Virtual Works
Actual Things

Essays in Music Ontology

Edited by Paulo de Assis
Virtual Works—Actual Things:
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VIRTUAL WORKS—ACTUAL THINGS: ESSAYS IN MUSIC ONTOLOGY

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Leuven University Press
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Acknowledgments

This volume would have been impossible without the active and generous collaboration of all its authors—Andreas Dorschel, David Davies, Gunnar Hindrichs, John Rink, and Lydia Goehr—whom I warmly thank for their time, engagement, and enthusiasm. Further, I thank Kathy Kiloh and Jake McNulty for their willingness to be part of this project even without having attended the Orpheus Academy 2016. At the Orpheus Institute, I am particularly grateful to Heloisa Amaral and Lucia D’Errico, two advanced doctoral students who enormously helped me in designing, preparing, and running the Orpheus Academy 2016. Their professionalism and affability in communicating with the faculty members during the Academy contributed greatly to the successful unfolding of the discourse. My thanks also go to Juan Parra Cancino for his creative collaboration in the musical performances and his technical assistance throughout the Academy. Last but not least, I am grateful to the Orpheus Institute’s front-desk collaborators Heike Vermeire and Kathleen Snyers, who highly efficiently communicated with the faculty before, during, and after the Academy on any practical and logistical matter. Regarding this book, I am grateful to the Orpheus Institute’s series editor, William Brooks, who enthusiastically embraced this publication from my very first proposal, and to Edward Crooks, who copy-edited the complete volume with the highest professionalism and intelligence. Finally, great thanks go to Peter Dejans, the director of the Orpheus Institute, who consistently facilitated and created all necessary conditions for the realisation of our Academies, as well as for the publications issuing from them.

Paulo de Assis
RASCH

On the morning of 4 April 2016, at the outset of the Orpheus Academy for Music and Theory 2016, together with other musicians of the ME21 Collective,1 I performed a new iteration of Rasch, an artistic research project around Robert Schumann’s piano fantasy Kreisleriana (1838, 1850).2 Under the title Rasch14: Loving Barthes(3), the complete musical score of Schumann’s piece was played on a modern grand piano. Additionally, the performance included pre-recorded sounds and live electronics, as well as video projections of texts, images, and film fragments. The performance had no perceptible beginning: when the doors opened, a sonic installation based upon a recorded reading of Roland Barthes’s 1979 essay “Loving Schumann” was diffused over four loudspeakers. Another essay by Barthes—“Rasch,” from 1975—functioned as a constant, recurrent conceptual layer throughout the complete performance, fragments of which were projected onto the walls or heard through the loudspeakers. At some points, the pianist, while scrupulously playing all the notes prescribed in the score, played them in extreme slow motion. At other times he sustained a chord, or even stopped playing for more than a minute. Other pieces of music were played live or through the loudspeakers at specific moments of the performance: Beethoven’s An die ferne Geliebte (especially number 6, “Nimm sie hin denn, diese Lieder,” at the end of Kreisleriana no. 2), Ignaz Moscheles’s Etude caractéristique pour piano, op. 95, no. 1 (immediately before Kreisleriana no. 5), Bach’s Gigue from the second French Suite, BWV 813 (as a lead-in to Kreisleriana no. 1).

1 The ME21 Collective is composed of artistic researchers involved in or collaborating with the research project MusicExperiment21, a five-year programme on practice-based research in music. The project brings together diverse artistic, performative, historical, methodological, epistemological, and philosophical approaches, creating experimental performance practices and new modes of thinking about music and its performance. The project crucially moves from interpretation towards experimentation, a term that is not used in relation to measurable phenomena, but rather to an attitude, to a willingness to constantly reshape thoughts and practices, to operate new redistributions of music materials, and to afford unexpected reconfigurations of music. The project is funded by the European Research Council and is hosted at the Orpheus Institute. The ME21 Collective is its performative extension. It is made of musicians, performers, composers, dancers, actors, and philosophers, and it has no stable formation. Its modes of communication include conventional formats such as concerts, performances, and installations, but also lectures, publications, and web expositions. It has performed in Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Germany, Ireland, Portugal, and the United Kingdom.

2 Rasch is a series of mutational performances, lectures, and essays grounded upon two fundamental materials: Robert Schumann’s Kreisleriana, op. 16 (1838, 1850), and Roland Barthes’s essays on the music of Schumann, written in 1970, 1975, and 1979 (see Barthes 1985a, 1985b, 1985c), particularly “Rasch,” a text exclusively dedicated to Schumann’s Kreisleriana. To these materials other components are added for each particular version: visual elements, other texts, or further aural elements. An overview of the complete instantiations of the Rasch series is available at Research Catalogue, https://www.researchcatalogue.net/view/64319/64320. A full-length video recording of Rasch11: Loving Barthes11 can be watched online at https://www.researchcatalogue.net/view/99320/99321.
8), and very short fragments of the Goldberg Variations, BWV 988 (during the pre-performance sound installation), and also recordings of pianists like Yves Nat and Vladimir Horowitz playing Schumann’s Kreisleriana. Instead of the customary thirty or so minutes of a rendering of Kreisleriana, this performance had a duration of around fifty-five minutes.

Clearly, this was not a performance “of” Kreisleriana, though all its pitches, rhythms, dynamics, and formal “proportions” have been played and “faithfully” respected. It was also not a performance “about” Kreisleriana, as it had no pedagogical intention of revealing to the audience anything it didn’t know before (even if that happened as a side effect). And it was also not a performance “after” Kreisleriana, for the simple reason that the full score was played in an intended mainstream, modern mode of musical interpretation. Significantly, all materials external to Schumann’s score, all the various layers that were brought into dialogue with it, were not chosen incidentally or “associatively,” but rather following a precise and rigorous research process. Every single component of the performance had a close relation to Schumann’s piece, be it prior to the composition as a fertile humus that had an impact on the compositional process, or a posteriori, as reflective exercises directly inspired by the piece. As examples of such materials, one can mention the following: Roland Barthes’s essay “Rasch,” which is exclusively dedicated to Kreisleriana (see Barthes 1985b); his text “Loving Schumann,” which not only is devoted to the German composer but also was published as the introduction to Marcel Beaufils’s monograph on Schumann’s piano music (see Barthes 1985a; Beaufils 1979); Beethoven’s An die ferne Geliebte, which is literally quoted in Schumann’s Fantasie, op. 17 (composed immediately before Kreisleriana), in a passage with close melodic resemblance to the end of Kreisleriana no. 2; Moscheles’s piano study Zorn [Anger] that served as direct inspiration for Kreisleriana no. 5 (see Rostagno 2007, 98–102); and Bach’s Gigue from the second French Suite, whose rhythmical pattern is exactly the same as the rhythm of the main theme of Kreisleriana no. 8.

Kreisleriana, a famous piece of the mainstream pianistic repertoire, is regarded as well known; thus, normally, there would be many “fully qualified” performances and recordings of it. However, we now know, at least since Antonio Rostagno’s (2007) exhaustive account of the compositional and editorial history of this piece, that this is not the case. Not only are there two versions of the score (the first from 1838, the second from 1850), but also four different editions were printed in the nineteenth century, two prepared by Schumann, the other two by Clara Schumann (see Rostagno 2007, 205–8). In the twentieth century, attempts were made to offer the reader a combination of all these disparate bits of information. The result was that, with the exception of Charles Rosen, every single pianist plays the version of 1850, but does not really play everything as it was notated by Schumann—some possible alternative passages from the 1838 version “infiltrate” these renderings, so that most performances are

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3 On the notion of “fully qualified” performances, see David Davies in this volume, p. 47, where he states that “something is fully qualified to play the experiential role in the appreciation of a given artwork X at a time t just in case at t it possesses all those experienceable properties that are necessary, according to the practices of the art form in question, to fully play this role.”
we hear today are of a musical object that was not exactly designed in that manner by the composer. So much for "fully qualified" illusions.4

But, beyond the specific problem of "the score," the question that the performance made by the ME21 Collective raises is of a different nature: what kind of relation is there between all these things—that were part of the performance and that have an umbilical relation with the piece—and Schumann’s work? What are these things in relation to this piece? In an orthodox ontological account, they have nothing to do with Kreisleriana.5 Still, they obviously do concern it. Ontological questions were not part of the original research plan of MusicExperiment21, and we did not turn to them from a philosophical will to clarify the nature of our objects of daily work. Nor did we aim at developing a new aesthetic model for the reception of past musical works. More simply, but—I suspect—with deeper consequences, we found ourselves in a situation where our own practices could not be aesthetically assessed on the basis of existing ontological accounts, and where our ways of working with the materials started suggesting new and alternative views of what a musical work is, which component parts it might have, and how its material constitutive parts allow for the individual and collective construction of an "image of work."

Crucially, our mode of operating clearly considers the performative moment not as a place for representation of already known sound structures, but of a critical problematisation of the musical objects under consideration. With the project Rasch, a major breakthrough happened: it seemed to us that musical works could be considered from a completely new perspective, moving beyond currently available music ontologies, which are based on a representational mode of thinking about musical works.6 Is there a possibility to think about those

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4 I am referring here to those ontological accounts that determine a work’s “qualification” solely on the basis of a score or a plurality of scores, per se. This view must be differentiated from other accounts (such as the one mentioned in the preceding footnote) that are less essentialist, including the modalities through which a given musical community frames and receives performance practices. I thank David Davies for calling my attention to this important differentiation.

5 David Davies has pointed out that this statement depends on which particular ontological account I am referring to. As Davies wrote (pers. comm.): “For a contextualist like Levinson or myself, at least some of the things included in the performance do enter into the work. To cite the most obvious example, the Beethoven passage quoted by Schumann in the earlier piece [Fantasie, op. 17] would, for the contextualist, be partly constitutive of the earlier piece, in the sense that the passage features in Schumann’s work as a quotation, and a failure to grasp this is a flaw in a listener’s grasp of that piece. Whether this also extends to Kreisleriana will depend, for the contextualist, on how [he or] she takes this to itself relate to the earlier piece.” In any case, Davies agrees with me in that “even for such a contextualist, most of the things incorporated into the performance of Rasch would not enter into the appreciation of Kreisleriana as a work.” As an example of relative openness to the inclusion of heterogeneous components into a work, Davies mentions Jerrold Levinson, who “thinks that the ways in which future composers or performers take up elements in a given piece do enter into a full engagement with the latter.” I thank David for this precise and crucial remark.

6 With "representation," I am referring to the performance "of" something, or, more precisely, to the performance of something "as" something, which implies the existence of something "original," prior to the performance, something that is then rendered perceptible through some sort of "representation" in the moment of the performance. In this sense, the performance functions as a "representation" of something exterior to it. Thus, I am not referring to the old aesthetic question of music’s "resistance to representation," related to the absence of the signified in musical pitches, rhythms, or formal structures. In any case, music theory and music philosophy have a long tradition of thinking about musical entities in representational terms. As Christopher Hasty (2010, 4) has put it, “[e]ven if music seems to defy representation and has occasionally challenged the claims of representation, music theory has embraced representation as a way of fixing the musical object.”
entities that we usually call “musical works” in another way? Is there another way of conceiving musical renderings of past musical objects? Is it possible to move beyond the classical paradigm of music performance and reception? How could all those materials that are not supposed to be played in a performance, but which obviously relate to a given “musical work,” be considered as being part of that work? What kind of “image of work” would that imply? It seemed to me that there are multiple ways of thinking about, and of conceiving, musical works. And every specific image of work has implications for its renderings in concerts, recordings, performances, or installations. All of a sudden, in the middle of the MusicExperiment21 project, and to my own surprise, I saw myself obliged to address ontological questions, as new views on ontological issues seemed to be necessary. And this was the reason to organise the Orpheus Academy 2016 on this topic, to which we invited some of the leading experts in the field.

**The Thirteenth International Orpheus Academy for Music and Theory**

The International Orpheus Academy for Music and Theory is the annual conference organised by the Orpheus Research Centre. For the Academy, a selected guest faculty with outstanding expertise in a specific topic is invited to attend a series of lectures and to write an individual essay. All researchers from the Orpheus Research Centre, as well as the doctoral students from the docARTES programme, are invited to participate, and have the opportunity to present aspects of their research to a high-level group of experts. In its first eight editions, from 2003 until 2011, the Orpheus Academy was particularly oriented towards music theory and historical musicology, and all those academies had a profoundly historical perspective, focusing on particular periods of Western art music. Their faculty constitution was impressive, and the Academy gained international recognition as an important event for musicians, performers, composers, musicologists, and music theorists alike. Since 2012, a reorientation took place and the academies primarily addressed transhistorical aspects of the utmost relevance for artistic research of less relevance for historical musicology or applied music theory. This development was clearly in line with the overall growth of the Orpheus Institute as an international centre of excellence for artistic research, thus attracting audiences and faculty members from wider areas of research and from diverse fields of knowledge. More than reducing knowledge production to a narrow period in history, these academies aimed at opening horizons of thought for future creative developments.

For its thirteenth edition, we invited the authors of the present book: Andreas Dorschel, David Davies, Gunnar Hindrichs, John Rink, and Lydia Goehr. During the Academy, Lydia Goehr discussed the notion of “discomposition” as a philosophical and musical concept, reading Stanley Cavell’s 1965 essay “Music Discomposed” through the lens of Adorno. David Davies first addressed “musical practice” and “metaphysical principles,” focusing on what participants in artistic practice do rather than on what they say or think they are
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doing, proposing a prescriptive (rather than descriptive) ontology; his second lecture dealt with the distinction between musical works and performances, using the notions of “multiple instantiations,” “repeatability,” and “variability.” John Rink explored diverse issues concerning the relation between musical structures and musical performances, in addition to addressing the possibilities arising from innovative digital editorial practices, specifically focusing on case studies from his extensive work on Chopin; in his second lecture, he addressed issues of aesthetic evaluation, sharing with the audience his experiences as a jury member of the International Chopin Competition in Warsaw in 2015. Gunnar Hindrichs suggested a new kind of ontology, presenting a blueprint of musical works explained through six concepts: material, sound, time, space, meaning, and thought; his second lecture advanced a theory of musical listening based upon the notion of hearing “something as something,” challenging the function of values in the aesthetic experience of music. Andreas Dorschel explored the idea of “music as play,” and reflected on the question in which way musical expression can and should be historicised. Finally, I presented my ongoing work on a “new image of work,” a domain-specific ontological perspective, grounded on material documents, taking into account the intensive processuality involved in the generation of such documents (sketches, drafts, scores, editions, recordings, etc.), and sustained by an understanding of “musical works” as multiplicities. These appear as highly complex, historically constructed, actual and virtual assemblages of things (topics I develop in detail below, in my own chapter).

In addition to these lectures, there were three music performances, and several installations across the building (see Appendix). These were not intended as decorative moments within a substantially theoretical debate, but as an integral part of the discourse, contributing concrete sonic and visual materials to the topic. Tackling the notion of performance not as a place of representation, but of problematisation, these musical interventions explored unknown and unpredictable encounters between music, texts, and imagery. Prepared by the ME21 Collective—concretely by myself, Lucia D’Errico, and Juan Parra Cancino—these performances were further explorations of experimental performance practices in Western notated art music, problematising major works not only by Robert Schumann, Ludwig van Beethoven, John Cage, Bruno Maderna, and Luigi Nono but also by Athanasius Kircher, Nicola Vicentino, Sigismondo d’India, and even Friedrich Nietzsche.

The publication process

Between the Orpheus Academy (4–6 April 2016) and the present publication, further critical reflections happened, in the form of a productive dialogue and exchange of draft chapters among all involved authors. Each faculty member submitted an early version of his or her lecture well in advance, that is, before the Academy took place. During the Academy, all presentations were vividly discussed by the other faculty members and by the audience, leading to additional lines of thought not originally planned. After the Academy, first drafts
of the chapters—already reflecting developments resulting from those discussions—were circulated among all the authors in order to collect comments and responses and stimulate critique. Next, each paper was read and annotated by at least two other faculty members, and, finally, a revised version was sent again to the editor, who in dialogue with the author agreed the final version of the text. This form of intensive collaboration is especially well suited to a group of thinkers with powerful voices who do not fear positive, productive critique to make their cases even stronger; it is also a means of integrating previously unthought components into their arguments.

This methodology led to a high level of understanding of the others’ positions, enabling the inclusion of some fruitful comments and footnotes that became part of the final versions of the essays.

David Davies offers a broad overview on the varied landscape of music ontologies currently available. Starting with the central challenge of determining the best ontological account for a practice in which the “work-concept” does have “regulative force,” Davies presents a series of different ontologies and their relation to what he labels “the classical paradigm,” arguing for a non-Platonist interpretation of this paradigm. Proactively contributing to MusicExperiment21’s discourse, David Davies studied the official “statements” of our project (musicexperiment21.eu) and included our “position” in his wide map of ontologies, situating our practices within a nominalist/materialist perspective, and suggesting some kind of resemblance between our performances and those developed by American theatre theoretician and philosopher James R. Hamilton (see Hamilton 2007, 23–40).

Gunnar Hindrichs, openly assuming (in his own words) “a dogmatic mode of presentation” that does not aim at discussing either contrary or connatural positions, presents a case for a new kind of music ontology. First, he disqualifies common ontologies, which consist of providing sterile definitions of the kind of entities musical works are assumed to be; next, he claims that ontology

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7 Most of the comments were made via email, in a rather informal mode of communication that also included comments within the written files. These comments have been integrated into the main text, and the author of the comment only appears (as a footnote) in those cases where a clearly different voice made or suggested some sort of clarification that positively influenced the essay.

8 The only exception is Gunnar Hindrichs, who due to several other commitments could not take part in this exchange of thoughts and comments.

9 A special case is Lydia Goehr’s essay, which is followed by three formal “responses” that were written independently of the Orpheus Academy 2016. Earlier versions of Goehr’s paper had been presented at the University of Toronto (2015), and at the Philosophy Department at the New School for Social Research, New York (see Chapter Six, footnote 2). On that occasion, Goehr received two written responses to her presentation, which, given their interest, and in line with our idea of a collective discourse, are published here for the first time. My own comment to her essay can be seen as a third response, making also the bridge to the concrete artistic presentations that took place during the Orpheus Academy 2016, which are briefly described in the concluding Appendix.

10 I wish to deeply thank David for his generous analysis of our statements, and for including us in his elaborated map of ontologies. I think he is correct from the point of view of currently available music ontologies, though I will argue that MusicExperiment21 operates outside such ontologies, suggesting a new image of work that is, at the same time, “more ideal” than Platonism’s views (including an “excess” of virtual singularities), and more empirical than nominalistic accounts (being grounded on actual, individual singularities). I will briefly explain these notions further on, and in greater detail in my forthcoming book Logic of Experimentation: Rethinking Music Performance in and through Artistic Research (De Assis 2018).
Introduction

understood as “first philosophy” is actually not needed; and, finally, he offers an aesthetic ontology, one that does not ignore the demands of aesthetics. In a post-Kantian style of thought, Hindrichs makes a plea for the full autonomy of musical works, and for the act of listening as disclosing the meaning of musical works.

John Rink focuses on the performer, suggestively offering a reflection on the work of the performer in relation to the musical work. The work (noun) gives way for “to work” (verb). By claiming that performers’ engagement with the “musical work” as conventionally understood entails a different sort of “work” in the sense of both process and outcome, Rink argues that what performers do influences music’s very content, how it takes shape, and how those who hear it perceive and understand it. He first describes the act of performing; next, he revisits key literature on musical narrativity, and puts it to use in addressing the performer–work relationship; finally, a case study based on his own experience as a pianist further illustrates that relationship in action.

In the place of a conventional essay, Andreas Dorschel wrote a four-part dialogue, a play situated in Cambridge, at St John’s College, on an early spring day in 1947. Four people are seated around a grand piano, which they occasionally play: philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, composer Elisabeth Lutyens, pianist Myra Hess, and singer Rae Woodland. In an apparently pleasurable and joyful conversation, central reflections about different definitions and varied understandings of the role of “play” (in music, but also in other forms of human expression) are presented. During the conversation, various pieces are played at the piano, including works by Bach, Beethoven, Chopin, Schumann, and Debussy.

Lydia Goehr interprets Stanley Cavell’s 1965 essay “Music Discomposed,” filtered “through the lens of Adorno,” with excursions into early nineteenth-century definitions of “discomposition” as offered, for example, by Emerson. Goehr notes that “Cavell included his essay in a volume published the year before Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory,” allowing her to claim that both writers were consciously responding to the post-war challenges to philosophy and the arts. Goehr examines Cavell’s remarks on the alleged “fraudulence” in contemporary music, but turns quickly to work out what he could have meant by the elusive term “discomposed.” Her argument turns on shifting attention away from a music that was (in one way or another) composed, un-composed, or dis-composed, to the modernist experience wherein a subject, and by extension a writer, feels decomposed in the face of a music where the meaning seems not sincerely to be meant (according to Cavell). The relevance of Cavell’s essay to this volume on music ontology is evident in the play between the discomposition of subjecthood and workhood around 1800, which follows from Goehr’s earlier study of the culmination of the emergence of the work-concept in her The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works ([1992] 2007).

On the one hand, these essays brilliantly illuminate specific aspects of existing music ontologies and practices. They range from transcendental considerations (Gunnar Hindrichs) to immanent modes of music production (John Rink’s concrete performance), from a neutral mapping of the available ontol-
ogies (David Davies), to a proposal of an “aesthetic ontology” (Hindrichs), from serene considerations on the playfulness of music (Andreas Dorschel) to the sharp claim for criticality and the overcoming of existing models (Lydia Goehr). On the other hand, though, they all remain within the thought horizon of the classical paradigm, a notion explored, for example, by David Davies in his book *Philosophy of the Performing Arts* (2011), where he looks for the best possible ontological account that could accommodate Goehr’s notion of the regulative force of the work-concept. Gunnar Hindrichs “aesthetic ontology” develops the notion of listening as the locus for disclosing musical works, thus giving to the act of “listening” an ontological role and impact, but crucially not challenging “the other side,” the one of “the work,” which remains fully autonomous and transcendent both to its performance and to its listening. David Davies constructs his own path within the ontological landscape of our day, situating his perspective in a non-Platonist interpretation of models based upon the work-concept. Both John Rink and Andreas Dorschel insist on the centrality of the performative action, favouring an epistemological rather than ontological approach to music-making. Lydia Goehr forcefully reminds us of the importance of being critical and of the necessity of breaking down dominant modes of thinking: both in her essay and in the discussions during the Academy, she claimed that Stanley Cavell and Arthur C. Danto in the 1960s were making philosophy respond to the “psychopathology” of that period, one where musicians and aestheticians had no hold on their concepts. According to her, that was also what she herself tried to do in the late 1980s, while writing *The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works*, a period when practice was demolishing concepts and conventions, forcing people to revisit their mental categories.

Today, almost entering the third decade of the twenty-first century, musical practices are demolishing the ontological establishment even more, but the most recent analytic philosophy tries to make things and musical “works” more transparent, grasping or explaining them better, mapping their position in an overall transcendentally defined territory. Some of the contemporary defenders of music ontologies, such as Andrew Kania (2012) or Julian Dodd (2007), for example, reaffirm the authority of the work, “improving” propositional judgements, but not challenging concepts or practices. Music ontology seems to be caught within dominant conservative views on music, and even conservative views on the world beyond music. Because of this state of affairs, most music practitioners, be they performers or composers, are extremely sceptical of music ontologies, which appear to them as profoundly sterile and unrelated to their practices. However, practical musicians should be aware that currently existing ontologies have a tremendous influence on what they play and how they are supposed to play it. The argument that ontological judgements have no aesthetic consequences (as claimed for example by James O. Young [2014–15, 1]) is unashamedly ideological because it aims to reinforce musical practices subsumed under the “strong-work concept,” tamed by authoritative...

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11 One should note that, whereas Goehr aimed at a social ontology, rooted in history and historicity, Davies is trying to better define an abstract ontology, in the tradition of transcendent music ontologies.
texts and sources, whose production is the property of a caste of privileged musicologists and music philosophers. The way one defines what counts as a work establishes profound constraints on what is considered as “acceptable” and “unacceptable,” as “possible” and “impossible,” what is allowed and what is forbidden, thus providing the musical market with precise instruments of survey and control. Therefore, ontological judgements, which are a priori judgements, do have empirical consequences—at least in the empirical world of music performance.

The role of artistic research

As Lydia Goehr wrote in 2001 (601), most philosophical engagement with music has been done by three different kinds of thinkers: (1) by philosophers developing metaphysical systems “in which each subject and type of phenomenon, including music, is assigned its proper place” (ibid.), which is Gunnar Hindrichs’s argument in this volume; (2) by “philosophers treating music as one of the arts within their different philosophical systems of aesthetics” (ibid.), which is David Davies’s take; and (3) by “musicians—composers, performers, theorists and critics—drawing on and thus contributing to explain the foundations, rationale and more esoteric aspects of their theories, practices and products” (ibid.), which is the case in John Rink’s and Andreas Dorschel’s contributions. At the same time, several contemporary performance practices, of which those developed by MusicExperiment21 are one example among others, suggest renewed ontological accounts—accounts that come from a fourth group, namely that of performers of notated Western art music who are working within a creative and research-based mode of performance. These are “artistic researchers,” and they are proactively contributing to a redefinition of our mental categories, namely in respect of ontological definitions of those entities usually called “musical works.” I am not saying that our practice “needs” an ontological rooting, nor am I saying that performers long for music ontologies; I am simply saying that the concrete, creative practice of music is generating philosophical insights that “pure” philosophy or applied musicology are not delivering. In this sense, it seems to me that the necessary renewal of the ontological discourse will not come from music philosophers, nor from musicologists, but precisely from this new kind of performer, trained and oriented towards artistic research. Through our critical apparatus and creative mode of making music, new images of thought and new images of the musical work are emerging.

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Virtual Works—Actual Things
Paulo de Assis
Orpheus Institute

During the International Orpheus Academy for Music and Theory 2016, I presented a first attempt towards a completely renewed perspective on musical entities, one that could move beyond existing music ontologies, relating more to current performance practices and to the vast amount of available music sources and documents. Since the Academy, and partly as a result of it, my ideas developed into a music ontological thought strongly inspired by the differential ontology of Gilles Deleuze. A detailed account of my "new image of work" will be a major part of my forthcoming monograph Logic of Experimentation (De Assis 2018), but I wish to present its fundamental traits in this chapter, not least because they explain the title of this book, and of the Orpheus Academy 2016.
I will proceed in three steps: First (section 1), I will point out some of the problems with currently available music ontologies, as they have been discussed in recent years (mostly) by analytic philosophers. Next (section 2), I will present some basic components of a Deleuzian ontology as it has been extracted from his writings by post-Deleuzian philosophers (prominently by Manuel DeLanda, and first and foremost based upon Deleuze’s seminal book Difference and Repetition). Finally (section 3), I will present a novel way of thinking about musical entities, suggesting a "new image of work," and, consequently, an alternative music ontology. I would like to emphasise that I do not claim to offer a complete, finished, and transparent ontological account. It is more of an attempt (a Versuch) that will be followed by other essays addressing specific topics in greater detail.

1. Music ontologies: some problems
To start with, one has to register (as the Orpheus Academy 2016 also proved) that currently existing music ontologies are in an impasse, not to say in a deep crisis. In a recent collective volume on the appeal to abstract objects in art ontology generally, edited by Christy Mag Uidhir (2012), Guy Rohrbaugh (2012) enthusiastically opens his chapter (the first in the collection) by stating that “we surely live in a golden age for the ontology of art” (29). However, throughout the chapter, he presents us with a series of burning issues that seem to condemn music ontology to irrelevance, even concluding that “an ontology

1 I wish to express my gratitude to Lydia Goehr, David Davies, and Lucia D’Errico for their extensive and precise comments on draft versions of this chapter.
ultimately driven by a description of what it is we already do, as it must if it is to be an ontology of art at all, looks like it will be unable to turn around and informatively explain or justify any of those doings we described. . . . One might say that there is no such endeavor as the ontology of art” (37). Along the way, Rohrbaugh addresses several problems around pragmatist and deflationist views, comparing various positions, authors, and recent debates, not hesitating to openly discuss critical problems that might endanger the field of music ontology itself. First, he observes that ontologists are motivated to preserve the appearances of dominant practices (32), which remain by and large unquestioned. Second, he identifies a serious problem in the fact that music ontologists are squeezed between traditional metaphysics and traditional musical practices (33), not taking into account alternative or innovative approaches. Third, expressing a dilemma he shares with Jerrold Levinson, Rohrbaugh confesses that “We describe objects that fit our practices to a tee and then proceed to claim that there are such objects. Unfortunately, they are not there. Any number of critics, myself included, have pointed out that the idea of an indicated type does not really make much sense” (33). Fourth, he acknowledges that music ontology often ends up with two discourses: one is obvious, and thus unnecessary; the other is of a hermetic character, and thus highly elitist: “At the object-level, our practices may be recognized as going on just as they do, while our deflationary attitude at the meta-level need only be known to the philosophical elite for whom it matters. . . . But instead of ending up with a picture on which our practices give rise to the very objects of their own concern, we instead end up with, quite literally, nothing” (34–35). 2 Thus, what had been announced as living in a “golden age” seems to be more pertinently described as a discipline fading away in a sombre corner of the humanities.

A summary of all existing ontological positions would go beyond the scope of this chapter,3 but a very important observation—one that cannot be overlooked—is that the vast majority of music ontologists are philosophers attached to so-called analytic philosophy, focusing and presenting their arguments first and foremost in logical propositions, to which they claim most forms of human knowledge is reducible. 4 In the last decade a significant number of philoso-

2 Guy Rohrbaugh’s ontological arguments have been of personal interest to me, especially his notions of “continuants” and “historical individuals” (that he vaguely retrieves from biology and from processes of speciation), which makes his position—among all other currently available accounts—the one that comes closest to my own practice and perspective (even if still with substantial differences). Furthermore, I also share with him his declared scepticism about music ontologies, a scepticism related to the widespread use of a philosophical terminology that has lost the connection to the modes of existence of musical works and practices of our day.

3 For a precise and concise description of Platonism, nominalism, fictionalism, perdurantism, endurantism, and eliminativism, see the chapter by David Davies in this volume (pp. 45–54). Another excellent overview of ongoing positions and discussions, including viewpoints from several authors, is the volume Art and Abstract Objects, edited by Christy Mag Uidhir (2012), particularly Andrew Kania’s essay “Platonism vs. Nominalism in Contemporary Musical Ontology” (2012). A further recent edited volume on music ontology is Alessandro Arbo and Marcello Ruta’s Ontologie Musicales: Perspectives et Débats (2014).

4 As David Davies mentioned to me (pers. comm.), analytic philosophers acknowledge the existence of some practical forms of knowledge (“knowledge of how to do things”), “and many [analytic philosophers] would recognize that some knowledge is irreducibly embodied.” For a detailed account of the complex field of analytic philosophy in relation to music, see David Davies’s forthcoming essay “Analytic Philosophy of Music,” which will be part of the Oxford Handbook on Western Music and Philosophy.
phers, such as Ross P. Cameron, Ben Caplan, Carl Matheson, David Davies, Julian Dodd, Andrew Kania, Chris Tillman, and Guy Rohrbaugh (among others), have contributed major essays on art and musical ontology, renewing an analytic discourse initiated in the 1960s and continued up until the 1980s by music thinkers such as Nelson Goodman, Richard Wollheim, Nicholas Wolterstorff, Jerrold Levinson, Stanley Cavell, Peter Kivy, and Stephen Davies (among others). The problem with this analytic tradition is that, despite their differences, the very structure of its arguments, so fundamentally concerned with the conditions of identity, is incompatible with the objects it pretends to define and explain (see Butt 2002, 62). Analytic philosophers define the identity of things by the necessary conditions that enable such things to belong to a general category, that is to say, they must have an “essence.”

5 In this respect, David Davies (pers. comm.) reminded me that both Goodman’s and Wollheim’s writings “explicitly reject the project of defining art, any of the arts, and limit themselves to the more modest task of providing necessary conditions” for the existence of an artwork.

6 Here too, David Davies makes a call for a more nuanced formulation, taking into account recent developments in analytic philosophy. As Davies wrote (pers. comm.): “I think this is the important criticism of much of the analytic work on music (e.g., Kivy), although it is not true of all the writers you cite [in this chapter]. Levinson, for example, restricts his account of ‘what a musical work is’ to musical works of a certain period, and recent work by analytic philosophers has been much more sensitive to differences between musical practices. But it is also true that when Lydia Goehr wrote her book [late 1980s], analytic philosophy of music was, for the most part, guilty of the things she charged.”
and immanent fabrication of all those documents that enable us to think about “musical works” in the first place.

A second problem with contemporary ontologies concerns the problem of representation. Despite their profound differences and quarrels, the three main existing umbrella theories—Platonism, nominalism, fictionalism—share a common trait: they are all sustained by a representational model of thought and by representational musical practices. There is always the performance or the apprehension of something “as” something, or the performance “of” something. Whatever one perceives in any specific here-and-now (a performance, a recording, a description), it is a “representation” of something else. Platonists insist on the primacy of an original idea and of perfectly encapsulated sound structures (Wollheim’s types) that can be represented through performances (Wollheim’s tokens, which can be qualified or fully-qualified). Nominalists focus on the material entities internal to musical practice, rejecting abstracta but keeping the central assumption of performance as based upon the repeatability and variability of an immanently generated but clearly well-articulated work, which crucially pre-exists the performance and to which the performance is compared, thus reintroducing a transcendental entity into the picture. For fictionalists there are no works altogether, but through their construction of works “as if they existed” they commit—in practical terms—to the same model of performance as presenting (or representing) a pre-given musical entity (even if phantasmatic). They all agree that there “are” musical works (the exception being the eliminativists), and they all look for “what kind of things they are.” However, despite their considerable differences, these three main currents of music ontology further share a common set of fundamental questions that relate to the conditions of identity of musical works: What exactly is a musical work? Are musical works abstract ideas or concrete things? How can a musical work be identified as this musical work? How can an instantiation of a work be considered as adequate, legitimate, or, to use the language of ontologists, “fully qualified”? In addition to the conditions of identity, these questions also relate to the criteria of judgement of any given appearance of a musical work, thus doubly pertaining to a representational mode of thinking, a mode that is actually of Aristotelian imprint rather than Platonic.

In this double sense, the vast majority of current music ontologies could be seen as actually relying on the Aristotelian world of representation. But this world is umbilically related to Plato’s theory of ideas. The very notion of representation implies something prior to it that has the capacity for “being represented.” As Gilles Deleuze argued in a long section of Difference and Repetition (1994, 262–304), the Aristotelian world of representation is enabled, first and foremost by Plato’s theory of ideas, and crucially by its intrinsic moral motivation.

7 Broadly agreeing with me (“this is true of mainstream analytic ontology of music”), David Davies stresses that there are some exceptions, among which he counts Kania’s paper “All Play and No Work” (2011) (which rejects the assumption among many analytic writers that most jazz performances also fall under the classical paradigm) and Stephen Davies’s account of jazz performances (2002).
Plato inaugurates and initiates because he evolves within a theory of Ideas which will allow the deployment of representation. In his case, however, a moral motivation in all its purity is avowed: the will to eliminate simulacra or phantasms has no motivation apart from the moral. . . . Later, the world of representation will more or less forget its moral origin and presuppositions. These will nevertheless continue to act in the distinction between the originary and the derived, the original and the sequel, the ground and the grounded, which animates the hierarchies of a representative theology by extending the complementarity between model and copy. Representation[, thus,] is a site of transcendental illusion. (Deleuze 1994, 265, my emphasis).

While discussing and critically challenging Plato’s notions of copy and simulacrum, Deleuze observes—in the conclusion to Difference and Repetition—that from a Platonist perspective the copy can always be systematically distinguished from the simulacrum by subordinating its own difference to a fourfold principle: of the Same, the Similar, the Analogous, and the Opposed (ibid.). According to Deleuze, these strict verifiable correspondences do not per se imply a system based upon representation: “with Plato these instances are not yet distributed as they will be in the deployed world of representation (from Aristotle onwards)” (ibid.). It is in the transition from the Platonic world to the world of representation that “a slippage occurs” (ibid.). As Miguel de Beistegui (analysing and paraphrasing Deleuze’s reversal of Platonism) makes clear:

> It is only superficially that the Platonic method involves dividing something according to its natural articulations, that is, according to genus and species. In other words, the operation of specification, from genus to species and all the way to what Aristotle calls “differences,” with which Plato’s work is sometimes associated, is only a preliminary step towards a more significant goal. Or, to put it differently, the Aristotelian operation of division and specification is itself an effect of, and a response to, the image of thought that Plato had identified for philosophy. (Beistegui 2012, 59–60)

Thus, it was actually after Plato that “the sameness of the Platonic Idea . . . gives way to the identity of the concept, oriented towards the form of identity in the object, and grounded in a self-identical thinking subject” (ibid., 61). A “thinking subject” that “brings to the concept its subjective concomitants: memory, recognition and self-consciousness” (Deleuze 1994, 266). In this new representational model, both objects and subjects are taken as being perfectly defined, transparent, and uncorrupted. This is what allows analytical investigations (of the objects, but also of their coded, i.e., linguistic articulations), on the one side, and for phenomenological considerations (of and by the subjects), on the other. The main operation for knowing the world becomes recognition, and difference in thought disappears because, as Beistegui (2012, 61) observes, “the image of thought as recognition . . . requires the concordance and collaboration of all faculties (perception, memory, reason, imagination, judgment, etc.) in the presentation of the same object, or the object in the form of self-identity. Far from breaking with the doxa, and becoming paradoxical, the dominant image of thought inherited from Platonism solidifies into an orthodoxy, all the more

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difficult to shake off in that its hidden, underlying presupposition is moral through and through.”

In this light, and strictly in this particular sense, one can appropriate for musical ontology the Deleuzian qualifications regarding the problem of representation in Plato and Aristotle. Surprisingly, the major existing musical ontologies (even those not officially labelled “Platonic”) can be traced back to Plato’s theory of Ideas. The fundamental questions of the diverse music ontologies assume the existence of identifiable and stabilised musical works (be it *abstracta* or *concreta*), of uncorrupted subjects capable of immaculately apprehending them, and of a transparent link between a work’s written codification and its sonic manifestation in performance. They do not take into account the energetic, intensive conditions and processes of their coming into being, nor the intricacies of their transmission throughout time and history. They rely on a grounding model based upon the notions of original, copy, and simulacra, even if they disagree in the concrete definitions of these notions. And they agree on an ontological partition of the world into *genera*, *species*, and *individuals*, fully adhering to an Aristotelian conception of categories and hierarchies. The danger of falling into scholastic “great chains of being” is lurking at the door. The difficulty is to overcome rigidly entrenched beliefs, which keep many positions jailed in the sterile prisons of analytical logic and language games. As philosopher Manuel DeLanda (2012, 223) has put it, “For many analytical philosophers abandoning the categories of the general and the particular is a difficult step because many of them were trained to believe that *all of mathematics had been reduced to logic.*” It is not surprising, therefore, that realist analytical philosophers tend to speak like Aristotle, defining the identity of things by the necessary and sufficient conditions to belong to a general category. In other words, defining identity by the possession of an essence.”

This Aristotelian influence is manifest in some music ontological accounts, which explicitly refer to Aristotelian categories to ground their arguments. Curiously, this is particularly observable among the so-called Platonists. Julian Dodd, for example, when discussing *norm-types*, directly uses arguments from the field of biological species and individuals—his example being the domestic dog (*Canis familiaris*), about which he observes that even a dog missing an ear or a leg is still a *token* of the species (type) “dog”: “There can certainly be improperly formed tokens of The Domestic Dog (*Canis familiaris*): albino dogs and dogs missing an ear or a leg are nevertheless tokens of the type. And it is a truism that, just as long as an inscription is sufficiently close to being correctly formed, it counts as an inscription of a certain word, albeit one of which its author should not feel particularly proud” (Dodd 2007, 33). Jerrold Levinson, who defends a softer version of Platonism, accepting that composers are the “creators” of their own compositions (something that pure Platonists do not accept), in turn recurs to the hedgehog as his example: “The creatures we call

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8 In this respect, Gunmar Hindrichs writes that “Every ontology manifests a conceptual scheme that articulates the great chain of being” (see Hindrichs, in this book, pp. 67, my emphasis).

9 Against DeLanda, David Davies (pers. comm.) claims that he is describing something closer to logicism, a view of mathematics to which “very few analytic philosophers [would] subscribe.”
‘hedgehogs’ possess a certain structure and stand in certain causal relations to some particular creatures that came into existence at a given past date. . . . Musical works . . . are indicated structures too, and thus types that do not already exist but must instead be initiated. The same is true of poems, plays, and novels—each of these is an entity more individual and temporally bound than the pure verbal structure embodied in it” (Levinson 1990, 81–82, my emphasis).

Music ontologists, thus, talk about species, claiming them as means to further support their own art theories. As Rohrbaugh (2012, 36) wrote, “Orthodox views hold that species membership is a part-whole relation and that species are scattered individuals, perhaps four-dimensional sums.” Critically, the problem with these views is that they don’t allow, and they actually repress, any thought that could lead to the consideration of concrete and historical individuals as fundamental constitutive parts of musical works. On the contrary, “works” (especially with a capital W) become fixed, petrified, and highly reified generalities. Unfortunately, as Rohrbaugh (ibid., 37) puts it, “when one asks, ‘What sort of thing is a symphony?’ what one really gets in response is just an expression of the speaker’s own aesthetic views about what is and is not important about symphonies, in short, ideology.” Attempts to emphasize, or simply to propose the centrality of historical individuals, of elements that appear in a precise moment in time, that undergo changes throughout historical time, that disappear or that reappear in another century, are boldly excluded and rejected. This was the case with Guy Rohrbaugh’s concept of the “continuants,” which found resistances so strong that he himself (in a kind of externally induced self-critique) was forced to admit several shortcomings of his own (in my view interesting) formulations.

Thus, if one is aiming at a renewal of ontological discourses, if one wishes to propose and sustain a new image of work, one has to look farther away from the field of available music ontologies. One has to search for something capable of replacing Aristotelian metaphysics, for some sort of “image of thought” that doesn’t operate under the rules of the three Aristotelian categories of entities: genus, species, and individual. Moreover, such an image of thought must also overturn Platonism, in the strict sense of readdressing the fundamental distinction between icons and phantasms, between images and simulacra. In a nutshell, it must exclude both categorical hierarchies and idealist transcendence.

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10 In my view, this is the point where Rohrbaugh could have found a way out of the analytic tradition, making a critique of what he just so precisely described. Unfortunately, he continues alluding to the Aristotelian way of thinking about species as “scattered individuals” whose constitutive parts are individual creatures (his constituants, which have been strongly criticised by music Platonists). Within the ontological account that I propose further down, Rohrbaugh’s continuants can find a new mode of existence, independent of transcendent systems and from hierarchical categorisations.

11 P. D. Magnus (2012, 108) even writes that Julian Dodd pronounced an “accusation” against Rohrbaugh’s idea that “historical individuals are familiar parts of the world.”
If one is looking for some kind of ally in the search for a novel, nonhierarchical, and fully immanent ontology, Gilles Deleuze seems to be one of the best placed philosophers to help us. As is well known, the overturning of Platonism (in the wake of Nietzsche’s famous claim) and the overcoming of “representation” were two of Gilles Deleuze’s life-long projects, and they are at the very core of his primary thesis for his Doctorat d’État, his famous book from 1968, Différence et répétition (see Deleuze 1994). Deleuze himself did not “officially” write texts specifically devoted to ontological issues, but, as Constantin V. Boundas (2005b, 191) has written, “For Deleuze, philosophy is ontology,” and one could even claim that his books (also those co-authored with Félix Guattari) make significant contributions, not to “one” ontology but to several, multiple ontologies. Crucially, Deleuze’s philosophy is one of difference, a difference that remains unsubordinated to “identity” and to “being,” rejecting hierarchical categories, and insisting on the profound reality (and realism) of his concepts of the virtual, the intensive, and the actual, which manifest themselves in various assemblages of energies, forces, and tendencies, making the world in which humans and non-humans live.

