Edwards 1976:107). The future it refers to, however, is not an eschatological future, but the survivalist future of tomorrow (cf. Kirk 1998:324; pace Sim 1985:204–205).
There are a few reasons for preferring such an interpretation. Firstly, there is an absence in this text of unambiguous apocalyptic imagery. If one regards Q 6:21 to be an eschatological saying, it may influence one’s interpretation of the word ‘bread’ (ἄρτον) in Q 11:3, seeing it as an eschatological reference. Despite the extreme unlikelihood that Q 6:21 is eschatologically oriented (see above in this section), an eschatological rendering of the word ‘bread’ in Q 11:3 is unlikely for a number of additional reasons (Catchpole 1993:224; Kloppenborg 2001:176; cf. Robinson 2011:472): (1) the beatitude in Q 6:21 does not contain the word ‘bread’ (ἄρτος); (2) an eschatological reading does not fit the use of the possessive personal pronoun ‘our’ (ἡμῶν) in Q 11:3; (3) in the rest of Q, ‘bread’ does not denote an eschatological reward (cf. Q 4:2–4; 11:11); and (4) the presence of both ‘daily’ (ἐπιούσιον) and ‘today’ (σήμερον) in verse 3 almost necessitates a non-eschatological reading of ‘bread’. The possible eschatological references are unconvincing. Rather, verse 3 in toto ‘appears to be a wisdom-like assumption that God does assist his people by means of the regularity of his creation’ (Edwards 1976:108).

Secondly, although the exact meaning of the word ‘daily’ (ἐπιούσιον) in Q 11:3 is in doubt (Catchpole 1993:223), it should probably be translated as ‘daily’, ‘for today’, ‘for the coming day’, or ‘necessary for existence’ (Liddell & Scott 1996:649, s.v. ἐπιούσιος; Newman 1993, s.v. ἐπιούσιος). It follows that the imperative in verse 3 refers to either the present or the immediate future of daily existence. This is reinforced by the simultaneous presence of the word ‘today’ (σήμερον) in the same verse (Catchpole 1993:224; Kloppenborg 2001:176). Seeing as ‘daily’ (ἐπιούσιον) and ‘today’ (σήμερον) are the only temporal indicators in the whole passage, they probably apply to verse 2b as well.

Thirdly, the Lord’s Prayer was very likely followed by Q 11:[5–8], 9–13, which takes up the theme of daily existence in the present world (Piper 1989:20, 23, 24; see Allison 1997:13–15; Catchpole 1993:201–223, 225; Kirk 1998:177–180; Kloppenborg 2001:177–178; Robinson 1995:263, 265–266; 1997; 2003:30; 2011:472). Fourthly, seeing as the author(s) of Q preferred using future verbs when denoting eschatology, the absence thereof in the Lord’s Prayer renders an eschatological reading of this text improbable. The request to ‘let your kingdom come’ is expressed with an aorist imperative verb (ἐλθέτω), indicating that there is no focus on the time of the event’s occurrence. If futurist eschatology were at play, one would have expected the author to make this clear by means of a future verb or a future-directed temporal phrase. It is possible that verse 4 has an eye on the eschatological judgment, but the fulfilment of the request is intended for the present and/or immediate future of earthly existence. Lastly, if Kirk (1998:310–311, 319–327) is correct in his presentation of the macro structure of Q 10:23–Q 13:35, it would follow that the need for daily sustenance in the Lord’s Prayer is deliberately and compositionally contrasted with the oppression by and opulence of the religious authorities in Q 11:39–52. For all these reasons, the most likely exposition of the Lord’s Prayer is that the phrase ‘your kingdom’ (βασιλεία σου)
Q as document

has something to do with daily existence (Kloppenborg 2001:176–177; Robinson 1995:263, 264; 2001b:16; 2003:30, 35; pace e.g. Meier 1994:291–302). Logically, daily subsistence always applies to both the present and (concerns over) the immediate, non-eschatological future.

The same explanation applies to Q 12:31 (Kloppenborg 2001:178; Robinson 1995:264–265; 2001b:16; 2003:32, 35; pace Catchpole 1993:185). As a whole, Q 12:22–31 assumes the continued existence of the world as we know it. It is certainly a wisdom text, offering advice for daily survival in a tough world (Catchpole 1993:35; Edwards 1976:124; see Kloppenborg 1987a:216–221; Piper 1989:24–36; 2000:248–249). The audience is advised not to worry about subsistence in either the present or the immediate future (Robinson 2001b:16; 2002:15; 2003:35). God will provide! It is worth noting that this passage is not against work per se, but rather against anxiety over daily subsistence (Piper 2000:247). The only future tense verb in the entire passage occurs in verse 31: ‘will be granted’ (προστεθήσεται). The remainder of the passage deals in the present and aorist. The few subjunctive verbs that occur (φάγητε [x 2]; ἐνδύσησθε; πίητε) connote the uncertainty of the immediate future, which is the cause of the anxiety under discussion. The adversative conjunction at the beginning of verse 31 (πλὴν/δέ) has a dual function. Linguistically and structurally, it ties verse 31 to verse 29 (Kloppenborg 1987a:218). Semantically and rhetorically, it indicates that the kingdom of God should be sought instead of or rather than the foodstuffs, fluids and clothes of verse 29 (cf. Piper 2000:245; Robinson 1995:264–265). The latter three items are, to state the obvious, present realities of daily existence. Now, if God’s kingdom must be sought in the stead of these present realities, it logically follows that the kingdom in question can be nothing other than a present reality itself (cf. Robinson 2011:473–474; Sim 1985:184). Moreover, the present imperative verb ‘seek’ (ζητεῖτε) in verse 31 indicates that the kingdom must be sought from the present moment on. This strongly suggests that the kingdom is an existing reality, able of being found in the present moment, if not the near future of corporeal existence (cf. Sim 1985:184). Verse 31 explains the ‘more’ (πλεῖόν) of verse 23 (Catchpole 1993:32; Kirk 1998:226). Verse 31, therefore, states that a life in pursuit of the kingdom is ‘more’ than a life in pursuit of necessities (Catchpole 1993:32). That a necessity-oriented life is contrasted with a kingdom-oriented life indicates that the ‘kingdom’ is seen here by Q as an entity capable of being sought in the present (Piper 1989:76). Hence, if the future verb ‘will be granted’ in verse 31 is read in conjunction with the rest of the verse and passage, as it should be, then an eschatological interpretation is taken off the table as a legitimate possibility. Instead, the verb denotes the immediate future of normal, run-of-the-mill existence.105 This is the future being addressed in the current pericope (see Kloppenborg 1987a:219–220; pace Sim 1985:205).

105. Compare the future verb ‘will be granted’ (προστεθήσεται) in Q 12:31 with the future verbs in Q 11:9–13. In both texts, the future verbs apply to the immediate future of normal, run-of-the-mill existence.
Moreover, Q 12:22–31 notably lacks unmistakable apocalyptic imagery (see Piper 2000:248–249). Those who want to read a futurist eschatology into the text could point to the possible apocalyptic connotations of the words ‘eat’ (ἐσθίω), ‘sow’ (σπείρω), ‘reap’ (θερίζω), ‘tomorrow’ (αὔριον), ‘oven’ (κρίβανος) and ‘throw’ (βάλλω).

This goes beyond the text, however, and these Greek words make perfect sense in their immediate sapiential contexts as references to daily existence (Kloppenborg 1987a:220; cf. Piper 1989:31). Given the lack of verbs in the future tense – apart from ‘will be granted’ (προστεθήσεται), which references the immediate future of daily survival – and the further lack of unequivocal apocalyptic imagery, it is extremely unlikely that Q 12:22–31 even alludes to futurist eschatology (pace Catchpole 1993:34; Piper 1989:31, 33). This conclusion is further supported by both Luke and Matthew’s distinct interpretations of the kingdom saying in verse 31. Luke 12:32 states that the Father ‘took pleasure’ (εὐδόκησεν) in granting his flock the kingdom. The fact that ‘took pleasure’ (εὐδόκησεν) is in the aorist tense indicates that, by the time Luke wrote his Gospel, he understood the giving of the kingdom as a completed action in the past. Matthew 6:34 summarises the Q pericope by encouraging his audience not to worry about the physical needs of ‘tomorrow’ (αὔριον). In other words, Matthew also understood the future tense of προστεθήσεται in Q 12:31 as a reference to the immediate future of daily survival.

In light of the discussion up to this point, the following texts can very well be considered to be ‘eschatological’: [Q 11:21–22]; Q 12:39–40; Q 12:42–46; Q 12:49, 51, 53; [Q 12:54–56]; Q 13:24–27; [Q 13:30]; Q 13:35; [Q 14:11]; Q 14:16–18, 21, 23; Q 17:34–35; Q 17:37 and Q 19:12–13, 15–24, 26. Clear apocalyptic images and references are also a feature of the following texts: Q 12:39–40; Q 12:42–46; Q 12:49, 51, 53; [Q 12:54–56]; Q 17:34–35 and Q 17:37. Crucially, all the texts that qualify as ‘eschatological’ display the same two features as those texts whose eschatological and/or apocalyptic natures are beyond doubt (see above in this section); namely, they all lack any reference to either the kingdom of God or the imminence of the apocalyptic event (cf. Horsley 2012:35; Robinson 2001a:39; see Sim 1985:206–223). To start with the latter, the current list of texts seems to confirm that the apocalyptic event would occur unexpectedly at an uncertain and indeterminable time in the future. The bulk of these texts simply mention the apocalyptic event, without clarifying the time of its occurrence. This strongly suggests that Q could, for the most part, take this piece of information for granted on the part of its audience. Nonetheless, there are a small number of texts that address the temporal question directly. Out of these, Q 12:40 is the most straightforward, stating in no uncertain terms that the apocalyptic event will occur ‘at an hour you do not expect’ (ὥρᾳ οὐ δοκεῖτε) (Allison 1997:27; Hunter 1964:84; Jeremias 1966:40, 50; Kloppenborg 2000:118; Sim 1985:234). The point of the subsequent parable (Q 12:42–46), in its final form and position in the main
redaction, is to underline the unexpectedness of the eschatological event, as is made clear by the phrases ‘on a day he does not expect’ (ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ἣν οὐ προσδοκᾷ) and ‘at an hour he does not know’ (ἐν ὥρᾳ ἣν οὐ γινώσκει) in verse 46 (Bock 1996:1182; Casey 2009:220; Fleddermann 2005:637; Funk & Hoover 1993:253, 342; Kloppenborg 1987a:150; 2000:118; Luz 2005:221; Taylor 1989:142–143 fn. 58, 146). Apart from the unexpectedness of the eschatological event, these phrases further highlight the impossibility of knowing when the future event will take place (Kloppenborg 2001:166). These two features complement each other. If it were possible to calculate when the apocalyptic event would take place, then the event would not occur at an unexpected time.

The use of the word ‘delay’ (χρονίζει) in verse 45 should not be seen as a concern over the delay of the eschatological event (pace Allison 1997:27; Fleddermann 2005:623, 637; Kloppenborg 1987a:150; 1995b:293; Taylor 1989:147; Valantasis 2005:170). This description forms part of the narrative framework of the parable, explaining the slave’s inexcusable conduct on the literal level (Crossan 1974:22, 38; Jacobson 1992:197; Jeremias [1947] 1963:57; 1966:44; Luz 2005:221, 222; cf. Fleddermann 2005:637; Marshall 1978:542; see Nolland 2005:998–999). When the parable is interpreted in verse 46, the focus is on the unexpectedness of the Apocalypse, not its delay. The same is true if the parable is read in light of Q 12:40, as it is supposed to be. This is not to deny that the early church at some stage applied the word ‘delay’ in this parable to its own situation (cf. Allison 2004:441; Blomberg 1990:192; Etchells 1998:108; Funk & Hoover 1993:342; Jeremias [1947] 1963:56, 58, 63; 1966:44, 50; Marshall 1978:542). Yet, to argue from this word alone that the delay of the apocalyptic event was an important concern for the Q people seems forced. The only possible allusions to the delay of the apocalyptic event in the rest of Q appear at Q 12:38 and Q 19:15 (cf. Allison 1997:27). Both texts appear in the narrative context of a parable, and should not necessarily be taken as allusions to the delay of the apocalyptic event. Like with Q 12:45, they fulfil an important narrative function at the literal level. More importantly, though, it is not at all certain that either of these allusions belong to Q, with the parable in Q 12:35–38 appearing only in Luke, and the phrase ‘after a long time’ (μετὰ πολὺν χρόνον) in Q 19:15 appearing only in Matthew. Given Matthew’s habit of adding comments about the Parousia’s delay to his parables (Sim 2005:151), it is highly likely that the latter phrase originated not with Q, but with Matthew. If it were in Q, it would suggest the exact opposite of an imminent eschatology.

In addition to Q 12:40 and Q 12:46, there are a number of subtler clues in the current group of texts indicating that imminence and predictability were not features of Q’s eschatological orientation. The sombre scene of Q 17:34–35 is comparable to the content of Q 17:27 (Kirk 1998:261). In Q 17:34–35, everyday, run-of-the-mill activities (literally!, ‘grinding the mill’ [ἀλήθουσαι ἐν τῷ μύλῳ]) are unexpectedly interrupted by what can only be assumed to be the apocalyptic event. These ‘to-be-expected’ activities are contrasted to the unexpectedness of the Apocalypse (Kloppenborg 2001:166).
In Q 12:54–55, the apocalyptic imagery is apparent (cf. Carlton 1982:112–113; pace Horsley 1991:197). These images are followed by the lucid statement in verse 56 that, although people are able to read meteorological and natural phenomena to determine physical time, they are not able to read the same phenomena to predict metaphysical time (Kirk 1998:237). There is legitimate doubt about the presence of this passage in Q. Whether or not it belongs to Q, this text entertains an eschatological orientation similar to that of the remainder of Q.

One should not conclude from the demonstrative pronoun ‘this’ in the term ‘this generation’ that an imminent judgment is implied (see Sim 1985:211–213). ‘This generation’ represents the object of judgment, and has no bearing on the time of judgment. It does not automatically follow from the expectation that ‘this generation’ will be judged at the Final Judgment that such judgment would occur within the lifetimes of those who make up ‘this generation’ (pace Allison 2010:33). Significantly, Q 11:31–32 expects ‘this generation’ to be ‘raised from the dead’ (ἐγερθήσεται) before they are judged. Accordingly, ‘this generation’ will be raised ‘at the same time’ (μετά + genitive) as the Queen of the South and the Ninevite men, who had passed away long before Q was written. The general resurrection is obviously in view here (Allison 2010:39; Borg 1994a:54; Horsley 2012:31; Nolland 2005:512; Valantasis 2005:138). That some or all of those who make up ‘this generation’ would already have passed away before the general resurrection indicates that the term ‘this generation’ has absolutely no bearing on the time of the Final Judgment (cf. Gregg 2006:276). Instead of advocating an imminent eschatology, this text is uncertain about the precise time when the Final Judgment would take place (cf. Horsley 2012:14, 29).

As we saw, Tödt ([1959] 1965) was the father of reading an imminent eschatology into Q (see Chapter 1, ‘The Sayings Gospel Q’). His proposal was extremely influential, and many subsequent scholars took an imminent eschatology for granted when they approached Q. Yet, the evidence upon which Tödt based his theory was surprisingly weak (see Sim 1985:208–211). In fact, it rested on the shoulders of only one text: Matthew 10:23. This text has no Lukan parallel, and is not accepted as part of Q by scholarship today. R.A. Edwards (1971) could be held up as an example of a scholar who uncritically appropriated Tödt’s reading of Q. Edwards described the impending nature of the Parousia as a feature of Q’s theology without once providing any support for his position. On more than one occasion, Edwards explicitly and excitedly utters his approval of Tödt’s theory, and then continues to describe the Q people’s heightened anticipation of the rapidly-approaching end. What is most curious about Edwards’s exposition is that he excludes Matthew 10:23, the very text upon which Tödt’s theory was based, from his own version of Q. A number of other scholars could have been added. After Tödt, all efforts to ‘prove’ that Q proclaimed an imminent eschatology have, as a matter of course, been read into the text.

107. Cf. ‘flame red’ (πυρράζω) (x2), ‘heaven’ (οὐρανός) (x2), ‘wintry’ (χειμών) and ‘gloomy’ (στυγνάζω).
The present result that Q did not entertain thoughts of an imminent eschatology are interesting if compared with Kloppenborg’s (2001:165–169) discussion of imminent eschatology in Q. Besides agreeing with my non-imminent interpretation of most texts in Q,108 Kloppenborg finds three texts that, according to him, harbour an imminent eschatology, namely Q 3:7–9, 16–17; Q 10:12 and Q 11:51b. As here, he dismisses the relevance of Q 3:7–9, 16–17 in providing evidence for the eschatology of Jesus, since it applies rather to the Baptist’s particular brand of eschatology. Regarding the remaining two texts, he argues that their value for our understanding of the historical Jesus is practically omissible, since they derive from redactional material. Nevertheless, even these two texts do not to my mind betray any indication of an adherence to imminent eschatology. There is certainly no direct mention of imminence or even urgency in these texts. Kloppenborg’s choice of words109 when discussing these texts confirms that imminent eschatology is at most suggested by them, not indicated. But there is reason to doubt the validity even of these suggestions.

His case for reading imminent eschatology into Q 11:51b is essentially based on the term ‘this generation’, and the historic-chronological relation of those implied by this term to the figures of Abel and Zechariah (cf. Luz 2005:155). I have already argued that the term ‘this generation’ is not for Q indicative (or even suggestive) of temporality. This pertains no less to Q 11:51b. That only leaves Q 10:12. That the Sayings Gospel does not link the term ‘kingdom of God’ to its eschatology, imminent or otherwise, renders the applicability of the statement in Q 10:9 that the kingdom is near irrelevant to the eschatological presumptions of Q 10:12 (cf. Horsley 2012:29; Robinson 2011:472; pace Carlston 1982:112). Also, the comparison of the fate of the inhospitable in Q 10:12 with that of Sodom is to underline how unbearable and severe it will be, as the text expressly states (cf. ἀνεκτός), not to argue that apocalyptic judgment will transpire just as quickly as it did for Lot and his kin.

### Realised eschatology in Q

Proposals of a ‘realised eschatology’ in Q have traditionally been based on the present kingdom of God logia (e.g. Fleddermann 2005:324). Three of these texts have already received consideration: Q 6:20 (together with verses 22–23), Q 11:2b and Q 12:31 (see above, ‘Futurist eschatology in Q’). Although these three logia are indeed concerned with the present, they do not presume an eschatological or apocalyptic end (pace Allison 2010:38–39; Bock 1994:572; Marshall 1978:250). This does not mean that Jesus failed to proclaim a realised eschatology in the sense that his historical ministry introduced a new age, during which a number of Old Testament prophecies were realised. It does mean, however, that Jesus did not, according to these three Q texts, speak of the ‘kingdom of God’

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108. Or, to be chronologically accurate, the current interpretation of Q texts as non-imminent is largely in agreement with that of Kloppenborg.
109. Like ‘imply’ and ‘suggest’.
in an apocalyptic or imminent sense (see Piper 2000:248–249, 254–255, 259). The remaining texts that could be employed to argue for a realised eschatology in Q comprise the following: Q 7:1, 3, 6–9; Q 7:18–19, 22–23; Q 7:28; Q 10:9; Q 11:14, 20; Q 11:21–22; Q 11:52; Q 13:18–19; Q 13:20–21; Q 16:16 and Q 17:20–21. It cannot be denied that these Q texts understand the historical ministry of Jesus as fulfilling the prophecies of old, and as introducing a new era (see Sim 1985:179–197; cf. Allison 2010:42; Wink 2002:118). This new era could indeed have been interpreted as forming part of an expected eschatological age, commenced by the earthly ministry of Jesus. If so, it is understandable that Q’s Jesus at times incorporated such views about his ministry into his sapiential argumentation and rhetoric.

None of these texts, however, betray any indubitable references to imminence or apocalypticism (cf. Kloppenborg 2001:166; Wink 2002:161–162; pace Allison 2010:42). In fact, there does not seem to be any sense of (temporal) urgency whatsoever. If Catchpole (1993:60–70) is correct in viewing the Q passages about John the Baptist (esp. Q 7:24–27) as ‘editorial statements designed to define the person of Jesus by reference to his eschatological function’ (p. 70), then it is Jesus’ role in relation to a realised eschatology that is specifically in view, not his role in relation to an apocalyptic eschatology (cf. Kloppenborg 2001:166; Sim 1985:177–192; pace Edwards 1976:55). In Q 12:49, which might not have stood in Q to begin with, Jesus wishes that the apocalyptic fire had already been hurled upon the earth, indicating that the predicted apocalyptic event had not yet occurred during his ministry. The ministry of Jesus could indeed have been regarded as the fulfilment of certain prophecies by his followers. It may therefore not be wholly unjustified to describe the ministry of Jesus in terms of a ‘realised eschatology’. Nonetheless, the latter should not be confused with the apocalyptic eschatology that Q clearly also held. Whether or not he saw his ministry as some type of fulfilment of Jewish expectations, Q’s Jesus in no uncertain terms predicted the occurrence of a future, apocalyptic event. Although they overlap, and although they are not incongruent, these are two separate matters that should not be confused. Likewise, that Q subscribes to a realised eschatology should not be taken as evidence that the apocalyptic event was expected soon thereafter (see Sim 1985:206–208).

In the same vein, the possible references to a realised eschatology in Q should not lead to the assumption that Q understands the kingdom of God to be an apocalyptic phenomenon (cf. Kloppenborg 2001:166). Q 17:20–21, if it forms part of the Sayings Gospel at all, holds that the kingdom of God is not coming ‘visibly’ (μετὰ παρατηρήσεως), but that it is ‘within’ or ‘among’ (ἐντὸς) his audience (Wink 2002:162). Regardless of whether ἐντὸς should be translated as ‘within’ or ‘among’, the kingdom of God was not according to this text an expected future event (Casey 2009:223; Robinson 2003:32; 2011:473; pace Allison 2001a:111–112; 2010:98–116). In this pericope, Q’s Jesus does not go on to explain what the kingdom actually is, but the rest of Q leaves the impression that it is inseparably connected to the earthly ministry and message of Jesus. In particular, the ‘kingdom of God’ is associated with the healing of the

Additionally, Q 10:9 and Q 16:16 indicate that the kingdom of God, although it was initiated by Jesus’ earthly ministry, did not discontinue at the consummation of that earthly ministry, but was maintained by his followers (Järvinen 2001:521; Sim 1985:196; cf. Robinson 2003:31; 2011:471, 472). Thus, the earthly ministry of Jesus marks the beginning, but not the end, of God’s kingdom. A word of caution in this regard:

To be sure, this is not intended as a given status, like the ‘established church,’ as if God reigning [i.e. the kingdom of God] had been turned over to a sometimes all-too-human hierarchy to run. Rather God reigning is something that actually happens from time to time, as God participates in the living experience of people. (Robinson 2011:473)

Moreover, Q 13:28–29 indicates that the kingdom of God would continue after the Apocalypse, and be a feature of the post-apocalyptic world. This logion should not be used as a proof text to argue that the future ‘kingdom of God’ represents some kind of eschatological reality separate from the present ‘kingdom of God’, but should rather be seen as evidence of continuity between this age and the one to come (cf. Järvinen 2001:521). Whatever the phrase ‘kingdom of God’ might have symbolised to the Q people, it certainly did not reference a future, imminent or apocalyptic reality separate from the present kingdom of God inaugurated by the ministry of Jesus. An apocalyptic understanding of the term ‘kingdom of God’ has traditionally been read into the text.

### Findings

Q does not presuppose or advocate an imminent eschatology. The Sayings Gospel does, nonetheless, accept and promote both a futurist and an apocalyptic eschatology. The following Q texts have been found to harbour a futurist eschatology: Q 10:12–15; Q 11:19b; [Q 11:21–22]; Q 11:29–32; Q 11:50–51; Q 12:8–9; Q 12:10; Q 12:39–40; Q 12:42–46; Q 12:49, 51, 53; [Q 12:54–56]; Q 13:24–27; Q 13:28–29; [Q 13:30]; Q 13:35; [Q 14:11]; Q 14:16–18, 21, 23; Q 17:23–24; Q 17:26–27, [28–29], 30; Q 17:34–35; Q 17:37; Q 19:12–13, 15–24, 26 and Q 22:28, 30. Out of these, the


112.The term is also used to describe a phenomenon that incorporates the in-group, but that is larger than the in-group (Q 6:20; 7:28; 12:31; 13:18–19, 20–21, 28–29; 16:16), perhaps referring specifically to the symbolic family of which the Q people formed a part (cf. Vaage 2001:486).
following texts may be described more narrowly as apocalyptic: Q 10:12–15; Q 11:29–32; Q 12:8–9; Q 12:39–40; Q 12:42–46; Q 12:49, 51, 53; [Q 12:54–56]; Q 17:23–24; Q 17:26–27, [28–29], 30; Q 17:34–35 and Q 17:37. The first category may also presuppose an apocalyptic end, but the individual texts fail to make this entirely clear.

‘Realised eschatology’ should be clearly distinguished from apocalyptic eschatology. The former implies that Jesus fulfilled a number of Old Testament prophecies, thereby inaugurating a new this-worldly era during his public ministry. The latter denotes a future event of divine intervention that would terminate history (as we know it), bringing about a new this-worldly or other-worldly order (see ‘Introduction’). Whether or not Q understood the ministry of Jesus in terms of a realised eschatology is not central to our purposes.

The term ‘kingdom of God’ is not used by Q in relation or reference to apocalyptic eschatology (pace Allison 2010:38–39). The only text that mentions the kingdom of God in an eschatological context (Q 13:28–29) does so to indicate a measure of continuity between this age and the one to come, not to introduce the kingdom of God as a distinguishing feature of the coming age. In other words, the kingdom of God is not understood by Q as a distinctive reality that will only come into being after the Apocalypse. Instead, it is understood first and foremost as a present reality, even if it is expected also to be a feature of the post-apocalyptic world. Interestingly, the focus on God’s kingdom as a present reality accords with the usage of the term ‘kingdom of God’ in the Gospel of Thomas (see Kloppenborg et al. 1990:99–100, 119–120).

Ethnicity and Q

This section does not relate directly to the book’s overall theme, but will function as the background for upcoming arguments, judgments and textual analyses. Also, the import of Jesus’ Jewishness to the Third and Renewed Quests justifies a section on ethnicity and Q (see Chapter 1, ‘The Third and Renewed Quests’).

At the very beginning of Greek civilisation, the word ἔθνος, from which the English word ‘ethnicity’ originates, could refer to just about any type of group, including, amongst others, flocks of birds, bands of warriors, trade associations and the inhabitants of a particular village, town, city or region (see Duling 2012:297–298). Yet, at the start of the Hellenistic period, and throughout its duration, the word ἔθνος became increasingly used as a way of referring to the ‘other’, especially non-Greeks. Ancient Jews used the Greek word ἔθνος and the Hebrew equivalent ג'O exclusively in reference to groups of other people (see Duling 2012:299–300). These terms were used in either a neutral or a negative manner. The latter usage emphasised the oppositional ‘otherness’ of the outsider group.

Ethnic identity is achieved and maintained through boundary formation and maintenance. The latter happens in two ways simultaneously: (1) like-minded
individuals and groups come together to form a larger ethnic group; a process and position that is called the ‘us’ aggregative self-definition; and (2) ethnic groups demarcate themselves from ‘others’ who are different; a process and position that is called the ‘us-they’ oppositional self-definition. Five key approaches to the social-scientific concept of ‘ethnicity’ can be identified (see Duling 2012:292–294). The first, primordialism, which was first introduced by Shils (1957) and Geertz (1963), maintains that ‘natural affections’ hold ethnic groups together. Hence, internal bonds between individuals and smaller groups, like families and clans, are so powerful, compelling and passionate that they are cemented into the very fibre of an ethnic group’s self-perception. These bonds are indescribable, and are maintained involuntarily, being deeply rooted in language, territory, custom, family and religion. These foundations determine group behaviour, group norms and group values. Two noteworthy factions constitute this first approach. Socio-biological primordialists explain ethnic group formation and solidarity as an evolutionary strategy intended to increase the chances of survival during natural selection. Conversely, cultural primordialists, who constitute the majority, explain ethnic group formation and solidarity as both ‘natural’ and culturally generated. The second social-scientific approach to ‘ethnicity’, constructionism, was first introduced by Frederik Barth (1969). It argues that ethnic identity and solidarity is not natural, fixed or inherent, but freely chosen and fluid. According to this view, boundaries are constantly and perpetually being constructed and reconstructed. These social scientists argue that although the ‘cultural stuff’ of any ethnic group, like place of origin, eating habits and dress codes, are important for boundary formation and maintenance, the act itself of forming and maintaining boundaries is all-important. Whereas the primordialists focus on ethnic features, constructionists focus on the reasons behind and methods of boundary formation and maintenance.

The remaining approaches to ‘ethnicity’ are all rooted in constructionism. The third approach to ‘ethnicity’, instrumentalism, argues that ethnic groups construct identities consciously and out of self-interest. Ethnic identity and boundary formation are motivated by political and economic agendas. The fourth approach is known as the social psychological approach, and takes instrumentalism further. It holds that the creation of kinship myths, the establishment of ethnocentricity and the tendency to stereotype outsiders are all based on the economic, political and social advantages enjoyed by ethnic groups. The last approach is known as the ethno-symbolic approach. It argues that, even though ethnic groups constantly change and adapt, they are able to endure because of their nostalgic attachment to the past, which finds expression in various myths and symbols. Today, the constructionist approach is upheld by most social scientists, although these scholars still disagree about whether ethnic identity is involuntary or self-interested.

Duling (2012:294–296) constructs a model of ethnic identity out of nine aspects of ‘cultural stuff’, or ‘cultural features of ethnicity’. These aspects are: (1) an ethnic group’s
name; (2) common ancestral myths; (3) shared ‘historical’ memories; (4) ‘phenotypical features’, meaning traits that result from genetic predisposition and environmental influence, including genetic traits, physical traits and behavioural traits; (5) an ethnic group’s (home)land, both local and regional; (6) their language, including features such as dialect and accent; (7) ‘kinship’, which includes all the smaller groups that make up the larger ethnic group, like family, tribe and nation; (8) ethnic customs, such as eating habits, dress codes and preferences in music; and (9) religion, which encompasses ancient politics as well. In keeping with the constructionist approach, Duling’s model allows for change and adaptation of the ‘cultural stuff’. These ‘cultural features of ethnicity’ are not only shaped by an ethnic group’s norms, values and behaviour, but also influence such norms, values and behaviour. Such ‘cultural stuff’ further serves the purpose of constructing and maintaining ethnic boundaries (cf. Duling 2012:327). Duling (2012:296) sees this model of ethnicity as a heuristic tool that would ideally enable researchers to arrange, classify and describe the data available. Although this model will not be mentioned again, it serves as the underlying foundation and heuristic paradigm in much of the following discussion.

Q’s provenance

Allison (1997:52–53) bases his argument for a Palestinian origin of Q on a few textual indicators: (1) his Q1 lacks any indication of a Gentile mission; (2) Q 13:29 addresses the inhabitants of Israel and Jerusalem as if these places were the centre of their world; (3) Luke (Q?) 12:54–56 betrays and presents climatologic knowledge of Palestine; and (4) Q 17:23 speaks of the kind of sign prophets who were, to our knowledge, concentrated in Palestine. That Q originated somewhere in Palestine is accepted as a truism by virtually all Q scholars today (e.g. Kloppenborg 2001:152). Most of these scholars also feel that it is possible to zoom in further and locate Q, with a fairly high level of certainty, in Galilee (Horsley 1999c:46; Koester 1997:138). According to Kloppenborg (2000:174–175), Q’s rhetoric fits the situation of Lower Galilee before 70 CE. He bases this judgment on Q’s protests and rhetoric against the Pharisees and scribes, whom he locates in Galilee. That those responsible for Q ‘presume quite specific knowledge of the practices of Pharisees on the part of the audience’ (Kloppenborg 2000:174) indicates for him that Q was in all likelihood written in Galilee. Given our shortage of reliable information about the Pharisaic movement before 70 CE, Kloppenborg’s argument is not entirely convincing if considered in isolation. For the most part, the judgment that Q originated in Galilee is based on the mentioning of three Galilean villages,113 Capernaum, Chorazin and Bethsaida.

113. Distinctions between the terms ‘village’, ‘town’ and ‘city’ tend to be very imprecise and blurred in ancient sources (Horsley 1995a:191–192). Freyne (1988:145–146) explains that the physical characteristics of ancient settlements are not sufficient to determine their designations. Unlike today, population size had very little to do with the attribution of terms like ‘city’, ‘town’ or ‘village’ to particular settlements (Reed 2000:70, 167). Features of internal organisation and political (in)dependence are much more telling. Cities tended to be politically and socially organised according to Greek democratic ideals, whereas towns and
in Q 10:13–15 (Koester 1997:154; e.g. Horsley 2012:104). Tuckett (1996:102) might be correct when he laments that the mentioning of these three villages is hardly conclusive evidence for situating the whole of Q in Galilee. Even so, Galilee remains for most scholars Q’s most likely point of origin (Park 2014:4 of 11). This consensus is in no small way due to the efforts of Jonathan Reed.

The centrality of Capernaum, Chorazin and Bethsaida for the Q document and people is central to Reed’s (1995:21–24; 2000:170–196) investigation of the geographical positioning and social characteristics of all the settlements mentioned in Q. Using this information, Reed allocates each of Q’s cities and towns to one of three concentric circles. His discussion moves in a centrifugal direction. The three villages mentioned above, in addition to Nazara and Gath-Heper, belong to the innermost circle. Jerusalem, Tyre and Sidon belong to the middle circle. Nineveh and Sodom occupy a position in the outermost circle. Reed concludes that Q was probably penned somewhere in the central circle. In particular, Capernaum, Chorazin and Bethsaida are differentiated from the other six places mentioned in Q by the intensity of their condemnation in Q 10:13–15. Such passionate condemnation betrays a measure of emotional attachment to these three villages, indicating that they must have been highly significant to the Q people (Reed 1995:21; cf. Vaage 2001:484–485). Apart from Tyre and Sidon, the three villages by the Sea of Galilee seem to have been the only places considered by Q to be corporeal places, physically known to the author(s) (Arnal 2001:159). The import of these three villages for the Q document and people is further indicated by their general insignificance in the rest of the biblical tradition (see Reed 1995:21–22; 2000:140–141, 183–184; cf. Allison 1997:53; Arnal 2001:160; Tuckett 1996:102). 114 Out of the three villages, ‘Capernaum in particular is singled out for special condemnation’ (Cromhout 2007:286), being at the heart of the woes in Q 10:13–15 (Fleddermann 2005:436; Reed 1995:21–22; 2000:183). This focus on Capernaum is not only indicated by the content and structure of Q 10:13–15, but also by its grammar. Whereas Q 10:13 addresses Chorazin and Bethsaida indirectly with a personal pronoun in the dative case (σοι), Q 10:15 addresses Capernaum directly with a personal pronoun featuring as a vocative nominative (σύ). These observations seem to indicate that Capernaum was an important and central hub for the Q people (cf. Reed 2000:184). The cities of the two outer circles are not real prospects for consideration. A distanced and disinterested tone towards Jerusalem

villages tended to be organised according to kinship, seniority and prosperity. Cities also tended to be much more cosmopolitan, whereas the inhabitants of villages and towns were prone to homogeneity. These distinctions are not always helpful, and some towns or villages might have been fairly large and rather prosperous. Distinctions between the terms ‘town’ and ‘village’ are almost impossible to draw. In most cases, the two terms are used interchangeably by ancient writers. In the current study, Freyne’s definitions of ‘city’ and ‘town’ or ‘village’ will suffice. As an attempt not to evoke anachronistic ideas of modern towns, the current study will prefer the term ‘village’ for all settlements deemed not to qualify as cities (in the way Freyne understands the term ‘city’). This includes Capernaum, even if the canonical Gospels tend to reference it as a ‘polis’ (see Reed 2000:166–169).

114 Before the historical appearance of Jesus, Capernaum is not mentioned. Shortly after the time of Jesus, Josephus (Life 72; J.W. 3:519) and rabbinic sources (Midr. Qoh. 1:8; 7:26) mention it in passing. It is only with the rise of Christianity that Capernaum is mentioned with greater regularity.
indicates for Reed that this city should not receive genuine consideration. Regarding the ‘mythical’ cities of the third circle, neither of them existed at the time when Q was conceived.

A number of corroborating factors point to the centrality of Capernaum specifically. Q’s Jesus is much more stagnant than, for instance, Mark’s Jesus. For the most part, Jesus’ sedentary activity in Q is based in and around Capernaum (Reed 1995:21). After his temptation and delivery of the inaugural sermon, Jesus enters Capernaum, after which none of the verbs referring to him denote movement. In all of Q, it is only Q 7:1 that locates a saying or action of Jesus at a specific place, and the place happens to be Capernaum (Arnal 2001:161; Reed 2000:139). Another supporting factor is the strong textual connection between Capernaum and the origins of Jesus. Q also shares important references to Capernaum with the Signs Source behind the Gospel of John (see Robinson 1995:267–268). The healing of the Centurion’s son, which is the only narrated miracle story in Q, is corroborated by the Signs Source to have occurred in Capernaum (cf. Jn 4:46–54 & Q 7:1–10). Significantly, Q’s condemnation of Capernaum might also have a parallel in the Signs Source (cf. Jn 6:24 & Q 10:15). According to Reed (2000:189–195), Q’s pervasive and particular use of rural, agricultural and natural imagery, as well as its specific use of urban imagery, fits a Galilean context very well. Taken together, these observations strongly suggest a geographical provenance for the Q document and people in or around Capernaum. According to Robinson (2001a:49), the Q document features Capernaum in its description of the Jesus movement as the ‘base camp of a circuit’ that included Capernaum, Chorazin and Bethsaida.

### Galilean ethnicity

Earlier scholarship simply assumed that 1st-century Galilee was inhabited by numerous Gentiles, and perhaps a few Jews. Typically, these scholars would point out

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115. The canonical Gospels agree in locating Jesus’ public ministry in Galilee (Freyne 1988:143; Reed 2000:10). Despite Luke’s rather loose application of the term ‘city’ (πόλις), the Gospels further agree that Jesus’ career was directed at Galilean villages. Capernaum was within walking distance of most of the villages Jesus is said by the Gospels to have visited during his public ministry (Vorster 1999:296). In Mark 1:21–28, Jesus preaches at the local synagogue in Capernaum, where his first miracle also takes place. Other miracles also occur in Capernaum (see Mk 1:32–34; 2:1–12). Mark 1:29 also features Capernaum as the hometown of Andrew, John, Simon and James. Mark places Jesus in a house in Capernaum in Mark 2:1 (ἐν οἴκῳ) and Mark 9:33 (ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ) (Reed 2000:139). Matthew (4:13–16) likewise mentions that Jesus ‘lived’ or ‘settled’ (κατοικέω) in Capernaum after leaving Nazareth (Moxnes 2003:48). Matthew 9:1, 7 calls Capernaum ‘his [Jesus’ own city’ (τὴν ἰδίαν πόλιν), where he went to ‘his house’ (τὸν οἶκον αὐτοῦ). Luke 4:23 recognises Capernaum as an important centre for Jesus’ miracles. After starting his public career in Nazareth, and facing rejection there (Lk 4:16–23), Jesus turns to Capernaum (Lk 4:31–32) (Moxnes 2003:48). According to John 2:12, Jesus ‘stayed’ or ‘remained’ (μένω) in Capernaum for a few days with his biological family (ἡ μήτηρ αὐτοῦ καὶ οἱ ἀδελφοὶ [αὐτοῦ]). John 6:24 describes Capernaum as the place where people would ‘go looking’ (ζητοῦντες) for Jesus if they could not find him. Significantly, four (out of a possible five) Johannine references to Capernaum are from the Signs Source (Reed 2000:139).

116. Throughout this study, the term ‘Jesus movement’ may denote one singular Jesus group, like the Q people, or it may function as an umbrella term for all the Jesus groups that together formed a movement. The context will make the application clear.
Galilee’s ‘long history of conquests by ancient near eastern empires’ (Mack 1993:56). This ‘long history’ supposedly proved that Galilee held mixed peoples, including many Gentiles. With his groundbreaking book, The myth of a Gentile Galilee, Chancey (2002) comprehensively and convincingly refuted the long-standing notion that Galilee held a significant number of Gentiles. Most scholars have been convinced by Chancey’s results.

Some scholars have upheld the earlier conviction that 1st-century Galilee was mainly inhabited by Israelites, as opposed to Judeans (e.g. Horsley 1995a:39–40; Mack 1993:52–54, 59). In this book, the term ‘Judeans’ refers to those Jews who historically made up the southern tribes of Israel, while the term ‘Israelites’ refers to those Jews who historically made up the northern tribes of Israel. According to Horsley (1999c:50, 55), many Israelite populations escaped Assyrian deportation, and were still occupying the region at the time of Jesus. Horsley (1995a:26–27; 1996:22–23) believes that the Assyrians deported only the Galilean upper classes, and left the peasantry behind. With the advent of Hasmonean colonisation, these Israelites were joined by Judeans from the south (Horsley 1995a:243). Such an occupational history leads Horsley (1995a:50–51; 1999c:50; 1999e:102) to conclude that 1st-century Galilee was isolated from Jerusalem and the Temple for more than six hundred years. This conclusion, in turn, is responsible for the scholarly assumption that 1st-century Galilee had grown lax, failing to properly observe the Torah, or regularly visit the Temple (e.g. Horsley 1995a:51, 281; 1995b:39; 1999c:55–58; Kloppenborg 2000:229–234; Mack 1993:59). The Assyrian conquest happened more than 100 years before the high priest Hilkiah reportedly discovered the book of Deuteronomy (cf. 2 Ki 22:3–13), and the Pentateuch received its final edit.

These assessments have recently been called into question, resulting in their abandonment by most scholars. Two factors have contributed to the dispelling of these erroneous views: (1) a reconsideration of the textual evidence; and (2) the emergence of new archaeological evidence (see Freyne 2000:176–182). In short, both brands of evidence indicate that Galilee was (almost) completely depopulated after the Assyrian campaign (see Chancey 2002:32–33; Gal 1992; Reed 2000:29–31; cf. Cromhout 2007:234–235; Edwards 2007:359; Freyne 2000:11, 177, 219–220; Savage 2007:194). After the Assyrian depopulation of Galilee, the region was sparsely repopulated during the Persian and Hellenistic periods, probably by Syro-Phoenicians (see Chancey 2002:34–36, 43; Edwards 2007:359–361; Moreland 2007:143–144, 146–147; Reed 2000:35–39; Savage 2007:194–196; cf. Freyne 2000:179). The Hasmoneans subsequently recovered the region (see Kloppenborg 2000:215, 221–222). Not only were Judeans repopulating Galilee during this time, but they were also driving out whoever had thinly repopulated Galilee during the Persian and Early Hellenistic periods (see Aviam 2004:7–27; 2007:115–132; Cappelletti 2007:69–81; Chancey 2002; 2005:37–38; 2007:91; Cromhout 2007:231–256; Edwards 2007:361, 371–372;

If Galilee were indeed inhabited by Judeans, it is reasonable to assume that its residents ‘operated within the exclusive realm of covenantal nomism’, and also ‘shared the same symbolic universe as those Judeans that lived within Judea’ (Cromhout 2007:255). These Galileans seem to have practiced circumcision, obeyed the Torah and observed the Sabbath (see Freyne 1980:309–318; 1988:155; 2000:52–54, 80–85; pace Horsley 1995a:152–157).118 The archaeological evidence signifies a direct cultural and religious continuity between Judea and Galilee (see Robinson 2011:464–465). Such continuity can be explained as the necessary result of the Hasmonean colonisation of Galilee (Cromhout 2007:256). Inhabitants of both provinces probably reminisced over the same ‘historical’ memories and stories. Galileans also regarded both the Temple

\[117\] Moreland (2007:133–159) has contested these results. Although he agrees that the archaeological evidence supports the idea that some Judeans occupied Galilee, he does not agree that they necessarily constituted the majority. He has mainly three counter-arguments. Firstly, he points to the fact that the majority of Galileans were agrarian villagers, who left very little archaeological remains indicative of ethnicity. As such, Moreland argues that we should not simply assume their Judean ethnicity. Secondly, Moreland reminds his reader of the probability that miqva’ot [ritual baths] were mostly restricted to wealthier homes. He then goes further to suggest that the same might have been true of stone vessels as well. In other words, the material remains are indicative of purity concerns amongst the elite, not necessarily the majority. Thirdly, Moreland points to the general lack in 1st-century Galilee of ossuaries associated with secondary burial customs. All three arguments are ad silencium. More importantly, the first two arguments are simply misguided. As it stands, stone vessels (as well as bone profiles lacking pork) were not only discovered in wealthy (urban) homes, but also in poor (village) homes, like those excavated at Capernaum. This bolsters both of Moreland’s first two arguments. On the one hand, the majority was not silent in expressing their Judean ethnicity in the material remains. On the other, Judean ethnicity was not only a feature of the elite. Moreland’s third argument is simply based on the lack of ossuaries for secondary burial. Even if this is accepted, it still does not void the other three indicators of Judean ethnicity. Moreland fails to indicate from the archaeological profile who else could have inhabited Galilee. He does argue for a continued Syro-Phoenician occupation of Galilee, but his fallacious arguments are based both on the political-economic relations between Galilee and the coastal cities, which is undeniable, but has no bearing on Galilean ethnicity, and on archaeological evidence of Galilee being thinly repopulated during the Persian and Early Hellenistic Periods, which is similarly undeniable, but inconsequential for the 1st century. The only ‘evidence’ of a 1st-century Galilee being populated by Syro-Phoenicians is the presence of Syro-Phoenician cities on the northern and western border regions of Galilee, once again an undeniable situation, but one that has no bearing on the ethnicity of ‘Galilee proper’.

and Jerusalem to be integral to their centripetal cultic belief and practice, making pilgrimage visits there (see Freyne 1988:178–187; 2000:130, 154; Reed 2000:57–58; pace Horsley 1995a:144–147). Although some of the criticisms of Jerusalem and the Temple came from Galilee, these were not necessarily representative of mainstream Galilean views (see Freyne 1988:187–190). Many Galileans continued bringing tithes to the Temple, or offered them up whenever priestly representatives made their rounds (Freyne 2000:154). The people of Palestine tended to view Galilee as part of the ancestral Promised Land, given to them by the very same God who resides in the Jerusalem Temple (see Freyne 1988:190–198). God’s providence motivated their innate connection to the cultic centre in Jerusalem, which in turn motivated their pilgrimages. For Jews, the Torah legitimised the link between Temple and land, providing stipulations for the maintenance and management of both. The production of oil lamps and stone vessels in Galilee indicates that the region had not only cultic and cultural, but also economic, ties with Jerusalem (Aviam 2004:23). Torah observance was generally accepted by Galileans as the proper way in which to abide by the covenant, which was represented by the symbols of land and Temple (see Freyne 1988:198–213).

Texts such as John 6:52 and John 7:49–53, amongst others, should not allow scholars to erroneously conclude that Galileans were lax in observing the Torah. These texts rather reflect the views of Jerusalemites, who saw themselves as being socio-religiously superior to those from Galilee, who were cut off from the Temple by the province of Samaria (see Freyne 1988:208–212). Such social divisions should not be misconstrued as evidence of cultural or religious discontinuity between Galilee and Judea. Although Judeans might have judged Galileans for their perceived ignorance and their proximity to neighbouring Gentiles, they still thought of Galileans as co-ethnics. Some Galileans resisted rigorist interpretations of the Torah, preferring to concern themselves with

119It is highly unlikely that the cultic centres of Mount Gerazim and Dan had any religious pull or influence on local Galileans (see Freyne 1988:182–184).

120 Cf. Luke 2:41, 44; Josephus, *Jewish Antiquities* 2.280; 17.254–258; 20.118, 123; *Jewish War* 2.237. The fact that Galileans undertook pilgrimages to Jerusalem is particularly significant given the dangers such journeys entailed. These dangers included encounters with bandits and robbers (cf. Lk 10:30; 22:35–37), Samaritans (cf. Lk 9:26; Josephus, *Ant*. 20.123; *J.W.* 2.237), and Roman officials (cf. Lk 13:1). Not only were the journeys dangerous, but they also had economic repercussions. Pilgrimages entailed being away from one’s smallholding or work station for a period of about three weeks (Cromhout 2007:242). In addition, peasants and craftsmen imparted portions of their livelihood to the Temple. Given these circumstances, the lower classes must have had good religious reasons for setting off to Jerusalem. The religious reward(s) must have outweighed the physical dangers and economic drawbacks of visiting Jerusalem. These individuals must have believed that the Temple really was the centre of the religious universe, from where God blessed his children.

121 See 1 Enoch 14:18–22; 15:3–4; Testament of Levi 2–7 and Josephus’s *Jewish War* 6.300–309 for evidence of Galilean criticisms of the Temple. Sepphoris refused to participate in the Jewish Revolt (Josephus, *Life* 30, 37, 39, 104, 124, 232, 246–347, 373, 394). Such pacifistic attitude was not indicative of its religious views of Jerusalem and its Temple, but of its general neutrality regarding the aspirations of the Great Revolt (Freyne 1988:190; see Josephus, *J.W.* 2.574–575; 3.61–62; *Life* 348, 373–380). The Sepphoris coinage of 67 CE, inscribed with the term εἰρηνοπολις [city of peace], confirms this general attitude (see Reed 2000:100–101). Sepphoris’s inaction seems to have been chiefly motivated by self-preservation (see Chancey 2002:78–79); a strategy that paid off in the end (cf. Cappelletti 2007:79). In fact, the Temple is in this context described as being ‘common to us all’, including the inhabitants of Sepphoris.
day to day activities, such as craftsmanship and farming (cf. Freyne 2000:154). Some Galileans were dissatisfied with and opposed to movements like Pharisaism, which tended to expound the Torah so rigorously that it became impractical for day to day living, and a hindrance to survival. Such fanatic movements were sure to emanate from Jerusalem (cf. Ac 9:1). All in all, historical sources tend to portray Galileans as observant of the Sabbath, loyal to the pilgrimage, faithful to tithe payments, concerned with the purity of the Temple, and anxious about the presence of uncircumcised Gentiles amongst them.

As we have seen, Capernaum is a very probable location for the origin of Q (see above, ‘Q’s provenance’). A closer look at what we know of this village is therefore warranted. Archaeological findings indicate that Capernaum was very thinly occupied during the Middle Bronze and First Iron Ages (2200 BCE – 1000 BCE), and was desolate during the latter two Iron Ages (1000 BCE – 587 BCE), with the first signs of reoccupation dating to the late Hellenistic Period (167 BCE – 63 BCE) (see Reed 2000:144–145). As with the rest of Galilee, this occupational history corresponds to Assyrian deportation and subsequent Hasmonean colonisation, pointing to Capernaum’s Judean ethnicity. The Judean ethnicity of Capernaum is further corroborated by other archaeological finds (see Reed 2000:50, 156–161; cf. Chancey 2002:103).122 If Bethsaida is to be located at et-Tell, which seems likely, it also reveals signs of Judean occupation (see Savage 2007:193–206).

There is possible evidence of an earlier synagogue structure in Capernaum, underneath the 5th-century limestone synagogue. That this earlier structure was a synagogue is not unlikely, given the ancient custom of building holy sites on top of one another (Chancey 2002:104). The general lack of evidence for synagogue structures anywhere else in 1st-century Galilee has convinced Reed (2000:154–155) that this earlier structure in Capernaum does not date to the 1st century. Reed’s reasoning might be circular here.123 A 1st-century synagogue has also been discovered at Gamla (Aviam 2007:121). Although this structure stands outside the geographical boundaries of 1st-century Galilee, its relative proximity to Capernaum indicates that inhabitants of Capernaum were exposed to a variety of diaspora-type customs and praxes, including the use of synagogues. According to Chancey (2002:104), ‘[c]eramic evidence clearly dates the construction of the pavement to the 1st century CE at the latest’ (cf. Runesson 2007:239). There appears to be a rising consensus amongst

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122. As with all settlements excavated along the shore of the lake, Miqva‘ot were lacking, probably because the lake would have replaced the need for immersion pools (see Reed 2000:50, 157–158). Besides, Miqva‘ot were not a feature of rural homes, but could rather be found in the country near important public areas like synagogues or olive presses (Oakman 2008:259; see Kloppenborg 2000:231–234). The presence of Miqva‘ot in the domestic sphere was a feature restricted to wealthier urban homes (Cromhout 2007:246; Moreland 2007:140).

123. If the earlier structure in Capernaum is not a synagogue building, then there is no evidence that such buildings existed in Galilee during the 1st century. If there is no evidence of synagogue buildings in Galilee during the 1st century, then the one in Capernaum could not very likely have been a synagogue.
scholars not only that the structure at Capernaum was a synagogue, but also that it should indeed be dated to the 1st century CE (see Runesson 2007:232–233). The Gospels (Mk 1:21–29; Lk 7:5; Jn 6:59) mention a synagogue in Capernaum. Reed (2000:154–155) has contested the relevance of these biblical references by arguing that the ones by Mark and John probably refer to a gathering or assembly, not an actual building (cf. Horsley 1995a:222–227; 1996:131–132, 146–148). Reed’s position seems untenable in view of the fact that the verbs and prepositions in the Marcan pericope all connote movement in relation to an actual structure. Reed admits that Luke 7:5 refers to a building, but argues that this reference might be the result of Luke’s Sitz im Leben in the diaspora, where synagogue buildings were more prominent. This is a fairly weak argument, especially if seen in conjunction with the Marcan reference to an actual building. In this instance, archaeological and literary sources overlap in situating a synagogue building in Capernaum during the 1st century CE. The basalt synagogue confirms the Jewish ethnicity of Capernaum during the 1st century CE, and the limestone synagogue attests to a Jewish ethnic continuity into later periods.

Ethnicity and Q

Very few scholars would disagree that Q was written for a Jewish audience (cf. Kloppenborg 2000:256; see Cromhout 2007:267–268; Horsley 1999e:95–96). Q alludes and refers to traditional Jewish texts, personages and sites (Cotter 1995a:124; Park 2014:5 of 11; see Horsley 1995b:41–42; Vaage 2001:479–487). Q’s Jesus more than once directly quotes Jewish scripture, not to mention all the obvious references to biblical traditions throughout Q. More subtle allusions to generic Jewish traditions

124. Verse 21 says that Jesus ‘entered the synagogue’: εἰσελθὼν εἰς τὴν συναγωγὴν. Louw and Nida (1993a:195) define the verb ‘enter’ (εἰσέρχομαι) as: ‘to move into a space, either two-dimensional or three-dimensional.’ This ‘space’ is then described by them as an ‘area or structure’. The use of the preposition ‘into’ (εἰς) with the verb ‘entered’ (εἰσέρχομαι) only adds to the case that movement ‘into’ a physical structure is denoted, especially since εἰς is followed by the accusative noun συναγωγήν (cf. Newman 1993, s.v. εἰσέρχομαι). The definite article before συναγωγήν strengthens the current case, since one would not expect an article to feature in reference to a general assembly, especially if the assembly in question appears in the narrative or discourse for the first time, as it does in Mark 1:21 (cf. Ja 2:2). The phrase ‘he was in the synagogue’ (ἦν ἐν τῇ συναγωγῇ αὐτῶν) in Mark 1:23 might refer to either a general assembly or a specific structure, with the verb ‘was’ (ἦν) and the preposition ‘in’ (ἐν) lending themselves to both interpretations. If verse 23 references a general assembly, it refers to the assembly who had already been described in verse 21 as being gathered in the synagogue building. Verse 29 states that Jesus ‘exited the synagogue’ (δόθη τῇ συναγωγῇ ἐξελθόντες). Louw and Nida (1993a:187) define the verb ‘exit’ (ἐξέρχομαι) as: ‘to move out of an enclosed or well-defined two or three-dimensional area.’ Semantically, the verb denotes movement ‘out of’ or ‘from within’, which is the direct opposite movement as ‘enter’ (εἰσέρχομαι) in verse 21. As in verse 21, the sentence features the compound verb’s equivalent preposition, namely ‘out of’ (ἐκ). Also like verse 21, verse 29 features a definite article before συναγωγήν. If the phrases εἰσέρχομαι εἰς τὴν συναγωγήν (verse 21) and δόθη τῇ συναγωγῇ ἐξελθόντες (verse 29) are read together, they leave no doubt that an actual structure is intended. Physical movement is the main concern of verse 29 (cf. ἐξελθόντες, ἠλθόν), with such movement occurring from one physical structure (συναγωγής) to another (οἰκίαν).

125. The following direct quotations can be listed: Q 4:4 (cf. Dt 8:3); Q 4:8 (cf. Ex 20:8; Dt 6:13); Q 4:12 (cf. Dt 6:16); Q 7:22 (cf. Is 29:18–19; 35:5–6; 42:6–7; 61:1–2); Q 7:27 (cf. Ex 23:20; Mt 3:1).

also feature prominently in Q. 

Jerusalem is portrayed by Q as the ruling nucleus of the society in which its hearers found themselves. The Pharisees and scribes are the only formal Jewish groups expressly mentioned, and are depicted as rival analysts of Jewish tradition. Q features words transliterated directly from Aramaic without any need to explain their meaning, including ‘Gehenna’ (γέεννα) in Q 12:5 and ‘Mammon’ (μαμωνᾶς) in Q 16:13. Whenever Q refers to Gentiles, they are not only described as forming part of the out-group, but also used rhetorically to strengthen internal self-definition (cf. Q 6:33–34; 12:30). Gentiles function apologetically in Q to shame a predominantly Jewish audience (Kloppenborg 2011b:265; cf. Smith 2006:148; see Reed 2000:135–136). Shaming one’s own group by comparing them to other ethnic groups was a common **topos** at the time (Reed 2000:188). Referring to the rest of the world as ‘the nations’, like Q 12:30 does, is a distinctively Jewish custom (Cotter 1995b:118–119). Throughout the Sayings Gospel Q, Israel’s epic history is referenced numerous times. In Q 12:27, knowledge of Solomon’s wealth is taken for granted (Cotter 1995a:118; cf. Vaage 2001:481). A number of other Jewish heroes are also expressly named, including Abel, Noah, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Jonah, Zechariah, the Queen of the South, and perhaps Lot (Bork 2014:8 of 10; Park 2014:5 of 11; Vaage 2001:480). In these individual cases, knowledge of the heroes and their stories is similarly taken for granted. Jewish cities and villages are prominent throughout Q. The Sayings Gospel not only uses the Torah as a basis for polemic and rhetorical argumentation, but also regularly affirms the continued validity of the Torah (Horsley 1999e:115).

The overwhelming evidence that Galilee was not made up of Israelites in the 1st century CE has only been published fairly recently. Before these results became available, a number of Q scholars maintained that the Q people were Israelites. In many respects, an Israelite ethnicity fits the content of Q like a glove. Q’s arguments do not always draw upon southern institutions, like the Temple, the priesthood, purity distinctions or the Torah, even in cases where such references would support the argument in question. Conversely, many terms, references and themes in Q draw

23:20; Mi 3:1; Sir 4:11; 1 En. 42 vs. Sir 24); Q 10:3 (cf. Ezek 22:27; Zph 3:3); Q 10:7 (cf. Nm 18:30–31); Q 11:20 (cf. Ex 8:19; 31:18; Dt 9:10); Q 11:29 (cf. Dt 32:5, 20); Q 11:39–52 (cf. Mi 6:8; Hs 4:1; 12:7; Zch 7:9; 1 En. 42 vs. Sir 24; Is 5:18–24; Am 6:1–7); Q 12:49–59 (cf. Mi 7:6); Q 13:34–35 (cf. Dt 32:11; Jr 22:1–9; Ps 117[118]:26; Am 5:1–3; Is 1:21).

127. Horsley (1999e:95–98) lists the following: Q 3:7–9, 16–17 alludes to the Mosaic covenant and ‘harvest’ as a symbol of judgment; Q 4:1–13 references 40 years in the wilderness, the agency of the Holy Spirit and the title ‘Son of God’; Q 9:57–62 alludes to Elijah and Elisha; Q 10:21–24 contrasts Jesus’ mission with past experiences; Q 11:2–4 appeals to the Law of Moses; Q 11:14–15, 17–20 contextualises Israel’s dualistic view of the struggle between God and Satan; Q 12:39–40 mentions the Son of Man; Q 16:16–18 references the Mosaic Torah; Q 17:23–37 alludes to the sudden acts of judgment in the times of Noah and Lot; Q 22:28–30 mentions the twelve tribes of Israel, and alludes to the traditions of God’s justice being effected for widows and orphans, but also for the whole of Israel.


upon northern, pre-monarchic traditions (see Kloppenborg 2000:199, 203–206; cf. Horsley 1996:122–123, 174; 1999e:120; Mack 1993:143–144). Past constructs of an Israelite Galilee influenced the interpretation of Q’s content. Accordingly, Q’s reaction to Jerusalem and its Temple, as the symbolic nucleus of southern interests, both cultic and political, was explained as a reflection of general ‘Galilean’ sentiments (e.g. Horsley 1995b:38–39, 42; 1999a:89; 1999c:55–58; 1999e: 99, 101). The Sayings Gospel Q regarded Pharisees as the embodiment of Judean influence in Galilee (e.g. Horsley 1995a:149–151; 1995b:42; 1999c:56; Kloppenborg 2000:205; Mack 1993:141–144). Judean interests were physically represented by the Pharisees, and symbolically represented by Jerusalem, which was viewed as the destination of local goods and produce. It followed for these scholars that Q’s refusal to recognise or accommodate purity distinctions (cf. Q 11:39–41), tithing (cf. Q 11:42) and the social, religious and economic roles of Jerusalem and the Temple (cf. Q 11:49–51; 13:34–35) was based on its Israelite heritage.

Traditional Israelite themes, however, do not necessarily point to Israelite ethnicity or genealogical continuity (cf. Reed 2000:60). These traditions and stories were assimilated by Judeans before the Assyrian conquest, and were cultivated by them throughout the Babylonian, Persian and Hellenistic periods. Although Moses and David are not expressly mentioned, Allison (2000:25–73; 2001c:395–428) has shown convincingly that allusions and references to these heroes are prevalent throughout Q (cf. Cromhout 2007:310–311; Horsley 2012:105–107). According to Reed (2000:59, 204–208), Jonah was probably venerated and reinstated as an indigenous hero by Galileans in and around Gath-Hepher. Likewise, the centrality of prophetic themes in Q is not an indication of Israelite ethnicity. Prophecy suited Q’s specific message, especially to justify persecution against them, and to legitimate critique against Jerusalem (cf. Kloppenborg 1990:79; see Reed 2000:209–210). Galilee was not opposed to Judean influence. In fact, they were Judeans themselves.

It cannot be denied that Q cultivates a negative attitude towards Jerusalem and its Temple, as well as the Pharisees and ‘this generation’ (Hoffmann 1995:191; see Horsley 1995b:46; 1999e:120–121; 1999h:277). It may also be conceded that Jerusalem’s geographical distance from Galilee impacted Galilean perceptions and behaviour (cf. Tuckett 1996:439; see Reed 1995:22–23). However, Q’s antagonism must be interpreted by considering Q’s own polemic, and cannot be assumed to stem from Galilean sentiments in general (see Reed 2000:60–61). In other words, the Q people had their own reasons for harbouring a negative attitude towards Jerusalem and its

131. These include: The word ‘Israel’ in Q 7:9 and Q 22:30; the centrality of prophetic themes throughout Q; nostalgic ideals for tribal equality (Q 22:30); references to pre-Monarchic patriarchs like Abraham, Isaac, Jacob and Noah (Q 3:8; 13:28–30; 17:26–27); the reference to Jonah in Q 11:29–31; allusions to Elijah and Elisha in Q 7:21–23 and Q 9:57–62; the lack of direct references to kings and priests, particularly David and Moses (Solomon is either remembered for his wisdom or used as a negative example of wealth and kingship); the lack of any reference to Judeans (Ἰουδαίοι); and the lack of a Zionist theology.

Chapter 2

Temple, together with the Pharisees, scribes and ‘this generation’. Reasons for such antagonism must be extrapolated from the content of Q itself, and not assumed to be related to its ethnicity, which was Judean. In fact, throughout Israel’s history, but particularly around the turn of the Common Era, various southern groups also criticised and opposed Jerusalem, the Temple and the high priesthood, with skirmishes and rebellions at times turning violent (see Horsley 1999c:57–58; 1999e:99–100, 113). Popular prophetic and messianic movements were usually formed because of their opposition to Jerusalem and its Temple. These movements existed not only in the countryside, but also in cities, including Jerusalem itself.

The line between those 1st-century Jews who supported both the Temple and Jerusalem, on the one hand, and those who opposed these institutions, on the other, should not be drawn geographically or culturally, but socio-economically. Since the time of Augustus, foreign rule policy was to recruit indigenous, urbanised aristocracy to administer much of the empire on Rome’s behalf, which included the ingathering of various taxes and rents (Oakman 2008:75). As a result, high priests and their representatives collected taxes and tithes from struggling peasants (Freyne 1988:151; see Horsley 1995a:141–143; 2012:62–64). In both Judea and Galilee, the Jewish elite were contributing to the poverty and desperation experienced by the peasantry and the poor, who constituted the overwhelming majority of people on the lower levels of Palestinian society (Vorster 1999:297). The new Roman system made it easier for high priests to expropriate land and produce from the peasantry. There is positive evidence from antiquity indicating that some landowners in Jerusalem made use of debt contracts for the sole purpose of squeezing and wresting land from peasants (Oakman 1986:75). Similarly, the number of Palestinian large holdings increased dramatically during the early Roman period. Despite all the damage it did to the peasantry, Jerusalem elites participated in interurban trade, and the Temple provided an infrastructure for international commerce (Oakman 2008:195). Traditional Jewish law forbade the charging of interest and demanded that all debts be released in the Sabbath year (cf. Dt 15). As such, ancestral lands were the permanent properties of the historical clans and, if sold, had to be redeemed in the Sabbath year (cf. Lv 25:23–28). By the 1st century, however, Jewish aristocrats and landlords controlled the courts and manipulated the law, bypassing these ‘outdated’ commandments in order to grant loans against immovable property, enforce the foreclosure thereof, and so obtain land from the peasantry (see Arnal 2001:140–141; Oakman 2008:139–140, 225–227). Some Jerusalem elites even bypassed Roman law, and defrauded peasants out of their land (Oakman 2008:24).

133.Cf. 1 Enoch 92–105; Lamentations 2:13–17; the Dead Sea Scrolls.


135.See Rabbi Hillel’s prozbul in Mishnah tractate Shebi’it 10.
As a result, many peasants were forced into indebtedness, which initiated a downwards spiral of control by creditors, loss of land, starvation and ending up as day labourers, beggars, bandits or slaves (Arnal 2001:139–140, 146; Freyne 2000:205; Horsley 1995a:60, 215–216, 219; 1995b:43; Moxnes 2003:150; Oakman 2008:21, 25, 224). In Palestine, popular protests against the rule of certain high priests continued throughout the 1st century CE (Horsley 1995a:136). Textual evidence shows that Jews pleaded repeatedly for respite from tax burdens in the 1st century CE. As far as the villagers were concerned, these high priests had climbed into bed with the Herodian household, thereby illegitimating their previous claims of holy obedience to God (cf. Freyne 2000:198). Many peasants viewed Roman tax laws as contradicting Jewish tradition. Paying taxes to Romans was tantamount to denying the sovereignty of God.