Among other philosophies of difference (such as Derrida’s), one must stress the point that while rejecting laws and axioms, Deleuze “offers us principles and methods . . . whereas Derrida offers us an ethos and style of writing about difference explicitly resistant to the emergence of principles or methods” (Williams 2013, 27). For someone operating in the creative field of artistic research, which is by definition a “constructivist” field of activity (as it generates objects or events of artistic nature), a permanent resistance to principles and methods would be counterproductive, if not simply sterile. That’s why philosophers like Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, or Félix Guattari are so relevant to artistic research: they offer a possibility for thought and practice outside laws and axiomatic principles, but they also enable the positive fabrication of materialities issuing from intensive processes. “Deleuze’s ontology,” as Constantin V. Boundas (2005b, 191) makes clear, “is a rigorous attempt to think of process and metamorphosis—becoming—not as a transition or transformation from one substance to another or a movement from one point to another, but rather as an attempt to think of the real as a process” (my emphasis). If the real is thought of as a process, its processuality simultaneously is fed by and generates a continuous flux of forces and intensities, which reveal themselves only in the very moment of their transductive actualisation. These forces and intensities do generate forms and matter, but it would be a mistake to think of them exclusively in terms of things and their qualities. Extension and extended magnitudes are only the result of the intensive genesis of the extended. “Becoming” is not “becoming-Being,” but a much more complex and elaborated process of per-
manent actualisation, of endlessly “becoming-something-different.” Instead of a linear process from one actual state to another, becoming is better conceived as an intensive movement from an actual state of affairs, through a dynamic field of virtual tendencies, to the actualisation of this field of forces in a new state of affairs.\textsuperscript{12}

In what follows, I will briefly introduce five key notions that enable us to grasp the ontology of Gilles Deleuze, including the couple actual–virtual, intensity, individual and universal singularities, topological unfoldings, and multiplicities.\textsuperscript{13}

\textit{Actual/virtual}

The terminological doublet virtual–actual is central to the ontology of Gilles Deleuze, being present in his books and essays since his first published texts on Henri Bergson in 1956. Actual and virtual describe the fundamental domains of Deleuze’s differential ontology. According to Anne Sauvagnargues (2003, 22, my translation), “the actual designates the present and material state of things, while the virtual refers to everything that is not currently/presently here (including incorporeal, past, or ideal events).” It is the exchange and communication between the actual and the virtual that enable a dynamics of becoming as differentiation and creation. Primary differences of energy and energetic potentials generate “differentiation” (virtual structure) and “differentiation” (the genesis of actuality). Such dynamics always happen in the form of an event—an event being the individuation of differentiation, and the actualisation of differentiation. One cannot overstate that for Deleuze, both the virtual and the actual are real. As Deleuze (1994, 208–9) himself has put it: “The virtual is opposed not to the real but to the actual. The virtual is fully real. . . . Indeed, the virtual must be defined as strictly a part of the real object—as though the object had one part of itself in the virtual into which it plunged as though into an objective dimension. . . . The reality of the virtual consists of the differential elements and relations along with the singular points which correspond to them.”

Importantly, Deleuze’s virtual is by no means to be understood in terms of “virtual reality,” but, on the contrary, as something absolutely real, that is even “actually” perceived as tension or inconsistencies in/of the actual, as a diagrammatic reservoir of effectively potential actualisations (some of which will affect the world, some of which not), but that exist in a topological space of possibilities.\textsuperscript{14} Moreover, the distinction between the virtual and the actual is

\textsuperscript{12} For a thorough discussion of the relations between the couple virtual–real and the notion of becoming, see Boundas (2007, 489–91).
\textsuperscript{13} Other concepts, such as the couple molar–molecular, the dark precursor, the quasi-cause, transduction, or the event are not addressed here for the sake of space, though they are also central to Deleuze’s ontological construction.
\textsuperscript{14} It is in this sense that Deleuze, directly inspired by Bergson, could talk of a past that has never been present (the virtual as immemorial past), and of a future that will never be present (the virtual as a never-attainable messianic future). This link between the couple virtual–real and past–future temporalities prevents any reification of the past (as in Plato’s recollection), or of the future (as in some teleological ideologies) as it presupposes non-determining and non-deterministic tendencies.
not unilateral, nor is it ontologically black-boxed. This distinction is pros-
cessional and differential, making the “a priori and the a posteriori . . . a product of
individuating processes rather than their condition” (Toscano 2009, 389). The
“virtual–real” might lead (under precise, yet unforeseeable transductive condi-
tions) to an “actual–real,” which, in turn (as soon as it emerges-in-the-world)
fabricates a new “virtual–real.” Without resembling the actual, the virtual none-
theless has the capacity to bring about actualisation, and yet the virtual never
coincides or can be identified with its actualisation. The virtual is the whole set
of forces, energies, potentials, and intensities that exist, that are real, yet that
are not actualised in the here-and-now of the present. The actual are all the
forces, energies, potentials, and intensities that are currently happening in the
here-and-now of our presence. There is no actual without virtual, and no virtual
that cannot be actualised.

Intensity

Both the virtual and the actual appear, then, as the result of concrete energetic
processes, involving the passage, the relay, or the transformation of one type of
energy into another, crucially establishing a connection between two or more
series with different energetic potentials. The virtual does not exist a priori to
the intensive processes that generate it; it does not pre-deterministically define
the processes of its actualisation (which would imply a kind of neo-Platonism).
At the same time, the actual is not an “image” (a “copy”) of a pre-existing model,
but it emerges progressively as the result of concrete intensive processes of
onto- and morphogenesis. Before the definition of any ontological category,
there are several constantly ongoing ontological processes, which are summa-
rised—in Deleuze’s terminology—under the notion of the intensive. Intensive
processes generate singularities in the two sides of the real: individual singu-
larities in the actual–real, and universal singularities in the virtual–real. Thus,
Deleuze’s notion of intensity, the pre-individual relationship between two or
more fields with different potentials, gains centrality within his ontological
scheme. Intensities are not ontological entities or categories (as the virtual
and the actual can be considered to be), they are real events “whose mode of exist-
ence is to actualise themselves in states of affairs” (Boundas 2005a, 131).

A thorough discussion of the complex relations between the virtual, the actual,
and the intensive would lie outside the scope of this chapter, especially as there
have been several attempts to clarify this topic, each leading to significantly
different understandings.15 Be that as it might be, what seems clear from all
these different understandings of Deleuze’s ontology, is that “intensity holds

15 In fact, there is no consensus about the precise placement of these three notions within Deleuze’s on-
tological system. Dale Clisby’s recent essay “Intensity in Context: Thermodynamics and Transcendental
Philosophy” (2017, especially 550–55) offers a short, yet precise, overview of the three main currently
available positions: (1) those who align the intensive with the virtual, which is the (critical) position of
Peter Hallward (2006) and Alain Badiou (2000); (2) those who think the intensive as a third ontological
domain, as has been convincingly proposed by Manuel DeLanda (2002) and John Protevi (2013), who
excavated the precise scientific influences in the writings of Deleuze; and (3) those who consider the in-
tensive as being part of the actual, or as “the being of the actual” as Jon Roffe (2012, as quoted in Clisby
2017, 253) has suggested.
the true key for Deleuze’s metaphysical system,” as Clisby (2017, 251) pointedly summarises. Critically, Deleuze’s ontology is an ontology of forces and of actualisations, not an ontology of actualised phenomena. As its object, it takes not the completed form (be it ideal or nominal) but formation itself. In the words of James Williams (2013, 42), “Deleuze’s view is that no object is fully accounted for through its actual properties since the changes that it has undergone and will undergo, and the differences implied in those changes, must be considered to be part of the object.” In this sense, as long as we insist on the existence of well-defined things, Deleuze’s position will not be grasped, and his case to overturn Plato and Aristotle will not prevail. With Williams (ibid., 69), one can say that “to be is not to be a well-defined thing with recognisable limits [but] on the contrary, it is to be a pure movement or variation in relation to well-defined things.” The process of actualisation does not occur in a vacuum: “at every moment there exists a field of intensity implicated in the explicated objects of experience” (Clisby 2017, 254).

Within a dynamic system, any process of individuation starts from intensity, leading to the emergence of singularities, whether actual singularities or virtual ones. In the fifth chapter of *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze (1994, 247) clearly states that individuation precedes and gives rise to actualisation: “Individuation does not presuppose any differenciation; it gives rise to it.” Thus, “every differenciation presupposes a prior intense field of individuation” (ibid.). Critically, this “prior intense field of individuation” is a problematic field. There is no transparent nor straightforward correspondence between the prior field of individuation, the field of individuation itself, and the individuated singularity it affords. In all phases and at all moments of the individuating process there are multiple and incommensurable forces playing a complex game of intensive tendencies and unfoldings. Any intensive process is a metastable flux of energetic discharges, potentials, and tendencies. And whereas this differenciation establishes a problematisation, the concrete actualisation of that virtual field express differenciations as the constitution of solutions (by local integrations), leading to the formation of actual things. Such things are formed by different sets of specific individual singularities that are actualised in the here-and-now, in the present. The process of differenciation happens through *transduction*, changing one type of energy into another, critically leading to the formation of new and unexpected individuations, which contain emergent properties that were not predetermined in advance. These actualisation result in individual singularities, which can be things, objects, or documents, all with two parts: an extensive part (quantitatively measurable and divisible) and an intensive part (qualitatively active and non-divisible). The actual things in the world are thus not only the result of an intensive genesis, as they remain processual, even within their physical constraints. They are never (or only very rarely) petrified in a final state of zero energy. Intensive processes never stop and never come to an end.
Singularities

From the working together of the notions of virtual-actual, intensity, and transduction (or modulation as Anne Sauvagnargues prefers to call it\(^\text{16}\)), one starts grasping the virtual diagrams and the actual things that populate Deleuze’s materialist world—a world that radically departs from, and that is totally different from, the Aristotelian system of categories.\(^\text{17}\) With the couple virtual–actual and with intensity, we have the ontological “domains” of Deleuze’s system. I will now turn to those entities that Deleuze acknowledges as existing in the world.\(^\text{18}\) For Deleuze, the actual world is populated only by individual singularities that often appear as populations of individual singularities, which exist in different spatio-temporal scales and in different modes of interaction among individual components. The actual world is the world of actual things, and all these things have the same ontological status—thus, no hierarchies, but a flat ontology to start with. As DeLanda (2010, 83) makes clear: “In [Deleuze’s] approach all actual entities are considered to be individual singularities, that is, all belong to the lowest level of Aristotle’s ontological hierarchy, while the roles of the two upper levels are performed by universal singularities.”

Every individual singularity emerges as the outcome of a historical process, it is the concrete result of intensive processes that occur in the world. Every singularity is produced or fabricated in a specific point in time and space. So, for example, atoms of hydrogen are fabricated inside stars; there is no “hydrogen in general,” but a concrete population of materially existing hydrogen atoms (DeLanda 2010, 85). Likewise, there is no canis familiaris in general, but rather a population of single dogs, each of which is an individual singularity, unique and unrepeatable (as a simple DNA test can prove). As every individual singularity is unique, special, and remarkable, what deserves attention are not the “species” but the moment of “speciation,” that particular moment when something changes state or phase, when a mutation occurs, when a cosmic phenomenon happens. Bigger populations of singular individuals define “larger individuals,” and what matters are those moments when a new species appears, and when it disappears. Species are historical entities that depend on the concrete evolution, transformation, and mutations of all the individual singularities that define them—one individual at a time, one by one. The focus on such ontogenetical processes, on intensive individuations, enables Deleuze to populate reality exclusively with immanent entities, eliminating any transcendent ones, such as the essences of Aristotle’s two upper categories, genus and species. For


\(^{17}\) Deleuze’s extremely dense critique of Aristotle—which essentially focuses on his concept of “difference,” and which aims at showing that Aristotle’s definition of difference is problematic and misses a deeper understanding of the term—is to be found in paragraphs three to five of the second section of the first chapter (“Difference in Itself”) of Difference and Repetition (Deleuze 1994, 38–44). On this difficult passage, see also Williams (2013, 64–68), Somers-Hall (2013, 23–30), and Hughes (2009, 40–42).

\(^{18}\) As this is a notoriously difficult task, I support my inquiry with reference to authors who have already dealt with this topic in great depth. In addition to Constantin V. Boundas, I am deeply indebted to Manuel DeLanda’s several accounts of a Deleuzian ontology, to Anne Sauvagnargues on its implications for art, and to Arkady Plotnitsky for his invaluable clarifications in relation to mathematics (see Boundas 2003b, 2003c, 2007; DeLanda 2002, 2006, 2010, 2012; Sauvagnargues 2003, 2005, 2013, 2016; Plotnitsky 2006, 2009).
Aristotle the world is already divided by general and specific categories that are eternal, unchangeable, and not subject to corruption and decay. For Deleuze, on the other hand, the world of discrete things emerges constantly, as solutions to problems that are defined by conditions that do not determine a result, nor impose consistency. Finally, as DeLanda writes, “as these ontological problems undergo a process of actualization they become progressively differentiated into a multiplicity of actual solutions. This differentiation proceeds in a fully historical way, and may only reveal a portion of the possibility space at a time” (2012, 236, my emphasis). Thus, the Aristotelian categories of the general and the particular (in musical Platonism: the types and the tokens) can be replaced in a Deleuzian ontology by two radically immanent entities: the universal singular and the individual singular.

Topological unfoldings

Influenced by theories coming from mathematics and embryology, Deleuze thinks of the actualisations that lead to the individuation of singularities as happening through a sequence of “topological unfoldings.” In very simple mathematical terms, a topological entity is one that can be folded into another form without losing its identity. As philosopher and mathematician Arkady Plotnitsky (2006, 191) defined it, “Geometry has to do with measurements, while topology disregards measurement, and deals only with the structure of space qua space and with the essential shapes and figures.” Differently than in Euclidian geometry, in topological geometry a circle, for example, can be stretched into an ellipse or into a quasi-square without losing its topological identity. A sphere can be compressed into a cylinder, a cone, or a pear-like shape, its topological identity remaining untouched. In an essay on mathematician Bernhard Riemann (who, together with his teacher Gauss, was one of the inventors of topology), Plotnitsky (2009, 201) is very precise about this identity: “Insofar as one deforms a given figure continuously (that is, insofar as one does not separate points previously connected and, conversely, does not connect points previously separated) the resulting figure is considered the same.” However, spheres are topologically different from tori, and they cannot be converted into each other without disjoining their connected points.

If one extends these mathematical notions to biology, genetics, and embryology, one can think of the unfolding of an embryo as a matter of topological transformations, or of a vertebrate animal as the result of topological changes and developments. French naturalist Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire thought (at the beginning of the nineteenth century, i.e., before Darwin) that species could be conceived without genera, as transformation (transmutation was his word) from one into the other. This leads to the perspective that the world can be conceived first and foremost as a continuum of intensity that becomes segmented into species only as certain tendencies are manifested and certain capacities exercised (see DeLanda 2010, 91). These remarks are extremely relevant as we attempt to eliminate transcendent entities from the world. Every single animal or embryo is the result of concrete, immanent, intensive processes, and is absolutely not an “instantiation” of an idea, of a “genus,” or of a “species.” We need
to think of an animal as a topological animal (ibid., 96), which can be folded and stretched into the multitude of different animal species that exist on Earth. Of course, this is only physically possible at the level of the embryos, which are flexible enough to endure these transformations. Moreover, every topological or “virtual” animal must have the capacity of being divergently actualised (leading to concrete divergent individual singularities), and each actualisation must be inheritable with a slight degree of unpredictability. We come close to describing DNA structures, and it is indeed “the structure of the space of possible body plans that replaces the genus ‘Animal’” (ibid., 97). The relevant causal agents (chromosomes, genes, genes marking axes of longitude and latitude, cellular populations, etc.) do not operate and act as “formal causes,” but as “efficient causes.” As DeLanda highlights, “Aristotelian species like ‘Horse’ and ‘Human’ should be replaced by historically constituted species that have the same ontological status as the organisms that compose them, that is, that are individual singularities; and the genus ‘Animal’ should be replaced by a space of possibilities in which the different body plans are universal singularities, capable of being divergently actualized into a large number of sub-phyla and classes” (DeLanda 2010, 102, my emphasis).

On a higher scale, biological populations of individuals (what we use to call “species” in common language) are “as singular, as unique, and as historically contingent as individual organisms: species are born when their gene pool is closed to external flows of genetic materials through reproductive isolation, and they die through extinction” (ibid., 93–94). As today is widely accepted, no species is sempiternal, they are all historically contingent and ephemeral. Even stars are ephemeral: they exist for a limited amount of time, even if this is beyond our human capacity of imagining. Everything is ephemeral, everything is contingent, everything is part of a continuous relay of intensive energies from one actualisation to the next, without being predetermined and without being predictable. The diversity of entities that populate the world are bounded in extension, but they are generated by invisible and temporal processes set in motion by immanent differences of intensity—not by any transcendental “substance” or “essence,” which are no more than unreal reified generalities.

**Multiplicities**

In addition to the singularities and topological intensive transductive processes, the concept of “multiplicity” is absolutely crucial for a Deleuzian ontology. It is one of the most recurrent concepts in the works of Deleuze—alone or in collaboration with Félix Guattari—and it finds its roots not in philosophy or linguistics, but in mathematics, particularly in the subfields of differential geometry, group theory, and dynamical systems theory. Deleuze mentioned it early on, in his 1966 book *Bergsonism*, where the subtitle of the second chapter is precisely “Théorie des multiplicités” (Deleuze 1991, 37–49). Although

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19 This has been exhaustively disclosed and explained by DeLanda (2002, 2010). A very different perspective, critical of DeLanda’s assumptions and interpretation, has been offered by Mary Beth Mader (2017).

20 A subtitle that, unfortunately, is not rendered in the 1991 English translation of the book.
originally derived from Bernhard Riemann’s differential mathematics, Deleuze first uses it in relation to time (duration) and space, particularly focusing on the notion that time is the condition for change or becoming. As Eugene B. Young (2013, 210) observed, this has profound consequences: “If [time] is taken as the foundation for conceiving space, then space (or objects and subjects within it) is not subjected to transcendent criteria but must be conceived in terms of difference and intensity.”

For Deleuze, an important part of the role played by the concept of multiplicity is to further enable a replacement of the Aristotelian concept of essence. The essence of a thing is what explains its identity, and consequently how many different objects resemble each other by the fact that they share such an essence. However, in a Deleuzian ontology, “a species . . . is not defined by its essential traits but rather by the morphogenetic process that gave rise to it” (DeLanda 2002, 9–10). As we have seen before, species are historically and contingently constituted entities, not the representatives of timeless categories. While an essentialist worldview sees species as static, a morphogenetic account, such as the one offered by Deleuze, is inherently dynamic. As Boundas (2007, 489–90) has put it: “Deleuze’s ontology is an ontology of forces attempting to correct the mistake we make whenever we think exclusively in terms of things and their qualities: in privileging extension and extended magnitudes, we overlook the intensivegenesis of the extended.”

Critically, Deleuze’s notion of space, surfaces, and points on a surface is directly indebted to the mathematical constructions of Gauss and Riemann, particularly to their surfaces, which are spaces in themselves and thus do not need to have an additional (n+1) dimension perceived. These are purely immanent surfaces; they are not placed within a transcendent space. In such surfaces, which build a dynamical system, each point in the surface becomes a possible state for the system—be it in an actual or virtual mode of existence in the present moment. The complete space is a collection of all possible states that the system can have. Crucially, Riemann also discovered that some points more probably “occur” than others—these are called topological singularities. As there are too many possible points in a system (all its universal singularities), we cannot map them all. Instead, we can map the topological singularities (also called “attractors”). This is what allows for a replacement of hierarchical categories and of the necessary and sufficient conditions for those categories: a topological space of possibilities, where individual singularities are actualised entities, and universal singularities are virtual points.21 It is the virtual network of connectors between these topological singularities that makes the structure (the diagram) of a dynamic system. As Deleuze famously stated, “the reality of the virtual is structure” (Deleuze 1994, 209, my emphasis).

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21 I insist on the crucial aspect that these universal singularities are by no means to be confused with Platonic ideas. They are real and effective parts of a dynamic system, and they can be actualised instantly at any given time of the system’s lifespan. They are not the result of predeterminations, nor are they pointing towards necessary or unidirectional solutions.
To avoid any possible misunderstanding over Deleuze’s use of this term, one has to stress right away that *structure* is understood by Deleuze in its mathematical and anthropological sense, not in the conventional musicological sense of the “fixed system of relations” or “infra-structure” of a given piece. As Christopher Hasty (2010, 101n23) has put it, “Deleuze’s understanding of structure is quite different from that of musicology or linguistics, in which structure is regarded as a fixed form, a substance underlying the accidents of performance. Structure for Deleuze points to the differentiated multiplicity of Idea.”

James Williams (2013, 160) expressed a similar remark, clarifying that “structure as multiplicity is in movement and does not give priority to fixed structures.” Multiplicities specify the *structure of spaces of possibilities*, which, in turn, offer an explanation for the regularities and inconsistencies in the morphogenetic processes, and in the concrete, material actualisations of the individual singularities. “The reality of the virtual consists of the differential elements and relations along with the singular points which correspond to them. The reality of the virtual is structure. We must avoid giving the elements and relations which form a structure an actuality which they do not have, and withdrawing from them a reality which they have” (Deleuze 1994, 209).

In the last sentence of this quotation we find crucial arguments against the two dominant schools of music ontology. Nominalists should not insist in defending at all costs the *actuality* of all singularities that are part of a musical work (“we must avoid giving the elements and relations which form a structure an actuality which they do not have” [ibid., my emphasis]), and Platonists should not axiomatically deny the material and real existence of singularities that are part of a musical work (“we must avoid . . . withdrawing from them a reality which they have” [ibid., my emphasis]). As multiplicities, what we usually call “musical works” are diagrams of the virtual, that is, they are real but not actual, and they are capable of divergent actualisations in several different media, times, and modes of appearance.

To conclude this section, one can summarise Deleuze’s ontological proposal as defining a world view made of three separate, but intrinsically interrelated domains. One is the domain of actual *individual singularities*, of materially existing and observable products of natural and human invention, which can be defined by their extensive properties, by their length, area, volume, weight, number of components, and so on. Next there is a domain of *intensive processes* (transduction), defined by differences of potential, flows of energy, phase shifts, and critical thresholds, which change quantity into quality, and quality into quantity. They link the individual singularities to the *universal singularities* that remain virtual, some of which are more likely to be actualised than others (*topological singularities*). Finally, there is the domain of virtual *structure*, the *topological space of possibilities*, which diagrammatically maps the universal singular-

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22 Deleuze’s use of the term “Idea” would also require some further explanations, which unfortunately I cannot undertake here. In short, I simply stress the fact that Deleuze’s “Idea” is mobile and changeable, thus very different from the reified Ideas of traditional idealisms and from the Kantian concepts of the understanding, which Deleuze discusses in chapter 4 of *Difference and Repetition*, in relation to Salomon Maimon’s reading of Kant (see Deleuze 1994, 168–76).
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ities, and that accounts in a purely immanent way for the regularities (but also for the inconsistencies) in the processes and in the individuations. The virtual diagram cannot exist without the actual and virtual singularities that build it. Nothing would happen in the world without the continuous relay of intensities from the virtual to the actual, and vice versa.

This leads to an ontology that is processual, immanentist, and based upon difference (differentiation), a difference that is conceived not negatively, as lack of resemblance, but productively, as that which drives dynamic processes. Epistemologically, it defines a problematic epistemology (or an epistemology of problems and problematisations), one that gets rid of the general laws of axiomatic epistemologies without denying the objectivity of physical knowledge, which is now investigated by immanent distributions of the singular. The notion of truth is also devalued, as the dynamic processes are not predetermined, nor are they predictable. Ethically, the world emerges as profoundly transformed: a closed, finished and authoritative world pervaded by transcendental ideas and categories gives place to an open world of immanent events and singularities, “full of divergent processes yielding novel and unexpected entities, the kind of world that would not sit still long enough for us to take a snapshot of it and present it as the final truth” (DeLanda 2002, 6).

3. Virtual works, actual things: towards a new image of musical work

Deleuze’s philosophy has the potential to revolutionise other disciplines. (Williams 2013, 234)

At this point, the choice of our title for the Orpheus Academy 2016 is clear. What traditionally, or at least for the last two hundred years, have been called “musical works” are specific “zones,” or partial elements of something that can be more aptly described and thought about in terms of musical “multiplicities,” which are fabricated by intensive processes that generate virtual structures and actual things. Music Platonists focus only on the structures, the reality of which they deny and which they conceive as purely abstract, fixed, immobile, and eternal. For their part, nominalists rely only on extensive individual singularities, historically contingent, but also fixed and totally defined, to which they deny a virtual (intensive) component. For a Deleuzian-inspired music ontology, musical multiplicities must be grounded in the actual, even as some of the forces that the actual summons might remain virtual. Both—abstract structures and petrified strata—have to be overcome. Structures are mobile and fluid, while strata are constantly being dismantled and reshaped. As Michael Gallope stated, in his attempt to define “a Deleuzian musical work,”

Deleuze offers a glimpse of something different: music for him is certainly based in a materiality of sound, but is not reducible to any social or perceptual situation. It has a strange kind of autonomy, one that is oriented towards the absolute, but not as a
vehicle for the actual work’s content. Incredibly, he tries to think a musical work that is once more ideal and more empirical than the common perspectives. A Deleuzian musical work would be more ideal than a Platonist view since the logic of sensation has no “fallen” or exterior moment like performance external to itself. And it would be more empirical than a historicist perspective since it takes no recourse to the regulative norms of any historical moment. (Gallope 2008, 117–18)

Michael Gallope’s essay “Is There a Deleuzian Musical Work?” (2008) is, to my knowledge, the only serious attempt so far to think about music ontology from a Deleuzian perspective. However, he places his inquiry within currently available ontologies, using Peter Kivy and Lydia Goehr as two examples of the polarisation of the debate between Platonism and historicising views. My take is different: I think it is indispensable to think outside existing music ontologies, to come up with a new image of work (which replaces the word “work” itself), and to appropriate for music ontology the basic features of Deleuze’s ontology—and not so much what Deleuze said or wrote about music. So, I don’t think there is “a Deleuzian musical work,” which is Gallope’s central concern. There cannot be a Deleuzian musical “Work” (with a capital W). There can only be a Deleuzian musical work, which is a multiplicity made of virtual topological singularities, actual individual singularities (containing a virtual component in themselves), and intensive transductive processes (generating the virtual and the actual).

Under this new image of “work,” every musical multiplicity has two halves: a virtual image and an actual image, resonating with Deleuze’s statement that “every object is double without it being the case that the two halves resemble one another, one being a virtual image and the other an actual image” (1994, 209, my emphasis).

If we consider these two images in relation to musical works, one can think of the virtual image as the one relating to the structure, to the diagram of a musical work, with all its topological singularities. It remains ideal without being abstract (because those singularities are real; that is, they “exist”), and is dependent on the quantity and quality of the concrete mapping of its universal singularities made by every single person. Thus, there are as many virtual images of a musical work as persons “thinking” of it. Every single person has his or her own and unique “diagram” of any given musical work. This diagram is always individual, and can only be “thought” if one starts from the topological singularities that enable us to think about it in the first place. It is by no means something prior to our mapping of the singularities; it is not an abstract or transcendental entity. On the contrary, it is the most extreme immanently generated construction, being dependent on an innumerable amount of concrete singularities working together in a specific assemblage of forces, intensities, and tendencies (remember that every singularity is the result of intensive energetic processes of individuation, thus, not “sempiternal” Platonic fictions). In order to emerge, this “structural” image requires a “transcendental empiricism,” an enormous (“transcendental”) amount of events, of individual and topological singularities, of intensive processes, of forces and tendencies empirically experienced by every single agent (performer, listener, reader, etc.).
Thus, virtual images of a musical work are potentially infinite—there are no “absolute” or universally intelligible musical works. Every musical “work” is a space in itself, which has to be navigated internally by every single actant—it is not placed within an overarching (n+1) transcendental space containing it. Thus, a musical work is as many “works” as the people thinking of it. The virtual image, thus defines a problematic field, determining the virtual content of a musical work as a problem, as an ideal (though not abstract) constellation of differential topological singularities.

Whereas this differentiation (with a “d”) establishes a problematisation, the concrete actualisations of that virtual field express differentiations (with a “c”) as the constitution of solutions, leading to the formation of actual images. Such images are formed by different sets of specific individual singularities that are actualised in the here-and-now, in the present (and in the presence) of a receiver, be it a reader of a score, a listener of a recording or concert, or an active performer of the music (or a non-human for non-human forms of expression). The process of differentiation happens through transduction, changing one type of energy into another, critically leading to the formation of new and unexpected individuations, which contain emergent properties that were not predetermined in advance.

As we have seen, current music ontologies primarily insist on the conditions of identity and recognition of a given musical work. Their common basic questions are of the type: what is a musical work? Are musical works abstract ideas or concrete things? How can a musical work be identified as this musical work? How can an instantiation of a work be considered as adequate, legitimate, or “fully qualified”? However, these questions take for granted precisely what needs to be explained, namely, the fact that those objects they label as “musical works” emerged at a given historical time, have been defined by innumerable sets of physical documents, have been the result of intensive processes of generation, and undergo constant redefinitions throughout time. Anyone with experience of editions of musical works (for print), or in research on sketches (in archives), just to give two simple examples, knows that any fixed “definition” of a work is highly problematic, open to criticism, and the object of change over time. Not only do traditions of musical practice and reception change, but the very definition of a musical text is constantly shifting. Musical works from the past have been different entities throughout time. Think of a symphony by Beethoven and its many, varied, and literally different editions over the last two hundred years. There have been instruments added or changed, even pitches have not been totally indisputable. And the more one looks into its sketches, more problems arise and more options seem acceptable. Musical works don’t possess a final, definitive, and sempiternal formal definition and unchangeable identity. If anything, they are mobile entities.

23 I addressed this topic in detail in “Beyond Urtext: A Dynamic Conception of Musical Editing” (De Assis 2009, 7–18).
Traditional ontological accounts seem to ignore this, they treat musical works as perfectly defined entities, which are to be played by perfect performers, and which can be apprehended by perfectly intentionally oriented listeners. Instead of relying on such traditional ontologies (focused on “Being”), one needs to focus on the onto- and morphogenesis of musical works. The starting questions are, then, quite different: How are musical works effectively generated, constructed, formalised? Which intensive processes lead to their individuation? Which pre-individuating forces and materials create the humus where they will emerge? On which material basis are they transmitted throughout time? Which parts of them remain hidden and which ones are disclosed to a specific discipline, perspective, goal? What is the affective power of their extensive parts? Which concrete documents allow for their performance? How are they concretely performed? What other things influence their passive reception by an audience? Which things build their special topological singularities? Which are the modes of existence of such multiplicities? How can their “diagrams/structures” be thought? In the place of “fundamental” or “higher order” ontology, one urgently needs an “ontogenesis,” an account of the modes of individuation and continuous historical change of musical “works.”

From this perspective, one cannot ignore the intensive energetic processes that lead to the emergence, that is to say, to the factual production of sketches, scores, editions, recordings, analyses, and theoretical reflections on a given “work.” Critically, one cannot forget the innumerable material objects and things that enable the construction of any possible “image of work” in the first place. Before gaining their “identity,” their unmistakable modes of appearance, their enduring character, or their “aura,” musical works are constituted as energetic tendencies that generate complex conglomerates of things, such as sketches, drafts, manuscripts, scores, editions, recordings, transcriptions, treatises, manuals, instruments, depictions, contracts, commissions, letters, postcards, scribbles, diagrams, analytical charts, theoretical essays, articles, books, memories, and so on. These innumerable things are actual, they have been historically actualised at some precise point in time, and they persist existing, even if remaining modally and temporally flexible. Any single item from the list presented above can be differently read, interpreted, exposed, presented, or assembled as part of a book, an edition, a performance, a lecture, an installation, or whatever format. At this level, the individual singularities pertaining to a musical multiplicity function in a similar way to Guy Rohrbaugh’s “continuants,” possessing three qualities that Platonic entities do not: they are modally flexible (they might have had different intensive properties than the ones they currently afford), they are temporally flexible (their intensive properties might differ over time), and they can come into and go out of exposure. Thus, they are not ideal and sempiternal, nor are they materially fixed once and for all. When Julian Dodd asks Rohrbaugh, “where are those historical individuals you claim to identify?” (quoted in Rohrbaugh 2012, 33), well, here they are! But they are not the full story, they are not “the work,” they are transient, partial, and not always actualised components of the wider construction not of “works,” but of works as multiplicities.
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In very concrete terms, we have to be clear about which things we consider to be a legitimate part of the actual components of our musical multiplicities. In this sense, and as a useful tool for music practitioners creating innovative modes of performance, I have been proposing a terminology based upon strata and processes of stratification, which is vaguely inspired by Deleuze and Guattari’s use of these terms in A Thousand Plateaus (1987, 39–74, 637–39). Appropriating their terminology, and remaining aware of the unavoidable anisomorphism between philosophy and art, one can divide all those music materials that physically exist in the real world into diverse types of strata. Substrata are materials that already existed in the world before the first traits of instantiation of a new piece were produced; among them one finds other musical pieces, instruments, instrumental and compositional manuals, spoken and unspoken rules, codes of behaviour and practice, lists of personnel, payment sheets, and so on. Parastrata refer to documents produced while composing or preparing a performance, produced in view of the generation of a new piece, directly leading to the emergence of a new musical multiplicity; they include sketches, drafts, first editions, letters, and writings or annotations by composers and performers. From that particular moment in time, when a piece has been first defined, many other future materials become thinkable and possible: new and renewed editions, all sorts of catalogues (of the sketches, of the variants, of the renderings), technical analysis of the piece or parts of it, reflexive texts about it, theoretical contextualisations, recordings, and so on—these are epistrata, they appear from the first materials that defined the piece and evolve from them in ever growing circles. Next, there are metastrata, new materials generated at every future historical time, by practitioners aiming at presenting or, better, at exposing specific sets of materials from a given multiplicity in a new way; such strata include performances, recordings, transcriptions, expositions, or any other mode of critically reflecting on the available sources. Furthermore, there are also interstrata, particular singularities that function in more than one register, being sometimes part of one strata, sometimes of another one. Finally, materials that have apparently nothing to do with a given piece, but that might under certain circumstances create relations to it are called allostrata (one simple example is a concert situation where, for example, a piece by Schumann enters into an unexpected relation with a piece by Ligeti). Significantly, all these different strata are not ontologically predefined, that is, their belonging

24 Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 522n14) acknowledge their appropriation of these concepts from Italian paleoanthropologist Pia Laviosa Zambotti, more specifically from her book Les origines et la diffusion de la civilisation (1949), where she develops a whole theory on nomadic cultures and their progressive diffusion over the Earth’s ecumene. Especially in chapter four, she addresses the topic of strata, substrata, and parastrata, illuminating the processes by which a nomadic culture interfered with, and was influenced by, the sedentary cultures it met. A set of substrata, which were part of the structures of a sedentary population or of its milieu, starts being challenged, while new configurations (parastrata) begin to emerge. The concrete planetary movements and migrations of human populations described by Zambotti proved to be wrong by the late 1950s, but her descriptions of the kind of interactions between humans, and between humans and their milieu, still have validity and are worth reading.
to this or that stratum is more functional than “existential.” It all depends on the specific use made of them by the musical actants.

We can now understand some of the strata at work in the opening performance of the Orpheus Academy 2016, *Rasch* (see Introduction). Moscheles’s piano étude *Zorn*, which Schumann notated in his sketchbook to *Kreisleriana*, acted as a *substratum*, a piece of music that existed in the world prior to the composition of *Kreisleriana* and that had an impact on it. The same applies to Beethoven’s *An die ferne Geliebte*, which is literally quoted in Schumann’s immediately preceding work (the *Fantasie*, op. 17) and evoked at the end of the second number of *Kreisleriana*. Roland Barthes’s essays operated first as *metastrata* (when Barthes was writing them), and now as *epistrata*, adding new individual singularities to the multiplicity called “Robert Schumann’s *Kreisleriana*.” If one thinks of musical *works* as multiplicities, their constitutive parts become not only innumerable but also unpredictable, an aspect that enables infinite differential and experimental reconfigurations of their connectors and relationships.

In fact, one of the goals of ME21’s *Rasch* series is to generate an intricate network of aesthetico-epistemic cross-references, through which the listener has the freedom to focus on different layers of perception: be it on the music, on the texts being projected or read, on the images, or on the voices. Situated beyond “interpretation,” “hermeneutics,” and “aesthetics,” the *Rasch* series is part of wider research on what might be labelled “experimental performance practices.” Such practices offer a tangible mode of exposing musical *works* as multiplicities. On the contrary, if one sticks to a traditional image of work based upon the One (or Idea), one has necessarily to stick also to notions of “work-concept,” interpretation, authenticity, fidelity to the composer’s intentions, and other highly prescriptive rules that originated in the nineteenth century. And if one sticks only to the historical situatedness of practices and codes of the time of the original compositions, then one is condemned to historicism, to the cultivation of relics and fetishes from other epochs (even if “historically informed practices” are a highly modern invention, as Richard Taruskin sharply demonstrated in several passages of his book *Text and Act* [1995]). What I mean is that every musical practice, every way of doing performance depends on, or is the direct result of, a specific ontological commitment. If one’s goal is the passive reproduction of a particular edition of a musical piece from the early nineteenth century, one is indeed better advised to remain within the “classical paradigm,” with all its associated practices of survey, discipline, and control. But if one is willing to expose the richness of the available materials that irradiate from that piece, one has to move towards new ontological accounts, such as the one proposed in this chapter.

Critically, different disciplines look at the different strata differently, each discipline constructing its own specific “image of work.” Robert Schumann’s *Kreisleriana* is a different “entity” for a music sociologist, a music analyst, a clinical psychologist, or a pianist. They all take into account different actual things relating to that multiplicity, and they all build different virtual diagrams of it. And each individual person, even from the same discipline, sees different things and articulates them differently, thus constructing his or her own
Virtual Works—Actual Things

The (impossible to grasp) totality of materials pertaining to a work can only be considered as being virtual in the Deleuzian sense I explained above. Any actualisation of the virtual music singularities is a snapshot of wider images of work, the particular snapshot that a person, a group, or a community perceives for a certain duration of time. Brought together in specific configurations (historically, geographically, and disciplinarily situated), every imaginative individual stratum in its interaction with other strata enables the material, psychological, and sociocultural construction of diverse images of work, which have the potential to replace those reified generalities that we usually call “musical works.”

Works appear then as multiplicities, as highly complex, historically constructed assemblages defined by virtual structures and actual things. While traditional musical ontologies remain attached to hermeneutic, analytical, and interpretative approaches, the new image of work enhances the emergence of creative, performative, and experimental events. Beyond transcendental typologies, beyond extreme or qualified versions of Platonism, beyond functional theories of operative concepts, and beyond aesthetic considerations coming from the ivory-towers of academia, this new “image of work” offers a redefinition of musical works as highly flexible, mobile multiplicities with potentially infinite constitutive parts that can be exposed in different modes, to different audiences, and at different times. The shift from a work-centred perspective to a vision of an exploded continuum made of innumerable objects and things, in steady, intensive interaction with one another, creates fields of discourse, practice, and perception based on pure difference, leading to processes of differential repetition. Every single performance then becomes “different”—not different from any original transcendental idea, but different from difference itself. It is only one ephemeral solution to the problematic field defined by a musical multiplicity.

When looking at those exploded things, a musician or a scholar has two options: one is analytical, remaining at a certain distance from the materials of musical practice, questioning things in terms of what they are, how they appear, which properties they have, and what relations they entertain with each other; the other option is one that decidedly dives into the materialities of music-making, focusing on what to do with these things, how to reactivate them, searching for the yet unseen virtual components that they possess, asking which potentialities they have, how to give them renewed sounds and furies, and how to express them anew. The first approach remains hopelessly imprisoned in the past; the second creatively and productively designs new futures for past musical objects and things. The first relates to conventional scholarly research and disciplines, the second—so I claim—to new modes of research, primarily to artistic research, a mode in which the artistic dimension is quintessentially needed and requested. In the place of a reiteration of uncritically inherited performance practices, or patronising instances of survey and control, this perspective offers a methodology for unconventional, critical renderings that expose the variety and complexity of the music materials available today. More than repeating what one already thinks one knows about a given
work, it claims the pure unknown as the most productive field for artistic practices. Rather than accepting a reproductive tradition, it argues for an experimental, creative, and vitalist attitude.

References


Locating the Performable Musical Work in Practice:

A Non-Platonist Interpretation of the “Classical Paradigm”

David Davies
McGill University

In The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works, Lydia Goehr makes the following claim: “The idea of a work of music existing as a fixed creation independently of its many possible performances had no regulative force in a practice that demanded adaptable and functional music, and which allowed an open interchange of musical material. Musicians did not see works as much as they saw individual performances themselves to be the direct outcome of their compositional activity” (Goehr [1992] 2007, 185–86). To say that the “work-concept”—the concept of the multiply performable work—had no “regulative force” in eighteenth-century musical practice is to say that it did not regulate what musicians did nor, presumably, how what they did was received by those attending the events where music was performed. Goehr takes this to show that in general Western musical performances before the late eighteenth century are not rightly taken to be of performable works conforming to the “work-concept,” and she thereby appeals to artistic practice in arguing for ontological conclusions.

I have argued elsewhere (Davies 2017) that musical ontology is indeed reflectively accountable to musical practice. Practice must ground our ontological inquiries into the nature of artworks of various kinds because the ontologist’s primary task is to make sense of the practices into which such artworks enter, and terms like “musical work” as employed by the ontologist play an essentially explanatory role in this endeavour. More generally, the philosopher’s task, in addressing a human practice, is to provide a framework that both facilitates the achievement of the aims of that practice and furthers its comprehension by both practitioners and receivers.1

1 It is because the task facing the musical ontologist is reflective, and not merely descriptive, that the “explanatory” role I ascribe to the notion of “musical work” accords with this more general characterisation of the philosopher’s task in addressing a human practice. The musical ontologist’s task is to furnish us with a conception of the “musical work” that explains, and thereby makes sense of, those
My aim in this paper is not, however, to engage straightforwardly in musical ontology informed by this methodological directive. Rather than ask which ontological account would best reflectively represent our actual musical practices, I want to ask the following question: supposing that we were confronted by a musical practice in which the “work-concept” did have “regulative force” in the foregoing sense, what would be the best ontological story about that practice? Since saying that the “work-concept” has regulative force in a practice means talking about the practitioners’ enacted understanding of that practice, we leave open, in accordance with our methodological directive, the possibility that this understanding is ontologically flawed: We may decide against including in our ontology anything having the properties enshrined in the “work-concept.” But, as we shall also see, to grant that the “work-concept” has not only regulative force but ontological validity for a given musical practice does not settle matters, for the ontological validity of the “work-concept” itself admits of very different understandings.

In the rest of this paper, I shall for convenience speak not primarily of Goehr’s “work-concept” but of what I have myself termed the “classical paradigm,” a widely endorsed model for thinking about the performing arts more generally (Davies 2011, chapter 2). As we shall see, Goehr’s “work-concept” is precisely what is central to the classical paradigm. As a preface to this inquiry, I want to provide a brief outline both of the classical paradigm and of salient features of the more general art-theoretical context in which it can be located.

The classical paradigm is a model for thinking about the performing arts, where the latter are taken to be an artistic domain in which most performative practice involves “multiple artworks”—artworks that admit of multiple instances. According to the classical paradigm, a performance in the performing arts is generally of something else—what we can call a performable work—and plays a necessary part in the appreciation of the latter. Performable works prescribe certain things to performers, and are appreciated for the qualities realisable in performances that satisfy these prescriptions. Theorists differ as to the kinds of things that are prescribed and the nature of the things that do the prescribing. Performers, according to the classical paradigm, are in a sense collaborators with composers, for they are expected to exercise their creative freedom in interpreting what is prescribed. Only where this kind of interpretation is called for in generating work-instances of a multiple artwork do we think of it as a performable work.

Let me now back up and say a little about some of the notions I have just introduced. Multiple artworks, I have said, are works admitting of multiple
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instances.3 The word “instance” is very much a term of philosophical art—try going into a bookstore and asking for an instance of *War and Peace*—but philosophers, usually without noting this fact, have used the term in two distinguishable ways. On the one hand, the term is used epistemically to talk about entities that play a particular role in the appreciation of an artwork. An instance of a work in the epistemic sense—call this an *e*-instance—is an entity that makes manifest to the receiver some or all of the experienceable properties bearing upon the work’s appreciation. Instances, so conceived, are defined by the particular role that they play in appreciation, what we may term “the experiential role.” But entities can be more or less well fitted to play this role. A print of a film used in a screening may be damaged, or a performance of a musical work may depart unintentionally from what is specified in the score, and some copies of a novel may contain typographical errors. This suggests that we should talk not merely of entities “qualified” to play the experiential role for a work, but of entities “fully qualified” in virtue of not being so flawed. Something is *fully qualified* to play the experiential role in the appreciation of a given artwork *X* at a time *t* just in case at *t* it possesses all those experienceable properties that are *necessary*, according to the practices of the art form in question, to fully play this role.4 Where something fully qualifies in this sense at time *t*, we may term it a *strict instance* of *X* at *t*. Arguably, all artworks can have multiple strict *e*-instances—the only practical obstacles here are technological.

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3 For a much fuller presentation and defence of the following account of multiple artworks and of the different senses in which they can be said to have instances, see Davies (2010). The terminology used in the present context is slightly different from that used in the 2010 article—for the current terminology see Davies (2015).

4 Paulo de Assis has pointed out that this definition of being “fully qualified” to play the experiential role should be doubly relativised to a time. The first relativisation, in the formulation I give, concerns the properties that an instance possesses at the time it is experienced. Since these properties can change, at least in the case of instances that are material objects rather than events (for example, works of sculpture), a given object may be “fully qualified” at one time but, after suffering material change, not “fully qualified” at another time. But we also need to allow for changes in the *practices of the art form in question*. An object or event having given properties *p* may be “fully qualified” to play the experiential role according to the practices in art form *F* at time *T*, but not be fully qualified to play that role according to the practices in *F* at time *T*'. To take an example suggested by Paulo (pers. comm.), “a Bach performance by Pablo Casals, by Sigiswald Kuijken, or by Mischa Maisky, all of which were considered ‘fully qualified’ when they appeared, [were] not necessarily (so considered) afterwards (I think Casals, for example, would not count as fully qualified in the performance landscape of the 1990s, nor Kuijken in the 1890s).” To bring this out, the definition of being “fully qualified” needs to be modified to read as follows: Something is fully qualified to play the experiential role in the appreciation of a given artwork *X* at time *t* just in case it possesses at *t* all those experienceable properties that are necessary, according to the practices of the art form in question at a given historical time “*T*,” to fully play this role. Once we make explicit this second dimension of temporal relativisation, we must ask whether the practices in place in *F* at a particular time *T*—for example, the time of the work’s composition—have a privileged status in determining, atemporally, those entities that count as “fully qualified” (or as I term this, “strict”) instances of the work, or whether a work’s “strict” instances are only specifiable relative to, and may change according to, the performance practices of the artistic community evaluating or appreciating the work. Since I do not address these epistemological issues in the present paper, I shall let the simpler formulation stand in the body of the paper. I thank Paulo for his perceptive observation, however, which would bear crucially were we to raise such epistemological questions.
In a second sense, however, the term “instance” is used to identify certain entities that stand in some kind of direct historical relationship to an act of “initiating” on the part of one or more agents. An instance in this sense is something that has some or all of the properties necessary to play the experiential role in the appreciation of a work, by virtue of standing in this historical relation. For example, an original painting owes its perceptible properties directly to the agency of the artist who painted it, whereas a perfect reproduction of that painting, while equally suited to play the experiential role, does so in virtue of perceptible properties only indirectly related to what the artist did. An instance in this sense can be termed a provenential instance, or $p$-instance.

If the distinction between “multiple” and “singular” works, understood as a matter of how many instances a work can have, is to mark a significant distinction, then a multiple artwork must be understood as one that can have more than one $p$-instance that is a strict $e$-instance—that is, more than one strict $e$-instance directly historically related to the act of initiating the work.

Philosophers have distinguished three ways in which multiple artworks can be initiated. First, in the case of literary works, an artist may bring into existence a $p$-instance of the work, which serves as an exemplar. Strict $e$-instances of the work are then generated through emulating the exemplar, corrected if necessary to remedy slips of the author’s pen, in those respects required by relevant artistic conventions in place. Second, as in the case of standard analogue photography and cast sculpture, an artist may produce an artefact that, when employed in prescribed ways, generates $p$-instances of the work. This may be termed a “production-artefact” (Wolterstorff 1980). As in the case of exemplars, further conventions or understandings in place in the relevant art form determine how this artefact must be used if a $p$-instance is to be a strict $e$-instance of the work. Third, as in the case of classical musical works as standardly conceived, an artist may provide instructions that, if properly followed by those aware of the relevant conventions and practices, result in $p$-instances that are strict $e$-instances of the work. In such cases, compliance with the instructions also calls for performative interpretation, and the resulting instances of the work (strict or flawed) are performances of it.

Nothing interesting ontologically speaking follows from the fact that a work is $e$-multiple—this is no more interesting ontologically than the fact that there can be multiple pictures of an individual through which that individual can be recognised. But $p$-multiplicity has been taken to have very specific ontological implications. All $p$-multiple artworks give rise to the ontological problem that we may term the problem of repeatability: what kind of thing must a multiple work be if it is to admit of multiple $p$-instances? Philosophers in the broadly analytic tradition who have reflected upon this problem have generally assumed that multiple artworks must be abstract entities of some sort, and more particularly—following Richard Wollheim’s *Art and its Objects*—types. Wollheim (1980) claimed that, while singular artworks such as paintings and works of carved sculpture are physical objects, all multiple artworks are “types” having their instances as “tokens.” Repeatability is then just the familiar relationship between a type and its tokens.
For one subscribing to such a view of performable musical works, the salient ontological questions about musical artworks relate not to their abstract nature—as, in some sense, prescriptions for performances—but to the kinds of properties entering into those prescriptions, and thus to the manner in which performable works are individuated. Different answers to this question include pure sonicism, timbral sonicism, and instrumentalism. The distinctive claim of the sonicist is that “whether a sound-event counts as a properly formed token of \([a\text{ performable work}] W\) is determined purely by its acoustic qualitative appearance” (Dodd 2007, 201)—that is to say, purely by the way the performance sounds. Pure sonicists hold that the kinds of features prescribed for correct performance of a musical work are restricted to structural or “organisational” properties—pitch, rhythm, harmony, and melody (see, e.g., Kivy 1983). Timbral sonicists, on the other hand, maintain that the timbre of the notes produced, which will vary according to the instruments used in generating those notes, is an essential part of what the composer prescribes for well-formed performances of the work (see, e.g., Dodd 2007). While the timbral sonicist makes the timbral qualities of a sound sequence partly constitutive of the performable work, she or he doesn’t require that, in well-formed performances, this sound sequence is actually produced on the instruments with which we naturally associate those timbral qualities. Instrumentalists, on the other hand, insist that a correct performance of a performable work not only must have the prescribed timbral qualities, but also must be performed on the prescribed instruments (see, e.g., Levinson 1980). Another central question is whether performable works are essentially contextualised entities. The contrasting views here are that works are pure sound structures or sound sequences (see, e.g., Kivy [1983] and Dodd [2007]), and that they are sound structures or sound sequences as indicated in a particular musico-historical context (see Levinson 1980).

If, as I have argued (Davies 2017), we hold ontology of art reflectively accountable to artistic practice, what are the salient features of practice that must be accommodated by an ontology of musical works if the latter are taken to be performable works conforming to the classical paradigm? Repeatability seems to be essential, since this is just another way of saying that we have a work that admits of multiple \(p\)-instances and that therefore in some manner exists independently of its particular performances. Repeatability is built into the “work-concept” understood in terms of the classical paradigm and our question is how we should think ontologically about those cases, if any, where this work-concept is regulative.

In the analytic literature, we find a number of other things proposed as essential to our musical practice and thus, given our methodological directive, as features for which an ontology of music must account. But there is considerable disagreement about some of these properties, and they need to be balanced against one another in our attempts to make ontology of music rationally accountable to musical practice. Audibility, for example, is one property that
has been taken to carry ontological weight (see Dodd 2007). But the supposed audibility of musical works seems to be explicable on any ontological account as long as something appropriately related to the work is audible (see Davies 2009). Another often-cited property of works satisfying the classical paradigm is creatability (see Levinson 1980), but there are debates over whether performable musical works must be created by their composers or whether creativity in discovery is enough (Dodd 2007). Again it isn’t clear that there is a non-question-begging datum that an adequate ontology must explain. The same applies to the claimed modal and temporal flexibility of the musical work (Rohrbaugh 2003 makes such a claim; for criticism, see Davies 2012a, 271–73).

However, there is one other feature that seems essential to musical works in any musical practice that conforms to the classical paradigm, although it has attracted much less attention than those properties just cited. This is what I term the “variability” of at least some multiple artworks, including musical works. The “problem of variability” for an ontological theory of such works is to explain the range of acceptable variation in artistically relevant properties amongst the strict p-instances of such multiple works. Where, as in the case of literary works, initiation is by means of an exemplar, there is no room for variation in artistically relevant qualities among a work’s strict instances. This is because strict instances are required to emulate the exemplar in all artistically relevant respects—thus allowing no room for variation in such respects. But the problem of variability seems to be particularly acute for “type” theories of multiple artworks that are generated by means of a production-artefact, such as photographs, films, and works of cast sculpture (see Davies 2012b). It also presents a problem for theories of musical works taken to fall under the classical paradigm. We seem to have in our practice a perhaps imprecise distinction between performances and non-performances of a musical work, and between correct and incorrect performances, and, in musical practices describable in terms of the classical paradigm, we seem committed to variations in the artistically relevant properties of both performances and correct performances.

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Of the various proposed ontological accounts of works in musical contexts where the “work-concept” has regulative force, which ones can at least accommodate the two features—repeatability and variability—that seem intrinsic to the very idea of a performable work? There are broadly speaking three kinds of answer to the question, What kind of thing would a musical work that fits the classical paradigm be, ontologically speaking?

(i) According to musical “Platonism” in its various forms, the musical work is an abstract entity of some kind that stands outside our musical practice and informs and guides that practice in certain ways.

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5 Note here that this is not incompatible with the claim, in Davies (2017), that it is the whole of our practice to which the ontology of art is accountable. Our question here is not which ontological theory we should accept upon reflection, but which ontological theories have the resources to accommodate a practice that conforms to the classical paradigm.
According to musical “nominalism” or musical “materialism,” the musical work is internal to our practice and in some way definable in terms of relationships between material entities that enter into, and material states of affairs that obtain in, that practice.

According to “fictionalist” accounts, talk of “musical works” is a useful fiction for describing what goes on in our musical practice, but there are actually no musical works. A more austere alternative here is “eliminativism,” which holds not only that there are no musical works but also that we should stop talking as if there were.

If accounting for variability is a requirement for an ontology of performable musical works, Platonism faces a serious difficulty, as I have argued elsewhere (Davies 2012a). While I believe my argument generalises to all Platonist views, let me consider here the version of Platonism defended by Julian Dodd (2007).

Dodd maintains that a classical musical work is a norm-type that admits of both correct and incorrect instances. The type is associated with a property that specifies the features that are required in a strict instance of the work. For Dodd, all these features are sonic features, including timbral features, and he defends “timbral sonicism” as an account of how works, viewed as abstract norm-types, are individuated. Our question then is how the permissible range of variations in correct performances of works, if so construed, is determined.

I have argued (Davies 2012a) that, given certain explicit prescriptions by a composer embodied in a score for a musical work, we can derive a set of determinate requirements for correct performance of that work, and thus principled limits on the variability of such performances, only if we take account of certain norms operative in the intended performing and receptive communities for that work. These norms relate both to (1) the interpretation of what is explicitly notated in the work’s score concerning the work’s pure sonic qualities and (in the case of the timbral sonicist) to (2) the timbral qualities rightly ascribable to the work in virtue of the prescription of specific instrumentation for realising those pure sonic qualities.

The question for the Platonist is whether the properties taken to be normative within the work by the timbral sonicist—the sonic properties required in its strict instances—can be characterised independently of the ways in which performances are or would be classified as strict or flawed p-instances within the relevant historically situated performative and receptive communities. But why can’t we represent the specific norms that are operative in a performative or receptive community, and thus the features required in strict instances of a work given its score, independently of the ways in which members of that community actually apply those norms? Why, in other words, should we think that the very content of those norms depends upon the actual practices of those who apply them? In arguing for this conclusion, I have drawn (in Davies 2012a) on Robert Brandom’s (1994) neo-Wittgensteinian claim that explicit specifications of rules operative in a practice can never do anything more than make partially explicit the norms that reside implicitly in that practice. Applying this to the musical case, it is not only in scores or in explicit rules for following
scores, but also in the practical interactions between composers, performers, and receivers in a particular musical context that the norms determining correct performance of a musical work are located. These interactions give determine content to the idea of “shared understandings” as to how scores and other explicit specifications are to be rightly translated into practice. Crucially, the import of these norms cannot be characterised independently of those interactions through which content is given to the idea that particular performances are strict or flawed performances of a work, or fail to be performances of that work at all. It is only by reference to the class of strict instances determined through such interactions that we can give content to the idea of a set of features that are normative within the work, and thereby account for the range of variability in a work’s right performances, in the way that the classical paradigm requires.

Suppose it is indeed true that it is only in terms of norms realised in the activities of a particular performative and receptive community that we can identity the permissible range of variation in strict instances of a musical work. Nonetheless, the timbral sonicist might argue, these activities still serve to identify, through the class of p-instances that they validate as correct, a set of timbral sonic properties that are necessary and sufficient, given the prescriptions of the composer, for a sound-sequence to count as a strict instance of a work. The norm-type to be identified with the musical work, then, prescribes just these features for correct performance. The features themselves make no reference to either the instrumentation used or the context in which the work was initiated. It is the norm-type so conceived that is discovered by the composer, and that exists eternally, even if we can identify it only by reference to the practices of a given artistic community, the Platonist might insist.

It is undeniable that we can abstract a prescribed set of timbral sonic features from the set of performances of a musical work validated through the performative interpretations of a composer’s prescriptions by members of an intended performative community and the receptive practice of an intended community of receivers. But, to the extent that this prescribed set of features is accessible only “after the fact,” it cannot plausibly be said to either be conceived by the composer or serve as a guide to the practice of performers—the latter because it is constituted through that practice. It is unclear therefore how such a prescribed set of timbral sonic features—those individuative of a given norm-kind—can play any kind of explanatory role in our understanding of the initiation and reception of musical works.

Suppose that, for these or other reasons, we reject the Platonist option in an ontological account of musical practice describable in terms of the classical paradigm, and agree that the only entities to which we can appeal in such an account are entities that are nominalistically acceptable—concrete particulars or constructions out of such particulars. As those members of MusicExperiment21 proposing the “multiplicities” conception of the musical
work have pointed out, these entities—the multiple materialities entering into our musical practice broadly conceived—are both considerable and diverse. In presenting the case for thinking of musical works in terms of multiplicities, they identify these elements in the following passage:

From a materialist ontological perspective, works only exist as elaborated products of a network of relations and interactions between documents. In the place of works . . . one can look at the innumerable things on top of things that allow for the construction of an “image of work”: sketches, drafts, manuscripts, editions, recordings, transcriptions, treatises, manuals, instruments, depictions, contracts, commissions, letters, postcards, scribbles, diagrams, analytical charts, theoretical essays, articles, books, memories, etc. Brought together in specific combinations (historically and geographically situated), these things make up those reified generalities that we used to call musical works. From this materialistic perspective works emerge as “multiplicities,” as highly complex, historically constructed conglomerates of things that define and take part in an ever-expanding “manifold.” (MusicExperiment21, 2015)

I shall spend the rest of this paper exploring the options open to one who endorses a materialist picture and wishes to in some way accommodate those aspects of our practice that naturally lend themselves to description in terms of the classical paradigm. An obvious question will be how different alternatives can provide us with a reflectively acceptable framework for thinking about a practice apparently characterised by repeatability and variability. Theorists considering the nominalist options confronting the ontologist of multiple art-works describable in terms of the classical paradigm have identified the following more general alternatives (see, e.g., Tillman 2011; Kania 2012):

1. “Materialist” theories that commit themselves to the real existence of such multiple works construed as in some sense “constructions” out of the material elements entering into our practices. Two examples of such theories are musical perdurantism (Caplan and Matheson 2006) and musical endurantism (Rohrbaugh 2003), which take musical works to be either constituted by or ontologically dependent upon such material elements.

2. Eliminativist theories (e.g., Cameron 2008), according to which “there are only concrete objects, such as performances and the creative actions of composers, and none of these can be identified with musical works; therefore there are no musical works” (Kania 2012, 208).

3. “Fictionalism,” as proposed by Andrew Kania (2012), as a kind of “eliminativism light.”

Kania assumes that both materialist and eliminativist accounts entail that there are no musical works of the kind assumed in our ordinary musical practices, since he takes those practices to commit us to Platonism. (This, I think, will be so only if we are so committed by our commitment to repeatability and variability, but that is the very question at issue). So construed, the issue is whether it is better to identify musical works with concreta or to deny that there are musical works. Kania (2012, 210) takes the argument for eliminativism over materialism
to be that “it would do less violence to musical practice to deny the existence of musical works altogether than to identify them with the concreta the materialist believes them to be.” He also maintains that “the dispute between the materialist and the eliminativist is doubly pragmatic” (ibid.): (1) it is pragmatic in the sense that the materialist and eliminativist agree about what kinds of things exist, but not about whether to call one kind of thing a musical work; and (2) it is also pragmatic in the sense that something like the “methodological directive” identified at the beginning of this paper appears to be implicit common ground. The question the nominalist faces when choosing between materialism and eliminativism is whether it would be better to give up talk of musical works altogether or to transform it into talk of, say, fusions of performances. And the measure of what is better here is closeness to, or coherence with, existing musical practices.

Kania claims that we should prefer fictionalism over either materialism or eliminativism on these pragmatic grounds. The fictionalist about musical works claims that, while there are actually no such things, we have shared ways of representing such things in our musical practice. These shared representations play a valuable part in that practice, and this justifies continuing to talk as if there were such works even if the world contains no such things. The kinds of properties we have been assuming that musical works must have—Kania cites creatability and repeatability, in particular—play an important part in sustaining different elements in our musical practice. But, Kania maintains, it isn’t clear that anything can actually have both these features; so, in order to preserve the various useful parts of musical discourse centred on the work-concept, we should make-believe that there are such things. Kania argues that this practice, with its incorporation of the work-concept, is worth preserving. But the crucial fictionalist claim here is that “it would make no difference if there were no musical works, strictly speaking, as long as we all continued to behave as if there were” (Kania 2008, 440).

While musical fictionalism, like fictionalism more generally, is not without its defenders, it does raise more general metaphysical questions that I don’t want to get into in any detail here. To simply gesture at the issues, we might ask why the regulative role of the work-concept in our practice doesn’t itself justify being a realist about performable musical works. Kania seems to think that, if our concern is to preserve both creatability and repeatability as aspects of our practice, we cannot be realists about musical works because nothing could have both of these properties. But, as suggested above, I don’t think creatability is crucial to the work-concept, so this can’t be a conclusive reason for fictionalism about musical works. But any fictionalist move not supported in this way seems to assume practice-transcendent standards as to what “really” exists, and this is itself a contested meta-ontological position, especially if we consider recent work by authors such as Searle (1995) and Thomasson (2007) on social ontology.
Eliminativism about musical works is not open to this kind of objection since the eliminativist makes no claim about the practical indispensability of talk about musical works. Rather, the eliminativist can maintain that in fact those features of our musical practice worth preserving in no way require an overarching “work-concept.” This view might be read into the idea, in the passage from MusicExperiment21 cited above, that talk of multiplicities and relationships between different material elements should replace talk of “those reified generalities that we used to call musical works.” A related, but perhaps distinct, practical suggestion can be found in the same description of the MusicExperiment21 research programme, where it is proposed that we think of (performing) art as “a radical immanent process of intensive actualization of virtual, extensive potentialities” (MusicExperiment21 2015). To cite an earlier description of the programme:

The main goal of MusicExperiment21 is to propose and generate new modes of performance and exposition of research. Integrating material that goes beyond the score (such as sketches, texts, concepts, images, videos) into performances, this project offers a broader contextualisation of the works within a transdisciplinary horizon. . . . Combining theoretical investigations with the concrete practice of music, this project presents a case for change in the field of musical performance, proposing alternatives to traditional understandings of “interpretation.” Whereas traditional models are based on static conceptions of the score, this project proposes a dynamic conception, in which innumerable layers of notational practices and editions of musical works throughout time generate an intricate multi-layered set of inscriptions. If the source text is seen as dynamic, rather than fixed, and if the performative moment is—in its essential nature—also dynamic and ever-changing, it follows that every performance is more of an “event” than a reiteration of the given “form” of a piece. In place of a heuristic approach, there is an exploration of potentialities contained within a given score. The performer wanders creatively through such a landscape, using and training the imagination with the goal of breaking free from the past and constructing new assemblages. (MusicExperiment21 2013, 101)

This proposal suggests not that there is no material basis for the work-concept—it allows that we can indeed see the work as conceived by the classical paradigm as one possible construct out of the material multiplicities making up our historically evolving musical practice—but rather that we should now pursue other potentialities that those multiplicities would allow for musical performance. The issue between the first and second cited passages concerning MusicExperiment21 is that the latter passage seems to allow, whereas the former passage seems to deny, that at least some materialistically grounded musical practices are correctly described in terms of the classical paradigm even if other (new and innovative) practices would not be rightly so described.

These two ways of thinking on the part of nominalistically and materialistically inclined ontologists of music may be usefully mapped onto some recent work in the ontology of theatre. Prefiguring the sentiments of MusicExperiment21,
James Hamilton (2007, 31) affirms that “the texts used in theatrical performances are just so many ingredients, sources of works and other ideas for theatrical performances, alongside other ingredients that are available from a variety of other sources. Works of dramatic literature, in particular, are not regarded as especially or intrinsically fitting ingredients for performances. As ingredients they are but one kind among many possible sources of words for a theatrical performance.” But Hamilton is not merely affirming a possibility for theatrical performance. He maintains, in line with MusicExperiment21 (2015), that “a [theatrical] performance is . . . never a performance of some other work nor is it ever a performance of a text or of anything initiated in a text; so no faithfulness standard—of any kind—is required for determining what work a performance is of. . . . Theatrical performances are artworks in their own right” (Hamilton 2007, 32). His descriptions of theatrical practice stress the elements of deliberation, extemporisation, experimentation, and discovery that enter into the preparatory process, the choices open to the director and performers, and the fact that the text is always used by the performers to realise the general performative goals of the company—it is always a means to an independent performance, rather than something that, in itself, imposes any constraints on performance. As Hamilton (2007, 203) characterises this general feature of theatrical productions, “a company arrive at the first rehearsal and are given a script. There is no logically predetermined way for them to use the script. There is not even a requirement, of logic or of art, that they actually do use it. This is a situation in which a number of things can be decided.” This supports the further claim that where we have the appearance of a theatrical performance falling under the classical paradigm, the performers are merely exercising one among a number of possible options as to how to use the script as an ingredient in a production. The classical paradigm, Hamilton maintains, has no applicability to theatre understood as a performing art.

Hamilton’s rejection of the classical paradigm in theatre relies on the idea of theatrical productions as processes of “ensemble revision,” and one problem with this claim, historically, is that it fits uneasily with periods of theatrical practice where ensemble revision has played a minimal role, if any—see for example Tiffany Stern’s work on the nature of Shakespearean and seventeenth-century British theatre (Stern 2000; for a discussion of the significance

6 It might be thought that Hamilton’s use of the term “text” in this passage runs counter to Nicholas Cook’s influential contention (2001) that, in thinking about musical performance, we should “shift from seeing performance as the reproduction of texts to seeing it as a cultural practice prompted by scripts.” To think of the score as a text, for Cook, is to think of it as embodying the composer’s original vision, something to which performance is accountable; whereas to think of the score as a script is to think of it as “choreographing a series of real-time, social interactions between players.” Cook’s distinction has influenced much contemporary work in musical performance studies, but Hamilton’s use of the term “text” here in no way conflicts with Cook’s account, nor indeed with Hamilton’s own talk, in a passage quoted below, of the place of a “script” in the ensemble revision of theatrical works. Cook’s distinction between texts and scripts is a distinction between two ways of thinking about scores. In the case of theatre, on the other hand, the thing in need of reconceptualisation is itself a text—a play script—rather than a score. Hamilton’s claim is that we should view this text as a script in Cook’s sense—it is one among many things that can enter as ingredients into the social interactions that result in a performance. I am grateful to Andreas Dorschel for alerting me to the need to clarify this point.
of Stern’s work for Hamilton’s claims about theatre, see Davies 2011, 164–71). But even where we do have productions that involve “ensemble revision,” it isn’t clear why this establishes that the ingredients model accounts for all such productions better than the classical paradigm. Take a company attempting to present a “faithful” rendition of Ibsen’s *Hedda Gabler*, for example. While performances of this production indeed reflect decisions and modifications made in rehearsal, those decisions and modifications seem to be governed by the company’s overarching aim of being true to Ibsen’s play in the sense of conforming as far as possible to Ibsen’s prescriptions in the play script. Hamilton claims that, even if the company belongs to a tradition that always uses a text in this way, their treating it as the script of a performable work is still an unforced choice on their part, as the ingredients model requires. He supports this claim by appealing to an ideal companion company belonging to the same tradition who *would see* alternative ways of engaging with the text. So, where companies seek to faithfully realise an independent work, we have “performances that adopt constraints that are not binding in the tradition, but are taken as though they were” (Hamilton 2007, 210).

But this is rather mystifying. For suppose that we have a tradition where both performers and audience assume that the right, or the only, way to engage with the text of a dramatic work is to seek to mount a production that is faithful to the text of that work. In what sense does the observation that “objectively” there are other options open to both performers and audience show that performances intended by the performers and understood by the audience to be of a work are not really of the work at all? By analogy, it is *objectively* possible for musicians performing in a string quartet to treat the score as merely one “ingredient” in a group improvisation. But this surely does not demonstrate that their actual performance, which is intended by the performers and understood by the audience to conform to the classical paradigm, is not really of a musical work at all. This suggests that the right lesson to draw from Hamilton’s account is not that we should deny the applicability of the classical paradigm to theatrical performance, but that we should insist on its contingency and stress the range of possibilities that a text presents to a performing company and the exciting prospects for those who take advantage of this range of possibilities.

This then fits with a broader literature that points to the limitations of the classical paradigm as a model for performances in the performing arts, given the diversity of legitimate aims of performance, and the possibilities available for performers who are not bound by the classical paradigm or, if bound, are bound in a much looser way than has traditionally been assumed. To mention only a couple of issues here:

(i) Those late twentieth-century theatrical productions that provide a primary motivation for Hamilton’s “ingredients” model of theatre are only an extreme example of a more general problem that we face in identifying what is required for a performance to be a performance of a particular play. Theatrical practice allows considerable freedom in modifying the elements in the play script for a theatrical work while still performing that work, as is evident in Peter Brook’s “existential-
ist” interpretation of King Lear, for example. If the classical paradigm is to be applied to at least some theatrical works, we need a sense of what the work requires that distances itself from any attempt to accord the play script the role ascribed to the score in musical works held to fall under the classical paradigm.

(2) Extending the classical paradigm to dance is even more problematic, for a number of reasons. If repeatability is a necessary requirement for the paradigm, dance theorists have questioned whether there is a stable dance work that can be reperformed, except in cases where different performances can be grouped as “of the same work” in virtue of the supervisory role of the choreographer. Martha Graham is famously said to have remarked of her dance works, “when I go, they go”! The problem of “dance reconstruction” arises in part because we usually lack any authoritative “notation” for a dance work issuing from its creator and capable of serving as a guide to performers. The notations that we have are usually “after the fact,” constructed by trained notators who observe a performance of the dance. But there is no single notational system used for dance, and in trying to work from a particular performance to a notational representation of a work rather than, as in music, from a notational representation of a work to a particular performance, we face the problem of disentangling, in the overall embodied activity of the dancers, those movements that are constitutive of the work from those that are elements in a particular interpretation of it. We face a similar problem when the evidence upon which we try to base a dance reconstruction is a filmed account of an earlier performance.

(3) Finally, a number of authors have called into question the applicability of the classical paradigm to other musical genres such as rock and jazz. While some have tried to bring rock music under a modified version of the paradigm—for example, Stephen Davies (2001) who maintains that rock works are works for studio performance whereas classical works are works for live performance—Theodore Gracyk (1996) and Andrew Kania (2006) have each separately argued that the rock work is not a work for performance at all, but something owing its essential properties to the shaping and manipulation of various sonic elements in a studio, the result being what Kania terms a “track.” Such works are appreciated not through performance but through “playback” on an appropriate device. In the case of jazz, while some have maintained that jazz performances of “standards” fit the classical paradigm, others have held that they use the standards as “ingredients” in a performance, and are best described as being “after” rather than “of” those standards (see, e.g., S. Davies 2001; Kania 2011).
I started this paper by asking how we should think ontologically about a musical practice in which the “work-concept” does play a regulative role. It was suggested that two features that any such practice must have are repeatability and variability, and that it is difficult for a Platonist to accommodate the latter feature. If, in line with the reflections in the previous section, we think that there are at least some actual or possible forms of musical practice rightly characterised in terms of the classical paradigm, then we can return to our original question, now voiced in a nominalist/materialist key. Assuming that there are various ways in which a practice can be structured around the multiplicity of elements that enter into it, what is distinctive about the manner of structuration associated with the work-concept? In the final part of this paper, I want to consider two possible answers to this question.

A. Rohrbaugh on musical works as “continuants”

Guy Rohrbaugh has proposed that multiple artworks in general, and traditional musical works in particular, are “continuants,” historical individuals that depend for their existence on those concrete entities that are their “embodiments.” Some of these embodiments are occurrences that are distinguished from other embodiments in that they “display the qualities of the work of art and are relevant to appreciation and criticism” (Rohrbaugh 2003, 198). Rohrbaugh’s characterisation of “occurrences” in terms of the role they play in appreciation suggests that they are a work’s e-instances, or perhaps a work’s strict e-instances, but the role that they are intended to play as embodiments that enter into the dependence-base of works understood to be historical individuals suggests that they must stand in an appropriate historical relation to a work’s initiation, in which case they must also be p-instances. This is one example of the general failure to distinguish the two senses of “instance” in the literature, but, as we shall see, the distinction is important for the tenability of Rohrbaugh’s ontological proposal.

There are in fact two versions of the “continuant” view. On one account (e.g., Caplan and Matheson 2006), continuants are perduring entities made up of their temporal parts, which, in the case of musical works, will include their performances. Embodiment here is constitution. On Rohrbaugh’s alternative account, continuants are enduring entities, “‘higher level’ objects” (2003, 199) that depend on but are not constituted by those physical or spatial things that are their embodiments.

Continuants so construed, according to Rohrbaugh (2003), possess three qualities that artworks also possess and that Platonic entities do not:

1. continuants are modally flexible—the same continuant might have existed with different intrinsic properties from the ones it actually possesses;
2. continuants are temporally flexible—their intrinsic properties might differ over time; and
3. continuants can come into and go out of existence.
A particular house might be an example of a continuant. This very house, it might be claimed, could have had a slightly different design, may undergo various alterations in its intrinsic properties during its lifetime, and comes into and goes out of existence—the first when it comes to have, and the second when it ceases to have, an embodiment. In this sense, houses are multiplicities, but their existence depends only upon some of the elements entering into the story of their nature as continuants. For example, a house usually stands in a relation of causal dependence on an architect’s plan, but the plan is not one of its existence-constituting embodiments.

Rohrbaugh claims that the musical work is a continuant having the aforementioned kinds of properties, and that such a work can exist without performances as long as it has other embodiments. There are, however, a number of problems with Rohrbaugh’s account, given the way in which we have defined our task. First, to take internal difficulties, even were it to be agreed that continuants are modally and temporally flexible, this doesn’t obviously sit well with the work-concept as usually understood. Are performable works modally flexible, so that something having different requirements for its strict instances could have been the same work? And are they temporally flexible, admitting of change through time? Rohrbaugh draws an analogy with paintings that, so he claims, are endurants with these properties. But others have argued to the contrary that while the physical objects that “house” paintings are indeed continuants, paintings themselves are not but are modally and temporally inflexible. This is one reason why, for some philosophers, works of sculpture are constituted by but not identical with the physical masses that serve as their vehicles: the statue and the lump of clay have different persistence and existence conditions.

More germane in the present context, Rohrbaugh’s account doesn’t seem to provide an answer to our two central challenges for an ontological account of musical works that comply with the classical paradigm, the challenges of accounting for the repeatability and variability of such works. It might seem that the continuant account can explain repeatability in terms of a musical work’s capacity to have multiple occurrences among its embodiments. But we have defined the problem of repeatability in terms of a work’s capacity for multiple p-instances that are strict e-instances. We therefore require an account of how the latter are to be picked out, which requires, in turn, a solution to the problem of variability. But it isn’t clear that Rohrbaugh’s account has any way of addressing the latter problem. In dealing with the musical work in terms of embodiments and occurrences, it fails to address how status as an occurrence and as a strict occurrence is established through our musical practices, as argued in the discussion of Platonist theories. If Rohrbaugh were to argue that, given that continuants are historical individuals, a musical work’s occurrences must be p-instances, then he might avail himself of an independent account of how a work’s p-instances, and indeed those of a work’s p-instances that are strict e-instances, are determined. But since it would then be the independent account that would solve the problem of variability, this is simply to reiterate the point above, that Rohrbaugh’s account does not itself speak to this problem.
The significant objection to Rohrbaugh's “continuants” view then is not Dodd’s objection (2007, chapter 6) that such a view is ontologically opaque, since there is no reason why ontology of art cannot revise both our practice and our prior ontological categories (see Davies 2017). The objection is that such a view doesn’t seem to give us what we are looking for—an ontological account that captures the concept of the performable work as it occurs in the classical paradigm.

B. Musical works as Wollheimian types

As noted earlier, the idea of multiple artworks, and of musical works conforming to the classical paradigm, as abstract entities was in central cases a development of Wollheim’s idea (1968) that all multiple artworks are types. It was in response to Wollheim that Nicholas Wolterstorff (1975, 1980) developed his conception of such works as norm-kinds, a view largely taken over by Julian Dodd (2007). Both Wolterstorff and Dodd assume that works, as norm-kinds, are abstract entities, and Dodd argues forcefully that, as such, they cannot be created by artists but only discovered. What is striking in the present context is Wollheim’s claim that what distinguishes types from other kinds of generic entities—universals and classes for example—is that they are postulated “where we can correlate a class of particulars with a piece of human invention; these particulars may then be regarded as tokens of a certain type” (1980, 78). This suggests that “Wollheimian types,” as we may call them, differ fundamentally from the types/kinds posited by Platonist theorists such as Dodd.

What, then, are Wollheimian types? Wollheim (1980, 34–35) introduces the idea of multiple artworks as types in addressing what he terms the “logical” question, “Are works of art physical objects?” This asks about the logical category to which works of art belong, and thus the criteria of identity and individuation applicable to them. To answer the logical question positively is to say that works are particulars, rather than being non-particulars such as universals, or classes. Wollheim contrasts the logical question with what he terms the “metaphysical” question, “Are works of art physical objects?” Here we assume that artworks are particulars, and ask what kinds of particulars they are. Wollheim defends the idea of multiple artworks as types as one possible negative answer to the logical question. A negative answer to this question maintains that multiple artworks are not objects or particulars of any kind, and thus not abstract objects or particulars of any kind. Indeed, it is notable that, in his discussion of multiple artworks as types, Wollheim nowhere mentions abstracta. This isn’t to say that types might not be abstract entities, but it is to say that this is not relevant to answering the logical question as Wollheim conceives it. Rather, as noted earlier, he classifies types alongside classes and universals as generic entities, entities that, intuitively, can have other entities falling under them.

It might seem, however, that Wollheim’s claim that musical works are types, so construed, simply postpones the salient ontological question about such works. If, to take an example, the Enigma Variations is a Wollheimian type and

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7 I sketch here the account that I spell out in much greater detail in Davies (2012).
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is thus something we postulate in virtue of the way in which we group particular performances by reference to a piece of human invention by Elgar, what kind of thing is it, ontologically speaking, that we postulate? It is here that we see the temptation to reify types through the kind of analysis furnished by Dodd. Wollheimian types, it might seem, must be entities that somehow stand apart from their tokens, and that explain why those tokens are rightly grouped together. But we have already seen the difficulties with this view in our discussion of the failings of Platonism as an answer to the problem of variability.

How, then, if not in Platonist terms, might we illuminate the nature of what is postulated when, in identifying a work, we postulate a Wollheimian type? The answer, I suggest, is that we illuminate what is postulated by attending to the precise combination of an act of human invention and an enabling practice that, I have argued, does explain and legitimate both the groupings of certain things as $p$-instances of a work and the identification of the range of features necessary or possible in those $p$-instances that are strict $e$-instances. To postulate a work qua Wollheimian type is to postulate a piece of human invention “initiating” the work, where this act of initiation is embedded in a historically and culturally specific set of performative and appreciative practices that issue in the very groupings of tokens that we seek to understand.

To appreciate works as Wollheimian types is just to appreciate what was done in two senses: (1) it is to appreciate what manifest properties can be possessed by right tokens—strict $e$-instances—having the relevant causal history, and (2) it is to appreciate what was done in establishing the preconditions (for example, the generation of a production-artefact or the composition of a score) for that causal history to take place. On such a view, our understanding of works as Wollheimian types is not illuminated by appeal to Platonistic abstracta. Rather, the things that play the particular kind of logical role described by Wollheim might be viewed as what I have elsewhere (Davies 2004) termed “performances,” contextualised actions. On the “performance theory” of art, a work like Orson Welles’s Citizen Kane is a collective generative action, in the social context furnished by a set of artistic practices, that brings into existence a production artefact whose function is to enable multiple screenings of the work. A correct screening is one that has those distinctive manifest features required by norms embodied in the relevant artistic practice in virtue of standing in a causal relation to the work, qua contextualised generative process, mediated by the production artefact. And the Enigma Variations is a generative action, in the historical and social context furnished by a set of artistic practices, that brings into existence a score whose function is to enable multiple performances of the work. A performance of the work is an event that stands in the kind of historical-intentional relation to this generative action sanctioned in the relevant artistic practice, and the status of a performance as a strict instance of the work is similarly dependent upon norms embedded in actual artistic practice.
It is Wollheimian types so construed—historically and socially realised practices whereby particulars are grouped relative to a piece of human invention—that are the materialistically respectable realisations of the performable works characterised by the classical paradigm. Whether the “work-concept” is regulative in a musical practice depends, therefore, upon whether the artistic practices necessary to sustain repeatability and variability exist in a given historico-social milieu so that individuals, as participants in that milieu, can perform the acts of human invention necessary to initiate such works.8

8 I would like to thank all my fellow participants at the Orpheus Academy for a very stimulating and intellectually rewarding exchange. Above all, I would like to thank Paulo for his tireless work in bringing us together in the first place, and in editing the resulting volume.

References


Towards a General Theory of Musical Works and Musical Listening

Gunnar Hindrichs
University of Basel

I. Preliminaries

1. In the following I will offer an argument for musical works as autonomous sound complexes. Such autonomous sound complexes are understood to constitute the being of music. I will also offer a corresponding account of musical listening. It presents musical listening as the disclosure of musical works. From these two connected models, I will finally infer an idea of music history that defends the central role of the avant-garde.

2. Let me note in advance some points of contention. Among these might be: the privileging of musical works over musical practices; the elevation of a specific cultural-historical type of music to its constitutive exemplar; the neglect of social, cultural, or historical conditions in favour of musical autonomy; the disregarding of liturgical, communal, or political functions of music; and the ignorance towards phenomena that overcome formal closeness, such as installations, chance compositions, conceptual art, aesthetic situations, and the like. I hope that they, and other points of contention, will fall to the wayside over the course of the argument. My aim is neither to commit music to the work-concept that ruled the European tradition between, say, 1700 and 1950, nor to sterilise music by extinguishing its seemingly extra-musical aspects. Rather, I propose a concept of the musical work that is assumed to grasp the full being of music, which then helps us adequately understand those phenomena that seem to dissolve the work paradigm. I do hold, however, that such a concept of the musical work is central to the understanding of musical being in general.

3. The mode of presentation will be dogmatic. That is, I will discuss neither contrary nor connatural positions, but devote my argument to constructive work; exceptions prove the rule. I also will not give multiple examples, but stay mainly within the conceptual tracks of the argument. The latter is a deficit, for the meaning of any philosophy of music consists of its explicative function on concrete musical entities and experiences. However, I hope that this deficit is balanced by the fact that some crucial concepts stem from compositional and musicological reflection. In these concepts, musical experience has been precipitated, thus being present within the argument in an indirect manner. In any
case, the dogmatic outlook does not imply that I disrespect obverse theories or that I have not learned from them, nor does it imply that I fancy the following ideas were all invented by myself. It is simply a matter of concision. The restriction to constructive and conceptual work allows the argument to be expressed in the most straightforward manner.¹

II. Aesthetic ontology

4. If musical works are supposed to constitute the being of music, their account is an exercise in musical ontology. The common approach of contemporary philosophy to musical ontology consists of providing definitions of the kind of entities that works of music are assumed to be. These definitions are designed to distinguish musical works from other entities and to lay down their identity criteria and conditions of individuation. Most notably, Lydia Goehr (1992) has shown that this conception of musical ontology has failed. I will not repeat her arguments here, which prove the malfunction of such definitions in my eyes, but will take their destructive result as the origin of my own reasoning. There is also a second vein of disappointment with the common approach in musical ontology. Even if the approach were successful, its aesthetic significance would have been nil. Preoccupied with nitpicking about standards of definition, ontological definitions of musical works sound like gobbledygook to the aesthetic understanding. Understanding music is something different from watching for criteria that an entity must satisfy to count as a musical work. Thus, the internal flop and the external prevarication of the search for definitions disqualify the ontology of music as it is pursued in the common style.

5. The majority of people who share this disillusion concludes that musical ontology has been shipwrecked in general. If it is to be continued at all, ontology may survive in the form of an “as if” ontology. This is to say that, by using the concept of musical works, one does not commit oneself to their existence but articulates a regulative idea for certain musical practices: one acts “as if” works of music existed. Veritable ontological claims, in contrast, have to be abandoned. But this conclusion regarding the general collapse of musical ontology is overhasty. The failure of the common approach evidently does not imply that there cannot be an ontology that does not run after definitions and that does not ignore the demands of aesthetics. This possibility is crucial because the question of musical being remains somehow to be answered, for, after all, our musical experience is the experience of something that is. The task, then, is

¹ The argument draws on material that was presented on different occasions. Section II includes unpublished thoughts delivered at Brown and Harvard Universities. Section III compresses, and slightly reformulates, the much more detailed account of basic concepts as offered by my book Die Autonomie des Klangs (2014). The two sections were presented at the Orpheus Institute, as was the main body of section IV. Section IV also makes use of an argument discussed at the inaugural meeting of the Basler Forum für Musikästhetik in 2015, and of some parts of the keynote address that I delivered to the annual meeting of the Gesellschaft für Musiktheorie in Berlin the same year. The address was published as Hindrichs (2016a) and the Basel paper was published as Hindrichs (2016b). I am indebted to the audiences of all these presentations. I am also indebted to Elaine Fitz Gibbon for polishing my English.
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this: to construct the ontology of musical works in terms alternative to those of the common approach, and to compose it in an aesthetic key. Let us call this novel option “aesthetic ontology.”