Even the payment of tithes and Temple tax was increasingly being viewed by the lower classes as a form of exploitation (Freyne 2000:109). Debt collection was similarly viewed by the peasantry as a form of theft, being unjust at its core (Oakman 2008:271). It could not have done much for the image of the Judean and Galilean aristocracies that they contributed in collecting tax for foreign rulers. During the 1st century CE, the lower classes started seriously questioning the legitimacy of their Jewish rulers housed in Jerusalem, a city supposed to represent the presence of God on earth (cf. Douglas 1995:123; Horsley 1995a:60–61, 136–137; 1999c:57).

As a breakaway movement, Q must have shown signs of both continuity and discontinuity with traditional Judaism (see Tuckett 1996:426–427). The latter distinction will function to organise the discussion from this point forward, starting with continuities between the Q people and their co-ethnics. Throughout the Sayings Gospel, the Q people see themselves as part of Israel, coveting the cultural and symbolic identity that goes with such an identification (Tuckett 1996:427). In other words, they see themselves as part of a privileged people, occupying an ancestral ‘Promised Land’. They foster a positive attitude towards the land of territorial Israel and their place within it. Particularly significant in this regard is their expectation in Q 13:28–29 of an eschatological ingathering of the diaspora, perhaps as representatives of the twelve tribes of Israel (Horsley 1995b:38; 1999a:65, 69; 1999h:283; see


138.See, for instance, the views of Judas of Gamala as described by Josephus in Jewish Antiquities 18:4, 23.


140.Tuckett (1996:435–436) finds it noteworthy that Q says nothing about the Eucharist, which indicates to him that Q does not actively attempt to form boundaries between themselves and their co-ethnics by way of a new cultic act. Tuckett admits, though, that this argument is an argument ad silencium. It is still interesting, especially tradition-historically. The rite of baptism could possibly have its origin with the Q people in Galilee, while the Eucharist might have its origin with the Jerusalem movement in Judea. The two most important Christian rites (from a Protestant perspective) might have two quite separate origins.
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Davies and Allison (1991:27–28) list six reasons why an allusion to Gentiles should not be read into this text: (1) Gentiles are not expressly named; (2) the main intertext (Ps 107:3) is about the return of Jews from exile; (3) the term ‘east and west’ is often associated in Jewish literature with the homecoming of diaspora Jews; (4) the Old Testament does not feature the occasion of Gentile pilgrimage to thereby condemn Jews (ethnically) or Palestinians (geographically), but to exalt Zion; (5) if Q 13:28–29 does have Gentiles in mind as the ‘many’, the unlikely consequence would be that the saying imagined Israel in toto being condemned to eternal damnation; and (6) the Old Testament mentions the eschatological banquet only in relation to the return of diaspora Jews, and never in connection with the Gentile pilgrimage.141 To be sure, the main comparative texts142 all refer to the ingathering of scattered Jews. After the expected ingathering, many Jews will join Abraham, Isaac and Jacob at an eschatological banquet. At most, Q 13:28–29 allows for some Gentiles to join the diaspora Jews in going to Palestine and feasting with the patriarchs (cf. Nolland 2005:357). But even if this is true, the main image still pertains to diaspora Jews, with Gentiles featuring in the background as possible participants.

Q shares historic memories with broader Israel. In the formative stratum, references and allusions are made to Moses (Q 6:27–35; 10:4), the prophetic tradition (Q 6:20–21) and Solomon (Q 12:27), with the possibility of additional references to Elijah, Elisha and Lot, depending on whether or not Q 9:61–62 is judged to be part of the Sayings Gospel. In the main redaction, some positive allusions and references are also made, connecting John to Elijah (Q 3:7–9, 16b–17; 7:27) and Jesus to both Isaiah and Elijah (Q 7:18–23). Q features these memories to affirm and explain the status of Jesus, whose activities are interpreted as the fulfilment of long-standing Jewish expectations (Horsley 1995b:39).143 Even at the level of the main redaction, the Q people hope and long for solidarity with their co-ethnics (Mack 1993:141; see Horsley 1999e:94–95;

141. It has to be noted that Israel is more likely to be intended by Matthew’s (8:12) phrase ‘the sons of the kingdom’ (οἱ υἱοὶ τῆς βασιλείας) (cf. Luz 2001:9; Nolland 2005:357). Yet, Luke’s (13:28) personal pronoun ‘you’ (ὑμᾶς) probably featured in Q, possibly in a different form (ὑμεῖς) (Robinson et al. 2002:132; cf. Davies & Allison 1991: 30–31, 28 fn. 79; pace Luz 2001:9). In addition, Davies and Allison’s critique applies to Matthew’s text, even if it does feature ‘the sons of the kingdom’. They regard this phrase to be an ironic reference to those Jews who rejected the message of Jesus, especially the politico-religious establishment (Davies & Allison 1991:28). These are the people who regard themselves to be ‘sons of the kingdom’. If the ‘kingdom’ is here a veiled reference to the Roman Empire, the saying exposes the tendency of Jewish leaders to work with these foreign rulers to the economic and religious detriment of the people (cf. Freyne 1988:151; Horsley 1995a:141–143; Oakman 1986:75; 2008:75; Vorster 1999:297).


Tuckett 1996:201–207). Although their Christology separates them from other Jews, it also betrays their Jewish ethnicity in as far as Q² associates Jesus with the prophetic tradition in general, with prophets like Elijah and Elisha in particular, with the eschatological Son of Man, with the Sophia figure, and perhaps even with Moses (see Allison 2001c:404–411, 422–423; Mack 1993:141–142).

Conversely, the Q people distinguish themselves from Gentiles, who are frowned upon as outsiders (Horsley 1999e:95; Kloppenborg 1987a:241; see Tuckett 1996:202, 402–403; cf. Q 6:33–34; 12:30). The Gentiles clearly and matter-of-factly form part of 'them' in an us-them distinction, with Q's mission being focused on fellow Jews (see Tuckett 1996:403, 425–426). Hence, Cromhout’s (2007:377) general assertion seems to be on the money: 'Overall, Gentiles do not belong to Q's symbolic universe.' The main redaction is preoccupied with the future of territorial and ethnic Israel (see Tuckett 1996:196–197, 399; cf. Horsley 1999e:95). As part of the polemic of Q², references to Gentiles function as a rhetorical device to shame greater Israel (Kloppenborg 2011b:265; cf. Smith 2006:148). If Q betrays signs of a Gentile mission, which is not entirely certain, it is very much subordinate to the Q people's mission to greater Israel (cf. Hoffmann 1995:197; Kloppenborg 1987a:241; see Tuckett 1996:403–404). Paradoxically, Q's polemic against certain groups in greater Israel betrays its connection with greater Israel. As Tuckett (1996:427) explains, 'the very existence of hostility reflects an element of social identity between the two groups.' In fact, the 'degree of harshness' evident in the polemic language might operate as a gauge to determine the extent to which the Q people experienced an emotional connection with greater Israel. Accordingly, harsher polemic language would be reflective of a greater emotional bond and cultural connection between the two entities.

Q membership does not entail a wholesale abandonment of covenantal concerns (see Horsley 1999e:115–116). In Q 4:1–13, Jesus himself is held up as a prime example of Torah obedience. In this regard, the Q people are presented as normal Jews. They accept tithing and ritual purity as integral to the Torah. Despite accusing the Temple of murdering important Jewish figures from Israel’s past (cf. Q 11:51), some measure of concern for Jerusalem and its Temple is betrayed by Q 13:34–35 (Fleddermann 2005:704). In Q 13:27, the Q people seem to be dissociating themselves from those who abandon covenantal praxis, although the precise meaning of this parable is open for debate. Q 11:39–41 does not condemn purity rites per se, but condemns the Pharisees and their preoccupation with purity in disregard for higher moral values (see Tuckett 1996:412–413; cf. Piper 2000:228). Q 11:42c clearly guards against any interpretation of Q 11:39–44 that would result in a wholesale abolishment of tithing and other

purity rites (Kloppenborg 1987a:140; Tuckett 1996:410). The continued validity of the Torah is acknowledged in no uncertain terms by Q 16:17. Unlike Matthew or Luke, the Sayings Gospel Q does not entertain expectations that the Torah would one day be completely nullified, but accepts its present and continued validity (Tuckett 1996:406). Q 16:17 functions to preclude any interpretation of the preceding verse that entertains the mitigation or nullification of the Torah (Kloppenborg 2000:153; Tuckett 1996:407). The kingdom supersedes the Torah, but the latter surrenders neither its import nor its purpose as a consequence of this priority. Both Q 16:17 and Q 11:42c attempt to safeguard against a qualitative distinction between the ceremonial and ethical interpretations of the Torah; interpretations, in other words, that would inevitably yield the Torah redundant and superfluous (Tuckett 1996:410). Overall, Q betrays a measure of continuity in ritual and covenantal praxis with the rest of Israel. The attempt to illustrate a continued attachment to the Torah might be an apologetic tactic: ‘By recognising the everlasting validity of the Law, Q reclaims or affirms the Judean ethnic identity of the community and of its hero, Jesus’ (Cromhout 2007:373).

The discontinuities between the Q people and the rest of Israel has primarily to do with the former group’s radical understanding of God’s kingdom (cf. Bork 2014:10 of 10). Q envisions a new Israel, shaped by the kingdom message. They see themselves playing a determinate role in bringing about this new entity. The kingdom qualifies the meaning and usefulness of past events. Although common ancestry is affirmed, the presumption of privilege attached to such ancestry, including divine election, is denied (Smith 2006:104; Vaage 2001:480; cf. Q 3:8). Covenantal status ceases to be a Jewish birthright (Cromhout 2007:368). Ancestry is rather linked to the killing of the prophets (cf. Q 11:47–48). Jewish history is not recalled with nostalgia or sentiment, but used in the service of eschatology, prophecy and subversive wisdom. Historic traditions are predominantly used negatively, to denounce outsiders (cf. Mack 1993:144). As part of a thoroughly thought-provoking paper, Vaage (2001:480–487) argues that Q’s indirect appeal to Hebrew scriptures appears almost without fail in logia that enhance Q’s polemic against outsiders by announcing judgment against them. Their whole ideology revolves around the inauguration of God’s kingdom through the person and message of Jesus, to the exclusion of certain ‘outdated’ Jewish customs and traditions.

146. We saw that Kloppenborg regards Q 11:42c to be an interpolation from Q1. My reasons for disagreeing with this judgment were explained earlier (see above, ‘The final recension’). Redactional activity is obvious in the inclusion of Q 11:42c, but such activity does not in my opinion represent Q3. Instead, this insertion was probably made before this passage was added to the Q document.


148. As opposed to direct quotations in Q.
Regardless of their exact Christology, the Q people regard the person and message of Jesus to be integral to the inauguration of the kingdom. The reception or rejection of Jesus is tantamount to the reception or rejection of God himself (cf. Q 10:16). The Q people have reconstructed the traditional sacred canopy, defined by covenantal nomism (Mack 1993:143). Jesus now represents the essence of their sacred canopy. Their high regard for Jesus and his message about the kingdom thus separates the Q people from their co-ethnics (Bork 2014 of 10; Mack 1993:204; Tuckett 1996:426). For the Q people, the ministry and person of Jesus inaugurated the new era of God’s kingdom, superseding the old era during which the Torah was all-important (cf. Q 16:16). Jesus is held up as the new Moses, and as qualitatively more important than Moses (see Allison 2001c:404–411, 422–423; Horsley 2012:105–107). The Torah is ruthlessly reconstructed and reinterpreted in light of the kingdom. Although the Q people claim Torah obedience, such obedience applies specifically to the Torah as it was understood and taught by Jesus. They allege correct interpretation of the Torah, emphasising moral virtues like justice, mercy and faithfulness over ritualistic and purity concerns.\textsuperscript{149} Inherently, the inaugural sermon represents an effort to renew the covenant by redefining internal Jewish relationships, and promoting abstract values like love, mercy, justice and forgiveness (see Horsley 1995b:43–44; 2012:105, 123; cf. Piper 2000:228). A number of traditional laws are ‘modified’ in an attempt to align them with the message of God’s kingdom, including the holiness codes of Leviticus 19, and individual regulations like the divorce law (see Allison 2001c:411–420).\textsuperscript{150} The Temple is described as ‘forsaken’ (Q 13:35), and criticised for murdering historic Jewish figures (Q 11:51).

As we will see, the Q movement caused a great rift between Q members, on the one hand, and their families and co-ethnics, on the other (Horsley 1995b:44; Mack 1993:136; see below, ‘Family feuds’). There are a number of textual clues in the formative stratum to indicate that the Q movement experienced ongoing violence and exploitation by other Jews (see Tuckett 1996:283–323).\textsuperscript{151} Similarly, the main redaction betrays evidence of active opposition and repression, sometimes in the form of deliberate apathy and neutrality (cf. Horsley 2012:34).\textsuperscript{152} It might be that the Q people suffered particular abuse at the hands of the Pharisees (Horsley 1999f:270; cf. Q 11:39). Q responds to such alienation with severe polemical utterings, including pronouncements of judgment and destruction, doom oracles and ridicule (see Mack 1993:140–141, 204). Although Q’s polemic betrays a degree of emotional connectedness with greater Israel, it also betrays a degree of separation from greater Israel (cf. Reed 2000:61). Apathy and failure to ‘repent’ provoke the strongest language in Q


Chapter 2

(Tuckett 1996:322). The Q people define their boundaries by condemning a selection of Jewish out-groups, including ‘this generation’ (cf. Howes 2014b:7 of 11).

The term ‘this generation’ refers to either greater Israel in toto or some subgroup within greater Israel, as opposed to Gentiles in toto or some specific group of Gentiles (cf. Bultmann [1913] 1994:31; Horsley 1992:191, 1995b:38–40, 49; Kloppenborg 1987a:167; 2000:192–193; Lührmann 1969:93; Tuckett 1996:199–201). Out of the former two options, it seems more likely that ‘this generation’ refers to some subgroup within greater Israel (cf. Howes 2014b:8). Considering particularly the inclusion of Jewish patriarchs from Israel’s past at the expected eschatological banquet in Q 13:28–29, as well as the positive valuation of historic prophets and sages in Q 11:49–51, it would be a mistake to regard ‘this generation’ as a timeless, all-inclusive reference to past, present and future constitutions of greater Israel (see Tuckett 1996:196–201; cf. Howes 2013a:170; Vaage 2001:481). The occurrences of the word ‘Israel’ in Q 7:9 and Q 22:30 indicate that the Sayings Gospel could, and occasionally did, feature this lexis instead of the term ‘this generation’ when referring to greater Israel in toto (Howes 2014b:8 fn. 52; cf. Verheyden 2001:711). It is worth noting at this stage that Bryan (2002:81–86) makes a good case for viewing the term ‘this generation’ as a qualitative (rather than temporal) description, functioning to bunch together a group of past, present and future Jews who all have the same two elements in common: (1) rebellion against God; and (2) eschatological condemnation (cf. Gregg 2006:144–145). With the term ‘this generation’, the author of Q calls to mind the evil past generations of the flood and the wilderness, associating all Jewish people of all times who are disobedient to God with these defiant groups (cf. Cromhout 2007:375). This does not mean that the term includes all of greater Israel throughout all historical periods, but rather that it includes all the rebellious segments of greater Israel throughout history (Bryan 2002:84–85). Despite this wide range, those who directly opposed the Q movement must have been at the top of the list (Gregg 2006:144, 276).

The strong polemic against ‘this generation’ points to a situation of intense opposition (Mack 1993:204; Tuckett 1996:201). Much of the polemic probably stems from frustration in the face of constant challenges to individual and group honour. Q’s rhetorical strategy includes shaming opponents, threatening them with coming judgment, and complaining about their lack of repentance. The latter of these should probably be understood in the context of a failure on the part of these opponents to accept and appropriate the message of God’s kingdom (cf. Bork 2014:10 of 10; Kloppenborg 2000:204). The rhetoric of the main redaction thus represents an effort to legitimise the existence and ethos of the Q people by defending them against those who were either unwilling to acknowledge their claims, or who summarily opposed

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153. Horsley’s (1995b:40; 1999a:64) comment that the term could have Gentiles in mind should not be taken at face value, but seen for what it is: a rhetorical strategy to support his larger case against the stratification of Q. This reading of his comment is supported by the fact that Horsley (1995b:46–51; 1996:182–183; 1999a:69, 89; 1999g:299) argues elsewhere that the term ‘this generation’ refers specifically to the Jewish elite, particularly the Pharisees and scribes.
the movement. Although some have argued that the polemic against certain Jewish groups intended the conversion of broader Israel (e.g. Tuckett 1996:201–207, 434; cf. Horsley 1999a:69; 1999e:95), its primary function was undoubtedly inward, serving mainly to redefine group boundaries, to reimpose group identity, to increase internal solidarity, to legitimise internal convictions, and to rationalise opposition from broader Israel (see Kloppenborg 1987a:167–177; Piper 1995a:53–54; cf. Hoffmann 1995:196). In a nutshell, the main redaction represents a struggle for legitimacy within Galilean society. On the other side of the coin, there are indications that opponents of the Q movement occupy legitimate and influential positions in society (Kloppenborg 2000:205). The Pharisees enjoy social prominence (cf. Q 11:43), and the scribes are able to impose burdens on others (cf. Q 11:46b, 52).

Ultimately, ethnic continuity with broader Israel is restricted to a common name (Israel), a common place (the Promised Land), common historical memories, a common ancestry, and a common us-they perception of Gentiles. All other ethnic identity markers are reconstructed in light of Jesus and his kingdom, including purity rites, Torah obedience, covenantal nomism, the patriarchal family, and a positive regard for historic traditions. The Q people allege Torah observance as an aspect of continuity, but in reality Torah observance plays second fiddle to ‘kingdom observance’. In the process of appropriating the kingdom message, and abandoning patriarchal ties, certain religiocultural markers that were crucial to Jewish ethnicity and self-identity are abandoned. Instead, Jesus and his kingdom message function as replacement identity markers. The Q movement constitutes a new family and locus of identity (see Jacobson 1995:374–376). All previous practices and beliefs are re-evaluated in light of Jesus and his kingdom. Although the Q people see themselves as part of a reform movement within traditional Judaism (Tuckett 1996:436), they are destined, from the very beginning, to be a movement outside of Judaism (Cromhout 2007:380). Every effort is made to bridge their differences with opposing groups, and to remain part of Israel (see Tuckett 1996:438, 449–450). Unfortunately, they only succeed in undermining Jewish ethnic identity. As a result, they fail to convince others of their message, or to even evoke sympathy for their cause. The Q people might have believed that they were in the process of renewing Israel, but they were actually reconstructing core Jewish beliefs to such an extent that those beliefs became unrecognisable to Jewish outsiders (see Horsley 1999g:296–297). Even if the Q people continued to see themselves as authentic Jews, they had in fact become a separate religious and social grouping, with an entirely distinct identity (cf. Hoffmann 1995:196).

Family feuds


154. Although there might be evidence to suggest that the Pharisees, in particular, did not exert much political or social authority in the period before the Jewish War in 70 CE (see Tuckett 1996:438–447).
people were socially disruptive by breaking up families in the name of the kingdom. The latter indicates that the Q people expected support from households, and promoted reconciliation, prayer and ethical virtuosity within such households. Blasi explains this by proposing that the tension was between itinerants, who disrupted traditional families, and the rest of the Q people, who continued to operate as traditional households. Apart from my own reservations about the itinerant hypothesis, both in general and with regard to Q, it is unlikely that households and household disrupters would have existed side by side in idyllic harmony. Surely, a better explanation would be that biological families were disrupted, but that new fictive families were created in their place when the Q group was formed (Jacobson 2000:194, 199). In antiquity, the establishment and configuration of fictive families was a well-known feature of village life, usually occurring during times of economic hardship as a direct reaction to pressures from above (see Oakman 2008:252–253). Fictive families were sanctioned by strong religious beliefs, and emerged in both villages and coalitions as attempts to reclaim some form of power in the face of oppression. Such fictitious families historically tended to emphasise new social orders, where domestic economics would replace political economics. It seems likely that the Q people substituted patriarchal families with fictive families, although they might at times have utilised existing kinship structures. The architecture at Capernaum might actually have promoted the formation of fictive family structures, with some ‘apartment complexes’ being several stories high, and being built around central courtyards (Piper 2000:262). Thus, by the time Q was written, the Q people probably already constituted a settled group, operating as a ‘new family’ on a household system (cf. Park 2014:7–8 of 11).155

Family division is evident from the content of Q¹. Although it might not have been the intention of the Q people to divide families (cf. Q 10:5–7), families were indeed divided (cf. Jacobson 1995:366–367; Robinson 2011:468).156 At the level of the main redaction, kinship divisions are an established fact, but are still happening as the movement grows (Jacobson 1995:364; Mack 1993:204; cf. Q 12:49, 51, 53). Proleptically, to be sure, the main redaction sees such division as the initial intent of Q’s Jesus (Jacobson 1995:366; 2000:193; Robinson 2001a:51; 2001b:17; 2011:468; cf. Cotter 1995a:127; Horsley 1995b:44; Moxnes 2003:58–59; cf. Q 12:53). Family

155 Vaage (1994:38–39) claims that the origins of the Q people might have been similar to the radical lifestyles of Cynics. Yet, there is no direct evidence to suggest Cynic-like beginnings for the Q people, notwithstanding the ambivalent references in Q 10:4 and the deliberately Cynic readings of the mission discourse in toto. Even if such a possibility is accepted, the Q document as it stands is concerned with community life, not a lifestyle based on anti-civilisation praxis.

156 Cf. Q 9:58, 59–60; 12:51, 53; 14:26; 16:18. Arnal (2001:174–177) reads these Q sayings as general statements about either the cost of discipleship (Q 9:59–60) or the fate of humanity (Q 9:58), not to be taken literally. Generally in Q, Arnal (2001:183) reads references to the poor metaphorically, as part of Q’s rhetoric of social inversion ‘to communicate the repudiation of social hierarchy.’ Yet, the social programme described by Arnal would undoubtedly have been welcomed more by the poor than the wealthy, and would have found better support amongst underprivileged than privileged individuals. Arnal’s aim is to refute the theory of itinerancy. Fortunately, a literal reading of these texts does not necessarily promote itinerancy. In keeping with the nature of the Q document as a whole, it is our current intention to read all Q texts as if they reflect the social location of the Q people in some way or another.
division is legitimised by appeal to prophetic tradition, and seen as a necessary evil for the investiture of the kingdom. Ultimately, Q 12:51, 53 describes the impact of the Q movement in dividing and destroying the patriarchal family (Horsley 2012:34; Moxnes 2003:58).

This rift seems to have occurred mostly between young adults and their parents, or children-in-law and parents-in-law (cf. Q 12:53; see Destro & Pesce 2003:217–222; cf. Cromhout 2015:4 of 22). Most of these young recruits were probably married with children (Jacobson 2000:194; see Destro & Pesce 2003:217–222). In ancient Israel, the whole extended family, first generation parents and grandparents included, usually lived together in the same dwelling. Q 9:59–60 clearly preaches against the Decalogue’s commandment to honour thy father and mother (Jacobson 1995:361–362; 2000:191; Schottroff 1995:354; see Cromhout 2015:13–14 of 22; cf. Ac 5:6, 7–10; 8:2). The saying probably advocates the forsaking (ἀφίημι) of one’s family, which is described as being ‘dead’ (νεκρός), so that one can join the Q movement (ἀκολουθήσω σοι) (see Moxnes 2003:54–55). Q 14:26 is even more in your face, advocating hatred (μισέω)157 between children and parents (Jacobson 2000:193; Robinson 2001a:51; 2001b:17). Filial respect, submission and obedience were demanded and expected in ancient Jewish culture (Jacobson 1995:363). Stubborn and rebellious children were to be stoned to death (cf. Dt 21:18–21).158 Both of these sayings (Q 9:59–60 & Q 14:26) would have been entirely insensitive and extremely offensive to ancient Jewish ears, contradicting the most holy of commandments in Exodus 20:12 (and Dt 5:16) to ‘honour one’s father and mother’ (cf. Kloppenborg 2011b:266; see Allison 2001c:417–418; Jacobson 1995:361–364). These traditions might indicate that younger people, including the middle generation, were more attracted to the Q movement than older people (see Destro & Pesce 2003:217–222; cf. Jacobson 1995:365; Moxnes 2003:59). Q 12:51, 53 provides further evidence of the Q group’s appeal and attractiveness for young people (Jacobson 1995:365; 2000:193; cf. Destro & Pesce 2003:219). It is certainly no coincidence that Jesus is associated with the tradition of the rebellious son when called a ‘glutton and a drunkard’ (Q 7:34; cf. 11Q19 LXIV:4–6; see Cromhout 2015:10–11 of 22). As a side note, it is worth contemplating whether Q’s much-loved term, ‘this generation’, has any bearing on this rupture between the older and younger generations (cf. Q 11:53). If so, Q’s Jesus cleverly turns the derogatory phrase with which older people tend to reference the defiant and untamed younger generation on its head by applying it to the older generation. Similar questions may be asked of Q 11:19 (see Chapter 3, ‘They will be your judges’).

157. The word ‘hate’ (μισεῖ) refers here not to a feeling or emotion such as ‘dislike intensely’, but to an orientation or action such as not to ‘recognise one’s responsibility toward someone’ (Jacobson 1995:364; 2000:194), which is the direct opposite of ‘love’ or ‘honour’ (τίμα) in the Septuagint’s version of Exodus 20:12 and ‘honour’ (כַּבֵּד) in the Masoretic Text’s version of that verse. In terms of group orientation and responsibility, the word denotes the abandonment of, distancing from, separation from, alienation from or forsaking of the group in question; in this case, the traditional family (cf. Moxnes 2003:58). See also Josephus, *Jewish Antiquities* 6.255, 324; 7.254.

158. It is doubtful that such commandments were actually practiced.
Besides the division between children and parents, it is not unlikely that at least some older people were attracted to the movement as well (cf. Luke’s version of Q 12:51–53). Q 16:18 seems to betray a situation of division between husbands and wives, ultimately ending in divorce (see Jacobson 1995:371–373; Schottroff 1995:354–355). Q members who had divorced as a result of joining the movement were not allowed to remarry (Jacobson 2000:197). Whether in the form of divorce or a breakup along generational lines, individuals from both genders appear to have left their families in exchange for Q membership (Destro & Pesce 2003:220; Jacobson 1995:363; Robinson 2001b:9; see Freyne 2000:271–272, 282–283; cf. Q 12:53; 14:26; 16:18). If Q 9:58 is read in conjunction with Q 9:59–60, the actual situation in which many Q people found themselves comes to the fore (cf. Jacobson 2000:191). Because of their abandonment of the patriarchal family, many of the Q people were probably homeless, and, even worse, without a family. Since individual ancient Mediterranean households were the nucleus and source of all social, economic, religious and cultural identity and activity, such schisms must have had a tremendous impact on the Q people (see Destro & Pesce 2003:212–213; cf. Bork 2014:5 of 10; Horsley 1995a:195–196; 1999g:297; Jacobson 1995:378–379; Van Aarde 2014:4–5 of 25). The Q people were regarded by outsiders as being ‘poor’ (Q 6:20), probably because they no longer enjoyed family support, amongst other reasons (Moxnes 2003:62–63, 114; Piper 2000:242, 251, 252; Schottroff 1995:360; cf. Jacobson 2000:195; Van Aarde 2014:4 of 25; see Cromhout 2015:1–6 of 22). Fidelity towards the Jesus movement was regarded by insiders to be more important than belonging to a patriarchal family (Arnal 2001:175; Jacobson 1995:364; see Mack 1993:136, 139–141).

Jewish villages behaved corporately, and family networks made decisions together (Draper 1999:33; Horsley 1999c:52–53; 1999g:297). Abandoning one’s family invariably meant abandoning the larger groups that were constituted by networks of families, resulting in an honour-shame ripple effect (Jacobson 2000:191; see Destro & Pesce 2003:212–213; cf. Douglas 1995:123; Moxnes 2003:52). According to ancient views, the extended family and/or household structure in which an individual found him or herself controlled and determined his or her behaviour, activity and social position (Oakman 2008:249). If a child leaves, the father is perceived as being unable to control the actions of his children, bringing shame to the abandoned family (cf. Bork 2014:4 of 10). The child who leaves is also shamed by the family and the larger community, not least of all for dishonouring his or her parents, and for ‘not knowing his or her place’ within the family and community (Moxnes 2003:52). Moreover, young males who forsook their families ‘represented a provocation to the very order of the community’ (Moxnes 2003:72). Young men were expected to succeed their fathers as paterfamilias (see Cromhout 2015:6–9 of 22). With the father-child relationship severed, the traditional source of honour and identity is broken, and the young individual is left honourless (Moxnes 2003:95–96; cf. Cromhout 2015:4 of 22). In addition to the impact on the honour of both parties, abandonment also had an impact on the sustenance of
both parties. The deserting child had in effect robbed the abandoned family of a pair of hands to work the fields (cf. Robinson 2001a:51; 2001b:17). Conversely, the deserting child could no longer expect support from his or her family.

However, if the father was the one who decided to abandon societal structures, the entire family would in most cases likely follow (cf. Bork 2014:4–5 of 10); although not in all cases, as is apparent from Q 16:18. The father would typically then be shamed by the greater community, and such shame would spread to the whole family. Fathers who joined the movement would have severed their ties with community-based agricultural (or other vocational) networks, rendering them unable to provide, and thereby endangering the well-being of their families (cf. Bork 2014:4 of 10). Q 12:51, 53 suggests that the Q movement also housed women (Jacobson 2000:193). Wives who left their husbands would have been shamed for dishonouring their husbands, ‘not knowing their place’ and giving up their virtuousness and purity (Moxnes 2003:52). Joining the Q community would have left women husbandless and children fatherless, placing them in a particularly vulnerable socio-economic position (cf. Bork 2014:4 of 10; Cromhout 2015:3 of 22; Jacobson 2000:195). Women’s abandonment of patriarchal families would not only have had an impact on them, but also on the families left behind, seeing as women’s contribution to agricultural labour could sometimes be extensive, and could include, amongst other things, fruit gathering, animal tending, vine tending, pottery and tailoring, not to mention occasionally working the fields (Arnal 2001:114; Freyne 2000:284; Horsley 1995a:200–201; Park 2014:8 of 11). Since economy at the lower levels of society was primarily a family endeavour, Q 16:13 might effectively represent a choice between family support and membership in the kingdom of God, the latter of which was practically achieved through Q membership (cf. Jacobson 1995:369; Park 2014:7–8 of 11).

Rebellious individuals and families who broke away from the community proper were faced with constant challenges from the greater community, pertaining to both honour and subsistence (Destro & Pesce 2003:215; Douglas 1995:123; Piper 2000:223). Joining the Q movement meant being shamed, rejected and ostracised by the larger community (cf. Moxnes 2003:61, 114; Piper 2000:264). Missionaries historically preached the kingdom to their co-ethnics, but not only was their kingdom message rejected, they themselves were also rejected.159 For most of the individual Q members, self-definition was no longer to be found from the most important group that traditionally served to provide a sense of self (cf. Moxnes 2003:43, 48–49). Abandoning one’s family must have been very unsettling, representing separation from the most important, perhaps the only, location where personal identity was traditionally found (Bork 2014:5 of 10; cf. Horsley 1995a:195–196; Jacobson 2000:191; Moxnes 2003:68, 151). The fear that

159. Apart from all the Q passages pointing to rejection, the absence of a significant Jesus movement in Galilee during the 2nd century CE also suggests that the Q people were largely unsuccessful in convincing their co-countrymen of the kingdom message (Freyne 1988:271).
accompanied leaving family and abandoning self-identity is reflected in the content of Q (see Moxnes 2003:49–51; cf. Q 9:58).

It is for these reasons that fictive kinship patterns were created (cf. Freyne 2000:206; see Jacobson 1995:374–376). That the Q movement did not just advocate abandoning one’s family, but also constituted new fictive families, is clear from Q 11:11, where it is taken for granted that the men in the audience (τίς ἐστιν ἐξ ὑμῶν ἄνθρωπος) would have children (ὁ υἱὸς αὐτοῦ) in need of support (cf. Arnal 2001:174). Since all ancient life and self-identity was rooted in and determined by the group, Moxnes (2003:57–58) is probably correct in claiming that the saying in Q 17:33 reflects the abandonment of patriarchal family for the Q movement, or the replacement of the childhood locus of personal identity for a new locus of such identity. In order to effectively replace the patriarchal family as the primary locus of identity, the Q movement had to establish a new social structure and support such a structure ideologically by means of a substitutive symbolic universe (cf. Moxnes 2003:91). An alternative symbolic universe was created by projecting a new kind of family, with God acting as Father, Q members acting as children, and fellow Q members acting as siblings (Park 2014:9 of 11). For the Q people, God replaced the traditional patriarch as the source of protection, identity, sustenance and honour (cf. Piper 2000:264; see Moxnes 2003:115–121, 152; cf. esp. Q 11:11–13). There are suggestions that common meals might have been important occasions for group and/or ‘family’ assemblies (Jacobson 1995:375).

Apart from those who had left their families behind in order to join the Q movement, there were probably also others who joined the Q movement because they were already without family and/or land (cf. Piper 2000:251; see Freyne 2000:284–286). In the first half of the 1st century CE, some families and individuals were forced off their lands, giving rise to a growing ‘landless class’, which constituted beggars, bandits, prostitutes and others (Arnal 2001:139–140, 146; Freyne 2000:205; Oakman 2008:21, 25, 224; cf. Horsley 1995a:60, 215–216, 219; 1995b:43; Moxnes 2003:150). The rise of brigandage and popular rebellions indicates not only that males left their families behind, but also that many men lost their lives, both of which must have had an impact on women, either by widowing them prematurely, or by depriving them of opportunities for marriage (Horsley 1995a:219–220; 1996:36, 123; Oakman 2008:13, 20–21, 224). Seeing as marriage was the primary means through which women were able to ensure economic stability and future sustenance, a sizable group of

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desperate, poor and marginalised women must have lived in Galilee. With the break-up of extended families due to economic pressures, the age-old roles and honour of traditional patriarchs were considerably weakened (Moxnes 2003:42). The extended and household family units were also under increasing economic pressure from the outside world, rendering them less and less capable to support all their members. While the economic inability of many families to provide for all their members must have motivated a number of individuals, especially young males, to leave their homes, the decreasing importance of family patriarchs must have eased the decision to leave tremendously.

The very same economic developments that weakened family structures also created profitable opportunities for young individuals outside these family structures, such as working on larger estates for daily compensation and getting involved in village-level industries, like the fishing industry in Capernaum (Destro & Pesce 2003:225; Moxnes 2003:43, 149–150; cf. Arnal 2001:109, 111, 126, 150; Chancey 2002:164; Horsley 1995a:194, 201; 1996:116; Weber 2007:460; see Edwards 2007:357–374; Freyne 2000:101–103, 110, 169–170, 188; Moreland 2007:143–157; Savage 2007:193–206). We may thus speak of both a pushing and a pulling factor motivating young people to abandon their homes. For these individuals, particularly single, divorced or widowed women and young adult males, the Q movement must indeed have seemed like an attractive alternative to patriarchal family life (see Freyne 2000:285–286; Moxnes 2003:42–43). The Q movement offered a social network similar to, but different from, patriarchal families, that could fill the social vacuum created when these individuals left homes or lost their husbands. The ‘new family’ represented by the Q movement promised to elevate and accept the marginalised and honourless, particularly women and children, as well as men who were perceived as weak by the greater community (cf. Moxnes 2003:94–95; Piper 2000:251). The parable in Q 13:18–19, about the impure mustard seed sown illegally into a house garden, suggests that the Q movement was mostly made up of marginalised, impure and ‘displaced’ people (Moxnes 2003:112; cf. Vaage 2001:486).

The ‘new family’ was not simply an emulation or imitation of traditional families, but crossed its borders, discarded its hierarchy and comprised a different compositional and social structure (Moxnes 2003:105). Although another male image, that of God as Father, replaced the traditional paterfamilias image, there are no indications that this new image perpetuated male supremacy (Moxnes 2003:121–122, 152; cf. Park 2014:9 of 11). Rather, the providential and protective attributes of God were emphasised, not the authoritarian aspect of his role as Father. Moreover, God’s position as paterfamilias was seemingly not transferable to other males in the Q group. That the Q people operated on egalitarian ideals is debatable (see Elliott 2003:173–210), but that they were fictive siblings living under the imagined providential care of God is indisputable. Ultimately, the Q movement provided a new family to those who were homeless, alone or dissatisfied (cf. Park 2014:7–8 of 11).
In conclusion

This chapter has produced the following results:

- Q was in all likelihood a single Greek document when used by Matthew and Luke.
- Unless and until Kloppenborg’s stratigraphy of Q can be successfully refuted, it remains the best proposal of the document’s redactional development, and should be upheld.
- Regarding its genre, the Sayings Gospel Q is a sapiential document, even if it contains eschatological, apocalyptic and prophetic themes and micro genres.
- The eschatology of Q is at times apocalyptic, but never imminent.
- Incidentally, Q’s *formative stratum* does not develop a futurist eschatology, apocalyptic or otherwise.
- The term ‘kingdom of God’ relates specifically to the healing of the sick and the feeding of the poor through both the earthly ministry of Q’s Jesus and the corporeal conduct of the Q people.
- Q was most likely written in Galilee for resident Judeans, whose focus on the message of Jesus about God’s kingdom alienated them from co-ethnics, including family members and friends.
Son of Man logia in general

Authenticity

As a term and an expression, ‘Son of Man’ is highly likely to be authentic. Apart from Acts 7:56, John 12:34, Revelation 1:13 and Revelation 14:14, all the Son of Man sayings in the New Testament appear on the lips of Jesus, implying that it was unique and typical of the way in which Jesus spoke. Jesus is not once in the canonical Gospels called the Son of Man by anyone other than himself. Moreover, out of all the terms that would later become Christological titles, the Gospels depict Jesus as using only ‘Son of Man’ in reference to himself; apart from two instances where Jesus implicitly (not explicitly!) refers to his role as a ‘prophet’ (i.e. Mt 13:57 // Mk 6:4 // Lk 4:24; Lk 13:33). In the New Testament, the term ‘Son of Man’ appears only in literary works by the evangelists (i.e. the four Gospels, Acts and Revelation), meaning that it is entirely absent from the New Testament epistles, including all the Pauline letters. Despite having a Sitz im Leben in isolated confessions about Jesus (cf. Mk 8:38; Ac 7:56; 1 Thess 1:10), there is no record of the Son of Man expression being used on the lips of Jesus in any other context.


166 Burkett (1999:56) does not believe that this peculiarity serves as evidence that the Son of Man expression is authentic. His counterargument is that other inauthentic titles, like Son of God, also appear on the lips of Jesus. True as this may be, the current argument is not that the term ‘Son of Man’ sometimes appears on the lips of Jesus, but that it always appears on the lips of Jesus in the canonical Gospels. This is indeed a remarkable phenomenon that cannot simply be shrugged off. While other Christological titles appear mostly in confessions about Jesus and only rarely on his own lips, the Son of Man expression occurs only on the lips of Jesus and never in confessions about him (cf. Bock 2011:90; Hurtado 2011:169; Owen 2011b:vii).

167 Both these texts are probably well-known 1st-century Jewish proverbs (Wink 2002:275 fn. 2). Furthermore, Jesus probably rejected the title ‘prophet’ as a designation for himself in John 1:21.

168 The pre-Pauline formula (tòν ιύνον οὐρανόν [ἀν τὸν οὐρανὸν]) in 1 Thessalonians 1:10 might be an allusion to the Son of Man.
Jn 9:35–38), the term is absent from the confessions, creeds and liturgy of the early church. Neither does it occur in the predicative form: ‘Jesus is the Son of Man’, or ‘Jesus, the Son of Man’. The early church does not seem to have had much Christological use for the term. The term’s presence in the Jesus tradition, combined with its absence as a confessional title in the early church, is highly suggestive of authenticity.

Wink (2002:207–211) argues that Paul was aware of the term ‘Son of Man’, but deliberately chose not to use it in order to accommodate his Gentile audiences. Apart from the fact that there is no direct evidence of Paul’s familiarity with this expression, it is highly unlikely that a theologian so obsessed with Christology would have ignored one of the most attested titles for Jesus had he known about it. However, if Paul did deliberately ignore this term, it adds to the argument of its futility for the early church. Burkett (1999:123) argues that the term is absent from the remainder of the New Testament because these writings represent ‘Hellenistic Christianity’, where the term had no currency. Conversely, the term appears in the Gospels and the early chapters of Acts because these writings contain traces of ‘Palestinian Christianity’. This outdated distinction between Jewish and Hellenistic Christianity is not convincing. That there would be no inherited traditions from ‘Palestinian Christianity’ in the New Testament outside of the Gospel texts and the early chapters of Acts seems highly unlikely. Also, Burkett’s suggestion does not explain why John would use the title in his Gospel, but not in his epistles. John’s writings were all intended for the same Christian community. In his Gospel, he faithfully recounts the use of the expression ‘Son of Man’, while in his epistles he chooses not to make use of the expression at all. The most convincing conclusion to be drawn from this phenomenon is that, for John, the term ‘Son of Man’ had historical value, but no confessional value. Finally, it is curious that the term ‘Son of Man’ does not appear before the seventh chapter of Acts, seeing as the first few chapters deal specifically with the emergence of ‘Palestinian Christianity’ (Hurtado 2011:170).

Although the term ‘son of man’ was well known in 1st-century Judaism, the specific form ‘the son of the man’, as it was employed by Jesus, was highly unusual for the time (cf. Owen 2011a:29–30; Shepherd 2011:50; see Owen & Shepherd 2001). Given the almost complete absence of the forms בר אנשׁא (Aramaic), בן האדם (Hebrew) and ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἄνθρωπος (Greek) in Palestine during and before the 1st century (see below, ‘Casey criticised’), it is highly likely that the historical Jesus coined this definite singular form of the term. As an uncommon form, this was in all likelihood a highly memorable feature of Jesus’ idiolect: ‘This would be an example of what competent users of languages often do, adapting idiomatic expressions, either in form or connotation, to serve some new and particular semantic purpose’ (Hurtado 2011:175; cf. Nolland 2005:365). Ultimately, the term was of no confessional value to the early church, and it was formulated in an atypical way if compared to contemporary Judaism.

Although the specific form was unusual, the term itself formed an integral part of many Jewish traditions, being well attested in both Aramaic and Hebrew writings
before and during the ministry of Jesus. The term further appears in every single complex of the Jesus tradition, including the four canonical Gospels and the Gospel of Thomas (86). Within the four canonical Gospels themselves, the term occurs in independent traditions like Mark, Q, Matthew’s Sondergut, Luke’s Sondergut and John. Lastly, the tendency by all the canonical Gospels to translate the Aramaic term literally, with the inelegant Greek form ‘the Son of the Man’ (ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου), strongly suggests authenticity (cf. Hurtado 2011:160). The only legitimate explanation for the consistent application of this sloppy Greek form is that the evangelists wanted to remain faithful to the authentic words of Jesus (cf. Hurtado 2011:170). The conclusion seems unavoidable that, even if all the individual Son of Man sayings were created by the early church, the expression ‘Son of Man’ was in all probability authentic.

The likelihood that the term ‘Son of Man’ is authentic does not necessarily imply that all (or any) of the Son of Man logia are authentic. Since the ‘suffering Son of Man’ sayings do not feature in Q, we shall leave them aside in our present discussion.169 Regarding the authenticity of the remaining Son of Man logia, scholars have routinely felt obliged to choose between one of four possibilities (Burkett 1999:44; Theissene & Merz 1998:550; cf. Gregg 2006:181–182): (1) all the Son of Man sayings are authentic; (2) all the Son of Man sayings are inauthentic (3) only the future Son of Man sayings are authentic; (4) only the present Son of Man sayings are authentic. Naturally, proponents of an apocalyptic Jesus, like Witherington (1995:95–97), tend to support the first or third positions, while proponents of a sapiential Jesus, like Crossan (1991), tend to support the second or fourth positions (Theissene & Merz 1998:245; cf. Borg 1994a:8, 51; 2001b:41). It follows that scholars who defend a sapiential understanding of the historical Jesus and those who defend an apocalyptic interpretation can readily appeal to this term. The multitude of extant proposals, ranging from the one extreme that all Son of Man sayings are authentic to the other extreme that none of them are authentic, with no shortage of positions in-between, testifies not only to the complexity of Son of Man scholarship, but also to a current impasse in this terrain. The same is true of arguments about the (in)authenticity of certain Son of Man logia in Q specifically (cf. Burkett 1999:79–80 fn. 25; see Müller 2008:405–407).170 According to Theissene and Merz (1998:550), ‘scholars are not yet in a position to make a well-founded decision

169.I am referring here specifically to the Son of Man sayings that allude to the crucifixion of Jesus, not to those Son of Man sayings that hold up the earthly suffering of Jesus as a prototype for the future suffering of his followers (see Tuckett 2001:373–375, 391–392).

170.Schürmann (1975:146–147) believes that all the Son of Man sayings in Q developed after the earliest layer was penned down, and before the final redaction was made (i.e. in the second of his four layers). Both Schulz (1972:481–489) and Vaage (1991:103–129) distinguish between the coming and the earthly Son of Man sayings in Q. Yet, whereas Schulz believes the former to be more authentic, Vaage believes the latter to be more authentic. Tuckett (1993:196–215) sees Son of Man logia in both tradition and redaction, implying that both sapiential and apocalyptic Son of Man logia are authentic. These representative views on the authenticity of Son of Man sayings in Q specifically overlap completely with the four general positions on authenticity noted above.
between the [four] possibilities \textit{[listed above]} \cite{Allison1998:128; 2001d:95; Burkett1999:5}.

Some believe that philological research into the linguistic roots of the expression ‘Son of Man’ provide a handle on arguments pertaining to authenticity. Using Aramaic as a criterion of authenticity is not legitimate in all cases, but seeing as Jesus most probably used the term ‘Son of Man’ in Aramaic, it remains one of the best criteria for determining the authenticity of these sayings in particular \cite{Casey2009:61}. In recent scholarship, the most influential philological proposal of exactly \textit{how} the Aramaic idiom functioned at the time of Jesus has been the one argued by Maurice Casey \cite{Hurtado2011:172; Müller2008:313; Owen2011a:28}.

\section*{Maurice Casey}

In 1976, Casey proposed that Vermes’s (1967:310–328) idiomatic examples from ancient sources had two levels of meaning. According to Casey (1976a:147–154), the term \(\text{אֵּשׁ} \text{בר} \) could be employed to make a general statement (first level of meaning) that was in effect applicable to the speaker herself, albeit indirectly (second level of meaning). As many scholars before him had recognised, the general level of meaning often contrasted people with animals. Thus, the general level of meaning often identified an aspect of humanity that was unique if compared to animals. By paying particular attention to research done by other scholars on translation theory, Casey was able to argue that the translation of \(\text{אֵּשׁ} \text{בר} \) with \(\text{ὁ} \text{υἱὸς} \text{τοῦ} \text{ἀνθρώπου} \) was both natural and practically inevitable \cite{Müller2008:314–315}. The latter term is both an example of what Casey calls ‘translationese’, and the best option available to the ancient translators. In the same year, Casey (1976b:11–29) looked at the Ge’ez version of the Similitudes of Enoch, and found that the term \(\text{אֵּשׁ} \text{בר} \) was used to reference Enoch specifically. Consequently, Casey was able to make a case for disregarding the Similitudes of Enoch as evidence for a Son of Man concept in 1st-century Judaism.

Casey took this incentive further in his 1980 monograph on the relation between Daniel 7:13 and the Son of Man difficulty, arguing that the Son of Man concept was a scholarly construct, and not a feature of 1st-century Judaism at all. According to Casey, Daniel 7:13 did play a role in some Son of Man texts, but these instances were too few to be authentic, or to explain how the term had originated. Casey believed that the early church had invented the small number of Son of Man sayings that were influenced by Daniel 7:13. This work led Casey to the conviction that only those Son of Man sayings that were derived from the Aramaic expression \(\text{אֵּשׁ} \text{בר} \) could possibly have been authentic. At the end of his book, Casey (1980:236) featured a table that illustrated how the Son of Man logia developed in line with the Gospel traditions. Son of Man logia derived from the Aramaic term \(\text{אֵּשׁ} \text{בר} \) were almost exclusively from the most authentic sources, particularly Mark and Q. Casey then attributed all the
other Son of Man sayings, including those derived from the early exegesis of Daniel 7:13, to the early church, and demonstrated how well these sayings fit the theologies and *Sitze im Leben* of the respective Gospel writers.

Casey continued his investigation in 1987 by arguing that (א)בר, when used idiomatically, may occur with or without the prosthetic definite article א, having no impact on the meaning or reference point of the idiom at all. Another piece of the puzzle was added when Casey (1994:87–118) surveyed the utilisation of (א)בר in both the Peshitta and the Targums. This survey confirmed his 1976 proposal that the Aramaic term (א)בר, when used idiomatically, was oftentimes used in generic statements with specific reference to the speaker. However, he also found that (א)בר could be utilised in generic statements with particular reference to someone other than the speaker. This person could be any specific and well-known individual, like Joseph or Moses. For this reason, (א)בר did not have any ‘messianic overtones’ in and of itself, but could indeed refer to the Messiah when he is expressly mentioned in the (con)text. Finally, the Aramaic term could reference the speaker and one or more other persons.

In 1995, Casey appealed to brand new evidence from various related fields, including bilingualism, translation studies and research on translation techniques in the Septuagint. Previous scholars struggled to understand why ancient translators would retain the first article and the word υἱός [‘son’] in their translations. Some of these scholars accused the ancient translators of making either deliberate or unintentional mistakes, proposing better alternatives (Van Aarde 2004:433; e.g. Collins 1987:399; 1989:14; 1990:190; Hare 1990:249–250; Ross 1991:191). In reaction to these anachronistic suggestions, Casey (1995:164–182) maintained, firstly, that many bilingual translators suffered from transference, and, secondly, that translators of sacred texts often operated with a hefty degree of literalism. It followed for him that the translators acted within the norm when they translated (א)בר with ὁ υἱός τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. In Casey’s opinion, the featuring of υἱός and its article could be explained as a necessary by-product of ancient translation techniques influenced as it were by transference and literalism. Moreover, by keeping both the article and υἱός, the ancient translators ensured that references to Jesus were clear in the Greek versions of these sayings. Also, Casey argued, translators who were prone to transference would inadvertently have noticed both the generic and the specific references of these sayings in the Greek text.

In 1998, Casey investigated the Aramaic sources behind the Gospel of Mark, and in 2002 (2002a), he looked at the Aramaic sources behind Q. In both monographs, he paid particular attention to the translation strategies used by ancient authors. This focus allowed Casey to offer an explanation not only for the reason why the term ὁ υἱός τοῦ ἀνθρώπου never occurred in reference to someone other than Jesus, but also why the term almost never occurs in the plural. Accordingly, the strategy of the translators of
was to use the Greek term ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου when it referred to Jesus, and not to translate the term when it referred to someone or something else. In the same year that his monograph on Q appeared, Casey (2002b:3–32) also argued that generic nouns may interchangeably appear in either the definite or indefinite states, without affecting their meaning or function.

All Casey’s efforts on the Son of Man problem converge in his 2007 monograph (second edition printed in 2009), entitled *The solution to the Son of Man problem*. After providing a selective overview of Son of Man scholarship in Chapter 1, Casey continues in Chapter 2 to explain and justify his methodological approach. He argues four points that underlie his method. Firstly, the Aramaic language remained surprisingly stable for centuries. This allows one not only to uncover the idiomatic usage of the expression ‘Son of Man’ from a wide chronological range of Aramaic sources, but also to reconstruct the Aramaic Vorlage of certain Greek sayings from just as wide a range of sources. Casey draws upon Aramaic sources as early as 750 BCE and as late as 1200 CE. Secondly, when Aramaic nouns function in a generic way, they could occur in either the definite state (also known as the ‘emphatic state’ or ‘determined state’) or the indefinite state (also known as the ‘absolute state’), without any difference in meaning. Seeing as (א)נשׁבר is a generic term for ‘man’, it could appear in either state without causing a change in meaning. Thirdly, the expression (א)נשׁבר could reference either humanity in general or a more restricted grouping of people. When appearing in the singular, it could likewise refer to an individual, ‘whether anonymous, generic or specific’ (Casey 2009:67). Fourthly, when used idiomatically, the speaker would employ the term (א)נשׁבר in a general statement, only to say something indirectly about either herself, herself and others, or someone else indicated by the literary context. Casey concludes that Jesus used the term in this latter way. Chapter 3 of Casey’s book is entirely devoted to persuasively dispelling the Son of Man concept.

These three chapters lay the foundation for the rest of the book, which argues for the authenticity of those logia that can be reconstructed in their original Aramaic forms, and the inauthenticity of those logia that ‘clearly’ did not originate from the lingua franca of Jesus. Casey provides cumulative support for his distinction between authentic and inauthentic sayings by appealing to the criterion of historical plausibility, which is undoubtedly Casey’s favourite criterion after the use of Aramaic reconstructions. He argues that the sayings with Aramaic underlays all have plausible *Sitze im Leben* in the life of the historical Jesus, while the sayings without such underlays all have plausible *Sitze im Leben* in the early church. Casey’s ‘solution’ naturally relegates all the Son of Man sayings based on Daniel 7:13 to the early church. Surprising about Casey’s work is that the suffering Son of Man sayings, which are generally in the Renewed Quest regarded as inauthentic, are shown to stem from the Aramaic language, and to have plausible *Sitze im Leben* in the life of Jesus (cf. Wink 2002:256). Particularly relevant to our case is Casey’s proposal that the Son of Man sayings developed from their Aramaic-idiomatic usage in the ministry of the historical Jesus to their titular-apocalyptic
usage (with reference to Daniel 7:13) in the early church. If Casey’s division between authentic and inauthentic Son of Man sayings is accepted, Q would contain both the earlier Son of Man logia that stem from the Aramaic language and the later Son of Man logia that allude to Daniel 7:13 (cf. Edwards 1976:35; Müller 2008:318).

According to Casey (2009:270–272), the following Son of Man sayings in Q are authentic: Q 7:34; Q 9:58; Q 12:8–9 and Q 12:10. Conversely, Casey regards the following Son of Man logia in Q as inauthentic: Q 6:22; Q 11:30; Q 12:40; Q 17:24 and Q 17:26–27, 30. A feature that inadvertently presents itself when one considers Casey’s division between authentic and inauthentic Son of Man logia in Q is that they cut across Kloppenborg’s two layers. The formative layer contains both authentic (Q 9:58) and inauthentic (Q 6:22) Son of Man sayings. The main redaction, too, holds authentic (Q 7:34; 12:8–9, 10) and inauthentic (Q 11:30; 12:40; 17:24, 26–27, 30) Son of Man traditions. This feature supports the case made by Kloppenborg that the redaction of Q should not be mechanically equated with the tradition history of individual Q sayings (cf. Koester 1994:540–541; see Allison 2010:120–125). Most traditions in Q¹ may indeed be close to the historical Jesus, but other traditions in Q¹ may be further removed. Some traditions in Q² may indeed be the result of later developments, but other traditions may stem from the historical Jesus. Each Q pericope should be assessed independently as to whether or not it actually goes back to the Jesus of history (Casey 2010:84; Kloppenborg 2001:155).

A second feature of Casey’s proposed division between authentic and inauthentic Son of Man logia is that it cuts across the separation between sapiential and eschatological material. At least two of Casey’s authentic Son of Man logia address intrinsically eschatological themes (cf. Wink 2002:178). In other words, Q features authentic (Q 7:34; 9:58) and inauthentic (Q 6:22) sapiential Son of Man sayings. Similarly, Q features authentic (Q 12:8–9, 10) and inauthentic (Q 11:30; 12:40; 17:24, 26–27, 30) eschatological Son of Man sayings. In both authentic eschatological sayings just noted (Q 12:8–9, 10), it is not the expression ‘Son of Man’ that is necessarily eschatological, but the whole saying. In each case, the term ‘Son of Man’ could be interpreted non-eschatologically, but the saying in toto could not.

**Casey criticised**

There may be some difficulties with Casey’s methodological approach, which has been criticised by a number of scholars. Here are some of their main objections:

- Contrary to what Casey claims, the Aramaic language did not remain stable for such a long period of time (Hurtado 2011:173; Lukaszewski 2011:11, esp. fn. 50). In fact, the development of the Aramaic language can be divided into different epochs, each

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171 In Q 22:30, the term ‘Son of Man’ occurs only in the Matthean version of the saying, and was very likely added by him to the Q material he inherited (see below, ‘Enthroned followers’).
with its own dialect and grammar. The examples Casey provides to demonstrate that the language remained stable are trivial and of no use. Owen (2011a:29) dubs his appeal to the specific examples he selects as ‘an extended exercise in obfuscation.’

- The Aramaic construction \( \text{בר אֶנֶשֶׁא} \) is anachronistic and grammatically ambiguous (Shepherd 2011:51; see Lukaszewski 2011:10–12, 20–21; Owen 2011a:30–31). It neither represents a particular dialect (like Middle Aramaic) of a specific people (like the Galileans), nor does it fit into any specific time period (like the 1st century CE). Rather, it represents four divergent Aramaic terms (בר נשא, בר נשא, בר נשא & בר נשא), each of which may have had a different meaning in the 1st century CE. Casey utilises this problematic and ambiguous term not only to discover the original idiomatic usage of the term, but also to ‘reverse-translate’ the Aramaic Vorlage of Greek sayings.

- The definite singular form ‘the son of man’ (בר אֶנֶשֶׁא), which is necessary to translate the Greek term \( \text{ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου} \), appears only twice in all of the Aramaic literature deriving from Palestine at the time of Jesus (see Owen & Shepherd 2001:81–122; cf. Hurtado 2011:172; Müller 2008:2; Owen 2011a:29–30; 2011b:viii; Shepherd 2011:50–60). In neither case does it function to make a generic reference. Moreover, the almost complete absence of this form in Middle Aramaic utterly contradicts the idea that it was a ‘familiar idiom’ when Jesus lived (Hurtado 2011:173). The indefinite singular form ‘a son of man’ (בר אֶנֶשֶׁא) appears more frequently in Middle Aramaic, but never in the generic way Casey proposes. Rather, this generic application is always achieved either by the plural form ‘the sons of men’ (בני אֶנֶשֶׁא) or plainly by ‘man’ (אֶנֶשֶׁא). Significantly, these observations apply not only to the Aramaic language, but also to Hebrew and Greek, being representative of the term’s usage in the Old Testament, including both the Masoretic Text and the Septuagint (see Hurtado 2011:160–162, 173).

- The definite and indefinite states of nouns had not yet coalesced in the Western Aramaic of the 1st century CE (Lukaszewski 2011:12; Owen 2011a:29; Shepherd 2011:51–52; see Owen & Shepherd 2001; Williams 2011:72–77). This means that the expression בר אֶנֶשֶׁא had not yet lost its determinative force at that time, and could therefore not have been used in generic expressions by Jesus (Owen 2011a:31–32).

- It is not a given that an Aramaic phrase, whether it be the one proposed by Casey or not, lies behind the Greek expression \( \text{ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου} \) (see Lukaszewski 2011:17–20, 25–27; Williams 2011:68–69; cf. Pokorný 2011:344). The term might be a Greek original. It might also have originated from Hebrew, from one of the pre-Arabic dialects, or from another Semitic language.

- Regarding his appeal to translation theory, Casey considers studies that concentrate on modern languages (Lukaszewski 2011:18). The few times that he does appeal to ancient translation techniques, especially as they pertain to the Septuagint, he tends to oversimplify the modus operandi. In particular, the Septuagint's consistent refusal to translate the expression ‘son of man’ with a definite article speaks against
the suggestion that translators ‘quite naturally’ added or retained the definite article when translating this term in the sayings of Jesus (Hurtado 2011:162).

- Throughout the argumentation of his hypothesis, Casey almost entirely ignores secondary scholarship devoted to the grammar of the Aramaic language (Owen 2011a:32–33).

- According to Owen (2011a:34–35), the examples put forward by Casey to substantiate the particular idiomatic use of שֶׁבֶר אֵנֶּה proposed by him are not discussed adequately. In Owen’s view, the literary contexts of these examples are consistently ignored. For example, the literary context of Sefire 3:14–17 – a central text for Casey (2009:81), ‘because it establishes the use of this idiom long before the time of Jesus’ – clearly identifies the term שֶׁבֶר אֵנֶּה in that instance as a specific reference to a future heir of the kingdom. In fact, these examples only accomplish to illustrate that בֵּר אֵנֶּה, the form required to translate the Greek ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, is consistently avoided by these ancient authors.

- As was the case with his examples of the idiomatic use of בֵּר אֵנֶּה, Casey does not spend enough time or effort trying to understand the actual use of the Greek term ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου in its various literary Gospel contexts before reconstructing the Aramaic Vorlage (see Williams 2011:65–66; cf. Pokorný 2011:344; Tuckett 2001:380–381). As a result, attempts to construe certain Son of Man logia as generic have been forced (cf. Burkett 1999:94).

- One cannot simply assume, as Casey does, that only those sayings capable of being reconstructed into their (supposed) Aramaic originals are authentic (Williams 2011:73; see Owen 2011a:48–49; cf. Pokorný 2011:344). Apart from the possibility that Jesus might at times have spoken another language, the translators might also at times have paraphrased Jesus’ sayings; not to even mention the complicated process of their individual oral and written transmissions.

- One should only appeal to the phenomenon of transference as a last resort, when all other attempts at understanding the text have been ruled out (see Williams 2011:71–72). Given the relatively infrequent occurrences of transference in general, as well as the difficulties in detecting it properly and assuredly, Casey’s regular appeal to this phenomenon in supporting his hypothesis is highly suspect.

- As we saw, Casey proposes that ancient translators only translated בֵּר אֵנֶּה with ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου when the former term referred to Jesus (see above, ‘Maurice Casey’). The suggestion that all ancient translators applied exactly the same translation strategy across the board seems a bit incredible (see Williams 2011:70–71). Such consistency amongst translators never occurred spontaneously, only deliberately. Also, there is no evidence from antiquity that translators intentionally rendered the same phrase in two or more different ways.

- Casey’s ‘corporate’ reading of Daniel 7 is not accepted by all (see Owen 2011a:35–38; e.g. Collins 2010a:195). Neither is his conviction that a messianic reading of this text is inherently erroneous and inauthentic.
According to Burkett (1999:92–96), Casey’s approach leads to ‘implausible results’, since they cannot be applied to most of the Gospel sayings themselves (cf. Kloppenborg 2011b:259–260; Owen 2011a:38–39). His ‘solution’ forces us to believe that only a handful of sayings are authentic, and that, out of these, not a single one survived with its original meaning intact, while the overwhelming majority of them were created by the early church, receiving a completely new meaning in the process. In accord with Burkett’s objection, it could be added that Casey even partitions those Son of Man logia that appear in Q, one of the earliest Gospel sources, into authentic and inauthentic sayings.

When Casey applies the criterion of historical plausibility, he assumes a priori not only that Jesus himself could not have appealed to Daniel 7, but also that Jesus himself could not have preached an apocalyptic message (see Owen 2011a:39–45). Thus, all apocalyptic sayings are ‘naturally’ attributed to the early church as references to the Parousia of Jesus.

These objections are significant and plentiful enough to cause at least some concern. Although Casey’s ‘solution’ is currently the most influential and well-argued philological solution to the Son of Man problem, and although it (unexpectedly) supports the idea that the historical Jesus made use of the expression ‘Son of Man’ in both sapiential and apocalyptic contexts, his hypothesis remains for a number of scholars fundamentally and methodologically problematic (e.g. Hurtado 2011:176). In such circumstances, one might be pressed to appeal to one or more of the other philological ‘solutions’ to the Son of Man problem. Most scholars in this field now agree on three fronts: (1) Jesus used the expression ‘Son of Man’ in a circumlocutional, generic and/or indefinite sense, thereby referring to himself, either directly or indirectly; (2) sayings are only authentic if they can be ‘reverse-translated’ into Aramaic; and (3) the early church added the titular Son of Man logia, particularly those where the expression itself refers to Daniel 7:13. Lindars (1980; 1983), for example, argues that הבאר was an Aramaic idiom by which the speaker could refer to a selected class of individuals, amongst whom the speaker self was included, translating the term as ‘a person’ or ‘someone in my position.’ Bauckham (1985) believes that Jesus used the Aramaic term שָׁאֵל in the indefinite sense (meaning ‘someone’ or ‘a man’) as an intentionally ambiguous self-reference (cf. Fuller 1985:207–217). Kearns (1988) proposes that the term was used by Jesus in a generic, non-titular sense. Chilton (1996:35–39, 45–47; 1999:259–287) argues that Jesus employed the expression ‘Son of Man’ generically, as a reference to himself and others, as well as distinctively, as a reference to an apocalyptic angel other than himself.

Unfortunately, these ‘solutions’ suffer difficulties similar to those of Casey (see Burkett 1999:92–96). These scholars are all faced with the same fundamental predicament, which is that the grammatical form needed to understand the expression ‘Son of Man’ in its original Aramaic is almost entirely absent in Middle Aramaic (Shepherd 2011:51). Unless and until 1st-century Galilean sources are
excavated containing the exact Aramaic form needed, philological ‘solutions’ will remain unconvincing (cf. Hurtado 2011:174; Lukaszewski 2011:26–27; Shepherd 2011:60). The proposals that suggest an indefinite meaning, like those by Bauckham, Fuller and Lindars, all suffer from an additional difficulty. Regardless of what the original Aramaic term might have meant, the Greek term ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου could not under any circumstances have meant ‘a man’ (Burkett 1999:92–93; cf. Tuckett 2001:380–381). Suggestions of transference or mistranslation do not explain away this difficulty. The proposal by Lindars, in particular, has been met with widespread disapproval and refutation (Lukaszewski 2011:9, esp. fn. 40). Kearns’s suggestion that שְׁנֵרֶב derives from Ugaritic is problematic for a variety of reasons (see Casey 2009:48–49). Also, his suggestion that the term (א)נָשׁ (א)בר has multiple meanings (like citizen or Lord) is erroneous. Kearns here confuses the term’s idiomatic point of referral with its denotative meaning.

Apart from a handful of scholars, including for example Chilton, those who follow a philological approach tend to agree that the early church added those Son of Man logia that refer to Daniel 7:13. There may be some reasons for doubting this relative consensus. According to Owen (2011a:30), the most natural philological explanation of Jesus’ use of the Aramaic expression ‘Son of Man’ is that he used it in reference to Daniel 7:13 (cf. Tuckett 2001:394). Likewise, Williams (2011:75) holds that ‘the linguistic evidence is compatible with the idea of a defined [Son of Man] concept, if that concept could be established in pre-Christian sources on other grounds.’ Thus, an appeal to the Aramaic roots of the expression ‘Son of Man’ does not necessarily contradict the idea that Jesus made use of this expression in reference to an apocalyptic figure, be it to himself or someone else. Yet, I would take these suggestions with a grain of salt (cf. Q 14:34–35). They are mostly made as part of a rhetorical strategy against Casey and others, as opposed to being the result of painstaking and in-depth philological research. As a general rule, one should always be more wary of reactive proposals, and more accepting of proactive proposals.