6. The argument for an aesthetic ontology goes thus. Its first premise asserts that ontology is not fundamental. This premise stands in contradiction to the venerable idea of ontology as first philosophy. Stretching from Aristotle to contemporary accounts, this idea argues that ontology comes first because it investigates being as such, in contrast to all approaches that investigate specific kinds of being and thus build on a general account of what there is. However, ontology cannot maintain the first place in the order of philosophical inquiry. Every ontology manifests a conceptual scheme that articulates the great chain of being. Without such a scheme, or a framework of basic ontological concepts (categories), being remains an inarticulate sphere of which nothing could be said. This conceptual scheme, in turn, requires an analysis. And its analysis cannot be an ontological analysis, since any ontology presupposes a conceptual scheme. Thus, ontology is not the fundamental inquiry, but depends on a prior investigation into its conceptual scheme. Ontology is dethroned.

7. That the conceptual scheme articulates the great chain of being means that it articulates the elementary ways of how the things are. The concepts of the scheme, or categories, operate on these elementary ways of being. Now, a general formula for “how the things are” is to say that “the things are thus and thus.” Accordingly, the basic ontological concepts operate on the things being thus and thus. However, that the things are thus and thus is not only the universal structure of being, but also the universal structure of judgements. It is their generic logical form. It follows that the great chain of being substantiates the generic logical form of judgements. In other words, the content of judgements, “that things are thus and thus,” and the facts of reality, “that things are thus and thus,” have the same form. This puts us in a position of assuming that the basic ontological concepts can be founded in the reflection on the logical form of judgements. Judgement theory may provide us with proper access to the conceptual scheme of ontology.

8. The premise that ontology is not fundamental thus drives us to take notice of the proper order of judgement. And here I believe the Kantian view to be right: that there are three distinct types of judgement, which are irreducible to one another. These types are theoretical judgements, practical judgements, and aesthetic judgements. For reasons evident enough, let us focus immediately on the third type. Aesthetic judgements differ from theoretical judgements and practical judgements in peculiar ways. On the one hand, unlike theoretical judgements, aesthetic judgements are not made true by facts, for judgemental content made true by a fact consists of the description of the fact, and the description of a fact and its aesthetic apprehension are two distinct things. On the other hand, unlike practical judgements, aesthetic judgements do not entail any interest in the realisation of their contents, for the aesthetic
appraisal of something is impartial to the question of its reality and concerns *facta* and *ficta* likewise. It follows that aesthetic judgements are judgements that are not made true by the facts of the world and are disinterested in their realisation. Accordingly, they cannot be reduced to theoretical or practical judgements. Although the three types may stand in specific relations to one another, the aesthetic judgement is a judgement in its own right.

9. In the horizon of this Kantian idea, an important conclusion for the proper ontological approach has to be drawn. If judgement theory gives access to the framework of basic ontological concepts, and if a cardinal tenet of judgement theory consists of the differentiation of judgement into theoretical, practical, and aesthetic judgements, then ontology too has to be differentiated. This is to say that there are different, irreducible kinds of ontology: one under the prescription of theoretical judgement, one under the prescription of practical judgement, and one under the prescription of aesthetic judgement. Correspondingly, we have reason to speak of a specifically aesthetic being, whose articulation depends on the third type of judgement and which is ruled by neither one of the two other ontologies. Such ontology is tuned in a genuinely aesthetic key.

10. The most salient characteristic of aesthetic ontology is the autonomy of its entities. This becomes clear when one considers the opposite of autonomy. The opposite of autonomy, heteronomy, applies where entities are not ruled by themselves, but are submitted to laws imposed on them. Here, the entity and the law are two sides that have to be brought together, and the entities become cases of the law. As such cases, they have to be identifiable, and re-identifiable, as particular instances of a law that is, in principle, general. Accordingly, the judgement type on which the framework of heteronomy depends must be a judgement type that identifies its objects. But identification is not an issue of the aesthetic judgement. Questions like, Does the reference fail?, How is one guaranteed to get the object right?, What discriminating knowledge must the judging subject have?, and so on, are nonsensical from the aesthetic point of view, for aesthetic judgements are not made true by facts. If the truth-makers of aesthetic judgements were facts, they would indeed have to identify their objects, for the correct or incorrect discrimination of their objects would contribute to their truth. Since this is not the case, the issue of identification is not significant. It follows that the entities of aesthetic ontology are not to be considered as identifiable, and re-identifiable, objects. And from this, it follows further that they cannot be cases of imposed laws. Thus, aesthetic entities are not subject to any kind of heteronomy. The structures of aesthetic being are structures of autonomy.

11. An interesting analogy to first-person thought should be noticed here. There is a well-known distinction by Wittgenstein between the object use and the subject use of the “I” (Wittgenstein 1970). While the first use requires the recognition of a particular person in the world, the second use is free of such
recognition. Examples of the different uses are, on the one hand, me seeing someone in the mirror and identifying him as myself by thinking “I am standing there and there,” and, on the other hand, me thinking “I feel pain,” regarding which the question of whether it is really me who feels pain is nonsensical. These examples suggest that, using the “I” objectively, I spot myself in a range of objects, whereas no identification is pursued when I use it subjectively. In an analogous manner, we can distinguish between the object use and the aesthetic use of the singular term in a judgement. Its object use identifies a particular object with which the judgement is concerned; its aesthetic use, however, does not recognise an object in contrast to other things, for identification is not at issue in the case of judgements that are not made true by facts. Here the singular term refers to something that is simply present. To acknowledge this feature marks the most important difference to the other versions of musical ontology onstage. All of them are meant to offer matrices of identification, be they versions of Platonism, nominalism, or other isms; however, a truly aesthetic ontology does not need such a matrix.

III. Musical works

12. We are now able to design the ontology of music in its adequate form. Musical ontology shall be considered as a subgenre of aesthetic ontology. That is, it has to be carried out under the prescription of the aesthetic judgement, and not under the prescriptions of the theoretical or the practical judgement. Accordingly, musical being must be understood neither in terms of natural being nor in terms of social being. It is a kind of aesthetic being, which means that its entities are autonomous entities.

13. These autonomous entities are designated by the notion of the musical work. There is no musical being that is not a work; that is, there is no musical being that is not constituted as an autonomous entity. To be significant, this general notion needs to be articulated in a series of explicata. Such explicata are the basic ontological concepts that build the framework in which the aesthetic being of music can be understood. It follows that the basic concepts of musical ontology must be constructed under the auspices of autonomy.

14. The first concept is the concept of musical sound. Whatever else music may be, it is something audible. Sound is therefore its most elementary characteristic. However, not every sound is musical sound. According to the requirements of aesthetic ontology, the difference between musical and non-musical sound is to be explained in terms of autonomy and heteronomy. Thus, we can say that musical sound is sound giving itself its own laws, while non-musical sound is sound being subject to foreign laws, for example, to the laws of physics or the laws of social praxis. In this sense, the most elementary characteristic of the musical work is the autonomy of sound.
15. The autonomy of sound has to be read in the strict sense. The fact that sound gives itself its own laws means, first, that the rule system of musical sound is not imposed upon by anything external to it and, second, that this rule system has to be validated by the musical entity itself. To say the latter is to say that there is no musical apriority. Musical apriority would consist in pre-established rule systems that would determine whether sounds might count as musical sounds. Many epochs of music history suggest the existence of such musical apriority, and one is seduced by this into assuming that musical sound stands under its condition. However, twentieth-century currents as distinct as musique concrète, electronic music, musique formelle, and chance music have all proven that the decision of whether sounds may count as musical sounds is a basic problem for composition. The second condition of the autonomy of sound is a conclusion from this: the musicality of sound is not decided by some musical apriority, but by the self-legislation of sound. Self-legislation means that the laws of sound hold in virtue of the sound complex alone. They are instituted by the inner consistency of the sound constituted by them. Rule systems that appear to be preset, such as tonality, counterpoint, and the like, are in fact to be reconstructed by each musical work in terms of their own rule systems.

16. There are different types of musical sound. Such types cannot be deduced, but have to be induced by musicological, compositional, or practical reflections. Their most important requirement is that they are common enough to precede all specific functions that musical sounds fulfil. Sound types articulate generic possibilities of musical sound. As such articulations, they remain on the merely structural level. In contrast, the individuality of a musical sound is articulated by the concept of timbre. Timbre must not be misunderstood as one sound parameter alongside others. Rather, timbre is the “general physiognomy” (Chion 2011, 237) of an individual sound of music. However, since we often do speak of the same musical sound appearing in different timbres, for example, in the case of a figure played at different pitches or performed by different instruments, one has to restate the assessment of timbre with the proviso that musical sound possesses a core towards which its physiognomy gravitates. This core can be the same in different individual sounds and belongs, accordingly, to an intermediate level between the generality of types and the individuality of timbre. Different physiognomies constitute different individualities of sound without excluding a common kernel that allows their equation.

17. Individual sounds, sound kernels, and sound types are identifiable and re-identifiable. This is grounded in the concept of rules. Because a rule requires the discrimination of particulars as its cases, it implies the identifiability, and re-identifiability, of items. Accordingly, sound rules identify sounds as their instances. This seems to contradict the statement that the question of identification is nonsensical concerning musical being. But although the question of identification indeed does not apply to the musical work itself, it does apply to the sounds whose complex the work is. And this means that individual sounds, sound kernels, and sound types are not the object of aesthetic judgement as
long as they are taken for themselves. The aesthetic judgement refers only to the complex, or the totality, of sounds, while all identifiable sounds remain under its radar. The complex of autonomous sound differentiates into them.

18. After all, musical sound can be understood as an autonomous complex of identifiable, and re-identifiable, audible phenomena of certain types with physiognomies gravitating towards shared kernels.

19. Having introduced musical sound as standing under self-given rules, the adjacent basic concepts have to be explicata of the different kinds of these rules. The first of these kinds consists of rules that govern the temporal relations of sounds. Accordingly, the second basic concept is the concept of musical time.

20. Traditionally, the temporal character of music was seen as evidence against the conception of musical works. Music, it was said, could not form a work because its fugaciousness contradicted the endurance that works of art must have. Leonardo thus subordinated music to painting, which remains in being, whereas music dies immediately after its creation (Leonardo 1651, 1.25). The argument relies on the assumption that the temporal structure of music subjects music to time, and therefore to its fugaciousness. However, if the concept of musical time articulates autonomous sound, music cannot be subject to time, but gives the time rules by itself to itself. It does not stand in time, but has time within it. Autonomous sound is sound possessing time.

21. If musical time is not the time to which music is subject, but the time that music has, musical time is, in the first instance, not a time span. Time spans are units of the temporal order. But musical time is not an element of the temporal order, but its own autonomous order. Thus, it is not a time span. Correspondingly, musical time cannot be compared to other units of time. Since a unit that can be compared to other units is called an extensive magnitude, musical time is not an extensive magnitude. Now, the opposite of extensive magnitudes are intensive magnitudes. They are characterised by the continuity of degrees. It follows that musical time is such an intensive magnitude. It is the continuity of degrees, or a flowing magnitude, that then differentiates into distinct units. Accordingly, the rules of musical time are the rules of differentiation of this flowing continuity: they are rules of differentiation of the intensive magnitude into extensive magnitudes. Therefore, it is of foremost importance to bind the temporal units of music to the continuity of musical time. The comparable units of metre, for example, have to be understood neither as divisions nor as additions of time, but as products of the evolution of time, as Moritz Hauptmann (1853, 238) put it and Christopher Hasty (1997) worked out. Products of the evolution of time are differentiations of its continuity. Its extensive magnitudes result from its intensive magnitude.

22. Autonomous complexes of sound, or musical works, are self-differentiating intensive magnitudes of time. But there must be a relation between the
intensive magnitude of musical time and the extensive magnitude of the time span in which a musical work is performed or heard. How can these incommensurable magnitudes correspond? Their correspondence can be formulated in terms of claims and compliance. The intensive magnitude of musical time calls for an adequate extensive magnitude of extra-musical time, and the extra-musical time span satisfies this claim if the performance is felicitous. Note that this allows for a variety of compliances, for musical time does not define the measurement of the extra-musical time for which it calls, as its intensive magnitude cannot represent an extensive magnitude. Compliance remains a matter of judgement. And note further that this feature explains the repeatability of musical time in extra-musical time. The musical time of a work is repeated again and again in extra-musical time, for the claim that it presents remains the same while its compliances change.

23. After all, musical time can be understood as an intensive magnitude that differentiates into intra-musical extensive magnitudes and that calls for the compliance of extra-musical time spans.

24. Time rules cannot be the only kind of rules. The concept of musical sound has established musical sounds as identifiable, and re-identifiable, items. Time rules, however, do not institute the framework that is needed in order to identify, and re-identify, musical sounds. Let us assume that, contrary to fact, time rules were the only rules of autonomous sound. If we wanted to state the numerical difference of qualitatively identical sounds under this condition, the only way to do so would be to distinguish by the instants of time at which they sound. Accordingly, sounds at different instants would need to be different sounds. But then, sounds would not be re-identifiable at different instants of time. It follows that identifiable, and re-identifiable, sounds require a framework that entails more than just the rules of time.

25. The identification, and re-identification, of sounds that are numerically different, but qualitatively the same, presupposes a spatial order. Qualitatively identical sounds can be distinguished according to the places at which they sound, and they can be re-identified when they sound at other places (see Strawson 1959, 71–85). But since the autonomy of musical sound suspends it from extra-musical laws, the required spatial order cannot be found in extra-musical space, that is, in physical space. A genuine space of music is needed. This, then, is the third basic concept: the concept of musical space.

26. Musical space is often either confused with the space in which music appears or taken as a metaphor. But like musical time, musical space is not the space in which music is, but the space that music has in itself; and it is more than a metaphor because it is the constitutive condition for identifiable sounds whose complex the musical work is. Nonetheless, musical space is a rather marginal concept in musical aesthetics. The old distinction between temporal and spatial arts seems to have suppressed the spatial characteristics of music.
Towards a General Theory of Musical Works and Musical Listening

Fortunately, historical investigations into medieval theories of music as well as compositional reflections, especially those of serialism, have brought the concept of musical space to light. They show that our speaking of high and low pitch, of lines and parallels, of inversions and intervals, and so on, are more than mere façons de parler. They are expressions of the constitutive role of the rules of musical space.

27. Musical space has three dimensions: breadth, height, and depth. The first dimension determines the horizontal order of musical sound. It is the simultaneous representation of temporal succession, “sounds being side by side,” and its factors correspond to the respective factors of musical time. The second dimension, height, determines the vertical order, “sounds being one upon another.” It is operated by the distinction between high and low and differentiated by intervals, scales, their repeatability in other positions, and the like. The diastematic and chordal structure of music is constituted in its height, as well as the pitch determination of clusters and sound clouds. The third dimension, depth, introduces “sounds being behind one another.” Its fundamental operator is the construction of nearness and remoteness in different respects, extending from factors of background and foreground over the topology of tonal regions, to musical gestures like wie aus weiter Ferne.

28. In addition to the three dimensions, at least two other spatial functions rule autonomous sound. These functions are the diagonal and the density of musical space. The diagonal correlates horizontal and vertical functions. It is important especially for counterpoint, which constructs musical structures that embody internal relations between vertical and horizontal positions. Density, in turn, determines musical sound concerning whether it is open-worked or compact. Questions of complexity or minimalism are variations of density. All these spatial functions generate the order of distance between sounds. Globally, they govern the constriction or the extent of musical structures; locally, they operate on their internal patterns.

29. As musical time, musical space must not be understood as an extensive magnitude, but as an intensive magnitude. Otherwise, a musical work would be subordinated to the extra-musical spatial order in which it would be comparable to other spatial items. Accordingly, musical space should be understood as an intensive magnitude that differentiates into extensive spatial magnitudes through the functions of its three dimensions and their two corollary factors.

30. The concepts of musical time and musical space articulate the structural order of musical sound. However, in addition to their structural order, the spatio-temporal sounds of music must also be convincing. Their power to convince is because musical sounds are not arbitrary, but consequent. That is, they have to have some kind of logical force. The spatio-temporal sounds’ power to convince is grounded in their musical logic.
31. Musical logic must not be cast in terms of analytical necessity, but has to be understood in respect to the uses of argument. The musical order of sounds works like an argument that is meant to convince someone of a certain consequence in a particular context: it is a topical argument of a certain scope. The spatio-temporal sounds’ power to convince depends on this scope. To assert that a sequence of sounds is an argument of a certain scope is to assert that a sound sequence in, say, a Chopin nocturne is convincing under different presuppositions than it would be in a motet by Josquin. To be sure, sound sequences also contain elements independent of scope. Rules of counterpoint, for example, contribute to the persuasiveness of a fugue by Bach as well as of a symphony by Bruckner, although their musical logic is otherwise quite different. Nonetheless, even the elements independent of scope acquire their specific function within an argument of a certain scope. Thus, musical arguments are topical, or dialectical, arguments and not analytical ones.

32. That musical sound sequences are arguments meant to convince someone introduces a further condition. Convincing someone makes sense only if the consequence of which one shall be convinced is not already obvious. There must be some opposition to it. With regard to music, this means that doubt about and resistance against sound sequences are the precondition of musical arguments. If music runs like clockwork, it has no power to convince. It must “unsettle the aesthetic apparatus” in order to become convincing (Lachenmann 1996, my translation). On the basis of such a disturbance, the topical arguments of music can do their work. They convince those who are resistant to sound sequences of their consequence. Accordingly, the functional order of music institutes persuasiveness on the basis of disturbance.

33. The upheaval of the aesthetic apparatus is not restricted to the currents of twentieth-century music that explicitly have formulated it. It holds for all autonomous sound complexes, that is, for all musical entities in the realm of aesthetic being. Ordinary oppositions like rhapsodic versus logic, drastic versus gnostic, music at hand versus music in presentation, and so on, miss the point insofar as they rest on a mistaken view of musical logic. To repeat: musical logic is constructed in the form of topical arguments that convince someone of certain sound sequences under certain premises. This holds both for ad libitum and obliggato styles of music. And since topical arguments presuppose the resistance of an opponent, musical arguments presuppose the resistance of the listener to their sounds. This can be seen even in the case of the most easy-going forms of music. Tonal music, for example, rests on the exposure of its tonality in the form of the cadence. The cadence, in turn, consists of two falls of the fifth (I–IV, V–I). The first fall suggests that the tonic is the dominant of the subdominant, although it is posited as the tonic; the second fall dissolves this contradiction and reconfirms the right of the tonic. The cadence is thus grounded in a harmonic malfunction: the elements of the first chord represent a different tonal function (the dominant) than the function that they are supposed to represent (the tonic). It follows that the argument in favour of a
certain tonality, which the cadence presents, presupposes the resistance and disturbance of the aesthetic apparatus, whose understanding of the first tonal function is shaken. Where such elementary upheaval is missing, the musical argument of the cadence becomes nonsensical. Thus, being successful, musical arguments sublate the resistance of the aesthetic apparatus into a fuller understanding of the music.

34. The logical force of music manifests the spatial-temporal structures of musical sound as argumentative functions. Now, the formula “something as something” expresses the meaning of the object in question. Thus, the articulation of the argumentative order of music is done by the concept of musical meaning. It is the fourth basic concept in the aesthetic ontology of music. However, musical meaning cannot be restricted to the argumentative function of sounds. Musical sounds are argumentative functions insofar as they operate in regard to other sounds. But there seem to be aspects of musical meaning that are not restricted to relations of sound alone. Sounds might expose ideals, enact ways of life, or anticipate what has not yet come to be. Such aspects, all of which are instances of sound as something, put sound in relation to non-sound. Notwithstanding, they must still be understood in terms of autonomy, being the products of the self-legislation of music. Thus, the concept of musical meaning has to be modelled in such a way that simultaneously respects the autonomy of sound and points to the world of non-sound.

35. The best model I can find is that of the fourfold meaning of Scripture. In this model, what is written in a Scriptural text can be interpreted in four ways: the literal sense, or “what is said”; the allegorical sense, or “what you shall believe”; the tropological sense, or “how you shall live”; and the anagogical sense, or “what you can hope for.” Applying this model to music, the different layers of musical meaning can be distinguished in the following ways: the literal sense of musical sounds is the meaning of sound solely in regard to sound, “what is said in terms of sound alone,” and we have seen that this meaning consists of the argumentative function that a sound possesses in a sequence of sounds. On the basis of this literal sense of music, the three other senses point to something other than sound alone. The allegorical sense is what musical sounds make you believe from the particular premises that they imply. To give an example: under certain implicit premises of eighteenth-century German Protestant music, a sound structure is to be understood as passus duriusculus and thus as the enactment of pain. The tropological sense, in turn, is what musical sounds mean when their auditors apply them to themselves and the comprehension of their own lives. To again give an example: the meaning of rhythm could be understood as the exposition of the movement of the animate world. Finally, the anagogic sense is the utopian meaning of musical sounds: they present an order of freedom not realised in the existing world. Each of these higher senses is constituted as autonomously as the elementary literal sense. They are construed under implicit premises for beliefs, with conditions for the application to oneself, or as structures of anticipation that are all part of the rule system.
of musical sounds and understandable in terms of it. Thus, their contents are functions of musical sound, in opposition to musical sound as a function of such contents.

36. With the concept of musical meaning, the articulation of musical being seems to be completed. The spatio-temporal structure of autonomous sound and its fourfold meaning are spelled out. But the last step is still missing. As seen, the logical force of musical sound is of a certain scope, instituted by each of its autonomous complexes. Its power to convince depends on this scope. Therefore, it calls for the persuasiveness of the scope itself. The persuasiveness of the scope, in turn, cannot be decided by the arguments working within it. That is, musical meaning, resting on the argumentative functions of sounds, stands under the constraint that the scope of the autonomous sound complex itself proves to be valid. And this proof cannot be a matter of musical meaning, but has to be articulated on a superordinate level.

37. In order to be valid, the scope of the autonomous sound complex has to be related to a normative instance. If it satisfies the demands of this instance, its validity is realised. The instance cannot be external to the musical work, for this would run counter to the autonomy of sound. Accordingly, the required relation of the autonomous sound complex must be an internal relation. This means that the complex has to manifest an aspect that is different from the aspect of which the articulations hitherto given are comprised, and to which the latter aspect can be related. Let us call this latter aspect the aspect of form. In our context, musical form shall be defined as the answer to the question “what is it?” asked about a musical entity. The framework of this answer has been explained: the form of a musical entity is a certain autonomous spatio-temporal structure of fourfold meaning. But the question “what is it?” is not the only question to be asked of a musical entity. An equally important question asks “whereof is it?” The answer to this question is given by the musical material. Musical material is everything of which a musical work is made. It comprises not only inventories of tones and systems of their relations, but also rules of performance and social conditions of music. What matters is that these materials have been transformed into the form of autonomous sound. Seemingly given determinants from nature and society are thus subordinated to the self-legislation of sound. Indeed, these materials are present only within the autonomy of sound, for they have been processed by the rule system of the musical work before they become an issue. Thus, the musical material is an internal aspect of autonomous sound complexes, although external matters have precipitated into it.

38. The musical material is the normative instance to which the rule systems of autonomous sound are related in order to be valid. This is because the musical material is itself not formless, but was preformed over the course of history. Being historically preformed, the musical material implements a specific range of possibilities of what can be made of them. In Adorno’s words, the musical
material has a certain tendency (Adorno [1949] 1975, 38–42). To it, the musical form has to respond if it wants to realise the possibilities offered by the material. One must not misconceive this tendency. It is clear that it cannot be straight linearity, and it is also clear that it cannot be used as a tribunal to condemn, or to praise, abstract methods of composition. Rather, it has to be understood as a historically instituted, and historically changing, field of compositional possibilities to which the rule systems of autonomous musical sound have to react. As such a field of possibilities that excludes other possibilities, the musical material has normative power.

39. The internal relation of aesthetic validation has now become manifest. It consists of the consistency of material and form of an autonomous sound complex. Therefore, the final concept of musical ontology has to be a concept that articulates the internal consistency-relation of works. In recourse to some considerations of Schoenberg (1975), I call this final concept the “musical idea.” The musical idea is the method used to generate cohesion through the homeostasis of material and form. It institutes rule systems of spatio-temporal sound sequences with meaning in response to the demands of material possibilities.

40. Because musical meaning is an element of form, while the musical idea is the method that relates form and material in a consistent manner, the musical idea is meaningless. It is the meaningless centre of musical meaning. As such, it transcends everything that can be interpreted in music. But it is not ingrained into music and its interpretations from above. Rather, it is the explicatum of the fact that musical form has to respond to material requirements. That is, the musical idea manifests a transcendence of meaning that is rooted in the materiality of music. As such, it proves the aesthetic ontology of musical works to be materialistic and transcendent at once.

IV. Musical listening

41. The aesthetic ontology of musical works has presented works as autonomous complexes of sound. As mentioned previously, sounds are audible phenomena. Accordingly, musical works are complexes of audible phenomena. This means that musical works are constituted with regard to musical listening. They imply the possibility to be auditively disclosed. However, not every kind of listening is apt to disclose the being of music. It must be performed in specifically musical terms. Thus, the ontological account of music translates into an investigation into the characteristics of musical listening.

42. The characterisation of musical listening shall begin with its intentional-ity. To say that musical listening is intentional is to say that it is the hearing of something as something. The formula “of something as something” entails two conditions: musical listening is, first, directed towards something and, second, perceives that towards which it is directed under a certain aspect. Wittgenstein explains the latter condition, perceiving something under a certain aspect, by
the phrase “according to an interpretation” (Wittgenstein 1960, §511, 524, my translation). Perceiving something as something is to perceive it according to an interpretation. Wittgenstein further introduces the concept of guidedness into the context of aspect perception (1960, §368–71). The different interpretations according to which someone perceives something as something correspond to different forms of perceptive guidedness. This means that the ongoing flow of our perception is guided and determined by the different interpretations according to which we perceive something. Finally, Wittgenstein makes a third point. This point states that to perceive different aspects means to be disposed to different behaviour. When we perceive something according to a certain interpretation, we are disposed to behave in a certain way, while we are disposed to behave in other ways when we perceive it according to other interpretations (ibid., §505, 513–14, 517–18). Let us rely on Wittgenstein’s three considerations and put them together. Intentional perception, then, is the perception of aspects according to interpretations that guide the track of perception and that correspond to certain types of behaviour.

43. When we apply these general considerations to the question of listening, we can say that to hear something as something means to hear it under an aspect. That is, the flow and determination of auditory perception is guided according to interpretations and connected to behavioural dispositions. “Hearing-as” is interpretative hearing. Here we have the precise point of distinction between musical and non-musical listening. Both kinds of listening hear different aspects of something, which implies that they hear audible phenomena according to different interpretations; the difference in these interpretations marks the difference between musical and non-musical forms of listening. From this account, it follows that the interpretations according to which one listens to musical works have to be specifically musical interpretations. Musical listening is aspect-hearing guided by interpretations that constitute those aspects under which sounds become music.

44. Before becoming more explicit about that which makes an interpretation a musical interpretation, let us refine the general idea a little bit more. The interpretations according to which something is heard as something cannot be general concepts under which audible phenomena are subsumed or classified. Subsumption and classification are analytical operations. But the interpretative guidance of the flow of perception is a synthetic function. It synthesises perceptual information into perceptual items of certain aspects, making an indeterminate “this” into a recognisable “this-such.” Using terminology introduced by Kant, we can call the “this-such” a figurative synthesis of perceptions, and we can call the function that carries it out the productive imagination of this-suches (Critique of Pure Reason B150–52, Kant 1998 256–57). This synthetic function is productive because it generates the recognisable items of percep-

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2 Here and in the following, I draw on the interpretations provided by Wilfrid Sellars (1968, 4–8), and Peter F. Strawson ([1971] 1974).
tion. And it is imaginative because it not only operates on present perceptual information, but refers to all perceptual content that is connected with the behaviour to which the performance of aspect perception disposes us. In other words, productive imagination synthesises perceptions according to interpretations that imply an entire horizon of perceptual possibilities. Thus, the interpretations according to which we hear something as something are substantiated in figurative syntheses of auditory perceptions that imply a wide range of perceptions present and absent. They guide the flow of listening.

45. Yet another point: the results of productive imagination, the figurative syntheses of “this-suches,” are closely connected with judgements. For example, the perceptual contents “this-sound trope” and “this-triad” can be easily stated in the propositional forms “this is a sound trope” and “this is a triad.” In these propositional forms, they become the content of judgements. From the easy transformability of non-propositional content into propositional form, it follows that a perception according to an interpretation is not a mere “this.” As a “this-such,” it is conceptually rich, closely connected to the predicative use of concepts and implying a framework of them. Notwithstanding, the this-such nexus is distinct from judgement insofar as it is in the perception itself, having been put there by productive imagination according to an interpretation. To hear something according to an interpretation, it is not necessary that one be able to transform one’s “this-suches” into propositional forms. Thus, the perception is not reducible to the concepts and the conceptual framework that it implies. The figurative syntheses of productive imagination are transformable into propositional forms, but independent of their actual transformation.

46. Under these premises, the distinction between musical and non-musical listening can be restated more precisely. The differences in their interpretations are differences of figurative syntheses by productive imagination. Musical listening is imaginative in its own way. And we can state the direction in which this way leads. The distinctive imaginative form of musical listening must concern the conceptual factors that are implied in the respective interpretation according to which we hear.

47. By this, one could feel prompted to say that the required conceptual difference becomes explicit in the different conceptual frameworks implied in productive imagination. When we hear a “this-triad,” the conceptual richness of this perception leads to another framework, namely that of tonal harmony or at least of chord systems, than does the conceptual richness of a “this-signal.” But it seems that the difference between musical imagination and non-musical imagination must be more than just the implication of different conceptual schemes. Musical and non-musical imaginations not only involve different sets of concepts, they also appear to involve concepts in different ways.

48. One way to state this difference in conceptual involvement is to say that the productive imagination in musical listening does not assert the concepts it
implies. This statement could be concluded from Roger Scruton’s position that aesthetic experience employs unasserted thought (1974, 87–98). Unasserted thought goes beyond what is believed truly or falsely. To be sure, not everything that we believe is asserted; but everything that we believe when we believe truly or falsely is asserted. Scruton’s position that aesthetic experience employs unasserted thought fits nicely with the pre-propositional side of productive imagination. But it misses the transformability of “this-suches” into propositional form. When we hear a “this-triad,” we are allowed to move on to the proposition “this is a triad.” And here we clearly make an assertion. Thus, the concept of a chord is implicitly asserted when we hear a “this-chord,” and the concepts that are at work in figurative syntheses are not at work as unasserted concepts but as tacitly asserted concepts. We thus have to look for another possibility in order to state the different ways in which concepts are involved in musical imagination.

49. I suggest that this possibility can be found in the fundamental characteristic of aesthetic judgements. This characteristic, and not the contrast between asserted and unasserted thought, marks the difference between musical and non-musical listening. As argued in the first section, the fundamental characteristic of aesthetic judgements consists of the condition that these judgements are not made true by facts. In the context of musical listening, this condition becomes important because the transformation of “this-suches” into propositional form occurs under the prescription of aesthetic apprehension. Musical listening is a form of aesthetic experience. Hence, its propositional form must be a function of the aesthetic judgement, and the perceptual content that can be transformed into a propositional form has to be explicable in regard to the aesthetic judgement. Now, if musical listening tacitly asserts the concepts that are implied in its figurative syntheses, and if it amounts, in the end, to aesthetic judgements, then the assertion of those concepts is not made true by facts. Here the distinctive factor of musical listening becomes evident. Musical listening synthesises something according to an interpretation whose propositional form is never made true by a fact. Nonetheless, musical listening asserts its interpretations, that is, it claims to be true. Both conditions amount to the circumstance that musical listening is full of tacit claims encapsulated in its conceptual richness, and that it nonetheless can never be nailed down by facts. Musical listening is marked as imaginative freedom, being the issue of an ongoing critique.

50. We are now in a position to give an elementary account of musical listening. To hear sounds as music means to hear them according to imaginative interpretations that produce conceptually rich “this-as-suches,” standing in a horizon of perceptual possibilities and being the subject of a never-ending debate in freedom and strife.

3 Scruton continues his claim in his The Aesthetics of Music (1997, 88–90).
51. Since musical listening intends to disclose musical being, the concepts that are involved in its productive imagination are the very concepts that articulate the being of music. Correspondingly, the scheme of ontological concepts is also the tacit conceptual scheme of musical listening, articulating the conceptual richness involved in our hearing of sounds as music. The basic concepts are not only explicata of musical being, they are also explicata of the figurative syntheses of musical imagination.

52. With their help, we can distinguish different layers of figurative syntheses. The first layer refers to musical time and musical space. Musical time and musical space are interpretative frameworks in which audible phenomena can be heard. According to them, these phenomena are heard as products of the evolution of musical time and as sounds at a certain place in musical space. They are synthesised as “this-torrent,” “this-crotchet,” “this-foreground,” or “this-high-pitch,” and the conceptual richness that is involved in these figurative syntheses according to an interpretation is evident. Musical analysis, in its broadest sense, devotes its work to bringing this richness into propositional form. However, by such transformation, it provides new means for new interpretations according to which one can hear sounds as music, so that a reciprocal influence between productive imagination and analytical explication is applicable. Explicit conceptual work precipitates into musical listening in the form of an implicit cultural memory. Such cultural memory contributes to the tacit assertion of concepts that are involved when we hear sounds according to an imaginative interpretation.

53. This also concerns the second layer of figurative syntheses, the layer of musical meaning. Here, we have the iteration of the formula “something as something.” In the first layer, audible phenomena are heard as spatio-temporal structures. In the second layer, these spatio-temporal structures are heard as convincing spatio-temporal structures, and this means that they are heard as argumentative functions of a musical logic. The interpretation according to which an audible phenomenon becomes a sound within musical time and musical space is now the issue of a further interpretation, which is concerned with its meaning.

54. One might object that this iteration of interpretations is gratuitous. All kinds of music at hand, for example, seem to be the issue of interpretations of sounds that do not care about argumentative functions of a musical logic. That very well may be. But if sounds are supposed to be heard in an aesthetic key, the question of their aesthetic validity arises. And these sounds have to be heard as convincing sounds. In other words, they have to be heard as sequences that endorse certain consequences. This is their argumentative function. If you restrict the conceptual richness that is involved in the interpretation of sounds as music to the frameworks of musical time and musical space, you deprive these interpretations of their aesthetic significance. That is, you disconnect them from the aesthetic judgement. Correspondingly, such rudimentary inter-
pretations are connected either to theoretical or to practical judgement. You hear them as natural or social phenomena. Of course, it is up to the will, or better, up to the education of the ear whether one hears sounds as natural, as social, or as aesthetic phenomena. But if your listening intends to disclose the aesthetic phenomenon, then the iterated interpretation must happen. Musical listening, whose figurative syntheses refer to the aesthetic judgement, hears spatio-temporal sound structures as argumentative functions.

55. On the level of interpretations of musical meaning, the peculiarity that musical arguments presuppose the resistance of someone who has to be convinced by them becomes crucial. The subject who is to be convinced by these arguments is the listener. Accordingly, hearing sounds as argumentative functions of a musical logic implies the resistance of the listener and its sublation. As Lachenmann put it, the listener’s aesthetic apparatus has to be shattered. We can specify this idea in our terms of musical listening. The aesthetic apparatus is the functional set-up of hearing sounds as music according to an interpretation that guides the flow of perception. If this apparatus has to be shattered, the guidedness of musical perception has to be shattered. That is, the determination of the perceptual flow must be distracted. The argumentative function of sounds is supposed to carry this out and to procure a kind of consent that neither forgets the shattering nor has the final say. Thus, in the first instance, there must be some failure, or distraction, of the guidedness of listening in order to hear sounds as argumentative functions of musical logic. But, at the same time, the logical functions of sound are nothing other than products of this guidedness. Hence, the productive imagination undergoes an internal upheaval. On the one hand, it follows the flow of perceptions guided by a conceptually laden interpretation. On the other hand, this interpretation is thwarted by the very products of the musical imagination. Its anticipations are annulled, and the syntheses are circumfered.

56. But hearing sounds according to an interpretation does not stop at the level of their functional sense. We hear spatio-temporal sound structures of a certain musical logic as birds, as grief, as the movement of life, as something that no ear has heard before, and so on. The figurative syntheses produced by such interpretations entail a conceptual richness of a different texture than the richness involved in the figurations of argumentative functions. In their case, the guidedness of the perceptual flow acquires forms that make the listener hear some extra-musical content in sounds. Taking advantage of a distinction drawn by Richard Wollheim (1980, 140–50) in a different context with different intentions and different implications, we can say that, according to these interpretations, you hear sounds as something that prompts you to hear something in them.

57. In respect to these figurative syntheses, the formula “something as something” is iterated again. From hearing sounds as spatio-temporal structures, and from hearing spatio-temporal sound structures as argumentative func-
tions, we move on to hearing argumentative functions as making you hear something extra-musical in them. The conceptual richness opens the ear for the three higher senses of music.

58. Corresponding to the three higher senses, the guidedness of the perceptual flow that is accomplished on this layer of figurative syntheses manifests three different modes. In its first mode, the guidedness stands under implicit premises that make you hear some extra-musical content in them. The sounds produced by it embody affections or enact nature or expose ideals: being guided under the premises of, say, the doctrine of figures, you hear the chromatically descending fourth as *passus duriusculus*, and, accordingly, hear pain in it. In its second mode, the guidedness works in regard to what music means to us and our lives. Here, the sounds are heard as inviting us to apply their features to ourselves and thus to hear extra-musical content in them: being guided by the application of, say, the sonata form to your bourgeois life, you hear the history of a subject or its *Bildung*, moving through contradictory experiences and reflections to a solution, in the piece of music. And in its third mode, the guidedness operates in view of something that is lacking. The sounds are heard as substantiating a state that is nowhere else realised and thus to be heard in them: being guided by the anticipation of, say, true freedom, you hear such freedom in the constellation of musical sounds.

59. On the level of the three higher senses, the conceptual richness of productive imagination seems to violate the autonomy of sound. Sounds are heard as something according to an interpretation that employs extra-musical content. Thus, they appear to be subject to heteronomous conditions. But this would be true only if the extra-musical contents were not integrated into the scope of the aesthetic judgement. Since the figurative syntheses of musical listening are implicitly asserted propositions that stand under the prescription of the aesthetic judgement, the conceptual richness of these syntheses also involves this prescription. That is, the extra-musical contents are deprived of interests and from being made true by facts when they precipitate in the figurative syntheses of musical sound, for these are the two marks of the aesthetic judgement. By this, extra-musical contents, which as such are laden with interests and identifications of facts, become functions of autonomous sounds. Thus, the fact that something extra-musical is heard in the music does not impose extra-musical rules onto the laws of music. On the contrary, the extra-musical meanings of sounds are the results of the rule system of music that incorporates the rules of extra-musical content under the prescription of the aesthetic judgement.

60. The integration into the scope of the aesthetic judgement applies also to a further issue. The interpretations according to which we hear audible phenomena as musical sounds involve certain values. To stay with one of the examples above, whether you hear the chromatically descending fourth as *passus duriusculus* or as embodiment of expressive subjectivity depends on the value relations
of the respective frames of reference. Let us say that the piece in question is Bach’s Invention for Three Voices in F minor. To hear it under the premises of the theory of figures, you have to emphasise the traditional context in which Bach’s music stands, and you have to estimate highly the German Protestant music of the eighteenth century. To hear it in the other way, you have to stress the path-breaking quality of Bach’s compositions, which relates them to forthcoming ideas, and you have to place the expression of the subject over the rhetorical craftsmanship that produces music for church services. Here, different evaluations are at work. These evaluations, which concern intra-musical questions, are entangled with extra-musical evaluations. Considering Bach’s music in the context of the older tradition refers to the value of a pre-modern ordo divinus; in contrast, considering it with regard to the forthcoming ideas refers to the value of the modern subject and its individual expression. Musical values and extra-musical values go hand in hand and shape the interpretations according to which something is heard as music.

61. The values that are implied in musical listening make clear that the interpretations of audible phenomena are by no means purely descriptive. They are also normative. Intra- and extra-musical values are involved in the guidedness of the perceptual flow, and the figurative syntheses of musical listening are full of evaluative impact. In other words, the “this” that becomes a “this-such” is normatively laden because the “such” manifests the guidedness of perceptions according to interpretations including value relations. This should be no surprise. Perceptual guidedness requires points of orientation that establish the direction into which the flow of perceptions runs. Such points of orientation cannot be randomly selected. They have to be of some value in order to be directive, and they have to be of higher value than other potential points of orientation. And this means that the points of orientation embody value relations. They determine the content of the figurative syntheses. Because musical listening is interpretative listening, it is descriptive and normative at once.

62. The fact that musical listening is packed with value relations seems to introduce the predicament that Nicolai Hartmann aptly called “the tyranny of values” (1926, 574–76; 1932, 2:421–26). The tyranny of values consists of the tendency of each value to posit itself as the tyrant of interpretative contexts. It is connected with the devaluation of other values, with the corresponding struggle of values, and with the submission of our understanding to a decision for certain values. This proves that values are positions in a system of values. The devaluation of values downgrades them within the system, the struggle of values is a struggle for position, and the submission of our understanding to value decisions makes it into something that must occupy a position registered in the system. All this is well known from the history of musical listening. The tyranny of values pops up again and again.

4 Hartmann considers the tyranny of values in the context of practical reason. His solution, however, which suggests a “value synthesis,” is as dissatisfactory as his material value ethics in general.
63. But as in the case of musical meaning, the values involved in musical listening are integrated into the scope of the aesthetic judgement. That is, their genuine articulation—value judgements—are subordinated to another kind of judgement. Often, aesthetic judgements are considered to be a special case of value judgements. Indeed, beauty itself is frequently defined as aesthetic value. Nothing could be more wrong. Values are connected with interests, as are their articulations, value judgements. Aesthetic judgements are not. Thus, the aesthetic judgement is of a different kind than the value judgement. If the latter has to be in the scope of the former, the interests that are connected with it have to lose their power. And this means that the values themselves cannot be the tyrants of our understanding any longer. On the contrary, aesthetic judgement deprives of their decisive force the values that are involved in musical listening. To be sure, hearing audible phenomena as musical sounds still involves value relations, but these value relations are not the determinative factors in the end.

64. This leads us to the highest point at which musical listening is attached. The formula “something as something” has been iterated several times. The layers of musical listening extend from hearing something as spatio-temporal sound structures, to hearing spatio-temporal sound structures as argumentative functions, to hearing argumentative functions as something that makes you hear something in them. All these layers are pervaded with tacit value relations. But the aesthetic nature of musical listening is not yet explained: to subordinate all these layers under the aesthetic judgement requires hearing them as autonomous sound complexes.

65. At first glance, it seems that this requirement is a further iteration of the formula “something as something.” What else could the phrase “hearing something as an autonomous sound complex” mean? But we have to be careful here. As seen, the formula “something as something” can be explained in terms of “hearing something according to an interpretation.” And this cannot hold for autonomous sound complexes for the following reason: to hear something as an autonomous sound complex is to hear the sound as self-legislating sound. As we saw in the previous section, the self-legislation of sound is grounded in the internal relation of musical form and musical material. Correspondingly, in order to hear something as an autonomous sound complex, one must apprehend this internal relation. The internal relation of form and material, in turn, has proven to be the meaningless centre of musical meaning. Thus, it cannot be interpreted. It follows that hearing it is not an issue of interpretation. The phrase “hearing something as an autonomous sound complex” is corrupted. It does not allow for a reformulation in terms of “hearing something according to an interpretation” and is, accordingly, mistakenly expressed. Instead of saying “musical listening hears something as an autonomous sound complex” we should merely say “musical listening hears an autonomous sound complex.” The musical work is simply present in musical listening. Hearing something as musical sound depends upon this.
66. Because hearing autonomous sound complexes is not a matter of interpretation, musical listening is, in the end, beyond interpretation and the value relations involved in such an act. Nonetheless it cannot dispense with interpretation, for all its layers rest on it. Musical listening must thus work through the interpretations of audible phenomena as musical sounds, as well as through the tacit value relations that are involved in them, in order to approach the meaningless centre of music at which all this is attached and by which all this is transcended. Musical listening is the infinite reshaping of interpretations for the sake of the nonsensical core of music.

67. But the nonsensical core at which musical listening is attached has, as we saw, a structure. It consists of the response of the form to the tendency of the material. This tendency is directed to the actualisation of hitherto unactualised possibilities that the material offers. The movement that is concerned with such actualisations is the avant-garde. Thus, the infinite reshaping of interpretations for the sake of the nonsensical core of music is connected to the musical avant-garde. It receives from the avant-garde the works that open our ears, and it is committed to the avant-garde. Musical listening in the sphere of the aesthetic judgement is partisan.

References


Towards a General Theory of Musical Works and Musical Listening


The Work of the Performer

John Rink
University of Cambridge

This essay considers the work of the performer in relation to the musical work. More is at stake than the play on words implied here. By claiming that performers' engagement with the "musical work" as conventionally understood entails a different sort of "work" in the sense of both process and outcome, I argue that what performers do influences music's very content, how it takes shape, and how those who hear it perceive and understand it. The essay first describes the act of performing and what I have termed "the problem of performance" (Rink 2001b). The next section then revisits key literature on musical narrativity and puts it to use in addressing the performer/work relationship at the heart of the enquiry. Finally, a case study based on my experience in playing a piece by Rachmaninoff demonstrates that relationship in action.

Premises

"Music-making," writes Jonathan Dunsby (2001, 346), "is a virtually universal human activity"; motivated at the most fundamental level by "private biological necessity," it takes the form of "public property" at its most elevated extreme. For all its universality, however, musical performance is notoriously resistant to explication, notwithstanding an avalanche of research in recent years and growing recognition of its centrality to musical thought and musicological enquiry. Gaining a clear and comprehensive understanding of musical performance is thwarted by its evanescence and ontology, ambiguity surrounding what it signifies and how it conveys meaning, and the performer's variable identity in the act of performance. In surveying these problems, I lay the groundwork for reconsideration of aspects of performative process from the perspectives of both performers and listeners.

Performances do not exist so much as happen, and live performances in particular are temporal, ephemeral acts—in Nicholas Cook's words, a "snatching of eternity . . . from the jaws of evanescence" (2001, §19). Furthermore, a single performance is rarely if ever adequate or definitive: as Janet Schmalfeldt (1985, 28) has observed, "there are always 'different, better' performances . . . to be

1 I am grateful to Daniel Leech-Wilkinson, Andreas Dorschel, and Paulo de Assis for their insightful comments on a draft of this essay.
2 See Leech-Wilkinson (2015) for further discussion of what I call the "performer/work relationship." For example, referring to multiple recordings of Chopin's Berceuse, op. 57, Leech-Wilkinson comments: "There is much less work being done by the score and much more by the performer than is implied by the way we habitually talk about scores" (345). While the composer provided "a starting point" in the form of the finished score, "most of the musical work is done later" (344).
3 See Godlovitch (1998) for discussion.
achieved.” At least in the Western art tradition, performance typically involves a quest for an elusive ideal at odds with its “inevitably contingent” nature and its characteristic “element of risk” (Dunsby 2001, 348). Many performers feel the need to perform not just once but over and over—whether in striving for specific artistic goals or simply because of the self-affirming value of the act of performance. Performing over and over is also what practice and rehearsal are all about, to which the lion’s share of one’s time as a performer is devoted.

As indicated, one of the challenges to studying performance is its evanescence. Recordings, the most concrete and accessible incarnation of performance, are only a trace thereof, not the performance itself—as Dunsby (2001, 348) has observed, “not in fact a reproduction but a mere simulacrum, an approximation.” Musical recordings can be likened to photographs as opposed to the events that give rise to them, the fixed image failing to capture one’s sense of the original experience, which naturally was shaped by a host of factors outside the frame. Cook (2001, §28) among others has argued that performance involves not just “the music” but constitutive elements including “performance values” related to context, venue, visual appearance, and so on, all of which influence how listeners perceive it.

As for how performers themselves perceive performance, it is virtually impossible to describe the performance act from the executant’s perspective as it is happening—and certainly not in its synchronic entirety. While performing, one’s consciousness is often different from, indeed at odds with, any normal state. A suspension of time and place can occur while performing—the overriding feeling being one of connection and identification with the music (to the extent that concentration remains focused) but also one of disembodiment, disenfranchisement from normal awareness and the outer world. Paradoxically, that disembodiment is counterpointed by a heightened awareness of one’s corporeal being, each physical motion directly or indirectly invoking sound while subsuming and being subsumed by the workings of a transcendent yet actively engaged mind. One way of describing this experience is to compare it to living out a dream, in which objects and words loom larger than in real life, in which feeling predominates over rational thought, and after which only a vague recollection of the experience can often be mustered. Just as dreams defy explanation, so does music as performance with its sometimes illogical, attenuated, intangible meanings and narrative flow.

The factors that I have identified impinge on what performances mean and communicate to listeners—or, from the performer’s perspective, on what is being communicated and how that communication might be effected.

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4 A point also made by Godlovitch (1998), among others.
5 For discussion of relevant issues, see, for example, Clark, Lisboa, and Williamson (2014); Lisboa, Chaffin, and Logan (2011); Coessens, Crispin, and Douglas (2009, especially 149–56); Doğantan-Dack (2008); Hardy (2006); Hallam (2001). See also Guymer (forthcoming) on tacit and explicit knowledge in performance.
6 Compare the description of the experience of performing in Rink (2017). It would be an exaggeration to claim that this state of disembodiment, of “living out a dream,” characterises each and every performance act. Nevertheless, even if these comments are likely to pertain to solo performance more than other performance contexts, the descriptions of the “strong experiences” of orchestral and other ensemble musicians in Gabrielson (2011) suggest that the immersion described here is by no means confined to soloists.
Admittedly, to hope for “communication” may be too optimistic, given the uniqueness of every perceiver’s response, likewise a uniqueness of intention on the part of every performer. An inevitable distance therefore occurs between the performer’s intentions and the responses of one’s listeners—not to mention an inevitable distance between the composer’s intentions (whatever they might be) and the responses of performer and listener alike. Furthermore, performers rarely have the opportunity to make their intentions explicit. In the concert traditions of Western art music, performers are rendered mute except in texted repertoire: most of the time, performances must speak for themselves, even though verbal explication of some sort would be beneficial in conveying their particular message to listeners. Of course, therein lies performance’s richest potentiality—not for the communication of specific meaning but for the construction of infinite meanings. The downside, however, is that an audience’s response cannot be confidently predicted by the performer—hence the need for more than just “the music” if communication is to be effected.

No less problematic is the vulnerability that performers tend to experience while performing; their identity is often laid on the line in an act of personal disclosure. Indeed, much performance goes beyond public divulgence to the point of public assimilation, through the audience’s subjugation of an inferred other. That act of conquest explains why performers customarily put on masks, for example by assuming an alter ego while onstage; this depersonalises (or “repersonalises”) them, thereby avoiding intrusion that might be uncomfortable at the very least. Paradoxically, performers habitually strive to take control of audiences in a reciprocal act of conquest. The language used in the nineteenth century to describe listeners’ reactions to certain keyboard virtuosos was charged in precisely that way. But here again there are alternatives, namely, an enhanced form of communication outside conventional performance contexts, of which I will say more later.

The obstacles to which I have referred make it difficult to grasp musical performance in essence and totality. Yet its importance in our lives—whether out of “private biological necessity” or for the sake of aesthetic delectation and expression at the “most elevated” plane—means that we have a fundamental need to try to comprehend it. To that extent, the performative turn in musicology over the past two decades or so has been enlightening as well as successful in redressing inattention to musical performance on the part of preceding generations of musicologists, who had focused on “product” to such an extent that the discipline ceased to recognise music as a performance art (Cook 2001, §6). Indeed, in “traditional” musicology, music was generally understood in terms of textual artefacts rather than socially enacted processes.

7 For a critique of the notion of “communication” in performance, see King and Gritten (2017).
8 The “talk-and-play events” described below represent one way of meeting such a need. Note that in smaller-scale concert venues many professional musicians now give verbal introductions to the pieces they will be performing; these “ice-breakers” establish a rapport with listeners and help avoid the barriers that persist in more formal concert settings.
9 Katharine Ellis (1997, 357) cites one review from 1837 which “makes clear how a quasi-sexual possession of the audience was an integral and necessary part of the performance,” in which “issues of control” were at stake.
involving sound, time, and human experience: the score tended to be seen as “the music,” and vice versa. In proposing new means of studying music as performance, Cook encouraged a “dissolving of any stable distinction” between performances and works by regarding scores not as texts but as “scripts,” a term implying “a reorientation of the relationship between notation and performance” (§16). Such a reorientation, he argued, would allow the prevailing conception of “a single work located ‘vertically’ in relation to its performances” to be transcended in favour of “an unlimited number of ontologically equivalent instantiations, all existing on the same ‘horizontal’ plane” (§17).

According to this model, engagement with “the work” therefore yields innumerable new conceptions and constructions thereof, rather than a singular version that musicians are expected to reproduce in performance. The creative agency of the performer is obviously critical in that respect, and this has been increasingly recognised in recent decades. For example, the role of gesture and physicality in performance has now been widely investigated, along with other factors defining the “total performance event.” An extensive literature has grown up around practice and rehearsal, and along with it an increasing attention to the technical, artistic, and practical concerns of performers with regard to both research into practice (see Frayling 1993, 5), which considers what Jane Davidson (2015, 93) calls “the practice-focused behaviour of others,” and practice as research (characterised by Frayling [1993, 5] as practice “through” research), which investigates emergent, practitioner-led activity through a cycle of research planning, acting, observing, and reflecting. The five-year CHARM initiative promoted the musicological study of recordings by drawing on a “wide range of approaches ranging from computational analysis to business history” in four projects that now have many counterparts; and CHARM’s successor, CMPCP, explored key research questions focusing on the creative practice of performance rather than the outcomes thereof.

Questions nevertheless remain about how the “relationship between notation and performance” is played out, and further attention is also needed to the process by which performers devise the “ontologically equivalent instantiations” referred to above. These are the focal points of the next two sections, which address—if only provisionally—the work of performers in interacting with and shaping the musical work.

**Programming the musical work**

*Musical narrative in perspective*

I referred above to re-evaluation of both the “work-concept” and the presumed identity between score and music that dominated musicological thought for

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10 AHRC Research Centre for the History and Analysis of Recorded Music; www.charm.rhul.ac.uk.
11 AHRC Research Centre for Musical Performance as Creative Practice; www.cmpcp.ac.uk. CMPCP addressed three main research questions: In what ways are performers creative? How does their creative activity vary across different cultures, idioms, and conditions? How do musical performances take shape over time, through the exercise of individual and collective creativity?
so long. For reasons that will become clear, further re-evaluation is warranted here, especially in respect of the literature on musical narrativity from the 1980s and 1990s. In retrospect, it seems astonishing that so little attention was paid to performance in that literature, given that music’s narrative properties—however constituted—can be actualised only through performance. Moreover, any claims about a musical structure’s ostensibly immanent narrativity must account for the fact that works signify in unique ways on each performance occasion, and furthermore that “musical structure” is a fundamentally synchronic notion valorised by analysis but at odds with the diachronic process of music-in-sound. I am not suggesting that the leading authors on musical narrativity altogether ignored its time-dependency, but some of their conclusions seem remote from, and inimical to, musical reality and to what I am calling the work of performers. This is problematic in itself and frustrating in respect of the potential of the narrative concept to shed light on what performers do; on how they regard, engage with, and co-create the musical work; and on how listeners make sense of what they are hearing. To redress these lacunae, I survey and critique the principal literature here, teasing out definitions that eventually are reconceived and newly employed.

In an article applying Proppian theory and terminology to music (especially the notion of “plot archetype”), Anthony Newcomb (1987) defined a narrative as a continuous “series of functional events in a prescribed order” (165), and he asserted that “the very heart of musical meaning . . . lies in modes of continuation,” which in turn “lie at the very heart of narrativity, whether verbal or musical” (167). Elsewhere, Newcomb (1994) described musical narratives as “a comprehensible series of intentional acts” (84) potentially comprising “two distinct elements”: “those aspects or characteristics within the music itself that suggest or stimulate a narrative interpretation,” and the “criteria and strategies by which the listener identifies, locates and interprets narrative aspects in music” (85). According to Newcomb, such aspects “are themselves purely musical” (86) and require no literal “story,” although any narrative activity on the listener’s part “is stimulated by a heightened sense of contingency within the series of events itself” (87).

Notwithstanding this emphasis on immanent and “purely musical” properties, Newcomb cites Jerome Bruner’s (1991, 5) distinction between the “narrative mode of thought” and “forms of narrative discourse,” each of which “enables and gives form to the other.” For Bruner, narrative is “a form not only of representing but of constituting reality” (5), operating “as an instrument of mind” in the construction thereof (6). Its characteristics include:
1. diachronicity (6)
2. a “part–whole textual interdependence” whereby “parts and wholes in a narrative rely on each other for their viability” (8)
3. a distinction between a narrative’s “plot” and its mode of delivery (12)
4. a normative background and its subversion through “breach[es] of conventional expectation” (15)

Similar points inform Eero Tarasti’s Theory of Musical Semiotics (1994), which claims that “some music is narrative even though it has no explicit connection with a verbal, gestural, or pictorial language that can provide a ‘plot’” (23). Tarasti defines three types of narrativity. The first involves “latent trait[s]” that emerge only “when a musical work is interpreted, played, or performed in a given way,” and which cannot be analysed “merely at the ‘neutral’ level of musical structure” (23). In contrast, the second is “based on an immanent process of signification” (30) and manifests itself “at a purely structural level” (23). And the third should be seen as a “general category of the human mind, a competency that involves putting temporal events into a certain order, [i.e.] a syntagmatic continuum” with “beginning, development, and end,” whose logic reflects a given tension that is manifested in an “arch progression” (24). Tarasti’s book mostly concerns the second type and the semantic content of the “musical utterance” (énoncé musical), but he broaches the first—the act of utterance (énonciation musicale)—in an analysis of Fauré’s “Après un rêve,” studying eight “pertinent parameters” in twenty-eight select recordings, among them tempo, vibrato, and breathing (205–8). This rare attention to the performance act is undermined, however, by Tarasti’s commitment to an ostensible “basic truth” concerning musical interpretation, namely, that “performance can only be analyzed in relation to the musical enunciate itself” (193).14 Such a “truth” is problematic for reasons shown later.

Other references to performance in narrative terms can be found in roughly contemporaneous writings by Janet Schmalfeldt (1985), Fred Maus (1988), and William Rothstein (1995), who claimed that the performer’s aim is “to discover, or create, a musical narrative,” synthesised “from all he or she knows and feels about the work; listeners, in turn, will construct their own narratives, guided by the performer. One performer’s narrative may differ radically from another’s for the same work, and not all will accord equally with the composer’s intentions. . . . But a narrative there must be, even if it . . . cannot be translated into words” (1995, 237).15

I too have written about musical narrative, defining it as “a time-dependent unfolding of successive musical events, palpably linked to produce a coherent

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13 According to Bruner (1991, 6), a “narrative is an account of events occurring over time”; it is both “irreducibly durative” and based on a “mental model” whose defining property is its unique pattern of events over time.
14 Tarasti translates énoncé musical both as “musical utterance” and as “musical enunciate,” while énonciation is variably translated as “uttering,” “utterance,” “musical performance,” and so on.
15 See also Schachter (1988, 253) on Chopin’s four Ballades and Fantasy op. 49: “Among the musical values of all these works is their narrative quality; but the narration is a musical one, carried out by tonal structure, texture, form, and motivic design.”
The Work of the Performer

‘statement’ embodied in sound alone” (Rink 1999, 218). I represented the background to one such “narration” as an intensity curve capturing the overall shape of the performance, likening it to the intonatory curve of speech (see Rink 1999, 235, 236; cf. Cook 1999, 2013). Elsewhere (Rink 1994, 112) I commented that if a “hidden narrating voice” is to be found in music (as some of the authors surveyed here once insisted), it surely “belongs in large part to the performer, who, as ‘story-teller,’ determines the music’s essential ‘narrative’ content by following indications in the score as to ‘plot’ and, as in the enactment of any ‘plot archetype,’ by shaping the unfolding tale on the spur of the moment.”

This allusion to the “storytelling” qualities of performance echoes similar comments by John Sloboda (1985), Stan Godlovitch (1998), Nicholas Cook (2001), and others. Discerning numerous commonalities between performance and story-telling, Godlovitch (1998) proposes the latter as a narrative “model of instantiation for the relationship between works and performances” (95), hence his descriptions of musical performance as an act of “variety under fixity” (86, 88), of “invited variety” (88), and of “instantial variety” (86, 89, 95) with regard to some underlying framework. Such variety—which should be considered axiomatic—is hard to square with a putatively immanent narrativity for the reasons I have indicated.

Thus, two types of narrative can be said to exist in relation to musical performance: one that is constructed by the performer and is poïetic in function, whereas the other is constructed by the listener and is esthesic in nature. These are depicted in figure 4.1, which shows the performer’s narrative “program” feeding into the performance. The figure also shows the perceiver’s “narratived response” to the performance. I contend that narratived response may not occur in all listening situations—hence the question mark in the figure—whereas the performer is bound to follow a “narrative program” of some sort, the comprehensivity of which will depend on intangible factors such as the degree of familiarity with the music in question, the performer’s aesthetic goals and prerogatives, and his or her capability as well as experience. The performance here—which in my view cannot be construed as operating at a “neutral level”—involves not only the music-as-sound but the very act itself, which has signifying powers just as the performer’s narrative conception comprises more than “the music” alone, as I will show.

16 My view about embodiment “in sound alone” has since evolved, as I show later.
17 Note Shaffer’s (1995, 18) complementary claim that the performer is a “privileged listener.” For further discussion of the semiotic tripartition see Nattiez (1990b), among others.
18 As we will see, I mean “program” in the sense of a “series of coded instructions and definitions,” as “something conceived of as encoding and determining a process, esp. genetically” (OED 2018, 9b), not as in “programming music” (ibid., 4: “A sequence of scenes or events intended to be conveyed by a piece of music, or serving as the inspiration or basis for a composition”). Moreover, as will also become clear, the focus here is on the solo performer, although relevance to other performance contexts should by no means be ruled out.
19 I concentrate here on the listener, though there are of course many different sorts of perceiver, including critic, analyst, and so forth.
20 See Donington (1965) on the role of familiarity and unfamiliarity in the performance of “early music” as well as more generally.
The available space allows only brief observations on musical narrativity as perceived by listeners, and what it is listeners hear. A significant component of the latter will be what Peter Johnson (1999, 63) terms “the physical properties of musical sound itself”; in his view, “performance is constituted by the listener from physical sound as signifier, constituting the fabric of the music.” The implications of sound are greater than one might assume: as Clarke (2002a, 190) claims, “The sounds of a performance have the potential to convey a wealth of information to a listener, ranging from physical characteristics related to the [performance] space . . . and the nature of the instrument, to less palpable properties such as the performance ideology of the performer.”

Moreover, “information about the body of the performer and its relationship with the instrument” is also specified (ibid., 191; see also Doğantan-Dack 2008; Rink 2017). That is why Godlovitch (1998, 43) describes “the sound sequence in performance” as “not just a physical commodity but a phenomenal one.” But, as observed previously, the listener’s construction of meaning stems from a good deal more than just the sound of the music: citing Kershaw’s (1992, 22) pronouncement that “no item in the environment of performance can be discounted as irrelevant to its impact,” Cook (2001, §28) encourages an ethnographically inspired understanding of “the performance of a particular piece in the context of the total performance event,” as noted above. This more broadly constructed meaning explains the presence of “music” and “act” in the centre of figure 4.1, along with my resistance to claims of unmediated immanence and my misgivings about Tarasti’s “basic truth,” given that the factors influencing the meaning of performance as constructed by listeners (whether narrative meaning or not) may well reside outside the score and the musical enunciate as he understands it.

Furthermore, any theory of narrativised response must avoid further naive assumptions about how listeners listen and their inclination or ability to hear structurally ramified, comprehensive narratives within performed music. Referring to Levinson (1997), Clarke (2002a, 192) claims that “listeners do not construct elaborate and large-scale hierarchical structures, but are primar-

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Figure 4.1

Perceiving performance

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21 Or rather, the performance ideology of the performer as inferred by individual listeners. In private correspondence, Daniel Leech-Wilkinson commented that listeners draw on their own ideologies to attribute intentions and motivations to the performer.
ily focused on the continuously evolving detail of a small amount of ‘current’ music”—a claim “consistent with work in the psychology of time perception which suggests that at any moment we are aware of a relatively brief ‘patch’ of time (around 6–10 seconds), referred to as the perceptual present.” He continues: “Larger structures are a function of memory, and Levinson argues that listeners’ memories for these structures are usually rather imprecise and do not support a large-scale ‘architecture’” (ibid.; see also Stern 2004; Leech-Wilkinson 2017). Not only are these comments relevant to how and whether narratives may be constructed by listeners, but they offer a salutary reminder of the potential pertinence of psychological research to any study of musical performance.

Conceiving performance

A psychological perspective is by no means sufficient, however. The next step in this more broadly conceived enquiry into musical narrative and specifically the “narrative programming” that I referred to earlier is therefore to consider what I call the score–sound continuum, the primary relevance of which to solo performance must again be emphasised. Shown in figure 4.2, this continuum implies that the score only hints at “the music,” which necessarily will be imagined and internalised by the performer either at first sight or, more usually, over an extended timescale involving rehearsal and actual performance, in a durative and recursive process. The performance “program” is never entirely fixed, although (as we will see) it may remain largely stable over time and, in some respects, possibly across different performers’ conceptions.

The means by which music takes shape from the score22 involves what pianist Alfred Brendel (1976c, 25) terms a “translation” of the composer’s intentions “into one’s own understanding . . . with the help of one’s own engaged emotions, one’s own senses, one’s own intellect, one’s own refined ears.” In his

22 The score has been variously described as a recipe, rough outline, template, blueprint, roadmap, and (as noted earlier) script. See, for example, Clarke (2002b); Cook (2001); Howat (1995).
view, a key priority of practice is “the task of clarifying, purifying, fortifying and restoring musical continuity” (1976a, 124)—the accent on continuity chiming both with Godlovitch’s (1988, 34) reference to the “spatiotemporal continuity” on which the cohesion of a performance depends, and with Newcomb’s “modes of continuation.”

That continuity partly explains why I refer to the performer’s program as being “narrative” in nature. A second reason relates to the deliberate construction by some performers of more traditionally conceived “narratives, tableaux and programmes for the works they play,” as noted by Rothstein (1995, 238). Such literal prompts are of only passing interest in one sense, but the comments of two performers along these lines do offer more general insight into performance conception and into the musical narrative under discussion here. Brendel’s essay “Form and Psychology in Beethoven’s Piano Sonatas” intriguingly claims that in one movement, “the psychological process establishes the form . . . but the form itself is also cast in such a way that one can deduce from it the psychological process” ([1971] 1976, 50). Though never defined, the process in question takes on more specific meaning in Brendel’s “narrativised,” diachronic description of the music, which presumably conveys verbally the basis of his performances thereof. Similarly, one of the first priorities of concert pianist Murray Perahia in learning a piece is to discern a “unifying” image or framework “so that the whole thing is either telling some kind of story, even if the story is only with tones, or [so that] those tones can somehow metaphorically transform themselves into some kind of story that one can make sense of, so that the whole piece can be seen as one, so that one isn’t only working on details, . . . so [that] one has the whole picture before one begins” (quoted in Rink 2001a, 12, reproduced with additional original text). Close study then follows, contextualised within the broad framework, as in one movement of a sonata by Chopin where Perahia found the essence of the music’s meaning—at least as conveyed in his performance—within an inner voice, which professed an overriding “sadness” and “disappointment of not being able to go higher” to its implicit goal (quoted in ibid., 12). For Perahia, “it is important to try to sketch what’s happening—the drama of the tones—into a kind of metaphorical drama, so that it speaks to you on as many levels as possible, not just the musical level” (quoted in ibid., 15).

These comments reveal one aspect of what I am referring to as the performer’s “narrative program”—a “drama of the tones,” which might be consciously played out in the performer’s mind to the point that it “becomes” the music and possibly even subsumes the identity of the performer (see Rink 2017). But coupled with this assignment of function to individual musical elements and their shaping in an overarching “plot” (however defined) is the structuring of the mental model behind the musical continuity so essential to performance and to any narrative conception. To understand this requires reference to

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23 For further discussion of Brendel’s notion of “psychology,” see Rink (2017).
24 Perahia also tries to capture “the general harmonic shape” at the beginning, as well as the basic phrase structure.
The Work of the Performer

the literature on cognitive representation and how performers map musical thought to musical action (see Palmer 1989). It must be stressed, however, that psychologists themselves cannot fully explain that process. Indeed, the fundamental point of this discussion is that performance conception—and more specifically any “narrative program” underlying performance—has multiple dimensions and must be explained accordingly.

I have cited Bruner’s view of narrative as a form of representing and constituting reality, and certain “cognitive structures” relevant to performance follow from this. Defining a “cognitive structure” as a “nonspecific but organised representation of prior experience,” Ulric Neisser (1967, 286, 287) states in his classic study of cognitive psychology, “When we first perceive or imagine something, the process of construction is not limited to the object itself. We generally build (or rebuild) a spatial, temporal, and conceptual framework as well... The preattentive processes delineate units, provide partial cues, and control simple responses; focal attention builds complexly structured objects or movements, one at a time, on the basis thus provided; [and] the background processes build and maintain schemata to which these objects are referred.” According to Neisser (ibid., 287), this multi-level “process of construction leaves traces behind. The schemata themselves are such constructions, elaborated at every moment in the course of attentive activity. Recall is organized in terms of these structures because the original experiences were elaborated in the same terms.”

Musical performance is of course highly demanding of both mental and physical skills, but it depends at least in part on the basic mechanisms just described, even if one would need to go much further to explain it as a creative practice. Following on from Neisser, Caroline Palmer (1997, 116) writes that “During a performance, musical structures and units are retrieved from memory according to the performer’s conceptual interpretation, and are then prepared for production and transformed into appropriate movements.” Discussion of the motor aspect will follow below; first, let us consider how musical memory is constituted, the so-called executive process, the hierarchical structure of performance programs, and the relation thereof to musical expression. Recall in performance—whether fully memorised or not—depends on auditory, visual, conceptual, and kinaesthetic memory (see Williamon 2002). Together these different types of memory enable performers to execute complicated sequences at high speed and typically without directing conscious attention to their constituent parts. The process involves both sequential and parallel (or multiple) processing, respectively handling “one thing at a time” and many functions either “simultaneously, or at least independently” (Neisser 1967, 297). Neisser (ibid., 299) notes the need for a “conception of the mind which allows for multiple activity at some levels, but also has a place for an executive process.” Neither “serves simply as a retrieval system,” given that each is “essentially constructive in nature, making use of stored information to build something new.”

All of this supports my claim that the performer’s “programming” entails both multi-level awareness—that is, multiple processing—and some sort of
control over the flow of events. It also helps explain why, or how, performances and thus “the music itself” vary from occasion to occasion, thanks in part to each performance’s unique actualisation of an underlying conceptual framework (which itself can be highly dynamic). That is true of any narrative act, as is the existence of some sort of hierarchical structure in the first place. Discussing solo piano performance from memory, Eric Clarke (1988, 3) writes: “Though something of an idealization, we can imagine a performer who, at the start of a performance, has a complete knowledge of the generative structure of the piece, from the very highest level, where the whole piece is represented as a unity, down to the lowest level, . . . where each . . . note is represented.” Clarke illustrates this hypothetical structure as a conventional tree diagram, only part of which is likely to be “active at any time” (ibid., 4). Although the essentially static nature of Clarke’s diagram and especially the fixed point at the top fail to capture the essential process of performance (even at the most remote conceptual level, which in principle should encapsulate the performed music’s shape, its “arch of tension,” as heuristically represented in my intensity curve, discussed earlier), his depiction alludes to important and intriguing parallels between the actualisation of a performance conception and the “improvisatory” composing-out described by Heinrich Schenker, whose theory represents music—in Tarasti’s words (1994, 24)—as “a totality created by a structure wherein all events relate to a basic model and the tension it provides,” which “corresponds well to the syntagmatic demand of narrativity.”

That demand is also met through the agency of performance expression, notably performers’ apparent use of what Palmer (1997, 125) calls “a syntax or formal set of rules to generate expression,” by means of which “systematic patterns of expression result from transformations of the performer’s internal representation of musical structure.” For example, Clarke (2002b, 61) writes that “the stability (or otherwise) of . . . higher-level tempo shape can . . . be directly attributed to the stability of the performer’s representation of the music,” particularly with regard to phrase structure. Bruno Repp (1992) discovered significant agreement between the timing profiles of twenty-eight performers’ renditions of a given piece, all of which, according to Clarke (2002b, 65), “were organised around the phrase structure,” with an “increasing diversity between the performers [occurring] at more superficial levels of expression.” The fact that “subsequent studies by Repp with even larger samples (over 100 performances of the same music) have confirmed these conclusions” (ibid.) suggests the existence of generally perceived paradigms (or “archetypes”) derived from phrase structures that are individualised on each performance occasion. This

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25 The proposition that “each note is represented” does not imply a conscious focus on each and every one by the performer as the music is played or sung. On the contrary, the consciousness of the performer necessarily operates at a higher level, in part to reduce a cognitive load that otherwise would be too great to allow operational fluency.

26 The time-dependency of a performance’s “fundamental structure” is implicit in my intensity curve and also in the “theory of performance” espoused by Rachmaninoff, which I discuss later.

27 See for example the rule systems devised by Johan Sundberg and Neil Todd (cited in Clarke 2002b).

28 For discussion, see Buck, MacRitchie, and Bailey (2013); compare however Rink (2013) and Cook (2013, esp. chap. 6).
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lends some credence to claims that music’s meaning derives from structure, even if that is by no means the full story. (For further discussion, see Rink 2013, 2015.)

The final matter for consideration here concerns the physical aspect of performance, specifically motor programming. Palmer (1989) defines this as “the memory representation for the organization (prior to execution) of a sequence of commands to the performing muscles” (332) operating at hierarchical “levels of conscious and unconscious control,” respectively comprising “conscious intentions influenced by cognitive and emotional” factors and, at lower representational levels, “automated procedures” (345). Jeff Pressing (1988, 131) observes that motor programs take shape through the combination of “specific single movements . . . into sequences, and ultimately into various subroutines that make up goal-directed action[s].” [These] are then organized and initiated by an executive,” which various authors have explained in terms of motor schemata, frames, scripts, and action plans (see, e.g., Shaffer 1981). Expert performers have access to a vast repertoire of “finely timed and tuneable” motor programs (Pressing 1988, 139) learnt over many years, which are “susceptible to tuning (adjustment) on the basis of feedback” (133) in the heat of performance.

The hierarchical nature of such programs, the existence of archetypes (even if personal ones), and their flexible and spontaneous realisation in performance all resonate with the definitions of “narrative” advanced earlier. Furthermore, the individual “gestures” that make up these programs—gesture in the literal sense of physical motion and in terms of the sonorous shapes that result—potentially have a functional role as bearers of semantic content, as “units of code” within the unfolding narrative (for discussion see Robb 2015). The need to recognise physical movement as an integral part of any performance conception and enactment is one more reason why we must look beyond the score to understand both musical meaning in general and musical narrativity more specifically. In my view, we cannot properly define music’s narrative character or indeed understand music in general and its effect on us unless the actions of the performer are fully taken into account.

**Work in progress**

Some years ago (Rink 2001b), I suggested that the combination of words and music in what I have since called “talk-and-play” events offers a highly effective means of surmounting the obstacles to communication that I identified earlier in this essay. In my experience, greater insight tends to be generated through that combination than by means of either performance or verbal commentary alone. Although more traditional modes of presentation will continue to have their place, the pursuit of alternative formats like those I am describing could significantly enhance the prevailing understanding of musical performance, however recondite the latter remains. 29 Unfortunately, because the medium of

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29 Hence the programme of “talk-and-play” events initiated in 2009 by the AHRC Research Centre for Musical Performance as Creative Practice.
performance is unavailable in the context of this essay, we must rely on words alone to try to capture (however imperfectly) aspects of the performer’s work in performing a given musical work. The ensuing case study is incomplete in that sense, yet it draws together the threads of the previous discussion while yielding some unforeseen conclusions.

Imagine that I have just played the case-study piece in the context of a “talk-and-play” event of some kind (for example, a lecture-recital, an “illustrated talk,” a workshop, or an informal concert featuring verbal interaction between performer and audience). Let us assume that the performance was of a professional calibre both expressively and technically. The piece in question was Rachmaninoff’s Prelude in G♭ major, op. 23, no. 10, composed in 1903, the score of which appears in figure 4.3. Depending on the context, on my aims for the session, and on my sense of both the general mood and what felt suitable for the occasion, I might embark on an exercise borrowed from my analysis teaching, asking either the audience as a whole or individual listeners what they heard in the music, by which I mean the music as performed. There is every likelihood that the responses on offer would diverge from each other as much as from my own, given the vexed nature of “communication” as entailed in and through performance (as observed previously). Nevertheless, this sort of consciousness-raising would be enlightening not only in itself but in challenging any casual assumptions about unanimity across disparate listeners. What might then follow is my own description of the music as I conceive, feel, and seek to project it, using words and possibly images to get across what my performance alone could not.

Geoffrey Norris (2001, 715) refers to some of Rachmaninoff’s preludes as “small tone poems” noteworthy for their “vivid portraiture,” and this prelude exploits an introspective, contemplative mode of expression also found in the Second Piano Concerto, to which it is sometimes thematically compared. A quick glance at the score in figure 4.3 might lead one to conclude that the music is technically straightforward at least until the rhapsodic outpouring in bars 49–52, when the writing becomes more complicated. It might surprise my audience to hear that, at least for me, learning the piece was by no means straightforward. The left- and right-hand parts are inverted, with the melody often in the bass and the accompaniment in the treble, and though this is hardly of earth-shattering difficulty, it involves a delicate balancing act complicated by the manifold contrapuntal tendencies within the accompaniment. That is certainly true in bars 11–18, where the left hand leads and a right-hand obbligato follows in canon, with a variegated middle texture also vying for the ear’s attention. Similarly, a great deal of activity takes place in bars 35–42, though this passage seems like child’s play compared with the almost orchestral effusion seconds later in the rhapsody. In learning the piece, I was not helped by the lack of pedal markings, given the subtle intricacies of voicing and connection that

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30 Without wishing to seem immodest, I should observe that alongside my work as a musicologist I regularly perform professionally, having received the Premier Prix and the Concert Recital Diploma in piano from the Guildhall School of Music & Drama in 1981.
come to a head in the fascinating build-up from bar 19 to the climax around bars 29–31, where the pianist’s hands continually interlock and awkwardly but tellingly compete within the same space and for the same notes. The pedalling must be highly refined elsewhere as well so that contrapuntal textures are not obscured or evocative dissonances resolved too quickly.

I gradually came to imagine, hear, and embody this deceptively complex music in a form different from the published score. I now regret that I did not follow my habitual advice to students (whether performers or not) to log their evolving impressions in a diary as they get to know a piece; nevertheless, it is possible to reconstruct the process by which I grew more familiar with this music. Early on I was aware of a fundamental thematic idea: the falling iambic figure announced in the bass at the beginning. This continually crops up in various intervallic guises and at different registral levels, demonstrating Rachmaninoff’s technique of building his preludes “from tiny melodic or rhythmic fragments” (Norris 2001, 715). I also revelled from the start in the ingenious counterpoint, the rhythmic play during the approach to the climax, the rich timbres made palpable by all the black notes, and the lushness of attack invited throughout, especially in the chordal figurations. But only later did everything coalesce into a sense of the music’s “shape”—a property difficult to define but essential to, or at least characteristic of, coherent performance, as I have argued over the years.31

Rachmaninoff seems to have held a similar view. Professing what Norris ([1976] 2001, 78) calls a “theory of performance centred on the idea that every piece has a culminating ‘point,’” Rachmaninoff himself declared: “This culmination, depending on the actual piece, may be at the end or in the middle, it may be loud or soft; but the performer must know how to approach it with absolute calculation, absolute precision, because if it slips by, then the whole construction crumbles, the piece becomes disjointed and scrappy and does not convey to the listener what must be conveyed” (quoted in ibid.).32

This extraordinary manifesto leads one to question where the “culminating point” might be in the musical “narrative” of this prelude, and how to approach and then move beyond it. Such were the complexities of the score that I had to engage in analysis away from the piano, rather than rely on my ear alone, in order to develop a feel for the music’s shape and thus meet the challenge set by Rachmaninoff—as well as to memorise the music, for only when it was learnt by heart could I really begin to hear it. The analysis involved teasing out the manifold contrapuntal implications by constructing a new score (discussed below) which explicitly showed the various textures. I also devised a profile of contrapuntal texture (see figure 4.4) to trace the progression from two active parts or strands at the opening through three in bars 11–18, one in bars 19–34, four then three then four in bars 35–56, and back to two in the coda (bars 56–62), with a brief contraction to one just before the end. This diagram reveals an innate textural rhythm, a process of expansion and contraction that is embedded in the music while also impinging on, indeed shaping, the music as performed. It is the basis of the performance’s physiognomy as well as its breathing.

31 See, for example, Rink (1990, 2002a); see too the essays in Leech-Wilkinson and Prior (2017).
32 This passage is also discussed by Cook (1999, 2013) and Dansby (2002).
Figure 4.4 shows my reworked score, which preserves everything in Rachmaninoff’s original apart from its standard layout on two staves. In a sense, it is more a reconfiguration than an analysis, yet it has analytical import as well as constituting a performing edition of sorts. Bars 1–10 conform to the published score, while at bar 11 the canonic obligato enters in an additional upper system—an altogether new voice in sometimes strained dialogue with the ongoing left-hand melody, even as the accompaniment continues (by no means neutrally) in the middle. At bar 19, the music contracts to a single system: strictly speaking, there are two parts here, not one (as shown in figure 4.4), but the two are so physically proximate as almost to be conjoined. Four parts come into play in bars 35–46: from bottom to top, the left-hand melody from the opening; the ascending line also from the beginning; offbeat chords recalling similar ones earlier; and a different, largely conjunct obligato coupled to the intervallically jagged bass melody. After a new peak of emotional intensity in bars 41–42, the music briefly winds down, reverting to three strands in bars 47–48 in a reminiscence of the first two bars. The rhapsody then ushers forth in four voices, with a version of the melody sounding in the top part (as if played by first violins and high woodwinds?), a countermelody in system 2 (second violins and violas?), “touched-in” accompanimental chords (winds?), and surging left-hand triplets. Although somewhat pared down after bar 52, the same arrangement prevails in a three-part texture extending to the coda in bar 56, whereupon two parts balance out the opening even as the brief return to a single, fused part in bars 59–61 recalls the climactic passage from before.

I found the exercise of redrawing the score instructive—as it can be in general for performers (see Rink 2002a)—and I even started practising from this “edition” apart from the rhapsody, which I could not hear and did not wish to look at in this literal, worked-out form, given the considerable technical challenge of playing so many parts at once with just two hands (especially the right hand: note the brace) rather than full orchestra, and also the fact that much of what appears here is virtual, only implied in the sounding music. Throughout this passage, my “ear” hovered in control within the background as I focused.

33 I noticed the connection with the introduction at a late stage in learning the piece, such is the richness of the writing here.
Figure 4.5. Rachmaninoff, Prelude op. 23, no. 10: reworked score, based on first edition (see figure 4.3).
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* RH part rolled

** lower note in octave treated as triplet quaver - hence, 'delayed'
more deliberately on getting the notes out, not only accurately but with sufficient dynamic and timbral finesse to effect the “right” linear connections—and within an overall piano. It is possible to hear the rich textural intricacy by playing the passage without pedal, which masks the gaps between individual attacks.

Referring again to the reworked score, note the physical properties of bars 11–18, which constitute the first three-voice passage. For instance, in bars 13 and 17 the two hands share an accompaniment which needs to sound seamless (hence my additional articulation markings), while in bars 12 and 16 the upper note of the arpeggiated bass is impossible to play with the left hand except on a fairly unresonant piano, as the pedal has to catch the anticipatory lower note so “early,” though played with the right hand the upper note might lack linear connection within the melody. Hence the question mark above the G♭ in bar 16—a
As for the build-up to the climax, not only is this difficult by virtue of the pedalling and the cumbersome yet meaningful interlocking of the hands, but bars 27 and 28 present unforeseen rhythmic complexities just as the physical juxtapositions become most vexed. The implied hemiola has been foregrounded in the reworked score by recalibrating the metre as $1/4 + 2/4$ in bar 27, then $2/4 + 1/4$ in bar 28, with the return to $3/4$ reinforcing bar 29’s fortissimo. Here, at the point of climax, one must employ immensely careful fingerwork and subtle pedalling to release and then reapply the G♭s at the end of bar 29 (first melodic, then accompanimental), as well as the A♭s in the middle of bar 30 (first accompanimental, then melodic). Using Rachmaninoff’s terminology, this is the prelude’s point of “culmination”—or rather, a first point of culmination, as a second one occurs in the rhapsody. The passage that follows is intensely felt, as if to celebrate the hands’ hard-won but ecstatic union.

Earlier I cited Rothstein’s comments about the “narratives, tableaux and programmes” that performers sometimes construct for the works they play. Perhaps my references here to ecstasy, celebration, and rhapsody have suggested the existence of such a programme on my part, likewise my allusion to the counterbalancing tensions that I sense in the dialogue between the main voices. But there is no need to relate the exact story that I have in mind if indeed there is one. Instead, I will avow that my overall conception was determined in large part by the way the music physically feels and, as a result, sounds—in other words, by the positioning and interaction of the two hands as they make their way from start to finish. Physicality and texture in the broadest sense are one of the keys to musical meaning here, as the prelude moves towards and recedes from the “culminating point” of which Rachmaninoff spoke—texture as seen in the contrapuntal profile and reworked score, texture as literally embodied through the performer, texture as heard and felt. What I have attempted in the foregoing analysis is to identify this physical embodiment as the basis of the “musical narrative” underlying my performance, to describe how it takes shape over time, and to highlight its relation to and—during the actual performance—its identity with the musical work itself. (For further discussion, see Rink 2017.)

By way of conclusion, I will mention the recording that Rachmaninoff made of the prelude in March 1940—a recording that I heard for the first time long after learning the piece.34 I subsequently chose not to allow his interpretation to influence mine to any significant extent (though the rapidity of his tempo proved to be liberating). However inspired it might be, his rendition is of course not “the work,” that is, a version that I or anyone else must revere and strive to resurrect as a matter of course. In the light of musicology’s dictates over past generations, it would seem ironic, if not perverse, to claim that the

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34 According to Martyn (1990, 489), Rachmaninoff recorded op. 23 no. 10 in New York Studio No. 2 on 18 March 1940. The recording was originally issued by Victor (V 2124) and HMV (DA 1772) and is currently available on Magic Talent CD 48074 (duration 3'16"), as well as on YouTube.
John Rink

work of the performer must surely be not to reproduce the music, but rather to create it as if from scratch. Yet that is precisely what I would be doing were I to perform it again now.

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John Rink


In the beginning was the sound. What a sound is like depends on its source and on the space it has to fill.