Despite the potential inaccuracy of the foregoing proposals by Owen and Williams, there is evidence in the more mainstream philological solutions themselves that Jesus was not allergic to (apocalyptic) eschatology. According to Casey, the Aramaic-idiomatic term ‘Son of Man’ appears in two authentic logia that are eschatological in nature and theme (i.e. Q 12:8–9, 10), even if he considers the expression itself to be non-eschatological in these sayings. One or both of these sayings are also considered to be authentic by Lindars, Bauckham, Fuller and Chilton. In addition to these two sayings, some other intrinsically eschatological sayings are also believed to be authentic by Lindars (Q 11:30), Bauckham (Q 11:30; Mt 26:64 // Mk 14:62 // Lk 22:69), Fuller (Q 11:30; 12:40; 17:24, 30) and Chilton (Mt 19:28). Hence, all these scholars (perhaps

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172. Lindars (1985:35) denies that he understands ‘Son of Man’ as an indefinite term, claiming rather that he interprets it as a generic term in which the definite article is used idiomatically to communicate an indefinite statement. Yet, his translations and applications of the term do betray the former understanding (see Bauckham 1985:23–33; cf. Müller 2008:318). Burkett (1999:92) agrees, and also categorises him together with other scholars who prefer the indefinite interpretation.
inadvertently) agree that Jesus was not averse to eschatological themes, and that he discussed them on occasion. According to Burkett (1999:93), the eschatological saying in Q 12:10 features the only occurrence of ‘Son of Man’ that can with any degree of confidence be said to have a generic Vorlage.

There need not have been an existing Son of Man concept in order for Jesus to have used the term in an apocalyptic way or context. Even though the elaborate Son of Man concept no longer holds sway amongst contemporary scholars, Collins (2010a:191–214) has argued convincingly that ‘by the first century CE there were some common assumptions about the figure in Daniel’s vision that go beyond what is explicit in the biblical text’ (Collins 2010a:193). Accordingly, the ‘one like a son of man’ in Daniel 7:13 was assumed around the time of Jesus to be all of the following: (1) an individual figure, as opposed to a corporate symbol; (2) a messianic figure; (3) a pre-existent, transcendent heavenly being; and (4) an active participant in the annihilation of the wicked. There is no reason why Jesus could not have been aware of these ‘common assumptions’ (cf. Collins 2010a:212). Apocalyptic texts dating to the 1st century all interpret Daniel 7:13 as a reference to a specific individual figure (Burkett 1999:118). Although a few rabbinic texts did interpret Daniel 7:13 as a corporate reference to all of Israel, most of these writings viewed the ‘one like a son of man’ in Daniel 7:13 as a specific figure (Burkett 1999:118–119). Whenever Daniel 7:13 was seen as a reference to a specific figure in the 1st century, which was almost all the time, that figure was associated with the Messiah. It follows that even if there was no unified Son of Man concept in the 1st century – which there was not! – it was still natural at the time to see the ‘one like a son of man’ in Daniel 7:13 as a specific messianic-apocalyptic figure (Bock 2011:90, 94). In fact, the absence of a specific Son of Man concept was probably conducive to both Jesus’ and Q’s intent with the expression, not least of all in allowing them to fill this term with meaning and content as they used it (Bock 2011:89, 96–97; cf. Collins 2010a:213–214). Therefore, the possibility that Jesus himself used the expression ‘Son of Man’ in reference to Daniel 7:13 should not summarily be dismissed (Bauckham 1985:28, 29–30).

Given everything that has so far been said in this chapter, it is no surprise that the two views currently predominating Son of Man scholarship are the (messianic-)apocalyptic view and the idiomatic-non-titular view (cf. Burkett 1999:5, 122). The current division between scholars like Casey, Lindars, Bauckham, Fuller, Kearns and Chilton, on the one hand, and scholars like Owen, Lukaszewski, Shepherd, Williams and Bock, on the other, mirrors an almost identical division at the end of the 19th century between scholars like Wellhausen, Eerdmans and Lietzmann, on the one hand, and scholars like Dalman and Fiebig, on the other (cf. Müller 2008:315). This division is further not only a cause, but also a result, of the current schism between historical Jesus researchers on whether Jesus was primarily a wisdom teacher or an apocalyptic prophet.
A final comment before moving on to the next section. A distinction must be made between using Aramaic to uncover the meaning of the phrase ‘Son of Man’ and using Aramaic to determine the authenticity of individual Son of Man logia. If an appeal to Aramaic is insufficient to determine the meaning and usage of the term ‘Son of Man’ for the historical Jesus, it does not automatically follow that an appeal to Aramaic is useless for determining authenticity. The former has proven to be dubious, but the latter still has its place in historical Jesus research. The objections against Casey are mostly relevant to his ‘solution’ of how the expression functioned at the time, not his ability to uncover sayings with Aramaic roots. Even if the criterion of ‘Aramaic traces’ is currently overshadowed in historical Jesus research by more important criteria, like multiple attestation and double dissimilarity, the criterion remains useful for determining authenticity, especially if applied together with other criteria. An ability to reconstruct a saying’s Aramaic or Semitic Vorlage is suggestive of authenticity, even if an inability to do so is not necessarily indicative of anything. Even if one camp of scholars concludes from Aramaic reconstructions that Jesus used the expression ‘Son of Man’ in a circumlocutional, generic and/or indefinite sense, and another camp of scholars concludes from Aramaic reconstructions that Jesus used the same expression in reference to an apocalyptic figure, these scholars should all agree on which selection of sayings have Aramaic roots, and are therefore likely to be authentic. Perhaps it would be wise to allow Aramaic a place in the determination of authenticity, while applying a different approach to determine the actual meaning and application of the term ‘Son of Man’.

A focused investigation of Q

Decades of discussing and debating the authenticity of individual Son of Man sayings have ended in a cul-de-sac of sorts. On the one hand, there is widespread disagreement about which Son of Man logia are actually authentic (cf. Burkett 1999:79–80 fn. 25). On the other hand, there is doubt about the precise meaning and application of the term itself. Theissen and Merz (1998) aptly summarise the latter problem:

Unfortunately the two linguistic and literary traditions which could give us a clear understanding [i.e. ‘Son of Man’ as an apocalyptic figure and ‘Son of Man’ as a generic expression] provide no clear information about how the term is to be understood. (p. 524; cf. Borsch 1992:144)

Although philological research has a lot of promise, there are currently not nearly enough extant texts, from either the right period or the right region, to enable one to put forward a ‘solution’ of the term’s use and meaning with any degree of confidence (Stanton 2002:249).

I would like to propose a different methodological approach; one that draws upon both the Aramaic roots and the Greek text. In this new approach, the first step would be to determine the meaning of the term ‘Son of Man’ in its various literary contexts in the Greek text. In 1968, Leivestad remarked that the meaning of the term ‘Son of Man’
could only be determined from within the New Testament. A growing number of scholars have recently begun to favour such a line of enquiry (see Müller 2008:375–419, esp. 375, 418–419; cf. Casey 2009:176; e.g. Schenk 1997). Bock (2011:89) maintains that ‘any “son of man” remark [will] be ambiguous unless it is tied to a specific passage or context.’ In two articles on the Son of Man tradition in Q specifically, Tuckett (2000a:174–175; 2001:372) voices his agreement:

Before we seek to say anything about what something might have meant at any ‘pre-Q’ level or in an earlier stratum within Q, we should perhaps start with ‘Q itself’ (insofar as that is accessible to us). (Tuckett 2001:372)

The second step in my proposed method would be to determine the authenticity of individual Son of Man logia by combining the results of philological research with the other criteria of authenticity (cf. Meier 2011:331). Philological research is a fairly objective means by which to determine authenticity: For the most part, a saying either lends itself to Aramaic reconstruction or it does not. In my view, this is where the usefulness of philological research ends; at least for the moment. Given the absence of applicable Aramaic texts from Palestine before 70 CE, Aramaic reconstructions should perhaps not currently be used to determine the expression’s original meaning and application. The two methodological steps need not be applied in that order. In most cases, however, the meaning of both the logion and the term itself influences the question of authenticity. It therefore makes more sense to first determine the term’s meaning before addressing the question of authenticity.

The present study will not spend too much time or space on the second step. For the most part, Casey’s division between authentic and inauthentic logia corresponds to that of historical Jesus scholars generally, even if some of them disregard the criterion of Aramaic roots. The only discrepancies in this regard apply to the logia in Q 12:8–9 and Q 12:10. Both of these logia are regarded to be inauthentic by a number of scholars, notwithstanding their ability to be reconstructed in Aramaic. In addition to considering the authenticity of these two logia in particular, the rest of this chapter will deal with the first step of my proposed method: Considering Q’s synchronic treatment of the term ‘Son of Man’. Diachronic questions of authenticity must retreat to the background, so that room can be made for synchronic questions of literary context. The synchronic investigation to follow will mostly concentrate on what Burkett (1999:32–42) calls ‘the question of reference’. In other words, the following investigation will mainly concern itself with discovering the referent of each occurrence of the expression ‘Son of Man’ in Q. These results should not only reveal the meaning of the term ‘Son of Man’, but should also assist in the overall quest to determine the relationship between wisdom and (apocalyptic) eschatology in Q. In answering ‘the question of reference’, one must first determine whether a saying refers to Jesus or not. If it refers to Jesus, one must determine whether it is used as a title or as a straightforward self-reference. If, on the other hand, it does
not refer to Jesus, one must determine who (or what) it does in fact refer to. Lastly, if Jesus did use it as a reference to himself in the third person, one must decide whether or not other people were also implied by the term. Each individual saying will determine the sequence in which these issues are addressed.

In addition to the Son of Man sayings in Q, this chapter will also look at those Q passages that refer or allude to eschatological judgment. The reason for this selection of texts is twofold: (1) eschatological judgment is one of the most prominent themes in Q; and (2) future judgment is integral and important to both wisdom and (apocalyptic) eschatology (Allison 2001b:26–27; Borg 1994a:9; 2001b:42; Frey 2011:6; Wink 2002:159, 162). Although authenticity and diachronic development will not be ignored, the main purpose will be to analyse the synchronic relationship between wisdom and (apocalyptic) eschatology in these traditions. Many of the eschatological judgment traditions in Q feature the expression ‘Son of Man’. As such, many of the individual passages will be examined to determine their treatment of both the Son of Man expression and the interrelation of wisdom and (apocalyptic) eschatology. Whenever the expression ‘Son of Man’ appears in a saying, it will be examined within its literary context, with special attention to ‘the question of reference’. The investigation will look at the following eschatological judgment passages, some of which contain the expression ‘Son of Man’:173 Q 10:2, 12–15; Q 11:19b; Q 11:16, 29–32;174 Q 11:49–51; Q 12:8–9; Q 12:10; Q 12:39–40; Q 12:42–46;175 Q 13:24–29, [30], 34–35; Q 17:23–24, 26–27, 30, 34–35 and Q 19:12–13, 15–24, 26; 22:28, 30.176 But first, three purely sapiential Son of Man logia will be considered: Q 6:22; Q 7:34 and Q 9:58.

**Persecution explained: Q 6:22**

Our focused examination begins with Q 6:22. In Luke (6:22), the saying ends with ‘Son of Man’ (τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου), but in Matthew (5:11), the saying simply ends with ‘me’ (ἐμοῦ). It seems probable that the expression ‘Son of Man’ was originally part of

173. Once again, our interest is with the traditions about Jesus, not John the Baptist. As such, Q 3:7–9, 16–17 will not form part of our investigation. Also, Q 6:37–38 will form the crux of a subsequent discussion, and will therefore be overlooked in the present analysis.

174. The Pharisees and scribes of Q 11:39, 41–44, 46b–48, 52 are criticised for their treatment of the ‘little people’, but unlike the woes against the Galilean towns, they are nowhere expressly threatened with eschatological or apocalyptic judgment. Hence, these texts will not receive any treatment currently.

175. Concerning Q 12:49, 51, 53, it is not at all clear that verse 49 should be added to Q. If this verse is excluded from Q, an eschatological interpretation of verses 51 and 53 is not obviously apparent (cf. Ps.-Phoc. 42–47; pace Kloppenborg 1987a:151–152). This text might in fact be referencing the public ministry of Jesus, which resulted in family division and inter-familial feuds. If verse 49 did form part of Q, it remains uncertain whether or not it references apocalyptic judgment per se. There are no direct references to judgment specifically. General uncertainty regarding the acceptance of Q 12:54–56 into the Sayings Gospel has also prevented discussion of this saying here (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a fn. 219).

176. As should be obvious at this point, I have taken a conservative approach in my selection of the relevant logia by restricting myself to only those logia that undeniably and indisputably (1) belong in Q (2) as the eschatological judgment sayings (3) of Q’s Jesus.
the Q text, seeing that the deliberate exclusion thereof by Matthew makes more sense than its deliberate inclusion by Luke (Catchpole 1993:93; Davies & Allison 1988:462; cf. Casey 2009:239; Robinson 1994:323; Wink 2002:274 fn. 3, 305 fn. 111; pace Betz 1995:148–149). Matthew probably disliked the fact that the term fails to reference either the apocalyptic role of Jesus at his second coming, or anything significant about Jesus’ public career. Matthew was probably also displeased with the fact that ‘Son of Man’ can here be interpreted as a reference to someone other than Jesus.

According to most scholars, the Son of Man is put forward here as the reason why (ἕνεκεν) the followers of Jesus are being persecuted. If that is indeed the case, Q 6:22 betrays no sign of being influenced by Daniel 7:13, and the term ‘Son of Man’ acts as either a title for Jesus or a self-reference in the third person (Smith 2006:141; cf. Casey 2009:239). In this reading, the term cannot be viewed here as inclusive of other people besides Jesus (Tuckett 2001:380; cf. Casey 2009:240; Catchpole 1993:94; Williams 2011:75; pace Wink 2002:101). In support of a titular understanding, it could be argued that Jesus does not speak of himself in the same mundane manner he does in either Q 7:34 or Q 9:58 (see below, ‘Eating and drinking’; ‘Foxes have holes’). Rather, he puts himself forward as the reason for persecution, which betrays a somewhat swollen sense of self-regard and self-interest. However, Jesus is not making any Christological or soteriological claim (Betz 1995:147). He is simply stating that those who follow his lead might be subject to persecution. In other words, the mortal Jesus, and his earthly ministry, is the cause of persecution. The expression ‘Son of Man’ could in this case easily be replaced by the proper noun ‘Jesus’ without changing the logion’s meaning (cf. Bock 1994:580). As such, the best understanding of the present logion is probably that Jesus used it as a non-titular self-reference.

It is, however, also possible that the Son of Man is put forward here as the reason why the addressees are blessed, as opposed to insulted and persecuted. If such a reading is followed, it could be taken to imply that the persecuted are blessed because of their reward at the apocalyptic court, where the Son of Man will confess them before the angels (cf. Q 12:8–9; cf. Allison 1997:101; Catchpole 1993:94; Smith 2006:141). The latter reading would indicate that the expression ‘Son of Man’ is here neither a title for Jesus nor a self-reference in the third person. In fact, the apocalyptic agent should not necessarily be associated with Jesus at all (Robinson 1994:319–320). The term ‘Son of Man’ could easily here be taken to reference someone other than Jesus. In this reading, if Q 6:22 does refer to Jesus, it refers to his role as an agent of the apocalyptic event. In summary, Q’s Jesus uses the expression ‘Son of Man’ in Q 6:22 either as a reference to himself in the third person, or as an allusion to an apocalyptic agent, who may or may not be Jesus himself.

There are five reasons for preferring the former interpretation: (1) the preposition ‘because of’ (ἕνεκεν) follows directly after the phrase ‘speak every kind of evil against
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you’ (ἐἴπωσιν πάν πονηρόν καθ’ ύμων), and not after the phrase ‘blessed are you’ (μακάριοι ἐστε); (2) as part of a deliberate parallelism, Q 6:22 mirrors the other beatitudes in featuring a main clause that starts with ‘blessed’ (μακάριοι), and a causal clause that starts with ‘because’ (ὅτι) (Fleddermann 2005:323); (3) both Matthew and Luke understand the term ‘Son of Man’ in this Q logion as a mundane, non-eschatological reference to Jesus (Casey 2009:239); (4) for the most part, the second interpretation is not even mentioned or discussed by scholars as an option; and (5) 1 Peter 4:14 betrays knowledge of this tradition, and presents it in a way that makes Jesus the cause of denigration, not the cause of fortune (Wink 2002:207). It seems reasonable to conclude that Q’s Jesus uses the expression ‘Son of Man’ in Q 6:22 as a non-titular reference to himself in the third person (cf. Robinson 1991:189; 1994:323; Smith 2006:141; Tuckett 2001:380).

Eating and drinking: Q 7:34

In Q 7:34, the idiomatic use of ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἄνθρωπον could theoretically imply more than one person by means of the masculine singular. The masculine singular form of the participles ‘eating’ (ἐσθίων) and ‘drinking’ (πίνων) may be explained as an extension of that Aramaic idiom. Therefore, these two participles may be referencing a group or class of people. The same can, however, not be said of the response by ‘this generation’, since the idiom is concluded beforehand. These opponents are not speaking in idiomatic terms when they describe the Son of Man as ‘a person (ἄνθρωπος) who is a glutton (φάγος) and a drunkard (οἰνοπότης), a friend (φίλος) of tax collectors and sinners’ (Q 7:34). The Son of Man is clearly portrayed here as a single, individual person (ἄνθρωπος) (Wink 2002:89). In this instance, the four nouns referring to the Son of Man are in the nominative masculine singular because they refer to no more than a single individual. If the response by ‘this generation’ were an extension of the foregoing idiom, it would also have featured ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἄνθρωπον. Instead, it features ἄνθρωπος only. If the response does not refer to more than one person, neither does the initial statement. In other words, although it is theoretically possible to read the two participles (ἐσθίων & πίνων) as an extension of an Aramaic idiom that implies more than one person, the literary context renders such a reading impossible (Wink 2002:89). Like the four nouns in the response, these two participles are in the masculine singular form because they refer exclusively to a single individual. Thus, we may rule out any ‘corporate’ or generic interpretation of the term ‘Son of Man’. In support of a generic understanding of Q 7:34, Casey (2009:137) observes: ‘Everyone does come eating and drinking, otherwise they die!’ Unfortunately, it does not automatically follow from such a general observation that Q 7:34 was intended to be understood in such a generic way. The Greek text clearly refers to a single person. As a result of his commitment to the generic level of meaning, Casey is obliged to put forward a novel interpretation of this text, and to introduce a background not explicit or implicit in the text itself (cf. Owen 2011a:45).
In this case, it seems very probable that the expression ‘Son of Man’ refers to Jesus (Bock 1994:683; Valantasis 2005:92). We have already seen that the indefinite interpretation would never be an appropriate or acceptable explanation of the Greek form ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἄνθρωπου. Besides, the memorable actions of Jesus are specifically in view here. The larger literary context (Q 7:18–35) is primarily concerned with establishing and describing the relationship between Jesus and John the Baptist (Allison 1997:8; Carlston 1982:102; Kirk 1998:366, 377; Piper 1989:124; Robinson 1991:191; 1994:322). This theme is carried forward in Q 7:33–34 by comparing not only the two personages and their respective lifestyles, but also the responses extorted by each of them (Bock 1994:683; Fleddermann 2005:385; Kloppenborg 1987a:111; Valantasis 2005:92). Whereas the Baptist refrains from eating and drinking, the Son of Man does not (Pokorný 2011:345). Even so, both receive a negative response from ‘this generation’ (Carlston 1982:102–103; Fleddermann 2005:385; Holmén 2001:507–508; Kirk 1998:376; Kloppenborg 2001:188; Luz 2001:149; Nolland 2005:464; Pokorný 2011:346). Conversely, both receive a positive response from tax collectors and sinners (Q 7:[29]). This comparison only makes sense if the term ‘Son of Man’ does indeed here refer to Jesus (Robinson 1994:322; Wink 2002:89). The accusation that the Son of Man is ‘a friend of tax collectors and sinners’ (τελωνῶν φίλος καὶ ἁμαρτωλῶν) certainly seems to be aimed at the distinctive features of Jesus’ public ministry (Neirynck 1982:70). That Jesus is intended by the Son of Man expression in Q 7:34 is finally confirmed by the consistent use of the masculine singular form, which appears no less than eight times in verse 34 alone.

This leaves us with a choice between understanding the term ‘Son of Man’ here as a self-reference or a title. Since Jesus is not making a Christological or soteriological statement about himself, but simply mentioning his mundane habit of ‘eating’ and ‘drinking’, it seems unlikely that the expression is meant here as a title for Jesus (Davies & Allison 1991:263–264; pace Bock 1994:683; Fleddermann 2005:385). The saying is unconcerned with the significance of Jesus for the early church, and instead pays attention to those activities that distinguished him as a corporeal human being from other people. Robinson (1994:322–323) adds two more reasons why the term ‘Son of Man’ should not here be viewed as a title: (1) the text does not otherwise attempt to illustrate or highlight the superiority of Jesus over John (cf. Marshall 1978:302; pace Luz 2001:149); and (2) if the intention was to use a title of Jesus, ‘the coming one’ (ὁ ἐρχόμενος) would have been more appropriate in this context (cf. Q 3:16; 7:19). The verb ‘came’ (ἦλθεν) has no titular significance in this context, but merely indicates vocation, implying that Jesus saw it as his duty to eat and drink with sinners (Wink 2002:88–89). Even the mild claim by Bock (1994:683; cf. Marshall 1978:303) that the Son of Man expression here ‘adds a note of authority to [Jesus’] action’ is unsupported by the text. Instead, one might argue that in Q 7:34 the expression ‘Son of Man’ connotes the lowliness and/or shamefulness of Jesus, who is being accused of the shameful behaviour of acting as a glutton and a drunkard (cf. Casey 2009:137; Kirk 1998:380).
By a process of elimination, we have to conclude that Jesus used the term ‘Son of Man’ in Q 7:34 as a mere reference to himself, and only himself, in the third person (cf. Carlston 1982:102; Nolland 2005:464; Robinson 1991:189; Valantasis 2005:92; Wink 2002:89; pace Funk & Hoover 1993:303).

**Foxes have holes: Q 9:58**

Q 9:58 does not make sense as a reference to some specific entity other than the person of Jesus, whether it be an apocalyptic emissary, an expected Messiah, or something else. There is no trace of an eschatological theme or apocalyptic form in the saying itself, in its utilisation of the expression ‘Son of Man’, or in its literary context. Q 9:58 does not make a Christological or soteriological statement, indicating that it was probably not employed as a title for Jesus (pace Fleddermann 2005:400–401). Both the opening statement in verse 57 and the greater literary context (Q 9:57–60; 10:2–9) indicate that we have to do here with the sapiential topic of discipleship (Allison 1997:11; Edwards 1976:101; Kirk 1998:347; Kloppenborg 1987a:190; Marshall 1978:408; see Fleddermann 2005:398–403). The word ‘follow’ (ἀκολουθέω), being a usual indicator that discipleship is in view (see Kingsbury 1978:56–75), appears not only in verse 57, but also in verse 60 (Crossan 1983:239; Fleddermann 2005:399). In both cases, Jesus is the individual potentially being followed. Verse 58 represents Jesus’ answer to the anonymous comment in verse 57 (Edwards 1976:101). Since Jesus is in view in verse 57, he should also be identified with the expression ‘Son of Man’ in verse 58. It follows that the term ‘Son of Man’ cannot here be understood as a reference to some specific entity other than Jesus.

The latter conclusion does not take away the simultaneous possibility of an otherwise general applicability, meaning that the term ‘Son of Man’ could here be read as a non-exclusive reference to Jesus and others (see Casey 2009:168–178). One should not read too much into the fact that both of the verbs that feature the Son of Man as a subject (ἔχει & κλίνῃ) appear in the third person singular, since this feature is completely compatible with the idiomatic use of the expression ‘Son of Man’. A non-exclusive idiomatic interpretation is perhaps supported by the fact that the ‘foxes’ (αλώπεκες) and ‘birds’ (πετεινά) with which the Son of Man is compared appear in the plural. Also, logic would indicate that discipleship by its very nature implies more than the person being ‘followed’. These arguments are not determinative, though. The number of animals featuring in the comparison may have absolutely no bearing on the meaning of the term ‘Son of Man’. And even though the undertaking of discipleship implies more than one person, the Son of Man reference may exclusively be to the lifestyle of Jesus, while the saying in toto implies a degree of participation in that lifestyle (cf. Bock 1996:979; Kloppenborg 1987a:192). It seems rather unlikely that the term alludes here to humanity in general, even if the Son of Man is compared to animals. By definition, discipleship is not something that is shared by all people.
Neither is the statement that the Son of Man has nowhere to lay his head logically true of humankind in general (Bock 1996:978; Marshall 1978:410; pace Edwards 1976:101; Wink 2002:82). This conclusion is not to deny that the Son of Man expression could at some earlier stage have made reference to humanity in general (cf. Bultmann [1921] 1963:28 fn. 3; Crossan 1983:241; Davies & Allison 1991:52), but in its literary context in Q, including especially the contextualising introduction in verse 57, the term cannot be understood in this way (Nolland 2005:365; Robinson 1991:189; 1994:321).

Hence, in Q 9:58 the expression ‘Son of Man’ is used by Jesus as a self-reference in the third person (Funk & Hoover 1993:317; cf. Cromhout 2015:12 of 22; Horsley 2012:33; Jacobson 2000:191; Meyer 2003:21). This self-reference may or may not allude to a group of disciples sharing in Jesus’ lifestyle. If it does imply participation, this is due to the saying and its literary context, not the expression ‘Son of Man’ (Kloppenborg 1987a:192). As it appears in Q, the saying may be paraphrased along these lines: ‘Remember, before you commit to following me, that unlike many animals I often do not have shelter or refuge’ (cf. Fleddermann 2005:400; Järvinen 2001:519). The unstated implication is that if you follow Jesus, you will share in his hardships, including possibly homelessness.178 As such, the Son of Man saying in Q 9:58 purports to elucidate the potential cost, harshness and difficulty of being Jesus’ disciple. The most natural reading of Q 9:58, considering its literary context, is one that has Jesus use the term ‘Son of Man’ as an exclusive self-reference (cf. Casey 2009:178; Stanton 2002:248). It is possible that the expression ‘Son of Man’ here connotes the lowliness of Jesus not having a permanent residence, and/or the humility or embarrassment of Jesus not being able to provide refuge for his disciples (cf. Casey 2009:175; Davies & Allison 1991:42; Funk & Hoover 1993:161; Kirk 1998:340, 341). Nolland (2005:366) points out that birds and foxes were generally considered to be amongst the most insignificant of animals. In Q 9:58, the Son of Man is worse off than even these lowly animals (Bock 1996:978).

On a mission to condemn: Q 10:2, 12–15

We turn now to the other concern of this chapter: the relationship between (apocalyptic) eschatology and wisdom in Q. As we have argued, the mission discourse should be seen as a wisdom text (see Chapter 2, ‘Characteristic motifs’). Both the individual sayings in Q 10:2 and the mission discourse in its entirety are introduced with the phrase ‘he said to his disciples’ (ἐλέγεν [or λέγει] τοῖς μαθηταῖς αὐτοῦ).179


179. Luke has the personal pronoun ‘them’ (αὐτοῖς) in place of the direct reference to ‘disciples’ (μαθητής). Irrespective hereof, Luke’s personal pronoun refers to the (70 or 72) followers or disciples of Jesus mentioned in Luke 10:1. In Matthew, Luke and Q, the content of what Jesus says is clearly directed at his disciples.
Fleddermann (2005:430) calls verse 2 ‘an overture to the discourse’. The mentioning here of ‘disciples’ is a deliberate attempt to introduce the mission discourse, including verse 2, as a piece of wisdom (cf. Kirk 1998:346; Valantasis 2005:54, 95). It was argued above that the ‘harvest’ (θερισμός) of Q 10:2 is not an apocalyptic reference or allusion (see Chapter 2, ‘Characteristic motifs’). If this reading is correct, Q 10:2 would be a purely sapiential saying, and would therefore have no bearing in and of itself on the question of how wisdom and apocalypticism interact in Q (cf. Carlston 1982:112; Koester 1997:152). Let us, for argument’s sake, consider that the word ‘harvest’ does feature as a metaphorical reference to the Apocalypse. The core of the wisdom saying in verse 2 is the sapiential admonition to ‘ask’ (δεήθητε) (Edwards 1976:102). Syntactically, this admonition is an inferential command, as is made obvious by the conjunction ‘so’ or ‘thus’ (οὖν). The semantic and rhetorical function of the preceding maxim is therefore to substantiate the subsequent admonition. It follows that if the threefold reference to ‘harvest’ is indeed an allusion to apocalyptic eschatology, an eschatological theme would here be presented as part of a sapiential micro genre (Edwards 1976:102). In particular, the eschatological theme functions to support the sapiential admonition. It needs to be reiterated, however, that the current author does not consider the Q1 form of the mission discourse to be referencing either the Q mission or the Apocalypse, but prefers a purely literal reading of the text (see Howes 2014a). To my mind, the title ‘mission discourse’ is a misnomer.

Q 10:10–11 is a sapiential instruction for the ‘workers’ (ἐργάται) to ‘shake the dust off their feet’ (ἐκτινάξατε τὸν κονιορτὸν τῶν ποδῶν ὑμῶν) if any town does not welcome them (Catchpole 1993:174, 187; Fleddermann 2005:434; Valantasis 2005:105). This instruction is followed by the prophetic claim that such an inhospitable town will fare worse than Sodom at the apocalyptic judgment (Catchpole 1993:174; Edwards 1976:49, 104; see Valantasis 2005:105–106). Q scholars overwhelmingly agree that Q 10:12 is a transitional verse between Q 10:2–11 and Q 10:13–15 (Kirk 1998:353; e.g. Jacobson 1982:421; Kloppenborg 1987a:196; 2001:167). Luke’s version of Q 10:12 only features ‘that day’ (ἡμέρᾳ ἐκείνῃ), while Matthew is clearer with his designation ‘day of judgment’ (ἡμέρᾳ κρίσεως) (Davies & Allison 1991:179). Matthew probably felt the need to explain which day was meant, indicating that Luke’s version should probably be preferred at this juncture. Even so, it is absolutely apparent that the phrase ‘that day’ refers to apocalyptic judgment (Allison 2010:34). Not only is ‘Sodom’ mentioned, a town routinely associated with apocalyptic judgment in the Old Testament, but there is also no other explanation that would make sense of the phrase ‘that day’ in this context (cf. Bock 1996:1002; Catchpole 1993:175; Edwards 1976:104; Funk & Hoover 1993:169; Kloppenborg 1987a:196; Nolland 2005:420; see Kirk 1998:350–358). This is indeed how Matthew understood Q.

Unlike the beatitudes in the inaugural sermon, ὅτι does not in this case function to introduce a causal clause. Rather, it functions to introduce direct speech after ‘I tell you’ (λέγω ὑμῖν). Regardless, verse 12 acts as an explanatory justification for the
sapiential instruction in verses 10–11 (Catchpole 1993:175, 187). Verse 12 explains why the workers must ‘shake the dust off their feet’. Hence, the ultimate outcome of the apocalyptic judgment has an impact on how to live and act in the present (cf. Edwards 1976:104). Futurist eschatology supports and motivates present action. Although the prophetic theme of apocalyptic judgment figures strongly in verse 12, this verse should nonetheless be viewed as a sapiential micro genre, most likely an aphorism (see Kirk 1998:353–354; pace Edwards 1976:104). Explanatory statements are signature attributes of the wisdom genre (cf. Edwards 1976:45). Prophetic genres are more interested in basing their pronouncements on divine authority, not logical reasoning. Compositionally, verses 13–15 are little more than an elaboration and amplification of the justification in verse 12 (cf. Edwards 1976:104–105). It follows that the prophetic woes against the Galilean towns mainly function in the overall structure of the mission discourse to strengthen the case for the directive in verse 10 (see Kirk 1998:351–352, 359–361). Thus, the apocalyptic eschatology of Q 10:12–15 justifies the wisdom of the mission discourse, particularly verses 10–11.

They will be your judges: Q 11:19b

The short story in Q 11:14 contextualises and sets the stage for the subsequent interaction between Jesus and his opponents (Fleddermann 2005:504; Valantasis 2005:124–125). The pericope in Q 11:14–15, 17–20 should therefore be seen as a sapiential *chreia* of challenge and riposte (Kirk 1998:184, 328; Kloppenborg 1987a:168). The sapiential character of this pericope is further indicated by the repeated use of conditional clauses and rhetorical questions, as well as the overall argumentative nature of the passage (Edwards 1976:111; Kirk 1998:188, 327; cf. Fleddermann 2005:502). In verse 15, Jesus is accused of casting out demons in the name of Beelzebul. He counters this accusation with two separate logical arguments; one featuring in verses 17–18, and the other in verses 19–20 (Fleddermann 2005:505). The maxim in verse 17 represents the heart of his first rhetorical argument against the sceptics, if not his whole case (Valantasis 2005:124; see Kirk 1998:185–186). In this verse, Jesus asserts that it is impossible for a divided kingdom or household to prevail. The conditional-clause-plus-rhetorical-question construct in verse 18 not only concretises the open-ended maxim in verse 17, but also applies the maxim to the initial accusation (Kirk 1998:187). Verses 17–18 argue that if Jesus is casting out demons with the aid of Beelzebul, then Satan’s kingdom is divided, and will come to a fall (cf. Mt 12:26). Presumed here is the ancient worldview according to which certain medical afflictions are the result of demon possession (cf. Davies & Allison 1991:336). One of the ways in which Satan builds his kingdom is by orchestrating this process of copious individual demon possessions (Bock 1996:1076).

The argument of Q 11:17–18 can be construed in one of two ways, depending on how one views the relation between Beelzebul and Satan in this pericope. If the two are
equated, then ‘Satan-Beelzebul’ is depicted as being responsible for not only expanding his kingdom by causing demon possession in the first place, but for also damaging his own kingdom by allowing exorcists to cast out demons as they see fit (see Bock 1996:1076–1077; Davies & Allison 1991:337–338; Fleddermann 2005:504–505; Funk & Hoover 1993:185–186; Luz 2001:203). With this reading, the accusation against Jesus depends on the inconsistency that Satan is simultaneously both building and destroying his own kingdom. Jesus’ defence consists of pointing out the logical inconsistency in his opponents’ accusation. The argument is not foolproof, since ‘Satan-Beelzebul’ could indeed be imagined as being cunning enough to lose one or two battles on purpose in order to win the ultimate war against God (Luz 2001:203; cf. Nolland 2005:499).

It is unlikely, however, that Q intends the argument to be understood in this way. Instead, the text clearly distinguishes between Beelzebul and Satan, as is indicated by a number of factors (pace e.g. Bock 1996:1074; Davies & Allison 1991:337; Marshall 1978:471, 474). Firstly, the Q author would presumably not feature two separate names for the same entity in one short passage. The latter is especially true for a passage that is made up of intricate argumentation, since the ambivalence created by separate designations could foreseeably cause misapprehension. Secondly, the auxiliary description of Beelzebul as ‘the ruler of demons’ (τῷ ἄρχοντι τῶν δαιμονίων) would be redundant if he were Satan himself. It is much more likely that the text features this description precisely to distinguish between the two entities by clarifying the position of Beelzebul in Satan’s kingdom. Thirdly, the whole pericope features military imagery and language, calling to mind the destructive power of a civil war (Nolland 2005:499; Valantasis 2005:125; cf. Bock 1996:1076; Luz 2001:203). Accordingly, Beelzebul is portrayed as a military commander (ἄρχων), while Satan is portrayed as the king or emperor of his own kingdom (ἡ βασιλεία αὐτοῦ). It would be interesting to research whether or not Beelzebul was also distinguished from Satan in other Jewish literature of the time, if the name is indeed represented in comparative literature (cf. Marshall 1978:473, 474).

That Beelzebul and Satan are two separate entities changes the sapiential argument. If Beelzebul is responsible for the exorcism in question, it would follow that he is acting in opposition to Satan’s general programme of expansion. In other words, while the demon responsible for the mute’s condition is playing a role in Satan’s master plan, the higher ranking Beelzebul is reversing the demon’s efforts and thereby nullifying his contribution (cf. Valantasis 2005:125). Such dissention amongst Satan’s ranks is the division of which Jesus speaks. It follows that if the sceptics are correct, and Jesus is indeed casting out demons in the name of Beelzebul, then both Jesus and Beelzebul are waging war against Satan. Their retaliation consists not only of reversing the progress made, but also of causing division. Both actions destabilise Satan’s kingdom. In other words, even if Jesus is casting out demons in the name of Beelzebul, he is contributing to the ultimate demise of Satan’s empire. Q’s Jesus merely takes a positive answer to the initial accusation to its logical conclusion (Valantasis 2005:126).
Jesus then continues with a slightly different argument in verses 19–20 (Luz 2001:203; Valantasis 2005:126; pace Kirk 1998:187), where he once again makes use of two conditional clauses (Edwards 1976:111; Fleddermann 2005:506). Like the previous argument, the first conditional clause takes a positive answer to the accusation to its logical extreme (Kloppenborg 1987a:125). Yet, the second conditional clause takes a negative answer to the accusation to its logical extreme. In the first sentence, the conditional clause is followed by a rhetorical question. In the second sentence, it is followed by a statement. The reference to ‘your sons’ (οἱ υἱοὶ ὑμῶν) points to the children of the attending crowds (Davies & Allison 1991:338). At least in part, the term ‘your sons’ intends to call to mind the younger generation, and the rupture that the ministry of Jesus has caused between children and their parents (Cromhout 2015:11 of 22; cf. Bock 1996:1077; Howes 2014b:7 of 11; Jacobson [1982] 1994:107–108; Robinson 2011:471; see Valantasis 2005:126–127; see Chapter 2, ‘Family feuds’). The conditional sentence, therefore, argues that if Jesus is working with Beelzebul, so are the sceptics’ own children, especially those who count amongst the followers of Jesus (Bock 1996:1077). In an attempt at defending the public honour of their families and themselves, one can imagine the sceptics vehemently denying the implied accusation that members of their own families are in cahoots with Beelzebul. It would follow from such a denial that neither was Jesus (Bock 1996:1077; Funk & Hoover 1993:186, 330; Luz 2001:203).

This denial enables Jesus to make the following statement: ‘This is why they will be your judges’ (διὰ τοῦτο αὐτοὶ ὑμῶν κριταὶ ἔσονται). Combined, the reference to ‘judges’ (κριταί) and the future tense of the verb ‘will be’ (ἔσονται) strongly suggest that this statement refers to the Final Judgment (Davies & Allison 1991:338; Marshall 1978:475). The use of the standard conjunctional construction διὰ τοῦτο [‘this is why’], which could also be translated as ‘therefore’ or ‘for this reason’ (Edwards 1976:111; Newman 1993, s.v. διά), indicates that we are dealing with an inferential statement. As a result, the eschatological statement in Q 11:19b forms part of Jesus’ overall argument. As with its other occurrences in verses 19–20, the second-person personal pronoun ‘you’ (ὑμεῖς) refers in this eschatological statement to the sceptics described in verse 15 as ‘some’ (τινὲς). The third-person personal pronoun ‘they’ (αὐτοὶ) can only be a reference to ‘your sons’ (οἱ υἱοὶ ὑμῶν) in the foregoing sentence. In other words, in response to the sceptics’ denial that their own biological children are working with Beelzebul, Jesus claims that the sceptics will for this very reason be judged by their own children at the Final Judgment. Stated differently, it is precisely because the children of these accusers do not perform exorcisms in the name of Beelzebul that they qualify to act as judges over their parents (Valantasis 2005:126). Thus, the sceptics’ children are working with God, and will therefore be afforded the privilege of judging the rest of Israel, their own parents included, at the Final Judgment (cf. Q 22:28, 30; cf. Bock 1996:1078; Kloppenborg 1987a:125; Robinson 2001b:16; 2001a:50). By denying that their sons are working with
Beelzebul, the sceptics are in effect denying that Jesus works with Beelzebul. If this is true, then the only logical conclusion is that Jesus is working with God, expanding his kingdom one exorcism at a time (Bock 1996:1077; Crossan 1983:48, 187; Funk & Hoover 1993:186, 330; Marshall 1978:475). Verse 20 therefore concludes the argument by claiming that through the exorcism just witnessed, Jesus has brought his accusers face to face with God’s kingdom (Nolland 2005:501). For the record, this claim indicates that Q perceives the kingdom of God as a present reality, being established through the ministry of Jesus and his followers (Robinson 2011:472; cf. Fleddermann 2005:506; Luz 2001:204; see Bork 2014:6–7 of 10).

The eschatological claim in Q 11:19b is part and parcel of the pericope’s overall sapiential argument. Q’s Jesus makes use of his own beliefs about the eschaton to strengthen his sapiential argument and message. In this passage, eschatology functions in the service of a larger sapiential argument. In addition, the eschatological claim in Q 11:19b naturally and logically follows from the sapiential argument itself, as is indicated by the phrase ‘this is why’ (διὰ τοῦτο). In this manner, Q’s Jesus bases an important conclusion about the nature of the eschaton on his wisdom. It seems that wisdom is the base from which he speculates about the end times.

The sign of Jonah: Q 11:16, 29–32

Like the previous pericope, Q 11:16, 29–32 is a challenge-and-riposte chreia, commencing with a very short tale that functions to contextualise the subsequent message (Kirk 1998:195, 328; Kloppenborg 1987a:168). It is at least possible that Matthew 12:38 faithfully preserves the reference to Jesus as a ‘teacher’ (διδάσκαλος) in Q 11:16, which would strengthen the case that Q 11:16, 29–32 is formally presented as a piece of wisdom (cf. Fleddermann 2005:491, 509). Although the sign requested in verse 16 has usually been taken as a request for a miracle, there is reason to believe that much more was at stake (see Bryan 2002:34–41):

Rather, they sought a sign which by close analogy with one of God’s great redemptive acts in the time of the Exodus and Conquest unmistakably demonstrated the truth of Jesus’ claim that the time of fulfilment had come. (p. 39)

This type of sign need not have functioned to authenticate Jesus as the Messiah, or even as a prophet. As such, it would not have been in the service of apocalyptic eschatology or even prophecy, but rather of realised eschatology.

Verse 29 represents the focal message, claiming that ‘this is an evil generation’ (ἡ γενεὰ αὕτη γενεὰ πονηρά ἐστιν) who ‘will not be given a sign’ (σημεῖον οὐ δοθήσεται) (Catchpole 1993:51). As the riposte in the challenge-and-riposte chreia, verse 29 is formally presented as a piece of wisdom about an apocalyptic theme. As such, the apocalyptic content of verse 29 forms part of the sapiential message of Q’s Jesus. Verse 30 further develops this apocalyptic theme by means of the
prophetic-eschatological micro genre called the ‘prophetic correlative’ (Fleddermann 2005:514; Robinson 1991:192; 1994:334; cf. Davies & Allison 1991:356; see Edwards 1969:9–20; 1976:41, 114; Schmidt 1977:517–522). Verses 31–32 develop the apocalyptic theme of verse 30 further (Edwards 1976:50). The eschatological court is probably in view here (see Gregg 2006:143–144). In toto, verses 30–32 function in the current literary context to support and explain the sapiential claims in verse 29 that ‘this is an evil generation’ and that ‘she will not be given a sign’ (Catchpole 1993:243; see Kirk 1998:195–196; Kloppenborg 1987a:133–134). This function is indicated by the conjunction ‘because’ (γὰρ) at the beginning of verse 30, which turns it into a causal statement. Moreover, verses 31–32 make use of authoritative examples from scripture to validate, support and explain the sapiential assertion of verse 29 (Kirk 1998:197, 198). Thus, apocalyptic forecasts are used in this passage to validate the wisdom of Q’s Jesus. Apocalypticism was commonly utilised in such a manner by 1st-century wisdom texts (Kirk 1998:198). In this pericope, the apocalyptic themes and forms not only feature as part of the sapiential content, but also function to strengthen and support it.

The expression ‘Son of Man’ also features in this pericope, at verse 30. As far as its interpretation is concerned, scholarship is generally divided between two options (Kloppenborg 1987a:132; Smith 2006:144). A number of scholars believe that the Son of Man expression is here an allusion to Daniel 7:13 (e.g. Catchpole 1993:246; Tödt [1959] 1965:270–271). Other scholars reason that the term ‘Son of Man’ functions in Q 11:30 as an unmistakable term for Jesus during his this-worldly ministry (e.g. Kirk 1998:198). There have also been those scholars who have attempted to harmonise the two options (e.g. Fleddermann 2005:509–515). In support of the former view, attention could be drawn to both the literary context (verses 31–32), which develops apocalyptic themes, and the future tense of the verb ‘will be’ (ἔσται) in verse 30 (cf. Catchpole 1993:246; Luz 2001:218; Smith 2006:144). There are, however, excellent reasons for preferring the second view.

In this text, one must first determine the referent of Jonah’s ‘sign’ (σημεῖον) before reaching any judgment on the usage of the term ‘Son of Man’ (Fleddermann 2005:512). One question is fundamental at this point: What exactly was Jonah’s sign? It could not have been the ‘historical’ figure of Jonah himself, since Jonah spent a whole day gallivanting in Nineveh, without raising as much as an eyebrow (Jnh 3:4; cf. Catchpole 1993:245; pace Bock 1996:1097; Bryan 2002:41, 44; Smith 2006:144). But when Jonah cried out his apocalyptic message, the people of Nineveh took notice, and radically changed their ways (Jnh 3:4–9). This reaction ultimately led to their apocalyptic salvation (Jnh 3:10). It logically follows that ‘Jonah’s sign’ must have been his apocalyptic message (Bock 1996:1097; Funk & Hoover 1993:189; Valantasis 2005:136; cf. Wink 2002:91; see Bryan 2002:41–42; pace Catchpole 1993:246). This conclusion indicates that the term ‘Son of Man’ does not in Q 11:30 reference the apocalyptic agent of Daniel 7:13. Neither in Daniel 7 nor in the Sayings Gospel Q does this figure bring any kind of message (pace Edwards 1976:114). Instead, he simply appears at the apocalyptic event, when it is already too late
for repentance or redemption. In Q 11:30, the referent of the Son of Man is Jesus (Kirk 1998:198; Valantasis 2005:136). Once this is accepted, the comparison between Jesus and Jonah becomes clear. In part, the message of both Jonah and Jesus revolves around apocalyptic destruction and repentance (cf. Jnh 3:4, 10; Q 10:12–15; cf. Luz 2001:218; Wink 2002:91). It is important to note in this regard that Jonah did not preach a message of repentance, but of inevitable, irrevocable destruction (Bryan 2002:41–42). Repentance and deliverance was an unfortunate (from Jonah’s perspective) side effect or outcome, but not the content of his apocalyptic message. With both Jonah and Jesus, the apocalyptic message represents the only warning sign of apocalyptic doom (cf. Jnh 3:5; Q 11:29; cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:133). Both Jonah and Jesus become a sign by means of their this-worldly conduct (cf. Jnh 3:1–4; Q 11:16; cf. Bock 1996:1097; Robinson 1994:323). It goes without saying that this is not the marvellous sign originally requested (Bryan 2002:44, 45; Marshall 1978:485; Nolland 2005:510).

The literary context in Q 11:31–32, which also mentions Jonah, the Ninevites and ‘this generation’, supports the foregoing conclusion, even if it does develop apocalyptic themes (Kloppenborg 1987a:133). The comparative adjective ‘greater’ (πλεῖόν) is in the neuter here because it refers back to the ‘sign’ (σημεῖον) of verse 29, which should be understood as the Son of Man’s message (Robinson 1992:370; see Wink 2002:91–92; pace Catchpole 1993:242). Like Jonah and Solomon, the one responsible for this ‘greater message’ (πλεῖόν) not only has to be flesh and blood, but must also have been on earth at some stage before the Apocalypse arrives. It follows that the mysterious figure of verses 31–32 cannot be equated with the apocalyptic figure of Daniel 7:13, since that figure only arrives on the scene when it is already too late (cf. Q 17:23–24; cf. Luz 2001:219; Marshall 1978:485). The respective messages of Jonah and Solomon were beacons for their contemporaries. Similarly, the message of the arcane figure in Q 11:29–32 has to be a beacon for its contemporaries, including ‘this generation’ (cf. Horsley 2012:21; Wink 2002:90–91). The latter statement is supported by the vocabulary of Q 11:31–32. The interjection ‘look!’ (ἰδοὺ) and the adverb ‘here’ (ὧδε) both indicate that this figure must be a corporeal person that existed when Q 11:29–32 was spoken (cf. Smith 2006:145). As Kloppenborg (1987a:133) puts it, ‘the double saying [in Q 11:31–32] pronounces judgment upon those who refuse to respond to some present reality which is greater than Jonah or Solomon.’

In light of all this, the ‘something greater than both Jonah and Solomon’ has to be the message of the earthly Jesus. It follows that the Son of Man reference in verse 30 must be to Jesus during his worldly ministry; that is, if we are to make sense of the explanatory examples in verses 31–32 (cf. Kirk 1998:198; Robinson 1991:189; 1994:323). Hence, both the book of Jonah and the literary context in Q support the proposal that Jesus, and not the apocalyptic figure of Daniel 7:13, is the Son of Man in Q 11:30.

When discussing the comparison between Jesus and Jonah, it was reasoned that the ‘sign of the Son of Man (or Jesus)’ is his apocalyptic message, not his person.

180 Italics original.
Also this conclusion is confirmed by Q 11:31–32, where it is said that the Queen of the South and the Ninevites experienced apocalyptic favour, not because they knew Solomon or Jonah, but because they heeded the wisdom (σοφίαν) of Solomon and the announcement (κήρυγμα) of Jonah respectively (cf. Catchpole 1993:242; Kirk 1998:198; Robinson 1994:323). Verse 32 explicitly states that the Ninevites will experience apocalyptic favour ‘because’ (ὅτι) they ‘repented’ (μετενόησαν) when they heard Jonah’s apocalyptic ‘message’ (κήρυγμα) (Smith 2006:146). Likewise, verse 31 explicitly states that the Queen of the South will experience apocalyptic favour ‘because’ (ὅτι) she ‘listened’ (ἀκοῦσαι) to Solomon’s sapiential ‘message’ (σοφίαν). Although Solomon was primarily known for his wisdom and wealth, he was also admired in the 1st century for his role as a staunch preacher of repentance in the face of apocalyptic judgment (Catchpole 1993:242; Kloppenborg 1987a:133–134; cf. e.g. Wis 6:1–19). Generally speaking, contemporary Jewish wisdom often includes stern messages of repentance (cf. e.g. Wis 11:23; 12:10, 19; Sir 17:24; 44:16, 48). According to Q 11:31–32, both the Queen of the South and the Ninevites will experience apocalyptic salvation because they took the respective messages of Solomon and Jonah to heart (Fleddermann 2005:514; see Valantasis 2005:137–138). According to Q 11:29–30, on the other hand, ‘this generation’ will experience apocalyptic condemnation because they failed to heed the sign of the Son of Man, meaning the message of Q’s Jesus (Nolland 2005:512; cf. Bryan 2002:44; Piper 1989:167; Smith 2006:146).

Although Fleddermann (2005:510, 512) also concludes from Q 11:31–32 that the sign of Jonah must be his message, he then goes beyond his own exegetical conclusion in claiming that ‘[t]he sign fuses Jesus’ person with his message’ (p. 512) (cf. Davies & Allison 1991:358; Valantasis 2005:138). It is exactly the claim that the Son of Man’s sign refers to his person that must on exegetical grounds be rejected. The neuter form of the comparative adjective ‘greater’ (πλεῖόν) indicates that the Son of Man’s sign is his message only, and not also his person (Bock 1996:1098, 1099). Fleddermann (2005:514–515) claims that the neuter form of this adjective is not determinative, since there are other examples from Q, the New Testament and extra-biblical Greek writings where a predicate features in the neuter in reference to a masculine or feminine noun (cf. Marshall 1978:486). This may be true, but the noun is in most cases only masculine or feminine in grammatical gender, while denoting a gender-neutral entity in real life, usually an abstract concept or a physical object. If the intent was to make a Christological statement, one would have expected the author to make this obvious by featuring the adjective in its gendered form (πλείων). Even though Jonah, Solomon and the Son of Man are each the subject of their respective messages, it is according to this text

182. See previous footnote.
183. For example, Q 12:23; 1 Corinthians 6:11; 11:5; 13:2; 15:10.
their *messages* that carry apocalyptic and soteriological weight. If the Son of Man has an apocalyptic and soteriological function otherwise, it is not developed by this text.

The content of verses 31–32 also disqualifies the proposal that ‘Jonah’s sign’ refers to his three-day stay in the belly of a big fish. This happening was only indirectly relevant to Nineveh’s apocalyptic pardon, having enabled Jonah to bring his apocalyptic message to the ancient city. It is unclear how Jonah’s sign would relate to Solomon’s wisdom if this sign were a three-day stay in the belly of a big fish. In any case, the Ninevites could scarcely have known about Jonah’s ordeal with the big fish, and such knowledge would be a prerequisite for Jonah’s sign to qualify as a sign in the first place (Fleddermann 2005:511; cf. Luz 2001:219). Bock (1996:1097) speculates that Jonah might have told the Ninevites of his experience, but such conjecture is even more ‘fishy’ than Jonah’s encounter with the obliging big fish. As ‘fishy’ is Marshall’s (1978:485) claim that ignorance of Jonah’s ordeal is unimportant, since it were Jesus’ contemporaries who needed to be familiar with it.

If the Son of Man does not in this case refer to the Danielic emissary, what are we to make of the fact that, in verse 30, the verb ‘will be’ (ἔσται) appears in the future tense? Kloppenborg (1987a:132) reasons that it is a gnomic future that intends present time. It is much more likely, though, that Q’s Jesus uses the future tense because he intends future time (Catchpole 1993:246; Edwards 1976:114). There are two ways to explain the future tense in this case. Seeing as the term ‘Son of Man’ here refers to the corporeal Jesus, the future tense could indicate the rest of his earthly ministry, including the immediate future during which Jesus will or will not give a sign (cf. Bock 1996:1097). The future tense of the verb ‘will be given’ (δοθήσεται) in verse 29 could be held up as evidence in support of this interpretation (Marshall 1978:485; cf. Bock 1996:1097–1098; Kloppenborg 1987a:132). However, such an explanation would exclude the part of his ministry that had already been completed, including his concurrent message of apocalyptic doom. This seems unlikely to have been the intention (cf. Wink 2002:90–91).

It is much more likely that the future tense points here to the predicted time of the Apocalypse (Catchpole 1993:246; Edwards 1976:114). When ‘this generation’ stands before God at the apocalyptic court (cf. Q 12:8–9), the ‘sign of the Son of Man’, meaning the message of Q’s Jesus, *will have been* their only warning of apocalyptic judgment (cf. Bock 1996:1096; Wink 2002:91). *Koine* Greek does not have a perfect-future tense that would enable it to articulate something similar to the English phrase ‘will have been’. The future tense alone must suffice. Just like the acceptance of Jonah’s message resulted in apocalyptic pardon (cf. Jnh 3:10), the message of Q’s Jesus, if accepted, *will result in* apocalyptic pardon. Just like the respective messages of Solomon and Jonah *will result in* apocalyptic favour for the Queen of the South and the Ninevites at the general resurrection (cf. Q 11:31–32), the message of Q’s Jesus, if accepted, *will result in* apocalyptic favour for ‘this generation’. Q 11:30 is therefore looking forward at the apocalyptic event, and
Chapter 3

predicting that ‘this generation’ will regret not heeding the ‘sign of the Son of Man’, which they had already received during their lives on earth (cf. Piper 1989:167). In dealing with Q 11:29–30, Wink (2002:91) states: ‘[The Son of Man] will not come in the future to judge; rather, he is the present standard by which one will be judged in the future.’ Just like the message of Jonah could only be appreciated after it had resulted in apocalyptic pardon, the message of Jesus, as the sign of the Son of Man, will only be appreciated after it had already resulted in apocalyptic destruction. The beauty of hindsight!

If the expression ‘Son of Man’ refers here to the earthly Jesus, is it possible that Q 11:30 also connotes more people with its use of the expression? If more people are intended, it certainly does not include all of humanity, since only a few individuals throughout history have preached at all. The ‘silent masses’ are exactly that: ‘silent’. The generic and indefinite interpretations of the term ‘Son of Man’ are thereby removed from consideration. Nonetheless, an idiomatic application of the expression ‘Son of Man’ could perhaps imply a selected group of individuals. Jesus was certainly not the only one in Israel’s history to preach a message of repentance. Q 11:29–32 recalls also Jonah and Solomon. The apocalyptic message of John the Baptist also comes to mind (cf. Q 3:7–9, 16–17). Unfortunately, this corporate reading goes against the intention of Q 11:29–32, where the Son of Man is compared to Jonah and Solomon. Such comparison with other historical figures naturally excludes these figures from being identified with the Son of Man. When dealing with Q 7:34, we concluded that the comparison in that context between Jesus and the Baptist meant that the term ‘Son of Man’ referred there exclusively to Jesus. The same is true in the present (con)text. One entity, the Son of Man, is compared with another entity, Jonah and Solomon respectively, indicating that the two entities are mutually exclusive.

The elevated role that Q 11:30 bestows upon the Son of Man, in view of the apocalyptic judgment, opens up the possibility that the term ‘Son of Man’ is here used as a title for Jesus (cf. Edwards 1976:114). Yet, it is the ‘sign’, meaning the apocalyptic message, that carries soteriological weight, not the Son of Man (Kloppenborg 1987a:133; Robinson 1992:370). Instead, the expression ‘Son of Man’ refers here to the earthly Jesus and his mortal ministry. If the expression ‘Son of Man’ were intended as a title for Jesus, one would have expected the Son of Man himself to be the enforcer of soteriological and apocalyptic salvation, not merely his message. To conclude, as with the other Son of Man texts we have looked at thus far, the expression ‘Son of Man’ refers here exclusively to Jesus during his earthly ministry (cf. Robinson 1991:189). Even though it appears in a text that handles apocalyptic images and themes, it is neither a title for Jesus nor a reference to the apocalyptic figure of Daniel 7:13.

Sophia judges ‘this generation’: Q 11:49–51

Q 11:49–51 is basically a declaration that ‘this generation’ will be held accountable at the Final Judgment for all the prophets and sages who had been killed in the past

If the current logion is considered together with the preceding woes against the Pharisees and scribes, the entire section resembles an extended prophetic micro genre, commonly found in apocalyptic literature. This micro genre traditionally consisted of a series of accusations, the messenger formula ‘thus says the Lord’, and a subsequent announcement of future judgment (Edwards 1976:69; Kirk 1998:316; see Crossan 1983:171–173; Kloppenborg 1987a:143–144; cf. Davies & Allison 1997:316). That Q 11:49–51 has the Final Judgment in mind should not be doubted (Bock 1996:1122; Luz 2005:152, cf. 156). Despite the prophetic and eschatological content, the replacement of Yahweh with ‘Sophia’ at Q 11:49a signals a deliberate attempt at presenting the logion as a piece of wisdom (cf. Carlston 1982:104–105; Luz 2005:152, cf. 156). Despite the prophetic and eschatological content, the replacement of Yahweh with ‘Sophia’ at Q 11:49a signals a deliberate attempt at presenting the logion as a piece of wisdom (cf. Carlston 1982:104–105; Luz 2005:151). There are only two ways of interpreting the occurrence of ‘Sophia’ in this Q text (cf. Piper 1989:165). The first is to see it, as did Matthew, as a reference to Jesus, in which case the Sayings Gospel Q equates Jesus with heavenly Sophia. The second is to see it as a plain reference to heavenly Sophia, in which case Jesus quotes Sophia in this saying (Carlston 1982:104; Smith 2006:102). The second option is probably more accurate, since there is no concerted effort in the introduction to signal or suggest that Sophia and Jesus are being equated (Carlston 1982:105). Also, the content of the saying itself seems to differentiate between Sophia and Jesus, with Sophia sending a number of envoys to Israel, including most probably Jesus himself (Smith 2006:102; cf. Luz 2005:156). According to Valantasis (2005:152), the Q people placed this saying in the mouth of Sophia because they wanted to distance Jesus from the harsh and judgmental content of Q 11:49–51. Irrespective of whether or not the two figures are being equated, the content of the logion is deliberately presented as wisdom, having derived from the mouth of Wisdom personified (Carlston 1982:104–105). Marshall (1978:502) labels this logion ‘a prophecy of judgment couched in wisdom terminology.’ The prophetic-eschatological content of Jesus’ sapiential message is that ‘this generation’ will be held

\[184\] Piper (1989:164–165) adds another six reasons for accepting the reference to ἡ σοφία as being originally part of Q.

\[185\] Although Jesus himself is not expressly mentioned, there are two indicators that Jesus should in this case be seen as the one quoting Sophia. Firstly, Jesus is introduced in Q 11:16 as the ‘speaker’ of the extended wisdom teaching in Q 11:16–51. Secondly, Jesus is implied by the thematic content of the saying itself, being depicted as the last individual killed by ‘this generation’ (Piper 1989:169).
responsible for the killing of traditional prophets and sages (Valantasis 2005:151). Prophetic and eschatological motifs feature as part of the sapiential message of Q's Jesus. All in all, Kirk (1998:333–336) argues persuasively that the so-called ‘controversy discourse’ (Q 10:23–24; 11:2–52; 13:34–35) should in its entirety be seen as a sapiential text that develops a number of prophetic and eschatological themes.

The fact that ‘prophets’ (προφῆται) and ‘sages’ (σοφοί) are mentioned here does not have any bearing on the formal genre of the logion (Carlston 1982:104), but it does perhaps betray something about Q’s perception of Jesus. As is well known, Israel has a long history of murdering her own prophets (see Bock 1996:1122; cf. Q 11:47). The same is not true of sages, though. As far as the ‘Israel-killing-her-own’ motif is concerned, the mentioning of ‘prophets’ is to be expected, but the mentioning of ‘sages’ is unusual. To my mind, the best explanation for this oddity is that Q 11:49 has the death of Jesus in the back of its mind, who is otherwise understood to be a sage (cf. Luz 2005:156; Smith 2006:102, 131; pace Horsley 2012:115). On the one hand, ‘prophets’ are mentioned in Q 11:49–50 because they fit the traditional motif according to which important personages from Israel’s past are killed by the elite (cf. Horsley 2012:141). On the other hand, ‘sages’ are mentioned because Jesus was also killed by the elite, and he was primarily viewed as a sage. In other words, Jesus’ known identity as a sage contradicted the Deuteronomistic model, according to which only prophets were killed in the past, forcing the authors of Q to add the reference to ‘sages’ to a text that would only have featured prophets if Jesus’ death was not also implied.

The specific identity of the individuals mentioned in Q 11:51 might support the previous suggestion. Considering their respective portrayals in the Old Testament, neither Abel (cf. Gn 4:8–10) nor Zechariah (cf. 2 Chr 24:20–22) qualify as prophets (Davies & Allison 1997:318; Valantasis 2005:150; cf. Marshall 1978:505, 506). That the prophet of the book Zechariah is not intended here, but rather the priest named Zechariah in 2 Chronicles 24:20–22, is indicated by the fact that only the latter figure fits the description of being murdered and deserving vengeance (Davies & Allison 1997:318; Valantasis 2005:150; see Bock 1996:1123–1124; Luz 2005:154–155; Marshall 1978:506).186 The latter Zechariah also fits the chronological pattern intended by Q, with Abel being the first and this Zechariah being the last martyr in the Hebrew scriptures. It is at least possible that Abel and Zechariah are intentionally chosen because they are not prophets, sharing this attribute with Q’s Jesus. Q 11:49–51 is comfortable mentioning both sages and prophets in the same breath because the wisdom of Q’s Jesus could often be described as ‘prophetic’, as the content of this saying makes clear. Be that as it may, Q 11:49–51 is presented as a piece of wisdom that develops prophetic-eschatological themes (Carlston 1982:104–105).

186 It is not impossible that the two traditional figures have inadvertently been conflated here (Davies & Allison 1997:319; cf. Bock 1996:1124; Luz 2005:155). If so, Q 11:49–51 might indeed be intending to hold up a prophet from Israel’s history, even if it is in reality not doing so.
Confessing Jesus in public: Q 12:8–9

Luke features the term ‘Son of Man’ in Q 12:8, but Matthew does not. Most scholars agree that Luke is more original at this point (Piper 1989:58; Robinson 1994:331; Tuckett 2000a:172). According to Piper (1989:58), for example, Luke would not deliberately have introduced a distinction between Jesus and the Son of Man by adding the term ‘Son of Man’ to his Q source (cf. De Jonge 1997:108). Yet, the rest of Luke’s Gospel indicates that the two figures had already been equated by both the author and his audience at the time of writing, suggesting that they would not have taken the text in its Lukan form to presuppose a distinction between Jesus and the Son of Man (Gregg 2006:174; cf. Funk & Hoover 1993:337). As we will see shortly, the Lukan text can just as easily be read as an invitation to associate the two figures. If this is true, the concern about potentially encouraging a distinction between the two figures by adding or retaining the phrase ‘Son of Man’ is a scholarly concern, anachronistically projected upon ancient authors, for whom it was no concern at all. Some scholars who defend Lukan priority at this point regard only his treatment of Q, forgetting that both the saying and the term are also attested in Mark 8:38 (cf. De Jonge 1997:106). Catchpole (1993:93), for example, argues that it is not customary for Luke to add the term ‘Son of Man’ to his sources. Yet, Luke did not ‘add’ the term to his ‘sources’ if he was following Mark in this regard. Likewise, Marshall (1978:515) states that the term ‘must have stood in Luke’s source’, as if Luke had only one source. Ultimately, the presence of the term ‘Son of Man’ in Luke can be explained by the possibility that the evangelist prefers Mark’s version that features the term over Q’s version that lacks the term (cf. De Jonge 1997:106).

The logion’s potential for inviting a distinction between Jesus and the Son of Man also governs explanations of Matthew’s editorial activity. Accordingly, Matthew replaced the term ‘Son of Man’ with the typically Matthean ‘and I’ (κἀγώ) to remove any doubt that Jesus is the intended referent (e.g. Casey 2009:186; Catchpole 1993:93; Davies & Allison 1991:216; Piper 1989:58; Smith 2006:135; cf. Luz 2001:98, 100; Marshall 1978:515). As with Luke, however, it is not certain that this concern played a part in Matthew’s editorial decision to feature ‘I’ instead of ‘Son of Man’. Once again, Mark is not given its due as one of Matthew’s sources. If the term ‘Son of Man’ featured in both Mark 8:38 and Q 12:8, then one is forced to imagine a scenario according to which Matthew intentionally disregarded both of his sources, and replaced a doubly-attested original reference to the Son of Man with a personal pronoun. The difference between Matthew and Luke could alternatively be explained as a difference in preference for two distinct sources. In other words, Matthew preferred Q, where the term was absent, and Luke preferred Mark, where the term was present (cf. De Jonge 1997:106). Fleddermann (2005) makes the following claim:

[I]f Matthew’s ‘I’ is original, then it would mean that Mark and Luke would both have introduced the Son of Man into a saying that originally did not refer to the Son of Man. (p. 573)
This comment is misleading. Far from Mark and Luke both introducing the term ‘Son of Man’, its absence in Q would indicate that Mark or his (non-Q) source introduced the term Son of Man at 8:38, and that Luke simply preferred Mark over Q. Not too long ago, Hoffmann (1991:165–202; 1997:210–238) also argued for the absence of the Son of Man expression in Q 12:8 (Fleddermann 2005:573 fn. 29; Tuckett 2000a:172 fn. 7). His case basically consisted of four arguments: (1) the version of the saying that includes a reference to the Son of Man fits poorly in Q, not being conducive to the document’s larger interests; (2) Matthew had no good reason for exchanging a possible reference to the Son of Man with a personal pronoun; (3) Luke had good reasons for adding the term to his source, where it was missing; and (4) Mark may have been responsible for the version of the logion that includes the term.