The Evangelist St John my patron was,
Three gloomy courts are his; and in the first
Was my abiding-place, a nook obscure!
Right underneath, the College kitchens made
A humming sound, less tuneable than bees,
But hardly less industrious; with shrill notes
Of sharp command and scolding intermixed.
Near me was Trinity’s loquacious Clock,
Who never let the Quarters, night or day,
Slip by him unproclaimed, and told the hours
Twice over with a male and female voice.
Her pealing organ was my neighbour too.1

In these verses from The Prelude, book III, William Wordsworth described his undergraduate residence of the 1780s at St John’s College, Cambridge. Sounds, notes, voices: his room became a musical chamber—of sorts, certainly. By 1947 it was no longer an obscure nook; it was enlarged, and, thanks to Wordsworth’s autobiographical poem, had become famous. On an early spring day of that year, Ludwig Wittgenstein, who had been elected professor of philosophy in 1939, met in that same room with his acquaintances Elisabeth Lutyens, a modernist composer, Myra Hess, an acclaimed pianist, and Rae Woodland, a young singer.2 In the middle of the room stood a Blüthner grand piano from the 1880s. Myra Hess had just finished playing the C-major prelude from book I of Bach’s Well-Tempered Piano.

ELISABETH LUTYENS: The way you play this is a marvel.
MYRA HESS: And yet it is only “before play”—a prelude. Real play, for Bach, would only start with the fugue.
EL: It would, had he been keen on language. And had he been keen on language, he might have become a preacher rather than a musician.
MH: Which, I must admit, would have been a shame.
EL: It would. What is a “prelude”? It’s a word. And what’s a word? Air. Air, that better serves us in an organ playing a prelude by Bach than in a mouth telling us what music really is—its essence.

LUDWIG WITTEGENSTEIN: My heart sinks when I hear the words “real” or “essence”; it doubly sinks when both come up in the same sentence.
RAE WOODLAND: What can we do to lift your heart?
LW: Russell told me there is, in this very room, an English-style humidor of mahogany inlaid with ivory that contains Havana cigars.
MH: One of so many St John’s myths. They have had nearly 450 years to pile up. At least there is now more grandeur to the room than in Wordsworth’s days. Can we do something else for you?
LW: Perhaps—play . . .
EL: I am rather good at chess. Should I get . . .
RW: You are not going to get away with this. Ludwig plays his own games—with words. He is rather good at them.
LW: I am rather bad at them, but otherwise Rae is right. It will have to be a game that will rid Miss Lutyens of “real” and “essence.”
EL: Is there such a game?
RW: I warned you. He calls it philosophy.
EL: Has that ever been a game? It does not seem to share much with what we call games otherwise.
LW: Consider what we call games (in a mocking tone) “otherwise.” I mean board games, card games, ball games, Olympic games, and so on. Is there something common to them all?
EL: There must be something common, or they would not all be called “games.”
Music as Play

LW: What, then, is this “something”?
MH: They are all amusing, aren’t they?
EL: I would not say that of the game he is playing with us now. It feels more like an interrogation.
LW: And you would be right. On the same count, also compare chess with noughts and crosses.
MH: There is always winning and losing, or competition between players, isn’t there?
LW: Think of patience. In ball games, there is winning and losing; but when a girl throws her ball at the wall and catches it again, this feature has disappeared.
MH: There is always skill. I certainly need some for playing Bach.
LW: Look at the parts played by skill and luck, and at the difference between skill in chess and skill in tennis. Look now at games like ring-a-ring o’ roses; here is the element of amusement, but how many other characteristic features have disappeared! And we can go through all the other groups of games in the same way. Similarities crop up and disappear.
EL: So there is no such thing as a “game”?
LW: It turns out not to be a thing defined by an essential feature. Instead, we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail.
EL: But if there is no common core to the concept of a game, then it will be open to everything and thus arbitrary. Anything could enter it and claim to be a game, as your philosophy already has done. How is the notion of a game bounded? What still counts as a game and what no longer does? Can you identify the boundaries?
LW: No.
EL: So you don’t know the boundaries of the concept?
LW: This is not ignorance. We do not know the boundaries because none have been drawn. We can draw boundaries, but for a special purpose. Does it need that to make the concept usable? Not at all! Except for that special purpose. But you look absent-minded. Wherever have your thoughts wandered off to?
EL: They are still here, contemplating Wordsworth’s lines, from The Prelude: “that false secondary power, by which / In weakness we create distinctions, then / Deem that our puny boundaries are things / Which we perceive, and not which we have made.”
LW: He would not do it for less than that, would he? “False power”! He wrenches high drama out of it. I wonder whether too much went on in the kitchen beneath when Wordsworth jotted this down.
EL: You don’t mind the lack of boundaries?
LW: It never troubled you before when you used the word “game.”
EL: I had not met you then—that’s why it did not vex me.
LW: Meeting a philosopher has often been a curse.

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EL: That is part of the game you call philosophy, I guess.
LW: You will see that the curse proves to be a blessing after a while—a therapy.
EL: Am I ill? Is such a serious state an occasion for playing?
LW: Do not think play has to be fun. Bach knew one or two things about that.
Do not think, I say, look!
RW: “Of sharp command and scolding intermixed.”
EL: If your philosophical game speaks in an imperative tone, I shall not
doubt for a moment that playing can sometimes be utterly serious.
LW: Though I would have given you the benefit of the doubt.
MH: Pff. If both Bach and Wittgenstein teach us how serious play can be, I
prefer to take my lesson from the former. In twenty-four keys.
LW: Unlike other philosophers I at least have more keys than just one.
Perhaps they do not add up to twenty-four . . .
EL: Keyless, clueless, stuck with my problem. On your account, Herr
Wittgenstein, the use of the word “game” is unregulated.
RW: Why should that bother you, as an Englishwoman?
EL: It should bother him, as a German.
RW (stepping deliberately on EL’s foot): Ssshhh. He’s from Vienna.
MH: That might explain something.
LW: Philosophers can never be explained.
EL: But they can explain certain things, can’t they? And there is still that
thing I wish to be explained. How can the word “game” perform its job,
if the “game” we play with it is unregulated?
LW: It is not everywhere circumscribed by rules. There are no rules about
how high one throws the ball in tennis, or how hard; yet tennis is a game
for all that, and has rules too. One might say that the concept “game” is
a concept with blurred edges.
EL: I am at a loss. Is a blurred concept a concept at all?
LW: Isn’t an indistinct photograph a picture of a person, too? Is it even always
an advantage to replace an indistinct picture with a sharp one? Isn’t the
indistinct one often exactly what we need?
EL: I am now getting relieved that you work as a philosopher rather than as
a passport photographer. Not all arts have reached their impressionistic
period at the same time. But stay with me; how, on your account, should
we explain to someone what a game is?
LW: I imagine that we should describe games to her, and we might add: “This
and similar things are called ‘games.’” And do we know any more about
it ourselves? Is it only other people whom we cannot tell exactly what a
game is?
RW: Or a game for a particular situation?
LW: Imagine someone says to me, “Show the children a game.” I teach them
gaming for money with dice, and the other person says, “I didn’t mean
that sort of game.” Must the exclusion of the game with dice have come
before his mind when he gave me the order?
RW: It would not, since he would have taken so much for granted—to the extent of not even thinking of it.

MH: If the question is over not just what a game is, but rather what is an appropriate game and for whom, then matters, it seems to me, are settled within a way of life. Life happens against some backdrop to which we constantly refer. Other ways of life can be imagined in which, for example, boys were trained to kill enemies and to see that as a sort of adventure game.

EL: They cannot just be imagined. They were real a few years ago—that sort of adventure game in the infamous Hitler Youth. Hence I was worried about “game” being an open concept that any practice could appropriate.

LW: Concepts are not there to teach us morals. They are in place for the good and the wicked alike. Or rather, the good and the wicked put them in their place.

RW: I am glad we are the good ones.

MH: Good, that is, at playing music.

RW: I do not play it.

MH: Why not?

RW: For one thing, because some of it just isn’t play.

EL: Professor Wittgenstein will find a beastly “essence” in what you say there. Nothing is just what it is. The meaning of something is its use.

RW: There is use and there is abuse. Yesterday I sang in Beethoven’s Missa solemnis at King’s. I did not understand all of it—but that much I understood: It would not have come about without the ambition to be more than mere play. Beethoven’s setting of the Mass is itself a religious profession. It makes the actual church rite superfluous. *(Hums Dona nobis pacem from the Missa solemnis, op. 123.)*

EL: That’s good for someone. At least.

MH: If we have learnt anything from Ludwig—

RW: Which Ludwig?

MH: Wittgenstein. If we have learnt anything from him so far—who, I beg, could resist his teachings?—and if, at the same time, we wish to keep up such a spirited conversation, then we shouldn’t ask now: Is all music play?

RW: What question do you suggest instead?
MH: We often say that music is play or that music is played—this may already imply a difference. What do we mean by it? Do we mean by it one thing or many?

EL: Where Wittgenstein is concerned, always many.

LW: And is that such a bad thing? “I will teach you differences.”

RW: *King Lear*, Act 1, Scene 4. Kent speaks these words. At the end of the play, when Lear is grieving over Cordelia, Kent tries to explain how he had followed him faithfully all the time. Lear does not listen.5

LW: See in him what happens to those who ignore teachers of differences.

RW: After the king dies, Albany offers the rule of the kingdom to Kent. Kent refuses, hinting that he is going to follow Lear into death.6 See what happens to teachers of differences.

LW: Depending on the audience. You are not like Lear, are you? There is something musically wrong with him, after all.

EL: “O you kind gods / Cure this great breach in his abused nature; / The untuned and hurrying senses O wind up / Of this child-changed father!”7 Cordelia’s words.

RW: Being in tune with the teacher, I trust I have learnt some differences. We sometimes say that people play because we deem their performance entertaining or find it structured towards winning and losing or based on competition or requiring skill or springing from luck.

LW: Praise your memory! But do not think the list is complete. None of the features you recorded will be present in all games, and they will be present in a host of things that are not games.

RW: I will recollect that, too.

MH: And still, with such variety at hand, you say you do not play music, Rae?

RW: Have you never noticed that we call those who perform on musical instruments players, but that this is never said about singers?

MH: Why is that, I wonder.

RW: We say that somebody plays with something, say, a child with building blocks. An instrument seems to fit this schema, but not a voice: for the singer is her voice.

MH: You know that I am rather fond of jazz. I found my way into it through that Californian family, the Brubecks, whom I got to know in London. Last night I went to that odd Scottish jazz club on Bishopsgate, Boisdale. An American singer performed there, Ella Fitzgerald, of stupendous diction, phrasing, and intonation, as well as a tenor saxophone player with large, but light, warm and silky tone, a rhapsodist on his instrument, Paul Gonsalves. I call him a player, not her; that’s the way we talk. Yet my musical instincts went against it, and still go now. In their musical dialogue, Fitzgerald played around with its elements, whether pitch or rhythm, just as much as Gonsalves did. She also played with her voice. And, finally, I would even say, bewildered: she played her voice.

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5 Ibid., 941.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid., 936.
Music as Play

RW: Which of the features from Ludwig's list makes you think so?
MH: Skill perhaps. It was so remarkable on both Fitzgerald's and Gonsalves's parts.
RW: Remember, we listened together last week on the BBC to Kathleen Ferrier singing the Alto Rhapsody by Brahms. Outstanding skill on her part, wouldn't you say?
MH: I would. Some of that skill was very different from Fitzgerald's, though not all of it.
RW: But you would never say that Ferrier played the Alto Rhapsody, would you?
MH: I wouldn't, indeed.
RW: I know what you mean by playing with one's voice and even playing one's voice. But the voice is in its own precisely when it is not being played with. That's why Ferrier is so moving. That's also why I do not even aspire to playing my voice.
EL: Sour grapes? And, by the way, I never try to be moving in music. For moving, we have public transport now.
RW: Sour grapes?
MH: Stalemate. I suggest we have the last three bottles of Weingut Dönnhoff Roxheimer Höllenpfad Riesling Kabinett 1921 at St John's—from grapes that were not sour. 82° Oechsle. (She opens the first bottle and pours the others, then herself, a glass.)
LW: You are doing your best to turn the interrogation into a proper symposium.
EL: As long as you are rather silent, that is not very difficult. Even the wine would hardly have been needed, much as I welcome it.
LW: Silence is Cordelia's virtue, though it isn't until a long way into the play that one discovers that.
EL: What is virtue in Cordelia could be fatigue in you. And, anyway, it would not be much healthier than Kent's teaching of differences.
MH: Good health, then. (They all clink their glasses and drink.)
RW: Do you believe, Myra, it is healthy to turn something into what it is not—a voice into an instrument?
MH: Transfiguration may be a sign of strength. Fitzgerald can do a lot of things with her voice that Gonsalves can do with his instrument, whereas unskilled voices master very few things that saxophones, played competently, achieve. Even some differently though highly skilled voices may not at all match the peculiar achievements of saxophones.
RW: Instruments do not use words. For consistency, you should give up on words if you wish to turn your voice into an instrument.
MH: Fitzgerald did, much of the time. It is called scat singing, I have been told. She articulates syllables and combinations of syllables like (sings) "di yu di dee doohdun di di oohnbee" that do not constitute words.
LW: That reminds me of one of the streaks criss-crossing within the game network. Those syllables lack reference and meaning. Sometimes games seem to make up a world of their own. When playing chess, in moving
around the two bishops, we do not need to understand the authority bishops hold in church hierarchies. What we must understand are the rules internal to the game: the bishop is limited to diagonal movement.

EL: A world of its own. That’s what music should be like, rather than moving hearts.

MH: At a few points, Fitzgerald inserted word shreds into the sequence of the syllables, such as, “That was Paul Gonsalves playing.” These, then, referred to the actual situation. They also referred to the music itself, not to anything beyond it. It appeared spontaneous, and most probably was. Spontaneity plays a role in some games, doesn’t it?

RW: Think of Ludwig’s list. Spontaneity can link the otherwise opposed streaks of skill and luck. Playing the lottery or throwing dice requires a lot of luck but very little skill; with chess or tennis it is the other way round—though again the skills required differ sharply.

MH: Quite so. Playing the lottery or throwing dice are “games of chance.” Their outcome is shaped by some randomising device. They seem spontaneous, in one sense of the word, in so far as they are unpredictable. In games of skill, by way of contrast, spontaneity takes the character of quick-wittedness. That’s what I relished in Fitzgerald’s and Golsalves’s performances.

EL: How much exercise will have been needed to arrive at such spontaneity! Bless the philosopher-cum-amateur-clarinet-player . . .

LW: -cum-whistler . . .

EL: . . . -cum-whistler who has never gone through such an ordeal. I often feel the tension between the enormous discipline professional music-making requires and the play element in music. It can tear you apart.

RW: But discipline has never been incompatible with all kinds of play and games. And it has been a precondition for some of them.

MH: At the bottom of Fitzgerald’s and Gonsalves’s quick-wittedness must be years of exercising their musical wit. The performance I listened to grew from a practice bound by the ever same “jazz standards” but it had the unpredictability of a singular improvisation.

RW: I take your point. That improvisatory quality is by no means due to “chance” and can be due to “luck” only in the remote sense of a fortunate encounter of two congenial performers.

EL: I trust we never call music “play” from a reference to “games of chance.” Even if the composer were to throw dice to determine pitch, or the performers did so right before they play, the audience would receive the result very much like a finished composition.

MH: As the Höllenpfad brings us closer together, Rae, I wonder whether there ever has been such a rift between us two—me the player, you the singer.

RW: What do you mean?

MH: Think of winning and losing. It will be the same for both of us. Whether it is a piano recital or an aria recital, the audience wants us to succeed. For that gives them the feeling they have spent their money well. They
also want us to fail. For that gives them something to gossip about. Concert life—it’s not unlike those sports games that people watch. What matters is presence: the performance of the actual moment. For both of us, audience suspense will set up one and the same game. And rarely a fair one at that.

RW: I know what you mean. But that’s just the social setting for our art. Now it is placed in that ambience; it could be placed elsewhere. The setting does not touch the art itself.

EL: Dream on.

RW: “I was the Dreamer, they the Dream.”

MH: Wordsworth forever. Send him down to the kitchen where they prepare his cornflakes. There is another matter that definitely touches the art itself. It has to do with the history of European music. Instrumental and vocal music, at least since the seventeenth century, have each instilled features of their own in the other. On the one hand, it has been demanded of instrumentalists that they “sing” on their instruments—even we pianists whose instruments, based on hammers, do not seem to be made for that purpose in the first place.

RW: Poor percussionists that you are . . .

MH: Well—the demand to sing on the instrument can seem to be a restriction, rather than an expansion; a restriction, though, that has led to delightful results.

EL: Yes, and the piano is better at it than the harpsichord. Let us have more of your Bach. And Scarlatti. And Mozart. And Chopin.

RW: To move your heart, at last?

EL: To make it stand still, for moments.

RW: That issue is not that pressing right now. I urge you to tell me of the other hand, Myra, as it concerns me.

MH: On the other hand, singers have been asked to develop their organ so that it is capable of all the figures instrumentalists can muster—clearly an expansion rather than a restriction. It produced, among other ravishing results, the florid aria di bravura.

RW: I am glad we singers do not have to imitate pianos.

MH: Positively. You would never have reached that standard. Either wind instruments or string instruments set the yardstick of virtuosic play with the voice.

RW: As a soprano, here I feel at home. Rossini has the mezzo-soprano revel in coloratura, too. But poor Kathleen and the other altos—it’s a world closed to them. When wind instruments, string instruments, and voice are directly set against each other, in the aria concertata, we attend a game that corresponds to another one of Ludwig’s streaks: competition.

EL: Don’t we have enough of that outside art? That’s hard enough to bear.

RW: It will be all the more welcome in art. We want a safe show of competition sometimes, to be viewed from the outside. The performing artist

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8 Wordworth ([1850] 2000, 408).
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will then be inside it, of course. When Kathleen and I studied with Roy Henderson at the Royal Academy of Music a short time ago, I had the chance to sing Mozart’s “Martern aller Arten”—with full orchestra.

MH: What a feast!
RW: That aria is really a C-major concerto, or sinfonia concertante, for soprano and four solo instruments—flute, oboe, violin, cello. While they attempt to outdo each other in bravura, the game keeps the audience in enchanted disbelief as far as “torments of all kinds” (sings)

Figure 5.3. Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, Die Entführung aus dem Serail, KV 384, Act II, No. 11: Aria “Martern aller Arten” (Konstanze), bars 61–63.

and the final wish for death are concerned.
MH: Could it be a game if we believed it?
RW: The instruments take a lot of time to have their first say in the contest. Hence whom we must take to be the protagonist, Konstanze—or Rae—can seem doomed, musically, to twiddling her thumbs at the outset.
MH: Some stagings fall into unintended comedy, others rise to intended comedy at this point of the drama.
RW: Fortunately, mine was a concert performance. No nasty stage directors around. Subsequently, Konstanze’s voice proves master of all leaps and figurations within the range of the concertante woodwind and string instruments, a sublime player, although, admittedly, at the same time something more than a player. Or so I imagined myself to be.
EL: Honour to whom honour is due. But isn’t the composer here the player behind the players?
RW: You have been keen on this message all along.
EL: If it is the true one . . .
RW: I admit it is. The dramatist-composer plays his game with us musicians. Konstanze and the Bassa compete over power. The Bassa has all the power in his sexual playground, the Seraglio, but, paradoxically, is denied the power of music.
EL: That he threatens violence demonstrates his only power and thus, ultimately, his powerlessness.
RW: His impotence.
EL: I was avoiding that word.
RW: As the Bassa cannot compete musically, Mozart sets up that other competition, between instrumental and vocal music.
EL: And what a difference it makes. While the libretto dialogue is immediate—Konstanze right away takes up the words of the Bassa, “Martern aller Arten”—the music breaks that immediacy; the orchestra, but in particular its soloists, assert that they can say what is to be said here.
RW: But then I say it.
EL: Because the composer makes you say it.
Music as Play

RW: Yet it is still I who must say it.
LW: Games are a family, why shouldn’t players also be one? Especially if they drink Höllenpfad together.
EL: Your no-border policy on concepts relieves us of all embarrassment. So do embrace us—composer, pianist, and singer alike!
LW: I have done so all along.
EL: And set out the theory of the embrace!
LW: Philosophy is not a theory. It is a practice.
RW: Of embracing?
LW: With some of its practitioners, the embrace is suffocating. (Sound of bells.)
RW: Oh dear.
LW: What is it?
RW: Nothing, “Bells, the poor man’s only music.” It’s Trinity’s loquacious clock.
EL: (to LW): You have been a fellow of Trinity College, haven’t you?
LW: I have, since 1930.
EL: Follow your long loquacious practice, then.
LW: It is taciturn, by comparison.
EL: By comparison to whom?
LW: Look around and choose yourself.
EL: Go on: speak your few words then.
LW: When we come across the notion of play, we think of doing something first, not of making something. But play can be turned into productions rather than performances.
EL: Di yi deh deh doh dooh—my entry. The performer plays with actual sounds, the composer with the material of her musical imagination. A composition in the medium of musical notation is written for performance, and that allows direct comparison. A work of this kind is, it seems to me, an image of play, born from play, and to be turned into play by performers once again.
LW: Now you are doing the philosophy you asked me to do. What more could I wish for? Perhaps I could wish to avoid talk of “an image.” I once believed that the sentence was an image of the world. Now I have become tired of the image altogether. But how are compositions related to performances? To find something better than your image I would have to think long and hard.
EL: Don’t think—look!
MH: Or listen. One thing that struck me both in Ella Fitzgerald’s improvisation and Mozart’s aria concertata—Gwen Catley sang it recently at Sadler’s Wells—was a quick movement repeated with small variations. This element features widely in children’s play. Take skipping with a rope. Often the movement is sought to accelerate, nearing a state of vertigo. There is no dividing line between such play and dance.

RW: Ludwig mentioned ring-a-ring o' roses.
EL: But he wouldn't play it with us.
RW: You never tried hard enough to compel him.
EL: He would not be a philosopher could he be compelled.
RW: Then try to convince him. Given his preference for practice over theory, you might stand a chance.
LW: Talking about children's games is no reason to get childish.
EL: But being childish may be our reason for talking about children's games in Wordsworth's room at St John's—that intellectual's sanctuary.
RW: Verily I say unto you, Except ye become as little children, you will not enter the kingdom of art.
LW: Little versed in German as you all are, you may be unaware that the name of the wine you are drinking cheerily, Höllenpfad, means the path to hell.
MH (opening the second bottle of wine): Take the sober route with me then, friends. Ring-a-ring o' roses is a game, a song and a dance at once. Characteristically, there is a penalty for the slowest child.
EL: She has to go to hell, doesn't she?
MH: A motto for music critics.
LW: Jesus says it to Judas.
MH: They won't look that up. Too busy.
EL: As I used to be a very slow child, I had to go to hell all the time. From that position, you end up a modernist composer. Thomas Mann is said just to have written a novel about this, Doktor Faustus. I shall read it. Slowly. In German.
MH: The slowest child does not have to go to hell but I am not surprised you remember it that way. Another aberration from the path of reason. Stay with me. In all cultures, music has its share in dance as it has, at the opposite pole, in language. While prosaic language is averse to literal repetition—we repeat a sentence precisely when it has not been understood—repetitions form dance. Dance is motion of the living body: these repetitions cannot be mechanical. And they allow modification and variation, indeed require them, for otherwise boredom is going to paralyse the activity. Yet these modifications and variations are modifications and variations of a pattern that runs through—they can only be experienced as modifications and variations by someone who senses the pattern.
RW: Such abstract boulders on the path of reason! Offer us a less arid track, even if it leads to hell.
MH: It could lead to Vienna.
LW: Isn't that the same destination?
MH: Let us talk of waltzing, then, that nineteenth-century game between the sexes. Combining repetition and acceleration, it could lead dancers into a state of rapture—Joseph Strauss composed one called Delirien.
LW: It would lead me into sickness, but again that may be the same thing.
Music as Play

MH: A composition like Strauss’s *Delirien* was made for actual dancing; but at the same time composers wrote waltzes for imaginary dancing rather than actual—playing a different sort of game.

LW: It makes me feel much better.

MH: Chopin was a master of double play in that, for the naïve listener, he went along with the approved game while, at closer attention, casting suspicion upon it.

EL: Through genre, the rules of a game are laid out; but secretly subverting them is yet another game.

MH: Even the briefest and most popular of his waltzes, the “Minute,” hints at such double play. (*She sits down at the Blüthner and plays it.*)

EL: Wondrous, as always when you play.

MH: Just genius loci.

EL: Your false modesty! You played through the London air raids, so obviously you do not need favourable circumstances. But what did you mean earlier by “a different sort of game”? And what is the common one from which it has to be distinguished?

MH: The common one first. Oddly, the common one turns already against the common, the everyday. But that turn against is itself very common. Games can offer an escape from ordinary life. In playing them we recede from one kind of reality only to enter another kind. The nineteenth-century ballroom waltz was such a game. It replaced the straight-on movements of the rational, goal-directed individual with circling that, ideally, has to offer a little delirium. Precisely that rapture required the most regular and foreseeable structure. Unlike riders on today’s rollercoaster, who are offered a little delirium as a ready-made technology for consumption, dancers have to produce the waltz each time by themselves and for themselves. Their circling—in six steps around the body axis—must be coordinated.

EL: I see. Regressions have forever thrived on simplicity, not on complication.

RW: Instead, Myra is getting ever more complicated. Is this going to turn into an extended college lesson? I hanker after our quick conversation.

EL: Let Myra lecture and consummate that peculiar university feel while you are all ears.

RW: Or the particular feel of the dreary flat obdurate Cambridgeshire fens in November? Grey sky and black land, boringly repeating themselves, separated as if by a ruler.

EL: What a figure of speech. Don’t talk: look and listen. It takes a while to discover the Fens’ bleak beauty. You should manage, though, Queen of the Night! If you wish to keep up your distaste, though, I recommend Vaughan Williams’s *In the Fen Country*, composed in 1904, ten years after his graduation from Trinity. His first great exercise in orchestral tedium.

MH: Thanks, Elisabeth. In Cambridge, landscape and academic spirit are one.

RW: I won’t deny that.
MH: Subtle works of art keep some distance from the escapist frenzy rather than altogether giving in to it: in Chopin’s D♭-major waltz, marking that distance, in the gentlest way, itself takes the form of play. (She picks up the score from the Blüthner.) Starting a perpetuum mobile, the composer introduces a rotation model, alluding to the circling motion of the waltz. The chain of quavers plays around the tone A♭. Listeners may relate the figuration to a waltz metre for the first two bars, but not for those that follow. The rotation model consists of four quavers, counteracting the 3/4 metre. But it acts not just against the waltz metre, but also against the expected dance periodicity of 4 + 4 bars. Bars 3–4 and 5–6 are identical in the right hand. Chopin’s handling of the rotation model produces a structure of 2 + 4 + 2. When the left hand comes in regularly in bar 5, the uncommon grouping appears to be covered up for the moment; but a tension in the right hand remains—the accompaniment has started either too late or too early. If the quaver figuration isn’t really dancing, although it alludes to the circular motion of the waltz, perhaps it is better understood as an attempt to rush off. (She plays the beginning of the piece once more.)

EL: What a lecturer has been lost in you! Alas, Cambridge! You are brilliant. Chopin’s oblique art of dancing. I thought I heard an oblique kind of singing, too, when you played the entire piece.

MH: In bar 63, Chopin starts a cantilena. But it is left as a fragment, hanging in the air on its highest note. A trill of the right hand on A♭, the central tone of the perpetuum mobile, interrupts, followed by the return of the latter. (She plays, with a hint of parody, from bar 64 to the end.)
Vis-à-vis the fine-tuned expectations of listeners in the salon, Chopin in 1846 toyed with rather than contributed to the game that three decades earlier, since its international breakthrough at the Congress of Vienna, had become the craze of the bourgeoisie.

RW: Yet none but the bourgeoisie have come to appreciate the oblique kind of games Chopin plays. They are our audience. Aren’t we even part of it?

MH: I am never too sure who is bourgeois and who isn’t. Even those of whom I am pretty sure dress up as something else some of the time.

RW: That’s true and has a lot to do with what you said before. The ballroom has not merely been the venue for the play of whirl and swirl. It has also been, and often at the same time, the venue for games of masquerade.

MH: Indeed. For these, we owe the imaginary counterparts not to Chopin, but to Schumann—Carnaval and Faschingschwank aus Wien. (She plays the opening bars of Faschingschwank.)
Andreas Dorschel

Figure 5.6. Robert Schumann, Faschingsschwank aus Wien, op. 26, bars 1–8.

LW: Did I go to Cambridge in order to be drawn constantly back to Vienna?
MH: As long as we talk music, you will have to suffer it. Name me even one Cambridge composer.
RW: Sir Charles Villiers Stanford of Trinity College was the most famous one.
MH: I am afraid Ludwig will not count any talent below towering genius. Towering genius and Josef Labor. He grants an exception for him, but not for Stanford and Vaughan Williams.
LW: Perhaps the true Cambridge composers hide, dressed up as something else, too—philosophers, say.
EL: We’ll not suspect you.
LW: In that case I shall quit my professorship this year. I had hoped our assembly would turn out to be more uplifting.
EL: It might still turn out that way once we three drop our masks.
RW: Masquerade is just a special brand of a wider phenomenon. As I can tell from my classical education, the Latin illudere literally means “to play in.” Aren’t we all playing and being played with? Vexing and being vexed?
MH (opening the last bottle of wine and refilling the glasses): Stay sober! An illusion is play only as long it is recognised as an illusion—children’s threats at Halloween, the masquerade in the ballroom, Lear’s death onstage. When deception is not seen through as an illusion, it becomes ordinary fraud. Fraud is beyond play for the deceived person, otherwise it would not work as fraud.
EL: Could it not be conducted as play by the deceiver?
MH: It might. For, eerily, there does not seem to be any human activity that could not be conducted, by some weird individual, as play. Or, perhaps, the individual does not even have to be weird. Cats usually aren’t; but what the cat relishes as play is deadly reality for the mouse. Warfare may be seen as a tactical and strategic game by those in control, but not by those being bombed.
EL: Reciprocity, in such matters, is not a given. Is that what you are saying?
MH: It is. The military strategist plays with his soldiers and with the civilians of the other side, but they do not play with him. Love is a game for Don Giovanni, but not for Donna Elvira. I could imagine a poet playing virtuosically with certain elements of the Gospel, but devout Christians would not be willing to join in the game. More than that, they might deny that there was a game to be played.
EL: To be play, then, is not a feature of things, but an attitude towards them? And that attitude could sometimes be shared by others and sometimes not be shared by them, couldn’t it?

MH: Players may announce the attitude they expect from those who watch them. It is the frame, the stage, the screen, the situation, the context that allows the pretence to be seen through when and if “the girl plays a fairy” or “Vivien Leigh plays Cordelia.” Taking her utterances with the attitude that “this is play” on the part of the audience saves Leigh from being carted off to the psychiatric ward. And though Leigh must be able to distinguish herself from Cordelia—that’s why she is not sent to Bedlam—she must be Cordelia for her audience during the performance of Lear.

LW: Note the different way in which we are talking here. Confronted with such play, we do not say that someone plays with someone or with something. In a characteristic turn, we use the simple accusative object instead of the prepositional phrase: someone plays someone or, indeed, something.

RW: Something?

LW: Yes, something. What such play references is not restricted to what is ordinarily considered a “person.” Children sometimes take on the roles of water, fire, or wind. Such is the case in ring-a-ring o’ roses—it includes the pretended metamorphosis of a human being into a plant. The slowest child, when it comes to falling down, turns into the stationary “rosie,” the rose bush around whom the other children dance.

EL: No hell there?

MH: No hell. Your memory played a trick on you.

EL: Or it wasn’t my memory.

LW: Your mask seems to be inside rather than outside.

EL: That will make it difficult to drop it.

RW: A few rounds of ring-a-ring o’ roses could at least help you to sunnier recollections. It is just so much nicer to be a blossoming rose bush than to go to hell.

EL (molto rubato con morbidezza): What if I don’t like it nice?

RW (agitato): Then go to hell.

MH: Goodness gracious me. So hostile?

RW (hums Dona nobis pacem from Beethoven’s Missa solemnis, op. 123.)

Figure 5.7. Ludwig van Beethoven, Missa solemnis op. 123, V. Agnus Dei, bars 123–26, Soprano.
EL: As long as it is just imitating one thing instead of another, the difference—hell versus rose—may not be that important.

RW: Wagner blurred it. In *Parsifal*, Kundry is called “Höllenrose”—the rose of hell.

LW: I’ll teach you a difference. Another one. Not all imitation is considered play-acting. If a girl draws a dog, she must keep a distance from the animal, and it is because of this quality of “staying outside” that we do not call drawing “acting.” But the girl may as well imitate a dog by making herself similar to it, creeping into the dog’s body and mind; that sort of getting or being “inside” someone or something is imitative play.

MH: Last Friday, Beecham conducted Strauss’s *Alpensinfonie* at the Royal Albert Hall. Some found it sublime, others banal. Whatever it is, it is not a great instance of imitative play. The illustrator stays outside. On studying Debussy’s *Préludes* recently, by way of contrast, I was amazed to see that the composer placed the individual titles not above, but below the pieces. He took so much care not to limit the imaginative freedom of play.

RW: But, inevitably, players will know the titles beforehand.

MH: That’s true. Yet the gesture is characteristic and points towards play. A title above the piece takes the external object as given and invites comparison with it—a procedure as remote from play as it gets. (She sits down one last time at the piano and plays Debussy, *Préludes*, book 1, no. 6: “Des pas sur la neige.”)

(Having finished, she pauses for a moment.) “Footsteps in the snow.” Music does not walk. It can perhaps depict walking; Richard Strauss did that, and well enough. Debussy’s music, however, gets inside the walker. It embodies the steps. Just as Vivien Leigh plays Cordelia, being her, so Debussy’s music plays steps on the snow, being them.

LW: You are right. Acting, or impersonation, is another streak within play, and also within the play of music. If we wish to make sense of the claim that music, or some music, is play, looking out for such streaks may be the least violent way. We cannot find a particular trait that renders all
Music as Play

pieces and performances of music that strike us as play into instances of play.

RW: But is that not circular reasoning?

EL: It is. For there is something wrong with the injunction not to think, but to look. The flaw is in the alternative it suggests. We have thought already as we look. There are an infinite number of things we might look at. Why do we look at a Chopin waltz? Because we have thought, before looking, that this might be an instance of music as play. But then such is the circle we, thinking animals that we are, cannot avoid. It is, as it were, the human game. Man's real essence.

LW: How thoughtful. I'll look into it.10

10 I am immensely grateful to John Rink (St John's College, Cambridge) for detailed comments on a previous version of this dialogue; I have not been able to do justice entirely to his considerate critique. I would also like to thank Paulo de Assis and Edward Crooks (Orpheus Institute, Ghent) for helpful suggestions.
What Anyway Is a “Music Discomposed”?

Reading Cavell through the Dark Glasses of Adorno

Lydia Goehr
Columbia University

Compos’d by calms, and discompos’d by winds.
—Virgil, *Georgics*

1. “Must we mean what we say?”

When I first thought about this essay, I was responding to an invitation to speak at a conference on the topic of dissonance and dissidence. I determined straightaway to juxtapose three broken images: of a music untuned, of a work uncomposed, and of a concert disconcerted. I intended to set these images in a broader picture in which the prefixes “de,” “dis-,” or “un”—or “ent” in German—had long been attached to dominant words offered in dissonant discourses of disenchantment in which disasters had been experienced as the disorder of the day. Yet, though this was my aim, I quickly became distracted by a single phrase from the work of Stanley Cavell. It was simply the title given to his essay of 1967: “Music Discomposed” (Cavell [1967] 1976b).

I had read Cavell’s essay more than once over the last decades, but never had it grabbed my attention. It had always somehow irritated me; I couldn’t get my thought around it. Reading it again recently, I found a key, to read it through

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1 Dryden’s translation, as quoted in Crabb (1818, 371).
2 Editor’s note: The present essay is published here for the first time; its first presentation, as “Music De-Tuned and Works Dis-Composed,” was delivered at the conference Dissonance and Dissidence: Counterpoints in Aesthetics and Politics, 12–13 May 2015, at the University of Toronto; its second presentation was at “Nature, Materialism in Adorno,” the fourth annual meeting of the Association for Adorno Studies, hosted by the Philosophy Department at the New School for Social Research, New York, 9–10 October 2015. Lydia Goehr’s presentation, “A Music Discomposed: Untimely Thoughts on Adorno and Cavell,” was followed by a response by Kathy Kiloh (published here at the end of Goehr’s text). Jake McNulty, the author of the second comment on Goehr’s essay (see below), attended the conference, and offered the comment at Goehr’s request. Details of the event can be accessed at http://www.adornostudies.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/AdornoCircle2015Poster.pdf. From the very beginning of the publication process of this book, Lydia Goehr expressed her gratitude for “the time and care” both commentators took in reading her essay and regarded both comments as important complements to her text.
an enigmatic mirror, in fact, the dark glasses of Adorno. A skewed approach I grant, but what I saw in Adorno’s writing I saw in Cavell’s: namely, a strategic displacement of the subject matter. The apparent subject matter was the state of contemporary musical composition; the underlying, even repressed subject, was the modernist philosophical subject. If the state of music was discomposed, then so, too, was the philosophical subject, when, in writing the essay, the author placed himself in contemporary concerts disconcerted by the over- and under-composed offerings of his day.

One clue I found, or perhaps devised, to sustain my reading turned on the fact that Cavell never once used the term “discomposed” within the essay. The title alone condensed the anxiety that was expressed throughout. The form of the essay, as I read it, was a working through of an anxiety by a writer who aimed to turn a discomposure into a new form of composure, consistent with an ethics of conviction, wherein, from feeling unsafe, one would feel again safe knowing that this subject had the capacity to make music still mean. The title thus served as an allegory of a subject seeking the key or pitch of a philosophy that would forge a path through the contemporary situation. This means, too, that Cavell’s term “discomposed” did not issue a self-evident meaning from the start. Its meaning was not obviously the same as that of “decomposed” or “uncomposed.” This being so, Cavell’s titular phrase performed the same role as the first strike of Adorno’s *Aesthetic Theory* (1970, 1997) when Adorno declared that what was once self-evident no longer was, not least because the very idea of something being self-evident was being subjected to radical doubt.

Cavell included his essay in a volume he published in 1969 with the title *Must We Mean What We Say?*, the year before Adorno’s *Aesthetic Theory* was posthumously published. All that turns on this particular fact was that both authors were writing in and very consciously responding to the post-war challenges of the 1950s and even more to the 1960s. To his titular question, “Must we mean what we say?,” Cavell answered with an insistent yes, where his insistence reflected his anxiety in posing the very question. The “must” of meaning was evidenced in our intentions to communicate something through the medium of words, paint strokes, or, in the musical case, through structures of harmony, melody, rhythm, and counterpoint, but where the anxiety emerged from the realisation of how often the intended communications could fail in their transmission or effect. Cavell was interested in the failure not of particular or individual intentional acts of communication, but in the larger possibility that (a collective) “we” might no longer mean anything in the contemporary musical world and thus, by allegorical extension, in any other world of art, science, or thought. The possibility of not meaning at all was the urgent question of his day, and hence the “must,” the most important word—and the first word—of his question. *Must* we mean? *Yes we must*—but how and on what terms?

To articulate the terms of meaning’s success against an apparent world-pervasive failure to mean, Cavell sought not a hard foundation in a priori conditions of sufficiency and necessity. He sought a vaguer and more existential necessity to serve as an antidote to that which had led communication astray, to that which had poisoned the very possibility of meaning. He bottled this
antidote in a classical or antiquated glass, speaking of the conviction, sincerity, authenticity, and attunement required (or once required) of our communicative acts. It was not therefore a matter of articulating the logical conditions for producing referentially meaningful sentences, but a moral-aesthetic matter now of laying down secure conditions for the composition of our communications, be they musical, literary, filmic, or philosophical.

In his essay on music, as elsewhere in his writings, Cavell brought attention to what he called a fraudulence, although he focused not on the individualising sort of imposture perpetuated by lonesome tricksters. What he had in mind was an atmosphere of the times, a crisis of imposture that saturated a world, in this case a world of contemporary music. In this moment of the sixties, it seemed to have become well-nigh impossible to say what it meant to catch out an impostor red-handed. Drawing from, but also countering, the Anglo-American analytical aesthetics of the period, Cavell ([1967] 1976b, 190) wrote of there being “no one feature, or definite set of features” that one could describe “in technical handbooks,” or “no specific tests by which its fraudulence [could] be detected and exposed.” We are not, he was saying, in a situation where our impostors, like “forgers and counterfeiters, admit clear outcomes [or] conclude in dramatic discoveries.” We are not at a masked ball where we raise the masks of some—the impostors—leaving others dancing authentically in place. We are not in a grimy world in which we catch forgers “signing another man’s name” or even in a Dostoevskyean world in which a criminal seeks constantly the opportunity to confess. No, he was maintaining, we—the collective we—seem to feel ourselves now to be in a world with a new sort of imposture, where the only evidence given is through the pervasive impression that our communications have broken down.

Critically aware that such fraudulence was impossible to pin down with any exactitude, Cavell showed the poverty of the many explanatory terms that were being offered mostly by Anglo-American theorists. Again, it was not a matter of showing how the necessary and sufficient conditions of what made something—say, art or music—were not being met by this or that particular production. It was a matter now of showing that all such conditions had been blown to the wind in a total situation of fraudulence. To get a sense of the broader picture, a philosopher such as himself would have to look symptomatically at the total range of contemporary experience if an adequate diagnosis were to be offered—and then a cure.

Moving between the more general situation of contemporary art and the more specific condition of contemporary music, Cavell ([1967] 1976b, 190) wrote of how there were “no such proofs possible for the assertion that the art accepted by a public is fraudulent,” because even “the artist himself may not know.” This claim was deliberately suggestive. For artists or composers not to be aware of the untruth of their productions meant that, though thinking themselves sincere, they had been taken in by the times, and even so taken in that their sincerity, despite being grounded in fraudulence, was carrying over to a public with the result that the public too was somehow accepting what the artists were offering as art. Taken in by the times, artists thus seemed to be
acting with sincerity: they seemed to mean what they said, even purposefully
to be trying to communicate with their publics. Still, the sincerity was decept-
tive given the more basic claim that what they were producing was somehow
already false.

Here, Cavell implicitly appealed to a modernist false consciousness, a situ-
ation in which the public could be accepting-yet-discontent with the contem-
porary state of art, and hence intrigued by all the claims of artists, yet suspi-
cious that the whole enterprise was a hoax. Once more, for Cavell, the fraudu-
lence attached to contemporary music or art was not exhausted by a deliberate
deception on the part of artists—or con artists—aiming to mislead the public
or trick them into accepting something that either categorically was not art or
honorifically should not have been accepted as art. He was not merely contin-
uing the general suspicion that Plato had set into action: that artists were on a
par with deliberately deceiving sophists. Instead, he was describing a new or
contemporary form of not-knowing—not one deceptively paraded around by
individual impostors as knowledge, but a not-knowing saturating the entire
atmosphere of the times, the detection of which required a special sort of
social-psychopathological analysis. Put like this, he joined those in the same
period who were trying to capture something like a total or mass deception, a
full-scale crisis of humanity, though one whose symptoms could then be read
back through the long history of modernity as a whole.

2. The atmosphere of the 1960s

Many commentators have discussed Cavell’s essay. An entire volume (Kane and
Decatur Smith 2010) was recently published of essays impressive in breadth
and insightful in substance celebrating the fortieth year of the essay’s publi-
cation. In the earliest commentaries, beginning with those of Joseph Margolis
(1967) and Monroe Beardsley (1967), the matter of fraudulence was generally
thought to have been too vaguely spelt out, leading most to concentrate on
other concepts in the essay. More recent commentators, contrarily, have stuck
with the matter of fraudulence, often making sense of Cavell’s use of the term
by reference to what others were saying about it in the same period. This is my
approach too, although I emphasise something others have stressed less: that
if, in reading Cavell’s essay, one finds oneself frustrated by his having under-
described what he meant by fraudulence, then one benefits by turning the frus-
tration into a dialectical possibility, that the underdescription was a deliberate
philosophical strategy to capture the pervasive but inexact atmosphere of the
times. By not saying too much by way of what he meant, or by not clarifying the
concept, he captured an atmosphere that was phenomenologically impossible
to put into precise words. To capture the general atmosphere of fraudulence
without reducing it to detectable acts on the part of deceiving artists was how
he brought the situation to consciousness in a new way. Hence, not through
direct description, but through indirect detours with suggestive signposts that
would lead one through the labyrinths of a contemporary world in which one
could experience at one extreme all the slogans of sincerity and authenticity
posted on the walls, while, at the other extreme, all the deafening cries of crisis, scepticism, hocus-pokery, and doubt.

Of late, I have had several opportunities to consider the atmosphere of the sixties that motivated so many thinkers to capture in their philosophical thought an urgency that they associated with the then contemporary arts. They premised the urgency on their observations that current theories were at odds with the practice, the reception with the production, and that the public's expectations, experiences, and judgements were radically at odds with the works being produced. Even if the contemporary art was “intoxicating,” as for example Arthur Danto liked to use this term, it was often described as too “difficult” to understand, or “incomprehensible,” to use the dogged German words associated with Adorno. The incomprehension was attributed to a failure either of experience or of philosophical terms, terms that were either too analytic or dreary or too harmonious and outdated to accommodate what was actually being produced as art. The question then was how to make sense of art’s offerings in ways that would both philosophically and phenomenologically satisfy those who felt most disenchanted and dispossessed. It was, clearly, a far more anxious than celebratory project.

In pursuing this anxiety, I have found that the term “atmosphere” was often used to capture not clear and transparent worlds or forms of life made explicit or articulated conditions, but worlds rendered opaque by dense and deep grounds and backgrounds of bad faith, erroneous habituation, naturalised intuitions, and false prejudices and expectations. Used this way, the term echoed an earlier use with a most striking effect when George Santayana, first, and then John Dewey wrote of an atmosphere and human environment that was being denaturalised or debased, or of a Weltanschauung borrowed from across the Atlantic that had already reached a breaking point at the apocalyptic start of the twentieth century. Terms like “atmosphere,” “environment,” or “worldview” were given a special presence in writings of philosophers who sought some sort of exit out of a labyrinth covered over by a very German grey fog.

Cavell wrote of how aestheticians were now incapable of producing criticism, given a perceived inability even to recognise the proper objects of the discourse. “It is not clear,” people now think, “what is and is not essentially connected to the concept of music” (Cavell ([1967] 1976b, 204). And also, “I believe it is true to say that modernist art—roughly, the art of one’s own generation” has become—precisely because it has not yet properly become—“a problem for the philosophy contemporary with it (in England and America anyway)” (ibid., 183). After this, he asked whether this would be true of any generation or particularly of his own. He wanted to have the answer go both ways. The problems so acute for his generation would allow him to view the entire discipline of aesthetics going back, as he put it, two hundred years. And with this extended gaze, he would try to come to understand modernist art, then modernism, then art as a whole. If aesthetics was done right, a path would be forged if not to recomposing the world, then to rewarding the philosophical subject, or Cavell as the writer, with a transcendent or radical new insight into a world discomposed.
3. Reading Cavell through the dark glasses of Adorno

When Cavell described a music discomposed, he rendered the condition extreme. Like many around him and long before him, he pulled on the once classical but now antiquated terms of rhythm, poetry, harmony, and composition as leitmotivic metaphors to restore philosophical sense to a world that seemed to have lost all proportion. A world that did not make sense was experienced as bereft of its musicality, leaving only unwitting impostors to conduct a discomposed public through the dissonant rhythms of the day. If Cavell did not clarify the term “fraudulence,” then just as deliberately he did not clarify the term “discomposed”: again, in this second case, he did not even use the term beyond the title. Yet, let us consider now all that the term “discomposed” might mean.

One is very likely to read a music discomposed first off as pointing to musical works that have been or become decomposed, if they were not somehow uncomposed to begin with. Consider Adorno’s description of some modernist works that, with their refusal to be fully-formed, or to be totally- or through-composed, were produced as fragmented or broken. Or think of the many pronouncements of the likes of John Cage, James Joyce, or Samuel Beckett who, in their endgames of chance and improvisation, refused to compose in a way that would allow the dominant work-concept to remain comfortably in place.

Or consider another sense, when the term “discomposition” is attached not to works but to an experience or a response. “It is in the tranquillity of decomposition,” wrote Beckett in 1955 in *Malloy*, “that I remember the long confused emotion which was my life… To decompose is to live too, I know, I know, don’t torment me” (Beckett [1955] 2009, 22). To this sort of feeling, Cavell ([1964] 1976, 115) then responded in his own study of Beckett: “Beckett’s perception is of a ‘meaningless universe’ and language in his plays ‘serves to express the breakdown, the disintegration of language’—by, one gathers, itself undergoing disintegration. Such descriptions are usual in the discussions of Beckett I am aware of, but are they anything more than impositions from an impression of fashionable philosophy?” Cavell’s remark is odd, even disingenuous, given what one would think could have been a shared feeling. But here one has to read his remark as trying, with Nietzsche, to separate the feeling of breakdown from what follows as a consequence for the philosophy if, as Cavell fears, the philosophy will lead persons now to live down in the depths only of a “naysaying” nihilism. Nihilism was not and could not be the right answer for Cavell as it was not the right stopping place for Nietzsche.

Given this sort of discourse, many have blamed the fashions of art and the fashions of philosophy, but the critique has gone deeper when theorists have looked to the changes brought about by social forces—by what Marx had described, say, in his *Capital: Critique of Political Economy*, when a certain sort of bartering decomposed a community from the inside out, or when technological developments allowed fashions, in Freudian terms, to become also fetishes and fixations.
Against this same background, Adorno described the profound changes in listening habits when the new technologies closed the doors of traditional musical works, such as by Beethoven, to any effective or truthful transmission. Listeners were accordingly left either distantly remembering what listening to Beethoven’s works once meant or taking in the music through the broken and interrupted transmissions of endlessly repeated and variated sound bites. In describing the rage, fetish, and regression of the new listening habits, he wrote of the erasure of any workable classificatory and evaluative distinction between the high and the low, or between a musical production that issued in works and one that issued in hits. “If,” he wrote, “atomized listening means progressive decomposition for the higher music, there is nothing more to decompose in the lower music” (Adorno [1938] 1973, 37 as translated in Adorno 2002, 305–6).³ His idea of a music *dekomponiert* worked alongside Walter Benjamin’s declaration of a perceptual attention that had become “deconcentrated” and “distracted” (see Benjamin [1968] 2007]. Any perception of an artwork considered as a whole was now impossible, since the whole—*das Ganze*—was not even offered. The public was given only splintered parts, allowing them to focus on and fetishise only what was most striking and immediate. Without any perception of a binding or glue between the parts, or without any access to the dialectical unfolding of a whole, all that was realised, Adorno wrote, was “What the spotlight falls on—striking melodic intervals, unsettling modulations, intentional or unintentional mistakes, or whatever condenses itself into a formula by an especially intimate merging of melody and text. Here, too, listeners and products fit together; they are not even offered the structure which they cannot follow” (Adorno [1938] 1973, 37, as translated in Adorno 2002, 305).⁴

In his writings, Adorno rarely used the term *dekomponiert*: he wrote more often of subjects and objects as variously *zersetzt*, *zerstört*, *zersplittert*, *zerstreut*. These terms then applied to music and brought attention to music as an allegory of the social subject as both tended toward disavowal, degradation, and disassociation. In the extremely polarised expressions of his *Philosophy of New Music* (Adorno [1949] 1975, 2006), he described one sort of modern music as dispensing, both seriously and in parody, with music’s essential temporal unfolding as it approached the stasis of painting. “The Gordian knot is simply severed” (Es wird einzig der gordische Knoten zerhauen), he wrote, which he followed up by using the term *Zerfallen* in an awkward passive construction to speak of something as having been or become disintegrated or discomposed. The knot—the work—is severed when an opposition “is created between the objective-geometrical division of time and its subjective decay, without any constitutive connection between the temporal dimension and the musical content. In the spatialization of music, time, brought to a standstill, is disintegrated the same way that, in the expressive style, [time] is decomposed and

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³ “Bedeutet bei der oberen Musik das atomistische Hören fortschreitende Dekomposition, so gibt es bei der unteren schon nichts mehr zum Dekomponieren.”

⁴ “Auch darin stimmen Hörer und Produkte zusammen: die Struktur, der sie nicht folgen können, wird ihnen gar nicht erst angeboten.”
transformed into lyrical moments” (Adorno [1949] 1975, 196n34, translation by Susan H. Gillespie).5

In his Aesthetic Theory, Adorno wrote further of how “the unfolding” of artworks is the same as, or is at the same time, their decomposition (Adorno 1970, 266, as translated in Adorno 1997, 256; Am Ende ist ihre Entfaltung eins mit ihrem Zerfall). Adorno was addressing how the dialectical unfolding requires a decomposition so that the work may be recomposed in the act of structural listening or performing. But what if there was no work given to decompose and recompose because decomposition was already the given state of the work? Adorno took up this question also in his essay “Extorted Reconciliation: On Georg Lukács’ Realism in Our Time” (Adorno [1958–74] 1974, 1991–92), when he criticised Lukács for ignoring how far the avant-garde had gone in decomposing the unity of the subject through a new literary form—where the subject stood doubly for the subject matter and subjective agency in the text. He singled out Proust’s interior monologues as exemplary for producing this literally shattering effect of the literary. Proust, he wrote, “decomposes [dekomponiert] the unity of the subject [die Einheit des Subjekts] by means of the subject’s introspection [vermöge dessen eigener Introspektion]; the subject is ultimately transformed into an arena [es verwandelt sich schließlich in einen Schauplatz] in which objective entities manifest themselves [erscheinender Objektivitäten]” (Adorno [1958–74] 1974, 262, as translated in Adorno 1991–92, 125). Adorno saw the Proustian arena as a stage or scene of observation—ein Schauplatz—over which one would find senseless objects strewn, being picked and invested with new but random sorts of sensibility here and there, momentarily consumed with secret pleasures. Clearly, decomposition was not entirely a bad thing. But when it was, it was because further developments of the decomposition left objects not there to be picked up for reminiscences of things past, but worn out or threadbare as though they were merely grey shards washed up in storms at sea. He wrote, accordingly, not of a wasted world placed before one for the performance of memory, but there for the expression of a despair discoloured through the splintered gaze of the shipwrecked.

Another revealing use of the idea of decomposition is found in Minima Moralia, in the eighth section, titled by Adorno “Wenn dich die bösen Buben locken”—“If bad boys should tempt you.” He described an amor intellectualis for a kitchen staff of thinkers and artists who were tempted to “relax” the tension of their Bildung, given the pressure to conform, to produce strings of platitudes and banalities. He wrote: “The center of intellectual/minded [geistigen] self-discipline as such is understood to be disintegrating” (Adorno [1951] 1980, 26, translation modified from Adorno 2005; Das Zentrum der geistigen Selbstdisziplin als solcher ist in Zersetzung begriffen). Resuming the same thread in a later passage, no. 39, “Ego is id,” he described the historical decay, dissolution, and demolition of an ego whose repression had been shaped by a

5 “dem subjektiven Zerfall der Zeit ihre objektiv-geometrische Aufteilung entgegengestellt, ohne daß zwischen der Zeitdimension und dem musikalischen Inhalt ein konstitutiver Zusammenhang bestünde. In der Verräumlichung der Musik ist Zeit, durch ihre Stillstellung, ebenso zerfällt, wie sie im expressiven Stil sich in lyrische Momente dekomponiert.”
bourgeois individualism, which with its beginnings in antiquity had worked its way through the Renaissance to end up in ideologies of super-personalities, at which point the ego splintered as it fell prey to a mass fraudulence or deception of a fascistic and overcapitalised proportion. Beyond the kitchen staff, Adorno sought a resistance in the very few individuals who refused to play along. Such resistance would stand for a social moment in a “moral superego” that was not content merely to be or become “understandable to others” (ibid., 63–64).

Finally, in his *Negative Dialectic*, in his discussion directed toward breaking the spell of false totality, Adorno wrote: “The straighter a society’s course for the totality that is reproduced in the spellbound subjects, the deeper its tendency to dissociation. This threatens the life of the species as much as it disavows the spell cast over the whole, the false identity of subject and object” (Adorno [1966] 1973, 337, as translated in Adorno [1973] 2007, 346).6

4. Ancient and antiquated uses of the term “decomposition”

To what extent, now, do we find similar threads of modernist critique sewn into Cavell’s essay? Before describing a world of contemporary music, Cavell articulated in his book of 1969 the terms of what he took to be the two dominant problems in aesthetics. He treated the first in some detail and the second “more swiftly and crudely,” in part because the first said something also about the second. The first concerned the issue of paraphrase. Sentences, utterances, or works mean much more than what they say or display. As they engage rhetoric and metaphor, they become bottled up with psychic tension. And so, too, I believe, may we say this of his title “Music Discomposed”—so that the psychic tension becomes the very issue of his essay. His second problem asked how persons have dealt with atonality. Have they found only a negation, dismissal, lack, or loss of tonality? Have they sought a tonal key to guide them through despite the explicit rejection of such a key in this sort of music? Have they read “atonality” as standing for an incoherence, despite coherence being its central tenet—and this just because it sounds nothing like anything they have heard before?

Cavell articulated the questions to have an explicitly Wittgensteinian and Austinian tone so that he could capture the sense of persons having lost their way in a musical form of life, where all the utterances, though forceful, were experienced as though bricks were falling all round. Of course, persons would seek desperately familiar threads in the unfamiliar material, but at what cost to the unfamiliar material? Would it remain unfamiliar in any useful way? Or would it simply be brought into safety zones of comfortable comprehension? Cavell spoke with Wittgenstein of the happy person looking at the world not as the unhappy person looks. He could also have spoken of persons as being composed and discomposed in the face of the new music. Cavell ([1965] 1976,

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6 “Je mehr die Gesellschaft der Totalität zusteuert, die im Bann der Subjekte sich reproduziert, desto tiefer denn auch ihre Tendenz zur Dissociation. Diese bedroht sowohl das Leben der Gattung, wie sie den Bann des Ganzen, die falsche Identität von Subjekt und Objekt, dementiert.”
86) wrote of needing to find the right “form of account”—a *Weltanschauung* or way of listening to atonality that competitively challenged the one that was not working. The new form would entail, he said, a specific sense of revolution: the “reconception of the subject,” according to a correction in how one asked and answered the philosophical question.

But what did reconceiving or recomposing the subject mean if the philosophical subject were starting out from a seat of discomposure or of having become discomposed, a seat of what Cavell far more often broached as a problem of scepticism? To answer, it serves my purposes now to consider the ancient and antiquated uses of the term “decomposition” and hence a world or an atmosphere in which the very idea of a musical work was finding its explicit articulation in Classical musical practice. If the discipline of aesthetics went back two hundred years, so, as I have argued elsewhere, did the disciplinary regulation of the musical work-concept and hence of the strongest idea that there has ever been of a music “composed.” In different terms, returning to the revolutionary moment in the dialectic of Enlightenment around 1800 clues us into the tension and anxiety of the moment that was marked as “the sixties.”

Just after 1800, one George Crabb published a book titled *Synonymes Explained*. Many entries under the letter “D” were prefixed by “dis,” not the least of which was the word “*discompose*” (Crabb 1818, 370). This word was immediately preceded by the term “*disconcert***. To disconcert, he wrote, signifies a situation in which something or someone “is put out of the concert or harmony,” whereas to discompose fits a situation in which something or someone falls out of “a state of composure.” In both cases, something or someone begins whole, but then the whole is broken. Although both terms “express the idea of putting [something or someone] out of order,” the disorder finds multiple expressions. Of “disorder,” Crabb noted, it has a use “in a perfectly indefinite form” that might “be applied to any object”—to anything. “As every thing may be in order, so may every thing be disordered.” Yet “disorder” is “seldom used except in regard to such things as have been in a natural order,” which, however, contrasts with the terms “deranged” or “disconcerted,” for they usually are “employed for such things as have been put into an artificial order.” Hence “to derange is to disorder that which has been systematically arranged, or put in a certain range; and to disconcert is to disorder that which has been put together by concert or contrivance.” So “the body may be disordered,” whereas a person’s “affairs or papers” may be “deranged”—we would probably say nowadays, dis- or rearranged—and a scheme may be “disconcerted.”

Seeking examples, Crabb noted that derangements could apply to most things as when “a tucker, a frill, or a cap” is discomposed, or when the “slightest change of diet” disorders persons of “tender constitutions” (Crabb 1818, 370). Or persons may be deranged when by (tragic or comic) misfortune, their prosperity turns to poverty, or when domestic servants are caught out by the unexpected return of a master to his home. Crabb then turned to the sort of derangement with which we still associate the term: when the mind becomes temporarily or permanently deranged, such that persons neither think nor act with a collectedness of reason or temper. Crabb associated the state of being...
discomposed with an incapacity, with sudden interruptions of regular patterns of doing and feeling, leaving persons shamed and overheated, and thus without the cool or coolness—the clarity—of the regular beat. Discomposure does violence to the mind and brings confusion to a life of both work and leisure. He drew this thought from a common eighteenth-century view of the passions: that when passion is untethered from reason, society and culture discompose into confusion. And then Crabb (1818, 371) quoted even earlier lines, drawn from Dryden’s translation of Virgil’s *Georgics*.

But with the changeful temper of the skies,
As rains condense, and sunshine rarefies,
So turn the species in their alter’d minds,
Compos’d by calms, and discompos’d by winds.

Crabb (1818, 265) earlier described three terms that he regarded as nearly synonymous: **CONSONANT, ACCORDANT, and CONSISTENT**. He began with **CONSONANT**, noting how, from the Latin *consonans*, the participles of *con* and *sono* bring sounds together in “unison or harmony.” **ACCORDANT** signifies an accordance of meaning—hence, an agreement, whereas **CONSISTENT**, made from *con* and *sisto* is, as is the term itself, a placing or putting together. We speak of consonance, he wrote, “in matters of representation,” of accordance in “matters of opinion or sentiment,” and consistence “in matters of conduct.” Drawing his examples from the Old and New Testaments, and so also his temper and tone, he added that the “consistency of a man’s practice with his profession is the only criterion of his sincerity.” Although each of the three terms has its opposite—consonant to dissonant, accordant to discordant, and consistent to inconsistent—together they are unequal in value. “Consonance is not so positive a thing as either accordance or consistency, which respect real events, circumstances, and actions.” For whereas “consonance mostly serves to prove the truth of any thing, . . . dissonance does not prove its falsehood until it amounts to direct discordance or inconsistency.” Thus, “there is a dissonance in the accounts given by the four Evangelists of our Saviour, which serves to prove the absence of all collusion and imposture, since there is neither discordance nor inconsistency in what they have related or omitted.” But instead of telling us to what collusion or imposture might lead, Crabb concluded with three quotations regarding the consonance, accordance, and consistency toward which we rather should strive.

Crabb (1818, 265) drew the first and second quotations from British sermonist and professor of rhetoric Hugh Blair. The first read: “Our faith in the discoveries of the Gospel will receive confirmation from discerning their consonance with the natural sentiments of the human heart.” This sentence appeared in Blair’s sermon on the Last Judgment (Blair 1802, 462). To counter the idea that persons prosper by injustice without conscience, Blair alerted his readers to the truth that never has there been a nation on earth “among whom there did not prevail a consciousness that, by inhumanity and fraud, they justly exposed themselves to the hatred of those around them, and to the displeasure of any
secret invisible power that ruled the world” (ibid., 463). Aware of their crime, they seek out their punishment as a fact of human nature. “The difference of good and evil in actions is [therefore] not founded on arbitrary opinions or institutions, but in the nature of things, and the nature of man: it accords with the universal sense of the human kind” (ibid.). Crabb (1818, 265–66) quoted this sentence as exemplary for the idea of accordance. Then, for “consistency,” he offered this much briefer prescription drawn from Joseph Addison “Keep one consistent plan from end to end.” Addison’s sentence was a reduction of lines drawn from Horace’s *De Arte Poetica* (11:126–27). The matter at hand was how a poet or philosopher remains consistent from the beginning to the end of a poem, an argument, or indeed any extended expression of a thought. Horace had noted, however, the hermeneutic struggle where, if one does not begin in the proper place or on the right note, one would not reach the end in a way according with the beginning. To give greater consonance and consistency in the development of character and plot, he instructed, one sometimes must begin *in medias res*: hence, not at the beginning or at the end, but somewhere in the middle.

Crabb’s explanation of synonyms reflected a discourse of common terms, but terms that were constantly being challenged given the tendency toward their misuse. This, too, is something that was taken up by another writer in the same period: namely Ralph Waldo Emerson and particularly in his essay “Self-Reliance” ([1841] 2015). This was an essay that would later come to influence Cavell when, tending toward an autobiographical pitch for his philosophical writing, he moved from the expressions and experiences of one’s own subject or self to rethink the condition of a transcendent self, a philosophical self granted some sort of universal insight or perspective through the foggy atmosphere.

Emerson sought a consistency in the inner sincerity with which a writer or an artist expresses him- or herself, for such a “latent conviction,” he wrote, shall be or produce a “universal sense” ([1841] 2015, 127). For always “the inmost becomes the outmost,—and our first thought is rendered back to us by the trumpets of the Last Judgment” (127). Emerson found this sincerity and conviction of voice in Moses, Plato, and Milton, who spoke not what others, but what they themselves thought. The greater the genius of a person, the more thoughts, both inspired and rejected, entered into the minds and works of artists. Immediately distinguishing the true geniuses from the cowards and impostors, he wrote that “it needs a divine man to exhibit anything divine. A man is relieved and gay when he has put his heart into his work and done his best; but what he has said or done otherwise shall give him no peace. It is a deliverance which does not deliver. In the attempt his genius deserts him; no muse befriends; no invention, no hope” (128).

Emerson addressed the necessary non-conformism of the true thinker, the necessary solitude of place and thought that someone must find in a world that conspires as a “joint-stock company” (Emerson [1841] 2015, 129–30) to take away the freedom from persons in the name of compliance. “Self-reliance” was the term for the aversion to a compliance or bartering that relies rather on stock names and customs. Self-reliance is equal to a thoughtful integrity, of an
inner constitution freed from a constitution artificially founded on laws. “I am ashamed,” he wrote, “to think how easily we capitulate to badges and names, to large societies and dead institutions. Every decent and well-spoken individual affects and sways me more than is right. I ought to go upright and vital, and speak the rude truth in all ways” (130). Following a rude description of all that conformity brings by way of a life of untruth, Emerson dismissed the demand for the sort of consistency that, upheld as a principle, prevents any contradiction of thought or action. “A foolish consistency,” he wrote in what has almost become a proverbial saying, “is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers and divines” (133) Or:

With [a pedantic] consistency a great soul has simply nothing to do. He may as well concern himself with his shadow on the wall. Out upon your guarded lips! Sew them up with packthread, do. Else if you would be a man speak what you think to-day in words as hard as cannon balls, and to-morrow speak what to-morrow thinks in hard words again, though it contradict everything you said to-day. Ah, then, exclaim the aged ladies, you shall be sure to be misunderstood. Misunderstood! It is a right fool’s word. Is it so bad then to be misunderstood? Pythagoras was misunderstood, and Socrates, and Jesus, and Luther, and Copernicus, and Galileo, and Newton, and every pure and wise spirit that ever took flesh. To be great is to be misunderstood. (133)

5. Intentionality and purposiveness

When Cavell wrote in his essay of “objects composed,” he introduced notions of experiment, risk, improvisation, and chance not so much, or solely, as techniques of musical composition or works decomposed, but more as virtues in the ancient sense that had led persons “to act successfully” from the beginning to the end, “to follow the distance from an impulse and intention through to its realization” (Cavell [1967] 1976b, 198). He placed the virtue of this sort of intentionality or purposiveness on a par with the aim to be courageous and temperate, because only with such virtues would one overcome the many obstacles that aimed to trip one up. “A world,” he observed, “in which you could get what you want merely by wishing would not only contain no beggars, but no human activity” (199). This thought was a way of extending Wittgenstein's own Aristotelian thought that intention is never enough—one needs also the preparation, foresight, or know-how that allows one to carry an action through.

“The success of an action is threatened,” Cavell explained, “by the lack of preparation or foresight; by the failure of the most convenient resources, natural or social, for implementing the action (a weapon, a bridge, a shelter, an extra pair of hands); and by a lack of knowledge about the best course to take, or way to proceed. To survive the former threats will require ingenuity and resourcefulness, the capacity for improvisation; to overcome the last will demand the willingness and capacity to take and to seize chances” (199).
In a world that has no space for such improvisation or chance, there is, Cavell observed, no dissonance or antagonism, and where there is no dissonance, there is no consonance worth having, because the consonance achieved is really no achievement at all. Likewise, and I find this argument also throughout Adorno’s work, there is no sense of improvisation where the intention is missing or claimed no more to count in overly controlled procedures of making music. The form sustained by intention and improvisation is missing. Cavell spelt out one must of meaning as a must of composing where, from and through tensions, imbalances, shocks, surprises, risks, and dangers, we are led to a fulfilment, a calm, or a release, a sublimity of experience, almost a divinity of vision. He articulated the terms of improvisation and chance as an ethical inventiveness and resourcefulness that displayed itself as virtuous over the safer option, the latter being a cop-out from being human as when one merely imitates in academic ways. Producing what is obvious in the face of things is not to produce at all. It is merely or coldly to repeat what is already in evidence or already the case. Of such an obvious or repetitive production, he added, we do not use words of praise: we do not speak of the act of composing or its result with aesthetic predicates of achievement or virtue, as having been, say, “masterful, elegant, subtle, profound . . . .” (Cavell [1967] 1976b, 199).

To take a chance, to improvise, or to experiment is to issue an invitation to others to accompany one on one’s way. Cavell saw this invitation not as an authoritative command or as resting on a deontological foundation. Still, the invitation exacts an obligation in the only way exactitude should be. “The price for freedom in this choice of commitment and accountability is,” he wrote, “that of an exactitude in meeting those commitments and discharging those accounts which no mere morality can impose” (200). So when one makes a promise, for example, one asks for the trust of others that the risks one is prepared to take are worth taking. To compose or to create is ethically to commit oneself as one does in any action when one puts one’s values on display, when one embodies or enacts one’s values. When commitments and choices work out from beginning to end, we have assumed responsibility for them; we speak of them as consistent or coherent. And when we do not, we speak of a loss of coherence.

6. Ethical consequences

To flout the ethical demand was consequential. It was what led most to the condition of being discomposed. Cavell described how listening to a work one recomposes it, much as Dewey and Collingwood described listening and learning as a re-enactment, and much as Adorno wrote of a *dialektische Bewegung* wherein in the discomposing of the work one recomposes it in an act of listening or performing. Where and when there was a failure of re-enactment or recomposition, there was a failure of communication or comprehension. To explain the failure, Cavell described the loss of conventions or the stable background—a known background—against which we understand new moves in a practice. If the ground is taken from us, we do know how to go on—we lose
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As evidence for the new fashion and fetish for formulaic conventions, Cavell looked at an avant-garde that had retreated into academia and into producing journals for pre-chosen readers, where preaching for a new music in technical and arcane language was preaching to the already converted. Composers for composers; writers for writers—but all in the conspicuous absence of a public. What were construed as problems of our time were turned into problems only for those now already in the know. Only when there was an admission that composers or artists had lost their way in their own procedures did Cavell sense an honesty in the critical discourse. He did not buy the adage that time would tell or that in a thousand years (and this is Schoenberg’s language) we would come to whistle Schoenberg in the subways. Waiting for time to tell, Cavell wrote, is to ignore “what the present tells” ([1967] 1976b 188).

7. A dis-discomposed music?

Cavell asked after the situation when art only seems to trigger disappointment and dissatisfaction. Could and should we even trust that the triggers are real? Could not the discomposure itself be a fake? How, he asked, with Wittgenstein, do we ever know that those who express pleasures and pains are not faking it? Do we ever know another person at all? We feel disoriented—unstrung—when we discover something about another person in whom we have placed our trust. Our alienation from ourselves, triggered by our distance from others, allows us to experience the world—or our environment—as disharmonious. But what of a world in which no one seems to feel at home—where, as in a

our bearings: we are groundless or discomposed. We cannot grasp the purposiveness or end of the action either because there is no end or because there is no path—no “unfolding” in Adorno’s terms. We need to know the problem to know what counts as a solution—which was a thought that, having been shared by Schoenberg and Wittgenstein, was later shared by Adorno and Cavell. For both said, in the context of their times, that we need now and more than ever before to be able to recognise what counts as a mistake. For when “the entire enterprise of action and of communication has become problematic,” we no longer know “what you want” or “what would satisfy” us (Cavell [1967] 1976b, 201). Convention, Cavell concluded,

as a whole is now looked upon not as a firm inheritance from the past, but as a continuing improvisation in the face of problems we no longer understand. Nothing we now have to say, no personal utterance, has its meaning conveyed in the conventions and formulas we now share. In a time of slogans, sponsored messages, ideologies, psychological warfare, mass projects, where words have lost touch with their sources or objects, and in a phonographic culture where music is for dreaming, or for kissing, or for taking a shower, or for having your teeth drilled, our choices seem to be those of silence, or nihilism (the denial of the value of shared meaning altogether), or statements so personal as to form the possibility of communication without the support of convention—perhaps to become the source of new convention. (201–2)
crisis of humanity, all feel unstrung? Cavell recalled what the composer Saint-Saëns had said about the emperor of the avant-garde, as having no clothes, and of how history had stripped him naked. But if waiting for time to pass could not now perform the revelation or reveal the truth behind the fancy clothes of imposture, what, if anything, could?

One possible answer was philosophy—thinking the truth through to the end. Describing what the present tells, Cavell ([1967] 1976b) moved to a telling of all times: that, in the end, “the dangers of fraudulence, and of trust, are essential to the very experience of art” (188–89). “If anything . . . should count as a thesis,” he wrote, “that is my thesis” (189). He constantly reconfirmed this generalising move: “Contemporary music is only the clearest case of something common to modernism as a whole, and modernism only makes explicit and bare what has always been true of art” (189). Or “It is not merely a modern problem; it is, one could say, the problem of modernism, the attempt in every work to do what has never been done, because what is known is known to be insufficient, or worse” (195–96).

But still, though he had his philosophical thesis in hand, he did not count it as the cure. For the last time, the title offered the clue that had become now also the cure. One way out at least for music seemed to be to detach itself from the state of having become discomposed. Cavell wrote of modern taste being defeated not by new commandments of taste or by re-disciplining taste, but by allowing music or art to de-discipline taste—and hence our entire response structure. We were reading the entire situation in the wrong way. Turning to music and art, he seemed to fall back on what in music and art could not be defeated: namely, its power to resist its social discipline. Hence, if a music discomposed was the problem for the modern subject and the modern world, then perhaps a music that was dis-discomposed would be the cure. The cure was presented as revolutionary and radical. It had to be so presented in the extreme condition of the sixties against those who held on to so anxious a comportment in the world.

But from another perspective, the utopian cure was as old as the hills, and walking in those hills, the decomposed philosophical subject of modernism suddenly felt very safe: as calmed as the winds. Sitting in the world, the philosophical subject could now listen to tonal and atonal music anew, as an art expressive of a condition of scepticism overriding the dominant impression that the world now was lost as once it had not been. A music composed had always been also a music threatened by discomposure. [Or as my critics showed me, I was mistaken to write of a music dis-discomposed, for, all the time, I had really meant to refocus the target onto the philosophical self as the discomposed subject who looks toward the very idea of composition as a riddle or enigma of modernism, the enigmatic relation of subject to object where the dark glasses do not throw forth a clean and clear light.]
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References


In what follows, three responses to Lydia Goehr’s essay are presented to the reader. The first two—by Kathy Kiloh and Jake McNulty—were delivered at the fourth annual meeting of the Association for Adorno Studies, which was hosted by the Philosophy Department of the New School for Social Research in New York on 9 and 10 October 2015. Both comments are to be seen as an important complement to Goehr’s text. The third response—actually an extended comment—written by myself is a direct result of the editing process of Goehr’s essay. Fascinated by the topic, I read Cavell’s original essay and all subsequent discussions at the very beginning of 2017, coming to a rather critical view on Cavell’s original essay from 1965. It was sent to Lydia Goehr, Katy Kiloh, and Jake McNulty, who read it carefully. On the one hand, this extended comment slightly departs from the main topic of this volume; on the other hand, it argues for the making of music as the most compelling way to reply to Cavell, thus establishing a bridge to the performances and installations presented during the Orpheus Academy 2016, which are described in the appendix with hyperlinks to their video recordings.

Paulo de Assis
Response 1

What Is a Music Dis-discomposed?

Kathy Kiloh
OCAD University, Toronto

Lydia Goehr’s paper ends by characterising Cavell’s “cure” for a music discomposed as a strategic move that would be particularly at home in eighteenth-century aesthetic philosophy. She suggests that Cavell’s solution to the problem of a music discomposed (and by extension a subject discomposed) would be a music dis-discomposed. Although I feel fairly confident in my understanding of what it might mean to be discomposed (both music and subject), I remain unsure about what a music dis-discomposed would possibly be. I’m going to attempt to explain what I think that phrase might mean, with the assumption that my inability to hear what Goehr means, and the misconceptions that might result from this partial deafness, will be corrected or mitigated in the conversation that this paper and my response to it will open.

So there are three concerns that I want to clarify: (1) what would it mean for (music, the subject) to be dis-discomposed, (2) what is it about Cavell’s “cure” that reeks so openly of a conservative philosophical modernism, and (3) what happens when we bring all this back into conversation with Adorno? I will have to bring several key words into this conversation in order for me to try to hear what Goehr means, although I know that by applying these terms to what she has already said, I may misrepresent her meaning. Nonetheless, by deploying the terms autonomy and heteronomy and, alongside these terms, narcissism and love, transcendence and universality, I hope to make explicit the links and distinctions, connections and disconnections between Cavell and Adorno that Goehr has so eloquently indicated in her paper.

The atmosphere of fraudulence that Cavell attributes to the aesthetic production contemporary to the time of the composition of this essay (and, as Goehr suggests this atmosphere extends beyond the realm of aesthetic production to shape the human condition itself), is nicely articulated by her turn to the eighteenth-century writings of George Crabb. Crabb suggests that the meaning of the word consonance implies a proof of truth, whereas this is not true of its opposite: dissonance. Dissonance cannot act as a proof of falsehood unless it leads to complete inconsistency. The dissonance of atonal music therefore, because it remains an effect of a consistent aesthetic programme, cannot be cited as a symptom of art’s falsehood. But neither can this work be
proven to be “true” in any sense. We the public, and the artists as well, are left then with the feeling that all might not be right with the new music, and yet, we can’t prove it to be wrong. There is no real way to judge this work. And because of the dissonance that exists between the subject of modern philosophy and the subject experienced through modern literature and modern life, there is no way to produce and communicate meaning within this situation; we wade in a sea of fraudulence. In turning to Crabb’s dictionary of synonyms, Goehr also highlights the anxiety that emerges alongside the eighteenth-century discourse of aesthetics—this anxiety is the need for clarity in language—it is the desire to ensure that the speaking (or writing) subject can mean what he or she says, and that, in doing so, will be able to make him- or herself understood to the public at large. This anxiety should be understood as a reaction to the growing subjectivisation of the world that Luc Ferry (1993, 7) has identified as the hallmark of modernity. Communication of universal values and feeling becomes increasingly problematic in a world that rejects tradition as the enemy of individual freedom.

According to Crabb’s definition, to compose—that is, to impose an order upon that which has no “natural” order of its own—requires a subject endowed with the capacity to commit itself to seeing a piece through from the beginning to its end, and to thereby create and attempt to communicate meaning. As an antidote to the atmosphere of fraudulence, Cavell seems to argue for a heroic subject capable of taming chance and cultivating it into experimentation and improvisation. As Goehr points out, this is an ethical commitment, in that it requires the composer to expose his or her values for all to see, and potentially, for those values to be misinterpreted by others. When this meaning is created, and achieves the desired effect, then, Cavell argues, what results for the artist and the viewer/listener/reader is a sublime, divinely transcendent point of view. But for Adorno, the transcendence of the work of art can’t provide us with this sweeping view of history and the present as a totality: “Artworks . . . produce their own transcendence, rather than being its arena, and thereby they once again become separated from transcendence” (1997, 111). The transcendence produced by art is what provokes the shudder (ibid.): that which shakes us out of our identification with this subject conceived of as autonomous and masterful by reminding us of our very constitution as subjects, and of the suffering of the nonidentical left behind in this identification.

In Cavell’s essay, much is made of the new music’s conformity to technical prescription—in fact, Cavell also refers to the way this prescription has come to dominate literary production, specifically in the case of the nouveau roman. The author of the work no longer “composes” work—he or she merely follows a philosophically pre-determined programme. The work becomes a mere illustration of the overly technical directive published in academic periodicals—it is secondary, an afterthought that has no real bearing on the aesthetic theory itself. This perspective certainly shares something in common with Adorno, who writes in Aesthetic Theory: “the fatal aging of the modern: a result of the tensionlessness of the totally technical artwork” (1997, 452).
What Cavell describes is, in fact, a situation in which subjective autonomy has capitulated to the heteronomous constitution of the work of art in an attempt to guarantee universal aesthetic agreement, but in guaranteeing this agreement, the work communicates no subjective content. In response to this situation, Cavell proposes that what is needed are strong individuals (Goehr uses Emerson’s term, “self-reliant,” but we could also throw in Kant’s term “mature” here)—in any case—strong individuals who are capable of saying what they mean, even if this means that they may not be understood. This requires subjects who are capable of turning away from the adoration and respect of others in order to isolate themselves with their own genius. But, as Adorno points out in “Opinion, Delusion, Society,” in an atmosphere of fraudulence, when there are no clear truths to cling to, individuals cling all the more tightly to what they perceive to be their personal opinions, justified by “experience” (Adorno 1998). This is because in a world in which (quoting from Negative Dialectics) “none . . . are capable of love” (Adorno [1973] 1997, 362), opinion is always (here from Opinion Delusion Society) “invested with affect” (Adorno 1998, 107)—a tendency that Adorno believes to be based on a collective narcissism, defined as “the fact that human beings to this day are obliged to withhold a measure of their ability to love from, for instance, other loved ones, and instead to love themselves in a repressed, unacknowledged, and therefore, insidious manner” (ibid.). It is difficult, then, to determine whether what we experience as genius is, in fact, an original act of creative autonomy in which meaning is produced, or a delusion that arises from and returns us to the “collective narcissism” that “compensates” (ibid., 118) us for our lack of individuality.

I think it is precisely Cavell’s reliance upon this heroic subject and his investment in the sublimely transcendent—even omnipotent—perspective afforded by the work of art that makes his cure for a music discomposed “as old as the hills” (see, Goehr above, p. 146) and so (falsely) comforting to the modernist philosophical subject, made anxious by its own discomposition. And I think also that there would be no need to paint Adorno as a postmodern thinker in order for us to recognise that the modernist philosophical subject should feel anything but safe within the pages of his books and essays. As Goehr points out, Adorno, somewhat like Cavell, appeals to the few individuals still capable of performing the role of “moral superego”: whose aim is decidedly not to be understood by others at the expense of his own attempt to produce and express meaning. But from my perspective, the composing (or dis-discomposing) subject that Cavell calls for and the exemplary subject that Adorno appeals to look quite different. Adorno understood that when a work of art or a subject makes a claim to autonomy, we need look upon this claim with suspicion, with “dark glasses” perhaps. To assert one’s autonomy is useless if this exercise of so-called autonomy leaves the system it rails against intact. And while this most certainly does not appear to be Cavell’s intention, his reliance upon antiquated aesthetic forms and concepts ultimately reinforces the system as a whole.

On Cavell’s account, the atmosphere of fraudulence can’t be blamed on a lack of philosophical aesthetics; rather, philosophy dominates aesthetic production—and, what’s worse, it’s the wrong kind of philosophy. Cavell seems
to suggest that we need to develop a new Wittgensteinian “language game” in order to make sense of music discomposed, and this new discourse can only be composed from the transcendent perspective that can view the present situation in its relation to the two-hundred-year-long history of aesthetics. But without the aesthetic release provided by the composed work, we cannot achieve the transcendence craved by the modern philosophical subject. Therefore, we need not only a heroic subject, but also to harness the rebellious powers of art to kick away at the disciplining strictures of society; to quote Cavell’s “Music Discomposed” here, “What modern artists realize, rather, is that taste must be defeated, and indeed that this can be accomplished by nothing less powerful than art itself” ([1967] 1976b, 206). By my reading, what Cavell is referring to here as “taste” is both the traditionalist views that cannot hear anything but the absence of what they expect from music in the atonal, and the academic discourse that attempts to legitimate, and ends up dictating the terms of the new music. For Cavell, a music dis-discomposed would then be a music that uses its inherent power to resist the disciplining discourse of that “taste” (thereby destroying it) so that it might be replaced by a more adequate aesthetic theory, developed from the sublime and transcendent perspective he attributes to composed music.

But for the Adorno of Aesthetic Theory (roughly contemporary, as Goehr points out with the Cavell of “Music Discomposed”) taste is already an obsolete aesthetic category (Adorno 1997, 452). In this light, the rebelliousness of art and the heroism of the autonomous subject appear like so many Don Quixotes battling windmills. Is it too much to assert that this championing of autonomy over heteronomy in the composition of modern art, much like what would appear to be its opposite—the aesthetic theory Adorno accuses of becoming “art’s necrology”—is itself an abdication in favour of “one sort of barbarism that is no better than the culture that has earned barbarism as recompense for its own monstrosity” (ibid., 4)?

Back to Adorno’s exemplary individual: we can, I think, oppose the heroic autonomous subject that Cavell calls for to Adorno’s invocation, in his essay on Eichendorff in Notes to Literature, of the poet’s “power to be weak” (Adorno 1991–92, 70)—the poet’s ability to relinquish the self to language, and, as well, philosophy’s ability to relinquish itself to the object. Here we have an individual who is strong enough to resist the pull of narcissism that potentially makes “kitchen staff” of us all, and strong enough to be able to relinquish his or her right to impose order upon matter, a right bestowed on the philosophical subject of modernity by the (particularly Kantian and Hegelian) discourse of aesthetics. In the modern lyric poetry of Baudelaire, Adorno sees in the turn away from others and inward the emergence of a universality that is not ideal or abstract, or frankly, easily understood, but rather the recognition and expression of the universal conditions of alienation of the subject under late capitalism. In this sense, the song of Baudelaire seems to me to be the best example of a music dis-discomposed.
Lydia Goehr's piece offers a strikingly original explanation of the significance of Cavell's title, "Music Discomposed," to the theme of his essay. Goehr's piece does so mainly, though not exclusively, by viewing Cavell's essay through an Adornian lens, situating it in a post-war cultural context and reconstructing the etymological history of the term "discomposed." In revisiting Cavell's essay, however, I found myself drawn to a different explanation of the titular phrase: I think "music discomposed" is Cavell's pejorative label for a certain misunderstanding of the significance of modern music—a misunderstanding mainly found in Cage's interpreter Krenek. I will summarise that alternative explanation here. Then, I'll briefly note what I think are some suggestive discrepancies between it and Goehr's own.