Against the foregoing observations, however, there is evidence to suggest that Matthew was indeed concerned about the saying’s potential to invite a distinction between Jesus and the Son of Man (De Jonge 1997:108; see Fleddermann 2005:573; Tuckett 2000a:175–175). In Matthew 16:21, the author features a personal pronoun in the place of an original reference to the Son of Man in his source (Mk 8:31), where the saying could be taken to distinguish between Jesus and the Son of Man. If the phrase ‘Son of Man’ did indeed feature in Q 6:22, which seems likely (see above, ‘Persecution explained’), then Matthew also exchanged the term for a personal pronoun in this instance. It deserves mention, though, that Matthew also carries out the reverse redactional activity when replacing a personal pronoun that refers to Jesus with the term ‘Son of Man’ in Matthew 16:13 (cf. Mk 8:27). It is further possible that Matthew’s alteration of ‘before the angels’ (ἐμπροσθεν τῶν ἄγγελων) at the end of Q 12:8 to ‘before my Father in heaven’ (ἐμπροσθεν τοῦ πατρός μου τοῦ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς) obliged him to change an original occurrence of the phrase ‘Son of Man’ to ‘I’. Finally, in addition to avoiding a conceptual separation between Jesus and the Son of Man, Matthew might have been influenced by the theological difficulty of featuring the Son of Man as a mere witness at the Final Judgment, and not a judge as in the rest of his Gospel. In light of these observations, it is perhaps not too far-fetched to imagine Matthew disregarding two of his sources in order to prevent ambiguity over the identity of the Son of Man (cf. Tuckett 2000a:178). This was not an overreaction on Matthew’s part, considering that this individual saying has been elemental in convincing a large number of prominent scholars, including Wellhausen, Bultmann and Tödt, that the historical Jesus used the term ‘Son of Man’ in reference to someone other than himself (cf. Burkett 1999:38; Fleddermann 2005:591; Smith 2006:135; see Casey 2009:186–187). Ultimately, it seems that the evidence could support arguments for or against the presence of the term ‘Son of Man’ in Q 12:8. The present author remains undecided on this matter, but is at least suspicious of the confidence with which most scholars conclude that the term featured in Q. Due to my indecision, the rest of this section will follow the Critical Edition of Q and presume the presence of the term in Q 12:8 (Robinson et al. 2000:304–305; 2002:118–119).
The formal characteristics and argumentative nature of Q 12:2–12 leave no doubt about the sapiential genre of this pericope (Kirk 1998:206, 208–209; Kloppenborg 1987a:208; Piper 1989:55–56). Additionally, the whole pericope is wrought with individual cases of parallelism, which was wisdom’s most basic and fundamental building block (Ceresko 1999:31; cf. Carlson 1982:107). Q 12:2–12 starts in verse 2 with a general and familiar maxim, based on experience, that all secrets and hidden truths will at some stage be exposed (Edwards 1976:120; Kirk 1998:206; Kloppenborg 1987a:206; Marshall 1978:512; Piper 1989:57; cf. Bock 1996:1134; Funk & Hoover 1993:172, 336). The sapiential nature of verse 2 is supported by its occurrence in the Gospel of Thomas (5:2; 6:5). This maxim provides the reasoning and justification for the admonition in verse 3 to proclaim the message of Q’s Jesus in public (Kloppenborg 1987a:210; Marshall 1978:512). It is not clear when the exposure of ‘all things hidden’ will take place (Luz 2001:100). If Jesus were implying that the predicted disclosure would occur at the Final Judgment, as the divine passives seem to suggest, then this is yet another example of an eschatological logion providing justification for a sapiential admonition (cf. Bock 1996:1134; Davies & Allison 1991:202, 203; Fleddermann 2005:586; Kirk 1998:207; Luz 2001:101; Valantasis 2005:153). It is not clear, though, that verse 2 presupposes eschatology (cf. Piper 1989:56, 76–77). Its classification as a traditional maxim speaks against an eschatological rendering.

Fleddermann (2005:585) compares Q 12:2–3 with the tendency in apocalyptic literature to nurture a secret or hidden revelation. The appearance of the Greek verb ἀποκαλύπτω [‘expose’], from which the English word ‘apocalyptic’ stems, would seem to support Fleddermann’s comparison. Yet, the admonition in verse 3 to share the message with others seems to fly in the face of the apocalyptic tendency to protect secret knowledge from exposure to outsiders. The intent of Q 12:2–3 is clearly to counteract any inclination or programme aimed at keeping the message hidden (Valantasis 2005:152–153). This intent is diametrically opposed to the proclivity in apocalyptic literature to conceal the superior knowledge of insiders from the out-group. Whereas apocalyptic writings are aimed at establishing boundaries by ‘setting up a contrast between those inside who know and those outside who don’t’ (Fleddermann 2005:585), Q 12:2–3 is aimed at eradicating boundaries187 by sharing hidden knowledge indiscriminately (see Valantasis 2005:153–154).

The admonition to proclaim Jesus’ message in public is further substantiated by two admonitions: a negative one in verse 4 and a positive one in verse 5 (Kloppenborg 1987a:208; cf. Valantasis 2005:154). Both are concerned with anxiety (Piper 1989:52). The first (negative) admonition instructs the audience not to fear human beings, who are only able to kill the body, but have no power over the soul (Piper 1989:53; Smith 2006:121). This directive is motivated in verses 6–7 by reassuring the audience that God cares for them, and that God will protect them (Bock 1996:1130; 187. Internal boundaries between Jewish co-ethnics, that is.
Thus, people are instructed to proclaim the message of Jesus, and are encouraged not to be afraid when doing so, because God will protect them (Kirk 1998:208; Valantasis 2005:156). Allison (1997:168–172) argues that verses 6–7 do not discuss God’s protection, but God’s omniscience (cf. Bock 1996:1135). To be sure, the followers of Jesus are not promised that they will escape tribulation. The body might still be killed (verse 4), the sparrow still falls to the ground (verse 6), and the hairs might still perish (verse 7). If Allison is correct, the consolation of verses 6–7 is not that God will protect the audience against physical abuse, but that God is in control, and that he is aware of said abuse. In fact, ‘what befalls God’s own must somehow be within his will’ (Davies & Allison 1991:202, cf. 207–211; cf. Nolland 2005:438). Whichever interpretation is preferred, the rhetorical function of verses 6–7 remains the same, which is to motivate the instruction of verse 4.

Verse 5 provides quite a different type of rationale for the admonition to proclaim the message of Jesus in public. It instructs Jesus’ audience to be afraid of the one who has the ability to destroy both the body and the soul (Fleddermann 2005:587; Smith 2006:121; see Valantasis 2005:154–155). A number of scholars have taken the references in this verse to the ‘soul’ (ψυχή) and ‘Gehenna’ or ‘hell’ (γέεννα) as indications of prophecy or eschatology (e.g. Allison 1997:174; 2010:34; Davies & Allison 1991:202, 205; Fleddermann 2005:587; Marshall 1978:513; Piper 1989:55–56). Kloppenborg (1987a:208–210) has argued convincingly against these interpretations that this logion should not be seen as a prophetic small form, but as a purely sapiential instruction. References to the ‘soul’ and to ‘hell’ do not automatically presuppose futurist eschatology, but often presuppose the post-mortem judgment of individuals, especially in wisdom material (see Bock 1996:1136–1137). In fact, the latter interpretation is preferable. The saying presupposes the Platonic distinction between body and soul, with physical death meaning the end of the body, but not of the soul. In other words, ‘an ongoing life for the soul after the death of the body is presumed’ (Smith 2006:121). As a sapiential logion, Q 12:5 implicitly threatens those who fail to obey the admonition in verse 3 with eternal damnation (cf. Kirk 1998:208). As a whole, Q 12:4–7 motivates the admonition in verse 3 by favourably juxtaposing the pre-mortem fate of those who obey the admonition with the post-mortem fate of those who do not. The Q people are encouraged to face even certain death in view of post-mortem reward (Nolland 2005:436; cf. Davies & Allison 1991:210–211).

Respectively, the positive and negative admonitions in verses 4 and 5 find their indicative counterparts in verses 8 and 9, both of which are concerned with providing supplementary motivation for the admonition in verse 3 (Kirk 1998:209; cf. Horsley 1991:206). Both individually and together, the preposition ‘before’ (ἐμπρόσθεν) and

188.As is clear from the phrases ‘anyone who may speak out for me in public’ (πᾶς ὃς ἂν ὁμολογήσῃ ἐν ἐμοὶ ἔμπροσθεν τῶν ἀνθρώπων) and ‘but whoever may deny me in public’ (ὁς δ’ ἂν ἀρνήσηται με ἐμπροσθεν τῶν ἀνθρώπων).
the noun ‘angels’ (αγγελοι) unmistakably recall the traditional image of a heavenly council, like the one featured in 1 Kings 22:19–22, Job 1:6 (& 2:1) and Daniel 7:9–10 (Marshall 1978:515; Casey 2009:181; cf. Kirk 1998:209–210; Valantasis 2005:157; cf. Heb 12:22; Rv 5:11). In 1 Kings 22:19–22, Micaiah explains a vision he had of God sitting on his throne, with ‘all the angels of heaven’ (וְכָל־צְבָא הַשָּׁמַיִם) on either side of him. While discussing the prospective accomplishment of Ahab’s military demise, a ‘spirit’ (רווח) came and ‘stood before the Lord’ (לְהִתְיַצֵּב עַל־יְהוָה), offering his services. In its translation of this text, the Septuagint (3 Kgdms 22:21) maintains both the reference to a ‘spirit’ (πνεῦμα) and the phrase ‘stood before the Lord’ (ἔστη ἐνώπιον κυρίου).

In the familiar scene in Job 1:6, a group of ‘heavenly beings’ (הָאֱלֹהִים), including Satan himself (הַשָּׂטָן), come ‘to stand before the Lord’ (הָעַל־יְהוָה) and throw Job under the proverbial bus. On the one hand, the Septuagint exchanges the phrase ‘heavenly beings’ (εὐαγγελείς) with ‘the angels of God’ (οἱ ἄγγελοι τοῦ θεοῦ), and the reference to Satan (הַשָּׂטָן) with ‘the devil’ (ὁ διάβολος). On the other hand, the Septuagint retains the phrase ‘to stand before the Lord’ (παραστῆναι ἐνώπιον τοῦ κυρίου). In Job 2:1, the exact same phrase as in Job 1:6 features twice, stating that Satan and his entourage came again ‘to stand before the Lord’ (הָעַל־יְהוָה). Although the Septuagint exchanges ἐνώπιον for ἐναντίον (or ἐναντίον), which also means ‘before’, Job 2:1 features the same phrases as Job 1:6: (1) ‘the angels of God’; (2) ‘the devil’; and (3) ‘to stand before the Lord’ (παραστῆναι ἐναντίον κυρίου), which features twice. Neither 1 Kings 22:19–22 nor Job 1:6 (& 2:1) feature God’s council in reference to eschatological judgment, apocalyptic or otherwise. Rather, both texts allow the audience to be a fly on heaven’s wall, and to witness first-hand what goes on in heaven while people are living out their lives on earth. The non-eschatological nature of these intertexts indicates that the phrase ‘before the angels’ in Q 12:8–9 does not in and of itself suffice as evidence that Q 12:8–9 is an eschatological saying (cf. Horsley 2012:21).

Daniel 7:1–28 describes Daniel’s vision of God’s apocalyptic judgment. Verses 9–10 describe the preparation of the heavenly courtroom in anticipation of the commencement of unspecified legal proceedings. This preparation includes the placement of thrones, the assembling of countless angelic attendees, and the moment when God, referred to here as the ‘Ancient of Days’, takes his seat (Wink 2002:52). The angelic attendees are described as ‘standing before’ (ἐνώπιον) God. The Septuagint retains this associative meaning when it translates קָדָמוֹהִי יְקָוֹעַַה with παραστήκανται αὐτῷ ['stood before'].189 Although it does not feature as part of the phrase ‘stood before’, the preposition ‘before’ (ἐμπρόσθεν) features at the beginning of verse 10. After a description of the courtroom’s preparations, the Masoretic Text features the phrase בְּתוֹן. The Aramaic

189. ‘Stand before’ is one of the translation possibilities of παρίστημι (Newman 1993, s.v. παρίστημι & παριστάνω). The verb could also mean ‘to deliver a person into the control of someone else, involving … the handing over of a presumably guilty person for punishment by authorities’ (Louw & Nida 1993a:485; 1993b:189, s.v. παρίστημι). Another possible meaning of παριστάνω is to ‘show to be true’, denoting specifically the act of providing evidence in order to reveal the truth (Louw & Nida 1993a:673; 1993b:189, s.v. παρίστημι). The legal connotations of these semantic possibilities are obvious.
noun used here (דִּין) can denote either ‘judgment’ or ‘court’ (Bosman, Oosting & Potsma 2009, s.v. דִּין). This explains the contrasting translations of the phrase by the King James Version (‘the judgment was set’) and the New International Version (‘the court was seated’) respectively. Although both options are possible, the latter should probably be preferred. This is how the Septuagint understood the noun, translating it with ‘court’ (κριτήριον).

In Daniel 7:13, the vision continues with the ‘one like a son of man’ (שׁכְּבַר אֱנָ) being presented ‘before him [the Ancient of Days]’ (וּקְדָמוֹהִי). The Septuagint retains the reference to the ‘one like a son of man’ (ὡς υἱὸς ἀνθρώπου), but translates away the phrase ‘before him’, replacing it with a comment that ‘those standing beside him [the Ancient of Days]’ (παρεστηκότες) were also present. Apocalyptic language and imagery permeate the pericope, which culminates in verse 26 with the court (דִּין) of God judging the fourth beast, taking away his kingdom, and destroying it forever. In this case, the Septuagint translates דִּין not with ‘court’ (κριτήριον), but with ‘judgment’ (κρίσις). In this verse, God’s apocalyptic judgment is clearly depicted as taking place via God’s heavenly court (Wink 2002:52). Ultimately, the apocalyptic nature of Daniel 7 is indicated not only by the fact that it contains apocalyptic imagery as part of a cryptic vision, but also by the fact that it imagines God intervening directly and unmistakably into the course of history to obliterate an earthly empire and liberate Israel (cf. Seow 2003:109).

The exercise of considering Daniel 7:1–28 opens up the possibility that the saying in Q 12:8–9 references apocalyptic judgment (cf. Fleddermann 2005:590). An apocalyptic interpretation of this logion does not depend solely on the phrase ‘before the angels’, but on the combination of this phrase with both the reference to the Son of Man and the future tense of the verbs ‘will confess’ (ὁμολογήσει) and ‘will be denied’ (ἀρνήσηταί) (Davies & Allison 1991:214). The combination of these three features eliminates three potential interpretations, indicating that (1) Q 12:8–9 is not about non-apocalyptic, post-mortem judgment; (2) the future tense verbs do not refer to the immediate future of daily life; and (3) the term ‘Son of Man’ does not in this case refer to the earthly Jesus. Instead, the logion deliberately invokes Daniel 7:1–28 and its description of God’s apocalyptic judgment (Funk & Hoover 1993:337; cf. Casey 2009:181; Edwards 1976:40–41, 121). In fact, out of all the Son of Man logia in Q, this one employs the most obvious imagery from Daniel 7 (cf. Davies & Allison 1991:214, 215).

Horsley (2012:21) may be correct that the references to a heavenly court and future judgment do not necessarily indicate the presence of apocalyptic eschatology. Koester (1997) similarly declares:

In Q 12:8–9 the Son of Man is an angelic figure in the divine court who functions as the advocate for the faithful – a concept that is not specifically apocalyptic. (p. 146)

Horsley (2012:21) acknowledges the reference to Daniel 7:13, but argues (2012:20) that this Old Testament text should be seen as a non-apocalyptic text. As we saw, however, the apocalyptic nature of Daniel 7 is indicated not only by its apocalyptic imagery
and cryptic vision, but also by its description of devastating divine intervention. Given the intrinsic and undeniable apocalyptic nature of Daniel 7, a non-apocalyptic classification of this text seems indefensible, even if one were to accept a corporate reading of the ‘one like a son of man’. Horsley’s prophetic reading of Daniel 7:13 might be based on this verse alone, considered separately from its larger literary context. If so, Horsley is guilty of the same transgression he accuses other scholars of when treating the Jesus tradition (Horsley 2012:3). It is more likely, however, that Horsley is claiming that Daniel 7:13 is not apocalyptic in the older restrictive sense of denoting a termination of the physical earth and the cessation of history (cf. Horsley 1991:200). This claim is then part of his larger tendency to lump contemporary and previous scholars into the same cesspool in terms of their ostensibly simplistic understanding of apocalypticism (see Chapter 1, ‘The aftermath’). Horsley would be correct that this text is not apocalyptic in the Schweitzerian sense, but the text certainly qualifies as being apocalyptic if measured against the more nuanced definition of apocalypticism provided in the introduction to the current work.

Q 12:8–9 would not make any sense if we were to translate ‘Son of Man’ with the indefinite term ‘a man’. The saying demands a more specific referent. The logion would make no more sense if ‘Son of Man’ were translated with the generic term ‘man’, meaning humanity in general (pace Catchpole 1993:93). The latter translation would imply that the perpetrator would witness against herself at the apocalyptic judgment. It would also imply that outsiders, like Gentiles and ‘this generation’, would operate as witnesses at a trial that does not concern them in the slightest. The latter statement begs clarification. The Q document foresees a dual process of judgment at the apocalyptic court: Firstly, the followers of Jesus (or Q people) will be judged on how faithful they were in confessing Jesus during their earthly lives, and, secondly, the rest of Israel will be judged by the Q people (Howes 2014b:9 of 11; cf. Tuckett 2000b:115; Valantasis 2005:223). Q 12:8–9 only pertains to the first part of the process, while Q 11:31–32 and Q 22:28, 30, for example, pertain only to the second part of the process (cf. Gregg 2006:143–144). That explains why outsiders would not be appropriate witnesses at the trial foretold by Q 12:8–9, and why the term ‘Son of Man’ cannot in this literary context be understood in either its indefinite or generic sense. It also cautions one against trying to interpret Q 12:8–9 through an appeal to Q 22:28, 30 (e.g. Tuckett 2001:379).

Casey (2009:179–194) argues that the term ‘Son of Man’ references the multitude of witnesses at the apocalyptic court, amongst whom Jesus will be the primary witness. The problem with this suggestion in a synchronic reading of the Q text is that such an interpretation is not possible in Greek (Tuckett 2001:379–380). A bilingual audience might have recognised an Aramaic idiom underlying the Greek, but preference is currently given to the application of the term in Greek. Even if the Aramaic roots were obvious to the original audience, the main witness would still have been Jesus (Gregg 2006:272; cf. Robinson 1991:189; 1994:331–332; Valantasis 2005:157). If Jesus and his
message are so essential for both apocalyptic deliverance and condemnation, why would there be a need for additional witnesses? These witnesses seem superfluous. It is true that in Daniel’s vision the ‘one like a son of man’ should be associated with all the ‘saints of the Most High’ (קַדִּישֵׁי עֶלְיוֹנִין), who symbolised the Jewish nation, or their leader (Collins 1993:305; Horsley 2012:20, 59). Even so, the Similitudes of Enoch and 4 Ezra 13 demonstrate that it was fairly normal in 1st-century Judaism to interpret the ‘one like a son of man’ in Daniel 7:13 as a single apocalyptic-messianic figure (see Burkett 1999:122–123; Collins 2010a:196–211; Müller 2008:339–343; Tuckett 2001:379–380). The Q text precludes a corporate reading of the term ‘Son of Man’, since the followers of Jesus are the object of judgment, which means that they cannot also be the subject of judgment (Tuckett 2001:380). In Q 12:8–9, the Son of Man is clearly distinguished from the followers of Jesus, while outsiders are not even mentioned.

Q 12:8 is constructed as a saying of retribution (Catchpole 1993:198; Davies & Allison 1991:214; Fleddermann 2005:590; Gregg 2006:173; Piper 1989:56, 58, 59). In sayings of retribution, the subject of the protasis usually becomes the object of the apodosis, while the object of the protasis becomes the subject of the apodosis. Q 12:8–9 follows the same pattern (see Fleddermann 2005:588–589). In the protasis of verse 8, the subject of the subjunctive verb ‘may confess’ (ὁμολογήσῃ) is ‘whosoever’ (πᾶς ὃς ἄν), and the indirect object is indicated by the phrase ‘for me’ (ἐν ἐμοὶ), referring to Jesus. In the apodosis, ‘whosoever’ is replicated by the phrase ‘for him’ (ἐν αὐτῷ) as the indirect object of the verb ‘will confess’ (ὁμολογήσει). Similarly, in verse 9, the subject of the subjunctive verb ‘may deny’ (ἀρνήσηταί) in the first part of the sentence becomes the semantic object of the future passive verb ‘will be denied’ (ἀρνηθήσεται) in the second part of the sentence. Hence, the structure of this logion implies that the personal pronoun ‘me’ in the protasis of verse 8 should be equated with the term ‘Son of Man’ in the apodosis. In other words, this logion hints at an association between Jesus and the Son of Man, not a distinction (cf. Bock 1996:1139; 2011:89, 93, 96–97; Dodd 1971:112; Fleddermann 2005:591; Gregg 2006:174; Stanton 2002:251; see Theissen & Merz 1998:552–553; pace Hurtado 2011:171–172). Although the earthly Jesus has left this world, he will return as the prophesied Son of Man at the apocalyptic end.

It needs to be emphasised that in Q 12:8 the most obvious and direct reference of the term ‘Son of Man’ is to the apocalyptic figure of Daniel 7:13 (cf. Koester 1997:145–146). The association of this figure with Jesus is only suggested by the syntax on a secondary level. The association between Jesus and the Danielic figure is further suggested if one reads Q 12:8 with Q’s other (non-apocalyptic!) Son of Man logia in mind, where Jesus refers to himself as the Son of Man (see Smith 2006:136–137). The only difference is that the term does not in this case point to the pre-mortem Jesus, but associates the

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191.As opposed to the syntactical object.

Thus the distinction need not be between Jesus and the Son of Man as two different persons (even if such a distinction was made during the tradition history of the saying) but rather between different functions or phases of Jesus’ existence. (p. 137)

According to Lindars (1983:87), the ‘advocate’ logion in Q 12:8–9 ‘paves the way for the identification of the Son of Man, assumed to be an exclusive self-reference on Jesus’s part, with the Danielic Son of Man figure.’ Q’s Jesus probably intended this conclusion to be drawn, but also obscured it with the use of a vague term such as ‘Son of Man’ (cf. Bock 2011:89; see Bauckham 1985:28–30).

The post-apocalyptic judgment scene in Q 12:8–9 should be clearly distinguished from the content of Q 12:5, which only seems to have the post-mortem fate of individuals in mind (Nolland 2005:436; cf. Bock 1996:1136–1137; Smith 2006:121, 132). As an aside, this disjunction lends additional support to Kloppenborg’s stratigraphy, regarding not only this pericope, but also the Sayings Gospel Q in general. Like traditional instructions, the formative stratum concerns itself with the post-mortem fate of individuals in heaven or hell (cf. Valantasis 2005:55–56). Like many sapiential traditions of the Second Temple period, the main redaction concerns itself with the post-apocalyptic judgment of both individuals and groups. Be that as it may, Q 12:8 motivates the admonition in verse 3 by disclosing the eschatological reward for such behaviour at the Final Judgment (Sim 1985:223; Valantasis 2005:157). Conversely, Q 12:9 motivates the admonition in verse 3 by disclosing the eschatological punishment for the opposite behaviour at the Final Judgment (Valantasis 2005:157; Wink 2002:181–182). Whereas verse 8 provides a completely new motivation for the admonition in verse 3, verse 9 states explicitly what was already implied by verse 5, namely that those who deny Jesus in public will be punished in the next life (see Kirk 1998:209–210). The only possible outcome of such denial is eternal damnation, as verse 5 clearly points out. This thematic link between verses 5 and 9 remains valid despite the likelihood that apocalyptic judgment is envisaged by the latter, but not the former. In verses 8 and 9, present action is motivated by eschatological reward and punishment (Edwards 1976:121). Q 12:8–9 leaves absolutely no doubt that Q’s Jesus motivated and justified his wisdom teachings, including his admonitions, with apocalyptic eschatology (cf. Davies & Allison 1991:213, 215). Moreover, the apocalyptic motifs of Q 12:8–9 are part of the rhetorical fabric of the sapiential argument (Piper 1989:60).

On the one hand, three criteria have traditionally been summoned in defence of this logion’s authenticity (cf. Luz 2001:100; Robinson 1994:332; Wink 2002:178, 207; see Burkett 1999:37–38; Gregg 2006:173–174): (1) multiple independent attestation

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192.Cf. Q 6:23a; 12:5, 33–34. Whether or not Q 6:37 can be added to this list will be discussed in Chapter 4.

(Mk 8:38; cf. Rm 10:9); (2) Aramaic roots; and (3) dissimilarity from the tendency in the early church to identify Jesus with the Son of Man figure. The latter criterion should be discarded. Rather than differentiating between Jesus and the Son of Man, the syntax of Q 12:8–9 invites an association between the two (cf. Gregg 2006:174). What is more, if the term ‘Son of Man’ was originally absent from the logion, the basis for the third argument falls away (Marshall 1978:515).

On the other hand, there have been two main objections to the authenticity of Q 12:8–9 (see Burkett 1999:38–39). More than half a century ago, Käsemann ([1954] 1964:43–44) argued that the saying looks like a prophetic saying uttered by Christian prophets. Although it still sometimes features in discussions about the authenticity of Q 12:8–9 (e.g. Funk & Hoover 1993:173), the continuing validity of Käsemann’s hypothesis that Christian prophets were responsible for the secondary Son of Man sayings is highly questionable (see Gregg 2006:186–189; cf. Davies & Allison 1991:344). The same is not true, however, of Vielhauer’s (1957:68–71; 1963:141–147) argument that the pressure put on Christians by outsiders to deny their faith in Christ reflects a post-Easter situation, not a conceivable situation during the ministry of Jesus. This observation has managed to convince a number of scholars that this saying derives from the early church (Burkett 1999:38 fn. 10; e.g. Funk & Hoover 1993:337). Allison (1997:100) argues that the situation underlying Q 12:8–9 is indeed conceivable in the ministry of Jesus, but his arguments are mostly unconvincing. Vielhauer has also supplied another reason to be suspicious of the third argument above. Both the Son of Man expression and the first person singular personal pronoun (in reference to Jesus) appear also in Matthew 19:28, but in this case the combination is due to editorial activity during the appropriation of Q 22:28, 30. If we are correct about the original presence of the term ‘Son of Man’ in Q 6:22 and Q 12:8–9 (see above, ‘Persecution explained’; ‘Confessing Jesus in public’), Matthew also has no problem replacing this term with the first person singular personal pronoun in Matthew 5:11 and Matthew 10:32–33. In my view, the situation of the early church is not only betrayed by the pressure to speak up in public, but also by the shift in focus from the message of Jesus to the person of Jesus (cf. Funk & Hoover 1993:173; pace Gregg 2006:190). As far as I can tell, the historical Jesus charged people with proclaiming God’s kingdom, not his own person (cf. Funk 2006:158, 166). De Jonge’s (1997:119) objection that Q 12:8–9 focuses on people’s reaction to Jesus, not the person of Jesus, is weak. This distinction is extremely artificial, since it remains the reaction to Jesus that carries soteriological weight.

Ultimately, the criteria of multiple attestation and Aramaic roots are overshadowed by the indications that this text presumes the situation of the early church. What is more, there is reason to doubt the applicability of even these two criteria in the current case. Regarding the former, it is at least possible, although perhaps unlikely, that Mark 8:38 is directly dependent on Q 12:8–9, in which case it would not qualify as an independent tradition (see De Jonge 1997:105–106, 115–117). Regarding the latter,
the earliest form of the logion could in this case specifically just as plausibly have been created in Greek as in Aramaic (De Jonge 1997:118). Given these considerations, Q 12:8–9 is unlikely to have originated with the historical Jesus.

**The Spirit of God: Q 12:10**

Q 12:10 is notoriously difficult to interpret (Edwards 1976:121; Fleddermann 2005:591). Since this difficulty is in large part due to the ambiguity of the term ‘Son of Man’ in this saying, the ‘question of reference’ will be addressed before turning to the saying itself. Even though Q 12:10 follows directly after Q 12:8–9, it is doubtful that the term here connotes an apocalyptic figure. The logion prohibits ‘saying a word against the Son of Man’ (ἐἴπῃ λόγον εἰς τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου), with the phrase ‘say a word against’ (λέγω λόγον εἰς) being a Semitism that means ‘to curse’ (Marshall 1978:517). The question here is why anyone would want to curse or make a derogatory comment about an imaginary angelic being like the one in Daniel 7:13. Those who believe that the Son of Man expression is here a reference to an apocalyptic figure must explain the existence of a logion prohibiting an act that is unlikely to happen in the first place (e.g. Edwards 1976:122; Funk & Hoover 1993:187, 337). If the saying is considered in isolation, the term ‘Son of Man’ could have been used in its generic or indefinite sense (cf. Gregg 2006:201–202; Marshall 1978:518; Robinson 1994:320; Wink 2002:85; cf. Mk 3:28–29; Mt 12:31). Both would in this case amount to the same meaning, prohibiting the act of speaking against one’s fellow man (Casey 2009:140, 143). The saying would then maintain that the sin of cursing one’s fellow man is forgivable, but the sin of speaking against the Holy Spirit is not (Funk & Hoover 1993:187; Gregg 2006:202; Luz 2001:202). Unfortunately, Q’s literary context testifies against such an interpretation (pace Funk & Hoover 1993:337).

Q 12:2–12 is chiefly about confessing or denying both the person and the message of Jesus (cf. verses 3, 8a, 9a). If the literary context is considered, Q 12:10 is most naturally read as an exclusive reference to Jesus (Kirk 1998:210; Kloppenburg 1987a:212; Marshall 1978:517, 518, 519; Robinson 1991:189; cf. Davies & Allison 1991:346; Gregg 2006:202; Valantasis 2005:158). Hence, Q 12:10 is yet another example of Q’s Jesus using the term ‘Son of Man’ as an exclusive self-reference in the third person. In this context, Q’s Jesus might have used the term because he was embarrassed to mention that there were people who cursed him in public, thereby attacking and denigrating his social status (pace Wink 2002:85). By allowing this transgression against his person, Jesus could also have been emphasising his lowliness (cf. Marshall 1878:517). Most interpreters who reject the latter conclusion do so because it produces a flat contradiction between Q 12:10 and Q 12:8–9 (cf. De Jonge 1997:117; Funk & Hoover 1993:337;

194 Casey (2009:143) holds that this logion originally followed the Beelzebul accusation, and therefore proposes a potentially different reason for Jesus’ embarrassment. However, it is very likely that, in the Sayings Gospel Q, this saying followed Q 12:9 and not the Beelzebul accusation.
Verse 9 promises apocalyptic judgment for those who deny Jesus, while verse 10 claims that those who deny Jesus will be forgiven. This contradiction is no reason to doubt the likelihood that the term ‘Son of Man’ refers in Q 12:10 to the earthly Jesus, though. Deliberately placing such direct contradictions side by side was not unusual in ancient wisdom literature (Allison 2010:90; Kirk 1998:211, 346; cf. Meier 2011:321; Piper 2000:248).

By and large, attempts to harmonise the contradiction between verses 9 and 10 are unconvincing (see Kirk 1998:210–211; Kloppenborg 1987a:212–214). Out of these, the most popular solution has been that the first leg of Q 12:10 refers to the preaching of Jesus during his earthly ministry, and that the second leg of the saying refers to the preaching of the Q people or larger Jesus movement in the period between the death of Jesus and the eschaton (Marshall 1978:516; e.g. De Jonge 1997:117; Fleddermann 2005:591–592; Gregg 2006:178, 202; Nolland 2005:505–506; Tödt [1959] 1965:119). In other words, rejecting the message of Jesus during his earthly ministry is forgivable, provided that the guilty parties repent during the second epoch, but rejecting the message of the Jesus movement during the second epoch is unforgivable, because the eschaton will terminate all possibilities for atonement. There are two main difficulties with this attempted harmonisation. Firstly, the claim that those who speak against the Son of Man will be forgiven if they repent before the final end is unsupported by the text. The conditional ‘if they repent before the final end’ does not appear in Q 12:10, and neither does any other qualification. Instead, Q 12:10 makes the universal claim that those who curse the Son of Man will be forgiven, full stop (pace Bock 1996:1140; Marshall 1978:517). Secondly, the claim that Q 12:10 references two separate epochs is unsupported by the text. The logion is not at all concerned with chronology. Instead, it has all the hallmarks of a maxim with two parallel legs, each featuring a generally valid claim that extends all periods. In support of the latter, Davies and Allison (1991:347) point out that the verbs employed to describe the acts of ‘speaking’ (εἴπῃ) against the Son of Man and ‘speaking’ (εἴπῃ) against the Holy Spirit are in the same tense (cf. Marshall 1978:518). Such grammatical agreement might be coincidental, though, since the syntax (ἐὰν & ὃς ἄν) forces the verbs to appear in the subjunctive mood, which does not employ tenses to signify actual time (cf. Conradie et al. 1999:358). The notion of two epochs is also unsupported by the rest of the Sayings Gospel (Kloppenborg 1987a:213; Luz 2001:201). This is not to say that the saying fails to distinguish between the present and the eschatological future. Although Q 12:10 does not explicitly reference eschatological judgment, it is highly likely that the verb ‘will be forgiven’ (ἀφεθήσεται) refers to absolution at the Final Judgment, not only because of its future tense, but also because of the apocalyptic content of Q 12:8–9 (Davies & Allison 1991:345;

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195 It has been suggested that this contradiction might be an indication of changed circumstances in the lives of the Q people (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:212).
Eschatological judgment and the Son of Man

Edwards 1976:122; Marshall 1978:517). At any rate, other attempts to harmonise the contradiction between Q 12:10 and Q 12:8–9 are even less convincing.

The reference in Q 12:10 to the Holy Spirit (τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα) deserves some explanation. On the one hand, Q does not seem to have anything close to a developed pneumatology. The Holy Spirit is not portrayed by Q as the third person in the Trinity. On the other hand, Q does seem to have moved beyond the Old Testament notion of the ‘Holy Spirit’ as indistinguishable from God himself (Vosloo 1999:1830; cf. Psalm 51:13 [11]; Isaiah 34:16; 63:10, 11, 14). In Jewish literature, including the Old Testament, the word ‘spirit’ (רוּחַ & πνεῦμα) is at times used in very much the same way as the word ‘soul’ (ψυχή) in Greek literature, namely to indicate the essence of someone’s being (see Chapter 4, ‘Measuring judgment’; ‘The Old Testament’). This explains partly why the term ‘Holy Spirit’ was sometimes used as a designation for God himself. In Q, the early steps toward some kind of pneumatology are visible: ‘The holy spirit appears to be a higher divine power than Jesus is, and yet not God’s own self’ (Valantasis 2005:158). It follows that the Holy Spirit of Q 12:10 is not to be equated with God, and that the second leg of the logion is not on the level of Q a prohibition against cursing God or taking his name in vain (pace Funk & Hoover 1993:337).

In order to comprehend Q’s understanding of the prohibition not to curse the Holy Spirit, the logion’s literary context needs to be considered. In our discussion of the Son of Man saying in Q 12:8–9, it was determined that the logia in Q 12:2, 4–5, 6–7, 8–9 function to support the admonition in Q 12:3 to share the wisdom of Jesus with others (see above, ‘Confessing Jesus in public’). Q 12:11–12 can now be added to that list, similarly functioning to motivate the admonition in Q 12:3 by reassuring the audience that the Holy Spirit will teach them what to say when they are brought before the synagogues (Gregg 2006:177; Kirk 1998:213). We saw that the verb ‘will be forgiven’ (ἀφεθήσεται) probably has the Final Judgment in mind. Taken with verses 11–12, the second leg of verse 10 implies that it would not be forgiven at the eschatological judgment if anyone ignores the instruction of the Holy Spirit, and refuses to confess Jesus publicly in front of the religious authorities (cf. Bock 1996:1141; Tuckett 2001:374). The sapiential reassurance in Q 12:11–12 is motivated and supported by the eschatological warning in verse 10b. Even if this is how the Q people understood the second leg of Q 12:10, it needs to be noted that the saying cannot be understood in this way if considered in isolation. Taken on its own, Q 12:10b is about cursing the Holy Spirit, not about heeding the Holy Spirit in confessing Jesus or his message. Such disparity between the isolated saying and the Q saying indicates that the logion had a different meaning before it was incorporated into Q.

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196.Cf. Q [3:21–22]; 4:1; 12:11–12. In Q 3:16, ‘spirit’ (πνεῦμα) might only be a reference to wind, given both its combination with ‘fire’ (πῦρ) and the possibility that the adjective ‘holy’ (ἅγιος) derives from Mark 1:8, and not from Q (Robinson et al. 2000:15 fn. 9; cf. Valantasis 2005:158). On the other hand, the reference to the Spirit directly after this logion in Q 4:1 (or Q 3:22, if it stood in Q) supports the notion that Q 3:16 also has the Holy Spirit in mind. It should be mentioned that both Q (?) 3:22 and Q 4:1 lack the adjective ‘holy’ (ἅγιος), but that both are nonetheless clear references to the Holy Spirit.
The authenticity of this logion is customarily defended by the following criteria (cf. Bock 1996:1131; Wink 2002:83; see Gregg 2006:203–205): (1) multiple independent attestation (Mk 3:28–29; Gos. Thom. 44197); (2) Aramaic roots; and (3) dissimilarity, since the early church would presumably not have invented a saying that allows cursing Jesus (cf. e.g. 1 Cor 12:3). A number of charges can be brought against the third argument above. Firstly, if it is unlikely that the early church would have invented Q 12:10, one could argue that it is even less likely that the historical Jesus would have done so. Regardless of whether it is being advocated or prohibited, the topic of confessing Jesus is more at home with the early church than the historical Jesus. Whereas it might seem strange that the early church would allow its members to speak against Jesus, there would be no conceivable reason for the historical Jesus to bring up this topic at all. Like Q 12:8–9, the topic of whether or not to confess Jesus betrays a post-Easter situation (Horsley 2012:113). Secondly, the third argument above applies only if the term ‘Son of Man’ originally referred to Jesus. Even if this is true for Q, it is possible that the term denoted humanity in general before being absorbed by the Sayings Gospel (Davies & Allison 1991:346; Luz 2001:202; Marshall 1978:518; cf. Mk 3:28–29; Mt 12:31). As we saw, the saying would then purport that cursing people is forgivable, but that blasphemy against the divine Spirit of God is not. Such a claim is essentially conventional (cf. e.g. Ex 20:7; Jos 6:26), and would not have offended the early church (Funk & Hoover 1993:187). It is conceivable that Q 12:10 floated around as an existing Jewish maxim, and that it was added to the Jesus material by the early church. Thirdly, the distinction between Jesus and the Holy Spirit is reminiscent of the early church, not the historical Jesus (cf. Gregg 2006:206; Luz 2001:202; Robinson 1992:386). There would presumably have been no reason for the historical Jesus to draw a distinction between the Holy Spirit and himself. Like the fact that trees exist, this distinction would have been obvious enough to everyone, including Jesus himself, not to deserve any mention. It is only as a consequence of belief in the post-Resurrection Jesus that a comparison with the Holy Spirit makes any sense.

These objections to the application of the dissimilarity criterion to Q 12:10 depend on a specific understanding of the terms ‘Son of Man’ and ‘Holy Spirit’ in this logion (cf. Luz 2001:201). As mentioned above, there are legitimate reasons for accepting that this logion had a different meaning before being incorporated into Q. To my mind, this difference pertains to the term ‘Holy Spirit’ rather than the term ‘Son of Man’. In line with the overall proposal of the current study, it is suggested that Q’s interpretation of the Son of Man expression is more indicative of its meaning at a pre-Q stage than possible Aramaic solutions (cf. Marshall 1978:519). For our logion, this means that the term was in all likelihood originally used by the historical Jesus as an exclusive non-titular self-reference in the third person (cf. Marshall 1978:517). This proposal goes against the standard Aramaic solution, according to which the term

197. Didache 11:7 can perhaps be added to this list (Gregg 2006:203–204).
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referenced humanity in general in the Jesus tradition. It overlaps to some extent with Casey’s (2009:140–143) solution, however, according to which the historical Jesus used the term to refer both to himself and to humanity in general. Regarding the term ‘Holy Spirit’, Jesus movements like the one behind the Sayings Gospel Q were probably responsible for the separation between God and his Spirit in the early Jesus tradition. It follows that the Holy Spirit was in all likelihood still identified with God at the earlier stages of the tradition. In some cases, the term might even have functioned as an alternate designation for God himself. Irrespective of whether the Spirit of God and the person of God were understood to overlap completely, the term ‘Holy Spirit’ expressed the idea of God’s essence, particularly through the demonstration of his power and presence (Gregg 2006:203).198

If the terms ‘Son of Man’ and ‘Holy Spirit’ originally functioned in this way, Q 12:10 would at an earlier stage have carried the following meaning: ‘Cursing Jesus is forgivable, but cursing the Spirit of God is not.’ So understood, the first leg of the saying is about permitting slander against the person of Jesus. Such assent to speak negatively about Jesus must be read together with the second leg of the logion, where the focus lies (Casey 2009:140). Jesus forbids speaking against the Spirit of God. This is not a mere repetition of the commandment against blasphemy in Exodus 20:7. The issue is not verbalising the sacred Jewish name for God, but rather cursing the manifestation of God’s being through the message of God’s kingdom (Marshall 1978:517). To revert back to the level of Q for a moment, the sapiential kingdom message is for Q’s Jesus a revelation of God’s essence (cf. Q 6:35, 36; 10:22; 11:2–4, 13; 11:20; 12:6–7, 24, 28–31). If you partake in God’s kingdom, you get a glimpse of God himself, since it is God who feeds the hungry, consoles the poor and heals the sick.199 The likely authenticity of most of these Q traditions indicates that the same must have been true for the historical Jesus. This deduction is supported by the authentic Jesus material in general, which also portrays Jesus as revealing God’s essence by sharing the good news of God’s kingdom.200 Now, if part of the purpose of sharing the kingdom message is to reveal God’s essence, then rejecting this message is the same as cursing God (Gregg 2006:208). For the most part, it is not possible to distinguish in the Jesus tradition between the message of God’s kingdom and the kingdom itself. The kingdom of God is both revealed and established when Jesus tells a parable or shares an aphorism. The kingdom of God is both unveiled and unleashed when Jesus heals someone or shares good news with the poor (cf. Robinson 2011:471). To reject the message of Jesus is to reject the kingdom of God, and to reject the kingdom of God is to reject the God of

198 In Jewish literature, including the Old Testament, the word ‘spirit’ (רוּחַ & πνεῦμα) is at times used in very much the same way as the word ‘soul’ (ψῦχη) in Greek literature, namely to indicate the essence of someone’s being (see Chapter 4, ‘Measuring judgment’; ‘The Old Testament’). This explains partly why the term ‘Holy Spirit’ was sometimes used as a designation for God himself.


the kingdom. When the second leg of Q 12:10 states that cursing the essence of God is unforgivable, the assumption is that this divine essence is revealed in the kingdom message and programme. If both legs of the saying are read together, they claim that God would forgive someone for rejecting the person of Jesus, but not for rejecting Jesus’ message about God’s kingdom (Gregg 2006:272). Accordingly, Jesus allows people to reject his person, but implores them to accept his message. This message entails not only Jesus’ words, but his deeds as well, including especially his healings (Gregg 2006:272; cf. Robinson 2011:471). This interpretation of Q 12:10 is very similar to the proposal made by M-J. Lagrange in 1929, as recounted by Marshall (1978):

It is excusable to a point to fail to recognize the dignity of the One who hides himself under the humble appearance of a man, but not to disparage works manifestly salutary which reveal the action of the Divine Spirit. (pp. 517–518)

The appropriate setting for a saying such as this would be the opposition Jesus experienced during his earthly ministry (Casey 2009:140; Marshall 1978:519; cf. Davies & Allison 1991:344–345). It has to be assumed that there were many people who spoke against Jesus while he was on earth. This assumption is emphatically confirmed by the fact that the historical Jesus was gruesomely executed. One can easily imagine Jesus countering his opponents by telling them that they may be pardoned for rejecting his person, but that they will be held accountable if they reject his message about God’s kingdom (Marshall 1978:519).

This interpretation is confirmed by the literary context of the saying after the Beelzebul accusation in the Gospels of Mark (3:22–30) and Matthew (12:22–32) (cf. Q 11:14–15, 17–20). According to this tradition, Jesus reveals the kingdom of God by healing a mute,201 only to be accused of working with Beelzebul. The manifestation of God’s power and presence cannot be more tangible than through a healing (cf. Gregg 2006:203; Robinson 2011:471).202 Since Jesus claims that the healing took place by God’s own hand, its rejection is tantamount to rejecting God himself (cf. Gregg 2006:208; Van der Horst 1997:89–90). In fact, Matthew 12:28 claims that the healing took place ‘by the Spirit of God’ (ἐν πνεύματι θεοῦ), and that the ‘kingdom of God’ (ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ) ‘has therefore come upon’ (ἀρα ἔφθασεν ἐπί) the onlookers (Bork 2014:6 of 10; Van der Horst 1997:89). As part of his rebuttal, Jesus utters the remark that people who curse the Son of Man will be forgiven, but that those who curse the Holy Spirit will not. In other words, Jesus tells his opponents that they may speak against the exorcist, since Jesus is not unique in his role as exorcist (cf. Mt 12:27), but that they will pay the price if they speak against the exorcism, since it was achieved by God’s own Spirit (cf. Gregg 2006:203, 208). Bad-mouthing a divine healing is the same as bad-mouthing God.

201. In the Gospel of Mark, the healing itself is not recounted in 3:22–30. According to Matthew’s Gospel, the man was both blind and mute.

202. Or the delivery of a parable.
According to Van der Horst (1997:89–103), Exodus 8:15 is the best intertext for the final saying in the Beelzebul accusation (Q 11:20), since in both texts ‘it is God’s sovereignty over the powers of evil and his intervention on behalf of his people through a human agent that is in the foreground’ (Van der Horst 1997:91). This intertext strongly suggests that Jesus regarded himself to be no more than the ‘human agent’ who facilitated the arrival of God’s kingdom. Like Moses before him, Jesus functioned as the catalyst for God’s redemptive work, with the focus being on God and his awesome power, not the medium through which God achieves his liberation. This understanding is confirmed by the mentioning of other exorcists in Q 11:19, where the rhetorical question implies that they are no more or less important than Jesus in their function as vessels of God’s liberating power (cf. Robinson 2011:471). A few other texts in Q also seem to subordinate the person of Jesus to his message about God’s kingdom (Gregg 2006:272; cf. Q 10:10–15; 11:31–32).

The Marcan and Matthean setting for the logion’s original uttering is in all likelihood more historically accurate than the Q setting (see Casey 2009:140–143). One can easily imagine the historical Jesus making such an utterance as part of his rhetorical strategy to advance and defend the kingdom of God (Marshall 1978:519). Conversely, one is hard pressed to explain why the early church would invent a saying that permits people to curse Jesus. Some might object that the distinction between Jesus and his message seems artificial (cf. Gregg 2006:205), but this would be a mistake. The historical Jesus generally does not seem to have highlighted his own person in any significant way (cf. Funk 2006:158, 166). The tendency to conflate the person and the message of Jesus is typical of the early church, not the historical Jesus (cf. Funk & Hoover 1993:173). Whereas the kingdom and the message were indivisible for the historical Jesus, the person and the message became indivisible for the early church. For Jesus, the kingdom was the message, but for the early church, Jesus was the message. It is precisely the division between person and message that distinguishes Q 12:10 from the kerygma of the early church.

When considering Q 12:10 in its literary context in Q earlier on in this section, two arguments supported the eschatological nature of the logion: (1) the future tense of the verb ‘will be forgiven’ (ἀφεθήσεται), which features twice; and (2) the eschatological content of Q 12:8–9. If the logion is considered on its own, however, the second argument automatically falls away. This creates room for questioning the first argument as well. By itself, there is nothing in Q 12:10 that demands the verb ‘will be forgiven’ (ἀφεθήσεται) to be seen as a reference to eschatological judgment. The verb could refer equally to either the pre-mortem or the post-mortem future of the guilty party. God is often described in Jewish literature as forgiving or punishing...
people during their lives on earth. By the same token, God is often described in Jewish literature as forgiving or punishing people after death. Neither of these options includes an eschatological view of divine forgiveness. What is more, the syntax of Q 12:10 requires the future tense in any case, since the verb appears in the respective apodoses of two conditional-type sentences. Far from indicating eschatological judgment, the temporal orientation of the verb ‘will be forgiven’ (ἀφεθήσεται) is open to interpretation. Without a literary context, the most likely interpretation of the verb is that it refers to the foreseeable future of this-worldly existence. This hermeneutical preference is due to the saying’s generic formulation ((cf. ὃς ἐὰν), typical of a sapiential maxim drawn from the observation of causal tendencies in daily life.

If the interpretation of Q 12:10 proposed here is accepted, the objections to the dissimilarity criterion lose their sting. Against the first objection, it should be pointed out that Q 12:10 is not about ‘confessing’ Jesus at all, but rather about ‘cursing’ Jesus. There is a difference. It may be true that the topic of confession would not have been relevant to the historical Jesus at all, but the same is not true of the topic of rejection. As we saw, the historical Jesus must have faced rejection during his earthly career, culminating in his death on the cross. It is precisely in this respect that Q 12:10 differs from a saying like Q 12:8–9. Whereas the latter is about confession, and therefore straightforwardly symptomatic of a post-Easter situation, the former is about rejection, and therefore potentially applicable to either the pre-Easter or the post-Easter situation. What distinguishes the content of Q 12:10 from the post-Easter situation, however, is the consent it gives to speak against Jesus (Bock 1996:1131). Such consent would not by any stretch of the imagination have been conducive to the needs of the early church (Marshall 1978:518).

Against the second objection, it should be pointed out that the prehistory of the expression ‘Son of Man’ is in some sense irrelevant to its appropriation by the early church. Even if my interpretation of the Son of Man expression misses the mark, and the first leg of the saying was not originally about Jesus at all, it remains true that this expression was taken as a reference to Jesus early on in the reception of the Jesus tradition. In other words, even if Q 12:10 was originally a free-floating maxim about cursing fellow human beings, the early followers of Jesus would certainly have read a reference to Jesus into it. No matter what the saying might have meant in a former life, for the early church it would have been about Jesus. It is inconceivable that the early church would have added to the Jesus material a saying that permits speaking out against Jesus (Marshall 1978:518). Mark’s (3:28) amendment of the expression ‘Son of Man’ to its plural form ‘sons of men’ (οἱ υἱοί τῶν ἀνθρώπων) should be seen as an attempt to assail its original meaning (Casey 2009:117; Fleddermann 2005:581; Luz 2001:202; Schulz 1972:247; Wink 2002:83, 274 fn. 3; see Tödt [1959] 1965:314–318). For all the reasons already noted, the Q version of the logion would have been the lectio difficilior for the early church (Luz 2001:201). Moreover, Mark’s version would have contradicted the rest of the authentic Jesus tradition and the kingdom message.
in general by allowing people to speak ill of one another (cf. Mt 5:21–24). By the way, the same is true not only of the generic and indefinite explanations of the term ‘Son of Man’ in Q 12:10, but also of the later interpretations of this logion in the subsequent history of the church (Luz 2001:202, 209; cf. Marshall 1978:518). Getting back to the point, whereas my response to the first objection held that the early church would not have invented Q 12:10, my response to the second objection holds that the early church would not have assimilated Q 12:10 if it were not part of the Jesus tradition from the very beginning. It is much more likely that the logion was merely retained and tolerated by the early church out of respect for the Jesus tradition (Davies & Allison 1991:348; cf. Luz 2001:202, 209).

In response to the third objection, the distinction between the person of Jesus and the Spirit of God makes absolute sense as part of a polemical ploy against sceptics and opponents (Marshall 1978:519). The purpose of the distinction was to underline the worth of the kingdom programme, and claim that its rejection would not be forgiven by God, since it is God who steers it. A distinction between two persons of the Trinity might be reminiscent of the early church, but Q 12:10 betrays its authentic roots by using the term ‘Holy Spirit’ in its traditional Jewish sense as an inseparable extension of the divine. The distinction is not between Jesus and the Holy Spirit, but between the messenger and the Dispatcher, or between the exorcist and the Exorcist. To sum up, the authenticity of Q 12:10 is supported by three criteria, amongst which the criterion of dissimilarity is most convincing.

The robber and the Son of Man: Q 12:39–40

Most scholars agree that Q 12:40 was added to Q 12:39 secondarily (Luz 2005:217, esp. fn. 10; e.g. Crossan 1983:65; Koester [1968] 1971:170–172; Robinson 1994:332; Smith 2006:126). Kloppenborg (1987a:149–150) argues that this addition happened before these sayings were added to Q, and that Q 12:39–40 as a whole belongs to the main redaction. Alternatively, I have argued elsewhere that Q 12:39 followed after Q 12:33–34 in the formative stratum, and that Q 12:40 was added during Q’s redaction (see Howes 2014c). In my view, Q 12:39 did not initially function as a parable, but as a supportive maxim after Q 12:33–34 (cf. Crossan 1983:58, 61). It was only turned into a parable when the artificial application in Q 12:40 was attached to it by Q’s main redactor.

Regardless of its exact redactional history, Q 12:39–40 functions as a parable in the final form of the Sayings Gospel Q. As a micro genre, a parable qualifies as wisdom (Edwards 1976:74; see Kirk 1998:234, 246–248). Even if the content happens to feature eschatological, apocalyptic or prophetic themes and/or small forms, a parable operates as part of the teaching experience to incite reflection and contemplation. In this regard, the following comment by Funk (2006:104) is informative: ‘What the parable says cannot be simply divorced from the way it says. Form and content are wedded.’

205. Emphasis original.
More than once in Q, a statement about the Apocalypse follows after one of the parables of Q’s Jesus. A number of these parables probably circulated independently, with their apocalyptic explanations only added later (cf. Crossan 1983:65; Kloppenborg 1987a:149, 165, 225). It does not automatically follow from these observations that the attached apocalyptic sayings were inauthentic (cf. Koester 1994:540–541). They could have circulated independently as part of the authentic Jesus tradition before being added to the parables (cf. Casey 2009:219; Crossan 1983:59, 65).

As it stands, Q 12:40 functions as an application of the parable in Q 12:39, focusing specifically on the unexpectedness and ‘unknowability’ of the apocalyptic event (Catchpole 1993:57; Fleddermann 2005:634; Kloppenborg 1987a:149; 2000:118; Koester 1997:143; Smith 2006:127; see Kirk 1998:232–233). This theme is made explicit by the phrase ‘an hour you do not expect’ (ἡ οὐ δοκεῖτε ὥρᾳ). Interestingly, the parable application begins in Q 12:40 with a sapiential admonition to ‘be ready’ (γίνεσθε ἑτοιμοὶ) for the apocalyptic event (Edwards 1976:126). This admonition is then supported by a motive clause, which is initiated by the conjunction ‘because’ (ὅτι), foretelling that the Son of Man will come unexpectedly (Fleddermann 2005:634). It should perhaps be mentioned that the use of motive clauses to substantiate commands and prohibitions is a characteristic feature of ancient wisdom (Edwards 1976:59). This observation is important for many other discussions in the current work.

At this juncture, the term ‘Son of Man’ is an obvious allusion to Daniel 7:13 (Allison 2000:131; Casey 2009:219; cf. Edwards 1976:126; Kirk 1998:232–233; Robinson 1991:189; Valantasis 2005:167). No other interpretation would make sense of the apocalyptic imagery and language in this logion. The text is completely silent about whether or not Jesus is to be associated with this Son of Man (cf. Jacobson 1992:196; Robinson 1994:319–320). Whether the Q people made such an identification depends not on the text itself, but on whether or not Q’s Jesus is otherwise assumed to be Daniel’s apocalyptic Son of Man (cf. Smith 2006:129). The admonition to be ready is not only supported by the subsequent motive clause, but also by the preceding parable (cf. Horsley 1991:206). Structurally and rhetorically, Q 12:39–40 is a piece of wisdom. Even the motive clause about the future appearance of the apocalyptic Son of Man is formally sapiential in its rhetorical and syntactical function to support a sapiential instruction. Even if the parable in Q 12:39 is removed from consideration, the apocalyptic Son of Man saying would still function to motivate the sapiential instruction to be watchful (cf. Piper 1989:77).

**An inheritance with the faithless: Q 12:42–46**

Kloppenborg (1987a:150–151) treats the parable in Q 12:42–46 in its entirety as part of the main redaction. I have argued elsewhere that Q 12:42–44 was initially part of the formative stratum, to which verses 45–46 were added by the main redactor.
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(see Howes 2015a). If I am correct, Q 12:45–46 could not have circulated independently (like Q 12:40), since it essentially depends on Q 12:42–44 for meaning. In turn, it would follow that Q 12:45–46 could not have been derived from authentic Jesus material. Although verses 45–46 were in my view attached in order to direct the interpretation of the parable in an apocalyptic direction, they do not in this case constitute a parable application. Instead, they form an intrinsic part of the narrative structure of the parable itself (cf. Koester 1997:143). In its final form in the Sayings Gospel, Q 12:42–46 is clearly a parable (Bock 1996:1172; see Howes 2015a).

Despite its designation as a parable, Q 12:42–46 is itself made up of a series of small forms. Verse 42 introduces the parable with a rhetorical question (Dodd [1935] 1958:158; Luz 2005:221). Verse 43 constitutes a macarism or beatitude (Bock 1996:1179; Crossan 1983:59; Hays 2012:50; Jacobson [1982] 1994:101 fn. 9; Kirk 1998:234; Luz 2005:221; Nolland 1998; Scott 1989:211). Verse 44 is an amen saying that functions both to buttress the beatitude in the previous verse, and to conclude the train of thought (Marshall 1978:541; cf. Kirk 1998:234; Scott 1989:211). Significantly, these are all sapiential small forms, commonly used in wisdom literature (cf. Scott 1989:211). More specifically, these micro genres are all typical of instructional wisdom, and function deliberately to identify each individual verse as a piece of instruction. Regarding Q 12:42–46 as a whole, it was mentioned previously that parables are by their very nature sapiential micro genres (see above, ‘The robber and the Son of Man’). This taxonomy is substantiated by the deliberate use of the words ‘wise’ (φρόνιμος) and ‘loyal’ or ‘faithful’ (πιστός) to introduce the parable (Edwards 1976:66). The parable addresses two classic themes of traditional wisdom (Kirk 1998:230, 234; cf. Pr 31): (1) how to distinguish between wise and foolish slaves; and (2) shrewd household management. All in all, the parable is deployed in accordance with didactic convention (Edwards 1976:66).

Although there are no clear formal indicators in Q 12:45–46, the parable’s final verse functions as a prophetic warning about the apocalyptic end (Jeremias 1966:45; cf. Jacobson [1982] 1994:104 fn. 32). It houses no less than three future tense verbs: ‘will come’ (ήξει), ‘will cut in two’ (διχοτομήσει), and ‘will give’ (θήσει). More telling is its unmistakable threatening tone (Blomberg 1990:191). In fact, the final verse is not merely threatening in tone, but in essence. As in the preceding Son of Man logion, Q 12:46 has to do with the unexpectedness of the apocalyptic event (Catchpole 1993:57; Kloppenborg 1987a:150). Like Q 12:40, the parable’s final verse explicitly and emphatically singles out the unexpectedness of the apocalyptic event, dedicating no less than two temporal clauses to this purpose, namely ‘on a day he does not expect’ (ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ᾗ οὐ προσδοκᾶ) and ‘at an hour he does not know’ (ἐν ὥρᾳ ᾗ οὐ γινώσκει) (Bock 1996:1182; Fleddermann 2005:637; Funk & Hoover 1993:253, 342; Kloppenborg 1987a:150; Koester 1997:143; Luz 2005:221; Taylor 1989:142–143 fn. 58, 146). Like the Son of Man logion, the harshness of the dual punishment seems to be an attempt at endorsing preparedness in the face of apocalyptic judgment (Blomberg 1990:191; Fleddermann 2005:635; Kloppenborg 1987a:150; 1995b:294; Valantasis 2005:168, 169;
It is possible that the punishment depicted in verse 46, and especially the clause ‘give him an inheritance with the faithless’ (τὸ μέρος αὐτοῦ μετὰ τῶν ἀπίστων θήσει), connotes eternal damnation (Allison 2004:441, 442; Hays 2012:47; Jeremias [1947] 1963:57; 1966:44; Nolland 2005:1000; cf. Blomberg 1990:191–192; Kloppenborg 1987a:150–151; Luz 2005:223; see Bock 1996:1183–1184). As it stands, the eschatological nature of Q 12:42–46 is put beyond serious doubt by both its content and its literary context (Smith 2006:125). In its current form and position, the parable in verses 42–46 encourages the Q people to remain faithful in view of the apocalyptic event, which will occur unexpectedly (Allison 2010:35; Kloppenborg 1987a:150). In this way, it offers additional support to the instruction in Q 12:40a to ‘be ready’.


Kloppenborg (1987a:234–236) views Q 13:24 as a sapiential admonition belonging to the formative stratum, and Q 13:25–27 as a series of prophetic pronouncements belonging to the main redaction. Yet, if Q 13:25–27 is interpreted not as a passage about eschatological salvation, but as part of a sapiential argument that starts in verse 24 about the harsh realities of ancient life, and the potential heartlessness of ancient masters, it would suit the thematic content of the formative stratum much better than that of the main redaction. If so interpreted, Q 13:24–27 functions to describe circumstances opposite to those of Q1 passages like Q 10:5–9 and Q 11:[5–8], 9–10, where householders welcome workers and the needy into their houses. Signs of the potentiality of such opposite behaviour also feature in Q 10:3, 6b, 10–11 and Q 11:[8a], 11–12. One could argue against the reading just proposed by pointing to the phrase ‘you taught in our streets’ (ἐν ταῖς πλατείαις ἡμῶν ἐδίδαξας), which is a definite reference to the ministry of Jesus. It is not impossible, though, that verses 26–27 were added by Q’s main redactor to verse 25, which originally appeared in the formative stratum after verse 24 as an independent logion.

There need not be any contradiction between the small open door of verse 24 and the closed door of verse 25 (Marshall 1978:565; cf. Bock 1996:1236; Fleddermann 2005:695). The second half of verse 24 claims that few people are able to enter through the narrow door, not because some of these individuals are overweight, but probably because entry is restricted by the householder (Valantasis 2005:181). Verse 25 confirms this interpretation by admitting that the householder has a tendency to lock the door (Jeremias [1947] 1963:96). Nonetheless, the sudden jump from a narrow door to a closed door does suggest that Q 13:24 and Q 13:25–27 were originally two separate units (Funk & Hoover 1993:347; Kloppenborg 1987a:235; cf. Marshall 1978:565).

Whatever the diachronic history and internal (dis)unity of Q 13:24–27, the eschatological saying in Q 13:28–29 was added to it by Q’s main redactor. The artificiality of this addition is indicated by the fact that the resultant parable application actually
contradicts the sapiential admonition in Q 13:24. Whereas verse 24 claims that ‘many’ (πολλοί) will attempt to enter through the narrow door, but that ‘few’ (ὀλίγοι) will succeed, verse 29 claims that ‘many’ (πολλοί) will participate in the eschatological feast (Kloppenborg 1987a:235; cf. Kirk 1998:246–247). In the process of adding Q 13:28–29 (and perhaps Q 13:26–27), the instructional material in Q 13:24–25, [26–27] was transformed into a parable of sorts, which explains why Matthew features the sayings of this Q passage not only as straightforward instructions in his Sermon on the Mount (Mt 7:13–14, 22–23), but also as the conclusion to his parable of the Ten Virgins (Mt 25:10–12). A similar transformation from non-parabolic wisdom to eschatological parable was noticed when examining Q 12:39–40. Whether Q 13:25–27 is understood as a prophetic passage about the eschatological end or as a sapiential passage about daily survival, it functions rhetorically in Q to encourage the sapiential instruction in Q 13:24a.

Likely in an attempt to iron out the contradiction mentioned above, Fleddermann (2005:695–696) claims that the text imagines a ‘double displacement’. Firstly, ‘many’ Christians will displace non-Christians in receiving eschatological salvation (verse 29). Secondly, ‘few’ ‘true’ Christians will replace ‘many’ nominal Christians in joining the eschatological banquet (verse 24) (see Luz 2007:372–373). Despite the anachronistic use of the word ‘Christian’ (cf. Jacobson 1992:32), there are two difficulties with this attempted harmonisation. Firstly, verse 29 comes after verse 24 in the sequence of the pericope, and is separated from it by three fairly lengthy verses. In terms of normal literary convention, it would be extremely unusual for a later verse to be qualified by an earlier verse that is removed from it by some distance, especially if the qualification pertains to a second stage in a process described by the later verse. Secondly, even with Fleddermann’s solution, the association remains between the ‘many’ of verse 29 and the ‘few’ of verse 24. Such a paradox could hardly have been intentional. Crossan (1983:44–45, 144) holds that the ‘few’ of verse 24 refers to Jews, while the ‘many’ of verse 29 refers to Gentiles. Yet, as we have argued, there is no indication that the ‘many’ of verse 29 should be seen as Gentiles (see Chapter 2, ‘Ethnicity and Q’). The intertextual evidence rather seems to suggest that the ‘many’ refers to diaspora Jews who were faithful to the message of Jesus. By the same token, verse 24 is uninterested in the demarcation of ethnic boundaries, failing to identify either the ‘many’ who seek to enter or the ‘few’ who are successful (cf. Davies & Allison 1988:698).

With an ‘unadulterated’ synchronic approach to Q 13:24–29, the content is best described as ‘wisdom about the Final Judgment’. The eschatological intent of Q 13:24–27 is confirmed and demonstrated by Q 13:28–29 (cf. Marshall 1978:565, 568; see Fleddermann 2005:695–696). As it now stands in Q, the material in Q 13:24–27 constitutes a parable, which we have seen is a sapiential micro genre, about the possibility of being excluded from eschatological salvation. The parable begins with an admonition featuring the imperative verb ‘enter’ (εἰσέλθατε), followed by a motive clause introduced with the conjunction ‘because’ (ὅτι) (Kloppenborg 1987a:234;
Nolland 2005:332; Stanton 2002:229; Valantasis 2005:182). In the final form of the Sayings Gospel Q, the motive clause in Q 13:24b is best understood as a reference to the eschatological end. The future tense of the verb ‘will seek’ (ζητήσουσιν) supports this reading. The sapiential admonition to enter through the narrow door, whatever that might mean on a metaphorical level, is motivated by the prophecy that many will experience eschatological rejection (Nolland 2005:332; cf. Horsley 2012:106). Q 13:25–27 elaborates on the content of the motive clause by depicting the circumstances that will accompany such future rejection (Funk & Hoover 1993:348; see Bock 1996:1236–1237). Q 13:28–29 elaborates further by describing the procedure and consequences of eschatological rejection (Bock 1996:1238; Jeremias [1947] 1963:96). Although the first part of the logion (Q 13:29, 28a) mentions eschatological salvation, the focus is clearly on the second part of the logion (Q 13:28b), which paints a disturbing picture of eschatological rejection (Luz 2001:9; Marshall 1978:567; cf. Bock 1996:1238). As such, the sapiential admonition to enter through the narrow door is supported by all the eschatological material that follows in Q 13:24b–29 (cf. Nolland 2005:332; Piper 1989:109, 114). More specifically, Q 13:24b–29 motivates the admonition in Q 13:24a by appealing to the reversal of fortunes that will accompany the eschatological end (cf. Theissen & Merz 1998:379; see Kloppenborg 1987a:235–236). If it stood in Q, verse 30 makes this motif of eschatological reversal explicit, thereby summarising the thematic crux of the foregoing material (Bock 1996:1239; Jeremias [1947] 1963:96, 110; Marshall 1978:568; cf. Allison 2010:36; Crossan 1983:44, 45; see Valantasis 2005:185). Supposing it stood in Q, the proverbial nature of this concluding saying would indicate that the preceding material is best understood as wisdom, even if it develops a typically prophetic-eschatological theme (cf. Bock 1996:1240; Davies & Allison 1997:60; Marshall 1978:568). Q 13:34–35 finally functions to specifically identify (some of) those who will experience eschatological rejection as the inhabitants and/or leaders of Jerusalem.

The real possibility should not be overlooked that Q 13:34–35 appeared in its Matthean (23:34–39) context in Q; that is, as part of Sophia’s speech after Q 11:49–51 (cf. Lührmann 1969:48; Marshall 1978:502, 573; Neiryck 1982:66; see Bock 1996:1243–1244). The latter is supported not only by the presence of the catchword ‘house’ (οἶκος) in both Q 11:51 and Q 13:35, but also by the presence of the Deuteronomistic theme in both texts (cf. Carlston 1982:105; Smith 2006:102). If Matthew’s placement is indicative of Q, the whole passage in Q 11:49–51; 13:34–35 is deliberately introduced in the Sayings Gospel as words of wisdom (or, Wisdom), even if they qualify formally as prophetic logia (see Jacobson 1992:212; Marshall 1978:573–575; Piper 1989:164–165; Schulz 1972:351–356; Steck 1967:227–239; cf. Luz 2005:159–160; Smith 2006:100; see above, ‘Sophia judges “this generation”’). In all honesty, the Matthean placement of Q 13:34–35 would probably be slightly more conducive to my overall argument that eschatology is structurally and rhetorically subordinated to wisdom in the Sayings Gospel Q. It needs to be noted, however, that
the Lukan placement also supports my larger thesis, as the current exposition aims to demonstrate.

Be that as it may, the complex of material in Q 13:24–29, [30], 34–35 is concerned neither with the Apocalypse nor with one of its features, like its suddenness or unexpectedness. Rather, it is concerned with the reversal of fortunes that will accompany the eschatological end. A cataclysmic Apocalypse might be presumed by the author to have happened before the expected occurrence of such a reversal, but the text does not make this clear. Whatever the original intent of the material in Q 13:24–30, it has been recast in the final form of Q as a parable about people's eschatological fate (Edwards 1976:132; see Fleddermann 2005:695–697). Referring to this text in particular, Jeremias ([1947] 1963:95–96) describes the process by which 'a new parable has come into existence.'

Reserved for eschatological condemnation are the inhabitants and/or leaders of Jerusalem (Piper 1989:108; cf. Vaage 2001:481; see Kirk 1998:313–315). Q 13:28–29 also implies that the unbelieving Jews in Palestine will not fare well at the eschatological end, but that a multitude of believing diaspora Jews will partake in the eschatological banquet (Bock 1996:1234; Davies & Allison 1991:28). In Q 13:28–29, the land of Palestine is envisioned as the Mecca of eschatological salvation, even if many Palestinians will themselves only have damnation to look forward to (see Davies & Allison 1991:29). The eschatological reversal thus entails the salvation of (many of) those on the geo-cultic periphery, and the condemnation of (many of) those in the geo-cultic centre (Davies & Allison 1991:28; cf. Fleddermann 2005:705; Valantasis 2005:186). Verse 30, if it stood in Q, adds a socio-economic element to the eschatological reversal as well (see Valantasis 2005:185). Regardless of whether or not verses 34–35 harbour any hope that Jerusalem will repent and accept Q’s message, the text is specifically concerned with that city’s eschatological fate (cf. Allison 1997:192; Fleddermann 2005:704, 705, 706; Smith 2006:103, 115–116; see Davies & Allison 1991:323–324; Nolland 2005:952–953). A strong case can be made for regarding these logia to be prophetic micro genres. Although the lament over Jerusalem reminds one of sapiential small forms, and the image of the protective hen is a well-known theme in traditional wisdom, the text overtly mentions ‘the prophets’ (τοὺς προφήτας), and verse 35 makes a telling prediction about a future time in a typically prophetic tone (cf. Bock 1996:1248, 1249; Edwards 1976:67; Marshall 1978:573, 576; Smith 2006:103; see Horsley 2012:106, 140–141). In all likelihood, verse 34 operates as a prophetic invective, and verse 35 as one or two prophetic threats (Fleddermann 2005:705; cf. Marshall 1978:576; Nolland 2005:951). Irrespective of whether this material formally qualifies as prophecy or wisdom, it is concerned with Jerusalem’s eschatological future (see Edwards 1976:132–133). Ultimately, the eschatological logia in Q 13:28–29, [30], 34–35 function as the application of the parable in Q 13:24–27, while all the material

206.Although he blames Luke for this process, not the compilers of Q.

The speed of lightning: Q 17:23–24, 26–27, 30, 34–35

Q 17:23 is a prohibition not to search out or follow false prophets, whether they be in the wilderness or indoors. That verse 23 should be seen as a wisdom text is indicated by two linguistic features. The first is the occurrence of two prohibitions: (1) ‘do not go out’ (μὴ ἑξέλθητε); and (2) ‘do not follow’ (μὴ διώξητε). The second is the parallelism of verse 23: ‘if they say to you: “look, he is in the wilderness,” do not go out’ (ἐὰν εἴπωσιν ὑμῖν ἐν τῇ ἐρήμῳ ἐστίν, μὴ ἑξέλθητε) mirrors ‘[if they say to you] “look, he is indoors,” do not follow’ (ἐὰν εἴπωσιν ὑμῖν ἐν τοῖς ταμείοις, μὴ διώξητε). The two legs of the parallelism have the following elements in common: (1) both feature a conditional sentence, even if the phrase ‘if they say to you’ (ἐὰν εἴπωσιν ὑμῖν) is implied in the second leg; (2) both feature a claim made by outsiders; (3) both feature the imperative ‘look’ (ἰδοὺ); (4) both feature the preposition ‘in’ with a noun in the dative case (ἐν τῇ ἐρήμῳ & ἐν τοῖς ταμείοις); and (5) both prohibitions feature a negative particle with a verb in the subjunctive mood (μὴ ἑξέλθητε & μὴ διώξητε).

The prohibitions not to go out and follow false prophets are explained and supported by the motive clause in verse 24, as the conjunction ‘because’ (γὰρ) indicates (Bock 1996:1429; Kloppenborg 1987a:163; see Kirk 1998:256–258). Verse 24 is a prophetic correlative, and describes the arrival of the Son of Man at the Apocalypse (Edwards 1976:41, 142; Kirk 1998:260; Kloppenborg 1987a:160; Robinson 1991:192; 1994:334–335). Yet, a number of features indicate that verse 24 is also inherently sapiential: (1) the application of deductive reasoning to support the preceding prohibitions; (2) the utilisation of a natural phenomenon, lightning, in a comparison clause (Edwards 1976:142; cf. Fleddermann 2005:830); and (3) the deliberate employment of parallelism, with the phrase ‘streaks out from sunrise’ (ἐξέρχεται ἀπὸ ἀνατολῶν) being parallel to the phrase ‘flashes as far as sunset’ (φαίνεται ἐως δυσμῶν). These indicators illustrate that verse 24 constitutes a sapiential argument that makes use of an apocalyptic motif and small form to substantiate its case. In itself, the occurrence of the conjunction ‘because’ (γὰρ) at the beginning of verse 24 is enough indication that the apocalyptic saying is both a statement in support of the sapiential prohibition in verse 23, and an integral part of its structure.

The future appearance of the Son of Man is likened to the universality, vividness, suddenness, unexpectedness, finality and devastating power of lightning.208 Tuckett

207.If Catchpole (1993:257–262) and Allison (1997:19, 201–202) are correct, and Q 13:34–35 did follow immediately after Q 11:14–52 in the Sayings Gospel, then it is part of the eschatological content of Sophia’s sapiential message. The message remains sapiential in nature, even though it develops an eschatological theme.

(2001:385) holds that Q 17:23–24 focuses more on the universal visibility of the Son of Man’s appearance than on its unexpectedness (cf. Bock 1996:1429; Nolland 2005:980). Given the content of verse 23, this is no doubt true, but surely the saying also intends to evoke the other characteristics of lightning. The latter is supported by the ominous content of the subsequent logia (Q 17:26–27, 30, 34–35, 37), all of which tend to highlight some of the features of lightning listed above (see further below in this section).

In Q 17:23–24, the Son of Man expression is an obvious allusion to Daniel 7:13 (see Casey 2009:212–228; cf. Bock 2011:91; Catchpole 1993:78, 246, 250–255; Kirk 1998:257–268; Piper 1989:139–142; Robinson 1991:189). No other interpretation would make sense of the apocalyptic imagery and language in this logion. In particular, the ‘lightning’ (ἀστραπή) of verse 24 goes together well with the ‘clouds’ (עֲנָנִים) of Daniel 7:13 (cf. Funk & Hoover 1993:249, 366; cf. 2 Bar 53:1–12; Ac 1:9–11). As in Q 12:40, the Son of Man may or may not be identified with Jesus, depending on whether or not such an identification precedes the delivery of the logion itself (cf. Robinson 1994:319–320; Smith 2006:129).

The apocalyptic themes of verse 24 are taken up and elaborated by verses 26–27, 30, 34–35 and 37, which paint vivid pictures of just how universal, unexpected, sudden, devastating, visible and final the apocalyptic event will be. As in verse 24, the apocalyptic theme is expressed in Q 17:26–27, 30 by means of two prophetic correlatives (Crossan 1983:176; Edwards 1976:41, 142; Fleddermann 2005:830, 833, 834; Kirk 1998:260; Kloppenborg 1987a:160, 164; Robinson 1991:192; 1994:334–335). As in verse 24, the Son of Man figure acts in Q 17:26–27, 30 as a Danielic emissary of the Apocalypse, who may or may not be identified with Jesus (Bock 2011:91; see Casey 2009:212–228; Catchpole 1993:78, 246, 250–255; Piper 1989:139–142). Just like the ‘sign of Jonah’ passage, Q’s wisdom is in Q 17:26–27, 30 substantiated by an appeal to an authoritative figure from scripture, traditionally associated in one way or another with apocalyptic eschatology (cf. Catchpole 1993:255; Davies & Allison 1997:380). In addition, the sapiential nature of Q 17:26–27, 30 is demonstrated by its close parallelism: (1) the comparison clause ‘as it took place in the days of Noah’

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210. As was the case with verse 24, the authenticity of these sayings is doubted by many (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:160 fn. 257).

211. Against an overwhelming majority of scholars (from both sides of the wisdom-apocalypticism divide), Horsley (2012:21–22) claims that Q 17:26–27 is not apocalyptic. He argues that although Noah’s flood was devastating, history did not cease, and the world did not end. It is clear that what Horsley means here is that this Q text is not ‘apocalyptic’ in the older sense in which Schweitzer and Bultmann defined the term, that is, as the end of the physical world and the cessation of history. Q 17:26–27 undeniably qualifies as an apocalyptic text if measured against the more nuanced definition of apocalypticism provided in the introduction to the present study. Although Noah’s flood is a past event, it features in Q 17:26–27 as a comparative demonstration of what to expect during the Apocalypse, which will take place in the future.
Given its placement after Q 17:26–27, 30, the logion in Q 17:34–35 should be taken as a further development of that text (Luz 2005:214; Marshall 1978:667; Valantasis 2005:219). According to Q 17:27, the flood of Noah’s time came and ‘took them all’ (ἦρεν ἅπαντας). Q 17:34–35 expands on this motif by describing how certain individual persons will ‘be taken’ (παραλαμβάνεται) during the Apocalypse, while others will be spared. According to Fleddermann (2005:830–831), Q 17:26–27, 30 and Q 17:34–35 are also connected through grammatical patterning. Bock (1996:1432) further sees a chronological and natural development from the lightning in Q 17:24 to the rain that brings the food in Q 17:26–27, 30. Marshall (1978:667) finally sees a causal link between the unexpectedness of the judgment in Q 17:26–27, 30 and the unpreparedness that led to the division in Q 17:34–35. Like the logion that precedes it, the sapiential nature of Q 17:34–35 is demonstrated by its close parallelism: (1) the sentence ‘there will be two men in the field’ (ἔσονται δύο ἐν τῷ ἀγρῷ) is mirrored by ‘two women will be grinding at the mill’ (δύο ἀλήθουσαι ἐν τῷ μύλῳ); and (2) the comment ‘one is taken and one is left’ (εἷς παραλαμβάνεται καὶ ἕξις ἁφίεται) appears at the end of each verse (cf. Davies & Allison 1997:382; Fleddermann 2005:835).

Funk and Hoover (1993:252, 367) hold that Q 17:34–35 was originally an isolated logion, expressing the common wisdom that the time of a person’s death is unpredictable. The same is true of Q 17:37, which undoubtedly functioned as an individual gnomic maxim before being incorporated into Q (Funk & Hoover 1993:249, 368; Luz 2005:199 fn. 149). As isolated logia, neither Q 17:34–35 nor Q 17:37 are about the eschatological or apocalyptic end, but as part of the material in Q 17:23–24, 26–27, 30, they function to augment the apocalyptic imagery of these logia (Funk & Hoover 1993:367; cf. Nolland 2005:981). The Critical Edition of Q follows Matthew in placing Q 17:37 after Q 17:23–24 (Robinson et al. 2000:510–511; 2002:146–147). In my view, the Lukan placement after Q 17:34–35 has more to commend it (cf. Crossan 1983:178). Either way, the image of corpses surrounded by vultures describes in a lucid way how devastating, visible and final the apocalyptic end will be (see Bock 1996:1439–1440; Davies & Allison 1997:355–356).

Given the discussion up to this point, Q 17:26–27, 30, 34–35, 37 should be regarded as an elaboration of verse 24, functioning primarily to buttress the sapiential prohibition
in verse 23 (cf. Fleddermann 2005:832; see Kirk 1998:259–262). Taken as a whole, the passage is united in its attempt to answer both the temporal and the spatial question of the Son of Man’s return (Fleddermann 2005:831; cf. Smith 2006:128). Regarding the temporal question, the passage claims that the Son of Man will appear suddenly and unexpectedly at an undisclosed and unknowable time in the future (Fleddermann 2005:833; cf. Koester 1997:143). Regarding the spatial question, the passage claims that the Son of Man’s return will be a universal event, unmistakably witnessed by everyone on earth simultaneously (Fleddermann 2005:831, 836; Marshall 1978:660). Both the temporal and the spatial facets of the larger argument are supported not only by the historic example of Noah in Q 17:26–27, 30, but also by the futurist exemplar of two men and two women working side by side in Q 17:34–35 (cf. Smith 2006:128). After the sudden death of numerous people in the latter logion,212 Q 17:37 closes off the argument by generating a grim image of the whole world covered with corpses and vultures (cf. Bock 1996:1432, 1437, 1440, 1441; Davies & Allison 1997:356; cf. Ezk 39:17; Sib. Or. 3.644–646; Rv 19:17–18).213

The main argument of the passage is that the apocalyptic Son of Man will appear so suddenly and universally from heaven that there is no need to go looking for him on earth (Casey 2009:215; Kloppenborg 1987a:161; cf. Horsley 1991:203). You will not be able to find the Son of Man before he finds you. Escape will be impossible (Koester 1997:143). If someone claims to have spotted the apocalyptic Son of Man in the present at a remote location, she is lying (Nolland 2005:980; see Bock 1996:1428–1429). When the Son of Man appears, there will be no doubt (Bock 1996:1429, 1430; Davies & Allison 1997:353, 354; Luz 2005:199; Marshall 1978:660). The appearance of the Son of Man will replace subjectively concocted rumours with objectively observable fact. The precise time of the Son of Man’s return cannot be known by anyone, but when it happens, it will be known to everyone (Bock 1996:1441). In a nutshell, the purpose of the passage is to ‘discourage eschatological speculation’ (Fleddermann 2005:831;

212.There are stark similarities between the scenario of Q 17:34–35 and the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. During the Rwandan genocide, the mass slaughter of Tutsis was administered by Akazu, a body of political elite made up of Hutus. Although based on ethnic and other identity markers, the distinction between Hutus and Tutsis was in many respects artificial. Within families, workforces and friendship circles, certain members were Hutus and others were Tutsis. As in Q 17:34–35, two people were working next to each other when one was murdered and the other spared. And as in Q 12:51, 53, husbands were killed in front of their wives, and children in front of their parents. As Fleddermann (2005:835) says, Q 17:34–35 ‘highlights how the end-time judgment separates everyone, even those closely associated in this world’ (cf. Marshall 1978:667). Fleddermann (2005:836) continues to explain that ‘this judgment will divide the world into two groups, those who are received into the kingdom and those who are excluded’ (cf. Bock 1996:1437–1438, 1440, 1441). It is hard to ignore the fact that the Sayings Gospel Q envisions a genocidal scenario as the answer to their boundary-related concerns. Their eschatological hope entails the complete eradication of the out-group, even if the distinction between the in-group and out-group is based on artificial factors like loyalty to a deceased sage and, ironically, his irenic social programme. Valantasis (2005:219) ends his discussion of Q 17:34–35 with the following comment: ‘For whatever reason, the people in the early Jesus movements began to expect an apocalyptic and cataclysmic judgment separating one person from another on the basis of their engagement with the empire of God.’ Such an obsession with human separation also brings to mind apartheid South Africa and Nazi Germany.

213.Interestingly, the idea that the Son of Man will come down to earth from heaven, during which many people on earth will die simultaneously, but others will be spared, indicates a continuation of life on earth after the Apocalypse. In other words, it seems that the post-apocalyptic world will be on earth.

Enthroned followers: Q 19:12–13, 15–24, 26; 22:28, 30

Oakman (2008:36, 54–55, 68–69, 252) might be correct that if the parable in Q 19:12–13, 15–24, 26 is considered in isolation, it critiques the elite, and exposes the unfortunate status quo of village peasants (cf. Jacobson 1992:239–244; Scott 1989:217–234). The parable could also be understood as an extended instruction not to hide the message of Q’s Jesus about the kingdom of God, but to allow it to grow. In both cases, the parable as a whole, including verse 26, accommodates a non-eschatological interpretation. Accordingly, Q 19:12–13, 15–24, 26 could be regarded as a purely sapiential parable (cf. Kirk 1998:298). Both of the interpretations of the parable offered above would be much more at home in the formative stratum than in the main redaction. On the one hand, the parable’s intent to expose the daily conditions of the poor and the ruthlessness of the wealthy is reminiscent of the possible original intent of Q 13:24–25, [26–27] in the formative stratum (see above, ‘Rejection’). On the other hand, refusing to hide the message of Q’s Jesus about the kingdom of God, but allowing it to grow, is an important motif in the formative stratum (cf. Q 11:33; 12:2–3, 33–34; 13:18–19, 20–21). In the case of either interpretation, the future tense of the passive verbs ‘will be given’ (δοθήσεται) and ‘will be taken’ (ἀρθήσεται) in verse 26 makes perfect sense in the context of the wisdom espoused by the parable itself. If the parable application in verse 26 were added secondarily, which is very likely, this addition was probably made before the parable as a whole was incorporated into the Sayings Gospel Q. Despite the sapiential roots of this parable, the future passive verbs of the application in verse 26 eased the way for an eschatological interpretation of the whole parable. The artificiality of this eschatological interpretation is exposed by the fact that verse 26 contradicts the motif of eschatological reversal that is central to the main redaction (cf. Q 11:19, 31–32; 12:42–46; 13:28–29, [30], 34–35; [14:11], 16–19, 21, 23). Whereas the rest of Q² foresees the underdogs being rewarded and the top dogs being punished at the Final Judgment, Q 19:26 foretells the exact opposite scenario.

214. As I have argued elsewhere, this logion belongs in the formative stratum, and instructs its audience not to hide the sapiential message of Q’s Jesus (see Howes 2013b:303–332).

As a side note, it is worth mentioning that, unlike Matthew 19:28, this Q logion does not mention the Son of Man participating in the act of judgment (\textit{pace} Tuckett 2001:380; cf. Järvinen 2001:520; Smith 2006:139). In Q 22:30, the term ‘Son of Man’ occurs only in the Matthean version of the saying, and was very likely added by him to the Q material he inherited. The theme of the Son of Man sitting on a throne is particular to Matthew (cf. Mt 25:31), and absent from the rest of both Q and the New Testament. Moreover, Matthew’s introduction of the term ‘Son of Man’ into this context makes perfect sense in light of his midrashic use of Daniel 7:13–14. Verse 14 of the latter text specifically describes the glory, power and authority of the Son of Man at the apocalyptic end, when he will have dominion over everyone and everything. Hence, it is extremely unlikely that Q 22:30 ever featured the term ‘Son of Man’. His participation might be assumed by the Q people (Smith 2006:126, 132), but it is not expressly mentioned in this context. It could very well be that the apocalyptic role of the Son of Man was restricted to his arrival in catastrophic splendour (cf. Q 12:40; 17:24, 26–30, where ‘judgment’ is not explicitly mentioned), and his judgment of the Q

\(^{215}\) For a different view, see Jacobson (1992:244–245).

\(^{216}\) Cf. 1 Kings 22:19–22; Job 1:6; Daniel 7:9–10; 1 Enoch 61:8–9; Testament of Abraham 12:4–17; 13:10–14; Dead Sea Scroll: \textit{1QHabakkuk Pesher} (1QpHab) V:3–5.
people internally (cf. Q 12:8–9; see above, ‘Confessing Jesus in public’), whereafter the Q people would take over and judge the rest of Israel.

It is well known that the verb ‘follow’ (ἀκολουθέω) functions as a metaphor for discipleship in early Christian texts (see Kingsbury 1978:56–75). Discipleship should primarily be seen as a sapiential theme in Q (cf. Valantasis 2005:54). The phrase ‘those who followed Jesus’ (οἱ ἀκολουθήσαντές μου) literally references those who physically followed Jesus during his earthly ministry, but metaphorically references those who live in accordance with his sapiential teachings, whether during or after the corporeal ministry of Jesus (cf. Verheyden 2001:712). It is therefore an obvious allusion to the Q people, who, by living out his wisdom in their daily lives, identify themselves completely with those who followed Jesus during his earthly ministry. Q 22:28, 30 therefore predicts that the Q people will act as judges, determining the eschatological fate of greater Israel at the Final Judgment (cf. Smith 2006:140; Verheyden 2001:707). The same interpretation would follow if Luke’s phrase ‘those who remained with Jesus’ (οἱ διαμεμενήκότες μετ’ ἐμοῦ) were preferred for Q. In addressing ‘those who have followed Jesus’, the logion in Q 22:28, 30 encourages the Q people to remain compliant and committed to the sapiential teachings of Jesus in view of the eschatological reward. Despite (or perhaps because of) its eschatological nature, Q 22:28, 30 functions as a piece of encouragement in the service of Jesus’ sapiential message.


Eschatological judgment and the Son of Man


We saw earlier that Q 19:26 contradicts the motif of eschatological reversal in the remainder of Q^2. In all likelihood, Q 22:28, 30 was added after Q 19:26 in order to clarify and correct an interpretation thereof that would foresee the ‘haves’ being rewarded at the Final Judgment, while the ‘have-nots’ are punished (cf. Verheyden 2001:703, 712). Accordingly, the specific identity of those in verse 26 to whom more will be given is the Q people, who will sit on thrones and act as judges (cf. Smith 2006:132; Verheyden 2001:714–715). Conversely, the specific identity of those in verse 26 from whom something will be taken away is exposed by Q 22:28, 30 as greater Israel, who will be the object of eschatological judgment. The kingdom of God is possibly intended as the object of the verb ‘have’ or ‘possess’ (ἔχω) in verse 26. Elsewhere, I have paraphrased the parable application in Q 19:26, if it is read in combination with Q 22:28, 30 (and Q 3:8), as follows (Howes 2014b):

While the Q people, who already has the kingdom, will be afforded the additional privilege of judging the rest of Israel at the final judgment, Israel, who currently lacks the kingdom, will also be robbed of their privileged status as ‘sons of Abraham’ at the final judgment. (p. 6 of 11; cf. Fleddermann 2005:869; Kloppenborg 2011b:265; Reiser 1990:249; Vaage 2001:480; Valantasis 2005:222)

At least as far as the final Q document is concerned, the latter interpretation of Q 19:26 would support the earlier proposal that the parable is meant as an extended instruction not to conceal the sapiential message of Q’s Jesus about the kingdom of God, as opposed to the alternative proposal that the parable intends to expose the dire situation of the poor over against the callousness of the wealthy.

The eschatological logion in Q 22:28, 30 functions as an interpretive key to the parable in Q 19:12–13, 15–24, 26. Although Q 19:26 acts formally as the parable’s application, Q 22:28, 30 also fulfils the function of a parable application in that it unlocks the intended meaning of Q 19:26. Unlike the other Q passages that were considered in this chapter, neither the parable nor the subsequent logion formally motivates a specific sapiential instruction. Nevertheless, the parable application and subsequent logion
function to motivate and justify the conduct advocated by the parable. Considered in isolation, Q 22:28, 30 serves as encouragement to remain faithful to the general sapiential teachings of Q’s Jesus in light of the eschatological reward. Considered with Q 19:26 as part of the parable application, Q 22:28, 30 promotes faithfulness to the specific sapiential instruction not to conceal the wisdom of Q’s Jesus in light of the eschatological end. Either way, it must have been extremely reassuring for the Q people ‘to have Jesus himself encourage his disciples in this way’ (Verheyden 2001:718).

**In conclusion**

**The Son of Man**

Our investigation of Q has found that the term ‘Son of Man’ is not only used by Q’s Jesus as an exclusive self-reference, but also as a non-titular self-reference (cf. Robinson 2003:27). Q’s Jesus uses the expression ‘Son of Man’ as a non-titular self-reference in six Q sayings: Q 6:22; Q 7:34; Q 9:58; Q 11:30; Q 12:8 and Q 12:10 (see Robinson 1994:315–335). This usage is remarkably similar to the way in which the term is used in the Gospel of Thomas (cf. Meyer 2003:21). The term’s application in Q is also interesting in view of recent studies on the use of the term ‘Son of Man’ in the Gospels. Not too long ago, Hare (1990:246) came to the following conclusion after considering the Son of Man tradition generally: ‘Whatever its spelling and pronunciation, the Aramaic underlying *ho huios tou anthropou* was understood as referring exclusively to Jesus’ (cf. Smith 1991:207–242). In the canonical Gospels, the expression ‘Son of Man’ is consistently translated as an exclusive self-reference of and by Jesus. Bock (2011) likewise states:

The designation Son of Man appears 82 times in the Gospels and is a self-designation of Jesus in all but one case, where it reports a claim of Jesus (Jn 12.34). (p. 90)

A number of other scholars have followed a similar approach, with similar results (e.g. Hill 1983:35–51; Hurtado 2011:159–177; Müller 1984; Schwartz 1986; Smith 1991:207–242). Synchronic analyses of the individual canonical Gospels reveal a likely diachronic development of the expression ‘Son of Man’ from an exclusive, non-titular and ‘more or less colourless’ self-reference to a title for Jesus (Müller 2008:419). In other words, although the Gospels on numerous occasions do use the expression ‘Son of Man’ as a title for Jesus, it seems that its pre-canonical roots are to be found in its use as a non-titular self-expression. Thus, both in terms of it being an exclusive self-reference, and in terms of it being a non-titular self-reference, our current findings are independently corroborated by recent studies on the use of the expression ‘Son of Man’ in the canonical Gospels (cf. Robinson 1994:325). This result goes against the opinion of some scholars that ‘in Q … Son of Man has come to be used as a christological title’ (Kloppenborg 1987a:192), or that ‘Q uses Son of Man as a title of dignity, not to refer to Jesus’ humble guise’ (Kloppenborg 1987a:213; cf. Edwards 1976:40, 41, 114; Kirk 1998:341, 380; Piper 1989:126).
The proposal by Vermes (1967) that the Aramaic expression ‘Son of Man’ was a circumlocution for ‘I’ seems to be corroborated not only by recent synchronic studies of the individual canonical Gospels, but also by our present investigation of Q (see Chapter 1, ‘The Son of Man’). Vermes was justifiably criticised by a number of scholars that the examples he put forward of the term’s circumlocutional use were actually examples of its generic and/or indefinite use(s) (cf. Burkett 1999:86–87). Despite this line of criticism, Vermes’s proposal should be accepted, mainly because it provides the best explanation for the translation, utilisation and development of the Greek term ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου in the New Testament. The definite singular form may still have connoted humility, danger, lowliness, humanity (in contrast to the nature and disposition of animals), death or something else, but given the almost complete lack of this form in the appropriate Aramaic sources, we simply cannot be sure. For similar reasons as those just noted, Hurtado (2011:159–177) comes to the following conclusion:

I submit that the diversity of sentences/sayings in which ‘the son of man’ is used in the Gospels leads to the conclusion that in these texts the expression’s primary linguistic function is to refer, not to characterize. The expression refers to Jesus …, but does not in itself primarily make a claim about him, or generate any controversy, or associate him with prior/contextual religious expectations or beliefs. ‘The son of man’ can be used in sayings that stake various claims about Jesus …, but it is the sentence/saying that conveys the intended claim or statement, not the ‘son of man’ expression itself. … Instead, we are to attribute to the referent, Jesus, the import of these sentences. (p. 166)

These comments are true in those cases where the term is an obvious reference to Jesus (i.e. Q 6:22; 7:34; 9:58; 12:8, 10), but not in those cases where someone or something other than Jesus might be the referent. We have seen that some Q sayings (Q 12:8, 40; 17:24, 26, 30) undoubtedly refer to the apocalyptic agent of Daniel 7:13. Thus, Hurtado is still correct in claiming that the function of all Son of Man sayings is ‘to refer, not to characterize’, but in the case of the latter group of sayings, the primary referent has changed. The referent in this second group of sayings is the apocalyptic agent of Daniel 7:13. It is only after identifying Jesus with the Danielic emissary, and only if this identification is made to begin with, that these sayings become indirect allusions to Jesus (cf. Smith 2006:129). In none of the apocalyptic Son of Man sayings in Q is it a given that Q’s Jesus should be associated with the imagined Son of Man figure (Robinson 1994:319–320). Horsley (1991) summarises aptly:

It seems clear that when ‘son of man’ is a self-reference by Jesus in Q it does not refer to judgment, and when ‘(the day of) the son of man’ refers to judgment, it does not [necessarily] refer to Jesus. (p. 205)

Q 12:8 appears in both groups of logia, having two legitimate points of reference: the human Jesus and the apocalyptic Son of Man figure (cf. Tuckett 2003:184). Q’s Jesus uses the term in Q 12:8 as an ambiguous reference to both himself and the apocalyptic figure of Daniel 7:13 (cf. Allison 2010:39). This usage invites, but does not oblige, the conclusion that Q’s Jesus should be associated with the apocalyptic figure of Daniel 7:13.
The same hermeneutic is evident on a larger scale when the Sayings Gospel Q is considered as a whole. If the apocalyptic usage of the term ‘Son of Man’ in certain Q passages is interpreted in light of the ordinary usage of the term as an exclusive self-reference in other Q passages, the conclusion is both invited and obscured that Q’s Jesus should be identified with the apocalyptic figure in Daniel 7:13 (cf. Pokorný 2011:354; Theissen & Merz 1998:552–553; Tuckett 2001:386, 394). Accordingly, Q’s Jesus both intended and obscured an identification with the apocalyptic Son of Man figure through his clever use of the expression ‘Son of Man’. Thus, the term ‘Son of Man’ is used in Q both as an exclusive, non-titular self-reference and as an apocalyptic reference to the figure of Daniel 7:13. In both cases, as well as in each individual Q passage featuring the term ‘Son of Man’, this term supports and substantiates the sapiential message of Q’s Jesus. What is more, both the ordinary and the apocalyptic references to the Son of Man are integral to the rhetorical and structural fabric of each sapiential passage in which they appear. It is perhaps worth mentioning that none of the apocalyptic Son of Man logia appear in Kloppenborg’s formative stratum (Robinson 1994:318).

Only three Son of Man logia in Q were found to be authentic: Q 7:34; Q 9:58 and Q 12:10 (cf. Robinson 1994:325). Significantly, only one of the sayings derives from the formative stratum (Q 9:58), while two of them belong to the main redaction (Q 7:34 & Q 12:10). Once again, this result warns against a direct correlation between the redaction history of Q and the tradition history of the historical Jesus. As with the authentic Son of Man sayings, both layers of Q also contain inauthentic Son of Man logia (Q¹: Q 6:22; Q²: Q 11:30; 12:8–9, 40; 17:24, 26–27, 30). Crucially, all three of the authentic Son of Man sayings in Q are examples of its usage as an exclusive, non-titular self-expression by Jesus. Interestingly, if taken out of their Q contexts, all three sayings would also accommodate Casey’s understanding of the term ‘Son of Man’ as an Aramaic idiom that references both humanity in general and the speaker in particular. What is more, the three sayings appear in the midst of passages that develop sapiential reasoning and rhetoric. Conversely, Q’s inauthentic Son of Man logia constitute a mixed bag, containing both sayings that apply the term as an exclusive, non-titular self-expression by Jesus (Q 6:22; 11:30; 12:8) and sayings that apply the term as a reference to the apocalyptic figure in Daniel 7:13 (Q 12:8, 40; 17:24, 26, 30).

Eschatological judgment

In the Q passages considered, eschatology (and prophecy) functions to support the sapiential message of Q’s Jesus (cf. Horsley 1991:209; Theissen & Merz 1998:376). Some of these passages are clearly apocalyptic in nature, while others develop eschatological themes without the use of obvious apocalyptic language or imagery. On a rhetorical level, Q’s Jesus employs eschatological motifs and small forms
to strengthen and motivate his sapiential message. This conclusion supports the idea that Q features a ‘secondary apocalyptic eschatology’, in the words of Crossan, or a ‘symbolic eschatology’, in the words of Kloppenborg (see Chapter 1, ‘The aftermath’). In this sense, Q’s Jesus is comparable to Bultmann’s historical Jesus, who taught an ‘eschatological ethics’ (see Chapter 1, ‘Rudolf Bultmann and the “No quest” period’). Yet, eschatology is not only employed to substantiate particular sapiential traditions, but also constitutes an integral part of the structure and content of these sapiential traditions. In general terms, one could say that (apocalyptic) eschatology forms an integral part of the sapiential message of Q’s Jesus. It is important to note, however, that eschatology is not once used in Q as a basis from which to introduce, formulate or compose any specific moral directive or piece of wisdom (cf. Allison 2010:97). The sapiential content of Q is neither derived from nor utilised in the service of its eschatological content. Instead, (apocalyptic) eschatology is utilised in the service of existing wisdom (cf. Allison 2010:97). Even in those instances where (apocalyptic) eschatology forms an integral part of the structure of a sapiential argument, the former operates in service of the latter. Additionally, one could argue that the tendency to add eschatological applications to Q parables is an attempt at deducing information about the nature of the final end from sapiential traditions. In Q 11:19b, Q’s Jesus makes a deduction about the specific nature of the eschatological end from the content of his sapiential argument. Whether derived from or employed in the service of Q’s wisdom, (apocalyptic) eschatology formally fulfils a subsidiary role in the Sayings Gospel Q. Ultimately, whenever Q’s Jesus does not employ eschatology, including the apocalyptic Son of Man logia, to support his sapiential arguments, he employs wisdom as an appropriate basis from which to speculate about the end times. Q’s Jesus seems to be a sage who occasionally turns to eschatological and prophetic themes and small forms in support of his wisdom.
Reconstructing the Q text

The Lukan and Matthean versions of Q 6:37–38 differ substantially. Matthew (7:1–2) features the following text (with my translation):

1 Μὴ κρίνετε,
   ἵνα μὴ κριθῆτε.
2 ἐν ὧν γὰρ κρίματι κρίνετε
   κριθήσεσθε,
   καὶ ἐν ὧν μέτρῳ μετρεῖτε
   μετρηθήσεται ὑμῖν.

Luke (6:37–38) features the following text (with my translation):

37 Καὶ μὴ κρίνετε,
   καὶ οὐ μὴ κρίθητε·
   καὶ μὴ καταδικάζετε,
   καὶ οὐ μὴ καταδικασθῆτε.
   ἀπολύετε,
   καὶ ἀπολυθήσεσθε·
38 δίδοτε,
   καὶ δοθῆσαι υἱῷ·
   μέτρον καλὸν
   πεπιεσμένον
   σεσαλευμένον
   ὑπερεκχυννόμενον
   δόσουσιν εἰς τὸν κόλπον υἱῷ·
   ὃ γὰρ μέτρῳ μετρεῖτε
   ἀντιμετρηθήσεται υἱῷ.

1 Do not judge,
   so that you are not judged;
2 for with that judgment you judge with
   you will be judged,
   and with that measure you measure with
   it will be measured to you.
37 And do not judge,
   and you will not be judged;
   and do not condemn,
   and you will not be condemned.
   Forgive,
   and you will be forgiven;
38 give,
   and it will be given to you:
   a good measure
   pressed down,
   shaken together,
   overflowing,
   they will pour in your lap;
   for that measure you measure with
   it will be measured back to you.
The only verbal agreements between the two versions are the admonition ‘do not judge’ (μὴ κρίνετε), the motive clause ‘(so that) you are not judged’ (μὴ κριθῆτε), and the supportive maxim ‘that measure you measure with, it will be measured (back) to you’ (ὅ μέτρῳ μετρηθῆσεται ύμῖν) (cf. Youngquist et al. 2011:3). Luke features three additional admonitions on top of the prohibition not to judge, each with its own motive clause: (1) ‘do not condemn, and you will not be condemned’ (καὶ μὴ καταδικάζετε, καὶ οὐ μὴ καταδικασθῆτε); (2) ‘forgive, and you will be forgiven’ (ἀπολύετε, καὶ ἀπολυθήσεσθε); and (3) ‘give, and it will be given to you’ (δίδοτε, καὶ δοθήσεται ύμῖν) (Catchpole 1993:121; Crossan 1983:180; Piper 1989:37). These additional admonitions and motive clauses are similar in grammatical form and rhetorical function to the initial prohibition and motive clause (μὴ κρίνετε & μὴ κριθῆτε).

The three extra admonitions and motive clauses should be seen as Lukan additions. The first admonition means just about the same as ‘do not judge’ (μὴ κρίνετε), and appears somewhat superfluous. Luke probably wanted to clarify that the outcome of the judgment in the motive clause would be a negative verdict, since the word ‘judge’ (κρίνω) leaves open the possibility of a positive verdict (see Howes 2014b:1–11). The second admonition takes further the theme of forgiveness, a prominent theme for Luke, but not really for Q (Kloppenborg 2011a:90).217 In adding this particular saying, Luke was probably motivated by a need to propose forgiveness as the positive flipside of condemnation (Piper 1989:37). The third addition latches onto the idea, already expressed in Luke (Q) 6:30, that you should give to others (Tuckett 1996:432). The repetition of this admonition, featuring in both verse 30 and verse 38, is unlikely to have been a product of such a compact and succinct document as Q, but makes sense as the product of a lengthy and elaborate Gospel such as Luke (Carruth 1992:89–90). Moreover, the directive to give to others betrays Luke’s own interests here by expressing the trademark Lukan themes of charity, wealth redistribution and almsgiving (Kloppenborg 2011a:90; Piper 1989:37–38; Verheyden 2011:91). Luke probably added these three admonitions to replicate a ‘list of four’, which he has an apparent affinity for (Marriott 1925:100; Piper 1989:38; cf. Lk 6:22, 24–26, 27–28). In fact, Luke might have been responsible for elaborating other Q material in this way, notably Q 6:22 and Q 6:27–28 (Verheyden 2011:91). None of these additional sayings are developed by the supportive argumentation that immediately follows in Q. Also, there is no satisfactory explanation for why Matthew would have left these three admonitions out of his Gospel if he had any knowledge of them (Verheyden 2011:90–91).

There are a number of reasons for rejecting the argument that these additional admonitions contain ‘un-Lukan expressions’ (unlukanische Ausdrücke), and should therefore be accepted as part of Q (e.g. Schweizer 1982:82). Firstly, even if both the vocabulary and style of these additions are ‘un-Lukan’, which remains to be shown

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conclusively, the thematic content of these additions are, as we have seen, genuinely and essentially Lukan. Secondly, although the stylistic form of these additional admonitions is not typically Lukan, the style is explicable as an attempt by Luke to create a fourfold parallelism by modelling his additions after the original admonition: ‘do not judge … you are not judged’ (μὴ κρίνετε … κριθῆτε). Thirdly, at least two of the verbs featured in these additional admonitions are known to Luke, namely ‘forgive’ (ἀπολύω) and ‘give’ (δίδωμι) (cf. Moulten & Geden 1963:98, 211–215, s.v. ἀπολύω & δίδωμι). The verb that appears in the remaining admonition, ‘condemn’ (καταδικάζω), is indeed a hapax legomenon in Luke, but it is also unattested in Q, and very unpopular in the rest of the New Testament, where it appears only three additional times: twice in Matthew, and once in James (cf. Moulten & Geden 1963:533, s.v. καταδικάζω; Verheyden 2011:91).

Luke is certainly not unfamiliar with the concept expressed by the verb ‘condemn’ (καταδικάζω), seeing as he uses the noun ‘condemnation’ (καταδίκη) in Acts 25:15, which is the only appearance of this noun in the New Testament (Verheyden 2011:91). Fourthly, Luke’s use of this uncommon verb makes sense in the current context. The verb ‘condemn’ is more specific than the verb ‘judge’, and Luke probably attempted to clarify the exact application of the admonition not to judge (Patton 1916:289). Also, Luke needed to find a word that semantically overlapped with the word ‘judge’ to create his fourfold parallelism, which consisted of two negative legs (καὶ μὴ κρίνετε, καὶ οὔ μὴ κριθῆτε· καὶ μὴ καταδικάζετε, καὶ οὐ μὴ καταδικασθῆτε) and two positive legs (ἀπολύετε, καὶ ἀπολυθήσετε· δίδοτε, καὶ δοθῆσεται ύμίν) (Drury 1976:136). Thus, Luke’s introduction of ‘condemn’ both mimics and heightens the Q admonition against judgment (Fleddermann 2005:295).

In Luke, the admonition to give is followed by an odd sentence: ‘A good measure, pressed down, shaken together, overflowing, they will pour in your lap’ (μέτρον καλὸν πεπιεσμένον σεσαλευμένον ὑπερεκχυννόμενον δώσουσιν εἰς τὸν κόλπον ὑμῶν). This maxim recalls ‘the Palestinian custom of using the fold of a garment as a container for grain’ (Catchpole 1993:121–122; see Bock 1994:607–608). Not only for this reason, but also because it rather looks like a traditional maxim, is it unlikely to have been created by Luke ex nihilo, and might even have formed part of the Jesus tradition at some stage (cf. Catchpole 1993:122; Marshall 1978:267; Tuckett 1996:430). Even so, this maxim makes more sense in its Lukan position than it would in Q. Luke attempts to motivate the preceding admonition by arguing that if you give to others, you will receive more in return than the content of what you gave out in the first place. The vocabulary and imagery of this statement, especially the catchword ‘measure’ (μέτρον), naturally links it to the subsequent Q saying: ‘For that measure you measure with, it will be measured back to you’ (ὁ γὰρ μέτρῳ μετρεῖτε ἀντιμετρήθησεται ύμίν) (Crossan 1983:180).

Despite this superficial connection between the two maxims, the Lukan saying actually contradicts the Q saying (Blair 1896:100). The former claims that you will receive more than what you give out, while the latter claims that you will receive exactly the same as what you give out (Fairchild 1989:106). As such, Q 6:38 does not logically
fit into its Lukan placement, making no sense as a motivation for the admonition to ‘give’ (δίδοτε). If you only get back what you give out, what would be the motivating factor? Surely, it would be less effort not to give anything in the first place. Luke’s justification that you would receive more than what you give makes much more sense as a motivating factor for the admonition to give (cf. Schweizer 1982:82). Conversely, Q’s motivation that you will receive exactly what you give makes much more sense in its Q position, after the admonition not to judge, than it does in its Lukan position. The knowledge that you will be judged just as harshly as your own judgment of others would be an excellent incentive not to cast judgment to begin with. Moreover, the occurrence in this passage of two favourite Lukan words, namely ‘shake’ (σαλεύω) and ‘lap’ (κόλπος), supports the argument that this saying is a Lukan addition (Marriott 1925:99). Mark (4:24) adds the phrase ‘and even more’ (καὶ προστεθήσεται ύμιν) to his version of the ‘measure’ logion in Q 6:38. Luke must have been tempted by this parallel saying in Mark to add an extra motivating maxim to his version of the teaching (Verheyden 2011:92). Both the Marcan and Lukan variations have the effect of increasing the expected reward to more than what was measured out in the first place. In light of this discussion, it seems that only the verbal agreements with Matthew can be taken from Luke as forming part of Q.

Luke’s elaboration of Q 6:37–38 is quite masterful. He adds a few extra admonitions. One of these admonitions (δίδοτε) allows him to add a traditional maxim as a supporting logion (Tuckett 1996:432). This maxim not only shares the imagery of the original Q saying, but also produces the same semantic effect as the Marcan parallel. Adding this traditional maxim about measures to the teaching in question then allows Luke to effortlessly affix the Q saying about measures directly thereafter (cf. Crossan 1983:180). In the process, Luke manages to contradict himself, perhaps unintentionally. Luke’s elaboration of the Q text is probably motivated by an intention not only to palliate the abrupt introduction of a new theme in Q 6:38, but also to bring out the positive side of eschatological judgment, which would include ‘forgiveness’ and ‘receiving more than what was given’ (Catchpole 1993:123).

Matthew features only one additional sentence on top of the verbatim agreement with Luke, ‘for with that judgment you judge with, you will be judged’ (ἐν ᾧ γὰρ κρίματι κρίνετε κριθήσεσθε). The latter agrees syntactically and grammatically with the maxim in Q 6:38, resulting in a strong parallelism between the two (Catchpole 1993:121; Marshall 1978:266; Piper 1989:38). If Matthew’s version of Q 6:38 is followed, both sentences are introduced by the preposition ‘with’ (ἐν). Luke and Matthew agree about the vocabulary, grammar and syntax of the rest of Q 6:38. After the introductory ἐν, both sentences feature a relative pronoun in the dative case (ὁ) and the conjunction ‘because’ (γάρ), directly followed by a dative noun (κρίματι & μέτρῳ), a second-person present indicative active verb (κρίνετε & μετρεῖτε), and a future indicative passive verb (κριθήσεσθε & μετρηθήσεται). Matthew’s general affinity for parallelisms, and his specific affinity for introducing or creating them when copying Jesus’ sayings,

The Q maxim (ὁ γὰρ μέτρῳ μετρεῖτε μετρηθήσεται ὑμῖν) must have been too vague in Matthew’s mind, opening itself up to misapplication. His addition of the sentence ‘for with that judgment you judge with, you will be judged’ (ἐν ὧν γὰρ κρίματι κρίνετε κριθήσεσθε) should be seen as an attempt to clarify the meaning and application of Q’s maxim (see Reiser 1997:263–264). Matthew thereby spells out the intended meaning of the Q maxim about measures. In his Sermon on the Mount, Matthew shows great interest in the topics of ‘reciprocity’ and ‘judgment’ (Carruth 1992:89; Youngquist 2011:52). In fact, Matthew shows a particular interest in the theme of ‘reciprocal judgment’ elsewhere in his Gospel (cf. Mt 5:21–26, 40; 23:32–33; see Verheyden 2011:53–54). His attempt at clarifying a logion that deals with the motif of reciprocal judgment is therefore explicable. This explanatory addition is quite unnecessary, though. The application of the Q maxim to the admonition not to judge invariably results in the exact same interpretation. The Q text makes perfect sense without this addition. Matthew’s need to add this explanation might also have been motivated by the abrupt introduction of a new theme in Q 6:38 (Piper 1989:38). Thus, Matthew attempts not only to explain the maxim in Q 6:38, but also to introduce a more seamless transition between the admonition in Q 6:37 and the maxim in Q 6:38.

Luke might also have been attempting to introduce a more seamless transition, but went about it in a different way. Whereas Luke introduced three additional admonitions and a supporting maxim that was thematically similar to Q 6:38, Matthew added an explanatory maxim that was formally and grammatically similar to Q 6:38 (cf. Catchpole 1993:121; Davies & Allison 1988:669). The likelihood that Luke attempted to palliate the transition between Q 6:37 and Q 6:38 supports the proposition that Matthew added the sentence ‘for with that judgment you judge with, you will be judged’ (ἐν ὧν γὰρ κρίματι κρίνετε κριθήσεσθε) to the Q text. Similarly, the likelihood that Matthew attempted to palliate the transition between Q 6:37 and Q 6:38 supports the earlier proposition that Luke added three admonitions and a maxim to the Q text. In this way, the two proposals of redactional activity corroborate each other (cf. Piper 1989:38; Verheyden 2011:53). In the end, the sentence ἐν ὧν γὰρ κρίματι κρίνετε κριθήσεσθε seems rather superfluous and redundant in a Q context, where pithy sayings are the norm, rather than the exception. Moreover, if this sentence was indeed part of Q, why would Luke have left it out of his text (cf. Verheyden 2011:53)? Luke had no clear theological or rhetorical reason for doing so. In fact, the mere absence of this Matthean addition from Luke should warn us against adding it to Q (Catchpole 1993:121; Reiser 1997:263). The conclusion seems justified: ἐν ὧν γὰρ κρίματι κρίνετε κριθήσεσθε should be seen as a Matthean addition.

A few minor uncertainties remain. Luke begins the admonition not to judge with the conjunction ‘and’ (καί), while Matthew has no conjunction. In the Sayings Gospel Q,
this admonition probably followed directly after Q 6:36, which is an admonition about showing mercy. In the literary context of Q, the conjunction καί would have functioned to connect the two respective admonitions of verses 36 and 37 (Kloppenborg 1987a:180). The need to link verses 36 and 37 is explicable on account of the thematic and formal similarities between them (see the rest of this section and chapter). Moreover, Luke is highly unlikely to have introduced the ineloquent καί at this point, seeing as the use of a resumptive καί is not a trademark feature of Luke’s own style (Carruth 1992:88; Marriott 1925:92–93). In fact, he frequently omits or replaces the resumptive καί in his redactional copying of other sources, including especially Mark. Whenever the resumptive καί is present in Luke, it is routinely attributable to his source at that point. Matthew also tends to dispose of the resumptive καί in his sources, which explains why it is not present in the Matthean version of this logion. Since Matthew had, in his Gospel, already covered the theme of ‘mercy’ comprehensively, and since he was introducing a new section in Chapter 7, his omission here of καί coheres completely with his redactional activities (Carruth 1992:88; Gundry 1982:120). For these reasons, Luke’s καί should probably be accepted as stemming from Q.

As with his other motive clauses in this text, Luke begins the one about judgment with another καί, and both negative particles: οὐ μή. There are text-critical issues and uncertainties with Luke’s use of καί οὐ here. A number of text variants prefer the conjunction ‘so that’ (ἵνα) in its place. Unsurprisingly, Matthew’s text leads in the motive clause with the conjunction ἵνα. On the one hand, the different reading in Luke could be explained as an effort by copiers of Luke to align the Third Gospel more with the First Gospel. On the other hand, a genuine alternative version of Luke 6:37 could also explain the textual variant. This uncertainty in Luke gives precedence to the Matthean version, which introduces the motive clause with ἵνα μή. Seeing as both Gospels use μή, and both Gospels betray traditions of using ἵνα, the construct ἵνα μή should probably be preferred as the most original Q rendition. Against this conclusion, it could be stated (1) that Luke is not averse to the Matthean construction ἵνα μή, which features elsewhere in his Gospel; (2) that Matthew tends to add the construction ἵνα μή to his sources, especially Mark; and (3) that Luke’s οὐ μή occurs frequently in all three Gospels, most commonly in Jesus’ sayings (Youngquist 2011:37). These observations are not determinative, however. Luke does in fact have a tendency to remove ἵνα (μή) from his sources, sometimes replacing it with an οὐ (μή) construction (Cadbury 1920:137).218 He also has a habit of adding καί whenever it might help a sentence read more smoothly. In my view, the text-critical difficulties with Luke’s οὐ μή should be decisive at this point. Moreover, the Lukan use of οὐ with μή looks very much like an attempt to overemphasise and dogmatise this motive clause. In doing so, Luke transgresses beyond the borders of Q, which is simply interested in communicating morality and wisdom at this point.

Unlike Luke, Matthew begins the Q maxim in verse 38 with ‘and with’ (καί ἐν). Starting with the preposition, Luke has a tendency to drop the instrumental ἐν from his sources, and might have done so here, precisely because it is superfluous in its current Q context (Cadbury 1920:204; Carruth 1992:90; Fleddermann 1995:85; 2005:115; Kloppenborg 2011a:115; Youngquist 2011:115). However, Luke does not always avoid the instrumental use of ἐν (Verheyden 2011:116). In fact, he retains it quite often when copying his sources. More significantly, he often produces it autonomously, not only in Sondergut material (cf. Lk 22:49), but also when he is rephrasing Mark (cf. e.g. Lk 4:32 // Mk 1:22; Lk 21:19 // Mk 13:13). There are a number of indicators that the preposition ἐν was added by Matthew, instead of being dropped by Luke. The preposition is superfluous, and explicable in the Matthean context as a need to parallel the same preposition in the phrase ἐν ὧν γὰρ κρίματι κρίνετε κριθήσεσθε. Matthew could have been copying Mark’s (4:24) ἐν here, and not that of Q. The same procedure might lie behind his copying of Q 3:16–17 in Matthew 3:11–12 (par. Mk 1:7–8) and Q 14:34 in Matthew 5:13 (par. Mk 9:50) (Verheyden 2011:116). Against most scholars, I maintain that in this instance Matthew preferred Mark’s ἐν over Q’s lack thereof, because it enabled him to create an even better parallel with the sentence he added (ἐν ὧν γὰρ κρίματι κρίνετε κριθήσεσθε); a probability that is largely overlooked by scholars (see Youngquist et al. 2011:113–116). The conjunction καί links the Matthean maxim ἐν ὧν γὰρ κρίματι κρίνετε κριθήσεσθε to the Q maxim copied by him. Thus, once it is accepted that Matthew added the explanatory maxim ἐν ὧν γὰρ κρίματι κρίνετε κριθήσεσθε to the original Q text, his use of καί ἐν before the authentic Q maxim also becomes explicable.

Luke introduces the Q maxim with the conjunction ‘because’ (γάρ), but Matthew does not. Nevertheless, Matthew introduces his explanatory maxim with the very same conjunction (Fleddermann 1995:85; Reiser 1997:263). One can understand why Matthew would move the conjunction back one phrase. When he added an additional maxim between Q’s motive clause and Q’s maxim, he was forced by the linguistic rules of Greek to move the conjunction γάρ backwards so that it would still follow the motive clause (cf. Carruth 1992:90; Gundry 1982:120). Hence, the earlier conclusion that Matthew added the sentence ἐν ὧν γὰρ κρίματι κρίνετε κριθήσεσθε to Q is currently substantiated, since it provides the best explanation of the differences between the two Gospels, especially their respective usages of the conjunctions and prepositions they inherited from Q (cf. Fleddermann 1995:85). The likelihood that γάρ stood in Q is also substantiated by the agreement between Luke and Matthew in their act of reproducing this preposition against Mark (4:24), who lacks it (Verheyden 2011:97).

Lastly, whereas Matthew has ‘measure’ (μετρηθήσεται), Luke has ‘measure back’ (ἀντιμετρηθήσεται). The latter verb represents a much better handling of the Greek language, since the verb, in and of itself, means to ‘measure out in return’ (cf. Liddell & Scott 1996:159, s.v. ἀντιμετρέω). The former verb, however, produces much better poetic and sapiential rhythm with μέτρῳ and μετρεῖτε. For both these reasons,
Do not judge! (μὴ κρίνετε) in Q 6:37–38

μετρηθῆσεται should be preferred for Q. Poetic rhythm is far less important in a lengthy narrative Gospel than in a collection of pithy sayings. Luke probably changed the verb because of the unfortunate Greek. Luke has an acknowledged tendency to substitute his sources’ simple verbs for compound verbs, and probably did the same here (Cadbury 1920:166; Carruth 1992:90; Marriott 1925:117; Schulz 1972:146). Moreover, Luke seems to have a much greater affinity for the preposition ἀντί than any other New Testament writer. Additionally, Luke loves lengthening future passive verbs (Fleddermann 1995:85; 2005:295). Lastly, the introduction of ἀντί fits very well with Luke’s additional maxim, and its theme of ‘receiving more’ than what was given in the first place (Verheyden 2011:121). Considering the discussion up to this point, the following reconstruction can be made of Q 6:37–38:

37 Καὶ μὴ κρίνετε, ἵνα μὴ κριθῆτε·
38 ὃ γὰρ μέτρῳ μετρεῖτε μετρηθῆσεται ὑμῖν.

There are three formal indicators that verses 37 and 38, as they have been reconstructed here, belong together. The first is the (semi)colon at the end of verse 37. The second is the use of the conjunction γάρ at the beginning of verse 38. The third is the introduction of verse 38 with the relative pronoun ὃ. Although the latter pronoun congrues with a noun (μέτρῳ) in verse 38 (as opposed to verse 37), the decision to place this pronoun first in the sentence structure signals a deliberate choice to link the two verses. In this way, the relative pronoun ὃ deliberately associates the ‘measure’ (μέτρῳ) of verse 38 with the implied ‘judgment’ of verse 37.

There is a poetic simplicity to the saying as it has been reconstructed. Verses 37 and 38 are in parallel. Both begin with an active verb (κρίνετε & μετρεῖτε), and are then followed by a passive verb (κριθῆτε & μετρηθῆσεται). The two verbs of prohibition in verse 37 (μὴ κρίνετε & μὴ κριθῆτε) are followed by two indicative verbs in verse 38 (μετρεῖτε & μετρηθῆσεται). The two verbs of verse 37 have the same stem (κρίνω), and the two verbs of verse 38 also have the same stem (μετρέω). Two of these features are further paralleled in the preceding logion. In verse 36, the same stem (οἰκτίρμων) also appears twice. Verse 36 also produces an imperative verb of admonition (γίνεσθε), followed by an indicative verb (ἐστίν). Hence, there is a fair bit of formal agreement between the admonitions in verses 36 and 37–38 respectively. It follows that the proposed reconstruction of Q 6:37–38 not only makes good linguistic sense of the two applicable verses (internally), but also fits the immediate literary context of Q (externally).

Due to the stylistic agreement between verse 36 and verses 37–38, a case could be made for relating the maxim in verse 38 to both preceding admonitions. In that case, the maxim could be interpreted ‘either salvifically or judgmentally’ (Catchpole 1993:121). Without disregarding such a possibility completely, our focus is rather
on the logion in Q 6:37–38, and the internal relationship between its constituent forms. In any case, the text does seem to prefer and advocate a reading that puts most of its weight on the connection between verses 37 and 38. Firstly, there are a number of formal links between verses 37 and 38, but not one between verses 36 and 38. Secondly, the stylistic linkage between verses 36 and 38 is much weaker than that between verses 37 and 38. Thirdly, to state the obvious, verse 38 is sequentially closer to verse 37 than to verse 36. Fourthly, the maxim in verse 38 clarifies and substantiates the reciprocal theme of the motive clause in verse 37, not the *imitatio Dei* theme of the motive clause in verse 36. Lastly, Matthew understood the maxim in verse 38 as an exclusive reference to judgment. Although Luke added the positive values of ‘forgiveness’ and ‘generosity’, these were not in reference to the Q maxim itself. Thus, our case for attaching the maxim in verse 38 directly to the preceding admonition, and only tentatively (and secondarily) to the mercy logion, is based on the form, style, order, rhetoric and reception of the literary text.

### Micro genre

The process of determining the micro genre of Q 6:37–38 will begin with consideration of its presence in the inaugural sermon (Q 6:20–49). The Lukan version of the inaugural sermon commences with the comment that Jesus ‘raised’ (ἐπάρας) his eyes to ‘his disciples’ (τοὺς μαθητὰς αὐτοῦ) before speaking. This description, in no uncertain terms, recalls the image of a Jewish rabbi or sage (Casey 2009:169–170; Valantasis 2005:54). Firstly, it was common for Jewish rabbis to be seated when instructing their followers (Davies & Allison 1988:424; Luz 2007:183; Nolland 2005:193). Secondly, the pupils of ancient wisdom teachers were distinctively referenced by the term ‘disciple’ (μαθητής) (Nolland 2005:191). The Matthean version is even more explicit in this regard, and expressly states that Jesus ‘sat down’ (καθίσαντος) before ‘teaching’ (ἐδίδασκεν) ‘his disciples’ (οἱ μαθηταὶ αὐτοῦ) (see Davies & Allison 1988:424–425). The verb ‘teach’ (διδάσκω) leaves no doubt that a traditional wisdom-teaching scenario is being imagined. The Lukan version should probably be followed in this case, but the allusion to a sage instructing his disciples remains clear nonetheless. Notably missing is the prophetic formula ‘thus says the Lord’ (τάδε λέγει ὁ κύριος), or in fact any reference to God whatsoever (Kirk 1998:51; Kloppenborg 2000:140).

Besides introducing Jesus as a sage in Q 6:20, the sapiential nature of the inaugural sermon is indicated by its overall structure (*pace* Luz 2007:174). It was customary for Jewish wisdom to introduce a sapiential argument or a collection of ethical maxims with one or more beatitudes (Van Aarde 1994:174; cf. Koester 1997:149–150; see Betz 1995:97–105). In the Jewish world, the beatitude is to be associated above all with wisdom, not only because it originated there, but also because examples of sapiential beatitudes are abundant (Betz 1995:94; Davies & Allison 1988:432; Luz 2007:187). The beatitude form was later adopted by apocalyptic literature, with the subordinate clause
typically pointing to the eschatological future. Due to the influence of apocalyptic literature, *sapiential* beatitudes of the Second Temple period could also substantiate their main clauses with eschatological subordinate clauses (Luz 2007:187). In Jewish tradition, the first known collected or serialised list of beatitudes occurs in sapiential literature (Bock 1994:572). As was common in wisdom literature of the time, the two passages appearing directly before and after the inaugural sermon function to identify and legitimise both the sage and his message (see Kirk 1998:388–390, 396–397).

Formally, the inaugural sermon corresponds best with the wisdom genre, not only because it features a great number of imperatives, motive clauses and traditional wisdom topics, but also because it employs cause-and-effect reasoning (see Edwards 1976:61, 84–93; Kloppenborg 1987a:187–188). Parallelism is also a feature of most sayings and clusters in the sermon. As we saw, parallelism was the most basic and fundamental building block of ancient Jewish wisdom (see Chapter 3, ‘Confessing Jesus in public’). In sum, the inaugural sermon as a whole should be regarded as wisdom. This finding does not rule out the possible presence of eschatological motifs and small forms in the sermon. Although some scholars question the sapiential nature of individual sayings in the inaugural sermon, most notably Q 6:20–23 and Q 6:47–49 (e.g. Allison 1997:5; Hoffmann 1995:188; Sato 1988:4; Tuckett 1996:160–161, 337), they all seem to acknowledge the obvious sapiential nature of the sermon as a whole (Horsley 1999a:88; e.g. Koester 1997:151–152). That Q 6:37–38 appears in the inaugural sermon is reason enough to classify it as wisdom. Even so, the micro genre of Q 6:37–38 deserves to be examined in its own right.

Regarding form, there are a number of good reasons for categorising Q 6:37–38 as a sapiential logion. The saying begins with a prohibition, and is immediately followed by a motive clause (Betz 1995:489; Ceresko 1999:35; Edwards 1976:89; Kloppenborg 1987a:180; Murphy 1981:6; Piper 1989:36–37; Winton 1990:28). The prohibition-plus-motive-clause construction is substantiated by the maxim in verse 38 (Betz 1995:490; Kirk 1998:91; Kloppenborg 2012:245, 251, 260; Luz 2007:352; Murphy 1981:4). Not only does the saying feature three traditional wisdom forms, namely a prohibition (or negative admonition), a motive clause and a maxim, but the last two small forms are also argumentative in nature. The motive clause provides a commonsensical reason for obeying the initial prohibition (Nolland 2005:318). The maxim in verse 38 functions to substantiate the validity of the claim that judgment of others leads to judgment by others, as the conjunction ‘for’ or ‘because’ (γὰρ) clearly shows (cf. Luz 2007:352; Piper 1989:61–62). Particularly telling is that verse 38 constitutes a traditional and widespread maxim of the time (Davies & Allison 1988:670; Luz 2007:352; Perdue 1986:10; Piper 1989:38; see Kloppenborg 2012:248–249; cf. Mk 4:24). In its capacity as a traditional maxim, verse 38 provides ‘gnomic authority to the opening admonition’ (Kirk 1998:168). As a whole, the logion in Q 6:37–38 is argumentative and rational in nature. Added to the sapiential small forms and argumentative nature of the logion is the parallelism pointed out earlier (see above, ‘Reconstructing the Q text’). These three
formal characteristics, if considered together, leave little doubt that the logion should be classified as wisdom. The use of a traditional maxim in verse 38 puts this genre classification entirely beyond doubt.

Can the same be said of the logion’s thematic content? After discussing the characteristic traits of wisdom literature, Crenshaw (2010:16) concludes: ‘It follows that wisdom is the reasoned search for specific ways to assure wellbeing and the implementation of those discoveries in daily existence.’ Q 6:37 is undoubtedly concerned with the well-being of its hearers, as is evident from the phrase ‘so that you are not judged’ (ἵνα μὴ κριθῆτε). It is also concerned with the implementation of the saying in daily existence, with the admonition ‘do not judge’ (μὴ κρίνετε) being an attempt at directing the behaviour of its recipients (cf. Piper 1989:44). Crenshaw (2010:16) goes on to say: ‘Wisdom addresses natural, human and theological dimensions of reality, and constitutes an attitude towards life, a living tradition, and a literary corpus.’ Q 6:37–38 undeniably addresses ‘human dimensions of reality’. Whether one is the subject or object of judgment, the act thereof forms an integral part of everyday life, whether ancient or modern. The saying also constitutes an ‘attitude towards life’, with its goal being to harness a general attitude that is devoid of judgmental thoughts and actions (Betz 1995:490; Luz 2007:351). Overall, the logion does seem to foster an intentionality that is comparable to wisdom literature in general. It does not automatically follow that we are here dealing with conventional wisdom. Such a conclusion can only be reached after comparing the specific content of Q 6:37–38 with other sapiential texts of the time. Funk and Hoover (1993:153–154, 297) claim that the principle of non-judgment was not really subversive, but rather representative of widespread Jewish and Christian wisdom (cf. Bock 1994:606). Conversely, Kloppenborg (2012:260) argues that the maxim in verse 38 does not simply support traditional morality, but rather ‘functions to underline the “payoff”, should one engage in the socially adventuresome behavior of imitating divine mercy or refusing to judge peers.’ I disagree that the maxim in verse 38 should be read positively as a form of ‘payoff’ (see further below in this section), but agree that the admonition in verse 37 is subversive in its wholesale discouragement of judgment. Whether subversive or not, the thematic content of Q 6:37 is thoroughly sapiential, dealing specifically with the traditional theme in Jewish wisdom of fraternal reprove and rebuke (Betz 1995:488).