1. **What is music “discomposed”?**

Understanding the meaning of Cavell's title ("Music Discomposed") requires taking account of his discussion from Section VI of what it means for music to be “composed” in the first place ([1967] 1976b, 189–93). For Cavell, musical works are “composed” in the specific sense that they are (and are encountered by the listener as) products of human intention ("they are, in a word, not works of nature but of art," as he says [ibid., 198]). Moreover, Cavell argues, the great achievement of many modern musical works is to vividly encapsulate phenomena connected with human agency. In particular, Cavell stresses the way they alert us to certain disconcerting facets of our encounters with the deeds of others. As Cavell explains, modern musical works confront us with the ever-present possibility of a certain kind of fraudulence in such encounters. Moreover, these works suggest we can never fully eliminate the suspicion that the trust we necessarily place in others may have been betrayed in a given instance. Ultimately, then, Cavell maintains that our encounters with modern musical works model almost perfectly our encounters with other people. They are no less fraught with opportunities for misunderstanding, alienation, and miscommunication, but also no less rich in possibilities for mutuality and connection.
As Cavell stresses, this account implies a novel view of the relation of these modern works to past ones. In particular, it implies that the possibility of fraudulence has always been present. If that possibility is inherent to human action, artistic or not, then it follows that it will have been present in all past musical works, since all were products of agency. At least in this one respect, modernism’s break with the past is less radical than either its detractors or its defenders might have us believe.

The truths about our condition encapsulated in modern musical works are disconcerting; we therefore have a tendency to repress their true significance, a tendency Cavell finds in certain (then) contemporary critics and composers. One of the great themes of Cavell’s work of this period is that many of the more extreme ideas in both traditional philosophy and contemporary criticism (those in the periodical Die Reihe, for instance) represent misbegotten attempts to evade these truths about our condition. This is a facet of one of Cavell’s central preoccupations in Must We Mean What We Say?: philosophy’s flight from the human.

It is against this backdrop, I suggest, that we should understand the meaning of the phrase “music discomposed.” If music “composed” is music that is a product of intention, then music “discomposed” is modern music and criticism that mistakenly strives to eliminate intention from theory and practice. Although Cage is clearly implicated in attempts to create music of this kind, his interpreter Krenek is the main culprit here. For Krenek, “chance” displaces human responsibility completely and therefore divests music of its status as a product of the human will (Cavell explicitly labels Krenek a “nihilist” and includes Stockhausen in this camp, too). Put crudely, Krenek, Stockhausen, and, to a lesser extent Cage, are fleeing the human.

If this answer to Goehr’s question (“What anyway is a music discomposed?”) seems plausible, then I think that Goehr’s argument should be qualified in a certain respect. Goehr’s essay often equates “music discomposed” with modern music and, more specifically, its radical break with convention; moreover, the essay seems to include Cavell in the chorus of authors who lament the breakdown of convention, bemoan the disorientation modernism creates, and so on. In my view, however, Cavell’s reaction to modern music is not conventionally conservative but more nuanced and complex. What Cavell bemoans is not the break with convention itself but rather the wrongheaded attempts of certain critics, composers and philosophers (e.g., Krenek and Cage) to understand this break as having rendered human intention obsolete.

There is textual evidence that this is what Cavell meant by his title. Admittedly, he does not explicitly say so, but he comes very close. For Cavell, critics and composers like Cage and Krenek, with their appeals to “chance,” threaten music with “discomposition” in the following way: “When a contemporary theorist [Stockhausen, Cage, Krenek, et al.] appeals to chance, he obviously is not appealing to its associations with taking and seizing chances, with risks and opportunities. The point of the appeal is not to call attention to the act of composition, but to deny that act; to deny that what he offers is composed” ([1967] 1976b, 202).
2. **Atonal music: disorienting modern subjects? Or reorienting them?**

Goehr’s piece emphasises Cavell’s preoccupation with the challenge “atonality” poses to modern listeners who may find it inaccessible. In my view, however, it is just as important to emphasise a countervailing theme in Cavell’s treatment of atonal music. For Cavell, atonal music represents one of two paths that can be taken by modern composers. The atonal music of composers like Schoenberg, inaccessible as it may be, actually represents the last hope for a certain kind of accessibility. Such accessibility, says Cavell, is unachievable in the other main form of modern music—the “total organisation” of composers like Stockhausen. Atonal music represents a heroic attempt to re-establish convention in an era of “mass-deception” in which tradition has become an object of profound (perhaps justified) mistrust. Responding to the challenge posed by late Romantic extensions of chromaticism that eventually overwhelmed tonality entirely, atonal music finds a new, non-tonal basis and substitute for the structure and organisation that characterised traditional musical works. In this respect it both breaks with and preserves tradition, and indeed does so in the interest of preserving the possibility of communication between artist and audience. By contrast, the “total organisation” of Krenek and Stockhausen renounces convention of even the most minimal kind. It therefore completely forecloses the possibility of shared understanding between artists and their audience—it rules out the possibility of saying (or better, playing) something that means anything at all to another person (it is, as Cavell says, “nihilism”).

3. **Cavell’s “historicisation” of the category of improvisation**

In the closing section, Goehr discusses Cavell’s elevation of the musical phenomenon of improvisation to the status of an ethical ideal (a virtue reflecting resourcefulness, courage, and other praiseworthy human qualities). I wonder, however, if this section should have included an engagement with Cavell’s “historicisation” of improvisation. I ask because it seemed, at points, as if the essay implied that Cavell celebrates improvisation and even looks to it as a “saving power” to redeem us from the disorientations of modernism; although that’s partly right, Cavell also appears to maintain that improvisation is no longer a possibility in modern music and may never be again.

Among Cavell’s most provocative claims in the essay is the seemingly paradoxical one that improvisation, which seems spontaneous, unstructured, and free from various strictures, can actually only take place where an agreed upon and stable set of shared conventions exists. As I understood it, the rationale for this claim is that the novel gestures of the improviser achieve their aesthetic effect only by virtue of tacit reliance on such conventions—even if, or maybe especially if, they are relied upon only in order to be subverted. Accordingly, improvisation, which we often associate with certain trends in modern music (jazz, for instance), actually has its home in a much earlier “convention-bound” period, and is scarcely possible in modern music—at least in those quarters
where convention has (more or less) completely broken down. With Bach, Cavell says, improvisation is still possible: his music, although not ordinarily improvised, can at least be imagined to have been improvised or to be the product of the composer’s improvisational experimentation. With Beethoven, however, improvisation is no longer possible: not because there is, in fact, less improvisation in his works but because we can no longer hear his pieces as if they were improvised. Here, Cavell draws a distinction between what is a product of “improvisation” (for him, an honorific) and what is merely a product of “chance” in Cage and Krenek’s sense (for him, a symptom of decline, as we saw earlier). Cavell does so in an effort to express his conviction that what appears improvised in modern music—Stockhausen’s Klavierstück XI, for instance—is, in fact, not improvised at all but rather a mimicry of true spontaneity.
When I received Lydia Goehr’s note of acceptance to my invitation for the Orpheus Academy 2016—on musical ontology—I was surprised by her choice of topic: a paper providing a new interpretation of Stanley Cavell’s 1965 essay “Music Discomposed.” The reference to Adorno in the subtitle, and my knowledge of Lydia Goehr’s erudition and sophisticated argumentation, made me believe that there would be a “secret path” from Cavell’s apparent discussion of the state of musical composition in the 1960s to the subject matter I had imagined she would broach, namely a revisitation of musical ontological questions twenty-five years after the publication of her book The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works (1992). If Cavell, according to Goehr, operated a “strategic displacement of the subject matter” in his essay, so she would do the same with the topic of the Orpheus Academy 2016. And indeed, after hearing her presentation, and after reading her essay, I was able to discern that secret link, one that is not obvious but crucial. Goehr introduces it at the end of her second paragraph: the origin of Cavell’s “strategic displacement of the subject matter” (the real matter being the “repressed . . . modernist philosophical subject” and not really the “state of contemporary musical composition”; see, Goehr above, p. 132) is Cavell’s uneasy relationship to, or “disconcert” with, “the over- and under-composed offerings of his day.” Music that according to Cavell is “over-composed” (Krenek and Stockhausen with their “total organisation” being his examples) or “under-composed” (Cage and the Stockhausen of Klavierstück XI) obviously challenges the dominant notion of the regulative work-concept, raising questions of what a musical work is and what it is not. If under-composed, a piece cannot claim to have a fully prescriptive, normative instance of reference, therefore having literally as many different renderings as performances. If over-composed (be it by extreme rationalised compositional algorithms and/or by electroacoustic, mechanical renderings), it loses any possible variability from performance to performance, becoming something fixed, frozen, dead. Thus, under- and over-composed music seems to exist outside the classical paradigm of the work-concept, which among other qualifiers requires a strong reference (“the work”) and a pluralistic variability of render-
ings (“interpretations”). Cavell’s essay critically (and openly in a negative manner) addresses, therefore, a kind of music that undermines the work-concept as it would be defined by Lydia Goehr twenty-seven years later, in 1992. Cavell’s quick solution was to dismiss such works altogether as not being music, as being the result of the fraudulent and nihilistic tendencies of his day—nihilism being defined as “the denial of the value of shared meaning altogether” (Cavell [1967] 1969b, 202). Cavell’s problem (at least as Cavell put it) was that musical works that operated outside the classical paradigm of the work-concept did not seem able to partake in structures of “shared meaning.”

Goehr’s reinterpretation of Cavell’s essay, through the lens of Adorno, but crucially through her own theoretical apparatus, offers a more elaborated, nuanced, and intelligent outcome, suggesting that out of an apparent “discomposure” a “radical new form of composure” can emerge. Her line of thought—more or less as she explained it in the discussion following her presentation in Ghent—is that Cavell worked his way from a state of discomposed music/subject to producing an “ethics of decomposition” such that one would end up feeling “safe.” “Music Discomposed” would thus be an attempt to restore Cavell’s ethical conviction—the certainty that he had the capacity to make music still have meaning. This is, in my opinion, Goehr’s very interesting but highly complex interpretation of Cavell’s essay, making a point that is difficult to argue in the face of the original text. It seems far more straightforward to see Cavell simply aiming at discrediting certain modes of doing art (and music) as not being art at all, as producing fraudulent objects, characterised by “the denial of the value of shared meaning altogether” (Cavell [1967] 1969b, 202). If there is any doubt about Cavell’s negative (and even personal) intentions, it suffices to read the very last sentence of Section VI (the core section of the essay), which reads like a passionate, anti-analytic, almost melodramatic assault on both Krenek and Stockhausen. Coming to a “new form of composure” from that extremely negative position seems to require a very arduous line of reasoning, which might generate a new and rich thesis, but loses reference to Cavell’s hopeless condemnation of the avant-garde. In this sense, Goehr’s essay on Cavell’s “Music Discomposed” suggests to me the Borgesian idea that Cavell (in 1965) would have benefited from having read Goehr’s *Imaginary Museum of Musical Works* and Jacques Rancière’s definitions of the “aesthetic regime of the arts.” Both situate an epistemic rupture in the late eighteenth century, somewhere between 1750 and 1800: Goehr points to the emergence of the work-concept as a regulative force in music composition, performance, and reception; Rancière describes a post-Kantian (and very Schillerian) mode of producing and relating to the arts in general. Interestingly, and in total agreement with this view *avant la lettre*, Cavell starts his essay with a reminder of the birth of aesthetics: “It is a widespread opinion that aesthetics, as we think of it, became a subject, and acquired its name, just over two hundred years ago” ([1967] 1969b, 180). Cavell was thus very close to what Goehr and Rancière would theorise thirty years later. Both would have given him a horizon of thought that was obliterated by his obvious resentment against the avant-garde and by a human, all too human belief in a shared language, in “the familiar,” in authenticity, intention, serious-
ness, sincerity, honesty, profundity, and other “virtues” that are explicitly presented by him as “necessary to act coherently and successfully at all” (ibid., 198).

The gregarious, conservative, and reactionary perspective of Cavell’s text cannot be overlooked, and I am not totally convinced that “Music Discomposed” deserves the respectful attention we are giving to it. The essay was written in 1965 for the Oberlin Colloquium in Philosophy, and published in 1967 in the proceedings of that conference (Capitan and Merrill 1967). Already in that volume, two comments by no less than Joseph Margolis and Monroe C. Beardsley pointed out some significant problems in Cavell’s argumentation. Margolis (1967) focuses on Cavell’s central notion of fraudulence and his hyper-judgmental considerations of what is art and what is non-art, while Beardsley (1967) struggles with Cavell’s peregrine idea that one should treat works of art like people, and disagrees with his stated thesis that “the dangers of fraudulence, and of trust, are essential to the experience of art” (Cavell [1967] 1969b, 188–89). Cavell’s response to Margolis and Beardsley appeared in that same volume, just after their comments under the title “Rejoinders” (Cavell 1967), and was later reprinted as “A Matter of Meaning it” (Cavell [1967] 1969a, 213–37) in Must We Mean What We Say? More recently, in 2010, Brian Kane and Stephen Decatur Smith edited a special issue of the Journal of Music Theory under the suggestive title “Cavell’s ‘Music Discomposed’ at 40” (which was in fact at 45), with contributions by Amy Bauer, Brian Kane, Dmitri Tymoczko, Eric Drott, Franklin Cox, Lawrence Kramer, Michael Gallope, Richard Beaudoin, and Stephen Decatur Smith. I will not enter into the details of that excellent volume, nor of any of those brilliant contributions, as they are easily available to the reader and do not deserve to be summarised out of their respective contexts of argumentation. In terms of a precise critique of Cavell’s essay, I find particularly relevant the contributions by Franklin Cox, Amy Bauer, and Michael Gallope, which sharply articulate some significant shortcomings and factual mistakes in Cavell’s argumentation. Thus, in what follows, I shall simply present three further critical points that were not mentioned in the debate (or at least not sharply enough): (a) Cavell’s reliance on a quotation by a secondary figure, (b) the now visible historical defeat of his position, and (c) the underlying (unconscious?) presence of Schopenhauer in Cavell’s notion of improvisation and musical “discovery.”

In “Music Discomposed” Cavell alludes to Kant’s aesthetics, Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy, and Tolstoy’s What Is Art? and makes references en passant to Thomas Kuhn, Paul Oskar Kristeller, and René Wellek; however, the only extended quotation (211 words long!), the one that constitutes the core “proof” of his anti-modernist argument, is by Ernst Krenek (see Cavell [1967] 1969b, 195). Throughout the essay, Krenek is considered as an exemplary representa-
tive of “modern” or “contemporary” music, and a paragraph extracted from his “Extents and Limits of Serial Techniques” (Krenek 1960) is treated as a paradigmatic statement on the “impersonal mechanicity” of contemporary composition. Two remarks must be made: first, Krenek’s quotation is presented here without any contextualisation, ignoring Krenek’s own remarks on the “limits of serialism,” and his personal artistic trajectory from a late Romantic composer (in the first two decades of the twentieth century) to a neoclassical one (in the early 1920s), to an eclectic one (in the late 1920s, integrating elements from jazz and Renaissance modal counterpoint), to an adherent of the twelve-tone technique (1930s), and finally to a composer of electronic music in the 1950s. To condense Krenek to that particular quotation is incomprehensibly reductionist. Second, and more importantly, Krenek cannot be seen as a porte parole of modernity (nor of contemporaneity). To say that Krenek “was for years a faithful disciple of Schoenberg” (Cavell [1967] 1976b, 195) is not sufficient argument to give him any special authority, and to proclaim that he “has emerged as an important spokesman for total organization” (ibid., my emphasis) is very doubtful—at least, and for sure, not in continental Europe, where his theoretical and artistic output played and still play a very minor role. Other pieces of writing, and crucially other authors, would have been more relevant to Cavell’s argument. In view of Cavell’s focus on under- and over-composed music, the crucial text that exactly addressed that question was Luigi Nono’s 1959 Darmstadt lecture, “The Presence of History in Music Today” (Nono [1959] 1975). Nono’s plea for engagement with and responsibility toward the historical moment was an explicit attack on John Cage’s aleatoric procedures, but also on Stockhausen, who was advocating graphic scores and propagating the idea of artistic processes totally independent of historicity. In fact, that lecture marked the violent and ferocious rupture between Nono and Stockhausen, who is said to have left the room in the middle of Nono’s talk. Had Cavell known Nono’s essay, many of his critiques toward Cage and Stockhausen would have found more solid arguments and a couple of clarifications, which, significantly, would have come from a composer who can be seen as a porte parole and as one of the major figures of integral serialism of the 1950s, a composer who knew how to perfectly integrate the most rigorous organisation of musical structures with the utmost expressive materials (for details about this intrinsic relationship, see Wolfgang Motz’s [1998] book on Nono’s 1956 work Il Canto Sospeso).

Nevertheless, the crucial point is not so much that Cavell’s essay was already outdated when he wrote it but that his thesis and his perspective were defeated by history. As Franklin Cox (2010, 38) put it: “History appears to have proven Cavell wrong.” Today, fifty-two years after the composition of Cavell’s essay, Cage’s and Stockhausen’s works have already become classics of the twentieth century, their musics being played somewhere almost everyday, and with great success. It seems as if the “nihilists” managed to “act coherently and successfully.” This story also applies to other artists Cavell explicitly referred
to as not producing art, or as making fraudulent art: Raymond Roussel, Alain Robbe-Grillet, Pop Art, Jackson Pollock, Frank Stella, Kenneth Noland, and Jules Olitski. But this historical confirmation of the intrinsic quality and futurity of Cage’s and Stockhausen’s approaches to music (and art) was obtained not through theoretical comments or critiques, not through musicological or music-philosophical exercises of interpretation and reinterpretation of arguments, but blandly and more strongly through musical composition itself, by the innumerable pieces of music composed in the last fifty-two years. By the time of Cavell’s writing, Stockhausen was working on *Momente* (1962–69), a piece that addressed many of Cavell’s doubts about contemporary art, achieving a refreshing fusion between freedom and constraints, between the ritual of the concert and the abstraction of autonomous musical forces. György Ligeti and Helmut Lachenmann (as Amy Bauer so eloquently describes in her essay [Bauer 2010]) were about to shake some foundational aspects of music-making and listening. Brian Ferneyhough, Wolfgang Rihm, Gérard Grisey, and Morton Feldman’s late works, among many, many others, were going to continue the adventure of Western music in unprecedented ways, condemning any form of post-Hegelian “end of history,” or “end of art,” to the role of the academic fantasies of art critics. Music was never so florescent as in the second half of the twentieth century. And that is an achievement of the diverse, pluralistic, and highly creative forms of the avant-garde. Had music remained within Cavell’s categories of the “familiar” and the “common language,” looking to identify (and condemn) “mistakes” (see Cavell [1967] 1976b, 201), looking for “inspiration,” had composers improvised hoping to “discover” some metaphysically hidden sound structure, had composers gone that way, there would have been no new music at all—just repetition of the already known, sterile epigones of a lost age, impotency masked as criticality, true nihilism.

5

Cavell never provides a definition of “music discomposed,” but he offers a romantic view of “composed music” (Cavell [1967] 1969b, 198, 200). This is music that results from inspired improvisations: “One can hear, in the music in question [“composed music”], how the composition is related to, or could grow in familiar ways, from a process of improvisation; as though the parts meted out by the composer were re-enactments, or dramatizations of successes his improvisations had discovered . . . containing essentially only such discoveries” (Cavell [1967] 1969b, 200–201, my emphasis). Cavell thus places himself on the side of those who pretend that sound structures are “discovered” and not “invented.” “Composed music” would be, paradoxically, one that sounds as if it were improvised (200), a music where improvisation and chance play a crucial role (198). In a certain sense “composed music” would be music that sounds as if not composed, as if coming from unknown areas of creativity, from some sort of secret origin of art. Inventiveness, the “artificial” generation and manipulation (by humans or by an algorithm) of sounds and structures, would sound as if composed and is therefore disdained by Cavell as “discomposed
music,” because it supposedly operates beyond the “shared codes” of a common language.

I do not want to invert Cavell’s terms “composed” and “discomposed,” though his argumentation would allow us to do it. What I wish to point out is that there are vague (and problematic) echoes of Schopenhauer in Cavell’s ideas. His “discoveries” would come out of intuitive improvisations, which would act as a connector to some sort of oceanic pre- or unconscious. An oceanic dimension that would escape articulated knowledge, making of music that “special” form of art that also for Adorno occupies a particular sphere of intangibility. Here Cavell and Adorno are indeed problematically close to each other (as Goehr said in the discussion following her presentation), suggesting an obscure zone of creativity where artists are delivered to mysterious, enigmatic, and uncontrollable forces.

It is true that Foucault once said (in an interview) that he could have saved himself a lot of work had he read the Frankfurt School. Conversely, I think that Foucault has a lot to say to post-Adornian philosophies of art. In the five lectures he gave in Rio de Janeiro in 1973, published under the title “Truth and Juridical Forms” (Foucault 2002), Foucault stressed the fundamental difference between the “invention” and “origin” of both knowledge and religion, showing how “invention” is the term used by Nietzsche and “origin” the one employed by Schopenhauer. We know how Schopenhauer elevated music to a quasi-religious human activity, and it is in relation to religion that Foucault notes, “Nietzsche says that Schopenhauer made the mistake of looking for the origin—*Ursprung*—of religion in a metaphysical sentiment present in all men and containing the latent core, the true and essential model of all religion. . . . [But] things didn’t happen like that. Religion has no origin, it has no *Ursprung*, it was invented, there was an *Erfindung* of religion. . . . Between the great continuity of the *Ursprung* described by Schopenhauer and the great break that characterizes Nietzsche’s *Erfindung*, there is a fundamental opposition” (Foucault 2002, 7). It seems to me that Cavell’s insistence on the “discovery” of sound structures and on commonly shared and shareable musical codes are indebted to Schopenhauer’s idea of “origin” and of music as a proto-religious human activity. Cavell’s reiteration of the importance of conventions, rules, and familiarity with a common language disclose his profound, existential need for gregariousness, precisely in Nietzsche’s meaning of the term, as dependence, as being servile to others for the sake of being servile, to become part of a herd. In this sense any form of modernity, not even necessarily contemporaneity or the avant-garde, with its will to critically rethink the order of things, the relationships between things and persons, to fundamentally operate a redistribution of the sensible, and to creatively open up new avenues for thought and practices, obviously will be seen as a dangerous phenomenon for all those persisting in having things as they have “always” been before. This was the case with Artusi against Monteverdi, with Saint-Saëns against Stravinsky, and with Cavell against Cage and Stockhausen.
Furthermore, were time and space to allow—which they don’t—I would have liked to include in this comment three more topics, which I simply list here as very problematic, and as a possible guide for future work:

(a) Cavell’s repugnance for precompositional work, drafts, and schema, a “problem” he associates with modernity, ignoring not only Beethoven’s sketches, but also Old-Flemish imitational processes, Bach’s canons, and so on.

(b) His apparent belief in an uncorrupted “I.” Cavell ([1967] 1969b, 198) sustains that “a work of art . . . celebrates the fact that men can intend their lives at all . . . , and that their actions are coherent and effective at all in the scene of indifferent nature and determined society,” as if Freud, Nietzsche, and Marx had not existed and had not written the books they did.

(c) His essentialist, controlling, and disciplining credo that art must have “a definite set of features” that one could describe “in technical handbooks,” whereby “fraudulence could be detected and exposed.” The question for me is not What counts as art? but Who decides what counts as art? or Who decides what is “false”?

As a final remark, I think it is fair to say that Lydia Goehr’s choice of topic was obviously pertinent. The responses to her paper, including this one, prove that Stanley Cavell’s essay “Music Discomposed” still provokes reactions and is, therefore, somehow still “alive.” Philosophically and compositionally, it seems to me completely dated and outdated, but it poses questions with which we—composers and performers of new music—are still confronted today. Those questions, even if anachronistic and reactionary, as I believe they are, must nevertheless be answered. Goehr’s attempt to move from Cavell’s “discomposure” into a “radical new form of composure” is certainly one of them, to which every respondent to her paper is adding newer and different ones. Let’s only hope that one day such questions will vanish, as it will be clear to everybody the positive, energetic, and luminous power of creativity, the constructive force of desire production—and no longer a discourse on dark forms of negative dialectics, on intricate interpretations and reinterpretations of obscure academic terminologies, on unproductive reiterations of past subject matters and problems. Instead of revolving the past, we should be making the future.

References


Paulo de Assis

Book first published 1958–74 as Noten zur Literatur I–IV (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp).


Appendix

The International Orpheus Academy for Music and Theory 2016: Concerts and Installations

In addition to the guest faculty lectures, discussions, and dialogues out of which the six chapters of this book evolved, the International Orpheus Academy for Music and Theory 2016 included several performances, music interventions, and installations. These were intended not as subsidiary or decorative moments within a substantial theoretical debate, but as an integral part of the discourse, contributing concrete sonic and visual materials to the topic. Considering the performative moment not as a place for representation (of already known sound structures), but of problematisation of the musical objects under consideration, the three concerts explored unknown and unpredictable encounters between music, texts, and imagery. Prepared by the ME21 Collective, concretely by Paulo de Assis, Lucia D’Errico, and Juan Parra C., these performances were further explorations of experimental performance practices of Western notated art music, problematising major works not only by Robert Schumann, Ludwig van Beethoven, John Cage, and Bruno Maderna, but also by Athanasius Kircher, Nicola Vicentino, and Sigismondo d’India. Furthermore, there were four installations that displayed diverse sets of material objects related to the works played in the concerts. These included a table with copies of materials that led to the composition of Luigi Nono’s „sottete onde serene...“., a video installation documenting a previous performance by the ME21 Collective of music by Friedrich Nietzsche, a video documentary on “Hyperion’s Explosive Compression,” a piece by Juan Parra C. after Bruno Maderna’s Hyperion, and a diagram representing Einar Torfi Einarsson’s re-notation of Kreisleriana no. 1 in diagrammatic form.
All these concerts and installations have been devised and realised with a strong focus on their immediate physical materiality, and it is very difficult to describe and to communicate them a posteriori, especially in written format. Thus, in what follows, the reader can find hyperlinks to video recordings that simply function as documentation of the concerts and performances, as well as the introductory texts to them, as they were printed during the Orpheus Academy 2016.

**VIDEO RECORDING/DOCUMENTATION OF THE PERFORMANCES**

To watch the video recordings of the three performances follow the QR code below, which links to a multimedia repository hosted by the Orpheus Institute web server.

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1. **Musical performances**

I. Opening Session—4 April 2016, 10:00–10:30 | Orpheus Institute, Auditorium

Video recording available at: https://www.researchcatalogue.net/profile/show-work?work=350826.

*Rasch* Loving *Barthes* for piano, tape, and video projector

Paulo de Assis: concept and piano

Juan Parra C., sound and video projection

Lucia D’Errico, intertitles

Music: Robert Schumann, *Kreisleriana*, op. 16 [1838] (movts. 1, 2, and 3)


*Rasch* is a series of performances, lectures, or lecture-performances based upon two fundamental materials: Robert Schumann’s *Kreisleriana*, op. 16 (1838), and Roland Barthes’s essays on the music of Schumann (1970, 1975, 1979), particularly “Rasch,” a text exclusively dedicated to Schumann’s *Kreisleriana*. To these materials, other components may be added to each particular version: visual elements (pictures, videos), other texts, or further aural elements (recordings, live-electronics, etc.). All these *things* are treated as parts of different strata of an assemblage, which are destratified following the notions of *substrata* (socio-
historical contexts), *parastrata* (documentary sources), *epistrata* (editions, writings, theoretical discourses), and *metastrata* (future performances). The main goal is to generate an intricate network of aesthetic-epistemic cross-references, through which the listener has the freedom to focus on different layers of perception, be it on the music, on the texts being projected or read, on the images, on the voices, and so on. The purely “aesthetic” experience is therefore “disturbed” by the “intellectual” moments; at the same time, these reflective moments would remain senseless without the aesthetic dimension. Beyond “interpretation” and beyond “aesthetics,” the series *Rasch* is part of wider research on what might be labelled “experimental performance practices”—practices that urge us to think (during the performative moment) about what we do know, about what we do not know, and about what we think we know about a given piece.

II. Evening Concert—5 April 2016, 20:00–21:30 | Orpheus Institute, Concert Hall
Video recording available at: https://www.researchcatalogue.net/profile/show-work?work=307388

*Diabelli Machines* #5, after Beethoven’s Diabelli Variations, op. 120
New works by Lucia D’Errico (WP), Paolo Galli, David Gorton, Tiziano Manca, Juan Parra C., Bart Vanhecke

Paulo de Assis: concept and artistic direction
Kurt Dreyer: scenography and lighting
Ensemble Interface
   - Bettina Berger, flutes
   - Niels Hap, clarinets
   - Christophe Mathias, cello
   - Marieke Berendsen, violin
   - Anna D’Errico, piano
   - Agnieszka Koprowska-Born, percussion
ME21 Collective
   - Paulo de Assis, piano
   - Lucia D’Errico, guitars
   - Juan Parra C., live electronics
Special guest: Benjamin Widmer, actor/singer and video projection

*Diabelli Machines* #5 is a series of performances developed by Paulo de Assis and his team in the framework of the artistic research project Experimentation versus Interpretation: Exploring New Paths in Music Performance for the Twenty-First Century (MusicExperiment21), hosted at the Orpheus Institute, Ghent. Inspired by Gilles Deleuze’s *Logic of Sense* (1969) and *Difference and Repetition* (1968), by William Kinderman’s essay “Beethoven’s Diabelli Variations” (1987), and by Michel Butor’s *Dialogue avec 33 variations de Ludwig van Beethoven sur une valse de Diabelli* (1971), this project exposes Beethoven’s Diabelli Variations, op.
to several musical encounters, letting other times and styles interfere with Beethoven, making unconnected connections happen. In the time frame of the original piece, diverse techniques of elimination, suppression, substitution, and replacement are used. Alongside interventions from other times and styles, including from composers such as Bach, Mozart, and Cramer, to which Beethoven openly related, new pieces are regularly composed for every particular instantiation of the project.

More specifically, *Diabelli Machines* is the first outcome of a collaboration between the MusicExperiment21 Collective and Ensemble Interface, a collaboration that was preceded by a two-week long residency by Ensemble Interface at the Orpheus Institute. In addition to recently composed pieces by Paolo Galli, David Gorton, Tiziano Manca, Juan Parra C., and Bart Vanhecke (which were composed as part of the previous collaboration between MusicExperiment21 and the Antwerp based HERMÈSensemble), Lucia D’Errico composed a fully new piece. All the “new” pieces are intended as variations on the variations, including musical reflections or glosses on the original. The composers are all researchers at the Orpheus Institute, affiliated either with its research centre or with the docARTES doctoral programme. Juan Parra C. worked on live-electronic comments on Variation 20. Lucia D’Errico prepared not a score but a “sonic image” of Variation 8 that has to be re-enacted by the performers. Tiziano Manca composed a musical reflection on the entirety of the Diabelli Variations, placed after Variation 10. David Gorton wrote a set of three variations to replace Variations 12, 13, and 14. Bart Vanhecke prepared a dark comment on Variation 20, and Paolo Galli wrote a problematisation of the third part of the work, that is, of Variations 21 to 28. More than simple commissions, these compositions are part of a collaborative endeavour that was built through a series of team meetings involving the core team of MusicExperiment21, all the musicians of Ensemble Interface, the six composers, and the choreographer Kurt Dreyer—a regular collaborator with Ensemble Interface who embraced this project with incredible energy, the highest professionalism, and contagious communicative skills.

III. Closing Performance—6 April 2016, 17:00–18:15 | Orpheus Institute, Concert Hall

Part I
*Shadows from the Empty Centre*, after pieces by Athanasius Kircher, Nicola Vicentino, and Sigismondo d’India
Lucia D’Errico: concept, guitars, and electronics

The current model of production in notated art music, based on the distinction between composer and performer, is designed to make the function of the latter redundant: the sonic result is already envisioned by the projection of sound on a visual medium—the score. Is it possible to retain a correspondence with past musical works while departing from the—supposedly—faithful reproduction of a score? The research project *Shadows from the Empty Centre* experiments
with the production of sonic instantiations that retain a resemblance through non-resembling means with past musical works, mainly but not only from the early Italian Baroque. Starting from the experience of notated repertoire, it attempts to overcome the distinction between notation and improvisation, as well as that between composer, performer, and listener. The model that is looked for is an alternative to the performer as an intermediary between text and sound: a new figure of a musician, an operator who combines the functions of instrumental performer, composer, and listener. Such functions can also be regarded as implicitly contained in the role of the traditional performer, but only if his or her attitude shifts from interpretational (delving into the text and connecting to its meaning) to experimental (diverging from the text and activating unexpected potential). This project aims at radicalising such a shift and making it explicit through sonic instantiations that can be considered from the angles of composition, performance, and perception, but that unfold their full potential only as a hybrid of the three.

Such a quest is backed up by investigations into the idea of empty centre, devised as a concept that encompasses momentous traits of Baroque art, music, and thinking. The shift between the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries was informed by the loss of a centre in many respects. The renewed relationship between man and the world, between subject and object, is a useful tool to experiment with in the search for a different possibility in musical performance. The change towards an art based on the depiction of sensation, rather than of semblance, is the byword for a desired change in the relationship between performers and scores: what if works from the past were approached not as a set of instructions, but as generators of affects that could trigger ever-changing aural outputs?

Part II
Reinterpretation: On John Cage’s Aria/Fontana Mix
Juan Parra C.: electronics

This case study deals with the notion of reinterpretation, understood as the process of recovering not only a particular piece of music but also the circumstances of its composition and original performance in order to adapt it for a performance with electronic instruments. Although today they are considered and performed as individual compositions, Aria and Fontana Mix were first performed together as a single work. This was the point of departure for me to (a) review the compositional procedures behind the creation of Fontana Mix, (b) apply them in the design of a musical instrument to be used in performance, as a complement to Aria, and (c) propose a simultaneous performance of both works following the score of Aria as a structural guideline.
2. Installations

I. Con Luigi Nono: An Archaeology of Things (curated by Paulo de Assis)

*Con Luigi Nono: An Archaeology of Things* displayed copies of the crucial materials that led to the composition of Luigi Nono’s *sofferte onde serene...*, as well as further materials that were generated after the original piece was done. Such things include sketches, working tapes, manuscripts, the final score, the final tape, editions, recordings, books, and articles, the digitalisation of the tapes and the new critical edition and its transcoding for orchestra. Inspired by Michel Foucault’s concept of “archaeology,” this installation exposed the material things that can make *sofferte onde serene...*, a part of a “discourse-object.”

II. Rasch11+1 Re-notations by Einar T. Einarsson

*Re-notations* is a project that re-notates classical piano masterpieces from a specific angle and with an entirely different aim from the original scores. *Re-notations* focuses on the materiality and physical context of these works and gives us a specific perspective on these classical pieces, a perspective that maps out in space and time the activity of the physical materials involved: the specific locations of hands and fingers on the piano keyboard. Through this, the intensity and density of the involved activity is revealed as an overcrowded space of movements and entanglements. Music seen from this perspective is constantly occupying the same locations where actions keep folding one another, repeating differences. A performance of spatio-temporal multiplicity is disclosed. Each keystroke (depression) is accounted for as a link between a spatial location on the keyboard and a temporal axis. Overpopulated location, excessive quantity, and interpenetration become the subjects of this notational act where the relationship between hands and keyboard are highlighted. The “score” becomes an abstract, virtual, diagrammatic “recording” of the actuality of performance: a limited number of space-points are occupied and activated in specific temporal order. Thus, notation reverses its direction and becomes an active post-performance activity, not instructional but speculative, reflective, and itself performative.

(Einar Torfi Einarsson)

III. Hyperion’s Explosive Compression, after Maderna, by Juan Parra C.

[Online version available at:](https://www.researchcatalogue.net/view/262403/262404)

HERMESensemble and Muta Imago

Claudia Sorace | director
Jonathan Schatz | actor, dancer
Valérie Vervoort / Hanne Roos | soprano
Karin De Fleyt | flute
Juan Parra C. | electronics
HYPERION is a production by HERMÉSensemble and Muta Imago in collaboration with Sagra Musicale Malatestiana, Fondazione Romaeuropa, Music Theatre Transparant, and the Orpheus Institute.

The larger goal of this research project is to look at the performance practice of electroacoustic music as reflected by the mirror of traditional instrumental interpretation, and by a specialised performer rather than by the composer. Specifically, it aims to present a number of strategies to analyse, reconstruct, reinterpret, and create electroacoustic music that is actively situated in a larger historical context and either is informed by or is a rendering of pre-existing repertoire. In doing so, the positive aspects of the notions of “core repertoire,” so commonly used in traditional instrumental contexts, can be adapted and utilised by electronic music practitioners, in all three aspects of their practice: technical, compositional, and performative.

In Juan Parra C.’s collaboration with the Italian theatre company Muta Imago, these notions of interpretation are activated by the needs, constraints, and challenges of producing a new version of Bruno Maderna’s Hyperion, focusing on the double dramaturgical and dramaturgical-musical roles of the solo instruments, and the use of recordings of the orchestral parts as a sound object that both contributes to the musical structure and provides a dramaturgical character: an aural representation of a different temporal and spatial plane, one that both sustains and collides with the “live” performers. In the process of creating the electronic processing system, selecting the orchestral recordings, and reconstructing the final timeline for the work, the dramaturgical needs, the logistical constraints, and Parra’s own considerations when approaching interpretation in live electronic music equally contributed to the decision-making.

IV. Nietzsche6+1: The Weight of Music (documentation curated by the ME21 Collective)
Online version available at: https://www.researchcatalogue.net/view/262403/262404

Between 1854 and 1874, Friedrich Nietzsche composed a substantial number of musical works, including fragmentary pieces for solo piano, several songs, and even a sketched opera. His activity as a composer remains essentially unknown and his musical pieces are rarely performed. Moreover, they are usually considered, at best, as juvenilia. Indeed, when Nietzsche decided to be first a philologist, then a philosopher, he stopped composing music. Nevertheless, beyond aesthetic judgements, his musical compositions disclose a character and personality quite different from the far better known Nietzsche-the-philosopher. Nietzsche-the-composer understands himself as a “medium,” an agent dominated by transcendent powers of inspiration and creation submitting him to pre-existing values; on the other hand, Nietzsche-the-philosopher was a destabilising constructor, the inventor of new images of thought, the active operator of a fundamental redefinition of values. For Nietzsche, music had the problematic potential of carrying an “oppressive weight”—an expression he openly
used to refer to one of his compositions, and, later on, to Wagner's music in general. This weight he increasingly associated with the idea of “swimming,” to which he proactively opposed the notion of “dancing.”

In this performance, which took place on 28 November 2015 in the Tanzquartier Wien, the ME21 Collective presented musical works by Nietzsche in dialogue with fragments of his texts, exposing some of the tensions between Nietzsche-the-composer and Nietzsche-the-philosopher.
Notes on Contributors

David Davies is Professor and Chair of Philosophy at McGill University. He is the author of *Art as Performance* (Blackwell, 2004), *Aesthetics and Literature* (Continuum, 2007), and *Philosophy of the Performing Arts* (Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), the editor of *The Thin Red Line* (Routledge, 2008), and a co-editor of *Blade Runner* (Routledge, 2015). He has published widely on the ontology and meta-ontology of art, on philosophical issues relating to music, film, photography, performance, literature, and visual art, and on more general issues in metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language.

Paulo de Assis is an experimental performer, pianist, musicologist, and music philosopher. As an artistic researcher, he is the Principal Investigator of the EU project MusicExperiment21, which challenges conventional definitions of musical works and their renderings. An expert in music performance, contemporary music, experimental performance practices, transdisciplinary discourses, and artistic research, he has wider interests in contemporary philosophy and psychoanalysis. He is a research fellow at the Orpheus Institute, Ghent.

Andreas Dorschel has been Professor of Aesthetics and Head of the Institute for Aesthetics of Music at the University of Arts Graz (Austria) since 2002. Before that appointment, he taught at universities in Britain, Germany, and Switzerland, where in 2002 the University of Berne awarded him the Habilitation. In 2006, he was a visiting professor at Stanford University. Dorschel was elected to the Board of the Austrian Research Fund (FWF) in 2008, in 2011 and, again, in 2014. He co-edited *Bodily Expression in Electronic Music* (New York: Routledge, 2012; 2nd ed., 2013). Among his six authored monographs are *Verwandlung: Mythologische Ansichten, technologische Absichten* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2009) (Neue Studien zur Philosophie 22) and *Ideengeschichte* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2010). Articles by Andreas Dorschel have appeared in publications including the *Cambridge Quarterly*, *The Oxford Handbook of the New Cultural History of Music*, and *Philosophy* (Cambridge University Press).

Lydia Goehr is Professor of Philosophy at Columbia University. In 2009–10 she received a Lenfest Distinguished Columbia Faculty Award, in 2007–08 the Graduate Student Advisory Council (GSAC)'s Faculty Mentoring Award (FMA), and in 2005 a Columbia University Presidential Award for Outstanding Teaching. Lydia Goehr is the author of *The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An Essay in the Philosophy of Music* (1992; 2nd ed. with a new essay, 2007); *The Quest for Voice: Music, Politics, and the Limits of Philosophy: Essays on Richard Wagner* (1998); *Elective Affinities: Musical Essays on the History of Aesthetic Theory* (2008), and co-editor with Daniel Herwitz of *The Don
Notes on Contributors

Giovanni Moment: Essays on the Legacy of an Opera (2006). She has written many articles on the works of Theodor W. Adorno, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Arthur Danto. Lydia Goehr offers courses in the history of aesthetic theory, the contemporary philosophy of the arts, critical theory, and the philosophy of history. Her research interests are in German aesthetic theory and in particular in the relationship between philosophy, politics, history, and music.

Gunnar Hindrichs is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Basel. He has published a book on Kant’s theory of subjectivity, a book on the relation between metaphysics and post-metaphysics, and a book on the philosophy of music, the last two of which caused agitated discussions. Gunnar Hindrichs has held visiting positions at universities in Finland, Italy, and the United States, and his work was awarded the Academy Prize of the Heidelberg Academy of Sciences and Humanities.

Kathy Kiloh is Assistant Professor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Liberal Studies and the School of Interdisciplinary Studies at OCAD University in Toronto, Canada. She is the co-founder and former vice-president of the Association for Adorno Studies and co-editor of the Adorno Studies journal. Her new research project, A Love toward Things, is a study of reification and narcissism, and the socially transformative power of love.

Jake McNulty is a PhD student in philosophy at Columbia University, writing a dissertation on Hegel under Fred Nouhouser and Axel Honneth. He also has strong research interests in German Idealism, on the one hand, and Marx and Marxism, on the other. His article on Fichte’s Foundations of Natural Right, “Transcendental Philosophy and Intersubjectivity: Mutual Recognition as a Condition for the Possibility of Self-Consciousness,” recently appeared in the European Journal of Philosophy.

John Rink is Professor of Musical Performance Studies at the University of Cambridge, and Director of Studies in Music at St John’s College, Cambridge. He studied at Princeton University, King’s College London, and the University of Cambridge; he also holds the Concert Recital Diploma and Premier Prix in piano from the Guildhall School of Music & Drama. He specialises in the fields of performance studies, theory and analysis, nineteenth-century studies, and digital applications in musicology. The six books that he has published with Cambridge University Press include The Practice of Performance (1995), Musical Performance (2002), and Annotated Catalogue of Chopin’s First Editions (with Christophe Grabowski; 2010). He is the General Editor of a series of books on musical performance published by Oxford University Press in 2016. John Rink directed the AHRC Research Centre for Musical Performance as Creative Practice, which was based at the University of Cambridge from 2009 to 2015. He currently directs the Cambridge Centre for Musical Performance Studies. He is one
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of four Series Editors of *The Complete Chopin—A New Critical Edition*, and he directs Chopin’s First Editions Online (funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council) and Online Chopin Variorum Edition (funded by the Mellon Foundation). He holds three visiting professorships and serves on the advisory boards of numerous research projects, scholarly journals, and institutes.
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Paulo de Assis is a researcher affiliated with the Orpheus Institute, Ghent. He is an experimental performer, pianist, and music philosopher, with transdisciplinary interests in composition, philosophy, psychoanalysis, and epistemology.

Contributors: David Davies (McGill University, Montreal), Gunnar Hindrichs (University of Basel), John Rink (University of Cambridge), Andreas Dorschel (University of the Arts Graz), Lydia Goehr (Columbia University, New York), Kathy Kiloh (OCAD University, Toronto), Jake McNulty (Columbia University, New York).