It is something of an axiom that ancient wisdom is most commonly motivated and substantiated through an appeal to either nature or human conduct. Both the motive clause in Q 6:37b and the maxim in Q 6:38 are examples hereof. On a purely literal level, the relationship between the prohibition ‘do not judge’ and the motive clause ‘so that you are not judged’ is dictated by the ancient social value of ‘reciprocity’ (Kloppenborg 2001:178; cf. Fleddermann 2005:331). In the ancient world, reciprocity ensured the equal distribution of goods within the village (see Malina 1993:99–103; Oakman 2008:137–138). Goods were given to someone with the implicit expectation of an obligation is owed. Families and neighbours cultivated and maintained reciprocal ties and relations based
on mutual needs of nutrition and honour (Freyne 1988:154). As the last word in the previous sentence reveals, reciprocity also regulated the distribution of abstract values in ancient societies, like honour, mercy and love. If someone showed kindness to you, you were obliged to return the favour. You remained indebted to that person, unless and until you were able to show the same measure of kindness in return. Reciprocity also applied to negative values, such as hate and envy. In these cases, the social value of reciprocity entailed and encouraged retribution, dictated by the ancient principle of *jus talionis*, or the ‘law of retribution’ (cf. Kloppenborg 2012:246; cf. Lv 24:19). According to the principle of *jus talionis*, a person will receive the same measure of evil in return as she or he inflicts upon another person (Catchpole 1993:107; Fleddermann 2005:590; Piper 1989:38–39).

Q 6:37 is therefore an example of wisdom that is based on the experience and observation of everyday human behaviour (Betz 1995:490, 491). The content of verse 37 would have made perfect sense as a reference to the reciprocal principle of *jus talionis*, without a need for additional explanation (Edwards 1976:89; Piper 1989:39). If you judge others, they will judge you; this is how society works (Betz 1995:490; Valantasis 2005:67). Ultimately, Q 6:37 describes a social pattern observed by sages in the cause-and-effect schema of daily life (Kloppenborg 1987a:180 fn. 45; Piper 1989:38). Kloppenborg (2012:251) argues that Q 6:37–38 is unlikely to appeal to the *jus talionis* principle, since the preceding admonitions promote positive practices (e.g. Q 6:27, 29, 30, 31, 36). Yet, the logion’s purpose in appealing to the principle of *jus talionis* is to discourage the negative action of moral judgment, thereby breaking the retributive pattern presupposed and practiced by society at large (Betz 1995:490). In other words, it is precisely because the negative principle of *jus talionis* is presupposed by Q 6:37–38 that this logion is able to promote a *positive* ethos by discouraging negative conduct. If the maxim in verse 38 functions to buttress the statement in verse 37, the transparently negative view of judgment in the latter applies also to the application of the ‘measure for measure’ analogy in the former. Since the word ‘judge’ is clearly coloured in a negative light in Q 6:37, it is safe to assume that the same is intended for the word ‘measure’ in Q 6:38.

Q 6:38 similarly substantiates the claim in Q 6:37 with an image from everyday human conduct (Piper 1989:38). The image evoked by the maxim is possibly that of the ancient marketplace, where common household goods and everyday staple foods were measured out to determine their cost (Duling 1995:170–171; cf. Kloppenborg 2012:258–259). That the Q people were familiar with the marketplace is evidenced by Q 7:32 and Q 11:43. In antiquity, the social value of reciprocity underlay just about every economic and social exchange between people, even in the marketplace and on the grain farm. Ideally, people would exchange goods for other goods or for money of the same or similar value. During transactions, reciprocity and fairness was enforced by measuring goods with scales, balances and weights. Thus, the measure (or value) of goods, produce or money given during
a reciprocal transaction should equal the measure (or value) of goods, produce or money received in return.

A more specific context for the maxim could have been the loaning of grain and other produce (Nolland 2005:318–319). That the Q people were familiar with crop farming is evidenced by texts like Q 3:17; Q 10:2 and Q 12:24. In an effort to achieve fairness, grain contracts of the time frequently specified that grain be measured with the same measuring instrument for both the loan and its subsequent repayment in kind (see Kloppenborg 2012:249–250, 253–258). In principle, the same practice was expected of all ancient transactions: As a rule of thumb, people were expected to use the same measuring instruments across the board for all transactions, especially if the same individuals were involved in more than one transaction with each other (Betz 1995:491).

Whether it presupposes the marketplace, grain contracts or economic transactions in general, the saying in Q 6:38 is a truism, observable everywhere and all the time (Luz 2007:352; cf. Kloppenborg 2012:263). Maxims like this one tended to be based on experience and observation (Kirk 1998:91; Murphy 1981:4). The maxim in verse 38 validates the deductive logic of verse 37 by relating the abstract theme of moral judgment to the concrete model of reciprocal exchange in economic transactions (Betz 1995:491; Duling 1995:170–171; cf. Kloppenborg 2012:263). Thus, an abstract argument is substantiated by concrete evidence.

Cumulatively, a very strong case has been made for viewing Q 6:37–38 as a sapiential logion. Firstly, the saying appears in the inaugural sermon, which is deliberately introduced as wisdom. Secondly, each of the formal characteristics undeniably indicates that the logion should be classified as wisdom. Thirdly, the thematic content, taken literally, corresponds to the conventions and motifs of ancient wisdom in general. This finding does not exclude or negate the possibility that Q 6:37–38 presupposes eschatology in some way (see the rest of this section and Chapter). What the finding does indicate is that Q 6:37–38 must be interpreted at face value as common wisdom before any attempt is made to discover references or allusions to eschatology therein.

Turning now to its specific sapiential micro genre, Q 6:37–38 is either an instruction or a chreia. In order for a sapiential saying (or action) to qualify as a chreia, it needs to adhere to the following criteria (cf. Alexander 2006:24; Hedrick 2014:3 fn. 12; Hock & O’Neil 1986:26; Robbins 1996:61): (1) the saying should be expressed concisely; (2) the saying should be introduced by a short story or anecdote; (3) the main character of the anecdote should be overtly mentioned, and be a particular personage; (4) the function of the anecdote should be to contextualise the particular saying; (5) there should be a causal and thematic link between the anecdote and the saying; and (6) the function of the anecdote should be to provide a clearer understanding of the saying. Regarding the
last criterion, the interpreter should ask herself: ‘If the anecdote is removed, does the saying (or action) lose some of its meaning or impact?’ If the answer is ‘no’, then the logion in question is probably not a chreia.

The inaugural sermon is indeed introduced by a very short story in Q 6:20a: ‘And raising his eyes to his disciples, he said.’ It is not clear, however, that this introduction qualifies as an ‘anecdote’. Nothing particularly memorable or out of the ordinary happens. One could argue that Q 6:20a adheres to the third criterion. Even though his name does not overtly appear, the personal pronoun ‘his’ (αὐτοῦ), which appears twice in Q 6:20a, undoubtedly refers to Jesus. It has to be said, though, that the absence of his name in the text is at least suspect. Although each of the logia in the inaugural sermon is ‘expressed concisely’, Q 6:20a introduces the sermon as a whole, which is not concise at all. One could perhaps argue that Q 6:20a in some sense contextualises that which follows. The function of the sermon’s introduction, however, is not primarily to contextualise the sayings that follow, but rather to introduce Jesus as a wisdom teacher at the beginning of his public career in Q. What is perhaps most telling is that none of the individual sayings in the inaugural sermon would become any less comprehensible if you were to remove the introduction in Q 6:20a. Neither would they sacrifice their rhetorical impact in any way. Although there might have been a causal link between the introduction and the sermon itself in the sense that the sermon followed directly after Jesus raised his eyes, there is absolutely no thematic link between the introduction and the content of the sermon. It follows that neither the inaugural sermon nor any constituent part thereof should be classified under the heading ‘chreia’.

Does it follow from this finding that Q 6:37–38 qualifies by default as an instruction? I believe so. Admonitions, and imperatives as their form-critical indicators, abound in the inaugural sermon. Although not determinative, such a compounding of admonitions is most prominent in instruction collections (Kloppenborg 1987a:264, 317). Furthermore, attributing a saying to a particular sage is not only a trait of chreia collections, but also a distinctive feature of instruction collections (Kloppenborg 1987a:265, 277, 317). Regarding Q 6:37–38 in particular, the formal criteria identified earlier are trademark features, not only of wisdom material in general, but also of instruction collections specifically (see Kirk 1998:167–168). Moreover, the thematic content and intention of Q 6:37–38 cohere with the content and intention of most instruction collections. Lastly, utilising a traditional maxim is more characteristic of instructions than chreiai. Defining Q 6:37–38 as an instruction does not in any way delimit its sapiential application. Kirk (1998) makes the following general comment about Q 6:37–38 specifically:

The opening admonition is a wisdom admonition (prohibition) with motive clauses. Standing programmatically at the beginning, it remains, like most maxims, open-ended, general, and hence in need of specification and application. (p. 168)
This comment is comparable to the following observations by Piper (1989), also referring to Q 6:37–38 specifically:

Once again one finds at the outset [of a collected cluster of sayings] a remarkably simple and very general and unqualified exhortation [referring to καὶ μὴ κρίνετε]. No particular subject, object or situation is specified. … The initial support for the prohibition raises the idea of retribution. … No direct appeal to the Law or word of God or coming judgement of God strengthens or validates this statement of retribution. This absence of elaboration heightens the impression that this principle could apply to many aspects of human experience (cf. Sir 7:1–2; 28:1). This impression will be strengthened by appeal later to the commercial metaphor of ‘measures’. (p. 37)

In Table 1 and Table 2 is a diagrammed summary of our present results.

**TABLE 1: Q 6:37 as an instruction.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Logion</th>
<th>Καὶ μὴ κρίνετε</th>
<th>ἵνα μὴ κριθῆτε</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small form</td>
<td>Prohibition</td>
<td>Motive clause</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Moral judgment</td>
<td>Moral judgment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject</td>
<td>The audience of Q’s Jesus</td>
<td>Other people in general</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Object</td>
<td>Other people in general</td>
<td>The audience of Q’s Jesus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Function</td>
<td>To influence moral behaviour</td>
<td>Supports the prohibition</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 2: Q 6:38 as a supportive maxim.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Logion</th>
<th>ὧ γὰρ μέτρῳ μετρεῖτε</th>
<th>μετρηθήσεται ὑμῖν.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small form</td>
<td>Maxim</td>
<td>Maxim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literal subject</td>
<td>Person A (‘you’)</td>
<td>Person B (‘someone else’)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literal direct object</td>
<td>Everyday goods</td>
<td>Everyday goods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literal indirect object</td>
<td>Person B (‘someone else’)</td>
<td>Person A (‘you’)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implied subject</td>
<td>The audience of Q’s Jesus</td>
<td>Other people in general</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implied direct object</td>
<td>Moral judgment</td>
<td>Moral judgment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implied indirect object</td>
<td>Other people in general</td>
<td>The audience of Q’s Jesus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Function</td>
<td>Supports the previous logion</td>
<td>Supports the previous logion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Rhetorically, Q 6:37 acts as an enthymeme. Robbins (1998:191) defines an enthymeme as ‘an assertion that is expressed as a syllogism.’ The Merriam-Webster dictionary (n.d.) defines a ‘syllogism’ as ‘a formal argument in logic that is formed by two statements and a conclusion which must be true if the two statements are true.’ The same dictionary provides the following example: ‘All men are human; all humans are mortal; therefore all men are mortal.’ The two statements are usually distinguished as the ‘major premise’ and the ‘minor premise’ respectively. The conclusion of a syllogism is better known as the ‘rationale’. An enthymeme is a syllogistic argument, used in ancient informal debates and reasoning, that builds on a premise that is not necessarily or generally true, but is assumed to be true in all circumstances. Although it is characteristic of an enthymeme to leave one of its premises unexpressed, trusting the audience to infer it (Robbins 1998:191–192), some enthymemes do articulate all three steps in the argument.
(Mack 1990:39; Robbins 1996:59). Moreover, although one of the notable features of an enthymeme is the presence of a rationale, usually introduced by causal conjunctions like ‘so that’ (ἵνα), ‘for’ (ὥστε) or ‘because’ (γὰρ) (Robbins 1998:191), the absence of a rationale ‘may not mean that an enthymeme was not intended’ (Vinson 1991:119). In other words, although the presence of a rationale and the suppression of a premise are trademark characteristics of an enthymeme, these characteristics are not absolutely determinative when trying to decide whether a saying is an enthymeme or not. The saying in Q 6:37 is expressed syllogistically. The unexpressed major premise is that judgment of others leads to judgment by others (cf. Nolland 2005:318). If this saying is unpacked in terms of logical and deductive thinking, the argument looks something like this:

(a) Judgment of others leads to judgment by others;
(b) do not judge other people,
(c) so that you are not judged by them.

There is no inherent or apparent logic in the assumption that judgment of others leads to judgment by others. It is only if (a) above is known and taken for granted that (c) is the logical result of (b). Matthew was probably concerned that his audience would not be able to infer the major premise, and added it to the Q text (Fleddermann 2005:294–295; Henderson 1996:258). The genuine probability that we are dealing with an enthymeme is supported by the following characteristics of Q 6:37: (1) it is syllogistic in nature; (2) it contains a rationale that is introduced by ‘so that’ (ἵνα); and (3) the major premise is left unexpressed. A maxim is added to the enthymeme to clarify and support the unexpressed major premise.


In [Q 6:37–38], a remarkable ambiguity is maintained, in which it is possible to view these opening sayings as referring either to cause and effect in ordinary life or to End-time events. (p. 77; cf. Allison 2010:136 fn. 469)

If the passive verbs in Q 6:37–38 are indeed divine passives, each respective verse could qualify as a prophetic correlative. As we saw, Edwards (1969:9–20) and Schmidt (1977:517–522) discovered this prophetic-eschatological micro genre in the New Testament (see Chapter 2, ‘Futurist eschatology in Q’).219 This proposed micro genre

is typically made up of two parts containing the same verb. In the first part, the verb is usually in the active voice, and refers to human activity. In the second part, the verb is usually in the passive voice, referring to the eschatological judgment of God. Q 6:37–38 has all these formal features in common with Edwards and Schmidt’s prophetic-eschatological small form. Apocalyptic literature of the Second Temple period took over many retribution logia of traditional wisdom (see above in this section), but typically adapted their second legs to read more like prophetic correlatives (Fleddermann 2005:590). This was part of a wider process whereby sapiential admonitions were incorporated into apocalyptic and prophetic material by adding eschatological motive clauses (see Sato 1988:202–225).

Even if the passive verbs in Q 6:37–38 qualify as divine passives, there are a number of reasons for doubting that either verse 37 or verse 38 qualifies as a prophetic correlative in the Sayings Gospel Q (cf. Betz 1995:490). Firstly, a saying cannot belong to two separate micro genres. Since the evidence is overwhelmingly in favour of viewing verse 37 as a sapiential admonition (plus motive clause) and verse 38 as a sapiential maxim, one has to disregard any possibility that Q 6:37–38 qualifies as an eschatological or prophetic small form. Secondly, the verb ‘be judged’ (κριθῆτε) does not appear in the future tense. Although the aorist subjunctive does not exclude future time, one would particularly expect a prophetic correlative to feature its main verb in the future tense. Even though the verb ‘will be measured’ (μετρηθῆσεται) in verse 38 is in the future tense, it needs the preceding logion for contextual interpretation. Thirdly, the subjunctive mood of the verb ‘be judged’ (κριθῆτε) is by itself suspect, since it foresees the possibility of future judgment, as opposed to the certainty thereof usually associated with eschatological and apocalyptic logia, especially the correlative. Reckoning only with the possibility of future judgment fits a sapiential cause-and-effect scenario very well, since the effects of individual human actions are not always predictable. Conversely, eschatological and apocalyptic traditions deal in subjective certainties about the future, at least on a literary level.

Although the divine passive is commonly associated with apocalyptic and prophetic material, it is not exclusive to those writings, appearing in wisdom literature as well.220 According to sapiential logic, people are responsible for their own fate, because of the choices they make. Despite such responsibility, God is in complete control of the whole system. He manages and determines both the daily and the ultimate fate of each person on earth. In sapiential writings, the divine passive expresses this role of God in the daily lives of people. Thus, divine passives do not automatically signal the presence of prophecy or eschatology. In Q 6:37–38, the potential use of divine passives is entirely explicable in light of the sapiential worldview just described (cf. Bock 1994:608). Nevertheless, if κριθῆτε and μετρηθῆσεται are indeed divine passives, it would affect the interpretation of Q 6:37–38. Accordingly, the implied subject of

220. For example, Job 4:20; 14:5; Proverbs 11:31; 19:23; Ecclesiastes 6:10; Q 11:2, 9; 12:2, 10, 31; [14:11].

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these verbs would no longer be ‘other people in general’, but God. In other words, if you judge other people, God will judge you. Or rather, the same standard by which you judge others, God will judge you (Bock 1994:608). The reference could be either to non-eschatological post-mortem judgment, or to non-eschatological judgment as part of the cause-and-effect schema of daily life within the confines of this world. Hence, your judgment of others has an impact on your fate either in this world or in the afterlife, as determined by God. A person’s judgment of others is the cause, and God’s judgment of that person is the result. If this interpretation is accepted, the foregoing tables would change as seen in Table 3 and Table 4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Logion</th>
<th>Ἰνὰ μὴ κριθῆτε</th>
<th>Ἰνὰ μὴ κριθῆτε</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small form</td>
<td>Prohibition</td>
<td>Motive clause</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Moral judgment</td>
<td>Divine judgment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject</td>
<td>The audience of Q’s Jesus</td>
<td>God</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Object</td>
<td>Other people in general</td>
<td>The audience of Q’s Jesus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Function</td>
<td>To influence moral behaviour</td>
<td>Supports the prohibition</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Logion</th>
<th>ὑπὸ γὰρ μέτρῳ μετρεῖτε</th>
<th>μετρηθῆσαι ὑμῖν.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small form</td>
<td>Maxim</td>
<td>Maxim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literal subject</td>
<td>Person A (‘you’)</td>
<td>Person B (‘someone else’)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literal direct object</td>
<td>Everyday goods</td>
<td>Everyday goods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literal indirect object</td>
<td>Person B (‘someone else’)</td>
<td>Person A (‘you’)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implied subject</td>
<td>The audience of Q’s Jesus</td>
<td>God</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implied direct object</td>
<td>Moral judgment</td>
<td>Divine judgment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implied indirect object</td>
<td>Other people in general</td>
<td>The audience of Q’s Jesus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Function</td>
<td>Supports the previous logion</td>
<td>Supports the previous logion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Both levels of meaning could have been intended simultaneously, so that the implied subject of κριθῆτε is at the same time both God and other people. For ancient Jews, the concurrent reference to both subjects would not have caused a contradiction. For them, an act of being wronged in any way by someone else happened because it was part of God’s will. God’s this-worldly judgment of someone was at times indirectly accomplished through other people. Put differently, other people’s direct judgment of someone was the result of God’s indirect judgment of the person in question. It was believed that God controlled the daily circumstances and fate of each individual by controlling the reciprocal system itself. Thereby, God ensured that a person got what she gave, whether it be positive or negative. Hence, if you are being judged by someone, it is probably because God is punishing you for judging others. Ultimately, God lies behind each and every corporeal event, pulling the strings and keeping the balance. Such a dual understanding can be summarised as seen in Table 5 and Table 6.
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Despite God’s perceived culpability in everything that happens on earth, there are reasons to doubt that Q 6:37–38 intends κριθῆτε and μετρηθῆσεται exclusively, primarily or whatsoever as divine passives, even if the author otherwise underwrites the concept of ultimate divine control. Firstly, as a comparison between the Tables above reveals, the simplistic beauty of the intended parallelism is damaged if the two verbs are understood as divine passives: (1) instead of both legs in verse 37 pertaining to moral judgment, the second leg becomes about either divine judgment or a combination of moral and divine judgment; (2) instead of the object in the admonition (‘other people in general’) being replicated as the subject in the motive clause, the motive clause features as subject either ‘God’ or the overly complicated blend of ‘God and other people in general’; (3) instead of both legs in verse 38 featuring ‘moral judgment’ as the implied direct object, the second leg features either ‘divine judgment’ or a mixture of ‘divine and moral judgment’; and (4) instead of the implied indirect object in the maxim’s first leg (‘other people in general’) being reproduced as the implied subject in the second leg, the latter has either ‘God’ or a combination of ‘God and other people in general’. In a nutshell, understanding the verbs κριθῆτε and μετρηθῆσεται as divine passives unnecessarily complicates the simple structure and intent of the antithetic parallelism in Q 6:37–38. Secondly, as a keen eye would undoubtedly have noticed when comparing the tables above, interpreting the verbs in question as divine passives renders the maxim’s literal meaning incongruent with its implied metaphorical meaning: (1) whereas the maxim’s literal meaning refers throughout to reciprocal dealings between equals, its implied metaphorical meaning refers to dealings between people and God in the second leg; and (2) whereas the literal direct object (‘everyday goods’) remains the same in the maxim’s literal meaning, it changes in the maxim’s metaphorical meaning from ‘moral judgment’ to either ‘divine
'Do not judge!' (μὴ κρίνετε) in Q 6:37–38

judgment’ or a combination of ‘moral and divine judgment’. Interpreting the verbs in question as divine passives also renders the maxim’s literal meaning incongruent with the preceding logion: (1) whereas the maxim’s literal meaning refers throughout to reciprocal dealings between equals, the motive clause in the preceding logion refers to dealings between people and God; and (2) whereas the literal direct object (‘everyday goods’) remains the same in the maxim’s literal meaning, it changes in the preceding logion from ‘moral judgment’ to either ‘divine judgment’ or a combination of ‘moral and divine judgment’. Hence, viewing the verbs κριθῆτε and μετρηθῆσεται as divine passives seems to harm the logic of the argument. Reciprocal dealings in the ancient economy becomes an incoherent and imperfect metaphor for the message of Q 6:37–38. These observations are not intended to completely eradicate the possibility that divine passives are intended by the verbs in question, but rather to warn the interpreter to proceed with caution. If the verbs are to some extent intended as divine passives, this meaning is secondarily connotated, not primarily denoted. Additional evidence will have to be considered before ruling on this matter.

The literary context

Wisdom in the inaugural sermon

Apart from the introduction in Q 6:20a, the logion in Q 6:37–38 has so far been considered on its own, disregarding its literary context. The syntagmatic literary context of Q 6:37–38 is the inaugural sermon (Q 6:20–49). Given the positioning of this logion by both Matthew and Luke in their respective Sermons on the Mount and Plain, it should not be doubted that Q 6:37–38 originally stood in Q’s inaugural sermon. Matthew and Luke do differ about the exact placement of this logion in the sermon. Overwhelmingly, scholars accept the Lukan placement of Q 6:37–38 as most probable (see Youngquist et al. 2011:3–21). Although scholars disagree about the diachronic prehistory of the inaugural sermon, they are in relative agreement that, as it stands, Q 6:20–49 represents a synchronic, compositional unity (Kirk 1998:390; see Fleddermann 2005:314–322). The text should be subdivided into four blocks: (1) the beatitudes in Q 6:20–23; (2) the command to love one’s enemies and supportive argumentation in Q 6:27–35; (3) the commands to be merciful and not to judge with supporting arguments in Q 6:36–42; and (4) the extended rhetoric to hear and obey Jesus’ teachings in Q 6:43–49.221

After identifying the sermon itself as the wisdom of Q’s Jesus with the introduction in Q 6:20a, the content commences with four beatitudes in Q 6:20b–23. The beatitudes

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mirror one another, with each featuring a main clause\(^\text{222}\) that starts with the adjective 'blessed' (\(μακάριοι\)) and a causal clause\(^\text{223}\) that starts with the conjunction 'because' (\(ὅτι\)) (Fleddermann 2005:323; cf. Piper 2000:251; see Betz 1995:110-111).\(^\text{224}\) Each causal clause is an attempt at providing supportive proof for each preceding main clause. The first three beatitudes are grammatically and syntactically closer to one another (Betz 1995:147; Davies & Allison 1988:461, 463; Marshall 1978:251).\(^\text{225}\) Unlike the fourth beatitude, they are extremely compressed, in each case featuring only one word after \(μακάριοι\) and a very short explanation after \(ὅτι\). Regarding the latter, the two beatitudes in verse 21 only feature a single word after \(ὅτι\), both times in the future indicative passive second person plural (Fleddermann 2005:323). In each of the first three beatitudes, \(μακάριοι\) is followed by a substantive appearing in the nominative or vocative masculine plural. The main clause of each beatitude should be regarded as the heart of Jesus’ sapiential message.

The beatitudes’ concern for the poor, hungry, mournful and persecuted is certainly reminiscent of prophetic disquiet, but these are also traditional themes in Jewish wisdom (Betz 1995:94, 114, 149, 150). Given the sermon’s sapiential introduction and undeniable sapiential content, the beatitudes should be taken as wisdom with a strong prophetic slant, as opposed to prophecy with a strong sapiential slant (Piper 2000:242-243). This determination remains valid despite the beatitudes’ intertextual affinities with Isaiah 61 (see Chapter 2, ‘Characteristic forms’; ‘Characteristic motifs’; ‘Futurist eschatology in Q’). The sapiential claim that the poor, hungry, mournful and persecuted are blessed in the present moment was fairly radical and subversive for the time – and still is today (Betz 1995:112-113; Piper 2000:243; Valantasis 2005:53, 55; cf. Luz 2007:188; see Kloppenborg 1987a:188-189). They are blessed because they can partake in God’s kingdom, which includes more than enough food and solace, not to mention heavenly rewards. Betz (1995:114) distinguishes between poor persons and the condition of poverty, arguing that the first beatitude relates to the former and not the latter. This distinction is somewhat artificial, and needlessly diminishes the subversive nature and sting naturally inherent in the logion.

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222.(1) ‘blessed are you poor’ (\(μακάριοι οἱ πτωχοί\)); (2) ‘blessed are you who hunger’ (\(μακάριοι οἱ πεινῶντες\)); (3) ‘blessed are you who mourn’ (\(μακάριοι οἱ πενθοῦντες\)); (4) ‘blessed are you when they insult and persecute you, and say every kind of evil against you because of the Son of Man.’ (\(μακάριοί ἐστε ὅταν ὀνειδίσωσιν ὑμᾶς καὶ διώξωσιν καὶ εἴπωσιν πᾶν πονηρὸν καθ ὑμῶν ἕνεκεν τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου\) ‘be glad and exalt’ (\(χαίρετε καὶ ἀγαλλιᾶσθε\)).

223.(1) ‘because the kingdom of God is for you’ (\(ὅτι ὑμετέρα ἐστὶν ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ\)); (2) ‘because you will be fed’ (\(ὅτι χορτασθήσεσθε\)); (3) ‘because you will be consoled’ (\(ὅτι παρακληθήσεσθε\)); (4) ‘because your reward in heaven is vast; for this is how they persecuted the prophets who were before you’ (\(ὅτι ὁ μισθὸς ὑμῶν πολὺς ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ· οὕτως γὰρ ἐδίωξαν τοὺς προφήτας τοὺς πρὸ ὑμῶν\)).

224. The unorthodox and subversive content of the inaugural sermon is not evidence that there is a prophetic ‘undertone’ or ‘foundation’ beneath this wisdom teaching (pace Edwards 1976:87). Neither does the radical nature of the sermon even begin providing proof that imminent eschatology lies beneath this extended piece of wisdom (pace Edwards 1976:86).

225. With most scholars (e.g. Horsley 2012:113; Jacobson 1992:36; Luz 2007:187; Piper 2000:242), Robinson (1992:369) deduces from such ‘divergent formulation’ that the fourth beatitude was added secondarily to the first three. For the minority view that the fourth beatitude always belonged with the first three, see Marshall (1978:247, 251-252), Bock (1994:577-578) and Fleddermann (2005:325–326).
It was argued earlier that the beatitudes in Q 6:20–23 should be read in light of the passages in Q 11:2–3, 9–13 and Q 12:22–31, indicating that the former does not entail any reference or allusion whatsoever to futurist eschatology (see Chapter 2, ‘Futurist eschatology in Q’). The same texts also indicate that God is the mastermind behind the actions of each causal clause in the beatitudes. In other words, God is ultimately responsible for granting his kingdom to the poor, for feeding and consoling the hungry and mournful, and for rewarding the persecuted. In Q 6:21, the author employs the verbs ‘will be fed’ (χορτασθήσεσθε) and ‘will be consoled’ (παρακληθήσεσθε) as divine passives to communicate the idea of God’s agency (Betz 1995:124; Davies & Allison 1988:448, 453; Marshall 1978:250). Yet, one should not deduce from these divine passives that the hungry and mournful had no part in their own sustenance and joy. God’s involvement does not rule out human involvement.

Possibly to undermine their sapiential nature, Luz (2007:189) argues that the first three beatitudes depend so much on divine providence that they are not in any way related to human behaviour. In the larger context of Q, however, readers and hearers are encouraged to participate in their own physical and emotional well-being by not only speaking to God directly (Q 11:2–4), and trusting in his care (Q 11:11–13; 12:22–31), but by also seeking out hospitality from others (Q 10:8; 11:9–10). It would seem that in God’s kingdom, as Q understands it, physical and emotional happiness are attributable to the conduct of both God and man. Luz argues further that the claims made by the divine passives contradict the daily experiences of their addressees, who were not adequately nourished and consoled in their daily lives. Yet, his own interpretation of these beatitudes in terms of a realised eschatology contradicts his claim that the addressees were not fed and comforted in the present through their participation in God’s kingdom. The remainder of Q makes clear that the kingdom of God is about receiving nourishment and healing in the present moment of daily life (cf. Q 10:8–9; 11:2–3, 9–13, 20; 12:20–31). The beatitudes of the inaugural sermon are thoroughly sapiential. Far from excluding a sapiential interpretation, the divine passives actually support it. To the extent that the kingdom of God will continue unabated after the expected end, the promises of nourishment and consolation will remain valid (cf. Q 13:28–29; see Chapter 2, ‘Futurist eschatology in Q’; ‘Realised eschatology in Q’). It needs to be noted that Luz’s case relates to the beatitudes as they were used by the historical Jesus, not the Sayings Gospel Q. Nevertheless, it seems highly doubtful that his interpretation would be much different for Q, since Luz (2007:186) admits that ‘[t]he first three beatitudes – those transmitted in Q (Luke 6:20b, 21) – may go back to [the historical] Jesus in approximately their Lukan form.’ Conversely, my case against Luz applies equally to the level of the historical Jesus, seeing as the comparative Q texts featured above are for the most part considered authentic.

The beatitudes’ themes of persecution and blessedness provide the foundation for the admonition in Q 6:27 to love one’s enemies (Catchpole 1993:16; Davies & Allison 1988:460–461; Fleddermann 2005:325, 326; Horsley 1991:203; Kloppenborg
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The last beatitude claims that the persecuted are blessed, because their heavenly reward is great. This declaration naturally leads in the two admonitions in Q 6:27–28 to love one’s enemies and pray for one’s persecutors (Allison 1997:80). If the persecuted are blessed in the present moment (Valantasis 2005:55), then they are in an excellent position to love their enemies and pray for their persecutors (Catchpole 1993:112). The unorthodox command to love one’s enemies is the programmatic admonition that determines everything to follow in the inaugural sermon (Kirk 1998:159; Kloppenborg 1987a:177, 179; Robinson 2001a:41).

Q 6:29–30 provides admonitory examples of how one could love an enemy in practice (Piper 1989:111; cf. Fleddermann 2005:329; see Kirk 1998:159–160). Three arguments support the admonition in Q 6:27. The first argument is that obedience to the love-of-enemies command will transform adherents into sons of God. But how does loving one’s enemy translate into divine sonship? The first argument needs substantiation, which is subsequently provided by the claim that the heavenly Father brings good and bad weather to the righteous and the sinful alike (see Kirk 1998:161–162). This claim is subversive in its own right. Traditional sapiential logic held that God would reward the righteous and punish sinners (see Catchpole 1993:105; Howes 2014d:1–11). Verse 35 argues the opposite theology; one in which God rewards and punishes everyone all the same, regardless of their individual virtues or vices. The argument used in support of the admonition to love one’s enemies is an imitation Dei argument, but one that relies on an alternative and unprecedented image of God (Fleddermann 2005:330; Kloppenborg 1987a:176; Robinson 2001a:40; 2003:38). In other words, the argument is that adherents of the admonition to love one’s enemies will resultantly ‘become’ (γένησθε) sons of God, mainly because, in doing so, they are imitating God, who apparently loves everyone the same (Catchpole 1993:26). Thus, imitating God by showing love to one’s enemies translates for the author into sonship of the most high (cf. Ps 146:9; Sir 4:10).

The second argument is simply an appeal to the conventional logic and authority of the golden rule (Catchpole 1993:115; see Kirk 1998:163–165). Besides its function to substantiate the initial admonition, Q 6:31 describes the love to be shown to enemies as an action, not just an attitude (Catchpole 1993:28; Piper 1989:83; cf. Pokorný 2011:358). The examples of verses 29–30 support this interpretation. Some scholars have taken the golden rule to contradict the general intent of the rest of the inaugural sermon (e.g. Furnish 1973:57; Valantasis 2005:61–63; see Kirk 1998:153–158). Specifically, the inaugural sermon promotes unselfish exchanges between people, without expectations of return, and ‘going the extra mile’ for others, while the golden rule, according to them, promotes normal reciprocal exchanges. At face value, the golden rule might seem to advocate a general quid pro quo type of attitude (Piper 1989:80). However, the saying does not address the aspect of return in reciprocal dealings, but general behaviour in all types of dealings (cf. Piper 1989:80). The golden rule does not advocate treating people like they treat you, but rather treating people like you
would want them to treat you. Who would not like to receive more than what was given out in the first place? If most people would prefer receiving more than what was given, then the golden rule advocates giving more than what was received. As such, the saying endorses and summarises everything that has gone before in Q 6:27–28, 35, 29–30 (Crossan 1983:51–52). By not identifying the acting subject, the recipient or the specific action, this traditional saying renders itself relevant to many literary contexts, which is probably why it circulated widely and independently (cf. Kloppenborg 1987:176; Valantasis 2005:61; see Crossan 1983:50–51). In this context, it substantiates and advocates selfless and generous exchanges between people. As such, the golden rule fits well in the sermon.

The third argument appeals to the ancient obsession with holiness, and is formulated by means of a series of rhetorical questions (Kloppenborg 1987a:176; see Kirk 1998:161). That Q 6:32, 34 should be read in conjunction with the opening admonition in Q 6:27 is formally indicated by the repetition of the word ‘love’ (ἀγαπάω), and thematically indicated by the repetition of the idea that one must love more than just friends and family (Allison 1997:83; Fleddermann 2005:330; Valantasis 2005:63). Ancient Jews separated themselves from Gentiles, and believed that they were morally superior to other nations; literally, ‘holier-than-thou’ (see Howes 2014d:1–11). In Q 6:32, 34, Jesus argues that Jews are not really morally superior to Gentiles if they love only those who would love them in return, since the Gentiles do exactly the same (cf. Valantasis 2005:65). In other words, Q’s Jesus argues that the Jews should love their enemies, so that they can separate themselves from the Gentiles, and truly be holy (Catchpole 1993:102; cf. Fleddermann 2005:330). Jesus implies that this is the only way in which Jews would in reality be able to illustrate their moral superiority to other nations. These rhetorical questions overtly describe ‘love of enemies’ as something that must be ‘done’ (ποιέω), thereby underwriting the view of Q 6:29–30, 31 that the love command is an action (Fleddermann 2005:330; Piper 1989:84; cf. Pokorný 2011:358). Significantly, the love-of-enemies command and its supporting arguments all deal with human interaction, not human-divine interaction. God features not as the enactor of punishment or reward for certain behaviour, but as a divine mimetic ideal to be replicated on earth through the everyday dealings between people.

The admonition to be merciful and the command not to judge should be seen as a further development of the theme to love one’s enemies (Catchpole 1993:124, 128; Kloppenborg 1987a:181; cf. Allison 2001c:412; Fleddermann 2005:331). There are no less than six reasons for reading Q 6:36–38 in light of the admonition to love one’s enemies: (1) the admonition to show mercy is rhetorically similar to the admonition to love one’s enemies: both use imitatio Dei arguments (Q 6:35c–d & Q 6:36b) to support their respective admonitions; (2) the prohibition against judging others is similar in form to the admonition to love one’s enemies: both feature an admonition (Q 6:27–28

226. See further below in this section my reasons for joining verse 36 with verses 37–38.
& Q 6:37a), a motive clause (Q 6:35c & Q 6:37b), and a rationale (Q 6:35d & Q 6:38); (3) Q 6:27 and Q 6:36–38 are thematically similar: both are concerned with promoting a type of morality where the well-being of the other party is primary; (4) there is a causal relationship between Q 6:27, on the one hand, and the two respective logia in Q 6:36 and Q 6:37–38, on the other: If you love indiscriminately, you will not only show mercy to everyone, but you will also refrain from judging others; and conversely, if you treat people with mercy and without judgment, your heart will probably open up to them; (5) whereas Q 6:29–30 provides concrete examples of how one could love one’s enemies in practice, Q 6:36–38 provides more abstract examples of how to do the same thing; and (6) there is an intertextual relationship between Q 6:27 and Q 6:36–38: The idea that one’s enemies deserve to be judged and punished, which is exactly what the combined reading of Q 6:27 and Q 6:37 prohibits, was widespread and commonplace in the ancient world (see Howes 2004).227

Reading Q 6:36–38 in light of the love command illuminates these passages. It is rather obvious that one would show mercy to a family member or loved one, but this admonition has in mind those people who are nasty, malicious, spiteful and cruel. The same goes for the prohibition against judgment. Showing mercy and refraining from judgment are held up as two of the ways in which the love command of verse 27 can and must be enacted.

The comparative clause in Q 6:36b refers back to the indiscriminate kindness of God in Q 6:35, which acts as its foundation (Allison 1997:83; Piper 1989:83, 86). That verse 36 intentionally refers back to verse 35 is indicated not only by the repetition of the phrase ‘your Father’ (ὁ πατὴρ ὑμῶν) in both, but also by the presence of an imitatio Dei argument in both (Catchpole 1993:119, 120, 124; Fleddermann 2005:330; Kirk 1998:162; cf. Kloppenborg 2012:260; Robinson 2001a:39; 2003:38).228 Q 6:35 describes God’s mercy, not in terms of eschatology, but as an attribute that determines the dealings of God in the daily lives of people (Piper 1989:84). Thus, if verse 36b is read in conjunction with verse 35, as it should be, the admonition to be merciful is substantiated by a non-eschatological argument (pace Catchpole 1993:124). This argument can be paraphrased as follows: The fact that God indiscriminately shows mercy in the daily lives of all people obliges the audience of Q to do the same. A non-eschatological reading of Q 6:36b is substantiated by the present tense of the verb ‘is’ (ἐστίν). If the comparative clause in verse 36b intended an eschatological rendering, one would have expected this verb to be in the future tense. Verse 36b probably also refers back to the kindness and compassion of God in the beatitudes. Since it


228. The phrase ‘our Father’ (ὁ πατὴρ ὑμῶν) appears only in Matthew’s version of Q 6:35, but in both versions of Q 6:36.
was argued earlier that the beatitudes are essentially non-eschatological, this textual association further supports the case for a non-eschatological reading of Q 6:36b. The verb ‘is’ (ἐστίν) should probably here be understood as a gnomic present, describing mercy as a timeless attribute of God. As with Q 6:20, suggestions that ἐστίν should here be understood as a futurist present are far-fetched and unsupported (see Chapter 2, ‘Futurist eschatology in Q’). The prohibition not to judge in Q 6:37–38 is not only an explication of the admonition to show mercy, but also its flipside (Kloppenborg 2012:251, 260). Kloppenborg (1987a) explicates further:


Significantly, if Q 6:37–38 is read together with the preceding admonition, the love command and the opening beatitudes, a non-eschatological reading is strongly suggested (cf. Betz 1995:490).

Some have argued that reading the judgment logion in light of the mercy logion betrays an eschatological intention behind the former, since God is expressly mentioned in the latter (e.g. Sanders 1977:133–134; cf. Davies & Allison 1988:670). According to this argument, mentioning God as the enactor of divine mercy (ὁ πατὴρ ὑμῶν οἰκτίρμων ἐστίν) in verse 36 increases the likelihood that God is implied in verses 37–38 as the enactor of eschatological judgment. 229 There are a number of reasons for discounting such reasoning. Firstly, the mere fact that God is mentioned does not qualify as evidence for the presence of eschatology in either verse 36 or verses 37–38. God is often mentioned in other genres and micro genres, including wisdom. Secondly, Q 6:36 does not have eschatology in mind, as we have argued, implying that neither does Q 6:37–38. Thirdly, the image of God is invoked in Q 6:36 not as part of an allusion to eschatological mercy, but as part of an imitatio Dei argument (Robinson 2001a:39; 2003:38; see Valantasis 2005:65–66). Fourthly, Q 6:36 does not feature a passive verb with which the passive verbs in Q 6:37–38 could be compared. Ultimately, the non-eschatological nature and essence of Q 6:37–38 is strongly suggested by everything that precedes it in the inaugural sermon (cf. Betz 1995:490).

Slightly more dubious is the related but separate question of whether or not the passive verbs in Q 6:37–38 constitute divine passives. If interpreted with the material in Q 6:27–36, the passive verbs in Q 6:37–38 refer plainly to dealings between human beings. If interpreted with the beatitudes, the passive verbs in Q 6:37–38 refer to God’s indirect involvement. The proximity of Q 6:37–38 to Q 6:27–36 strongly suggests that person-to-person interactions are either primarily or exclusively in view. More importantly, the sequential literary separation between Q 6:37–38 and Q 6:20–23

229. Cf. Mishnah, Shabbat 127b; 151b; Tosefta, Bava Qamma 9:30; Palestinian Talmud, Bava Qamma 8:10.
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strongly suggests that God’s indirect involvement is not primarily or exclusively in view in the former. On the other hand, reading Q 6:37–38 in light of the beatitudes keeps alive the possibility that it connotes divine involvement on a secondary level (cf. Betz 1995:491).

The admonition about mercy and the prohibition about judgment are rhetorically substantiated by three colourful arguments. Unlike Kloppenborg (1987a:187) and Kirk (1998:162), I do not see Q 6:36 merely as a transitional verse between Q 6:27–35 and Q 6:37–42. Unlike Edwards (1976:85–90), Piper (1989:78) and Allison (1997:79–95, esp. 84), I do not see Q 6:36 as forming an integral part of Q 6:27–36. Like Catchpole (1993:116–133), I perceive Q 6:36 to be an integral part of Q 6:36–42. This determination is primarily based on the intimate and inextricable connection between the concepts of ‘mercy’ and ‘judgment’ in the intertextual tradition (cf. Bock 1994:608). This connection usually finds expression in one of two ways: (1) mercy is seen as the exact opposite of judgment (cf. Kloppenborg 2012:251; see Catchpole 1993:117–119, 123); or (2) mercy features as an adjective that describes one of the attributes of judgment. Despite the exact nature of their interrelationship, there exists an astonishing number of contemporary Jewish texts – from the Old Testament, the Dead Sea Scrolls, other Jewish intertexts, and the New Testament – that mention the words and/or concepts of ‘judgment’ and ‘mercy’ in the same breath. That Q also sees the concepts of mercy and judgment as inextricably linked is evidenced by Q 11:42. Since Q 6:36 and Q 6:37–38 belong together, the arguments that follow in


231. IQ Community Rule (1QS) II:8–9; 14–15; IV:4–5; V:3–4; VIII:1–2; X:16, 20; XI:12–13; IQ Community Rule (1QM) XVIII:11–13; IQ War Scroll (1QM) XVIII:11–13; IQ War Scroll (1Q BM33) 8–10, I:1–6; IQ Habakkuk Pesher (1QpHab) VII:16; IQ Jubilees (4Q176) 19–20:1–4; 21:1–4; 1IQ Psalms (11Q15) XVIII:16–18; XIX:3–5, 11; 1IQ Psalms (11Q6) a:4–8; 4Q Non-Canonical Psalms B (4Q381) 33:4–9; 1IQ Qumran Psalms (1Q P48) IV:10–11; V:4–5, 11–12; VI:2–3; VII:19–24; VIII:17; IX:29–33; X:24–25; XII:30–32, 36–40; XIII:1–4; 21–22; XIV:9; XV:26–30, 35; XVII:3, 8–10, 14–15, 30–31, 34; XVIII:5–9, 18, 29–32; XXI:10; 1IQ Qumran Psalms (1Q P48) 1:1–2, 11; 1IQ Psalms (1Q P48) 1:1–2; 7, 21:23–24; 11:12–15; 1IQ Songs of the Sage (1Q 511) III:1–4; 1IQ Sapiential Work A (1Q418) 81:7–8; 4Q Messianic Apocalypse (4Q521) 2; IQ; 4Q Songs of the Sabbath Sacrifice (1Q403) I:18, 23–27; IQ Songs of the Sabbath Sacrifice (1Q405) 23, I:12; IQ Bless, Oh my Soul (4Q 434) 1, I:1–8; IQ Ritual of Marriage (4Q 502) 16:1–2.


the sermon are intended to support both admonitions. It should be noted, though, that these supportive arguments are indeed thematically closer to the judgment logion than the mercy logion. Nonetheless, the theme of mercy is never entirely absent from these subsequent arguments.

The first supporting argument is inferred by the two rhetorical questions in Q 6:39: ‘Can a blind person show the way to a blind person? Will not both fall into a pit?’ (cf. Horsley 1999b:223; Piper 1989:40). Jacobson (1992:106) is mistaken when he claims that this logion constitutes a break in the sermon’s rhetorical continuity. The connection between Q 6:37–38 and Q 6:39 is quite apparent: When an errant person judges someone who has also erred, it is like a blind person trying to lead another blind person. The very act of pointing out someone else’s mercilessness betrays that same trait in the one making the accusation. Likewise, the very act of passing judgment on someone else’s moral wrongdoings is morally wrong. When an individual judges other people, she is herself transgressing. By judging others, a person in fact draws attention to his or her own misgivings and infallibility. How can someone who is less than perfect judge another’s imperfection? Or, as Romans 2 puts it:

You, therefore, have no excuse, you who pass judgment on someone else, for at whatever point you judge the other, you are condemning yourself, because you who pass judgment do the same things.


The acts of judging and of withholding mercy induce unfavourable results for both parties, not just the hypothetical recipient of these actions.

The second argument in favour of the two relevant admonitions is the statement in verse 40 that a disciple is not superior to his teacher. Although he does not say so directly, Jesus holds up himself as a rhetorical example. In other words, Q 6:40 constitutes an imitatio Jesu argument (Valantasis 2005:71; see Kirk 1998:169, 172, 391–393). The reference is not to Jesus in resurrected or post-mortem form, but to the person who breathed Palestinian air before passing away. The inaugural sermon commences with an image of Jesus instructing his disciples. In verse 40, Q’s Jesus indirectly asks his disciples that they follow his lead – a request that includes the morality proposed by the sermon itself – and not the lead of ‘blind teachers’ (cf. Jacobson 1992:106). If Q’s Jesus shows mercy to others, and if he refrains from judging them, then his followers should do the same (Kloppenborg 1987a:184–185). The disciples are asked to internalise the teachings of Q’s Jesus so that they can practice it in their daily lives (Valantasis 2005:71; cf. Pokorný 2011:358). Allison (1997:95) suggests that the sage of verse 40 should be seen as God, and not Jesus. Such an interpretation would need to be supported by evidence outside the logion itself, since, to my knowledge, God is nowhere else in early Christian tradition, including the Sayings Gospel Q, the New Testament and apocryphal material, referred to as a ‘teacher’ (διδάσκαλος).

The vivid illustration of verses 41–42 constitutes the third argument (Allison 2001c:414; Horsley 1999b:223). This striking image from everyday human experience
latches onto the first argument’s theme of impaired vision (Kloppenborg 1987a:182; see Kirk 1998:170–171). Apart from the theme of ‘blindness’, the first and third arguments also share a certain vividness, as well as a fondness for rhetorical questions. In addition, the two arguments overlap conceptually (Catchpole 1993:127). The crux of the argument is not too difficult to extract, and very similar to that of the first argument (Piper 1989:40). A merciless and judgmental attitude distorts moral and spiritual vision. People who display these qualities go around looking for transgression in others, but fail to even notice their own shortcomings (Valantasis 2005:73; see Howes 2013b:320–321). In fact, these shortcomings are often far worse than the transgressions that were initially identified (Fleddermann 2005:332). Jesus likens the former to a ‘wooden beam’ (δοκός) and the latter to a ‘tiny splinter’ (κάρφος) (cf. Valantasis 2005:73). Thus, the argument is that by judging others, and by withholding mercy from them, people are actually committing far worse atrocities than whatever the recipients of such conduct were guilty of in the first place. Ironically, it is only when people rid themselves of their judgmental attitudes that they are in fact capable of judgment (Allison 2001c:414). Yet, when people are in this perfect position to judge, they typically no longer have any desire to do so. Mercy will replace judgment!

Piper (1989:42–43) points out another way in which the third argument illuminates the prohibition in Q 6:37 (καὶ μὴ κρίνετε) (cf. Allison 1997:92; Catchpole 1993:128). The judging act is here specifically applied to one’s ‘brother’ (τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ σου). As in the African American community, the word ‘brother’, in ancient Judaism, denoted not only a brother of kin, but also a fellow Jew (Betz 1995:488; Catchpole 1993:107, 125; cf. Valantasis 2005:72–73). The mentioning of ‘your brother’ in Q 6:41–42 strongly suggests that the inaugural sermon is directed at the Jewish nation in general. It follows that the admonition to love one’s enemies has Jewish enemies specifically in mind, as opposed to individual non-Jews or collective Gentile nations. Similarly, the prohibition against judgment applies to the treatment of other Jews, including Jewish enemies (Catchpole 1993:107; cf. Betz 1995:488). Such a view is substantiated by the mentioning of ‘Gentiles’ (ἐθνικοὶ) as part of the out-group in Q 6:32, 34 (see Piper 1989:84–85; cf. Valantasis 2005:65).234 It also makes the best sense of the golden rule in verse 31, as well as the allusion to Leviticus 19:18 in verse 27 (Catchpole 1993:115). Hence, the inaugural sermon is not intended as an endorsement of moral ideals to the world in general, but rather as an attempt at improving the general conduct and morality of the Jewish people in particular. This applies to each of the individual sayings in Q 6:20–49, including the prohibition against judgment.

The popular scholarly notion that the examples in Q 6:29–30 imagine Romans as the bullies could be taken to indicate that these examples in particular, as well as the sermon in general, apply to everyone on earth, not just Jews (see Valantasis 2005:59–60, 68).

234. Matthew’s mentioning of ‘Gentiles’ and ‘tax-collectors’ should in this case be preferred as deriving from Q (Catchpole 1993:102).
Against this, it should be pointed out that the text does not specify the culprits. The Sayings Gospel has a tendency to make explicit mention of Gentiles whenever they are in view in any particular scene (e.g. Q 7:3; 11:30–32). The absence of any explicit reference to Romans in Q 6:29–30 is telling. There is no reason why the individual acts of slapping, suing, conscripting, giving and lending cannot be indicative of how many Jews treated each other in the 1st century. The acts of ‘slapping’ and ‘conscripting’ do presuppose unequal relationships, but these relationships could just as easily have been between Jewish masters and their slaves or workers. The saying that lays most claim to be alluding to Roman bullies specifically is Matthew (Q) 5:41, but even this saying does not necessarily have a Roman offender in mind. In any case, it is not sure that this saying belongs in Q, being entirely absent from Luke. The acts of ‘giving’, ‘lending’ and ‘suing’ could presuppose equal or unequal relationships, if not both. Whatever the case, these actions almost certainly have Jewish participants exclusively in mind. Regarding the act of ‘lending’ in particular, the current text needs to be read in conjunction with Q 6:34, where the same act of ‘lending’ (δανείζω) is explicitly treated in reference to the ethos of Jews, to be distinguished from the ethos of Gentiles (cf. Valantasis 2005:65). Perhaps the exegete should allow the sayings that are far less ambiguous about the identity of the intended participants to inform the interpretation of those sayings that are more vague. In other words, the extreme likelihood that Q 6:29b; Q 6:30a and Q 6:30b envisage only Jewish partakers strongly suggests that the same is also true of Q 6:29a and Matthew (Q) 5:41.

Human-to-human interaction is a feature of all three arguments that support Q 6:37–38: (1) two blind people interact in Q 6:39; (2) a disciple and his teacher, probably the earthly Jesus, interact in Q 6:40; and (3) two ‘brothers’ interact in Q 6:41–42. God is not invoked, either as a mimetic ideal or a judge, in the arguments that support Q 6:37–38. Hence, Q 6:39–42 reinforces the conclusion that the passive verbs in Q 6:37–38 should not primarily or exclusively be regarded as divine passives.

The inaugural sermon is concluded by Q 6:43–49. This fourth block of material is linked to the previous one by similar images. Q 6:41–42 mentions a ‘wooden beam’ or ‘log’ (δοκόν). The subsequent pericope speaks not only of ‘trees’ (δένδρα), which is where wooden beams and logs come from, but also of ‘houses’ (οἰκίαι), which is where wooden beams and logs end up. Allison (1997:93) also points out that the threefold use of καρπός in verses 43–46 mirrors the threefold use of κάρφος in verses 39–42. This last block of material should be further subdivided into two components: verses 43–46 and verses 47–49 (Fleddermann 2005:332; see Allison 1997:93–95; Edwards 1976:90–93). Neither of these pericopes should be read as ‘parables’ (Piper 1989:47; pace Fleddermann 2005:334; Jacobson 1992:107; Robinson 1994:318). They are, nonetheless, thoroughly sapiential (Catchpole 1993:130).

Verses 43–45 use examples from agriculture to argue that one’s deeds reveal one’s heart (Valantasis 2005:74–75; see Howes 2013b:317–318; Kirk 1998:173–175). Conversely, one’s heart instigates one’s deeds. Thus, a good person will do good
deeds, and a bad person will do bad deeds (see Robinson 1997). That people’s deeds are being addressed is indicated, not only by the Q text itself, but also by the familiar metaphorical use of the word ‘fruit’ (καρπός) as a traditional reference to deeds and their consequences. It is wisdom that informs the nature of what exactly constitutes good deeds. This, in turn, is obvious from the well-known metaphorical use of the word ‘treasure’ (θησαυρός), which customarily represents ‘the resources of wisdom made available through instruction’ (Catchpole 1993:133). The wisdom of Q 6:43–45 is followed by a rhetorical question in verse 46: ‘Why do you call me “master, master”, but do not do what I say?’ The twice-repeated vocative κύριε ['lord' or 'master'] should not here be read as a Christological title, but as a form of direct address intended to convey a degree of respect and admiration for the person of Jesus (Jacobson 1992:107; Robinson 1994:318; Valantasis 2005:77; pace Fleddermann 2005:322, 333, 334). The point of the rhetorical question is that a student must act upon the teachings of her teacher (Valantasis 2005:77; cf. Catchpole 1993:41, 99; Fleddermann 2005:322; Kloppenborg 1987a:185; Pokorny 2011:358).

This cluster of sayings cannot be read separately from the rest of the inaugural sermon. If interpreted in conjunction with the rest of the sermon, the pericope has two converging interpretations. Firstly, love, mercy and non-judgment are primarily verbs, not nouns (Fleddermann 2005:334; cf. Pokorny 2011:358). The instruction is not to have a change of heart, but to act differently. However, such improved conduct is impossible without an initial change of heart, which is another point of the pericope (cf. Fleddermann 2005:334; see Piper 1989:50–51; Robinson 1997). Secondly, people are disciples of Jesus only if and when they act in accordance with his moral message, which entails, above all else, the admonition to love one’s enemies (Catchpole 1993:41, 99; Edwards 1976:91; Kirk 1998:392). Two of the most basic and crucial ways in which a person can do this are to show mercy and to desist judging others (Catchpole 1993:124, 128). The likelihood that this pericope is specifically interested in good or bad speech does not change our current interpretation thereof (cf. λαλεῖ τὸ στόμα in verse 45; cf. Catchpole 1993:132; Fleddermann 2005:331, 333). The act of judging someone else usually finds expression in verbal communication, as is clear from the question ‘how can you say?’ (πῶς ἐρεῖς; // πῶς δύνασαι λέγειν;) in verse 42. In fact, the interest in speech as a demonstration of obedience to the love command is another feature that binds Q 6:43–45 to Q 6:41–42, and both of these to Q 6:37–38 (Fleddermann 2005:322, 331, 333).

Q 6:47–49 confirms the exegesis of the foregoing pericope (Allison 1997:94; Edwards 1976:92; Fleddermann 2005:334). This passage is introduced with the phrase: ‘Every one who hears (ἀκούων) my sayings and acts (ποιῶν) on them’. The latter phrase
encapsulates the intent and objective of the foregoing pericope. Jesus is not mainly teaching pleasant ethical principles, but also moral directives, intended to radically alter and transform people's conduct. Only if and when people start implementing Jesus' moral message on a daily basis will their lives be built on bedrock foundations (Carlston 1982:106; Catchpole 1993:97; Valantasis 2005:80). Yet, people will only be able to change their conduct if they first change their attitudes.

It is certainly appropriate to conclude that a purely sapiential, non-eschatological reading of Q 6:37–38 is preferable if its literary placement in the inaugural sermon is considered (cf. Betz 1995:490). If this finding is paired with the results of the previous section, where the isolated logion was determined to be an instruction, a very strong case can be made for classifying Q 6:37–38 as a purely sapiential logion, devoid of any eschatological features, references or allusions (Horsley 2012:29). Correct or incorrect as it may be, such a conclusion is at this stage still premature, since the rest of the Sayings Gospel Q has not yet been considered.

**Eschatological judgment in the rest of Q**

The theme of judgment determines the paradigmatic literary context of Q 6:37–38 within the Sayings Gospel. Kloppenborg's main redaction is sometimes also referred to as the 'judgment layer'. One of the central themes of this layer, as we have seen in Chapter 2 ('Kloppenborg's stratification of Q'), is the announcement of eschatological condemnation against a host of groups and individuals, including those who do not 'bear healthy fruit' (Q 3:9, 17; 13:27), 'this generation' (Q 11:29–32, 50–51), certain Galilean towns (Q 10:12–15), those who deny Jesus in public (Q 12:9), those who speak against the Holy Spirit (Q 12:10), the leaders and/or inhabitants of Jerusalem (Q 13:35), and those who fail to accept the invitation of Q's Jesus, probably to the kingdom of God (Q 14:16–18, 21, 23) (Howes 2014b:7 of 11). Besides the vociferous announcement of eschatological condemnation, moral condemnation is also furnished upon the specific conduct of certain groups, including the inhabitants and/or leaders of Jerusalem (Q 13:34), the Pharisees (Q 11:39, 41–44), the scribes (Q 11:46–48, 52) and 'this generation' (Q 11:49, 51).

The fact that the rest of Q associates the theme of judgment particularly with eschatology would seem to imply that Q 6:37–38 also intends eschatology when speaking of judgment. Reading Q 6:37–38 in light of the theme of judgment in the rest of Q, especially the passages listed above, seems to necessitate an eschatological reading of this logion (cf. Betz 1995:490). If the motive clause in Q 6:37b does indeed refer to God's eschatological judgment, it would be congruent with the announcement of eschatological judgment in the rest of Q. An eschatological understanding of Q 6:36–38 would imply that the opponents of Q deserve the eschatological judgment of God because they are merciless and judgmental by their very nature. Importantly, eschatology would in this case apply not to the admonition ‘do not judge’ (καὶ μὴ
κρίνετε), but to the motive clause ‘so that you are not judged’ (ἵνα μὴ κριθῆτε) (Allison 2010:136 fn. 469; cf. Betz 1995:490; Luz 2007:351). An eschatological interpretation of καὶ μὴ κρίνετε is precluded on a purely semantic level. The semantic impossibility of reading the admonition itself eschatologically should caution one against accepting an eschatological rendering of the motive clause too hastily, regardless of the application of the theme of judgment in the rest of Q.

Noteworthy about the ‘condemnation’ passages listed above is that the verb ‘judge’ (κρίνω) does not occur once to denote either eschatology or moral condemnation (Howes 2014b:6; pace Tuckett 2000b:103; although cf. also p. 113). In fact, Q 11:31–32 seems to prefer the verb ‘condemn’ (κατακρίνω) to describe eschatological condemnation in particular (cf. Kloppenborg 1995a:13). Although the noun ‘judgment’ (κρίσις) occurs in some of these passages, it features not to signify eschatological condemnation per se, but rather as part of the temporal phrase ‘at the judgment’ (ἐν τῇ κρίσει) to reference the time at which the Final Judgment will take place. The only occurrence of the verb ‘judge’ (κρίνω) in the main redaction is in Q 22:30, and I have argued elsewhere that the verb does not in this case refer to eschatological condemnation, but instead to impartial eschatological judgment, the outcome of which is to some extent still undetermined (see Howes 2014b:1–11). This interpretation of the verb ‘judge’ (κρίνω) in Q 22:28, 30 is corroborated by Q 11:19b, where the noun ‘judge’ (κριτής) similarly refers to open-ended eschatological judgment instead of eschatological condemnation (see Howes 2014b:7 of 11; cf. Jacobson 1992:163). The point of this lexical exercise is simply to argue that if Q 6:37–38 is indeed determined to denote or connote eschatology, then the logion should not be interpreted as one-sidedly referencing eschatological condemnation. Instead, the logion should be understood in terms of impartial eschatological judgment, of which the particular verdict is still undecided (cf. Betz 1995:491). The passages that pronounce eschatological condemnation against certain individuals and groups do presuppose the process of impartial judgment, as the temporal phrase ‘at the judgment’ indicates, but nevertheless focus exclusively on the negative side of this judicial process, which culminates in condemnation. As far as the main redaction is concerned, the fate of specific individuals and groups within greater Israel has already been determined, and it does not look good.

One cannot help but wonder how the inaugural sermon and these announcements of judgment and condemnation can possibly co-exist in the same document. Whereas the inaugural sermon preaches against the judgment of others, the rest of Q announces the judgment and condemnation of just about every group imaginable (cf. Allison 2001c:414; Wink 2002:180, 189–190). For the most part, the main redaction seems to contradict the message of the inaugural sermon, especially the admonitions to love one’s enemy, show mercy to others, and refrain from judging others (cf. Luz 2005:154). Robinson (2001a:38–44; 2005:705–709) is particularly resolute in not only acknowledging such a contradiction, but also spelling out its nature and consequences. He explains that the Q people’s view of God has shifted from the formative layer’s
merciful God, who treats good and bad people the same (Q 6:35, 36), to the main redaction’s judgmental God, who is expected to wholly condemn ‘this generation’ at the Final Judgment (esp. Q 11:31–32, 49–51). Robinson continues to explain that this altered image of God has changed the disposition and outlook of the Q people themselves, since their morality is generally based on *imitatio Dei* logic. The central Q\(^1\) command to love one’s enemies makes way for the Q\(^2\) prophecies that anticipate the condemnation of ‘this generation’.

I would certainly agree with Robinson that one can quite clearly notice a shift in focus from the loving, merciful and non-judgmental content of Q\(^1\) to the hypercritical, condemning and judgmental attitude of Q\(^2\). However, to claim that the two layers foster two opposing theologies and moralities is unwarranted. Rather than a shift in theology or morality, there is evidence of a shift in group boundaries. The more I deal with the formative stratum, the more I become convinced that the wisdom it contains is directed at the Jewish nation in general, not only some sectarian group within it, otherwise known as the ‘Q community’ or ‘Q people’.\(^{238}\) It is probable that only a small group of Jews accommodated and advocated the message of the formative stratum, particularly the inaugural sermon. In this sense, it remains legitimate to speak of those behind the formative stratum as the ‘Q people’. Yet, even if we dub these advocates the ‘Q people’, the message of the formative stratum might still be aimed at greater Israel in toto. By accommodating and advocating the message of Q\(^1\), these people were attempting to revolutionise Jewish society as a whole. Even if the process of family division had already started during the writing of the formative stratum (see Chapter 2, ‘Family feuds’), the content of Q\(^1\) was nonetheless aimed at Israel in general. If I am correct, it would follow for the formative stratum that Israel constitutes the in-group, while Gentiles constitute the out-group. This division is substantiated by the mentioning of Gentiles in Q 6:34 and the featuring of the word ‘brothers’ in Q 6:41–42 (see above, ‘Wisdom in the inaugural sermon’). If this religio-ethnic division is accepted, it would follow that the ‘enemies’ in Q 6:27 and the recipients of mercy and non-judgment in Q 6:37–38 are not outsiders, but insiders (see above, ‘Wisdom in the inaugural sermon’). Similarly, both the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ people of Q 6:35 refer to members of the in-group. The inaugural sermon focuses on how members of the same group should treat one another, not on how members of one group should treat members of another group. The inaugural sermon focuses almost exclusively on the in-group.

Whereas the division in Q\(^1\) is between Israel and the Gentiles, the division in Q\(^2\) is between the Q people and a number of Jewish out-groups, including ‘this generation’, certain Galilean towns, the Pharisees and scribes, and the inhabitants and/or leaders of Jerusalem. As a result of this shift in group boundaries, the main redaction is not

\(^{238}\) In this regard, Holmén’s (2001:513) general reservation acts as a word of caution: ‘The idea that the texts are bound to yield information about their preservers, that they are always revelatory of their transmitters, does not hold true.’
concerned with internal group ethics, but with boundary formation. Internal group ethics are taken for granted, while the relationship between the Q people and a host of Jewish out-groups receive top billing. Hence, the shift from Q’s love of enemies to Q’s hatred of enemies is explicable as a focal shift from love of fellow insiders to hatred of undeserving outsiders. The former does not exclude the latter, and the latter does not exclude the former. Regarding their morality, there is no reason to presume that the in-group ceased practicing their radical ethos once their boundaries started shrinking, and once they started focusing on the condemnation of outsiders. Conversely, there is no reason to presume that the advocates of Q’s radical ethos loved non-Jewish outsiders in the same way they loved Jewish insiders. Regarding their theology, there is no reason to presume that those responsible for the formative stratum viewed God as a loving parent of outsiders. Conversely, there is no reason to presume that those responsible for the main redaction viewed God as a tormenter of insiders. Instead of a theological or moral shift from loving mercy to hateful judgment, the differences between Q¹ and Q² represent a focal shift from how to treat insiders to how to treat outsiders, from internal group morality to external group demarcation.

Q 6:37–38 might actually support the foregoing hermeneutic. If the passive verbs in this logion connote indirect divine involvement, the motive clause in verse 37 (ἵνα μὴ κριθῆτε) and the second leg of the maxim in verse 38 (μετρηθῆσεται ὑμῖν) connote divine judgment, even if other sayings in the inaugural sermon focus on God’s even-handedness and mercy. Ultimately, the development from Q¹ to Q² entails a shift in focus, not a change in message.

These arguments against Robinson are not only significant for their own sake, but are also relevant to the larger discussion. Whether or not the stratification of Q is upheld, it is clear that those passages preaching eschatological condemnation and judgment do so with outsiders specifically in view. Conversely, Q 6:37–38 features in the inaugural sermon as an attempt to direct the behaviour of insiders (Horsley 2012:29). On the one hand, it is unlikely that Q’s Jesus would threaten insiders with the same eschatological punishment as outsiders. On the other hand, the threats against outsiders would forego their rhetorical potency and persuasiveness if individual insiders were to receive the same threat. Hence, rather than support an eschatological reading of Q 6:37–38, a comparison with the theme of judgment in the rest of Q seems to exclude eschatology as a feature of this logion (cf. Horsley 2012:29). In any case, syntagmatic context should usually enjoy methodological priority over paradigmatic context when interpreting any individual pericope or saying. The inaugural sermon is much more telling of the genre and intent of Q 6:37–38 than the rest of the Sayings Gospel.

Judicial judgment in the rest of Q

There is one last hermeneutical possibility for the interpretation of ‘judgment’ in Q 6:37–38 that needs to be considered. Some time ago, Piper (1995a:53–72) made an
important contribution to our understanding of Q by noticing in Q’s aphoristic sayings a thread of pessimism in the face of institutionalised violence and exploitation. In general, Q betrays a fear of authorities, and suspicion over administrative procedures (Piper 1995a:62–63; 2000:250). More specifically, the content of Q reveals distrust in the institutionalised legal system, resulting in the habitual and deliberate avoidance of institutional courts (Piper 1995a:60; cf. Horsley 1995b:45). Such distrust accords well with ancient views in general, since lower-level citizens were mostly suspicious of higher-level courts (Horsley 1996:120). The mentioning of ‘higher-level’ courts is important. On the one hand, the judicial issues and images featured in Q are rather formal, and mostly applicable to courts at higher urban levels (Reed 2000:193). On the other hand, much of Q concerns itself with local judicial matters. In particular, Q 12:11–12 has smaller (rural) courts or village assemblies (συναγωγαί) in mind. This combination of references to both higher and lower level courts indicates that the Q people were subject to both, which in turn implies not only that they were rural villagers, but also that they were, at least in part, made up of the socio-economic underclass.

Q 6:22–23 and Q 12:5 suggest that the Q people were persecuted, and Q 16:16 suggests that they were subjected to some types of violence (Betz 1995:149, 150; Funk & Hoover 1993:173, 336; Horsley 2012:34; Kloppenborg 1990:79; Koester 1997:151). That some of this violence and persecution came from the (Roman and Judean) elite might be implied by the reference to Gehenna in Q 12:5, which was a place that particularly connoted a brand of judgment reserved for rulers (Horsley 1999f:273). The reference in Q 12:8–9 to a heavenly courtroom might also hint at oppression by the elite, since the metaphor of a heavenly courtroom developed specifically in response to earthly injustice inflicted by the powers that be (Horsley 1999f:273–274). The tone of the discourse in Q 12:2–12 suggests that injustice and repression were realities facing the Q people. It is further interesting that the only saying in this literary context taken over by either the Didache or the Gospel of Thomas is Q 12:10, which is about the sin against the Holy Spirit, implying that similar threats of injustice and oppression were totally absent in the communities responsible for these documents (Horsley 1999f:274). Q 12:4 suggests that a meeting with judicial (and other) authorities might well end up being fatal (Horsley 1999f:272). If the reference to ‘wolves’ in Q 10:3 is understood in terms of its traditional connotation of ‘rulers’, this passage confirms that the Q people could meet their mortal ends when dealing with authorities.

239. These include: persecution (Q 6:28), physical assault (Q 6:29), and indebtedness (Q 6:30; 12:58–59).

240. These include: magistrates, judges, rulers, law suits and litigation.

Chapter 4

(Jacobson 1982:422). Q 14:27 also implies that opposing the Romans typically resulted in (a particularly painful) death.

Based on Q’s juxtaposition of sayings about legal matters with sayings about sustenance, Piper (1995a:61–62) argues for a relationship between the subsistence levels of the Q people and judicial proceedings in general. In the Lord’s Prayer, the petition ‘cancel our debts’ (Q 11:4) follows directly after ‘give us bread’ (Q 11:3), suggesting that indebtedness subjected the people to severe poverty and starvation (Horsley 1999h:278; Oakman 2008:104). Likewise, Q 12:4–7, 11–12, which is to some extent concerned with local court appearances, appears directly before Q 12:22–31, which deals with daily survival. The official judicial system, run by the city, offered very little, if any, assistance in terms of poverty alleviation. On the contrary, the courts played their part in maintaining the status quo. In the ancient world, the interests of socio-economic underlings were not protected by the judges and lawmakers of higher courts. These courts were geared towards the servicing of the wealthy (Horsley 1996:120). In Q 11:4, the word ‘trial’ (πειρασμός) connotes judicial proceedings, suggesting that indebtedness was initiated, maintained and enforced by the legal system, possibly in the form of debt contacts (Oakman 2008:104).242 A similar suggestion is made by Q 12:58–59 (Oakman 2008:225). Verse 59 puts the legal proceedings of verse 58 within the context of indebtedness. This passage advises not to go to court for the alleviation of debts, but to try and negotiate with one’s ‘legal opponent’ (ἀντίδικος) before even getting to court. Within this context, the ἀντίδικος is most likely understood as a legal landowner, or some sort of creditor. The reason for such advice is simple: You will lose the case, be forced to pay your debt in full, and perhaps even go to prison! It is possible that Q 9:58 refers to the inevitable outcome of indebtedness that all peasants feared: losing house and home, thereby becoming ‘landless’. In general, Q betrays and endorses a negative attitude towards money (cf. Q 12:33–34; 16:13). It is at the very least possible that Q grasps and exposes the inevitable and detrimental link between monetisation and indebtedness (Reed 2000:98).

On the whole, Q seems concerned with the vulnerability of the underclass in relation to both the Judean and the Roman elite. The conditions criticised by Q cohere with what is known of Galilean conditions in general, especially during the reign of Antipas. Rather than reaffirm the political and judicial institutions by calling upon them for justice, sustenance and the allocation of honour, Q advocates relying on God and his kingdom for those things. God is contrasted with such institutions as the real source of merciful justice, endless providence and limitless honour. The kingdom of God is the means by which these necessities are provided for his children. For Q, justice at local levels supersedes justice at higher levels. Local reciprocity provides sustenance.

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Honour is transferred from the Father to his children. In addition, eschatological hopes of ultimate justice, sustenance and honour are anticipated.

Suffice it to say that Q betrays a gloomy attitude to the institutionalised judicial system, and that the Q people had valid reasons for fearing not only court appearances, but also the authoritative figures who were in charge of such proceedings. It is not at all impossible that this genuine concern lies behind the saying in Q 6:37. The latter is supported by the specific examples in the inaugural sermon of how to love one’s enemies (Q 6:29–30). If the phrase ‘the person wanting to take you to court’ (τῷ θέλοντι σοι κρίθηναι) in Matthew 5:40 is accepted as part of Q, then we have here an explicit reference to judicial judgment, as opposed to eschatological or moral judgment, in the inaugural sermon (cf. Valantasis 2005:59). This Matthean phrase is the only other instance where the verb ‘judge’ (κρίνω) is repeated in the rest of the inaugural sermon. It is certainly not insignificant that the only other occurrence of the verb κρίνω in the inaugural sermon denotes judicial judgment, and not moral or eschatological judgment; that is, of course, if this Matthean phrase is accepted as part of Q.

The idea that there is a deliberate connection between these two texts from the inaugural sermon might be supported by the use of the passive verb κριθῆτε in Q 6:37b. The passive voice of κρίνω was often used for the judicial act of standing trial (Louw & Nida 1993a:555). If interpreted in this light, Q 6:37 specifically exploits existing fear of the institutionalised legal system to support its argument against judging other people. The argument may then be paraphrased like this: Do not act as judge and jury over other people, especially your enemies, or you yourself will inevitably face the terrifying situation of being judged in a court of law by an authoritative figure. A different understanding of Q 6:37 remains possible. In the literary context of Q 6:29, the infinitive verb ‘to judge’ (κριθῆναι) is a shorthand for the act of ‘taking someone to court’. If this application is transferred to Q 6:37a, judicial judgment would be applicable to both occurrences of the verb ‘judge’ in this logion. If so, the argument of Q 6:37 would look a bit different: Do not take people to court, especially your enemies, or you yourself will inevitably face the terrifying situation of being judged in a court of law by an authoritative figure.

If Q 6:37 has judicial judgment in mind, the first option above seems preferable. The literary context invites a more general application than the second option would allow (Betz 1995:490; Luz 2007:351). Q 6:27 is a general admonition to love one’s enemies, and Q 6:36 implores people to show mercy in general. Neither of these instructions references a specific moral act, like the saying against divorce in Q 16:18, for example. Moreover, the three arguments in support of Q 6:37a are all of a general nature; not the type of arguments you would expect in support of a specific command like ‘do not take people to court!’ This is particularly true of the third argument (Q 6:41–42), which does seem to be defending a prohibition against moral judgment in general, as opposed to a specific prohibition against taking people to court. Despite the general
applicability of the admonition in Q 6:37a, the motive clause in Q 6:37b might still represent a specific reference to judicial judgment (Allison 2010:136 fn. 469). However, the general applicability of the admonition in Q 6:37a strongly suggests that a similar interpretation applies to the motive clause in Q 6:37b. It seems highly unlikely that the two legs of such a close parallelism would fill the same verb, deliberately duplicated, with mutually exclusive meanings.

The latter is supported by the content of the maxim in Q 6:38, which we have argued refers specifically to reciprocal dealings in the ancient economy (cf. Kloppenborg 2012:263). Both occurrences of the word ‘measure’ in Q 6:38 presuppose the same type (e.g. weight) and standard (e.g. same instrument) of measurement. It follows by implication that both occurrences of the word ‘judgment’ in Q 6:37 presuppose the same type (e.g. moral) and standard (e.g. harsh) of judgment (cf. Betz 1995:491). Uncertainty about whether or not the phrase τῷ θέλοντί σοι κριθῆναι belongs in Q (6:29) should caution one against using it to unlock the meaning of Q 6:37–38. Even if this clause belongs in the Sayings Gospel, Q 6:29–30 deals deliberately with particularised examples of how to love enemies, while Q 6:37–38 deals deliberately with generalised examples of how to love enemies (cf. Betz 1995:490; Luz 2007:351; see above, ‘Wisdom in the inaugural sermon’). It follows that the replication of the same verb in two nearby literary contexts should not automatically invite the conclusion that this verb presumes the same semantic meaning in both cases. It seems justified to conclude that Q 6:37 does not refer or allude to judicial judgment, despite the prevalence of this theme in the rest of Q, including the inaugural sermon (cf. Nolland 2005:319). Once again, syntagmatic literary context deserves methodological preference over paradigmatic literary context in the determination of this logion’s meaning. Ultimately, internal literary evidence strongly suggests that the ‘judgment’ of Q 6:37–38 is intended as moral judgment, and that the logion therefore qualifies as wisdom. One wonders if external literary evidence would support this finding.

The intertextual context

Measuring judgment

The purpose of this intertextual investigation is to determine whether the passive verb in Q 6:37 does indeed have moral judgment in mind, as opposed to eschatological or judicial judgment. Unfortunately, it will not be of much help to investigate the theme of ‘judgment’ in the Old Testament, or the usage of the words ‘judgment’ (κρίσις & κρίμα) and ‘judge’ (δικαστής & κρίνω) in the Septuagint. The Old Testament employs this word and concept in reference to all three types of judgment: moral, eschatological.

243. For example, Genesis 19:9; Exodus 2:14; Deuteronomy 19:15.

244. For example, Isaiah 51:5; Ezekiel 7:8; Joel 3:12; Zechariah 14:5.
and judicial. The same is true of the concept of ‘mercy’. The author(s) and audience(s) of Q 6:37–38 had access to all three types of judgment in the tradition. A much more promising enterprise is to focus on the graphic saying in verse 38, paying particular attention to the connotative meaning(s) of the word ‘measure’, both in its verbal (μετρέω) and substantive (μέτρον) forms. It was argued earlier that this reference alludes to the act of measuring goods and/or produce during reciprocal transactions, be it in the marketplace or on the grain farm (see above, ‘Micro genre’). However, another application is equally and simultaneously possible. The specific combination of the concepts of ‘judgment’ and ‘measuring’ calls to mind the ancient concept of ‘psychostasia’.

‘Psychostasia’ is the academic term for the ‘weighing-of-the-soul’ concept (Brandon 1969:91). Put differently, ‘psychostasia’ is the umbrella term for the ancient notion that a divine or supernatural figure judges ordinary people by weighing their worth on scales. Although the ‘soul’ is most frequently associated with this concept in ancient literature, other items might also be weighed, like the ‘heart’ or the ‘spirit’. Regardless of the exact item being measured or weighed, it is normally some or other symbol for a person’s inner being. The idea of psychostasia had its inception in Egyptian mythology. It is well known that the concept was an integral and widespread feature of Egyptian thought (Pearson 1976:249). Yet, the earliest Egyptian texts about the afterlife, written during the Old Kingdom period (2425–2300 BCE), do not utter a single word on psychostasia (see Brandon 1969:94–96). In those texts, post-mortem judgment is described in terms of symbolism and imagery taken from the earthly courtroom.

It is only during the First Intermediate period (2200–2050 BCE), in the ancient Egyptian writing Instruction for King Merikarē, that a new element is added to the traditional imagery of a legal courtroom (Brandon 1969:96). According to this text, the court proceedings would include the act of placing the good and bad deeds of the individual being judged in two respective heaps. This is done so that the deeds in each heap can be accurately measured. The fate of one’s judgment would then depend on which heap contained more deeds, the good or the bad heap. Brandon (1969:96) argues that this new addition to court proceedings was introduced in Egyptian myths about the afterlife because people generally did not trust the earthly justice system (cf. Horsley 1995b:45; 1996:120; see Piper 1995a:53–72). Accordingly, the act of measuring good deeds against bad deeds ensured that the imagined legal proceedings would be objective and impartial (cf. Betz 1995:491). People were not at the mercy of the supernatural judge and his potential misgivings, preconceptions and partiality. Rather, their own deeds and behaviour determined their ultimate post-mortem fate.

The idea of ‘weighing’ first appeared in the Middle Kingdom period (2160–1580 BCE) in a series of manuscripts known as the Coffin Texts (Brandon 1969:96–97). In

245. For example, Exodus 18:26; Joshua 23:2; Proverbs 31:9.
post-mortem judgment scenes, mention is made in passing of balances, scales and weights (cf. Coffin Texts, spells 44, 335 & 452). It is only during the New Kingdom period (1580–1090 BCE) that the concept of psychostasia became full blown in Egyptian mythology. The Egyptian Book of the Dead describes the Final Judgment as an act of weighing the hearts of the dead against maāt on a pair of scales (Balentine 2006:480; Pinch 2004:27–28, 93, 160, 210; Wink 2002:178). For Egyptians, the heart was more than just a vital organ. It was a cognisant entity that acted on its own, sometimes even against its owner. Some described the human heart as a little god that lived inside human beings (Pinch 2004:59, 64). The heart contained a person’s memory and intelligence, which is why it could act as a record of his or her life on earth (Broyles 2006:31). More importantly, the heart symbolised the entirety of an individual’s moral centre and censor (Brandon 1969:92). In Egyptian mythology, the goddess Maāt, daughter of the sun-god Rē, personified Egyptian ethics and cosmology (Pinch 2004:159). She represented the Egyptian idea of cosmic and social order, although the idea of cosmic order was ultimately personified by Rē himself. In her distinctive role as representation of social order, Maāt was viewed as the embodiment of truth, justice and righteousness. The Egyptian word maāt could literally mean ‘truth’, ‘justice’, ‘righteousness’, ‘balance’, ‘cosmic law’ or ‘order’. In essence, Maāt (as well as maāt with a small letter) symbolised a criterion, benchmark or standard by which a person’s character and conduct in this world was measured. In depictions and descriptions, the soul is often measured against a feather symbolising maāt (Balentine 2006:480). The balance was typically controlled by the god Anubis, while verdicts were recorded and announced by Thoth. Thus, divine judgment was seen as a process of measuring and weighing a person’s moral worth. From the New Kingdom period onwards, the concept of psychostasia gradually started replacing the idea that post-mortem judgment was a judicial process comparable to an earthly courtroom. According to Brandon (1969:98–99), this shift in emphasis was probably due to a growing need amongst Egyptians to emphasise the impartiality of divine judgment. It is important to note, however, that the two different symbols of divine judgment were never mutually exclusive. To the contrary, they occasionally existed side by side in not only the same manuscripts (like the Book of the Dead), but also the same passages (like the Instruction for King Merikarē and the Papyrus of Ani 125).

The concept of psychostasia spread from Egypt to many other peoples and religions of the time (Brandon 1969:99). Early Greek literature made regular use of the expression ‘weighing of the souls’ to describe judgment (Wink 2002:178). In the Iliad (22.179), for example, Zeus is described as weighing the respective fates of Achilles and Hector as they fight against the Trojans. In this scene, there are two noteworthy exceptions to the Egyptian understanding of psychostasia. Firstly, it is not the hearts (or moral worth) of the Greek heroes that are weighed, but their individual fates. Secondly, the Egyptian post-mortem judgment is replaced here by a Greek notion of pre-mortem judgment. Hence, this depiction of psychostasia concerns itself not with the judgment of the dead,
but with the destiny of the living in this world. This attests to the tendency in ancient writings to not only adopt the Egyptian notion of psychostasia, but to also adapt it to their own particular needs. Thus, it would seem that the symbolism of psychostasia, including the concepts of weighing, measuring and balancing with scales, was easily taken over by others, but that the exact application of that symbolism, including the time and nature of judgment, as well as the types of items being weighed, was modified to fit existing ideas of divine and/or supernatural judgment. This process of selective borrowing assured the successful assimilation of the psychostasia concept by many other peoples and religions.

Despite such varied application, the purpose of the weighing action remains the same in ancient literature: It was an impartial means by which some or other divine or supernatural figure determined how people should be judged (Brandon 1969:99). Similarly, in all ancient versions of psychostasia, the symbolism finds expression in one of two ways. Either a representation of the individual under examination is weighed (sometimes, but not always, against something else), or a person’s good and bad deeds are weighed up or measured against each other. The concept of psychostasia became very widespread in the ancient world, and was commonplace in many cultures by the turn of the millennium. It also became common practice in many religions, including Islam, Zoroastrianism, Hinduism, Buddhism and medieval Christianity, to describe impartial divine judgment by employing the imagery of psychostasia (see Brandon 1969:109–110).

The Old Testament

Leviticus 19 is indisputably the most important intertext for the inaugural sermon as a whole (see Allison 2000:29–38; 2001c:411–417). The mercy saying in Q 6:36 is mirrored in Leviticus 19:2. The second-person imperative verb of Leviticus 19:2 (ָּתִּשׁפֹּט עֲמִיתֶ or ָּססְסְתֶה) is replicated by a second-person imperative verb in Q 6:36 (ססְסְתֶה or גָּינְסְסְתֶה). Furthermore, both texts justify their imperatives with an imitatio Dei rationality. Yet, the Old Testament text is significantly altered by the Q saying when it exchanges ‘holy’ (קדש or ἅγιος) for ‘mercy’ (οἰκτίρμων). Thus, the form of the original statement (second-person imperative plus imitatio Dei justification) is kept intact, but the meaning is radically renovated with the substitution of ἅγιος for οἰκτίρμων. Similar exegetical activities appear in rabbinic commentaries on Leviticus (e.g. Lev. Rab. 308; b. Shab. 133b). Like Q 6:36, these rabbinic writings also substitute holiness for another virtue. Q 6:36 is an example of Q’s Jesus reconstructing established Mosaic Law by deliberately trading holiness for mercy (Borg 1984:128). This trade-off corresponds to a similar priority order in the woes against the Pharisees and scribes (cf. Q 11:42, 46b).

The prohibition not to judge (καὶ μὴ κρίνετε) in Q 6:37a antithetically contradicts the commandment in Leviticus 19:15 to judge your neighbour (τῆς ἐνέργειας or κρίνεις
In Leviticus, the syntactical object of the judging act is one’s neighbour. This object is deliberately removed from the Q text. The removal of the syntactical object of judgment in Q 6:37 is an affirmation that this logion should be read in combination with the admonition to love one’s enemies in Q 6:27. In other words, the prohibition against judgment does not only have family members, loved ones or friends in mind, but all Jewish people happening to cross one’s path, including enemies. Just as with the instruction to be merciful, Q 6:37 provocatively rewrites and reapplies conventional Mosaic Law. In the current case, the exact opposite of the Torah tradition is commanded. Hence, Q’s Jesus advocates the following: Regardless of what Leviticus teaches, you must not judge other people, not even enemies! The reconstruction and modification of Leviticus 19 is a trademark tendency of the entire inaugural sermon (see Allison 2000:33–34; 2001c:411–417). This tendency was not altogether unusual in ancient Jewish tradition (see Allison 2000:34–37; 2001c:415–416). Due to the popularity and familiarity of Leviticus 19 in 1st-century Judaism, it is highly likely that Jewish audiences would instinctively pick up on these subtle alterations and intertextual allusions (see Allison 2000:37–38; 2001c:416–417).

Q 6:37b adds the qualification ‘so that you are not judged’ (ἵνα μὴ κριθῆτε) to the Leviticus intertext, where it is entirely absent. In the Q text, this addition is cleverly supported by an entirely separate maxim (Q 6:38). Leviticus 19:35–36 is a commandment not to be dishonest in daily economic dealings, expressed by means of a negative admonition not to use fraudulent measuring implements, and a positive admonition to use measuring implements that are accurate. A literal translation of the Masoretic Text is quite revealing for our purposes:

You must not do injustice (עָוֶל) in judging (בַּמִֹּּשְפָּט) length, weight or quantity. You must have balances (מֹאזְנֵי צֶדֶק), stones (אַבְנֵי־צֶדֶק), an ephah (אֵיפַת צֶדֶק) and a hin (וְהִין צֶדֶק). (MT Lv 19:35–36, my translation)

Three of the Hebrew words in this text relate semantically to the concept of ‘judgment’. The first (עָוֶל) denotes the type of injustice or wrongdoing that would typically be carried out by an evildoer or criminal (Bosman et al. 2009, s.v. עָוֶל & עַוָּל; Holladay 1971:267, s.v. עָוֶל & עַוָּל). The second (בַּמִֹּּשְפָּט) denotes a legal decision in a court case, lawsuit or arbitration (Bosman et al. 2009, s.v. מִשְׁפָּט; Holladay 1971:221, s.v. מִשְׁפָּט). The third (צֶדֶק) is repeated four times, and denotes that which is just and (legally) right (Bosman et al. 2009, s.v. צֶדֶק; Holladay 1971:303, s.v. צֶדֶק). In Leviticus 19:35–36, these words are used figuratively to connote unfair and dishonest dealings when goods are being sold or bartered; hence the NIV’s paraphrase of Leviticus 19:35–36: ‘Do not use dishonest standards when measuring length, weight or quantity. Use honest scales and honest weights, an honest ephah and an honest hin.’ The Septuagint did not translate the denotations of judgment and justice away:

You will not do injustice (or dishonesty) (ἀδικον) in judgment (κρίσει) in measures (μέτροις), neither with weights (σταθμίοις) nor with balancing scales (ζυγοῖς). Just (or fair or honest) balancing scales
'Do not judge!' (μὴ κρίνετε) in Q 6:37–38

(ζυγὰ δίκαια) and just (or fair or honest) weights (στάθμια δίκαια) and just (or fair or honest) dust (χοῦς δίκαιος) will be for you. (LXX Lv 19:35–36, my translation)

As with the Masoretic Text, the Septuagint’s translation uses the concept of judgment or justice figuratively to connote unfair and dishonest dealings when goods are sold or bartered.

The individual(s) responsible for Q 6:38 obviously noticed the references to judgment in the original Masoretic and/or Septuagint text(s) of Leviticus 19:35–36. These references to the concept of ‘judgment’ in a text that deals with the idea of ‘measuring honestly’ enabled Q’s Jesus to link his admonition against judging others with a normal maxim about measuring fairly. The saying in Q 6:37–38 has two crucial words in common with the Septuagint’s version of Leviticus 19:35–36. The Q logion’s κρίνετε and κριθῆτε parallel the Septuagint’s κρίσει. Also, the Septuagint’s μέτροις is repeated three times in Q 6:38 with the phrase μέτρῳ μετρεῖτε μετρηθήσεται. The link between Q 6:37–38 and Leviticus 19:15, 35–36 is quite ingenious, and culminates in a total revision and inversion of the original Mosaic commandments.

The Torah commandment of Leviticus 19:35–36 was incorporated into the common wisdom of Israel. Proverbs 11:1 states: ‘The Lord abhors dishonest scales, but accurate weights are his delight’ (NIV). Proverbs 20:23 simply repeats the same sentiment: ‘The Lord detests differing weights, and dishonest scales do not please him’ (NIV). A third Proverb (16:11) reiterates the same basic principle: ‘Honest scales and balances are from the Lord; all the weights in the bag are of his making’ (NIV). Interesting about this third saying is that it occurs in the midst of five sayings that deal with the king of Israel in particular. Proverbs 16:10, which immediately precedes the wisdom saying just quoted, states: ‘A divine decision (ANGUAGE) is upon the king’s lips; in judgment (tà µετρήµατα), he does (or must) not act unfaithfully (τῷ Θεῷ) with his lips’ (my translation). The noun µαντεῖον denotes specifically a decision or divination made with God’s assistance through the casting of lots (Holladay 1971:320, s.v. µαντεῖον; cf. Waltke 2005:17). As in Leviticus 19:35–37, the word µετρήµατα denotes a legal decision in a court case, lawsuit or arbitration (Bosman et al. 2009, s.v. µετρήµατα; Holladay 1971:221, s.v. µετρήµατα; Waltke 2005:17). When the two legs of this parallelism are taken together, the ‘divine decision’ of the first leg signifies a legal decision made with God’s help (Waltke 2005:17). It follows that this wisdom saying has the king’s role as legal judge specifically in mind. Hence, the saying in verse 11, about just weights and balances, follows upon a saying about judicial judgment. It seems as though Q was not the first ancient writing to connect the commandment in Leviticus about measuring instruments with the concept of judgment. This connection was already part of Israel’s sapiential tradition. The Septuagint did not translate the references to legal judgment away, preferring to keep both the reference to the ‘king’ (βασιλέως) and the reference to a ‘divine decision’ (µαντεῖον). Like Q 6:37, the Septuagint’s translation of Proverbs 16:10 employs the verb κρίνω to refer to ‘judgment’. In both the Masoretic Text and the Septuagint’s translation of Proverbs 16:10–11, measuring instruments, like balancing scales and weights, are
linked to legal judgment. Insofar as God is involved in the king’s dispensation of justice on earth, this text alludes to the concept of psychostasia.

A more direct reference to psychostasia occurs earlier in the same chapter. Proverbs 16:2 makes additional mention of the measuring act; only this time it is not the king who acts as the subject thereof, but God: ‘All a man’s ways seem innocent to him, but motives (רוּחוֹת) are weighed (וְתֹכֵן) by the Lord (יְהוָה)’ (NIV). One of the more literal meanings of the Hebrew word translated here as ‘motives’ (רוּחוֹת) is ‘spirit’ (Bosman et al. 2009, s.v. רוּחַ; Holladay 1971:334–335, s.v. רוּחַ), which is how the King James Version (KJV) translated the word. This lexical meaning denotes the essence of what it means to be human (cf. Waltke 2005:10–11). In at least this respect, the Hebrew noun רוּחַ is not conceptually dissimilar to the Platonic ‘soul’ of Hellenistic thought. In its Qal stem, the Hebrew verb ‘weigh’ (וְתֹכֵן) literally means to ‘examine’ (Holladay 1971:390, s.v. תוכן) or to ‘test’ (Bosman et al. 2009, s.v. תוכן). However, the Pi’el and Pu’al stems of תוכן mean to ‘measure’ or ‘weigh’ something. This more than suggests that the Qal stem connoted ‘examination’ by means of ‘measuring’, ‘weighing’ or ‘counting’ something. In light of all this, Proverbs 16:2 could just as well be paraphrased as such: ‘All a person’s ways seem innocent to her or him, but her or his spirit is examined when it is weighed by the Lord.’ Waltke (2005:10) explicitly relates this verse to the ‘ancient Egyptian belief’ of psychostasia.

In all of the Old Testament, the Qal stem of the verb תוכן ['measure' or 'weigh'] occurs only in two other texts, both of which happen to be in Proverbs (21:2; 24:12). All three of these texts feature the verb in the participle, and in contexts where God is the implied or stated subject (Bosman et al. 2009, s.v. תוכן; Holladay 1971:390, s.v. תוכן). In both Proverbs 21:2 and 24:12, the verb in question takes the noun ‘heart’ or ‘inner being’ as object, thereby confirming the likelihood that רווח should in Proverbs 16:2 be translated as ‘spirit’ (or even ‘inner being’). The reason for ‘weighing’ a person’s ‘spirit’ is not overtly mentioned in Proverbs 16:2, but the immediate context suggests that it has everything to do with that person’s fate in this world. In verse 2, the word חַזְק ['innocent' or 'pure'] implies that a person’s ways are sometimes not innocent, and are therefore deserving of judgment. Verse 3 argues that God is in control of a person’s destiny in this world. If verses 2 and 3 are read together, as they should be, they suggest that a person’s destiny in this world is determined by God’s act of measuring the weight of that person’s deeds (cf. Brandon 1969:99). Thus, Proverbs 16:2–3 symbolically describes the judging act of God as a procedure of weighing people’s deeds. This judging act occurs during this lifetime, where it is implemented indirectly by God as the inevitable consequence of unacceptable behaviour. This understanding of God’s involvement in people’s lives forms the basis of traditional wisdom, as it is particularly developed by the book of Proverbs. It is also the crux of what is criticised by both Job and Qohelet, although Job (42:7–17) might be understood as ultimately reaffirming this sapiential schema. Interestingly, the Septuagint leaves out verse 2 in its translation of Proverbs 16.
The other two proverbs that feature the verb תכן ['measure' or 'weigh'] in its Qal stem are remarkably similar to Proverbs 16:2. Proverbs 21:2 states: ‘All a man’s ways seem right to him, but the Lord weighs the heart’ (NIV). In the original Hebrew text, there are only three small differences between Proverbs 16:2 and Proverbs 21:2: (1) the latter text changes the singular form of the word ‘way’ (ךְדֶּרֶך) to a plural form (ךְדַּרְכֵי); (2) the lexis ‘pure’ or ‘innocent’ (ךְזַז) is exchanged in the latter text for the lexis ‘smooth’ or ‘right’ (יָשָׁר); and (3) as we have seen, the latter text prefers the word ‘heart’ (לִבּוֹת) instead of ‘spirit’ (רוּחוֹת). In all other respects, the two texts are exact copies of each other. Like the Jewish word ‘spirit’, the Jewish word ‘heart’ symbolised the essence of what it meant to be human. Verse 1 of Proverbs 21 mentions the king, and states that even his heart is in God’s hands (see Waltke 2005:167–168). Thus, although the king, as we saw, weighs the hearts of others, and determines their destinies, God weighs his heart, and ultimately determines his destiny. The focus of Proverbs 21:1–8 is on this world, not on eschatological or post-mortem judgment, as is especially obvious in verse 5, where the reward is monetary profit in this world, and the punishment is material poverty. For some reason or another, the Septuagint changes the verb ‘weigh’ in verse 2 to ‘guide’ or ‘direct’ (κατευθύνει).

Proverbs 24:11 advises the wise to direct others in the ways of righteousness in order to save them from death and slaughter. That such death and slaughter do not refer to apocalyptic destruction is indicated by the mentioning of this-worldly violence and warfare in verses 2 and 6. In verse 12, the following rhetorical questions are asked of the wise:

If you say, ‘But we knew nothing about this,’ does not he who weighs the heart perceive it? Will he not repay each person according to what he has done? (NIV)

That the last sentence in Proverbs 24:12 has post-mortem divine judgment in mind is not only indicated by the lexis ‘life’ or ‘heart’ (ךָנַפְשָׁם), but also by the future tense (Hiph’il perfect) of the verb ‘repay’ (שׁוּב). These features should not in this literary context be taken as indications that the text pertains to eschatological judgment. Although God is not overtly mentioned as the subject of the weighing action, there should be no doubt that God is the intended subject (Waltke 2005:277). As in the previous text, the Septuagint exchanges the verb ‘weigh’ for another verb; in this case ‘know’ (γινώσκει).

There are three occurrences in the Masoretic Text of Proverbs (16:2; 21:2 & 24:12) that symbolically link God’s judgment of people’s deeds with the act of weighing their inner beings, which is either expressed as their ‘spirits’ or their ‘hearts’. Proverbs 21:2 focuses on God’s causal, this-worldly judgment, while Proverbs 24:12 focuses on God’s post-mortem, other-worldly judgment. Proverbs 16:2 focuses not only on God’s this-worldly causal judgment, but also on his other-worldly eschatological judgment. This indicates that these types of judgment were neither contradictory nor mutually exclusive in contemporary Jewish thought. It also indicates that the symbolism of weighing someone’s inner being was already an obvious metaphor for God’s judgment when these proverbs were conceived.
Chapter 4

Another sapiential text that deals with this theme is Job 31, where the protagonist is in the midst of defending himself and his own blamelessness against his friends. In verse 2, Job claims that man's lot is determined by God. Verse 3 carries this motif forward by stating that God effects ruin for the wicked and disaster for those who transgress. In verse 4, Job admits that God sees his actions and counts his every step (Hartley 1988:410). Hence, Job argues that God determines the fate of each man on earth by counting his righteous and sinful deeds, and by then rewarding or punishing him accordingly (cf. Brandon 1969:99). In light of these observations, Job laments in verses 5–8 that if he had transgressed in any way whatsoever, then others should be judged and punished just as harshly. In the midst of this lamentation (verse 6), Job makes the following assertion: ‘Let God weigh me (יִשְׁקְלֵנִי) in honest scales (בְּמֹאזְנֵי־צֶדֶק), and he will know that I am blameless’ (NIV). Balentine (2006:479, 480) relates this text to the scales of justice used in psychostasia. Job 31:6 clearly associates the images of being ‘weighed’ and of ‘honest scales’ with God’s this-worldly judgment (cf. Brandon 1969:100).

It should be noted that the prophetic tradition also reproduces the commandment of Leviticus 19:35–36. Ezekiel references this commandment as part of his efforts to reorganise the Jewish cult after the Babylonian exile. The Leviticus mandate appears in Ezekiel 45:10, which is part of a whole passage about standardising the types of produce and measures to be used during cultic sacrifices (cf. Am 8:4–6; Mic 6:11). In verses 11–12, Ezekiel spells out in no uncertain terms just how precise, accurate and consistent these measuring instruments are to be from now on. The intention behind this development was to protect the poor against exploitation by the cultic and regal leaders of Israel (cf. esp. Ezk 45:8–9). In this sense, the Ezekiel text is an attempt to incorporate the Leviticus commandment as part of a brand new piece of legislation. What is missing for our purposes, however, is a connection between correct measures and the act of judging. Although not particularly useful for illuminating Q 6:38, this prophetic application of the Leviticus text to a post-exilic situation does attest to the popularity and prevalence of the commandment in Leviticus 19:35–36. This commandment occurs in all three of the Tanakh’s major segments, namely the Torah (Dt 19:35–36; 25:14–16; Lv 19:35–37), the Nevi’im (Pr 11:1; 16:10–11; 20:10, 23), and the Ketuvim (Ezk 45:8–9; Am 8:4–6; Mi 6:11).

The apocalyptic book of Daniel (5:1–31) describes a scene according to which a human hand appears out of nowhere, in the midst of a royal banquet, and writes four Aramaic words on the palace walls. The king, Belshazzar, summons Daniel to interpret the writing. The four words are ‘minay’ (מְנֵא) (appearing twice), ‘tekel’ (תְּקֵל) and ‘pharsin’ (וּפַרְסִין). All three Aramaic words are units for measuring weight (Bosman et al. 2009, s.v. מְנֵא, תְּקֵל & וּפַרְסִין). The first unit (מְנֵא) was usually employed to measure the weight of coins and other precious metals, like gold and silver (Holladay 1971:412, s.v. Aramaic מְנֵא; Seow 2003:83). Daniel’s interpretation of this word is that God has counted or weighed (מְנָה) Belshazzar’s kingdom, and has brought it to an end. The
second unit (תְּקֵל) is also used to measure coins, other precious metals and luxury items (cf. Gn 24:22; Ex 30:23). Daniel’s explanation of this word is that Belshazzar has been weighed (תְּקִילְתָּה) in the balance (בְּמֹאזַנְיָא) by God, and found lacking. The third unit (וּפַרְסִין) constitutes half a ‘minay’ and/or half a ‘tekel’ (Bosman et al. 2009, s.v. פְּרֵס; Collins 1993:251; Holladay 1971:418, s.v. Aramaic פְּרִיס; Seow 2003:83). Through clever wordplay (פְּרֵס & פְּרִיסַת), Daniel explains the third word as meaning that Belshazzar’s kingdom has been divided, and given to the Medes and Persians (Collins 1993:250, 252; Seow 2003:83).

Although the word ‘judgment’ occurs nowhere in this pericope, God is indeed portrayed as judging Belshazzar and his reign (cf. esp. Dn 5:22–23). In Daniel’s interpretation of the writings on the wall, measurements, balancing scales and weights are used to symbolise God’s judgment of Belshazzar (cf. Brandon 1969:100). The fulfilment of the prophecy that God will judge Belshazzar is accomplished that same night already, when Belshazzar is killed and his kingdom is taken over by Darius the Median (cf. Dn 5:30–31). In its literary context, this narrative is not an example of eschatological or post-mortem, other-worldly judgment, since the judgment is exacted upon a single individual within the confines of history (cf. Brandon 1969:100). In Proverbs 16:10–11, measures by weight and balancing scales are symbolically linked to acts of juridical judgment by the king of Israel. In the current text, balancing scales and units of measurement are used to symbolise God’s judgment of a foreign king. In this way, Daniel 5:1–31 is very similar in meaning to Proverbs 21:1–2. Thus, measures and balancing scales came to symbolise both human and divine judgment. Although these references to units of measurement and balancing scales are translated away by the Old Greek version of the Septuagint, they are picked up again by the Theodotion version.

### Apocrypha

Fourth Ezra was probably written somewhere in Palestine between 90 and 100 CE, in reaction to the fall of Jerusalem (Jones 2003:15; Metzger 1983:520; see DeSilva 2002:323, 330–332; Stone 1990:9–10, 55). In 4 Ezra 3:28–36, the author laments the perceived state of affairs whereby Gentile nations like Babylon (symbolising Rome) prosper regardless of how sinful, godless and wicked they are (DeSilva 2002:325). Conversely, Israelites keep God’s commandments, living virtuous lives, but still they suffer. This leads him to question the age-old sapiential schema according to which God always rewards the righteous and punishes the sinful (Stone 1990:76). Whereas the book of Job addresses the theodicy question by comparing the lives of individuals with that of Job, 4 Ezra 3:28–36 addresses the same question by comparing the lives of different nations with that of Israel (cf. Jones 2003:15, 21). The pericope does not

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246.Fourth Ezra is also known as 2 Esdras 3–14. The very same text is therefore referenced by both of the following designations: 2 Esdras 3:28–36 and 4 Ezra 3:28–36.
explicitly say so, but the obvious undercurrent is a wish for justice within the world, so that people and nations are fairly and impartially judged by God according to their deeds (cf. 4 Ezr 4:18; cf. Brandon 1969:98, 99, 110). It is within this literary context that verse 34 makes the following statement:

`So weigh our sins in the balance against the sins of the rest of the world; and it will be clear which way the scale tips.'

In this text, the item being weighed is not the 'heart', 'soul' or 'spirit', but the sins of the different nations. Nevertheless, the purpose remains the same, namely to ensure fair and impartial judgment by God. Stone (1990) relates this verse to the Old Testament texts on psychostasia discussed earlier (see above, 'The Old Testament'), which leads him to make the following comment:

[The image serves to stress the righteousness of the deeds of Israel when compared with those of the Gentiles, but it derives doubtlessly from the more specific idea of God's weighing righteous and wicked deeds. (p. 77)]

In Chapter 4, the angel Uriel answers Ezra and explains that God will provide justice for Israel at the apocalyptic judgment. Although God’s judgment might seem unreasonable in this world, the Final Judgment will be wholly fair and impartial. Ezra is still not satisfied, and asks Uriel, in verse 33, how long Israel must wait and suffer in this world before God decides to introduce the Final Judgment. In verses 36–37, Uriel answers by quoting the archangel Jeremiel: ‘As soon as the number of those like yourselves is complete. For the Lord has weighed the world in a balance, he has measured and numbered the ages.’ Thus, God not only weighs the deeds and inner being of each individual, but also measures the number of righteous individuals. According to this text, the exact number of people who will be rewarded at the Final Judgment has been preordained by God (Stone 1990:97). Before this number has not been achieved, the apocalyptic event will not take place. In 4 Ezra, God is the one who judges, and the symbolism of ‘weighing’ and ‘measuring’ is invoked in reference to both his this-worldly judgment (4 Ezr 3:34) and his apocalyptic judgment (4 Ezr 4:36–37).

The apocryphal writing Wisdom of Solomon was almost certainly written somewhere in Egypt, likely Alexandria, and could have been conceived at any stage between the 2nd century BCE and 70 CE (cf. Evans 2005:14; Jones 2003:71; see Clarke 1973:1–2; DeSilva 2002:131–133; Winston 1979:20–25). This apocryphal writing is a prime example of how wisdom and apocalypticism became integrated genres during the Second Temple period. In verses 15–20 of Chapter 11, the writing describes how God, if he so wished, could have punished the Egyptians with more than ten plagues, and how God could have obliterated them with a single breath (Winston 1979:231). Yet, God chose not to do these things, because it was not part of his plan. This latter idea is expressed in verse 20 with the statement ‘but thou hast ordered all things by measure

247. All translations of Jewish Apocrypha are taken from The New English Bible (1970).

248. That is, Proverbs 16:2, 11; 21:2; 24:12; Job 31:6; Daniel 5:27.
and number and weight. In a word, the author expresses the belief that God’s judgment against the Egyptians was measured. By means of psychostasia imagery, God’s judgment is here correlated to his creation and governance of the cosmos (cf. Jones 2003:83). Just like God’s creation and rule are logically planned and measured, his judgment is never arbitrary, but similarly planned and measured (Winston 1979:234). The judgment of God is here clearly ‘confined to this world’ (Clarke 1973:78).

In verses 21–26, the author continues to explain that God is powerful, and that he is in full control of his judgment. If he shows mercy to a person or nation, it is because he loves his creation, and because he chooses to spare it. It is within this context that the author says in verse 22: ‘[F]or in thy sight the whole world is like a grain that just tips the scale.’ The idea that, to God, the whole world is merely a grain (of sand?) expresses his unfathomable strength and power; indeed, his omnipotence (Clarke 1973:79; cf. LXX Is 40:15; Wis 11:2). The phrase ‘that just tips the scale’ is unnecessary for the communication of this analogy, and probably features to allude to God’s judgment. This understanding is reinforced by the conjunction δέ, with which verse 23 begins. After saying that the world is to God like a grain that tips the scales, verse 23 states: ‘But (δέ) thou art merciful’. The mercy of God is therefore described as the opposite of whatever is meant by ‘tipping the scale’. The most obvious counterpart of God’s mercy is his judgment. The argument that the reference to a ‘scale’ symbolises God’s judgment is further supported by the literary context of Chapter 11 as a whole, which deals overtly and directly with the subject matter of God’s judgment and mercy (cf. esp. Wis 11:8–10).

The central point of verses 15–26 is that God has the power to exert judgment and/or show mercy whenever and however he pleases. The same symbolism is expressed in Wisdom of Solomon 12:26; only here in reference to God’s judgment in the world to come: ‘[B]ut those who do not take warning from such derisive correction will experience the full weight of divine judgment.’ On this occasion, God’s other-worldly judgment is pertinently mentioned, and the degree thereof expressed in terms of weight. To be sure, this ancient Jewish text uses each of the images of ‘measure’, ‘weight’ and ‘scale’ as a shorthand symbol for God’s judgment, not only in this world, but also in the world to come.

The date and provenance of Sirach have been determined with some degree of confidence. Although the Greek translation of this writing was made in Alexandria, the Semitic original was composed in Judea, most probably Jerusalem, during the 2nd century BCE (Evans 2005:15; Snaith 1974:1; see DeSilva 2002:157–161). A saying similar to the one in Wisdom of Solomon 12:26 appears in Sirach 5:6: ‘To him [God] belong both mercy and wrath, and sinners feel the weight of his retribution.’ Also


250.’Wisdom of Jesus ben Sirach’ in full, also known as ‘Ecclesiasticus’.
here, God’s judgment is pertinently mentioned, and the degree thereof expressed in
terms of weight. The present tense of this maxim implies that this-worldly judgment
is meant. In his commentary on this text, Snaith (1974) explains the broader context
that informed Sirach’s treatment of God’s this-worldly judgment:

Ben Sira, however, was still trying to counter the arguments of those who, believing in retribution
before death and observing the prosperity of the wicked, ceased to believe in God’s retribution at all. (p. 32)

In this light, Sirach 47:23–25 interprets the exile of Israel as the inevitable result of
her sins against God. Verse 24 starts with the statement: ‘Their sins increased beyond
measure, until they were driven into exile from their native land.’ Verse 25 reiterates
the same idea in different words: ‘[F]or they had explored every kind of wickedness,
until retribution came upon them.’ In this context, the retribution can be nothing other
than the exile itself. The mention of the word ‘measure’ implies that the sins of Israel
were so numerous that no man could measure them. The twofold use of the word ‘until’
implies that God could and did indeed measure Israel’s sins (cf. 2 Macc 6:14–16; 4 Macc
5:19–25). The direct result of this measuring act was God’s this-worldly judgment in
the form of an exile (cf. Jones 2003:124). Sirach uses the words ‘measure’, ‘weight’ and
‘scale’ to speak about God’s judgment. The subject of the judging action is God, and the
judgment in question happens within the confines of history.

Another text in Sirach (9:14) applies the same language to the moral judgment of
one human being upon another: ‘Take the measure of your neighbours as best you
can, and accept advice from those who are wise.’ Like Sirach 37:8, this text is about
taking advice. Unlike Sirach 37:8, however, this text has a human being, and not
God, as the subject of judgment. Although the word ‘judgment’ is absent, to ‘take the
measure of your neighbour’ certainly here implies judging his moral integrity and
sapiential expertise. This sapiential text about moral judgment follows in the tradition
of Leviticus 19:15, which commands people to judge their neighbours. Sirach 9:14
certainly reminds one of Q 6:37–38, especially because it bears a sapiential admonition
that is formally and thematically comparable to the one in Q 6:37a, while also bearing
the word ‘measure’ as in Q 6:38. If the content of Sirach 9:14a is compared with that of
Q 6:37a, the subversive nature of the latter comes to the fore. Not only does Q 6:37a
advocate behaviour opposite to that of the more conventional admonition in Sirach
9:14, but it also intends such radical behaviour to be directed at enemies, and not merely
one’s ‘neighbours’ as in Sirach 9:14. The same subversive features were observed
earlier, when Q 6:37–38 was compared to Leviticus 19:15. The comparison to Sirach
9:14 indicates that these subversive features should not exclusively be understood as
an attempted rewriting of Mosaic Law, but also as a challenge to traditional wisdom.
Sirach 9:14 further indicates that the word ‘measure’ did not always function to evoke
the concept of psychostasia, but could also function to describe purely moral, non-
divine, non-eschatological judgment.
Pseudepigrapha

Even though some scholars have dated Pseudo-Philo to a time just after 70 CE, it seems much more likely that it was composed in Palestine before the Temple was destroyed, perhaps even as early as 135 BCE (cf. Harrington 1985:299–300). On more than one occasion, Pseudo-Philo (26:13; 36:1; 41:1; 47:9) speaks of people’s sins ‘reaching full measure (against them)’. Elsewhere, Pseudo-Philo (45:3) speaks of people’s sins being ‘multiplied against them’. These texts suggest that people’s sins are measured during their lives on earth, and that the sum total will at some stage be held against them (cf. 2 Macc 6:14–16; 4 Macc 5:19–25; Pr Man 9–10). These notions are supported by Pseudo-Philo 33:3, which describes the finality of death as a time or state during which ‘the measure and the time and the years have returned their deposit.’ It is not certain what the word ‘measure’ refers to in this text. It could have something to do with post-mortem judgment, seeing as the subject matter of verse 2 is people’s earthly deeds. However, it could just as well refer to the measured time span of one’s life. The association in verse 3 of the word ‘measure’ with the words ‘time’ and ‘years’ strongly suggests the latter interpretation. Nevertheless, the use here of the word ‘deposit’ supports the deduction made above, that people’s sins are measured during their lives on earth, and that the sum total will at some stage, whether it be in this world or the next, be held against them. The noun ‘deposit’ is repeated twice more in verse 3, and used in a similar fashion. The idea that people ‘store up credit’ with God, who measures and counts people’s daily (good and bad) deeds is also expressed elsewhere by Jewish texts, which tend to use words and terms such as ‘account’, ‘credit’, ‘debt’, ‘store up’, ‘record’, ‘count’, ‘write down’, ‘treasure in heaven’, ‘heavenly tablets’, ‘heavenly book’, ‘preserved’, ‘kept’ and ‘recompense’ in apocalyptic and eschatological contexts. This idea is developed even further in some texts, which declare that God ‘tests’ people in their daily lives on earth in order to provide a fair balance of good and bad deeds.

Two other texts from the same pseudepigraphical document may illuminate this topic further.

In Pseudo-Philo 40:1, Jephthah addresses the following rhetorical question to his daughter after returning home from a victorious battle: ‘And now who will put my heart in the balance and my soul on the scale?’ Jephthah does not seem to associate this imagery with any kind of judgment. Instead, he seems to use it as a metaphor for...

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253. For example, Wisdom of Solomon 11:8–9; Pseudo-Philo 40:5; Testament of Abraham 12:14; Dead Sea Scrolls: IQCommunity Rule (1QS) V:24; 1QWar Scroll (1QM) XVI:15; XVII:1–2, 8–9; 4QWar Scroll (4QM) 11, II:12.
measuring his own joy, as the rest of verse 1 suggests: ‘And I will stand by and see which will win out, whether it is the rejoicing that has occurred or the sadness that befalls me.’ This text nonetheless illustrates familiarity with the imagery of weighing one’s ‘heart’ and ‘soul’ with ‘balances’ and ‘scales’. As before, this text also indicates that the mere presence of words like ‘balance’ and ‘scale’ does not automatically indicate that the concept of psychostasia is being recalled, even if such words feature together with words such as ‘heart’ and ‘soul’. Be that as it may, the word ‘balance’ is indeed pertinently linked to God’s judgment in Pseudo-Philo 63:4, where David explains the consequences of killing Goliath: ‘And would the judgment of truth be placed in the balance so that the many prudent people might hear the decision.’ Whereas the first cluster of texts from Pseudo-Philo alluded to a future judgment, during which measured sins would be held against their perpetrators, the current text overtly connects the word ‘balance’ with God’s this-worldly judgment.

Proposed dates for the origin of the Sentences of Pseudo-Phocylides have varied widely, but the most probable option seems to be a date between 30 BCE and 40 CE (see Van der Horst 1985:567–568). Conversely, there is widespread agreement that its place of origin was Alexandria. Pseudo-Phocylides (9–21) exhort the powers that be to judge fairly and impartially. Words like ‘justice’, ‘injustice’, ‘just’, ‘judge’ and ‘judgment’ permeate this pericope, occurring no less than 9 times, if combined. In the midst of this exhortation (verses 14–15), the following admonitions appear: ‘Give a just measure, and an extra full measure of all things is good. Do not make a balance unequal, but weigh honestly.’ Considered in isolation, these admonitions seem to be speaking of honesty during economic transactions (see Wilson 2005:92–93). Within their current literary context, however, they apply to the process of judicial judgment. The redactional strategy of placing an admonition derived directly from Leviticus 19:35–36 into a context that deals with judicial judgment is reminiscent of Proverbs 16:11, discussed earlier (see above, ‘The Old Testament’; cf. Wilson 2005:92). Accordingly, the phrases ‘make a balance unequal’ and ‘weigh honestly’ symbolise, respectively, unjust and just acts of judgment by mortal judges. Likewise, the most natural reading of verse 14 within its current literary context is that a judge should be fair and merciful in his judgments. Thus, images of ‘measure’, ‘weight’ and ‘balance’ are used to symbolise the procedure of judicial judgment. The subject of the judging action is not God, but a human judge.

Internal evidence indicates that the individual Psalms of Solomon were most likely formulated for the first time in Jerusalem, during the 1st century BCE (see Wright 1985:640–642). One of the most direct and unambiguous references to psychostasia features in this writing. The first three verses of the fifth psalm praises God for his ‘righteous judgments’ and mercy. Verse 4 continues with this statement: ‘For an individual and his fate [are] on the scales before you; he cannot add any increase contrary to your judgment, O God.’ In this sapiential saying, images of psychostasia are straightforwardly linked to God’s judgment. The phrase ‘before you’ also reminds
one of the apocalyptic courtroom (see Chapter 3, ‘Confessing Jesus in public’). It is not clear from this quotation whether the reference is to this-worldly or other-worldly judgment, but verses 8–19 certainly suggest that the former is in view here (cf. Brandon 1969:99).

Another pseudepigraphical writing that speaks openly about psychostasia is the apocalyptic work of 1 Enoch. This writing was familiar to the communities responsible for the Dead Sea Scrolls, and was almost certainly composed in Judea (Isaac 1983:7–8). The same provenance probably applies to Chapters 37–71, also known as the Similitudes of Enoch. As we have seen, however, the Similitudes should be dated to a period after 70 CE, even if the rest of 1 Enoch predates the destruction of the Temple (see Chapter 1, ‘The Son of Man’; cf. Burkett 1999:72; Müller 2008:337; pace Brandon 1969:100). Collins (2010a:196–197) provides a number of loose-standing arguments to support the possibility that the Similitudes might have existed before 70 CE, even if they are absent from the Qumran caves. Amongst these, the most important observations include the following: (1) other documents that came into being before 70 CE are also missing from the Qumran caves (cf. Stanton 2002:251); (2) the references to the Son of Man sitting on his throne in Matthew 19:28 and 25:31 are a result of the Similitudes’ influence; and (3) the text of the Similitudes contains no reference or allusion to the fall of Jerusalem. Each of these observations can be challenged: the third argument is ad silencium; the second argument represents a minority opinion; and the first argument fails to distinguish between the complete absence of whole documents from Qumran and the consistent absence of the same section within a document that is otherwise present at Qumran.

First Enoch 41:1, which forms part of the Similitudes, says: ‘And after that, I saw all the secrets in heaven, and how the actions of the people are weighed in the balance.’ Clearly, the eschatological event, during which God will judge the people of this world, is in view here. First Enoch 61 is just as unequivocal, and deserves to be quoted in full:

He placed the Elect One on the throne of glory; and he shall judge all the works of the holy ones in heaven above, weighing in the balance their deeds. And when he shall lift up his countenance in order to judge the secret ways of theirs, by the word of the name of the Lord of Spirits, and their conduct, by the method of the righteous judgment of the Lord of Spirits, then they shall all speak with one voice, blessing, glorifying, extolling, sanctifying the name of the Lord of the Spirits. (vv. 8–9)

No measure of agreement exists regarding either the date or the provenance of 2 Enoch (see Andersen 1983:94–97). It could possibly predate 70 CE, and might have been written in Palestine, but neither of these claims can be made with any degree of confidence. Second Enoch (44) is just as unequivocal as 1 Enoch in its application of psychostasia imagery, and also deserves to be quoted in full. The following quotation derives from manuscript J:

Because on the day of the great judgment [text missing]. Every weight [text missing] and every measure and every set of scales will be just as they are in the market. That is to say, each will be
weighed in the balance, and each will stand in the market, and each will find out his own measure and each shall receive his own reward. (v. 5)

Like 1 Enoch 61:8–9, 2 Enoch 44:5 has the eschatological judgment of God in mind. Particularly interesting about this text is that it overtly associates the measuring of goods in the marketplace with being measured at the Final Judgment. This association indicates that there was no contradiction in Jewish thought between the two points of reference. In fact, the two ways of understanding the imagery are deliberately combined in this text so as to complement each other. Second Enoch [J] 49:2–3 makes the following claim:

And I make an oath to you – ‘Yes, Yes!’ – that even before any person was in his mother’s womb, individually a place I prepared for each soul, as well as a set of scales and a measurement of how long he intends him to live in this world, so that each person may be investigated with it. (vv. 2–3)

‘Second Enoch [J] 52:15 continues: ‘For all these things [will be weighed] in the balances and exposed in the books on the great judgment day.’” As before, these two texts not only relate future judgment to divine creation, but also apply the imagery of scales and measures to claim that God has preordained the lifespan of each person on earth. Particularly telling is that the texts openly claim that exactly the same scales and measures are used for both the determination of people’s lifespan and the determination of people’s ultimate fate ‘on the great judgment day’. The explicit identification in this text of eschatological judgment with preordination through the imagery of scales, balances and weights validates our earlier findings, where preordination and judgment were also found to be linked through such imagery. These texts are further interesting if read together with a separate saying in the same apocalyptic book. Second Enoch [J] 44:3 does not recall psychostasia as such, but corresponds to Q 6:37–38 in presenting the jus talionis motif through similar syntactical structuring:

He who expresses anger to any person without provocation will reap anger in the great judgment.
He who spits on any person’s face, insultingly, will reap the same at the Lord’s great judgment. (v. 3)

This quotation warns one against ruling too quickly against the possibility that the passive verbs in Q 6:37–38 are on some level intended as divine passives; or that Q 6:37–38 alludes to eschatology, for that matter.

The Apocalypse of Zephaniah was probably written in Egypt, sometime between 100 BCE and 175 CE, with slight internal evidence suggesting a date before 70 CE (Pearson 1976:250 fn. 66; Winternute 1983:500–501). Like the books of Enoch, the Apocalypse of Zephaniah describes an apocalyptic journey through heaven. In Chapter 8, Zephaniah is surrounded by a host of angels (Pearson 1976:250–251). Verse 5 has the following to say: ‘Now, moreover, my sons, this is the trial because it is necessary that the good and the evil be weighed in a balance.’

Another work of this nature is the Book of the Apocalypse of Baruch, The Son of Neriah, more commonly known as 2 Baruch. It can be dated fairly accurately to
the beginning of the 2nd century CE, and can be placed somewhat confidently in Palestine (cf. Klijn 1983:616–617). In Chapter 41, Baruch asks about the ultimate fate of the proselytes, seeing as they lived in sin before converting to Judaism (Klijn 1983:633 fn. 41b, c). In verse 6, Baruch formulates the question like this: ‘Their time will surely not be weighed exactly, and they will certainly not be judged as the scale indicates?’ In other words, Baruch is concerned that the proselyte Jews’ former sinful lifestyles will be counted and weighed against them at the Final Judgment. The use of the verb ‘judge’ with the verb ‘weigh’ and the noun ‘scale’ indicates a deliberate and necessary relationship for the author between the Final Judgment and the imagery of psychostasia.

The most vivid and detailed description of psychostasia in Jewish literature of the time, reminding one of the Egyptian Book of the Dead, comes from the Testament of Abraham (see Brandon 1969:104–105; Pearson 1976:251–252). Recension A of this work was likely written in Egypt around 100 CE (Brandon 1969:104; see Sanders 1983:874–875). The document describes the scene of the Final Judgment in Chapters 12–14 (Recension A). Because of its elaborate description of psychostasia, as well as its testimony to how this concept was adopted, understood and transformed by contemporary Jews, it is worthwhile to quote significant portions from these chapters:

And between the two gates there stood a terrifying throne with the appearance of terrifying crystal, flashing like fire. And upon it sat a wondrous man, bright as the sun, like unto a son of God. Before him stood a table like crystal, all of gold and byssus. On the table lay a book whose thickness was six cubits, while its breadth was ten cubits. On its right and on its left stood two angels holding papyrus and ink and pen. In front of the table stood a light-bearing angel, holding a balance in his hand. [On his] left there sat a fiery angel, altogether merciless and relentless, holding a trumpet in his hand, which contained within it an all-consuming fire [for] testing the sinners. And the wondrous man who sat on the throne was the one who judged and sentenced the souls. The two angels on the right and left recorded. The one on the right recorded righteous deeds, while the one on the left [recorded] sins. And the one who was in front of the table, who was holding the balance, weighed the souls. And the fiery angel, who held the fire, tested the souls. And Abraham asked the Commander-in-chief Michael, ‘What are these things which we see?’ And the Commander-in-chief said: ‘These things which you see, pious Abraham, are judgment and recompense.’ And behold, the angel who held the soul in his hand brought it before the judge. And the judge told one of the angels who served him, ‘Open for me this book and find for me the sins of this soul.’ … The Commander-in-chief said: … ‘And the sunlike angel, who holds the balance in his hand, this is the archangel Dokiel, the righteous balance-bearer, and he weighs the righteous deeds and the sins with the righteousness of God. And the fiery and merciless angel, who holds the fire in his hand, this is the archangel Purouel, who has authority over fire, and he tests the work of men through fire. And if he burns up the work of anyone, immediately the angel of judgment takes him and carries him away to the place of sinners, a most bitter place of punishment. But if the fire tests the work of anyone and does not touch it, this person is justified and the angel of righteousness takes him and carries him up to be saved in the lot of the righteous. And thus, most righteous Abraham, all things in all people are tested by fire and balance. (Test. Abr. 12:4–17; 13:2a, 10–14)
Despite all the obvious images of both psychostasia and the divine courtroom, the idea that people build up credit with God during their daily lives on earth is also expressed in this passage. Particularly noteworthy in this respect are words like ‘record’, ‘recompense’ and ‘book’. Similarly, the idea that people are ‘tested’ during their earthly lives to determine their ultimate fate also finds expression here.

The Dead Sea Scrolls

It is widely accepted today that the sectarian Dead Sea Scrolls were composed before 70 CE near Khirbet Qumran, which is on the north-western shore of the Dead Sea in Judea (see García Martínez 1996:xlv–xlvi).254 The Rule of the Community, or Community Rule, was discovered in the first and fourth Qumran caves. The in-group is described as the Yahad (יהד; literally, ‘community’). Like some of the other scrolls discovered at Qumran, the Community Rule divides its salvation history into three distinct phases: (1) the present pre-messianic age; (2) the future messianic age; and (3) the ultimate post-apocalyptic age (see Howes 2014d:5–7 of 11). Although most of the scroll deals with the pre-messianic age, 1QS VIII:1–IX:11 pertains to the (pre-apocalyptic) messianic age as such (see Howes 2014d:8–9 of 11; cf. Berg 2007:161–174). During this messianic age, it was expected that the Yahad would be completely purified through a process of strict internal judgment (Flint 1997:60). This process is partly described in 1QS VIII:

In the Community Council [there shall be] twelve men and three priests, perfect in everything that has been revealed about all the law to implement truth, justice, judgment, compassionate love and unassuming behaviour of each person to his fellow to preserve faithfulness on the earth with firm purpose and repentant spirit in order to atone for sin, doing justice and undergoing trials in order to walk with everyone in the measure of truth and the regulation of time. (vv. 1–4)255

The ‘Community Council’ is most probably here an alternative designation for the Yahad itself (Berg 2007:165–166; Collins 2010b:161; Hempel 2003:75; 2008:44, 49–54; Metso 2008:72–77, 80–81). The ‘twelve men and three priests’ very likely represent an elite leadership group within the Yahad, who would oversee the in-group’s process of purification during the messianic age (see Berg 2007:161–177; cf. Collins 1998:176; 2010b:161–162; pace Metso 2008:78–84). The numbers ‘twelve’ and ‘three’ refer to the twelve tribes of Israel and the three tribes from Levi respectively (Collins 2010b:162; Hempel 2008:54; Metso 2008:81). The implementation of truth, justice and judgment probably refer to the role of the 15 as judges of their respective tribes. To a certain extent, independent evidence hereof is provided by the War Scroll (4Q491 1–3:9–10), where priests, Levites and the ‘chiefs of the camps’ are responsible for judging the men of the tribes before they go into battle (cf. Arnold 2006:199). Better support comes

254. Some of the scrolls in the Qumran library might have originated elsewhere, having merely been stored in the caves for safekeeping. Some other scrolls might have found their way to the caves as a result of the Jewish War, having been hidden from the Romans. The decidedly sectarian scrolls, however, were almost certainly written at or near the shore of the Dead Sea in Judea.

from the *Damascus Document* (CD 10:4–10), where the representative leaders of the tribes of Israel and Levi are expressly described as ‘the judges of the congregation’ (cf. Metso 2008:67).\(^{256}\)

These observations are all intended to contextualise and clarify the phrase ‘walk in the measure of truth’ in the quotation above. According to 1QS VIII:1–4, the most important goal of the judicial process of internal purification is to ensure that the whole community ‘walks in the measure of truth’ during the messianic age, in preparation for the apocalyptic end. By implication, ‘truth’ is understood as something that can be measured, and it is measured by means of a formal process of judicial judgment. Even though the text is eschatological in nature, it does not describe apocalyptic judgment, which will only occur after the messianic age has been completed. Instead, it describes a process of judicial judgment expected to take place during the messianic age. It is in this context that the ‘measure of truth’ is mentioned.

In 1QS IX:12–22, the focus shifts to the responsibilities of the *Maskil* (משכיל; literally, ‘the one who enlightens’ or the ‘instructor’), as these pertain to both the pre-messianic and messianic ages (see Berg 2007:174–176; Schiffman 1994:123–125). The following instructions appear within this pericope:

> [H]e [the *Maskil*] should separate and weigh the sons of Zadok according to their spirits; … he should carry out the judgment of each man in accordance with his spirit. (1QS IX:14–15; idem. 4QS III:10–12)\(^{257}\)

The term ‘sons of Zadok (or justice)’ is here a designation for the *Yahad*’s priests, and the phrase ‘each man’ refers either to the same priests of the community or to all the community members. The latter option is perhaps preferable, especially if considering the application of the same phrase in line 12 (cf. 1QS III:13–15). Either way, the two instructions foresee the same action being performed by the *Maskil*. That the description ‘separate and weigh’ in the first instruction should be identified with the description ‘carry out the judgment’ in the second instruction is indicated by the replication of the phrase ‘according to his [or their] spirit(s)’ in both instructions. In other words, the *Maskil* is here directed to ensure the holiness of the community priests (and members) by means of judicial judgment (cf. Howes 2014d:8 of 11). It is clear that this text understands the verb ‘weighing’ as shorthand for the concept of ‘judging’. In the two texts considered, words like ‘measure’ and ‘weigh’ are employed to denote the process and act of *judicial* judgment within the community. The logic behind this association is expressed clearly in *Sapiential Work C* (4Q424) 3:4, offensive as it may be: ‘Do not send the hard of hearing to investigate the judgment, for he will not weigh up the men’s dispute.’

\(^{256}\)Although, in this case, their numbers differ: four from the tribe of Levi (and Aaron) plus six from Israel add up to ten (cf. Metso 2008:67).

\(^{257}\)Translation from García Martínez and Tigchelaar (1997).
The words ‘measure’ and ‘judgment’ (repeated three times) appear within the same literary context in *Hymnsa* (1QHᵃ) IV:1–6. Unfortunately, the text is extremely damaged, making it impossible to determine either the larger literary context or the specific internal relationship between the words in question.258 Luckily, a relevant text from the same collection has remained intact. The following lines appear as part of a poem about the apocalyptic end: ‘When the measuring line for judgment fails, ... then the torrents of Belial will overflow their high banks’ (1QHᵃ XI:27–29). According to the poem, apocalyptic judgment will be delivered with the assistance of a ‘measuring line’. Regardless of the precise function of the ‘measuring line’ in antiquity, a measuring implement of some kind is associated in this text with apocalyptic judgment.

The psychostasia motif finds full expression in the following fragment of a poetic text from the Dead Sea Scrolls (4Q418 126, II:3–4): ‘And with the scales of justice God measures all [text missing] he separates them in truth. He positions them and examines their delights’ (cf. 4Q418 127:5–6). The verbs ‘position’ and ‘examine’ remind one of the judicial courtroom. Although the verbs of this sentence appear in the present tense, future judgment is in view. The gnomic nature of the statement probably necessitated present tense verbs. That future judgment is intended is made clear by the subsequent verses:

[Text missing] judgment to carry out vengeance on all the evildoers and the visitation [text missing] to confine the wicked for ever and to lift up the head of the weak [text missing] with eternal glory and perpetual peace, and the spirit of life to separate [text missing]. (vv. 6–8)

The mention of ‘all’ the evildoers, as well as the usage of words like ‘for ever’, ‘eternal glory’ and ‘perpetual peace’, leave no question marks behind the apocalyptic nature of this passage. The description is of an apocalyptic and universal judgment; one that will result in a new and everlasting status quo. In verse 10, the text continues to describe this post-apocalyptic condition with future tense verbs: ‘They will bow down the whole day, they will always praise his name.’ Considering the texts discussed in this section, it is certainly justified to conclude that (some of) the communities behind the Dead Sea Scrolls associated words like ‘scale’, ‘measure’ and ‘weigh’ with not only judicial judgment by men, but also apocalyptic judgment by God.

Back to Q

One could argue that only those texts written in Palestine before 70 CE are relevant to the Sayings Gospel Q, witnessing to the usage of words like ‘measure’, ‘scale’, ‘weigh’ and ‘balance’ at the time and place Q was written.259 Such a cutback would still leave a

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258. The same applies to *4QBless, Oh My Soul* (4Q434) 1, I:5–11, where the words ‘judge’ and ‘judgment’ occur together with the words ‘measure’ and ‘scales’. Although more of the text is available here, pieces of text crucial to our inquiry are missing.

259. Q’s date of origin has not been determined with any degree of certainty, but general consensus does exist. It is generally agreed that Q received its final form before or slightly after the Roman War (66–73 CE), since, on the one hand, Q seems
number of witnesses, including Proverbs, Job and Daniel in the Old Testament, Sirach in the Apocrypha, Pseudo-Philoi and the Psalms of Solomon in the pseudepigrapha, and the *Community Rule, Hymns* and *Sapiential Work* in the Dead Sea Scrolls. A distinction should further be made between intertexts that do and intertexts that do not evoke the concept of psychostasia when using words like ‘measure’, ‘weigh’, ‘balance’ and ‘scale’. On the one hand, the following texts from the earmarked time and place feature words like ‘measure’, ‘weigh’, ‘balance’ and ‘scale’ *without* invoking the concept of psychostasia: (1) texts about this-worldly judicial judgment: Proverbs 16:10–11; *Community Rule* VIII:1–4 and *Community Rule* IX:14–15; and (2) a text about this-worldly moral judgment between individuals: Sirach 9:14. On the other hand, the following texts from the relevant time and place clearly employ the concept of psychostasia in reference to God’s judgment: (1) texts about other-worldly apocalyptic judgment: *Hymns* XI:27–29 and *Sapiential Work* 126, II:3–4; (2) texts about other-worldly post-mortem judgment: Proverbs 24:12 and Pseudo-Philoi 33:3; and (3) texts about this-worldly divine judgment: Proverbs 16:2; Proverbs 16:10–11; Proverbs 21:2; Job 31:6; Daniel 5:1–31; Sirach 5:6; Sirach 47:23–25; Pseudo-Philoi 63:4 and Psalm of Solomon 5:4.

It is clear from this distribution that this-worldly divine judgment is by far the most popular application of the psychostasia concept in the relevant literature. Although there are a few texts from Palestine before 70 CE that apply the psychostasia concept to eschatological judgment, it seems that the full potential of this application was only developed after the destruction of the Temple in 70 CE with texts like the Similitudes of Enoch and the Testament of Abraham. In fact, there are only two texts from the relevant time and place that apply the psychostasia motif to eschatological judgment, and these texts are from the library of one or more isolated sectarian communities. At any rate, this list of texts confirms that the concept of psychostasia existed in Palestine before 70 CE, and perhaps much earlier. Brandon (1969:99) believes that the Jewish expression of the idea can be traced as far back as the 2nd century BCE. Out of all these texts, Sirach 9:14 is formally and thematically most comparable to Q 6:37–38.

None of the texts considered provide direct evidence of psychostasia being known in Galilee specifically. This is to be expected, given the general and pervasive scarcity of extant literature from Galilee before 70 CE. Two considerations suggest
that Galileans were indeed familiar with the concept of psychostasia. The first is the historical association of rabbinic Judaism with Galilee (cf. Horsley 1995a:94). Tannaitic literature, like the Mishnah and Tosefta, apply images of psychostasia, similar to the ones encountered above, to their descriptions of judgment scenes (e.g. t. Kidd. 1:13–14; t. Sanh. 13:3; see Sanders 1977:128–147). Although these texts are from a later period, they do provide evidence of Galilean familiarity with the concept of psychostasia. The second consideration is the Judean ethnicity of Galileans (see Chapter 2, ‘Galilean ethnicity’). Some Judeans were still uprooting themselves and moving to Galilee at the turn of the millennium. Given that Jewish Galileans were ethnically and religiously Judean, one would expect them to bear the same religious and mythological traditions as Judea, including the concept of psychostasia. If these Galileans were ignorant of certain Judean traditions, whether it be as a result of moving away or as a result of intentional disregard, they could easily refamiliarise themselves with such traditions during one of their pilgrimage visits to Jerusalem (see Freyne 1988:178–187; 2000:130, 154; Reed 2000:57–58). In light of all this, it seems very likely that those responsible for the Sayings Gospel Q had access to the concept of psychostasia.

The latter judgment is confirmed by internal clues. In Q 11:4, the author petitions God to ‘cancel our debts’, and to ‘not put us to the test’. This choice of words reminds one not only of the tradition that God keeps score of good and bad deeds, but also of the tradition that God tests our commitment during our lives on earth. This reading of the Lord’s Prayer does not turn it into a text that deals with futurist eschatology. The focus is here on the account that God keeps in the present, and not on the ultimate consequences of his bookkeeping (cf. Kloppenborg 2001:177). If some type of futurist judgment is here being implied, it is non-eschatological, post-mortem judgment that is at play. The literary context (Q 11:9–13) indicates that we have to do here with God’s causal, this-worldly efforts. The present reading should also not be seen as a contradiction of the hermeneutic that interprets this text as referring to the cancellation of economic debts and the avoidance of legal trials (see above, ‘Judicial judgment in the rest of Q’). As part of God’s ultimate control over all aspects of earthly life, economic debts and judicial trials are also orchestrated by God. It follows that if God forgives an individual’s heavenly debts, earthly debts are sure to evaporate. By the same token, a divine refusal to test someone could practically translate into an earthly evasion of a legal trial.

The phrases ‘settling of accounts’ and ‘an accounting will be required’ in Q 11:50–51 provide further evidence that the Q people imagined God to be keeping an account of our deeds on earth. Whereas Q 11:4 provides evidence of the sapiential application of this tradition, Q 11:50–51 provides evidence of its eschatological application. The parable in Q 19:12–13, 15–24 could also be read in a way that recalls this tradition. As in other literature, it is at least possible that the heavenly record of good deeds is

symbolised in Q 12:33–34 as ‘treasure in heaven’. Also the idea that God counts the souls of the righteous and the sinful alike finds expression in the parables of the Lost Sheep (Q 15:4–5, 7) and the Lost Coin (Q 15:8–10).

If we accept that Q had knowledge of psychostasia, which seems somewhat likely considering the discussion up to this point, it would not automatically follow that Q 6:37–38 summons this concept. There is evidence from contemporary literature of the words ‘measure’, ‘weigh’, ‘balance’ and ‘scale’ being used without any reference to psychostasia. Significantly, the two intertexts that are most comparable to Q 6:37–38, namely Leviticus 19:15, 35–36 and Sirach 9:14, do not refer or allude to psychostasia at all, but rather to moral judgment between individuals. This observation supports our earlier finding that the passive verbs in Q 6:37–38 denote moral judgment, as opposed to eschatological or judicial judgment. The latter has now been substantiated by considerations of the logion’s micro genre, its syntagmatic literary context in the inaugural sermon, its paradigmatic literary context in the rest of Q, and intertexts written in Palestine before 70 CE. Like the active verbs in Q 6:37–38, the passive verbs denote moral judgment between humans.

Even so, the possibility exists that this logion connotes the concept of psychostasia at a secondary level. A ruling in this regard depends to some extent on whether or not the passive verbs in Q 6:37–38 feature as divine passives. Previous considerations of both the saying itself and its literary context indicated the unlikelihood that Q 6:37–38 intends its passive verbs to be understood primarily or exclusively as divine passives, but the possibility was left open that these verbs function as divine passives on a secondary level. If Q 6:37–38 intends the passive verbs to be understood as divine passives at this secondary level, and if the logion thereby connotes the concept of psychostasia, it is highly likely that God’s causal, this-worldly judgment is intended, as opposed to his other-worldly judgment, whether in its post-mortem or eschatological mode. The latter is not only suggested by the popularity of this application of psychostasia imagery, but also by the sapiential nature of the logion and its syntagmatic literary context. If the divine passives do in any way refer to other-worldly judgment, the reference is specifically to the post-mortem judgment of individuals in the next world, as in the rest of the formative stratum (see Chapter 2, ‘Futurist eschatology in Q’; ‘In conclusion’; Chapter 3, ‘Confessing Jesus in public’; ‘The Spirit of God’).

A number of intertexts that are very similar to Q 6:37, but that have not been considered yet, do indeed reference God’s this-worldly judgment, while probably also alluding to God’s other-worldly post-mortem judgment. In a context that is very similar to Q 6:37, Sibylline Oracle 2:63 says: ‘If you judge badly, God will judge you later.’ Pseudo-Phocylides 1:11 likewise states: ‘If you judge evilly, subsequently God will judge you.’ A similar saying appears in rabbinic Judaism: ‘The one who judges his neighbour on the side of innocence is judged favourably by God.’ On the one hand, these quotations warn one against summarily discounting the possibility that the
passive verbs in Q 6:37–38 are intended as divine passives. On the other hand, these quotations highlight the fact that God is not at all mentioned in Q 6:37–38. In other words, despite their most obvious and direct references to mortal and moral judgment, the passive verbs in Q 6:37–38 probably also connote this-worldly divine judgment, and perhaps even post-mortem divine judgment. Such hermeneutical multiplicity reminds one of Jesus’ parables (see Funk 2006:165–169, 174). Blomberg (1999:32) might be on the right track when he says: ‘Perhaps one needs to recognize multiple lessons and multiple layers of meaning from many forms of Jesus’ teaching, not only from the parables.’

Despite such multiplicity, the conclusion seems justified that Q 6:37–38 does not refer or allude to either judicial or eschatological judgment (cf. Horsley 2012:29). The intertexts that apply the symbols of psychostasia to judicial judgment make this application clear in their respective literary contexts. The same cannot be said of the syntagmatic literary context of Q 6:37–38, despite the passing reference to judicial judgment in Q 6:29, which might not even have featured in Q. The evidence is even more convincing when it comes to eschatological judgment. As we saw, there are only two texts from the relevant time and place that apply the psychostasia motif to eschatological judgment, and these texts are from the library of one or more isolated sectarian communities. Like the positive conclusion that Q 6:37–38 refers to moral judgment, the negative conclusion that this logion does not refer or allude to eschatological judgment has ultimately been substantiated by considerations of the logion’s micro genre, its syntagmatic literary context in the inaugural sermon, its paradigmatic literary context in the rest of Q, and intertexts written in Palestine before 70 CE. This conclusion is comparable to Piper’s (1989) assessment of Q 6:37–38:

Once again there is also no explicit appeal to End-time reward or punishment in order to reinforce the instruction. This is perhaps all the more significant since the theme of judgement lay so readily at hand. There may be indirect allusions to eschatological judgement in the retributive maxims [i.e. ἐν ᾧ γὰρ κρίματι κρίνετε κριθήσεσθε and ὑμῖν ὑμῖν ὑμῖν μέτρῳ μετρεῖτε μετρηθήσεται ὑμῖν] or even in the metaphor of falling into a pit [in Q 6:39], but these remain little more than hints, which receive no elaboration and certainly no application to imminent events. On the contrary, argument rather than eschatological threat dominates the tone of the passage [in Q 6:37–42]. … Therefore, one must take seriously the fact that experiential wisdom itself dominates the thought of this collection of sayings [that is, Q 637–42]. The direct threat of final judgement is avoided in favour of an approach which is less polemical and less potentially divisive. It seeks to win assent, to encourage an attitude of self-examination, not to specify an offending party. (pp. 43–44)261

In conclusion

Q 6:37–38 is purely sapiential in nature and essence, neither referring nor alluding to (apocalyptic) eschatology in any way.

261. Emphasis original.
The Sayings Gospel Q and the historical Jesus

Wisdom

This monograph directed much of its attention to the genre of Q. The second chapter considered Q as a whole, arguing that it should be classified as a sapiential document. The third chapter considered the eschatological judgment sayings in particular, arguing that even these logia function in Q to strengthen overarching sapiential arguments (cf. Horsley 1991:209). It was also found that Q’s Jesus utilises wisdom as a basis from which to speculate about the nature of the eschatological end. The fourth chapter considered the possibility that a particular Q¹ saying (Q 6:37–38) pertains in some way to eschatological judgment, but found that it was purely sapiential. These analyses combine to sketch a consistent picture of Q as a sapiential document. By structuring both the Sayings Gospel Q as a whole and each of its constituent pericopes as wisdom, the document presents Jesus as a teacher of wisdom (pace Horsley 1991:208). In short, Q’s Jesus is a sage. This remains true despite the fact that Q’s Jesus employs prophetic and eschatological motifs and small forms to support his sapiential message.

One does well to bear in mind that Q’s Jesus and the historical Jesus might be two completely different entities, and should not automatically be equated (Kloppenborg 2001:163; cf. Holmén 2001:513; Robinson 2011:471). Yet, Q’s chronological and geographical proximity to the historical Jesus in all likelihood indicates conceptual and essential proximity between Q’s Jesus and the historical Jesus (Robinson 1991:192; 1993:9 of 18; 2001b:14; 2007:vii, viii; 2011:470; Vaage 2001:479; cf. Horsley 2012:103, 117, 154; Kloppenborg 2001:152, 171; Theissen & Merz 1998:27, 29). There is likely to be a great degree of overlap between the two figures (Kloppenborg 2001:158). At the very least, Q’s portrait of Jesus is closer to the historical Jesus than the Synoptic portraits of him, especially those of Matthew and Luke, but probably also that of Mark (cf. Vaage 2001:479). Robinson (1993) goes one step further:
Q does not only predate the canonical Gospels in the source-critical sense, but also in the tradition-historical sense, containing a more primitive form of theology and Christology than the rest of the New Testament. If Q’s Jesus turns out to be inherently and substantially different from the historical Jesus, it would stand to argue, like many scholars during the No Quest period did, that nothing at all can be known about the Jesus of history. Such pessimism seems unfounded (cf. Holmén 2001:513). If nothing else, one may assert that Q’s presentation of Jesus offers strong support for the case that the historical Jesus was a teacher of wisdom.

In my view, the sapiential genre of the Q document is much more significant to the wisdom-apocalypticism debate in historical Jesus studies than the stratification of Q. This is an important corrective to the tendency in contemporary historical Jesus studies to focus on Kloppenborg’s stratification as the most decisive evidence from Q for preferring a sapiential Jesus over an apocalyptic one. When considering the relevance of Q for historical Jesus studies, especially in the context of the wisdom-apocalypticism debate, scholars tend to direct attention exclusively to Kloppenborg’s stratigraphy of Q. Whereas Renewed Questers tend to summon Kloppenborg’s stratigraphy of Q in support of a sapiential Jesus (e.g. Borg 1994a:15 fn. 13; Mack 1993:36–37; Patterson 1998a:171–172; 2001b:72, 73), Third Questers tend to direct their criticism of a sapiential Jesus against Kloppenborg’s stratification of Q (e.g. Allison 1997:3–8; 2000:175; 2010:118–120; Wright 1992:437–442; 1996:41–43). Yet, when it comes to the priority of wisdom in Q, Kirk’s (1998) genre-critical analysis of Q’s composition, and Kloppenborg’s (1987a:263–328) comparative genre-critical investigation of Q, are much more determinative. It is at least peculiar that scholars have not made more of Kloppenborg and Kirk’s genre-critical studies of Q in their arguments for or against a sapiential Jesus. This is not to say that Kloppenborg’s stratigraphy is wholly insignificant to the wisdom-apocalypticism debate (see further below in this section), but merely that Q’s genre is much more significant.

In affirming a sapiential portrait of the historical Jesus, three reasons may be given for emphasising the primacy of Q’s genre over its stratification: (1) a document’s genre is generally more telling than its diachronic development when considering how that document understands its protagonist; (2) all three of Q’s main layers are sapiential, with Q¹ being an instruction collection, Q² being a chreia collection, and Q³ being a biographical introduction to the sage; and (3) regardless of its persuasiveness and probable accuracy, Kloppenborg’s diachronic analysis is slightly more vulnerable to critique than Kirk’s synchronic analysis. It may be possible to list a number of issues or problems with Kloppenborg’s stratification, legitimate or illegitimate as these may be, but no longer should these concerns be regarded as sufficient evidence against Q’s vision of Jesus as a sage. Those who wish to argue against a sapiential understanding of Q’s Jesus need to illustrate that Q’s framework genre is eschatological, apocalyptic and/
or prophetic, and that the sapiential traditions in Q are structurally and rhetorically supportive of this framework genre.

Historical Jesus scholars need to take seriously the proclivity of Q to portray Jesus as a teacher of wisdom by presenting the Jesus material in a sapiential framework. When the redactors and compilers of Q added eschatological and other traditions, they did so by expanding the document in a way that was customary for sapiential literature. It is certainly relevant to the profile of the historical Jesus that, in every phase of its literary development, the Sayings Gospel Q preserved its formal character as a sapiential document. Such carefulness is likely to be the result of an inherent need to remain true to the essence of the historical Jesus. Funk’s (2006:105) generalising comment on the relationship between the parables’ mode of delivery and their creator may, at least to some extent, be brought to bear on the relationship between the genre of Q and the historical Jesus: ‘Messenger, mode [or genre], and message, consequently, are conjoined.’

In addition to Q’s genre, a number of considerations further combine to support the case that the historical Jesus was a sage: (1) Kloppenborg’s stratigraphy of Q; (2) the Son of Man logia in Q; (3) the kingdom logia in Q; and (4) the parables in Q. It was argued in Chapter 2 that criticism against Kloppenborg remains unable to successfully refute his hypothesis, and that his explanation of Q’s stratification should therefore be upheld. Even though all three layers in Q qualify as wisdom, the genre of Q¹ is untainted by eschatological or apocalyptic traditions. This study has found that the formative stratum lacks any reference or deliberate allusion to eschatology, whether apocalyptic or otherwise (see Chapter 2, ‘In conclusion’; Chapter 4, ‘In conclusion’). The latter finding pertains also to the apocalyptic Son of Man logia, which do not appear in the formative stratum (see Chapter 3, ‘The Son of Man’; cf. Koester [1968] 1971:170–172; 1997:143).²⁶² Although it would be premature to deduce from this that either Q’s Jesus or the historical Jesus was essentially non-eschatological or non-apocalyptic (see below, ‘[Apocalyptic] eschatology’), it does indicate that the authors of Q understood Jesus to be a teacher of wisdom. Historical Jesus scholars cannot ignore the likelihood that the Q document initially (in its Q¹ form) contained only the wisdom of Jesus, and that (apocalyptic) eschatology only became important at a secondary redactional stage.

Even if redaction history and tradition history do not overlap completely, it remains significant that the formative stratum of Q is purely sapiential. Despite Kloppenborg’s

²⁶² Tuckett (2001:384) is concerned that this finding is essentially based on a circular argument: ‘For if one of the criteria for distinguishing Q² from Q¹ is whether there are threats of judgment, it is scarcely surprising that the coming SM [Son of Man] sayings, which are replete with such an idea, end up in Q² rather than Q¹.’ However, Tuckett is not entirely correct when he says that threats of judgment is a criterion for separating the two layers. Methodologically, Kloppenborg identifies the layers of Q by applying three redaction-critical tools to the material (see Chapter 2, ‘Kloppenborg’s stratification of Q’). Only after applying these tools does he extrapolate the characteristics of each layer, including the theme of apocalyptic judgment. Finally, after completing the latter two steps, Kloppenborg applies the identified characteristics as criteria to assign interpolations and difficult logia to one of the three strata.

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justified insistence that tradition history and redaction history should not be equated, it seems that there might very well be a fair degree of overlap between the two. As Dunn (2013:81) observes, Kloppenborg’s archaeological imagery of ‘excavation’ and ‘stratigraphy’ more than suggests that the ‘earliest layer’ from a redactional point of view is also earliest from a historical point of view (cf. Perkins 2007:90). Robinson (1995:260; cf. Robinson 2011:471) addresses this topic directly, stating that older and later traditions about Jesus do not necessarily conform to the layering of Q, although by and large this would seem to be the case.263 If Robinson is correct, it would follow that although the material in Q1 is not automatically authentic and the material in Q2 is not automatically inauthentic, the presence of a saying in Q1 is suggestive of authenticity, while the presence of a saying in Q2 is similarly suggestive of inauthenticity. Stated differently, although the redaction history of Q should not be equated with the tradition history of Jesus material, the former can indeed be related to the latter to some degree. Järvinen (2001) sheds more light on this relationship:

In any case, the dominant views related to the tradition and redaction historical models of Q are correlated and echoed by the contemporary Jesus research – be it intentionally or by coincidence. In effect, what seems to have been important for the Q community of the later days, i.e., those responsible for the alleged secondary redaction, is not likely to offer as much building blocks for the ‘Life of Jesus’ as those traditions that are believed to stem from earlier (sub)collections. (pp. 516–517)

It needs to be clarified that Järvinen is not here expressing his own opinion on how Q and the historical Jesus should be related in contemporary research, but rather making an observation of the way in which the two are being related in existing research. At any rate, just as it is illegitimate to equate redaction history with tradition history, it is illegitimate to deny any relation between the two (cf. Kloppenborg 2001:190). The central question is no doubt the precise degree to which the two relate. The potentially significant overlap between tradition history and redaction history explains (but does not justify) the tendency amongst Renewed Questers to equate the two.

If Robinson is correct, it would be all the more significant that the formative stratum of Q is purely sapiential. At the very least, it indicates a general tendency in the redaction of Q to add eschatological traditions, authentic or otherwise, to largely authentic sapiential material (cf. Carlston 1982:113). Contrary to these findings, Koester (1997) makes the following claim:

The original version of Q [closely resembling Kloppenborg’s formative stratum] does not justify the view that the community of Q began as a rather innocuous wisdom association that only later developed

263. He explains further (1995:261 fn. 5): ‘It would of course weaken considerably Kloppenborg’s position if what he identified as the younger literary layer contained primarily traditions older than the older literary layer.’ This may be true, but it would not hurt Kloppenborg’s position if much of the material in both layers were authentic. Robinson’s argument is reductio ad absurdum. To my knowledge, no one is suggesting that Q1 contains largely inauthentic material while Q2 contains largely authentic material. The issue is rather the extent to which the traditions in Q2 are also authentic, with the authenticity of most Q1 material largely being acknowledged.
an eschatological outlook because its members had experienced rejection and persecution. (pp. 152–153)

The persuasive force of this claim, as well as the larger argument that it represents, is bound to the word ‘innocuous’. Koester’s claim might be correct as far as the ‘non-innocuous’ disposition of the Q people is concerned, but this study has found him to be incorrect about the presence of eschatology in the formative stratum. Hence, the content of the formative stratum strongly suggests that the Q people began as a rather subversive ‘wisdom association’ that subsequently developed in an eschatological and apocalyptic direction, mostly due to polemical concerns. This finding is diametrically opposed to Koester’s (1997:137–154) larger argument: ‘The image of Jesus that is accessible through the most original version of Q [once again, closely resembling Kloppenborg’s formative stratum] is that of an eschatological prophet’ (p. 153). Koester’s valuation is ultimately based on isolated observations, all of which are contestable, and is not based on thoroughgoing textual analysis. To prove his case, Koester would have to engage in an exegetical analysis of Q¹ similar to the analysis applied to Q² in Chapter 3 of the current work. Whereas the latter attempted to illustrate that despite the strong eschatological slant of Q², it is still primarily sapiential, the former would have to illustrate that despite the strong sapiential slant of Q¹, it is still primarily eschatological (or prophetic). I suspect that this would be a tall order for any scholar, perhaps prohibitively so.

Apart from suggesting the primacy of wisdom for Q’s understanding of Jesus, the lack of eschatology in Q¹ supports the identification of Q¹ as the formative stratum and of Q² as the main redaction. The latter is not based on the a priori assumption that wisdom is more authentic than eschatology, but on the observation that Q¹ contains one specific element (wisdom), while Q² contains the same element (wisdom) together with a brand new element (eschatology). Logic would indicate that the layer lacking the newly introduced element, whatever that element may be, came chronologically first. As we saw, Kloppenborg has the following reasons for regarding Q² as the redactional layer, and not Q¹: (1) Q² appears at the beginning and end of the Sayings Gospel; (2) Q² seems to function as the organising principle in at least four blocks of material; and (3) interpolations from Q² interrupt the flow of Q¹ speeches (see Chapter 2, ‘Kloppenborg’s stratification of Q’). The present study can now add a fourth reason: Whereas Q¹ contains only sapiential material, Q² contains both sapiential and eschatological material. If Q¹ were the redactional stratum, one would have expected it to betray knowledge of the eschatological traditions in Q².

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264. On pages 152–153, and randomly throughout the rest of Koester’s article.

265. Classified under three categories (Koester 1997:145): (1) Sayings which are not characteristic for the theology of the redactor are found in these “secondary” sections. (2) Sayings with parallels in the Gospel of Thomas appear not only in the sections assigned by Kloppenborg to the first stage of Q – were they are very frequent – but occasionally also in the sections assigned to the redactor. (3) A number of sayings in Kloppenborg’s original wisdom book Q [i.e. the formative stratum] are in fact prophetic sayings.
This observation relates similarly to the Son of Man logia in Q. As we saw, Q¹ contains only those logia that use the term ‘Son of Man’ as an exclusive, non-titular reference to the earthly Jesus (Q 6:22; 9:58), while Q² contains both groups of Son of Man logia: Those that use the term as an exclusive, non-titular reference to the earthly Jesus (Q 7:34; 11:30; 12:8, 10), as well as those that use the term as a reference to the Danielic Son of Man (Q 12:8, 40; 17:24, 26, 30) (Robinson 1991:189; 1994:318; cf. Koester [1968] 1971:170–172; 1997:143; see Chapter 3, ‘The Son of Man’). It is only legitimate to conclude that the layer which reproduces elements of the other layer while also introducing new elements came chronologically second in the redactional process. If we are correct that Q 12:8 applies the term in both ways, this saying functions as a microcosm for the main redaction as a whole, providing additional evidence that those responsible for Q² had knowledge of both applications of the expression ‘Son of Man’. The lack in Q¹ of both eschatological material in general and apocalyptic Son of Man logia in particular confirms Kloppenborg’s assessment that Q² represents the main redactional layer of the Sayings Gospel Q (see Burkett 1999:79–80). These arguments overlap with Mack’s (1993:108) general observation that Q² betrays knowledge of Q¹, but not Q¹ of Q². They also overlap with Robinson’s (1991:188–189; 2007:x) observation that Q²’s ordinary terms, like ‘Son of Man’ (referring to the earthly Jesus), ‘sons of God’ (referring to the Q people) and ‘lord’ (as a direct address, meaning ‘sir’ or ‘master’), become Christological titles in the main redaction.266 With such developments, the non-Christological traditions are generally considered to be earlier (cf. Schottroff 1995:356).

Since wisdom is the only common denominator between all the layers of Q, with all eschatological and prophetic traditions betraying knowledge of sapiential influences, but not all sapiential traditions betraying knowledge of eschatological and/or prophetic influences, Q’s Jesus is best described as a sage. This finding is highly suggestive of the sapiential essence of the historical Jesus. It needs to be emphasised that this argument is separate from the previous argument that the formative stratum probably comes closer to the historical Jesus than the main redaction. The redaction-historical or tradition-historical ascendency of the formative stratum has very little impact on the present argument. Even if Q¹ were second from a redactional or historical point of view, wisdom would still be the only common denominator between all three layers of Q, and therefore in all likelihood the most historically reliable aspect of Q’s portrayal of Jesus. In other words, the finding that Q¹ is devoid of (apocalyptic) eschatology supports a sapiential sketch of the historical Jesus in two distinct ways. Firstly, since Q’s redaction history is highly suggestive of tradition history, the historical Jesus was in all likelihood more of a sage than an eschatological prophet. Secondly, since all three layers of Q have wisdom in common, but not eschatology, the historical Jesus was in all likelihood more of a sage than an eschatological prophet.

266. Compare Tuckett’s (2001:376) observation that Q’s Jesus does not differentiate between himself and his followers in either the idiomatic or the apocalyptic Son of Man sayings in Q, and his reservations about speaking of a ‘Son of Man Christology’ at all.
The third consideration of Q research, in addition to its genre and stratification, that would support a sapiential understanding of the historical Jesus, is the Son of Man logia in Q. Our investigation of Q has found that only three of the Son of Man sayings go back to the historical Jesus, namely Q 7:34; Q 9:58 and Q 12:10. In all three of these sayings, the term ‘Son of Man’ is used by Q’s Jesus as an exclusive, non-titular self-reference. This ordinary usage lends itself particularly well to application in sapiential contexts, as opposed to prophetic, apocalyptic or eschatological contexts. And indeed, these three authentic Son of Man sayings appear in Q contexts that develop sapiential arguments and reasoned rhetoric. All three logia could be defined as ‘non-eschatological’ if considered in isolation. Two of the three are also non-eschatological in their current Q contexts, with Q 12:10 being the exception. Yet, with Q 12:10 it is the saying itself that is turned into an eschatological prediction as a result of its placement in Q, not the term ‘Son of Man’, which continues to operate in a strictly non-eschatological way.

It is certainly significant that none of the Danielic Son of Man sayings in Q could be shown to be authentic. Out of this group of logia, the only real candidate for authenticity is Q 12:8, but in addition to the reasons provided earlier for doubting its historicity (see Chapter 3, ‘Confessing Jesus in public’), one would do well to remember that the expression ‘Son of Man’ is not in this case doubly attested, being absent from Matthew. As De Jonge (1997:106) rightly notes, the absence of the term from this logion would indicate that Q 12:8–9 ‘is not a witness to a saying of [the historical] Jesus about the Son of Man at all, let alone about the Son of Man as a distinct person.’ In the context of the current discussion, one could add at the end of the latter quotation: ‘or an apocalyptic figure’. What is more, the tradition of interpreting the expression ‘Son of Man’ as Jesus’ self-reference has left its mark on this logion as well. Conversely, none of the Son of Man logia referring to the earthly Jesus betray any sign of being influenced by an apocalyptic prehistory (Robinson 1994:327). The probable inauthenticity of the Danielic Son of Man sayings in Q strongly argues against the possibility that the historical Jesus used the expression in an apocalyptic way.

That the inauthentic Son of Man logia in Q feature the term not only as a reference to the apocalyptic figure in Daniel 7:13, but also as an exclusive, non-titular reference to the earthly Jesus, strongly suggests a tradition-historical development from the latter to the former. In other words, that the authentic Son of Man material in Q contains only the self-referential sayings, while the inauthentic Son of Man material in Q contains both the self-referential and the Danielic sayings, seems to indicate that the historical Jesus used the term ‘Son of Man’ exclusively in reference to himself, and that the tradition continued to use the term in this way, even if the term also came to be associated at a later stage in the tradition with the figure behind Daniel 7:13. In fact, that the expression ‘Son of Man’ features at all in the tradition as a reference to the earthly Jesus supports the conclusion that the Danielic Son of Man sayings are inauthentic. Robinson (1994) explains:
For the ability to use the term to refer to Jesus during his public ministry would seem not to be due to the term having been used as an apocalyptic title for Jesus and then transferred back by the Q community to Jesus’ public ministry, but to the term’s use as an unimpressive Aramaic idiom with an implied reference to the speaker. (p. 325)

The same development is suggested by the fact that the formative stratum contains only self-referential Son of Man logia, while the main redaction contains both self-referential and Danielic Son of Man logia (Robinson 1991:189; 1994:318). As with Q’s genre, the judgment that the self-referential application of the expression is more authentic than its Danielic application is based on two distinct factors: (1) if the redaction history of Q overlaps extensively with the tradition history of the historical Jesus, then Q’s application of the expression ‘Son of Man’ is in all likelihood more authentic, and (2) if the common denominator between the Son of Man logia in Q¹ and Q² respectively is the term’s application as an exclusive, non-titular self-reference by Jesus, then this application is in all likelihood authentic. To be sure, the tendency in Q to develop ordinary terms like ‘sons of God’ and ‘lord’ in a Christological direction supports the finding that a similar development occurred with the Son of Man expression in Q. Given the present results, it seems highly likely that, after the death of Jesus, his followers searched the Hebrew Scriptures in their exegesis of the Jesus tradition, and related the authentic term ‘Son of Man’ to the apocalyptic figure in Daniel 7:13 (Hoffmann 1995:193; Robinson 1994:327, 335).

These results cohere with the general consensus amongst those who investigate the Aramaic roots of the Son of Man material that the early church added the titular Son of Man logia to the Jesus tradition, particularly those sayings that associate the term with Daniel 7:13 (see Chapter 3, ‘Casey criticised’). The present results also cohere with the independent findings of those who have recently considered the term as it appears in the canonical Gospels, determining that it was in all probability used by the historical Jesus as an exclusive non-titular self-reference (e.g. Hare 1990; Hill 1983; Hurtado 2011; Müller 1984; Schwartz 1986; Smith 1991). Moreover, in the context of historical Jesus studies generally, there are four reasons for preferring an exclusive, non-titular, self-referential application of the term ‘Son of Man’ by Jesus (Hurtado 2011:167, 174): (1) it would explain why Jesus used the term in such a wide variety of seemingly incompatible contexts; (2) it would explain why Matthew and Luke, on certain occasions, felt adequately uninhibited to substitute the term ‘Son of Man’ in their sources with ‘I’; (3) not only in Greek, but also in Hebrew and Aramaic, the definite form of the expression ‘the son of the man’ had a particularising force, meaning that it referred to someone or something in particular; and (4) it would explain why the term occurs in the tradition as an expression used almost exclusively by Jesus.

The fourth consideration that supports the case for a sapiential understanding of the historical Jesus is the document’s view of God’s kingdom. In Q, the term ‘kingdom of God’ relates specifically to the healing of the sick and the feeding of the poor during both the earthly ministry of Q’s Jesus and the corporeal conduct of the Q people
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(Robinson 2011:474; see Chapter 2, ‘Realised eschatology in Q’). The kingdom of God is the symbolic family created by Q’s Jesus and maintained by his followers. By bringing hope and caring for the sick and poor, Q’s Jesus creates a new symbolic family on earth, naming it the ‘kingdom of God’ (see Chapter 2, ‘Family feuds’). According to Q 13:28–29, this kingdom will continue to exhibit the same characteristics in the world to come. Q’s understanding of God’s kingdom is essential to the current discussion, since historical Jesus scholars overwhelmingly agree that the kingdom of God at the least represents a very important topic for the historical Jesus, and at the most represents the essence of his message (e.g. Pokorný 2011:347; Robinson 2011:474). That the kingdom of God is not understood as a future reality, to be inaugurated at the eschaton, but rather as a present reality, to be established and maintained on a daily basis, indicates that present concerns are superior to future concerns for Q’s Jesus. Another word for such ‘present concerns’ is ‘wisdom’, since wisdom has generally to do with how to live in the here and now, even if it sometimes looks beyond.

True enough, feeding the poor was a central concern for the prophets of old, but these prophets tended to address this concern by looking to the future, and foretelling the establishment of new and better circumstances for Israel at a future date. Even if prophets were dissatisfied with present circumstances, they sought a solution in the future. By contrast, the Sayings Gospel Q tends to address its dissatisfaction with present circumstances by seeking solutions in the present. It is therefore reasonable to say that the wisdom of Q’s Jesus is principally about the formation of a new reality in the here and now; one that he calls the ‘kingdom of God’. Conversely, it is equally legitimate to say that the kingdom of God is the main subject matter of Q’s Jesus, even if the term ‘kingdom of God’ does not appear often in the document as a whole (cf. Funk 2006:59; pace Kloppenborg 1995b:287–289, 317–319). Historical Jesus scholars must acknowledge that Q describes what many consider to be the most important and central issue for the historical Jesus in sapiential terms.

The final consideration supporting a sapiential portrait of Q’s Jesus is the parable tradition. On its own, the mere presence of parables in Q strongly suggests that Q’s Jesus should be viewed as a wisdom teacher, seeing as parables were characteristically associated with ancient sages. I classify only the following material in Q as parables: Q 12:39–40; Q 12:42–46; Q 13:18–19; Q 13:20–21; Q 13:25–27; Q 15:4–5, 7; [Q 15:8–10] and Q 19:12–13, 15–24, 26. Significantly, those parables belonging to the formative stratum (Q 13:18–19, 20–21; 15:4–5, 7, [8–10]) are all purely sapiential, lacking any hint of eschatological application or elaboration. Conversely, those parables belonging to the main redaction (Q 12:39–40, 42–46; 13:25–27; 19:12–13, 15–24, 26) are all interpreted in light of the eschatological end. Yet, as I have argued, this latter group of parables all betray purely sapiential roots, with the eschatological elaborations and applications added later, most likely by the main redactor. In part, an eschatological

267. These findings would not change if I were to add other Q passages often classified by other scholars as parables to my list.
rendering of these parables was also achieved by placing them in literary contexts that are otherwise eschatological in nature. Not only does the evidence of the eschatological expansion of Q\textsuperscript{2} parables support the view that the historical Jesus was a sage, but so does consideration of the relation between Q\textsuperscript{1} and Q\textsuperscript{2} parables. As with the Son of Man tradition, the exclusivity of wisdom in the parables of Q\textsuperscript{1} and the presence of both wisdom and eschatology in the parables of Q\textsuperscript{2} suggest a chronological development from purely sapiential parables in the earliest Jesus tradition to parables that were subsequently turned into eschatological proclamations by the early church. As Miller (2005:121) has noted, ‘the parables have been unhelpful in making the case for the apocalyptic Jesus.’ This is not insignificant, since ‘[i]he parables are one of the most distinctive features of the teaching of Jesus’ (Stanton 2002:218; cf. Kloppenborg 1995b:275, esp. fn. 1).

Ultimately, the sapiential origin of the Jesus tradition is confirmed by means of a careful consideration of Q’s content. On the one hand, Q’s stratification, Son of Man tradition and parable tradition combine to betray a tradition-historical directionality from purely sapiential beginnings to a more complex sapiential tradition that also features (apocalyptic) eschatology (cf. Carlston 1982:113; Robinson 1995:259). On the other hand, Q’s genre and kingdom sayings reveal the centrality of wisdom for the Q document as a whole, and for its understanding of the person and message of Jesus. In view of these findings, what is one to make of the apocalyptic and eschatological traditions in Q?

(Apocalyptic) eschatology

Although Q’s Jesus is a teacher of wisdom, he is also portrayed in Q both as appealing to eschatology in support of his sapiential message, and as reaching conclusions about the specific nature of the eschatological end from the content of his wisdom. What is more, eschatology is typically an integral aspect of the sapiential rhetoric of Q’s Jesus (Carlston 1982:112). Some of the eschatological traditions in Q are visibly apocalyptic, but some are less clearly defined. If the latter traditions are considered in light of the former ones, there is reason to conclude that the less clearly defined eschatological traditions presume an apocalyptic framework as well. For example, it is reasonable to suppose that Q 11:19b (‘this is why they will be your judges’) presumes an apocalyptic scenario if this text is read against the backdrop of the apocalyptic images in Q 17:23–24, 26–27, 30. It is certainly the case that apocalyptic eschatology is a feature of the Sayings Gospel Q, even if some of the eschatological texts do not feature unambiguous apocalyptic language or imagery. ‘As in every other late Second Temple text dealing with final judgment, God’s intervention in the course of history is clearly the starting point’ (Gregg 2006:270). It remains important, though, to bear in mind that some of the eschatological traditions in Q are not straightforwardly apocalyptic (cf. Horsley 1991:197; Kloppenborg 1987b:292; 1990:90). Discussions of individual texts like
Q 11:19b should not carry on as if their apocalyptic nature were indisputably evident. In the remainder of this section, I will speak only of ‘eschatology’, assuming that the particular brand of eschatology favoured by Q's Jesus can at times legitimately be defined as ‘apocalyptic’.

If redaction history and tradition history do not overlap completely, then one is required to take the eschatological material in Q seriously (Gregg 2006:277–278; cf. Carlston 1982:116). Even though the document portrays Jesus as a sage, it is unjustified to hold up Q as evidence that the historical Jesus was not in any way eschatological. Considered as a whole, the Sayings Gospel Q depicts Jesus as a sage who every so often draws upon eschatology to substantiate and motivate his sapiential message, and who also allows his sapiential arguments to inform his comprehension of the ultimate end. The apocalyptic Son of Man logia fit this general schema. Each time the Son of Man is used as a reference to an apocalyptic figure, it functions in Q to support the sapiential tradition in question.

While discussing the criterion of coherence, Meier (2011) makes the following argument:

Since we should not conceive of the earliest Christians as totally cut off or different from Jesus himself, there is no reason why they should not have created sayings that echoed faithfully his own ‘authentic’ words. In a loose sense such derived sayings could be considered ‘authentic’ insofar as they convey the message of the historical Jesus; but they cannot be considered ‘authentic’ in the technical sense, i.e., actually coming from Jesus himself. (p. 321)

Applied to the current discussion, these observations by Meier suggest that Q could faithfully describe the tendency of the historical Jesus to buttress his sapiential teachings with eschatology and speculate about the ultimate end even if none of the eschatological traditions in Q are authentic to begin with. In other words, if those responsible for Q’s main redaction inserted supportive eschatological material into an existing sapiential framework, it stands to reason that they did so because the historical Jesus likewise supported his wisdom with eschatology, while also using his wisdom to reach conclusions about the eschatological future of Israel.

Kloppenborg (2011b:259) has recently suggested that a method of ‘triangulation’ be employed as a yardstick against which to test the results of historical Jesus research. This process would involve ‘judging various modern construals of the significance and character of the Jesus tradition against the interpretive commonalities of traditions that appear independently in multiple streams of tradition.’ Underlying this proposal is a conviction that ancient authors treated the Jesus tradition somewhat conservatively, meaning that they would rather preserve a tradition faithfully than change or reinterpret it (see Kloppenborg 2001:170–172). Kloppenborg (2011b:260) does not hereby claim that reinterpretations of authentic traditions did not occur in the early church, but rather that one ‘should a priori expect more by way of continuity than discontinuity.’ Kloppenborg (2011b) summarises his proposed method well:
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What I am proposing here is an approach to the Jesus tradition which attends to the rhetorical inscriptions of sayings and stories in later documents...and which uses these inscriptions as an index of earlier, perhaps dominical usage. (p. 262)

If the same logic is applied, not to an individual saying, but to the ‘rhetorical inscriptions’ of the main redaction as a whole, the result is a historical Jesus who substantiated his wisdom with eschatology. It must immediately be clarified that Kloppenborg’s proposed method of triangulation pertains to the interpretation of Jesus traditions, not the process of determining their authenticity. At any rate, the proclivity of the main redaction to present Jesus as a sage who not only buttresses his wisdom with eschatological logia, but also considers the implications of his wisdom for eschatology, could very well stem from familiarity with the authentic practice of the historical Jesus. The main redaction might have introduced inauthentic eschatological sayings as part of their redactional technique, but they might nevertheless have done so in a way that was faithful to the rhetorical tendencies of the historical Jesus. This would further explain why the Q redactors regarded it legitimate to add apocalyptic Son of Man sayings to authentic Jesus material, as well as eschatological elaborations to the parables. These early followers of Jesus would presumably have refrained from introducing eschatological material, including the Son of Man sayings and parable applications, to the authentic tradition if the historical Jesus was essentially non-eschatological. Kloppenborg (2001) explains:

[I]n spite of the evidence of Q’s tendentious editing of the traditions it selects, its depiction of Jesus is unlikely to have represented a substantial deformation of earlier depictions, either in its scope or in its presentation. (p. 158)268

At the conclusion of the same article, Kloppenborg (2001) is even more decisive:

The ways in which early followers of Jesus actually inscribed and employed the canon [of traditional Jesus material] is the first, and perhaps best, guide to the rhetorical and social practice of the historical Jesus. (p. 190)

Hence, taking the documentary status and stratification of Q seriously not only confirms the sapiential Jesus of the Renewed Quest, but also argues against the wholly non-eschatological Jesus of the Renewed Quest (cf. Carlston 1982:116; Gregg 2006, esp. 269, 270, 277–278).

To be clear, I am not proposing that all the eschatological sayings in Q are inauthentic. Some of these traditions are no doubt authentic. Each individual saying would have to be considered independently before any judgment could be made in this regard (Casey 2010:84; Kloppenborg 2001:155). In a study focused specifically on the authenticity of

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268 He elaborates later on in his article (2001:171): ‘Given the relatively early date for Q’s inscription, the likelihood that Q was framed somewhere in Galilee, and the likelihood of some socio-rhetorical continuities between Jesus and the Q people, it is doubtful that the framers of Q could have offered a construal that was either so negligent of the breadth of what might be “sayable” about Jesus, or so tendentious in its presentation, that the resultant depiction would not be recognizable to Galilean Jesus people, or even other sectors of the Jesus movement, whether or not they would agree in particulars or emphasis.’
the eschatological judgment logia in Q, for example, Gregg (2006, esp. 269, 277–278) found ten of these sayings to be authentic.269 One also does well to remember that some of the eschatological parable applications have legitimate claims to authenticity if considered in isolation as individual logia (e.g. Q 12:40; 13:28–29). What I am saying is that even if all of Q’s eschatological logia were inauthentic, it would not automatically render the historical Jesus non-eschatological. The likelihood that a number of eschatological traditions in Q are indeed authentic only adds to the argument that the historical Jesus was not allergic to eschatology, apocalyptic or otherwise, irrespective of Q’s stratigraphy.

It also needs to be said that although Q’s Jesus uses eschatological traditions as part of his rhetoric, he remains a sage first and foremost. As we saw in the previous section (‘Wisdom’), Q provides sufficient evidence to justify the conclusion that the historical Jesus was a sage. Unfortunately, the document provides very little evidence, if any, that Jesus was an eschatological (or apocalyptic) prophet, even if he did at times mention and discuss (apocalyptic) eschatology. The Sayings Gospel Q does not portray Jesus as an eschatological prophet, who either used wisdom in support of his eschatological proclamations or based his sapiential conclusions on eschatology. In Q, wisdom is never used in the service of eschatology. Scholars who claim that Q’s Jesus is an eschatological prophet focus on individual sayings or units in disregard of not only the document’s diachronic development, but also its synchronic presentation. Even with regard to individual traditions, these scholars at times read (apocalyptic) eschatology into the purely sapiential text. Ultimately, Q does not support the notion that eschatology was central or thoroughgoing to the person or message of the historical Jesus. This is not to claim that the wisdom of Q’s Jesus was not eschatological at all. Q presents Jesus’ particular brand of wisdom as inclusive of eschatology. I see no contradiction between wisdom and eschatology, whether in general, in the Sayings Gospel Q, or in the Jesus tradition. Despite the eschatological slant of Jesus’ wisdom in Q, however, Jesus is still portrayed by Q as a sage, not an eschatological prophet or apocalypticist. In other words, Jesus is portrayed in Q as a sage whose particular brand of wisdom was often eschatological, not as an eschatological prophet whose particular brand of eschatology was sapiential.

Finally, imminence is not in any way a feature of Q’s eschatology. Instead, the Sayings Gospel Q betrays no knowledge of the precise time of the final eschatological happening. If anything, Q highlights the unexpectedness of the ultimate end, thereby

269. These are: (1) Q 10:10–12; (2) Q 10:13–15; (3) Q 11:31–32; (4) Q 12:4–5; (5) Q 12:8–9; (6) Q 12:10; (7) Q 12:42–46; (8) Q 13:28–29; (9) Q 17:1–2; (10) Q 17:33. Out of these, I personally doubt that sayings 4, 9 and 10 are about the Final Judgment. As I have argued, saying 4 is most likely about post-mortem judgment. The same is probably true of saying 9. Saying 10 is very generic, and might not even be about divine judgment at all. With saying 1, verses 10–11 are not about the eschatological judgment, but verse 12 certainly is. I further doubt the authenticity of sayings 2 and 5, as well as verses 45–46 of saying 7 (see Chapter 3, ‘Confessing Jesus in public’; ‘An inheritance with the faithless’). At the moment, I am on the fence about saying 3. With saying 1, I am suspicious of the authenticity of at least verse 12. Despite my separation of the chaff and the wheat, sayings 6 and 8 still qualify as being both eschatological and probably authentic.
implicitly denying the mere possibility of predicting its occurrence temporally. It follows that even if one could argue from the content of Q that the historical Jesus was mindful of eschatology, it is impossible to argue from the content of Q (without distorting the evidence) that the historical Jesus expected the end to occur soon. The Third Quest’s insistence that the person, conduct and message of the historical Jesus was wholly or partially motivated by imminent eschatology and eschatological urgency is not supported by the Sayings Gospel Q. Adherents of the Third Quest might simply want to dismiss this result, given the tendency amongst these scholars to sidestep Q altogether. However, their conventional criticism of the utilisation of Q in Jesus research will not in this case suffice, since the result that Q regards the time of the ultimate end to be incalculable is not dependent on Q being a document, being stratified or being representative of a whole community. In true Third Quest fashion, this result comes from the *synchronic* investigation of each individual tradition that makes up Q. Even if the documentary status and stratification of Q are utterly denied, Q still understood the eschatology of Jesus to be temporally indistinct. Investigating the individual traditions that make up Q, whether they were part of a unified document or had a more chaotic prehistory, leads to the unassailable result that sources much closer to the historical Jesus than the canonical Gospels, both geographically and chronologically, adamantly recollect a Jesus who did not foster any kind of eschatological imminence or urgency.

### Prophecy

Horsley (2012) has recently proposed a solution to the wisdom-apocalypticism debate in historical Jesus studies, successfully encapsulated by the title of his monograph: *The prophet Jesus and the renewal of Israel: Moving beyond a diversionary debate*. He proposes that the best way out of the wisdom-apocalypticism stalemate is to supplant it with an alternative view of Jesus as a social prophet. As part of his larger case, Horsley (2012:105–106) attempts to show that Q ‘portrays Jesus as a prophet engaged in the renewal of Israel in opposition to the Jerusalem rulers and their scribal representatives’ (p. 106). Although he claims that ‘[t]he form of the speeches [in Q] is usually prophetic in some way’ (p. 105), he does not offer a form-critical or genre-critical analysis of Q to support this claim. Unlike Sato (see Chapter 2, ‘Q as prophecy’), he mainly treats the motifs in Q. In my view, this is his greatest failing, since the genre of Q is the first and most important clue about how this collection of traditions understood not only Jesus, but also its own disposition and function (*pace* Horsley 1991:202, 209). Be that as it may, Horsley offers an informative bird’s-eye view of Q’s content to illustrate its portrayal of Jesus as a prophet, summarising much of his previous research on Q. What this overview illustrates is that Q’s Jesus was unquestionably interested in prophecy. A number of the motifs and small forms in Q can undoubtedly be classified as ‘prophetic’.

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270. This is also true of his comprehensive investigation of Q in a separate book with Jonathan A. Draper (see Horsley 1999f:267).
Like the eschatological motifs and small forms in Q, however, these prophetic motifs and small forms operate under the rubric of wisdom. In other words, the prophetic traditions in Q are structurally and rhetorically subordinated to the document’s larger sapiential framework genre. Prophetic motifs are typically presented as part of sapiential discussions. Hence, the Sayings Gospel Q depicts Jesus as a sage who had some issues in common with the prophets of old, including most notably a concern for the downtrodden and a problem with the powers that be. It is further noteworthy that although some of the sapiential traditions in the formative stratum are thematically comparable to prophetic traditions in the Old Testament and other Jewish writings (e.g. Q 6:20–23), it contains no irrefutably prophetic micro genres. These prophetic micro genres all appear in Q’s main redaction and final recension. To these arguments for the ascendancy of wisdom over prophecy in Q can be added the self-referential function of the Son of Man expression in the authentic Jesus tradition, as well as the purely sapiential roots of the parable tradition. Finally, although the concept of God’s kingdom assimilates a number of prophetic motifs, including most notably a genuine concern for the sick, the poor and the marginalised, its nature in Q as an existing reality separates it from standard prophetic traditions and their expectations that God would establish his kingdom and deliver his people at some stage in the foreseeable future. One can therefore at most speak of a possible overlap between the wisdom of Q and traditional prophetic motifs.

Yet, even the latter more restricted result can be further challenged. Piper (2000:219–264, esp. 257–259) has argued rather persuasively that Q’s treatment of the ‘poverty’ motif is clothed in the argumentative rhetoric of sapiential instructions, as opposed to the ‘polemical’ and ‘consolatory’ rhetoric of prophetic and eschatological literature. Piper also points out that the ‘poverty’ motif appears almost exclusively in Kloppenborg’s formative stratum, where it lacks prophetic micro genres. If Piper is correct, it would follow that even some of the ‘typically prophetic motifs’ in Q are more typically sapiential, at least in the way Q treats the subject matter. Everything discussed thus far suggests a tradition-historical trajectory for the Sayings Gospel Q from purely sapiential material to sapiential material that is in some sense also prophetic.

One of the contributions of Horsley’s research is that it sensitises the reader to the differences between prophecy, on the one hand, and apocalypticism and eschatology, on the other. Epithets like ‘apocalyptic prophet’ and ‘eschatological prophet’ might create the wrong impression that all ancient prophets were concerned with (apocalyptic) eschatology. It may be true that prophetic literature became increasingly apocalyptic and eschatological in later periods, especially after the introduction of apocalyptic literature to Israel’s literary repertoire, but these developments do not magically turn all prophetic genres into apocalyptic or eschatological material. In focusing on the traditional dichotomy between Jesus as a wisdom teacher and Jesus as an eschatological or apocalyptic prophet, this book might itself have been guilty of not distinguishing
satisfactorily between prophecy and (apocalyptic) eschatology. Not all prophets in Second Temple Judaism were interested in (apocalyptic) eschatology, and not all apocalypticists in Second Temple Judaism were interested in prophecy.

Yet, it remains true that prophecy and (apocalyptic) eschatology overlapped rather extensively during this period. More importantly, it seems that Q’s particular brand of prophecy was indeed both eschatological and apocalyptic. It is true that some texts in Q are more symptomatic of a social prophet than an eschatological prophet, but many of the other prophetic texts in Q do indeed treat (apocalyptic) eschatology. By denying the eschatological and/or apocalyptic nature of these latter texts, Horsley is himself guilty of clinging to archaic definitions of apocalypticism and eschatology. As we saw, Horsley (2012:53) accuses other scholars of working with Schweitzer’s outmoded conception of apocalyptic eschatology (see Chapter 1, ‘The aftermath’). Yet, when Horsley discounts the apocalyptic and/or eschatological nature of certain texts because they do not envision the end of the physical world or the termination of history, he is himself working with Schweitzer’s outmoded categories. Based upon Horsley’s (2012:38–52) own discussion of Second Temple apocalyptic texts, many of the texts in Q should indeed be characterised as ‘apocalyptic’, including many of those that qualify as ‘prophetic’.

This is not to claim that the wisdom of Q’s Jesus was not prophetic at all, but rather to argue against Horsley’s utterly non-apocalyptic and non-eschatological prophet. Q presents Jesus’ particular brand of wisdom as being not only eschatological, but also prophetic in nature. In addition to the tendency of Q’s Jesus to buttress his wisdom with (apocalyptic) eschatology, the wisdom of Q’s Jesus is prophetic both in the sense that it makes predictions about the future and in the sense that it takes a stand for the subjugated against the subjugators. Despite the prophetic and eschatological slant of Jesus’ wisdom in Q, however, Jesus is still portrayed by Q as a sage, not a prophet. In other words, Jesus is portrayed in Q as a sage whose particular brand of wisdom was often prophetic, not as a prophet whose particular brand of prophecy was sapiential. As with (apocalyptic) eschatology, the tendency in the Sayings Gospel to feature prophetic motifs and small forms as part of the wisdom of Q’s Jesus could very well stem from the actual practice of the historical Jesus. There is no reason why the wisdom of the historical Jesus could not have been influenced to some extent by prophetic concerns, like the situation of the poor and the future of Israel. This does not turn the historical Jesus into a prophet, though. Horsley’s case that the wisdom-apocalypticism debate should be abandoned in favour of a prophetic Jesus is aimed almost exclusively against the ‘apocalypticism’ aspect of the debate. It remains to be shown why Horsley’s prophetic Jesus has more claim to authenticity than Renewed Questers’ sapiential Jesus. At least

271. Although I have consciously tried to do so throughout.

272. For example, Q 7:22; 11:39, 41–44, 46–48, 52.

as far as the Sayings Gospel Q is concerned, the evidence that the historical Jesus was a sage by far outweighs the evidence that he was a prophet. To the extent that his wisdom was prophetic, it was also apocalyptic and eschatological.

Building bridges and crossing ditches

Meier (2011:322) reminds us: ‘There is no reason why the preaching of Jesus may not have contained elements of both apocalyptic eschatology and traditional [or subversive] Israelite wisdom.’ In order for the Third and Renewed Quests to move closer to one another, in the hope of a more unified scholarly image of the historical Jesus, the Third Quest would have to admit that imminence was not at all a feature of Jesus’ understanding of the eschatological end, while the Renewed Quest would have to accept that eschatology was indeed a feature of his message, at least to some extent. As before, my discussion of eschatology in this section assumes that the eschatology of Q’s Jesus was at times apocalyptic, even if I do not use the word ‘apocalyptic’ in all instances. I will be the first to admit that any hope of reconciliation, or even a mutual movement towards one another, is wishful thinking. Nevertheless, there may be some motivating factors with the potential to persuade a number of scholars on both sides of the ditch.

We saw at the beginning of this study that not all scholars of the Renewed Quest reject all the eschatological aspects of Jesus’ message (see Chapter 1, ‘The aftermath’). However, all proponents of the Renewed Quest vehemently deny that an eschatological expectation dictated every aspect of Jesus’ message and conduct. This outlook has been confirmed by the present study. Although Q’s Jesus made use of eschatological themes and images, he was a wisdom teacher first. Eschatology functions in Q to substantiate and support Jesus’ wisdom (cf. Theissen & Merz 1998:376). These results are not very far removed from what many Renewed Questers believe anyway. For example, it would seem that Borg’s issue is not really with eschatology per se, but with imminence (see Borg 1994a:82–84; 88–90; 2001b:34, 42). It seems extremely likely that the antagonism displayed by Renewed Questers against (apocalyptic) eschatology is actually against imminence. Borg’s other issue is the Schweitzerian tendency to view apocalyptic eschatology as the primary Gestalt for interpreting the Jesus tradition, as if it dictated every aspect of his message and conduct (see Borg 2001a:115–116; 2001b:43–48). According to Borg (2001a:115–116; 2001c:134), Allison’s ‘millenarian prophet’ should not be used as a ‘shorthand characterisation’ of the historical Jesus. This shorthand description of Jesus leaves the impression, erroneous in Borg’s view, that eschatology dictated every other aspect of Jesus’ mission and message (cf. Pokorný 2011:350). In light of Borg’s two main areas of discomfort, scholars of the Renewed Quest may just welcome Q’s image of Jesus as a somewhat eschatological sage, who was not at all motivated by imminence or urgency. The results of this study may also encourage scholars of the Renewed Quest to make more of eschatology in their portraits of Jesus, not least of all because such portraits could end up being more convincing to scholars from the opposing camp.
Chapter 5

It may prove more challenging to convince scholars from the Third Quest to take a reconciliatory step across the dividing ditch. The fact remains that the canonical Gospels, in which the Third Questers place all their trust, describe the eschatology of Jesus as being imminent and urgent. Yet, there could be a motivating factor with the potential to nudge these scholars onto the bridge, and encourage them to take their first reconciliatory steps across it. This pertains to the thorn, or rather the log, that imminent eschatology has been in the sides of conservatives ever since its introduction by Weiss and Schweitzer. There are no two ways about it: An apocalyptic, Schweitzerian Jesus was plainly wrong about when the end would occur (Miller 2005:113; Pokorný 2011:348; Robinson 2003:29; cf. Horsley 2012:15; McDonald 2013:336). He was a mistaken, perhaps even deluded, individual. Many conservatives and/or Third Questers have struggled with this inevitable and unassailable consequence of accepting the proposal that Jesus proclaimed a thoroughly imminent eschatology (see Allison 2005:104–105). Such discomfort is tangible in Fredriksen’s (2005:63) distressing question: ‘In what sense could the author of such an emphatically disconfirmed prophecy be “god”?’ Many years ago, Jeremias asked the same question in different words: ‘How could God incarnate be mistaken in his eschatological expectations?’ (in Allison 2005:107). The thorn goes deeper and deeper the more one tries to pull it out. Miller (2005) considers the ramifications of this failure on Jesus’ part for his entire ministry and message:

Miller (2005:115) continues to examine this central question in the light of specific traditions. If Jesus’ instructions to sever family ties and become part of a new symbolic family was motivated by imminent eschatology, was Jesus not wrong in subverting patriarchal families in the first place? If people left their homes in the expectation of an imminent reward that never came, suffering severe consequences in the meantime, was Jesus not downright (albeit perhaps unwittingly) cruel in manipulating people in this way? Was it not just as cruel to make a number of downtrodden and helpless individuals hope against all hope for an imminent reversal of fortunes? A host of other examples could be added.

The thorn cuts deeper yet. As Schweitzer rightly perceived, the inevitable result of a thoroughly imminent eschatology is that the moral code and ethical teachings of Jesus become useless. In a thought-provoking but almost forgotten study, J.T. Sanders ([1975] 1986) illustrates how a thoroughly imminent eschatology completely nullifies the ethical programme of Jesus for subsequent generations. Carlston (1982) relates this concern to Q specifically:

This is the nub of the problem. Why, if the Son of Man is to return soon as judge … does one need to worry about the rules of conduct ordinarily associated with wisdom, with what one scholar [referring to Crenshaw] has called ‘the art of steering’? (p. 113)
He continues (1982):

What we need to explain, in other words, is the curious – some would say, inconsistent – failure of the community behind Q to conclude that the imminence of Judgment seriously qualified all the old rules. (pp. 115–116)

From the very beginning, the ethical consequences of Schweitzer’s thoroughly imminent eschatology troubled conservatives just as much as the suggestion that Jesus might have been wrong about the time of the final end. Allison (2005) explains why:

Schweitzer offended a host of Christians when he claimed that Jesus had an ‘interim ethic’, that his moral teaching was inextricably bound up with his belief in a near end. It might be natural to disregard families and money if they are soon to dissipate in the eschaton. But if Jesus promulgated an ethic for the interim, if he did not leave behind a set of general precepts or principles designed for every time and place, what good is his counsel? Not much in the minds of many. Can any moralist, firmly persuaded of history’s imminent dissolution, frame an ethical code adequate for those of us who continue to live in history? Presumption of a negative response explains the vehement resistance to Schweitzer’s claims about an interim ethic. (p. 106)

Scholars of the Third Quest have tried in a number of different ways to sidestep these disconcerting, but inevitable, consequences of imminent eschatology. Wright (1992:280–338; 1996:passim, esp. 202–214; 1999:265–266), for example, has given us a Jesus who expected not the end of the universe, but of the Temple in Jerusalem. For a number of reasons, this suggestion should not be seriously entertained (see Eddy 1999:43–49; cf. Allison 1999:135–136; Borg 1999:240–241; Witherington 1995:246).

Space does not allow an assiduous refutation of Wright’s position. Nonetheless, the point is that some Third Questers have tried to sail around the unassailable, mainly because a Jesus who was wrong makes them uncomfortable. The current study offers an attractive solution: Keep the eschatological Jesus, but drop imminent eschatology altogether. This would solve not only the problem of Jesus being wrong in his timekeeping, but also the problem of Jesus advocating an irrelevant moral code. Moreover, seeing as the Renewed Quest is mainly distressed about imminent eschatology, and not apocalyptic eschatology per se, this move would be welcomed by many intellectuals on the other side of the partition. This would mean, however, that even though Jesus was correct in his eschatological teachings, the canonical Gospels were mistaken when they claimed that Jesus would come again soon. But surely a mistake by the early church is the lesser of two evils. In fact, this mistake is explicable on account of the excitement of Jesus’ followers after Easter. It could even be construed as an expression of the longing to be with Jesus; not really a ‘mistake’ in the proper sense of the word.274

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274. This argument would not be dissimilar to the move that occurred from Reimarus to Strauss. Reimarus convinced a number of scholars that the disciples of Jesus deliberately lied about the nature and content of Jesus’ ministry. Strauss subsequently convinced virtually all scholars that these ‘mistakes’ in the Gospels were not due to deliberate deceit, but rather due to the ancient process of ‘mythmaking’.
Finally, I would like to invite scholars of the Third Quest to consider taking the sapiential traditions in the Jesus material more seriously; that is, those who have not already done so. In a perfect world, similar to the one imagined by ancient apocalyptic prophets, the results of this study would encourage scholars of the Third Quest to make more of wisdom in their portrayals of Jesus, not least of all because such portrayals could end up being more convincing to scholars from the other side of the tracks.
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The monograph *Judging Q and saving Jesus* is ambitious in its scope and judicious in its conclusions. According to Llewellyn Howes, the macrogenre of the Sayings Source Q is sapiential with occasional insertions of apocalyptic microstructures and motifs. He hereby puts an end to the great ‘either-or’ of contemporary Jesus scholarship that the historical Jesus was ‘either eschatological or not’ – an alternative that dates back to Albert Schweitzer.

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*Judging Q and saving Jesus* is ambitious in its scope and judicious in its conclusions. The central problem investigated by Llewellyn Howes is exactly how ‘wisdom’ and ‘apocalyptic’ work together in Q, both compositionally and generically, and how they relate to the historical Jesus. Showing a mastery of the relevant primary and secondary literature, Howes – after introductory chapters on the history of Historical Jesus research and Q as a document of the first century – undertakes first of all a detailed examination of Son of Man and eschatological sayings in Q. Howes judges three Son of Man sayings (Q 7:35, 9:58, 12:10) to be authentic, two of which belong to the redactional layer of Q, and all three embedded in passages that display a sapiential form of argumentation. Howes also finds that generally, and even when used apocalyptically, the term Son of Man tends to support arguments best understood as sapiential in outlook. This is consistent with the sapiential genre of the document as a whole. This finding is supported by the close and careful exegesis of Q 6:37–38 (on not judging) … Howes reconstructs the original wording of the saying in Q and takes the reader deep into the relevant background literature, particularly on the idea of ‘weighing’ in judgment (psychostasia), determining in the end that the saying is entirely sapiential.

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*Judging Q and Saving Jesus* is a book that must be commended first of all for its ambition to tackle large, but also extremely crucial issues. The solutions that are provided … are very well argued and … open up significant methodological avenues to which other scholars would do well to pay attention … The textual analyses of single Q passages constitute another great strength of the book. In particular, the deep and convincing reading of Q 6:37–38 … ought to be taken as a model for future similar research on other passages in Q or in other early Christian writings. [T]he very balanced conclusion with respect to the impact of a study of the Q genre on historical Jesus research is another strong point of the book. Too much of the current writing on the subject is still hindered by the use of too abstract categorizations. *Judging Q* escapes such problems by attending at categorical distinctions first and foremost by way of the careful and critical reading of primary sources.

**Giovanni B. Bazzana, Associate Professor of New Testament, Harvard Divinity School**